AN APPENDIX TO THE REPRESENTATION, (Printed in the Year 1769,) OF THE Injuſtice and Dangerous Tendency of To⯑lerating Slavery, or of Admitting the leaſt Claim of Private Property in the PERSONS of MEN in ENGLAND.
BY GRANVILLE SHARP.
LONDON: PRINTED FOR BENJAMIN WHITE, (NO. 63.) IN FLEET-STREET, AND ROBERT HORSEFIELD, (NO. 22.) IN LUDGATE-STREET.
MDCCLXXII.
ERRATA.
[]- Page 3. l. 12. for Principals read Principles.
- Page 12. l. 5. for them read him.
- Page 14. l. 22. for part read parts.
- Page 15. l. 14. for is untrue read is an untrue.
- Page 19. l. 8. for wordly read worldly.
- Page 24. l. 17. for ineffectually read ineffectual.
- Page 24. l. 18. for the read their.
- Page 26. l. 13. dele not.
AN APPENDIX TO THE REPRESENTATION, &c.
[]SINCE the Publication of my Book on ‘the Injuſtice and dangerous Ten⯑dency of Tolerating Slavery in England,’ ſeveral unforeſeen circumſtances ha [...]e obli⯑ged me to conſider that ſubject more ſtrictly, in order to obviate the inſinuations of ſome intereſted Perſons, who ſtill en⯑deavour to inculcate and maintain, even in this Iſland, the ungenerous Weſt Indian Notions concerning property in Slaves.
Upon theſe dangerous princip [...] ſeveral violent Outrages have lately been commit⯑ted [4]for the recovery of ſuch pretended property; and ſeveral Negroes have been knocked down and kidnapped by Ruffians, hired for that purpoſe, and have been hur⯑ried on Ship Board in order to be tranſpor⯑ted to the Weſt Indies, in open Contempt of the Engliſh Laws, and of the Habeas Corpus Act in particular, which denounces heavy Penalties againſt thoſe who attempt to tranſport any Perſon whatever from this Kingdom againſt their Will: for I have ſhewn in my former Treatiſe in Pages 20 to 28 that Negroes, and all other Aliens are the King's Subjects, when reſiant in this Kingdom; and that they are entitled to the Protection of the Engliſh Laws in ge⯑neral, and of the Habeas Corpus Act in particular. The ſame Arguments are fur⯑ther inforced in Pages 152 to 159.
In Pages 136 to 146 of the ſame Book will be found a full Anſwer to ſuch Argu⯑ments as had then been offered, concerning any right which the Maſter may have ac⯑quired to the perpetual ſervice of a Man; [5]and in Pages 163 and 164 it is (I hope) demonſtrated that the Service of a Slave cannot juſtly be compared to the Service of an Apprentice; and that a Contract cannot be implied in ſuch a Caſe, as ſome learned Men have inſinuated.
In the fourth and laſt Part of the ſaid Tract the Doctrines of Villenage are ſhewn to be obſolete, ſo that the leaſt Claim of perpetual Service, cannot be juſtified thereby.
Theſe References to my former Work are inſerted here, partly to avoid a recapi⯑tulation of theſe neceſſary points, and partly, that thoſe, who have any concern at preſent in ſuch matters, may thereby be enabled to conſider and examine theſe ſeveral Heads without the trouble of reading the whole Book; which is not ſo compendious as the Author could wiſh, it having been wrote at ſeveral different Periods, as occaſion offer⯑ed, and new Arguments were oppoſed, during the time that an Action (which was ſhamefully prolonged) depended againſt the Author and one of his Brothers, for having [6]accidentally (not officiouſly) aſſiſted a poor Negro Servant who was kidnapped and con⯑fined in the Poultry Compter without a Warrant, and there ſold to a Weſt-India Planter to be tranſported to Jamaica.
It has already been proved, in the places before referred to, that no right whatever can be acquired to the perpetual Service of a Man without a Contract, and that ſuch a Contract cannot be implied, unleſs the free Conſent of both Parties is implied likewiſe, and clearly proved. Nevertheleſs as ſome ſordid and tenacious Contenders for this kind of imaginary Property are ſtill ſo in⯑conſiderate as to riſque all the Penalties of a Premunire, beſides heavy Fines, by ven⯑turing to ſeize and carry away by force their quondam Slaves, I am willing for the pre⯑ſent to admit their Plea of Private Property merely that I may examine the Weight of it, and balance it with the Negroes Pro⯑perty in his own Perſon, which, in a Land of Juſtice, doth equally demand ſome ſhare of our Conſideration.
