SECT. I.

AMONG the many attempts, to recommend and accommodate the pro⯑found myſteries of divine wiſdom to the ſhallow comprehenſion of the human underſtanding, the preſent is by no means the leaſt promiſing or plauſible. [2] But the Impoſſible, neceſſarily includes the Impracticable, and all attempts, to reconcile objects, that are in their very eſſence irreconcileable, muſt ever be ineffectual.

Hence nothing can be more repre⯑henſible, than the arrogance of our modern Rationaliſts, in cavilling at e⯑very thing in Revelation, that is not reconcileable to Reaſon, and in deny⯑ing every thing to be religious that is not rational. Tenacious of the name of Chriſtians, as they are of the prin⯑ciples of Heathens, they want to new⯑model the ſyſtem of Chriſtianity, by ex⯑punging all thoſe doctrines, which they cannot reconcile to their new⯑ſangled ſcheme of Rationality. But, [3] alas! their reaſoning faculties are too confined, to ſoar above ‘—this viſible, diurnal ſphere;’ ſo that, after all, they muſt ſit down content with a religion, which entitles them to no better an appellation than that of honeſt heathens, or give up even their nominal title to Chriſtia⯑nity, and honeſtly confeſs themſelves real Infidels.

Let them chuſe; but the time ſeems to be approaching when they muſt make their choice. The Chriſtian world is no longer to be deceived by theſe wolves in ſheep's cloathing; theſe believers in the name of a Saviour, whoſe power of ſalvation they openly deny.

There is ſo much diſingenuouſneſs and ſophiſtry in the practices of theſe minute philoſophers, that we are particu⯑larly ſorry to ſee them kept in coun⯑tenance by the miſapplied abilities of [4] more ingenious and ingenuous writers.

It has, indeed, been publicly hint⯑ed, that this little work is a mere con⯑troverſial bubble, blown up to amuſe well-meaning Chriſtians, in order to impoſe on their credulity, and raiſe a ſneer at the expence of their ſimplicity and ſincerity.

For our own part, we have a better opinion of the author, than to give credit to ſuch a ſuggeſtion. His rank and reputation in life, as well as in literature, forbid our entertaining a thought ſo derogatory to his charac⯑ter, as a man of ſenſe, honour, and probity. For his Chriſtianity, it is true, we have hitherto given him credit; but, as he now profeſſes himſelf reli⯑giouſly ſolvent, we ſhall take the li⯑berty of inveſtigating the terms of pay⯑ment, by a particular and impartial re⯑view of his preſent performance.

[5]Before we begin this inveſtigation, however, it may not be amiſs to enter a caveat, againſt the reader's giving cre⯑dit to the argument merely on the au⯑thority of the writer. The good faith of the latter, reſpects himſelf alone, the validity of his, reaſoning only re⯑ſpects the reader.

Should his work, he ſays, ever have the honour to be admitted into ſuch good company as the buſy or the idle, they will immediately determine it to be that of ſome enthuſiaſt or me⯑thodiſt, ſon beggar, or ſome madman. "I ſhall, therefore," ſays he, ‘beg leave to aſſure them, that the au⯑thor is very far removed from all theſe characters: that he once perhaps believed as little as themſelves, ^* but [6] having ſome leiſure and more curio⯑ſity, he employed them both in re⯑ſolving a queſtion which ſeemed to him of ſome importance, —Whe⯑ther Chriſtianity was really an im⯑poſture founded on an abſurd, incre⯑dible, and obſolete fable, as many ſuppoſe it? Or whether it is, what it pretends to be, a revelation com⯑municated to mankind by the in⯑terpoſition of ſupernatural power? On a candid enquiry, he ſoon found, that the firſt was an abſolute impoſ⯑ſibility, and that its pretenſions to [7] the latter were founded on the moſt ſolid grounds: In the further pur⯑ſuit of his examination, he perceived, at every ſtep, new lights ariſing, and ſome of the brighteſt from parts, of it the moſt obſcure, but productive of the cleareſt proofs, becauſe equally beyond the power of human artifice to invent, and human reaſon to diſ⯑cover.’

That the brighteſt lights, and cleareſt proofs Should ariſe from the moſt obſcure parts of ſcripture, is as ſingular as is the reaſon given for it; viz.‘be⯑cauſe they are beyond the power of human artifice to invent, and human reaſon to diſcover.’ But, may we not aſk here, how our author could aſ⯑ſign ſo notable a reaſon, without hav⯑ing himſelf, carried human artifice and human reaſon to their utmoſt extent of diſcovery and invention? How elſe [8] ſhould he find this diſcovery and in⯑vention to be an abſolute impoſſibility? —If, indeed, he meant to infinuate that he hath carried the powers of in⯑veſtigation ſo far as this; well and good! The improvements of art, the progreſs of ſcience, are at an end!— But we muſt have ſtronger proof of the fact than a mere ipſe-dixit, in a matter of ſo much importance.

That it is of conſequence to the rea⯑der to know, that the author is not an enthuſiaſt or a madman, we admit; but why we are told he is not a me⯑thodiſt or a beggar we do not readily conceive. Is any doctrine the leſs true becauſe it is taught by a methodiſt? Is any argument the leſs valid becauſe it is urged by a beggar? Or would the ſame doctrine be more true if main⯑tained by a metropolitan? Or the ſame argument more valid if urged [9] by a Nabob?—Our Saviour and his apoſtles were men of eminence neither in church nor ſtate. They were nei⯑ther high-prieſts nor lords of trade; nei⯑ther men of credit nor men of fortune. Nor do we ſee any incongruity in a very credible man's being a methodiſt and a very ſound reaſoner's being as poor as Job.

It is more to the purpoſe that we are told, the author is not an enthu⯑ſiaſt or a madman. But who tells us this?—The very man himſelf.—And who ever took a man's own word for his not being in a ſtate of inſanity or intoxication?—"I drunk!" ſays drun⯑ken Caſſio in the play, ‘No, Sir, — This is my right hand and this is my left’—at the ſame time miſta⯑king one for the other.

We do not ſay, this is actually the caſe with our author; but, we ſay, [10] that his own aſſeveration merely cannot be admitted as evidence to the contra⯑ry. From his own confeſſion it ap⯑pears, he is a convert from infidelity: now all converts are apt to run into ex⯑tremes and from exceſs of incredulity to become too credulous. From doubting and diſbelieving what is pro⯑bably true, they affect to believe what is palpably falſe. Nay, from denying almoſt every thing, they come really to believe almoſt any thing.

New Converts, we ſay, are apt, thro' inordinate zeal, to give into exceſs of credulity: a conduct, which, howe⯑ver pious, certainly borders on En⯑thuſiaſm. Indeed, we cannot help thinking our author betrays a little tincture of it in his paradoxical obſer⯑vation, reſpecting Divine Revelation in general; when, he ſays, all circum⯑ſtances conſidered, ‘if it were in eve⯑ry [11] part familiar to our underſtandings, and conſonant to our reaſon, we ſhould have great cauſe to ſuſpect its divine authority; and, therefore, had this revelation been leſs incomprehenſible, it would certainly have been more in⯑credible.’—That is, in plainer terms, ‘If we underſtood it more, we ſhould be apt to believe it leſs.’—Is not this on the plan of Credo quia impoſſibile eſt?[I believe it becauſe it is impoſſible.] And does our author give this, as a proof that he is in no degree, touched with enthuſiaſm or inſanity?—Credat Judoeus Appella!—We ſay not haud nos, becauſe Charity, though it feareth all things, hopeth all things.

‘To prove the truth of the Chri⯑ſtian religion’, ſays he, ‘we ſhould begin by ſhewing the internal marks of Divinity, which are ſtamped upon [12] it ^†, becauſe on this the credibility of the prophecies and miracles in a great meaſure depends: for if we have once reaſon to be convinced that this religion is derived from a ſu⯑pernatural origin; prophecies and miracles will become ſo far from being incredible, that it will be highly probable, that a ſupernatural revelation ſhould be foretold, and inforced by ſupernatural means.’

Not that our author profeſſedly, means to depreciate the proofs of the truth of the Chriſtian religion ariſing from either prophecies or miracles. They both, have, or ought to have, he ſays, their proper weight. Let us weigh them then in his own ballance.

‘Prophecies, he ſays, are permanent miracles, whoſe authority is ſufficiently [13] confirmed by their completion, and are therefore ſolid proofs of the ſu⯑pernatural origin of a religion, whoſe truth they were intended to juſtify; ſuch are thoſe to be found in vari⯑ous parts of the ſcriptures relative to the coming of the Meſſiah, the de⯑ſtruction of Jeruſalem, and the unex⯑ampled ſtate in which the Jews have ever ſince continued, all ſo circum⯑ſtantially deſcriptive of the events, that they ſeem rather hiſtories of paſt, than predictions of future tranſ⯑actions; and whoever will ſeriouſly conſider the immenſe diſtance of time between ſome of them and the events which they foretell, the un⯑interrupted chain by which they are connected for many thouſand years, how exactly they correſpond with thoſe events, and how totally unap⯑plicable they are to all others in the [14] hiſtory of mankind; I ſay, whoever conſiders theſe circumſtances, he will ſcarcely be perſuaded to believe, that they can be the productions of preceding artifice, or poſterior ap⯑plication, or can entertain the leaſt doubt of their being derived from ſupernatural inſpiration.’

Now, this is ſo far from being true, that we ourſelves, and we dare ſay many others, have ſeriouſly conſidered all theſe circumſtances; and, notwith⯑ſtanding the pains ingenious interpre⯑ters have taken to develope, conciliate and harmonize them, we do ſtill look upon them (taken in a mere rational view) to be ſo imperfectly aſcertained and ſo doubtfully applied that, judg⯑ing of them merely from reaſon, they do not ſtrike us with any thing like that force of conviction which they ap⯑pear to carry with our author.

[15]As to the miracles, recorded in the New Teſtament to have been perform⯑ed by Chriſt and his apoſtles, he ſays, ‘they were certainly convincing proofs of their divine commiſſion to thoſe who ſaw them; and as they were ſeen by ſuch numbers, and are as well atteſted, as other hiſtorical facts, and above all, as they were wrought on ſo great and ſo wonder⯑ful an occaſion, they muſt ſtill be admitted as evidence of no inconſi⯑derable force.’

Here again this writer either equi⯑vocates or ſins againſt the truth. The miracles performed by Chriſt and his Apoſtles were not certainly convincing proofs of their divine miſſion to many of thoſe who ſaw them. Witneſs our viour's dreadful denunciation to whole cities of impenitent unbelievers, to Choraizin, Bethſaida and Capernaum; [16] in which his mighty works had been diſplayed: unleſs, indeed, we are to ſuppoſe their impenitency not the con⯑ſequence of their unbelief; but that they were ſo much worſe than the devils, who believe and tremble, in that they believed and trembled not. But, with the Scribes and Phariſees; who, ſee⯑ing him work miracles, immediately conſulted to deſtroy him and ſaid, he caſt out devils, through Beelzebub, the prince of devils; were thoſe miracles, we ſay, convincing proofs of his di⯑vine miſſion to them?

It even appears that our Saviour wrought his miracles and preached his doctrines, in the ſight and hearing of many who were never intended to be convinced by them. This our author himſelf obſerves, in accounting for that ‘want of irreſiſtible evidence of their truth, by which they might poſſibly [17] have been enforced:’ quoting from the Evangeliſt Mark the following de⯑claration of Jeſus to his deſciples. "To you it is given to know the my⯑ſtery of the kingdom of God; but unto them that are without, all theſe things are done in parables, that ſee⯑ing they may ſee, and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not un⯑derſtand; and left at any time they ſhould be converted, and their ſins ſhould be forgiven them."

What weight or degree of force, then, doth our author give to the evi⯑dence of miracles? Surely, no conſide⯑rable weight, if he thinks, as he ſays that ‘they muſt now depend, for much of their credibility, on the truth of that religion whoſe credibi⯑lity they were at firſt intended to ſupport.’

[18]How! are the religion and the mi⯑racles to be made reciprocally the cri⯑terion of each other? Are the pillars of ſupport, on which the truth of Chriſtianity hath ſo long reſted, to be now themſelves ſupported by the ſtrength and ſymmetry of its ſuperſtruc⯑ture? This is making the whole hang by Geometry indeed!—

The internal marks of the divine origin of Chriſtianity, are to give a credibility to the prophecies and mi⯑racles; which they, in turn are to re⯑flect back on Chriſtianity, to do credit to its divine origin. If this be not rea⯑ſoning in a circle, and beating round the buſh of argument to no end, we, at leaſt, ſee no end to ſuch a mode of argument. It is like that of the world's being ſupported by an ele⯑phant, the elephant by a tortoiſe, the [19] tortoiſe by another elephant, and the other elephant by another world!

In regard to the prediction of pro⯑phecies and the working of miracles, it may indeed be juſtly objected, as it has often been, that the completion of a prophecy or the performance of a miracle, taken merely as a fact, how⯑ever wonderful, does not neceſſarily infer the interpoſition of a ſupernatural agent. ^*

[20]But, granting that it did, and that ſuch completion of the prophecies and performance of miracles are as well atteſted as other hiſtorical facts. Such atteſtation they may have; and yet, if they have no more, they cannot lay claim to more than a mere moral pro⯑bability of truth.

The difficulty of aſcertaining the truth of probable and ordinary facts, which happen daily almoſt under our immediate obſervation, is ſo notorious, that it is a ſufficient caution againſt the putting implicit faith in the hiſtorical [21] relation of facts improbable and ex⯑traordinary, which are ſaid to have happened at ſuch a conſiderable diſ⯑tance of time and place.

The weight or degree of force, therefore, which our author gives to the evidence of prophecies, muſt, not⯑withſtanding he ſtiles it not inconſider⯑able, be little worth conſideration.

The utmoſt that he propoſes indeed, is, a high probability; and even this depends on our having other reaſons to be convinced that Chriſtianity is of di⯑vine origin. A foundation itſelf far ſhort of the neceſſary proof in ſome caſes; for men may often have reaſon to believe what is, nevertheleſs, not actually true.

Even the internal evidence, this wri⯑ter attempts to inveſtigate, appears hence to amount to a mere probability; ſo that, by adding this evidence to [22] thoſe of both prophecies and miracles, he is at beſt only adding one probabi⯑lity to another.

SECT. II.

‘WHAT pure Chriſtianity is (ſays this writer) diveſted of all its or⯑naments, appendages, and corrup⯑tion, I pretend not to ſay; but what it is not, will venture to affirm, which is, that it is not the offspring of fraud or fiction: that however fraud and fiction may have grown up with it, yet it never could have been grafted [23] on the ſame ſtock, nor planted by the ſame hand.’

This our author undertakes to ſhew by ſtating the following plain and, as he ſtiles them, undeniable ^* propoſitions.

Such is this writer's plan, as exhi⯑bited by himſelf; on which we beg leave firſt to obſerve that, the terms, in which it is laid down, are too vague and the ſtyle too metaphorical for a [25] logical eſſay; the form of which it affects to aſſume.

One would imagine that a caſuiſt, ſo rigid as to think it neceſſary to offer ‘the mere exiſtence of a book entitled the New Teſtament’, as a formal propoſition, would have been ſtrict e⯑nough to ſet out with as formal a de⯑finition of the enthymeme, or object itſelf in contemplation.

The deſign in view is profeſſedly ‘to prove the truth of the Chriſtian religion,’ and yet ‘what pure chri⯑ſtianity is, diveſted of all its orna⯑ments, appendages and corruption, the writer will not pretend to ſay.’

Does our logician then predicate nothing of his ſubject?—Yes, though he will not pretend to ſay what pure chriſtianity is, he will venture to affirm what it is not. His affirmation, how ever is not even a negative predicate [26] of its eſſence or property, but an aſſer⯑tion relative to its derivation ‘it is not the offspring of fraud or fiction.’ —‘Fraud and fiction may have grown up with it, yet it never could have been grafted upon the ſame ſtock, nor planted by the ſame hand.’—Theſe metaphorical expreſ⯑ſions, we ſay, are ill adapted to the ſubject in hand; which requires ſimple, unequivocating and preciſe terms, not liable to miſconception or miſtake. We cannot help thinking it, alſo, ex⯑tremely illogical to undertake to prove what any thing may be imputed to, as its cauſe, without being able to give ſome definition of the thing itſelf, as an effect. To affirm poſitively what and ſhew whence it is not derived, with⯑out pretending to know what IT is, is certainly not a very philoſophical, [27] however popular, mode it may be of theological controverſy.

But to accommodate our Review to the view itſelf. As to this propoſition the firſt, very little, as the author hints, need be ſaid. It is a plain fact, which cannot be denied, ſuch writings do now exiſt: the leſs need, therefore, as be⯑fore obſerved, to give it the formality of a propoſition, either to be proved or granted; we paſs it over therefore as fu⯑tile and frivolous.

SECT. III.

‘MY ſecond propoſition, ſays our author, is not quite ſo ſimple, but, I think, not leſs undeniable than the former, and is this: that from this book may be extracted a ſyſtem of religion entirely new, both with re⯑gard to the object, and the doctrines, not only infinitely ſuperior to, but totally unlike every thing, which had ever before entered into the mind of man: I ſay extracted, becauſe all the doctrines of this religion ha⯑ving been delivered at various times, and on various occaſions, and here only hiſtorically recorded, no uniform or regular ſyſtem of theology is here [29] to be found; and better perhaps it had been, if leſs labour had been employed by the learned, to bend and twiſt theſe divine materials in⯑to the poliſhed forms of human ſyſ⯑tems, to which they never will ſub⯑mit, and for which they were never intended by their Great Author. Why he choſe not to leave any ſuch behind him we know not, but it might poſſibly be, becauſe he knew that the imperfection of man was incapable of receiving ſuch a ſyſtem, and that we are more properly, and more ſafely conducted by the diſtant, and ſcattered rays, than by the too powerful ſunſhine of divine illumi⯑nation.’

