SECTION I. SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON ASSOCIATIONS IN A STATE.

IN theſe Remarks will be conſidered, the cauſe and end of Aſſociations, their organization, the compact entered into, and its limits and object.

THE Aſſociations to be conſidered are ſuch as are in a ſtricter ſenſe popular; where the individuals aſſociate as equals—not as heads of parties—or effective rulers of ſmall diſtricts of a kingdom.

IN Society at large, we may obſerve three degrees of union, diſtinctly differing in effect and appearance: the middle or average, which is the very health of public ſpirit; the weaker, which is its corruption, moſtly pre⯑ceding ſome fatal cataſtrophe; and the ſtronger, which is its fever: ſometimes the ſtruggle of a vigorous habit, to expel whatis deleterious in the conſtitution; and ſome⯑times terminating fatally.

A SOCIETY, or a part thereof, may be brought into this ſtronger degree of union by different means. Com⯑mon principles will effect it, by the force of an increaſed [2]reciprocal attraction of the individuals who compoſe it. The union is greater or leſs, as theſe are ſtronger or more remiſs. A party may likewiſe be condenſed into greater union, by external preſſure. Theſe two cauſes are gene⯑rally ſeen acting in conjunction.

AT the commencement of ſuch a union, its object may be defined by a formal contract, either in writing or by parole. Its numbers may be increaſed by the acceſſion of others, who thus become virtually parties in the formal contract. Every ſociety or party is here ſaid to be aſſo⯑ciated, when a very ſtrong and unuſual degree of union takes place among them, from whichever of theſe ſources it may have originated, and by whatever contract, tacit^* or expreſs, it may to combined.

THE object of an Aſſociation is to unite the action of the Aſſociators in ſome mode: that of a ‘General Aſ⯑ſociation of the People,’ or Mr. Fox's Aſſociation, is to bring a whole people into action, including the popu⯑lace^†.

A SINGLE aſſociation of the people is the moſt per⯑fect union they can be brought into, but its force will be highly concentrated if it give obedience to a Directory at its head, which "the General Aſſociation of the People" poſſeſſes in the remainder, or rump, of the Whig Club, who have already aſſumed, over its future members, [3]ſomething ſuperior to legiſlative power, in giving to the Aſſociation a conſtitution. If an individual of the Direc⯑tory ſway all the reſt, for the preſent he is the effective Dictator of the Aſſociation. It is eaſy to name one whoſe political character and ability ſeem to ſecure him that aſcendancy. The founders of this Aſſociation profeſs to attempt to make it univerſal; if they ſucceed, they will at firſt concentrate the greateſt poſſible force, under the greateſt poſſible union.

BUT no ſingle power in a State ſhould operate without a counterpoiſe (at hand at leaſt) to check it. The ‘General Aſſociation,’ by the very definition of the term, is a power which can have no ſuch counterpoiſe.

IT perhaps might be more accurate to ſay, that when any power puts a nation in motion in any direction, ano⯑ther ſhould be always ready capable of deflecting its courſe upon occaſion; for it never, in fact, will continue long in a right track, except by the compoſition of mo⯑tion, from two powers at leaſt acting in different direc⯑tions. Now the whole State muſt obey the impulſe of an Aſſociation really general: it is a ſhip with every inch of canvas out, without a rudder, moved by the ſingle im⯑pulſe of the wind. Again, in all caſes where ſuch Aſſo⯑ciations exiſt, and have only great influence, the ſhip will not anſwer the helm, or its working will be hindered greatly by it; and the ſea, in which ſhe is going at ſuch times, is always full of rocks and quickſands.

WE have had in theſe latter Centuries only one ſpecies of deſpotiſm to fear, that of Kings; we have now two, that of Kings and Demagogues. The uſurpations of the latter are the more ſanguinary and ferocious. When our [4]forefathers ſaw the former muſtering round them powerſ which might hereafter be abuſed, they loſt no time to impoſe ſalutary limits upon them. As much as the ty⯑ranny of the latter is more dreadful, with ſo much the more jealouſy, its gathering forces together ought to be guarded againſt. We are not to ſhut our eyes upon the one, but we are intenſely to watch the other. Great is the danger of popularity on certain principles to the in⯑dividual who poſſeſſes it. The man who is become a Dema⯑gogue, the loweſt fall from wiſdom, has often loſt his free⯑dom of will to abſtain from crimes before he knows it: while he is the apparent conductor of his faction, he is already become their paſſive inſtrument; and in ſuch a State the miſery of thoſe who are about to fall the victims of the atrocities called his, may be next to his own; they will not be of that magnitude which entitles them to be rated as ſecond to it.

THERE are other modes in which a people or a party ſcattered over the face of a country may aſſociate. That embraced by the upper and middle claſſes in 1792 is an example of one of them, and the only one there is any preſent occaſion to conſider. They formed themſelves into local Aſſociations: the obligations they ſubſcribed varied according to the opinion of every meeting. No ſingle form was followed, to conſolidate theſe numerous and perfectly inſulated bodies into one they all ſeemed to have a like object; but there was nothing more in their conſtitutions to give them unity of action, unleſs we may ſuppoſe ſuch union could reſult from the cor⯑reſpondence moſt of them maintained with the commit⯑tee of the original Aſſociation, of which Mr. REEVES was the Chairman. The members of that Committee were the acknowledged heads of no party in the State—in this they [5]are far leſs formidable than the Whig Club; and Mr. REEVES himſelf, with no pretenſions to the higher or ſe⯑condary poſts of Government, and holding not even a ſeat in the Houſe, to attach the members of theſe ſeveral bodies to him, by the dependencies of expectation, certainly has not the dangerous weight of their Leader. This Committee then had no power to draw the other Aſſocia⯑tions into an union of any kind, and no ſtep to this end was taken by them among themſelves.

THESE independent Aſſociations, it is ſaid, exceeded two thouſand in number: they had all the union of two thouſand individuals, inhabiting a diſtrict, in the ſtate of equality; without an elective aſſembly, a ſenate of no⯑bles, or ſingle perſon to govern them: or of a cluſter of two thouſand independent republics, without an aſſembly of the States at their head, to give them that imperfect unity, of which ſuch confederacies have, at certain periods, been ſeen for a time to keep up the external appearance.

IN theſe Aſſociations, the principle of union was not at all provided for in their original formation; in that which I ſhall denominate "the Aſſociation of Mr. Fox," becauſe he is certainly its effective Head, we have ſeen the leading feature to be, the cloſeſt concentration of force, and that of the whole people. In this reſpect, therefore, the firſt meaſure is no precedent for the ſecond.

IT has been ſaid in ſubſtance above, that the object of all Aſſociations is to combine the ſubſcribers for imme⯑diate action, or to be in readineſs to act on occaſion. By immediate action I underſtand acting in perſon, and not mediately or by deputy. Mr. REEVES and Mr. Fox have each addreſſed themſelves to the people to form Aſſo⯑ciations. [6]To compare their ſeveral plans in a ſecond point of view, let the qualities of the immediate action of the people be now conſidered.

SECTION II. ON THE ACTION OF THE PEOPLE.

WHEN the whole of the people, or a great part of them, are aſſociated, it is for ſome one purpoſe; but let that purpoſe be what it may, they will be bad agents therein. There is not a maxim in Monteſquieu which has more truth or brilliancy in it than the following: ‘The people (collectively) have always too much action, or too little. Sometimes with a hundred thouſand arms the multitude overthrows every thing; ſometimes with a hundred thouſand feet it creeps only like an in⯑ſect ^*’

THIS difference of the effect of the action of the peo⯑ple muſt ariſe from the difference of the ſpirit by which they are actuated at ſuch times; and this, again, muſt depend much upon the object which excited it. Now the object of theſe Aſſociations is either the continuance of the preſent ſtate of the members, or the acquiſition of a better by their united force: and from this conſideration we derive another diviſion of Aſſociations into Defenſive and Offenſive, and both conjointly.

[7]HENCE, as all Aſſociations to gain what the members do not poſſeſs are Offenſive, an Aſſociation to regain what they ceaſe to poſſeſs is Offenſive alſo. Its ſpirit, at leaſt will be equal in ſtrength to that with which an acquiſi⯑tion of an object never poſſeſſed before, is purſued, and poſſibly more, as ſome degree of reſentment may warm it. If the aſſociators have been deprived of it by law, they contend for an illegal poſſeſſion, or a legal right they poſ⯑ſeſs not.

LET us now compare theſe two claſſes of Aſſociations as to their effects, from the known qualities of human nature; and afterwards, from what Hiſtory has given us upon the ſubject.

THE fear of loſing what we already enjoy occupies the mind but very little. Hence Aſſociations of parties formed upon a Defenſive principle, are very different in the ſpirit which pervades them, and in their effects, from thoſe formed on principles of acquiſition, or Offenſive Aſſocia⯑tions. The efforts men exert to continue as they are, par⯑take greatly of the moderation of that frame of mind which gives birth to them—content in their preſent ſtate: a ſentiment which has not habitually all that force on our minds which it ought to have. On the other hand, there is no emotion which we indulge ourſelves in with ſo little reſtraint, as the hope of a change of our ſtate for the better; and the conſtancy of that indul⯑gence is ſuch, that men habituate themſelves to it; until that paſſion has, in moſt minds, acquired a very diſtem⯑pered magnitude and force. This is the reaſon that when men form combinations in Civil Society to defend the good they enjoy, there is too much inertneſs in all their movements: but if the object of their formal union is [8]ſomething they wiſh to acquire, they are heated to a fervor which carries them far beyond the bounds of ſobriety and expedience; and when a State is divided into two parties, the majority acting upon the firſt, and the minority upon the ſecond principle, the latter has been too frequently able to overpower the former, with the better cauſe, and the apparent weight of influence on its ſide. Hence Mr. Hume, conſidering the colliſion of two ſuch parties, ſays with great truth, ‘One furious enthuſiaſt is able, by his active induſtry, to ſurmount the indolent efforts of many ſober and reaſonable antagoniſts^*’.

THEREFORE, theſe two kinds of Popular Aſſociations, the Defenſive and Offenſive, fall under the two caſes de⯑ſcribed by Monteſquieu: in the firſt of which, the action of the people has too little energy; and in the laſt, over⯑whelms every thing in ruin. The original Aſſociation of Mr. REEVES, and all thoſe afterwards formed upon the ſame plan, were Defenſive, being to guard the Conſtitu⯑tion againſt Republicans and Levellers; Mr. Fox's Aſſo⯑ciation is Offenſive, being againſt exiſting laws formed for that purpoſe^†.

I SHALL now conſider more particularly the nature of theſe two ſpecies of Aſſociations, chiefly deducing my concluſions from Hiſtory, beginning with that which is here termed Defenſive.

SECTION III. ON THE SPIRIT OF DEFENSIVE ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PEOPLE TO MAINTAIN THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN.

THE ſpirit by which we may, in future, expect to ſee defenſive Aſſociations actuated, will be clearly ſeen in the conduct of thoſe which have preceded them. The object of ſuch an Aſſociation may be the defence of the authority of one or more of the conſtituent parts of the Legiſlature, of particular laws, or of the whole ſyſtem.

THE Royaliſts who followed the fortunes of Charles the Firſt, formed an Aſſociation in defence of the Crown. The formal nature of this compact I ſhall preſently come to the expoſition of. Before the adjournment of the Houſes in September 1641, many excellent conſtitutional and municipal laws had been paſſed: and if Parliament had ſuffered ſome violences to take place, there ſeemed no danger of their being drawn into precedent. To paſs over the two outrages which took place immediately after that aſſembly met again, the one on the part of the Com⯑mons, the other on the part of the Crown; the firſt of which ſeemed calculated principally to draw after it ſome⯑thing of the nature of the ſecond^*; I go to the further part of the conduct of that aſſembly. They attempted to poſſeſs themſelves of a great part of the executive power, by originating commiſſions by bill, for the higheſt offi⯑cers [10]civil and military, the Lords Lieutenants and Depu⯑ties; they refuſed to define the extent of their demands for the ſettlement of the nation^*; and they ſeized the King's magazines into their own hands. The catalogue of their attempts of this kind might be enlarged.

THE King was at laſt ſupported, not only by a vir⯑tual, but what is entitled to be called a formal Aſſocia⯑tion; according to the definition of ſuch a compact gi⯑ven above. It was purely in its nature Defenſive; its ob⯑ject was to maintain the Conſtitution and exiſting laws, including thoſe paſſed in the Parliament then ſitting. The articles of that of the Peers, who firſt joined him at York, were in writing. The King made a Declaration, ‘That he expected from them no obedience to any com⯑mands which were not warranted by the laws of the land.’ They ‘anſwered this Declaration by a Proteſt, in which they declared their reſolution to obey no commands not ſo warranted. Deliberate engagements,’ (ſays the Hiſtorian) ‘worthy of an Engliſh Prince, and an Engliſh nobility^†.’ Again, when the King was on his march to Shrewſbury, in a ſolemn Proteſtation at the head of his army, he recognized the conditions on which he was to receive "aid and relief" from his ſubjects in general. We have here his own teſtimony to the terms of the Aſ⯑ſociation, the preſervation of the eſtabliſhed laws; a⯑mong which, thoſe of the exiſting Parliament were then firſt expreſsly named^‡. This compact, not reduced into writing by the parties like the firſt, was a defenſive Aſſo⯑ciation of the People on terms recited to them; very [11]nearly approaching to the form, and fully equal to the preciſion of an Aſſociation by parole; and to this, thoſe of the Royal Party who were abſent, are to be underſtood as acceding.

THESE tranſactions are too ſolemn for us to ſuppoſe, without ſomething of proof, that they were intended for the purpoſes of mere deception. It muſt be admitted, in⯑deed, that the Declarations of the Heads of Parties ſome⯑times hold forth only ſpecious pretenſions to gather ſtrength, not their ultimate objects. While they ſeem to reſt only on the firſt, their agents, by their intrigues and writings, are preparing the way for the ſecond; but when the primary and ſecondary partiſans of a cauſe both de⯑cidedly look one way, we may preſume with confidence that the oſtenſible and real views of the party are the ſame. "During the war," ſays Coke^*, ‘it is obſervable, that the writers for the King chiefly maintained his cauſe out of Sir Edward Coke's Pleas of the Crown.’ But this appeal to his authority goes ſomewhat farther; it amounts to a full, though tacit dereliction of the princi⯑ples held at Court about ſeven years before the commence⯑ment of the war; when Sir Edward Coke's MS. of the Pleas of the Crown, his Comment upon Magna Charta, and on the Juriſdiction of Courts, had been ſeized by order of the Privy Council, as dangerous and ſeditious. They had been lately printed by order of the Houſe of Commons, and the originals reſtored to Sir Edward's heir, on their petition to the King.

THE Parliament at that time, without doubt, declar⯑ed with equal warmth for the Laws and the Conſtitution, in general terms; but their literary advocates looked ano⯑ther [12]way. It ſuited neither the meaſures nor the ultimate object of their principals, to fix the attention of the na⯑tion upon theſe repoſitories of conſtitutional knowledge "I do not find," ſays Coke, ‘any who wrote for the Parliament ever uſed any one topic out of the Pleas of the Crown^*, although that aſſembly had ordered them to be printed:’ They probably repented of this order.

HENCE it appears, that the principles the Royaliſts ſet out upon, and continued to hold, were thoſe of a de⯑fenſive Aſſociation.

IT is a question which comes in here, not directly in⯑deed, but collaterally, Had the popular part of the Con⯑ſtitution obtained a due degree of ſtrength when this Aſ⯑ſociation to maintain it in its exiſting ſtate took place? I have lately held the affirmative ſide of this question, but the examination of it is of ſuch a length, that it is given in an article of the Appendix^†. It may however be eſtabliſhed very briefly à fortiori, upon the authority of Blackſtone, in his Hiſtory of the Progreſs and Spirit of the Laws of England, with which he concludes his Commentaries. Speaking of this period, ‘The King had now,’ ſays this learned Expoſitor, ‘conſented to reduce the prerogative to a lower ebb than was con⯑ſiſtent with monarchical government^‡.’ It is a fact, that the Bill of Rights left to the Crown more legal prerogatives than Charles then poſſeſſed ‖, or the Royaliſts fought to continue to him; and that he would have been very glad, after he had been peaceably readmit⯑ted to reign upon the terms of his Proteſtation, to have [13]exchanged the whole maſs of the prerogatives, which would have been ſo left him, to be a limited King on the footing of that inſtrument: and the place of all thoſe Whigs, who, at the Revolution, thought the liberties of the kingdom ſufficiently defined and provided for, would, in Charles's time, have been in the royal camp.

IT is remarked in the laſt Section, that a Defenſive Aſ⯑ſociation does not act up to the whole ſpirit of its princi⯑ples. It might be expected, if this general obſervation were frequently falſe, it would be found ſo here. The ſeverities the Parliament exerciſed, in their own quarters, againſt the Royaliſts, under the name of Malignants and Delinquents, muſt have thoroughly taught thoſe about the King what they were to expect, who had actually borne arms againſt the Parliamentarians, if they were finally conquerors. Beſide, the engagements of the King, and the power they held in their own hands to enforce them, might have ſeemed to them a ſufficient ſecurity to the Conſtitution, if that Party were vanquiſhed; but they were determined not to ſuffer him to make peace as a con⯑queror. Coke lived and acted in thoſe unhappy times: his father was a member of the Long Parliament, ‘and one of the firſt rate^*.’ He tells us, ‘I have often heard ſeveral of thoſe who followed the King in the war, ſay, they as much dreaded the King's overcoming the Parliament, as they feared to be overcome by them^†.’ This is confirmed in ſome extracts of James's Papers, which I ſaw about ſix years ago. The Parliamentarians he ſtates to have been in ſuch a ſitua⯑tion, that the King was able to have put an end to the [14]war at once, the metropolis lying at his mercy for ſome time: the leading men about him put a negative upon his march to London. The ſuperiority of the Royaliſts over the Parliamentarians, until the junction of the latter with the Scotch, was inconteſtible. They acted with the humanity of an able ſwordſman, who, feeling his advantage over his antagoniſt, whom he is deſirous to ſpare, waits to diſarm him, till he receives a mortal thruſt himſelf. We ſee here, that Aſſociations in defence of the conſtitutional power of the Sovereign are not in their ſpirit inimical to the Conſtitution; and even that when great danger urges them to ſecure the full object for which they come forward, and it is placed completely in their power, they will not at up to the full ſpirit of their original compact.

