TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

COMMON CHARITY will induce us to believe that the advocates for an occaſional ſuſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus laws are not really aware of the dangerous tendency of ſuch a meaſure; and therefore when the author of this Proteſt (in the following pages) charges the adviſers and promoters of the ſuſ⯑penſion with ‘high-treaſon againſt the king and ſtate,’ he profeſſes to aim the ſeverity of his cenſure chiefly againſt the meaſure itſelf, (in order to expreſs the real danger and malignity of its ef⯑fect,) rather than againſt the perſons of thoſe men who, inadvertently, or through inattention to the fundamental or indiſ⯑penſable principles of law, have promoted [4] it: and therefore to thoſe perſons, joint⯑ly with all the other People of England, (as being equally intereſted with the reſt in the effects of ſuch a meaſure) the au⯑thor of this Proteſt now addreſſes himſelf, not to promote a ſpirit of vengeance and perſonal reſentment, but merely for the purpoſes of warning and inſtruction to all parties, that they may cordially unite in reſtoring the due limitations of govern⯑ment, on which depends the common ſafety both of king and people.

The Advocates for an occaſional ſuſ⯑penſion of the law, perhaps, will alledge, that the new temporary powers (whate⯑ver they may happen to be) which would thereby be thrown into the hands of the perſons intruſted with the adminiſtra⯑tion of government, are by no means intended to take effect againſt the People of England, that are reſient in this iſland, but only againſt ſuch perſons as [5] have been guilty of treaſon in foreign parts (in America, let us ſuppoſe, for inſtance) or on the high ſeas, or for piracy; and therefore they conceive, that the free inhabitants of this iſland could not be injured by ſo limited a ſuſpenſion of the laws, eſpecially if they ſhould admit in their bill an additional clauſe of limita⯑tion, propoſed even by an oppoſite par⯑ty, by way of ſecurity; which we will ſuppoſe to be couched in the following terms, viz. ‘That nothing herein is intended, or ſhall be conſtrued, to extend to the caſe of any other priſoner or pri⯑ſoners than ſuch as ſhall have BEEN OUT OF THE REALM AT THE TIME OR TIMES OF THE OFFENCE OR OFFENCES wherewith he or they ſhall be charged, or of which they ſhall be ſuſpected.’ Such a clauſe as this ſeems, on a ſlight examination, to ſe⯑cure the inhabitants of this iſland from the danger of an unlimited power, againſt [6] which all true Engliſhmen ought to be ever upon their guard: but, alas! ſo dan⯑gerous is it to ſtop the ordinary courſe of juſtice and common right, or to alter the "due proceſs of the law," in any ca⯑ſes whatſoever wherein perſonal liberty (the higheſt and moſt valuable temporal object of Engliſhmen) is concerned, that, if we ſhould ſuppoſe the caſe of ſuch a ſuſpenſion of the laws as courtiers in general would endeavour to obtain, were they to be intruſted with the com⯑piling of a bill for that purpoſe, and then carefully compare the ſaid ſuppoſed bill with the abovementioned clauſe of limitation, we ſhould ſoon have reaſon to be convinced that the ſecurity of the latter is only imaginary; and that mul⯑titudes of his majeſty's innocent and peaceable ſubjects would be ſtill liable to be oppreſſed, and be denied the benefits of public juſtice and common right, by ſuch a ſuſpenſion of law, if they ſhould happen [7] to incur the diſpleaſure of perſons in power, or be miſrepreſented to them by any ſecret enemy.

The propoſed clauſe leaves unpro⯑tected all the nobility, gentry, and other perſons whatſoever, that have made any excurſions into France, Italy, Germany, Flanders, &c. or even to Ireland, ever ſince the commencement of the troubles (whatever they might be) which occa⯑ſioned an imaginary neceſſity, or plea, for SUSPENDING THE LAWS. And this, perhaps, might be extended three or four years back, and might thereby exclude from the protection of the limiting clauſe a great multitude of the moſt re⯑ſpectable people of the kingdom, who might happen to have travelled abroad during ſuch a period. Neither does the clauſe protect the merchants, traders, and other perſons, that have arrived from the Weſt-Indies, Ireland, or any other [8] country, within ſuch a ſuppoſed period. And they are, ſurely, too numerous and reſpectable a body to be thus outlawed!

Add to this, that all ſeafaring Perſons without exception (though they are the moſt valuable ſubjects of this maritime ſtate) would be left unprotected by ſuch a clauſe, and of courſe would be rendered ſubject to the unlimited WILL of man, (ARBITRIUM hominis, which is the true definition of ARBITRARY POWER,) in⯑ſtead of LAW! And, laſtly, all other perſons whatſoever are liable to ſuffer the ſame inconveniences, if they have not kept a diary, or have not memory or memo⯑randums, to enable them to produce ſuf⯑ficient evidence of their being actually WITHIN THIS REALM at any period of time that might be fixed upon within the laſt three or four years; ſo that not only perſons ‘ſeized and taken OUT OF THE REALM’ would be made liable to [9] the effects of ſuch a ſuſpending act, but all the other perſons abovementioned, though they are actually RESIENT WITHIN THE REALM.

In order to ſtate the caſe for my argu⯑ment as clearly as I am able, I have here ſuppoſed the adoption of ſuch a ſuſpend⯑ing bill as we might naturally conceive to be propoſed by any ſet of men in power, who are warmed by the ſunſhine of court-favour till they forget that their own real intereſt is inſeparably connected with that of the public, and that the increaſe of power, which they promote, may poſſibly fall into ſome other hands than their own. But the hands of govern⯑ment muſt be ſtrengthened, they would probably ſay; and, for this purpoſe, they would be very apt to inſert in their bill ſome diſcretionary powers to enable the king and his miniſters to impriſon not on⯑ly perſons ‘ſeized and taken out of the [10] realm,’ but alſo perſons ‘who ſhall be committed in any part of his majeſty's do⯑minions for the ſaid crimes,’ I mean, any crimes which I have before ſup⯑poſed in ſtating this caſe, viz. ‘High-treaſon in any of his majeſty's colonies or plantations in America, or ON THE HIGH SEAS,’ (which will include our own coaſts any where beyond low-water mark,) ‘or the crime of piracy,’ without any deſcription or limitation of place whatſoever! So that if any inno⯑cent man (who happens not to be able to prove an alibi for every day, and even every hour, ſince theſe troubles began) ſhould be maliciouſly "charged with" the crime of treaſon or piracy committed within half a mile of the Britiſh coaſts, he may be ſeized and impriſoned, ‘without bail or mainprize,’ at the will and plea⯑ſure of the king and council, for many months; and, at the expiration of the limited time, (without any farther exa⯑mination [11] or opportunity of being heard at all by his country,) his term of con⯑finement is prolonged by another ſuch act, and perhaps another after that, (as evil examples beget others,) till the time of his relief by ‘due proceſs of the law’ becomes totally uncertain and in⯑definite! — A deplorable condition this! which, in our common law, is deemed "wretched ſlavery;" — for, ‘Miſera eſt ſervitus’ (ſays the maxim) ‘ubi JUS eſt vagum aut incertum.’ (Prin⯑cipia leg. & Aeq. p. 61.)

