Two Great Queſtions conſidered, &c.
[3]I Thought at the Writing each of theſe Papers, that the Part before me would be the laſt; and have been always Cautious of Crowding the Reader of theſe Eſſays with too many Subjects.
But every Day brings with it New Occaſions of Debate, and 'tis in Vain for me to reſolve upon ſilence, unleſs I will aban⯑done Truth, and ſee it every Day inſulted with Errors, both in Practice and in Opinion.
I have ſtood ſtill, and ſeen the Parliament throng'd with Addreſſes or Petitions, and ſome of them in an Unuſual Stile, a Stile Parliaments in other Kingdoms reſent with more Severity a great deal; I have ſeen Authority inſulted, Her Majeſty in the Perſon of Her Repreſentative very ill Treated, and all paſt over with Lenity and Gentleneſs.—To this I have thought my ſelf oblig'd to ſay nothing, as not in my Sphere: His Grace the High Commiſſioner and the Parliament kno' how to reſent, and when to reſent; and 'tis not my Buſineſs to preſume to Direct.
But after all this, I cannot but take Notice of the Dialect of ſome People here, which to me is very ſtrange; who have been talking very Confidently, of going to ask the Parliament for an Anſwer to their Addreſſes;—this in Engliſh, I take to be Equivalent to Calling the Parliament to Account: and ſome Gentlemen have as good as call'd it ſo.
[4]Indeed their Reſolution has not been equal to their Project, and they have not yet thought fit to put their Schemes in Practice: but I thought it neceſſary, for the Informa⯑tion of thoſe who pretend to juſtifie ſuch a Method, to examine a little the Nature, Right and Obligation of Adreſ⯑ſing or Petitioning our Superiors, and ſtate the Point of Duty between both Addreſſers and the Perſons Addreſſed. And this is the firſt Article I ſhall enter upon in this Eſſay.
Of Petitioning Parliaments, and the Duty in that Caſe both of Parliament and People.
AS this is a nicer Subject than ordinary, and he that writes upon it, may eaſily be miſunderſtood; ſo I deſire a little to explain my ſelf, before I proceed to the Particulars.
And firſt, I deſire to note, that I ſhall not diſtinguiſh in this Diſcourſe between Addreſſing and Petitioning; not but that there are Eſſential Differences between them, and which uſed to be obſerved by the People: Petitioning being applied to Requeſts only, and Addreſſing to every thing, congratu⯑lating, or otherwiſe ſummary in repreſenting the Subject, it is upon.
But Cuſtom has now brought theſe things together, the Addreſs is call'd a Petition, and the Petition an Addreſs: and as the Age makes no Diſtinction, neither do I; and therefore I deſire thro' out this Paper to be underſtood promiſcuouſly of both.
2dly. I note here, that I ſhall in no wiſe diſpute, whether it be lawful upon all Occaſions for the People to Addreſs to, or Petition the Parliament.
I ſhall take it for granted, and agree with any Body in this, That it is the undoubted Right of the People of any free Na⯑tion, [5] but particularly of the three Kingdoms of Scotland, England and Ireland, to preſent their Grievances to their reſpective Au⯑thorities, be it King or Parliament or both, and to do it by Peti⯑tion, Addreſs, or any other way within the limited Preſcription of the Law.
When theſe Things by way of Note are firſt granted, I know nothing more in the way of my Diſcourſe, but to come directly to the Subject of Petitioning or Addreſſing of Parlia⯑ments; and in this 'tis neceſſary to conſider,
- 1. The Nature of Petitioning or Addreſſing.
- 2. The Manner of Preſenting.
- 3. The Duty of the Perſons Addreſſed to.
- 4. The Duty of the Perſons Addreſsing.
1. The Nature of Addreſſing or Petitioning.
And me thinks, I need go no further than the very words themſelves, which without troubling my ſelf to dive into their Etymologies and Original, do plainly and ex⯑preſly ſignify the Poſture of Supplicants; a Petition is in its Nature a Prayer, a Begging or Entreating; and let the Sub⯑ject of the Petition be never ſo much Matter of Right, it is, by the Nature of the Thing, ſubmitted to the Pleaſure of the Perſons Petitioned, either when to grant it, or in ſuch manner as they ſhall ſee meet, or not to grant it at all.
I confeſs, we have of late ſeen different Steps taken in this Caſe, and ſome Gentlemen are pleaſed to tell us of Addreſſes to the Parliament, Commanding them, &c. Others in their Addreſſes, come with a We hope and confidently Expect, &c. Of which by it ſelf.
However theſe Gentlemen think of their Method, I muſt take the Liberty to tell ſuch, if they will act fairly, and give every thing its proper Stile, they ſhould call ſuch things, Re⯑preſentations or Remonſtrances; not Addreſſes or Petitions.
[6]And therefore in our own Memories, when the People of Scotland applyed themſelves to the late King William for the Eſtabliſhment of their Privileges, they did not call it an Ad⯑dreſs or a Petition, but a Claim of Right.
To petition or addreſs muſt certainly acknowledge a Right in the Perſons addreſſed to, either to grant or not to grant the thing addreſſed for; referring the Manner and Seaſon of Granting to them, and contents it ſelf with having laid the Requeſt be⯑fore them.
All other or further purſuing the Subject, is Tumultuary, and tends to Riot and Diſorder, the thing ceaſes then to be an Addreſs or a Petition, and becomes a Demand, a Force or Threatning of Force; which in its Nature, is abſolutely De⯑ſtructive of the very Being and Subſtance of Government, tends to all manner of Diſorders, and cannot be call'd Petiti⯑oning:
And therefore, that Reverend Divine, that lately Preached in the New Kirk in this City, ſpeaking of this very thing, had this moſt pertinent Expreſſion, That when he conſidered ſome of the Addreſſes here, they had on the Frontiſpiece the Words AN HUMBLE PETITION: but if they were to Correſpond with the Subſtance, they ſhould have been Stil'd A BOLD DECLARATION, in Oppoſition to Authority, and that he could not underſtand the Meaning of a Petition or Addreſs, Sword in Hand.
No truly, nor can any Man elſe underſtand it by the Words; for Petition and Sword in Hand, are two contraries, that do not Illuſtrate, but really Deſtroy one another.
