THE CASE of the War in ITALY STATED: &c.

THE Eyes of Europe ſeem at this time to be turn'd wholly upon the King of Spain's New Undertaking againſt the Em⯑peror. The Reaſons of his making this Attempt, his Catholick Maje⯑ſty has publiſhed by his Miniſters, and the Memorials, or Letters, which they have given in to the ſeveral Courts of the Princes where they reſide, fully expreſs the Preten⯑ſion of the King of Spain, and the Reaſons why he takes this Occaſion to break with the Emperor.

Theſe Memorials, or Letters, are firſt, The Letter of Seignior Grimaldi, Secretary of State to the King of Spain, directed to the Spaniſh Ambaſſadors, or Reſidents at [2] Foreign Courts; Secondly, The Memorial of the Marquis Beretti Landi, Miniſter for the King of Spain to the States General, and the Memorial of the Prince de Cellamere at Paris, to the Regent of France, all on the ſame Subject, and all tending to juſtify the Conduct of the King of Spain in this Affair, beſides the declaration by word of Mouth from the Marquis de Monteleone, the Am⯑baſſador of Spain, to his Britannick Maje⯑ſty.

The ſum of all theſe Memorials, for they are too long to repeat here, may be drawn up and abridg'd in the following Heads, viz.

• 1ſt. That the Emperor does not acknow⯑ledge King Philip to be King of Spain, but gives him only the Title of Duke of Anjou, aſſuming to himſelf the stile and Dignity of King of Spain, Spaniſh Majeſty, like⯑wiſe all the Titles attending the Poſſeſſion of the Spaniſh Monarchy; that He (the Emperor) whom the King of Spain there⯑fore calls only Arch Duke, has Erected a Council at Vienna, which he calls the Coun⯑cil of Spain; That he Confers Titles and Honours, ſuch as Grandee of Spain, as if he was really King of Spain in Poſſeſſion, and the like.
• 2dly, That theſe things are Evedences of his reſolving to attack King Philip, and Chace him out of Spain it ſelf if he was able, [3] or when he ſhall be ſo; and in the mean time, takes all Occaſions to ſhew himſelf a mortal Enemy.
• 3dly, That the Emperor Broke the Terms of Peace and Neutrality, even as ſoon as they were made, viz. That when (his Im⯑perial Majeſty) conſented by Treaty to quit Catalonia, where in a few Days more he muſt have been overcome, and been redu⯑ced to the neceſſity of having fallen into the King of Spain's Hands; yet he did not quit the Towns and Strengths, as he ought to have done, by Conſigning them into the King of Spain's Hands, to whom they were to be ſurrendred, but gave them over to the Rebels the Catalans, encouraging them to hold out againſt his Spaniſh Majeſty, by pro⯑miſing to return and aſſiſt them, which occa⯑ſion'd the ſhedding of much Blood, and the Expenſe of an Infinite maſs of Treaſure, to reduce thoſe Places to Obedience.
• 4thly, That he not only encourag'd the Rebel Majorkins in their Rebellion againſt his Spaniſh Majeſty, but actually ſent them Ships, Men, Money, Arms, Proviſions, Ammunition, &c. to ſupport them in their Rebellion againſt the King of Spain; Ex⯑horting them alſo to maintain their Rebelli⯑on, in hopes of farther Aſſiſtance.
• 5thly, That the Imperial Governor of the Milaneſe, has, by order from the Em⯑peror, Arreſted, and put in Priſon, the Abbot Molinez, a Perſon Sacred by his Cha⯑racter [4] of Grand Inquiſitor, Reverend by his Age, and who ought to have been ſo by the Paſports which were given him at Rome from the Pope, with Approbation of Count Gallas the Imperial Miniſter there; and laſtly, who having given no Offence in Perſon to the Emperor, is viſibly Arreſted, as an Af⯑front to his Spaniſh Majeſty, and an Inſult upon his Government.
• 6thly, That his Imperial Majeſty has him⯑ſelf broken the Neutrality of Italy, by ex⯑torting Immenſe Sums of Money from the Princes of Italy, on pretence of its being their juſt Due to pay towards the carrying on His War againſt the Turks.
• And Laſtly, That this being a particular Conjuncture for the King of Spain's Purpoſe, favourable for his Deſigns, and the like, his Spaniſh Majeſty thinks he cannot let ſlip ſo fair an Occaſion, as well reſpecting the Troubles in Hungary, as the general Diſcon⯑tent of the People of Italy, and their readi⯑neſs to enter into Meaſures, for the effectu⯑al delivering themſelves out of the Hands of the Houſe of Auſtria.

