Mr. PANINE's DEFENCE.
Mr. ERSKINE on the Part of the Defendant.

THE Attorney General, in that part of his addreſs to you which aroſe from the communication of the letter written to him from France, did not appear to me at all to play the actor; when he ex⯑hibited, moſt undoubtedly, ſigns of great ſenſibility and emotion, he ſpoke, I am perſuaded, as his own feelings dictated. With reſpect to his ſituation in receiving that letter, and feeling it his duty to pre⯑ſent it before you, Gentlemen, if his embarraſſment were that which he expreſſed, and that which he felt, what do you think mine muſt be? And, Gen⯑tlemen, as I am perſuaded my learned friend, for we have known one another from our childhood up⯑wards, does not conſider me to be bereft of thoſe feelings which belong to the human mind when it is well cultivated, though I do not poſſeſs them, I am perſuaded, in the degree he has the means to feel [34]them; yet, I truſt, my mind is not unſuſceptible of ſuch ſenſations. He ſpeaks, as he can only ſpeak, as a ſubject of a ſovereign, whoſe high ſituation re⯑moves him too far from his ſubjects to have any other affections than thoſe which grow from his great ſituation in ſociety. You will remember, Gen⯑tlemen, that I ſtand in the ſame ſituation towards another great perſonage, who is implicated in that which I am ready to admit to you is a groſs and ſcandalous libel, and that that is the moſt improper part of that letter which has been read, though I ſtand in a different relation. Beſides the duty I owe to that Prince to whom I am a ſervant, I owe to him and feel for him that affection which he de⯑mands as a man; but that ſhall not detach me from the duty which I conceive belongs to my preſent ſi⯑tuation. I ſtand here, Gentlemen, to do that which, if it were not done by me, the Author of this book, if in your eyes he is criminal for detracting as he has done from the Engliſh conſtitution, he would have ample ground indeed for that detraction; for an im⯑partial trial is one of the fruits we all hope is derived from that conſtitution under which we live, and from which we derive ſo many benefits. It would appear, I am perſuaded, a blur and a blot upon that conſtitution, if a man, ſtanding upon his trial, could ſay he could not be defended. I confeſs, Gentlemen, I ſhould have been glad if I had had an earlier opportunity of knowing correctly the con⯑tents of that letter. I ſhould have been glad if I [35]could have had an earlier opportunity alſo of know⯑ing, which I do not admit at preſent, that it was genuine and authentic; becauſe I know not only the impreſſion which ſuch a letter muſt make upon Gen⯑tlemen's minds who are the Jury to try the cauſe, but I feel the impreſſion it neceſſarily makes upon my own mind: but, as far as nature is able to ſtruggle againſt any difficulties thrown in, and with my duty to my client, I will exert it in the beſt manner I am able. I confeſs I cannot help thinking it would be a great advantage to the public, if the Attorney General is right in his comment upon the book, that by the law of England this book cannot exiſt, or be circulated, from the matter contained in it. I cannot help thinking he thought it for the intereſt of his country, and the merits of his proſe⯑cution, to read that letter. That letter contained what is wholly foreign to the proſecution before you, and my Lord could not receive it upon any other principle than this, that it admitted the Defendant was the author of it, and might tend to prove quo animo, that book was written by him. Gentlemen, no one fact whatever has been proved by the At⯑torney General as coming from the Defendant; or are they capable of faſtening upon him one act pre⯑vious to the work before you. No one expreſſion that he meant to produce civil war and diſcord in England; nothing reproachful either to the character or conduct of the Sovereign, or any of the family. And that letter is written months and months after [36]this book, which is the work of his brain, and after he had been, in a manner, drove from and expelled his country, to a new ſociety; where new ideas may have ſtarted up in his mind long ſubſequent to the work, and which, therefore, do not furniſh any fair commentary on the work itſelf. My friend has ſtated to you, that rumour has ſpread it abroad that this proſecution is carried on by him as a public of⯑ficer of the crown, without any private approbation of his own; and he thinks it neceſſary, and I think it right, to think, if he does ſo think, it has his concurrence, and he ſhould hold himſelf diſgraced in his profeſſion, of which he is ſo honourable a member, and in ſociety, if he had not brought this matter before you. Here he and I ſtand in a little different ſituation: he tells you rumour has ſpread it abroad; I am perſuaded it has ſo as to come to his ears. You will attend to truth or falſehood, and I might call upon all around me, except the few that are about the Attorney General, and who are within the immediate intelligence which he can convey, and aſk, Whether that rumour has ſpread itſelf abroad to any large or extended circle? With re⯑ſpect to myſelf, do I ſtand in that ſituation before you? Can you go to any of the places where men reſort for pleaſure or buſineſs, without ſeeing my name attacked and character wounded and torn to pieces for only doing that which, till I die, or while I continue in this profeſſion, I ſhall always continue to do? That is, without making myſelf a party in [37]the cauſe, without undertaking the defence of this or any other man, I will aſſert the freedom and in⯑tegrity of the Engliſh bar, with which the moſt va⯑luable part of the Engliſh conſtitution is loſt; for from the moment that any Engliſh advocate can ſtate he will or not ſtand between the Crown and the Subject that is put upon his trial, from that moment the liberty of the ſubject is gone. If a man high in the profeſſion preſumes to give judgment againſt the Defendant, he aſſumes the character of judicature; and if he is a man of ſome reputation (and my ſitua⯑tion entitles me to ſuppoſe I have ſome) refuſes to do it, how is any man to be defended? But, Gentlemen, I have no complaint to make, either againſt thoſe printers who have circulated opinions, or the authors of them. I take it a great many of them may be deluded, ſo as to think they render a ſervice to the public. If there be any deſcription of men, who, from malice and injuſtice, or from perſonal diſregard to me, have mixed in it, I forgive them; but I ſtand here, in my ſituation at the bar, to defend this book and the author in the manner I conceive by the laws of England they may be defended. Gentlemen, I could not help mentioning this, but I ſhould rather, I believe, poſtpone it for further conſideration. It is now my duty to ſtate to you what the queſtion in this cauſe is; for if it were the queſtion which rumour has invented and perverted, if it were the queſtion that thoſe who have ſo thought and ſpoken of me had conceived, it would [38]be a very ſpeedy determination; the queſtion is not, Whether the conſtitution of our fathers, under which we live, and under which I now preſent myſelf be⯑fore you, be or be not preferable to the conſtitution of America, or the conſtitution of France, or any other human conſtitution? In the nature of things that cannot be the queſtion. Gentlemen, I will put this matter in a light in which it appears to me, not merely the ſtrongeſt for the Defendant, but the ſtrongeſt for us all; for, though I abhor the calum⯑ny in the concluding part of that letter which has been read, there are truths in it which it imports us all to conſider; and, I am convinced, every man in a court of judicature, to diveſt himſelf of all pre⯑judices, and meet fairly the caſe of the parties that are ſubmitted to their conſideration.

Gentlemen, it has been aſſerted loudly and vari⯑ouſly, and Parliament has been aſſembled together out of the ordinary mode, upon the preſumption that theſe things were of miſchievous tendency. I ſhould ſuppoſe I am now addreſſing ſome gentlemen infected with the doctrine of this book, and have no love for the conſtitution of the country, and believe the country would be happier under the form of a republic. I have no difficulty in aſſerting, that if there were any of that opinion, and I believe I am not addreſſing myſelf to ſuch, but if I were addreſſ⯑ing myſelf to any who had ſuch ideas, I ſhould ſay, you cannot upon that ground find a verdict for the Defendant. You are bound to convict him, pro⯑vided, [39]in your judgment, he has tranſgreſſed thoſe limits the wiſdom and policy of the law of Eng⯑land (and it was that principle that made the con⯑ſtitution) have allowed, not merely for the preſerva⯑tion of the law of England, but for the liberty and freedom of the preſs; therefore it is impoſſible that you ſhould have any other ſpecies of juriſdiction: you have no authority but by the law of England; you have no right to give a verdict, and his lordſhip has no right to paſs ſentence againſt the Defendant, but for that juriſdiction, which the ſame law confers upon him; and therefore the queſtion is not whe⯑ther that law under which we live, is ſuperior or infe⯑rior to any other law, but whether it is upon thoſe principles upon which the conſtitution gave us that law, and that which is continued, and which the conſtitution does ſupport; and whether it does or does not give any man liberty to write as the Defendant in this book has written. Gentlemen, it may appear, in the outline of a cauſe like this, to be a large con⯑ceſſion, but my learned friend would ſay, it is rather an artful declaration of counſel; but it is neither, for it is truth: but if true, and I cannot ſuppofe go⯑vernment had not ſome foundation for aſſertions ſo general, if I were addreſſing myſelf to men who had read this book, whoſe ſouls were impreſſed with this book, who thought they were doing God ho⯑nour, and human nature juſtice, by haſtening to a revolution; I ſhould think myſelf wrong, if, as an advocate in an Engliſh court, and I ſhould think I [40]diſgrace my profeſſion if I ſaid, upon thoſe princi⯑ples, you could not give judgment for the Defendant. The law binds every man's conduct, and, therefore, it binds your conduct and mine, but it leaves opi⯑nion free and open; the conſequence follows there⯑fore abſolutely, and without any poſſibility of drawing a diſtinction; but if, upon the other hand, you ſhould diſapprove of the matter contained in the book, and feel that your own government, which he detracts from in ſeveral circumſtances, is far more valuable and firm in its original conſtruction, than that which he repreſents, and is not ſubject to en⯑croachments or abuſes which he ſtates, and that the propagation of the doctrines of it may tend to alienate the opinions and affections of ſome of the people, the ſubjects of the country, from the go⯑vernment of the country, ſtill you cannot, upon that footing, convict him, without going beyond thoſe limits, unleſs he has overſtepped that authority which the law of England has conſtituted as the ſcope and bound of the freedom of the preſs. Gen⯑tlemen, admit with the Attorney General, for it is in vain to deny it, that in every matter where you are to inveſtigate the mind of the man that has writ⯑ten, you muſt look alſo to the mind of the man who wrote it; you muſt ſee whether it is written bona fide, as lawyers expreſs it: but that, like every other queſtion of juſtice, muſt depend upon the evidence before a court of juſtice, and on the opinion of the court on that evidence; and therefore, whenever a [41]man is to be judged by any thing but the work itſelf, and the conſtruction that work affords; if it is neceſ⯑ſary to connect it with any other extrinſic matter, that extrinſic matter muſt be put on a part of the record: as, for inſtance—if Mr. Attorney General ſhould ſay, I do not mean to ſay that theſe things were written at another time, I do not mean to ſay, if they were circulated in a different manner, or connected with different circumſtances, which I ſay was the caſe of this book, it would be productive of bad conſe⯑quences, but that it was owing to the ſituation of France at this preſent moment; and it is owing to the ſitua⯑tion of that people, who have introduced and erected a republic, which Mr. Paine wiſhes to introduce into this country, for which purpoſe he writes a book, which at this moment is before you, and which I am to put a conſtruction upon, and to ſubmit thoſe circumſtances to your conſideration, I humbly con⯑tend before his lordſhip, that the law requires, for the ſafety of mankind, that any charge which a ſub⯑ject of the country is called upon to anſwer, ſhall be put literally on the record, that he may know what crime it is that he comes to anſwer. The Defend⯑ant here comes to anſwer having written this book; it does not ſtate any extrinſic circumſtances which render the writing of this book criminal in one in⯑ſtance, though it might be criminal in another; it does not ſtate any times or ſeaſons of publication, but it is ſetting down to pen theſe ſentences, and ſend⯑ing them to the world, that conſtitutes the off [...] [42]and conſequently the grammatical conſtruction of the book not in bits and ſcraps. The Attorney General, out of a book of 178 pages, has plucked only four and a half; but whether thoſe ſentences be or no beyond the liberty of the preſs, which the law of England has given for the moſt wiſe and uſeful purpoſes of ſociety; it is not whether you approve the book; not whether you condemn part of the paſſages of it; not whether you are of the ſame opinion with the author; but whether the man, at the time he wrote it, felt as he wrote, and whether he deſcribed himſelf as he felt. If my learned friend could make out to you this propoſition, I admit he will ſtand in a very different ſituation before the court. Mr. Paine ad⯑mired the conſtruction of the Engliſh government, perſuaded of its virtues, conſcious of the benefit de⯑rived from it to all the ſubjects under it; wiſhing to deſcribe the happineſs which is enjoyed under the conſtitution, with that belief he ſets down to write thoſe pages. He could not be defended or pro⯑tected for what he wrote, if he himſelf is deceived, and believes that which other men might materially differ from him in. If he thinks what you and I do not think, and under that impreſſion, and the ge⯑nuine apprehenſion of his underſtanding, he ſets down to write this book, he is not guilty of any of⯑fence againſt the law of England, although what he writes may be inconſiſtent with the principles of our government. I take it to be a great part of the free⯑dom of the Engliſh government, that every man, [43]as I ſtated before, ſhould be protected in the courſe of his trial; and I believe alſo, if the advocate en⯑tertains ſentiments hoſtile to the principles of the man he defends, he is not only juſtified, but called upon to conceal thoſe particular ſentiments from the court: if his ſentiments happen to be different from the man he is defending, he is equally bound to ſtate them; on the other hand, if his ſentiments ap⯑pear to be beneficial, he is equally bound to declare them. Now I know I am addreſſing myſelf per⯑fectly well to ſubjects of this country, and therefore entitled to ſuppoſe, what I have every reaſon to do, I am addreſſing myſelf to thoſe that are ſatisfied with the conſtitution of this country. I know very well every thing would come with very little weight from any quarter hat could be ſuſpected upon that head, therefore I give the Defendant the benefit of contend⯑ing he is not guilty; and I give him the benefit of knowing, that which it is not neceſſary you ſhould know, that I profeſs myſelf to be a man who love and admire the genuine principles of the Engliſh conſtitution; that you may know what comes from me comes from no ſuſpected quarter. I give the Defendant the liberty of the preſs in ſaying his opi⯑nion differs from mine; though you may think, as I take it for granted you do, that mine and yours are better than his, and that the form of our government is far better than that which he approves and wiſhes to inculcate, there is an end of the freedom of Eng⯑land, and of that conſtitution we all profeſs to love, if [44]every man, poſſeſſed of an opinion, may not freely write thoſe ſentiments, which he does not take up upon the ſpur of a particular occaſion, but merely to expreſs the ſentiments of his mind. Gentlemen, the principle I mean to lay down as to the liberty of the Engliſh preſs is this, that every man may ad⯑dreſs himſelf, not to individuals to excite them to diſobedience to the laws, but that every man may addreſs himſelf to the individuals of a whole nation, and may in that addreſs canvaſs the propriety and advantage of the form of government in general, and the government in a particular country which he inhabits; that he may find fault with the conſtitution, that he may take it to pieces, that he may point out its errors and defects, and ſtate what are its corrup⯑tions, and what are likely to be the conſequences, and where the public, from falling into thoſe cor⯑ruptions are long ſuffered to remain; and in doing all that, he is not a ſubject of criminal juſtice, unleſs it can be ſhewn, that at the time he ſo wrote, and at the time he ſo publiſhed, he did it, not contemplat⯑ing the happineſs, but ſeeking the miſery of the hu⯑man race; that he did it at a time, ſeeking to bring about conſultations in a country by exciting indivi⯑duals, and informing them they had a right to think and act for themſelves, and that any individual might, in his diſcretion, oppoſe the general law of the ſtate; I have no difficulty in ſaying, that if it ſhall be found, upon an attentive peruſal of the works of the Defendant, he inculcates thoſe doctrines, nay, if the [45]direct contrary ſhall not be found, or if it ſhall appear that he ſays to one m [...]n what we might ſuppoſe to have been ſaid by him, and what was ſaid by an unfortunate criminal who ſtood heire inſulting the court for a length of time yeſterday, who, inſtead of ſaying I was a priſoner, I put up theſe premiſes to be ſold, becauſe the French will ſpeedily come and releaſe us, and I did it to excite others to releaſe me from my impriſonment; if there could be one ſylla⯑ble that could have put that man's defence in the preſent Defendant's mouth, in the face of a patient judge, I muſt ſay, upon that occaſion, he ſhould be held up to the juſtice of his country.