In ſhort, to Addreſs or Petition, is to Pray, to Deſire and to Submit to the Wiſdom and Authority of the Perſon you Peti⯑tion or Addreſs to, for the Granting or not Granting the Re⯑queſt, all that goes beyond this, is Excentrick, Remote and Inconſiſtent, not only with the Due Reſpect of Subjects to [7] Authority, but with the Nature & Subſtance of the Thing it ſelf, and indeed ought not to go by the Name of Addreſs or Petition.
When the Flemings, in the time of Philip the II. made the Famous Petition to the Lady Infanta, then Governeſs of the Spaniſh Netherlands,—tho they Petitioned for their Native Right and Liberty of Religion, yet they Voluntarily took upon them the Name of Geux or Beggars, and were call'd ſo on both ſides, ſignifying, That tho' it was really their Right they Demanded, yet while they did it by way of Petition, it ought to be agreeable to the Nature of a Petition, viz. as a Prayer or Humble Requeſt. I omit the Application of this part, till the laſt, and proceed to Examine,
2. The Manner of Petitioning.
This reſpects the Words of the Petition, and the Method of Petitioning.
As to the Words or Terms of the Petition. As every Ser⯑mon ought to Conform to the Text, every Book to its Title, every Application to the Doctrine, ſo every ſuch Application to Authority, ought to Conform to the Title, which always bears the term HUMBLE in the Front of it, An Humble Addreſs, or An Humble Petition, and the like.
I Confeſs there is room for Reflection enough here, where Humility takes up the Title, and all manner of Inſolencies, Scandals, Reproaches, and unjuſt Aſſertions, fill up the Bo⯑dies of Addreſſes; and Petitions are made in the Language of the Spaniſh Beggars, who they ſay, beg an Alms with the Hat in one hand, and the Sword in the other.
What elſe can we ſay of the Addreſſers, that tell the Parli⯑ament, they are Acting contrary to the Fundamental Rights of the Nation; that their Votes are Inconſiſtent with the Conſtitution of Scotland, Enſlaving them to England, and Surrendering the Liberties and Freedoms of the Scots Nation; in plain Words, [8] Betraying their Native Country to the Engliſh, and Deſtroying that Foundation, which is their Duty to preſerve and defend, and the like?
In all Nations ſuch Addreſſings have been eſteemed con⯑trary to the Duty of Subjects, contrary to the Nature of Ad⯑dreſſing, and contrary to the Dignity of Authority; and there⯑fore the Parliament of England, in the Caſe of the Famous Kentiſh Petition ſhow'd their Reſentment, not at Petitioning in General, for that every Body allowed, was the Privilege of the Subject, but at the manner or Expreſſion, the Words of which were, That they would turn their Humble Addreſſes into Bills of Supply. Now, tho' it was no Breach of Duty to Pe⯑tition the Parliament to ſupply the King's wants for the Pub⯑lick Good; yet in this particular turn, the Parliament thought the Petitioners took upon them to Reproach the Houſe, with trifling their time away in Complements and Addreſſes when the neceſſity of the Nation called for ſupply⯑ing the Publick for Action.
This as out of the Sphere of a Petition they reſented, and therefore Voted, it Scandalous, Inſolent, and Seditious; ſend for the Perſons who preſented it in Cuſtody, and afterwards committed them to the Gate-houſe, tho' Gentlemen of the beſt Quality in their Country.
I am not arguing from hence, what ſhould be done here, the Government here is Gentle, Mild, and bear a great deal; but they ought not to have the more Inſult put upon them for that very Reaſon.
The manner or method of a Petition, ought to Correſpond with its Title, be Humble, the Expreſsion Modeſt, the Diction Decent, Soft, and Void of every thing Diſreſpectful, Unmannerly, and much leſs Untrue, I mean the Language of it.
[9]As to the manner of Delivery, this ought to be ſtill, more Courteouſly managed, and to ſute Firſt the Cuſtoms of the Place in the Caſe of Petitions, Secondly, The Perſons Peti⯑tioning, and Thirdly, The Perſons who are Petitioned or Ad⯑dreſſed to.
The Decency due to Government, and eſpecially to the Au⯑thority of Parliament, requires all poſſible Reſpect, as it is the Supreme Authority of the Nation, the Body cloathed with the Sanction of Legiſlature on one Hand, and Sovereign Judica⯑ture on the other.—An humble Petition, and humbly preſented, is without doubt, the juſt Debt of applying to this Power.—All manner of Tumultuous Aſſemblings, all manner of Threatning Appearances or Speeches, are in this Caſe Scandalous, Inſolent, and Seditious, to lead, direct, Com⯑mand, much leſs threaten and ſpeak roughly to them, is an Inſolence deſtructive to the very Nature of Government, and the Diſtance of Subjects.—What tho' they are the Ser⯑vants of the State, and accountable for Juſtice, Truth, and Liberty; yet, are they not ſubjected to the Inſults of the Sub⯑ject in the Execution of their Great Truſt?—The Authori⯑ty they exerciſe is Sacred, and ought not to be treated with Diſreſpect or Contempt.
The long diſputed Caſe of their being accountable, never amounted to more, than that they are accountable in Con⯑ſcience, Honour and Intereſt: But it remains to prove, that ever any Member repreſenting his Country, can be called to account in any Court for things done in Parliament, either in this Kingdom, or in England; if they were, no Man would ſerve his Country at that Price.
The Method of Petitioning therefore in your Neighbouring Kingdom is thus far Confin'd by Law, to prevent all manner of Tumultuous Aſſemblies, that not more than five Perſons can appear at the preſenting any Petition, be the Subject of it of [10] never ſo Publick a Nature: and this has effectually prevented the great Miſchiefs of Riotous Petitioning, which in their turn have proved Pernicious, both to Government and to People in England, and muſt have ill Conſequences in any Country where ſuch Exorbitances are unreſtrain'd.
But ſay the Objectors againſt this Doctrine, Have we com⯑mitted all our Power to our Repreſentatives, and is it in their Power to Ruin us all? This brings me to the Third Head.
3. Of the Duty of the Petitioned.
And here I lay ſome Heads down for others to inlarge upon, for in this ſmall Tract I have not Room.
