[]

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITION DURING THE Laſt Seſſion of Parliament.

DUBLIN: PRINTED FOR THE COMPANY OF BOOKSELLERS. M,DCC,LXXIX.

ADVERTISEMENT.

[]

THE preſent ſituation of Public Affairs calls forcibly upon every good Subject, to exert himſelf in the Public Service. Every individual poſſeſſes a power, which can aid and ſupport his country. He can draw his ſword in her defence, contribute to her reſources, or combat with argument, and expoſe to juſt indignation, thoſe, who have proved themſelves her internal, and conſequently, her unnatural enemies.

The Author of the following Eſſay has long entertained an opinion, that the moſt formidable foes of Great Britain were nurſed in her own boſom: Theſe, under the maſque of Patriotiſm, fomented rebellion in her Colonies; and by expoſing her pretended weakneſs, created a combination of powerful States, not only againſt her intereſt, but her very exiſtence, as a great and independent Kingdom.

In the emergency, which is the reſult of that combination, two objects ſeem neceſſary to the [iv] Public Safety. Theſe are, the knowledge of our friends from our enemies; and that ſpirited exertion, which alone can extricate us, from our preſent ſituation. If the facts advanced, and encouragements exhibited, in the following Eſſay, ſhall contribute to throw light, on the one; or to add vigour to the other, the Writer has attained his purpoſe.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITION.

[]

IN every age, and almoſt in every country, the ambition, which is inherent in human nature, has prompted individuals to aſpire to diſtinction and pre-eminence, among their fellowcitizens. The means, uſed to obtain thoſe objects, are various; as to render them ſucceſsful they muſt be accommodated to the ſpirit of the government, under which they are applied. In deſpotic monarchies, the favour of the Prince, who is the fountain of all preferment, is generally procured by intrigue or addreſs. In republics, influence and authority are acquired, by gaining the confidence, or by ſeducing the principles of the people; and, in mixed governments, like that of Great Britain, [2] the neareſt road to power lies between thoſe two extremes.

The Revolution, which happened about ninety years ago, though it made but few changes in the forms of authority, eſtabliſhed a balance of influence, between the Crown and the People. The firſt retained the eſſence, but loſt much of the terror of power. The repreſentatives of the latter having a great deal to beſtow, as a body, thought themſelves, as individuals, entitled to a ſhare in a government, which they ſupported. A mutual dependence was created, by the poſſeſſion of the means of conferring mutual favours. A Prince, who ſtood in need of ſupplies, was directed, by common prudence, where to chuſe his ſervants. But as candidates were more numerous than offices, the diſappointed never failed to perſecute the ſucceſsful, till, by watching faults, errors, or misfortunes, they obtained their point, and they themſelves became, in their turn, the objects of attack.

As a degree of the public confidence was neceſſary to direct the Sovereign in his choice of ſervants, men who wiſhed to be employed, took care to ſupport, in their public appearances, the principles and perhaps the prejudices of the people. An habitual jealouſy of the power [3] of the Crown, kept open the ears of the public to every alarm. Scarce any meaſure of Government could be ſo free from error, as not to be vulnerable on ſome popular ground. Every Oppoſition ſeized this obvious advantage, and aſſumed or obtained the title of "the popular party." No diſtinction was made, in this reſpect, between Whig and Tory. Each party, when out of place, adopted the ſame principles; and thus both were alternately dignified with the once honourable name of PATRIOTS.

The preſent reign began, with advantages, calculated to put an end to fooliſh diſtinctions, which ought to have expired, with the prejudices, on which they had been founded. A young prince had ſucceeded to the throne, who diſdained to govern his people through the medium of a faction. The door of preferment was laid open to all his ſubjects; but though this liberal conduct might have pleaſed the unprejudiced, it was incapable of extinguiſhing party among the intereſted. Theſe, though of different principles and characters, by impoſing on the weak and credulous, formed new factions, on the ſhadows of departed political tenets. However heterogeneous before, the heat of reſentment, and rage of diſappointment, as it were, gradually melted them into one maſs; [4] and they revived in themſelves the name, though little of the principles of WHIGS.

The vehemence of the preſent Oppoſition ſeems to have carried them to extremities, which ſuperſede all former deſcriptions of party, and which cannot fail to defeat their views. In former times, the candidates for public favour thought it prudent to adhere, in their exhibitions, to public principles. But in our times, an eagerneſs to thwart the meaſures of Government has expelled all regard for the opinions of the people. The dignity and honour of the nation were formerly the favourite themes of Oppoſitions; melancholy, meanneſs, and deſpair, now fill the whole circle of patriotic oratory. With a want of prudence, as well as of decency, they tie up the hands of their country in the hour of danger. They not only juſtify rebellion, againſt her authority, but indirectly promote a foreign war againſt her very exiſtence: By magnifying the power of her opponents, they endeavour to depreſs her ſpirits; by expoſing her real or pretended weakneſs, they wiſh to inſpire her enemies with a confidence of ſucceſs.

Theſe ſtrange poſitions, and many more of the ſame kind, might be eſtabliſhed, on inconteſtible authorities, by a plain narrative of the [5] conduct of oppoſition, ſince the commencement of the preſent parliament. But, the purſuing them through ſuch a variety of matter, and ſuch a length of time, would be a taſk of great labour, and little entertainment. We ſhall, therefore, confine ourſelves to the moſt ſtriking features of the laſt ſeſſion. In the ſpace of ſeven months, they have contrived to croud together moſt of the abſurdities of ſeven years; and, though the ſtudied brevity of this diſquiſition muſt neceſſarily exclude many circumſtances, enough, we truſt, will appear to ſhew the principles, deſigns, and views of ſo ſtrange a confederacy.

On the 26th of November, 1778, the fifth ſeſſion of the preſent parliament was opened, with a ſpeech from the throne. A complaint of the perfidy of France, in commencing hoſtilities, and the obſtinacy of America, in refuſing terms, together with a requeſt of ſupport, were the chief heads of the ſpeech. It expreſſed, at the ſame time, a regret "that the efforts of his Majeſty had not been attended with all the ſucceſs which the juſtice of the cauſe, and the vigour of exertions, ſeemed to promiſe." Unanimity was, in the uſual form, recommended; and ſurely no period in hiſtory more required the unanimous exertion of the whole nation.

[6] Oppoſition have denominated themſelves "an active Oppoſition;" and if zeal in thwarting, aſſiduity in obſtructing, and ſucceſs in defeating public meaſures, merit a deſignation, which implies a kind of applauſe, they are certainly entitled to that name. The unanimity and concert, which their Sovereign requeſted, for the ſupport of the intereſts and honour of the nation, exiſt only among them, for the ruin of the one, and the tarniſhing of the other. A ſhort detail of the principles, which they advanced in the firſt exhibitions of the ſeaſon, will eſtabliſh the truth of this obſervation. The orators in the Lower Houſe mixed reflections on the paſt, with prophecies of future diſaſters. The firſt we ſhall ſubmit to the judgment of the Reader; ſeveral of the latter have been already refuted by time.

Oppoſition opened the political campaign, with aſſertions, which had been often refuted; and with predictions of national diſaſters, which their own conduct ſeemed, uniformly, calculated to realize. As the public misfortunes may be deduced, from the rebellion in America, they aſſerted, contrary to fact, that hoſtilities had been firſt commenced by government. They recurred to their uſual prophecies, relative to foreign wars; and they even went ſo far as to arm Holland, our ancient ally, againſt this devoted [7] kingdoma To ſow diſcontents, among the militia, they alleged, that the officers had been ſcandalouſly neglectedb. To excite mutiny in the army and navy, they aſſerted that Government had employed no commander of an army, no admiral of a fleet, whom they had not diſgraced, or with whom they had not quarrelledc. With a contradiction in terms, which neither folly nor rage itſelf could juſtify, they averred that Miniſtry had ſucceeded in no inſtance; yet that fortune had been favourable in every inſtance, during the whole campaignd. They owned, that unanimity was abſolutely neceſſary for the ſafety of their country; yet, with peculiar honeſty, avowed "that they would clog the wheels of government, when it ought to be aſſiſted by every mane."