Theſe are the General Heads of the Charge, as may be ſeen by the ſaid Memo⯑rials or Manifeſtoes of the Spaniſh Miniſters, to which I refer, they having all been made publick in the common Printed Papers of the Town, as to the pretence of the Emperor uſing Artifices to ſecure to himſelf the Suc⯑ceſſion [5] to the Eſtates of the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, That I look upon as Trifling and without Foundation, and therefore not worth naming among the reſt.

It is not our buſineſs to enquire here, whether theſe Objections are juſt, and whe⯑ther what is Alledged can be made good in Fact, viz. That the Emperor has done ſo and ſo, as above: Nor is it the preſent Queſtion, whether if theſe Allegations are juſt, they are a ſufficient Argument for the King of Spain to take up Arms, and begin a War in Italy.

But the Deſign of this Tract, is to En⯑quire how theſe things reſpect the other Powers of Chriſtendom; and what Part it is probable they may take in the Quarrel; and by other Powers here, I am to be under⯑ſtood, to mean in particular the Dutch, the Kings of France and Britain, the King of Sicily, and the Cantons of Swiſſerland, what ſhare they are like to have in the Quarrel, and whether they are bound by the Treaty of Neutrality to Concern them⯑ſelves in a War for the keeping the Poſſeſ⯑ſion of Italy to the Houſe of Auſtria, yea, or no.

I begin with the King of Sicily. To make ſhort with his Story, I ſhall look on him as one of the Princes of Italy, for ſuch he [6] is: We ſee his Majeſty acting a very ſubtle Part, as indeed it ſtands him in ſtead at this time to do. It is true, the Im⯑perialiſts threaten him, and notwithſtand⯑ing all his Proteſtations of being reſolved to purſue the Neutrality, they miſtruſt him, and ſeem as reſolv'd to fall on him in their Way; nay, ſome ſay, they reſolve to begin with him. No Man will be ſo weak as to ask what is his Sicilian Majeſty's Bu⯑ſineſs if he is attack'd; but the Queſtion with him ſeems to be, whether his Majeſty having now a very great Army on Foot, in a Readineſs for Action, and apprehending the Imperialiſts will certainly attack him, ought not, by way of Prevention, to begin firſt, having ſo clear an Advantage, and an Opportunity, which it is very probable, may not be offer'd again, I mean, as that of joyning with Spain?

This is the Queſtion which the Politicians who conſider not what is right, or what is wrong, but what is fitteſt to be done, reſpe⯑cting the Intereſt of the Party; I ſhall in brief ſtate what I think will be the Caſe here, and as therein I give only one Opinion, let others judge as they ſee Cauſe, and let the Event determine. In a Word, I ſay, I think it ſeems unavoidable, and the King of Sicily cannot be unconcern'd in a War, if it follows, and that his Majeſty will not fail to oyn his Arms with the [7] K. of Spain; only that this cannot be expected till the Spaniards have landed a conſiderable Body of Men on the Coaſt of Italy, either in the Kingdom of Naples, or perhaps high⯑er up, towards the King of Sicily's own Country, which is more than probable, by the Spaniſh General's demanding Paſſage of the State of Genoa, for an Army into the Parmeſan.

This therefore being ſo near a Deciſion, and at preſent, repreſenting it ſelf to our View as unavoidable, I lay it down as a thing moſt certain, either voluntarily of himſelf, or forced by the Imperialiſts them⯑ſelves, will certainly joyn with Spain in this new Enterprize; and I muſt tell the Impe⯑rial Miniſters, who talk ſo loudly of the Certainty of the King of Sicily's Ruin in ſuch a Caſe, and let the Event be what it will, there is great Reaſon to believe, ma⯑ny, if not all the Princes of Italy, ſeem to reſolve to run the Venture of it, if the Spa⯑niards give them but a little more Encourage⯑ment. What their Dependence and Encou⯑ragement are, Time will not fail to diſco⯑ver.

I will not ſay, but theſe Princes may have their ſeveral Grievances, and may have juſt Reaſons to complain of the Violences and Oppreſſions of the Houſe of Auſtria, I am willing in Compliment to their Integrity, to [8] ſuppoſe, tho' not to grant, the Imperial Governours have perhaps exceeded their Commiſſions, or that even their Commiſ⯑ſions have been in ſome things invaſive of the Right of the ſeveral Powers complain⯑ing, contrary to Juſtice, and to a Treaty of Neutrality; and I will give theſe Complaints their full Weight, when I come to examine the grand Queſtion, viz. Whether for this they ought to take up Arms, and de⯑ſtroy the Neutrality, in which the preſer⯑ving their Rights is not the only Queſtion; but by which the Ballance of Power in Europe is preſerv'd: In which Ballance of Power, moſt, if not all the other Powers of Europe are concern'd, at leaſt thoſe Powers are, of whom I am more particularly to ſpeak.