- 1. All our Civil Rights are not ſubjected, no not to Parliament, as particularly, 'tis not in their Power to take away the Right of being Repreſented, tho' without doubt it is in their Power to Enlarge, or Con⯑tract, Settle, and Limit the Number of the Repreſenta⯑tives and the ſpace of the Countries they ſhall Repre⯑ſent. And whereas ſome infer from hence, That then they may reſolve the whole Repreſentative into a ſingle Perſon, and they think they have a mighty Victory in this.—I Anſwer,—Every part of the King⯑dom, which has been a ſeparate Government, muſt be ſeparately Repreſented; becauſe its Right of being Repreſented, began in its ſeparate State, and cannot be taken away.—But yet every Kingdom, that by themſelves or their Repreſentatives, Conſent even to Suſpend their being Repreſented at all, may doubtleſs do it for a time, tho it cannot be for their Poſterity; becauſe the Right of being Repreſetned de⯑ſcends with the Land, and the Free-holder himſelf cannot give it away, Charters, Burghs, or Corpora⯑tions, [11] may be Forfeited and Disfranchiſed, but the Free-hold Land ſhall ever Entitle the Poſſeſsor to a Right of being Repreſented.
According to Mr. Hodges ‘"The Repreſentative has all the Right and Power of the Free-holder P—:"’ And if ſo, then he has this Authority much more, and may give away all, but I dare not run that length.
- 2. A Repreſentative cannot bind Conſcience, or oblige in Contradiction to the Laws of GOD.—All their Votes, all their Authority ceaſes, when once they Contraveen the expreſs Laws of GOD, and in that Caſe, their Power is ipſo facto Diſſolved, and they ceaſe to be a Legiſlature, in ſo far only as they Act a⯑gainſt, or in Oppoſition to the Divine Law, the Apoſtles Queſtion in that Caſe ſtrongly implying the Negation.—Whether it be lawful to obey GOD rather than Man, judge ye?
Nor can they make Laws againſt Nature or Reaſon, but in every thing elſe they have the full Legiſlative and Judicature committed to them, and it can not be Rational to ſubject them to the Tumultuous Authority of their Conſtituents.
I know it is affirm'd here, That the Barons have a Right, if they pleaſe, to Decline a Repreſentative, and come up and ſit in Perſon, as the Peers do.
Whether they have ſuch a Right or no, is not my buſineſs to Debate here, but I'll offer one Negative to ſuch an abſurd No⯑tion, that I believe will ſerve to the preſent Caſe, viz. That they cannot have ſuch a Right now, for this Current Parliament; they having by their Election, already concluded themſelves for this time; if ever they have ſuch a Right, which nevertheleſs I do not grant, it muſt be when a new Parliament is to be choſen.—But the Caſe, for this Parliament is Determin'd, and cannot be altered.
[12] But how far then is a Parliament obliged by the Addreſſes of the Heretors or Conſtituents, and what is their Duty in ſuch Caſes? For this is the Grand Queſtion before us.
I Anſwer, Addreſſes if decently Worded, Dutifully with reſpect to Authority Preſented, and Significant in their Nature, ought to be received; and in this part, I muſt own, The Parliament of Scotland, have been over and above, regard⯑ful of their Duty, for that they have received ſuch Addreſſes, containing ſuch Inſulting of their Authority, ſuch Arraigning their Proceedings, ſuch Leading their Voices, ſuch Limi⯑ting their Legal Power, and ſuch Indecent and Diſreſpectful Treating their Perſons, as no Subject in theſe Ages have ever, that I remember, done with Impunity, in any Nation but this;—and therefore, I think, with Submiſſion, no Objection will ly againſt them on that Score.—
2. Nor is it the Duty of Repreſentatives to receive only the Addreſſes of the Subjects; but indeed they ſeem to me to owe a Reading, and if the Subſtance require it, to conſider and debate the Matters laid before them in it. If any Man ſhall ask ſo weak a Queſtion, as who ſhall be Judge, whether the Subſtance require their Debates or no? The Nature of De⯑bating anſwers that, for they can debate upon nothing elſe but the Merits of the Petition; And if they find it fri⯑volous or vexatious, without queſtion they may either lay it aſleep in the houſe by the ſtill Voice of a general Neglect, or caſt it back with Reſentment, as the Caſe in their Opinion de⯑ſerves; If this be not in their Choice, then it is no more an Ad⯑dreſs or Petition, but a Precept or Mandamus, the People ſign⯑ing it are no more Addreſſers, Petitioners or Deſirers, but Di⯑rectors and Preceptors, and the whole Scale of Order inverts to Democracy and Confuſion.
3. Doubtleſs, and I believe any Member of Parliament will allow me this, if the Parliament in Caſe of an Addreſs [13] preſented, receiv'd and conſidered, find Matter of Right in it, the Subjects Grievances truly repreſented, and the Demand juſt, if an Oppreſſion to be remedied, if injurious Encroach⯑ments on Right and Property are to be removed, if any thing previous be there laid before them, in which they ſee the Sub⯑ject injur'd, and that 'tis in their Power to right him; tho the Addreſſer be never ſo mean, ſo low, or ſo deſpicable, and tho the Injury were back'd with never ſo much Power, they are bound in Duty, in Conſcience, and in regard to the Truſt committed to them, to anſwer the ſaid Requeſt, redreſs, right, reſtore, and help the injur'd People, whoſe Rights they are entruſted to protect and defend.
I ſhall not enlarge on the Duty of a Repreſentative, I ſee no Members here ſtand in need of my weak Inſtructions, or that want to be put in mind of their Duty to their Country.
4. Of the Duty of Petitioners.
I come now to the laſt Article, and the main Occaſion of this Tract, the Duty of Perſons addreſſing or petitioning; for without queſtion there is a Duty due there too, how negli⯑gent ſoever People are of it, and how willing ſoever ſome are to forget the Obligation.
And here I muſt begin with Negatives, and I cannot but put you in mind of the honeſt Miniſter at the New Kirk, who told ye, that he did not underſtand addreſſing to Authority with SWORD IN HAND: This, as that Gentleman very well ſaid, is rather a bold Declaration, than an humble Addreſs.