Gentlemen, I ſay, and I ſay it in the name of Thomas Paine, the Defendant, the Author of the Rights of Man, and in his words, which I ſhall read to you,—‘The end of all political aſſociations is the preſervation of the rights of man, which rights are liberty, property, and ſecurity; that the nation is the ſource of all ſovereignty derived from it; the right of property being ſecured and invio⯑lable, no one ought to be deprived of it, ex⯑cept in caſes of evident public neceſſity, legally aſcertained, and on condition of a previous juſt in⯑demnity.’ Gentlemen, thoſs are undoubtedly the rights of man. The rights of man it is the end of all governments to eſtabliſh; and I ſay no man, af⯑ter any government id legally conſtituted, can with⯑our rebellion withdraw his allegiance from that go⯑vernment which he has lived under and paid obedi⯑ence to; that all attempts againſt it are unwiſe and [46]unjuſt, as well as criminal, for the beſt reaſons are policy, juſtice; and nothing ſhort of the will of a whole people can change any form or ſpecies of go⯑vernment. Any man, therefore, who is told by an⯑other he has a right to act and think for himſelf, that he is no longer to wait, that he is no longer to ſee whether the operation of that conviction ſhall be equal to the common ſenſe of mankind, but the moment he has brought himſelf to a concluſion that any part is defective, he is not to ſee whether it will be meliorated by common conſent, but that from that moment his own judgment and underſtanding ſhall free him from the opinion the law is wiſe and the conſtitution is juſt, he may pull it down, and re⯑fuſe all the obedience to the law and the govern⯑ment; unleſs I can convince you that the Defendant has taken pains to inculcate direct contrary, doc⯑trine, a doctrine that is directly contrary to the peace and older of the country, however his own conſci⯑ence may acquit him, he cannot be acquitted at the tribunal of an Engliſh Jury. Does any man ſuppoſe a perſon can write a book to another, and ſay, The inſtant I can convince you the government of Eng⯑land is defective, you are to go about to deſtroy it? But, on the other hand, had it not been that per⯑ſons had a right (and thanks be to God, and thanks be to our conſtitution for permitting it) to explain thoſe inalienable rights which nature has given us, and that ſpirit which God has given us, how ſhould we have had that conſtitution we ſo juſtly boaſt of? No man could have gone before and pointed out the [47]abuſes of the form of government under which he lived: or how could the government have paſſed on from ſtate to ſtate, ſo as to have ariſen to ſuch a pitch of perfection, to ſuch a ſtate of maturation, that the Attorney General conſiders it as profanation to touch it? Gentlemen, you underſtand the princi⯑ple upon which I mean to defend my client; and I will not advance one ſtep further till I put him bet⯑ter in your minds than it is poſſible he can ſtand at preſent, either from what you have heard from abroad, or what you have heard in court, or from the means moſt unqueſtionable taken to cry down this book and the Author, who ſtands in a ſituation dif⯑ferent almoſt from any other man who ever preſented himſelf in an Engliſh court of juſtice. If I were to aſk you, Gentlemen of the Jury, what it is that is the laſt fruit of the tree of liberty, not what they deſcribe it, but what they would wiſh it, the Eng⯑liſh tree of liberty; if I may emphatically expreſs what is the fruit of that tree, it is ſecurity of the rights under the law, not only the rights of pro⯑perty, but the rights of liberty and reputation. How are we to have thoſe rights, but by the adminiſtra⯑tion of juſtice? Conſequently there is not a man in England ever brought upon the circumſtances he repreſents himſelf before a court and jury, there can be any prejudices in thoſe who are to hear the cauſe. So anxiouſly does the conſtitution guard againſt thoſe evils, that if the ſmalleſt circulation [48]of any paper that leads to the perverſion od juſtice, or if from the beſt motives a perſon ſhall do the leaſt thing that can at all affect the juſtice of the tribunal, from that moment the trial is poſtponed. If his Lordſhip will give me leave to remind him, upon the trial of the Dean of St. Aſaph, or rather when he was brought to trial, there was a circulation of books read, not books relative to the object of trial, not books, that affected to take notice even that he was coming to any trial, but extracts from ancient authors of high reputation, pointing out the rights of jurors, and ſhewing that juror had a right to conſider the innocence or guilt of the party, the No⯑ble Lords put off the trial of the cauſe, not from any particular opinion that theſe writings were falſe, but becauſe it was out of even courſe of trial. Gentle⯑men, in what ſituation do I ſtand before you? This unfortunate Defendant and his book have been pre⯑judged in a thouſand ſhapes, but, what is more ex⯑traordinary, pending the very trial, and when the cauſe was ſtanding upon the paper. Gentlemen whom, I take it for granted, mean well to the coun⯑try (though I have no doubt other perſons act upon the ſame principle); but gentlemen who ſeem to know ſo little of the conſequences, publiſhed through⯑out the world a proteſt againſt this very work of Mr. Paine; Gentlemen who ſeem ſo fond of holding up that conſtitution it is circulated throughout—it meets you at a turnpike, it is thrown down your areas, it is thrown into your chaiſe. An anſwer to [49]this very book, which is now to receive a judg⯑ment; nay, that very tribunal, much higher than that in which we now ſit, and in which I have the honour to be a member, and my learned friends know the truth of what I ſay, that from what has paſſed in that houſe, and gone on in every channel of circulation, this cauſe is prejudg⯑ed. I do not make this obſervation relating to his Lordſhip, for there has not been a motion be⯑fore to poſtpone the trial. I know perfectly well, if any ſuch motion had been made, the effect of it would have been what juſtice and law required. No man can reſpect more the juſtice that I am ſure I ſhould have received than myſelf. What is the conſequence of all this? You are to guard your againſt every thing, except that which meets you here. You ought to come prepared to look at this work, to give it its genuine conſtruction, and to collect the evi⯑dence in the cauſe. With reſpect to the letter, I ſhall ſay a word at the concluſion of my addreſs. You will at preſent put it wholly out of your mind as being written long ſubſequent to the book; then the cauſe will ſtand thus: the Defendant wrote the book, and ſends word he is deſirous to be given up as the author of it, if any criminal inquiry takes place. There is not any evidence whatever of an indiſcreet declaration; no taunting expreſſion pre⯑vious to the publication; not any thing that might not come out of the mouth of a man meaning no harm. It is not a libel upon the King. charged [50]upon the record. I never heard that ſuch a letter had been brought about—I know nothing but from the record—I had ſeen ſomething which profeſſed to be a copy of a letter—I ſaid it was a foul forgery to embarraſs the cauſe; and it comes at a time that it produces embarraſſment in my mind, and tends to prejudice my caſe.