[7]The Authors and Abettors of the ſcan⯑dalous and Inhuman Outrages of which I complain, cannot poſſibly ground their De⯑fence on any other Point whatſoever, than this ſingle Plea of private Property, and the neceſſary obligation of the Courts of Juſtice to ſecure to every Man his own. Now if a Negro Man, or any other human Being whatever, is conſidered as property in this Country, he falls under the Head of Chat⯑tels and muſt neceſſarily (ſo far I mean as the Maſter's right ought to be conſidered) be ranked under that denomination.
Now A CHATTEL is "res eſtimabilis;" a thing to be valued; a thing merely of a pecuniary conſideration; and the Slaveholder, accordingly, rates his ſuppoſed Property in a Man at a baſe price, not more, upon an average, than the value of a good Horſe, viz. 30 l. 40 l. or 50 l. to the diſgrace of hu⯑man nature: whereas, on the other hand, the Negro (though conſidered as a Chattel with reſpect to the Maſter's claim, yet be⯑ing himſelf, alſo, a Man) has certainly a [8]ſuperior right and title to his own Perſon; a claim of natural Property in himſelf, which is ineſtimable; far above all pecuniary conſi⯑deration; for, with reſpect to his ſide of the queſtion, THE HUMAN BODY IS ABOVE ALL PRICE, ‘Corpus humanum non recipit aeſti⯑mationem.’ * Surely his Liberty to him is ineſtimable!—at leaſt, the Engliſh Law preſumes that it is ſo. ‘LIBERTAS EST RES INEST⯑IMABILIS..’ Jenk. Cent. 52. Now let the idea of the CHATTEL, even at the higheſt price it will bear, be weighed and compared with the ſubject of the laſt men⯑tioned maxim, and let Juſtice hold the ſcale!—Shall we doubt whether the Eſtimable claim or the Ineſtimable claim is to be pre⯑ferred?
‘The Law regards the Perſon above his Poſſeſſions;’—‘Life and Liberty moſt;’—‘Freehold and Inheritance above Chattels, &c.’ ‡—ſo that Chattels, we find, are but of a very inferior conſideration, being ranked only in the third degree.
[9] ‘Law favoureth, Life, Liberty, and Dower,’ and cannot, therefore, give the preference to the Maſter's mere mercenary claim of property, without a manifeſt con⯑tradiction to itſelf,— ‘And the Law abhors Falſhood, Variance, Contrariety, &c.’—‘Lex Angliae non patitur ABSURDUM. 9. Cook. 22.’—‘Lex rejicit PUGNANTIA, incongrua. Jenk. Cent. 140, 133, 176.’
It is true, indeed, that the Law, in this caſe, may ſeem to ſuffer (or permit) a wrong by the Maſter's loſing his ſuppoſed right and property; but if we conſider, that the admitting ſuch a Property would be a want of Mercy in the Law, nay, even an act of Cruelty (which the Law abhors) to⯑wards thoſe perſons who have a ſuperior, becauſe a natural intereſt in the determina⯑tion of this queſtion, it muſt appear to de⯑monſtration, that the Law doth no wrong, when it rejects the leſſer claim of eſtimable property, in favour of that natural intereſt which is ineſtimable: And therefore, how⯑ſoever the imaginary proprietor may think [10]himſelf aggrieved, yet the law is vindi⯑cated herein, when we conſider that every claim of Property is abſolutely unjuſt in itſelf, and muſt neceſſarily be ſet aſide through the mercy of the Law, if it interferes, or is in⯑conſiſtent with that natural and equitable claim to perſonal ſecurity, which the law of this kingdom hath always favoured; for "the Law of England is a Law of Mercy." ‘LEX ANGLIAE EST LEX MISERICORDIAE, 2 Inſt. 315.’ ſo that each Slaveholder muſt ſtill be obliged to allow, ‘that the Law (even in this unavoidable deciſion againſt himſelf) doth injury to no man:’—‘Lex nemini operatur iniquum.’—‘nemini facit injuriam.’