If People will addreſs—let them do it like an Addreſs; if they will petition, let it be a Petition—On the other hand, if they will remonſtrate, let them remonſtrate, and be plain; if they have Reaſon and Juſtice, no doubt the Parliament will hear them both ways: But to remonſtrate and addreſs both [14] in a breath, that's like the French King making War while he gives Peace to Europe. To have it be an Humble Addreſs in the Title, and a bold Declaration in the Body of the Paper, this is neither Peace nor War; it looks no way and every way, all together: In ſhort, 'tis neither Honeſt nor Legal; 'tis not Legal, becauſe 'tis againſt Government, and does not correſ⯑pond with lawful Authority; and 'tis not honeſt, becauſe it does not correſpond with it ſelf, it calls it ſelf one thing, & really is an⯑other; it has a Silken Face and a Steely Heart, a Smile on the Brow and a Grin in the Thought, 'tis Unjuſt and Unfair.
If you will be call'd Addreſſers or Petitioners, you muſt act as ſuch, or elſe 'tis honeſter to quit the Title.
The Duty of Addreſſers, in the next place, is to leave the Matter of their Addreſſes to the Conſideration of the Perſons addreſſed or petitioned, and to acquieſce in their Determina⯑tion or Judgment: An Addreſs that will have no Nay, is no more an Addreſs, but, as I ſaid before, a Precept and Dire⯑ction.
To ſuch, for ſuch I find here, I cannot but ſpeak a word by way of Direction.—At the ſame time that you plead for a Right of Petitioning, I hope you do not demand a Right, or by it mean a Right of directing.
I confeſs, I am at ſome loſs to know how ſome Gentlemen, who addreſs'd the preſent Parliament, would have us to underſtand theſe Words, WE HOPE AND CONFIDENTLY EXPECT; Words frequently uſed in ſome Addreſſes I have ſeen here, whether they really have any Confidence in the Parliament or no, I cannot tell; 'tis my Opinion, they have ENOUGH in the Expreſsion.
A Right of Petitioning, I agree, is undoubted, but what Authority theſe Gentlemen will bring for a Right to oblige the Parliament to follow their Di⯑rections, I cannot imagine any more, than I can how [15] they would properly be called a Parliament, or Re⯑preſentative, if that Power were left in the Perſons they repreſent.
As therefore, I would by no means leſſen the Au⯑thority of the People, in the Reſerves of Right left them, and which are not Committed to the Repreſenta⯑tives; ſo I would by no means Reduce Parliaments to Mobs and Rabbles, and make them pay their Homage every day to the Abſolute Directions of their Conſtitu⯑ents; this were indeed, to ſacrifice to OUR SOVEREIGN LORD, THE PEOPLE; this were to level the Legiſlators, as a late Author has it, to the Will and Humour of the People, State of the Controverſie. Page 4. This were to make the Members Repreſentatives, and the Mob be the Parliament. GOD deliver this Nation from the Confuſion of ſuch a Conſtitution, and the Conſequences of ſuch kind of Doings.
The People, without doubt, have Committed to their Re⯑preſentatives, the Management of all their Civil Affairs, the power of Making, Explaining, Amending, Executing and Re⯑pealing Laws.—In theſe terms, are concluded all the Truſts, that are contain'd in Life, Limb, Property and Eſtate.—This Management extends to Subjecting Life and Eſtate to Puniſh⯑ment for Crimes, Stating Protection to Property, and Admi⯑niſtration of Juſtice, Regulating, Altering, Limiting, and Declaring all things belonging to Government, Succeſſion, Conſtitution, and Executive Power.
In all theſe things, you are to Acquieſce and Submit to the Determination of the Repreſentatives; you, mark that, your ſelves having Conſtituted and Appointed them by a Volunta⯑ry Legal Choice, your Deputies, your Plenipotentiaries, to Concert, Settle and Eſtabliſh all theſe things in your behalf.
[16]If your neareſt Relations break the Laws they make, you follow them to the Gibbet with Regret and Lamentations, at the Misfortune in Committing the Crime; but no Complaint at the Makers of the Law, ye Acquieſce in that, as the Act and Deed of the Parliament.
'Tis hard, we ſhould Acquieſce in ſome things, and ſcruple others, ſince their Authority is Equal in all.
What has been ſaid on this Part, will however bear this juſt Inference, and 'tis one of the beſt Uſes I can turn the Diſcourſe to, viz.
This Doctrine quite overthrows the Legality of People, firſt addreſſing, and then aſſembling to make an open De⯑mand of an Anſwer, or what elſe they pleaſe to call it to their Addreſs.
And thoſe Gentlemen that find fault with the late Procla⯑mation, for preventing ſuch Aſſembling, as Illegal, can ne⯑ver defend the Legality of their Part, to come in a Body, as ſome People call it, expecting therefore the more Reſpect: This can have no other nor better Conſtruction, than to ſay, We will make ſuch an Appearance as ſhall awe the Parlia⯑ment by our Numbers to grant our Demands.
I would not be a forward Cenſurer of the Deſigns of any Body, further than Reaſon juſtifies; but I cannot ſee it will bear any other Conſtruction, and if not, then it is directly contrary to the very Nature of Addreſſing, as well as to the Duty and Deference owing to Parliamentary Authority.
What can the meaning of Number be but Strength, what their Appearing, but Force? The Government therefore are highly juſtified in exerting the needful Authority entruſted to them for that end, in preventing the early Beginnings of thoſe Aſſemblies, that contrary to the Nature and true Mean⯑ing of Addreſſers, deſign'd to have aw'd or influenc'd the Parliament in their Appearance.
[17]Thoſe Gentlemen, who ever they are, that contriv'd that Deſign, were in my Opinion ſtrangely miſtaken in their Mea⯑ſures, and have ſomething to account for to their Diſcretion, if they had really a Deſign to have inſulted the Parliament; for they could not but imagine, that an Attempt of drawing to⯑gether undiſcerned, muſt be impoſſible in a City no bigger than this, and in a Government that God be praiſed has their Eyes about them.
Nor could they expect, but at the firſt Appearance of a Concourſe of Strangers, the Town would be allarm'd, their Deſign be diſcovered, and conſequently prevented.
But I muſt own, they made amends for their want of Fore⯑caſt in the Deſign, by the Diſcretion of laying it aſide at laſt, and not ruining themſelves and their Friends upon the cer⯑tain Deſtruction of an impracticable Attempt; and I doubt not, they will be ſenſible by this time, that they were in the wrong.
