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TWO SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE ORIGINAL EAST-INDIA BILL AND ON THE AMENDED BILL, ON THE 16th AND 26th OF JULY, 1784.

BY PHILIP FRANCIS, ESQ.

LONDON: Printed for J. DEBRETT, oppoſite Burlington Houſe, Piccadilly M.DCC.LXXXIV.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1784.
Mr. FRANCIS.

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"THE order of the day being read, for the Houſe to reſolve itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe, upon the Bill for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the Eaſt-India Company, and of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, and for eſtabliſhing a Court of Judicature for the more ſpeedy and effectual trial of perſons accuſed of offences committed in the Eaſt Indies; the Speaker put the queſtion, That he ſhould now leave the chair?"
Mr. SPEAKER,

I am ſorry that I muſt be obliged to oppoſe your leaving the chair. My opinion of the bill will not allow me to conſent to its going to a Committee; for I not only think it materially defective [2] in the detail, but liable to fundamental and eſſential objections. Particular proviſions might be added, improved, or omitted; but objections, that go to the foundation and eſſence of the bill, are not to be removed by any alterations, that would not make it compleatly a new one. I have attentively conſidered the ſubject; and I mean, if the Houſe will permit me, to ſubmit to you my opinion of it, more at large than I ſhould venture to do any other. I mean to examine the principles as well as the proviſions of the bill;—a taſk, I fear, not to be performed without a long and a tedious diſcuſſion. To me the taſk is particularly heavy, but I am bound to undertake it by many obligations. The labour we are engaged in does not offer me the ſame hopes, which it may have ſuggeſted to others: I am not encouraged to engage in it by a ſanguine expectation of ſucceſs. I very much fear, that the object of our preſent deliberation is dead. You have neglected it too long. You have ſuffered it to fall into a ſtate of ruin from which, I fear, no remedy within the reach of human wiſdom can recover it. But a great authority, under which I had the honour and good fortune to be bred, has taught me, that duty may ſurvive hope.—On this principle alone, I am ſtill ready to take my ſhare in the duty, though I cannot partake in any hope of its ſucceſs.

The views and principles of the bill may naturally and properly be divided into three diſtinct general heads.—Firſt, the new arrangement and diſtribution [3] of power at home, with all its probable effects and influence on our domeſtic government.—On this part of the ſubject I ſhall confine myſelf ſtrictly to the fact, which I think will be eaſily eſtabliſhed, that there is a compleat and abſolute transfer of the whole power and patronage of the Eaſt-India Company into the hands of the Crown. Of the effects of this transfer of power, of its probable influence on our own Government, and of the danger with which it may threaten the Conſtitution of England, I do not mean to offer an opinion. If thoſe topics have not already been ſufficiently diſcuſſed, they properly belong to the department, and ſhould be reſerved for the employment of the greateſt abilities in this country. A right honourable gentleman near me will do juſtice to the ſubject.

The ſecond diviſion of the bill includes the arrangements and regulations intended for the Governments abroad; and on this I ſhall hope to be permitted to enlarge. Without pretending to ſuperior qualifications, or preſuming to dictate to the wiſdom of the Houſe, I am perſuaded you will liſten to information, which only profeſſes to be derived from experience.

The third diviſion regards the new plan of criminal judicature propoſed to be introduced into England, for trying offences committed in India. On this laſt point my opinion will not be delivered in many words, but the words that I make uſe of ſhall be the ſtrongeſt I can find.

[4] Sir, There are two preliminary obſervations, which ariſe on a general view of the bill, and which I wiſh the Houſe to carry along with them, through the diſcuſſion of all the parts of it. Firſt, that the whole bill on the face of it is remedial; that it is a remedy of a new and violent nature, neceſſary perhaps, but neceſſary only on the ſuppoſition of ſome great and inveterate diſorders, both at home and abroad, which, though conſtantly implied, are no where ſtated.

Secondly, Sir, admitting ſuch diſorders to exiſt, I think it will appear, through the whole plan of the bill, that the remedy applied is in every inſtance directly the reverſe of what the diſorder requires. With reſpect to the Governments abroad, the acknowledged grievance is, that the powers, hitherto intruſted, have been groſſly and notoriouſly abuſed. But you will find that, in the contemplation of this bill, the true and natural remedy for an abuſe of power is to increaſe it. With reſpect to the Company's Government at home, the conſtant complaint of the Directors has been, that their power over their ſervants was too feeble to enforce obedience, that their authority was diſregarded, and their orders avowedly and conſtantly diſobeyed. You have facts in abundance, reported to you by your Committees, to ſatisfy the Houſe that theſe complaints of the Directors are perfectly well founded. Now, Sir, in the contemplation of this bill, the remedy for diſobedience of orders is to ſtrengthen the power that diſobeys; and when inſulted authority calls for [5] ſupport, either, in effect to reduce it to nothing, or, what is ſtill worſe, to ſuffer it to exiſt and to make it contemptible. The pretended power, left in the hands of the Directors, is a mockery of the degraded ſtate of thoſe unfortunate gentlemen. It is worſe than uſeleſs; for ſince, in fact, they are only to be the channel of the operations of a ſuperior power, you diminiſh even that power, which unqueſtionably the bill propoſes to eſtabliſh, and expoſe it to ſhare in the contempt attached to the medium, through which it is to act. In theſe obſervations I mean only to ſtate the general reſult and impreſſion of the bill, without immediately referring to the ſpecific evidence, from which they are deduced. The ſhorteſt and cleareſt way to eſtabliſh the truth of them is to enter at once into the detail of the bill, and to follow it as it goes.

Sir, the very outſet of the bill is eſſentially defective. When an act of legiſlative power is applied to the total alteration of an exiſting Government, it muſt of neceſſity be ſuppoſed that ſuch Government is either radically corrupt, or unfaithfully adminiſtered. No man, I preſume, will diſpute that ſuch is the fact in the general government of the Eaſt-India Company's affairs. The preſent bill, through every part of it, ſuppoſes what it no where avows, that nothing leſs than a vigorous interpoſition of the Legiſlature can ſave the object. For aught that appears in the preamble of this act, where the general grounds of it ſhould naturally be ſet forth, the territorial poſſeſſions, for whoſe better government [6] we are going to provide, may be perfectly well governed at preſent. For want of this eſſential preliminary, the whole body of the bill is in effect a concluſion without premiſes, a remedy without a diſeaſe, a penalty without a crime. The omiſſion of ſuch a preamble to ſuch a bill as this will appear extraordinary as well as improper, to thoſe who recollect with how much force and energy the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in opening the plan and principles of the bill, inſiſted on the magnitude of thoſe crimes and abuſes, which demanded and juſtified a proportionate effort of power to puniſh or correct them. He was not very reſerved in his deſcription of the offenders, or of their offences, but painted them both in the blackeſt colours. It is much to be regretted, that the ſubſtance, at leaſt, of his opinion of Indian delinquency ſhould be no where recorded for the benefit of his friends.

The new Board of Commiſſioners for the affairs of India is to conſiſt of certain Members of His Majeſty's Privy Council, and they are to be inveſted with the ſuperintendence and control over all the Britiſh territorial poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies, and over the affairs of the United Company of Merchants trading thereto. The powers, conveyed by the latter part of this clauſe, evidently and expreſſly include the Company's commerce. The affairs of a Company of Merchants trading to India can only be commercial. Let the Court of Directors look to it. I am perfectly aware, that in a ſubſequent clauſe it is provided, that if the Commiſſioners ſend any orders [7] to the Court of Directors, which, in their opinion, ſhall relate to points not connected with the territorial government or revenues, they may apply to the King in Council for redreſs; that is, if they are diſſatisfied with the judgement of His Majeſty's Miniſters at one Board, they may appeal to His Majeſty's Miniſters at another. The power given is unlimited. The appeal againſt the exerciſe of it is nugatory.

The Court of Directors are to be governed and bound by the orders they receive from the Commiſſioners; and are not to ſend diſpatches of any kind to India, without their previous approbation.

The Commiſſioners may ſend their own orders originally to the Directors, who are obliged to inſert ſuch orders in their diſpatches, purſuant to the tenor thereof; that is, in the ſame words.

If the Commiſſioners ſhould be of opinion that the caſe requires ſecrecy, they may ſend their own orders directly to the Governments in India, without any communication with the Court of Directors, who are not to be truſted even with the knowledge of meaſures, in which the moſt eſſential intereſts, the ſafety, and, perhaps, the exiſtence of the India Company may be involved. In the ſame clauſe, the Commiſſioners may not only ſend their orders to the Governments abroad without the knowledge of the Directors, but, what is much more extraordinary, and much more alarming, they may ſend ſecret inſtructions to the Commanders in Chief in India, independent of the Civil Government on the [8] ſpot. If there be no miſtake in the conſtruction of this clauſe; if it be ſeriouſly intended to give this power to the Miniſters of the Crown, there is no clauſe in the bill that more urgently demands the attention of the Houſe. By another clauſe, the nomination and appointment of all the Commanders in Chief in India, and of perſons to ſucceed to the command in caſe of vacancy, are directly veſted in the Crown; and theſe officers are required to obey whatever orders they receive from the King's Miniſters, not only independent of the Directors at home, but of the Civil Government of the Preſidency to which they belong. I ſtate the facts as I find them, and ſhall leave them without comment to the judgement of the Houſe.

The general patronage of the Company is profeſſedly left with the Court of Directors, but with exceptions and reſtrictions which really reduce it to nothing. The Commanders in Chief and their immediate ſucceſſors, at all the Preſidencies, are to be under the immediate appointment of the Crown. By this proviſion the military is ſeparated from the civil power of the Company's government. The Court of Directors, who pay the army, and whoſe general authority over it is apparently continued, can neither appoint, nor remove the perſons who command it.

With reſpect to the offices of Governor General, Preſidents, and Members of the ſeveral Councils in India, the Directors, it is true, may nominate and appoint: but it deſerves to be conſidered, that they [9] who appoint are not permitted to remove; that power is excluſively veſted in the Crown; and even the pretended power of appointing to theſe offices is ineffectual. Their nomination is to be ſubject to his Majeſty's approbation. If the King diſapproves, the Directors muſt proceed to another nomination; and ſo on, toties quoties, until perſons ſhall be appointed who ſhall be approved by His Majeſty. This is the way, in which the patronage of all the principal offices in India is diſpoſed of. All other promotions, civil and military, are to be made according to ſeniority of appointment in a regular progreſſive ſucceſſion; and the Directors are prohibited from ſending out any new ſervants, civil or military, until certain eſtabliſhments ſhall be completed, and then, only to fill up the vacancies that may happen therein. I do not mean to blame theſe laſt regulations: but, if all the preceding exceptions and limitations are combined, it is evident, that no real patronage will be left with the Directors, or, at the utmoſt, a patronage to operate upon trifles. Not ſo the powers given to the Commiſſioners. In every department of the Company's affairs, their direct authority, or their indirect influence, is real and effective. On the real principles of this bill, whether acknowledged or not, the Court of Directors ought to be aboliſhed. To leave a ſhadow of power after the ſubſtance of it is gone, is to eſtabliſh a contradiction, which can only do miſchief. Whenever the conſtitution of any government is eſſentially altered, the forms ſhould not be allowed to ſurvive [10] the eſſence. Under the ſhelter of theſe forms, things will be done, or duties will be neglected, for which no man will be reſponſible. No deſpotiſm was ever ſo ſevere as that, which exiſted in the form of a republic. In whatever degree the powers reſerved to the Directors are effective, they can only be productive of miſchievous effects. They can only claſh with, and retard the operations of the ſuperior Board, and furniſh them both with pretences for accuſing each other of whatever may happen amiſs.

Now, Sir, I ſubmit it to the Houſe, to determine whether my firſt propoſition be not ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, that in every ſenſe in which power can be ſuſpicious, in which power can be miſchievous to the thing ſubject to it, or dangerous to objects not immediately connected with it, there is by this bill a complete and abſolute transfer of power from the India Company to the Crown. I conſider it only as it affects the Government of India, and ſhall purſue the remaining clauſes in the order in which they ſtand.

I have already taken the liberty of obſerving to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the bill makes no proviſion for the ſituation of a Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces in India. The office exiſts, though it be not actually filled up, and it ought to be provided for. That officer has always had a ſeat in the Supreme Council; of courſe, there muſt be a miſtake in the ſeventeenth clauſe, which gives voice and precedence in Council [11] to the Commander in Chief of the Preſidency of Fort William, as if he had a ſeat there, which, in fact, he never had. The miſtake muſt be corrected.

From the terms of the nineteenth clauſe, I conclude that Lord Macartney is to be removed from the Government of Fort St. George; that is, that he is to be ſacrificed to the views and reſentments of the Government of Bengal. I have not the honour of knowing Lord Macartney, nor have I a connection with him of any kind: but, in order to be convinced that the noble Lord has done his duty, it is ſufficient for me to know who the perſons are, and what the combination is, that are united againſt him. By a different courſe of conduct, their enmity is not to be incurred. The moment I knew the fact, I drew the concluſion—I foreſaw the conſequence, and foretold it to his friends: This man is doing his duty, and aſſuredly he'll be recalled for it. Comparing this clauſe with another that relates to Fort William, the Houſe will obſerve, that in Bengal, which is the ſeat of power, and where, if miſchief has been done in India, the ſource of it muſt exiſt, there is to be no change of hands; but, in the ſubordinate ſettlements, there is to be an univerſal ſweep.