You muſt look, my learned friend ſays, at the nature of the book, and the conſequences it has produced; not only has it been publiſhed among the judicious part of the community, which was the caſe with the firſt part of the Rights of Man, which the Attorney General did not proſecute for a year and an half; he did not proſecute that book, becauſe he thought it would only extend among the judici⯑ous. Every one muſt ſee whether the manner of the man is not as viſible in the one as the other; it would have been an antidote to the poiſon, and little might be hoped or feared from the circulation of it. But with reſpect to this work, its ſituation had been dif⯑ferent, and had gone down among all people, was printed on whited brown paper, was thruſt into the hands of children to wrap up their ſweetmeats, and was circulated in every corner. I ſhould humbly ſubmit to his Lordſhip, the mode of circulation of this book is not proved, neither the extent or the mode of circulation are proved, nor is there any evidence againſt the Defendant. Is it ſaid that Mr. Paine deſires the book might be ſo circulated? If he had, there would have been an end; but did he or not, [51]at the time he was writing it, believe he was writing that which was beneficial to the Engliſh nation at large, and not meaning to deprive them of the ad⯑vantages they had, or contemplating their miſery? I am not examining what this man wiſhed, I am not inveſtigating that, but you muſt look to the ſitu⯑ation of the man from his education, from his ha⯑bits, and the whole hiſtory of his life, whether there is not one uniform caſt of thinking to ſhew this book was not written upon the ſpur of the occaſion, but from the reſult of his mind, his ſentiments, and a long courſe of thinking for a long courſe of years. I cannot help being ſurpriſed that Mr. Attorney General, in the whole courſe of his addreſs, took no notice how this work firſt came to be publiſhed in England; he deſires you to take for granted Mr. Paine volunteered this firſt part of the Rights of Man, and, if wrote in anſwer to nobody, it was a thing done for a malicious purpoſe, and that he had nothing at all to provoke that inquiry; that it was followed by the ſecond part; that he was the firſt man that ſet about this attack. In order to ſhew you how that matter is, I will read to you what my learned friend ſays, for the book muſt be all in evidence together; when my learned friend reads to you a paſſage con⯑cerning hereditary tyranny, or concerning the Ha⯑noverian ſucceſſion, what is the foundation of the obſervation, that every man muſt be judged moſt un⯑queſtionably from what he writes, that the mind is ſuppoſed to go with the hand; it follows equally, if [52]you read any part of my book: it is common ſenſe, and the common adminiſtration of juſtice ſhews you, if you read any thing or any letter to make againſt me, you muſt read the whole together, and judge of the object by all that he has written—that I ſee I have the aſſent of his Lordſhip to—and you muſt take it out of court; you are to look at the whole book, and compare thoſe parts with the context and the concluſion; and, above all, attend to that part which I am now about to read. He here ſtates, in page 11 of the preface, before he begins the diſ⯑cuſſion, and conſequently every man who reads the book has a warning before he begins what is the in⯑tention of the author. Read his introduction and pre⯑face, they have no other meaning than as a key or index to the intention of the author; and it is as much as to ſay, any man what reads my work, al⯑though I furniſh him with a clue to my ſentiments and principles, and although I give him a preface, he leaves that our, and faſtens a meaning and con⯑ſtruction different from that the preface itſelf would explain. He ſays, "I have differed from ſome profeſſional gentlemen," meaning gentlemen of our profeſſion, ‘on the ſubject of proſecutions, and I ſince find they are falling into my opinion, which I will here ſtate as fully, but as conciſely, as I can.’—

‘I will firſt put a caſe with reſpect to any law, and then compare it with a government, or with what in England is, or has been, called a conſti⯑tution.’

[53] ‘It would be an act of deſpotiſm, or what in England is called arbitrary power, to make a law to prohibit inveſtigating the principles, good or bad, on which ſuch a law, or any other, is founded.’

He will put it upon the very footing the greateſt writers upon the Engliſh government have put it. He goes on—‘If a law be bad, it is one thing to oppoſe the practice of it, but it is quite a different thing to expoſe its errors, to reaſon on its defects, and to ſhew cauſe why it ſhould be repealed, or why another ought to be ſubſtituted in its place. I have always held it an opinion’ (making it alſo my practice), and there is no evidence he has not made it a practice (for he has never been called be⯑fore a court), ‘it is better to obey a bad law, making uſe at the ſame time of every argument to ſhew its errors and procure its repeal, than forcibly to vio⯑late it; becauſe the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the force, and lead to a diſ⯑cretionary violation of thoſe which are good.’

‘The caſe is the ſame with reſpect to principles and forms of government, or to what are called conſtitutions and the parts of which they are com⯑poſed.’

‘It is for the good of nations, and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular indi⯑viduals, that mankind are at the expence of ſupport⯑ing it. The defects of every government and con⯑ſtitution, [54]both as to principle and form, muſt, on a parity of reaſoning, be as open to diſcuſſion as the defects of a law, and it is a duty which every man owes to ſociety to point them out. When thoſe defects, and the means of remedying them, are generally ſeen by a nation, that nation will reform its government or its conſtitution in the one caſe, as the government repealed or reformed the law in the other.’

Gentlemen, you moſt undoubtedly wiſh to deal with every man that comes before you in judgment as you deſire to be dealt with yourſelves, if you ſhould accidentally publiſh any thing that might not be thought proper, and any man brings you to trial for it. And, I hope, it will not be laid down as law to-day, if you or I ſhould publiſh any opinion concerning the government of this country, that ſome amendment was neceſſary, and ſhould point out the foundation upon which thoſe amendments were to be made, and were to explain the errors, that I am to be convicted or acquitted juſt as twelve men ſhall think. If I am not perfectly right in my argument, there is an end of all freedom, that has made the conſti⯑tution what it is; and by and bye, I truſt, will make it better in form, and purify it from thoſe abuſes which, if they had not exiſted, we ſhould not have been here to day in the trial of this cauſe. He ſays, I obey the law until it is repealed; I make it my practice; I muſt not diſobey the law till it is repealed; I make it a duty to obey the law. If a [55]man chooſe to diſobey a law that was bad, the ſame would apply to any other man that would not obey a law that was good; and he ſtates the advantages to ſociety in the different ages of the world. He goes on and ſtates them in page 162, Second Part; the former pages in the preface were 11, 12. The rea⯑ſon I am occupying a little portion of your time upon this ſubject, is with this view—I wiſh you to follow me throughout upon the principles I put the cauſe upon, that, if you find any thing in this book which inveſts any individual, or any number of individuals in this country, or any thing but the whole nation itſelf, with the power of changing any part of the law or conſtitution, I give up the cauſe. I muſt give up the cauſe, becauſe I will not affront the majeſty of the court with ſtating propoſitions which muſt be falſe. If a man does not like the country, let him retire to another. If a man is reſolved not to obey, let him go. A man is not only called upon, but it is a duty caſt upon him by God and his country, to en⯑lighten his country, and do a ſervice to his country; and I never yet heard it ſaid, not without contradic⯑tion, not only it is not illegal, but highly beneficial to the community, to write what his mind and heart, and not what his malice, ſuggeſts—Not what, in the contemplation of the miſery of others, he thinks pro⯑per to put upon paper, but what his own conſcience dictates, whether it be the truth, or beneficial or not, it is the law of England, and no other law, that gives this right to the ſubjects of this country.

[56]He goes on—‘When a nation changes its opinion and habits of thinking, it is no longer to be go⯑verned as before; but it would not only be wrong, but bad policy, to attempt by force what ought to be accompliſhed by reaſon. Rebellion conſiſts in forcibly oppoſing the general will of a nation, whether by a party or by a government. There ought, therefore, to be in every nation a method of occaſionally aſcertaining the ſtate of public opinion with reſpect to government. There is, therefore, no power but the voluntary will of the people that has a right to act in any matter reſpecting a general reform; and by the ſame right that two perſons can confer on ſuch a ſubject, a thouſand may. The object, in all ſuch preliminary proceedings, is to find out what the general ſenſe of a nation is, and to be go⯑verned by it. If it prefer a bad or defective go⯑vernment to a reform, or chooſe to pay ten times more taxes than there is occaſion for, it has a right ſo to do.’

