AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD.

I AM glad to have found you, PERICLES: Since your Converſation with COSMO, (which, you know, I overheard) I have been revolving the Subject of it in my Mind; and begin to think, you left the Matter ſhort.

Your Sentiments on this Subject will give me Pleaſure. Tell me, ARISTIDES; in what Reſpect do you eſteem the con⯑cluſion of our Argument to have been de⯑fective?

With Regard to yourſelf, I think your Concluſions were juſt: I grant you, ‘that by weakening the Power of the Court of the AREOPAGUS, you tore up that An⯑chor, which SOLON had fixed, to keep his Republic ſtedfaſt and firm, againſt the Storms of popular Faction.’ On this Account, I farther muſt allow, that ‘not⯑withſtanding the Integrity which you preſerved in your public Conduct, and the great Virtues which you exerted, your Place in Elyſium is juſtly below that of thoſe, who have governed Repub⯑lics, or limited Monarchies, not merely with a Concern for their preſent Advan⯑tage; but with a prudent Regard to that Balance of Power, on which their per⯑manent Happineſs always depends.’

If you allow me this, it is all I contend for. What could remain farther to be ad⯑juſted in the Debate?

I am of Opinion, that the Queſtion was decided in too general a Manner: And that for Want of a little more Particularity of Argument and Proof, Concluſions might be plauſibly drawn, which would be very diſtant from the Truth.

Pray, explain yourſelf a little farther, ARISTIDES; for as yet I do not clearly comprehend you.

What I mean is this: That Free States, or limited Monarchies, though they may greatly reſemble each other in their external Conſtruction, may yet be ſo very unlike in their internal Condition, that no juſt Con⯑cluſions [12] could be drawn concerning their Proſperity and Welfare, merely from their external Reſemblance. Thus we will ſup⯑poſe two States to be equally free, in their legal Conſtitution: But let us farther ſup⯑poſe, that the Manners or Principles, which prevail in theſe two States are widely differ⯑ent; and, in that Caſe, I apprehend, that if you regard only the legal Form of the Conſtitution, without weighing the Man⯑ners and Principles of the Members of the State, you will be in great Danger of im⯑poſing falſe Concluſions on yourſelf and others.

I did not force any of theſe Concluſions upon you. They are of your own making.

It is true, you did not force them upon me: Yet they are not of my own making. For ſome of the Shades, who overheard your Converſation, have ſince told me, that the general Turn of your Diſcourſe oblique⯑ly led to theſe Concluſions; and therefore [13] thought that it would become ARISTIDES to diſcuſs this Point with a little more Preciſion.

I am ready to hear any thing you have to ſay on this intereſting Subject.

You will give me leave then, to examine ſome things that paſſed in your Diſcourſe with COSMO.

Pray be as free with them as you pleaſe. I rely on the Candor as well as Juſtice of ARISTIDES.

I will endeavour to deſerve your favour⯑able Opinion. You may remember, you ſaid ‘That by weakening the Power of the Court of AREOPAGUS, you tore up that Anchor, which SOLON had fixed, to keep his Republic ſtedfaſt and firm, againſt the [14] Storms of popular Factions.’ This, I think, was the firſt Foundation of your Ar⯑gument.

It was.

Is it a ſafe Practice, PERICLES, to build an Argument on a Metaphor?

I ſhould think it is; provided the Meta⯑phor contain a juſt Image of the Fact in Queſtion.

That I allow: but ſtill the Queſtion re⯑mains, whether the Metaphor contain that juſt Image or not. So that we are not yet advanced a Step towards the Diſcovery of Truth.

At leaſt it is an Illuſtration.

Then, I think it had better have come after the Diſcovery. I believe I can give you another Metaphor which ſhall lead di⯑rectly to the contrary Concluſion. 'Tis a wiſe Practice, you ſay, to keep fixed the Anchor. In general, I grant you, it is ſo. Yet you know, that in Times of Tempeſt and Diſtreſs, the moſt experienced Admiral, when anchored near a rocky Shore, is forced to ſlip his Cables, and commit his Fleet to the wide Sea, till he can anchor on a ſafer Bottom.