In this Circumſtance then I lay down the State of things in Italy, at this time, viz. That the Princes of Italy are in a preſent Diſpoſition to Revolt, and that the King of Sicily is in the ſame Caſe, and that they on⯑ly want a powerful Protection of ſome other Potentate to ſupport them, and that there⯑fore we may expect, if the King of Spain ap⯑pears thus able to protect them, they will certainly joyn with him whenever a pow⯑erful Army appears.

The King of Spain's Pretenſions then, and the Princes of Italy, being thus ſtated, the [9] Plot among them ſeems to be diſcover'd, viz. That the King of Spain, on the Foun⯑dation of his own Grievances only, ſhall be⯑gin the War, and according to the Succeſs his Spaniſh Majeſty meets with, the other Princes ſhall declare themſelves; ſo that if the King of Spain ſhould not be able to car⯑ry on the Deſign, they may all retreat to their Solemn Proteſtations of not being con⯑cern'd in the Quarrel of Spain, and may make ſmooth Water with the Emperour, when they find themſelves unable to raiſe a Storm: But on the contrary, if the King of Spain can force his Way into Italy, and diſ⯑poſſeſs the Imperialiſts, ſo as to protect them, then they will declare themſelves.

Upon this Foot I ſhall treat the Affair in general; if I do any Wrong to the Princes of Italy, it will be time to acknow⯑ledge it when the Wrong appears.

But to proceed to the Hiſtory of Fact: The King of Spain, according to this Scheme, has begun the War, and ſerving himſelf, of the Emperor's being perfectly deſtitute of a⯑ny Marine Power, and of the unhappy Con⯑juncture of a furious War with the Turks, he invades the Dominions of his Imperial Majeſty, in particular, the Iſland of Sardig⯑nia, which the Spaniards, having a power⯑ful Fleet, and the Imperial Government not [10] three Men of War, could no ways be re⯑liev'd.

Here we ſtop a while, and make a Tran⯑ſition at once to the Courts of Great-Britain and the Hague. The Spaniards were not ſo ignorant, as not to know, or ſo dull, as not to think of it; That the Powers or Courts above mentioned, who had all ſeverally ſo great a Share in making the Capitulation, or Treaty for the Neutrality of Italy, would intereſt themſelves in this Affair, as having charg'd themſelves with the Guarantee of that Neutrality, and therefore his Spaniſh Majeſty caus'd, not only the Letters and Memorials mentioned above, to be pre⯑ſented in the Nature of Manifeſto's to the ſaid Courts, but made often a repeated Pro⯑poſal of ſtopping their Proceedings, till time might be given to the pacifick Princes and Powers, who he thus appply'd to by ſuch Methods as they thought moſt proper to bring his Imperial Majeſty to liſten to Rea⯑ſon, and to do Juſtice to his Spaniſh Ma⯑jeſty's Pretenſions.

Theſe Propoſals being taken Ad Referen⯑dum, did indeed entitle the ſaid Princes and Powers to make the needful Repreſentations to the Emperor, and to make uſe of all the good Offices they found for their Purpoſe, to induce the Emperor to refer likewiſe the Matters in Diſpute to their Mediation, as the King of Spain likewiſe offer'd to do.

[11] By the way, I muſt here obſerve as I go, in order to make every thing clear to the Reader of this Enquiry. 1. That theſe Powers were more or leſs, all of them en⯑gag'd before as Guarantees of the Treaty of Neutrality in Italy. 2. That tho' their be⯑ing ſo Guarantees qualified them the better to be Mediators; yet this Mediation, if they had accepted it, does not by any Means tye up their Hands from, or leſſen the Right they have to act as Guarantees of the Neutrality of Italy. 3. That we do not find in the Propoſal, any Conditions made with them, that this Offer ſhould ſubſiſt on⯑ly in caſe they declar'd themſelves accepting the ſaid Mediation. 4. We do not find that the King of Great-Britain, their High Migh⯑tineſſes the States General, and the Regent of France, did actually engage in any ſuch Mediation. But 5. that being willing to do all good Offices, for the preſerving the Peace and Tranquility of Europe, they have concerned themſelves, in the moſt earneſt Manner to his Imperial Majeſty, in what the King of Spain demands, and to induce him to accept of the Propoſals of his Spaniſh Majeſty, in Order to a Treaty.