Our author expreſſes himſelf here, alſo, in terms very vague and equivo⯑vocal. ‘A ſyſtem of religion, he ſays, may be extracted from the New [30] Teſtament infinitely ſuperior [ſupe⯑rior in what reſpect?] to every other; and yet no uniform or regular ſyſtem of theology is to be found there: and it had been better perhaps if the learned had never attempted to form ſuch ſyſtems; being probably incom⯑patible with the divine oeconomy reſpecting mankind.’

Here is a probability ſuggeſted that is very high indeed! He might almoſt as well have ſuggeſted that the divine oeconomy itſelf is not ſyſtematical.

Equally paradoxical with a former illuſtration ^* alſo is the preſent. As, before, the brighteſt lights aroſe from the moſt obſcure parts of revelation, ſo here we are to be more ſafely conduct⯑ed in the dark, than we ſhould be in the brighteſt ſunſhine of divine illumi⯑nation!

[31]There is likewiſe a palpable incon⯑ſiſtency on the very face of the propo⯑ſition itſelf. How can a ſyſtem of re⯑ligion be extracted from a book, in which no ſuch ſyſtem is to be found? —Or means our author only that the form of that ſyſtem is not to be found there? But, what of that? Every doctrine that is ſound muſt be ſyſtemati⯑cal, whether the declaration or expli⯑cation of it be formally ſo or not.

It is cuſtomary for writers, either from literary incapacity, or to ſave themſelves trouble, to deliver their ſen⯑timents, however conſiſtent and con⯑nected with each other, in a looſe, un⯑connected and deſultory manner. Hi⯑ſtorians ^* in particular, muſt, from [32] the very nature of their compoſi⯑tion, blend doctrinal precepts with practical narration. But, if the pre⯑cepts, thus interſperſed in the courſe of the narrative, are inconſiſtent in themſelves, or incompatible with each other, they can neither be truly doc⯑trinal nor doctrinally true.

Men may write as looſely and deſul⯑torily as they pleaſe; but, if they think juſtly they muſt think conſiſtently, and, of courſe, ſyſtematically. Nor do we ſee the leaſt reaſon (except that of our author's deſire to accommodate things, at any rate, to his own ſyſtem) for ſuppoſing that mankind are, through any imperfection more incapable of receiving doctrines in a ſyſtematical form than they are of receiving them in no form at all. As good a logician and as good a Chriſtian as our au⯑thor, [33] tells us ‘the beſt way to learn any ſcience is to begin with a ſyſtem.’ ^*

As to this author's metaphorical al⯑luſion to the rays of light, it elucidates nothing. That a moderate portion of light is better adapted to weak optics than an exceſſive blaze of it, is un⯑doubtedly true; but the ſuppoſition, thence deduced, of our ſeeing better by means of diſtant, ſcattered rays, than by a regular emanation, is a rhetorical flouriſh altogether inconſiſtent with ſound logic and true philoſophy.

In regard to the bending and twiſt⯑ing of the materials of divine revela⯑tion ‘into the poliſhed forms of hu⯑man ſyſtems, to which they never will ſubmit;’ the attempt ſo to twiſt and bend them is certainly an unjuſti⯑fiable violence, which it might have been better the learned had never made: but this is no reaſonable ob⯑jection [34] to their forming a plain, unpo⯑liſhed ſyſtem; ſuch as is really contain⯑ed in the Scriptures.

Whether any ſyſtem of ſcriptural thinking already reduced to form in wri⯑ting, be in all reſpects unexceptionable, it is not our buſineſs here to enquire. But if there be not, it is in this parti⯑cular we trace the ſource of imperfec⯑tion: it lies in the incapacity of men to form ſuch a divine ſyſtem, to con⯑nect detached and deſultory doctrines into a regular and conſiſtent theory; and not to their incapacity of comprehend⯑ing ſuch a theory, had it been formally digeſted and in ſuch form firſt given them.

In reſpect to the total novelty and unheard of ſingularity of the doctrines of revelation when firſt promulgated, our author affirms that thoſe doctrines are equally ‘new with the object; and [35] contain ideas of God, and of man, of the preſent, and of a future life; and of the relations which all theſe bear to each other totally unheard of and quite diſſimilar from any which had ever been thought on, previous to its publication.’

"But," continues he, ‘Whether theſe wonderful doctrines (which he enumerates) are worthy of our belief muſt depend on the opinion, which we entertain of the authority of thoſe who publiſhed them to the world; certain it is, that they are all ſo far removed from every tract of the hu⯑man imagination, that it ſeems e⯑qually impoſſible, that they ſhould ever have been derived from the knowledge or artifice of man.’

Now to us there ſeems no ſuch im⯑poſſibility. Even granting, in oppo⯑ſition to the Son of Wiſdom, that there [36] is any thing new under the ſun, and that there is nothing in the tract en⯑titled "Chriſtianity as old as the crea⯑tion;" admitting, we ſay, that the Chri⯑ſtian religion, when promulgated by our Saviour, was as new and ſtrange as our author repreſents it, we think little ſtreſs of argument is to be laid upon ſuch ſingularity or novelty.

We ſhall not go about to enquire whether the extravagancies of the Pagan Mythology, many of which certainly bear ſome reſemblance to the ſublime myſteries of Chriſtianity, were of later or earlier origin. Yet, wonderful as are the latter and firmly as we believe them derived from God, being in their execution ſuperior to human comprehen⯑ſion, and totally incompatible with hu⯑man reaſon; we do not ſee any thing, merely in the idea or deſign of the ſu⯑blimeſt of them, ſo far ſuperior to the [37] powers of human invention or diſſimu⯑lar to its ſublimer conceptions. On the contrary, man hath made to him⯑ſelf ſo many inventions, human ge⯑nius hath ſoared ſo high into the re⯑gion of impoſſibilities, that nothing which can come within the aſſociation of the moſt incongruous ideas, can in our opinion be juſtly ſaid to exceed the artifice of the human imagina⯑tion ^*.

[38]To attend, however, a little to the author's mode of proving his propo⯑ſition. "To ſay the truth, ſays he, before the appearance of Chriſtianity there exiſted nothing like religion on the face of the earth; the Jewiſh only ex⯑cepted: all other nations were im⯑merſed in the groſſeſt idolatry."

‘At this time Chriſtianity broke forth from the eaſt like a riſing ſun, and diſpelled this univerſal darkneſs, which obſcured every part of the globe, and even at this day prevails in all thoſe remoter regions, to which its ſalutary influence has not as yet extended. From all thoſe which it has reached, it has, notwithſtanding its corruptions, baniſhed all thoſe e⯑normities, and introduced a more ra⯑tional [39] tional devotion, and purer morals: It has taught men the unity, and at⯑tributes of the ſupreme Being, the remiſſion of ſins, the reſurrection of the dead, life everlaſting, and the kingdom of heaven; doctrines as in⯑conceivable to the wiſeſt of mankind antecedent to its appearance, as the Newtonian ſyſtem is at this day to the moſt ignorant tribes of ſavages in the wilds of America: doctrines, which human reaſon never could have diſcovered, but, which when diſ⯑covered, coincide with, and are con⯑firmed by it; and which, though beyond the reach of all the learning and penetration of Plato, Ariſtotle, and Cicero, are now clearly laid open to the eye of every peaſant and mechanic with the Bible in his hand. Theſe are all plain facts too glaring [40] to be contradicted, and thereſore, whatever we may think of the au⯑thority of theſe books, the rela⯑tions which they contain, or the in⯑ſpiration of their authors, of theſe facts, no man, who has eyes to read, or ears to hear, can entertain a doubt; becauſe there are the books, and in them there is this religion.’

Doubtleſs all this is well ſaid. It is pity it is not all quite ſo true. But the truth is, that theſe plain facts which our author ſays are too glaring to be contradicted, are glaringly contradic⯑ted every day.—It is not only denied that the doctrines of the Chriſtian faith coincide with, and are confirmed, by reaſon, but it is denied by many that the devo⯑tion actually introduced by Chriſtianity is more rational or the morals purer than thoſe profeſſed and practiſed by ſome peo⯑ple [41] who never heard of Chriſtianity ^*.

[42]We urge nothing againſt the purity of thoſe morals now in practice through⯑out Chriſtendom, nor compare them with thoſe of other nations now exiſt⯑ing, who have not embraced Chriſti⯑anity. —The compariſon might be looked upon as too ſevere a libel on the good Chriſtians of the age! But might not an able caſuiſt, and as good a rhetorician as our author, as plau⯑ſibly declaim in favour of the conquer⯑ors, legiſlators, and moraliſts of un⯑enlightened paganiſm, to the ſhame of the immorality of profeſſed Chri⯑ſtians.

Might he not exhibit a picture of horror, faithfully drawn from the hiſto⯑ry of Chriſtianity and the propaga⯑tion of our holy religion, ſtill more ſhocking to humanity, and contradic⯑tory to its divine precepts, than is af⯑forded [43] from that of the moſt horrid aera in the annals of heatheniſm?

Hath the ſavage fury of hoſtile barbarians, the avarice of inſatiable tyrants, or the boundleſs ambition of heathen conquerors been the cauſe of more blood-ſhed or greater cruelty, than the zeal of religious fanatics, the phrenzy of pious enthuſiaſm, or the pride and avarice of Chriſtian prieſts?

Might not an artful declaimer, we ſay, very reaſonably pretend that a re⯑ligion, whoſe profeſſors have been guil⯑ty of ſo much wickedneſs, could not poſſibly merit the epithets of divine or, holy? Would he not rather derive it from Hell, as its moſt natural ſource, than from Heaven, the declared foun⯑tain of mercy and goodneſs?

Declamations of this kind, prove nothing.

[44]We ſhall proceed, therefore, to the conſideration of the author's third pro⯑poſition; leaving that of his farther proof of the ſecond, till we come to his ſolving of objections; where indeed, much of it would have with more propriety found a place.

SECT. IV.

IN proof of this third propoſition, our author begins by making a diſtinc⯑tion, between the moral precepts of Chriſtianity (founded, as he obſerves, on reaſon) and thoſe precepts, which, being founded on falſe principles, in⯑culcate in fact no virtues at all. Un⯑der the former he includes piety to God, benevolence to man, juſtice, cha⯑rity, temperance and ſobriety, with all thoſe which prohibit the contrary vices, and all that debaſe our natures, and, by mutual injuries, introduce univerſal diſorder, and conſequently univerſal miſery. Under the latter he [46] claſſes thoſe fictitious virtues, which, he ſays, produce no ſalutary effects; and however admired, are no virtues at all, ſuch as Valour, Patriotiſm and Friendſhip.

The Monthly Reviewers, in their critique on our author's work, ob⯑ſerve, on this diſtinction, that they ‘never conceived that the virtues of friendſhip, fortitude, and patriotiſm, do not form a part of the moral ſyſtem of the goſpel: much leſs could they have urged the want of theſe vir⯑tues as a peculiar recommendation of its excellence. They are conſpi⯑cuouſly illuſtrated," ſay they, "in the character of its author, and it would be eaſy to produce ſtriking inſtances in which his courage and friendſhip, and concern for the wel⯑fare of his country, were actually diſplayed. But this is needleſs; the [47] advocates of the Chriſtian religion, in anſwer to Lord Shafteſbury and others, have ſufficiently vindicated it in this reſpect. Theſe are unqueſtion⯑ably virtues of conſiderable impor⯑tance; and ſo far as they do not in⯑terfere with the general principles of benevolence which Chriſtianity in⯑culcates, they conſtitute a part of Chriſtian morality.’

It is well for theſe diſtinguiſhing cri⯑tics that they bring in the ſalvo, at the at the cloſe of the above paragraph, reſpecting theſe popular virtues not in⯑terfering with the general principles of benevolence, which Chriſtianity incul⯑cates.

This is the very point in queſtion; and, however ſucceſsfully the advocates for Chriſtianity may have combated Shaftſbury and others, there is ſome [48] room ſtill left for oppoſing our au⯑thor's argument.

‘Valour, ſays he, for inſtance, or active courage, is for the moſt part conſtitutional, and therefore can have no more claim to moral merit, than wit, beauty, health, ſtrength, or any other endowment of the mind or body; and ſo far is it from pro⯑ducing any ſalutary effects by intro⯑ducing peace, order, or happineſs into ſociety, that it is the uſual per⯑petrator of all the violences, which from retaliated injuries diſtract the world with bloodſhed and devaſta⯑tion. It is the engine by which the ſtrong are enabled to plunder the weak, the proud to trample upon the humble, and the guilty to op⯑preſs the innocent; it is the chief inſtrument which Ambition em⯑ploys in her unjuſt purſuits of wealth [49] and power, and is therefore ſo much extolled by her votaries: it was in⯑deed congenial with the religion of pagans, whoſe gods were for the moſt part made out of deceaſed he⯑roes, exalted to heaven as a reward for the miſchiefs which they had per⯑petrated upon earth, and therefore with them this was the firſt of vir⯑tues, and had even engroſſed that denomination to itſelf; but, what⯑ever merit it may have aſſumed a⯑mong pagans, with Chriſtians it can pretend to none.’

There would be ſome argument in all this, if, becauſe valour be the oc⯑caſional inſtrument of oppreſſion, it be alſo the neceſſary cauſe of it; or if men were always miſchievous in proportion as they are bold. But we preſume that this is not the caſe; cruelty being characteriſtic of cowardice, and bene⯑volence [50] of bravery. Perſonal valour may, therefore, be juſtly eſteemed to have ſome moral merit; although, as it is allowed to be in a great degree conſtitutional, it is certainly no farther to be deemed a moral virtue, than it is to be perſonally acquired. For a virtue, notwithſtanding the plauſibility of our author's reaſoning, we preſume it may juſtly be ſtiled.

Our author, indeed, ſays, that few, or none are the occaſions in which Chriſtians are permitted to exert their courage or valour. "They are ſo far," ſays he, ‘from being allowed to inflict evil, that they are forbid even to reſiſt it; they are ſo far from being encouraged to revenge injuries, that one of their firſt duties is to forgive them; ſo far from being incited to deſtroy their enemies, that they are commanded [51] to love them, and to ſerve them to the utmoſt of their power.’

Surely our author here miſtakes the nature of that evil which Chriſtians are forbid to reſiſt. It certainly is not the moral evil of injuſtice! Admitting they are not to revenge injuries, ſurely they may exert their valour to prevent the execution of them! If not, a good Chriſtian muſt not reſiſt the violence of a robber, a houſe-breaker, or a murderer!

But, granting that individuals, anxi⯑ous to copy after Chriſtian perfection, are juſtified in thus ſubmitting to (though it be in fact conniving at) the commiſ⯑ſion of acts of injuſtice; valour may be yet a neceſſary virtue to the ſupport and defence of Chriſtian communities; as we ſhail ſhew, when we come to treat of Patriotiſm.

But though our author will not ad⯑mit [52] active courage to be a real virtue; paſſive courage, or fortitude, he allows to be conſiſtent with the pureſt Chri⯑ſtian morality.

‘Paſſive courage, ſays he, is frequent⯑ly, and properly inculcated by this meek and ſuffering religion, under the titles of patience and reſignation: a real and ſubſtantial virtue this, and a direct contraſt to the former; for paſſive courage ariſes from the nobleſt diſpoſitions of the human mind, from a contempt of misfor⯑tunes, pain, and death, and a con⯑fidence in the protection of the At⯑mighty; active from the meaneſt: from paſſion, vanity, and ſelf-de⯑pendence: paſſive courage is derived from a zeal for truth, and a perſeve⯑ranee in duty; active is the offspring of pride and revenge, and the parent of cruelty and injuſtice: in ſhort; [53] paſſive courage is the reſolutiot of a philoſopher, active the ferocity of a ſavage. Nor is this more incompa⯑tible with the precepts, than with the object of this religion, which is the attainment of the kingdom of hea⯑ven; for valour is not that ſort of violence, by which that kingdom is to be taken; nor are the turbu⯑lent ſpirits of heroes and conquerors admiſſibleinto thoſe regions of peace, ſubordination, and tranquility.’

This is, on the whole, well ſaid; though we cannot agree that va⯑lour or active courage is always the off⯑ſpring of pride and revenge, or the parent of cruelty and injuſtice.—Paſſivecourage may, alſo, be juſtly ſtiled the reſolution of a philoſopher and yet active courage be very unjuſtly called the ferocity of a ſavage. Not but that the activity of [54] ſome men is fierce and ferocious, as the paſſiveneſs of others is tame and irre⯑ſolute.

On Patriotiſm our author declaims thus:

‘Patriotiſm, that celebrated virtue ſo much practiſed in ancient, and ſo much profeſſed in modern times, that virtue, which ſo long preſerved the liberties of Greece, and exalted Rome to the empire of the world: this celebrated virtue, I ſay, muſt alſo be excluded; becauſe it, not only falls ſhort of, but directly counteracts, the extenſive benevo⯑lence of this religion. A Chriſtian is of no country, he is a citizen of the world; and his neighbours and countrymen are the inhabitants of the remoteſt regions, whenever their diſtreſſes demand his friendly aſſiſtance: Chriſtianity commands [55] us to love all mankind, Patriotiſm to oppreſs all other countries to ad⯑vance the imaginary proſperity of our own: Chriſtianity enjoins to imitate the univerſal benevolence of our Creator, who pours forth his bleſſings on every nation upon earth; Patriotiſm to copy the mean partiality of an Engliſh pariſh-offi⯑cer, who thinks injuſtice and cruelty meritorious, whenever they pro⯑mote the intereſts of his own incon⯑ſiderable village. This has ever been a favourite virtue with mankind, be⯑cauſe it conceals ſelf-intereſt under the maſk of public ſpirit, not only from others, but even from them ſelves, and gives a licence to inflict wrongs and injuries mot only with impunity, but with applauſe; but it is ſo diametrically oppoſite to the great, characteriſtic of this inſtitu⯑tion, [56] that it never could have been admitted into the liſt of Chriſtian virtues.’