Though the clogging the wheels of Government at home, and their encouraging the ſeditious abroad, had been the obvious cauſe of the riſe and progreſs of the American war, they traced the cauſe of the war to the pretended tyranny of Great-Britainf. Though America had continued an atrocious rebellion for many years, [8] againſt her parent and benefactreſs; yet they affirmed, that a war againſt America "is againſt our own country." Though the Americans have been declared rebels, by all the ſolemnity of law, by all the forms of the conſtitution, "they are ſtill our fellow-ſubjects, and every blow we ſtrike is againſt ourſelvesh." Though they have broke capitulationsi, diſregarded flags of trucek, violated conventions, trampled on every principle of war, that governs civilized nationsl; "yet as their war is a war of paſſionm," we ought "to withdraw our forces entirely from their coaſtn." Though "offenſive war is pointed out as proper for this countryo," war ought not "to be offenſive with reſpect to America." With unexampled abſurdity, they alleged, that rebels in arms had a better right to "a relaxation of hoſtilities," than foreign enemies, whom the alliance of thoſe rebels had excited againſt their country. With a perverſion of terms, unknown, in any other times, they aſſerted, that men, whoſe hands are daily ſtained with the blood of their countrymen, [9] ought to be treated not as enemies, but as peaceable fellow-ſubjects and friendso.

In the Upper Aſſembly the zeal of Patriotiſm, as ſpringing from higher ground, roſe to a greater height. Not content to amend the Addreſs to the Throne, it was inſiſted, that no Addreſs at all ſhould be madep. It was aſſerted that our armies were either mouldered away, by death, deſertion, and ſickneſs, or reduced by loſs in battleq. That our commerce was totally loſt, our public credit drawing to annihilation, our fleet on the verge of abſolute ruinr. That nothing could ſave the empire, but withdrawing our troops from America, acknowledging her independence, and imploring her forgiveneſss. That it would be even imprudent, if not impoſſible, to perſiſt in a war againſt Francet. That Spain would aid France; that Holland, as a commercial ſtate, would treat with America; that the whole world would join againſt us; that we were without men, without money, without an ally; that nothing, in ſhort, could [10] ſave the ſtate, but an immediate diſmiſſion of all his Majeſty's preſent ſervants, and the placing the reins of Government, in the hands of Oppoſitionu

Aſſertions, which carried along with them their own refutation, were not likely to make converts within, nor proſelytes without doors. But what the party could not effect by facts and arguments, they endeavoured to accompliſh, by addreſs and intrigue. Miſmanagements, and a conſequent want of ſuceeſs, on every ſide of the war, had convinced the nation, that there was an error in planning at home, or a defect in the execution abroad. Generals and Admirals had returned, from their different commands, not only without laurels, but ſome of them covered with diſgrace or misfortune. The coldneſs, with which they had been received, by their country, had raiſed their reſentment, as it hurt their pride. As Government brought forward no accuſation againſt them, the preſumption was, that they themſelves were partly to blame. As men of little prudence and conſiderable names, are the fitteſt tools for the hands of party, Oppoſition took care to ſecure engines, which they hoped to play off with advantage, on the enemy.

[11] G [...]l B [...]ne, though a man ſpirit, of conducted himſelf, as if political prudence formed no part of his character. His enemies remarked, that he came from America, where he had loſt an army, with as much confidence, as Terentius Varro returned to Rome, from the fatal fields of Cannae. Men, in general, have leſs blamed his conduct abroad, than his behaviour at home. His accepting a leave of abſence from a Congreſs, who had ſhamefully evaded hs own convention, the remembrance of recent misfortunes, and a ſuſpicion of former errors, juſtified the court, in adhering to an etiquette, which excludes officers, who have been unfortunate, from the Royal Preſence, till they are acquitted by a Court Martial.

The General forgot his own errors, if ſuch exiſted, and remembered only, what he thought, the ſeverity of Government. He alſo forgot, that he had left his captive fellow-ſoldiers, whom he ought to have protected from inſult and oppreſſion, by his preſence; and he even, eluded orders given him to return to their aid, in their melancholy and ſevere captivity. It was obſerved, upon the whole, that regret and pity were all he could hope to meet with; but, it ſeems, he expected approbation. Reſentment aroſe, in his mind, as from injuſtice; [12] and with a precipitancy, which cannot eaſily be defended, he either ſought or accepted the protection of Oppoſition.

Sir W [...] H [...]e had, indeed, loſt no army, but as he had deciſively improved no advantage, the American war rather increaſed, than diminiſhed, upon his hands. Poſſeſſed of the common routine of military knowledge, he ſeems to have been capable of ſecuring from defeat ſuch troops as be led againſt ſuch an enemy: But the conducting them to any brilliant victory, and the making a deciſive uſe of the ſuperiority he enjoyed, appear to have been objects foreign to his talents. Senſible, perhaps, of this defect, in his own mind, he choſe to prevent any reverie of fortune by retiring from the command of the army; but as "military ſeceſſions," in the midſt of war, require an explanation, his retreat was aſcribed to his having loſt the confidence of men in power. The fact might be true, but it was not ſufficient, to ſatisfy the people. Though he was received with kindneſs by the Sovereign, and attention by the Miniſtry, he perceived that he was vaniſhing faſt from the memory of the nation. In the ſpace of a few months, he found himſelf of as little account, in the eſtimation of the Public, as any of his own commiſſaries; [13] and, to recover his reputation, he cloſed eagerly, with Oppoſition; as they promiſed him their hearty aſſiſtance, in a Parliamentary Inquiry.

To theſe lucky aids from America, the party added a ſtill greater acquiſition in Europe. An Admiral poſſeſſed of profeſſional reputation, equal at leaſt to his merit, though connected with Oppoſition, was placed at the head of the Weſtern Squadron. The ſelecting men of oppoſing principles, for the command of fleets and armies, has been long a favourite maxim of Government. This conduct may have had its foundation in liberal ſentiments; but it has operated like weakneſs, and led to a train of miſfortunes. Few officers are ſuch "ſturdy moraliſts," as to exclude political prejudices from the line of their duty.

Our Admiral put to ſea, with one of the moſt powerful ſquadrons, that ever ſailed, from the ports of this kingdom. He met the enemy; and a running fight, rather than an engagement, enſued. No trophies were loſt; but no laurels were gained. The profeſſional terms, in which the accounts of naval actions are involved, render them obſcure, if not unintelligible, [14] to the generality of mankind. One fact, however, was univerſally admitted: "A ſuperior Britiſh fleet had engaged an inferior French ſquadron; and neither advantage nor trophy was obtained."

A nation, accuſtomed to value themſelves upon naval victories, were not likely to be ſatisfied with a drawn battle, under ſuch circumſtances. But though no ſymptoms of approbation appeared, no ſigns of reſentment were ſhown. A cold ſilence certainly prevailed; a ſpecies of cenſure, more mortifying to a feeling mind, than even clamour. Had the Admiral been permitted to remain, under this cloud, he would have become a uſeleſs engine, in the hands of his party. To derive benefit from his former popularity, it was found neceſſary to remove the ſtain, which want of ſucceſs had left upon his character. Some officers, in his ſuite, were, accordingly, induced to propagate inſinuations, to the diſadvantage of Vice-Admiral Sir H [...] P [...]r. That gentleman, by being in place, might be ſuppoſed to act in concert with men in power, for the ruin of his Admiral; and to make the former the accuſer was to arm the prejudices of the people in favour of the latter.

[15] The Vice Admiral being a man of more ſpirit than foreſight, unfortunately fell into the trap laid for him by the faction. Conſcious of his deſerving praiſe, inſtead of cenſure, for his behaviour on the 27th of July, he became irritated at the injuſtice done to his reputation. From being the accuſed, he became the accuſer; and this ſtep turned the ſcale of opinion in favour of his opponent. In this circumſtance alone the gallant Vice-Admiral, as it afterwards appeared, was to blame. Had he demanded and inſiſted upon his own trial, his character would have recovered its deſerved luſtre; and that of the Admiral might have loſt much of that ſplendour which was thrown upon it, by his induſtrious friends.

A party, who had loſt the confidence of the nation, ſeized with eagerneſs the ſudden change which appeared in the popular tide. Whiſpers artfully propagated, without doors, were improved by degrees into a general clamour. Within doors, every opportunity was taken, and every artifice uſed to feed the riſing flame. The two Admirals, if a vulgar expreſſion may be uſed, were pitted againſt each other. Much ſport, or what is the ſame thing to Oppoſition, much miſchief, was expected from this conteſt. A man of popularity was accuſed, by a man [16] in office. The common changes of miniſterial interference were rung, without ceaſing, in the ears of the people. The helpleſs condition of INNOCENCE, when perſecuted by POWER, was echoed, from every corner, by the runners, writers, and abettors of Oppoſition. The two houſes of Parliament reſounded with vehement declamations, or broken accents of whining oratory; and that amiable but much abuſed virtue, pity, was excited, every where, in the breaſts of the deluded, the credulous and the weak.