Let the Slaveholder remember, alſo, that his being thus deprived of his imaginary Property, cannot be conſidered otherwiſe (let him make the moſt of it) than merely, as a private loſs; whereas, if ſuch an unna⯑tural right be admitted without due conſi⯑deration of the ſuperior Perſonal Right of the Negro, a worſe Vaſſalage, than the An⯑cient [11]Villenage, * would in time be introduced into this free Chriſtian Country, by which the Publick would be materially injured, as well in Honour, as in Morals, and National Safety: therefore, ‘the Law will rather endure a particular miſchief (as the loſs of private property) than a general incon⯑venience.’ ‘Lex citius tollerare vult PRI⯑VATUM DAMNUM quam PUBLICUM MALUM. Co. Lit. 152.’
Thus ſtands the Common Law, with re⯑ſpect to the point in queſtion; and it is not (I apprehend) in the leaſt altered by Sta⯑tute Law; ſo that unleſs the Advocates for Slavery can prove that it is altered, we may ſafely conclude with the following maxim, that ‘whatever was at Common Law, ana is not taken away by Statute, remaineth ſtill, Co. Lit. 115.’
[12]I flatter myſelf, that no Gentleman of the Law will attempt to contradict or ſet aſide the eſtabliſhed Maxims which are here quoted, becauſe ſuch a behaviour would neceſſarily draw upon them that juſt cenſure and contempt, which the learned Author * of the Doctor and Student expreſ⯑ſes in his VIIIth † Chapter againſt all Lawyers, without exception, to dignity, that preſume to contradict approved maxims.— ‘The Fourth Ground of the Law of Eng⯑land (ſays he) ſtandeth in divers princi⯑ples that be called in the Law, Maxims, the which have been always taken for Law (SEMPER HABITA ET TENTA SUNT PRO LEGE) in this Realm, ſo that it is not lawful for any that is learned to deny them; for every one of thoſe Max⯑ims is ſufficient authority to himſelf.’— Thus far the Tranſlator, but we may ga⯑ther from the words of the excellent Au⯑thor [13]himſelf *, that Men, who deny theſe Maxims are no longer worthy to be talked with;—for he adds, ‘in tanto quod cum ne⯑gantibus ea (viz. Maxima) non eſt ulterius arguendum †.’
A more modern, but not leſs reſpectable Author, has furniſhed us with a Maxim nearly to the ſame effect, viz. ‘Thoſe that forego (or ſet aſide) the Law of the Land, deſervedly incur from thence a perpetual ſtain of Infamy.’—‘Legem terrae amittentes perpetuam infamiae notam inde merito incurrunt. Sir Ed. Cook. IIId. Inſt. 221.’
Thus the Plea of private property in the Perſons of Men muſt neceſſarily fall to the [14]Ground, when it is meaſured by the Maxims of the Common Law.
I have not, deſignedly, done any injuſtice to this Plea; and, tho' I may, perhaps, have treated my ſubject injudiciouſly, and not according to Method, yet I defy the moſt intereſted advocate for Slavery to give more real weight or value to ſuch kind of pro⯑perty than what I have already ſtated, if, at the ſame time, the Learned Judge Black⯑ſtone's arguments concerning the three Origins of Slavery be duly conſidered.
I have quoted theſe Arguments at length in my former Tract (from page 141 to 145) but ſhall, nevertheleſs, repeat them here and pledge them as unanſwerable by the moſt able Caſuiſt, or even by the Learned Author himſelf were he to undertake it. But this I ſpeak only comparatively, refer⯑ring to his great abilities, not his will: for though I have been obliged to guard againſt ſome doubtful expreſſions in other part of his Works (See my former Tract pages 136 to 141) yet I have too good an opinion of [15]that worthy Gentleman to conceive that he will ever entertain any real inclination for ſo ungenerous a taſk.