The wiſdom and neceſſity of the thirtieth clauſe, by which the General Court of Proprietors are reſtrained from interfering with any act, order, reſolution, matter, or proceeding of the Court of Directors, will, in this Houſe at leaſt, be generally acknowledged. [12] All parties, I believe, are agreed on the neceſſity of putting an end to the cabals of that aſſembly. Every bill, from every quarter, that has hitherto been propoſed for the better regulation of the Company's affairs, makes ſpecial proviſion for this favourite object. I therefore give the clauſe my entire and hearty approbation. At the ſame time, Sir, I cannot help obſerving, that the principle and object of this proviſion is not to be reconciled to the language, or rather to the cry, by which a bill that paſſed the Houſe of Commons laſt year was run down, and the honourable perſon who moved it, for a moment diſpoſſeſſed of his popularity, and driven from his ſtation. If the rights conveyed by an excluſive charter be in their nature ſacred, they can no more be invaded in part, than they can be wholly reſumed. If the charter itſelf be ſacred, it ought to be inviolable; or, if any part of it be more eſſentially ſacred than the reſt, it muſt be that, which ſecures to the Proprietors the control and direction of their own affairs. In this reſpect, the preſent bill adopts the very ſame principle, by which a much better was defeated. It aſſumes a diſcretion, where, on the profeſſed principles of thoſe who defend it, there ſhould be none. It takes or leaves juſt as much of the Company's charter, as ſuits the purpoſes of the preſent Adminiſtration.

The object of the thirty-ſecond clauſe is proper. The ſubordinate Preſidencies ſhould either be dependent on the ſuperintendence and control of the [13] Governor General and Council in all caſes, or totally exempt from it. We know by experience, that an attempt to ſubject them to a partial control is not likely to ſucceed. We know that it has hitherto produced no good effect. On the other hand, it is evidently abſurd and hazardous, that the members of one ſtate, and the parts of one ſyſtem, ſhould not be united under one power, whenever they are to act, and not move together under a ſingle direction. There is no alternative, therefore, but to eſtabliſh a general authority at Fort William, and to inſiſt on a general ſubmiſſion to it: but, at the ſame time, let care be taken to unite the powers, and ſtrengthen the authority at home in the ſame proportion.

The thirty-third clauſe is ſo very incorrect and obſcure, that, I confeſs, I ſhould be glad to ſee it tranſlated into common ſenſe. It is ſaid, that the rules, ordinances, and regulations, which the Governor General and Council are empowered to iſſue, ſhall extend to all rules, ordinances, and regulations made by the ſaid Governor General and Council. If this be not poſitively nonſenſe, it is, at leaſt, an extraordinary way of removing all former queſtions and doubts upon the ſubject. Whoever drew up the clauſe evidently knew nothing of the matter. So far from explaining the queſtions, or removing the doubts to which he alludes, he does not even know what they were, nor what they referred to. The only queſtion that ever aroſe in Bengal, concerning the power granted by the act of 1773 to the [14] Governor General and Council, to make rules and ordinances for the ſettlement of Fort William, was, to what things, to what ſubject matter, and not to what perſons or places, the power extended; and this, indeed, is a doubt which it would be proper to clear up. If it be intended to give a general legiſlative power, the terms you make uſe of muſt be much more comprehenſive and much more explicit.

The thirty-ſeventh clauſe declares, that to purſue ſchemes of conqueſt, and extenſion of dominion in India, are meaſures repugnant to the wiſh, the honour, and policy of this nation. Sir, I wiſh to ſee a propoſition ſo full of truth and wiſdom, not only acknowledged, but enforced. In this moſt eſſential view, the plan of the bill is moſt eſſentially defective. It alludes to facts and offences which are not ſtated, and to criminals whom, ſo far from attempting to puniſh, it does not even venture to deſcribe. If ſuch facts and criminals do not exiſt, the whole bill is a ſuperfluity built upon a falſehood. It ſuppoſes imaginary diſorders, for the imaginary merit of correcting them. But if they really exiſt, it is in vain to expect that they will be checked or prevented by the empty threats of a Legiſlature, that contents itſelf with piling up laws upon laws, and regulations on regulations—of a Legiſlature, that never has hitherto been obeyed, yet always looks forward to future obedience. Reward and puniſhment are the right and left hand of Government. It is the office of the head to frame and denounce the law, but it is the hand that muſt enforce it. In another point [15] of view, the bill is unjuſt as well as impotent. It makes no diſtinction between thoſe perſons, who have uniformly acted on the principles you approve, and others, who have uniformly acted on the principles you condemn. In not ſtating any to be innocent, it ſuppoſes all to be guilty. Now, Sir, I ſhall do what the mover of the bill has not had courage to do. I attach reſponſibility to power, and I affirm, that, at the end of the year 1777, the whole political power of the Britiſh empire in India, nominally veſted in the Governor General and Council, was really and ſubſtantially veſted in Mr. Haſtings. If Mr. Haſtings, ſupported by one Member of the Supreme Council againſt the other two, be not excluſively reſponſible for the war which was undertaken at that period, for the avowed purpoſe of conqueſt and extenſion of dominion, which carried deſolation with it wherever it extended, and which has ended in the ruin of the Eaſt-India Company, it is fit that Parliament and the nation ſhould know, nay, it is the duty of Parliament to inquire, who was the author of the war, and who is to be anſwerable for it. Facts, it will be ſaid, may be very differently repreſented, and variouſly accounted for, eſpecially at ſo great a diſtance as from India to England. Sir, I well know the facility, with which facts at ſuch a diſtance may be ſtated to advantage. But principles formally declared, and deliberately avowed, are not to be diſguiſed or retracted. They ſtand for public judgement, and they demand it. If the Houſe have any doubt about the fact, let them look to the acknowledged [16] principles of the perſon, to whom the fact is imputed. Does Mr. Haſtings himſelf deny, that conqueſt and extent of dominion were his object in the purſuit of the Maratta war? No, Sir; he avows it. Let him anſwer for himſelf. I will not run the riſque of doing him an injuſtice.

‘"If the Britiſh arms and influence have ſuffered a ſevere check in the Weſtern world, it is the more incumbent on thoſe who are charged with the intereſts of Great Britain in the Eaſt, to exert themſelves for the retrieval of the national loſs; that we have the means in our power; and that, with ſuch ſuperior advantages as we poſſeſs over every power which can oppoſe us, we ſhould not act merely on the defenſive *."’

In theſe explicit words you have all the policy and all the juſtice of the Maratta war: If we have ſuffered loſſes in the Weſt, let us repair them in the Eaſt; wherever we are powerful, it is our buſineſs to attack. Surely, Sir, if no other evidence exiſted, it would not be very unreaſonable to preſume, that Mr. Haſtings's meaſures have been formed on the principles he profeſſes.

I am ready to admit that the clauſe in queſtion does all that can be done, by mere legiſlative prohibition, to put a ſtop to ſuch meaſures in future. Yet I very much fear that the general rule will be defeated by the exception that attends it. The Governor General and Council are not to make war, or to commence hoſtilities againſt any of the country [17] powers, unleſs ſuch powers ſhall be actually making preparations for the commencement of hoſtilities againſt us or our allies. I beg leave to aſſure the Houſe, that whenever the Governor General and Council are diſpoſed to make war upon their neighbours, they can at all times fabricate a caſe to ſuit their purpoſe, and ſend home a maſs of incontrovertible evidence to ſupport it.—The exception in the next clauſe, by which a ſimilar latitude is given to Fort St. George and Bombay, is not ſo dangerous, becauſe thoſe Preſidencies are nearer to a power that may control them. They cannot make war, if the Governor General and Council be ſeriouſly determined againſt it. But again I tell you, that one example is worth a hundred laws.

I am not very converſant with the affairs of the coaſt of Coromandel, and therefore ſhall offer but a ſingle obſervation on the ſeveral clauſes that relate to the liquidation of the debts due to Britiſh ſubjects from the Nabob of Arcot, the Rajah of Tanjore, and any other of the native protected princes in India. The labour of inquiring into and liquidating theſe debts, which the bill impoſes on the Governor General and Council, in addition to their own immediate duties, will be very heavy, and, I believe, equally uſeleſs. They may adjuſt the account; but I have no conception how the debts are to be paid out of an exhauſted revenue, and a ruined country. I believe it to be impoſſible, unleſs a preference is to be given to the private debts before [18] thoſe of the Company, which, I preſume, is not intended.

The final ſettlement of the preſent indeterminate rights and poſſeſſions of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, with reſpect to each other, is a juſt, a neceſſary, and an attainable object. The principles, on which the ſettlement is to be made, appear to me to be the beſt that could be adopted. But I moſt ſtrongly object to, and proteſt againſt the idea of leaving the execution of the meaſure to the Governor General and Council. The power, which predominates in that Government, is notoriouſly partial to the Nabob of Arcot, and hoſtile to the Rajah of Tanjore. The tribunal, to which you refer the parties, is prejudiced in favour of the ſtronger of the two, and, if its intentions were over ſo upright, ſhould not be truſted with the power of judging between them. Neither is it neceſſary. There is no queſtion of right between the contending parties, which may not be decided as properly and as effectually in England as it can be in Bengal. The Court of Directors have all the materials before them: they may determine the points in diſpure, and ſend their orders directly to the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, to carry their deciſion into effect. If they can do it, they ought to do it.

On a ſimilar principle of reaſon and juſtice, I object to the mode adopted in the next clauſe, for the profeſſed purpoſe of reinſtating certain Rajahs, Zemindars, Polygars, and other landholders, who [19] have been diſpoſſeſſed of their lands. The claims of the parties are to be referred to the reſpective Preſidencies, who are to inquire into, and determine upon them: that is, if injuſtice has been done, the perſons, who have done it, are to repair it at their diſcretion. Is there any colour of propriety, is there any prudence in ſuch a delegation of power? or do you think it would be effectual? For example, do you believe that any orders from the Court of Directors, or even from the higheſt power in this country, could engage Mr. Haſtings to liſten to the claims of the Rajah of Benares? Can he be reaſonably deemed an impartial judge of ſuch claims? He has told the Directors*, that ‘"if they ſhould proceed to order the reſtoration of Rajah Cheyt Sing, and, if the Council ſhould reſolve to execute the order, he would inſtantly give up his ſtation and the ſervice."’ He ſuppoſes it will be a queſtion in the Council, whether the order of the Directors ſhall be executed or not; and he fairly appriſes them of his own reſolution to oppoſe it. For my own part, I am perſuaded that he would hazard his life rather than ſubmit to carry the order into execution himſelf. Yet, if ever there was a caſe that called upon the national honour and humanity for juſtice and protection, aſſuredly it is that of the Rajah of Benares.

The next clauſe is material indeed. The well-being, if not the exiſtence of the natives of all [20] your Eaſtern Dominions, depends on a firm eſtabliſhment of that principle of taxation, which appears to be the object of the clauſe. Ever ſince I have known any thing of the ſubject, or had an opportunity of offering an opinion about it, it has been the labour and effort of my life to inculcate and eſtabliſh the truth of this propoſition—that the tribute, rent, ſervice, or payment to be paid by the ſeveral landholders, of whatever denomination, ſhould be fixed and unalterable. The profeſſed object of this clauſe is the real object, and reſult of every concluſion, that my underſtanding is capable of deducing from experience and reflection. The means, taken to accompliſh it, are the very worſt that could be thought of. After twenty years poſſeſſion of the Dewanny, after twenty years collection of the revenues, the fixation of the rents is ſtill to be a queſtion for future inveſtigation.—Good God! Sir, are theſe inquiſitions into the property of our Indian ſubjects—are theſe ſcrutinies into the value of their eſtates never to have an end! Are the natives of India never to have a quietus under an Engliſh Government!—In the year 1784 you order the Governments abroad to deviſe ſuch methods as ſhall to them ſeem moſt fitting and convenient to eſtabliſh a fixed and unalterable tribute! The language held by the Directors, ſeven years ago, on a ſimilar occaſion, is wiſer and more humane than yours, and ought to be a leſſon to you. In July, 1777, ſpeaking of a new mode of inquiſition propoſed and eſtabliſhed by Mr. Haſtings, they ſaid, ‘"In the preſent ſtate of the buſineſs, our ſurpriſe [21] and concern were great on finding, by our Governor General's minute of the firſt of November, 1776, that, after more than ſeven years inveſtigation, information is ſtill ſo incomplete, as to render another innovation, ſtill more extraordinary than any of the former, abſolutely neceſſary to the formation of a new ſettlement."’

But the preſent courſe, it ſeems, is taken, in order to prevent any corrupt or oppreſſive practices.—Sir, the Court of Directors are in poſſeſſion of annual accounts of the revenues of Bengal ſince the year 1766. They have an account before them of the demand, receipt, and balance of every reſpective year. In ſhort, Sir, they poſſeſs every poſſible light and information on the ſubject, which the Government of Bengal ought to look for, or would be able to obtain. They may take the collections of any one year for a ſtandard, or, what is much better, they may take an average of the collections of ſeveral years, and determine at once, and for ever, what all the principal diſtricts ſhall invariably pay. Perhaps it may be neceſſary, though I do not think it will, to leave ſome parts of the minuter diſtribution to the power upon the ſpot. The leſs you leave to it the better. The only danger of the mode I propoſe, or of any mode of fixation that can be propoſed, is this—that, take what period or what average you will, conſidering the daily and rapid decline of the country, the amount of revenue, ſo taken, will prove too much. The ſtate of the country, and of the people, calls as loudly for [22] abatement, as the neceſſities of the Company call for increaſe of revenue.

This, Sir, is the true way to prevent corrupt or oppreſſive practices. If you refer it to the ſervants abroad to deviſe the methods, and then to tranſmit their proceedings and determination to the Court of Directors for their final orders and directions:—in the firſt place, the delay of itſelf is a new, or, rather, a continued act of oppreſſion to the natives; but what is much worſe, your meaſures are oppoſed to your experience:—you unneceſſarily give powers, which you know, or ought to know, have been conſtantly abuſed. One example, if there were no other, ought to deter you from replacing a ſimilar truſt in ſimilar hands. I have a right to aſſert, though not from my own knowledge, that the five-years ſettlement of the revenues of Bengal, made in the year 1772, was ſold by the Committee of Circuit. The fact is notorious in India; but it is on the authority of the Court of Directors that I affirm it to be true. In their letter of the 4th of March, 1778, they ordered the Governor General and Council forthwith to commence a proſecution in the Supreme Court of Judicature againſt the perſons who compoſed the Committee of Circuit, or their repreſentatives *.