In vain had Sir H [...] P [...]r declared, in the moſt ſolemn and public manner, that he had not communicated his deſign to any man in office. In vain did men in office affirm, upon the faith of Gentlemen, that they knew nothing of the accuſation, till it was officially delivered to the Admiralty. No credit was to be given to any member of a Tory Adminiſtration. They were leagued together in one plan of oppreſſion, in one dark deſign, in one pre-concerted conſpiracy, to ruin the reputation, and even to take the life, of a Whig Admiral.

In this general turmoil, this intemperate joy of faction, Oppoſition not only forgot their poor country, but even their poor [17] friends. Sir W [...] H [...]could not gain their promiſed ſupport, for a moment, with all the verdure of his laurels. The advantages hoped from his exculpation were not equal in themſelves, and they were more diſtant in proſpect, than the benefits to be drived from the acquittal of Admiral K [...]l. In vain did General B [...]ne endeavour to awake the pity of the party, when he failed to command their attention. In vain did he exclaim "that he was one of thoſe brave men who made the convention at Saratoga: That, however, he claimed no ſingle merit in that tranſaction; that, in the face of famine, deſpair, and death, he had compelled the enemy to grant conditions, honourable, if they had been complied withx." The party were deaf to "the tale of tears;" and all the attention paid to the unfortunate general ſcarce amounted to one "dolorous anhelationy," from the feeling boſom of Mr. E [...]d B [...]ke.

The conduct of Oppoſition, during the trial, and after the acquittal of A [...]l K [...]l, is too recent in the recollection of the public, to require more than a very general recapitulation. [18] Their abrogating the old forms of the Admiralty, by removing a trial for a naval offence to the land, to accommodate their own purpoſes, their appearance at Portſmouth, upon the occaſion, their biaſſing witneſſes, their carrying all the indecencies of a play-houſe audience into a Court of Juſtice, their ſoliciting the officers of the navy, their ſowing diſcontents among the common ſeamen, their parading the ſtreets, for the purpoſe of inflaming the populace, were ſuch mean, ſcandalous, and unjuſtifiable tricks of faction, as can ſcarcely be paralleled by any example in hiſtory.

The pitiful victory which they obtained over an unfortunate, becauſe a vehement, man, was purſued with an intemperance inexcuſable even in boys, and with a rancour which the moſt profligate and hard-hearted men, if prudent, would have concealed, to preſerve, at leaſt, the appearance of decency. That men of the firſt families, in this country, ſhould diſguiſe themſelves like porters to force illuminations by breaking windows, is a circumſtance which throws an indelible ſtain upon the times, as well as on the party. It even appeared, that, with every inclination to commit miſchief, the riotous demagogues were obliged to have recourſe to the bottle, for that courage which nature [19] had denied. That in the hour of "intoxication and adſcititious boldneſs," they attacked the feeble and old among the men, and terrified into fits and miſcarriages ſeveral women, by the rude barbarity of their behaviour. That, however, as a juſt retribution for their wanton cruelties, many of them ſuffered under the hands and cudgels of the injured; and that ſeveral were carried into Roundhouſes, covered with ignominious marks of the chaſtiſement they had received.

Few men of ſenſe, who were not connected with the views, or privy to the deſigns of the party, could perceive any juſt grounds for this ſpecies of vulgar ovation. Though the accuſer had not brought his charges to the ſtandard of legal proof, the accuſed had not exculpated himſelf to the ſatisfaction of the public. Thoſe who were moſt willing to deny his want of conduct, regretted his want of good fortune; and a general cry went forth, that an opportunity was loſt, which might never return again.

The conduct of the Admiral himſelf, on the occaſion, was not calculated to eſtabliſh any high idea of his good ſenſe or of his principles. If he thought that he merited a triumph for the drawn battle of the 27th of July, 1778, what [20] are we to think of his underſtanding? If, on the other hand, he made himſelf the tool of a faction, what judgment muſt we form of that "dignified honour" which his friends annex to his character? A victory, which had lain concealed for ſeven months, and was, at length, diſcovered by accident, was not, intrinſically, worth the expence of many candles; and the applauſe of a mob is the coarſeſt commodity either a gentleman or his friends can purchaſe.

But the Faction, as well as their naval friend, acted as if they really gave credit to their own aſſertions and aſſumptions. Whilſt HE paraded the ſtreets amidſt the fooliſh, if not hired, acclamations of a rabble, THEY were buſy in weaving a wreath, for his brows, in both Houſes of Parliament. Thinking, at length, they had ſufficiently charged the engine with popularity, they reſolved to bring it to bear, not only upon Adminiſtration, but upon their Sovereign. They propoſed to make motions, againſt the former, on naval ſubjects; he undertook, with peculiar modeſty, to write reſcripts to the latter. Even before this double battery was opened, Oppoſition began to preenjoy their expected ſucceſs with that childiſh intemperance which has uniformly marked their conduct.

[21] A [...]l K [...]l having acquired, in the beginning of March, as many laurels as he was likely to obtain, his honourable relation, Mr. F [...]x, introduced the firſt of a long ſtring of motions, which, he owned, led to an addreſs for the removal of the firſt Lord of the Admiralty, and ultimately of all his Majeſty's ſervantsz. In ſupport of the motion, he alleged, that the noble Lord, who preſided over the naval department, had, as early as the month of November 1777, ſolemnly pledged himſelf, in his official capacity, that there were thirty five ſhips of the line ready for ſea, and fit for actual ſervice. That, notwithſtanding this aſſertion, there were not ſix ſhips of the line, in a ſtate to meet an enemy, in the month of March 1778. That early in the month of June, his honourable relationa was ſent to cruize, on the coaſt of France, with twenty ſhips of the line only; though it was known, or ought to have been known, that there were twenty-ſeven ſhips of force lying in Breſt water. From theſe ſuppoſed facts, he deduced this concluſion, that the Miniſtry, who had led the nation into ſo perilous a ſituation, ought inſtantly to be removed, [22] as unequal to the truſt committed to their chargeb.

In oppoſition to theſe aſſertions, it was proved, from official documents, that, in November 1777, there were actually thirty-five ſhips of the line ready for ſervice. That in the month of March 1778, ſome more ſhips were in a ſtate of great forwardneſs for ſea. That the whole number, fit for meeting an enemy in June, amounted to forty-four. That when Mr. K [...]l was ordered to ſail, with twenty ſhips of the line, of which a large proportion was three-deckers, there were but ſeventeen ſhips in the harbour of Breſt ready for action. That ſhould it even appear, which was by no means the caſe, that there actually was a greater number of ſhips in Breſt, it was well known to ſeamen, that an inferior force may block up a ſuperior one in a narrow harbour. That, upon the whole, the Board of Admiralty had placed a number of ſhips, adequate to the ſervice, under the command of A [...]l K [...]l; even to the ſatisfaction and approbation of the Admiral himſelf. That, therefore, as the premiſes, endeavoured to be eſtabliſhed by Oppoſition, were not founded in [23] fact, their concluſions muſt of courſe fall to the groundc.

Such were the aſſertions, which Oppoſition, mixed with much abuſe and altercation, repeatedly echoed, from ſide to ſide, in both Houſes. Though the public, as well as Parliament, are frequently invited to an entertainment of politics, by ſome very eloquent Patriots, the diſh ſerved up is always the ſame. To uſe their own expreſſion, "they have travelled ſo often over the ground," that they have trod out every appearance of vegetation; and thoſe who are ſo idle as to accompany them in the "dreary journey," can neither expect amuſement, nor reap advantage.

The operations of the party, without doors, were more deciſive than their arguments within. Confident of ſucceſs, or aſſuming the appearance of confidence, they had previouſly gained the votes of ſeveral provident members, who wiſely look into futurity. Lazy Whigs and expecting patriots were roundly told, that to ſhare in the ſpoil it was neceſſary to take an active part in obtaining the victory. Mandates were iſſued for the immediate appearance of all [24] abſentees, from every corner of the kingdom. The beds of the ſick, the couches of the gouty and lame were viſited; leaders were ſent to the blind. In ſhort, patriotiſm crowded the lobbies of both Houſes, with all the mortifying pictures of age, misfortune and diſeaſe.