That is a dangerous Practice.

True: and therefore never to be tryed, except in a Time of extreme Danger.

Well: I will grant you that a Metaphor proves nothing.

That is the only Purpoſe for which I in⯑tended mine. We will proceed, therefore, with our Argument. And the ſum of what I have to ſay, will only tend to the Proof of this ſingle Point; ‘That a free State, or limited Monarchy, reſembling that of Athens in it's external Form, may yet be ſo differently circumſtanced in it's internal Condition, that a Conduct in many Reſpects ſimilar to Yours, ſhall be the only means of ſaving that State from Ruin, though Your well meant Conduct led the State of Athens to it's Deſtruction.’

It ſeems to me, ARISTIDES, that you undertake a Taſk of no ſmall Difficulty. Proceed: I am all Attention.

Pray tell me, PERICLES: Was the Court of the AREOPAGUS wiſe, courageous, uncorrupt, and bent upon the public Service in Oppoſi⯑tion to all ſelf-intereſted Views, when You ſet about to leſſen it's Authority?

To my Confuſion, I muſt confeſs it was. For in Fact; ‘The annual Magiſtrates, the Guardians of the Laws, the Governors of the ſacred Rites, and Chieftains in War, were all choſen by Lot: and they who had acquitted themſelves well in the Diſcharge of theſe Truſts, were advanced, and taken into the Court of the AREOPAGUS ^*.’

You are right in your Idea of this wiſe and diſintereſted Court. Tell me farther now. Was the Body of the Athenian Peo⯑ple ſenſible, honeſt, and united, when you threw yourſelf into their Arms, and increaſ⯑ed their Power?

I cannot ſay much, either for their Good Senſe, their Uprightneſs, or their Union; on the Contrary, I fear they were ignorant, ſelf-intereſted and diſunited. Nay, I muſt farther confeſs, that I myſelf was the Cauſe and Promoter of their Vices and Factious Temper. For I not only gain⯑ed and ruled them by my Eloquence, as I confeſſed in my Converſation with COSMO; but ‘by giving them the Plunder and Poſſeſſion of the Lands taken from the Enemy, and by ſquandering the public Monies (formerly reſerved for the Uſes of War) in Shows and Plays for their Entertainment, and by giving them Largeſſes or Penſions, I brought them from a ſober, modeſt, and thrifty People, who main⯑tained themſelves by their own Labours, to become riotous and debauched through theſe miſtaken Methods of Policy: Thus it was that I turned them againſt the Court of the AREOPAGUS ^†.’

It gives me Pleaſure to find you ſo much more full and explicit in this Affair, than you were in your Diſcourſe with COSMO. — So then, you took Power from a Body of Men, wiſe, diſintereſted, and uncorrupt, to put it into the hands of Men ignorant, ſelf-intereſted, and factious.

Too true: I did: ‘Becauſe I knew that my Eloquence would (with theſe other Methods, ſtill more powerful) ſub⯑ject the People to me, and make them the Inſtruments of all my Deſires: where⯑as the AREOPAGUS had an Authority and a Dignity in it which I could not con⯑troul.’

So you ſaid in your Diſcourſe with COSMO. Let us now reverſe theſe Facts, and ſup⯑poſe the Court of the AREOPAGUS had deſert⯑ed the Principles of their firſt Inſtitution: That either Luxury, the Love of Gain, or a [20] Spirit of falſe Ambition, had crept in among them; and rendered them either incapable, and corrupt: And farther let us ſup⯑poſe, that the Body of the People had been ſenſible, honeſt, and united: What had been the Conſequence?

The Caſe indeed had been altogether different. I would give all the Wreaths I ever was honoured with, to have built my Conduct on ſo noble a Foundation.

I commend your Wiſdom, though it comes too late. The Caſe indeed had been not only altogether different, but altogether contrary. Inſtead of deſtroying the Com⯑monwealth, you had reſtored the tottering Fabrick. You had then taken Power from Folly and Corruption, to beſtow it on Senſe and Integrity. And, depend upon it, in whatever Body of Men Senſe and Integrity are found, theſe are the Anchors of the State.