Gentlemen, theſe are the ſentiments of the author of this work—ſentiments which I will take upon me to ſay have the higheſt authority for their foundation—ſentiments which I think are the beſt title, and the ſecureſt title, that his Majeſty and his family have for the throne of Theſe kingdoms; and ſo far am I from thinking his Majeſty has any other advantage or foot⯑ing, that I thought it the higheſt act of attachment and fidelity I could ſhew for a perſon I regard, and [57]ſhall ever have the ſame affection for I have now, And I know the Attorney General can only ſay what he hopes, and I can only ſpeak of that part of the letter which ſpeaks of the profligacy of the royal children, which has been ſo much held out for a great length of time; that ſlanderous profligacy that ought to have been checked through the preſſes of this country. The Prince of Wales may be traduced and calumniated in every part of the kingdom, and they will never come in queſtion till they are brought in to load a defence with matter collateral to the charge; therefore I ſay, that which the Attorney General can only hope, but which I believe and know, that when⯑ever that Prince comes to be upon the throne of this country, (where I hope he will not but by the courſe of nature) he will make the conſtitution of this king⯑dom the foundation of his conduct; when I ſay that I am not in the ſmalleſt degree removed from contending the defendant is not guilty, and I ſay when he expreſſes ſuch ſentiments in this book, he expreſſes what is the intereſt of that illuſtrious family to cheriſh, and I ſpoke it in the preſence of one of the illuſtrious perſons, as I have ſince been informed. I put the title of the King's Majeſty, as I conceive it ſtands upon the ge⯑nuine principles of the Revolution, that is upon the majeſty of the people at elections, not as you elect the King of Poland, but as you elect a family in hereditary right, which in the ſenſe which Mr. At⯑torney General would give, that has no proof in this country, therefore it is fit you ſhould know how [58]the defendant came to write this book. God be thanked, the Attorney General knows my reſpect and value for him, and knows my ſenſe of the honourable manner in which he has conducted himſelf from the beginning to the end of this buſineſs, and that I would not throw the leaſt reflection upon him; but he will give me leave to ſtate, and I wiſh it had not been left to me to ſtate, how that firſt principle came to be the work of Mr. Paine. Concerning Heredi⯑tary Right I will now tell you, and it will give you a clue to the mind of the author. Taking it for granted you and I go together in thinking Mr. Paine miſtaken in his opinion of the Engliſh conſti⯑tution, and that we agree that King, Lords, and Commons, is ſuperior to every thing the wit or wiſ⯑dom of man ever put together, but the queſtion will be, whether he ever thought otherwiſe, and whe⯑ther he thought it badly governed under theſe circum⯑ſtances, then the book will appear different totally from that light it is repreſented to you. Gentlemen, we all of us remember the calamitous ſituation in which this country ſtood a few year ago; a ſituation no good man can help looking back to without horror; a ſituation in which no man could feel himſelf ſafe from its not happening again while the cauſes I am now about to ſtate ſtill remain; I ſpeak of the Ame⯑rican war. This book, let it be known, for it ap⯑pears upon the face of it, is written as an anſwer to Mr. Burke; it is written as an anſwer to him, not only the ſecond part, but the firſt, written under the [59]circumſtances I ſhall by and by explain, and in the courſe of that explanation I ſhall be obliged perhaps to cite one or two paſſages from the works of that celebrated perſon; and I ſhall ſpeak of him with high reſpect, for it is impoſſible for Mr. Burke ever to make me forget him, whatever he ſhall be pleaſed to think of me or my friends, who think as I do. With whatever contempt he may look down on my humble talents, when compared to his, he ſhall never oblige me to forget the benefit the people of this country owe to him for the writings which he has left upon record, and for which thanks are due, next to the thanks which we ought to have to God, moſt humbly for putting into our minds thoſe principles which are the ſafeſt and ſureſt for our government; undoubtedly, though that celebrated perſon does not ſeem to think now as he did formerly, and although the conſtitu⯑tion, as Mr. Attorney General told you, has remained from all eternity to the preſent time, without any material change, except a melioration of it, moſt undoubtedly that gentleman thinks very differently of it at preſent from what he did formerly; and if he had been as conſiſtent, and his opinion had been as uniform as Mr. Paine's, we ſhould not have had this trial. Mr. Paine may be right, Mr. Burke cannot. Mr. Paine has not contradicted himſelf, Mr. Burke has. He may be wrong in part, or right in part; but if he is miſtaken throughout, it does not remove me from the ground of my defence.—That great and alarming conflict the American war, made Mr. [60]Paine a Republican, which he confeſſes himſelf to be, and which I admit him to be; he means to de⯑clare it as his opinion to be a conſtitution defective in its form, and attended with abuſes which one day or another, in his judgment, will bring ruin on us all. I don't mince the matter of the defendant, I put it whether you ſhall be of opinion he thought ſo when he wrote; ſo whether he has written a matter that does contain any ſlander upon the magiſtracy of the King's perſon, or upon thoſe who execute the laws, and whether it is that which falls within the denomi⯑nation of a libel.—As to that letter, if the Attorney General was to indict him to-morrow, he could make no defence againſt it; having ſpoken of the King, and wrote of him as wanting proper qualifications, and repreſenting the profligacy of the Royal Family, and that it was likely to produce evils, could he de⯑fend himſelf againſt that? Good God, gentlemen, it is impoſſible! The queſtion will be for you, Whether this book, if you ſhall not find it to be infected by that letter (which is written nine months ſince) falls within the ſame principles?—Gentlemen, I ſtated to you the conſtitution of this country, as eſta⯑bliſhed by King, Lords, and Commons, is the conſti⯑tution which I like, is the conſtitution which I ſhould be ſorry to ſee give way to any other; is the conſtitution which has been productive of various bene⯑fits, and is the conſtitution which I truſt will be pro⯑ductive of many more, provided it does not carry in its form the ſeeds of decay, or unleſs we have not wiſ⯑dom [61]to prop it up.—I agree with the merchants that aſſembled in the city of London, and ſhould have been happy to have ſigned my name, and ſhould have ſubſcribed to it, had I a proof that the Engliſh go⯑vernment is capable of reforming all the abuſes that belong to it, the abuſes that are here ſtated, which is a clue t the mind of the man. I am defending a man whom I am not able to deſcribe, and that I am afraid we ſhall hardly ſee again; and as it was truly obſerved by Mr. Burke in the Houſe of Com⯑mons, when I ſtated the paſſage from the work of Dr. Johnſon, that it was a very wiſe ſelection, more than I or the ſpeaker could have found, I take it I ſhall ſtill have more the lead when I refer you to the expreſſions of Mr. Burke, where he gives the cha⯑racter of that great man, Sir George Saville. After ſpeaking of him in America, Gentlemen, (I am afraid I ſhall hardly have ſtrength to go through my duty) as to the character of that great perſon we have unfortunately for many years loſt, whether it would be attended with any benefit to the country, we muſt hear from himſelf in the letter he publiſhed t his conſtituents, and to the whole world; not taking the conſtitution of England in the abſtract, or its formation of King, Lords, and Commons, in the abſtract, but a direct account and explanation of his opinion concerning what was tranſacted by the Parliament of Great Britain, which for many years we were obliged to ſubmit to with hardly a ray of hope of ſeeing a change. "I return to you" (ſays [62]Sir George Saville) ‘baffled and diſpirited; and I am ſorry that truth obliges me to add, with hardly a ray of hope of ſeeing any change in the miſerable courſe of public calamities.’ Such were the thoughts of Sir George Saville; the conſe⯑quence we ſaw. America, from being an obe⯑dient colony, not thinking as we profeſs to think of the Engliſh government, became a republic, caſt off the yoke; and Mr. Paine, the Author, living at that time in America, and acting under the auſpices of Mr. Burke, whoſe book brings him here, and if you read them together would give you an expla⯑nation of a multitude of paſſages. Mr. Burke and Mr. Paine walked in the ſame field of reaſoning to⯑gether; they ſpoke in different places. Mr. Burke ſpoke in the Parliament of England, ſuch as that great ſtateſman deſcribes it, who had no ears for ſuch ſounds. Mr. Paine ſpoke to the people, reaſoned with them on their condition, told them no people could be bound to the ſubjection of any ſovereignty further than their own benefit required. Mr. Burke ſays theſe arguments are unanſwerable. The pam⯑phlet of Common Senſe contains all the doctrines con⯑tained in the Rights of Man, calumniates the form of government, and attacks all the principles and corruptions of the Houſes of Parliament, ſhews their defects; ſo does Mr. Burke himſelf in his letter to the Sheriff of Briſtol; and it juſtified the Americans in bringing about this happy and glorious revolu⯑tion. And I take upon me to aver at this moment, [63]there is as great a regard to property, leſs taxation, leſs grievances, leſs to deplore, and more to admire, in the conſtitution of America, than in any other country, any other conſtitution, any other govern⯑ment under Heaven. I will except none, except our own, and not that, unleſs it is purged, as it ſoon will be,—purged of thoſe ſpots which I truſt will not deſtroy wholly the vital parts, though they obſcure them. Is not Mr. Paine to be believed becauſe he was the only one out of three millions that did not remain attached to the crown, and tells you that all the blood that was ſhed in America was ſhed by the crown of Great Britain, under the authority of Parliament? Such as Sir George Saville deſcribes it, and Mr. Burke deſcribes. He came over to this coun⯑try with a mind wholly republican. If you look to his pamphlet of Common Senſe, he argues and builds his arguments upon what he has written before; and I ſhould almoſt ſay he is a plagiary from himſelf, for it is impoſſible for a man that writes one thing not to have the ſame thing in his mind. Now let us ſee what the American revolution in its conſe⯑quences produced. A revolution which has lately happened in Europe, and likely to make ſo vaſt a change upon the face of the earth,—how did that revolution ariſe? It was produced in conſequence of that incurable, corrupt, and profligate government that exiſted in France. God forbid, when I ſay that corrupt and profligate government, that I ſhould mean it as a ſarcaſm againſt that unfortunate Mo⯑narch, [64]who, for any thing that I know, at this mo⯑ment may be under affliction, and in a ſituation that grieves one to think of; no, it is not neceſſary I ſhould do it; and I caſt as little reflection upon that unfor⯑tunate Monarch, as I did when I ſpoke of this coun⯑try. I do not mean to be underſtood to treat the King not only with that duty and obedience which belongs to the ſubject, but to conduct myſelf to him with that juſtice which I think belongs to him, and is due to his conduct from all men, either in public or private life. When I ſpeak of theſe abuſes and corruptions of our government, I ſpeak of that which the commentator upon our law has ſtated ſo particu⯑larly, and whoſe book is put into the hands of every ſtudent before he comes here. I mean that unfor⯑tunate want of foreſight, as he expreſſes it, of our anceſtors. Why then, Gentlemen, can you ſuppoſe that reverend Judge was a libeller upon the conſti⯑tution of this country? He tells you it is from the want of foreſight in our anceſtors: if it was ſo, let the foreſight of poſterity prevent thoſe conſequences, and take them into conſideration; for it is not ne⯑ceſſary to pull down a whole building becauſe there happens to be a few of the tiles looſe; it is not ne⯑ceſſary to pull down the whole ſtructure. Then comes Mr. Paine at the time the French revolution took place. I am now ſpeaking to you of that which is within the reach of your own knowledge, at the time the French revolution had taken place in that coun⯑try, that the Baſtille was deſtroyed, that the King [65]had been pulled down, and had, by his own con⯑ſent, become the firſt magiſtrate of the people:— that had no manner of effect on this country: it would not have had any effect, had it not occurred to that celebrated perſon whoſe name I before men⯑tioned, to provoke a ſubject, and which, if it were dangerous to diſcuſs, he led the way to it. I truſt it is not to be endured, that the human mind is to be put in fetters: I truſt it does not belong to him, or any other man, to give us our leſſon, and to ſay, this ſhall be your creed, and that we ſhall not think for ourſelves. He has done that; and, in my opinion, more dangerouſly diſtorted the principles of our go⯑vernment. I ſay, if it be a libel for any man to miſ⯑take the conſtitution, or to put it upon the footing that will tend to deſtroy it, Mr. Burke is that libel⯑ler. But when I ſay Mr. Burke is that libeller, I do not mean that he is an object of criminal juſtice, be⯑cauſe I can have no right to make him ſo. I do not mean, when I am defending the motives of one man, to criminate the motives of another; but I will put the caſe upon it, and you will find that in the pre⯑face, and the introduction, and in the whole body of the work. Now I will give it you from Mr. Burke himſelf. It happened, Gentlemen, when the French revolution pulled down deſpotiſm, a great number of perſons felt an intereſt in the event, —an intereſt well worthy of Engliſhmen: they ſaw the fall of a government that had long been the ſcourge of Great Britain, and which had led to a [66]long, cruel, and deſolating war, from its pernicious government, they ſaw that deſpotiſm humbled to the ground; and a gentleman who is now no more, a reverend divine, knowing that the iſſues of a hu⯑man life are in the hands of God, thought it a mat⯑ter of juſt congratulation even from the pulpit, and reminded the people of this country of the glorious deliverance, and the advantages ariſing from that revolution. Gentlemen, it is Dr. Price I ſpeak of. It happened alſo, that a ſociety of gentlemen, at the time when France was a neutral nation, and under their conſtitution the monarch was going in triumph, and amidſt the crowds of his fellow-citi⯑zens, over and over again, to give aſſent to that which his oath had given ſanction, to that ſyſtem, be⯑cauſe in the opinion of a very few, for Mr. Burke, very unwiſely I think, makes it a ſarcaſtic matter of reproach upon the inſignificance and the ſmallneſs of the body of men, and that their names were never heard of till that moment; he thought it a matter for his eloquence to whip thoſe ſcourges of faction to their kennels, and I take upon me to aver, there was no proſecution, no charge, no man was brought forth as a diſaffected ſubject, there was no ſcourge of oppoſition, but he invents this ſuppoſed ſchiſm, in order to give the King a title which he has not from any body but Mr. Burke, and which, I am ſure, it would be his Majeſty's moſt ſolemn intereſt to deny. Mr. Burke, by the bye, cites two-thirds of this work, and no man is to put in a reply; a man is to put [67]government on what footing he pleaſes; a man is to take parts of my book, whatever he pleaſes, and I am not to anſwer it, but I am to be tied up from the common right which he aſſumes to himſelf. He ſays they are maſters of the commonwealth; the French revolution, ſay they, was the act of the ma⯑jority of the people; the people of England, for in⯑ſtance, wiſh to make the ſame change, and have the ſame right, ſo ſays Mr. Burke, that is to ſay, none at all. Gentlemen, if we have been inſane for cen⯑turies, as the Attorney General has ſaid, and that it would be to the advantage of this country to throw off the preſent government, that the people of Eng⯑land cannot do it, for God's ſake let that ſentiment never be uttered, and I deny, and I firmly deny it; if it be ſo, for God Almighty's ſake, let policy and wiſdom conceal it, and you had better furniſh every body with a copy of Mr. Paine's book, and tell him to write to the public, than put that book of Mr. Burke's into the hands of every man. Say to a man, look at that conſtitution; it came down form gene⯑ration to generation—there it is; it was a glorious ſtruggle that gave it you; there are ſome obſcurities upon it; the ſame wiſdom that gave it you, preſerves it; it is your own, will you have it or not; what is the anſwer? Yes, I will keep it. But if I tell a man it is packed upon your back as a beaſt of burden, you muſt carry it whether you will have it or not; it is not what your anceſtors gave you; remember, I do not affect to ſay, you or I may ſtir up rebellion, it is [68]merely my opinion, and may be the opinion of any man; it is like drawing up a curtain before a man that is confined in the dark. I will ſhew you that Mr. Paine is not ſpeaking upon the conſtitution, but merely anſwering Mr. Burke; he is denying Mr. Burke's principles, which are more dangerous than any that every came from the Engliſh preſs. What is the revolution? That his Majeſty undoubt⯑edly is not an elective monarch; but was it not the people of England that elected King William to the throne? What will Mr. Attorney General ſay to me? I am arraigning my client for faying, it was the vention of the people of England who got toge⯑ther, the Lord knows how, and ſent for King Wil⯑liam. If that convention did not affect to have the forms of law, it was called the Convention Parlia⯑ment. Did they give it to him in the line of ſucceſ⯑ſion? Did they not cut off the Prince of Wales, and might they not, as Mr. Juſtice Blackſtone expreſsly ſays they might, have given it to any other family? To be ſure they might; and he puts it upon the footing, that it was the wiſdom of our anceſtors to depart no further from the line of ſucceſſion. It was a matter of diſcretion, and I maintain it to be the beſt title, and long may the King and his family live under it; they ſhall have my vote for its continuance, and it is the beſt way to live in the affections of the people; and it is not in the power of man to ſtir the conſtitution of any country, but from the default of the government; nor is it from any libels that may [69]be written upon the conſtitution. Mr. Burke is pleaſed to ſay ſo in his ‘Thoughts upon the Cauſe of the preſent Diſcontents;’ he thinks fit to ſpeak upon thoſe parts of the government for which Mr. Paine is arraigned for ſpeaking upon. And I will ſhew that when I come to that grand part that brought me here to ſpeak to you, that is, the limits, authority, and the liberty of the preſs. Now let us ſee whether there be others that differ from us and every right of the people to change their govern⯑ment; to know they can change, and to circulate it among them that they can change, my learned friend will find it difficult to faſten the character of a libeller upon a gentleman whoſe work lays before me. Here I ſhall begin with a modern author; I have the ho⯑nour of my learned friend's perſonal acquaintance; he is a man, perhaps, more devoted to the real con⯑ſtitution of his country, as will be found from many parts of his work, than almoſt any man I am ac⯑quainted with. He is a man of great learning; I mean Mr. Paley, Archdeacon of Carliſle, in a work, entitled, "Principles of Moral and Political Philo⯑ſophy." Gentlemen, he is diſcuſſing this point, which was not thought dangerous the other day, and I hope we ſhall get over this ridiculous panic that makes us think that dangerous where no danger is in it. If the government of this country, like the Chriſ⯑tian religion, be of God, it will ſtand; if not, we can⯑not prevent it from coming to nothing. He was diſcuſſing and thinking of the government of this [70]country, and he begins with differing from Mr. Locke, not throughout, but in part, upon the foot⯑ing of a compact. You will ſee how different Mr. Burke ſpeaks from Mr. Locke; it is admirable ſenſe, and goes more to give one the true notion of go⯑vernment, than any book, and I ſhould wiſh the at⯑tention of every body in this Court to it. Mr. Paley ſays, reſpecting the inconvenience of a compact, he thought it dangerous to call it a compact, for if broken ever ſo little, it is contrary to the will of God, whoſe will is paramount to all others; he then ſtates this, which, I think, differs a little from the principles of my learned friend. ‘No uſage, law, or authority whatever, is ſo binding, that it need or ought to be continued, when it may be changed with advantage to the community. The family of the prince, the order of ſucceſſion, the prerogative of the crown, the form and parts of legiſlature, together with the reſpective powers, office, dura⯑tion, and mutual dependency of the ſeveral parts, are all only ſo many laws, mutable like other laws; whenever expediency requires, either by the ordinary act of the legiſlature, or if the occaſion deſerve it, by the interpoſition of the people.’ No man can ſay this gentleman wiſhed to infuſe diſ⯑content into this country. If you faſten a govern⯑ment upon a man againſt his conſent, and he has an inclination to get rid of it, if be do not like it, and other people approve of it, he will go out of the country; if all people diſapprove it, they will make it [71]what meets their approbation, and by that means the government will come to that perfection which can⯑not be done in a limited number of years, and will ſtand from age to age; and he goes on to ſay, and I think he ſays wiſely, ‘Theſe points are wont to be approached with a kind of awe; they are repre⯑ſented to the mind as principles of the conſtitu⯑tion, ſettled by our anceſtors, and being ſettled, to be no more committed to innovation or de⯑bate; as foundations never to be ſtirred; as the terms and conditions of the ſocial compact, to which every citizen of the ſtate has engaged his fidelity by virtue of a promiſe which he can⯑not now recall; ſuch reaſons have no place in our ſyſtem.’ So ſays this Gentleman; and I now contend, there is no part of this work of Mr. Paine that advances the propoſition.