To aid, with a ſpecies of mutiny among ſeamen, the attacks of Oppoſition upon Admiralty, the ſeeds of ſedition had been ſown with a laviſh hand at Portſmouth. Officers had been attacked through their ruling paſſions; the vain with flattery, the weak with fallacious reaſonings, and the avaricious and ambitious with promiſes. To add indecency to preſumption and folly, the nation was threatened, with what is vulgarly called a Round Robin, from every ſeaport. An Admiral, who had made ſuch a ſplendid figure on the 27th of July, 1778, dared to ſay to his ſovereign, that he would withdraw his talents from the ſervice, unleſs the Admiralty, and every department of the State, were placed in the hands of men whom he could truſt.

Oppoſition drove, with ſo much rapidity and ſo little judgment, that they overturned their own deſigns. Their mean, and even criminal conduct, offended the people; and the Sovereign, [25] with becoming dignity, rejected their inſolent requiſitions. The current turned againſt them, and their ſpirit vaniſhed when their hopes declined. The nation diſcovered their inſidious deſigns, their luſt for power, their thirſt for places. It was perceived that they meant to ſacrifice Great Britain, her rights, her intereſts, and even honour, to the demagogues of America, by rendering her independent of the parent from whom ſhe ſprung. Even thoſe who had been ſeduced by their aſſurances, or gained by their promiſes, finding their miſtake, began to retreat. The friends whom they had brought from the country, by a ſpecies of habeas corpus, packed up their cloak-bags and left the town. The beds of the ſick, and couches of the lame, were re-occupied; and even the blind found their way home. Ad [...]l K [...]l executed his threats againſt his devoted country, by quitting her ſervice. The muddy ſtream, which had overflowed the whole kingdom, and covered it with ſlime, returned to its old bed; and babbled, as formerly, through the rugged channel of Oppoſitionc.

[26] The hopes of the Faction had been raiſed ſo high, that diſappointment depreſſed their minds in proportion to their former elevation. Some, who either ignorantly or fondly imagined that the nation would take their part, began to talk of a ſeceſſion. A few orators are ſaid to have actually retired, to vent the tropes of unfiniſhed ſpeeches to the "echo of trees and murmur of rills" on ſome friend's eſtate.d. But as "liſtleſs groves and inſenſible ſtreams" are not the moſt encouraging audiences, the ſolitary patriots were induced to rejoin their friends, who, though defeated, ſtill remained in the field.

Whilſt the expectations of Oppoſition were at their height, by the aid received from A [...]l K [...]l's acquittal, a new topic was ſtarted, which, as it promiſed much miſchief to their country, opened a freſh proſpect of advantage to the party. The trade of Ireland, and conſequently its revenue, had been on the decline for ſome years paſt. The cauſes of that misfortune are more difficult to aſcertain than the fact itſelf. Whether this diminution of commerce [27] proceeded from a decreaſe of the domeſtic induſtry, or a failure of foreign markets, it equally demanded a remedy, if it could be applied. Some ſteps had been accordingly taken, toward that object, in the preceding ſeſſion. But it appeared, at the time, that the facility with which relief was granted, inſtead of ſatisfying Oppoſition, was calculated to create new demands. Theſe demands, as they interfered with the commerce of Great Britain, were certain of being oppoſed: a circumſtance, which could not fail to create the deſirable confuſion which ſuits the views of the party.

To thoſe, who really wiſhed to remove the evil, it appeared that the Iriſh legiſlature ought to be the beſt judges of the remedy. But neither that legiſlature, nor their conſtituents, had ſignified any diſſatisfaction at the relief obtained. To convince both of the impropriety of their peaceable conduct, Oppoſition, by making demands in the name of Ireland, pointed out what ſhe might extort from Great Britain. This artifice, they hoped, would reduce the Miniſtry to a diſagreeable dilemma. Should they grant the demanded relief to the Iriſh, they could not fail to offend the whole commercial intereſt in great Britain: ſhould they refuſe it, there was a proſpect, by proper management, [28] of creating tumults, and, perhaps, of kindling a rebellion in Ireland.

Though this commercial adventure has not yet been productive of all the profit expected by the Faction, as the ſhip is ſtill at ſea, the cargo may turn out to ſome account. The inferior Iriſh are, and have been in a diſtreſſed ſituation. The nature of the government, the tenures of the country, a liſtleſs inactivity, which always accompanies diſtreſs, a want of induſtry, created by domeſtic diſcouragements of various kinds, have combined to render their condition more wretched than that of almoſt any other in Europe. They have long felt their own miſery, without knowing well from whence it came. Our worthy Patriots, by pointing out Great Britain as the author of Iriſh diſtreſs, may have ſome chance of rouſing Iriſh reſentment. They have fomented and encouraged reſiſtance in America, and why may they not excite rebellion in Ireland? The truth is, they ſeem to have injured their country beyond their degree of forgiveneſs; and if they cannot ſatisfy their ambition by her misfortunes, they are at leaſt reſolved to gratify their reſentment by her ruin.

The attacks, in both Houſes were ſo ſimilar, in manner, aſſertion, declamation, and invective, [29] that it was apparent every meaſure had been weighed and pre-concerted in the cabinet of ſedition without doors. In this political warfare, the poſt of honour was given to the Patriots of the Lower Aſſembly, where the enemy was ſuppoſed to be moſt vulnerable. After the battle was loſt below, it was generally rehearſed above; where ſome noble orators wielded, with peculiar dexterity, thoſe very weapons of ſcurrility and invective, which had ſo little availed the cauſe in the hands of their more humble friends.

In the ſlighteſt ſkirmiſhes, with the common enemy, the ſame co-operation, the ſame concert appeared. Though compoſed of ſuch diſcordant members, the whole party played in uniſon; and every key, that was touched below, was faithfully anſwered by a ſimilar note from above.

The Iriſh buſineſs ſeemed to promiſe ſuch a plentiful harveſt of confuſion, that the whole party employed their joint labour, in preparing the ſoil and ſowing the feed. Individuals were not, in the mean time, idle, in their ſeparate efforts, for the benefit of the common cauſe. The D [...] of R [...]d, with his uſual application, tenacity, and vehemence, had introduced and ſupported, in the [30] Upper Houſe, an Inquiry into the Magagement of Greenwich Hoſpital. The nature and fate of this Inquiry, are ſo recent in the memory of the Public, that a particular detail is as unneceſſary in itſelf, as it would be here out of place.

It may be ſufficient to obſerve, that the intention of the enquiry was to criminate the firſt Lord of the Admiralty. That after a moſt tedious examination, which laſted near three months, not one of the charges was proved. That the E. of S [...]ch, inſtead of meriting cenſure, deſerved the higheſt praiſe. That he had paid peculiar and uncommon attention to the hoſpital. That he had improved its revenue, increaſed the number of the penſioners, prevented the admiſſion of improper objects, made new regulations, for the more ſpeedy recovery of the ſick, and the better accommodation of thoſe in health. That inſtead of converting his ſuperintendency of the charity to any advantage, he had aboliſhed all ſinecures of inferior offices, which had formerly been in the diſpoſal of the firſt Lord. That, in direct oppoſition to what had been alledged, there is not one, out of 2169 penſioners at preſent in the Hoſpital, who is not intitled to the charity, by length of ſervice, or infirmities, contracted in the diſcharge of duty.

[31] Whilſt the D. of R [...]d derived ſome hopes, to the faction, from the expected iſſue of the Hoſpital Inquiry, a more flattering proſpect of criminating men in office was opened, in the Lower Aſſembly. Sir W [...] H [...]we, though not publicly accuſed, was ſtill anxious to exculpate himſelf to the Public. Either ſwayed, by a good opinion of his own conduct, or truſting to the kind partiality of his friends, he had flattered the Patriots and, perhaps, himſelf, that he ſhould be able to lay the burden of American misfortunes, to the account of the miniſter for the American department. The nation found itſelf diſappointed, but till matters were examined, it was not known decidedly where cenſure ought to fall. An unwillingneſs in Government, to admit of a Parliamentary Inquiry, on a military ſubject, furniſhed their enemies with an opportunity of drawing concluſions, unfavourable to Miniſtry. Theſe concluſions, in the uſual manner, became topics of patriotic invective and declamation; which, in a manner, extorted an inquiry, that had been once refuſed, by a vote.