Without recurring to what other writers may have advanced in fa⯑vour of the Chriſtianity of patriotiſm, we ſhall offer a few reaſons, that ſuggeſt themſelves to us, to ſhew that the love of one's ſelf and one's country, is not ſo inconſiſtent with that univerſal philanthropy inculcated by Chriſtia⯑nity, as this writer here ſuppoſes.

True ſelf-love and ſocial, fays the Poet, are one and the ſame.

[57]What philoſophy there is in this poetry will appear in the courſe of our argument.

To the judicious omiſſion of theſe falſe virtues, Valour, Patriotiſm, and Friendſhip, our author ſays, ‘We may add that remarkable ſilence, which the Chriſtian legiſlator every where preſerves on ſubjects, eſteemed by all others of the higheſt impo⯑tance, civil government, rational po⯑licy, and the rights of war and peace; of theſe he has not taken the leaſt notice; probably for this plain reaſon, becauſe it would have been [58] impoſſible to have formed any expli⯑cit regulations concerning them, which muſt not have been incon⯑ſiſtent with the purity of his reli⯑gion, or with the practical obſer⯑vance of ſuch imperfect creatures as men ruling over and contending with each other: For inſtance, had he ab⯑ſolutely forbid all reſiſtance to the reign⯑ing powers, he had conſtituted a plan of deſpotiſm, and made men ſlaves; had he allowed it, he muſt have au⯑thoriſed diſobedience and made them rebels: had he in direct terms prohibited all war, he muſt have left his followers for ever an eaſy prey to every infidel invader; had he per⯑mitted it, he muſt have licenſed all that rapine and murder, with which it is unavoidably attended.’

Now, not to dwell on the improprie⯑ty in the laſt ſentence of charging, the [59] power, permitting war, with the li⯑cenſing of all the rapine and murder attending it; we object to the matter of fact, as ſtated in the whole paſſage.

Without inſiſting, with the Month⯑ly Reviewers, that the character of our Saviour was conſpicuouſly illuſtrious as a patriot, we may ſafely deny that he has not taken the leaſt notice of mat⯑ters of patriotiſm and civil polity, as our author aſſerts. His reply to the Phariſees, who tempted him on the ſubject of paying tribute—‘Give unto Caeſar the things that are Cae⯑ſar's, and to God the things that are of God’—is an irrefragable inſtance of the diſtinction he made between re⯑ligion and politics.

Civil government, national policy, and the rights of war and peace, were ſubjects, indeed, that appear not to have come directly under his deciſion. [60] Had they ſo done, we have no reaſon to think our Saviour lay under any kind of impoſſibility, to give a very ex⯑plicit and ſatisfactory anſwer.

If he was not explicit, however, in precept, reſpecting the authority of ci⯑vil government, it muſt be admitted he was illuſtriouſly ſo in example, by his ſubmiſſion to the forms of juſtici⯑ary trial and juridical condemnation; which ſurely were not neceſſary to his death, if, no ſuch example was in⯑tended to be given, or precept thence to be inculcated!

But had our Saviour himſelf given neither precept nor example on this head; his inſpired Apoſtles, Peter and Paul, have more than ſufficiently done it; by enjoining their diſciples to the moſt unreſerved obedience to the municipal laws and civil magiſtra⯑cy [61] of their times; and thence inſtruc⯑ting Chriſtians in general to a ſimilar obedience to the reigning powers that be in all times.

In this, however, they have made men no farther ſlaves in this world than they are Chriſtians, whoſe faith is fixed and whoſe hopes are centered in another. So far as they are ſtill men, and bound to take part in the con⯑cerns of this world, while on their journey to the next, they are at liber⯑ty to reſiſt oppreſſion, and combat in⯑juſtice, whether that of a domeſtic ty⯑rant or a foreign invader.

"Had my kingdom," ſays our Sa⯑viour to Pilate, ‘been of this world, then would my ſervants have fought, that I ſhould not be delivered to the Jews.’

Granting that Chriſtians, therefore, are not to propagate their religion by [62] force of arms, or to fight for Chriſt's kingdom, which is not of this world, they are not forbidden to fight for their own ſhare in the kingdoms, which are of this world.—If men may not fight for their religion, they may fight for their liberty and property; and, in our opinion, they act the part of brave men and good Chriſtians in ſo doing.

And yet our author ſays, ‘If Chriſtian nations were nations of Chriſtians, all war would be impoſ⯑ſible and unknown among them, and valour could be neither of uſe or eſtimation, and therefore could never have a place in the catalogue of Chriſtian virtues; being irreconcile⯑able with all its precepts.’

Of a piece with this reaſoning of our author's is that of Rouſſeau, in his So⯑cial compact; where he inſinuates that [63] a Chriſtian ſoldier is a kind of a contra⯑diction in terms. But we have here given our reaſons for thinking other⯑wiſe; from which it follows, that even active valour appears to be a real, and not a fictitious, virtue.

For if a good Chriſtian be a good patriot, he muſt be, ready to act, as well as ſuffer, for his country. He muſt at leaſt be ready to fight, if ne⯑ceſſary, in its defence; and valour is as requiſite to repel an invader as it is to invade the foe. There is as much active courage required in defence as in offence; and hence, as loyalty and pa⯑triotiſm are the virtues of a good ſub⯑ject, valour muſt have ſome merit even with Chriſtians as a moral virtue, at leaſt active courage muſt be as much a moral virtue as paſſive ^†.

[64]But be that as it may, our author certainly falls into an error, in ſuppo⯑ſing it neceſſary for a good Chriſtian to renounce his country to become a citizen of the world, a mere coſmopo⯑lite!

[65]In regard to the virtue of Friend⯑ſhip, our author, either wilfully or negligently impoſes a change of terms upon us; reaſoning very inaccurately on the ſubject.—

"Friendſhip," ſays he, ‘likewiſe, although more congenial to the prin⯑ciples of Chriſtianity ariſing from more tender and amiable diſpoſi⯑tions, could never gain admittance amongſt her benevolent precepts for the ſame reaſon; becauſe it is too nar⯑row and confined, and appropriates that benevolence to a ſingle object, which is here commanded to be ex⯑tended over all: Where friendſhips ariſe from ſimilarity of ſentiments, and diſintereſted affections, they are advantageous, agreeable, and inno⯑cent, but have little pretenſions to merit;’ for it is juſtly obſerved, ‘if ye love them, which love you, [66] what thanks have ye? for ſinners love thoſe, that love them. But if they are formed from alliances in parties, factions, and intereſts, or from a participation of vices, the u⯑ſual parents of what are called friend⯑ſhips among mankind, they are then both miſchievous and criminal, and conſequently forbidden, but in their utmoſt purity deſerve no recommenda⯑tion from this religion.’

In reply, however, to what is here advanced on friendſhip and the text quoted from Luke in ſupport of it, may be oppoſed the precept inculcated in John xiii. 34. quoted alſo by our au⯑thor in favour of that Chriſtian virtue Charity: ‘A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one ano⯑ther; as I have loved you, that ye alſo love one another; by this ſhall all [67] men know that ye are my diſciples, if ye have love one to another.’— Here we ſee that brotherly-love, or mutual friendſhip (which in the former text is repreſented as of little merit, being the virtue of ſinners) is made the teſt, or criterion of chriſtianity, the virtue one ſhould imaging characteriſtic of ſaints.

Chriſtian charity, in its utmoſt extent is certainly ſomething more than mere friendſhip; but we cannot help think⯑ing that reciprocal affection, or, as our author ſtiles it, that "benevolent diſpoſition" which is here made the characteriſtic of Chriſt's diſciples, the teſt of their obedience and the mark by which they are to be diſtin⯑guiſhed, is too near a-kin to friendſhip, to admit of friendſhip's being with pro⯑priety diſcarded as a fictitious virtue, or as no virtue at all.

[68]Our author, indeed, is far from rea⯑ſoning accurately on this head. For, after depreciating, as above, the virtue ſpecified, he tells us, he ‘means not by this to paſs any cenſure on the principles of valour, patriotiſm and honour.’

The attentive reader will here ob⯑ſerve that, in this reſpecification of the ſpurious or falſe virtues, our au⯑thor hath ſubſtituted the term honour inſtead of friendſhip. The reaſon is, that, having changed his ground, he found that more pertinent to the ſtate of his argument. Of that phantom modern honour, indeed, to which the moſt ſolid and ſubſtantial friendſhips are ſometimes ſacrificed, he may ſay juſtly, that ‘a man, who makes this his ruling principle, however virtuous he may be, cannot be a Chriſtian, becauſe [69] he erects a ſtandard of duty, and de⯑liberally adheres to it, diametrical⯑ly oppoſite to the whole tenor of that religion.’

That the laws of ſuch honour are in⯑compatible with the rules of Chriſtianity we readily allow, though we cannot allow that the ſirmeſt friendſhip for an individual is incompatible with that uni⯑verſal philanthropy, which Chriſtianity inculcates for all mankind. Nay, we do not hold patriotiſm or even valour to be ſuch mere heatheniſh virtues as our author would repreſent them.

"They may be uſeful," ſayshe, ‘and perhaps neceſſary, in the commerce and buſineſs of the preſent turbulent and imperfect ſtate; and thoſe who are actuated by them may be virtuous, honeſt, and even religious men: all that I aſſert is, that they cannot be chriſtians.’—And yet, in a ſubſe⯑quent [70] page of the work, we are ex⯑preſsly told that in the preſent ſtate as enlightened by the goſpel, ‘if we will not accept of chriſtianity, we can have no religion at all’. ^*

After degrading the falſe virtues of paganiſm, he proceeds to enhance the true virtues of chriſtianity. Theſe are poverty of ſpirit—Chriſtian charity—Penitence—Faith—Self-abaſement and detachment from the world.—

Admitting all that is ſaid in favour of moſt of theſe, as being founded on ſcriptural authority, the virtue of faith, that which is the moſt immediately connected with the evidence of the di⯑vine origin of chriſtianity demands our more particular attention.

"Faith," ſays our author, ‘is a⯑nother moral duty injoined by this [71] inſtitution, of a ſpecies ſo new, that the philoſophers of antiquity had no words expreſſive of this idea, nor nor any ſuch idea to be expreſſed; for the word [...] or fides, which we tranſlate faith, was never uſed by any pagan writer in a ſenſe the leaſt ſimilar to that, to which it is ap⯑plied in the New Teſtament: where in general it ſignifies an humble, teachable, and candid diſpoſition, a truſt in God, and confidence in his promiſes; when applied particularly to Chriſtianity, it means no more than a belief of this ſingle propoſi⯑tion, that Chriſt was the ſon of God, that is in the language of thoſe wri⯑tings, the Meſſiah, who was foretold by the prophets, and expected by the Jews; who was ſent by God into the world to preach righteouſneſs, judgment, and everlaſting life, and [72] to die as an atonement for the ſins of mankind. This was all that Chriſt required to be believed by thoſe who were willing to become his diſciples: he, who does not be⯑lieve this, is not a Chriſtian, and he who does, believes the whole that is eſſential to his profeſſion, and all that is properly comprehended un⯑der the name of faith.’

We ſee here that, though our author ſcrupled at firſt ſetting out, to ſay what pure Chriſtianity was, he has reduced it, in this illuſtration of Faith, to what he calls a ſingle propoſition. But he can⯑not be ignorant that this ſingle propo⯑ſition is ſufficiently multifarious and complicated.

He cannot be ignorant that the ex⯑preſſion, Son of God, is differently un⯑derſtood by different interpreters; that ſome think it conſiſtent with his being [73] a mere man, while others think it ex⯑alts him to an equality with the Deity.

He cannot be ignorant that his atonement by death for the ſins of mankind, is controverted and even boldly denied by a conſiderable num⯑ber of profeſſed Chriſtians.

To what purpoſe is it that our au⯑thor tells us this propoſition is the eſ⯑ſential creed of a Chriſtian, if other writers of equal authority tell us otherwiſe. Nay to what purpoſe is it, we are told that the ſame propoſi⯑tion is to be found in the Scriptures, whoſe truth we admit, if they are li⯑able to various interpretation?

It is in vain to ſay, that "when we are once convinced the Scriptures are of divine original, we have nothing more to do but implicitly believe what they tell us." How many thou⯑ſand volumes of controverſy have [74] there not been written to determine what they do tell us! And is it not ſtill left as indeterminate as ever.

Granting that implicit faith in di⯑vine revelation be our duty; by what means are we to trace from the hiſtory of that revelation, what is really re⯑vealed? Surely it muſt be by the ſame means as thoſe by which we become convinced of its divine original! And if reaſon be competent in the one caſe, it ſurely muſt be ſo in the other.

At the ſame time, if the operation of grace be neceſſary to impreſs the true ſenſe and meaning of the ſcrip⯑tures on the mind and heart of the un⯑converted ſinner, why ſhould it be leſs neceſſary, as it is evidently equally expedient, to convince him of the di⯑vine origin of revelation in general?— We firmly believe that, admitting the reality of our author's converſion to [75] Chriſtianity (of which we have no reaſon to doubt) he is much more indebted for it to the efficacious and irreſiſtible impulſe of divine grace, than to all the pains he has taken, and the inge⯑nuity he has exerted, in inveſtigating the moral proofs of its divine inſtitu⯑tion.

But we ſhall in this ſection confine ourſelves, in conformity to the au⯑thor's method, to the conſideration of Faith merely as a Chriſtian duty. The objects of that Faith, with the nature of it, we ſhall diſcuſs more particu⯑larly hereafter.

"Faith," ſays he, ‘cannot be alto⯑gether void of moral merit, (as ſome would repreſent it) becauſe it is in a degree voluntary; for daily experience ſhews us, that men not only pretend to, but actually do be⯑lieve, and diſbelieve almoſt any [76] propoſitions, which beſt ſuits their intereſts, or inclinations, and un⯑feignedly change their ſincere opi⯑nions with their ſituations and cir⯑cumſtances. For we have power over the mind's eye, as well as over the body's, to ſhut it againſt the ſtrongeſt rays of truth and religion, whenever they become painful to us, and to open it again to the faint glimmerings of ſcepticiſm and infi⯑delity’ when we ‘love darkneſs ra⯑ther than light, becauſe our deeds are evil.’ And this, I think, ſuffi⯑ciently ‘refutes all objections to the moral nature of faith, drawn from the ſuppoſition or its being quite in⯑voluntary and neceſſarily dependent on the degree of evidence, which is offered to our underſtandings.’

We cannot pretend to call in que⯑ſtion the ductility of our author's believing [77] organs, or the power he has over them to enable him to believe what he pleaſes. But, we muſt own, with regard to ourſelves, we ſhould be happy to be poſſeſſed of ſuch power of credulity; ſo as to be able to be⯑lieve every thing to be true which beſt ſuits our intereſts, inclinations, and circumſtances; even though we ſhould thence be ſubject to be ſometimes diſ⯑agreeably undeceived. We ſhould get rid of many irkſome reflections and enjoy many a happy hour, at the ha⯑zard only of being diſturbed from our pleaſing reveries, and exclaiming with the interrupted viſionary; ‘Pol, me occidiſtis, amici, Non ſervaſtis ait; cui ſic extorta voluptas, Et demtus per vim mentis gratiſſimus error.’

As it is, we do not perceive our⯑ſelves, eſpecially juſt at preſent, a whit more diſpoſed to believe, than to doubt [78] the reality of what we wiſh to be true. We do not think the obſervation holds good, at leaſt ſo generally, or in the degree here ſuppoſed. The bold and ſanguine, indeed, are apt to anti⯑cipate their wiſhes; but the timid and ſaturnine are as apt to procraſtinate even their juſt expectations. It is as natural for the one to be confident as for the other to be dubious; nay, per⯑ſons of the ſame conſtitution are not always in the ſame diſpoſition or mood either of doubt or credulity.

That there is ſome truth, however, in the rule, with reſpect to its general application, is probable; as faith or facility of Belief is frequently and ſtrongly recommended in the goſpel.

But by the faith or eaſineſs of belief, inculcated in the goſpel, can ſurely be meant nothing more than the pious aſſent and ſubmiſſive acquieſcence of [79] human reaſon to its myſterious and in⯑comprehenſible doctrines, agreeable to its goſpel ſignification mentioned above ^*, and not that rational conviction, which ariſes from a clear comprehen⯑ſion of a propoſition and the evident demonſtration of its truth. The fu⯑tility of recommending the latter kind of faith or facility of rational convic⯑tion, we think, is obvious.

Indeed we do not ſee the neceſſity of demonſtration to produce ſuch an aſſent, as is here admitted to conſtitute a Chriſtian's Faith. If ſuch Faith be, as our author ſays, an act of the will as much as of the underſtanding, there are many inducements to ſuch an act that fall far ſhort of demonſtra⯑tion.

[80]If it be, as he obſerves, "well worth every man's while to believe Chriſtianity if he can," and ſuch belief depends ſo much on his will, one would think motives of ſelf-intereſt alone would excite him to ſhew that he could, in this caſe, do as he would.