I do not doubt that the ſubſequent clauſe, for ſecuring the penſions allotted to ſome of the Zemindars [23] in lieu of their lands, was drawn up with a benevolent intention; but I believe the fact it refers to is miſunderſtood. The firſt and leading effort of national juſtice ſhould be to reinſtate the proprietors, of every denomination, in the poſſeſſion of their property. The very meaſure, that forced theſe penſions on the Zemindars, was an act of the moſt deſpotic oppreſſion. The rents demanded of them, for this very purpoſe, were ſo high, that, rather than be anſwerable for ſums which they knew their lands could not afford, they accepted of penſions, and ſurrendered the poſſeſſion and management of their eſtates to ſtrangers, to farmers, to adventurers, to the banyans of the Preſident and Council of Fort William. Is it otherwiſe to be believed, that any man in his ſenſes would give up his landed eſtate for a penſion, to be held at the pleaſure of an arbitrary Government?—Do juſtice to theſe people, and there will be no foundation for this clauſe.

It is proper and neceſſary that the Court of Directors ſhould be reſtrained from ſending any new ſervant, civil or military, to India, until the eſtabliſhments are fixed; and, when they are fixed, it is equally proper that the Directors ſhould be reſtrained from ſending out writers, cadets, or others, beyond the number neceſſary to fill up vacancies as they happen. The ſervice is overloaded with uſeleſs ſervants: they are a burthen to the Government, and they conſtitute a tax of the worſt ſort upon the country.

[24] There ſeems to be no occaſion for a law to confirm an exiſting rule of the Company's ſervioe. It is, and always has been, eſtabliſhed, that promotions ſhould be made according to ſeniority. The latitude given in the exception is perfectly unneceſſary, as well as incorrectly worded*. The Governments abroad are ready enough to find urgent occaſion to deviate from the general rule. The vote in Council is the very act of deviation, not the medium through which they ſee cauſe for it.

The next clauſe may properly be combined with another, which ſtands at a diſtance from it; I mean to conſider the ſixty-ſeventh and eighty-ninth clauſes together. By the former no perſon, beyond a certain age, is to be ſent to India as a cadet or writer; but no reaſon for the limitation is aſſigned. By the latter, no perſon whatſoever, who ſhall have been employed, in any capacity whatſoever, in the Eaſt Indies, ſhall be capable of being appointed to any ſtation or office in India, after he, having returned to this kingdom, ſhall have reſided at home a certain time, unleſs it be proved that ſuch reſidence was neceſſary for his health: ſo that the worſt man in the ſervice is capable of being reinſtated, provided he reſigned it on account of his health; whereas an able and meritorious ſervant, who may have been obliged to come to England, and to reſide here longer than the limited period, for the moſt urgent [25] and juſtifiable reaſons, though not for ill health, is utterly prohibited from returning to a ſervice, to which he may have devoted his life, and for which he may have relinquiſhed all other proſpects and purſuits. I ſee no reaſon for the diſtinction. There is no poſitive merit in ſickneſs, though it has a natural claim to indulgence. One would think that the executive power of the Company, if the Court of Directors are equal to any of their duties, might ſafely be truſted with ſuch details as theſe. It is not an object that apparently requires the interpoſition of the Legiſlature: but if it did, the proper and uſeful regulation would be, not abſolutely to prohibit abſentees from returning to the ſervice, but to prevent their gaining rank in their abſence over thoſe, who continued to do their duty on the ſpot. Whoever ſtayed in England, beyond the limit of a reaſonable leave of abſence, ſhould return preciſely to the rank he held when he left India.

Taking the operation of the two clauſes together, the reſult ſeems to be, that, in the firſt inſtance, no man, who ſhall have acquired knowledge or experience in England, ſhall be permitted to go India; and that no man, who may have acquired knowledge and experience in India, ſhall be permitted to return, unleſs his faculties have been ſufficiently impaired by his infirmities, to qualify him for reſuming the duties of his ſtation. The favourite idea ſeems to be, that youth and inexperience ſhould govern Bengal. An old maxim of policy attaches [26] experience to years, and wiſdom to experience; and though I know there is a brilliant exception to this maxim, I wiſh it to be left where it ſtands—a brilliant exception to a general principle, and not, that the exception ſhould be converted into a rule.

Nothing can be objected to the principle and purpoſe of that clauſe, which makes all offences committed by Britiſh ſubjects in every other part of India, or under pretence of the order of any native protected Prince, amenable to the ſame laws, and liable to the ſame penalties, as if they had been committed within the territories directly ſubject to the Britiſh Government. At the ſame time, there will be a legal difficulty in the proceeding, which gentlemen of the profeſſion would do well to conſider. The proceſs of our courts of juſtice does not run beyond the limits of our own provinces; ſo that, although the party accuſed may be in your power, the witneſſes neceſſary to convict or acquit him cannot, in any regular courſe of proceeding, be compelled to appear. If this difficulty be not provided for, there can be no trial of the offences in queſtion.

On the ſubject of preſents, my opinion, perhaps, may be thought particular. Forms and appearances, I know, are againſt it. Undoubtedly the Governor General and Council, the Judges, and any others who have great eſtabliſhed ſalaries, ſhould derive no other advantage from their ſtation. With reſpect to them, the prohibition of preſents is proper; but it ought to be complete. I can aſſure the Houſe, that the exception in favour of preſents of ceremony [27] on ſolemn occaſions, is founded on ideas which I know to be fallacious. The acceptance of ceremonial preſents is no way neceſſary for ſupporting the dignity of men in power, nor has the refuſal of them ever given offence. General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and I, conſtantly refuſed them. We told the natives, it was againſt the law of England, the very law by which we were appointed, and they were ſatisfied. Mr. Haſtings declared, that he ſhould continue to receive nuzzers, and carry them to the Company's account. Our other honourable colleague, who is now a Member of the Houſe, entirely approved of the honourable Preſident's conduct in the receipt of complimentary nuzzers: but he did not equally approve of accounting for them to the Company. His words are; ‘"I might here make a tender to the Public of the trivial nuzzers, to the acceptance of which my ſtation has impelled me. But what is proper for the Governor General, would in me, I apprehend, appear rather in the light of a conſequential, inſignificant diſplay of rigidneſs in exceſs!"’ In Mr. Haſtings's letters you have ſeen ſome ſplendid examples of the ſublime. The honourable gentleman, whoſe words I have juſt repeated, ſucceeds better in the profound. It is his forte. Theſe trivial preſents accumulate very faſt. If I had laid myſelf out for the receipt of them, I have no doubt, that whlie I was in Bengal I might have realiſed eight or nine thouſand pounds from this petty ſource of profit. To men in high ſtation, the prohibition ſhould be abſolute. [28] In all ſtations, it ſhould be highly penal to receive money for corrupt purpoſes, or to extort it. In the ordinary tranſaction of buſineſs, I am inclined to think that preſents are not dangerous, and I know that they are uſeful. The Government of Bengal, through all its gradations, is a Government of favour, not of juſtice. Nothing would ever be done for the natives, if they did not gratify the perſons who forwarded their affairs. Whenever there ſhall be a Government of ſtrict juſtice in Bengal, and whenever proviſion ſhall be made for the various offices under it, proportioned to their reſpective rank and power, you may totally aboliſh preſents. Till then, you neither can, nor ought to do it—till then, the oaths you preſcribe to the collectors of the revenue will bind none but men of honour. Men of a different character will either totally diſregard the prohibition, or ſatisfy their ſcruples, if they have any, by accommodating the exception to all caſes, or all caſes to the exception. For the purpoſe of receiving preſents of ceremony, all occaſions will be found ſufficiently ſolemn.

By the ſixty-ninth clauſe, the whole gift or preſent is to be forfeited to the King: by the ſeventieth, the court of juſtice may order the gift to be reſtored to the party who gave it. Can the ſame preſent, ſuppoſing it were a diamond, be forfeited to the Crown and reſtored to the owner; or is it meant that the offender ſhall forfeit double the value in every inſtance?—The two clauſes ſeem to me to contradict one another.

[29] The ſeventy-firſt makes an exception in favour of counſellors at law, phyſicians, ſurgeons, or chaplains; but it takes no notice of attornies, who are much more in the receipt of fees than any of the others.

With reſpect to the wilful diſobeying, or the wilfully omitting to execute the Company's orders, if there be no material inſtances of the diſobedience alluded to, the law that propoſes to puniſh it hereafter is ſuperfluous and unjuſt. The Legiſlature interpoſes before it is called upon:—it ſuppoſes offences, which are not ſtated, and, by ſuppoſing them to exiſt generally, it confounds the innocent with the guilty. If they do exiſt, to a degree, that warrants and demands the interpoſition of the Legiſlature, they ought to be puniſhed as well as forbidden; at leaſt the offenders ought to be removed from their places. When the laws prohibit on one fide, and perfect impunity encourages on the other, is it reaſonable to expect that the prohibition ſhould be regarded?—The minds of men will be determined by what you do, not by what you ſay; and the more you threaten, the more you will be deſpiſed.

The two next clauſes give a moſt exorbitant and formidable power to the Governor General and Council, and to the ſubordinate Preſidencies; even to Bencoolen!—All perſons ſuſpected of carrying on any illicit commerce or correſpondence with any body; may be ſeized, impriſoned, and detained in cuſtody by the Governor's warrant, until the Governor and Council ſhall think fit to bring them to trial, or ſend [30] them to England. No fact is ſtated, or even alluded to, that might require the delegation of ſo dangerous a truſt. I declare, that while I was in India, there never was an inſtance fit to be named as the foundation of ſuch a law as this; nor have I heard of any ſince. Correſpondence with the enemies of the State is high treaſon; and treaſon may be puniſhed without a new law. But what do you mean by illicit commerce? What tranſaction is there in life which an arbitrary Government may not interpret into an illicit commerce? Do you mean to deny the parties the benefit of the Habeas Corpus? Do you mean to leave it to the diſcretion of the Governor and Council at what time the party ſhall be tried, or to their option whether he ſhall be tried on the ſpot, or ſent a priſoner to England? No, Sir; I know perfectly well what is meant. The liberty of every individual in India is to be held at the mercy of the Governor General. The clauſe has no real object, but to increaſe his perſonal power, and to make it irreſiſtible.

I have now gone through the ſecond diviſion of the bill. Before I proceed to the third, I have an appeal to make to the honour and to the juſtice of the Houſe. It is of a nature ſo perſonal, that it will probaby excite their curioſity; but it is alſo connected with the public ſervice. It has a natural and a neceſſary relation to the general object of the preſent bill, and therefore deſerves their attention. It concerns the ſervice of the public in future, that the character of men, who have faithfully [31] and honourably diſcharged the duties of a high ſtation, ſhould be protected from reproach. The inſults, offered to the memory of ſuch men, contribute to deter others from following their example, are injurious to the community, and ought to be reſented with univerſal indignation. It is not of myſelf I ſpeak;—that ſpirit of preſumption does not belong to me. I am proud of the fortune, that connected my name and united my labours with thoſe of Clavering and Monſon, and it is all the diſtinction I pretend to.

When I ſought to obtain a ſeat in the Houſe of Commons, it was not merely for the honour of ſitting here, nor for any delight I take in your debates. With reſpect to India affairs, my firſt view was, not to ſerve England or the India Company; but the natives of India if I could. To them I am bound by every obligation of juſtice, gratitude, and compaſſion. From them I received the ſalary, which gave me a fortune. But, even if the ſervice of England had been my only object, this is the courſe I ſhould have taken to purſue it. I will not appeal to your virtues, or ſuppoſe that you have any. If you have common ſenſe, if, as intereſted men, you underſtand your own intereſt, you will treat the creatures, ſubject to your power, with lenity and juſtice. If wealth be your object, you will protect the induſtry, you will nurſe and cheriſh the eſtate, by which you expect to be enriched.

My ſecond reaſon for obtaining a ſeat in Parliament was to have an opportunity of explaining my [32] own conduct, if it ſhould be queſtioned, or defending it, if it ſhould be attacked. The laſt, and not the leaſt urgent reaſon was, that I might be ready to defend the character of my colleagues, not againſt ſpecific charges, which I am ſure will never be produced; but againſt the language of calumny, which endeavours to aſperſe, without daring to accuſe. It is well known that a groſs and public inſult has been offered to the memory of General Clavering and Colonel Monſon, by a perſon of high rank in this country. I was happy when I heard, that my name was included in it with theirs. So highly do I reſpect the character of thoſe men, that I deem it an honour to ſhare in the injuſtice it has ſuffered.—It is in compliance with the forms of the Houſe, and not to ſhelter myſelf, or out of tenderneſs to the party, that I forbear to name him. I mean to deſcribe him ſo exactly, that he cannot be miſtaken. He declared in his place in a great aſſembly, and in the courſe of a grave deliberation, ‘"that it would have been happy for this country, if General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, had been drowned in their paſſage to India."’—If this poor and ſpiteful invective had been uttered by a man of no conſequence or repute, by any light, trifling, inconſiderate perſon, by a Lord of the Bedchamber for example, or any of the other ſilken Barons of modern days, I ſhould have heard it with indifference. But when it is ſeriouſly urged and deliberately inſiſted on by a grave Lord of Parliament— [33] by a Judge,—by a man of ability and eminence in his profeſſion, whoſe perſonal diſpoſition is ſerious, who carries gravity to ſterneſs, and ſterneſs to ferocity, it cannot be received with indifference, or anſwered without reſentment. Such a man will be thought to have inquired before he pronounced. From his mouth, a reproach is a ſentence, an invective is a judgement.—The accidents of life, and not any original diſtinction that I know of, have placed him too high, and me at too great a diſtance from him, to admit of any other anſwer from me, than a public defiance, for General Clavering, for Colonel Monſon, and for myſelf. This is not a party queſtion, nor ſhould it be left to ſo feeble an advocate as I am to ſupport it.—The friends and fellow ſoldiers of General Clavering and Colonel Monſon will aſſiſt me in defending their memory. I demand and expect the ſupport of every man of honour in this Houſe, and in the kingdom. What character is ſafe, if ſlander be permitted to attack the reputation of two of the moſt honourable and virtuous men that ever were employed, or ever periſhed in the ſervice of their country?—I know that the authority of this man is not without weight; but I have an infinitely higher authority to oppoſe to it. I had the happineſs of hearing the merits of General Clavering and Colonel Monſon acknowledged and applauded in terms, to which I am not at liberty to do more than to allude. They were rapid and expreſſive. I muſt not venture to repeat leaſt I ſhould do them injuſtice, or violate [34] the forms of reſpect, where eſſentially I owe and feel the moſt. But I am ſufficiently underſtood. The generous ſenſations, that animate the Royal mind, are eaſily diſtinguiſhed from thoſe, which rankle in the heart of that perſon, who is ſuppoſed to be the keeper of the Royal conſcience.