But the condition of the deluded ſub⯑jects will be rendered ſtill more com⯑pletely uncertain and wretched, if the compilers of the ſuppoſed ſuſpending act ſhould endeavour to avail themſelves of vague terms and expreſſions: — for in⯑ſtance, — (in the body of the bill,) — "Such crimes" (referring to the crimes particularly named in the former part) [12] inſtead of "the ſaid crimes:" — for, as "Nullum ſimile eſt idem," — ‘( LIKE is not THE SAME,)’ — the expreſſion, "ſuch crimes," ſignifies only ſimilar crimes, and not the ſame crimes before expreſſed, whereby the power of the act would be liable to an arbitrary exten⯑ſion at the will of the magiſtrate!

Whenever perſons in power ceaſe to be duly limited by a free parliament, they will pay but very little regard to the groſſneſs of the propoſitions which they tender to that, once, auguſt aſſembly; and therefore, if ſuch an illegal power ſhould ever be uſurped by any ſet of men, we may then expect to find many more vague expreſſions in our public acts! — We may in that caſe, without improbability, ſuppoſe the penning of a ſuſpending act to be — not only ‘for ſuch crimes, OR ANY of them,’ — but alſo ‘for SUSPICION of SUCH [13] CRIMES, or any of them, by any ma⯑giſtrate,’ &c. viz. any trading ma⯑giſtrate, penſioned Middleſex juſtice, or other wretched time-ſerver, that may happen to be entruſted with a power of committing to priſon. — And in ſuch times it will afford a ſufficient handle againſt any perſon whatſoever, if they are but "charged with" ſuch crimes, whether they be guilty of them or not; or even if they be but ‘CHARGED WITH’ the ‘SUSPICION of SUCH crimes, or any of them, by ANY ma⯑giſtrate,’ &c. — Nothing more arbitrary or capricious can eaſily be de⯑ſcribed; and yet, alas! my ſuppoſed bill by no means exceeds the bounds of probability; for, when the baneful practice of bribery becomes triumphant, and the very foundations of government are thoroughly corrupted, we may ex⯑pect that probability will ſtill go farther, and that the above ſuppoſed extraordinary [14] powers will be farther augmented by a "non obſtante," to trample down at once, not only the Habeas Corpus Act, but all the other fences of Britiſh liber⯑ty, national juſtice, and common right, on which the ſafety of Engliſhmen de⯑pends! viz. ‘any law, ſtatute, or u⯑ſage, to the contrary, in any wiſe not⯑withſtanding.’

The clauſe is indeed a common one, for the repeal of uſeleſs or indifferent matters; but, when the effect extends to annul all the laws of perſonal protec⯑tion, and the common right of Engliſh⯑men to "the due proceſs of the law," (which is, to be tried without delay by their country, [per legem terrae,] and, if innocent, to be reſtored to freedom,) — ſuch a ſuſpenſion, I ſay, of common juſtice and common right is ſo fun⯑damentally ſubverſive of the Britiſh conſtitution of ſtate, that no authority [15] of parliament can make it legal; becauſe it it is high-treaſon againſt the king and people! and all the abettors and promo⯑ters of ſuch an act would thereby render themſelves "eternally infamous" in the eye of the law! — which is declared by a conſtitutional maxim: — ‘LEGEM TERRAE amittentes PERPETUAM IN⯑FAMIAE NOTAM inde merito incur⯑runt.’ (3. inſt. p. 221.)— ‘Thoſe men, who ſet aſide THE LAW OF THE LAND,’ (which is certainly the caſe of thoſe who vote for ſuſpending it,) ‘do thereby incur a PERPETUAL STAIN of INFAMY!’

If ever ſuch an act, therefore, ſhould ſubſiſt, and the promoters of it remain in power, Britiſh ſubjects may amuſe themſelves with the name of freedom if they pleaſe, but they will have no more real and juſt right to boaſt of their liber⯑ty than the ſubjects of France or Pruſſia! [16] For they would then be involved exactly in the ſame uncertain and precarious con⯑dition! And, though they might not, perhaps, for ſome conſiderable time af⯑terwards, begin to feel the pernicious effects of a government unlimited by law, yet that would not render their condi⯑tion leſs baſe or ſlaviſh, for our common law has already ſtated the condition of ſuch as an outlawed people: — ‘Res eſt miſera, ubi JUS eſt vagum.’ ^* — ‘WRETCHED is the ſtate of affairs wherever COMMON RIGHT is vague’ and uncertain! — Nay it is downright ſlavery, as declared by another maxim, already cited, in p. 11.

The learned Sir Robert Atkins (for⯑merly one of the judges of the Common Pleas) has remarked, (concerning ‘the pope's exerciſe of his power of diſpen⯑ſing,’ [17] or rather of ſuſpending laws, by virtue of ſuch a "non obſtante,") that ‘it was uſed with ſome moderation AT FIRST, in caſes that ſeemed to be of GREAT NECESSITY only; but at laſt, by degrees, it grew to be in⯑tolerable and unlimited.’ (See his parliamentary and political Tracts, p. 247.) And ſurely we ought to be e⯑qually jealous of every claim or preten⯑ſion to omnipotence, or unlimited power, whenever and by whomſoever it is made, though we do not immediately feel the baneful effects of it.—There are but too many advocates for the imaginary omni⯑potence, or unlimited power, of parlia⯑ment!

True it is, that the ſame perſons, who are entruſted with authority to make laws, are entruſted likewiſe with autho⯑rity to ſuſpend or repeal them; but in this (without the leaſt detriment to their [18] juſt liberty and free privileges) they are not without limitation. Even liberty it⯑ſelf is limited, and ſubmits to the ſame ſort of definition; for ‘liberty’ (ſays an old and eminent law-writer) ‘is not a power to act, quidquid libet, what we liſt, (for this may be licentious, and a luſt or paſſion may enſlave a man’ [or men] ‘as much as any chain or fetter,) but, quod licet, what is juſt and ratio⯑nal.’ ‘(Rights of the Kingdom, p. 136.)’ And, in the preceding page, ſpeaking expreſſly of the houſe of com⯑mons, or parliaments, he ſays: — ‘When they are FREEST they have LI⯑MITS, for they be NOT INFINITE. Nay, when they are MOST FREE, they are MOST BOUND to GOOD ORDERS and TO RIGHT REASON.’ The truth of this doctrine is unqueſtionable: for, if a parliament, or legiſlative power of any kind, (regal or popular,) preſume to enact ordinances which oppoſe, or in [19] any reſpect ſet aſide, natural juſtice, or the common right of innocent perſons, and ſhall claim an authority or privilege to do ſo, (which is ignorantly and vainly cal⯑led omnipotence of parliament,) the ſaid power ceaſes to be a legal power, becauſe it caſts off the reſtraint and government of God's indiſpenſable laws, and thereby becomes excommunicated from God! —‘Shall the throne of INIQUITY have fellowſhip with thee, which FRAMETH MISCHIEF BY A LAW?’ (Pſalm xciv. 20.)