BUT it may be ſaid, that after ſuch a Party is exaſperated by reſiſtance, and the ſufferings they muſt have undergone in the previous ſtruggle, they may be inflamed by victories to forget the moderation which reſtrained them in their doubtful fortunes, and puſh their vindictive triumphs to extremes. They will go further than the limits pre⯑ſcribed in their defenſive compacts, when every thing is in their power. Before we had ſeen what the extreme of calamity is, in the cruelties inflicted upon the French no⯑bility and gentry, we ſhould have affirmed, that the Royaliſts of England had been irritated as much as the utmoſt ſeverity of perſecution could effect in a chriſtian country and in an enlightened age. It may be ſtill ſaid their oppreſſions and ſufferings were great, and they felt their with all the violence of indignation. ‘No ſocial intercourſe was then maintained between the two par⯑ties, no marriages or alliances contracted^*.’ When [15]the crimes of the uſurpers ſtill further alienated the peo⯑ple, and their diviſions annihilated their power, the Royaliſts ſuddenly ſaw themſelves maſters of the king⯑dom almoſt without an effort of their own. As they had all along ‘affected a greater ſuperiority over their maſ⯑ters, the more they were reduced to ſubjection^*;’ their ‘implacability,’ their ‘fulneſs of rancour and revenge againſt all who were engaged in the late war againſt them^†,’ was the object of dread to the latter. Yet, in the firſt moment of their return to power, they pub⯑liſhed Declarations in all the counties of England, which completely bound up their hands from vindictive mea⯑ſures: engagements which they fulfilled with fidelity equal to the conciliatory prudence with which they formed them^‡. I copy the concluſion of one of them, that of the nobility and gentry in and about the City of London. ‘It is our hope and prayer, that when the building come to be raiſed, it may not, like Rome, have the begin⯑ning in the blood of brethren, nor like Babel, be inter⯑rupted by confuſion of tongues: but that we may all ſpeak one language and be of one name; that all mention of parties and factions, and all rancour and animo⯑ſities, may be thrown in and buried like rubbiſh under the foundation.’ This Declaration was ſigned by twenty peers, and fifty knights and eſquires.

THE Royaliſts in the Convention Parliament of Charles the Second have been cenſured for reſtoring him without [16]conditions; and the miſconduct of his reign, and the ſubſequent misfortunes of his family, have been attributed to this miſplaced loyalty. Nothing can be leſs grounded than this cenſure: the Royal prerogative, before the breaking out of the Civil Wars, had been reduced ‘to a lower ebb than was conſiſtent with Monarchical Government^*,’ and any new limitations upon the So⯑vereign would have been founding a ſecond Republic in the very act of deſtroying the firſt. The cenſure implies like⯑wiſe that the authors of the Bill of Rights, in the preroga⯑tives they left to the Crown, laid the foundations of a future tyranny.

AFTER the Reſtoration, the Royaliſts were ſtill united in one compact body. In the ſecond Parliament, their ma⯑jority over their opponents was deciſive; and beſide, the whole tide of popular enthuſiaſm was by this time turned in favour of their principles. Now, to argue in the ſpi⯑rit of that jealouſy with which a certain Party, now, ver⯑bally pretends to conſider the multitude of inſulated Aſ⯑ſociations of the gentry, and the greater part of the middle claſs of the people, in defence of the Conſtitution, and the conſtitutional power of the Sovereign, ‘from ſuch a Parliament, whoſe principles were ſupported by the zeal and ardour of a whole people, we might expect all the bad meaſures which could ſpring from the con⯑fidence of ſtrength and the inſolence of victory; goaded on by the recent memory of the ſterneſt and ſevereſt oppreſſions, the effects of which, from the heavy mort⯑gages by which compoſitions, ſequeſtrations, and dila⯑pidations, had involved their eſtates^†, they muſt ſtill have continued to feel. We might expect to ſee the [17]ſtatute-books, almoſt in every page, polluted by ſome violation of the Conſtitution.’—Inſtead of that, what do we find? Did they not clear that Conſtitution of every⯑thing which can be ſhown to be a relic of Norman ty⯑ranny, and (one Act excepted) carry it to what Black⯑ſtone has called its theoretical perfection^*? Compare the effects of their victory upon the Conſtitution with that of Republicans, real and virtual, which preceded it.

THE ſyſtem of Government, before the ſitting of the Long Parliament, ſtood in the greateſt need of a reform: the nation felt ſomething beyond the violation of ſophiſ⯑tical parities begetting ideal grievances: it laboured under great practical oppreſſions, and juſtly dreaded they would be perpetuated and increaſed. The paſt conduct of the King could not find a reputable defender in the Com⯑mons when they firſt aſſembled: this aſſembly contained many excellent men, intent on real reformation, who were ſoon able to effect whatever they had intended. On his return from Scotland, the King had at leaſt an equa⯑lity in the Lower Houſe; the beſt men were diſpoſed to ſtop at the point they had attained: the other party, backed by the populace of London, rendered it impoſſi⯑ble. An inſtructive leſſon to thoſe who directly or in⯑directly appeal to the populace to effect the beſt re⯑forms;—always to be ſure to have an effective reſtraining force in hand, to put an immediate ſtop to the conti⯑nuance [18]of their movements when their purpoſe is at⯑tained^*.

I AM approached ſo near to the Abdication of James, that I ſhall continue the hiſtory of the tranſactions of this Party to that great epoch. There we ſhall find ſome deviations from the rectitude of their former conduct, and a ſplendid return to it; exhibiting a balance much in their favour After the fiction of the Popiſh Plot had obtained too extenſive belief, the danger of a civil war appeared as threatening at leaſt as in the year 1640. Coke, who ſaw the ferment of the nation in both pe⯑riods, affirms, that at that time ‘the nation was more fiercely rent in diviſions, under the names of Whig and Tory, than it was before the wars^†.’ In 1680 the Popular and Republican Party had recourſe to the ſame means of inflaming the Nation which had been practiſed with ſo much ſucceſs in 1640—tumultuous Pe⯑titioning. The end this leads to is always the ſame, be its object what it will; namely, the conſtraint of ſome power which the Conſtitution leaves free. It was now employed to obtain an immediate ſeſſion of Parlia⯑ment. The Royaliſts endeavoured to counteract the effect of this meaſure, by Addreſſes to the Throne, declaring their ‘abhorrence of thoſe, who endeavoured to en⯑croach upon the prerogative, by preſcribing to the King any time for aſſembling the Parliament.’ Tumul⯑tuous Petitioning is at all times a tacit menace, and meant to be ſo underſtood. At this juncture it was be⯑lieved to be the ſignal of civil war. Yet the abhorrers, influenced by their recollection of the paſt and their [19]fear for the future, certainly expreſſed themſelves in words not favorable to the right of orderly Petitioning, though they cannot be directly applied againſt it. It may very well be alſo affirmed, that the moſt zealous friends of the popular branch of the Legiſlature ought at that inſtant to have been the moſt determined oppoſers of the Peti⯑tioners. For the King, without doubt, had at that time fallen upon the plan which, with an addreſs fatal to his family, he was afterward able to carry into execution;— that of diſguſting the nation with the violence of ſuc⯑ceſſive Parliaments, that he might at laſt rule without them. After the diſſolution of his ſecond Parliament, it was his conſtant practice to iſſue writs for a new Houſe of Commons, at a ſeaſon when the moſt intemperate of his opponents had the beſt chance to obtain ſeats in the Lower Houſe. With the ſame policy, when it was aſſembled, he ſo adjuſted his conceſſions to their violent Motions, that the friends of the Laws and Conſtitution of the kingdom thought them to be ſo great as to be inconſiſtent with the internal balance of their ſyſtem; yet they were ſo limited that he perfectly knew before⯑hand they would be rejected contemptuouſly by Oppo⯑ſition. Beſides, this apparent facility in making conceſ⯑ſions they never could have expected, elevated them with the ſtrongeſt expectations of a final victory over him; and led them on from extravagance to extravagance, until the Nation, warm in the praiſes of his conciliating moderation, became united againſt them, and was not ſolicitous to ſee ſuch aſſemblies meeting again very ſoon. He hardly made a ſecret of this policy, previous to the meeting of his laſt Parliament^*. The tumultuous Peti⯑tions [20]of the times increaſed the violence of the Commons by the aſſurance of popular ſupport; thus aſſiſting the lures and irritations of the Court to hurry them into the ſnare. They ought to have been oppoſed with the moſt determinate meaſures: but the zeal of the Addreſ⯑ſers pointed out to the King, with what rapidity the credit of Parliaments began to fall.

IT is thus we ſee, that in the middle of the ferment about the Popiſh Plot, in 1679, he diſſolved one Parlia⯑ment, and iſſued writs for the election of another next day^*. This could ſerve only to irritate his opponents; ſure, in the preſent temper of the lower voters, of their re-election, and even to increaſe their number. And, that he might farther aggravate the factious violence of the new Houſe of Commons, by repeated proclamations he hindered their aſſembling for more than a year after the time originally appointed. This gave birth to the Petitions for a ſeſſion mentioned above. That his con⯑ceſſions were conſtructed with the art I have deſcribed, in order to diſcredit Parliament with the ſober part of the people, will appear from the following account from Hume, where we ſhall ſee him making a previous expe⯑riment, upon a large ſcale, of their aptitude for this very purpoſe, before he brings them actually forwards into practice. Temple and Shafteſbury were of the Privy Council in 1679, when Charles propoſed to the Board a ſcheme of limitations on a Popiſh ſucceſſor, to defeat the Excluſion Bill. From what Temple ſaid on them, he was confirmed in his judgment of the ſentiments the true ſupporters of the National Conſtitution would form [21]of this ſacrifice. It was the opinion of that great Stateſ⯑man, ‘that the reſtraints were ſo rigorous as even to ſubvert the Conſtitution; and that ſhackles put upon a Popiſh ſucceſſor would not afterwards be eaſily caſt off by a Proteſtant^*.’ By this authority Charles was confirmed in his expectation, that, when three ſucceſſive Parliaments ſhould have rejected ſuch conceſſions, and the fear of a civil war was hanging over their heads, he ſhould have led the ſentiments of a miſguided and, at length, confiding people to the point to which he wiſhed to bring them. By the oppoſite declarations of Shafteſ⯑bury he was likewiſe aſſured what powerful aſſiſtance he ſhould receive from his faction toward the ſucceſs of his ſcheme, when the Preſident of his Privy Council told him at the Board, "that the reſtraints" (which Temple thought exceſſive) ‘were inſufficient; and that nothing but the total excluſion of the Duke could give a proper ſecurity to the kingdom^†.’ In this he foreſaw the contemptuous rejection of his propoſitions, and his ulti⯑mate miſerable triumph. If I underſtand what Mr. She⯑ridan is ſtated to have ſaid, he thinks he has diſcovered ſome ſimilitude between the Aſſociators for the defence of the National Conſtitution in 1792, and the Royaliſts at the period here treated of. To diſcriminate exactly how much of truth and how much of error may enter into that conception, would draw me too far; but of two points I am confident: No ſyſtem ſo inſidious will be now uſed to lead us into ruin; and that, enlightened as we are by the example of the paſt, if ſuch an attempt were made, it would not be ſucceſsful.

[22]THERE is alſo a farther charge which may be brought againſt the party of the Royaliſts in Charles the Second's time Shafteſbury, to forward his attack upon the Royal power, forged the Popiſh Plot. Thus he took away the lives of many innocent men with, and ſome almoſt with⯑out, the forms of law. The Royaliſts, in the latter end of Charles the Second's reign, abuſed a ſeeming victory for a ſhort time; giving countenance to ſomething too much like an imitation of thoſe ſhameful hoſtilities com⯑menced by their adverſaries, but not on ſo terrible a ſcale. But when a general danger, augmented perhaps ſomewhat by their former intemperance, threatened the liberties of the kingdom, they ſtood forth the foremoſt in their defence: the great majority of the Diſſenters and Excluſioniſts had inliſted as the ſatellites of Ty⯑ranny.

THE fear of a ſecond Civil War, when they had hardly emerged, half ruined, a very few years before, from the firſt; the terrors of legal aſſaſſination ſuſpended over their heads; and the profound art of Charles the Second, led this defenſive party, at the beginning of this latter period, into ſome bad meaſures; and though we may ſay of thoſe of their opponents, which cauſed them, that they were much worſe, they detract ſomewhat from their political merit, in being the chief inſtruments in placing William on the Throne, and maintaining him there, but not the greater part of it.

I BUILD nothing upon a few extravagant declarations of either Party. Both of them are to be judged by their practical principles; that is, thoſe which they diſplay in action, or which are diſplayed in the actions of men [23]whom they hold out as examples. The characters of Parties are alſo to be eſtimated like thoſe of individuals— from the general tenor of their actions; not from acci⯑dental errors, which are an exception to it: and ſo eſti⯑mating the Defenſive Aſſociation to preſerve the limited Royal power, from the Civil Wars to the Revolution, we have ſeen that it was friendly to the limitations of the Monarchy, as well as to the Monarchy itſelf; and twice, in fact, preſerved them at its own proper hazard.

I CONCLUDE my remarks on the intereſting hiſtory of their conduct with the following obſervation:—If this Aſſociation had been able, not only to preſerve the legal power of the King when it was attacked, but even to extend it afterwards, and had ſo done, it by no means follows, that if it had been divided into any great num⯑ber of ſections, as, for inſtance, two thouſand, acting independently of each other, without a Council or ſingle perſon at their head, that it would have been able to effect both theſe purpoſes; or even the firſt, againſt a con⯑centrated Oppoſition of any degree of power. It appears therefore, that a Republic of ſmall Defenſive Aſſociations, ſuch as that which ſtarted up in 1792, is by no means dangerous. But a people ſo aſſociated is much ſooner formed into order to oppoſe any violence upon their Laws and Conſtitutions, than if the danger comes upon them when totally unprepared.

SECTION IV. ON THE SPIRIT OF DEFENSIVE ASSOCIATIONS TO MAIN⯑TAIN THE LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT.

FOR the ſupport of the Offenſive Aſſociation now ſet on foot, examples of others, Defenſive in their nature, and whoſe tranſactions are intitled to the veneration of all ſucceeding ages, will certainly at this time be pro⯑duced, and ſaid to be of the former kind. Of theſe there are three eminent inſtances in our Hiſtory: The Aſſociation of the Barons at Merton; that in the time of John; and the Coalition of the Whigs and Tories in 1688, to invite the Prince of Orange into the kingdom. Two of theſe at feaſt we might have paſſed by, as not being Popular Aſſociations, if it had not been foreſeen that it would be neceſſary to ſhow that all of them were Defenſive only; and to take care, that in all diſcuſſions on this ſubject, a Defenſive Aſſociation of the Nobles ſhould not be brought as an inſtance of an Offenſive Aſſoci⯑ation of the People.

FROM the definition of the term, it appears that the noble and unanimous reſiſtance of the Barons againſt the intro⯑duction of the Civil Law into England, in the Parliament at Merton, ſaid to have been deſigned by the Clergy, was a Defenſive Aſſociation, not Popular.

THE Aſſociation of the Barons againſt John was likewiſe Defenſive. At his coronation he had ſworn [25]to maintain the Laws of Edward the Confeſſor, the particulars of which were fallen almoſt into oblivion. A Charter of Henry the Firſt recited and confirmed them. Of the contents of this little was known, until a copy of it fell into the hands of Stephen Langton, Archbiſhop of Canterbury. Favored by opportunity, he determined to make uſe of this fortunate diſcovery. In this he pro⯑ceeded ſtep by ſtep, with great addreſs. One condition impoſed by the Archbiſhop, before he gave John an abſolution from his excommunication, was, his renew⯑ing his oath to the Saxon Laws; he afterward induced him to confirm the Charter of Henry the Firſt. At the breaking up of the following Parliament in London, the Archbiſhop called a private meeting of ſome of the chief of the Barons. They were eaſily induced to promiſe to take the firſt convenient opportunity to have this Charter validly eſtabliſhed, and they retained it in their own hands^* John now departed on an unſucceſsful expe⯑dition to his foreign dominions. A little time pre⯑vious to his return, the confederacy having ſpread wider, and comprehending almoſt all the Barons of England, a meeting was ſummoned by the Archbiſhop at St. Ed⯑mundſbury, under pretence of devotion. It was there agreed, that they ſhould prefer their petition for the ac⯑tual obſervance of the Charter in a body; and in the mean time take arms to enforce their demands. Theſe [26]particulars being ſettled, going up to the high altar in the church there, they ſwore in their order to ad⯑here to each other, and not to lay down their arms until they had obtained their demands; which, after ſome in⯑effectual reſiſtance, John was obliged to grant at Runny⯑mede. This Aſſociation, ſanctified by the forms of reli⯑gion, was ſtrictly Defenſive. The Charter had before been admitted by John to be the Law of the Land, and even ſome articles of that inſtrument, which would have increaſed the value of their baronies, but greatly affected the Crown revenues^*, the Barons had the moderation to give up, when John could not have ſucceeded in maintaining them. But the faithleſs character of that Prince induced them to demand the nomination of twenty-five members of their own body, as conſervators of the articles of the amended Charter^†. We find here, and during the whole of the following reign, when the Houſe of Com⯑mons firſt became a conſtituent part of the Legiſlature, the Engliſh Clergy taking part with the majority of the Barons againſt the Pope and the King, who always acted in conjunction.