Is it not a ſufficient incitement, to faith in Chriſtianity, to reſſect that "it is the ſureſt preſervative againſt vicious habits and their attendant evils, the beſt reſource under diſtreſſes and diſappointments, ill health and ill fortune, and the firmeſt baſis on which contemplation can reſt?"—That "it is the only principle, which can retain men in a ſteady and uniform courſe of virtue, piety, and devotion, or can ſupport them in the hour of diſtreſs, of ſickneſs and of death?"—

The word Faith, indeed, our author calls unfortunate: ‘It has, ſays he, [81] been ſo tortured and ſo miſapplied to mean every abſurdity, which ar⯑tifice could impoſe upon ignorance, that it has loſt all pretenſions to the title of virtue; but if brought back to the ſimplicity of its original ſig⯑nification, it well deſerves that name, becauſe it uſually ariſes from the moſt amiable diſpoſitions, and is always a direct contraſt to pride, ob⯑ſtinacy, and ſelf-conceit. If taken in the extenſive ſenſe of an aſſent to the evidence of things not ſeen, it comprehends the exiſtence of a God, and a future ſtate, and is therefore not only itſelf a moral vir⯑tue, but the ſource from whence all others muſt proceed; for on the be⯑lief of theſe all religion and morality muſt intirely depend.’

Here again, we muſt remind this writer of his having before admitted [82] that men might be virtuous, honeſt and even religious men and yet not be Chri⯑ſtians: whereas now he makes not only all religion, but all morality depend on Chriſtian Faith for its very exiſtence; ſuch faith being here expreſsly de⯑clared not only in itſelf a moral virtue, but the ſource from whence all others muſt proceed.

Wits, they ſay, have ſhort memo⯑ries; but, when they turn logicians, philoſophers and divines, they ſhould endeavour to extend their memory, and keep it on the ſtretch, with the thread of their argument, from one end to the other.

On the whole, with reſpect to Faith, as a moral duty; there appears to us but very little argument neceſſary to enforce it. If men can believe or even half-believe what they will, it is ſo much their intereſt to do it in believing [83] the truths of Chriſtianity; the man muſt be either a very great fool or a very great philoſopher indeed, who would remain one moment an Infidel.

If, as this writer declares; Faith be alſo the ſource from whence all other real virtues muſt proceed, who would not be a Chriſtian in practice as well as theory, without waiting a moment for any rational proof of the internal evi⯑dence of Chriſtianity!

SECT. V.

THIS propoſition, or rather two propoſitions united, our author gives, as corollaries to the three preceding; preſuming they are ſo concluſive as to amount to little ſhort of demonſtra⯑tion. It is, indeed, founded, ſays he, ‘on the very ſame reaſoning by which the material world is proved to be the work of his inviſible hand. We view with admiration the heavens and the earth, and all therein con⯑tained; we contemplate with amaze⯑ment [85] ment the minute bodies of animals too ſmall for preception, and the immenſe planetary orbs too vaſt for imagination: we are certain that theſe cannot be the works of man; and therefore we conclude with rea⯑ſon, that they muſt be the produc⯑tions of an omnipotent Creator.’

‘In the ſame manner we ſee here a ſcheme of religion and morality unlike and ſuperior to all ideas of the human mind, equally impoſſible to have been diſcovered by the know⯑ledge, as invented by the artifice of man; and therefore by the very ſame mode of reaſoning, and with the ſame juſtice, we conclude, that it muſt derive its origin from the ſame omnipotent and omniſcient Being.’

With due deference to this inge⯑nious writer, this, like many other [86] parts of his work, is rather declama⯑tory than argumentative. In contem⯑plating the works of creation, our wonder is excited and our admiration raiſed, in proportion as human ge⯑nius is enabled to trace the marks of divine wiſdom in the Great Artificer.

The vulgar indeed may gape and ſtare at what they cannot compre⯑hend; but how limited are their ideas, how low are their conceptions of the power and wiſdom of the Deity! Their wonder at the moſt ſtupendous inſtances of both, is like that of a child at the ſqueaking of a trumpet or the tinkling of a rattle.

The admiration of the ignorant in⯑deed is founded on their ignorance, that of the ſcientific on their know⯑ledge. It is not from what we do not comprehend that we deduce the wiſ⯑dom and power of the Creator, but [87] from what we do comprehend; which, however comparatively little, is the real foundation of our faith in his omniſcience and omnipotence.

On the other hand it is, according to this writer, from the incomprehen⯑ſibility of the ſcriptures, as well as of the works of nature, that their divine origin is to be deduced.

The manner of reaſoning therefore, is not, as this writer aſſerts, the ſame in both caſes, but totally different. In reaſoning from our view of the mate⯑rial world, we prudently reaſon from what we know, and how ſhall we reaſon other⯑wiſe. "What can we reaſon but from what we know?" And yet, in logiciſing according to our author's mode from a view both of the material world and of revelation we fooliſhly attempt to reaſon from what we do not know.

Thus, he ſays, of the former.‘It [88] is not in the leaſt ſurprizing, that we are not able to underſtand the ſpiritual diſpenſations of the Al⯑mighty, when his material works are to us no leſs incomprehenſible, our reaſon can afford us no inſight into thoſe great properties of matter, gravitation, attraction, elaſticity, and electricity, nor even into the eſ⯑ſence of matter itſelf: Can reaſon teach us how the ſun's luminous orb can fill a circle, whoſe diameter con⯑tains many millions of miles, with a conſtant inundation of ſucceſſive rays during thouſands of years, with⯑out any perceivable diminution of that body, from whence they are continually poured, or any augmen⯑tation of thoſe bodies on which they fall, and by which they are con⯑ſtantly abſorbed? Can reaſon tell us how thoſe rays, darted with a velo⯑city [89] city greater than that of a canon ball, can ſtrike the tendereſt organs of the human frame without inflicting any degree of pain, or by what means this percuſſion only can convey the forms of diſtant objects to an imma⯑terial mind? or how any union can be formed between material and im⯑material eſſences, or how the wounds of the body can give pain to the ſoul, or the anxiety of the ſoul can ema⯑ciate and deſtroy the body? That all theſe things are ſo, we have vi⯑ſible and indiſputable demonſtra⯑tion; but how they can be ſo, is to us as incomprehenſible, as the moſt abſtruſe myſteries of Revelation can poſſibly be.’

But, ſo far are we from having any viſible and indiſputable demonſtration of the union, or even exiſtence of two eſſentially different and diſtinct ſub⯑ſtances [90] in body and ſoul, that our ableſt philoſophers deny the poſſibility of ſuch demonſtration.^*

And, indeed, if our author did not himſelf confeſs it, we ſhould hardly be made to believe that he is himſelf ſo bad a philoſopher, as to take the evi⯑dence of ſenſe (than which nothing is niore fallible) for demonſtration.

It is with propriety indeed he aſks if reaſon can explain the popular ſyſtem of the ſolar rays in exhibiting the ema⯑nation of light: becauſe that popular ſyſtem is unphiloſophical, unreaſonable, and merely imaginary. Were he ac⯑quainted with the real mechaniſm pro⯑ductive of thoſe phenomena, he might be ſtruck with the amazing diſplay of wiſdom and power in the divine mecha⯑niſm, but he would find no greater myſ⯑tery [91] tery in it than in the complicated ope⯑ration of the moſt ſimple mechanic powers.

We do readily agree with this inge⯑nious inveſtigator, that we ſee but a ſmall part of the great Whole; that we know but little of the relation, which the preſent life bears to pre-ex⯑iſtent and future ſtates; that we can conceive little of the nature of God and his attributes or mode of exiſtence; that we can comprehend little of the material and ſtill leſt of the moral plan on which the univerſe is conſti⯑tuted, or on what principle it pro⯑ceeds.

But we cannot admit ourſelves to be quite ſo ignorant of the mechaniſm of the material univerſe or the true prin⯑ciples of natural philoſophy, as our author appears to be.

And though with regard to the theo⯑logical [92] plan of the univerſe, we ſhould confeſs our greater ignorance and inca⯑pacity of comprehenſion, we ſhould not preſume, as our author in fact does, to deduce the internal evidence of its divine origin from that very incapa⯑city. —On the contrary, we think even the beſt experience and hiſtorical in⯑formation reſpecting both the works of nature and the doctrines of revela⯑tion equally inſufficient to form ſuch a concluſion. ^*

[93]Another argument, adduced by this author, reſpects the propagation of this religion, which, he ſays, is not leſs extraordinary than the religion itſelf, or leſs above the reach of all human power, than the diſcovery of it was a⯑bove that of all human underſtanding.

‘It is well known, ſays he, that in the courſe of a very few years, it was ſpread over all the principal parts of Aſia and of Europe, and this by the minlſtry only of an inconſiderable number of the moſt inconſiderable perſons; that at this time paganiſm was in the higheſt repute, believed univerſally by the vulgar and patro⯑nized by the great; that the wiſeſt men of the wiſeſt nations aſſiſted at its ſacrifices and conſulted its oracles on the moſt important occaſions: Whether theſe were the tricks of the prieſts or of the devil, is of no conſe⯑quence [94] as they were both equally u [...] ⯑likely to be converted or overcome; the fact is certain, that on the preach ing of a few fiſhermen, their altars were deſerted, and their deities were dumb.’

Out of veneration for the ſubject, we ſhall not place this argument in that ridiculous light, into which it might be thrown. At the ſame time, having intimated in what a ſuſpicious light we hold hiſtorical evidence in ge⯑neral, we ſhall not enter into any diſ⯑pute about matters of fact. ^*

We might otherwiſe controvert the reputable ſtate of paganiſm at the com⯑mencement of the Chriſtian aera; the immediate dumb-founding of its oracles [95] by the preaching of the fiſhermen, and the conſequent eſtabliſhment of Chri⯑ſtianity in the principal parts of Eu⯑rope and Aſia. ^†

The belief of the vulgar in any age [96] reflects but little credit on their religion; and as to the wiſeſt men of the wiſeſt na⯑tions of paganiſm conſulting the oracle on important occaſions; we can no more infer their really intereſting them⯑ſelves in behalf of paganiſm, than we can infer a ſimilar concluſion in favour of Chriſtianity from the ſimilar farce which the wiſeſt men of the wiſeſt na⯑tions in Europe play now.

Even in this proteſtant country, do not our patricians, ſenators, and ma⯑giſtrates, goin proceſſion to church, and pay their formal devoirs on certain red letter days, though they laugh at the in⯑ſtitution, and even execrate the occa⯑ſion? —In poliſhed popiſh countries, their religious ceremonies are ſtill as much more pompous and ſolemn, as the occaſion or deſign is ſtill more held in contempt and deriſion, even by the [97] very perſons aſſiſting in their celebra⯑tion. ^*

The fact is, paganiſm was juſt in the ſame reputable ſtate in Greece and Rome at that time, as Chriſtianity is in Paris and Rome at this day: ſo that if po⯑litical circumſtances did not interfere, and Chriſtianity had no better ſupport than the patronage of the Great and the piety of the populace, it might without a miracle be preached out of both cities by a methodiſt or a moun⯑tebank, in much leſs time than paga⯑niſm, was formerly preached out of Rome and Athens, by a few fiſher⯑men. Our author allows that ‘nei⯑ther [98] learning nor ſagacity is now able preciſely to aſcertain circum⯑ſtances, equally intereſting, of ſtill later times;’ we wonder, therefore, he ſhould reſt on this circumſtance a⯑lone the divine authority of the fiſher⯑men's commiſſion. It is equally ſurpriſing, that having ſo many ar⯑guments, and all of them according to him ſeparately irrefragable, he ſhould think it neceſſary to accumu⯑late others merely plauſible.

Of this kind is that paradoxical in⯑ſinuation that the improbabilities on the other ſide of the queſtion are ſo much greater that an infidel muſt be an unbeliever from mere credulity. ^*

Of the ſame kind is that trite, in⯑ſinuating, beggarly plea (as Lord Shafts⯑bury calls it) of ‘what harm could [99] enſue, if Chriſtianity ſhould after all prove a fable?’

There may be in ſome caſes great virtue in that if; but to us, it appears very extraordinary that ever ſuch a ſuppoſition ſhould come from a writer, who has laboured ſo hard, and ad⯑duced ſo many arguments to prove its impoſſibility.—Suppoſe! quotha!—

Surely, after all, he does not think there is ſtill ‘left a loop to hang a doubt on,’ that he is ſo very anxious to perſuade thoſe he may not convince! that he dwells ſo earneſtly on the ſaving pleas of their being nothing to be loſt and ſo much to be got by believing in Chriſtianity!^* Be this as it may, the whole argumentative part of the au⯑thor's propoſitions and inference may be reduced to this: ‘The Chriſtian [100] ſyſtem would never have entered in⯑to the heads of any perſons whatever. It is inconceivable therefore how ſuch men as did, could propagate it. —Ergo, It muſt have been conceiv⯑ed and propagated by the immediate and miraculous interpoſition of the Deity’.—

Such is, in ſum and ſubſtance, the whole of this mighty argument! in the expoſition of which, we have poſ⯑ſibly beſtowed already much more time and pains than the diſcerning reader will think neceſſary.

But, having proceeded ſo far with our author's view, we ſhall now pro⯑ceed till we have ſhewn the vaniſhing point of his perſpective.—

SECT. VI.

ADMITTING even this writer's propoſitions to have been demonſtrated and the internal evidence of the divine origin of the Chriſtian religion fully proved; we yet ſtill recur to the queſ⯑tion, ‘What is the Chriſtian religion, or what are its doctrines?’

We have already obſerved that even the actual profeſſors of Chriſtianity are, by no means agreed on this head.^* Our author himſelf, indeed, com⯑plains, [102] plains, that ‘ſome there are, who, by perverting the eſtabliſhed ſignifi⯑cation of words, (which they call ex⯑plaining) have ventured to expunge all the principal doctrines out of the ſcriptures, for no other reaſon than that they are not able to comprehend them; and argue thus:—The ſcrip⯑tures are the word of God; in his word no propoſitions contradictory to reaſon can have a place; theſe propoſitions are con⯑tradictory to reaſon, and therefore they are not there: But if theſe bold aſſertors would claim any regard, they ſhould reverſe their argument, and ſay—Theſe doctrines make a part, and a mate⯑rial part of the ſcriptures, they are contradictory to reaſon; no propo⯑ſitions contradictory to reaſon can be a part of the word of God, and therefore neither the ſcriptures, nor the pretended revelation contained in them, can be derived from him: [103] this would be an argument worthy of rational and candid deiſts, and de⯑mand a reſpectful attention; but when men pretend to diſprove facts by reaſoning, they have no right to expect an anſwer.’

Our author will, therefore, hardly think it worth his while to anſwer the queſtions, put to him, on this head, by certain Reviewers; who demand to know where, or by what paſſages the New Teſtament inculcates the doctrines he ſpecifies: doctrines, which the rational advocates of Chriſtianity, they pretend, are afraid to adopt. ‘Theſe advocates,’ ſay they, ‘cannot adopt notions and ſentiments, which are founded on ambiguous, ſigurative, or ſacrificial expreſſions; and ſuſpect a miſinterpretation of ſcripture, where the doctrine they embrace is [104] far removed from every tract of the human imagination.’

This is exactly what our author upbraids them for, their wanting to reduce the extent of divine wiſdom to the line of the human underſtanding.

At the ſame time, before we can ad⯑mit our author to have deduced any concluſive argument reſpecting the in⯑ternal evidence of the Chriſtian reli⯑gion, it is requiſite he ſhould certify what its doctrines are. The critics laſt⯑mentioned ſuſpect a miſinterpretation of ſcripture, where the doctrine they inculcate is far removed from every tract of the human imagination.—The Monthly Reviewers ſay alſo, ‘it has not occurred to them that doctrines, al⯑lowed to be contradictory to reaſon, are not on this account the leſs cre⯑dible.’

On the other hand, our author [105] makes their inconſiſtency with reaſon, and their being above the flight of hu⯑man imagination, the very criterion of their divine origin and, of courſe, their credibility. The ſcriptures, accord⯑ing to him, ‘contain ideas totally unheard of, and quite diſſimilar from any which had ever been thought on previous to their publication. No other, ſays he, ever drew ſo juſt a portrait of the worthleſsneſs of this world; and all its purſuits, nor ex⯑hibited ſuch diſtinct, lively and ex⯑quiſite pictures of the joys of ano⯑ther; of the reſurrection of the dead, the laſt judgment, and the triumphs of the righteous in that tremendous day, when this corrup⯑tible ſhall put on incorruption, and this mortal ſhall put on immortality. No other has ever repreſented the ſupreme Being in the character of [106] three perſons united in one God. No other has attempted to reconcile thoſe ſeeming contradictory but both true propoſitions, the contingency of future events, and the foreknow⯑ledge of God, or the free will of the creature with the over-ruling grace of the Creator. No other has ſo fully declared the neceſſity of wicked⯑neſs and puniſhment, yet ſo effec⯑tually inſtructed individuals to reſiſt the one, and to eſcape the other: no other has ever pretended to give any account of the depravity of man, or to point out any remedy for it: no other has ventured to de⯑clare the unpardonable nature of ſin without the influence of a mediato⯑rial interpoſition, and a vicarious atonement from the ſufferings of a ſuperior Being.’

[107]Such are the objects of the Chriſtian, Religion according to this author; but it is well known that the moſt eſ⯑ſential of theſe doctrines are either to⯑tally diſbelieved or explained away by a very conſiderable part of the profeſ⯑ſors of Chriſtianity.

The very Reviewers, above men⯑tioned, in particular, cannot allow with this writer ‘that the province of rea⯑ſon is only to examine into the autho⯑rity of Revelation; and when that is proved that reaſon has nothing more to do than to acquieſce.’

And ſo far we agree with them that Reaſon is juſt as well qualified to judge of the interpretation of particular texts and paſſages of ſcripture, as to judge of the authenticity of the whole.

But we deny, on the authority of that very ſcripture, that unenlightened [108] reaſon is qualified to judge of either, Our author "readily, as unneceſſarily, acknowledges, as before obſerved, that the ſcriptures are not revelations from God, but the hiſtory of ſuch Revela⯑tions;" of whoſe imperfections and fallibility, therefore, we ſay, nothing leſs than the influence of that divine grace, which inſpired the revelation it⯑ſelf, can qualify any man to judge.