A due conſideration of this ought to reſtrain the modern rage of act-making! for it is laid down, in that ancient and re⯑ſpectable law-book, called FLETA, that ‘the power of RIGHT (or juſtice) is of God alone, but the power of WRONG (or injury) is of the DEVIL; and the works of whichſoever of theſe two,’ (viz. of God or of the devil,) ‘he ſhall [18] [...] [19] [...] [20] do,’ (ſpeaking of the agency of a king, and the ſame may ſurely be ſaid alſo of a parliament,) ‘of him he is the ſervant.’ ^* And to this doctrine, as an unqueſtionable truth, that illuſtrious lawyer, Henry de Bracton, (who was a judge in this realm above 530 years ago,) has made the following addition: — ‘Therefore,’ (ſays he, ſtill ſpeaking of a king,) ‘while he DOES JUSTICE he is the vicar of the ETERNAL KING; but he is the SERVANT OF THE DEVIL while he declines to INJUSTICE or WRONG.’ ^† And, in like manner, a parliament, or [21] the perſons entruſted with the power of legiſlation, are to be eſteemed as the ſer⯑vants of the devil, and as enemies to God, while they promote or eſtabliſh any no⯑torious injuſtice: for, ‘Know ye not, that, to whom ye yield yourſelves ſer⯑vants, to obey, his ſervants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of ſin, unto death, or of obedience, unto righteouſ⯑neſs?’ (Rom. vi. 16.)

Many laws there are which belong to God as well as man, and which are there⯑fore to be eſteemed as parts of the E⯑TERNAL LAW: i.e. the WILL of GOD that all things be moved and directed to a good and proper end; a perpetual and conſtant WILL to give to every one his RIGHT;^‡ and [22] no right can be more ſacred than the right of an innocent man to obtain FREE⯑DOM, by "due proceſs of the law," from dureſs and unjuſt impriſonment: for, ‘LIBERTY is ineſtimable;’ (‘libertas eſt res ineſtimabilis, Jenk. cent. 52.’) and ‘is planted BY GOD in the very na⯑ture of man.’ (‘Libertas a Deo ho⯑minis eſt indita naturae. Forteſcu de laud. Leg. Ang. 41.’) So that ‘hu⯑man nature intreats (or implores) fa⯑vour in the CAUSE OF LIBERTY more than in any other cauſe;’ ^‖ and conſe⯑quently the man, who ‘does not favour the cauſe of LIBERTY,’ is already con⯑demned, in our common law, as ‘im⯑pious [23] and cruel.’ ^§ And, in like man⯑ner, every act of parliament, or ſtatute, which is unfavourable thereto, (by redu⯑cing freedom and augmenting ſlavery,) muſt neceſſarily be eſteemed equally ob⯑noxious and inimical to GOD and MAN: — for, ‘CRUDELIS etiam NECESSARIO judicabitur LEX, quae ſervitutem aug⯑mentat et minuit libertatem.’ (Forteſcu, c. 41.) And, as this "will of God," reſpecting the right of men, is, in the a⯑bove quotation, declared to be ‘perpe⯑tual and conſtant,’ it neceſſarily fol⯑lows, that no human authority upon earth can ſuſpend or annul any part of the eter⯑nal law, without grievous ſin! for our firſt allegiance is made in baptiſm to God and his laws: and the latter conſiſt not merely in the written injunctions of di⯑vine revelation, (which we call the ſcrip⯑tures,) but alſo in reaſon and natural juſ⯑tice; [24] the knowledge of which (though it is a divine attribute) is inherited by mankind in general, and written in their hearts; ^¶ or elſe there could be no ſuch thing as the imputation of ſin! THE LAW OF REASON is therefore juſtly e⯑ſteemed the firſt foundation of the laws of England: — ‘Primum fundamentum legis Angliae eſt lex rationis.’ (Doct. et Stud. c. v. p. 14.) And ‘the law of reaſon’ includes ‘the laws of nature,’ which cannot lawfully be ſuſpended or changed by parliament; for our common law declares that they are immutable:— [25] "Jura naturae ſunt IMMUTABILIA." (Prin. Leg. et Aequit. p. 46.) ‘The laws of nature are unchangeable:’ they cannot therefore be lawfully ſuſ⯑pended or changed by parliament; nei⯑ther can any manifeſt injuſtice be made lawful: for, by the ſame authority, we know, that ‘LEX INJUSTA non eſt LEX.’ "An unjuſt ordinance" (or act of parliament) "is not law."— No plea of neceſſity could render ſuch a parliamentary exertion even excuſea⯑ble; for, though there are many max⯑ims on this head, as ‘Neceſſitas non habet legem;’ and ‘Salus populi’ (which even bad legiſlators will pretend to regard) ‘ſuprema eſt lex;’—‘Ne⯑ceſſitas facit licitum quod aliàs non eſt licitum;’—‘Neceſſitas vincet legem.’ Yet theſe can relate only to ſuch laws as are made to remedy inconveniences, not in themſelves evil, mere mala prohibi⯑ta; but cannot authorize any thing that [26] is malum in ſe; for that would be RE⯑BELLION AGAINST GOD, which no caſe can juſtify. For, of thoſe who ſay ‘Let us do evil that good may come;’ the Scrip⯑ture has added, ‘Whoſe damnation is juſt.’ (Rom. iii. 8.) ‘Fiat juſtitia, ruat coelum,’ is, therefore, a ſound maxim both of law and politics; ſo that no ne⯑ceſſity whatever can juſtify the eſtabliſh⯑ment of any injuſtice, without a reme⯑dy: and no injuſtice, evil, tort, wrong, or iniquity, can be more flagrant or more dangerous to the ſtate than an un⯑neceſſary delay of common right and juſ⯑tice to an innocent man, whoſe per⯑ſonal liberty is unjuſtly invaded; for, if "perſonal liberty" is not ſecured and protected BY EQUAL LAW, no proper⯑ty, or other rights whatſoever, can have any real value; and from thence it ariſes that the common right of every inno⯑cent perſon to the laws of protection, is eſ⯑teemed our higheſt and moſt valuable [27] inheritance; for, ‘Major haereditas venit unicuique noſtrum a JURE et LE⯑GIBUS quam a parentibus;’ ‘A greater inheritance deſcends to every one of us from’ (the conſtitutional eſtabliſhment of) ‘right^* and the laws than from our pa⯑rents.’—A "non obſtante;" therefore, which boldly ſuſpends at once all the an⯑cient conſtitutional laws of perſonal protec⯑tion, and leaves an innocent man without a remedy, cannot be LAW, being contrary to all that ought to be eſteemed law; for, ‘Lex nemini operatur iniquum, nemini fa⯑cit injuriam;’ ‘Law works no iniquity to any man, does INJURY to no man:’ and, ‘Quicquid eſt contra norman RECTI eſt [28] injuria;’ ‘whatever is contrary to the rule of RIGHT, is INJURY:’—and ‘Tort à la ley eſt CONTRARY.’ Co. Lit. 158. ‘Wrong is CONTRARY to law,’ and therefore ‘whatever is done CON⯑TRARY TO LAW’ (or ‘makes againſt law’) ‘ought to be eſteemed as UNDONE.’ — ‘Pro infecto habetur,’ (ſays the maxim;) ‘Quod contra legem fit pro infecto habetur;’ ſo that the ex⯑amples, that have been cited as prece⯑dents for ſuſpending the laws of liberty and protection, are no precedents of juſti⯑fication; for the legiſlative power of diſ⯑penſing with laws, extends only to thoſe laws which relate to mala prohibita, as I have before remarked, ‘(Diſpenſatio eſt MALI PROHIBITI provida relaxatio utilitate communi penſata,)’ and can⯑not effect the laws of natural juſtice and common conſtitutional right; becauſe an act of parliament for any ſuch pur⯑poſe [29] muſt be a malum in ſe, and conſe⯑quently is null and void in itſelf.