The third diviſion of the bill includes the inſtitution of a new judicature, avowedly repugnant to all the principles of the criminal juriſprudence of this country, and of which there is no example, but the Star Chamber, in the hiſtory of England. My ſurpriſe and diſappointment, when I heard this part of the bill recommended and inſiſted on by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, are not to be expreſſed. Yet I might have been in ſome degree prepared for the event. This is not the firſt inſtance, in which I have obſerved that the right honourable gentleman is never more urgent, is never more eloquent in eſtabliſhing the truth of a general propoſition, or in exaiting the virtues of a general principle, than at the moment he is going to introduce an exception to it.—No man, who heard him, can have forgotten, how earneſtly and how vehemently he recommended it to the Houſe, not to let their anxiety for the better government of India, however laudable, engage them to do any thing inconſiſtent with the ſecurity of our own domeſtic eſtabliſhment, or that might directly or indirectly intrench on our own conſtitution. From this general caution, he proceeded to a warm and animated panegyric of the trial by jury. I declare moſt ſolemnly [35] that I thought he was going to new model the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta, and to reſtore the Britiſh ſubjects in India to their birthright, of which they were deprived by the charter of that Court, for no good purpoſe that I can diſcover, but certainly without any good effect. When the right honourable gentleman had thus eſtabliſhed his premiſes, by an appeal to conſtitutional topics, which always gain upon an Engliſh audience, he turned ſhort to a concluſion, which I imagine muſt have diſappointed and aſtoniſhed every man, who was not immediately in the ſecret—‘"That the beſt general rules were ſubject to exceptions, that neceſſity created a law of its own, and that ſuch a neceſſity exiſted at preſent. That the puniſhment of Indian delinquents could not be obtained by proceedings in Parliament, nor by proſecution in the courts of common law,—of courſe that there was no alternative, but to create a ſpecial judicature, with ſummary proceedings, and without the intervention of a Jury, for the trial of offences committed in India."’—In the firſt place, Sir, I deny the ſuppoſition, on which the inference is founded. I have no doubt that delinquency of every kind may be effectually tried and puniſhed by the judicatures that exiſt. But if I thought otherwiſe,—if I were perfectly convinced that Indian delinquents could no way be puniſhed but by a violent innovation in the criminal law of the kingdom, I would not purchaſe their puniſhment at ſo ruinous an expence. I would not, for the ſake of that object, [36] though I think it important, conſent to a breach of any kind in the principal barrier of the freedom of England. When the precedent is eſtabliſhed, I know not what farther innovations may be gradually grafted upon it, or how rapidly it may advance to the deſtruction of thoſe principles, which it begins with invading. We are not yet however reduced to that conſideration. Let us try whether, in effect, the right honourable gentleman is warranted in affirming that there is no alternative. If there be, the principles we both profeſs oblige him to prefer it.—I am but little of a lawyer, and I am very deſirous to be inſtructed. If I ſhould be miſtaken in my facts, ſome of the learned gentlemen oppoſite to me will have the goodneſs to correct me.

Suppoſing it to be admitted, that taking the law as it now ſtands, the formality of pleading, and the difficulty of aſcertaining, according to the ſtrict rules of evidence, facts which have ariſen beyond ſea, are ſuch as will create a failure of juſtice, it does not follow, that it is at all neceſſary to deprive perſons accuſed of offences in India of trial by Jury. The Court of King's Bench has already the power of trying miſdemeanors committed in India, under the 13th of Geo. III. cap. 63. with the aſſiſtance of a Jury. If the forms of pleading and the rules of evidence ſtand in the way of juſtice, let the law be altered:—with reſpect to ſpecial pleading and evidence, let the King's Bench be governed by the ſame rules that are laid down to govern the practice of this new Court; and then it will be as competent [37] as this can be, to take cognizance of, and puniſh offences committed in India, and ſtill the party accuſed will, in every inſtance, have the privilege of being tried by his peers. When the act of 1774 was made, it was thought neceſſary to alter the law with regard to evidence: and it was accordingly enacted, that depoſitions, taken under a commiſſion in India, ſhould be admitted as evidence in the King's Bench; but trial by jury ſtill remained. The Legiſlature did nothing to affect that mode of trial. Before that act, a miſdemeanor committed in India could not have been tried upon an information in the King's Bench, ſo that here was a new juriſdiction given to that Court; its juriſdiction was at leaſt extended to offences in India, which were before not cognizable in that Court, either by information or indictment. At common law, treafons committed out of the realm were not puniſhable in England. To remedy this defect, various acts were made in the reign of Henry VIII.: but even in the arbitrary reign of that Monarch, no attempt was made to deprive the ſubject of trial by jury. At common law, murders committed in foreign parts could not be inquired into in England; but by the 33d Henry VIII. cap. 23. they might be inquired of, and tried by the King's ſpecial commiſſion in England. By that act a new tribunal was erected; but ſtill no attempt was made to aboliſh trial by jury. Even in that commiſſion court, the party had the privilege of being tried by his peers. If it be true, that a new ſpecies of criminality makes [38] a new courſe of proceeding unavoidable, the ground of the diſtinction muſt be fairly and clearly eſtabliſhed. The anſwer I expect muſt not be technical, but plain enough to ſatisfy the underſtanding of men, who are not learned. When the common intereſt is at ſtake, the common ſenſe of the nation ſhould be conſulted.

A word or two more on the general ſituation of the country, and I have done. We have it from the authority of a noble Lord*, or rather of a noble convert, whoſe opinions very properly bend to his experience, that, at a former period, he had oppoſed the preſent Adminiſtration, becauſe he diſapproved of the courſes, by which they had poſſeſſed themſelves of power;—that the caſe was now completely altered; that the ſenſe of the nation had been unanimouſly declared, and that the united voice of the nation could not be reſiſted;—that the Miniſter had now come into power, at the front door of the Houſe, and on the ſhoulders of the People. I do not mean to diſpute the truth of theſe propoſitions, much leſs the propriety of any change of opinion, that may be founded upon them. Take the fact as it is ſtated, and compare it with the conſequences, which it has immediately produced. Wherever ſenſation exiſts, the compariſon will be felt; and, if men are ſtill capable of reflection, it will force them to reflect. The very firſt act of this popular Adminiſtration, of a Miniſter, who comes into power on the ſhoulders of the People, attacks the Democracy [39] of the country, and annihilates the firſt of all the popular powers of the Conſtitution. The deciſion of the queſtion upon the Weſtminſter election, however it may be turned, or in whatever colours it may be dreſſed, carries you finally and inevitably to this concluſion; that the People of Great Britain may be governed by laws, to which they have not conſented, and may be taxed by a Houſe of Commons, in which they are not repreſented. If this be the fact of Weſtminſter to-day, why not of London tomorrow,—of Middleſex the next? On the face of the precedent, I ſee nothing to confine it.

The ſecond meaſure of this popular Adminiſtration attacks the trial by jury, and threatens to aboliſh it. Such are the inſtant operations of that very power, which pretends to be derived from the confidence of the People.—But if the People of England are not mad as well as blind, if they have not loſt their underſtanding as well as their feelings, they will ſoon ſee how unwiſely they have beſtowed their confidence, and repent of their deluſion, when repentance is too late.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. MONDAY, July 27, 1784.
Mr. FRANCIS.

[40]
"THE order of the day being read, for taking into further confideration the Report from the Committee of the whole Houſe, to whom the Bill for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the Eaſt-India Company, and of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, and for eſtabliſhing a Court of Judicature for the more ſpeedy and effectual trial of perſons accuſed of offences in the Eaſt Indies, was committed."
Mr. SPEAKER,

My objections to the bill, as it now ſtands, are in ſome reſpects changed; but they are very little diminiſhed. It is not to be denied, that the bill has been materially altered, and, in ſome inſtances, improved in the Committee. Inſtead of profeſſing candour, which too often is affectation, I ſhall [41] ſpeak of the preſent merits of the bill, with ſincerity. I allow that ſeveral clauſes have been prudently corrected, and others very properly omitted; but I do not mean to admit, that particular improvements, grafted on falſe principles, can eſſentially mend the meaſure. It is poſſible that a thing, which is wrong in one extreme, may be equally wrong in another. In acknowledging the improvements that have been made, I hope at leaſt to eſtabliſh a claim to credit, when I return to my objections.

No orders are now to be ſent to India by the Commiſſioners without the knowledge of the Directors, or to the Commanders in Chief in India, without the knowledge of the reſpective Preſidencies. Orders of every kind are now to be conveyed through the proper conſtitutional channels. While you ſuffer the Court of Directors to exiſt, their authority belongs to the conſtitution of the Company. To paſs by the firſt is to deſtroy the ſecond. The abſurdity of that idea is acknowledged and corrected. The clauſes, by which the appointment of the ſeveral Commanders in Chief, and of perſons to ſucceed to the command in caſe of vacancy, was to be given to His Majeſty, are omitted. Undoubtedly, nothing could be more extravagant than the idea of ſeparating the military from the civil power of the Company's Government. The alteration was indiſpenſably neceſſary. At the ſame time, I have no conception how it can poſſibly be reconciled to a political principle, which a right honourable gentleman, in opening the [42] original plan of the bill, laid down as fundamental. He urged and inſiſted on the truth of this propoſition, and aſſerted it to be inherent in the Engliſh conſtitution, that the armies of any one State, however they might be divided, or wherever they might be employed, belonged to the department of the executive power, and that therefore the appointment to the ſeveral commands of the Company's forces ſhould unqueſtionably be veſted in the Crown. He had then forgotten, what he poſſibly may ſince have recollected, that the Court of Directors are in fact the executive power of the State in queſtion. But I need not combat a propoſition, which he himſelf has ſo completely abandoned. The right honourable gentleman, I ſee, is not obſtinately tenacious of his principles, or his complaiſance to his friends muſt be unbounded.

The ſeveral clauſes in the original bill, which relate to the private debts of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore;—the reſpective claims or undetermined rights and pretenſions of thoſe princes;—the reinſtatement of diſpoſſeſſed Rajahs, Zemindars, and other landholders;—the fixation of the rents or tributes to be paid in future;—the reduction of expences, and the final limitation of eſtabliſhments, offices, and emoluments;—are all completely relinquiſhed,—I will not preſume to ſay, in compliance with my opinion, but a good deal in conformity to it.—The principle I recommended ſeems to be generally adopted, that whatever can be done, immediately by the Directors at home, ſhould [43] not be referred to the ſervants abroad. Yet I am ſorry to ſee that, in this general ſweep, the very beſt clauſe of the firſt bill is included. I mean the one marked 58, by which it was provided ‘"that it ſhould not be lawful for the Governor General and Council of Fort William, or the Governor and Council of any of the other Preſidencies, or any ſervant or agent of the ſaid United Company, of what deſcription or denomination ſoever, to alter ſuch tribute, rent, ſervice, or payment as the ſaid Court of Directors ſhould have finally confirmed, upon any pretence whatſoever, or to exact from or impoſe upon any native Prince, or his heirs, or perſons claiming under them, any greater or different tribute, rent, ſervice, or payment, than ſuch as ſhould have been confirmed by the Court of Directors."’

I moſt earneſtly recommend it to the right honourable gentleman to reinſtate this clauſe, or to revive the ſpirit of it, in terms accommodated to the new principle which appears to be aſſumed. The tribute once fixed, I would not leave it in the power even of the Directors to alter it.

The clauſe, reſpecting preſents, is properly amended. Wherever the prohibition is right, it ought to ſtand without exception. Admitting that preſents were really and purely ceremonial, in my mind they degrade the dignity of a high ſtation inſtead of exalting it. What in fact, and even in appearance, can be more diſgraceful, than for a Britiſh Governor to hold out his hand to receive a [44] few gold mohrs or rupees from every native, who comes to viſit him, and frequently from perſons, who are unable to afford it. The true dignity of power is to be acceſſible to its ſubjects, without expecting them to pay for it. With reſpect to the ſubordinate ranks of the ſervice, I ſtill have my doubts. I am perfectly ſatisfied, that in the preſent ſtate of the ſervice, no law can prevent the practice, and I am not ſure that you ought to attempt it. I have no expectation that ſuch a direct proviſion will ever be made for the Company's ſervants, as will even afford them a ſubſiſtence; much leſs an exceeding, out of which an independence can be gradually accumulated, by any efforts of oeconomy. People in England have no idea of the expence of living in Bengal. There is no ſuch thing as commerce. The few, who have engaged in enterpriſes of internal induſtry, have either totally failed, or been obliged to abandon them:—and the falaries, given by the Company, below the Board of Trade and the Colonels of Brigades, are very inconfiderable. Yet no man ſhould be cut off from the hopes of a reaſonable and moderate independence, in proportion to his ſtation.—Human inſtitutions ſhould conſult human nature.