But the reſult of the Inquiry, was very different from what Oppoſition hoped. It appeared, that rebellion firſt aroſe in America, from an ambitious [32] faction; and not from the general ſenſe of the body of the peoplea. That the reduction of that faction and, conſequently, the extinction of rebellion, had uniformly been the object of Adminiſtration, and not the conqueſt or unconditional ſubjection of the coloniesb. That to accompliſh that deſirable end, they had not only ſent a force ſufficient for the purpoſe, but a much greater one, than was either wiſhed for or expected, by the moſt ſanguine friend of Government in Americac. That the army had been amply provided, on all occaſions, with every neceſſary, every implement, every reſource of war. That the hands of the General had been ſo far from being tied up, by inſtructions, or his operations counteracted, by orders, from home, that the manner of carrying on the war had been left entirely to his judgment and diſcretion.

[33] It appeared, that the Americans, inſtead of overpowering by numbers, had never, together, at one place, above 16,000, and conſequently had never been ſo numerous in the field, as the army under Sir W [...] H [...]wed. That our troops were well diſciplined, and uniformly made the beſt and moſt military appearancee. That the enemy were an undiſciplined rabble, without order, without arms, without cloathing f; though by procraſtinating the war, they attained diſcipline and acquired military knowledge. That, upon all occaſions, the Britiſh troops executed their duty, with energy, bravery and effect. That, upon no occaſion, thoſe of America behaved, with the ſpirit, firmneſs, and intrepidity of ſoldiers. That the former were victorious, in every aſſault, attack, and fair battle. That the latter obtained no advantage, but by ſtratagem or ſurpriſe. The inferences deducible, from theſe facts, were, that the Britiſh army were either unſkilfully or languidly led; or that the natural ſtrength of the country, and unanimity of its inhabitants, had enabled the Americans to prevent the conſequences of loſſes, and diſaſters in the field.

[34] In ſupport of the firſt poſition it appeared, That the evacuation of Boſton had been too long delayed; and undertaken, at length, in an improper ſeaſon. That the retreat to Halifax furniſhed the rebels, with an opportunity of ſtrengthening their force at New-York. That the victory obtained at Long-iſland might have proved deciſive, had it been properly purſued g. That an opportunity of putting an end to the war had been loſt at the WhitePlains, by a delay in attacking the rebels, when they offered battle. That the diſtance and injudicious diſpoſitions of the ſtations choſen in the Jerſeys, the placing foreigners, who neither knew the nature nor the language of the country, in a poſt liable to ſurpriſe and attack, the giving the command to an Officer, whom an habitual intemperance had rendered unfit for the diſcharge of his duty, by preſenting an unexpected opportunity to a ruined and diſperſed enemyh, encouraged them to re-aſſemble, and enabled them to obtain an advantage which turned the ſcale of the war. That the operations, which followed this diſaſter, were [35] leſs calculated to retrieve the misfortune, than to encourage the enemy. That the retreat from Quibbletoni, the embarkation of the troops, the tedious expedition to the Delaware, and then to Cheſapeak-Bay, the neglecting to improve the victory obtained at the Brandywine, the ſurpriſe at German Town, the injudicious manner of aſſaulting Red-Bank and attacking Mud-Iſland, the inactive winter at Philadelphia, if not proofs of incapacity, were inſtances of blameable inactivity, in the General.

With regard to the ſtrength of the country, it appeared, that it preſented no advantages to the natives, which it did not hold forth to the invaders. That, on the contrary, it was rather more favourable to the latter, than to the former. That its great rivers, inſtead of covering the retreat of the rebels, by being navigable, laid them open to freſh misfortunes, from an enemy, poſſeſſing the command of the ſea. That Hudſon's River, in particular, by dividing the whole continent from North to [36] South, formed a natural and ſtrong barrier, between the revolted provinces. That the ſeizing this barrier was an object of the firſt conſequencek, towards the extinction of the rebellion. That this object might have been eaſily obtained, as the river preſents an excellent and expeditious water-communication, between New-York and Albanyl. That this great advantage rendered the co-operation of the main army, with the troops coming from Canada, as obvious, as it was eaſy and expeditious; and that, it was the want of ſuch co-operation, that ruined the Northern expeditionm, loſt an army, turned the ſcale in favour of rebellion, and loaded Great-Britain, with the expence and danger of a foreign war.

In the courſe of the Evidence taken at home, and more eſpecially by the moſt authentic information from abroad, it has appeared, that the [37] injudicious and inactive management of the war has been the ſole obſtacle, to the reſtoration of peace. That a very great majority of the people of America are and have been, averſe to the meaſures, and diſguſted at the tyranny of the Congreſsn. That they were prevented, from exhibiting their loyalty to their Sovereign and their averſion to uſurpation, by the deſultory manner, in which the war was conducted, on our part; as it deprived them of permanent protection, and left them expoſed to the inſolence, cruelty, and revenge of their enemies.

That the quitting of the Jerſeys, and the going to ſea, with the whole army in July 1777, terrified other provinces from ſubmitting, for fear of being deſerred. That the three Delaware Counties had offered their ſubmiſſion to Government, on condition of their being only aſſiſted, in protecting themſelves, againſt the rebelso. That their application having either been diſregarded or neglected, they adhered to the uſurped government. That, as a general idea had gone abroad, that protection was uncertain, or rather that deſertion was certainp, [38] the victory at the Brandywine, the taking of Philadelphia, the deſtruction of the rebel ſhipping, the reduction of Mud-Iſland and Red-Bank, were attended with none of thoſe advantages, which accompany ſucceſſes in war. That no perſon of great conſequence, and few of any conſequence at all, ſubmitted after thoſe events. That, when a reſolution was formed to evacuate Philadelphia, ſuch as had ſubmitted were adviſed to make their peace q, with the congreſs. That ſome unfortunate perſons, who followed that advice, fell a ſacrifice, to the relentleſs violence and unforgiving tyranny of the rebels. That, in ſhort, the want of protection on the one ſide, and the certainty of puniſhment for defection, on the other, eradicated every hope from the minds of the loyal, and forced them to ſwear allegiance to an uſurpation, which they deſpiſed and abhorred.

[39] Though theſe facts came forward with a force, which commanded conviction, the faction adhered, with invincible obſtinacy, to the line of their former conduct. With their uſual inſult, upon the common feelings and common ſenſe of mankind, they eſtabliſhed falſe premiſes, and deduced, from thoſe premiſes, arguments for the total dereliction, and conſequently, for the dependance of America. They affirmed, that rebellion can never be extinguiſhed; though the want of vigour, in purſuing our ſucceſſes, has been the demonſtrable cauſe of its continuing ſo long. They aſſerted, that a general unanimity prevails againſt Great Britain; though the adherence of the people to the congreſs proceeded, from our not affording them a permanent protection, under the ſhelter of our arms. They alleged, that the courage of the rebels, and the natural ſtrength of their country, are unſurmountable obſtacles; though the firſt ſeldom appear in the field, but to fly, and the latter opens every where its boſom to invaſion, by the means of extenſive arms of the ſea, and many great and navigable rivers.

When we deny other public virtues to Oppoſition, we muſt allow, that they poſſeſs the negative merit of conſiſtency in their political [40] conduct. They ſtruck one key, at the beginning of the American troubles, and they have ever ſince continued the ſame note, or improved upon it, as events aroſe. When the tumults began at Boſton, when licentiouſneſs and riot exhibited their firſt wild ſcenes, in Faneuil-Hall, they encouraged the piece, by applauding the actors. The prints of the departing ſteps of Freedom, like thoſe of Aſtraea, were only to be found, they affirmed, round the Tree of Liberty, on Boſton Common. A gloomy deſpotiſm had ſeized Great Britain at home, and it became neceſſary, that her hands ſhould be ſettered, to prevent the recovery of her authority abroad. Every effort on the part of the Mother-country was an exertion of tyranny; every reſiſtance, in the colonies, was an inſtance of public virtue. The grim tyrant, Arbitrary Power, had taken up arms againſt that innocent little child, American Liberty; and to defend the weak againſt the ſtrong was a ſervice of much reputation and little danger.

Obvious as the deceptions, held forth by the party, ought to have been, they were attended with ſucceſs, both without and within doors. The people thought, that aſſertions, ſo confidently and ſo often repeated, had ſome foundation in truth; and, though Government knew [41] the contrary, they acted, as if they gave them credit. The conſequence was, that languid meaſures were adopted, when vigour and exertion were neceſſary; and, thus, by the forbearance of Adminiſtration, the encouragement of Oppoſition, the inactivity or inability of commanders, that monſter, REBELLION, which ſhould have been ſtifled as ſoon as born, was foſtered and reared to maturity.