Hence the moral arguments, and hiſtorical evidence, which our author adduces, to prove the divine origin of revelation, appear nugatory.

To deny the probable facts, he ſays, related in the New Teſtament, would be as abſurd as to deny the probable facts in any other hiſtory.—This is true, and yet the joint evidence of all the probable facts, related in any hiſtory ſacred or profane, amounts to no more [109] than that moral evidence, which will juſtify the belief of probable (not im⯑probable) facts.

The ſame may be ſaid of the doc⯑trines of the Scriptures; if their di⯑vine authority is to depend on mere hi⯑ſtorical evidence, they ſhould appear to be as rational as the evidence, on which that authority is ſupported, is probable: and not the credibility of both facts and doctrines left prepoſterouſly to be ſupported, according to our author's ſcheme, by the improbability of the one, and incomprehenſibility of the other ^*.

[110] ‘To aſcertain the true ſyſtem and genuine doctrines of this religion af⯑ter the undecided controverſies of above ſeventeen centuries, and to re⯑move all the rubbiſh, which artifice and ignorance have been heaping upon it during all that time, would indeed be an arduous talk, which our author will by no means under⯑take;’ nor is it, indeed, neceſſary when he can reduce all the eſſentials as he ſuppoſes, into ſo ſmall a com⯑paſs.

[111]But it is neceſſary that theſe eſſen⯑tials ſhould be agreed on and rendered indiſputable, before the proof of their divine origin can be of any uſe.

With reſpect, for inſtance, to one of the moſt eſſential:—‘That Chriſt ſuffered and died as an atonement for the ſins of mankind, is a doc⯑trine,’ ſays the writer, ‘ſo conſtant⯑ly and ſo ſtrongly enforced through every part of the New Teſtament, that whoever will ſeriouſly peruſe thoſe writings, and deny that it is there, may, with as much reaſon and truth, after reading the works of Thucydides and Livy, aſſert, that in them no mention is made of any facts relative to the hiſtories of Greece and Rome.’

We are perfectly of his opinion in this reſpect, and yet it is with aſto⯑niſhing confidence the contrary is [112] maintained by many late writers of pretended candour and undoubted abi⯑lities. So that while the doctrines of Chriſtianity are thus in diſpute (that is) till it be determined what the eſſential doctrines of Revelation are, we con⯑ceive, as we ſaid before, the determi⯑nation of the queſtion reſpecting its divine origin to be of very little impor⯑tance; even if it were determinable by our author's mode of argument. But, again we ſay, we can by no means agree with him that men would believe divine revelation in proportion as its tenets were incomprehenſible to the underſtanding.

On the contrary, the inference we ſhould naturally draw from the imper⯑fect ſtate of human ſcience and the in⯑ſufficiency of unaſſiſted reaſon to attain any portion of divine knowledge, would be, that nothing but the imme⯑diate influence of Grace, the inſpira⯑tion [113] of the Almighty which giveth underſtanding, could induce the ſcep⯑tic to believe either the divine origin of the ſcriptures or the doctrines, they contain.

SECT. VII.

[114]"IF," ſays our author, ‘I have demonſtrated the divine origin of the Chriſtian religion by an argument which cannot be confuted; no others, however plauſible or nume⯑rous, founded on probabilities, doubts and conjectures, can ever diſ⯑prove it, becauſe if it is once ſhewn to be true, it cannot be falſe ^*.’

There is no parrying theſe ifs; but if this writer's argument be not ſuch as cannot be confuted, there may beſome⯑thing in the arguments founded on probabilities, doubts and conjectures, that make againſt it.—It is on that ſup⯑poſition, we imagine, he attempts to refute ſuch objections: as it is on that conviction, viz. that his argument it⯑ſelf is invalid, that we ſhall proceed to conſider how far he has been ſucceſs⯑ful in removing them.

[115]In anſwer to the firſt objection ^*, ‘That Revelation is incredible be⯑cauſe unneceſſary, on the plea of the ſufficiency of human reaſon to diſ⯑cover all the religious and moral du⯑ties God requires of them.’ He ob⯑ſerves, that ‘Reaſon alone is ſo far from being ſufficient to offer to man⯑kind a perfect religion, that it has never yet been able to lead them to any degree of culture or civiliſation whatever;’ deducing a demonſtra⯑tion (as it ſeems to him.) from Hiſtory, that ‘although human reaſon is ca⯑pable of progreſſion in ſcience, yet the firſt foundation muſt be laid by ſupernatural inſtructions. ^†’

Now, ſays he, ‘As Reaſon in her natural ſtate is incapable of making [116] any progreſs ^* in knowledge, ſo when furniſhed with materials by ſuperna⯑tural aid, if left to the guidance of her own wild imaginations, ſhe falls into more numerous, and more groſs errors, than her own native igno⯑rance could ever have ſuggeſted.’

Only think, reader, of the wild ima⯑ginations of Reaſon!—And yet the rea⯑ſonable ſuggeſtions, which our author enumerates, it muſt be owned, are wild and extravagant enough.

"SHE," ſays he (that is Reaſon) ‘has perſuaded ſome, that there is [117] no God; others that there can be no future ſtate: ſhe has taught ſome, that there is no difference be⯑tween vice and virtue, and that to cut a man's throat and to relieve his neceſſities are actions equally meri⯑torious: ſhe has convinced many, that they have no free-will in oppo⯑ſition to their own experience: ſome that there can be no ſuch thing as ſoul, or ſpirit, contrary to their own perceptions; and others, no ſuch thing as matter or body, in contra⯑diction to their ſenſes. By analy⯑ſing all things ſhe can ſhew, that there is nothing in any thing; by per⯑petual ſhifting ſhe can reduce all exiſtence to the inviſible duſt of ſcepticiſm; and by recurring to firſt principles, prove to the ſatis⯑faction of her followers, that there are no principles at all.’

[118]After this curious piece of ſophiſ⯑tical declamation, he adds, ‘How far ſuch a guide is to be depended on in the important concerns of religion, and morals, I leave to the judg⯑ment of every conſiderate man to de⯑termine.’

That is, after declaring Reaſon to be a fallacious guide and an incompetent judge, he will leave it to the direction of that very guide and the determina⯑tion of that very judge, how far ſuch direction and determination are to be depended on!—For what elſe can he mean by leaving it to the judgment of any conſiderate man? Is not this leaving it to Reaſon, or ſetting up Reaſon in judgment on herſelf?

To do juſtice to the nobleſt fa⯑culty of the human mind, we will venture to declare that Reaſon never [119] ſuggeſted any of the above extrava⯑gancies to any man.

Reaſon never could perſuade any man that "there is no God." Indeed the office of Reaſon is not perſuaſion but conviction, and no man, capable of con⯑viction, ever yet was even perſuaded that ſecond cauſes do not proceed from a firſt. ^*

Reaſon never taught any man there is no difference between virtue and vice: His neceſſary uſe of the very terms is a proof of it; as well as the [120] natural ſenſe of juſtice, implanted in the breaſt of every humanbeing. ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,’ is not merely New Teſtament doctrine. It is as old as the multiplication of mankind; it is an univerſal principle, a law of which (to uſe the expreſſion of a cele⯑brated, though inconſiſtent, moraliſt) ‘every man may find the expoſition in his own breaſt ^*’.

Reaſon never taught any man, there can be no future ſtate. The utmoſt, that reaſon ever taught, is that we are indebted to revelation for the certain knowledge of ſuch ſtate or muſt de⯑pend chiefly on ſcriptural proof for the evidence of it. Not but that there are even rational arguments in its favour, as [121] well of the phyſical and moral ^* as of the religious kind. ^†

[122] Reaſon never perſuaded any man that he hath no free-will, in oppoſi⯑tion to his own experience.—If ſhe ſuggeſted a doubt of his capacity to [123] will or act without a motive, it is a ſuggeſtion founded on all experience; as his conviction of not being a mere mechanical machine, actuated by no motives at all, is founded on the ſame experience.

Reaſon never ſuggeſted the non-exiſt⯑ence of ſoul or body, of matter or ſpi⯑rit, in contradiction to our ſenſes and perceptions.—Neither matter nor ſpi⯑rit are ideas of ſenſation, but of reflection. Reaſon teaches us, indeed, the fallibi⯑lity of ſenſation and perception, and the means of correcting their errors; and well for us it is, that ſhe does ſo: we ſhould elſe be totally deſtitute of ſcience; and, for want of the inſtincts of other animals, ſhould be in a worſe ſituation than the brutes that periſh.

From the above ſpecification, indeed, of the ſuppoſed abſurdities of human reaſon, it appears to us that, our au⯑thor [124] hath neither phyſics nor metaphy⯑ſics enough to enter on a philoſophical diſcuſſion of the points in queſtion.— We might, therefore, in like manner, leave to the judgment of our conſide⯑rate readers to determine, whether the Reaſon, or rather the Imagination, of any man, in his ſenſes, ever fell into groſſer errors than has here that of our au⯑thor; in which caſe, they would like⯑wiſe determine how far ſuch a guide is to be depended on in the important concerns of religion and morals.

We might, indeed, cenſure here the ſuperficial and illogical manner; in which this writer has ſtated this objec⯑tion; viz. his ſpeaking of mankind, as if the human mind was ſomething diſ⯑tinct from, and poſſeſſed of, the power of controuling its eſſential faculties.

But that excellent logician, Mr Har⯑ris, in his Dialogue on Happineſs, [125] hath illuſtrated, in the moſt perſpicu⯑ous manner, the reciprocal influence of reaſon and paſſion in the conduct and compoſition of the human mind. To ſuch writers, therefore, we refer our author, for the attainment of more pre⯑ciſe ideas on this ſubject than he ſeems at preſent to poſſeſs, or will ever ob⯑tain from the looſe and rambling rea⯑ſonings of thoſe who ſtile themſelves Chriſtian philoſophers or rational divines.

SECT. VIII.

HERE our author very readily (and, as we before obſerved, in our o⯑pinion, for his argument unneceſſa⯑rily) acknowledges that the ſcriptures are not revelations from God, but only the hiſtory of them. ‘The reve⯑lation itſelf,’ ſays he, ‘is derived from God; but the hiſtory of it is the production of men, and there⯑fore the truth of it is not in the leaſt affected by their fallibility.’ ^†

He admits, of courſe, that the in⯑ſpired writers were not always under the influence of inſpiration; for, if they had, ſays he, St Paul, who was ſhipwrecked, and left his cloak and parchments at Troas, would not have put to ſea before a ſtorm, nor have [127] forgot himſelf ſo much as to leave his cloak behind him.

"But," continues he, ‘if in theſe books a religion ſuperior to all hu⯑man imagination actually exiſts, it is of no conſequence to the proof of its divine origin, by what means it was there introduced, or with what human errors and imperfections it is blended. A diamond, though found in a bed of mud, is ſtill a dia⯑mond, nor can the dirt, which ſur⯑rounds it, depreciate its value or de⯑ſtroy its luſtre.’

This alluſion may be well calculated to catch the ſimple apprehenſion of the ſuperficial reader; but, one of the leaſt diſcrimination cannot fail to diſ⯑cover how totally inapplicable it is to the ſubject in queſtion.

A fine lady, indeed, may careleſsly drop a manufactured brilliant into the [128] kennel, to be accidentally picked up by a gold-finder; but rough diamonds are not originally found there; they have not their native bed in the ſtreets, or on the dunghill; but are dug from mines, prepared by Nature's proceſs for their production: in which ſtate, alſo, they do not ſhine with a luſtre ſo greatly ſuperior to the ſurrounding materials.

We by no means agree with our author, therefore, that his proof of the internal evidence of the divine origin of revelation, does not ſuffer, by ad⯑mitting that ‘the prophecies are all fortunate gueſſes or artful applica⯑tions, and the miracles there record⯑ed no better than legendary tales.’ ^*

On the contrary we conceive that ſuch an heterogeneous mixture of truth and falſehood, as he hypothetically [129] admits in the hiſtory, as he calls it, of revelation, would, if it really exiſted there, very reaſonably bring the truths it contains into doubt.—Nay, we will go ſo far as to admit that there really do appear ſo many errors and incon⯑ſiſtencies, in that hiſtory, that unen⯑lightened reaſon cannot reconcile them: the inſpiration of grace being as neceſ⯑ſary to point out theſe truths and induce a firm belief of them, as it was to di⯑rect and enable the inſpired writers to record them.

SECT. IX.

‘TO ſome ſpeculative and refined obſervers it has appeared incredible’, ſays our author, ‘that a wiſe and be⯑nevolent Creator ſhould have conſti⯑tuted a world upon one plan, and a religion for it on another; that is, that he ſhould have revealed a reli⯑gion to mankind, which not only contradicts the principal paſſions and inclinations which he has implanted in their natures, but is incompatible with the whole oeconomy of that world which he has created, and in which he has thought proper to place them. This, ſay they, with [131] regard to the Chriſtian, is apparently the caſe: the love of power, riches, honour, and fame, are the great incitements to generous and magna⯑nimous actions; yet by this inſtitu⯑tion are all theſe depreciated and diſ⯑couraged. Government is eſſential to the nature of man, and cannot be managed without certain degrees of violence, corruption, and impoſi⯑tion; yet are all theſe ſtrictly forbid. Nations cannot ſubſiſt without wars, nor war be carried on without ra⯑pine, deſolation, and murder: yet are theſe prohibited under the ſeve⯑reſt threats. The non-reſiſtance of evil muſt ſubject individuals to con⯑tinual oppreſſions, and leave nations a defenceleſs prey to their enemies; yet is this recommended. Perpetual patience under inſults and injuries muſt every day provoke new inſults [132] and new injuries, yet is this injoined. A neglect of all we eat and drink and wear, muſt put an end to all com⯑merce, manufactures, and induſtry; yet is this required. In ſhort, were theſe precepts univerſally obeyed, the diſpoſition of all human affairs muſt.be entirely changed, and the buſineſs of the world, conſtituted as it now is, could not go on.’

The Monthly Reviewers very juſtly obſerve, on this paſſage, that no ſeri⯑ous advocate for Chriſtianity can admit all theſe contradictions: for, indeed, they militate not leſs againſt the prac⯑tical principles of Chriſtianity than againſt: thoſe of Common-ſenſe. Our author, nevertheleſs boldly affirms that ‘Such is the Chriſtian revelation, tho' ſome of its advocates may perhaps be unwilling to own it, and ſuch it is conſtantly declared to be by him [133] who gave it, as well as by thoſe who publiſhed it under his immedi⯑ate direction:’ To theſe he ſays, ‘If ye were of the world, the world would love his own; but becauſe ye are not of the world, but I have choſen you out, of the world, therefore the world ha⯑teth you’ ^*. To the Jews he declares, ‘Ye are of this world; I am not of this world’ ^†. St Paul writes to the Ro⯑mans, ‘Be not conformed to this world ^‡’; and to the Corinthians, "We ſpeak not the wiſdom of this world ^§." St James ſays, ‘Know ye not, that the friendſhip of the world is enmity with God? whoſoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God ^‖’. This irreconcileable ‘diſagreement between Chriſtianity and the world is announced in num⯑berleſs [134] berleſs other places in the New Teſ⯑tament, and indeed by the whole te⯑nour of thoſe writings. Theſe are plain declarations, which, in ſpite of all the evaſions of thoſe good managers, who chooſe to take a lit⯑tle of this world in their way to hea⯑ven, ſtand fixed and immoveable againſt all their arguments drawn from public benefit and pretended neceſſity, and muſt ever forbid any reconciliation between the purſuits of this world and the Chriſtian in⯑ſtitution.’

We have as much contempt as our author can have for thoſe good mana⯑gers, who chooſe to take as much of this world as they can with them in their journey to the next. We are alſo as well ſatisfied as he can be, that Chriſtian morality in its purity is not calculated for the practice of man in [135] his preſent ſtate; but inculcated to in⯑ſpire a proper diſpoſition preparatory to another. But, for the ſame reaſons, we think the obſervance of it no far⯑ther required of us than it is practi⯑cable.

‘If it be poſſible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men ^*,’ ſays St. Paul to the Romans. The Chriſtian religion enjoins not impoſſi⯑bilities; it impoſes not hard and im⯑practicable duties; requiring no more of any man than lieth in him. The Scripture expreſsly declares; ‘Its yoke is eaſy and its burthen is light^†.’

[136]The ſeveral texts, therefore, above adduced by our author, are evidently miſapplied.

That a conformity to the vices and follies of the world is prohibited to Chriſtians, is moſt certain; but where are they forbid to conform to the eſta⯑bliſhed cuſtoms and neceſſary duties of ſociety? Are they not, on the other hand, expreſsly enjoined, to ſubmit to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake?—To pay the moſt implicit obedience to magiſtrates and all that are in power; for that the powers, that be, are of God?

Where is it, we aſk again, that Chri⯑ſtians are required by the Scriptures ſo to act as to put an end to all com⯑merce, manufactures, and induſtry; to change the diſpoſition of all human [137] affairs, and put a ſtop to the buſineſs of the world?—

Are theſe extravagances deduced from our Saviour's ſermon on the Mount and the inſtructions he gave his immediate diſciples?—Men poſſeſ⯑ſed of the power of working miracles for their ſupport or defence, might ſafe⯑ly indeed leave to-morrow to take care for itſelf, careleſs of what they might eat, drink or wear. But ſetting aſide the conſideration that many things may be enjoined as particular and perſonal duties, adapted to time and place, which are by no means required uni⯑verſally; ſetting aſide alſo the conſide⯑ration that our Saviour was exhibiting to his diſciples a theory of morality, adapted rather to man in a ſtate of perfection than to man in his preſent imperfect ſtate of probation; it is plain that he had in view the holding [138] up a contraſt to the boaſted morality of thoſe vain-glorious hypocrites the Scribes and Phariſees; in order to check that overweening pride, with which they exulted in their good-works over the ſincere and humble pe⯑nitence of the publican and ſinner.