‘The three origins of the right of Sla⯑very, (ſays he) aſſigned by Juſtinian, are all of them built upon falſe foundations. As firſt, Slavery is held to ariſe "jure gentium," from a ſtate of captivity in war; whence Slaves are called mancipia, quaſi manu capti. The conqueror, ſay the Civilians, had a right to the life of his captive; and, having ſpared that, has a right to deal with him as he pleaſes. But it is untrue poſition, when taken generally, that, by the law of nature or nations, a man may kill his ene⯑my: he has only a right to kill him, in particular caſes; in caſes of abſolute neceſſity, for ſelf-defence; and it is plain this abſolute neceſſity did not ſubſiſt, ſince the victor did not actually kill him, but made him priſoner. War is itſelf juſtifiable only on principles [16]of ſelf-preſervation; and therefore it gives no other right over priſoners, but merely to diſable them from doing harm to us, by confining their perſons: much leſs can it give a right to kill, torture, abuſe, plunder, or even to enſlave an enemy, when the war is over. Since there⯑fore the right of making Slaves by capti⯑vity, depends on a ſuppoſed right of ſlaughter, that foundation failing, the conſequence drawn from it muſt fail like⯑wiſe. But ſecondly, it is ſaid, that Sla⯑very may begin "jure civili;" when one man ſells himſelf to another. This, if only meant of contracts to ſerve or work for another, is very juſt: but when ap⯑plied to ſtrict Slavery, in the ſenſe of the laws of old Rome, or modern Barbary, is alſo impoſſible. Every ſale implies a price, a quid pro quo, an equivalent given to the ſeller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: but what equivalent can be given for life and liberty, both of which (in abſolute Slavery) are held to [17]be in the maſter's diſpoſal?—His pro⯑perty alſo, the very price he ſeems to receive, devolves ipſo facto to his maſter, the inſtant he becomes his Slave. In this caſe therefore the buyer gives nothing, and the ſeller receives nothing: of what validity then can a ſale be, which deſtroys the very principles upon which all ſales are founded?—Laſtly, we are told, that beſides theſe two ways by which Slaves "fiunt," or are acquired, they may alſo be hereditary: ſervi naj⯑cunter;" the children of acquired Slaves are, jure naturae, by a negative kind of birth-right, Slaves alſo. But, this being built on the two former rights, muſt fall together with them. If nei⯑ther captivity, nor the ſale of one's ſelf, can by THE LAW OF NATURE AND REASON reduce the parent to Slavery, much leſs can they reduce the offspring. Upon theſe principles THE LAW OF ENG⯑LAND abhors, and will not endure the exiſt⯑ence of Slavery, within this nation:’ ſo that [18]when an attempt was made to introduce it▪ ‘by ſtatute 1 Edward VI. c. 3. which ordained, that all idle vagabonds ſhould be made Slaves, and fed upon bread, water, or ſmall drink, and refuſe meat; ſhould wear a ring of iron round their necks, arms, or legs; and ſhould be compelled by beating, chaining, or otherwiſe, to perform the work aſſigned them, were it never ſo vile; the ſpirit of the nation could not brook this condition▪ even in the moſt abandoned rogues; and therefore this ſtatute was repealed in two years afterwards.’ Coms. 1. Vol. p. 4 [...]3.
Thus it is clear that there can be no claim of right to the perpetual Service of a man which is not ORIGINALLY FOUNDED EITHER IN RAPINE THEFT OR NOTORI⯑OUS INJUSTICE. ‘For it muſt be obvious to every perſon, who is not blinded by the deſire of gain,’ ſays the author of a Short Account of the Slave Trade, &c. which I cauſed to be reprinted in 1768, p. 64) ‘that the Right, by which theſe [19]men hold the Negroes in Bondage, is no other than what is derived from thoſe who ſtole them, who, having no other Title, but that which Robbers have over their Prey could not convey any better to the purchaſer; and that therefore to continue to hold them in Bondage, for wordly Advantage, by no other right than that which thoſe guilty men give them, is conſenting to, and partaking of their Guilt.’
Therefore when a Notorious Outrage and Breach of the Peace is committed under the pretence of any ſuch groundleſs claim of ſervice, the Magiſtrate who neglects to re⯑lieve the perſon oppreſs'd, and to puniſh the Offenders, is certainly a partaker of their Guilt; and no upright and conſcientious Judge (who does not ſet up his own will above the laws of the Land) can poſſibly entertain any doubt in his mind about the puniſhment of ſuch Offenders: for when the Laws of the Land, and eſpecially the Habeas Corpus Act, are expreſsly and [20]clearly on one Side of the Queſtion (without the leaſt exception whatever concerning any difference or diſtinction of Perſons,) and when the only plea on the other ſide of the Queſtion is abſolutely without Foundation either in Natural Equity or the eſtabliſhed Law and Cuſtoms of this Country, what room can there be for doubt? and how would a Judge be able to juſtify an Arreſt of Judgment in ſuch a caſe?