IT muſt be admitted, that this and the former Aſſoci⯑ation were purely Defenſive. They alſo reſembled in nothing a Popular Aſſociation: they are no more intitled [27]to be called ſo, than a league of the numerous Princes, Dukes, and Counts of Germany againſt the Emperor, or the Eccleſiaſtical Electors would be; or the oppoſition of an hereditary Senate of Nobles againſt a Prince or the Prelates of a State.

AT the Revolution there were two Aſſociations; for we may call the invitation of the Prince of Orange an act proving an antecedent compact of that kind; and after his landing, there was an inſtrument bearing that name, drawn up by Burnet, on the requiſition of Sir Edward Seymour. He is the beſt reporter of the object of his own paper. It contained, in few words, ‘an engagement of the ſubſcribers to ſtick together, in purſuing the ends of the Prince's Declaration^*,’ and in defence of his perſon. That Declaration was confined to paſt violations of law, and a requiſition of redreſs by Parliament. ‘And the Prince thereby aſſured the world, that his expedition was intended for no other deſign but to procure a free Parliament, to heal the breaches between the King and his ſubjects^†.’ Nothing is to be diſcerned here but meaſures of defence and concili⯑ation. ‘It was ſigned by all who were with the Prince, even by many who refuſed afterwards to take the oaths to the Prince when ſeated on the Throne^‡’

THE Abdication of James annihilated the greater part of the conditions of the Aſſociation, by rendering the execution of them impoſſible; but while it ſubſiſted, no act [28]took place which went beyond its primary object; and when the members found themſelves in circumſtances abſolutely unprovided for, becauſe they could not have poſſibly been foreſeen, they acted on the defenſive ſpirit of that engagement which ſurvived the letter. At the Revolution ‘no one part of the Conſtitution was altered or ſuffered the leaſt damage; but, on the con⯑trary, the whole received new life and vigour.’ This was the doctrine held by Sir Joſeph Jekyl at the Trial of Dr. Sacheverel^*.

THIS compact likewiſe was very different from a Gene⯑ral Aſſociation of the People: it was an Aſſociation of Heads of Parties, or rather of perſons holding a power over their followers; ſomewhat between Heads of Parties and Feudal Chiefs. For, in the confuſion of the Civil Wars, the tenants and dependants of the greater landed Gentry had been accuſtomed again to follow them as their mili⯑tary leaders. The habits and ideas of the military ſubordi⯑nation of a tenant to his chieftain, thus revived, were not worn out again. Much of it was ſuperadded to the in⯑fluence of landlord over tenant, as we now ſee it exiſt. This yeomanry therefore did not, by the act of follow⯑ing their landlords, accede to the Aſſociation as equal parties therein, or as inveſted with an equal power of deliberation and reſolution in claims or meaſures. That great majority of People, the Populace, did indeed, while the event of the Revolution remained in ſuſpenſe, de⯑clare their wills twice; or at leaſt the only part of the lower orders of the kingdom who were enabled by cir⯑cumſtances to declare it; that is, the populace of Lon⯑don. [29]When James, after the failure of his attempt to go over to France, returned thither, ‘never Prince re⯑turning after victory to his capital, was received with louder acclamations of joy^*’ by the "populace." On the 16th of December they rejoiced at the appearance of his reſumption of the Royal power; and on the 4th of the following February they expreſſed their ſecond will upon the ſubject; tumultuouſly aſſembling in crowds at the doors of the Houſes of Parliament, loading with imprecations thoſe who adhered to their will of the 16th of December, and its opponents with bleſſings. The Prince of Orange iſſued a Proclamation to ſtop theſe diſorderly proceedings, although in his favour^†.

THE manner in which the attack upon our Conſtitu⯑tion of Government will be on this occaſion made, in writing or ſpeaking, is ſo evident, that it is not difficult to guard againſt it. It may be very well foreſeen, that every Aſſociation recorded in our Hiſtory, which has been followed by a happy event, will be cited as a precedent in defence of Mr. Fox's. To prevent ſuch irrelevant inſtances being brought into [30]the argument, it has been ſhown that none of theſe have been General Aſſociations of the People, or to which the populace were a party; and that none of them have been Aſſociations of acquiſition, or Offenſive.

SECTION V. ON THE SPIRIT OF OFFENSIVE ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PEOPLE.

1. ON PRETENCES OF RELIGION.

I REPEAT what has been laid down in a former Section: Thoſe Aſſociations are here termed Offenſive, the objects of which are, ſome change of the exiſting Laws; whether relating to the governors or the govern⯑ed:—and Popular, in which the populace become, or are invited to become, contracting parties.

THE objects of ſuck Aſſociations may be very laxly declared, or they may be very accurately limited, in the original contract. After having given examples of ſome of the indefinite kind, it will be in like manner ſhown what confidence may be placed in the fidelity of the en⯑gagements of limitation held out by others.

THE inſtances of Aſſociations, the objects of which have been very laxly defined, are ſo many, that it will be expedient to arrange them in ſome order. Thoſe which [31]have been formed under Religious Pretences, and thoſe on the principles of the Rights of Men, will form two Sections: in the latter no particular account of the late French Revolutions will be entered upon; they will be referred to incidentally, and by way of illuſtration only. Offenſive Aſſociations, ſtrictly limited, will then become the ſubject of a ſeparate Section.

POPULAR Offenſive Aſſociations, under religious pre⯑tences, are firſt to be here conſidered. I ſhall begin with the Catholic League in France, which was formed in 1575. Its nominal object was to annul the famous Edict of Pacification, granted by the King to the Proteſtants in May the ſame year: hence it was an Offenſive Aſſocia⯑tion. It was not until the death of the Duke of Alençon, nine years after, that it was converted into an inſtrument to further an attempt to change the ſucceſſion of the Crown. This was the fatal precedent of the Scottiſh Covenant for the abolition of Epiſcopacy; afterwards adopted in England with ſome variations. By the opera⯑tions of theſe General Aſſociations, Great-Britain and France were each divided, as it were, into two hoſtile nations, ſhut up in one territory, and each of them in⯑volved in civil wars, in uſurpation, and anarchy, about twenty years. This is not the firſt inſtance in which the contagious example of a French inſurrection has given riſe to another in this country, threatening to annihilate us as a nation: but I hope our remoteſt poſterity will continue to be able to ſay,—It is the laſt.

THE only remaining compact falling under this divi⯑ſion, here to be noticed, is the Proteſtant Aſſociation under Lord George Gordon. This likewiſe was Offen⯑ſive, [32]as its object was the repeal of certain Acts made in favour of the Romaniſts^*. The plan of his Aſſociation alſo, though nominally of a part of the people, was effectively general; for the proportion of the followers of the Roman Church in Britain in this age, to the number of Proteſtants, does not exceed that which took place in King William's time; or the hundred and ſeventy-ninth part of the people^†. The ſpirit of perſecution had long been dormant, and it might have been hoped was ex⯑tinct: for the paſſions of the populace had not for years been rouſed againſt the objects to which they were now turned. Yet the direction was given to them with ſo little preparation, as hardly to be the ſubject of alarm: they unexpectedly broke out into inſurrection, and we ſaw them maſters of the metropolis ſome days, the pri⯑ſons broken down, and their vileſt inhabitants turned looſe again upon Society, or ſet at their head to plan and lead them on to more dangerous and enormous crimes; fires in every quarter of the City; and the Bank, the depoſitory of the wealth and the column of the credit of the Nation, which cannot be ſhaken without extreme hazard, or overthrown without cruſhing everything, be⯑neath it in its ponderous ruin, hardly ſaved from their attack; when abroad we were at war with four nations, without an ally, the reſt of Europe looking upon our danger with a lowering and inimical neutrality, and at home we were almoſt torn in pieces by our inteſtine divi⯑ſions.

AS it is not pretended that any amelioration of the ſpirit and manners of the Engliſh populace has taken [33]place ſince this dangerous period; we may legitimately, from this event; deduce ſome concluſions on the ſtate of their diſpoſitions at this juncture, directly applicable to our main ſubject. The inveterate ſpirit of perſecuting the Romaniſts, and the principles of Levelling, were the diſtinguiſhing marks of the Republicans of the laſt age. Little art or endeavour, however, has been exerted to keep the former alive, ever ſince it began apparently to die away. Yet we have ſeen this ſpirit, as it were, ſtart up, and threaten the ruin of the State. But the embers of Republicaniſm and Levelling have, during all that period, been carefully raked up; and, for fear they ſhould become extinct, there were hands which were ſeen from time to time ſupplying them with a ſuf⯑ficient quantity of fuel to keep them alive. Theſe prin⯑ciples have been never ſuffered to die; but lately they have been diffuſed with the moſt ſyſtematic and malig⯑nant diligence, and they have been embraced with all the fervor of a new fanaticiſm by a great number of the populace. Where Lord George Gordon made one real enthuſiaſt, the Agitators have made fifty. And is there no danger to be apprehended from the new Aſſociation, to which they will all throng to ſubſcribe, when that of Lord George Gordon, conſtructed with ſo much leſs art and preparation, formed of ſo much feebler materials, brought us to the brink of ruin? 'It was not,' it will be ſaid, ‘the real fanatics that did the miſchief, but a multitude of miſcreants under the maſk of the fanaticiſm of religion.’ But are the morals of the populace improv⯑ed ſince that time? Are not ſuch miſcreants mixed among them at leaſt in an equal proportion? And if any maſk be provided for them, will they not make uſe of it, whether it be that of religious or political fanaticiſm? If we urge to you the example of France, you will ſay, ‘No [34]ſuch violences are to be dreaded from the populace of England: they are more enlightened than the French were at the commencement of the Revolutions; that the oppreſſions of the commonalty of France was greatly more than that claſs of people experience here.’ As for the lights which they may poſſeſs, thoſe which have been given them ſince the Riots of 1780 are not of a kind to make them leſs forward in inſurrec⯑tion; and as for oppreſſion, the poor man ſuffers none here: he has been taught, indeed, to give that name to the whole amount of the taxes; as well of thoſe which do not, as thoſe which do affect him: this total is his re⯑puted meaſure thereof; and it has been increaſed in theſe laſt fifteen years. Popular tumults are therefore to all appearance more probable, more big with the proſpect of national ruin now, than they were on the day preceding the inſurrection of the Proteſtant Aſſociation. And when you call upon us to rely upon the good ſenſe of the populace to make a juſt compariſon of their own ſtate with that of the lower claſſes of other nations; by exaggerating the increaſe of the taxes, and declaiming^* perpetually and with extrava⯑gance upon it, you endeavour to make the reſult of that com⯑pariſon falſe, on which you call upon us to depend. With their minds thus prepared, whether the fanaticiſm infuſed into them for that purpoſe be either of the kind called religious or political, or both conjointly, they generally effect all the deſtruction in their power: and if their aſſociation now become general throughout the kingdom, their power will have no limit. It may be aſked now, what will become of that poſition ſo much inſiſted on, that ‘nothing but real grievances will drive the popu⯑lace [35]into inſurrection and violence; that their wrath, though often dreadful in its conſequences, is always juſt in its cauſe and commencement; that though they may reaſon ill, the effect of the errors of their judgement always paſſes off in harmleſs and empty noiſe; and that they never begin to act but from their feelings only, which cannot deceive them.’ In this inſurrection we ſee a ſtrong inſtance of the falſity of this opinion, which many have endeavoured to ſup⯑port from different motives, in order to impreſs upon us a belief of the infallibility of the people, when they come into political action. The humane indulgence ex⯑tended to a reſpectable but perſecuted ſect in 1780, was no grievance which the populace felt anything from. It even attacked no prejudice which had any active opera⯑tion in their minds the day before this Aſſociation was planned: and the event clearly ſhows, that falſe abſtract principles may be infuſed into them; prejudices long dor⯑mant may be re-excited as it were in a moment, and in⯑ſtantaneouſly produce an inſurrection which may hazard or deſtroy the exiſtence of Civil Government.

SECTION VI. ON THE SPIRIT OF POPULAR OFFENSIVE ASSOCIATIONS, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (SO CALLED).

EVERY inſtance in Hiſtory of the fatal effects of re⯑ligious fanaticiſm has, in this age, been ſtudiouſly and invidiouſly collected, and brought forward to public view; but thoſe of combinations and aſſociations to ob⯑tain Political Equality, and to vindicate what are now [36]called the Rights of Men, have been little enquired after; and France is very generally ſuppoſed recently to have exhibited the firſt example of the calamities they have produced. I have often wondered at the prevalence of this opinion, and it would have been fortunate for human kind, and for that fine country in particular, if it had been true. But her fate has reſembled too much that of the beautiful and cultivated tracts which lie round the baſe and aſcend part of the ſides of Mount Veſuvius: the volcano ſeems extinct for ages; the harveſt, the vine⯑yard, the farm, the villa, the palace, and every mark of fertility, cultivation, and ſplendor, ſeem to have made it their ſelected ſpot: but the periodical eruption returns, and a conflagration ſweeps all theſe beauties from the earth.

WHEN the populace is brought into action, they will ultimately be governed in their conduct by the moſt vio⯑lent ſet of principles which has infected any large ſec⯑tion of them. This point is laid down ſimply now; I ſhall return to the conſideration of it. But the princi⯑ple of the Equality of Right, and that underſtood in its moſt fatal ſenſe, has been long fermenting among, and at length infected no ſmall part of the lower claſſes of Society in Europe. While, therefore, we look upon the late calamities of France as a political phenomenon, ſin⯑gle and unprecedented in its kind, when it is only one inſtance among many, we eſtimate the greatneſs of our hazard much beneath its magnitude, which increaſes in proportion to the number of ſuch events that have taken place during the period of authentic hiſtory, and like⯑wiſe with the relaxation of our watchfulneſs cauſed by this error; which is more ſingular, as our own Hiſtory [37]points out to us the danger of England being a ſecond time deſolated by the contagion of theſe principles, by an expreſs example. This Section I ſhall divide into Parts; each containing the hiſtory of one inſurrection of this kind, with obſervations.

I. ON THE INSURRECTION OF THE JEWS, BEGUN IN THE REIGN OF NERO, AND TERMINATED IN THAT OF VESPASIAN.

THE firſt country which the ſuppoſed modern metaphy⯑ſical philoſophy of politics deluged with the blood of its inhabitants, was Judea. Judas and Sadoc (ſays Joſe⯑phus) were the founders of a ſchool of philoſophy new to mankind ^*. Their followers were diſtinguiſhed from the three pre-eſtabliſhed ſects, by teaching the doctrines of Liberty in the abſtract (THE, FREE): their attach⯑ment to theſe nothing could move. Thoſe who dreſſed out their panegyrical orations on Liberty with the am⯑bitious ornaments of tragical declamation^†, were ſure of an admiring audience. Thus we ſee the orators of the Palais Royal and Copenhagen Houſe had their predeceſ⯑ſors in Judea. Theſe men conſecrated the doctrines of Civil Equality, by conſidering it as a point of religion to acknowledge no lawful ſuperior or King but God^‡; and [38]then (perhaps) mankind were firſt taught the ſacred duties of inſurrection; and Ananus, the high prieſt, is repre⯑ſented to have been ſo much attached to the principle of Equality, that he delighted to make it evident in his con⯑duct to the moſt abject. His enthuſiaſm for Liberty ex⯑ceeded all meaſure, and he was an ardent lover of Demo⯑cracy ^*. The profeſſors of this new philoſophy, by an inſurrection, got all the powers of the State into their hands. I ſhall not deſcribe here the crimes of a fero⯑cious populace, whom they let looſe againſt the upper orders, or excited againſt each other. Every ſucceſsful commotion, upon theſe principles, has the ſame termi⯑nation;—the maſſacre or emigration of the Nobles and people of property. That of Judea ended finally by the Jews ceaſing to exiſt as a Nation.

II. INSURRECTION OF THE BAGAUDAE, IN THE REIGN OF DIOCLESIAN.

BUT France has ſuffered oftener from the ſpreading of theſe principles than any other nation. When that country has been greatly exhauſted by foreign wars, they have repeatedly burſt, as it were, from a latent ſtate, into action, and added this extreme of calamity to what it ſuffered before. A long ſeries of troubles agitated Gaul from the reign of Gallienus to that of Diocleſian; the peaſants, oppreſſed with the joint weight of public diſ⯑treſs and feudal ſervices^†, took arms againſt their lords; [39] ‘an event (ſays Gibbon) which, though it is mentioned in a few words by our imperfect writers, deſerves, from its ſingularity, to be recorded in the hiſtory of human man⯑ners.’ The inſurgents were called the Bagaudae; a name derived from the Celtic word Bagad, which ſignifies a tumultuous aſſembly. ‘They aſſerted (continues the hiſtorian) THE NATURAL RIGHTS OF MEN, but they aſſerted thoſe rights with the moſt ſavage cruelty. The Gallic Nobles, juſtly dreading their revenge, either took refuge in the fortified cities, or fled from the wild ſcene of anarchy. The peaſants reigned without controul ^*.’ As this account was publiſhed in 1776, it will not be ſaid that the hiſtorian has tortured ſome obſcure and brief notices into a parallel with the late Revolutions in the ſame country. The reduction of the Bagaudae was the firſt exploit of Maximian, after his nomination to the Empire by Diocleſian.

III. INSURRECTION OF THE JACQUERIE, IN THE REIGN OF JOHN OF FRANCE.

THE next irruption of this kind, which laid waſte France, took place in 1358. It reſembled that of 1789 ſo much, not only in its general character, but in par⯑ticular circumſtances, that we ſeem almoſt to be read⯑ing the ſame hiſtory under different names. It was the inſurrection of the Jacquerie, to whom the modern Jaco⯑bins [40]have ſucceeded, not only in ſpirit, but in title^*, after the interval of 440 years.