But while this is depending, and before they have been able to obtain any Anſwer, or enter into any Negociation on the Pro⯑poſal, we find Spain entirely regardleſs of the offer'd Suſpenſion of her Conqueſts, and [12] taking no Notice of the Engagements ſhe had enter'd into with his Britanncik Ma⯑jeſty, and other Powers, as above? I ſay, we find Spain vigorouſly puſhing on her Advantages, making Preparations for new Enterprizes, and even by her Ambaſſador, the Prince de Cellamare, at the Court of France, declaring publickly, that ſhe in⯑tends to do ſo; this laſt Declaration being indeed ſo inconſiſtent with thoſe mentioned above, deſerves to be remark'd as follows;

[16]Before I enter then upon the main Que⯑ſtion of a War, I think here occurs a parti⯑cular or previous Queſtion to be Conſider⯑ed, viz. Is this proceeding of Spain an Af⯑front to the King of Great-Britain, and to all the Powers to whom thoſe pacifick Pro⯑poſals were made, and who ſo willingly be⯑gan their good Offices with his Imperial Majeſty, or is it not? Is it uſing his Majeſty well, or is it oftering the higheſt Contempt to his Perſon, and to the Interpoſition of his Intereſt, as is poſſible to be offer'd? Is it not a Breach of Faith and Honour? In a Word, Is it not dealing Deceitfully and Diſhonourably with His Majeſty, making uſe of his good Offices to Amuſe and De⯑ceive the Prince who they were propoſed to ſerve; and in a Word, making a Property of the three moſt Potent Powers of Europe, in order to advantage himſelf of their Civili⯑ties; and, as before, he had Deceived Eu⯑rope in the matter of his Armament by Sea, on Petences, and indeed Promiſſes, of fitting out a Fleet for the Aſſiſtance of the Venetians againſt the Turks, ſo now Deceiving the Emperor by the fraud of a ſpecious Propo⯑ſal, which no Prince could have ſuch mean thoughts of the King of Spain, as to believe he was not ſincere in? It cannot be ſug⯑geſted that in this the King of Great-Britain is uſed well, or uſed really as one Crown'd Head ought to uſe another; nor can it be ſuggeſted, but that when Occaſion preſents, [25] and Circumſtances concurs, His Majeſty knows very well how to Reſent it, and is not without the Means of making his Spa⯑niſh Majeſty ſenſible of it.

But our queſtion at home is it ſeems of another nature, and indeed ſomething of a new faſhion, viz. whether we ſhall be wil⯑ling the Honour of the Britiſh Throne ſhall be ſo far aſſerted, as that His Majeſty ſhall, upon the ſingle Point of being Affronted, Engage in this matter? or whether we ſhall leave the Britiſh Powers to be ſo far depre⯑ciated, as to take no notice of ſuch Uſage, and conſequently to be Affronted on all oc⯑caſions by all the Kings of the Earth?

However for once, and to gratify the Op⯑poſers far beyond their Expectations, and to leave room for all their ſpecious ſoft ways of covering theſe things over, I ſhall give way to their Harangues upon the cir⯑cumſtances of the Nation, viz. That we have lately been involv'd in a heavy War, which has brought an inſupportable Burthen of Debt upon the whole Kingdom; That we are but juſt entering upon Methods for working out of thoſe things, and have ſcarce taſted the ſweet part of any one Arti⯑cle worth naming; That all the Savings of the laſt Year have not eaſed the People of one Tax, neither can they in ſome years yet [16] [...] [25] [...] [26] to come, and that it will be a great many years before we can poſſibly give ſuch Eaſe to the poor People, as to bring their living, and keeping their Families, to be as Cheap to them as before, and yet their Proviſions are even dearer than in time of War: That all neighbouring Countries are reducing their Expence and leſſening their Debts, and in a fair way to be out of Debt before us, even tho' no new War ſhould be Com⯑menced: But that every year brings with it ſome new load upon Britain to keep her low, as for Example, the Rebellion for one Year, the Swediſh Affair for another, and if now we Engage in a War with Spain, we are in a fair way to continue the Charge of all the Taxes and Funds that are upon us, be⯑ſides what new Demands may be neceſſary, and ſo the Nation will for ever ſink under a weight already own'd to be inſupportable.

To all theſe things, they add the ſuppoſi⯑tion of a War with Spain, the Conſequen⯑ces of it to our Commerce, which after a long Decay, and ſuffering infinite Convul⯑ſions in the laſt War, began to revive again in all parts of the World; but will imme⯑diately be overwhelm'd in the moſt ſenſible parts of it, ſuch as the Trade to Spain it ſelf, the Aſſiento Contract, the Trade to Italy, and the like; and perhaps the Effects of our Merchants and South-Sea Company, &c. be ſeized by the Spaniards.

[27] This is a long Detail of plauſibles, which indeed our People begin to fill their Mouths with in this Caſe, and in ſome of the parti⯑cular Caſes they are not without weight; It is true, our Debts are many and great, and the Nation wants a receſs of Taxes; it is true, our Spaniſh Trade is Conſiderable, and the Effects of our Merchants are Great Abroad, and may be liable to be Confiſca⯑ted by the Spaniards.