Every Judge is (or ought to be) ſworn, that he will miniſter Juſtice indifferently (or without reſpect of Perſons) to all Men.— ‘Se juſtitiam miniſtraturum indifferenter omnibus hominibus.’ (Forteſcue de Laudibus Leg. Angliae, Chap. 51.) And therefore if the Laws and Eſtabliſhed Cuſ⯑toms of the land with reſpect to the pre⯑ſent Queſtion make no diſtinction of Perſons (whether Bond or Free, White or Black) neither can a Judge, without riſquing the guilt of Perjury.
I have proved in Page 159 of my for⯑mer Tract, ‘that the Laws of England [21](in the late Reign) were eſteemed obnox⯑ious to any involuntary Bondage without a juſt cauſe, and to all private jurisdictions whatſoever; ſo that an extenſion of THE INFLUENCE,* BENEFIT AND PROTEC⯑TION’ of theſe laws was conſidered as a relief to our Fellow Subjects in Scotland from all private oppreſſion. I mean the late pernicious Vaſſalage of Scotland; the extinction of which has happily produced the preſent flouriſhing State of Arts, Trade, and Manufactories amongſt our Brethren in that part of the Iſland.
But as the claim of private property in the perſons of men is the very root and foundation of the worſt kind of Vaſſalage, I muſt obſerve, that, if any Judge ſhould hereafter venture to ſuſpend the execution of the Engliſh Laws in conſideration of any ſuch kind of pre⯑tenſions whatever, he might be ſaid to ſtab the conſtitutional freedom of two Great and [22]ancient Kingdoms at one blow. For how ſhould our fellow ſubjects at the other end of the Iſland be able to truſt in the parlia⯑mentary Promiſe of the ‘Influence, Benefit and Protection of the King's Laws’ to be extended as far as Scotland, if the ſaid Laws were really liable to be rendered ineffectual, even in England, by a mere groundleſs doubt of one ſingle Judge.
A Doubt is certainly a very inſuffi⯑cient excuſe for an arreſt of Judgment, in any caſe whatever, unleſs "ſtrong and probable Grounds" are alledged to juſtify it; but a groundleſs doubt upon the preſent queſtion would be more parti⯑cularly criminal; becauſe it would, pro⯑bably, tend to the introduction of the diabolical * Tyranny and Injuſtice of our Weſt Indian Colonies, whereby human Nature is vilifyed and degraded to the Rank and level of brute Beaſts; for not only the groſſeſt op⯑preſſion of our fellow man but even murder † [23]is there tolerated, and Marriage exclu⯑ded, * as I have ſhewn in the notes to my former work. †
Whatever tends to the ſame point (viz. the degradation of human nature and the in⯑troduction of that conſummate wickedneſs which muſt of courſe prevail wherever Slavery is tolerated) does certainly promote the Work and Service of the Grand Enemy of Mankind, and conſequently ought to be eſtemed highly offenſive to Almighty God.
Some Perſons may, perhaps, alledge in vindication of the ſuppoſed doubt above men⯑tioned, that the Legiſlature has, at diffe⯑rent times, given encouragement to the African Slave Trade, (however deteſtable, and pernicious to mankind it may be eſteemed) and that the ſame ought to be accounted [24]an acknowledgment, that Property in Slaves is, in ſome degree, lawful.
Such Arguments, and Inſinuations I have frequently heard, but let the Advocates for Sla⯑very make the moſt of them they can, yet ſhall they not be able to avail themſelves of any ſuch ſtrained, conſequential Doctrines: for ſuppoſe that the Legiſlature ſhould, un⯑warily, happen to do wrong in any parti⯑cular point whatſoever, and that any one of their Subjects in a judicial character ſhould, inſtead of giving them warning of the evil, be ready to go before them in it, and ſhould even ſhew himſelf prone to carry the miſ⯑chief to a much higher pitch, than the Le⯑giſlature ever conceived or intended, by en⯑deavouring to render ineffectually one of their moſt ſolemn acts, relating, in ſome re⯑ſpect, to the ſame point, which we will ſuppoſe to have remained unrepealed and in full force, and which might therefore have been uſed as a juſt and honeſt expedient to ſave the honour of the Legiſlature and cor⯑rect the inadvertent evil. Such a neglect [25]and contempt of a poſitive and eſtabliſhed ſtatute, added to a diſregard of natural as well as national Juſtice, ought to be eſteemed as a ſufficient reaſon for condemning ſuch a man as a moſt undutiful ſubject, and dangerous Politician.