THE war with England had exhauſted the reſources of France; King John was a priſoner in London; the Dauphin, then of the age of eighteen, aſſumed the exer⯑ciſe of the Government, and having obtained a truce of two years of the Engliſh, he called an Aſſembly of the States to procure ſupplies. Here he found every Order negligent of the public diſtreſs, and deſirous only to aug⯑ment its own power: he therefore haſtened their ſepara⯑tion. At that juncture, Charles the Bad, King of Na⯑varre, who had great poſſeſſions in France, aſpired to the Throne. We have ſeen him and his crimes re⯑vived in one of his deſcendants, the late Duke of Or⯑leans.

[41]CHARLES of Navarre had been able to gain to his party the ſeditious Prevôt des Marchands, or Mayor of Paris, Marcel, and that factious populace. The latter ſent an aſſaſſin to murder the Treaſurer of France, who after⯑wards took ſanctuary: the Regent ſent two mareſchals to apprehend and execute him: the Mayor, Marcel, upon this raiſed the populace, broke into the apartment of the Prince, murdered the mareſchals before his face, and, when he ſaw him apprehenſive of his own fate, as a mark of his protection, ſnatched the Prince's hat off, and clapped the cap (the badge of the faction of Navarre) upon his head. I muſt candidly remark here, that the colour of this cap was blue^*, and not red. The Dau⯑phin-Regent was forced to diſſemble his reſentment, and to take all in good part.

AFTER this inſult, he was detained in a kind of capti⯑vity; in which ſtate a poiſon was adminiſtered to him, by which he loſt his hair and his nails. This was ſuſ⯑pected to have been done by the direction of the King of Navarre.

IN the meantime the faction at Paris, though ſeem⯑ingly inclined to Charles, was more diſpoſed to change France into an effective Republic than to pull down one [42]King in order to ſet up another. The plan of the leaders of the inſurgents of Paris of that time was preciſely copied in the firſt of the new French Conſtitutions; it was ‘to change the form of the Government, to veſt the ſupreme power in the Third Eſtate, and to leave the King his title with little or no authority.’ This was the Conſtitution propoſed by that metropolis to the other cities, but then rejected by them. It was not until ſome little time after that their minds were elevated to the height of ſuch a Revolution ^*. But the Regent, who had been obliged to temporize and diſſemble, having been ſo fortu⯑nate as to eſcape out of Paris, and not to be intercepted in his flight, that capital and the other cities of the kingdom ſhook off the Royal authority, took the Government into their own hands, and ſpread diſorder into every Province; and the troops, left without pay, no longer regarded their Officers, or were reſtrained by any diſcipline from indiſ⯑criminate plunder.

YET this devoted country was to be afflicted with the addition of another calamity, in weight and magnitude ex⯑ceeding the total of what it then ſuffered: this was the in⯑ſurrection of the Jacquerie or peaſantry. The populace of the cities had found employment for the exerciſe of the new lights they had obtained in the ſchool of the meta⯑phyſical politicians, in the eſtabliſhing of their new muni⯑cipalities or little independent republics; deſtined, perhaps, if their progreſs to the perfection of civil ſociety had not received a check, to have become the inſulated and repul⯑ſive elements of a prior French Republic, one and indivi⯑ſible. The principles of this Aſſociation, as it has been [43]already remarked, have been aſſigned by Gibbon, who par⯑ticularly profeſſes to have examined the original accounts of them himſelf, for the purpoſe of acquiring light to fix the character of a ſimilar event. Theſe inſurgents, he ſays, "aſſerted the natural Rights of Man." It has been proved, that he ought not to be accuſed of having ſur⯑veyed the occurrences of this period with an eye tinctured with the prejudices of the preſent; of having corrupted the faith of hiſtory to inflame what is called liberticidal prejudice.

THE Members of the Jacquerie did not repel the vio⯑lence of the citizens and ſoldiers as an injury to them⯑ſelves; they followed it as an example. The object of their fury was the Gentry; whom, while they were recovering their own rights, they upbraided with cowar⯑dice for deſerting their Sovereign at the battle of Poictiers. From this precedent, perhaps, has ariſen the conſtant ſub⯑ſequent practice of thoſe who are endeavouring to convert a Monarchy into a Republic, to maſk their firſt meaſures under great profeſſions of zeal for the honour, happineſs, and dignity of the Prince.

‘THE caſtles of the gentry were conſumed by fire, and levelled to the ground; and they were hunted like wild beaſts, and put to the ſword without mercy. The ſa⯑vages proceeded ſo far as to impale ſome gentlemen and roaſt them alive before a ſlow fire. Their wives and daughters were firſt raviſhed, and then murdered: a body of 9000 of them broke into Meaux, where the wife of the Dauphin, with above 300 Ladies, had taken ſhel⯑ter: the moſt brutal treatment and moſt atrocious cru⯑elty were juſtly dreaded by this helpleſs company: but [44]the Captal de Buche, though in the ſervice of Edward, yet moved by generoſity and the gallantry of a true knight, flew to their relief, and beat off the peaſants with great ſlaughter^*.’

[45]ONE obſervation muſt be here made on the proximate cauſe of both theſe ſanguinary inſurrections, adverting more particularly to the latter.

FROM the very nature of the feudal ſyſtem, it is not to be ſuppoſed that either of theſe calamitous periods was diſ⯑tinguiſhed by any extraordinary oppreſſion of the lower orders by the Nobility or Gentry. Previous to the latter, the arms of Edward, and the intrigues of the King of Navarre, had long kept France in a moſt unſettled ſtate; and the Nobility muſt have felt, for a conſiderable term of time, an increaſing want of the attachment of their vaſſals, and, conſequently, been obliged to treat them with more than ordinary regard. Beſide, it is by no means certain, that in the ſemi-barbarous ſtate in which France was then plunged, the burthen of the feudal ſervices exceeded the value of the protection the tenant then received from his lord: the latter at that time might be eſteemed fully equal to the former. As it was a well-known practice for thoſe who poſſeſſed allodial lands, or ſuch as were free from feudal [46]ſervices, as our freeholds, to convey them over to ſome neighbouring baron, who engaged to grant them back again to the former owner, liable to the feudal ſervices of his barony; that thus the former independent proprietor, by becoming a vaſſal, might acquire a right to the protec⯑tion of his new lord. Thoſe ſervices he therefore volun⯑tarily, engaged in, becauſe what he gave was not of the ſame value to him as what he acquired: and they were undoubtedly of the kind called privileged or definite: he certainly did not thereby ſubmit himſelf to a ſtate of villenage in groſs.

IV. INSURRECTION UNDER WAT TYLER IN ENGLAND, IN THE REIGN OF RICHARD THE SECOND.

THESE events in France muſt in all probability have pro⯑duced the firſt party of Alarmiſts, who then held out the danger of theſe principles getting footing here; and it is alſo probable, that there were many Engliſh in that age, ſome from that levity which derides all troubleſome foreſight; ſome not favouring their ultimate ſucceſs, but deſirous to promote their own oblique purpoſes by their temporary extenſion and prevalence; and others who deſired to ſee them adopted in practice to their utmoſt extent; who treated the melancholy declamations of the Alarmiſts of the Four⯑teenth Century, on the calamities to be apprehended at home, from the effect of the inſurrection of the antient Jacobins or Jacquerie upon the minds of the populace, with the ridicule the ſame apprehenſions meet in our days: the verification their predictions received from the event, the politicians deſcribed above do their utmoſt to give to thoſe of their ſucceſſors; and they may ſucceed. In the time of the Jacquerie, Edward the Third ſat upon the [47]Throne; and the vigour of his adminiſtration, and the po⯑pularity of his brilliant reign, muſt have been a great re⯑ſtraint upon thoſe principles from burſting forth into pre⯑ſent action: but the diſtemper of the minds of the popu⯑lace, though latent, was probably ſpreading during its lowering decline. It broke out in the minority of Richard. Seditious orators were not then wanted to propagate the ſacred duty of inſurrection; the name of one of them is handed down to us: John Ball, a prieſt, went about the country, inculcating on his audience ‘the equal right to liberty, and to all the goods of nature; the tyranny of artificial diſtinctions; and the idea of primitive equali⯑ty^*.’ To borrow a metaphor from a modern writer of great eminence, it was thus a mine was dug to blow up civil ſociety; a poll tax had been granted by parliament, and an inſult offered by an abandoned collector to the daughter of a blackſmith, ſet fire to the train which led to it. The populace of Eſſex, Kent, Hertfordſhire, Suſſex, Surrey, Suffolk, Norfolk, and the counties of Cambridge and Lincoln, immediately flew to arms: and before the Government had the leaſt warning of the danger, the diſor⯑der had riſen beyond controul or oppoſition: the moſt audacious and criminal of their leaders aſſumed the feigned names of Tyler, Straw, Carter, or Miller, ‘by which they were fond of denoting their mean origin.’ Thus thoſe who borrow their principles from France now bor⯑row from the ſame country the groſs name of Sans Culottes. In all inſurrections of this character the populace are con⯑ſtantly actuated by one motive, "the purpoſe of levelling all mankind:" the means too by which its end is purſued are always the ſame: ‘the inſurgents committed the moſt [48]outrageous violences on ſuch of the Nobility or Gentry as had the misfortune to fall into their hands;’ and ‘favoured by the city rabble they broke into London; ****murdered the Primate, the Chancellor, and the Treaſurer; ****cut off the heads of all the Gentry whom they laid hold of; expreſſed a particular animoſity againſt the lawyers; and pillaged the warehouſes of the rich merchants:’ even the Widow of that revered hero the Black Prince could not eſcape from their inſolence and outrage; ‘ſome of them, to ſhew their purpoſe of levelling all mankind, forced kiſſes from her^*:’ ‘whoſe head they alſo broke in a tyrannizing frolick^†.’

This event being recorded in our own Hiſtory, I ſhall be more particular in my obſervations upon it.

THE conſtruction and mode of working that machinery, which is to diſorganiſe Society we ſee was not then totally unknown: and the means to diffuſe conſtitutional infor⯑mation employed in that period were the ſame as are now in practice, if we except the preſs, that moſt powerful en⯑gine to promote the beſt and the worſt ends; and on the balance, for a certain period after the commencement of the attack, a formidable addition to dangers of this kind. The minds of the populace were regularly prepared for inſurrection in the manner deſcribed; and the principle of equalizing, then copied from the French, was the pre⯑diſpoſing cauſe of this unhappy and ſanguinary commo⯑tion. The criminal inſolence of a tax-gatherer, repelled [49]by an immediate murder, was the occaſion or premature ſignal only, which brought this ſpirit into action, not the primary origin of the ſeries of events which then com⯑menced.

THE principles of ſedition preached by John Ball have a ſingular ſimilitude to thoſe now ſolicitouſly propagated. We are able to trace in them the great outline of thoſe laid down in the advice of Mr. Barlow to the Privileged Orders. This is evident in the account given of the former from Hume. It is worth the while only to inſtance particularly one of theſe points of reſemblance, which is curious and ſtriking. Mr. Ball, in his Homilies on the Rights of Man, preached on "their equal title to all the goods of nature;" and Mr. Barlow, that ‘every man is born with an impre⯑ſcriptible claim to a portion of the elements, which por⯑tion is termed his birthright^*.’ We ſee both of them lay down the ſame doctrine in the ſame guarded manner; half holding forth to the populace, and half keeping back, an expectation of an equal diviſion of lands. This Century had not the honour of firſt diſcovering this fine principle of tribunitial morality, in the claſſical records, or of the re⯑invention of it.

THERE ſeems to me little reaſon to aſcribe the miſeries in which this inſurrection involved England, at that parti⯑cular point of time, to any other cauſe than the contagion of the principles which had prevailed in France ſome time before. I ſhall, however, ſtate and conſider what may be ſaid againſt this.

[50]MR. HUME joins another with it, on the authority of Froiſſart, ‘that perſonal ſlavery was then more general in England, than in any other country in Europe.’ He himſelf, in ſome places, has cenſured that Writer, as falling into many errors in point of fact; but there is one circumſtance which ſhews, that the number of ſlaves (by which I ſuppoſe villeins in groſs^* to be meant) muſt, in that age, have been very greatly reduced. The influence of the clergy over the minds of the people had, at that time, ſuffered a ſhock which it never recovered. On this ſomething more particular will be ſaid hereafter^†. Hence the greater part of every Revolution they were to bring about, in the relative ſtate of the different claſſes of Society, had been already effected. Now the total abo⯑lition of this ſpecies of ſlavery was completed in Eng⯑land, and that by the exertions of the clergy, before the Reformation; for Sir Thomas Smith, who was Secre⯑tary to Edward the Sixth, ſays, that in all his time he never knew any villein in groſs throughout the realm: ‘for he tells us, that the holy fathers, monks, and friars, had, in their confeſſions, and eſpecially in their extreme and deadly ſickneſs, convinced the Laity how dangerous a practice it was for one chriſtian man to hold another in bondage; ſo that temporal men, by little and little, by reaſon of that terror of their con⯑ſciences, were glad to manumit all their villeins^‡.’ It ſeems, therefore, reaſonable to ſuppoſe, the effect of [51]their exhortations being at all times proportioned to their aſcendancy over men's minds in general, that they made the moſt rapid progreſs in this work, and had performed the greateſt part of it before their influence was much de⯑clined, or before the acceſſion of Richard the Second: nor are we to aſcribe thoſe great inſurrections to perſo⯑nal ſlavery, at a time in which it was greatly dimi⯑niſhed, which are not to be found in the time it was moſt prevalent.

FURTHER, to ſhew that nothing is contained in this inſtance, tending to demonſtrate that a calamity of the like nature is probable at preſent, it will be ſaid, that ‘theſe were the exceſſes of a barbarous age, but that the diffuſion of light in Society has humanized the manners of every claſs of mankind, and that this is particularly the caſe of England at this period; and although in the Fourteenth Century, the populace both here and in France were equally involved in darkneſs, and led with the fame facility into atrocious crimes; that the lower orders in this kingdom have, in the former of theſe reſpects, and conſequently in the latter, in this age, a relative ſuperiority over their neighbours, which they were by no means entitled to boaſt of in the age of Edward the Third. The concluſion of this is obvious: that a danger ſo probable then as juſtly to have been the ſubject of alarm, muſt be totally viſionary now.’

BUT it cannot be admitted that the populace of Eng⯑land were then ſo totally involved in ignorance as this objection ſuppoſes; for whenever a certain portion of knowledge on any one ſubject becomes generally diffuſed [52]among the upper claſſes of a State, their inferiors will ſoon become poſſeſſed of that part thereof, which their relative ſituation permits them to acquire. The increaſe of the information of the former becomes diſſeminated among the latter, by the middle claſs, converſing ordina⯑rily with both. And the feudal ſyſtem tended to inſure this, in the age which is under conſideration; not only by the frequent attendance of the vaſſals in the courts of their Lords, but by the multitudes of retainers which their hoſpitality, their oſtentation, or their love of war, induced them to live ſurrounded by. Theſe originally taken from, occaſionally mixing with, and ultimately returning to the body of the common people, diffuſed among them the outline of every new opinion, as ſoon as it was eſta⯑bliſhed. The propagation of new ideas throughout the whole of Society, was not much leſs rapid then than it is now; much of the effect of the diſcovery of printing be⯑ing counterbalanced by the change of cuſtoms in this par⯑ticular; and thus perhaps the feudal ſyſtem contained within itſelf the ſeeds of its own decline.

NOW from a detail of numerous circumſtances pre⯑ſerved to us is hiſtory, it appears, that the upper claſſes in the reigns of Edward the Third and his ſucceſſor, were far advanced in general knowledge, and particularly in that of political, commercial, and conſtitutional prin⯑ciples: inſomuch that it ſeems that the nation was, in theſe reſpects, in a retrograde ſtate, from the age of Edward the Third to the acceſſion of the Tudors, and that it did not re-acquire its former point of advance upon the whole, until the reigns of the firſt Scottiſh Princes^*.

[53]In the hiſtory of France for the ſame period, I recol⯑lect none of theſe circumſtances, and I think it would be in vain to ſearch for them: for the greater part of theſe improvements were moſt probably ſo early called forth in England, by the inſtitution of a Houſe of Commons re⯑latively new, and then beginning to produce its effects on the ſpirit and ideas of the nation.

OF this knowledge, according to what is obſerved above, every claſs of the nation muſt have imbibed its ſhare, according to its powers of abſorption: the genius of the age prevented its being confined. If, therefore, we compare the Engliſh populace of that period with that of France, as great a ſuperiority at leaſt muſt then be al⯑lowed to them in uſeful knowledge as can be admitted now: but the event ſhewed, that the difference in that age was not enough to protect this nation from the expe⯑rience of many, and the hazard of all the miſeries which had recently overwhelmed France. And as that diffe⯑rence is not increaſed, it is a folly which tends to the laſt extremity of national ruin, to rely upon it more firmly now.

THERE is another point of view likewiſe, in which the inſurrection of the Fourteenth Century requires conſide⯑ration. The late ſubverſions of the Governments of Hol⯑land and of France ſhew us, that there is almoſt as much to fear as to hope from regular troops: and if we look to a force on which we can place unlimited confidence, in oppoſition to ſuch an inſurrection, at this juncture; from the revolution which has taken place in the ſtate and manners of Society, we ſhall ſee that force greatly weak⯑ened. In the feudal ages, the upper and opulent claſſes [54]were chiefly military men. Hence, though the encoun⯑ter was terrible, they finally prevailed, by the advantage of diſcipline and military habits. On a late occaſion, from the decay of them, we have ſeen the gentry and no⯑bility of France unable to make a ſtand, and ſwept away almoſt without reſiſtance: a country where the educa⯑tion of a camp was much more general among the ſupe⯑rior orders than in Britain. Admit now the chance of inſurrection to be leſs than here ſtated, the danger to be apprehended is from the chance of attack, and the weak⯑neſs of the means of defence jointly: if that chance de⯑creaſe, and the ſtrength of defence decreaſe in the ſame proportion, the danger of the State remains ſtill the ſame

5. OTHER INSURRECTIONS TO ASSERT THE RIGHTS OF MANT.

SOME other inſurrections will be here mentioned, that a general concluſion may he drawn from the whole of them; but with little detail of their particular inci⯑dents.