Mr. Attorney General ſays Mr. Paine diſlikes the Engliſh conſtitution; he has a right, and I will ſhew you the wiſdom and policy of the Engliſh law pre⯑vents a man being ſubject to a proſecution for it, and you will ſee I do not make uſe of my own au⯑thority when I make uſe of that expreſſion. Gentle⯑men, Mr. Locke ſays, and perhaps his might be a libel alſo, though he was an affectionate ſervant to King William, high in the ſervice of the ſtate; he wrote before King William was warm upon the throne; and, holding a high ſituation, he puts it upon the very ſame footing, when he wrote in anſwer to Sir Robert Filmer, as Mr. Paine writes to Mr. [72]Burke: what does it ſignify a fig, whether a king exiſt by divine rights, or whether it is from a com⯑pact which cannot be altered; whether it be from ſomething ariſing from God or man does not alter the queſtion. Mr. Locke puts it upon the footing Mr. Paley does.

Mr. Attorney General ſays, the firſt parts of the Rights of Man being among the judicious claſſes of the community, he does not fear concerning it; but when it deſcended and was circulated in the lower order, there the evil begins. It may be ſaid, the people being ignorant and diſcontented was the cauſe. To this I anſwer quite the contrary; and if there be defects introduced by time or corruption, it is not an eaſy thing to change them; and it is univerſal throughout the world; ſo you obſerve. I have two autho [...]ties which I have ſtated, beſides an authority I will read that is more in point, the authority of Mr. Burke himſelf; which ſhews the footing upon which he puts it is not that principle upon which the government can ſafely ſtand. He ſays, ‘the diſpo⯑ſition of the people of America is averſe to any other than a free government, and this is indica⯑tion enough to any honeſt ſtateſman how he ought to adapt whatever power he finds in his hands to their caſe. If any aſk me what a free government is? I anſwer, that, for any practical purpoſe, it is what the people think ſo; and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter. If they practically allow me a [73]greater degree of authority over them than is con⯑ſiſtent with any correct ideas of perfect freedom, I ought to thank them for ſo great a truſt; and not to endeavour to prove from thence that they have reaſoned amiſs, and that, having gone ſo far by analogy, they muſt hereafter have no enjoyment but my pleaſure.’

Gentlemen, I am ſorry to feel myſelf conſiderably conſumed in ſtrength before I have arrived at what I conceive to be the material object for your conſidera⯑tion. All I have ſtated has been to lead you to think there is not that novelty in Mr. Paine's opinions—I have ſhewn how they grew up in his life—how his hiſtory led to it—how his ſituation under General Waſhington led him to be a republican in belief, and, being ſo, gave him an opportunity of writing what he believed to be the defects of the Engliſh govern⯑ment. I do not mean to put the defence of my cauſe upon the exiſtence of abuſes. I have ſtated thoſe authors for the reaſon of ſhewing you the nature of the liberty of the preſs, and I ſhall not be mortified in the leaſt, or dejected, or put down from what I feel to be my own ſentiments reſpecting the liberty of the preſs. If I ſhould not meet with the approba⯑tion of the court in what I ſtate, I ſhall go out of court moſt undoubtedly with a belief of what I know is well founded, that is, that the liberty of the preſs is as it occurs to you who are to decide it; but I have opportunities of ſeeing before now, and it ought to make us cautious before we condemn a man by bell, [74]book, and candle. It was but a year ago I had the opportunity of addreſſing you upon ſome of theſe ideas, and, notwithſtanding Mr. Attorney General may ſay this is peculiarly for your conſideration, you will remember your authority to judge of it is but a year old, and I ſhould be very ſorry, in the infancy of your juriſdiction, it ſhould be arraigned. I wiſh to exclude his Lordſhip, and wiſh he ſhould conſider himſelf wholly out of the caſe.