The king has no power, nor can be allowed any power, to defer, poſtpone, or ſuſpend, that equal and right juſtice which is due, by inheritance, to all Bri⯑tiſh ſubjects, (to common ſailors as well as others,) without reſpect of perſons; becauſe the king ſubſcribed Magna Char⯑ta when he received the Holy Sacrament at his coronation, (of which the author of this proteſt is an eye-witneſs, being very near the king's perſon at that time,) where⯑by he has promiſed before God and the people, that he will delay or deny to none right or juſtice; — ‘Nulli negabimus aut differemus juſtitiam vel rectum;’ (cap. xxix.) ſo that this excludes all power of ſuſpending any of the laws on which juſtice or right depend! The king, therefore, muſt neither delay juſtice him⯑ſelf, nor be, in any way, inſtrumental in [30] preventing his judges from proceeding to do juſtice according to Magna Charta and the other ancient and fundamental laws of the land; for the judges are alſo ſworn to ‘deny to no man common right, by the king's letters, nor none other man's, nor for none other cauſe.’ (See the oath made 18 Edward III. Keble's Statutes, p. 110.) This wary expreſſion in the oath, (viz. ‘for none other cauſe,’) ex⯑cludes all poſſibility of admitting any ex⯑ception whatſoever; ſo that the ſworn judges are ſo bound to GOD, the king, and the people, (for they are ſworn to "ſerve the people" ^* as well as the king,) that they muſt not obey even an act of parliament which ſets aſide this matter of "common right," I mean the common right of PERSONAL LIBERTY to all ranks of men that are innocent from crimes and free from debt.

[31]Some worthy men, zealous for the privileges of parliament, are, indeed, un⯑willing to admit this ſeeming independence of the judges, in the adminiſtration of juſtice or common right; which, by their oaths, they are to "deny to no man:" but the juſt privileges of parliament never can be injured by the independence of the judges in this ſingle point; becauſe, if a judge is ſo ſcrupulous, or conſcientious, that he refuſes to enforce or obey an un⯑juſt ſtatute, it is ſtill in the power of par⯑liament to impeach or diſcharge him from his office for diſobedience, ſo that the loſs would fall only upon the honeſt and worthy judge, though the diſhonour of the injuſtice would reſt where it began! Nevertheleſs, while JUDGES remain in office, they muſt not acknowledge any obligation ſuperior to that which they owe to natural juſtice and the laws of God; for they are bound to GOD (as I [32] have already remarked) by the nature of their office, as well as to the king and the people; though this firſt and moſt binding obligation is not expreſſed in their oath; yet the Scripture ſays, ‘The judgement is God's;’ (Deut. i. 17.) and again, ‘Ye judge not for man, but for THE LORD, who is with you in the JUDGEMENT:’ (2 Chron. ix. 6.) and, therefore, neither the judges nor the king himſelf are to be accounted laymen, but "miniſters of God," for righteouſneſs, juſtice, and judgement. — By the two lat⯑ter, in the preſent caſe, I do not mean penal juſtice or judgement, but the duties of maintaining the "common right" of inno⯑cent perſons, and of relieving the op⯑preſſed. Theſe are, in a peculiar man⯑ner, ſacred to God, and, therefore, una⯑lienable from the people, and not to be ſuſ⯑pended by the authority of parliament; becauſe the commands of God, in theſe matters, are peremptory, and can admit [33] of no exceptions.—‘Thus ſaith the Lord,’ (Jehovah,) ‘KEEP YE judge⯑ment and do juſtice,’ (Iſaiah lvi. 1.) which is diametrically oppoſite to the meaſure of ſuſpending or poſtponing them. And again,— ‘KEEP mercy and JUDGE⯑MENT, and wait on thy God CONTINU⯑ALLY’ or ‘ALWAYS: ’ (Hoſ. xii. 6.) ſo that there never can be any time of danger, or difficulty, ſo preſ⯑ſing and urgent as to juſtify the plea of a NECESSITY for the ſuſpenſion of juſtice and judgement, when demanded by in⯑nocent perſons under illegal reſtraint or dureſs! For, priſoners, that are really guilty, will not demand judgement, (by writs of Habeas Corpus,) for fear of the penal ſtatutes; and even if ſuch priſoners (truſting, at any time, to the want of ſufficient evidence againſt them) ſhould demand judgement, and thereby eſcape; yet it is better that TEN offenders ſhould eſcape penal juſtice, than that ONE [34] innocent man ſhould ſuffer by the denial or ſuſpenſion of "COMMON RIGHT."— ‘Melius eſt ut DECEM NOXII evadant, quam ut UNUS INNOCENS pereat.’ — For herein the difference between the ſort of juſtice and judgement, for which I contend, and penal juſtice, (which may be ſuſpended by competent authority,) is manifeſted, viz. that THE RIGHTEOUS "JUDGE OF ALL THE WORLD" decla⯑red himſelf willing to ſuſpend his penal judgement againſt A WHOLE NATION of notorious convicted offenders, rather than he would involve TEN innocent perſons in their deſtruction, if ſo many could have been found among them! This ſenti⯑ment of divine juſtice was revealed, for our inſtruction, to a man, who was honoured with the teſtimony of being inclined to ‘KEEP the way of the Lord;’—and ‘the way of the Lord,’ (as the following words declare,) is —‘to DO juſtice and judgement,’ (Gen. xviii. 19-33.) — [35] The ſuſpenſion, therefore, of ‘juſtice and judgement’ from innocent perſons, is plainly the reverſe of ‘KEEPING the way of the Lord!’ Wherefore,— ‘Let it ſuffice you, O princes of Iſrael; remove violence and ſpoil, and EXECUTE JUDGEMENT AND JUSTICE;’ (which is the very reverſe of ſuſpending them!) ‘take away your exactions from my people, ſaith the Lord.’ (Ezek. xlv. 9.)— ‘Ceaſe to do evil; learn to do well; ſeek judgement; RIGHTEN the OPPRESSED;’ (for this is plainly the kind of judgement, which, in the former texts, God has com⯑manded men to KEEP, and which, there⯑fore, ought never to be SUSPENDED;) ‘judge the fatherleſs; plead for the wi⯑dow.’ (Iſaiah i. 16, 17.)