IN the feeble reign of Henry the Sixth, Cade raiſed a formidable commotion, under a pretence of a Reduction of taxes, and a Reform in the State; but no trace of the Levelling principle is to be found in his Declarations or his conduct: an article in his Manifeſto in favour of the old againſt the new nobility, ſeems even in the moſt dia⯑metrical oppoſition to it, and he is generally eſteemed to have been an inſtrument of the Duke of York. This is noticed, as the only inſtance I recollect in the Hiſtory of this country of the more dangerous inſurrections of the populace, which was not founded on the doctrine of the Equality of the Rights of Man.

[55]AFTER the death of Iſabella of Caſtile, in 1503, the Regency of that kingdom was diſputed between her huſ⯑band Ferdinand of Arragon and the Auſtrian Princes. During the following ſixteen years, a kind of turbulent Interregnum prevailed in Spain, with intervals of regu⯑lar government. The Royal power being by theſe viciſſi⯑tudes weakened, a democratic faction aroſe, conſiderated under the title of the Germania, the Brotherhood, or Aſſociation of the People. It involved Spain in diſcord and bloodſhed for nearly two years. The Progreſs of Civil Society toward anarchy in that time in the king⯑doms of Spain, was nearly the ſame as what we recently ſaw it in France in the ſame period: it was advanced ſo far, that two clothworkers and a tanner ruled the debates of their Third Eſtates^*.

TO the ſtern government of Henry the Eighth in England, ſucceeded the feeble minority of Edward the Sixth, and the feeble Protectorate of his uncle the Duke of Somerſet, continually traverſed by his factious bro⯑ther, and his intriguing ſucceſſor. Popular commotions aroſe in ſeveral parts of the kingdom: ſome inſurgents took arms on account of religion, others were what Ba⯑ker calls "Commonwealth Mutineers." The object of the three greater bodies was to form a junction: one of them declared for no King, the deſtruction of the nobi⯑lity and gentry, and holding a Parliament in commotion, which ſhould begin at the South and North Seas of England. Another for no Gentry, no Lawyers, no [56]Judges, no Juſtices, no Incloſures^*. It was with diffi⯑culty and great exertion that two of theſe bodies were ſe⯑parately conquered, on which the third diſperſed. If the projected junction had taken place, it would moſt pro⯑bably have involved the whole kingdom in a deſolation equal to that in which the Jacquerie involved France.

ONE conſequence is plainly deducible, from a view of all theſe accounts conjointly, that the executive power of the Sovereign can never be both ſuddenly and greatly weakened or relaxed below its accuſtomed tone, without expoſing Society to the hazard of that moſt dreadful of calamities, the tyranny of Levelling principles, or thoſe of Equality: for the latter term bears no other ſenſe in the conception of the multitude, and is intended to convey this to them, by the great majority of thoſe who affectedly dwell upon it. This ſpirit is ready to break out on all ſuch occaſions: and this we have ſeen it do when John of France was a priſoner to a foreign ene⯑my; when Charles the Firſt and Louis the Sixteenth were priſoners to their own ſubjects; during the feeble and diſtracted minorities of Richard the Second and Ed⯑ward the Sixth, and in the effective Interregnum follow⯑ing the death of Iſabella of Caſtile.

ALTHOUGH this is the moſt permanent and gene⯑ral of the irregular paſſions acting upon the minds of the populace, it ſometimes gives place to others; which, if they happen to be predominant at a time when the Royal power is ſuddenly diminiſhed, the former will not appear in action, but the latter will [57]produce the ſame effect. Thus in Ireland, when the vigo⯑rous, and in ſome inſtances perhaps the arbitrary, admini⯑ſtration of Lord Strafford was removed, and it be⯑came evident that Charles the Firſt was a King in came only, and that his government had very little effective power; the long ſuppreſſed reſentments of the Iriſh againſt the Engliſh, and their ferocious bi⯑gotry, broke out in the Iriſh Rebellion and Maſſacre. This ſeeming exception gives an indirect but ſtrong ſupport, to one of the propoſitions on which the pre⯑ceding concluſion is founded. But to confine ourſelves to the principles of the ?Commonwealth Mutineers."

HENCE it may be laid down as a general fact, that when the power which keeps the lower people in ſubordi⯑nation, be it equal to, or more than the degree every good man would wiſh to have permanently eſtabliſhed in a State, be of a ſudden greatly diminiſhed, in⯑ſurrections of this kind will be the conſequence of it; for if it be juſtly ſaid, that Governors are always endeavouring to increaſe their coercive power, yet when we ſee it for a conſiderable term of years ſtationary, notwithſtanding that perpetual effort, we know that the ſpirit of reſiſtance of the People in that generation is preciſely equal to the whole of that power. Diminiſh the latter greatly, and the elaſticity of the former will caſt the remaining weight entirely off. Such diminutions muſt be made by degrees, and an at⯑tentive and accurate adminiſtration of the powers left, will ſupply the place of the ruder compreſſion that is removed, until the people become accuſtomed to enjoy their new degree of liberty with temperance: then it becomes capa⯑ble of a ſecond further extenſion, and not before. In the [58]progreſſive growth of the Britiſh Conſtitution, we ſee an illuſtration of this: we may deſcribe it in the ſame terms in which Tacitus deſcribes that of the Roman Empire from its origin to its higheſt point of grandeur, Octingentorum annorum fortunâ & diſciplinâ compages haec coaluit — This noble edifice was erected by the fortune and virtue of eight hundred years. Every courſe of maſonry was ſuffered to ſettle and conſolidate as it was carried up. The period, indeed, was long: but in ages of barbariſm and ſemibarbariſm, this work will, and perhaps ought to proceed, very tardily.

IT follows from all the inſtances given in this Sec⯑tion, that offenſive popular Aſſociations, on principles called thoſe of the Rights of Men, have always been at⯑tended with the moſt tragical conſequences; and it muſt be added, that this has not ariſen ſolely from accident, or the circumſtances of the times in which the experi⯑ment has been made, but from the principle itſelf, which is contrary to the legitimate conſequences of the laws of human nature. It reſts to be ſhewn, that on whatever ground a ſtrong Offenſive Aſſociation ſhall at this time begin to act, it will be preſently loſt ſight of, and this ſubſtituted in its place.

SECTION VII. ON OFFENSIVE ASSOCIATIONS, THE OBJECTS OF WHICH ARE LIMITED.

THE objects of theſe Aſſociations,' it will be ſaid, ‘were extreme and moſtly indefinite. Had their Leaders, at the beginning, laid down certain ends or limits, the cala⯑mities [59]above deſcribed would never have happened; or, at leaſt, the greater part of them would have been avoided: their operations would have ceaſed as ſoon as theſe fixed points had been attained: and, to reaſon of the preſent time—Suppoſe the worſt: ſuppoſe even that there ſhould exiſt a Party in Great Britain, with whom the tie of al⯑legiance is of no force, and that they might be looked upon in the ſame light as a body of foreign enemies within the realm; yet from foreign enemies we ſhould entertain a full expectation of peace, or ceſſation of ho⯑ſtilities, on our performance of ſuch conditions as they propoſe and we accede to. And ſhall we entertain of Engliſhmen, doubts that would be injurious to a fo⯑reign enemy? Can we think ſo ill of our country⯑men? Have they rejected every principle analogous to the Law which binds hoſtile nations, which can preſerve the good faith of hoſtile parties to each other?’

IT may be the belief of the majority of the original Leaders of an Offenſive Aſſociation, that they ought, and it may be their determination that they will act up to their engagements; but if they be at the head of a Party, combined on the principles taught as the Rights of Man, ſuch Leaders may bona fide make the attempt to act up to their original Manifeſto; but the probability runs very ſtrongly againſt their being able to effect their purpoſe: for whatever principles they may ſet out with, the ex⯑treme and moſt violent that their lower adherents ſhall have imbibed, prior to their Aſſociation, or that they ſhall pick up in the courſe of the ſtruggle, will moſt pro⯑bably be thoſe ultimately acted upon.

[60]I SHALL here ſhow the reality and magnitude of this danger, from the examples of the moſt enlightened na⯑tions, and in their moſt enlightened periods. It muſt be on this occaſion ſuppoſed that it will not be diſputed, that when the heads of a Party declare that they will preſerve any one part of a Conſtitution, in its exiſting ſtate, they thereby impoſe limits upon their own operations; and that as much reliance may be placed on thoſe they im⯑poſe upon themſelves in the courſe of action, as if they had laid them down immediately before they began to act. To attempt to diſtinguiſh between the validity of the two ſecurities, would be to make a diſtinction without a dif⯑ference, unleſs it be contended, that when the Leaders of ſuch a Party have begun their ſeries of meaſures, they loſe entirely the power or the with to obſerve their en⯑gagements; but an opponent who ſhall reſt upon this concedes the whole argument.

THE object of Mr. Fox's Aſſociation is clearly limited. It is to continue in force until two Acts of Parliament named therein be repealed; and the ſubſcribers, as Aſſo⯑ciators, are to purſue no other point. But we have had the calamity to ſee a very recent and terrible example of the failure of an engagement, defined with as much pre⯑ciſion as that now held out to us, and which was con⯑tracted with a more awful ſolemnity. It was on the 7th of July 1792, that M. Lamourette, Biſhop of Lyons, moved in the National Aſſembly, ‘That all thoſe who hold, in equal deteſtation a Republic and two Chambers, and who wiſh to maintain the Conſtitution as it is— Rise’ The words were ſcarcely pronounced, when ‘the whole Aſſembly, by an inſtantaneous impulſe, roſe from their ſcats. The two parties advanced and em⯑braced [61]each other, and ſolemnly proteſted their adhe⯑rence to the Conſtitution^*.’ It is of conſequence to add, that this motion was made ‘at the moment M. Briſſot aſcended the tribune to pronounce a diſcourſe on the means of ſecuring the State againſt all its enemies.’ It was at the very criſis of the Revolution: the army of the Pruſſians and Auſtrians were advancing in France: no adequate force was prepared to oppoſe them; and when ſuch a man brought forward ſuch a diſcuſſion at ſuch a time, no doubt can be entertained that the Leaders and the body of his Party were preſent; and all preſent con⯑curred in this ſolemn Proteſt. It was on the 10th of the following month the Tuilleries were attacked, and the King depoſed. Briſſot, Louvet, and Barbaroux, in their public ſpeeches and writings, aſſerted that this Revolu⯑tion was effected by them, and their aſſociates, to eſta⯑bliſh a Republic: and that the day originally fixed on to carry it into execution was the 29th of July^†, twenty-two days only after this public declaration. Now if twenty-two days was a ſpace of time long enough for arranging the plan of the inſurrection, and making the neceſſary preparation for it, the Briſſotine Party muſt almoſt inſtantly have gone from the making this Proteſt to the direct violation of it. If the period were ſo ſhort that they cannot be ſuppoſed at firſt to have expected to be able to bring about ſo great an event, in ſo little a time after the firſt conception of it (which ſeems almoſt certain), then the conſpiracy exiſted at the time this ſolemn en⯑gagement was entered into; and the only object of the Republican Conſpirators, in taking the Proteſtation, was to caſt a neceſſary veil for a few days over thoſe meaſures [62]they were purſuing, which brought ſuch dreadful cala⯑mities upon themſelves and their country.

THUS the Declaration againſt Republicaniſm was vio⯑lated: the remaining half of the Proteſtation continued uninfringed ſome little time longer. The National Con⯑vention, containing many of the members who had taken this Proteſtation, ſat for a ſhort and ſanguinary period as one Aſſembly; the members whereof were chiefly occu⯑pied in mutual proſcriptions. It then diſſolved one third part of itſelf, filled up the vacancy, and divided into two Chambers. Such is the leſſon recent experience holds forth to us, on the faith that is to he put in the engagements of this kind, ſolemnly entered into by the Leaders of a People, enlightened by the torch of Philoſo⯑phy, kindled at the ſacred and eternal fire, on the altar of Liberty and Equality. Theſe men, theſe means, this act have been defended—Defended did I ſay? The enthuſiaſm of the Republicans of England has applauded them be⯑yond every example the annals of public virtue preſent us with, in ancient or in modern ages. They will be ad⯑mitted parties to Mr. Fox's Aſſociation; and become, by their ſubſcriptions, the guarantees of its limitations. And will not theſe idolizers of the violation, and the viola⯑tors of one of the moſt ſolemn compact on record, emu⯑louſly; follow the example they adore? At the commence⯑ment of this year, a ſecond ſolemn farce, the ſame in form, but oppoſite in its engagements, was exhibited at the com⯑memoration of the beheading of the King; the members of the two aſſemblies ſwore deteſtation to Royalty. This oath certainly cannot be ſuppoſed to have any tendency to accelerate or retard its reſtoration.

[63]WE now come to the examples of the inſufficiency of theſe limiting clauſes contained in our own Hiſtory: but to this the following obſervation muſt be premiſed, on the nature of limitations in general. The object of an Offenſive Aſſociation may be to effect alterations in the State, or in Religion, ſeverally or in both conjointly; and, in the two firſt caſes, the Aſſociators may pledge themſelves to the entire conſervation of the one, but fix no limits to the extent of the alterations they propoſe in the other. Thus an Aſſociation may refuſe to lay down any limits to the alterations they wiſh to effect in the State, but by expreſs declaration engage to make none in the national religion. This was the ſtate of obligation in which the Leaders of the Long Parliament and their ad⯑herents placed themſelves before the Civil Wars com⯑menced; for it has been ſeen before, that they refuſed to define the extent of their propoſed alterations in the State, on the King's requiſition; and that, in the juſtification of their conduct and views, they never referred to that repoſitory of law and conſtitutional knowledge, the works of Sir Edward Coke: their object in the State was there⯑fore indefinite, and as ſuch has been before conſidered: but this Aſſociation was ſtrictly limited with reſpect to changes in religion; the fidelity with which they adhered to thoſe limitations will preſently be examined.

THOSE who at that time endeavoured to bring about alterations in the exiſting Laws, inimical to the conſtitution of its government^*, drew large [64]parts of the nation to aſſociate with then; having previouſly defined, in expreſs terms, certain points thereof, which they would maintain and defend in their exiſting ſtate. The conditions of ſuch Aſſociations ſhall be here produced, and the entire breach of them ſhewn; and, from a compariſon of the manners and morals of the nation at that time and the preſent juncture, it will be likewiſe proved, that before the events to be related took place, the apparent danger of a flagrant violation of theſe limits, in the former period, was much leſs than that of a like breach of the reſtraints the Aſſociators of the preſent day have impoſed upon themſelves.

IT was between the 2d and 5th of May 1641, that the Houſe of Commons entered into a vow and Proteſta⯑tion, ‘in the preſence of God, to maintain the true Proteſtant Religion, expreſſed in the doctrine of the Church of England ^*.’ The Lords concurred with them in taking this Proteſtation: but in oppoſition to that Houſe, the Commons, by their ſingle authority, or⯑dered it to be ſubſcribed by the whole nation, under the penalty, to ſuch as ſhould refuſe, of being declared unfit for any office in Church or Commonwealth, and being deemed malignants and diſaffected^‡. The oppoſition of the Peers to the general ſubſcription, ſhews it to have been brought forward by the moſt active opponents of the Court.

[65]THIS engagement became at length an obſtacle to the Parliamentarians, when they wanted to obtain the aſſiſtance of the Scotch, in the depreſſed ſituation to which they were reduced. In September 1643, or in little more than two years, they ſubſcribed the Solemn League and Covenant, whereby they engaged to eſtabliſh Preſbyte⯑rianiſm in England. Vane had, indeed, the addreſs to have the Article on this ſubject drawn ſo, that it did not abſolutely bear the ſenſe the Scots put upon it: but the Parliament executed it in that ſenſe, and the concurrence of both the contracting parties thereto, eſtabliſhes what is to be received as the meaning of the ambiguous phraſe he inſerted.

THIS engagement the Parliament ſubſcribed them⯑ſelves, and they ordered it to be received by all who liv⯑ed under their authority. It may be pretended, that this change was juſtified by a change of religion in the body of the people; but this is a poſition which cannot be ſupported. It is not digreſſing from my purpoſe to ſhew this, for it proves that a cabal of leading men may draw a great part of the nation into an Aſſociation with them; one condition of which ſhall be, to preſerve inviolate ſome inſtitutions for which the people entertain the higheſt reverence; and obtaining political power by this means, the Junto, or a part of them, ſhall convert that very power to effect the abolition of what they originally engaged to defend.

AT the meeting of the Long Parliament, the Puritans were by no means the majority of the nation^*. There [66]was not a leſs proportion of the Sectaries in the Houſe of Commons than in the kingdom at large: and the Prote⯑ſtation in 1641 could not have been voted by an Aſſem⯑bly where the majority, or even a numerous and active Party were of that deſcription. The doctrine of the Pu⯑ritans had taken root before, and its followers were in⯑creaſing; but when it attained its utmoſt growth, under the ſhelter of that Party who began as reformers, and ended as ſubverters of the legal Conſtitution, they ſtill continued to be a minority in the nation; and the Cove⯑nant was impoſed by force, or the fear of force, upon the majority of the people. Of this we have the beſt cotemporary evidence, that of the Diſſenters themſelves. Before the commencement of the Civil War, it was one of their leading tenets, that the individuals of every con⯑gregation had, jure divino, a right to elect their own mini⯑ſter; but after they had begun the operation of ejecting the epiſcopal Clergy, the Aſſembly of Divines found it neceſſary to give up the ?divine right of election:" at which time, Emanuel Knutton expreſſes his fervent gra⯑titude to our bleſſed Parliament and reverend Synod," who took ‘the care to ſend zealous and godly miniſters to’ vacant pariſhes. The neceſſity of the conceſſions of the Aſſembly, and the joint care of that body and of the Parliament, is clearly ſhewn by Needham, who tells us, that if the people had then been permitted to chuſe their own paſtors, ‘the godly and well-affected would have the leaſt ſtroak in the choice.’ And he adds, that ‘if there be no other ſupplies made for pariſhes but ſuch as the pariſhioners cordially reverence and affect, the man to be choſen in moſt pariſhes would be, a man in a ſurptice, with a common-prayer book, &c. ^*.’ Hence [67]we ſee that the Preſbyterian diſcipline was impoſed upon the majority of a reluctant people, by a Party who had drawn them in to aſſociate with them, by taking a ſolemn ‘Proteſtation, in the preſence of God, to maintain the religion expreſſed in the doctrine of the Church of so England.’