Gentlemen, when I had leſs to ſupport me, leſs ſtrength, leſs knowledge, and leſs acquaintance with thoſe ſtanding around me, I remember not being treated with contempt or unkindneſs by Lord Manſ⯑field (for he always treated me with regard and ten⯑derneſs); with his mighty mind, enlightened with all the learning that belongs to the higheſt elevated [...] laughed at me, as one laughing at an [...] prattle, when I ventured to ſtate [...] the conſtitution, that a man was not [...] with a verdict the moment the publi⯑ [...]on was proved. Therefore, Gentlemen, let us be cautious when we ſee men on a ſudden changing their opinions ſo entirely. We find the whole par⯑liament unanimous that I was in the right, though ſo often in the wrong before; and I muſt feel that it is a great leſſon of caution, to be careful before we con⯑demn others, knowing that it is by ſlow and painful degrees that all the rights of the world have made themſelves known. If Mr. Burke is right in his prin⯑ciples of government, that the people cannot change [75]it, then I am wrong; for no man alive can write about government at all, or the rights of the people, as they have no juriſdiction whatever. But if the people may change the government upon the genu⯑ine principles of government, they are a competent juriſdiction; and therefore Mr. Paine has, bona fide, wrote for the conſideration of the whole people of England, whether the government of England is right of wrong, whether it is ſubject to theſe imper⯑fections. Mr. Attorney General thinks that Mr. Paine wrote the many things he has here wrote without theſe imperfections exiſting; but his habit of life throughout ſhew that he wrote to the whole nation. Now let us ſee what has been the caſe, and I will give you ſome awful authorities of the progreſs of ſociety, and the civilization of government, from the earlieſt accounts to this time; and then you will ſee if we ſhould not have been in the woods, with dreadful ignorance, whether religious or poli⯑tical, if every man had been condemned as a crimi⯑nal who had dared to advance any doctrine upon government. Are men to ariſe at no change or per⯑fection but by the blood abſolutely of the inno⯑cent? Gentlemen, I am defending an humble in⯑dividual, and it is ſaid of him he is only ad⯑dicted to conſider religious topics when drunk; but I am ſtanding for a much more valuable object, the liberty of the preſs.—That I may know my condemnation may not go with it, and that I may not be criminal to-morrow, let us ſee [76]what the courſe of the world has been with reſpect to the diſſemination of truth; let it be remembered that the univerſal God that created us was one of the firſt martyrs to the diſſemination of truth; that he came with that divine qualification; that the Saviour of the world expired upon the croſs for ſtating that which was the object of ſcorn to all thoſe that it was ſtated to; his bleſſed followers experienced the ſame fate.—Why did they follow the ſame fate? Our Sa⯑viour might have done like the Mahometan Prophet, he might have come and promulgated that which was growing by ſlow degrees; he might have ſpread it at once over the whole world by devaſtation and con⯑queſt: he came to confound the pride of man, and he came to preach up thoſe univerſal and equal rights which are the great privileges of mankind in every age of the world; he came therefore in that low eſtate he is repreſented, and preached his doctrines and his conſolations to the poor. We find, ſubſequent to that time, as the converſion to the Church began, political power, and eccleſiaſtical power, going hand in hand, making havock throughout the world, beating down truth, and wounding by ignorance and ſuperſtition, till the revival of letters and learn⯑ing began to advance upon the world. You will find ſuperſtition advancing the ſecond time. Gentle⯑men, if you ſee in what manner the liberty of the preſs began in this country, or rather at what time its freedom was firſt abridged; if you will look into the books of the law, you will find no man puniſhed, [77]or puniſhable, for the propagation of opinion, till the erection of the Star Chamber, in the year 1637. Now I admit the ſafety of every community ought to be the rule; there is no country but muſt take care of its own ſafety; and if my learned friend can ſhew to me that the ſafety of this country depends on the ſpeaking of the freedom of the people, that it is im⯑plicated in the freedom of all principles of govern⯑ment, then I ſhall admit the freedom of the law ſhould purſue this gentleman. Has it that effect? Gentlemen, during the time the preſs was laid under fetters; during the time it was made ſubject to a li⯑cenſe that no man ſhould print a work unleſs he had a licenſe, and until he had the authority of the ſtate; during the ſhort period, which was but for eleven years, that that government laſted, all the authority of the government was coming to ruin, and terminated with that foul cataſtrophe and tragedy, the death of King Charles the Firſt; that is to ſay, in the igno⯑rance of the people in preventing freedom of com⯑munication. It is the freedom of communication that prevents evil; let men communicate their ſen⯑timents to one another, it is like fire ſcattered on the ground, or like gunpowder ſcattered on the ſurface of the earth; it communicates, but the exploſion is not heard: keep it under conſtraint, it is like gunpowder compreſſed, and like ſubterraneous fire, whoſe agitation is unſeen till it burſts into an earth⯑quake. Let argument be oppoſed by argument, and reaſon be oppoſed to reaſon, and the country is [78]ſafe. In the time of Oliver Cromwell it was the ſame; in the reign of Charles the Second, how ſoon was that done away by a revolution; all thoſe cob⯑webs were ſwept away, all were deſtroyed, and the country has laſted for a century without them; the vital parts of the conſtitution have been preſerved; the freedom of writing and ſpeaking have been in⯑culcated, and the nation has been ſafe. Gentle⯑men, I will ſtate to you ſome writers of great autho⯑rity on this ſubject; and here I would humbly ſug⯑geſt to his Lordſhip, that in a caſe of this ſort it is impoſſible to give authorities, and go to books of the law, with the ſame preciſion as we look for autho⯑rities in caſes of particular deſcription; as if, for inſtance, the queſtion be, whether an individual be guilty of ſlander, and we go to books to ſee what had been conſidered ſlander by the law of England: but in a ſubject of this ſort you can go no where but to the ſenſe and opinion of the jury, and that ſenſe is to be taken and compared with what has been written by one individual, with what in general is tolerated throughout the realm. I know, if I was to ſtate to my Lord, that twenty men had written twenty things libellous, and not ſhewing this is not one, he might ſay, that does not ſhew your client has not written one. If you will read matter written by other people, which is reprehenſible, ſhew libels in the writings of men that are conſidered as claſſics in the language, which are ſuffered to be printed and reprinted, cer⯑tainly [79]tainly that obſervation will not ariſe. Gentlemen, I will read to you what is written by a perſon moſt un⯑doubtedly of the moſt ſublime genius; and not only that, but a man of the greateſt virtues; a perſon whom I am ſure my learned friend will think at leaſt a great authority in point of learning, however he might be of opinion he was a Republican and Leveller in his writings and principles; it only ſhews that a man may be a Republican and a good man, as moſt undoubtedly that man was. Gentlemen, I ſpeak of the poet Mil⯑ton, who wrote in the beginning of the Common⯑wealth againſt the act made by Oliver Cromwell's parliament, to tie up the liberty of the preſs. Mr. Attorney General may ſay, and ſo far he will ſay with truth, there is a difference between a previous diſtinc⯑tion and puniſhment for an overt act which is com⯑mitted while the preſs is free; undoubtedly there is one great diſtinction, but in my humble opinion, if every thing is to be judged a libel that does not fall within the principles of the government of the country in what was written, it would be infinitely better there ſhould be a licenſer than not. If I pub⯑liſh under a licenſe, I do it with authority, and pub⯑liſh with ſafety. I ſend my book to a magiſtrate, who is to judge and examine its contents; if he diſ⯑approves it, I will withdraw it; if he approves it, I am ſafe; for if a licenſer is appointed by govern⯑ment, he muſt judge of the book I preſent to his, and he muſt approve it before I can publiſh it: but if there is no magiſtrate appointed by the law of Eng⯑land [80]the preſs is free in the firſt inſtance, and every man may ſay and publiſh as he pleaſes. It is ma⯑terial certainly that every man ſhould know upon what principle that judgment ſhould be formed; for if that judgment is to be formed upon the jury not being of the ſame opinion with the writer, no man would venture or dare to put his mind on paper upon any ſubject in the world: therefore it depends on the principles on which he wrote, and what were the purpoſes of his ſentiments.

Gentlemen, Milton mentions Gallileo. Now when Milton ſaw Gallileo, he was confined, becauſe, upon ſeeing the phaſes of Venus in the teleſcope, he em⯑braced the Copernican ſyſtem, and was led to believe that the ſun was in the center of that ſyſtem. He ended his illuſtrious life in priſon for only ſtating the ſun to be in the center of that ſyſtem, which we all now know it is, and which enables us to extend our navigation to the furtheſt corners of the world, and to carry our line and rule to the dimenſions of the works of the Great God; yet for thoſe truths you find that man was condemned by the inquiſition for an opinion of his own, becauſe it was different from the confined ideas of the days in which he lived. Gentlemen, remember I am not bringing you to think or believe, though we may think hereafter, or more probably ſhall think here⯑after, that the Engliſh conſtitution is inferior to the conſtitution which my client approves; but it is enough for my argument that it is ſpeculatively he ſpeaks of it in the anſwer to the book which puts [81]the different parts of magiſtracy in a different manner to which he thought it ſhould be put. Gentlemen, there is another author, whoſe opinion concerning the liberty of the preſs perhaps you may think more in point; he was an authority living much nearer our own times; he is a man who cannot be ſuppoſed to be carrying liberty farther than it ought to be; a man that held the higheſt and moſt enlarged princi⯑ples of government. I ſpeak of Mr. Hume; and he conſiders this liberty of the preſs, finding fault with the conſtitution, as the grand ſource of the liberty of the country: thoſe grand principles account for the great liberty of the preſs in England, by which all the wit, genius, and learning of the nation, may be employed on the ſide of freedom, and every one may write his own ſentiments. Gentlemen, this doctrine ſeems to me cut down and paired to no⯑thing; for if I cannot write againſt the forms of the Engliſh government, then I cannot write againſt any part of it, I cannot find fault with it, I cannot ſay the King's Bench ought to be abrogated, I cannot ſpeak againſt the Court of Chancery; I cannot, in ſhort, make any one remark which would tend to make any alteration in the conſtitution or govern⯑ment. There are two other authorities that I will cite to you on the ſubject; they are both of them Peers of Parliament, and therefore judges of the law: one of them is a lawyer high in the adminiſtration of magiſtracy, and the other is no longer living, but made a ſplendid appearance while member in the [82]Upper Houſe of Parliament, and was attached moſt unqueſtionably to the King, as he held an high of⯑fice under the King at the time he wrote this: I ſpeak of the Earl of Cheſterfield. ‘There is the diffi⯑culty of diſtinguiſhing between liberty and licen⯑tiouſneſs; one of the greateſt bleſſings people can enjoy is liberty; but every good in this life has its alloy.’

Lord Kenyon. I believe the writer of the life of Dr. Johnſon ſpeaks of that very ſpeech, and claims that part.

Mr. Erſkine. It is extremely true; Lord Cheſter⯑field is ſuppoſed to borrow that which I am now about to ſtate.—Lord Kenyon. That very ſpeech was writ⯑ten by Dr. Johnſon.—Mr. Erſkine. If that is ſo, it certainly places me higher than I had any right to place myſelf. Though Lord Cheſterfield was a great and ingenious wit, he certainly was far lower, and inferior in underſtanding and in monarchical writing, than the celebrated writer to whom my Lord has now alluded. If ever there was a man that profeſſed himſelf an enemy to any thing that looked like po⯑litical freedom, if ever there was a man that would knock down with a hammer every thing that had it, it was Doctor Johnſon; therefore I am much obliged to his Lordſhip for his information. He ſays one of the greateſt bleſſings a man can enjoy is liberty; for there is ſuch a connection between licentiouſneſs and liberty, that it is not eaſy to correct the one without dangerouſly wounding the other. It is extremely [83]hard to diſtinguiſh the true limit between them; like a changeable ſilk, we can eaſily ſee there are two different colours, but we cannot eaſily diſcover where the one ends or where the other begins. He concludes that arbitrary power has ſeldom or ever been introduced; and I confeſs myſelf much obliged to his Lordſhip for giving this paſſage to Dr. Johnſon. Gentlemen, I confeſs I cannot help agree⯑ing with the learned author of this obſervation. My learned friend, who has juſt now gone out of court, has not given you any principle; he has not told you what it is a man may not ſafely write, if this parti⯑cular book is condemned. If indeed it is true that a man did contemplate the miſery of the people of Great Britain, and thought as you and I do upon the government, he might think this book was writ⯑ten with an evil intention; but moſt probably he did not think of it as we do. I ſhould be glad to know how much ſhort of what Mr. Paine has written any man may write. May I ſay a republic is a better thing than a monarchy? May I ſay this conſtitution would be better without a Houſe of Lords? Is there any language in which I may expreſs thoſe ſenti⯑ments, or does a libel conſiſt in the ſaucy manner in which the ſentiment is expreſſed; If ſo, where is the boundary to be drawn? How am I to know when I am within the limits of the preſs or not?

I think there is a noble perſon I have deſcribed, whoſe mind is not turned to introduce diſorder into the ſtate, or extend the privileges of the public be⯑yond [84]what the law now is; I mean Lord Loughbo⯑rough, Chief Juſtice of the Court of Common Pleas. I believe I can anſwer for the correctneſs of this. My Lord Loughborough gives this opinion, and I ſhall follow it up with an authority of the Earl of Stan⯑hope; as I may overlook it, I will take that firſt. He ſays, with great ſhrewdneſs, after alluding to what fell from Lord Loughborough, ‘The thing that is illegal, is the exciting any one to ſedition, or to a breach of the peace. The queſtion therefore upon a libel is, whether a paper publiſhed did thus excite, and was ſo intended; conſequently, mere ſpeculative writings on the conſtitution are not libels, however abſurd they may be. Suppoſe, for inſtance, that a man were to write a ſpecula⯑tive work to prove, that a trial by a ſingle judge would be far preferable to the trial by jury; or that a Parliament, compoſed only of a King and Houſe of Peers, would be, beyond compariſon, better than the legiſlature of King, Lords, and Com⯑mons; no man could poſſibly reprobate ſuch a work more than I ſhould: but if the work did not excite people to ſedition, ſuch a ſpeculative pub⯑lication could certainly never be deemed a libel, for abſurdity is no part of the definition of a libel. If our boaſted liberty of the preſs were to conſiſt only in the liberty to write in praiſe of the con⯑ſtitution, that is a liberty enjoyed under many an arbitrary government. I ſuppoſe it would not be deemed quite an unpardonable offence, even by [85]the Empreſs of Ruſſia, if any man were to take it into his head to write a panegyric upon the Ruſſian form of government; ſuch a liberty as that might therefore properly be called the Ruſſian liberty of the preſs; but the Engliſh liberty of the preſs is of a very different deſcription, for by the law of England it is not prohibited to publiſh ſpeculative works upon the conſtitution, whether they contain praiſe or cenſure.’