It is alſo neceſſary to remark the divine teſtimony againſt thoſe who ſuſpended or did not "KEEP juſtice and judgement;" but, on the contrary, deviſed wicked ordinan⯑ces: [36] —‘They conceive miſchief, and bring forth iniquity. They hatch cockatrice eggs, and weave the ſpider's web,’ &c. All which may well be ſaid of thoſe who enact wicked ſtatutes to enſnare and op⯑preſs the people! And again, ‘The act of violence is in their hands. Their feet run to evil, and they make haſte to SHED INNOCENT BLOOD: their thoughts are thoughts of iniquity; WAST⯑ING AND DESTRUCTION are in their paths. THE WAY OF PEACE THEY KNOW NOT; and’ (there is) ‘NO JUDGEMENT in their goings;’ (mean⯑ing no legal judgement, or ‘due proceſs of the law;’ for the Hebrew word is [...] properly ſignifying a legal deci⯑ſion, as [...] alſo ſignifies a JUDGE;) ‘they have made them crooked paths;’ (which may ſurely be ſaid of wicked or unjuſt laws, but more eſpecially of any law to ſuſpend or annul the law itſelf!) ‘whoſoever goeth therein ſhall not know [37] PEACE. Therefore is JUDGEMENT far from us,’ (meaning that ‘the due pro⯑ceſs of the law,’ or proper LEGAL deci⯑ſion, is far from us; for it is the ſame Hebrew word as before;) ‘neither doth RIGHTEOUSNESS’ ^* (or "common right") ‘reach us,’ &c. (Iſaiah lix. 4—9.) And again, the 14th and 15th verſes of the ſame chapter, demonſtrate, that what I have already cited from it relates to the failure of juſtice and judgement, or the ſuſpenſion of due legal proceſs! ‘And judgement’ (ſaid the prophet) ‘is turned away backward; and juſtice’ ‘(or rather COMMON RIGHT’ as I have before remarked; for the Hebrew word is [...] "RIGHTEOUSNESS") ‘STANDETH A⯑FAR OFF: for TRUTH is fallen in the [38] ſtreet,’ (i. e. the TRUTH of conviction or acquittal, by legal proceſs, "is fallen,") ‘and EQUITY cannot enter;’ (which muſt generally be the caſe when WILL is ſet up above law! but hear the prophet,) ‘Yes; TRUTH’ (ſays he) ‘faileth; and he that departeth from evil maketh himſelf a prey:’ (or, as we read in the margin, "is accounted mad:" i.e. in the o⯑pinion of thoſe deteſtable politicians who ‘do evil that good may come:’) ‘and the Lord’ (Jehovah) ‘ſaw! and it diſpleaſed him that there was NO JUDGE⯑MENT!’ ( [...] — ſo that it can never be either lawful or expedient to re⯑move the "due proceſs of the law" from the reach of innocent perſons, by ſuſpen⯑ſion, or in any other manner,). ‘And he ſaw that (there was) no man:’ that is,—no man to ſtand in the gap for the defence of his ETERNAL LAW, which is explained by the 4th verſe, — ‘None calleth for juſtice,’ ( [...] more pro⯑perly [39] for RIGHTEOUSNESS, or "THE COMMON RIGHT" of the people,) ‘nor any pleadeth for truth,’ &c. [Neither prince, prelate, nor judge, it ſeems, were inclined to enter a proteſt in favour of immutable juſtice and right! — Horrible depravity!] ‘And he’ (the almighty) ‘wondered that there was no interceſſor! therefore his arm brought ſalvation unto him; and his RIGHTEOUSNESS, it ſuſ⯑tained him. For he put on RIGHTEOUS⯑NESS as a breaſt-plate: and an helmet of ſalvation’ (i. e. in behalf of the poor, and thoſe that were unjuſtly op⯑preſſed) ‘upon his head; and he put on the garments of VENGEANCE (for) cloathing; and was clad with ZEAL as a cloke.’ (And then follows, ‘THE LAW OF RETRIBUTION;’). "According to their deeds, accordingly he will repay,—FURY to his adverſaries, RECOMPENCE" (or retribution) "to his enemies, to THE ISLANDS he will REPAY RETRIBUTION!" [40] Where then (if we have any belief in God's eternal law) is the boaſted "om⯑nipotence of parliament!" Or, who can be truly "loyal," in the proper ſenſe of that epithet, but thoſe who acknowledge that the former is unchangeable, and that ‘com⯑mon right,’ and the juſtice due to in⯑nocent perſons, can never be SUSPENDED without rebellion againſt GOD! For there is no ſalvation for man without CHARI⯑TY; and our common law teaches us,— that "the higheſt" (and therefore the moſt indiſpenſable) ‘CHARITY is to do JUSTICE to all and every ſingle ſoul at ALL TIMES:’—ſo that A TIME of NECESSITY (I mean SUCH A TIME as is generally called ſo) will afford but a poor excuſe for ſo notorious a breach of this ‘FIRST principle of CHARITY;’ ‘Summa CARITAS eſt facere JUSTI⯑TIAM ſingulis et omnibus OMNI TEM⯑PORE.’ —My countrymen, in general, I fear are too depraved to bear all the [41] truths of my remonſtrance; but I cannot now be ſilent without guilt!

Many are the limitations of ‘the law of reaſon,’ (too numerous to be here re⯑cited,) which neceſſarily annul all acts of legiſlature that unhappily exceed them,^† if the ‘firſt foundation of the Engliſh law’ (already mentioned in p. 24.) be duly regarded. And the ſecond foundation of our excellent legal eſtabliſh⯑ment acknowledges no fewer limitations of legiſlature than there are divine pre⯑cepts of morality and juſtice in the Holy Scriptures. For ‘THE SECOND FOUNDA⯑TION [42] of the law of England is the LAW OF GOD:’ againſt which the haughty ‘omnipotence of parliament’ (the pope of England) has not the leaſt authority to ordain any thing! inſomuch, that ‘if ANY STATUTE is ſet forth AGAINST them, it ought to be eſteemed of NO FORCE in the law of England.’ ^‖ For, if FOUNDATIONS are removed, the whole fabric of our law and political conſtitu⯑tion muſt precipitate into deſtruction!