THE Proteſtation, as we have mentioned above, was ſuperſeded by the Solemn League and Covenant, the preamble of which profeſſes all regard to the honour and happineſs of the King's Majeſty and his posterity, and the true public liberty, ſafety, and peace of the kingdoms. And in the body of it it is declared, that the parties thereto. had ‘no thoughts or intentions to diminiſh his Majeſty's juſt power or greatneſs.’ Thus the former limits to the projected reforms ſecuring the national reli⯑gion were removed, but new ones were entered into re⯑lating to the civil ſtate, to preſerve the juſt power of the King undiminiſhed.

THESE were no more adhered to than the former; every Party to bring about an alteration in the Law by their perſonal interpoſition^*, contains men of three de⯑ſcriptions; its moderate members, its warm members, and its fanatics. In the period of our Civil Wars, the power had early ſhifted, from thoſe of the firſt to thoſe of the ſecond deſcription of the Parliamentarians, and was [68]ultimately ſeized by thoſe of the third. We have ſeen the ſame progreſs of the devolution of power take place in the French Revolutions: and ſuch tranſitions are not to be looked upon as ſingular incidents attending theſe two turbulent periods, but as general conſequences occurring in every ſuch criſis of a State: and in both theſe caſes, thoſe Leaders into whoſe hands the power ſucceſſively fell, never perſevered any longer in the preſervation of the limits they had themſelves laid down to their enter⯑prize, than until it became their intereſt to pay no regard to them. The only uſe ſuch ſtipulations ſeem to have ſerved is this: they enabled their projectors to acquire or retain the immediate poſſeſſion of power; and by that power they compelled a reluctant people to follow, or to ſubmit to them in their ſucceſſive violations of their Compacts.

As the terms of the firſt Aſſociation ‘to maintain the true Proteſtant religion as expreſſed in the doctrines of the Church of England,’ were fulfilled by aboliſhing them by law, and by the introduction of the doctrines of the Church of Scotland, inſtead of them; ſo the Solemn League and Covenant next entered into, profeſſing in its preamble all regard to the honour and, happineſs of the King's Majeſty and his poſterity, was fulfilled by thoſe, into ſe hands the military and civil power of the League bad now fallen, by murdering him, and expelling his family out of the kingdom. Europe then firſt beheld the fatal example of regicide, committed with the moc⯑kery of the forms of law, and by the eſtabliſhment of an ex poſit facto juriſdiction. The firſt example of a Revo⯑lutionary Tribunal is diſcovered alſo in the High Court of Juſtice which ſentenced the King. Cromwell continued [69]the practice in caſes he called Treaſon, ſuperſeding the trial by jury, to the preſervation of which the parties to the latter Aſſociation or Covenant muſt be conceived to have ſworn, as a leading part of the ‘true public liber⯑ty.’

THERE is but one ſtep further to go in this account. A Party may begin with limits, to be violated the firſt moment an iniquitous intereſt prompts them ſo to do, and end with proſcriptions. Mr. Hume has obſerved, that had the Reſtoration been poſtponed a little longer, ‘there was juſt reaſon to dread all the horrors of the ancient maſſacres and proſcriptions^*.’ Coke has informed us, that an accuſation was brought againſt the Royaliſts, which cannot be ſuppoſed calculated for any other pur⯑poſe, than to prepare the way for ſuch an execrable mea⯑ſure, and to ſhelter it under a verbal juſtification after it was executed. When the degradation of Richard Crom⯑well had taken place, the Council of Officers at Wal⯑lingford Houſe publiſhed a Remonſtrance, in which they charged the Malignants or Royaliſts, ‘that they had printed liſts, and marked for deſtruction the godly, eſpecially the King's judges^†.’ and in an hiſtorian of that time, we find that it had been debated in a Council of War ‘to maſſacre and put to the ſword all the King's party. The queſtion was carried in the negative but by two votes^‡.’ In Oliver's Parliament, which met [70]in 1656, a Bill had been brought in to decimate the Royaliſts^*.

WHEN the hiſtory of the ſucceſſive French Revolu⯑tions ſhall come to be carefully examined, it will be ſup⯑poſed very probable, that many of the wounds which, have been inflicted upon France, were made by daggers forged in this country. In the following caſe ſome doubts may be entertained. The project to eſtabliſh a fingle National Aſſembly, inſtead of two Houſes, was attempted by the Commons before the Civil Wars, but they did not ſucceed in it. Foulis informs us, that the Commons ‘had another mode to drive on their deſigns of altering the Government of England. They put ſeveral agitators to draw up a Petition, that the Peers who were agreeable to them would ſit and vote with the Commons, to the intent to have but one [71]Houſe^*.’ This Petition was accordingly framed, and by the Commons it was preſented to the Houſe of Lords. This might be the remote origin of the National Aſſem⯑bly, or both the Engliſh Commons and the Tiers Etat in France might have poached for a precedent in the Memoirs of the Jacquerie.

THERE are deſperate diſeaſes, certainly, in the politi⯑cal as well as the natural conſtitution, which require and may juſtify very hazardous applications: but theſe are to be attempted only when it is evident that the caſe will terminate fatally, before a courſe of ameliorating alteratives can produce their effect. A vigorous remedy may alſo at one time be applied with little hazard; at another that hazard will be much increaſed. We muſt always endeavour to form a true eſtimate of the alue in uſe of our object, ſtripped carefully of thoſe gay ac⯑coutrements and tinſel with which imagination dreſſes out all its favourites. This value we are then to com⯑bine, with the probability of attaining our object, aſſign⯑ed as truly as we can. This reſult is, what a diſciple of Simpſon or De Moivre would call, the expectation of gain from the experiment. We are then to view the real magnitude of the evils this object may draw after it; examining them with a mind equally clear from all pre⯑vention. This amount alſo is to be combined with the chance of their happening, to find the expectation of loſs; the two expectations are to be balanced againſt each other, and we are to determine in favour of the greater, unleſs any evil may follow from the failure of the firſt attempt. In that caſe, having eſtimated its mag⯑nitude [72]and chance, or what is above called its expectation, that expectation will be alſo a legitimate deduction from the former balance of gain, if any had been found.

To give an example of this proceſs:—In a Society like our own, let the ſucceſs of an aſſigned alteration in the State be extremely probable; the advantage very great: let there be a ſmall chance that the progreſs of alteration will not ſtop at the acquiſition intended, but that it may go on until a ſtate of anarchy takes place; and let it be propoſed to determine, whether this alter⯑ation is to be attempted. Here we mull reaſon thus: Anarchy is the arbitrary power of all over each indivi⯑dual; or the tyranny of all but one over every one. It is an evil in Society, like annihilation to the individual, infinite; and the chance of coming into this ſtate being finite, though ſmall, the expectation thereof, or the quantity of evil to be ſet againſt the good, exceeds in magnitude any finite good which can be aſſigned^*.

[73]But to return to the hiſtory which led to this train of general reflection. Theſe temperate men, who ſaw the neceſſity of a great amelioration of the ſyſtem of exiſting Government in 1640, in order to reſtore to the Legiſla⯑tive Eſtates the actual exerciſe of their legal functions, though they had perhaps the moſt efficient influence in impreſſing the firſt movement toward that end, found themſelves, from a concurrence of various cauſes, actu⯑ally not able to ſtop it, when it was gotten even beyond that point at which they wiſhed things to become ſtation⯑ary. When the inclination of a plane exceeds a very ſmall degree, a heavy body, to which the ſlighteſt revo⯑lutionary movement is given, is urged along continually, as it moves, by an accelerating force, which ſoon becomes indefinitely greater than that which was applied at firſt to put it into motion; and nothing will ſtop it at the limit originally determined for its progreſs, but ſome firm obſtacle placed before-hand, at that point of the line of its direction. And, in any tolerable ſyſtem of Govern⯑ment, men ought to be abſolutely certain that they ſhall be able to ſtop at ſuch an aſſigned point, before any alteration be attempted. If mo e than a little be required to be done, the work ſhould be ſubdivided, and under⯑taken at intervals; the firſt ſtep in the progreſs may be ſo taken as to enſure ſome little facilities to the ſecond, but not to precipitate it. To uſe for a moment out pre⯑ſent political neologiſm, the Parliament in 1640 accele⯑rated that revolutionary movement which they ought to have reſtrained; the ferment of the people, which ori⯑ginally perhaps required tempering, was increaſed by eve⯑ry art. They greedily acquired a power too great for the weight to be removed; and they were not maſters of its effects. When a quantity of maſonry wants to be [74]picked out of the fabric of any Conſtitution, in order to have the place ſupplied with better materials, a batter⯑ing ram is rather too potent an inſtrument to be uſed to effect the removal: it will ſhake the edifice, and may reduce it to a heap of formleſs ruin. The old materials muſt be removed with care, and the parts left unſupport⯑ed muſt be carefully propped until the vacancy be filled up.

THE Members of the Commons who ſat at Oxford, and who voted under compulſion at Weſtminſter, may be looked upon, when contradiſtinguiſhed to the remainder, as one party in ſentiment, and as forming an undoubted majority of the original Aſſembly. Hence even if every one of them had voted freely in the places where they ſat and upon the ſame queſtion, that majority had loſt the poſſibility of expreſſing a legal will. But the Legi⯑ſlative Aſſembly in France, in the laſt period of its exiſ⯑tence, had been, by their own fanaticiſm, and the crimes it gave birth to, forced to work in chains to demoliſh that edifice, that glory of philoſophy! that pride of en⯑lightened Europe! the firſt Conſtitution.

THE ruin brought upon Britain by the Leaders of theſe Aſſociations paying no regard to their limits, was almoſt extreme. The obſervations on the hazards this country has run from Offenſive Aſſociations, in other inſtances, have, in this Tract, always been followed by an inquiry, whe⯑ther there was anything in the manners and character of the people, previous to thoſe ſeveral calamities, which had a more alarming appearance of danger than can be ob⯑ſerved at preſent: and I ſhall cloſe this Section with an inquiry, whether, before the Civil Wars, from the cir⯑cumſtances [75]of the times and the moral character of the people, any more threatening appearances might have been diſcerned, of a Revolution deſtroying the Conſti⯑tution, and terminating almoſt in the deſpotiſm of Anar⯑chy, than have been of late years and are at preſent, plainly ſeen among us.

IN both periods we ſee Revolutions deſtructive to the Conſtitution, attempted under the pretence of a reform, (the neceſſity of which exiſts not in one caſe, and had ceaſed in the other by exciting fanaticiſm, religious or political. We have ſeen either ſpecies, ſeparately, capa⯑ble of producing the ſame effects upon the populace; that is, to bring all their ferocious paſſions into action: conſequently, if they be ſtimulated by a mixture of both, as was the caſe in the laſt Century, it cannot produce a greater effect than either of them ſimply; as, for inſtance, political fanaticiſm; as each, ſeparately, will occupy the active powers of the whole mind, and both together can do no more.

To conſider next the real or ſuppoſed grievances of the two periods.—Such grievances muſt be, either violations of right, or privations of gratification by State charges, or mixed. By the Agitators of the laſt Century, it was im⯑preſſed on the minds of the populace, that many of their legal rights were violated: and, as it always happens in ſuch times, they equally believed what was truly and what was falſely alledged on this ſubject. Stronger repreſenta⯑tions are now made, and a more extenſive circulation given them. The great majority of the populace are taught that they are, defrauded, not only of many of their legal rights [76]as ſubjects, but of a great maſs of their natural rights as men; and they give the ſame implicit belief to their de⯑magogues now, as their anceſtors did in the laſt Century; and the great amount of the taxes at preſent, is as favour⯑able a ſubject for inflammatory declamation, as the ille⯑gality of their impoſition was then.

LET us now enter into a compariſon of the qualifica⯑tions of the Agitators of the two periods for their re⯑ſpective taſks. The operations of thoſe of the laſt age reſembled the attacks of an undiſciplined multitude, com⯑paratively without order or concert. Their mode of ac⯑tion is now reduced into a ſcience; and they are can⯑toned over the whole country, the chiefs of a hoſtile State within a State, formed into the exacteſt diſcipline, under an active Directory, which knows how to diſtri⯑bute its force, and apply its operations to every point of attack and defence where they ſhall become neceſſary. They are an army actuated by a ſingle will and a ſingle intelligence, which has diſcovered a new and profound ſyſtem of tactics.

HAVING thus balanced their abilities for action, we may paſs to the review of the materials one of theſe Catilinarian bands of conſpirators had, and the other has now, to act upon. It will be ſaid, that ‘men have at this day before them the dreadful example of the infringement of the engagements of limitation, by which the Parliament of Charles bound themſelves and the people.’ But to this it will be replied, that there never was a time in which the crime that followed them, had ſo many and ſuch determined advocates, at leaſt in the lower claſſes of the demagogues, nor in which [77]they were heard by the multitude with ſuch partial atten⯑tion. Nor, though we call this an enlightened age, are men enlightened by ſimply exchanging one ſet of prin⯑ciples for another; the mind is not enlightened with reſpect to any object, which it formerly conſidered ex⯑cluſively in one point of view, if it now comes to ſurvey it excluſively in a ſecond.

BUT let it be admitted, that the populace may poſſeſs a more exerciſed keenneſs of mind on political points now, than in the middle of the laſt Century; unleſs it can be ſhown that their morals are not worſe, that they are not more addicted to rapine, that they have not leſs reve⯑rence for laws, as ſuch, or if the contrary of all this ap⯑pears a melancholy truth, with what advantage can an increaſe of ſuch knowledge be pleaded, when the queſ⯑tion is, Can we put more faith in articles contained in their Covenants or Aſſociations at this juncture, than were due to the ſtipulations of their anceſtors?—which repeated experiments proved to be intitled to none. It is an acknowledged fact, with reſpect to every individual, that if as his reaſon grows more acute, his principles grow worſe, his fidelity will not be improved: his cha⯑racter will even become more dangerous, and that in a degree determined by the ſum of thoſe two changes: and the ſame muſt be true of a multitude compoſed of ſuch individuals.

IF ſome increaſe of their knowledge be to be admitted, the degeneracy of the morals of the populace is capable of fuller proof. Will any one contend that the annual number of convictions of criminals does not increaſe [78]with much greater celerity than our population? Are not criminal connections of the ſexes, the ſource of mi⯑ſery and profligacy, more frequent among the lower or⯑ders^*? But this queſtion may be reſted on the autho⯑rity of Mr. Hume; certainly not a writer who had taken up the idea of a progreſſive degeneracy of the morals of mankind, as the generations ſucceed each other, and who was thence induced, by his ſyſtem, to make a fine declama⯑tion on the purity of a former age. The account he has given us of the national character of the Engliſh at the commencement of that ſanguinary period the Civil Wars, may be eſteemed a faithful portrait of what his extenſive reſearches ſhowed them to have been; aid it demon⯑ſtrates, that both the National Proteſtation, and the Na⯑tional Covenant which ſupplanted it, were, in that age, experiments greatly ſafer than a General Aſſociation of the People now is. ‘Never (ſays that Writer) was there a people leſs corrupted by vice and more actuated by principle than the Engliſh during that period; never were there individuals who poſſeſſed more capa⯑city, more courage, more public ſpirit, more diſinte⯑reſted [79]zeal^*!’ Can this be ſaid, or is this believed, of the character of the maſs of the people at this day? Are all theſe qualities admitted in all the leading Members of Oppoſition?

SECTION VIII. CONCLUSION. FURTHER REMARKS ON MR. FOX'S ASSOCIATION.

THE firſt part of this Tract begins with a compariſon of the nature of the Aſſociations of 1792, and the Gene⯑ral Aſſociation of the People under Mr. Fox. There remained many particular obſervations to make on the latter; but the principles on which I intended to found ſome of them, are ſuch as will be received with greater authority when demonſtrated by induction from Hiſtory, than if they had been ſimply proved by abſtract reaſon⯑ing. [80]A further uſe alſo appeared to me to ariſe from this way of managing the ſubject: it has enabled me to point out the ſimilarity of the ſpirit of all commotions, excited by Offenſive Aſſociations againſt an exiſting Government, not deſpotic; and more particularly of thoſe where a Sec⯑tion of the Aſſociators originally ſets out with democratic principles, or takes them up in the courſe of their pro⯑greſs. In this manner of treating the remainder of the ſubject, there will he ſome recapitulations; but they will be given with as much brevity as it will permit.

THE Aſſociations of 1792 may be compared to a cluſter of about two thouſand Republics, independent, or at moſt ſlightly connected by the laxeſt principle of fede⯑raliſm: their object was Defenſive. From the hiſtory of ſuch Aſſociations in this country, it appears that they alone have been uſeful in the ſupport of the conſtitution of Government^*.

[81]THE Aſſociation of Mr. Fox is in its object l Offenſive; and it has been ſeen that all ſuch of which a ſurvey has been taken above, have been attended with very fatal conſequences: and if the plan of this can be carried into execution completely or nearly ſo, it will become a ma⯑chine capable of deſtroying any Government: the general body of the people being invited to become par⯑ties thereto, and generally ſo becoming, its force will be effectively the greateſt poſſible: to this it adds the ſtrongeſt degree of union, while it has a Directory at its head, the Whig Club, which is to be regarded as under the con⯑duct of an effective Dictator^*.