‘The liberty of the preſs is of ineſtimable value, for without it this nation might ſoon be as thorough⯑ly enſlaved, as France was, or as Turkey is; every man who deteſts the whole government of France, and the preſent government of Turkey, muſt be therefore earneſt to ſecure that palladium of liber⯑ty, and muſt alſo be anxious to preſerve to the people inviolate the trial by jury, that tranſcend⯑ent, that incomparable and guardian right.’ There⯑fore you ſee, Gentlemen, as far at leaſt as general principle goes, we have ideas in the opinions of perſons; if this is not true, the noble Lord is writ⯑ing a libel himſelf, for exciting people to do all theſe things contrary to the law made by the upper houſe of Parliament. Now, Gentlemen, as to Lord Loughborough's opinion, if I was to read it, I be⯑lieve it would be correct. Now, Gentlemen, you obſerve, if Mr. Attorney General had meant to ſay, if Mr. Paine had written theſe obſervations upon the Engliſh government, as I will ſhew you other men have made the ſame obſervations upon both houſes [86]of Parliament; if he had done it, as the Attorney General ſays, not extending the circulation of it by acts of his own; he has put no ſuch fact upon re⯑cord, there is no evidence of it; he has not charged any particular circumſtance or act of the Defendant antecedent to writing this book; he has ſhewn you no declaration of his contrary to thoſe of a good ſubject; he has ſhewn you no converſation which marked him to ſay by and bye we ſhall ſee confu⯑sion in England, and ſuch deſtruction as is going on in France. I would give up my brief if it was ſo, for it would give the lie to his preface; it would have ſhewn he did not addreſs himſelf to the uni⯑verſal reaſon of the people of England, but that he thought to introduce miſery among the various claſſes of mankind in this country. Gentlemen, therefore I ſtand before you upon this ground, which brings me to remark upon the paſſages, and then I have done. I am not ſurpriſed, becauſe when I conſider the nature of the human mind, how much I have to ſtruggle againſt in your opinions, and know you are anxious to retire from the conſidera⯑tion of the buſineſs, I know your juſtice will indulge me with the hearing of what it is my duty to ſtate to you. I ſtand at this bar for the purpoſe of giving a criminal arraigned before you that defence which the law entitles him to; if any part is inconſiſtent, my Lord will ſtop me; if any thing is improper, if it can be anſwered, or if it is ſo clear in your mind as not to require any, your verdict will in a mo⯑ment [87]overthrow all that I have been ſaying,—Our duties are of the moſt different nature in the world; you will diſcharge your duty while I diſ⯑charge mine: it is not mine to judge, but to lay the materials before you to judge; the ſame right any man has Mr. Paine has. When my Lord and I were engaged together in 1780, I do not imagine we were conſidered as contending for the propriety of aſſaulting the Houſe of Commons, or putting the city of London into a conflagration; I am doing that to day which my Lord and I did in court to⯑gether then. What I am doing now is in expectation of juſtice; and his Lordſhip, I have no doubt, will think no diſgrace or obloquy that any man can ſtate, ſhould be thrown out againſt me for having done my duty in the manner I have done it. Some have ſtated that I am zealous from diſaffection; others, that I am ſolicitous to ſhew my abilities from vanity: though, if there were any ſituation which would forbid a man to do it, it muſt be this, when he is to contend, and obliged to ſpeak, againſt the moſt innate feelings of the mind; when he is ob⯑liged, by looking round, to ſee ſo many counte⯑nances expreſſing no very great ſenſe of approbation at what he is maintaining with all his ſtrength, and feels his duty, and ſhall to the lateſt hour of his breath, and hopes to maintain that ſtrength and col⯑lection ſo neceſſary to ſupport ſo painful, laborious, and unpleaſant a duty, as my ſituation calls upon me to perform.

[88]Gentlemen, I come now, and then I have finiſh⯑ed, which will not be long, and ſhall relieve you from the pain of hearing me any longer, to obſerve upon the paſſages in this book. I am ſure, to every candid mind, it will operate as an excuſe. If I had ſet about commenting upon theſe paſſages without having laid a foundation for my arguments by au⯑thorities wrote by other perſons, you could not have underſtood the text; and I know it would have been impoſſible to have received any attention from you if I had not done ſo; you would have gone out of the court and ſaid, as lovers of the conſtitution, ſhall we not condemn this man?—I tell you I expect your verdict upon no ſuch foundation. If you were called upon by truth and juſtice to give a verdict, I ſhould think you might ſay, we are of opinion that the King, Lords, and Commons, are not only in the original conſtitution the beſt eſtabliſhed government, and the moſt beneficial, but we believe none of the corruptions ſtated are in it, and we acquit the De⯑fendant becauſe he thought otherwiſe, and did it without looking to any particular magiſtrate; and that theſe criticiſms did not apply to any particular perſon in the country. If that appears upon the face of your judgment, then I ſay the public is not in⯑jured, and the liberty of the preſs is not wounded through any man's ſide; but if you tranſgreſs thoſe bounds laid down by the policy of the law, you make a ſnare for others; therefore all I ſeek for is the eſtabliſhment of that principle, leaving you to [89]compare the facts, and ſee whether they have any ap⯑plication. With reſpect to the firſt paſſage, I ſhall do it away in a moment: it ſays, ‘All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. An heritable or unheritable throne, or by what other fanciful name ſuch things may be called, have no other ſignificant explanation than that mankind are he⯑ritable property. To inherit a government is to inherit the people, as if they were flocks and herds.’

Is it to be endured, ſays the Attorney General, the people are to be told they are like ſo many ſheep and oxen?

Certainly not. I am of opinion, a more danger⯑ous doctrine cannot be inſtilled into the people of England. Mr. Paine is not doing that, when he ſtates they are like flocks and herds; he is writing in anſwer to Mr. Burke's book, that aſſerts the he⯑reditary monarchy is faſtened on the people, without any conſent of their own. But, ſays Mr. Payne, I deny that that is the conſtitution of England: the King is the magiſtrate of the people, how then can you inherit them? the King, Lords, and Commons repreſent the people, and can confer the throne upon his Lordſhip, or you or me: they repreſent the whole people of England, and therefore, ſays Mr. Paine, there is no ſuch King as you repreſent inhe⯑riting the people by abſolute neceſſity, or ‘that to inherit a government is to inherit the people as if they were flocks and herds.’ And ſo Mr. Locke [90]expreſſes it. No man can conſent further for him⯑ſelf; for he ſays no man, by any compact whatever, can bind his children or poſterity. So ſays Locke, and ſo ſays Paine; therefore it is not the King of England, it is the King of France, it is the Emperor, and the King of Pruſſia; it is all thoſe monarchs that are faſtened upon their unwilling ſubjects; therefore, he ſays, that ſpecies of inheritance to inherit the people, is it not binding? But if I my⯑ſelf am the ſhepherd, does any body inherit me like a flock? If I by my free conſent give up my liberty, nobody is to blame: I am the guardian and pro⯑tector of the government. I may be wrong in attack⯑ing the foundation of the Britiſh government, but am not wrong in ſaying Mr. Burke ſays it: therefore Mr. Paine contradicts Mr. Burke in his explanation of an heritable crown; he is diſtinguiſhing the King of England, as he ought to be diſtinguiſhed from that title, the moſt unpleaſant to faſten upon a prince: he conſiders him as a Majeſty of the people, and therefore not inheriting us like herds and flocks; therefore I think this paſſage is out of the caſe entirely.

Gentlemen, the next is, what I think extraordi⯑nary, my learned friend from page 21 leaps over to page 47, and begins in theſe words: "This con⯑vention,"—you will ſee what convention he is ſpeak⯑ing of; he is making a compariſon between the con⯑vention of America and that which took place on the Revolution in France—he ſays this ‘convention [91]met at Philadelphia, in May 1787, of which General Waſhington was elected Preſident:—he he was not at that time connected with any of the ſtate-governments or with Congreſs; he delivered up his commiſſion when the war ended, and ſince then lived a private citizen.’

‘The Convention went deeply into all the ſub⯑jects; and having, after a variety of debate and inveſtigation agreed among themſelves, upon the ſeveral parts of a federal conſtitution; the next question was the manner of giving it authority and practice.’

‘For this purpoſe they did not, like a cabal of courtiers, ſend for a Dutch Stadtholder, or a German Elector; but they referred the whole mat⯑ter to the ſenſe and intereſt of the country.’

Now Gentlemen, I apprehend, whether King Wil⯑liam was brought over here by the ſoundeſt and juſteſt motives of the whole people acting for them⯑ſelves, or whether he was brought over here by thoſe motives which very frequently have a ſhare in the moſt refined eſtabliſhments, ſignifies not a farthing; the author of the Commentaries upon our laws warns us not to fix our regard or obedience to the government; but conſidering the motives of our anceſtors that eſtabliſhed them, it is enough that it is eſtabliſhed. I ſhould love the conſtitution of the country juſt as much, and be as happy as if all thoſe rights that were brought about by King William had been brought about by demons. Do you any of [92]you love the reformation the leſs becauſe it was brought about by Henry the Eighth? becauſe his motives were bad, and he had ſquandered the trea⯑ſures of his father, and had put to death one woman to marry another his affections had been fixed upon, and though he did it from the moſt degenerate mo⯑tive, does it alter the reformation or affect its priority, or in the ſmalleſt degree affect the Prince or hurt the title of the King who ſits upon the throne of this country? Will my learned friend ſay, if I were to write a whole volume againſt Harry the Eighth with the moſt pointed aſperity, that I ſhould be convicted of a libel? where is the difference, whether it be one or two centuries ago it happened? it was not in the ſmallest degree libellous; if it were, you will find that one of our moſt valuable hiſtorians had been guilty of it; he gives it us from the records of the country, the manner in which King William and his creatures brought this about; he would be anſwerable for a libel if Mr. Paine is for writing this; and it is im⯑poſſible any man write a page of hiſtory, if that is the caſe. Mr. Hume ſtates the intrigues which paved the way for King William's coming to the throne: he ſays,

‘It muſt be confeſſed that the former articles of the Great Charter contain ſuch mitigations and explanations of the Feudal Law as are reaſonable and equitable; and that the latter involve all the chief outlines of a loyal Government, and provide for the equal diſtribution of juſtice, and free en⯑joyment [93]of property; the great object for which political ſociety was at firſt founded by men, which the people have a perpetual and unalienable right to recall, and which no time, nor precedent, nor ſtatute, nor poſitive inſtitution, ought to deter them from keeping ever uppermoſt in their thoughts and attention.’

And thus the revolution was brought about by a coalition of the parties of the court: what matters it by what means it was brought about—the queſtion is, what is the thing brought about? and whether it ſtands upon the conſent of our anceſtors, followed up and kept in exiſtence by our own? if it is, no man can rebel againſt it without being a victim to the laws. All I am arguing for is the freedom of opinion, not the freedom of conduct which is bound, as Mr. Paine ſays, in every part of this work, by the inſtitu⯑tion by which a man is called upon to live.

With reſpect to what has been ſaid of the Edwards and Henries, ſurely my learned friend will not arraign this becauſe the author is not well enough read to know Edward the Third was a great Prince and King, and becauſe he names him with the Henries it is a lebel; but, ſays he, he tells you there was no Conſtitution up to the Revolution, but that all the conſtitution was got piece-meal, by the people ſtrug⯑gling with thoſe tyrants. I ſay ſo; and I think it for the honour and advantage of the country, that it ſhould be known. How is it poſſible to ſay Magna Charta was not to take from King John that [94]aſſumed power which he over and over again aſſerted? Two-and-forty times the ſtatute of Magna Charta has been re-enacted; ſometimes with arms in tho hands of the people; and King John was forced to ſign it at Runnemede. The people took it as their inheritance; they had a right to it. How is it with reſpect to the other parts? how did they eſtabliſh it at the Revolution, and in every other part of our hiſtory? Gentlemen, I was obſerving they were taken by the people with arms in their hands; and it was given even as a theſis in the different univer⯑ſities, and it happened to be allotted to me, while I was under the diſcipline of a college of England, to maintain, and a reward for maintaining ſucceſsfully, that the liberty of the people of England at the Re⯑volution, did not ariſe from any remains of the Saxon liberty, but it aroſe from the oppreſſive ſyſtem of the Normans; it carried the ſpirit of freedom from man to man, from one end of the kingdom to the other; and by ſlow degrees, by imperceptible and ſucceſsful ſtruggles that was obtained from thoſe princes whoſe power was aſſumed, in violation of thoſe rights which are unalienable, and belong to all mankind. Mr. Hume himſelf ſtates expreſſly, that the Conſtitution of this country was nearly an abſolute monarchy, notwithſtanding the numerous panegyrics upon it. It is impoſſible to ſay one man is to be puniſhed for what another man has written who has become a claſſic in the language. All the world will not make that intelligible. Notwithſtanding all the nu⯑merous [95]panegyrics upon Engliſh liberty, it may be ſaid to be an abſolute monarchy till the laſt century; it appears ſo from all Mr. Hume has recorded. Shall it be ſaid, if a grave hiſtorian writes that, that ano⯑ther man ſhall be made criminal for aſſerting the ſame principles?