I'll add to this, That we have Reaſon to believe from the Wiſdom, and the pacifick Diſpoſition of His Majeſty himſelf, from the Prudence and Moderation of his Coun⯑cils, from the juſt Deſire the King muſt ne⯑ceſſarily have to reſtore the Tranquility of His Subjects, and from a willingneſs once to Enjoy his new Dominions in Peace, and ſee his People flouriſhing in Arts and Trade, by which they are now in a fair proſpect of making themſelves more than ever, the Greateſt and moſt Opulent Nation in the World.

But againſt all theſe Things, doubtleſs there are other matters that weigh ſome⯑thing in the Scale of this Queſtion, and which merit to be conſidered by themſelves; I ſhall fetch nothing remote to make good the deficiency, for the Subject is but too fruit⯑ful of Argument, and the Neceſſity will ap⯑pear [28] even at firſt ſight, if we go back Hiſto⯑rically but a little way into things paſt, and compare them with the viſible pro⯑ſpects of things to come.

The Great, and indeed the true Reaſon, which was always alleg'd for the puſhing on the late War at ſo vaſt an Expence, and the continuing it thro' ſo many Difficulties, as at firſt for many years obſtructed the Suc⯑ceſs of it, was the fixing the Ballance of Power in Europe.

It was for this, That ſo many Powers of Europe Confederated to reduce the Exorbi⯑tant Power of France, by whoſe Conqueſts and Ambitious Deſigns that Ballance was deſtroyed, and the Nations of Europe in Danger of ſubmitting at laſt to an Univer⯑ſal Tyranny in the Conqueror.

It was for this that the Glorious King Wil⯑liam fix'd the Pyrenean Treaty, as the boun⯑dary of his Demands from France; and de⯑clar'd, if Spain went beyond thoſe limits, he would be then as much a Frenchman, as he was then a Spaniard.

It was for this that ſuch long Struggles were made to prevent the Spaniſh Monarchy falling into the Hands of the Houſe of Bour⯑bon.

[29] It was for this we Complain'd ſo warmly of the Meaſures in the laſt Reign, and of the Conditions of the late Peace, as betraying the Confederacy, and deſtroying the Great End of the War, by giving up Spain to King Philip, who at that time was entirely in the Intereſt of France.

It was for this all the Renunciations of the Treaty of Ʋtrecht were entred into, and the weight of the Argument acknowledg'd, even in thoſe very things which were ſaid Eventu⯑ally to betray it, and by thoſe very People who have been ſo openly Charg'd with lea⯑ving it unprovided for, or not ſufficiently ſe⯑cur'd.

It was on the Pretence of this being ſuf⯑ficiently ſecur'd, that the People who made the Peace of Ʋtrecht juſtify themſelves, and tell us that it was a good Peace, and that it fully anſwered the end of the War.

It muſt then follow, that even thoſe very People ought to be the firſt to declare, that what ever Prince breaks in upon that Bal⯑lance, Deſtroys the Efficacy of the Peace, and brings us into the ſame neceſſity of re⯑newing a War, that there was at that time for Beginning and Carrying it on.

[30] As the Ballance of Power was the Reaſon of the War, ſo it is the only Baſis of the Peace; whatever Prince makes an attempt upon that Ballance, declares War againſt all the reſt, as they are naturally Guarantees of the whole; or elſe they tacitly declare that there was no juſt Reaſon at firſt, from the Interruption of that Ballance, to begin the former War, much leſs to carry it on as they did, which would Arraign all the Princes of the Confederacy, and Charge them with Ambition, Unjuſt Invaſion, and Blood.

Theſe Points carry their own Evidence with them, and admit ſo little diſpute, that it would ſeem a meer ſpinning out our Diſ⯑courſe, to go about proving, or farther ex⯑plaining any part of them; all the publick Tranſactions, Declarations of War, Memo⯑rials and Treaties, which were ſeverally di⯑ſpers'd thro' Europe in the Time when theſe things were done, are full of it, and may be all call'd up as Evidences to this one Great Prin⯑ciple of the Policies of Europe, viz. That Preſerving the Ballance of Power in Europe, was the Reaſon of the War, and the Grand Preliminary of the Peace.

This then being laid down as a Funda⯑mental to argue from, it follows to enquire in few Words, Is the diſpoſſeſſing the Houſe of Auſtria of their Dominions in Italy, and [31] reuniting thoſe Dominions to the Spaniſh Monarchy, a Breach of this Ballance of Power, or is it not?