Your Maxim looks plauſible: Yet ſtill I cannot but regard it as a dangerous Prac⯑tice, to make a Breach in the eſtabliſhed Conſtitution of a free State.

So do I. And I think your Principle is ſo far from overturning, that it confirms, my Argument.

That appears to me a ſtrange Paradox.

Tell me, PERICLES: Is not a Breach made in the political Conſtitution of a free State, when it's wholeſome Laws and Inſti⯑tutions have loſt their Power and Efficacy?

Certainly.

And can they ſo entirely loſe their Power and Efficacy, in any other Way, as by the Incapacity and Corruption of thoſe who govern?

I allow, they cannot.

Then you ſee, that upon Suppoſition that the Court of the AREOPAGUS had loſt their Ability or public Virtue, 'tis they who firſt deprive the Laws of their Power and Efficacy, and conſequently, 'tis they who make the Breach in the eſtabliſhed Conſti⯑tution.

This ſeems to be true: But ſtill, why ſhould the People follow their Example, and, by inſiſting on extraordinary Powers and Privileges, make a ſecond Breach in the Conſtitution?

O PERICLES, you view the Queſtion with a partial Eye: What you call a ſecond Breach in the Conſtitution is indeed no more than the natural Effort of the ſound Parts of the Body politic, to throw off the morbific Matter by which it is oppreſſed. Thus in the natural Body, all Diſeaſes come to their Criſis, and a Cure is effected by the Vigour and Activity of the uninfected Parts. Where⯑ever then the Diſeaſe lies, either in the Body politic, or the Body natural, the ſound Parts muſt check and throw off that which is infected, or Death enſues. — Thus, you ſee, ſuppoſing the People to be ſenſible and honeſt, and the Court of AREOPAGUS cor⯑rupted or incapable, the only Means of ſav⯑ing the State is the Power which the Peo⯑ple have to check and reform the Court of the AREOPAGUS.

But is not this unhinging the Conſtitu⯑tion?

So far from it, that it is the only Way of fixing it; by bringing it back to it's firſt Principles. — How did this famed Conſti⯑tution firſt ariſe? Was it not by the united Conſent of the ſeveral Ranks of the Com⯑munity, each of which had their ſeveral Privileges and Powers appropriated, on Con⯑dition of applying them to the public Good? The Court of the AREOPAGUS violates it's Engagements: The Voice of an honeſt and abuſed People rouzes them from their fatal Dream: What is the natural Conſequence? Why, ſurely, the Reformation of the Court of the AREOPAGUS. An honeſt and ſenſible People never deſires more than Redreſs of Grievances; and, when that is obtained, return chearfully to Subordination, and adore their Rulers.

This is at beſt an unſtable and fluctuating State of Things.

Every political State muſt be, in ſome Degree, fluctuating and unſtable, unleſs you [25] load it with the Chains of Deſpotiſm. But I maintain, that the beſt Security, nay the only one to a Free Government, lies in the upright Manners and Principles of it's con⯑ſtituent Members; and that, whenever there is any Deviation from theſe, the only Poſſi⯑bility of a Reſtoration lies in the Prevalence of the ſound and virtuous Part over that which is corrupted, in whatever Part of the Community the Infection may lie; whether it be the Court of the AREOPAGUS, or the Body of the People. For, as it was truly obſerved in your Diſcourſe with COSMO, ‘Force or Caprice may give (immediate and temporary) Power; but nothing can give a luſting Authority, except Wiſdom and Virtue ^*’.

But is not this a dangerous Principle to inſtill into the Body of the People, that they have a Right to controul the Errors of the Court of AREOPAGUS? Does it not lead to Sedition and Anarchy? And was not this the Conſequence of my miſtaken Con⯑duct?