I believe, Sir, I have now taken notice of every material amendment, that deſerves commendation. The other branches of the ſubject are more numerous and productive.

In comparing the preſent bill with the firſt, there is one general preliminary obſervation to be made [45] upon them both; that the two bills draw two concluſions equally falſe, though perfectly different, from one and the ſame falſe principle of policy. The principle, common to them both, is, that, where power is really wanted, where power ought to be ſtrengthened, the ſureſt way to ſtrengthen it will be to divide it. On this foundation, the firſt bill, inſtead of uniting the executive powers of the Company in any one Board, divided them between the Commiſſioners and the Directors, with ſo great a preponderance in favour of the former, that the latter in reality were reduced to nothing and ought to have been aboliſhed. On the ſame foundation, the preſent bill continues to divide a power, which ought to be united, but diſtributes it differently. The Crown and the Commiſſioners ſurrender almoſt every thing they had taken, and the Directors are reinveſted with a power, which evidently ſuppoſes them fit to be highly truſted. But the truſt, as it ſtands, is incompatible with the control. The firſt bill, placing no confidence in the Directors, diveſted them of all power. The amended bill continues a check, in which the ſame want of confidence is implied, yet reſtores them to a power, which ought never to be given to men who are diſtruſted.—With reſpect to the governments abroad, the means taken to accompliſh the profeſſed object of both the bills are nearly the ſame. In order to make the power at home more capable of governing, they divide it. But, in order to make the power in India more governable, they ſtrengthen and unite it. [46] This is the ſenſe, in which the old maxim, divide et impera, is now underſtood. This is the way, in which ancient maxims of policy are interpreted and applied by modern politicians.

The amended bill reduces the Preſidency of Fort William to a Governor General and three Counſellors, for the immediate purpoſe, expreſsly avowed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of giving effect to the caſting voice, in order to increaſe and ſtrengthen the power of the Governor General. This, I believe, is the firſt example of ſuch a uſe and application of the effect of a caſting voice. In all deliberative councils and aſſemblies whatever, the true and natural principle of deciſion is by a real majority of votes. But numbers, who debate, may diſagree; and, if the whole number happens to be even, they may poſſibly divide into equal parts. In that caſe only, the operation of the caſting voice is made uſe of to create a fictitious majority, not for the purpoſe of giving power, but merely to obtain a deciſion.—Hitherto the caſting voice has been conſidered as a neceſſary proviſion againſt a poſſible inconvenience. The preſent bill creates the inconvenience, not merely for the purpoſe of correcting it, but to convey a power, which, if proper to be given at all, ought to be given by a direct courſe, and ſecured againſt accidents. On the principle of the clauſes in queſtion, the Governor General ought to be a diſtinct perſon, and veſted with powers independent of the Council.—As long as a Council of four is full, the whole power, that belongs to it, [47] will certainly veſt in the Preſident, provided he has ſkill enough to ſecure the blind and devoted ſupport of any one of the other three; and this, I know, may be done. But, ſuppoſe his complaiſant friend ſhould die or depart, and the other two ſhould continue obſtinate;—the declared object of the bill is defeated.—The Preſident is reduced to a ſtate, in which he can do nothing but perplex or embarraſs the others, and in that ſtate he muſt remain, until his intereſt and influence at home ſhall have accompliſhed another appointment. A year and a half at leaſt muſt elapſe, before his new colleague can come to his aſſiſtance.—If therefore the power be proper, the bill ſhould take care to provide for its being held and exerciſed without interruption.—Sir, I am not ſuppoſing imaginary caſes. The oppoſition to Mr. Haſtings has not been conſined to General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and myſelf. His preſent colleagues, Mr. Wheler, Mr. Macpherſon, and Mr. Stables, have exactly the ſame opinion, that we had, of him and of his meaſures. Their oppoſition is as vigorous as they can make it, and, I believe, more deeply reſented by Mr. Haſtings, than ours.—From our oppoſition, however it might diſtreſs him, he felt no degradation. Of his preſent colleagues I know he has written home to this effect, that he ſhould have quitted the Government long ago, if he could have ventured to leave it in ſuch hands as theirs!

But perhaps it may be ſuſpected that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in ſorming this arrangement, [48] has been guided by experience, and that he has facts of importance to appeal to in ſupport of it.—I will tell the Houſe how the facts ſtand, and leave it to their judgement to compare them with the arrangement. Some of the Directors are preſent, and I call upon them to ſupport me if I am right, or to contradict me if I am wrong.

Before the death of Colonel Monſon, the Council conſiſted of five perſons. I do not mean at preſent to inquire into the reſpective merits of the two parties, into which it was divided, or to exalt one at the expence of the other. For the immediate purpoſe of the preſent argument, it is ſufficient for me to ſay, what every man in India and in the direction knows to be true, that, while the Government of Bengal was in the hands of five perſons, the Company's affairs were prudently conducted, and proſpered accordingly. The ſyſtem, laid down in their general inſtructions, was obſerved;—their orders were obeyed;—their debts were diſcharged;—their treaſury was filled;—and great inveſtments were provided by ſavings out of the revenue. Above all the reſt, we fixed our attention to the preſervation of peace throughout India. We maintained it ourſelves, and, when it was violated by the Preſidency of Bombay, we reſtored it by a direct interpoſition of the authority of our Government. When the death of Colonel Monſon had reduced the Council to four, which it ſeems is now the favourite number, the miſchiefs, which have ſince deſolated India and ruined the India Company, began to operate. The [49] ſecond war with the Marattas was planned at Bombay the moment they heard of the death of General Clavering, and received, embraced, and promoted by the Governor General and Council, the moment the plan was communicated to us. In leſs than five months after the death of General Clavering, the reſolution was taken at Fort William to break the definitive treaty of peace concluded but a year before at Poorundur, and to ſend an army acroſs India to invade the Peſhwa's dominions. The General's place was ſoon ſupplied by Mr. Wheler, ſo that, from Colonel Monſon's death in October 1776, to the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote in March 1779, the Council conſiſted of four perſons, excepting an interval of three or four months, in which I ſtood alone againſt Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Barwell; and in that period, I affirm that all the miſchiefs, with which you are now oppreſſed, took their birth, and grew into effects, which by this time, I fear, are not to be retrieved.—Your treaſuries are empty;—your debts are inſupportable;—your inveſtment, when you have any, is paid for by bills on the Company, and two thirds of India have been laid waſte. With theſe facts before you, is it poſſible for the Legiſlature to reject the number, under which the Company's affairs were wiſely and happily conducted in India, and voluntarily prefer that, under which every thing has been done, which this very law profeſſes to condemn, and moſt ſtrongly prohibits?

[50] By the ſeventeenth and eighteenth clauſes of the a nended bill, the ſituation of a Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces in India is now provided for. At laſt it has been diſcovered, that ſuch an office exiſts. I have no objection to the voice and precedence given him in the Supreme Council, or at the ſubordinate Councils of Fort St. George and Bombay, when he ſhall happen to be at either of them.—But I ſtrongly object to the ſituation, in which his arrival there will place the reſpective Commanders in Chief at thoſe two Preſidencies. He not only ſuperſedes them in rank, but reduces them to ſilence. During his ſtay, they are only to have a ſeat, but no voice, in the Council. The Houſe will obſerve that this is a civil office, not a military command; but, even on the ſtricteſt military ideas, the proviſion is abſurd. The arrival of a ſuperior officer diſpoſſeſſes the inferior, but does not annihilate him; he ſtill continues ſecond in command, with a real and effective, though not with an equal authority. For what reaſon he is inſtantly to be converted into a mute, I cannot conceive. Naturally he ought to be better informed than a ſtranger concerning the affairs of the Preſidency, where he has commanded. But the object of the clauſe is to filence the perſon, who, having the beſt information, ought to be ſpecially conſulted. It ought to be conſidered too, whether gentlemen of high rank in the army, whether a general officer in the King's ſervice, who may happen to command upon the coaſt, be likely to ſubmit to this ſort of [51] treatment, or how far it may wound the honourable feelings and ſpirit of the profeſſion?

Sir, I ſhall leave the remaining regulations of the bill to other gentlemen, who I believe have conſidered them with proper attention, and go at once to that article, which, I confeſs, is to me more important than all the reſt. I mean the new judicature, which the bill introduces into the criminal law of this country. I perceive that, in the apprehenſion of ſome gentlemen, this part of the bill has been conſiderably corrected and improved by the amendments made in the Committee, and that ſome gentlemen, who objected to it at firſt, are now ſatisfied. I am truly ſorry for it; becauſe I wiſh that the principle of every meaſure, which I deem to be dangerous to the conſtitution, ſhould appear at once to the public view, undiſguiſed, in its real ſhape, and in the colours that belong to it. They deceive themſelves groſſly who imagine that that, which is eſſentially wrong, can ever be formally right. It cannot be corrected or improved, becauſe the defect is in the eſſence, not in the form. And why ſhould you lay aſide the trial by jury in the caſe of Indian delinquents? I have yet heard no one affirmative reaſon aſſigned for it. Is it ſuſpected that a Jury will not do juſtice? You have no ground for the ſuſpicion; on the contrary, in the only caſe in point, in the only caſe of Indian delinquency that has been proſecuted in a court of common law, the Jury did their duty. I do not mean to enter into the merits of the proſecution of Mr. Stratton and Mr. Brooke for [52] diſpoſſeſſing and impriſoning Lord Pigot; it is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe to ſay, that the public in general thought that thoſe perſons deſerved to be ſeverely puniſhed, and expected that they would be ſo. Why were they not? The Jury did their part in finding them guilty. If they were not ſufficiently puniſhed, it was the fault of the Bench. Now, obſerve the conſequence: You lay aſide the Jury, who, in the only inſtance in point, did every thing that depended on them to bring the criminals to condign puniſhment, and you think you are ſure of juſtice, in uniting the incompatible offices of Judge and Jury in the ſame perſons, who, the only time they were tried, have totally diſappointed the public expectation of public juſtice. But all reaſon and argument are uſeleſs againſt power. If a Britiſh Houſe of Commons can, on any terms, conſent, in any inſtance, to aboliſh the trial by Jury, and if the people at large are inſenſible of the danger of ſuch a precedent, individuals, who have done their duty, muſt ſubmit to their ſhare in the miſchief, which they could not prevent. I fear the temper and character of the nation are changed. Though I am not an old man, I can remember a time, when an attempt of this nature would have thrown the whole kingdom into a flame. Had it [...]een made when a great man*, who is now no more, had a ſeat in this Houſe, he would have ſtarted from the bed of ſickneſs, he would have ſolicited ſome friendly hand to depoſit [53] him on this floor, and from this ſtation, with a monarch's voice, would have called the kingdom to arms to oppoſe it. But he is dead, and has left nothing in this world, that reſembles him. He is dead, and the ſenſe, and honour, and character, and underſtanding of the nation are dead with him. But it ſeems there is a neceſſity, that ſuperſedes all objections. Juſtice muſt be done, and criminals muſt be puniſhed. Sir, it requires ſome fortitude; it requires patience, long exerciſed, to endure ſo groſs a mockery. The bill, that threatens future puniſhment to future crimes, gives you a ſpecial earneſt of its ſincerity, in ſheltering every offence, and protecting every offender who has hitherto exiſted, or who does exiſt at this hour. The preſent law opens its boſom to receive them, and there they are ſafe: nay, it carries its precaution farther; it provides for the ſecurity of crimes in eſſe, that are actually unfiniſhed, and allows a ſufficient time, in which they may be compleated. When theſe honourable ſervices are accompliſhed, ſtrict Juſtice is then to take her ſeat. From that moment we are never to ſee any thing but her ſword. When the whole harveſt has been plundered, when the field itſelf has been trampled into duſt, you denounce racks and gibbets to the petty larceny, that hereafter may glean a few ears of corn. I have done my part to the utmoſt of my little judgement and ability. From thoſe, to whom more has been given, more will be expected. What I have ſaid will not be uſeleſs, if it ſuggeſts the materials [54] of reflection to others, and furniſhes employment for greater abilities.

The other regulations of the bill may be thought to require immediate diſpatch. If they are proper to be executed at all, they cannot be carried too ſoon into effect. But no argument of that kind can be applied to the clauſes, that regard the Judicature. The bill, on the face of it, expreſſes no particular hurry to puniſh any body.—For what poſſible reaſon then, ſhould this part of the bill be ſo urgently preſſed forward to keep pace with the reſt?—The preſent Adminiſtration, we are told, poſſeſſes the confidence, and are at all times ready to appeal to the judgement of the People. Let us ſee whether they are ready to act up to their profeſſions. Surely, Sir, there never can be an occaſion more proper for an appeal to the ſenſe of the nation, than when Government is going to introduce a new mode of trial into the law of this land, which, in the firſt inſtance, deprives a part of the people of their common right, and which, on ſimilar pretences, may be extended to the whole kingdom. If the nation acquieſces, you loſe nothing by the delay. If not, you are bound by your principles to relinquiſh the attempt.