[82]Now let it be ſuppoſed that a man of great ambition, yet that ambition purified from all meanneſs, whole plain manners are conſummately attaching yet manly, as if his object were power over all men collectively, not in⯑dividually, and poſſeſſing an eloquence maſculine, pure, and commanding, is ſet at the head of ſuch an omni⯑potent Aſſociation: admit him alſo to be a man of dex⯑trous and profound ability, fertile in expedients, rapid in the execution of his plans; and that the citadel of Government in his native country has a conſiderable ſtrength for reſiſtance, but is by no means an impregna⯑ble fortreſs; generally ſurrendering (but by capitulation) after a longer or a ſhorter ſiege: and that, in the chec⯑quered fortunes of his political life, he has twice made his way into it by ſomething like a coup de main; and that he has been ſaid, the laſt time, to have begun to ſtrengthen this fortreſs, as ſoon as he was poſſeſſed of it, with additional works, conſtructed on a new ſyſtem of fortification, ſo far improved as to bid defiance to any regular mode of attack yet diſcovered:—in dange⯑rous times, if ſuch a man miſ-allied himſelf he muſt be highly dangerous.

THE qualities by which he has attained power have been indicated; and, mixing in his councils, when in place, ſomewhat too much of the qualities by which he obtained it, let him be ſuppoſed, each time, ſuddenly to have fallen; and now well paſt the meridian of life▪ but again entertaining ſome fair hopes, by the aid of the band of friends whom he ſaw about him, eminent in ability, and with high national reſpect attached to their names, at laſt to obtain what had been the object of the labours of his youth and of his manhood to the verge of age: [83]to ſee this removed out of his reach by any common means, by the ſeceſſion of the great body of his party, with every name of higher ornament to it at their head, from the danger they ultimately diſcern in the courſe he has been of late years purſuing, as having been unduly qualified to the nature of a mixed Government; we might well dread, from the pall experience of his poli⯑tical enterprize, that if he openly put himſelf at the head of ſuch an Aſſociation as I have been deſcribing (thereby pointing out his deſpair of ſucceſs by every other reſource) that he might not be unwilling to re⯑acquire poſſeſſion of his object by uncommon means.

AND if, at ſuch a time, there exiſt a Republican Fac⯑tion in the State, or a Party that ſhould contend for a mixed Government, with a pageant of a King and a ſingle Elective Chamber (which, infallibly terminating in the former, is for the preſent to be regarded as the ſame thing^*), and the moſt eminent man, as to ability, ranging under either of thoſe two titles of the ſame thing, having brought forward a Declaration of the motives to entering into ſuch a political compact, which motives muſt be conſiſtent with the principles he has publicly maintained; if the effective Head of the Directory, with the whole body, ſhould unanimouſly approve of that Declaration, the only viſible end of his conduct can be, to invite ſuch Party or Parties to a cloſe junction with him, by thus holding out to. them an idea, not obſcurely conveyed, of a certain degree of concurrence with them [84]in their ſyſtems; and the apprehenſion of it to the ſup⯑porters of the preſent form of Government. Muſt not this man, by this junction, flinging himſelf at a greater diſtance from his former ſupporters, ſeem openly to re⯑nounce all ideas of reunion with them; the only regu⯑lar means left to him to obtain that pre-eminence, which he cannot be imagined ever to have intermitted his pur⯑ſuit of? And muſt he not appear, at the head of ſuch an Aſſociation, dangerous in the extreme?

I NOW take leave of this hypothetical perſonage and come to a real one. But I muſt here premiſe an abridged account of the original plan and object of the Jacobin Club from Dr. Moore; as it will be expedient to enter into a compariſon between theſe and a principle laid down in the Houſe of Commons in 1781.

IN 1789 a ſmall number of Deputies ſent from Brittany to the States General of France, aſſociated under the name of the Committee of that province. Being afterwards joined by ſome other members of that Aſſembly, and per⯑ſons attached to liberty, they aſſumed new titles, copying the ſtyle of ſome Engliſh Societies; taking firſt the name of The Revolution Club, and ultimately that of Friends of the Conſtitution. From the place of their aſſembling, they received from the Public the name of JACOBINS; under which they have ſince become ſo fatally diſtin⯑guiſhed. In this Society, at firſt, there were many perſons celebrated for their talents and character. Clubs of the ſame nature were multiplied over all France, who regularly cor⯑reſponded with them; and who, finding a central body ready formed, through which they might tranſmit their opinions and wiſhes to the National Aſſembly, they ap⯑pointed [85]them their agents for this purpoſe; and as the Club had, at the beginning, aſſumed the functions of the Delegates of thoſe in whoſe behalf they held themſelves forth as acting, they were by other Provincial Clubs ac⯑knowledged in that capacity: and the irregularity of the aſſumption was thus to appearance done away. It is to be obſerved, that when this ſyſtem was completely organized, and their extra-conſtitutional functions thus confirmed, the Club differed from the Meeting of the Delegates of the County Aſſociations, who ſat in Lon⯑don in 1781, in one circumſtance only. The objects the latter were to treat on were ſpecified; conſequently their delegation would have terminated when theſe ends were obtained: thoſe of the former were unlimited, the continuance of their functions not being dependent on their obtaining any ſpecific object or objects.

"THE avowed buſineſs of the Society" (of Jacobins) ‘was to deliberate and debate on ſubjects of Govern⯑ment, and watch over the general intereſts of Liber⯑ty^*.’ Now in a Government where everything de⯑pends in effect on the deciſions of the Repreſentative, this amounts to watching over its conduct without limitation of time^†, and to no more: and if the object of the [86]Delegates in 1781 had been ſo extenſive in that meeting, England would have exhibited the firſt example of a Jaco⯑bin Society.

BUT it is to the full; extent of that object that the principle goes, which is laid down in the following ex⯑tract of a ſpeech attributed to Mr. Fox. It is to be found in the Hiſtory of our Parliamentary Tranſactions, printed in The New Annual Regiſter in 1781, the wri⯑ter of which appears ſtrongly attached to his intereſts. ‘By what law or what act (that Stateſman is made to ſay) was it declared to be unconſtitutional for the people of this country to appoint Delegates to reſide in the metropolis, and to watch the conduct of their Repreſen⯑tatives ^*?’ Such interrogations carry the full force of affirmations.

IF thoſe who gave to the original Breton Committee its laſt Conſtitution, whereby it was transformed into a Jacobin Club, did not look for its avowed principle in the doctrine here laid down, yet, if they had, they muſt have found it. In defining the functions of that Club, the Legiſlators who gave to it its moſt finiſhed code, have almoſt copied the expreſſions here attributed to Mr. Fox; for if there be any difference between ‘watching over the general intereſts of liberty,’ and ‘watching over the conduct of our Repreſentatives,’ as the latter in⯑cludes their whole conduct in all its branches, it ſeems the more comprehensive, if we do not take the words [87]preceding the firſt citation (as formerly quoted) in aid thereof: and it would be very difficult to ſhow the fatal Inſtitution of the Jacobins not to have been derived from the principle laid down in this Hiſtory.

IF the above declaration aſcribed to Mr. Fox contain his real preſent ſentiments, and we combine this with his putting himſelf at the head of an Aſſociation of the Re⯑publicans, real and virtual, the qualities of which will be neither mitigated or modified by ſome miſguided men of better principles and little foreſight joining in it, it is a ſtep big with danger to the exiſting Conſtitution.

BUT I have done with the ſubject in this point of view, and make no doubt that there are many, even among his old opponents, who regret that he did not join the illuſ⯑trious body of his late political friends in their ſeceſſion from the remnant which continues to call itſelf The Whig Club; who think there is a part remaining for him to act at leaſt equal in dignity and ſplendor to any that he has yet acted in; whoſe wiſhes continue to be, that, forgetting ſome of thoſe extremes of opinion which made "him puſh his better Angel from his ſide," he would in part follow thoſe ſeceders: they would rejoice to ſee him (without that appearance of intire tranſition which, ſometimes rightly ſometimes wrongly, has de⯑ſtroyed the reputation of great rulers of Parties), for a time avowedly unconnected and alone, a Party by him⯑ſelf, aſſuming that function within, which can belong to no excluſive and organiſed body of men without the [88]walls of the Houſe; ‘to watch over the conduct of our Repreſentatives.’

LET us now examine the mode by which the object of this Aſſociation is to be obtained; thereby ‘the ſub⯑ſcribers pledge themſelves only to proſecute a ſole ob⯑ject by every legal and peaceable means.’ This implies the abſence of all force, apparent or latent, in the proſe⯑cution of it.

AND ſuppoſe, on this occaſion, the authors of this plan to be able to carry it into effect, or procure a Ge⯑neral Aſſociation of the People, is not the union of the People irreſiſtible? As ſuch, Will it excite no appre⯑henſion in the Legiſlature? The terror of an irreſiſtible petitioner is not among the means to obtain a repeal of a law which are to be called peaceable. It is not the Legiſlation of the land, but the law of the ſtronger, the jus fortioris, which decides, in effect, upon the merits of ſuch a petition. But it is only what takes place by the will of the Legiſlature, acting in total freedom, which is either legally or peaceably obtained. The act of appeal to the jus fortioris, formally made, or ſufficiently indi⯑cated by preparation, though denied in words, ſets aſide the Law and Legiſlation of the Land; and what is ob⯑tained thereby never can be, according to that, legal; for the Law ſanctions nothing while it is in a ſtate of non⯑exiſtence.

WE know that a Society has the right of ſelf-preserva⯑tion as well as an individual; and that there are caſes of extreme neceſſity, when the action of the whole peo⯑ple [89]may be called forth. But it is to be obſerved, that it never can be brought forward peaceably; it muſt operate by force or by terror: ſuch a meaſure is in effect reſiſt⯑ance at leaſt; it even amounts to compulſion, whether avowed as ſuch or not, which is ſomething more.

I TAKE it for granted the neceſſity muſt be as great and as obvious when the whole People are to he united againſt the three conſtituent parts of the Legiſlature, as when that union is directed only againſt one; againſt an act or acts of the King. Lords, and Commons, as againſt an act or acts of the King alone. The circumſtan⯑ces under which the latter meaſure is conſtitutional have been laid down by Sir Joſeph Jekyl; ‘the very ſtandard of Whig principles of his age;’ and on the occaſion when they were to be defined with the utmoſt accuracy, in order that the maxims on which the great preſervers of the Conſtitution in 1688 acted, ſhould be left upon record to all poſterity. This he did at the Trial of Dr. Sacheverel, when, ſpeaking in the name of the Managers for the Commons, he defines two great conditions, under which reſiſtance to the Crown becomes juſtifiable. Theſe ſhall be compared with the preſent caſe:—1ſt. ‘We have inſiſted, that in no caſe can reſiſtance be lawful^* but in caſe of extreme neceſſity, and where the Conſtitu⯑tion cannot otherwiſe be preſerved:’ 2d. ‘And ſuch neceſſty ought to be plain and obvious to the ſenſe and [90]judgement of the whole Nation:’ and this every good ſubject who knows the hiſtory of the times, believes with him to have been "the caſe at the Revolution." The act of the whole Legiſlature ought not to be oppoſed by the union of the whole People upon ſlighter grounds. I would therefore aſk the promoters of this Aſſociation, How they can prove the extreme neceſſity that men ſhould continue liable to be tried and condemned for trea⯑ſon, on proceedings analogous to the principles ‘of an ex poſt facto law^*?’ that the beacons which now more plainly point out legal danger to the factious ſhould be removed? and they ſhould be left, at their own extreme hazard and with ſome danger to the Public, to the chance of running upon a rock, not leſs fatal for being ſunk almoſt out of ſight? For the object of the Aſſocia⯑tion is to reſtore them to this ſituation, out of which the two Bills have taken them.

BUT let it be granted, that the proof of the extreme neceſſity of this reſtoration is by them made out in full form; ſtill that neceſſity wants the ſecond eſſential pro⯑perty, for them to be intitled to act upon it: it is not, as it ‘ought to be, plain and obvious to the ſenſe and judgement of the whole Nation.’ It is certain that the great majority of that claſs, who by their ſituation are able to acquire, and who actually do poſſeſs, by far the greater portion of political and conſtitutional ſcience, the greater weight of the whole maſs of the political knowledge of the State, deny the exiſtence of the neceſ⯑ſity; they even affirm the neceſſity of the exiſtence of the Acts thus oppoſed, as appears by their Addreſſes [91]to the Throne, and their Petitions to the late Parlia⯑ment.

IN this relative unanimity of the whole Legiſlature in ſupport of the two Acts, ſupported itſelf by almoſt the bo⯑norum omnium conſenſus, the conſent of all good Engliſhmen, notwithſtanding all the profeſſions that can be made of uſing none but legal and peaceable means to obtain the repeal of them, what confidence can the Aſſociations en⯑tertain of ſucceſs, except from power, or the apprehen⯑ſion of power? The very act of aſſociation adds no argument to the repeal; and I am certain the names of the Club which brought it forward, in its preſent ſtate does not add to that authority. The meaſure is a tacit menace to the Legiſlature, by no means a peaceable mode to carry through a petition; and, if not contrary to the letter of the Laws of England, contrary to the univer⯑ſal ſpirit of Law. Bacon, in his Hiſtorical Diſcourſes, ſays, that ‘when the written law maketh it treaſon to compaſs the deſtruction of the King's perſon, it leav⯑eth it obvious to common; ſenſe that it is a higher de⯑gree of treaſon to compaſs the deſtruction of the Re⯑preſentative^*’ And by the ſame mode of argument it may be ſhown, that the coercion of the King by effect⯑ive menace in the exerciſe of his Royal functions, being a high crime and miſdemeanor; the coercion of the Legi⯑ſlature, by ſimilar means, is of the ſame criminality; and ſurely ſuch a coercion of the Commons, according to the principles of theſe men, is a wound of the majeſty of the People, which reſides in them; and ‘all men do [92]agree (ſays Bacon) that treaſon is a wound of ma⯑jeſty^*’.

THE Heads of ſuch an Aſſociation would not commit themſelves in ſuch a meaſure without ſtrong hopes of ſucceſs, againſt the almoſt unanimous oppoſition of the informed claſſes of Society at large, and the union of all the conſtituent parts of the Legiſlature. On what can they found that hope? They muſt expect aid from ſome other quarter; external aid, but which they can cauſe to operate in the very walls of both Houſes, to awe them and the ſupporters of the Bills into ſubmiſſion. The horizon at leaſt muſt be involved in darkneſs, the ſullen ſound of diſtant thunders muſt be heard from many quarters, it the ſpirit that raiſed the ſtorm do not roll its strength over their heads, and let all its rage deſcend upon them. If theſe leaders of the people do not em⯑ploy actual tumults and commotions to force a reluctant Parliament into their meaſures, they muſt ſuffer them to be inforced by the fear of their near approach, or they are embarked in the moſt ridiculous of all undertakings, as it muſt he the moſt fatal to every future rational view of coming [...]nto power, which they may be ſuppoſed to entertain.

LET us grant now that the Heads of the Aſſociation are moſt ſtrictly determined to confine themſelves to the reſpectful conduct of real petitioners; that they will ſubmit to repulſe after repulſe without exceeding its bounds the certain fate of their application to Parliament [93]without the apprehenſion of latent or appare [...] force: I ſay their beſt intentions, realiſed in irreproach⯑able conduct, will probably add very little to the pro⯑tection of the State, from the extreme of danger hang⯑ing over it from this Aſſociation, if the project take place.

FOR their repeated efforts alone will generate a ferment in the minds of the populace; and can they anſwer that the lower claſſes of the aſſociators will not take up ei⯑ther their object or ſome other, re-involve the metropolis in the diſorders of: 1780, and expoſe the whole kingdom to them? In that year, when the multitude had ſeen the counties holding meetings to cenſure the internal ad⯑miniſtration of the kingdom; forming Committees of Correſpondence, ſending Delegates to ſit in Congreſs or Convention, in the metropolis: at that period, as it had been ſaid above, an individual of a doubtful deſcription, between an enthuſiaſt and a madman, availed himſelf of the agitated ſtate of their minds to direct them to an end with a new name; and they, mixing ferocity and the de⯑ſire of plunder, with certainly a very weak degree of re⯑ligious fanaticiſm, had nearly effected the ruin of the capital. Yet at this inſtant there is a greater real fer⯑ment in the minds of the lower claſſes, than Lord George Gordon was able to excite; nor, if the Chiefs of the Aſſo⯑ciation be now as averſe to lead then into ſimilar exceſſes as it is here ſuppoſed, will they want many really for⯑midable enthuſiaſtic leaders to hurry them forward.

NOR can the ſeat of Government at this juncture, nor the kingdom in general, expect leſs miſery from ſuch a [94]commotion, if not inſtantly ſuppreſſed, than the afflicted territory of France has recently ſuffered. In an inſur⯑rection of the Engliſh populace, political fanaticiſm and the eagerneſs of plunder will jointly ſtimulate them, even at firſt; but the devaſtations of France, for a long time, were cauſed by that fanaticiſm alone: the ſpirit of plun⯑der was not mixed with it. Even ſo late as the time when he palace of the [...]uilleries was ſtormed, the very aſſa [...]ſins killed on the ſpot ſeveral men ‘who on that day at⯑tempted to ſteal the plate.’ ‘It muſt appear (ſays Dr. Moore) in a peculiar manner ſtrange to perſons ac⯑cuſtomed to live in a country where there are fre⯑quent robberies and burglaries, in ſpite of the Govern⯑ment being undiſturbed and the Laws in full force, to find none, where all the hinges and ſupports of Law and Government are looſe and ſhaking from a recent convulſion^*.’ And great as the ſufferings of that kingdom are and have been, if a ſimilar inſurrection were to take place here, the diſpoſition of the populace to robbery and plunder being added to the fanaticiſm of liberty already highly excited in them, greater would our calamities he. This concluſion is, fully confirmed by an authority which will be very unexpected to many, that of Mr. Barlow, in his Advice to the Privileged Orders; who informs us, that ‘the Mobs in France were by no means to be compared with Engliſh Mobs in point of indiſcriminate ferocity and private plunder^†.’