You are now puzzling the Queſtion again by making it general. I reply then, that in your particular Caſe, the Practice was dan⯑gerous and fatal; becauſe the Court of the AREOPAGUS was capable and honeſt, the People of Athens were incapable, ſelf-inter⯑eſted, and factious. You therefore tore up the Anchor of the State. But ſuppoſe the Court of the AREOPAGUS to have been in⯑capable, and venal, and you have ſeen that the Security of the Republic was already loſt: You have ſeen (to uſe your own Me⯑taphor, in the Way of Illuſtration) that the Anchor of the State was already torn up; and the only Bottom, on which it could be again ſafely caſt, was the rational Influence of a ſenſible and honeſt People.

But ſuppoſing I had not corrupted the Integrity of the Athenian People; do you think they could have remained ſecure againſt the Influence of ‘indiſcreet or venal Ora⯑tors, who, encouraged by my Example, might have miſled their honeſt Intentions,’ [27] and rowzed them into Sedition againſt an uncorrupted Court of the AREOPAGUS?

Tell me, PERICLES; what was the Num⯑ber of the People of Athens?

I cannot be preciſe in this: But I know, that the Number of thoſe, whoſe Favour and Influence I courted, did not exceed that of a large Audience: I have often ha⯑rangued them in one collective Body.

What was their Rank, and what their Employments in Life?

They were compoſed, as you know very well, of Labourers and Mechanics. All who were able to keep a Horſe, were admitted in⯑to the ſe [...]ond Order of the Magiſtracy ^*. And therefore the Body of the People, whoſe [28] Influence I courted, was compoſed of ſuch as were not able to keep a Horſe.

What was their Capacity?

You will not expect much of That. It was ſuited to their Station.

Your Account is juſt: And therefore I confeſs, PERICLES, that, in my Opi⯑nion, they never could be ſecure againſt the Seduction of indiſcreet and venal Ora⯑tors. Their ſmall Number, their continual Neceſſities, their general Ignorance, muſt for ever expoſe them to the Deluſions of a powerful Rhetoric.

Then, I think, my Conſequence ſtands good: "That the united Voice even of an honeſt People can be no Ground of Securi⯑ty to a State.

I grant you, it is not, where the People are ſuch, in Number, Station, and Incapaci⯑ty, as, in your Time, the Athenian People were. But take Heed, leſt you make your Inference too general. The only juſt Con⯑ſequence that can be drawn is this, that a Republic ſo circumſtanced is abſolutely void of all Security: For you ſee, that in Caſe the Court of the AREOPAGUS was delinquent, the People were not of ſufficient Capacity or Weight to reſtore the Balance of the State. On the other Hand, ſuppoſing that Court to be uncorrupt, you ſee that the People were liable to be ſeduced to it's Deſtruction. Such a Republic, therefore, was formed for continual Factions while it laſted, and then for a ſpeedy Death.

Do you think, ARISTIDES, that, by a Change of Circumſtances, theſe Evils could admit of any Remedy?

I think they might. — In your Diſcourſe with COSMO, you hinted at a limited Mo⯑narchy. I will therefore leave this imper⯑fect Form, this Embryo of a Common⯑wealth, to ſpeak of a more auguſt Image of a Government. Suppoſe therefore, that the Athenian State, inſtead of a petty Province, had been a large, populous, and fertile Coun⯑try, governed by a King, and two Courts, veſted with higher Powers than that of the AREOPAGUS ^*; that one of them had been hereditary, the other choſen by the Bo⯑dy of the People; and that the Legiſlative Power was lodged in the united Suffrages of theſe three —

You charm me, by the very Suppoſi⯑tion. — What a glorious Republic! —

Do not you ſee, PERICLES, that all I have ſaid concerning the State of ATHENS, would gain new Strength, under ſuch a Sup⯑poſition?

My Views muſt be narrow indeed, if I could not ſee ſome Differences ariſe: pray go on.

In the firſt Place, what could ſhake ſuch a Kingdom as this, if all the ſeveral Powers maintained the Purity and Vigour of their Inſtitution?

Methinks I ſee the Picture of an eternal Government.