I appeal to the JUDGES THEMSELVES for the truths which I here aſſert. They know the foundations of our law: they know that there are many maxims of a ſupe⯑rior order ^§ which bear ample teſtimony [43] to my doctrine; that juſtice or ‘common right’ can never be ſuſpended, without ſubverting the legal conſtitution of this kingdom!—‘Si a JURE diſcedas VA⯑GUS eris, et erunt omnia omnibus IN⯑CERTA;’ ^¶ (Co. Lit. 227.) and ‘Res eſt miſera;’—‘Miſera eſt ſervitus ubi JUS eſt VAGUM aut INCERTUM;’ ^* (4 Inſt. 246.) wherefore, — ‘Juſtitia nemini neganda eſt. ^† Juſtitia eſt cuili⯑bet facienda.^‡ Injuſticia non eſt alicui [44] fa⯑cienda.^‖ Juſtitia non eſt neganda, non DIFFERENDA.’ ^§ (Jenk. Cent. 93.)— And, therefore, no plea of neceſſity what⯑ever can excuſe ſo great an evil as a SUS⯑PENSION of juſtice or common right! This is confirmed alſo by another maxim,— ‘Melius eſt OMNIA MALA pati quam malo conſentire.’ ^¶ (3 Inſt. 23.) How much ſoever any particular man, in au⯑thority, may be either inclined, or think himſelf obliged to accommodate his opi⯑nion to the preſent times of violence and injuſtice, yet, I flatter myſelf, that there is not a ſingle judge in the kingdom, who will venture to ſet his face againſt theſe indiſpenſable concluſions of reaſon; and, therefore, to the judges I have appealed for the truth of my aſſertion; that every [45] act of parliament which contains any thing in it contrary to theſe firſt ‘princi⯑ples of reaſon and honeſty,’ is null and void;—is a corruption, and not law! For ſtatutes,—‘Nec contra RATIONEM, nec contra LEGEM DIVINAM exiſtunt.’ ^* (Doct. et Stud. c. 10. de Diverſis Statu⯑tis.) becauſe ‘Hae duae leges declinari non poſſunt:’ ^† (ib. c. 17.) and becauſe the holy Scriptures denounce WO againſt the makers of unjuſt laws. — ‘Wo unto them that decree UNRIGHTEOUS DE⯑CREES,’ (or laws,) ‘and write grie⯑vouſneſs (which) they have preſcribed: to turn aſide the needy from JUDGEMENT;’ (which, in Iſrael, was a judgement of peers; the judgement of the congregation) ‘and to take away the right’ (or rather "the judgement" or "proceſs of the law;" for [46] the Hebrew word is [...]) ‘from the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey, and that they may rob the fa⯑therleſs.’ (And then follows the retri⯑bution, which proves that there never can be any NECESSITY for INJUSTICE.) ‘And what will you do in the day of viſitation, and in the deſolation (which) ſhall come from far? To whom will you flee for help? and where will ye leave your glo⯑ry?’ [or, (in the plural,) your honours?] (Iſai. x. 1—3.).

No neceſſity, therefore, whatever, can juſtify the adoption of an unrighteous or unjuſt meaſure, by any legiſlature up⯑on earth; becauſe no danger or evil what⯑ſoever is ſo much to be dreaded as God's vengeance for the failure of juſtice, judge⯑ment, and righteouſneſs; and, therefore, "common right" and equal juſtice, which belong to God, for the good of his peo⯑ple, are ſo interwoven and united with [47] the legal conſtitution of theſe kingdoms, that to ſet them aſide, by public autho⯑rity, amounts to a total ſubverſion of the common law, and, of courſe, to the legal conſtitution of theſe kingdoms, which no act of parliament can effect; for that (with reſpect to the legiſlature) would be a ſort of felo de ſe, ^† a crime of the higheſt treaſon in all who voted for it! for which they are liable to be impeach⯑ed by the great body of the nation, in caſe a political reformation ſhould take place; and precedents are not wanting for inflicting capital puniſhment on JUDG⯑ES, for enforcing unjuſt laws, though the ſame had obtained the ſanction of parliament. To ſubmit the operation of law to the WILL of the king and coun⯑cil, [48] (which is done by this ſuppoſed act,^‡) would tend to annul even THE KING'S AUTHORITY; for, it is laid down as an eſtabliſhed principle of the Britiſh conſtitution, by one of the beſt autho⯑rities in our common law, that ‘there is NO KING where WILL rules, and not law:’ ‘Non eſt enim rex, ubi dominatur voluntas et non lex;’ ſo that a king of England ceaſes to be king, when he ceaſes to be limited by the LAW; as another old conſtitutional maxim alſo informs us, ‘The law is the moſt high in⯑heritance that the king has; for, if the LAW was not, there would be NO KING nor inheritance;’ ^§ and another max⯑im [49] ſays, ‘Ceſſa regnare, ſi non vis judi⯑care.’ ‘Ceaſe to reign, if you will not do juſtice.’—The king, therefore, muſt not deny or delay common right; and the inſertion of a "non obſtante," to ſet aſide at once all the laws, ſtatutes, and uſages, of the kingdom, reſpecting THE PERSON⯑AL PROTECTION of the ſubject, is a manifeſt ſubverſion of our legal conſtitu⯑tion, and conſequently is HIGH-TREA⯑SON againſt the king, as well as againſt the ſtate, and the latter is declared to be no leſs a crime than the former;— ‘Non minor eſt proditio LEGIS, quam REGEM velle perdere.’ — So that ſuch an attempt againſt the law is not only a moſt dangerous undermining of the king's crown and dignity, but the higheſt act of treaſon and DISLOYALTY in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word: as no man can be LOYAL who votes for a general ſuſpenſion of all the LAWS and fences of that [50] moſt valuable right of the ſubject, the right to perſonal liberty!

Such a ſuſpenſion of law is too ſimilar to that non obſtante of pope Innocent IV. "whereby" (as the proctors of king Henry III. declared) ‘common right was annulled, and authentic records render⯑ed void.’—‘Per quam jus pro nihilo habetur et authentica ſcripta enervan⯑tur.’ (Judge Atkins Parl. Tracts, p. 212.) And the ſame learned judge re⯑marks, that ‘it is part of the deſcription given of antichriſt, by the prophet Da⯑niel, c. 7.’ ‘He ſhall think that he may change times and laws, and they ſhall be given into his hands.’ (P. 218.) In the following paragraph he alſo cites bp. Jewel's Expoſition upon the Epiſtle to the Theſſalonians, (fol. 131.) viz. ‘Antichriſt’ (ſays the biſhop) ‘is there called [...], a man without order or LAW, that man of ſin; which is one [51] of the peculiar notes of antichriſt.’ ‘He ſhall ſeek to be free, and go at liberty; he ſhall be tied to NO LAW, neither of God nor man.’ ‘Hence it is ſaid of the pope, that he is ‘So⯑lutus OMNI LEGE HUMANA. In iis quae VULT, eſt ei pro ratione VOLUN⯑TAS, nec eſt qui dicat illi, Domine, cur ita facis? Ille poteſt SUPRA JUS DISPEN⯑SARE, et de injuſtitia facere juſtitiam, corrigendo jura et mutando.’’