Allow me a word at parting to an honourable*, and a learned gentleman: to one of whom I am much indebted, and to the other, ſpecially engaged. The honourable gentleman aſſures the Houſe, that [55] he is not the repreſentative of Mr. Haſtings, though a conſiderable part of his life be employed in attacking, defending, and reſenting for that gentleman. I obſerve it to his credit, that, although he is not a principal in theſe queſtions, he takes part in them with no leſs activity and zeal, than if the cauſe were directly and eſſentially his own. Between the honourable gentleman and me there is not, nor ever has been, any perſonal ſubject of offence. In one ſenſe therefore, I may be permitted to conſider him as the repreſentative of Mr. Haſtings, ſince every man of honour is properly the repreſentative of an abſent friend. This, I preſume, was the principle, on which the honourable gentleman muſt have acted, when he very lately created an opportunity of reciting to the Houſe ſome tedious paſſages from a letter of ten years ſtanding, which, pronouncing it to be extremely dull, he naturally, and I cannot ſay unwarrantably, concluded to be mine. But his eagerneſs to puniſh the guilty, made him forget that the Houſe was innocent. The honourable gentleman had no mercy upon either. Not confining himſelf to my ſuppoſed writings, he thought it a good opportunity to produce ſome ſerious charges againſt my conduct. To theſe laſt, my anſwer upon the inſtant, I believe was thought ſufficient. My own feelings aſſured me, that I carried the ſenſe of the Houſe along with me. To his aſſertion, that we went to India pre-determined to declare war with Mr. Haſtings at the moment of our arrival, I ſaid, that the moment of our arrival gave us an [56] inſight into his conduct, which made it impoſſible for us, as honeſt men, to unite with him. Contrary to all his own repeated declarations and profeſſions reſpecting a pacific ſyſtem, we found the Company's army engaged by him in the extirpation of the Rohilla nation, with whom we had lately been in alliance, and with whom the Engliſh had no quarrel whatever, for the ſole and acknowledged purpoſe of gaining a ſum of money. We found he had ſold the extirpation of a whole people, who had never offended us, for forty lacks of rupees; not a rupee of which had been paid, though the ſervice was compleated. We found a third part of the whole military force of Bengal had marched to places, ſo remote from our own territory, that none of the ordinary maps of Hindoſtan went far enough north to include their ſituation. I ſubmit to judgement, whether theſe facts alone did not oblige us to alter our opinion, not only of Mr. Haſtings's political conduct, but of his perſonal character. The prejudices we carried with us to India were paſſionately and almoſt abſurdly in his favour. I need not enter farther into the merits of a queſtion, on which every tribunal, that was competent to examine it, has formally pronounced condemnation againſt him. On the 28th of November, 1775, the Court of Directors unanimouſly reſolved, ‘"That the agreement made with Sujah Dowlah, and the then Governor, (Mr. Haſtings) for the hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla country, [57] and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for the carrying on that war, were founded on wrong policy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company, for keeping the troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their conqueſts; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles of juſtice, which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported."’

Even his ſpecial friends the Proprietors, on this occaſion concurred with the Directors. Except that he had intereſt enough in that quarter to get the reference to juſtice omitted, the whole body of the Proprietors, unâ voce, condemned him. On the 6th of December, 1775, they reſolved unanimouſly, ‘"That notwithſtanding this Court hath the higheſt opinion of the ſervices and integrity of Warren Haſtings, Eſq. and cannot admit a ſuſpicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct without proof; yet they are of opinion, with their Court of Directors, that the agreement made with Sujah Dowlah for the hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on that war, were founded on wrong policy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company frequently repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their territories; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles, which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported."’

[58] The honourable gentleman was then pleaſed to charge me with having oppoſed General Clavering on a particular occaſion, but with ſo much apparent reluctance, and in terms of ſo much doubt and apprehenſion, as evidently betrayed the dependence of my ſituation. A difference of opinion ſeems a ſtrange proof of dependance. He concluded however that I was bound by ſome ſecret inſtructions to follow the dictates of General Clavering, and that, when I refuſed to be guided by him, I hazarded my employment. This, indeed, if it were true, would be a ſerious charge not only againſt me, but againſt General Clavering himſelf, whoſe memory the honourable gentleman profeſſes to reſpect, and againſt the noble LordLord North. in the blue ribband, by whom alone ſuch inſtructions could have been given. The honourable gentleman, however, has in ſome degree anſwered his own charge. Forgetting every thing that he had ſaid of my ſuppoſed dependence on my colleagues, he almoſt in the ſame breath aſſured the Houſe, that, with reſpect to General Clavering and Colonel Monſon, I was primus inter pares, and that being at the head of a majority, I had in effect the whole government in my hands. If that be true, my colleagues were no more than cyphers at my diſpoſal. But in reality, the charge and the defence are equally trifling. I differed with General Clavering, not once but often, as the honourable gentleman will find, if he will look over our proceedings. [59] Men of real honour, though generally united, and acting together on the ſame general principles, will often diſagree, and when they diſagree, will be ready to declare it. Men of a different character, uniting on a different principle, will never diſagree in particulars, as long as their general engagement to each other ſubſiſts. It is perfectly true that I felt and expreſſed the utmoſt anxiety at differing from General Clavering on a queſtion of importance; but not for the reaſon ſuſpected by the honourable gentleman. I dreaded the conſtruction, which ignorance and malignity would be ready enough to give to my concurring with Mr. Haſtings. I knew my ſituation. When I oppoſed him, it was faction. When I concurred with him, it was corruption. The honourable gentleman, however, has omitted a material part of the ſtory. He has inadvertently neglected to inform the Houſe that the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 5th of February 1777, intirely agreed with me on the point in queſtion.

The honourable gentleman ſays that we ſhould have acted wiſely for the public ſervice, if, inſtead of looking back to the errors of former times, we had drawn a veil over every thing that was paſt, and directed our efforts to future improvement. Sir, I am not of that opinion. I have no idea that ſuch a plan would have been practicable, and I am ſure it would have been unjuſt. Injuſtice is not valid becauſe it has been done. We could not abſolutely ſhut our ears to complaints. We could not ſay, [60] that no man, who had been injured, ſhould ever be redreſſed. The Supreme Court of Judicature looked very far back indeed, when it was their object to make an example, and to hold it out to the natives. But if the contrary had been true;—if the honourable gentleman's abſtract opinion were ever judicious, he forgets that we had no choice. He forgets that the Court of Directors preſcribed to us the very conduct we obſerved, and applauded us highly for purſuing it.

The only point, on which I could not inſtantly recollect enough of the ſubject to give the honourable gentleman an immediate anſwer, regarded the repreſentation, which he ſays, I drew up in December 1774, of the condition of Bengal at that time. He charges me with a wild exaggeration in ſaying, that Bengal, even then, was reduced to the hazard of beggary and ruin. Sir, a mere queſtion of perſonal debate between the honourable gentleman and me, would be of too little moment, even to ourſelves, to be obtruded on the Houſe, if it did not lead to information immediately connected with the general ſubject-matter of our preſent deliberation. You are going to make a law for the better government of Bengal. It is therefore proper you ſhould inquire, what the ſtate of Bengal was ten years ago, when the Legiſlature firſt interpoſed for the ſame purpoſe. The Houſe ſhould next endeavour to poſſeſs itſelf of the events, which have happened in the interval, and [61] then you will be able to determine, what is probably the actual ſtate of the object, concerning which you are going to exerciſe your legiſlative power.

The Houſe, I imagine, will hear with ſurpriſe, that the firſt intimation I received of the diſtreſs of the Government of Fort William, was in a private converſation with Mr. Haſtings himſelf. On evidence of this kind, I certainly ſhould think it improper to inſiſt, if it had not concurred with many recorded declarations made by Mr. Haſtings to the ſame effect. The fundamental argument conſtantly uſed by him in defence of the Rohilla war, was, the diſtreſs of the Company's affairs both at home and abroad. In his minute of the 3d December, 1774, he ſays,

‘"All our advices, both public and private, repreſented the diſtreſſes of the Company at home, as extreme. At the ſame time, ſuch was the ſtate of affairs in this Government, that for many years paſt, the income of the year was found inadequate to its expence, to defray which, a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to a hundred and twenty-five lacks of rupees, had accumulated. By allowing the Vizier the military aid, which he required, a ſaving of near one third of our military expences would be effected during the period of ſuch a ſervice, and the ſtipulation of forty lacks would afford an ample ſupply to our treaſury, and to the currency of the country."’

[62] On this declaration, our firſt obſervation was, that urgent diſtreſs was implied in the violent nature of the remedy.

The maxims of policy invented by Mr. Haſtings to ſupport the fact, accommodate themſelves perfectly to the motives on which he acted.

30th Nov. 1774. ‘"If the internal reſources of a ſtate fail it, or are not equal to its occaſional wants, whence can it obtain immediate relief, but from external means?"’

30th Nov. 1774. ‘"I ſhall be always ready to profeſs, that I do reckon the probable acquiſition of wealth among my reaſons for taking up arms againſt my neighbours."’

Obſerve, Sir, that one of Mr. Haſtings's motives for taking up arms againſt his neighbours, not againſt his enemies, is plainly and explicitly to get poſſeſſion of their wealth.

With reſpect to the actual diſtreſs of the Government and country of Bengal, I deſire nothing to be believed on my own aſſertion. On the 17th of October, 1774, a day or two before our arrival at Calcutta, Mr. Haſtings and his Council drew up a letter to the Court of Directors in defence of the Rohilla war, which they principally reſted on ‘"the acquifition of forty lacks of rupees to the Company, and of ſo much ſpecie added to the exhauſted curreacy of theſe provinces:"’ not a rupee [63] of which, however, was received until ſome time after our arrival.

With reſpect to the internal ſtate of the provinces, I preſume that the evidence of the late Mr. Samuel Middleton, one of the oldeſt and moſt experienced of the Company's ſervants in Bengal, will be allowed to be concluſive. If it were not, I could ſupport it by a maſs of other evidence of equal authority. In his letter of the 5th of February 1775, near five months after our arrival, he ſays, ‘"When a very conſiderable portion, ſuppoſed even a third of the whole inhabitants, had periſhed, the remaining two thirds were obliged to pay for the lands now left without cultivators. The country has languiſhed ever ſince, and the evil continues enhancing every day."’ Now, Sir, I think it will be admitted, that no deſcription of national or political diſtreſs can eaſily be exaggerated, which is founded on evidence and authorities ſuch as theſe. But has any thing happened, ſince that time, to improve the ſtate of the country?—Excepting the ſhort interval, in which General Clavering's principles and authority prevailed, have you heard of any thing but war in all parts of India?—But the oppreſſion and rebellion of Princes ſubject to your power?—Mutinies among the native troops for want of pay?—Extraction of ſpecie from Bengal for the ſupport of the other Preſidencies, the enormous amount of which is ſtated as the merit of Mr. Haſtings?—Inveſtments bought with paper—and draughts on the Directors, and debts accumulating [64] without end? Put the facts together, and then the Houſe will be able to determine, whether the labour they have at laſt undertaken of correcting ſo many diſorders, and recovering our Indian poſſeſſeſſions from ſo many diſtreſſes, be a taſk of common magnitude, or likely to be accompliſhed by common men?

Now, Sir, having diſmiſſed the ſerious part of the honourable gentleman's charge, I hope he will allow me to make a few obſervations on the manner and time, in which it was produced. Suppoſing him for a moment to be the repreſentative of Mr. Haſtings, and to feel for that gentleman as ſenfibly as he could do for himſelf, I beg leave to obſerve to him, that his ſeverity to me is not juſtified on any principle of retaliation. I never ſought for Mr. Haſtings's letters. The honourable gentleman himſelf brought them before the Houſe, and triumphantly referred the contents of them to an attentive examination. But, if it had been otherwiſe, I cannot admit, that an inoffenſive pleaſantry, which wounds no man, and ſometimes enlivens the gravity of debate, is equitably retorted by a ſerious deliberate attack upon the moral conduct or character of an opponent. It is not likely that I ſhould ever have occaſion to make a ſimilar reflection on that of the honourable gentleman. His actions are too well guarded, and my diſpoſition to him is too amicable, to allow me to ſuppoſe the probability of ſuch a caſe. Admitting it nevertheleſs to happen, I certainly ſhould not follow the example he has ſet me. [65] I would not endeavour to take him by ſurpriſe. I ſhould not expect him to carry letters or tranſactions of ten years ſtanding, correctly in his memory. If I thought myſelf obliged to bring a charge of any kind againſt him, I ſhould think myſelf much more bound, in honour and in juſtice, to give him previous notice of my intention, and warn him to prepare for his defence.

I am now to reply to the learned gentleman oppoſite to me, and with that I ſhall conclude. A challenge from him undoubtedly does me honour, for it ſuppoſes, in his mind at leaſt, an idea, which does not exiſt in mine, and could not have occurred to any other, that, on the ſubject in queſtion, there is ſome approach to equality from me to him. Not being converſant in the forms of the Houſe, I did not know, until ſome ſome hours later in the ſame evening, that I was at liberty to write down the words of gentlemen, uttered perhaps haſtily in debate*, for the purpoſe of anſwering them at a future occaſion.—In a day or two after, I endeavoured to recollect the learned gentleman's words, and I believe I have taken them very exactly. If not, I hope he will do me the favour to correct them. He ſaid, ‘"That gentlemen had talked in a looſe general way of diſobedience of orders, without coming to particulars;—that if they would point out inſtances, he ſhould know where to grapple [66] with them.—With reſpect to the Maratta war, he affirmed that Mr. Haſtings was not guilty of diſobedience of orders;—that the Directors themſelves were to blame, in forming and encouraging a plan of conqueſt on the Malabar coaſt, and that Mr. Haſtings, in commencing and purſuing the Maratta war, had not diſobeyed orders, but had conformed to the views of the Directors.—That Mr. Haſtings nevertheleſs was greatly to blame for violating the treaty of Poorunder. On the truth of theſe aſſertions, the learned gentleman challenged me, and declared himſelf ready to meet me at any time and on any ground*."’