But ſuppoſe that, by the Exceſs of Commerce, and an Overflow of Wealth, [32] or by any other Cauſe, a pernicious Luxury ſhou'ld creep in, and ſteal un⯑perceived on the higher Ranks: Suppoſe farther, that the very Genius of the Conſti⯑tution, formed for the nobleſt Ends, ſhould yet have a natural Tendency towards political Venality and Corruption, unleſs ſtrongly guarded by a Purity of Principle and Man⯑ners; and ſuppoſe this political Venality ſhould, in Fact, creep in along with Luxu⯑ry; what Conſequences would you expect?

You terrify me by the Repreſentation: I behold the State on the Brink of Ruin. Inſtead of Ability, Courage, and Public Spi⯑rit, among the leading Ranks; I ſee them immerſed in every fatal Indulgence. I ſee their Councils divided, their Fleets and Armies diſgraced, and ſome neighbouring PHILIP in Poſſeſſion of their Forts and Co⯑lonies.

Where would you ſeek for the Cure of theſe enormous Evils?

Certainly no Cure can take Place, till Ability, Courage, and Public Spirit ſhould ariſe on the Ruins of their Contraries.

Your Aim is good. But the grand Queſtion is, by what Means this can be ef⯑fected.

I fear, the Means muſt be violent. I have heard you talk of a coercive Power, ſufficient to reform Corruption.

Where, do you think, this might moſt probably be found?

I am caſting about; but I cannot find it. My Experience makes me afraid of the In⯑terpoſition of the People —

What? even though they were honeſt and ſenſible? Why ſhould you fear the Influence of a general good Senſe and Inte⯑grity?

I cannot conceive it probable, that the lower Ranks ſhould be more ſenſible or more upright, than their Superiors in Station.

I can ſuppſe, nay I do ſuppoſe, that ma⯑ny of the higher Ranks are ſenſible, upright, and worthy, in ſeveral Reſpects: That they have many private Virtues: That Juſtice and Humanity are their allowed Qualities: That their chief Defect lies in their Want of Public Virtue, in their Neglect of the Public Happineſs.

What Probability could there be, then, that the People ſhould attend to this, when it was neglected by their Leaders?

Tell me, PERICLES: When there are ho⯑neſt Inclinations in the Soul, whence can any Obſtructions ariſe to their due Exertion?

Why, ſure, from ſome contrary Inclina⯑tions, which may tempt the Mind from it's natural Integrity.

You are right. So then, if in a State thus circumſtanced, the Body of the People ſhould be more ſteady than their Leaders in their Zeal for the public Welfare; this muſt be, becauſe they are not liable to the ſame Temptations, which might expoſe them to a like Neglect of the general Happineſs.

What you ſay, ſeems probable.

Cannot you diſcern certain Circumſtances, which would naturally ariſe, and prove ſtrong [36] Temptations to the Great, while the Body of the People might, for a Time at leaſt, eſcape them?

Let me weigh the Matter. — Yes, in⯑deed; from what you ſaid before, I think I can. — You ſuppoſed, as I remember, that Luxury had crept in —

Go on: I ſee, you comprehend the Ar⯑gument.

I perceive, the natural Conſequence of this muſt be, that the higher Ranks would be firſt infected with it; and therefore muſt be expoſed to Temptations, which the Body of the People would eſcape: One Temptation muſt naturally ariſe from that unmanly or effeminate Character, which a refined Luxu⯑ry tends to introduce: Another, from an in⯑temperate Deſire of ſupplying Expences, now grown exorbitant.

You ſay true: But can you point out no farther Temptations, to which the leading [37] Ranks would be naturally expoſed, beyond the Body of the People?

Theſe are what offered themſelves to my Thoughts. Do you ſee any more?

Many, and ſtrong ones.—In a Kingdom thus circumſtanced, extenſive, fertile, mer⯑cantile, rich, and populous, a countleſs Number of lucrative Offices muſt ariſe, and be eſtabliſhed, for the Protection and good Order of the State.

I grant it.