Our Saviour did not preach the ſame ſtrictneſs of morals to all, as he did to his immediate followers. ‘Behold one came and ſaid unto him, good maſter, what good thing ſhall I do to inherit eternal life? —And he ſaid unto him, Why calleſt thou me good? there is none good but one, that is God: but if thou wilt enter into life keep the Commandments.—He ſaith unto him, which? Jeſus ſaid, Thou ſhalt do no murder, Thou ſhalt not com⯑mit adultery, Thou ſhalt not ſteal, Thou ſhalt not bear falſe witneſs; [139] Honour thy father and thy mother: and thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thyſelf.’—

Every one of theſe commandments, we ſee, reſpects the diſcharge of the ſocial duties incumbent on man in the preſent ſtate of ſociety. Not one is mentioned of a nature purely religious; even the firſt commandment reſpecting the very acknowledgment of God is omitted: and yet Jeſus ſays, keep theſe commandments and thou wilt enter in⯑to life.

The unattainable nature of moral goodneſs in this mortal ſtate is alſo here ſtrongly inculcated, "There is none good but God ^*. "—And yet ſo good [140] was the preſuming Queriſt, that he anſwered, he had kept all theſe com⯑mandments from his youth up; pert⯑ly adding, "what lack I yet?"— Jeſus ſaid unto him, "if thou wilt be perfect, go, ſell that thou haſt, give it to the poor and follow me."

[141]This ſacrifice of the things of this world, we ſee, was required of him, not as the conditions of his ſalvation, but as a proof of that moral perfection to which he pretended, and as a qualifi⯑cation neceſſary for him to become an immediate follower and diſciple of Je⯑ſus Chriſt.

In like manner, we will venture to ſay, that Chriſtianity, at this day, re⯑quires no purer morals in its profeſſors, than as much as in them lies, to live peaceably with all men, to keep thoſe commandments which are eſſential to the good of ſociety and the peace and happineſs of mankind.

Let the ſincere Chriſtian do this and we believe he will enter into eternal life, even though he ſhould be ſome⯑what nice in regard to what he eats, drinks and wears; though he ſhould promote commerce, manufactures and [142] induſtry, yea, though he ſhould, con⯑ſiſtently with the laws of his country, reſent inſults, puniſh injuries, enter into the civil or even military ſer⯑vice of government, draw his ſword againſt the enemies of the ſtate, and even fatally embrue it in blood, to chaſtiſe the inſolence of unnatural re⯑bellion!

SECT. X.

IN anſwer to this fourth objection, our author very candidly and very ſimply replies, that on examination all this will be found inevitable.—We be⯑lieve it; things could not poſſibly be otherwiſe, becauſe ſuch was the ge⯑neral deſign of Providence, and ſuch the Chriſtian diſpenſation, which was a part of it.

In reply to this objection, indeed, our author admits the whole force of it; which he endeavours to elude by a very ſimple expedient: much ſuch a⯑nother as that, by which he accounts elſewhere for the origin of evil, Ne⯑ceſſity! hard neceſſity; which even the omnipotence of the Deity could not [144] prevent! What is this but making the God of the Chriſtians a mere heathen Jupiter, ſubject to the controul of ſu⯑perior Fate?

He admits, that after Chriſtianity had had made its way, by means of the preach⯑ing of the poor and mean, in holes and caverns, under the iron rod of perſecution, till it ſo far prevailed as to obtain the countenance and protection of princes; when kings became its patrons, and queens its nurſing mothers; he ad⯑mits, we ſay, that it could no longer withſtand the irreſiſtible effects of the natural imperfection of man and the political evils of civil ſociety. ‘At length the meek and humble pro⯑feſſors of the goſpel inſlaved theſe princes, and conquered theſe con⯑querors their patrons, and erected for themſelves ſuch a ſtupendous fabric of wealth and power, as the world [145] had never ſeen: they then propa⯑gated their religion by the ſame me⯑thods by which it had been perſecu⯑ted; nations were converted by fire and ſword, and the vanquiſhed were baptiſed with daggers at their throats.^*’

Horrid abominations! exclaims our author at the enormities of the poor pagans. But what more horrid abo⯑minations could they be guilty of than theſe? Were any of thoſe, which, our author ſays, were practiſed in the pa⯑gan world, and vaniſhed at the approach of Chriſtianity, more horrid or more a⯑bominable? And yet they were per⯑mitted it ſeems, becauſe they could not be prevented. They proceeded, we are told, from a chain of cauſes and conſe⯑quences, which could not have been broken without changing the eſtabliſhed courſe of things by a conſtant ſeries of [146] miracles, or a total alteration of human nature.^*

What a pity that a buſineſs which had ſo promiſing a beginning, ſhould be ſo ſoon interrupted by ſuch ſiniſter and unforeſeen accidents! For ſurely they muſt have been unforeſeen, when the courſe of things was about to be eſtabliſhed and human nature firſt con⯑ſtituted!

To be ſerious, this is a bungling ex⯑cuſe for a ſuppoſed blunder in the firſt outſet of things, unleſs we ſeriouſly adopt the reaſon, our author deduces from revelation, viz. that it could not be otherwiſe, ‘becauſe that all men ſhould be exempted from ſin and puniſhment is utterly repugnant to the univerſal ſyſtem, and that conſti⯑tution of things, which infinite wiſ⯑dom has thought proper to adopt. ^†’

[147]This may be, but we revere the e⯑ternal councils of the great author and diſpoſer of all things too much, to ſuppoſe he was ever under the predica⯑ment of adopting any meaſure or ſyſtem of action, that reſulted originally from any thing but his own will.

SECT. XI.

[148]TO theſe objections, ſays our au⯑thor, ‘I ſhall only ſay, that no argu⯑ments founded on principles, which we cannot comprehend, can poſſibly diſprove a propoſition already pro⯑ved on principles which we do un⯑derſtand; and therefore that on this ſubject they ought not to be attend⯑ed to.’ But this is rather evading the difficulty than ſolving it. Indeed, with regard to the doctrines of the Tri⯑nity and vicarious atonement he be⯑ſtows on them ſome little attention. In reſpect to the former, he obſerves, ‘That three beings ſhould be one be⯑ing, is a propoſition which certainly contradicts reaſon; that is, our reaſon: but it does not thence follow, that it cannot be true; for there are many propoſitions which contradict our reaſon, and yet are demonſtrably true.’

[149]That this is a propoſition contradic⯑tory to reaſon, we admit; but we de⯑ny, that it is either true or capable of demonſtration. There may be pro⯑poſitions contradictory to reaſon, and yet not demonſtrably falſe; nay, they may be ſuch as, however contradictory to reaſon, we cannot help believing to be true; but to be demonſtrably ſo, they muſt be perfectly and evidently conſonant to reaſon; for demonſtration is nothing but the reſult of a com⯑pleat proceſs of rational argument.

That propoſitions apparently falſe are demon ſtrably true, is almoſt too notori⯑ous to merit illuſtration. Inſtances oc⯑cur every moment in which the infe⯑rence of our ill-informed and immediate apprehenſion is directly contradictory to that of a better-informed and deliberate reflection.

[150]There are propoſitions, alſo, that re⯑quire not only much deliberation, but much inſtruction, before our reaſon is qualified to paſs any judgment concern⯑ing them. This our author elſewhere admits, ^* though, under the preſent head, he proceeds to ſupport his aſſer⯑tion by example; offering an inſtance of the propoſitions, which, he ſays, are contradictory to reaſon, and yet demon⯑ſtrably true. ‘One, ſays he, is the very firſt principle of all religion, the be⯑ing of a God; for that any thing ſhould exiſt without a cauſe, or that any thing ſhould be the cauſe of its own exiſtence, are propoſitions equally contradictory to our reaſon; yet one of them muſt be true, or no⯑thing could ever have exiſted.’

The Monthly Reviewers very juſtly inſinuate, that here is a confuſion of [151] terms: indeed our author here ſadly expoſes his want of logical preciſion. —Not to cavil at his calling God a thing, his oppoſing the term being, or exiſtence (inſtead of effect) to the term cauſe, is illogical in the higheſt degree.

All created beings, or things, are con⯑feſſedly the EFFECTS of one firſt CAUSE; but we conceive this is the firſt time, ſo expert a logician ever made ſuch a blunder as to put the firſt cauſe on a footing with ſecond cauſes; and aſſert (as our author, in fact, does) that no cauſe could ever have exiſted that was not the effect of ſome prior cauſe. If he is not betrayed here into a ſlat denial of the exiſtence of a God, or firſt cauſe, we know not what is ſuch.

Our author palpably miſtakes the permanent predicament of exiſtence and duration, for the tranſitory one of pro⯑duction and ſucceſſion In the former the [152] terms being and thing are uſed with pro⯑priety: in the latter thoſe of cauſe and effect with equal propriety: but it is a ſoleciſm in ratiocination to confound one with the other. For, though, in the order of nature the exiſtence of one thing becomes the productive cauſe of another, the God of Nature, the pri⯑mary, and efficient cauſe of all, ſupe⯑rier to the work of his hands, ^* is ex⯑empted [153] from the laws of ſubordina⯑tion; which he has preſcribed as the tegular ſucceſſion of ſecond cauſes and effects. It is, indeed, in our concep⯑tion, a kind of metaphyſical blaſphe⯑my to repreſent God as an effect which could not have exiſted without a cauſe, even though it be ſheltered uhder the metaphyſical abſurdity of ſuppoſing that effect the cauſe of itſelf.

And yet our author proceeds with his examples; ‘In like manner, the over-ruling grace of the Creator, and [154] the free-will of his creatures, his cer⯑tain foreknowledge of future events, and the uncertain contingency of thoſe events, are to our apprehen⯑ſions abſolute contradictions to each other; and yet the truth of every one of theſe is demonſtrable from Scripture, reaſon and experience.’

Here again our author confounds the abſolute and eternal attributes of the Creator with the relative and tempo⯑rary properties of his creatures. That theſe ſhould be apparently contradictory is no wonder: but that they are not, as our author affirms, abſolute contra⯑dictions, is known to every man of ſenſe and ſcicnce, that hath beſtowed ſufficient attention on the ſubject; to whom theſe ſeeming contradictions muſt be eaſily reconcileable. The o⯑ver-ruling grace of the Creator is irre⯑ſiſtible and poſitive; the free-will of [155] his creatures reſiſtible and comparative. The agency of man, compared with that of the Deity, is limited, confined, and ſervile. On the other hand, if compared with the agency of inferior animals, plants, &c. it is liberal and free.—The foreknowledge of the Deity is abſolute and indiſputable, as the ſucceſſion of future events is with re⯑ſpect to him, fixed and unalterable; with reſpect to man, indeed, their con⯑tingency is as uncertain as is his want of foreknowledge, or ignorance, of their neceſſary ſucceſſion.

But to recur to the author's remarks on the doctrine of the Trinity. It is with propriety he obſerves, that ‘the difficulties with reſpect to our belief in this doctrine ariſe from our ima⯑gining, that the mode of exiſtence [156] of all beings muſt be ſimilar to our own; that is, that they muſt all exiſt in ſpace and time. Hence, ſays he very juſtly, proceeds our embar⯑raſſment on this ſubject. We know that no two beings, with whoſe mode of exiſtence we are acquaint⯑ed, can exiſt in the ſame point of time, in the ſame point of ſpace, and that therefore they cannot be one: but how far beings, whoſe mode of exiſtence bears no relation to time and ſpace, may be united, we can⯑not comprehend: and, therefore, the poſſibility of ſuch an union we cannot poſitively deny.’

This is philoſophical and juſt, but there is a wide difference between po⯑ſitively denying a doctrine, and abſo⯑lutely believing it.—Moſt certain, however, it is, that the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is taught by ſome of the [157] Athanaſians, cannot poſſibly be belie⯑ved by any human being. ^*

Our author reduces this formidable abſurdity (for ſuch it is, as ſome trini⯑tarians repreſent it) to a mere ſimple propoſition, as eaſy to be believed as that three equal angles or ſides conſti⯑tute one equilateral triangle. But this is not the caſe. In the exuberant and rattling eloquence of the famous Dr. Jeremy Taylor, the myſtery of the Godhead is thus enigmatically diſplay⯑ed. —‘See what was to be taught, a [158] trinity in the unity of the Godhead, [...]; that is, the Chriſtian arithmetic, Three are one and one are three. So Lucian in his Philopatris, or ſome other, decides the Chriſtian doctrines; ſee their philoſophy, Ex nihilo nihil fit.—No: Ex nihilo omnia, all things are made of nothing; and a man-God and a God-man, the ſame perſon finite and infinite, born in time and yet from all eternity, the ſon of God, but yet born of a woman, and ſhe a maid, but yet a mother; reſurrection of the dead, re-union of ſoul and body; this was part of the Chriſtian phyſics or their natural philoſophy.’ ^*

With due deference to the authori⯑ty of this eminent divine, as well as to [159] his late editor, Biſhop Hurd, all this is merely declamatory. It is alſo ſo far ſophiſtical, in that it is the Chriſtian theology and not either arithmetic or phy⯑ſics.—The mathematics and natural philo⯑ſophy of the Chriſtian and the Heathen are the ſame: nor is it any impeach⯑ment to the divinity of revelation, that it has no place in the cyclopaedia, or circle of human arts and ſciences.

The caſe is, theſe writers do not make a proper diſtinction between a palpable contradiction in terms and an apparent contrariety in fact. There is alſo a neceſſary diſtinction to be made between the belief of the truth of a propoſition (or the believing a propo⯑ſition to be true) and the belief of the propoſition itſelf: the former being conſiſtent with an imperfect apprehen⯑ſion of its meaning; and the other con⯑ſiſtent only with a clear and preciſe [160] comprehenſion as well of the predicate as of the ſubject.

From theſe diſtinctions ariſes a third, equally juſt and neceſſary, between the faith of the Chriſtian and the belief of the philoſopher. But of theſe diſtinctions more fully hereafter. ^*

SECT. XII.

TO this ſixth objection, our author anſwers, "Genuine Chriſtianity re⯑quires no ſuch belief."

‘It has diſcovered to us many im⯑portant truths, with which we were before entirely unacquainted, and amongſt them are theſe, that three Beings are ſome way united in the divine eſſence, and that God will accept of the ſufferings of Chriſt as an atonement for the ſins of man⯑kind. Theſe, conſidered as decla⯑rations of facts only, neither con⯑tradict, or are above the reach of [162] human reaſon: The firſt is a propo⯑ſition as plain, as that three equila⯑ral lines compoſe one triangle ^*, the other is as intelligible, as that one man ſhould diſcharge the debts of another. In what manner this union is formed, or why God accepts theſe vicarious puniſhments, or to what purpoſes they may be ſubſervient, it informs us not, becauſe no informa⯑tion could enable us to comprehend theſe myſteries, and therefore it does not require that we ſhould know or believe any thing about them.’

How! not any thing about them! Surely this is looſely and badly expreſ⯑ſed! As a declaration of fact merely, it has been already obſerved that the [163] orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is not ſo ſimple and rational as here laid down; but much more complex and paradoxical.

As to the quomodo of the triunion, and the reaſon why God accepts of a vicarious atonement for the ſins of mankind; theſe are certainly beyond rational inveſtigation, but Chriſtians are doubtleſs required to believe ſo much about them, as that the facts are as poſſible as their declaration is true.

Again, if no information can enable us to comprehend theſe myſteries, it is not with very great propriety ſuch important truths are ſaid to be diſcovered by Revelation. The doctrines as mere declarations, indeed, may be ſaid to be diſcovered, as they were not divulged before; but if thoſe doctrines them⯑ſelves ſtill remain myſterious, they [164] would with more propriety be ſaid to be ſimply declared or promulgated, than their truth to be diſcovered.

"The truth of theſe doctrines," our author owns, ‘muſt reſt intirely on the authority of thoſe who taught them; but then, ſays he, we ſhould reflect that thoſe were the ſame per⯑ſons who taught us a ſyſtem of reli⯑gion more ſublime, and of ethics more perfect, than any which our faculties were ever able to diſcover; but which, when diſcovered, are exactly conſonant to our reaſon; and that therefore we ſhould not haſtily reject thoſe informations which they have vouchſafed to give us, of which our reaſon is not a competent judge.’

By the truth of theſe doctrines, he evidently means the credibility of them; but what he means by the exact conſo⯑nance of thoſe which are diſcovered [165] to our reaſon, we do not underſtand. It is from the want of ſuch conſonance, neceſſarily ariſing from the myſterious nature of ſuch doctrines, that we de⯑duce the incompetency of reaſon to judge of their truth.

But men, as our author juſtly ob⯑ſerves, may very reaſonably believe propoſitions to be true, of whoſe truth, nevertheleſs, they are no competent judges. "If an able mathematician," ſays he, ‘proves to us the truth of ſe⯑veral propoſitions by demonſtrations, which we underſtand, we heſitate not on his authority to aſſent to others, the proceſs of whoſe proofs we are not able to follow: why therefore ſhould we refuſe that credit to Chriſt and his apoſtles, which we think reaſonable to give to one another.’

[166]Why? indeed! It is very unrea⯑ſonable: they doubtleſs deſerve our credit.—But ſtill we recur again to the authenticity of the hiſtory of the goſpel and the interpretation of its doctrines. Admitting, therefore, the propriety of placing the utmoſt confidence in the veracity of Chriſt and his apoſtles, and that what they really meant to incul⯑cate is worthy of all acceptation, ſtill, we ſay, the cautious and candid Chri⯑ſtian may, without the immediate di⯑rection of divine grace, remain at a loſs what to believe.