To ſet up the WILL and PLEASURE of man, therefore, above LAW, or to pre⯑tend to give a power to the king, or his privy-council, to SUSPEND the fun⯑damental LAWS of the kingdom, is to render them [...], lawleſs and un⯑limited, like the princes and powers of ANTICHRIST, foretold in the ſecond Pſalm, who ſay, — ‘Let us break their bonds aſunder, and caſt away their cords from us;’ viz. the bonds of reaſon, [50] [...] [51] [...] [52] law, and natural juſtice, and the cords of allegiance to divine authority; for, to this effect, I have ſeen a remark upon the text, by judge Atkins, though I cannot at preſent find the paſſage. An act of parliament for ſo baſe a purpoſe, as the eſtabliſhment of an unlimited power, is ſo far from deſerving the name of law, that it muſt neceſſarily be deemed a ſub⯑verſion of law; as it ſets up the will and pleaſure of man (king and council) above the operation of law, contrary to a funda⯑mental principle of the conſtitution. ‘More SECURE, as well as MORE POW⯑ERFUL, is the effect (or operation) of LAW, than the WILL and PLEASURE of man;’ ‘Firmior et potentior eſt opera⯑tio LEGIS quam DISPOSITIO hominis;’ (Co. Lit. 102.) becauſe, ‘the man who is allowed more power than is juſt and equal, will affect ſtill more than is al⯑lowed:’ ‘Cui plus licet quam par eſt, plus vult quam licet.’ (2 Inſt. 464.).

[53]From the unhappy experience of all nations, in all ages, this eſtabliſhed doc⯑trine of our common law may be amply proved; and, with reſpect to the ſup⯑poſed act in queſtion, it is certainly liable to afford ſuch opportunity and tempta⯑tion to promote unjuſt charges againſt innocent perſons; (arming a particular party with unconſtitutional powers of oppreſſion and iniquity, to intimidate all honeſt and independant people;) that it is manifeſtly a malum in ſe, (as I have ſaid,) which can never be made lawful; nay, the whole buſineſs is ſo diſ⯑loyal that it ſeems to be nothing leſs than "framing miſchief by a law," which is the moſt dangerous as well as moſt iniquitous mode of oppreſſion; becauſe it amounts to an apoſtacy from God! as the Scriptures declare, ‘Shall the throne of iniquity have fellowſhip with thee, which formeth miſ⯑chief by a law?’ (Pſ. 94.20.) And [54] again, ‘Wo be to them that decree un⯑righteous decrees, and that write griev⯑ouſneſs which they have preſcribed, to turn aſide the needy from JUDGEMENT,’ &c. The very caſe in point! Iſaiah x. 12. See pages 19, 33, 41, 44, and 45. — We are bound, by our baptiſmal vow, to "renounce the devil and all his works," and of courſe it is our duty to reſiſt and oppoſe evil to the utmoſt of our power; otherwiſe we deſerve not to be ranked with the ſervants and ſoldiers of the "prince of peace," becauſe he is, alſo, the king of RIGHTEOUSNESS; and, therefore, in a Chriſtian community, every private perſon, every individual, has an un⯑doubted right to detect and proteſt againſt every iniquity and injuſtice, even though it ſhall have obtained the ſanction of the public legiſlature; and it is a maxim of the common law, that ‘Unuſquiſque paci et juſtitiae publicae tenetur ſuccur⯑rere;’ but the judges are ſtill more [55] particularly bound (both on account of their learning and office) to point out and reject every ordinance of man that is contrary to natural juſtice and the laws of God. And ſo far is it from being their du⯑ty to obey, or enforce, any ſuch laws, that the common law has provided them a ready anſwer for refuſing the functions of their office in ſuch caſes; — ‘Contra juſtitiam nihil poſſumus:’ for, though they are officers of the king and people, and ſit in the king's judgement ſeat, judging in his name; yet their duty reſpecting common right and natural juſtice does not depend on the king, nor any other, but on GOD alone, as I have already remarked; for they ‘judge not for man, but for the Lord,’ &c. (2d Chron. xix. 6, 7.) — And again, — ‘Ye ſhall not be afraid of the face of man,’ (which excludes all partial influence of kings or any other human powers,) ‘for the judgement is God's.’ (Deut. i. [56] 16, 17.).—And all judges ought to be deeply impreſſed with that indiſpenſable doctrine of our common law, that ‘it is infinitely more heinous to offend ETER⯑NAL than TEMPORAL majeſty!’ for it is a maxim, — ‘Gravius eſt ETERNAM quam TEMPORALEM laedere MAJES⯑TATEM.’ — Thus ſtands THE LAW OF GOD reſpecting judges; and THE LAW OF GOD is always to be eſteemed an unalienable and unchangeable part of THE LAW OF ENGLAND! (See p. 42, 45.)

Both the king and his judges are ſworn (as I have already obſerved, p. 29, 30.) not to delay or deny common right; and, there⯑fore, no danger, or other evil whatſoever, (againſt which men have ever pleaded a NECESSITY of ſuſpending the laws of protection from innocent perſons,) can be ſo great an evil, or be ſo imminently dangerous in itſelf, as that very meaſure of ſuſpenſion! No NECESSITY whatſoe⯑ver [57] can be ſo deplorable, or ſo diſgrace⯑fully injurious to the ſtate, as the meaſure itſelf! and, therefore, there never can be a neceſſity for ſuch a MEASURE; and the ſame may be ſaid, with unqueſtionable truth, concerning every other MEASURE of oppreſſion and injuſtice; but more par⯑ticularly may it be ſaid of that other moſt notorious and iniquitous mode of ſuſpend⯑ing, or rather annulling, all the laws of Britiſh freedom, in the caſe of ſeamen; I mean the IMPRESSING ^‡ them into ſer⯑vice [58] by force and violence, which the moſt diſſolute of public miniſters never pre⯑ſumed [59] to palliate, or excuſe, by any o⯑ther plea than this mere bugbear, NE⯑CESSITY!

[60]It is a practice ſo notoriouſly repugnant to common right and equity, ſo funda⯑mentally [61] ſubverſive of the moſt eſſential and indiſpenſable principles of our happy [62] legal eſtabliſhment; and, at the ſame time, ſo impious a violation of that na⯑tural [63] equality, with reſpect to law, juſ⯑tice, and perſonal protection, which the [64] Almighty himſelf has commanded to be maintained "without reſpect of perſons;" [65] that even an act of parliament cannot make it lawful; for ‘God is no reſpecter of perſons.’ (Acts x. 34) ‘He ac⯑cepteth not the perſons of princes, nor re⯑gardeth the rich MORE THAN POOR; for they are all the work of his hands.’ (Job. xxxiv. 19.) ‘He hath made the ſmall and the great, AND CARETH FOR ALL ALIKE.’ (Wiſdom, vi. 7.) And, with reſpect to equal juſtice, God's direction to judges is part of the moral law, which is ſtill binding,—‘they ſhall judge the peo⯑ple with JUST JUDGEMENT. Thou ſhalt not wreſt judgement. Thou SHALT NOT RESPECT PERSONS; neither take [66] a gift,’ ^* &c. (Deut. xvi. 18.) The faſhionable ſneer, therefore, of ſome mo⯑dern lawyers, againſt the juſt doctrine concerning "the equality of mankind," ſavours of a lamentable ignorance in the firſt principles of their profeſſion, relating to "common right" or juſtice!