But this by the way; that Part I am upon is in ſhort thus: All Tumultuary Parts of Management in Matters of Addreſ⯑ſing or Petitioning Parliaments or Governours, is not contra⯑ry to the Laws only, but contrary to the Nature of Addreſ⯑ſing, contrary to the Duty of Subjects, and ought rather to be call'd, Bold Declarations in Oppoſition to Legal Autho⯑rity.
II. Of the Obligation of National Oaths
THis is a new Point, and if handled, in a way that may ſeem ſomething new, the Gentlemen concerned will, I hope, not be under any Surprize; ſince it will only diſcover, that ſome People raiſed their Scruples, more for want of due Enquiry, than from the real Difficulty of the Queſtion.
[18]Moſt People who have entred upon this Article, have a⯑muſed us with the Enquiries into the Extent of the Oaths and Obligations, which this Nation lyes under, and with Debat⯑ing how far they are, or are not binding to the Poſterity of thoſe that took them; and theſe Enquiries have one peculi⯑ar, which ſeems very natural to them, (Scilicet) To leave People as much or more in the Dark, than they found them.
The various Opinions, and weak Arguments on both ſides, entangle the Subject, and ſerve only to leave it a doubtful Point, which no body can unravel; & this is what the Enemies of the Truth aim at, and are very well ſatisfied with, and in⯑deed it anſwers their end but too well.
The Broachers of Opinions in the World, have in all Ages fled to this Refuge, viz. When ſtrength of Reaſoning, would not ſupport their Errors, they ſtruggle to cloud the Argument with abſtrufe Conjectures, ambiguous Interpretations, dark and difficult Suggeſtions, and any thing that may render the Subject myſterious; for, that if once the Doctrine has but dif⯑ficulty enough in it, to divide the Opinions of Men, and have ſome be of one mind, and ſome of another in the matter, they gain the Point; and 'tis odd, but ſome eſpouſe it, be the Error never ſo groſs.
To avoid this Evil in the Caſe in hand, to take from the Adverſary the Advantage of making this a Moot point, and that leaving People Doubting and Unſatisfied, they may bring them out of Love with the occaſion. I ſhall come quite ano⯑ther way, and I hope a nearer way to the Truth.
To ſtate the Queſtion right, is the way to make this plain Truth yet plainer, and I think it lyes as follows.
There are National Obligations, which have been taken in Scot⯑land, either by us our Fathers, and which we hold our ſelves e⯑qually bound to,—which in their Nature interfere with our Incor⯑porating with England, in the preſent propoſed Ʋnion.
[19]That this is the true ſtate of the Queſtion, I could prove from too many of the weak and ill temper'd Arguments, which ſome People have made uſe of in Publick, to Defend their Clamours at the Treaty; and which I only Conceal, becauſe I would not record the folly of the Perſons, who, I hope, may in time, come to be better Inform'd, and I am unwilling to leave them any thing to bluſh at.
But to put my Argument right, I muſt back it with one Authentick Quotation, viz. Out of the ſo well known Addreſs of the Presbytery of Hamilton to the Parliament; a Thing I ſhall have occaſion to mention again in the courſe of this Tract, the Words are thus.
But that which more eſpecially obliges us in Duty and Conſci⯑ence, as Miniſters of the Goſpel of Peace, moſt Humb⯑ly to Interpoſe with your Grace and Lordſhips, is, the Lamen⯑table and Diſtracted ſtate of the Kingdom, and particularly the People under our Paſtoral Charge, from the ſad Appre⯑henſion they have of the Woful Conſequences of ſuch an U⯑nion, to their Liberties, Civil and Religious;—And that IT CANNOT BE ENTRED INTO by the Nation, in the Terms, without Incurring the Guilt of NATIONAL PERJURY.
This is plain to my purpoſe, and Juſtifies my propoſed ſtate of the Queſtion.
I ſhall not ſpend the Readers time here, to ſtate the Obli⯑gations; nor ſhall I repeat the Oaths or Covenants, which are here meant, further than to lay it down, juſt as the Gentle⯑men themſelves alledge, viz. That having taken an Oath, or entred into a Solemn Engagement, either they or their Fathers, for that they ſay is all one, obliging themſelves, as far as ſhall be in their power, to Support and Maintain the Reformation, of Religion againſt all Error or Novations whatſoever, together with an Obligation to Maintain and Defend the Kings Perſon, [20] the Laws and Parliamentary Authority, all the lawful Juriſ⯑dictions, &c. as may be ſeen at large, in the National Con⯑feſsion.
This, they ſay, obliges them to have no Union, with a Na⯑tion profeſſing contrary to this Principle; much leſs, with a Na⯑tion, whoſe Church is eſtabliſht upon that very Epiſcopacy, which they think themſelves obliged by their Oath, and in both their National and Church Capacity, to Aboliſh and pull down.
Then as to Civil Matters, they are oblig'd, they ſay by this Oath, to Maintain and Defend the Parliament, Government and Sovereignty of Scotland, and the like, which they appre⯑hend, they do not do by the Union.
I'll do the Gentlemen that Juſtice, to acknowledge, that they begin very much to decline the laſt Objection, being, as they ſearch into it, further and further Convinc'd, of the Weak⯑neſs of that part;—and eſpecially as a thing they are not ſo Solicitous about.—But as to the firſt, they ſeem very poſitive and warm in the caſe.
I ſhall not lay the ſtreſs of this Matter, where theſe People do, and therefore the Triumph they make, over thoſe that Argue againſt the Obligation of National Oaths, on the Poſte⯑rity of the People taking them, ſhall ſtand them in no ſtead here, for I'll readily grant them for Argument ſake, whether I believe it or no is not material, That the National Oaths or Co⯑venant, or both, which their Fathers took, has all that Obli⯑gation they alledge, let that alſo be what it will, on us their Children; That they having eaten theſe ſour Grapes, our Teeth are ſet on edge by them, and that by no Shift, Evaſion, Subterfuge, or whatever Contrivance, we can be cleared of the Bond.
Having granted this, I hope no Man will take it ill, if I very narrowly ſearch all the unhappy Policies of this perverſe [21] Generation, to bring us in Bound by theſe National Obligations not to unite with England.
'Tis not at all to the preſent Purpoſe, whether we are bound by theſe Oaths, but whether do theſe Oaths prevent our joining with England in the Terms of the Union, and whether it be true or no, as is quoted from the Presbytery of Hamilton, That it cannot be entred into without incurring the Guilt of National Perjury.