What Part of the Community, do you think, would lay Claim to theſe? The ſu⯑perior Ranks, or the inferior?

Doubtleſs, the Superior: Their Educa⯑tion, Rank, Wealth, and Influence, would naturally lead them to expect a Preference.

And if you farther ſuppoſe, that Luxury and Expence prevailed, theſe Poſts would be more eagerly ſought for, in Proportion as they were more lucrative.

True: The Profit, I fear, would often be a leading Motive.

The higher Ranks, then, would be natu⯑rally aſſiduous to recommend themſelves to thoſe, who had the Diſpoſal of theſe profita⯑ble Employments: while the Body of the People, becauſe generally excluded from all Hope of being raiſed to them, would be more independent of thoſe in Power.

I muſt needs grant it.

See you no Conſequences ariſe?

You have convinced me, ARISTIDES: I ſee, that the higher Ranks in ſuch a State, though equally poſſeſſed of private Virtues, muſt be much more expoſed to the Temp⯑tations of political Venality and Corruption, than the Body of the People.

That is the Truth to which I meant to lead you.

Yet ſtill I fear the Effects of popular Power; becauſe, by Experience, I know ‘the Influence of indiſcreet and venal Ora⯑tors, over the Paſſions of a miſguided, in⯑fatuated Multitude, who thought their Freedom conſiſted in encouraging Ca⯑lumnies againſt the beſt Servants of the Republic; and conferring Power on thoſe, who had no other Merit, than falling in with, and ſoothing, a popular Folly ^*.’

This Objection, as I ſaid before, may be of Weight in a ſmall Republic, ſuch as that of Athens was in Your Days or Mine. But ſuppoſing it to have been augmented into a great, populous, civilized, and powerful, Kingdom, ſuch as I have now repreſented, which contains more Square Leagues than Attica contains Acres, more Cities than At⯑tica contains Villages, more Men of Fortune than Attica contains Mechanics, and the Objection vaniſhes into nothing. I can ea⯑ſily ſee, how a buſy Orator may mount the Roſtrum, and intoxicate an ignorant Mul⯑titude that ſurrounds him; and this, PERI⯑CLES, I fear was your Imprudence, nay, perhaps, my own. In a ſmall State, like that of Athens, ſuch an Event as this muſt affect the public Welfare: But, in a King⯑dom ſo inlarged, and ſo inlightened, as that which I have ſuppoſed, the Harangues of an Orator, to any ſurrounding Audience of the People, can no more affect the general Wel⯑fare, than the buzzing of an eloquent Bee can affect a Province, when he leads out the murmuring Hive on the Mountains of Hybla or Hymettus.

Do you think the Difference ſo great?

I do: Becauſe, in a City like that of Athens, the whole Multitude of the Com⯑munity is eaſily collected in one Body; and therefore may be ſuddenly ſeduced, by an Orator, into one ill Purpoſe: But, in a great and populous Kingdom, the whole Multi⯑tude of the Community cannot be collected into one Body; nay, nor into a hundred Bo⯑dies; and therefore cannot be ſuddenly ſe⯑duced, by an Orator, into one ill Purpoſe.

I grant you, the Difference is, in this Reſpect, eſſential.

There is another Reſpect, in which the Difference is no leſs eſſential and important. You have confeſſed, PERICLES, that the People, or Multitude, which you ſeduced, [42] were ‘a Rabble of Labourers and Mecha⯑nics, who had been accuſtomed to earn their Bread by the Sweat of their Brows.^*’ But, if Attica had been enlarged into ſo vaſt a Kingdom as I have here ſuppoſed, the Body of the People would have been of a Charac⯑ter far ſuperior. For, beſides thoſe of the higheſt Rank and Fortune, who would naturally form the two Courts of the AREO⯑PAGUS, and aſpire to the leading Offices in the Commonwealth; beſides theſe, I ſay, there would be an innumerable Number of landed Commoners, the general Body of the Prieſthood, the rich Merchants, and wealthy Plebeians of inferior Rank, all independent of the Governing Powers, many of them of excellent Ability, as well as Probity; moſt of them of Leiſure and Education ſufficient to enable them to judge of the leading Lines or Features of an upright Government; eſpe⯑cially in the great Article of Protection from foreign or domeſtic Injuries. And can you think it poſſible, that the good Senſe and Ho⯑neſty of all theſe ſhould be ſeduced into their own Deſtruction, by a deſigning or venal Orator?