I muſt confeſs, Sir, that this language, eſpecially from the learned gentleman, appeared to me very extraordinary. I hardly ever heard any thing with greater ſurpriſe. He has employed himſelf, near two years together, with infinite induſtry and toil, in an inquiry into the abuſes that prevail in the India Company's ſervice.—He has publiſhed the reſult of his laborious inveſtigations in many folio volumes, which, I verily believe, no man in the kingdom has read but myſelf.—The preſent bill, of which the learned gentleman is prochein ami , if not parent, ſuppoſes wilful diſobedience in every department of the ſervice;—the conſtant complaint [67] of the Directors has been that their orders are not obeyed; and finally the right honourable gentleman, who propoſes the bill, particularly urged and inſiſted on the neceſſity of conquering a ſpirit of reſiſtance, univerſally prevailing among the Company's ſervants in India. On any other preſumption, the clauſe would be ſuperfluous. In the face of all this evidence and authority, the learned gentleman gravely aſſures the Houſe, that there have been no examples of diſobedience, or that the inſtances, if any, have not been material. He calls upon his opponents to come to particulars, and then he ſhall know where to grapple with them. Sir, I will not weary the Houſe with a multitude of quotations from the Company's records. They are filled with the very proofs and examples, which the learned gentleman calls for. Setting aſide orders indifferent to the ſervants abroad, and which of courſe they had no motive to diſobey, and ſetting aſide orders, which were capable of being converted to ſome purpoſe of their own,—for theſe they have obeyed not only with exactneſs but oſtentation, I affirm that, ſo far from its being difficult to find inſtances of diſobedience, the difficulty would be to point out an order of the Directors, that ever was regarded. The India Company little know, in what ſort of eſtimation their Directors are held in India. But it is proper I ſhould encounter the learned gentleman on his own ground. Let him aſk the Directors, what they think of the following examples. They are not mere facts, for which excuſes or pretences [68] might be invented, but formal acts of diſobedience, deliberately avowed and defended on principle.

The firſt is the well-known caſe of Mr. John Briſtow, who had been recalled by Mr. Haſtings from his ſtation at Lucknow, without any charge whatever againſt his conduct, and whom the Directors repeatedly ordered to be re-inſtated. Your Select Committee * have reported to you, in what manner thoſe orders were regarded. The general ground taken and avowed by Mr. Haſtings was, that the orders in queſtion invaded his prerogative, and he ſhould be degraded by obeying them.

The ſecond is the caſe of Mr. Francis Fowke, which has alſo been fully reported to you by your Select Committee. This gentleman was recalled from Benares by Mr. Haſtings, who declared that there was no charge nor the ſlighteſt imputation of a charge againſt him. The Directors repeatedly ordered him to be re-inſtated, but to no purpoſe. In their letter of the 27th of May, 1779, they ſay, ‘"We have read, with aſtoniſhment, your formal reſolution, to ſuſpend the execution of our orders relative to Mr. Francis Fowke; your proceedings at large are now before us; we ſhall take ſuch meaſures as appear neceſſary for preſerving the authority of the Court of Directors, and for preventing ſuch inſtances of direct and wilful diſobedience in our ſervants in time to come."’ On [69] this occaſion, the principle maintained by Mr. Barwell was, that ‘"he muſt decline an acquieſcence in any order, which had a tendency to bring the Government into diſrepute."’

If the learned gentleman ſays, that theſe are inſtances of no great moment, I ſhall leave him to ſettle that queſtion with the Directors. Inſtead of combating his opinion, I ſhall take the liberty of aſking him, whether he ſeriouſly means to refer it to the Company's ſervants to determine, whether the orders they receive are material or not. If he does, I can venture to aſſure him, that the latitude he allows is ſufficient to anſwer all their purpoſes, and that they are not ſo unreaſonable, as to deſire any greater.

The buſineſs of contracts alone has opened a wide and fertile field of diſobedience. The fundamental principle laid down by the Company was, that all contracts ſhould be annual; that the Government ſhould advertiſe for propoſals, and always give a preference to the loweſt bidders. Theſe rules, I preſume, would be deemed unexceptionable, if they did not limit the patronage of men in power in India, or the profits of their friends. Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Barwell gave all the contracts, to perſons of their own choice, on their own terms, for five years inſtead of one, and without advertiſing for propoſals. I beg the learned gentleman will attend to what the Directors themſelves have ſaid upon the ſubject. In their letter of the 23d of December, 1778, among many other obſervations, they ſay,

[70] Par. 59. ‘"This waſte of our property cannot be permitted. You have diſregarded our authority, and diſobeyed our orders, in not taking the loweſt offers."’

77. ‘"In order to prevent the Company's money from being thus given away in future, we poſitively direct," &c. &c.’

99. ‘"With theſe materials before you, the queſtion is put, whether the contractor's terms, or the propoſals of Mr. Johnſon, ſhall be accepted: Mr. Francis, in ſtrict conformity with the Company's orders, and according to eſtabliſhed uſage, was of opinion, that the contract ſhould be advertiſed. Mr. Barwell thought the preſent contractor had, the preceding year, by making low propoſals (to uſe his own phraſe) ejected Mr. Johnſon, in hopes of obtaining future indulgence, and therefore he could not heſitate to give his vote for Mr. Johnſon."’

100. ‘"However ſtrange Mr. Barwell's motive, for giving his vote for Mr. Johnſon, may appear to us, we muſt confeſs, the Governor General's reaſons for concurring therein were ſtill more extraordinary. His words are, I diſapprove of publiſhing for propoſals; this contract is reduced too low already, and will require a vigilant attention to it on the part of the commanding officer of the corps of the army, that it will be duly performed; to which he adds, that according to the beſt information [71] he had been able to obtain, little profit would be made by the contractor, if he did his duty."’

101. ‘"But although the Governor General has thought proper to expreſs ſo direct and pointed a diſapprobation of the mode adopted and poſitively enjoined by the Company, for conducting ſo great a branch of their affairs, as that of the army contract, we nevertheleſs adhere to the propriety of the Court's orders," &c.’

If this part of the ſubject ſhould be thought to require any farther proof or explanation, the Records of the India Houſe will furniſh it in abundance. If the learned gentleman be ſtill diſſatisfied, if he ſtill has any paſſion for combat, I ſhall leave him to grapple with the Court of Directors.

I do not perfectly underſtand the learned gentleman, when he ſays, in the ſame breath, that Mr. Haſtings is not anſwerable for the ſecond Maratta war, though he was greatly to blame for violating the treaty of Poorundur. The breach of the treaty and the war are one and the ſame act. When he broke the treaty, he created the war. But it ſeems, he did it in compliance with inſtructions from the Court of Directors. Had that been the fact, it would have redounded to the credit of Mr. Haſtings, if, in that inſtance, he had treated their orders with the ſame diſregard, which he did in every other. He would then have had the real merit of ſupporting the permanent fundamental principles, the wiſe pacific policy of the India Company againſt an incidental order from a fluctuating Direction. [72] But it is not ſo. Sir, I am not a profeſſed advocate of the Court of Directors, and they are very well able to defend themſelves. In this inſtance, however, it is but juſtice to them to ſay, that they have not been juſtly accuſed. Firſt of all, let us conſider what the Company's acknowledged ſyſtem is. If I am not very ill informed, the learned gentleman himſelf has heretofore declared, that their written inſtructions would compoſe a perfect code of political wiſdom.

In the very firſt article of their general inſtructions to Bengal, dated the 29th of March, 1774, they ſay, ‘"We direct, that you fix your attention to the preſervation of peace throughout India, and to the ſecurity of the poſſeſſions and revenues of the Company."’

In their letter of the 15th of December, 1775, they ſay,

Par. 4. ‘"We diſapprove all ſuch diſtant expeditions, as may eventually carry our forces to any ſituation, too remote to admit of their ſafe and ſpeedy return to the protection of our provinces, in caſes of emergency."’

5. ‘"We alſo utterly diſapprove and condemn offenſive wars; diſtinguiſhing, however, between offenſive meaſures unneceſſarily undertaken with a view to pecuniary advantages, and thoſe, which the preſervation of our honour, or the protection or ſafety of our poſſeſſions, may render abſolutely neceſſary."’

[73] 6. ‘"The attention paid by the majority * to the tenor and ſpirit of our orders on this ſubject, is highly agreeable to us; and it is our moſt poſitive direction, that no deviation from thoſe orders he permitted, but upon the moſt urgent and abſolute neceſſity; as that alone can juſtify a departure from them; for the proſpect of any advantages, however alluring, can in no wiſe be adequate to the pernicious conſequences which muſt reſult from examples of diſobedience to our orders."’

7. ‘"The ſentiments expreſſed by the majority , in the thirty-ſixth paragraph of their addreſs, coincide exactly with our own; their determination to endeavour to maintain peace in India, and vigorouſly to defend our poſſeſſions and allies, cannot be too much applauded: we therefore ſtrictly enjoin every member of our Council, to concur heartily in ſuch meaſures as may be neceſſary for accompliſhing theſe deſirable purpoſes."’

8. ‘"We have already, in our letter of the 3d of March, 1775, expreſſed our extreme concern, in finding that our arms had been employed in conquering the Rohilla country for Sujah Dowlah, and diſapproved the meaſure; and we have no reaſon to alter our ſentiments reſpecting that tranſaction."’

[74] In their general inſtructions to the Commiſſioners appointed in the year 1769, they ſay, ‘"In all your treaties with the country powers you are to take care, that they be ſo framed, as neither immediately nor eventually to engage the Company in any diſputes between thoſe powers,"’

Theſe documents, out of a multitude, are ſufficient to eſtabliſh the general views and principles of the Court of Directors. With reſpect to the particular point in queſtion, it happens that they gave a particular injunction. In a letter of the 4th of July, 1777, they ſay, ‘"Though the treaty (of Poorundur) is not, on the whole, ſo agreeable to us, as we could wiſh, ſtill we are reſolved ſtrictly to adhere to it on our parts."’ If the Directors could have been mad enough to ſend out orders to ſet aſide thoſe, which I have recited to the Houſe, deprivation of power would be but a ſmall portion of the puniſhment their conduct would deſerve.

A word or two of perſonal application to the learned gentleman, and I have done. I have obſerved with concern, that his mind is not ſo perfectly free, as it ought to be, from uneaſy ſenſations. He is conſcious that, amidſt contending parties, he has done his duty impartially;—that, in ſpeaking of Mr. Haſtings, his language had been exactly balanced between condemnation and applauſe;—that he never ſaid that Mr. Haſtings was either a very good man or a very bad man; meaning, as we all do, the political principles of the governor, not the [75] moral character of the man; and that having purſued this middle, even courſe, without the ſmalleſt inclination to either ſide, he had not had the good fortune to ſatisfy any body. This indeed is too often the lot of moderate men in violent times. But I have great pleaſure in being able to aſſure the learned gentleman, that his lot is directly the reverſe of what he thinks it. Inſtead of pleaſing nobody, he has had the wiſdom to obſerve a conduct, by which every individual of every party has been gratified in his turn. I ſhall contribute to the public ſervice, if I can aſſiſt in relieving him from this ill-founded apprehenſion. He cannot be diſturbed in his application to buſineſs, without injury to the public. To remove one half of his apprehenſions I need only read to him ſome of his own reſolutions regarding Mr. Haſtings, which I dare ſay he has totally forgotten.

Extracts from the Reſolutions of the Committee of Secrecy, 28th May, 1782.

Reſolved, 18. ‘"That the reſolution of the majority of the Supreme Council, on the 2d of February, 1778, which, by the death of Colonel Monſon, was now decided by the caſting voice of the Governor General, had a ſtrong tendency to a renewal of the Maratta war."’

35. ‘"That the inſtructions and powers given to Colonel Goddard by the Supreme Council, on [76] the 5th of April, 1779, fixed on them, from that time, the chief direction and reſponſibility of the war with the Marattas."’

39. ‘"That it muſt be reckoned among the many additional miſchiefs, which have ariſen chiefly from this improvident war with the Marattas to the Company's affairs, that the military force of the Ca [...]atio had been weakened by reinforcements ſent to the Malabar coaſt;—that the Bengal Government have been under the neceſſity of ſupporting on their confines the army of a power, confederated, however involuntarily, againſt them; that they have been obliged to ſue for the mediation of the ſame power, (the Rajab of Berar) have ſubmitted to a refuſal, and purchaſed at leaſt an uncertain, becauſe apparently an unauthoriſed treaty, on moſt extravagant and diſhonourable conditions, with his ſon, Rajah Chimnajee; and finally, that, being burthened with the expences of a variety of diſtant expeditions, while their allies are in diſtreſs, and their tributaries under oppreſſion, there is alſo an alarming deficiency in their own reſources of revenue and commerce, by the accumulation of their debt, and the reduction of their inveſtment."’

40. ‘"That the attempt made by the Government General in the month of January, 1781, to form an engagement of alliance, offenſive and defenſive, with the Dutch Eaſt-India Company, by the means, and upon the terms ſtated in the [77] proceedings of their Council, was unwarranted, impolitic, extravagant, and unjuſt."’

42. ‘"That the Government of Bengal had been previouſly in poſſeſſion of a letter from the D [...]an of the Rajah of Berar, containing overtures for mediation for peace and alliance with the Peſhwa; and that this material information was wholly ſuppreſſed by them in their diſpatches to the Court of Directors, but a copy of it was ſent by the ſame conveyance to the private agent of Mr. Heſtings; and that, in thus neglecting to make immediate communication to the Court of Directors of ſuch important intelligence, the Government General appear to have failed in an eſſential part of their duty."’

Reſolved, ‘"That Warren Haſtings, Eſq. Governor General in Bengal, and William Hornby, Eſq. Preſident of the Council at Bombay, haveing, in ſundry inſtances, acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India, and enormous expences on the Eaſt-India Company, it is the duty of the Directors of the ſaid Company to purſue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the ſaid Governor General and Preſident from their ſaid offices, and to recal them to Great Britain."’