To enquire directly into this,—it will be neceſſary to diſtinguiſh here the Obligation of the Oath, and the Subſtance of the Treaty of Union.
The Obligation is againſt the Invaſions of Error, and for preſerving the Purity of Religion; 'tis an Oath to maintain and defend the Presbyterian Government and Diſcipline of the Church. This I take to be a fair Abſtract of it.
Now againſt this let us ſet the Treaty, and ſee what are the Stipulations between the Two Kingdoms; and without running thro' the Articles, they conſiſt in general Heads of Agreement and mutual Coalition in Matters of Civil Go⯑vernment, Communication of Privileges, Regulations of State and Poſtulata of Trade.—And pray Gentlemen, take it along with you, there is not in the Treaty one word of the things contain'd in the Oaths we are upon; nor are any of the Heads of thoſe Oaths concern'd here: Of which preſently.
Next, let us diſtinguiſh here of the Subjects of theſe Oaths on one hand, and the Subjects of the Treaty on the other hand, and the ſeveral Capacities of either, as they reſpect the Caſe in hand; and here we ſhall find them alſo as diſtinct and unconcern'd, as if they were not the ſame Perſons.
The Subjects of the Oaths are the People of Scotland, Na⯑tionally conſider'd, in their Eccleſiaſtick Capacity, or the Peo⯑ple of Scotland in their Religious Capacity, as Presbyterians, reform'd from Popery and Prelacy, and erected in a Na⯑tional [22] Church, which they engage ſolemnly to defend; and I would have them defend it to the end of the World.
The Subjects of the Treaty of Union are the People of Scotland in their Politick Capacity, as a Government under a limited Monarchy, a Queen reigning veſted with a Legal, Undoubted and Undiſputed Right; a Parliament Repreſent⯑ing, Sitting and acting by Law, and both together legally, and beyond the Power of Cavil, veſted with Right and Au⯑thority, to debate of and determine every thing which may be for the Publick Good of the Body to be Governed, and which relates to Civil Right, Law, Juſtice and Policy.
That to diſtinguiſh the People of Scotland thus in their ſe⯑veral Capacities Politick and Religious, is juſt and to the Pur⯑poſe, will eaſily appear in that they are diſtinguiſh'd ſo alrea⯑dy, both in the Nature of the Thing and in the different Pacts of Government.
The Government of the State, including all the latter Branch of the above Diſtinction, is entirely ſeparate from, Uncon⯑cern'd with, has no Influence upon, nor is at all influenc'd by the Government of the Church, which is the former Branch of the ſaid Diſtinction. The Parliament repreſents the People in their Civil Capacity; the Church has no Voice in the Election, nor is at all Repreſented there; nor is any thing co⯑gnizable there, relating to the Religious Capacity of any In⯑dividual Subject of Scotland: The Civil Government has in⯑deed the Eccleſiaſtick in its Protection, and 'tis its Duty to defend and ſupport it.—But even the Queen and Parlia⯑ment cannot, no not by Law, dethrone the Power and Con⯑ſtitution of the Church of Scotland, as Presbyterian,—be⯑cauſe it will for ever be juſt, as is expreſs'd in the Claim of Right, That the People ought to have that Religion eſtabliſh'd which is their own Choice.—
[23]Nor are they diſtinct in the Government only, but in the very Perſons governing; the People of Scotland in their Civil Capacities, are governed by the Queen; and the Laws, Juſtice and Legiſlature is lodg'd in the Queen, and the Parliament; and all Men are Subject to it.
The People of Scotland in their Religious Capacity are go⯑verned by the Eccleſiaſtick Authority of Seſſion, Presbytery, Synod and Aſſembly; and to theſe even the Sovereign and Parliament in their Eccleſiaſtick and Separate Capacity are pleaſed to be Subject.
Thus I defend the Diſtinction as to the Subjects of the re⯑ſpective Caſes before us.
Things thus ſet clear of one another, and examin'd apart, I muſt confeſs, to me it is one of the profoundeſt Myſteries in Nature; and I can ſee no ſhadow of a Diſcovery, how the Union of two Nations in their meer Civil and Politick Con⯑cerns, can affect their Religious Concern:
But to come nearer yet,—Theſe Things are not only divided and diſtinguiſh'd in their own Nature, but they are expreſly diſtinguiſh'd in the Treaty it ſelf, which profeſſes to unite the two Kingdoms in their Civil and Politick Capacity, as to Oeconomy, Government, Intereſt and Commerce; but expreſly reſerves to each, the Separate State and Abſolute Independency of all their Religious Affairs.
To make this more clear, care was taken to remove all manner of Jealouſies on either hand, by expreſly providing, limiting and forbidding, That the Commiſſioners on either ſide, ſhould have any Authority, to Treat of Matters relating to the Church.
The Reaſon was plain, the Union was not concern'd in it; the Churches in either Kingdom were ſettled, fixt and Eſtabliſhed, and were ſo to remain; They were not to Unite or to Treat about Uniting: the Buſineſs of the Union [24] is not to bring them together, but to keep them aſunder; not to bring them into one Government, but to ſecure them in their being two.
The Church of Scotland, or the People of Scotland in their Religious Capacity, have no Concern in the Treaty, they are not at all Uniting, the Pale of Diſtinction is as firm, and if I may ſay it, the Church of Scotland better Secured, and bet⯑ter Fixt as to Humane Power, than ever it was before: hav⯑ing the Faith of a Treaty, perhaps more Solemn than ever was yet made in the World to Support her, and all the Men of Honeſty and Principle in the whole Iſland, to Support and Defend, to Recognize and ſee to the Execution of that Treaty.
If then the Independency of the Religious Government in Scotland be thus reſerv'd and ſecur'd, I cannot ſee which way the Oaths or Covenants of the People of Scotland in Religious Matters, are any way infring'd, becauſe indeed, not any way concern'd in, or ſubjected to any Article of the Treaty.
The Firſt Objection I meet with here, is, Yet we are ſub⯑jected to the Legiſlation of Biſhops.