I need go no further for Arguments to ſet forth the Importance of thoſe Italian Domi⯑nions, than thoſe made uſe of by the Gen⯑tlemen, who magnified them as moſt mighty Additions to the Auſtrian Greatneſs, when they would have perſwaded us, that giving thoſe Parts to the Emperor, would make him too great for the reſt of the World, and overthrow that Ballance they were given to preſerve.

If then thoſe Dominions, whoſe Depen⯑dencies and Influencies are indeed equal to their Power, were ſcarce thought ſafe to be given to the Emperor, and were not thought ſafe to remain to the King of Spain, becauſe of the Ballance, which would thereby be in Danger; How then can it conſiſt with the Ballance, to have them ſnatch'd out of the Emperor's Hands again, and return back to the ſame Hand from whence they were taken?

This Conſideration alone, obliges not Great-Britain only, but even the whole Confederacy, as one Man, to Declare againſt this Invaſion of the King of Spain, and to oblige him to put a Stop to his Attempts, [32] or make War upon him; otherwiſe, the End of the late War is defeated, and the Effect of the late Peace is deſtroy'd.

Nor is it ſufficient to ſay, the Emperor had thoſe Dominions conquer'd for him, and put into his Hands, and he ought to take Care to maintain his Poſſeſſion; for, if the Emperor is, by any Incident of War, as the preſent War with the Turks, for Ex⯑ample, expos'd to the Poſſibility of a Surprize, it would ſhew a very ill Concern for the general Good of Europe, to let his Domini⯑ons, which we thought our ſelves ſo much concern'd to get for him, be loſt again, be⯑cauſe he (the Emperor) may not be able to prevent it.

It was for our own Sakes, and for the Publick Safety of Europe, in which the whole Confederacy were concern'd, that the War was carried on; it was not to aggrandize the Houſe of Auſtria, that theſe Dominions were conquer'd, but to weaken the oppo⯑ſing Enemies, whoſe Power was too great; and they were allotted to the Emperor, not becauſe his Arms had Conquer'd them, for without the Help of the Confederates, he neither did conquer them, nor could have Conquer'd them; but becauſe it was meet, in Order to preſerve this great Article of the Ballance, I ſay, it was meet for the Good [25] of all Europe that the Emperor ſhould have them.

Likewiſe ſpeaking of the preſent Con⯑juncture, it is not meerly in Compliment to the Emperor, whoſe immediate Intereſt or Family, we have no Concern in, that we are intereſted in this Affair; but it is the common Intereſt of Europe, the ſame which ſo many Years War was carried on for, and the ſame which the Peace was; or ought to have been made for: For this common Intereſt it is meet that theſe Places, theſe Domini⯑ons in Italy, ſhould remain to the Houſe of Auſtria; and they muſt remain to that Houſe, or that Ballance be ſo far deſtroy'd, and the Ends of the Confederates are not anſwer'd.

It remains then to judge, whether Great Britain can quietly and unconcernedly look on, and ſee the great Ends for which they laid out their Blood and Treaſure with ſo much Chearfulneſs, and for ſo many Years, deſtroy'd at once, and a Foundation laid for the ſame Neceſſity of Blood and Trea⯑ſure to be laid out again? Can we ſit ſtill, and ſee Meaſures taken, which have in themſelves a direct Tendency to renew the War? Thoſe pacifick Gentlemen who plead ſo earneſtly in Behalf of Peace, ſhould tell us the Meaning of the ancient well known [26] Maxim, Pax quaeretur Bello, and whether a timely Exerting the Strength which is now in our Hands, may not be the only Way to eſtabliſh Peace, and prevent War?

It is much eaſier to keep things in the Poſture they are in, than to reſtore them again after the Blow is given; Italy is a large Country, a Conjuncture offers to the ambitious Views of the King of Spain, which perhaps may be in it ſelf tempting enough; the delicious Morſel, ſeems, as it were, dropping into his Mouth; the Diſcontents of the People there are repreſented as very great, and perhaps they are ſo; it may be, the Germans have not treated them very kindly, they have oppreſs'd them with heavy Taxes, preferr'd Foreigners to the Places and Preferments which the Natives have claim'd a Right to, carried away their Native Troops to ſerve the Emperor in his Wars in Hungary, Extorted great Sums of Money and the like: What can we ſay to this, had they applied to any Foreign Princes to have interceeded for them to his Imperial Majeſty, none of the Con⯑federates would have refus'd their good Offices, as far as the Cuſtom of Nations would admit one Prince to concern himſelf in the Government of another: But that theſe Grievances ſhould entitle them to Re⯑volt, and to go back to a Prince from whom [27] the whole Intereſt of Europe was concern'd to ſeparate them; This quite alters the Caſe: And to ſay we muſt ſit ſtill, and per⯑mit and ſuffer it, as we have acted in the ſame kind our ſelves, and from the Princi⯑ples of Liberty we inſiſt upon for our ſelves, this is ſaying nothing to the purpoſe, for our Views are in this the Liberties of Eu⯑rope, and not the Liberties of Italy; the firſt we are Nationally concern'd in, not the laſt: Nay, if they were together in one bottom, we ſhould no otherwiſe be con⯑cern'd in the Liberties of Italy, than as they were on one bottom with thoſe of Europe; but when they are oppoſite to one another, the Caſe is quite alter'd. The particular Rights of the Italian Princes or People are quite out of the queſtion; the thing be⯑fore the Confederates is, the preſerving that Ballance, which is the Foundation of the Liberties of all Europe.