UNITE the populace by an Aſſociation, exhibit to them an object to acquire, and, if there be the leaſt delay [95]in its acquiſition, they will ruſh forward upon the ſcene of action. Little is the diſtance with them, between the point of time when they ſhall be thus combined and sti⯑mulated, and when they break forth in outrage; for ſooner than ſtand ſtill, they will make rapid vibrations in the moſt contrary directions; moving with impetuoſity to⯑ward one point, and returning with the ſame impetuoſity to that from which they ſat out. In the ſhorteſt ſpace of time before James fled to Feverſham, the ſovereign po⯑pulace of London had, without doubt, pronounced his decheance: but although by that flight he had attempted to annihilate civil government in this country, upon his return, he was received by them with every mark of, the moſt zealous affection. ‘This great turn in the minds of the city^*’ continued during his reſidence at Ro⯑cheſter, or until the 23d of December. Having proceeded to the extreme in that direction of movement, and un⯑able to continue ſtationary, we have ſeen, that ſo early as the 4th of the month of February, they announced a ſe⯑cond change of their will by an inſurrection, to compel the Convention to declare his throne vacant.

HENCE it may be reaſonably predicted, that if the pro⯑jectors of this Aſſociation be able to embody the popu⯑lace nominally under them, the latter will not wait for orders to come into action. The deſire to copy the ex⯑ample of the populace of France prevails among many; and by their being drawn more together by this dangerous meaſure, it will be more generally diffuſed. And Hiſtory informs us, that the ſpirit of inſurrection has moſtly mi⯑grated from France to England. The religious Aſſocia⯑tion or League under the Guiſes, was the precedent of [96]the Preſbyterian Solemn League and Covenant; and the Aſſociation of the Jacquerie, on the principle of the equal Rights of Men, was copied in England by Wat Tyler and his aſſociates. The eruption of both theſe evils was kept back here for a conſiderable period; and if either of theſe events excited any alarm in England when they firſt took place, the paſſing of five or ſix, or even ten or twelve years, without their producing any effect, was no proof that ſuch alarm was not founded on real danger; and it will be happy for this country, this generation, and poſterity, if the ſyſtem of the Jacobins, (the way of which ſeems now preparing by Aſſociations tendered to the populace) be kept permanently at a diſtance from us.

BUT let us paſs from this inveſtigation of the probabi⯑lity of the peaceable legality of the intended good conduct of this Aſſociation; which, if it be not meant to over⯑awe Parliament, is a great movement without a motive, and a prodigal waſte of the laſt chance of the man who guides it, of ſtanding again at the head of a great and regular Party; let us paſs from this to the declaration of the limitation of its object, and conſider the ſecurity ariſing from the engagement, that the Aſſociation will confine its operations to the ſingle object announced. This ſecurity muſt be determined, from the deſcription of the parties to the contract, and the matter thereof con⯑jointly.

THE whole Party of the avowed Republicans will be included among the ſubſcribers; all of them the defen⯑ders, and almoſt all of them the admirers of the viola⯑tors and violation of the ſolemn engagement to the ſup⯑port of Monarchy, taken by the French Aſſembly in July [97]1792, and broken the 10th of the following Auguſt. What they defend, and what they admire, they will not be very backward in copying. Together with theſe, the party will conſiſt of men of ſome other deſcriptions: of thoſe nominally profeſſing to wiſh for a King, and a ſingle Aſſembly of Repreſentatives, in order to introduce a Republic by ſtealth, and thoſe who wiſh for ſuch a ſyſtem in reality; the latter of which coming to act in a cloſer union with the two former ſections of the Aſ⯑ſociation, will be eaſily won over to their party; for the moſt decided opinions have always the loudeſt advocates: and, indeed, we can hardly diſcover on what ground they can hold out againſt the arguments with which theſe allies of theirs will be able to aſſail them; on the folly of a ſyſtem whoſe only conſequence muſt apparently be, to prolong, during a ſad and bloody interval, the laſt con⯑vulſions and dying ſtruggle of Monarchy. The remain⯑der of the Aſſociation will be compoſed of thoſe who wiſh for what they call a Reform of the Commons, or ſome other Reform, and at every hazard of the State; for the more temperate advocates of theſe meaſures will not join the Aſſociation. Thoſe who were content with our ſyſtem of laws before the paſſing of the two Acts, who will join in this compact, will be very few indeed: al⯑moſt the whole of them having concurred in declar⯑ing their opinion, that the temporary regulations in⯑troduced by theſe laws, is at this time neceſſary for the preſervation of the Conſtitution of Government. Hence it follows, that the obtaining the repeal of them, will ſatisfy the wiſhes of this laſt diviſion of the Aſſo⯑ciators only, a very ſmall minority of the whole body: and every one muſt concur in admitting, that the proba⯑bility that they will ſtop, when they have obtained thoſe [98]points which they have fixed as the limits of their claim, is much diminiſhed, as the wiſhes of the great majority, and their principles, extend indefinitely further.

I COME now to ſpeak of the matter or nature of this engagement, and ſhall ſhow it in one caſe to be to⯑tally uſeleſs, and in all others totally nugatory, as impoſing no obligation on the greater part of the ſub⯑ſcribers, according to their political principles.

FOR, in the firſt place, if the Aſſociation do not be⯑come general, or at leaſt obtain ſtrength enough to over⯑awe Parliament, the promiſe will be uſeleſs: the ſecurity of the State from all the effects of their proceeding be⯑yond their aſſigned limits, being as firm in their ſimple want of power, as in their want of power and their reſpective obligation (the promiſe not to make the at⯑tempt) conjointly.

FURTHER, if it do not become uſeleſs, as above, it will then be nugatory: for the ſovereign power, as the ſup⯑porters of this Aſſociation hold, reſides in the people, whenever they chuſe to act; and conſequently the legi⯑ſlative power, which is a branch thereof. The people may, if they pleaſe, make, and conſequently repeal laws: may they not, therefore, when aſſociated, repeal that clauſe of the compact, limiting to one object the exertion of their univerſal and illimitable ſovereignty? for if they can repeal a law made to bind themſelves, they can annul an article of any obligation, if not founded in moral right.

[99]AND to whom do the ſubſcribers give this obligation? To the people: and the party to whom it is given is in full power to remit it When, therefore, the ſubſcription becomes general, the ſubſcribers will be the people, and it will be an obligation entered into by the people individually, to the people collectively: a compact entered into by them⯑ſelves to themſelves, which is abſolutely nugatory.

AND if any collection of perſons, ſigning ſuch en⯑gagement, ſhall call themſelves the People, although their numbers be not ſuch as to entitle them to aſſume that name, by their aſſumption they claim as their own right all the rights of the people; in which is included, ac⯑cording to their principles, the right of declaring the li⯑mitation of action, to which they have, or ſhall pledge themſelves, to be void.

THERE are other grounds to ſhow that ſuch a pro⯑miſe can be of no validity, or not be the foundation of any obligation on the givers of it. When two parties exiſt in a State, the validity of their promiſes ſtands much upon the ſame ground as thoſe given by independent na⯑tions to each other. The authors who have treated on the reciprocal rights of nations, have deſcribed thoſe pro⯑miſes from which no obligation ariſes; and in defining them, I follow Grotius ‘To give validity to a pro⯑miſe, the ſubject-matter muſt be ſuch, that the per⯑ſon giving it has a full right to perform it; wherefore the promiſe to do an illicit act is not valid, becauſe no one has, or can acquire, a right to perform it^*.’ And by parity of reaſon, a promiſe to omit an act of moral [100]obligation ſo given, is void and null in itſelf. Now I ſay, to remove any great grievance, under which we ſtrongly believe our country to ſuffer, when it is in our power, is an act of moral obligation. The parties to the Aſſo⯑ciation are known to declare, that this country labours under many removeable grievances, beſide the two Acts for the repeal of which they combine: hence their pro⯑miſe to ſtop at that repeal, if it be in their power to pro⯑ceed any farther, is an engagement not to perform an act of moral obligation, and therefore null and void.

BUT let it now be admitted, for a moment, that in their ſpecification of limits, beyond which they would not go, they have contracted an obligation to their op⯑ponents, or to the State. The melancholy experience of our Civil Wars in the laſt age, points out to us what lit⯑tle reliance can be placed on all ſuch aſſurances. From the manners of the nation in that period, it has been ſhewn, that the utmoſt fidelity might have been expected in the performance of all their engagements: from its prevalent and general character of piety, men might with confidence have believed, that the national Proteſtation, conſecrated as it were by one of the moſt ſolemn forms of religion, would be ſacredly and inviolably adhered to. Religion was conſidered by them as a more immutable thing than a form of government is by us. There was no viſible party among them who conceived that its obligation was founded on the aſſent of the nation; that it might be believed experimentally for a month, or a quarter, or a year, and then be aboliſhed by ordinance of the two Houſes, and another enacted in its ſtead, by their own authority, or on the requiſition of the ſovereign people. They held, when [101]they took the Proteſtation, that no power could abſolve them from it, except that in whoſe preſence they profeſ⯑ſed to have made it. And when we ſee by the event, that even in ſuch times no effectual confidence could be placed in that ſolemn declaration, what reliance can we afford to the promiſes contained in the inſtrument now brought forward? eſpecially if we take into the account, that if it be generally ſigned, the parties thereto will, according to their own ideas, be, of right, able to abſolve themſelves from the obligation thereof. I do not tax the body of the promoters of this Aſſociation with intending to im⯑poſe upon their countrymen with falſe coin; but when they ſhall ultimately come to diſcover, that according to their principles they have obliged themſelves to nothing in the limits they have laid down, I ſhall not ſanguine⯑ly expect that their performances will extend a whit be⯑yond their obligation. Thoſe of our anceſtors in more moral times, and on a ſimilar occaſion, fell far ſhort of theirs.

A FEW remarks muſt be added on the conduct of the populace when excited into action, and its conſequences. When embodied, they are always found to be actuated by the moſt extravagant opinions afloat: thoſe which moſt flatter their deceitful hopes, their envy of their ſu⯑periors, and their ferocity and ſpirit of depredation; and that day, when the populace, calling itſelf the People, ſhall carry its firſt great point againſt a reluctant majo⯑rity, influenced by the apprehenſion of tumults out of doors, will be effectively the laſt day of the power of the three conſtituent parts of Parliament; for they are brought forward, by expectations diffuſed generally among them, of a change of their ſituation in life for the bet⯑ter, [102]of a multiplication of the objects of common uſe and enjoyment, and a diminution of the number of the privations their ſtate condemns them to: their firſt vic⯑tory will make no difference in their ſituation; diſap⯑pointment will inflame them more, and they will be caught to form new expectations from the effect of going further; and thus they will be rendered eager for a ſe⯑cond interpoſition of their ſtrength, which will be dou⯑bled by an appearance of ſucceſs, although it has been to them fruitleſs. But their Leaders in this country, it will be ſaid, will have a limited object in view▪ and will know how to ſtop them. The fallacy of relying upon this, which is matter of univerſal experience has been recently confirmed. In France, there were ſome great and well-meaning men among thoſe who put the whole body of the people into motion. When they thought they had gone far enough, they choſe to ſtop. A ſet of ſubaltern Leaders, at that juncture, urged the populace on further, whoſe irreſiſtible weight and impulſe bore them down, and they were trampled to death under their feet. Their new conductors, when they had carried them the lengths they deſired, that is, when they thought themſelves ſe⯑curely placed at their head, wiſhed likewiſe in their turn that they ſhould come to a halt. They tried to effect it, and ſhared the ſame fate as their predeceſſors. The mul⯑titude were ſtill excited to continue their march by Leaders of a viler claſs. The place they were gotten to, it was truly argued, was little better than a rocky or ſandy deſ [...]rt; and they were aſſured, that a ſingle day's journey more would lead them to the promiſed land of per⯑fect freedom and abundance, where their whole future lives would be ſpent in feaſting and revelry. Their migration [103]under theſe laſt Leaders, brought them into the land of famine and bloody ferocious anarchy.

IT will become, at this time, the original inſtitutors of all ſuch Aſſociations as have no remote tendency to promote popular inſurrections, to reflect, that when the lower claſs of people begin to act in matters of Govern⯑ment, there is no ability, no vigour, which can reſtrain them within the limits of their original plan. To carry ſome points, Cromwell brought the Levelling Agitators into action: when they had ſerved his purpoſe, he wanted to reduce them into their former inefficiency. They re⯑ſiſted: by one of the greateſt exertions of perſonal and political courage, of which Hiſtory furniſhes an example, he obtained the deluſive appearance of a triumph over them; but the realities of the victory all remained to the ſpirit of agitating. Even Cromwell himſelf gave way: he was compelled to relinquiſh his former plans of per⯑ſonal greatneſs, and ſeek for new ones, in the act of yielding to that impulſe, he could not reſiſt^*. There may be men in this Aſſociation whoſe political dexterity and vigour deſerve to be thought highly of; but I do not think that man lives, whoſe arm is ſo well ſinewed that he can ſhape his way againſt a torrent which Cromwell could only breaſt for a ſhort time, and then was hurried away by its rapidity. For, to me, in this part of his life, he ſeems like one of the mightieſt of men, ſtruggling for a few minutes againſt the ſtream in ſome branch of the In⯑dus, when the periodical rains have augmented its force to the utmoſt, and then compelled almoſt to reſign him⯑ſelf entirely to it, and to make his way obliquely, with incredible effort, to an iſland of jungle in the middle of [104]the channel, the thickets of which are filled with tigers and ſerpents, its only inhabitants; where he is incloſed from all eſcape to the ſafe ſhore he has left, which lies in full proſpect before him, while deaths without reſiſtance, the moſt terrible to nature, and which alone could be the object of terror to him, preſs on him, or watch in am⯑buſh around him on every other ſide.

AS accurately as the object of the Aſſociation is, in words, limited, if we ſuppoſe a majority of the Leaders of name faithfully to intend to diſembody it as ſoon as its ſole avowed end is obtained, ſhall we believe the ſame of all of them? For it has been ſhewn, upon the prin⯑ciples ſome receive as the foundation of Civil Govern⯑ment, that the promiſe this inſtrument holds out is a nullity; but if it were otherwiſe, and were that engagement in its nature binding; and all the oſtenſible Heads of the Aſſociation ſhould be determinately faithful to it, they are not the men who are the direct and proximate Lea⯑ders of the populace: it is a certain ſet of intermediate agents who act in that capacity, who directly hold this terrible power in their hands; and the greater Leaders muſt, like Cromwell, give way to their intermediate in⯑ſtruments, to thoſe who can inflame the Multitude into madneſs. They muſt become the inſtruments of their inſtruments in new crimes they may deteſt, or fall the ſecond ſet of victims to irreſiſtible ignorance, inflamed into immitigable ferocity.

I SHALL add here a little, and but at little, on the mode of reaſoning generally purſued in this Tract. There are men who object to a conſtant reference to the tragedies [105]now acting, and acted in France, during the laſt ſeven years; of which ſome direct mention, and to which more alluſion has been made, in the preceding Tract. ‘We are not,’ they tell us, ‘to point out the pretences and means by which that, and, by parity of reaſon, any other nation has been enſnared into all the miſeries of Anar⯑chy, in order to keep alive a jealous circumſpection with reſpect to every meaſure which may introduce it into this kingdom.’ Hence the argument from hiſtorical in⯑duction chiefly uſed here, which impreſſes the principles of experience, and thoſe only, upon the mind, with the very deciſion and warmth of feeling with which Nature meant them to be embraced, is proſcribed by thoſe who lean to the doctrines of the Republican School. They will have men addreſſed as beings formed of pure and im⯑paſſive intellect only: or, if they graciouſly permit us to continue to ſee, they prohibit to us the exerciſe of the faculty of feeling.

YET they might as well bid us blot out, from the re⯑cords of univerſal hiſtory, the errors or crimes which have led ſo many and great nations into ruin; ſay that it is uſeleſs to make any obſervations on the cauſes which brought it on, or the miſeries by which it was followed. Muſt we extract no uſeful leſſons for our own nation from the great regiſter of the experience of all ages? It is not in nature, and therefore I am ſure it is not in wiſdom, to turn away our eyes from the ſeries of French revolutions, ſo re⯑cent, and almoſt unprecedented in the ſum of their calamities; while we are in the very neighbourhood of the contagion, when ſuch multitudes are deſirous of introducing it among us. Who that had juſt ſeen a noble veſſel ſtriking upon [106]a ſand bank near our very coaſt, which had not been be⯑fore diſcovered, and totally wrecked, would ſay that a buoy, or a floating light, ſhould not, if poſſible, be im⯑mediately moored upon it? and if the poſition of the whole of the ſand were not accurately known, that we ought not to keep the ſounding line in our hand, when we have the leaſt ſuſpicion that our veſſel may be getting upon it?

WHEN Mr. Burke foreſaw ſo many of its enſuing ca⯑lamities in the firſt movements of the French Revolution, his probable train of reaſon from cauſe to effect was de⯑rided. Dr. Prieſtley fairly told him, ‘he would not call in queſtion his gift of prophecy; his peculiar talent to ſee all events, paſt, preſent, and to come, in their moſt concealed cauſes.’ Experience has nevertheleſs proved the error of thoſe who diſbelieved and thoſe who doubted theſe predictions; however, we might have been able, with ſafety to ourſelves, to con⯑tinue to doubt whoſe opinions were the beſt founded, until the event ſhew it clearly. Our exiſtence as a na⯑tion under an orderly government, might not have been hazarded even by diſbelief; but that theſe evils were in reality then impending over France, the followers of Dr. Prieſtley now admit: yet from the continuance of the ſame propenſions, they will diſ⯑pute the probability of the concluſions here drawn from hiſtorical induction, that a General Aſſociation of the People is a meaſure threatening this kingdom with great danger. I conclude with obſerving, that this is a caſe in which we cannot with equal ſafety poſtpone coming to a decided opinion, until a ſecond and equal ſeries of ca⯑lamities to thoſe we have been recently witneſſes to ſhall convict them of a ſecond error.