As to what genuine Chriſtianity re⯑quires us to believe; here again we plead for the ſame neceſſary latitude in matters of faith, as we have before done in morals ^*. Indeed, our author [167] is, in this reſpect, and very juſtly, a latitudinarian too: for though he hath reduced the Chriſtian's creed, as before obſerved, to a very ſmall compaſs, he hath, by ſo doing, opened a wide field for ſcepticiſm. And yet ſo far are the dictates of genuine Chriſtianity, even in our opinion, conſonant with reaſon, that, as it requires nothing which is impracticable to be performed, ſo it requires nothing, which is impoſ⯑ſible to be believed.

‘But how ſhall ſuch a ſhort-ſighted Being as man know what is, or is not impoſſible?’—True; he may be conſcious of what is impracticable, as [168] that regards himſelf, but he Cannot preſcribe impoſſibilities to God; of whoſe omnipotence he is no judge. To infinite power every thing is poſ⯑ſible, except, indeed, inconſiſtency or ſelf-contradiction. Every propoſition, therefore, reſpecting the deity, that doth not involve a contradiction in terms, however improbable or appa⯑rently impoſſible, may yet be really poſſible, and therefore believed on pro⯑per evidence, powerful perſuaſion, or the influence of divine grace: whereas no kind or degree of evidence, no power of perſuaſion, no influence human or divine can poſſibly make any man be⯑lieve a contradiction in terms.

This is one of thoſe impracticabilities which reſpects himſelf. Of the in⯑compatibility of facts he may not be a competent judge; but of the incon⯑gruity of his own deas, he cannot but be ſenſible. To a direct contradiction-in-terms, [169] therefore, he cannot give his unfeigned aſſent, though to the moſt egregious falſehood or palpable con⯑trariety-in-fact, he may.

This diſtinction between a contra⯑riety-in-fact and a contradiction-in-terms, we conceive, has not ſufficiently been attended to. The one is popular, and phyſical; conſiſting of natural incon⯑ſiſtency and moral improbabilities; the other philoſophical and logical, con⯑ſiſting of artificial inconſiſtencies and verbal incongruities. Hence, how⯑ever incompetent human reaſon may be, to determine of poſſibilities in nature and probabilities in providence, it is competent to judge of the agree⯑ment and diſagreement of its own ideas. Words, therefore, being the artificial ſigns of our ideas, a contradic⯑tion-in-terms becomes obviouſly and [170] certainly diſcaverable, whilſt a contra⯑riety-in-facts is not.

The greateſt falſehoods in fact, hence frequently paſs for inconteſtible and demonſtrable truths, on thoſe who would immediately detect a direct con⯑tradiction in terms.—To illuſtrate this diſtinction by a familiar elucidation. A man as totally ignorant of the Co⯑pernican ſyſtem as even the learned for⯑merly were, might be told that the ſun is much bigger than the earth and does not move round it every twenty⯑four hours, as it appears to do; the earth only moving imperceptibly rounds its own axis and carrying round with it every thing adhering to its ſurface with great rapidity.

An aſtronomer, we ſay, might tell an ignorant man this, who might either believe it, confiding in the aſtronomer's veracity, although it ſeem⯑ed [171] contrary to the evidence of his ſen⯑ſes; or he might diſbelieve and even deny it, confiding more in that evi⯑dence, he might ſay, ‘I cannot be perſuaded out of my ſenſes; I can ſee the ſize of the ſun, and ſee it goes round the earth, which I alſo perceive ſtands all the while ſtock⯑ſtill. It is impoſſible that I and every body about me ſhould be whiſked round with ſuch velocity without our perceiving it.’—If therefore, he ſhould believe the aſtro⯑nomer's aſſertion, however true it be in reality, he would believe, what we call, a contrariety-in-fact, viz. that things really are, as he perceives they are not. The ſame illuſtration holds good reſpecting the exiſtence of ſoul and body, matter and ſpirit, of which, it is popularly ſuppoſed, we have poſitive prooſ or indubitable de⯑monſtration; [172] whereas we have nothing more than the imperfect evidence of our ſenſations and perceptions; which are ſo far from directly affording us demonſtration of any thing, that they are conſtantly and egregiouſly de⯑ceiving us in almoſt every thing.

It will follow from the eſtabliſhment of this diſtinction that, however juſti⯑fiable men of diſcernment may be in their diſbelief or denial of inconſiſtent or ſelf-contradictory propoſitions, the very limited extent of their knowledge in the works of nature and the ways of providence, diſqualifies them from taking upon them abſolutely to deny improbable and even apparently impoſ⯑ſible facts.

Another diſtinction, which here of⯑fers itſelf to our conſideration, is that, between believing the truth of a doc⯑trine (or the believing that a doctrine [173] is true) and the belief of that doctrine itſelf.

For a man may very properly be ſaid to believe the truth of a propoſition (in other words, that ſuch propoſition is true) although the doctrine or decla⯑ration, it contains, appears doubtful, nay although the terms of ſuch pro⯑poſition be totally unintelligible: in which latter caſe he certainly cannot with any propriety be ſaid to believe the propoſition or doctrine itſelf.

The learned and ingenious author of a late plea for the divinity of Chriſt ^*, lays down in form, indeed, the follow⯑ing propoſition: ‘The belief of a pro⯑poſition does not neceſſarily imply a clear idea of the object of which the propoſition affirms any thing.’ So that in this caſe a man may be ſaid to [174] believe a propoſition he does not under⯑ſtand. But to this we cannot ſubſcribe: a clear idea is certainly required as well of the ſubject as the predicate, though not a full or adequate idea. The idea entertained of God by a philoſopher and that attached to the ſame term by an ignorant clown, are widely different: the one, magnificent and extenſive as human ſcience can teach or imagina⯑tion conceive; the other mean and confined as ignorance and dulneſs can dictate. We will yet venture to ſay they are both equally clear; nay, we conceive the confined idea of the clown may be the cleareſt, as being more definite, in coming nearer the preciſion of our ideas of material objects. This very preciſion, indeed, is more de⯑ſtroyed by the effulgence of too much light than by the obſcurity attending the want of it; even as the face of the [175] moon is ſeen clearer than that of the ſun.

No doctrine or propoſition, there⯑fore, can, in our opinion, be actually believed, unleſs it be clearly under⯑ſtood; and yet propoſitions which are not clearly underſtood, nay not under⯑ſtood at all, may comprehend a truth, or may be true; and "that they do "ſo," is a propoſition that may be be⯑lieved.

A man may believe, as already ob⯑ſerved, a contrariety in fact, a great falſehood, ſupported by competent evi⯑dence or credible affirmation; ſo may he with equal propriety and on the ſame grounds believe the truth of a myſterious or even unintelligible pro⯑poſition; or that ſuch a propoſition is true.

But then this is not the propoſition he believes; this is quite a new one, [176] viz, ‘That the ſaid myſterious or unintelligible propoſition is true,’ which new propoſition is neither my⯑ſterious nor unintelligible, and there⯑fore may be believed ^†.

Thus a magiſtrate or officer who ad⯑miniſters affidavits ex officio and knows not the contents, may, on the credit and veracity of the deponent, believe the truth of his depoſition, or that the contents of ſuch depoſition are true; but he cannot with any pro⯑priety [177] priety be ſaid to believe ſuch affidavit itſelf or the contents of ſuch depoſi⯑tion, becauſe he knows not what thoſe contents are and therefore can believe nothing about them.

Theſe diſtinctions lead us naturally to a third, which, we flatter ourſelves, may tend to conciliate the minds of polemical diſputants; or, at leaſt, to abate their rancour, which too often prevails between the orthodox and heterodox in religious diſputes: and this is the diſtinction, before hinted at, between the faith of the Chriſtian and the belief of the Philoſopher.

The former does not require a ra⯑tional conviction of the propoſition be⯑lieved; whereas the belief of a phi⯑loſopher not only requires rational con⯑viction, founded on poſitive evidence, but it requires alſo a clear and preciſe comprehenſion of all the terms of the [178] propoſition laid down, On the con⯑trary the unfeigned aſſent, or volun⯑tary ſubmiſſion of reaſon, to the truth of a propoſition, whoſe terms are not even perfectly underſtood, is ſuffici⯑ent to entitle a Chriſtian to rank among the number of the faithful ^*. But a philoſopher, who makes every thing ſubmit to reaſon, cannot believe either that which he does not clearly conceive, or that of which he is not as clearly convinced.

Should he, as a man, be induced, by any means or motives, to give up the authority of his reaſon in matters where human reaſon is incompetent, he would do this, not as a Philoſopher, but as a Chriſtian, and of eourſe be entitled to all the privileges and im⯑munities attached to that character.

[179]Of theſe our author has given an encouraging enumeration.—Unhap⯑pily for unbelievers, they require a proof of the truth of even thoſe ad⯑vantages, or, what would anſwer the ſame end, a belief or perſuaſion of their reality. There can be no doubt but this would be ſufficient to make them immediately adopt an expedient, ſo admirably calculated to promote their eaſe and happineſs. But whence is ſuch belief or perſuaſion to be de⯑rived? From reaſon? Surely not; un⯑leſs the truth of the Chriſtian religion could be much more rationally proved than by, what this writer calls, de⯑monſtration.

But what, we aſk again, is demon⯑ſtration? And what is its influence? Intuition is not demonſtration; in⯑ſtinct is not demonſtration; perception [180] is not demonſtration, nor is conceit demonſtration; and yet intuitive or inſtinctive impulſe, the force of ima⯑gination or firm perſuaſion, may have equal influence on the mind, with that of the cleareſt demonſtration.

This influence, however, is of ano⯑ther kind; and, though it be not ra⯑tional, it has often a greater effect over even rational creatures than the moſt clear and preciſe of rational de⯑ductions. We experience this, even in the common concerns of life: in the more uncommon, the force of incli⯑nation and the power of imagination, are ſo notoriouſly known to overpower the ſtrongeſt of our reaſoning faculties, that it were abſurd to ſupport the credit of demonſtration in caſes, where even demonſtration itſelf muſt give way to prejudice and prepoſſeſſion.—And if to prejudice and prepoſſeſſion, ſurely [181] to the operation of Grace, and the in⯑fluence of divine inſpiration!

That ſomething more than the mere exerciſe of reaſon, or even a good-will, or inclination to believe, appears ne⯑neceſſary from our author's own con⯑feſſion.

"There are people," ſays he, ‘who from particular motives have deter⯑mined with themſelves, that a pre⯑tended revelation founded on ſo ſtrange and improbable a ſtory, ſo contradictory to reaſon, ſo adverſe to the world and all its occupations, ſo incredible in its doctrines, and in its precepts ſo impracticable, can be nothing more than the impo⯑ſition of prieſtcraft upon ignorant and illiterate ages, and artfully con⯑tinued as an engine well-adapted to awe and govern the ſuperſtitious vulgar. To talk to ſuch about the [182] Chriſtian religion, is to converſe with the deaf concerning muſic, or with the blind on the beauties of painting: They want all ideas rela⯑tive to the ſubject, and therefore can never be made to comprehend it; to enable them to do this, their minds muſt be formed for theſe con⯑ceptions by contemplation, retire⯑ment, and abſtraction from buſineſs and diſſipation, by ill-health, diſap⯑pointment, and diſtreſſes; and poſ⯑ſibly by divine interpoſition, or by en⯑thuſiaſm, which is uſually miſtaken for it. Without ſome of theſe pre⯑paratory aids, together with a com⯑petent degree of learning and appli⯑cation, it is impoſſible that they can think or know, underſtand or be⯑lieve, any thing about it. If they profeſs to believe, they deceive o⯑thers; if they fancy that they be⯑lieve [183] they deceive themſelves. I am ready to acknowledge, that theſe gentlemen, as far as their informa⯑tion reaches, are perfectly in the right; and if they are endued with good underſtandings, which have been entirely devoted to the buſineſs or amuſements of the world, they can paſs no other judgment, and muſt revolt from the hiſtory and doctrines of this religion. 'The preaching Chriſt crucified was to the Jews a ſtumbling block, and to the Greeks fooliſhneſs;' ^* and ſo it muſt appear to all, who, like them, judge from eſtabliſhed prejudices, falſe learning, and ſuperficial knowledge; for thoſe who are quite unable to follow the chain of its prophecy, to ſee the beauty and juſtneſs of its mo⯑ral precepts, and to enter into the [184] wonders of its diſpenſations, can form no other idea of this revelation but that of a confuſed rhapſody of fictions and abſurdities.’

This is ſaying a great deal in diſcre⯑dit of a revelation, whoſe divine ori⯑gin is ſo obvious, and whoſe doctrines are ſo reaſonable as our author pre⯑tends. Surely there are no men, of good under ſtandings, ſo entirely devoted to the buſineſs or amuſements of the world, as to be quite unable to form any other idea of revelation than that it is a confuſed rhapſody of fictions and abſurdities.

Granting, indeed, it be ſo, and that the purſuits of this world are ſo totally incompatible with the things of the next; it ſurely affords a ſtrong argu⯑ment that reaſon is an incompetent judge in every thing relative to the ſyſ⯑tem, and that nothing but divine in⯑ſpiration [185] can effectually inculcate the dictates of divine revelation!

The admitting, that poſſibly divine in⯑terpoſition may be neceſſary to prepare ſome perſons for believing the truths of the Chriſtian religion, is, in fact, ad⯑mitting that to be true in a degree, and in particular caſes, which we con⯑tend for altogether and univerſally.

We are ſorry, however, to find ſuch divine interpoſition put on a footing with ill-health, diſappointment, diſtreſs and even enthuſiaſm.

Not that we conceive the mode of that interpoſition to be confined to unaccountable impulſe or miraculous converſion. Natural means may in this caſe be made the forerunners of ſuper⯑natural effects; nay we will not deny that even enthuſiaſm, or a falſe inſpi⯑ration itſelf, may be made the harbin⯑ger of the true.

[186]Through even the fooliſhneſs of preach⯑ing were unbelievers formerly con⯑verted. Learning and ſtudy, alſo, may be made the concomitant means of grace; but we do not conceive they are eſſentially neceſſary to give efficacy to other means or to divine interpoſi⯑tion itſelf. If they were, it would not appear that God had choſen the fooliſhneſs of this world to confound the wiſe. It would rather be the ſub⯑jecting of divine wiſdom to human ſa⯑gacity, and the excluding from Chriſ⯑tianity all but learned divines and profound philoſophers.

"And yet," ſays our author, ‘if it be aſked, was Chriſtianity intended only for theſe? I anſwer, No: It was at firſt preached by the illiterate, and received by the ignorant; and to ſuch are the practical, which are the moſt neceſſary parts of it, ſufficient⯑ly [187] intelligible: but the proofs of its authority undoubtedly are not, becauſe theſe muſt be chiefly drawn from other parts, of a ſpeculative nature, opening to our inquiries in⯑exhauſtible diſcoveries concerning the nature, attributes, and diſpenſa⯑tions of God, which cannot be un⯑derſtood without ſome learning and much attention. From theſe the generality of mankind muſt neceſſa⯑rily be excluded, and muſt there⯑fore truſt to others for the grounds of their belief, if they believe at all.’

"And hence," continues he, ‘per⯑haps it is, that faith, or eaſineſs of belief, is ſo frequently and ſo ſtrong⯑ly recommended in the goſpel; be⯑cauſe if men require proofs, of which they themſelves are incapable, and thoſe who have no knowledge on this important ſubject will not [188] place ſome confidence in thoſe who have; the illiterate and unattentive muſt ever continue in a ſtate of un⯑belief.’

Our author here ſeems to have run away from his argument; the faith recommended in the goſpel and there⯑fore required of Chriſtians by God, may be widely different from that required by men either of themſelves or of o⯑thers; and, of courſe, the requiſite proofs of the doctrines believed, may be different alſo.

We cannot admit, therefore, this neceſſity of any man's pinning his faith on his neighbour's ſleeve. The moſt ignorant and illiterate man is no farther removed from God, or inca⯑pable of receiving the illuminations of grace, than the greateſt philoſopher or the moſt learned divine. So that if men are content with believing only [189] What God requires of them, as neceſ⯑ſary to ſalvation, they may ſafely rely on him and the ordinary means of pro⯑vidence for inſtruction.

The caſe is different with thoſe, who, to gratify even a laudable cu⯑rioſity, are inquiſitive about circum⯑ſtances and doctrines uneſſential to ſal⯑vation. The object of that curioſity is a worldly object, and, if attained, muſt be attained by worldly means. They who poſſeſs not the means of ori⯑ginal purſuit, therefore, muſt be con⯑tent, as a certain author expreſſes it, ‘to receive the object of it at ſecond hand: but the faith neceſſary to ſal⯑vation is no ſuch ſtale bargain, it is the immediate gift of God.’

Our author would have the inatten⯑tive and illiterate receive this gift at the hands of man; and, becauſe uninform⯑ed reaſon is not to be depended on in [190] matters of faith, he adviſes them to reſt their dependence on the informa⯑tion of thoſe, who profeſſedly deduce what they know from the exerciſe of their reaſon. "They," ſays he, ‘that is the inattentive and illiterate, ſhould all remember, [what perhaps they never knew] that in all ſciences, even in mathematics themſelves [itſelf] there are many propoſitions, which on a curſory view appear to the moſt acute underſtandings, uninſtructed in that ſcience, to be impoſſible to be true, which yet on a cloſer examina⯑tion are found to be truths capable of the ſtricteſt demonſtration; and that therefore in diſquiſitions on which we cannot determine without much learned inveſtigation, reaſon uninformed is by no means to be depended on; and from hence they ought ſurely to conclude, That it [191] may be at leaſt as poſſible for them to be miſtaken in diſbelieving this revelation, who know nothing of the matter, as for thoſe great maſters of reaſon and erudition, Grotius, Bacon, Newton, Boyle, Locke, Addiſon, and Lyttleton, to be de⯑ceived in their belief: a belief, to which they firmly adhered after the moſt: diligent and learned reſearches into the authenticity of its records, the completion of the prophecies, the ſublimity of its doctrines, the purity of its precepts, and the argu⯑ments of its adverſaries; a belief, which they have teſtified to the world by their writings, without any other motive, than their regard for truth and the benefit of mankind.’