This, Sir, I conceive, is not the language of a man very much undecided in his opinion, or who heſitates between the extremes of cenſure and approbation. [78] If it be, I ſhould be glad to know, in what terms the learned gentleman would expreſs himſelf, when he ſeriouſly intended to condemn. I can truly aſſure him that I am not acquainted with any man, ſo hoſtile to Mr. Haſtings, as not to be contented with this deſcription of his conduct. So peremptory and decided is the condemnation expreſſed in theſe Reſolutions, that ſeveral of my friends in India concluded they had been drawn up by me. Knowing nothing of the ſtate of men and things in this country, they drew their concluſion from the knowledge they had of my opinions, and from that very character of deciſion, which is ſtamped on the face of the Reſolutions, and which the learned gentleman thinks it prudent to diſclaim. The fondneſs and applauſe, with which he has lately ſpoken of Mr. Haſtings, have compleatly reconciled him to that gentleman's friends. All parties now have been ſatisfied in ſucceſſion; and in this ſenſe, I confeſs the learned gentleman has been impartial. His cenſure and applauſe are diſtributed with an equal hand, and ſo the account is balanced.

I told my Indian friends, in return to their letters, that I indeed had no concern in the matter; but that the buſineſs was happily undertaken by a man of great induſtry, of eminent ability, and unexampled perſeverance, who, I was ſure, would carry it through. Of his induſtry and ability, my opinion is the ſame;—but I am forced to acknowledge, that perſeverance, ſuch as his, is not without [79] example.—Other men are obliged to employ their talents in one line, and direct their efforts to one object; and, even with this limitation, it is well if they ſucceed.—The learned gentleman's abilities are not ſo narrowly confined. He carries the application of them to every extreme, and equally ſucceeds in exerting them in every direction.

Appendix A APPENDIX.

[80]

Appendix A.1 No. I.

IN the courſe of the debate on the 16th of July, it was infiſted by a learned gentleman, in defence of the new Judicature, that the erection of ſome new tribunal was neceſſary, for that Juries would be found unequal to the taſk of trying miſdemeanors committed in India. In ſupport of this poſition, he contended that the trials of offences within the purview of this bill would probably be of great length; that many might laſt more than a week; and that ſome might laſt even more than a month. He then proceeded to obſerve, that common Jurymen were not fit to have ſuch cauſes brought before them. With regard to the probable length of the trials, it is ſcarcely poſſible that trials ſhould be ſpun out to ſuch a length, as he ſeemed to apprehend, even in this new Court, though in ſome reſpects it ſeems calculated for the purpoſes of delay. When any teſtimony is to be brought from India, a mandamus muſt iſſue from the King's Bench, and the depoſitions, [81] taken by virtue of it, muſt be tranſmitted to England, before even the commiſſion can iſſue from the Court of Chancery for holding the Court. All the teſtimony, that is to come from abroad, muſt be collected, even before the Court is in exiſtence. What reaſon then is there to fear that, when the foreign evidence is to be thus prepared, trials would in general be of long continuance? If they ſhould, it would be owing, not to difficulties in the procuring or examination of evidence, but to the power given to the Commiſſioners to adjourn from time to time, as they ſhall think fit; a power which would indeed, in all probability, be productive of the greateſt delays in the adminiſtration of juſtice. But it may be aſked, why a Jury is not as competent to try a miſdemeanor committed in India, as one committed in England; and why a greater time ſhould be neceſſary for the trial of the former than of the latter? The affirmative reſts on an aſſertion, which, ſtanding without argument, need only be denied. No man can be tried, even under the proviſions of this bill, on an accumulated or general charge. The information or indictment muſt be for ſome ſpecific offence or offences, to which the party is to plead, and upon which iſſue muſt be joined. If there be any teſtimony in India, it is to be tranſmitted under a mandamus to England. After all this preparation then, (a preparation which is preſcribed by the bill) a miſdemeanor committed in India may be tried by a Jury with as little difficulty, and in as little time, as one committed in [82] England. The learned gentleman's doctrine is of the moſt dangerous tendency: it leads to the abolition of trial by Jury. All the arguments, which have been uſed to ſhew the inconvenience and impropriety of this mode of trial in caſes of offences committed abroad, might with equal force be urged againſt the propriety of it in caſes of offences committed in England; and very probably we ſhall ſoon have them introduced for that purpoſe.

Let it be admitted, for the ſake of argument, that the inveſtigation of Indian miſdemeanors will probably take up a long time, and that common Juries are not fit to have ſuch cauſes brought before them;—ſtill it does not follow that there is any neceſſity for aboliſhing trial by Jury. All Indian miſdemeanors might be tried by ſpecial Juries, and this would obviate the faſtidious objection, on which ſo much ſtreſs has been laid. Special Juries are not ‘"choſen out of the maſs of mankind,"’ but out of the principal freeholders of the county. Men as little ſubject to bias, ‘"as little likely to go into common ale-houſes, and enter into porter-club converſations upon the evidence before them,"’ and as little liable to be miſled, as the members of either Houſe of Parliament.

As for the length of the trials, let the inveſtigation be ever ſo long, a Jury is competent to it. With deference to learned authority, there is no reaſon to admit that ‘"his going into his box, and remaining there locked up till he has given his verdict, is an eſſential characteriſtic of a Juryman."’—It [83] is eſſential that, after the Jury leave the bar, they ſhall not ſpeak with the parties or their agents; and that they ſhall receive no freſh evidence: and it is common, in order to prevent intemperance, or cauſeleſs delay, to keep them without meat, drink, fire, or candle; but I affirm that this is not eſſential: the law ſays, that, by permiſſion of the Judge, they may be allowed fire, candle, and refreſhments. That permiſſion would always be given, when the length and nature of the teſtimony might render much deliberation neceſſary, and thus the Jury would have it in their power, without any material inconvenience to themſelves, to give full conſideration to every part of the buſineſs before them.

Appendix A.2

Appendix A.2.1 No. II. Minute of Richard Barwell, Eſq. recorded in Conſultation of 7th of November, 1774, and referred to in Page 27.

"I entirely approve of the Honourable the Prefident's conduct in the receipt of complimentary nuzzers.

"The prejudices of the natives of Hindoſtan, bigoted to their ancient cuſtoms, make it abſolutely impoſſible to avoid deviating in this particular from the words of the Act of Parliament! The ſpirit of the act is not, however, by this [84] ſeeming deviation, departed from, but regarded with an attention, which ſhews the moſt ſcrupulous reſpect to the reſtrictions of the Legiſlature! Nuzzers are not made to the man, but to the ſtation he fills, and are very different in their nature from gratuitous rewards, or the gifts, denominated preſents; I therefore cannot but equally honour the principle, while I admire the juſtneſs of the motive, on which official nuzzers, or compliments are accepted by the Governor General. I ſee their acceptance in a light of the greateſt propriety, perfectly conſiſtent with the ideas of the Company, and regardful of what they have invariably recommended, attention to the particular prejudices, manners, and diſpoſitions of the natives!

"The Governor General has thought proper to ſubmit the nuzzers, made to his ſtation, to the Court of Directors, to be appropriated agreeably to their pleaſure. Small as the object is to the Company and to the nation, it gives dignity to his character as guardian of the public intereſts, and obviates all miſrepreſentation of the principle and the motive, which has induced him to a compliance with the rooted prejudices and manners of the Aſiatics. My experience, from a long reſidence in this country, convinces me of the real neceſſity there is of reſpecting uſages in immaterial points, and which, diſregarded, would be followed by impreſſions reſulting from a conduct repugnant to Aſiatic [85] notions of propriety and deference. I might here make a tender to the Public of the trivial nuzzers, to the acceptance of which my ſtation has impelled me; but what is proper in the Governor General, would in me, I apprehend, appear rather in the light of a conſequential inſignificant diſplay of rigidneſs in exceſs!! The amount of my complimentary nuzzers of a gold mohur, and five rupees, from the period of my arrival at the Preſidency, exceeds not the ſum of two hundred and fifty rupees, excluſive of a compliment from the Nabob of Arcot of a few pieces of cloth, the produce of his country, and two ſhauls, a compliment more than returned by myſelf in the manufactures of Bengal, to the amount of three thouſand Sicca rupees."

(Signed) "RICHARD BARWELL."

Appendix A.3 No. III.

Appendix A.3.1 Extract of the General Inſtructions, given by the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of Fort William, dated the 29th of March, 1774, and confirmed by a General Court of Proprietors.

35. "WE direct, that you immediately cauſe the ſtricteſt inquiry to be made into all oppreſſions, which may have been committed, either againſt the natives or Europeans, and into [86] all abuſes that may have prevailed in the collection. of the revenues, or any part of the civil government of the Preſidency; and that you communicate to us all information, which you may be able to obtain relative thereto, or to any diſſipation or embezzlement of the Company's money."

Appendix A.3.1 Extract of a General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council, dated the 5th of April, 1776.

Par. 27. "HAVING inveſtigated the charges exhibited againſt ſome of the members of our late Adminiſtration, we have come to the following reſolutions:

Reſolved, "That it appears that the conduct of the late Preſident* and Council of Fort William in Bengal, in ſuffering Cantoo-Baboo, the preſent Governor General's Banyan, to hold farms in different Purgunnahs to a large amount, or to be ſecurity for ſuch farms, contrary to the tenor and ſpirit of the ſeventeenth regulation of the Committee of Revenue at Fort William, of the 14th of May, 1772, and afterwards relinquiſhing that ſecurity without ſatisfaction made to the Company, was highly improper, and has been attended with conſiderable loſs to the Company.

[87] Reſolved, "That it appears that a conſiderable ſum of money has been given by one of the Company's tenants, for holding the ſalt farms of Selimabad and Duccann-Savagepore, in the diſtrict of Dacca, over and above the engagement for thoſe farms to the Company, contrary to the letter and ſpirit of the eleventh regulation of the Committee of Revenue, of the 14th of May, 1772; and that Mr. Barwell has acknowledged having charged the ſaid tenant, for his own uſe, and the other gentlemen of the Factory, with the amount of 125,500 rupees, for permitting him to hold the ſaid farms."

28. "Since paſſing the above reſolutions, the Northumberland's Purſer is arrived with your advices; and our concern is much increaſed on finding that improper influence, and interference of our ſervants in the revenue branch, has been much more general than we had been led to hope was the caſe; and that in the immediate views of private gain, the Company's intereſt has been greatly neglected."

30. "The powers and inſtructions veſted in, and given to General Clavering and the other gentlemen, were ſuch as fully authoriſed them in every inquiry that ſeems to have been their object; and we highly commend the indefatigable aſſiduity that evidently appears in their laborious reſearches, and their zeal for the intereſt of the Company and the welfare of individuals, as well natives as Europeans."

*
Mr. Haſtings.
[88]

Appendix A.3.1 Extract of a General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council, dated the 28th of November, 1777.

39. "WE find that the farm of Sylhet was granted by the Committee of Circuit; that the Company's advances to the farmers of Sylhet, of 33,000 rupees for elephants, was received by one of the members of that Committee. It has, however, ſince appeared, that the other oſtenſible farmers, or perſons named in the Committee's ſettlement, NEVER EXISTED; and that the Company's Refident at Sylhet, was the real farmer, under fictitious names."

Appendix A.4 No. IV.

The thirty-third clauſe of the original bill, which Mr. Francis deſired might be tranſlated into common ſenſe, is omitted in the amended bill. No ſkill in language could tranſlate it.—Vide page 13.

Appendix A.5 No. V.

The eighteenth reſolution of the Committee of Secrecy, of which Mr. Dundas, then Lord Advocate of Scotland, was Chairman, is guilty of an anachroniſm, in which the aſſertion of a falſe fact [89] is involved. It aſſerts that, ‘"in February, 1778, the reſolution of the majority of the Supreme Council, by the death of Colonel Monſon, was now decided by the caſting voice of the Governor General."’—It was not the death of Colonel Monſon, which gave Mr. Haſtings the caſting voice in February, 1778. He died about the end of September, 1776. It was the death of Sir John Clavering, in Auguſt, 1777, which gave Mr. Haſtings a majority at the period in queſtion. If the General had been alive in February, 1778, he, Mr. Francis, and Mr. Wheler, would have formed a majority againſt Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Barwell, and prevented the Maratta war. The reſolution, by ſuppoſing General Clavering to be alive, transfers to him, becauſe he is dead, the merit of the reſiſtance, made in Council to that meaſure, and keeps the efforts of Mr. Francis to prevent a rupture with the Marattas, compleatly out of ſight.

THE END.
Notes
*
Conſultation of 22d June, 1778.
*
20th March, 1783.
*
This letter is ſigned by the preſent Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, Mr. Smith and Mr. Devaynes.
*
The terms of the exception are, ‘"unleſs any of the ſaid Governments and Preſidencies ſhall, on any very urgent occaſion, by a vote in Council, ſee cauſe to deviate from the ſaid general rule."’
*
Lord Delaval.
*
[...]he late Earl of Chatham.
*
Major John Scott, member for Weſtloo.
Henry Dundas, Eſq. member for Edinburghſhire.
*
Mr. Dundas had quoted words of Mr. Fox, which he ſaid he had taken down two years ago.
*
Mr. Dundas aſſented to the exactneſs of this recital of his words.
A term uſed in law for him, who is the next friend, or next of kin to a child in his nonage.
*
Ninth Report, page 56.
Mr. Haftings and Mr. Barwell.
*
Clavering, Monſon, and Francis.
Ditto,
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Citation Suggestion for this Object
TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 4721 Two speeches in the House of Commons on the original East India Bill and on the amended Bill on the 16th and 26th of July 1784 by Philip Francis Esq. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5D7C-2