Unfortunately for this country, Oppoſition were permitted, in a manner, to take the lead in American meaſures. War, and eſpecially rebellion, being one of the greateſt evils, that can afflict a ſtate, the moſt ſpeedy and powerful remedies muſt be applied, to remove the diſeaſe. The only certain road to peace lies through exertion and victory. An anxiety for negociation, being generally a mark of weakneſs, too often encourages an enemy to a continuation of reſiſtance. It has alſo a moſt unfavourable effect on the ſpirit of the people, among whoſe leaders ſuch anxiety appears. This double conſideration had rendered the propoſing terms a favourite topic of patriotic eloquence. To depreſs the minds of their countrymen, to elevate thoſe of the rebels; to make the firſt to doubt, the ſecond to become confident of ſucceſs; to keep up, if the expreſſion [42] may be uſed, the ball of contention between the parties, were circumſtances that probably might lengthen the diſpute to the verge of ſome public misfortune; that misfortune, if it favoured not the views of ambition, might, at leaſt, be turned to the purpoſes of revenge.

The calamity expected, with ſo much anxiety, by Oppoſition, at length arrived. An army was loſt in America. A rebellion, which ſeemed to ſtagger under partial and ill-purſued defeats, became firmly eſtabliſhed by victory. The ſpirits of the country began to ſink; and the Faction added to the general depreſſion, by their unmanly oratory. Inſtead of propoſing thoſe vigorous exertions, which the honour, as well as intereſt of the nation required, they recommended a tame ſubmiſſion to rebels; an acknowledgment of former errors, and aſſurances of future amendment. The world, in general, aſcribed to artifice a conduct which could not be reconciled to the principles of common ſenſe. Was it probable that inſurgents, who had offered no terms during their misfortunes, would receive any in the moment of victory? Or could it be expected, that a Congreſs, who had declared for independence, when thirty thouſand diſciplined ſoldiers were ready to land on the coaſt, would [43] relinquiſh that independence, after they had made a whole army priſoners of war?

The moſt ſanguine lovers of tranquility could ſcarcely derive any hopes from this pacific ſyſtem; but it was adopted. The Faction thus obtained that degradation of their own country, which ſeems to have been uniformly a part of their plan. But as it had been juſtly apprehended, that American reſiſtance might, at laſt, ceaſe, through the failure of American reſources, it had become neceſſary to procure powerful allies, for the ſupport of the cauſe. The defeat and capture of the army, under G [...]l B [...]ne, had certainly its weight in the French cabinet. But the deplorable picture given, in both Houſes, of the ſtate of this kingdom, could only induce France to throw her weight into the ſcale of America.

The weight of France having been found inſufficient in the operations of the laſt ſummer, the neceſſity of obtaining another ally, to the cauſe of Liberty, became apparent during the winter. Every encouragement and every lure were held out to Spain. Under a pretence of bewailing their unfortunate country, Oppoſition expoſed her weakneſs. Their own declamations ſhewed that her councils were diſtracted by faction; and their aſſertions, relative [44] to the ſtate of her navy and army, repreſented her to foreigners as an eaſy prey. To bring the certainty of her approaching ruin to a point of demonſtration, ſome theoriſts, acquainted with figures, were employed to make fictitious ſtates of her finances. Even ſome of the party had the folly, or rather preſumption, to aſſert, in public, that the very independence of Great Britain was in the power of the houſe of Bourbonr.

The phlegmatic councils of Spain were, however, too ſlow for the fire and vehemence of her Britiſh friends. Though their eloquence had its proper influence at Madrid, that deſirable circumſtance had been concealed in "Caſtilian taciturnity." Deprived almoſt of every hope, from the other ſide of the Bay of Biſcay, the eyes of our Patriots were again turned to the regions beyond the Atlantic. As the treaty [45] attempted laſt ſummer had ſtopt the operations of war, it was expedient to throw negotiation in the way of hoſtility in the preſent year. Though the party had reprobated their own meaſure, the conciliatory bills, as degrading and diſgraceful, they propoſed the renewal of the commiſſion, which thoſe bills authorized. This mode of relief, or rather reſpite, to rebellion, having been refuſed, the old propoſal, of withdrawing the troops from America, was renewed. This laſt effort was alſo unſucceſsful; and that melancholy gloom, which uſually covers the rear of unſucceſsful, political campaigns, began to fall on the party.

A ſudden, though not unexpected light, broke through this gloom, and revived their drooping ſpirits. Spain, being ſeduced by France, and, perhaps, encouraged by the repreſentations given, in our public aſſemblies, of our weakneſss, determined to throw her [46] weight in the ſcale of our enemies. Of One hundred injuries, which ſhe had received, ſhe only ſpecified two, and proved none. With peculiar attention to her worthy friends out of office, ſhe pointed her whole reſentment againſt the Britiſh Miniſtry. Theſe men, it ſeems, had grievouſly offended this froward Dame; but how or where, ſhe could not tell. When ſhe has time to recollect the circumſtances, BUCCARELLI, or ſome other old Spaniſh acquaintance, will, no doubt, communicate them to C [...]l B [...]ré, and then we ſhall know the whole.

The uniform conduct of Oppoſition ſeemed calculated, if not intended, to arm Spain in favour of France and America; yet they affected a degree of melancholy when that event was announced. With a pernicious conſiſtency, they dwelt on the weakneſs of Great Britain, and on the force of her enemies. Inſtead of ſtanding forth with that manly boldneſs, which other patriots have either felt or feigned, in times of peril, they unbraced the nerves of their country with womaniſh lamentations. To magnify the danger, they pretended to recommend unanimity; and to promife ſupport to the S [...]n, whilſt they undermined his juſt influence and authority. But the notes of affected ſorrow were ſoon changed for the voice [47] of diſcord; and it became apparent, that the party lamented their own condition more than the ſtate of their country.

In the preceding detail, many circumſtances are omitted, equally deſcriptive of the conduct, and expreſſive of the deſigns of Oppoſition, with thoſe that have been related. But, as the intention of this Eſſay is only to give a general idea of the ſubject, it was thought unneceſſary to deſcend to every particular. One obvious obſervation will naturally ſuggeſt itſelf to the mind of the Reader: That an Oppoſition begun in ambition, has degenerated, through diſappointment, into a ſpecies of infinity; and that, in attempting to ruin the Miniſtry, the party have given a fatal ſtab to the honour and intereſts of their country.

In every popular government, oppoſition is not only natural, but, when conducted on liberal principles, uſeful, and even neceſſary. There is a kind of charm in authority, which may induce the moſt virtuous magiſtrates to extend it too far, if ſubject to no controul. The original object of a national repreſentative, was to watch over the political rights of the executive power. The truſt is great; and, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ought to be ſolely appropriated [48] to the public good. Thoſe who uſe it as an engine of private ambition and perſonal inrereſt, meet with forgiveneſs, on account of the frequency of the practice. But the employing a weapon, given for the defence of our country, againſt its exiſtence, is a ſpecies of political aſſaſſination which no example can juſtify, no ſtate ought to paſs without puniſhment.

If the great lines of the conduct of Oppoſition, during the laſt ſeſſion of parliament, have been fairly traced, in the preceding diſquiſition, no terms can be too ſevere, no indignation too violent, in expoſing the principles and plans of the party. If the account, which has been given of their aſſertions and actions, has been exaggerated, the Public will judge of both with more candour. But, unfortunately for Great Britain, the ſtamp of truth has been affixed to the repreſentation, contained in this Eſſay, by the moſt uncontrovertible of all arguments, the events of the times: events unparalleled in the hiſtory of any other age or country.

Let the conſequences of an oppoſite conduct, in the party, be conſidered, for a moment. Let it be ſuppoſed, that, inſtead of abetting rebellion and encouraging foreign war, they had declared that, when the American Congreſs [49] avowed Independence, and eſpecially when they leagued with France, the grounds of the original queſtion were entirely changed. That, as friends of their country, they had reſolved to ſtrengthen her hands, to reſtore her authority, to protect her intereſts, and to recover her honour. That the object of their purſuit had been to render Miniſters reſponſible for remiſſneſs in carrying on the war; or for obſtinacy in refuſing adequate and honourable conditions of peace. That they had been the firſt to inquire into the failure of meaſures in the execution; not to aſſert without examination, that the error lay in the cabinet and not in the field. That they had taken meaſures to aſcertain, by what miſmanagement or miſconduct, in commanders, an army had been loſt, to a contemptible enemy, and a ſuperior fleet had returned from action, without a victory? That, inſtead of receiving into the boſom of their party, a general, who had quitted his command in the midſt of war, they had inquired, why the advantages, he either poſſeſſed or obtained, had not been more deciſively improved?