In a matter of ſo great importance, we pay no authority even to great names. Without uncharitably queſ⯑tioning, [192] however, either the ſincerity or the motives of the ſeveral avowed defenders of Chriſtianity, certain it is that ſome of them have been ſecretly contemners of its doctrines and private⯑ly diſbelievers of its divine original.

It is, indeed, juſtly to be ſuſpected that the number of theſe, is much greater than is generally imagined; for, however widely religious infide⯑lity may have ſpread itſelf, moral hy⯑pocriſy hath, in the preſent age, kept pace with it.

Religious maſquerading hath, in fact, become ſo general and unbelievers ſo numerous that, they keep one another in countenance, while, with unparal⯑lelled effrontery they take off the maſk and openly belie the characters they aſ⯑ſume. Thus our modiſh Chriſtians wear the plain face of downright hea⯑thens, [193] while they retain the domino, or outward garb of Chriſtianity.

This they do, by explaining away, as our author obſerves, the plain and obvious meaning of ſcripture and mo⯑delling the articles of faith agreeable to their own imagination. And yet theſe very underminers of genuine Chriſtianity, who are daily ſapping its foundation and preying on its vitals, keep flouriſhing away with their miſre⯑preſentations of its proſperous and flouriſhing ſtate.

"If Chriſtianity," ſay certain bold Reviewers, in their critique on the pamphlet before us, ‘had been an impoſture, it could never have maintained its credit for almoſt eighteen hundred years, or ſtood the teſt of the moſt acute and accurate examinations of friends and enemies, of wits and infidels, critics and phi⯑loſophers [194] of all denominations; ſome fundamental defect, ſome irrecon⯑cileable contradiction, or ſome groſs abſurdity muſt have been diſcovered. But this is ſo far from being the caſe, that the more it is conſidered the more it convinces; every new enquiry produces new light, new evidence, and from every freſh at⯑tack it gains an additional tri⯑umph.’

What an impudent abuſe of the good faith of the Chriſtian reader! what an inſolent attempt to impoſe on his credulity!

Do not theſe very critics themſelves pretend to have diſcovered fundamental defects, irreconcileable contradictions, and groſs abſurdities in the primitive and orthodox tenets of Chriſtianity? Do they not ridicule the doctrine of the Trinity? Do they not deny the [195] Divinity of our Saviour? Do not they reject the tenets of vicarious atone⯑ment, juſtification by faith, and almoſt every eſſential article in the Chriſtian creed? And do they ſtill pretend that the mutilation of its very being, is gaining additional triumphs to its cauſe? Shame on ſuch bareſaced irony^*!

[196]The real ſtate of the caſe is quite otherwiſe: genuine Chriſtianity, not⯑withſtanding the vapouring of theſe nominal Chriſtians, being never at ſo low an ebb as it is among our modern rationaliſts; ſurviving chieſly among thoſe who are ridiculed as contemned viſionaries, enthuſiaſts and fanatics. The truth is that, ſo far has pure Chri⯑ſtianity been from profiting by the free⯑dom of enquiry, with which its doc⯑trines have of late years been treated, that it has really loſt ground among all the advocates for ſuch enquiry.

[197]It is an idle boaſt that a mere belief in the myſteries of religion will ſtand the teſt of ridicule and defy the powers of rational inveſtigation. Thoſe myſ⯑teries themſelves will undoubtedly do it, becauſe they depend not on the cre⯑dulity or credibility of men, but on the unchangeable promiſes of God. But we ſee daily the moſt plauſible profeſ⯑ſional characters laughed out of their religion, and even the warmeſt zealots argued out of their zeal ^*. So that if we were to calculate, to how ſmall a number of people genuine Chriſtianity is at preſent confined, we ſhall have no reaſon to boaſt, with this author, the extent of its propagation and influ⯑ence; and ſtill much leſs to advance it as a proof of its divine original ^†.

[198]Happily for Chriſtianity it hath a much firmer ſupport in the promiſes of its divine author, than in any rational arguments that can be produced from ſuch circumſtances: and happily for real Chriſtians their faith hath a more unfailing reſource in the operations of divine grace, than in the moſt fertile expedients of human reaſon.

SECT. XIII.

THIS objection is conveyed in ſuch diffuſe and deſultory terms that it amounts to little more than what has before been urged, viz. that the whole is incredible and bears no internal evi⯑dence of its divine original.

And, indeed, if we ſuppoſe human reaſon to be a competent judge of the divinity of Revelation, and alſo of what is worthy or unworthy an omniſcient and omnipotent Being, the objection ſtands in its full force.

[200]But we deny this competence, as in⯑deed does our author, who obſerves that though ‘Reaſon is undoubtedly our ſureſt guide in matters which lie within the narrow circle of her intelligence,’ ſhe is greatly deficient when ſhe proceeds farther.

‘God, ſays this ſelf-ſufficient teach⯑er [reaſon] is perfectly wiſe, juſt and good; and what is the inference? That all his diſpenſations muſt be conformable to our notions of per⯑fect wiſdom, juſtice and goodneſs: but it ſhould be firſt proved that man is as perfect, and as wiſe as his Creator, or this conſequence will by no means follow’ ^*:

But, ſays our author on the ſubject of revelation, her province is only to ex⯑amine into its authority, and when that is once proved, ſhe has no more to do but to acquieſce in its doctrines?—

[201]We have before hinted that we think reaſon has at leaſt as much to do in the one caſe as in the other; we ſhall now, therefore; only obſerve, on this head, that the Monthly Reviewers conceive it to be a very unguarded and dangerous poſition. "It precludes," ſay they, "and diſcourages all rational inquiry ^*.

Doubtleſs it does and properly, all rational inquiry on a ſubject that does not admit of rational inquiry.

But, ſay they, ‘if it were purſued it would juſtify the wildeſt enthuſi⯑aſm or ſuperſtition.’—How! will an acquieſcence, or the putting an impli⯑cit faith, in the doctrines of the ſcrip⯑ture, lead to the wildeſt enthuſiaſm and ſuperſtition? Is the human mind, when directed by divine revelation, [202] more apt to err, than when under the ſimple influence of reaſon? ^*

We have already obſerved that, in our opinion, it is the duty of Chri⯑ſtians to ſubmit the dictates of rea⯑ſon, as well with reſpect to the autho⯑rity of the ſcriptures, as the truth of its doctrines, to the influence of divine grace; and it would be but modeſt, in our rival Reviewers, to leave to the au⯑thor of the foundation of our faith the care of its ſuperſtructure.

They may reſt aſſured that, what⯑ever extravagancies of enthuſiaſm or ſuperſtition men have fallen into, it has not ariſen from their putting an impli⯑cit [203] faith in the doctrines of ſcriptures (in other words, from their ſubmitting their reaſon to revelation) but to their indulging, in the pride of their hearts, the wantonneſs of their imagination and trying their reaſonable practices on ſuch doctrines.

SECT. XIV.

HAVING thus aſſigned our reaſons for thinking the human underſtanding a very incompetent judge either of the myſteries of our holy religion, or of the proof of its divine origin; we [204] ſhall add only a few curſory reflections reſpecting the ſtate of the argument in general:

And firſt let us obſerve that were we diſpoſed to take away even the ſlighteſt prop, on which the popu⯑lar belief of revelation reſts, we might expoſe to the greateſt ridicule thoſe vain boaſtings of vaunting caſuiſts, who, declaring the truths of chriſtia⯑nity to be ſit objects of rational inveſti⯑gation, invite the attacks of argu⯑ment, wit, and ridicule, and boldly bid them defiance. Among theſe we may particularize, as of late the moſt eminent and conſpicuous, that ingenious and juſtly celebrated philo⯑ſopher, Dr. Joſeph Prieſtly and his very able coadjutors in the theological repoſitory.

It was with a very bad grace, alſo, the celebrated author of the Divine [205] Legation made a ſimilar boaſt and threw out the ſame defiance againſt the free⯑thinkers; while the civil power was actually up in arms to cruſh one of, the dulleſt, and inoffenſive inſects of the whole tribe; poor old Peter An⯑net! It was certainly a glorious tri⯑umph over infidelity and a fine proof of the clerical faith in the impregnability of the Chriſtian church, the getting a decrepid dotard of eighty, ſentenced to be impriſoned in Newgate, pilloried in the public ſtreets, and condemned to beat hemp in Bridewell for a twelve⯑month; and all merely for puſhing a few pitiful pellets, out of the pop-gun of his wretched gooſe-quill, againſt the credibility, of the Moſaic hiſtory of the plagues of Egypt!

Why was not the artillery of the ec⯑cleſiaſtical fortreſs levelled at ſome more formidable foe? in their oppo⯑ſition [206] to whom thoſe doughty engineers might have reaped ſome credit for their valour (if not for their conduct) and have at leaſt eſcaped the odium, which ever falls on cowards for their cruelty!

They may reſt, however, ſecure: the aſhes of poor Peter will remain quiet in his grave. We dare ſay there was not ſo much ſpirit buried with them, as to cauſe any future diſtur⯑bance either to him or them! ^*

The digniſied eccleſiaſtic abovemen⯑tioned has been bold enough to ſay, in ſome of his prefaces, that the free⯑thinkers (as they are falſely ſtiled) [207] have had fair-play in the argument? that they have been left at liberty to handle the weapons of offence and de⯑fence at pleaſure, and yet have been foiled.

But this is not true. The free⯑thinkers never had fair-play given them, nor in fact do they deſerve it, if it were prudent, in the civil magiſtrate, to indulge them. They are, in general, as little actuated by candour and the love of truth, as their antagoniſts are by the deteſtation of falſhood; and it muſt be owned of the latter, they do, for the moſt part, love a little deception DEARLY!

The writer of this critique can as truly aver his ſincerity as the author of the pamphlet, which is the ſubject of it. He can truly ſay that, with the moſt ardent deſire of reconciling reve⯑lation to reaſon, he long and labori⯑ouſly [208] attached himſelf to the ſtudy of the ſcriptures and the reading of the commentators: that, with the moſt earneſt with to find the doctrines of chriſtianity true, and its divine origin morally evident, he attended with the utmoſt candour, to the authorities of ancient hiſtorians and the arguments of modern reaſoners.

And yet, though early inſtructed to pay the moſt profound reverence and put the moſt implicit faith in the or⯑thodox doctrines of Chriſtianity, the more cloſely he applied the criterion of reaſon the more clearly did that crite⯑rion appear to be inapplicable. The farther advances he made in human ſcience the leſs compatible he found it with divine knowledge.

He felt, by no means, the force of argument reſpecting the divine miſ⯑ſion of our Saviour, either from the [209] completion of prophecies or the effect of miracles. The hiſtory of the former ſeemed too problematical and legend⯑ary, while the latter appeared to have had much leſs effect, than they might reaſonably be ſuppoſed to have, on the very perſons who were eye-witneſſes of them.

It appeared to him that the credit of Chriſtianity was ſo little eſtabliſhed, and even the name of its divine inſti⯑tutor ſo little known, in its very birth⯑place and infancy, that the magiſtrates themſelves ſpeak of one Jeſus ^*, as of [210] an obſcure and unheard-of ſtranger; and of his ſacrifice on the croſs, as a doubtful event.

It appeared to him that if there were any thing ſupernatural in the propagation of Chriſtianity, it lay in its ſubſequent progreſs in oppoſition to the incredulity of the times, and the inefficacy of the miracles of Chriſt and his apoſtles to diffuſe a more ge⯑neral and earlier belief. Next to this he conceived the ſtrongeſt proof that [211] could be brought of the divine origin, and of a ſupernatural interpoſition in the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, is that the enormous wickedneſs of its later profeſſors, the flagitious, the inhuman methods of propagating it, together with the apparent abſurdities, contain⯑ed in its myſterious tenets, have not been able to bring it altogether into diſcredit even in the moſt ſcientific ages and with the moſt rational and humane nations of the world.

Here is, indeed, the appearance of ſomething ſupernatural; the fulfilling of the divine founder's promiſe to the Chriſtian church that the gates of hell ſhall not prevail againſt it. It is to an over-ruling providence and the ir⯑reſiſtible power of grace in the comple⯑tion of this promiſe, as before obſer⯑ved, more than to the ſtrongeſt ration⯑al [212] arguments, that Chriſtianity owes its permanence and protection.

Depended its ſacred myſteries on the force of reaſon, what can be more ra⯑tionally advanced in defence of the in⯑carnation of Jeſus, than of the incarna⯑nations of Viſtnou? Depended they on rational arguments in favour of their truth? What could reaſonably be ſaid in favour of a God, the author of life, becoming ſubject to mortality? To his being born, of a woman, though not begot by a man? To his dying the death of a ſinner to atone for the ſins of the ſaints, to his deſcending into hell, and his aſcending again to heaven, to reaſ⯑ſume, after all, the priſtine glory of the Deity!

If there be any thing, in any reli⯑gion, more revolting to human reaſon than this, we are unacquainted with [213] the greateſt apparent abſurdities in the known world.

If we are aſked then, whether as mere rational beings, we can believe ſuch propoſitions? we frankly anſwer, no.—And yet, experimentally con⯑vinced how ſhort is the line of the hu⯑man underſtanding, how inadequate the ſtrongeſt powers of ſenſe and ge⯑nius to penetrate the veil of nature and of providence, we can readily ſubmit our reaſon to revelation, and give our unfeigned aſſent, as Chriſtians, to the truth of propoſitions, which, as men. and philoſophers, we can neither fully underſtand nor clearly conceive.—Be⯑lieving though not on any rational conviction, that faith, or as our author properly deſcribes it, an aſſent to the eſſential doctrines of Chriſtianity, is a religious duty enjoined every man, who lives under the diſpenſation of the [214] goſpel, we believe, even as men, ſo much of them as we comprehend; perſuaded that even what we do not comprehend, would command our belief, if we did, in the ſame propor⯑tion.

We can unfeignedly do this, even while the truth, as it is called, of ſuch myſterious propoſitions appears doubt⯑ful, nay while even the terms of ſuch propoſitions appear in part or altoge⯑ther unintelligible.

It is a favorite maxim with our modern rationaliſts (or as ſome call them divines) that ‘where myſtery begins religion ends.’ This maxim is, in our opinion, ſo far from being applicable to the Chriſtian religion, that we think the faith of the Chriſ⯑tian applicable chieſly to its myſteries, with which it begins and ends.

[215]There would, indeed, be ſomething myſterious in the promulgation even of the morals of Chriſtianity, if we could be brought to believe the prac⯑tice of them in their declared purity to be in our preſent ſtate required of us; a practice ſo diametrically oppo⯑ſite to the gratification of the appetites and paſſions of human nature, and even to the laws of juſtice and equity admit⯑ted in natural religion.

‘To ſubmit to every inſult, to re⯑turn good for evil, to love thoſe that hate us, and wiſh well to them that deſpitefully uſe us,’ are tenets ſo contrary as well to our natural impa⯑tience of injuries as to our ideas of na⯑tural juſtice, that, however the meek⯑ſpirited and grace-endowed individual may adopt them in private practice, no community of Chriſtians ever yet [216] dared to admit them into their ſyſtem of civil policy.

As to the Faith of the Chriſtian if it be not exerciſed on the myſteries of his religion, we ſee neither uſe nor merit in his belief. If he believe nothing but what appears rational and pro⯑bable, nothing but what is evinced by a cloud of witneſſes, and carries with it the cleareſt conviction, in what is it more meritorious than the creed of the ſkeptic or infidel? for even they have their creed.

"Becauſe thou haſt ſeen me (faith our Saviour to Didymus) thou haſt believed bleſſed are they that have not ſeen, and yet have believed."

We think this text perfectly appli⯑cable to ſuch as, like our author, are anxious to prove the divine authority of the Scriptures by rational argu⯑ment: in doing which, we think [217] them juſt as ill employed as, this writer ſays, they would be in pretending to accommodate the ſcriptural doctrines to our natural ideas of rectitude and truth.

The well-diſpoſed reader, therefore, ſubmitting his Reaſon to Revelation, and his belief of its divine origin, as well as of its eſſential doctrines, to a ſuperior mode of conviction, the influence of Grace, would do well patiently to wait the effect of its operation in God's own place and time, and not be importu⯑nately anxious for the elucidation of obſcurities, which nothing but divine illumination can illuſtrate.

For, after all, what men generally mean by the truth of the doctrines of revelation, is their conſonance or con⯑gruity with the deductions of common⯑ſenſe and mere unenlightened reaſon.

[218]The truly-devout need be under no apprehenſion of being guilty of a ne⯑glect of religious duty, in thus patient⯑ly-waiting for that inſpiration from above, which only can, make them wiſe unto ſalvation.

In the mean time, they ſhould not be ſurprized nor alarmed at finding their notions of divine truths not ex⯑actly to coincide with thoſe of other men, of whoſe talents, gifts or graces, they may entertain a higher opinion than they do of their own.

As there are few, if any, perſons in the world, that either hear, ſee or feel external objects exactly alike (our ner⯑vous ſyſtems being as diverſified as our features) ſo there are as few that con⯑ceive exactly alike the meaning of any one moral or religious propoſition; e⯑ven divine inſpiration itſelf accommo⯑dating [219] its influence to the different fa⯑culties of the individual.

This reflection, above all others, ſhould excite us to the exerciſe of that Chriſtian charity, which, covering a multitude of ſins, we ſhould throw, as a veil of univerſal candour, over the miſtakes and errours of the reſt of man⯑kind; juſtly ſuſpecting that, with re⯑gard to others more enlightened than ourſelves, we may ſtand in need of the ſame indulgence.