To this much might be ſaid, as that they are Barons, and Vote in the Houſe of Lords as ſuch, but exerciſe no Spiritual Authority there: And I do not ſee, but if an Eccleſiaſtick in Scotland, either by Blood came to be a Peer, or by Vote was Choſen a Repreſentative in Scotland, he might ſit in Par⯑liament too; but I wave that. My direct Anſwer here, is,
- 1. You as a Church, have no hand in the placing them there; for in your Eccleſiaſtick Capacity, you have no Concern in the Ʋnion at all, nor the Church of Eng⯑land neither.
- 2. To clear your Conſciences from the Guilt, and your ſelves from the Subjection, you Proteſt againſt your [25] being Subjected in any Religious Matters to their Vote.
And let what Pretences ſo ever be made here, I ſee no Room for any Queſtion, whether this does not effectually clear you, ſince you have neither Agency in the Fact, nor are ſubjected to the Conſequences. How then can the Oath be affected here?
2. But ſay ſome Gentlemen, more willing to be Scrupulous than to be anſwered; We are bound, as far as lyes in us, to pull down Prelacy, even in England.
This is a wild Objection, I confeſs, and more wildly made uſe of by ſome People.
Either this is an Eccleſiaſtical Obligation, or a Civil one, both it cannot be.
If it be a Civil Obligation, how will you underſtand it? Are you to do it by Force? If ſo, the very Words, As far as in our Power are againſt you, Ʋltra poſſe non eſt eſſe. I pre⯑ſume, no Man will ſay, he is bound to the Attempt, whether poſſible or no, like the Fifth Monarchy-mad-men in England, who were to Crown King Jeſus with an Army of 25 Men, and ſo went out to fight the Lord againſt the Mighty. 'Tis plain, the Impoſſibility on that ſide Diſſolves the Nature of the Oath.
If it be an Eccleſiaſtical Oath, it muſt be executed in an Ec⯑cleſiaſtical manner, and here all your Weapons are put into your Hands, and a fair Field given you; and I long, I con⯑feſs, to ſee the War begun. But what are the Weapons? Tru⯑ly they are terrible ones, THE WORD and PRAYER; and here you may Execute your Engagements to the full, PRAY them down, and PREACH them down, and LIVE them down; and the ſooner this Strife begins, the better, I am ſure the Union will be far from Obſtructing it; and I [26] wiſh all the Strife in Britain, I mean as to Religion, was re⯑duced to this.
In ſhort, to any that are willing to judge Impartially, it muſt be evident, the Church of Scotland has no manner of Concern in this Treaty as a Church, her Eſtabliſhment is founded upon the Laws, which Laws are made Inviolable by the Treaty, no ways ſubjected to the Parliamentary Power that ſhall follow, and Conſequently intirely free from the Legiſlation of the Epiſcopal Clergy of England.
Upon this Foundation being laid, it muſt follow, that the Oaths or Obligations inſiſted upon here, are not at all affected by this Ʋnion; And therefore, with Submiſsion to the Preſ⯑bytery of Hamilton, there can be no ſhadow of National Perjury in it.
As to any parts of the Oaths which ſeems to engage the People of Scotland not to alter their Conſtitution, it would be Ridiculous and Abſurd. For then, (1mo.) They muſt pretend they are Bound never to mend their Condition, tho' the greateſt Advantages in the World were to be offered them. (2do.) Tho' Subverſion at Home, or Invaſion Abroad, offered it ſelf, they could not Unite with any Body, tho for the ſupport & Preſervation of themſelves, to bind themſelves to theſe things, would make it an unlawful Oath, for every Man, and every Go⯑vernment, is bound to do all poſsible and lawful things for the Good and Advantage of the Publick, and to Swear not to do that Good which is your Duty would be unlawful.
All the Cavils at the Form have been effectually anſwer'd already; I ſhall repeat nothing, nor enquire any more into the Suggeſtions, of the Treaty being an entire Surrender of the Conſtitution diſſolving, ſubjecting, &c. The word U⯑NION is an Anſwer to it; Union cannot be a Subjection; the word TREATY is another; How can a Treaty upon [27] Conditions be a Surrender of Freedom? how can making of Agreements upon Articles be call'd a Subjection?
I ſee nothing needful to add to this Argument: I would be glad to hear what any Mens Scruples may dictate by way of further Objection; But till then I muſt conclude, the Oaths and National Obligations of the People of Scotland, are not at all concern'd in this Union, how binding ſoever they may be in other Caſes.
To fill People then with Scruples at the Publick Affairs, and alarm them with breaking Oaths, National Perjury, and the like: Where the Oath is not at all concern'd, is nothing but the Effect of Party Inſinuations, a Handle form'd to be taken hold of to ſerve a Turn, and to fright Innocent People from joining in the Good of their Native Country.
I muſt confeſs, I know not what to ſay to the Multiplying Oaths on either hand, and heartily wiſh, neither Nation were ſo much encumbred with them, as they are. A General Uni⯑on of Temper and Affection, which, I hope, will at laſt fol⯑low the Union of Politicks, will ſoon take away, not the Obli⯑gation, but the occaſion of theſe Bonds from us all.
I cannot therefore ſufficiently Applaud the Prudence of the Publick, in the caſe of a new invented Oath here, lately of⯑fered in the Commiſſion, and afterward in Parliament, and Rejected in both.
I muſt confeſs, I think there are good Reaſons to be given againſt Impoſing Oaths of any ſort upon the Subject, other than the common Oath of Obedience to the Government, which is a Reciprocal Obligation; the King or Queen taking an Oath to Govern, and the Subjects to Obey, and both with this San⯑ction, as the Teſt of the Obligation, viz. ACCORDING TO LAW.
The frequency of Oaths, has in my Obſervation, theſe Fa⯑tal but Conſtant Miſchiefs attending it. Firſt, That it tends [28] to leſſening the Solemnity of the thing, by making a formal Swearing familiar to the People; and I could give ſad Inſtan⯑ces of this in England, where the Word a Cuſtom-Houſe Oath is become ſuch a Proverb, and the thing ſuch a Jeſt, that 'tis fitter to be called a Cuſtomary Oath; and in ſome other Caſes, I believe, I could inſtance in ſome Oaths of Freedoms and Corporations, which I may ſay, 'tis Impoſſible to keep.
If theſe things are true, as I do not deſire to prove, be⯑cauſe I had rather conceal them; I think, they ſhould caution any Nation againſt Crouding the People with Oaths, and e⯑ſpecially unneceſſary ones.