[67]All that I have ſaid againſt the ſuppoſed act for ſuſpending the law, would be e⯑qually applicable to an act of parliament for impreſſing either ſeamen, or any other rank or denomination of Britiſh ſubjects: becauſe it would be a real ſuſpenſion (with reſpect to one part of the community) of all the moſt valuable acts of parliament which are deemed the pillars of the con⯑ſtitution, though the learned judge Foſter has proſtituted his pen by aſſerting that it is ‘not inconſiſtent with any ſtatute.’ That learned man, ſurely, did not con⯑ſider that the practice of impreſſing (as now carried on) neceſſarily includes the circumſtances of ‘taking’ and ‘im⯑priſoning’ without ‘due proceſs of the law;’ which is expreſſly prohibited not only by one ſtatute, but by many ſta⯑tutes. The very firſt ſtatute in our book ordains, that ‘No freeman ſhall be TA⯑KEN or IMPRISONED, &c. but by the [68] lawful judgement of his peers, or by the LAW OF THE LAND:’ which, in a⯑nother recital, by parliamentary authority, is explained to ſignify ‘proceſs of the law.’—And another venerable ſtatute (which, like Magna Charta, has been ſo frequently confirmed by other acts of parliament, in different periods, that no ſingle parliament can have ſufficient au⯑thority to repeal it) expreſſly ordains, that ‘No man, of what eſtate or condition that he be,’ (ſo that there can be no excep⯑tion of SEAMEN,) ‘ſhall be put out of land or tenements, nor TAKEN, nor IMPRISONED, nor diſinherited,’ (and the protection of THE LAW is already ſhewn to be our moſt valuable inheritance,) ‘nor put to death, without being brought to anſwer by DUE PROCESS OF LAW.’ Stat. 28 Ed. III. c. 3. This excellent ſtatute, and the clauſe above quoted from the Great-Charter, are both expreſſly re⯑cited and confirmed in the Bill of Rights, [69] (3 Cha. I. c. 1.) and alſo in the act for regulating the privy-council, (16 Cha. I. c. 10.)—So that judge Foſter's aſſertion in favour of preſſing, viz. that it is ‘not in⯑conſiſtent with any ſtatute,’ is an unpar⯑donable inſtance of diſingenuity! For what "due proceſs of law" can be pointed out to juſtify or warrant the taking, im⯑priſoning, and diſinheriting, (of his moſt va⯑luable inheritance, THE LAW) an innocent ſailor? — An admiralty-warrant cannot be conſidered as a ‘due proceſs of the law,’ to juſtify any ſuch taking, im⯑priſoning, &c. becauſe it is founded on no other authority than that of ‘the king and council,’ whoſe warrant, for any ſuch purpoſes, is rendered totally illegal by authority of an act of parliament, ſtill in force; (16 Cha. I. c. 10.) ſo that if a judge ſhould preſume to remand a man to confinement, that has been ‘taken and impriſoned’ by any ſuch warrant, (which is illegal, and of courſe no ‘pro⯑ceſs [70] of law,’) he would be liable to an impeachment of high-treaſon to the ſtate: for promoting an illegal power and pre⯑tenſion of the crown, in direct oppoſition to a ſolemn act of the whole legiſlature!

For the ſame reaſons, every magiſ⯑trate who preſumes to back a preſs-war⯑rant is alſo highly criminal, and makes himſelf an adviſer and party, in a moſt notorious breach of the king's peace! becauſe the effect of promoting an illegal warrant, to ſuſpend (as much as in him lies) the laws of the king's peace, common right, and perſonal protection, from any of the king's ſubjects, (and this even in the king's name,) muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend alſo, at the ſame time, the allegiance of the perſons injured, for ſo a long time as they are in any actual danger; and they are permitted, even by the FIRST foun⯑dation [71] of the Engliſh law, ^* ‘to repel force with force, and to defend themſelves and their own property againſt UNJUST violence.’ And they are not deemed guilty of murder, even if they kill the aſſailants, provided the killing be inevi⯑table in their defence; and that they can⯑not otherwiſe maintain their rights.—Nay, men are not only juſtified in defend⯑ing themſelves with force and arms, but may alſo legally defend and reſcue any o⯑ther perſon whatever, that is attacked or oppreſſed by an unlawful violence, though he be totally unknown to the reſcuers!— For this was literally the caſe of Hopkins, Hugget, and three others, (an adjudged caſe in B. R. 18 Car. 2.) who, in at⯑tempting to reſcue a ſtranger from the [72] cuſtody of ſome preſs-maſters, in Smith⯑field, happened to kill one of them.—‘This was but man-ſlaughter,’ (ſays Ld. C. J. Holt,^†) ‘for, when the liberty of [73] one ſubject is invaded, it affects all the reſt: it is a provocation to all people, as [74] being of ill example and pernicious conſe⯑quence.’

In ſhort, that excellent adage for all the ordinary circumſtances of life, viz. "Honeſty the beſt POLICY," will be found to hold equally good in real poli⯑tics, or affairs of government, even throughout the moſt dangerous and a⯑larming difficulties and emergencies of ſtate; becauſe (if we entertain any real be⯑lief in divine Providence) examples may be produced, from the hiſtories of all na⯑tions, to demonſtrate, that the crafty re⯑finements of mere worldly policy do fre⯑quently [75] haſten or produce the very evils they were intended to avert! An ad⯑miniſtration of government, therefore, which cannot ſubſiſt with law, juſtice, and common honeſty, is unfit to ſubſiſt at all! be⯑cauſe law is the only baſis of good and law⯑ful government; ſo that no man can be eſ⯑teemed truly loyal who thinks otherwiſe; and though ſeveral precedents for ſuſ⯑pending THE LAW (both in preſſing and other caſes) may eaſily be produced; yet they can afford no juſtification or ex⯑cuſe for ſuch meaſures; becauſe the ini⯑quity of them ſtill remains, and ‘Malum quo communius eo pejus;’ ſo that the citing bad preſidents is a manifeſt aggravation of the treaſon! And it is a maxim,—that ‘PEACE IS THE LIFE OF THE COM⯑MONWEALTH, LIBERTY THE SOUL OF IT, AND THE LAWS IT'S BODY.’—‘VITA REIPUBLICAE PAX, ET A⯑NIMUS LIBERTAS, ET CORPUS LE⯑GES.’ —And, therefore, the hateful [76] meaſure of SUSPENDING THE LAWS, under a pretended neceſſity of carrying on a cruel WAR againſt the advocates for LIBERTY, ought to be deemed an at⯑tempt to deſtroy the LIFE, SOUL, and BODY, of the republic!