I muſt confeſs, it is utterly incredible.

Still farther. As it would be thus impoſ⯑ſible to ſeduce by Eloquence, ſo it would be no leſs impracticable to corrupt, by Bribes, this whole Body of Men, to the Deſertion of their own true Intereſt. A few, nay indeed a Number, might be thus corrupted; but this would never produce an united Voice; for the remaining Part, and that much the largeſt, would loudly clamour; and thus, nothing but Diſcord could ariſe. To ſilence ſo many Millions, by repeated Bribes, would require ten Times the Wealth of CROESUS; and more than ever Man, nay, more than ever Nation, poſſeſſed.

You have Reaſon in what you ſay: I per⯑ceive now, that nothing but a fair and open Proſecution of the general Intereſt could ever unite ſo great a People.

I am of your Opinion. And thus you ſee, that as the ſmall, ignorant, and needy Body of the Athenian People, in ſuch a State as You and I beheld it, is the eaſieſt of all to be ſeduced by Eloquence, or gained by Bribes; ſo, upon it's being aggrandized into ſuch a vaſt, knowing, and wealthy Body, as I have here ſuppoſed, it would, above all o⯑thers, have been ſecure againſt the Attacks either of Eloquence or Corruption.

I perceive, I have been confounding two Things together, as being altogether ſimilar, when, in Reality, their Qualities are altoge⯑ther oppoſite; and this, merely becauſe they are called by the ſame Appellation, the ‘Bo⯑dy of the People.’

At length, you ſee the Foundation of your Error.

I confeſs, ARISTIDES, that in my Diſ⯑courſe with COSMO, theſe diſtinguiſhing Particularities were not ſufficiently attended to. I drew Inferences, and extended Con⯑ſequences, to all free States, without Ex⯑ception, which could only be juſtly applyed to a ſmall Republic, circumſtanced like that of Athens.

You ſee then, PERICLES, that if Athens had been a great, rich, literate, and power⯑ful Republic, under the Appearance and Name of a limited Monarchy, you could have had no Chance for ſeducing the whole collective Body of the People, either by Bribes or Eloquence.

I allow it.

You ſee farther, that in Caſe of any Delinquency in the Courts of the AREO⯑PAGUS, if you had exerted your Talents in Support of the general Welfare, this great and grateful People, with one united Voice, would have adopted and adored you: Yet only ſo long as you had made that ge⯑neral Welfare the undoubted Object of your Labours.

It ſeems probable.

You ſee then, that by building your Power on ſo firm a Foundation, you would have been enabled to diſpenſe Re⯑wards and Puniſhments with Juſtice and Vigour; that you could have diſplaced the incapable and unworthy, and put into Action thoſe who were moſt fit to diſcharge the ſeveral Offices of the Commonwealth; [47] that you could, by Degrees, have checked the Venality and Incapacity of the various Ranks, and thus have given the proper Elaſticity and Tone to the ſeveral Parts of the Body politic.

All this I think poſſible to have been done.

But in doing all this, you would have been ſo far from unhinging Government, that you would have new-hinged it when it was falling; ſo far from deſtroying the Balance of Power, that you would have re⯑newed it when it had been deſtroyed; ſo far from acting with a View to ‘preſent Advan⯑tage’ only, that you would have ſecured the future Welfare of the State; ſo far from conſulting a mere temporary Felicity, that you would have fixed it on a Principle of permanent Happineſs.

I cannot deny it.

Haſte then, PERICLES: And, leſt Miſ⯑takes ſhould grow inveterate by Time, in⯑form COSMO of all that hath paſſed be⯑tween us.