2. In all kinds of Oaths relating to payment of Taxes, there are ſnares to the People, and this effect follows of courſe, that he gets moſt Money whoſe Conſcience is looſeſt, he that can Swear hardeſt, pays leaſt; and the Man of Conſcience, who dare not Tamper with his Maker, nor hurry up his Meaning in Suppoſitions, but when he is to Swear, conſiders of the Fact, and confines himſelf to the Truth, lyes under the Diſcouragement of paying the moſt Duties, and being Under⯑ſold and Injured in his Trade.
This is my Obſervation, only on Oaths in general, but as to Religious Teſts and Oaths, by way of Equivalent, I muſt con⯑feſs, there is ſomething Aſtoniſhing in it, to ſee ſome Gentle⯑men warm for them, that have ſo freely Cenſured, and per⯑haps too juſtly, their Neighbours, for making the like.
I frankly own, I believe the Sacramental Teſt Impoſed in England, a thing unlawful in its Nature, and Irreligious, as it is a Debaſing the Sacred Inſtitutions of Chriſt Jeſus, to Uſes Differing, Remote and perhaps Contrary, to their Primitive Inſtitution; and I make no queſtion, but even the Church of England themſelves, when further Inlightned from Heaven, and the time of their Compleat Reformation ſhall come, will free the Nation from thoſe Eccleſiaſtical Fetters, which are the [29] only remains of the Tyranny and Popiſh Practices of the late Abdicated times.
But how it came into the Thoughts of any People here, who at the ſame time have been very free with England on that head, to fall into the ſame evil, and prepare the very ſame Chains for their Native Country, under which their Neighbours ſo loudly groan, and for which they ſo loudly have blam'd them, is a Myſtery paſt my underſtanding.
The Parliament have therefore very wiſely Rejected their Propoſal, as the Commiſſion had done before; and the Gentle⯑men, who too haſtily came in to it, will I doubt not, in time ſee, that they have cauſe to be Thankful, for being deliver⯑ed, tho' againſt their Wills.
I kno' 'twill be objected here, that the Oath propoſed, was only deſign'd for ſuch of the Engliſh Nation, &c. that ſhould come to enjoy Places of Truſt or Profit in Scotland.
But give me leave, to let ſuch Gentlemen know, that ye had thereby opened the Door to the thing in general; and by Approving the placing Religious Oaths, on their Civil Im⯑ployments, tho now confin'd to Strangers, they for ever ſtop⯑ped their own Mouths, againſt all poſſible Objection, if the ſame in time to come, ſhould on any other occaſion be ex⯑pected of them.
They could never have argued againſt the Lawfulneſs of the thing; they could never have fenc'd againſt the Propha⯑neſs and Irreligion of it, the Dishonour, &c. It is to the Inſtitu⯑tion and Nature of an Oath, ſince their Mouths would be ef⯑fectually ſtopp'd, by telling them, That when it ſerv'd their own turn, they could deſcend to the very ſame thing, and were for hampering the Conſciences of others.
Beſides, who is it they would have bound to own the Pres⯑byterian Church of Scotland upon Oath? And let us examine a little the Reaſon and Kindneſs of it.
[30]The Anſwer will be ready, I kno', 'tis the Engliſh—Well, Gentlemen, and who among the Engliſh would you entangle thus? the honeſt Men or the Knaves? 'Tis plain, the laſt will not be entangled by it, for they'll take fourty Oaths to get a good Place; there's none but the honeſt Men that you can have a Deſign upon, and 'tis a little hard you ſhould contrive Methods to let the Knaves in among you, and ſhut honeſt Men out.
Well, but ſays another warm Gentleman, We would keep Church of England Men out in general.—
Say you ſo, Sir, Then you ſhould have alter'd your Oath, and have made it, that the Perſon ſhould have ſworn, That he was not of the Church of England, or to abjure Epiſcopacy, or ſome Oath particularly bent againſt Prelacy in general, or the Church of England in particular: But 'tis plain, this Oath would as effectually have fore-cloſed three parts in four of all the Diſſenters in England, as well as all that were Conſcienti⯑ous among the Church; So that in ſhort only one Sect of Diſ⯑ſenters might come among you; for which many of your honeſt Brethren of the Diſſenters, with whom you make no ſcruple to join in Communion, when you come to England, are exclud⯑ed, for which they are very much beholding to you.
I might here enter upon a Debate againſt the making an Oath of Faith;—I believe there is room to queſtion, whe⯑ther in the Nature of the Thing, call'd Faith, every Man can ſwear to what he believes, ſwear that he believes this or that Church to be the only true Church, or this or that Wor⯑ſhip to be the only true Worſhip.
Likewiſe I muſt own, I think 'tis very hard to make any Man ſwear, as in a certain Oath is expreſs'd, to continue in the Profeſſion & Obedience of this or that Religion or Opinion all the days of our Lives; whereas perhaps the Perſon may be ſome [31] time or other poſſeſſed in his Conſcience with Convictions, that he ought to alter ſome part of that Profeſſion, either as to Doctrine or Diſcipline, Fundamental or Circumſtance.
But I omit entring on this Debate, not that I think it dif⯑ficult, but with the Apoſtle I ſay, I hope without prophaneſs, I have many things to ſay, but you cannot bear them now.
The End of this Diſcourſe is in order to open the Eyes of thoſe well-meaning People, who ſeem prejudic'd, that the Parliament has not agreed to the propoſed Oaths, but has cau⯑tiouſly refuſed to put that Knife into their Hands, with which they would ha' wounded themſelves.
They can have no Reaſon to be uneaſy at this, ſince 'tis what no Man can defend; 'tis the Burthen, the Bondage, and in my Opinion the Scandal of their Neighbour Nation; and what I could ſay, if the Seaſon were proper, this Treaty would in ſome meaſure ha' delivered them from, had the Gentlemen here not thought fit to raiſe that Devil, which, I doubt, will not be in their Power to lay. But of this I may have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter, and at preſent do not think it reaſonable to explain my ſelf further.
I believe both Nations freeſt from Bondage when they are freeſt from Oaths of Diſtinction; and while they continue, I ſhall never eſteem the Union as perfect in all its parts, to have, made new ones here therefore, would have been a Step to prevent, or at leaſt delay, that more Chriſtian Union of Hearts and Affections among all the Subjects of Britain: which all wiſe Men wiſh, and good Men pray for.