But, to carry the Argument ſtill further, let us ſuppoſe (what I truſt will never come to paſs) that even the Legiſlature itſelf ſhould become ſo miſerably degenerate as to repeal, or annul, the Habeas Corpus Act, and adopt, inſtead of it, the moſt horrid and diaboli⯑cal of the Weſt Indian Laws; yet, even in this caſe, the natural unlawfulneſs and wickedneſs of ſuch principles as thoſe laws contain, would ſtill remain; for ‘No Legiſ⯑lature on Earth, which is the ſupreme power in every Civil Society, can alter the Nature of things, or make that to be lawful, which is contrary to the Law of God, the ſupreme Legiſlator and Go⯑vernor of the World. Miſchief may be framed, and eſtabliſhed by a Law, but [26]if it be, it is miſchief ſtill, as much ſo as it was before it was eſtabliſhed, tho' its being ſo may make Men inſenſible of their Guilt, or bold and fearleſs in the Perpetration of it; for too many, among Chriſtians, are, contrary to Chriſt's Ex⯑hortation, more influenced by the Fear of Man, than by the Fear of God.—It is really a ſerious Subject, and I own it raiſes a ſerious concern in my Mind, that ſuch Barbarity ſhould be ſuffered in Chriſtian Nations. It is enough to make a Man's Heart ach, unleſs he has not loſt all Love and Regard to his Kind, to think that ſo many Thouſands of the Hu⯑man Race ſhould be ſacrificed every year to that greedy voracious God Mammon *.’
The Number of Negro Slaves bought in one Year only (viz. 1768) on the Coaſt of Africa, from Cape Blanco to Rio Longo, amounted to 104, 100 Perſons, according to a particular ſtate of that Trade inſerted in the Gazetteer of the 8th of July, 1769. [27]Theſe miſerable creatures, it is ſaid, ‘were bought by Barter for European and Indian Goods, chiefly at 15 l. Sterling each.’
Now it is dreadful to conſider what multitudes of men muſt have been killed merely in the attempt to take ſo many wret⯑ched Captives for ſale; and again what multitudes, out of ſo large a number, would die, as uſual, in their paſſage to the Weſt Indies and America either of Grief and deſpair, or by being inhumanly ſtifled in the Holds of Ships; beſides the large proportion (nearly one half) that would die of the ſeaſoning, (as it is called) after their arrival in the plantations; and laſtly that all the remainder of this vaſt multitude of 104, 100 miſerable human beings will probably be worn out by hard ſervice and oppreſſion in the ſpace of about 16 years, or leſs, ac⯑cording to the average rate of ſome calcula⯑tions that have been publiſhed. Theſe conſi⯑derations, I ſay, muſt needs inſpire us with indignation and horror even though the evil, at preſent, is at a conſiderable diſtance from [28]us. But if the advocates, for the unnatural and unlawful claims, againſt which I contend, ſhould receive ſuch encouragement as to confirm their pretenſions; the ſame muſt inevitably introduce by degrees a Tolera⯑tion of the Weſt India Slavery, with all its direful conſequences, into this Kingdom: which, added to the manifold corruptions and deprav [...]ties into which this Kingdom has already unhappily fallen, will certainly cauſe our meaſure of Iniquity to over⯑flow, and, in all probability, draw down upon us ſome dreadful and ſpeedy national calamity*, beſides that ſevere judgment, which is already but too apparent amongſt us, I mean that deplorable Hardneſs of Heart, and abandoned Spirit of Injuſtice, which has rendered the publication of this remonſtrance neceſſary.
- Zitationsvorschlag für dieses Objekt
- TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 3846 An appendix to the Representation printed in the year 1769 of the injustice and dangerous tendency of tolerating slavery or of admitting the least claim of private property in the persons of men. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5B02-C