To render ſtill more finiſhed the picture of the reverſe of their actual proceedings, let it be ſuppoſed, that inſtead of announcing, to all Europe, the weakneſs of Great Britain, they [50] had, in their ſpeeches and their actions, exhibited a ſpirited and diſintereſted love for their country, an unanimity to arm her exertions, not to clog her meaſures, a manly boldneſs to meet, to break, to diſconcert the combinations of her domeſtic and foreign enemies. What would have been, in ſuch a caſe, the preſent ſituation of public affairs? What the ſtate of public opinion, relative to themſelves? The reſiſtance of America muſt have ceaſed. France might have given up the conteſt; and the junction of Spain would have been prevented.

One ſhould ſuppoſe it hardly poſſible, that an Oppoſition, conſiſting of ſeveral men, whoſe rank and fortune connect their private intereſt with that of the public, ſhould follow a line of conduct, that leads to the deſtruction of their country, and, conſequently, to their own ruin. This is an argument which they themſelves repeat, and think unanſwerable. The truth is, that every faction may avail itſelf of the ſame argument; but general reaſoning muſt fall to the ground, when contradicted by facts. There is a pride and obſtinacy in party, which diſdain to acknowledge error; and, therefore, though Oppoſition may, nay muſt, perceive the pernicious tendency of their conduct, they chooſe to perſiſt, rather than own a fault.

[51] An opportunity offered itſelf lately, which might have reflected credit on Oppoſition, without the ſuppoſed diſgrace of changing their former opinions. The Spaniſh Reſcript furniſhed this opportunity; yet the nation cannot ſee, without indignation and aſtoniſhment, that ACTS indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſafety of the State have been combated, with all the virulence and obſtinacy of oratory, in every ſtage of their progreſs. That the party clogged every meaſure for arming the kingdom, by ſea and land, while they aſſerted, that the enemy were ready to invade our coaſt, and that a few days might bring the report of their guns to the ears of both houſes of parliament. That, when a ſpirit of unanimity and exertion became the duty of all lovers of their country, the faction announced, with a ſpecies of ſavage triumph, that the City of London would not vote a man or a ſhilling, for the national defence in the preſent emergency. That, in ſhort, they preſumed to aſſert in public, that the tyranny of France and Spain would be more welcome to them, than the continuance of their rivals in power.

After ſuch proofs of averſion to the public good, it will be in vain to hope for any reformation in Oppoſition. The diſtreſs in which they have involved their country, can advance but [52] one ſtep farther, to furniſh them with an opportunity of retreating from the line of their miſconduct. That ſtep is an invaſion of this Iſland, the laſt effort of the conſpiracy of our foreign enemies. In that critical moment, a moment which every good ſubject would meet with ſpirit and confidence in his cauſe, there is every reaſon to fear, that Oppoſition would be ſtill an Oppoſition. Such has been the inveteracy which a conſciouſneſs of criminality, a jealouſy of rivals, a habit of oppoſing the intereſts and degrading the dignity of their country; and a deſpair embittered by an unpopular and fruitleſs conteſt of many years, have mixed with every ſpring of their actions, every power of their minds.

Upon the whole, we may fairly affirm, that neither the talents they poſſeſs, nor the conduct they have purſued, are likely to recommend Oppoſition as proper perſons for managing public affairs at the preſent criſis. If our ſituation is alarming, we muſt look for relief to the reſources of the kingdom, and the ſpirit of our countrymen, and not to thoſe, who have uniformly endeavoured to depreciate the firſt, and to damp the ſecond. The truth is, that, very fortunately for this country, this deſponding party have hitherto failed in their views of convincing us that our ruin is inevitable. [53] We feel the contrary, in the internal vigour of the ſtate, and in that unanimity of ſentiment among the people, which forbids us to connect danger with deſpair.

But why ſhould either be mentioned, upon the preſent occaſion? This country, with much ſmaller reſources, and much leſs unanimity, has repeatedly weathered more dreadful ſtorms than thoſe which only ſeem to threaten it at preſent. In the firſt Dutch war, France and Denmark joined the enemy againſt Englandb. She had no friendly port on the continent, from the Pyrenees to the pole; no ally but the Biſhop of Munſter. The Dutch came out, to a deciſive battle, with one hundred and thirteen ſhips of war, eleven fire-ſhips, and ſeven yatchts; led by able, experienced, and brave commanders. France, co-operating with her allies, entered the Channel with forty ſhips of the line. The uſual revenue of England amounted only to the annual ſum of one million two hundred thouſand pounds; and the ſupplies granted, for the year, exceeded not double that ſum. Our ſtanding army ſcarcely conſiſted of five thouſand men; and there was no militia in the kingdom.

[54] The nation was, in the mean time, viſited with two of the moſt dreadful calamities that can afflict a people, peſtilence and fire. Near eighty thouſand perſons had been carried off by the firſt, in London alone. The city had become a kind of deſert; and graſs was obſerved to grow in the middle of Cheapſidec. The plague followed thoſe who fled to the country; and terror and death filled every corner of the kingdom. This ſcourge was followed by a fire, which conſumed fifteen out of the twentyſix wards of the city, conſiſting of four hundred ſtreets and lanes, thirteen thouſand houſes, and eighty-nine pariſh-churchesd. But theſe miſfortunes neither damped the ſpirits of the people, nor obſtructed the meaſures of Government. Our fleets, though much inferior, fought, and vanquiſhed the enemy. The alliance againſt us was broken, and an honourable and advantageous peace was obtained.

In the year 1690, the French fleet entered the Engliſh channel, appeared before Plymouth, on the 20th of June, drove the combined fleets of England and Holland, from the back, of the iſle of Wight, engaged and totally defeated them, in a general battle, near Beachy-head. [55] In this unfortunate action we loſt eight ſhips of the line, beſides many more, that were rendered unfit for ſervice; and the ſhattered remains of the fleet were forced to ſhelter themſelves in the Thamese. The French rode triumphant, for ſome months, in the Channel. They inſulted our ſea-ports; and threatened our coaſts with invaſion. There were, at the time, no more than five thouſand regular troops in England; the militia were not arrayed; King William was, in a manner, confined to Ireland, by the ſuperiority of the enemy at ſea.

The nation was, at the ſame time, diſtracted and divided in opinion, on account of a diſputed ſucceſſion. Public credit, during the whole war, was ſo low, that ſoon after this period, Exchequer and Navy Bills became almoſt of as little value, as the paſteboard dollars of the American Congreſs; and even the notes of the Bank of England were at forty per cent. diſcountf. Near ſix thouſand trading veſſels were taken by the French in the courſe of the warg. Notwithſtanding theſe misfortunes, the vigour of Government and ſpirit of the people ſurmounted all difficulties [56] The enemy was diſappointed, in all his ambitious views, an honourable peace was obtained, the revolution confirmed, the proteſtant ſucceſſion ſecured, and public credit reſtored.

In the preſent times, our reſources are much greater, our ſpirit equal, and our danger leſs, than at either of thoſe periods. We have an ample revenue, an untainted credit, a great and a growing navy. Inſtead of five thouſand men, we have above ſixty thouſand diſciplined troops, for our internal defence; and we have a certain proſpect of half as many more, in the ſpace of a few months. A ſpirit of unanimity, vigour, and exertion, begins to pervade the whole kingdom. Our nobility and gentry, with a ſpirit becoming Britons, either ſerve in our conſtitutional defence, the militia, or with their influence and purſes exert themſelves, in raiſing new corps. The greateſt commercial ſociety, in the kingdom, has ſet a noble example to their fellow-ſubjects, by an unanimous and powerful aid to the ſtate, in the preſent emergency. Voluntary ſubſcriptions, for raiſing ſoldiers, and for giving a bounty to ſailors, have been opened, in ſeveral places; and the ſame ſpirit will diffuſe itſelf through both the Britiſh iſles. Such as are debarred, by infirmities and [57] years, from perſonal ſervice, will undoubtedly exhibit, on the preſent occaſion, their love for their country, and their zeal for its ſafety.