Nor can we ſay in this Caſe that the Con⯑federacy is Diſſolv'd, and the Affair is now no more a Common Concern: The Com⯑mon Intereſt is the ſame, and the Princes, as I ſaid, even Natural Guarrantees for the preſerving it.

Much might be ſaid here for the Nature of this War, the Injuſtice of the manner, as well as that of the pretences for it: But [28] it is true, theſe regard the Emperor rather than us: However, I ſhall collect the Par⯑ticulars, that we may view them, and that the World may judge of, what Honour, what Equity, is to be expected from thoſe Powers, who can ſatisfy themſelves to give Europe Cauſe for ſuch Complaints as theſe. Some of them are to be found in the Pope's Letter to the King of Spain, where his Holineſs expoſtulates warmly, and even almoſt calls it perfidious Treatment, viz. 1. That his Spaniſh Majeſty promiſes and engages his Royal Word, to him the Pope, that he would not offer any Diſturbance to his Imperial Majeſty's Dominions in Italy, during his being thus engag'd in a War with the Turks. 2. That his Spaniſh Ma⯑jeſty engaged to his Holineſs, to ſend a powerful Fleet into the Levant, in Aid of the Chriſtian Princes againſt the Turks, which Fleet was to joyn the Venetians, and act in Conjunction with the other Auxili⯑aries; whereas, on the contrary, this Fleet was not only not ſent to the Levant againſt the Turks, but has been employ'd againſt the Chriſtian Emperor, at the ſame time when his Imperial Majeſty had employ'd his whole Force to reſiſt the Enemy of the Chriſtian Name, and not only has been thus employ'd; but the Venetians have been thereby abandon'd, and left to ſtruggle with the ſuperior Force of their Enemies, to [29] their great and unſpeakable Loſs and Diſap⯑pointment, and to the great Hazard of Chri⯑ſtendom; and the Turks being hereby left Maſters of the Seas, after two bloody En⯑gagements; which had the Spaniſh Fleet been joyn'd, would either not have been fought, or if they had, the Chriſtans might have obtain'd a moſt glorious Victory, or at leaſt, the Triumphs of the Infidels had been prevented, and the Effuſion of the Chriſtian Blood been ſaved. 3. That in order to this Equipment for the Service of Chriſtendom, his Spaniſh Majeſty demand⯑ed of his Holineſs, a Brief for the raiſing a great Sum of Money from the Clergy of Spain, which his Holineſs granted. Likewiſe, a Hat was inſiſted for the Ab⯑bot, now Cardinal Alberoni; upon the granting which, and the King of Spain's pro⯑miſes of ſending the ſaid Squadron with all Speed againſt the Turks was renewed; yet all theſe Engagements were laid aſide, and the Power rais'd to fight with the E⯑nemies of Chriſt turn'd againſt the Chri⯑ſtian Emperor in a Manner ſo ſurprizing, as to the Faith and Honour of his Spaniſh Majeſty, as is not to be expreſs'd in better Terms than in the Pope's Letter above⯑ſaid, to which I particularly refer.

[30] It is true, as I have obſerved, that theſe Breaches of Faith and Honour, do not in particular affect us, or relate to Britain; but the Reader may conſider them, and compare them with the Memo⯑morials and Declarations of the Marquis de Beretti Landi, in Holland, and ſome the like here; wherein his Spaniſh Ma⯑jeſty offers, or promiſes to ſtop his Prepa⯑rations, and proceed no farther than the Conqueſt of Sardignia, but leave the Mat⯑ters in Diſpute with the Emperor, to the Mediation of his Britannick Majeſty, and their High Mightineſſes the States Gene⯑ral, &c. And yet, as all Advices now ſay, and even the King of Spain's Mi⯑niſter in France acknowledges, his Spa⯑niſh Majeſty reſolves to puſh his Advan⯑tages to the utmoſt, in Purſuit of his Quarrel with the Emperor.