Inſtead of being depreſſed, with a ſenſe of danger, all ranks and degrees of men feel that elevation, which threatened perils excite, in generous minds. Inſtead of looking forward to future diſgraces or diſaſters, they reflect on the glory of former times. The poſterity of thoſe, who conquered at Poictiers, Creſſy, and Agincourt, and annexed France itſelf to the Engliſh crown, cannot form to themſelves any fears from a French invaſion. On the contrary, when they have ſufficiently prepared for ſecurity at home, they will act offenſively abroad; and carry back to the boſom of the enemy that terror, which he vainly hopes to create.

If we are at war in America, we have not the burden of a continental war; that ſink, in which our treaſure has always diſappeared, without any hope of return. The money laid out on our navy, or expended in our Colonies, will return to the center of the kingdom, through all the veins of commerce. Our trade has been protected, againſt the enemy, to a degree unknown in any former war. We have loſt, in no quarter of the world, any [58] territory without an equivalent; in ſome we have gained. In the Weſt Indies, we are ſtill ſuperior to our Enemies. We have eradicated them entirely from the Eaſt Indies, and we have a flattering proſpect of a ſpeedy termination of reſiſtance, in North America.

In the firſt ſtage of a war, the advantage of attack is poſſeſſed, by that nation, who firſt breaks the peace. The diſadvantages of defence muſt, for ſome time, remain with its opponent. A ſtate poſſeſſing ſuch extenſive dominions, as Great Britain, cannot be ſuppoſed, to be invulnerable, on every ſide. We may ſuffer ſome loſſes, at the beginning; for what people was ever uniformly ſucceſsful in war? The Romans themſelves were not always invincible. They frequently loſt provinces and armies; yet they roſe ſuperior to all nations. The profits and loſſes of war can only be eſtimated, on the day, which concludes a peace. Let us be unanimous among ourſelves, and that day cannot be diſtant, diſadvantageous, or diſhonourable; on the contrary, it will be attended with that glory, which the ſpirit and exertion of a great ſtate cannot fail to acquire.

THE END.
Notes
a
Mr. T. T [...]d's Speech, Nov. 26th, 1778.
b
Speech of T. T [...]d, Nov. 26, 1778.
c
Speech of C. F [...]x, Nov. 26, 1778. Speech of C [...]l B [...]e.
d
Ibid.
e
Ibid.
f
Ibid.
h
Speech of C. F [...]x, Nov. 26, 1778. Speech of C [...]l B [...]e.
i
Governor J [...]ſt [...]ne's Speech, Nov. 26, 1778.
k
Admiral Gambier's Letter to Congreſs.
l
Speech of Governor J [...]ſt [...]ne.
m
Speech of Mr. F [...]x, Nov. 26, 1778.
n
Ibid.
o
Ibid.
o
Speeches of all the Oppoſition.
p
L [...]d B [...]l's Speech, Nov. 26, 1778.
q
L [...]d C [...]y's Speech, Nov. 26.
r
L [...]d B [...]l's Speech.
s
Vide Oppoſition Speeches, paſſim.
t
B [...]p of P [...]rb [...]gh's Speech.
u
Speeches paſſim, Nov. 26, 1778.
x
Almon's Debates, No. XI. p. 75.
y
Vide Dr. Johnſon on the Iriſh Howl, p. 13.
z
Mr. F [...]x's Speech, March 3d and 8th, 1779.
a
Admiral Keppel.
b
Crime enorme aux yeux du Sieur Fox. Gazette de France, du Vendredi 26 Mars 1779.
c
Lord M [...]ve's Speech, March 3d and 8th, 1779.
c
The Gazette de France, du Vendredi 26 Mars 1779, with a kind of regret, ſays: Aupres touts ces débats, le voix etant recueillés, la motion de Sieur Fox n'en eut que 170 contre 204.
d
A certain Baronet, who in a fit of deſpair relative to the good Old Cauſe, has lately become a zealous Whig, is much given to ſuch ſolitary rehearſals of the Speeches which he intends to fire off, upon the Houſe.
a
Evidence of Major General Robertſon, before the Houſe of Commons, June 8, 1779, MS. p. 9. 10.
b
The object of the war was to enable the loyal ſubjects of America to get free from the tyranny of the rebels; and to let the country follow its inclination, by returning to the king's government. Evidence, June 10, p. 18.—No idea of ſubduing the Americans—but to aſſiſt the good Americans to ſubdue the bad ones. Ibid. p. 20.
c
Ibid. p. 17. "The demand of 20,000 men was thought to be rather extravagant." Ibid. p. 63."The force we had was adequate to the ſubduing the rebellion." Evidence, June 10, p. 22.
d
Evidence, June 10, p. 14.
e
ibid. p. 16.
f
"Except the Maryland Regiment, who were well cloathed and accoutred.". ibid. p. 16.
g
"Some of the troops were going to ſtorm the lines. Gen. H [...]we called them back.—Putnam, who had the command of 7000, had detached all but 300.—But this was not known." Evidence, June 9. p. 73, 74.
h
Who had dwindled to 3000 men. G. Robertſon's Evidence, June 8, p. 16.
i
"Our army (in the Jerſeys in 1777) was 17,015 men; that of the rebels, ſome ſaid 8, ſome 9, and ſome 10,000 men in that camp." Evidence, June 9. p. 63.—"We had 52,815 men in North. America; of thoſe Sir W. Howe had under his command 40, 874." Ibid. June 10, p. 39.
k
Evidence, p. 51.
l
"An army may paſs from New York to Albany (170 miles) by means of Hudſon's River, in two days." Ibid. p. 47. 75.
m
"Many feared that general Burgoyne's army would be loſt, if not ſupported by Sir W. Howe. I wrote myſelf, on being informed of the ſituation of the different armies, I wrote, &c. that if General Burgoyne extricated himſelf, future ages would have little occaſion to talk of Hannibal." Ibid. p. 39.
n
Evidence, June 9. p. 12. June 16, paſſim.
o
Evidence, June 16, p. 59.
p
"We ſoon left the country. The rebels took up the ſigners (of addreſſes), baniſhed them, or ſent them to the mines." Ibid. p. 25.
q
"Mr. Schumacker mentioned to me what he had told me, a few days before, that Sir William Howe adviſed him to go over to Waſhington, and make his peace."—Mr. Galloway's Evidence, June 16, p. 70. —"He (Sir William) gave me the ſame advice." Ibid. p. 71.—Sir Henry Clinton ſaid, "that the game was not up, that the war was not over, but would ſtill be carried on vigorouſly, and deſired that we would not entertain thought of going over to the enemy." Ibid. p. 74.
r
Contemptible as ſuch aſſertions may ſeem, at home, they make an impreſſion abroad; as appears, from the Gazette de France du Vendredi 18 Juin 1779: "Il ſoutint que les forces de la France étoient preſque egales a celle de la Grand-Bretagne en Europe et en Amerique; que I'Eſpagne tenoit la balance. Il oſa prononcer que Il' Angleterre ne domineroit plus, ſur les mers, qu'autant qu'il plairoit à la Maiſon de Bourbon."—L'eloquent Burke ſoutint que le Sieur Hartley avoit rien avancé, qui ne fut vrai il appuya cette opinion, par un detail circonſtancie de toutes les forces del'Eſpagne.
s
Le Sieur Thowſend, Fox et Burke furent, parmi les oppoſans, ceux qui ſignalérent davantage contre cette motion, en obſervant que la nation dans l'etat alarmant ou celle ſe trouvoit s'epuiſoit par des dèpenſes énormes, tandis que chaque jour lui decouvroit quelque nouvelle ennemi; que l'Eſpagne alloit immanquablement ſe declarer; que l'Irlande, menacée d'une invaſion, avoit pris cette circonſtance pour ſe ſoulever contre le gouvernement Anglois; que l'ECOSSE meme etoit plein de mècontents. Gazette de France du Vendredi 18 Juin 1779.
b
In 1665, 1666, &c. Vide Life of Clarendon, Burnet, Rapin, Ralph, &c. &c.
c
Baker, p. 637.
d
Vide Clarendon, Heath, Burnet.
e
Lord Torrington's Letter, July 1, 1690.
f
Kennet, Ralph, Burnet, &c. &c.
g
Vide Journals of the Commons, 169 [...].
Distributed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License

Citation Suggestion for this Object
TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 3769 A short history of the opposition during the last session of Parliament. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5A10-D