I am loth to make indecent Reflections upon Perſons exalted to the Dignity of Sovereign Princes, and always retain a Reverence to the Majeſty of Crown'd Heads; and therefore, forbear all thoſe Reflections which ſome People make upon his Spaniſh Majeſty, as a Branch of the Houſe of Bourbon, ſuggeſting that ſuch things as theſe ſeem to be Copying after the Pattern of France. I wiſh his Spaniſh Majeſty would adhere to the Maxims of [31] Honour, ſo ſtrictly adher'd to, and ſo no⯑bly practis'd by ſome of his glorious An⯑ceſtors on the Throne of the Spaniſh Mo⯑narchy, rather than ſend us back to his particular Progenitors, or to a Court, where ſuch things have formerly been too much practis'd; and which I mention with the more Caution, as the World ſeems to acknowledge, the Court of France it ſelf is acted now by other Principles, and may be expected, in a few Years, to eſta⯑bliſh other Maxims, as well of Policy as of Honour, differing from thoſe which brought it ſo eminently to the Gate of Deſtruction.

I ſee nothing can be ſaid then why the King of Spain ſhould be ſuffer'd unoppoſed, to puſh on his preſent Deſigns, which are founded on ſuch Trifling pretences, and on ſuch Diſhonourable Meaſures, unleſs we can ſay, that we have no Concern in the General G [...]od of Europe, and that we are not as much [...]oncern'd to keep any new Power from Growing too Formidable and Exorbi⯑tant in Europe, as we ſhall be afterwards to pull it down; and if it will be our Con⯑cern, as moſt certainly it muſt, to reduce every Exorbitance of Power in Europe, and preſerve the Ballance on which the Tranquility of Europe Depends, it muſt be our [...]rudence to prevent the firſt riſe of ſuch Exorbitance.

[32] As to the diſadvantages to our Commerce Abroad, our inability to Engage in the Ex⯑pence at Home, our being in Debt, and oppreſs'd with Taxes, and the like, they are all Granted, and I make no doubt, that as it is natural to infer from thence, that we ſhould by no Means Engage in any New Expence if it be poſſible to avoid it; ſo I believe, as is ſaid above, That His Majeſty will not be prevail'd on to uſe Force in this Caſe, if all poſſible Good Offices between the Parties can prevent it, and if Reaſon will take place; in a Word, that His Ma⯑jeſty will not bring us into a War without an abſolute and apparent Neceſſity.

But let us not Depreciate our Country ſo much, or lay our ſelves ſo low neither, as to ſuggeſt that we cannot do, what we cannot in Honour and Juſtice avoid; that would be to ſay, We are ſo weakned by the late War, that we are not able even to re⯑ſiſt an Enemy, if we are Attack'd.

If our Power is Contemn'd if the Ho⯑nour of the Britiſh Crown is ſlighted, if Princes come to think ſo meanly of Britain, as not to think it worth while to keep their Words with us, it is indeed attacking us: They that will break their Promiſes with Great Britain, How long do we think they would be before they would break the Peace [33] with his Majeſty, if they found it for their advantage to do it?

To be Treated thus, is to be attack'd in the worſt manner, and Great Princes have always reſented the breach of Faith with them, as the worſt Affront that could be put upon them; and I hope, none will ſug⯑geſt in this Caſe, that a Breach of Faith with the King, is not a Breach of Faith with the Kingdom, and that in a manner more particularly provoking.

As to our Trade, perhaps it may be true, that the King of Spain may take ſome ad⯑vantages againſt our Merchants; but let ſuch People who are frighted at thoſe ap⯑pearances, remember what infinite Advan⯑tages our ſuperiority at Sea gives our Sub⯑jects in War with Spain; let them remem⯑ber Queen Elizabeth's Reign, when the whole Nation was viſibly enrich'd by a War with Spain; and to this, let me add, ſhould we now heartily ſet about a War with Spain, Spain giving the Occaſion, it is no hard matter to ſhew how infinite Advantages may be made of it in the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, Capable to make full Reparation for all the Damages our Trade can ſuffer: But of that hereafter.

[34] Laſlty, Let it be obſerv'd, that this Diſ⯑courſe does not tend to an immediate De⯑claring War againſt the King of Spain; it takes it for granted, that Neceſſity ob⯑liges ſome Princes of Europe to joyn to pre⯑ſerve the Neutrality of Italy, and as has been hinted to the Spaniards, to act againſt thoſe that would break that Neutrality; if this leads us to act againſt the King of Spain, it is not Britain, but the King of Spain that leads us to it; and if in doing this, the King of Spain takes if for a Breach of the Peace, it is his Spaniſh Majeſty that begins the War, and not the King of Bri⯑tain, and the Conſequences muſt lye at their Door, and not at ours.