Gentlemen, the next paſſage arraigned is this: ‘The attention of the Government of England; for I rather chuſe to call it by this name than the Engliſh Government’ (tho' if there is any dif⯑ference, I am ſure I don't comprehend it) ‘ap⯑pears ſince its political connection with Germany to be ſo completely engroſſed, and abſorbed by foreign affairs, and the means of raiſing taxes, that it ſeems to exiſt for no other purpoſes: do⯑meſtic concerns are neglected, and with reſpect to regular law, there is ſcarcely ſuch a thing.’

That the Government of this country in conſe⯑quence of that connection has certainly been loaded with a great number of taxes, I believe no man can doubt: when a man contemplates the vaſt ſyſtem of revenue, he may be led to a thought of that ſort; he does not arraign the adminiſtration of law or juſ⯑tice; he does not ſay the law is adminiſtered with⯑out regard to truth, or that the magiſtrates are cor⯑rupt; if he had done ſo, that I admit would be a li⯑bel. He ſtates (which has been ſtated over and over again from the pulpits of this country) that the law of this country is mainly defective; that it wants that which ſhould belong to it, and is over⯑loaded with a variety of forms that tend, of many [96]ſubjects that are brought, to apply. Gentlemen, I am not arguing for the right of free diſcuſſion, let us ſee whether we cannot find authors that ſpeak their opinions from palaces (where certainly nothing ſeditious would be endured) and draw a compari⯑ſon of the law of England and that country from whence Mr. Paine came, America. This is obſerved by Mr. Newcombe de Cappe, and you will find others taking notice of our juriſprudence, by thoſe called upon to adminiſter the law from the bench; therefore, the Gentleman's obſervation as to the law, does not appear to be that ſpecies of attack that falls within the deſcription of a libel, if you take it in the ſenſe I am giving it, and in the ſenſe I wiſh you to conſider. Gentlemen, with reſpect to the Houſe of Lords, I believe I ſhall be able to ſhew you the very perſon who introduced this con⯑troverſy, and who is conſidered by thoſe that are intereſted in the government at preſent, as a man truly devoted to maintain the government of the country in the higheſt order and preſervation. He has made remarks not kinder, and you will think more ſevere, than the Attorney General did to-day. He ſays that two Houſes appear to be effectually in⯑fluenced into one, though not in their original con⯑ſtruction. Mr. Burke is pleaſed to ſay of the Houſe of Lords in theſe words: ‘It is ſomething more than a century ago ſince we voted the Houſe of Lords uſeleſs, and they have now voted them⯑ſelves ſo; and the whole heap of reformation’ [97](ſpeaking of the Houſe of Commons,) ‘is caſt upon us.’

He does not ſpeak of it in the Houſe, or merely in his place in Parliament, but it is printed and re⯑printed; and a new edition was publiſhed not above three months ago, and circulated through the pub⯑lic. This paſſage ſtill ſtands its ground; he thought it applicable to remark upon the abuſes which pre⯑vail in Parliament, and which may lead to various ſerious conſequences, if not conſidered by the people of this country.

Gentlemen of the Jury, this was held out upon a recent occaſion by that perſon who is now in the higheſt ſituation in his Majeſty's council, and who has the confidence of the nation, as I am given to under⯑ſtand, and who has the order of the ſtate put into his hands. I am not meaning to calumniate him; but in my opinion that was the brighteſt paſſage of his life, and I ſhould have thought him brighter, if he had continued in thoſe ſentiments.—That Right Honourable Gentleman I have a right to ſpeak of, and make uſe of as an authority for his talents, rank in the country, and various circum⯑ſtances that tend to adorn him; but I think, Gen⯑tlemen, it would be a hard thing not only upon the defendant, but a hard thing upon the country, if it is to be decided, That that which is to be done with impunity and with approbation, and ſpoken highly of by one man, ſhould bring another man to a pil⯑lory or a priſon. What is the aſſertion of Mr. Paine? [98]That the Miniſter touches the Houſe of Lords, as with an opium wand, and that it ſleeps obedience. Does he mean to ſay that is any part of the original misfoundation of it? Does he ſay it has deſcended from generation to generation? he does not, he gives it that root and foundation Sir George Saville, that illuſtrious patriot, gives it; who tells you that the Houſe of Commons was in his time what Mr. Paine repreſents it; that the Houſe of Lords was what Mr. Paine repreſents it; and all attempts to reform it would be ridiculous, except thoſe, the foundation of what is written in this book.

I oberved my learned friend raiſe his voice, as if any thing concerning Mr. Horne Tooke was to be a reaſon why the deſendant was not to have the ſame judgment as if Horne Tooke's name had not been mentioned. Let us ſee what is decided by that Right Honourable Gentleman at the time I am conſider⯑ing him that illuſtrious patriot for the preſervation of that Conſtitution we live under. I hope and truſt, whatever may be the event of this day, you will not ſurrender any part of the liberty of the preſs, or any part of the genuine freedom or benefits ariſing from it to this country; and though I have the un⯑pleaſant ſenſation of knowing I make no effect on your minds, yet I muſt diſcharge my duty in the minds of thoſe who hear me; I will maintain my own, here and everywhere; and with unabated patience and perſeverence will I go through what I take to be my taſk.

[99]This was recorded, and ſent throughout the coun⯑try; it is in theſe words, ſigned by that Right Ho⯑nourable Gentleman, by the Duke of Richmond, Lord Stanhope, and Mr. Wyndham, but particu⯑larly the name of the Duke of Richmond ſtands at the head of it; when I ſay that Right Honour⯑able Gentleman, I mean the Right Honourable William Pitt. This declaration was publiſhed not as an abſtract of ſpeculative writing, but as a writ⯑ing publiſhed within a week after the Houſe of Com⯑mons decreed they would make no alteration in the Commons Houſe of Parliament: they met at the Thatched-houſe (and they had a right to do it) and gave their opinion to the people of this country: Were they proſecuted for libels? I deſire you as men of honour, and as men of truth, to judge of Mr. Paine's book, which talks of the Miniſter with his opium wand. Mr. Burke, at that time of day ſays, ‘In conſequence of this corrupt and venal Parlia⯑ment, in conſequence of the influence of the crown extending throughout the realm taken together—’ What is the cure Mr. Burke preſcribes? he tells you the people without doors are to be excited to look to thoſe evils. I will read it in his own words: he ſays, ‘Let equal juſtice be done; don't let one man be burnt in effigy for affection to Government, while other men are enjoying all the ſweets that belong to a ſuppoſed attachment to the Conſtitu⯑tion.’ He ſays this, ‘The diſtempers of mo⯑narchy would be a great ſubject of apprehenſion; [100]it is not Parliament alone that can remedy it; and the people ought to be excited to a more ſtrict attention to the conduct of their repreſenta⯑tives.’ In God's name, Gentlemen, how are they to know it, if I cannot ſay it in general terms in the Houſe of Parliament, without venturing to ad⯑vance a libel? how am I to come forward, as it is one of my privileges to come forward, and warn the people of England, of the conduct of this or that man; he ſays, ‘he writes not to them only, but to the whole people of England, and it ought to be ſettled in the meetings.’

Now, Gentlemen, the Engliſh of it is this: Theſe ſeditious publications which are ſo loudly talked of, were in the market all that time, as my learned friend ſtated; no man thought of it, no man talked of it at the time, when a certain number of perſons pro⯑posed what I have read out of that green book; in another place no information was upon the file; but no ſooner this was publiſhed, than we hear the king⯑dom was to be overturned by perſons preſuming to publiſh ſarcaſms and libels. My opinion is, the Government will never be affected by any libel; let it be corrected by its own purity; as Doctor John⯑ſon ſays, ‘If they examine their own conduct they will find the cauſe; let them correct it, and they will find the remedy.’—I truſt it is one of the deareſt privileges the people have, to examine and watch over every part of the Government of the [101]country; and the preſs ought to be free for a man's conſideration, to make what remarks he pleaſes, touching the frailty of the ſtructure, or any part of the Government, whether it be frail in itſelf, or rendered frail by thoſe acts ariſing from its being conſtituted ſuch a number of years—provided you think the man who wrote it believed in thoſe im⯑perſections, and the advantage or diſadvantages. I think that any perſon ſtanding here upon his trial for giving that little account I have been reading, cannot be guilty of a libel. Let us remember what it is this celebrated perſon ſays, when he is ſpeaking of Lords and Commons, and why he would have aboliſhed ſome of thoſe high offices about the King's perſon. You all know I ſpeak of Mr. Burke; he ſays, among other things, "If thoſe ſalaries are taken away, the nobles would deſert the court."

I do not agree with Mr. Burke in his poſition; I diſmiſs the poſition, as I think it is a ſcurrilous ſhabby attack upon the nobles of the land, and upon his Majeſty; and though Mr. Burke has a right to write ſo, I ſay it is an infinitely more ſhabby and fouler attack than the preſent, — I hope your Lordſhip underſtands me, I am ſpeaking of it with diſapprobation. What does he ſay? he ſays, ‘a King is naturally a man who is fond of low company, is fond of the loweſt and worſt miſcreants; there⯑fore we muſt firſt get this neceſſary thing and then we muſt take care to bribe that part of it; [102]a parcel of fellows, not fit for any thing; and take care of another part that is equally as bad, though not quite ſo bad as fidlers and buffoons.’ Gentlmen, that is a ſarcaſm upon the Britiſh Conſti⯑tution; but mix it with the whole of the mat⯑ter contained in the man's book. If he writes any thing about the King, he muſt be convicted, and I could not defend him; I muſt ſtand in my place to do my duty, which would be over in an inſtant, though it is not charged even on record to be a libel upon the king's Majeſty. I ſay it does not include the King. Does the Attorney General ſay it does? if he does, I can call for a verdict; but if my learned friend chuſes to change his innuendo, he ſhall do it now; but no jury could find an innuendo which there is no evidence to ſupport. With reſpect to thoſe publications that ſpeak about monarchy, what a wonderful inſtance have you in Harrington: I don't know whether it did not come from ſome publiſhing ſocieties. He was repreſented as a republican wri⯑ter, that had been promoting the murder of King Charles I.: a low obſcure man, who ha no wiſh but that which every deſperate man has, of pulling down what was eſtabliſhed.

It does divert one to ſee thoſe perſons write thus, though I dare not be angry with any body that writes; but theſe are a ſet of fellows, who will let nobody write but themſelves; they publiſh books, and you have them thrown into your chaiſe in an⯑ſwer to this book; but if any man would give notice [103]of it, and undertake to proſecute and aid the civil magiſtrate, not thoſe that the Attorney General thinks objects of proſecution, but a ſet of Gentle⯑men who chuſe to call themſelves lawyers into the bargain, this conſpiracy, as they call it, and I call upon my Lord to ſupport me, that when a man is ſtanding upon his trial for publiſhing what he has written upon the conſtitution; are theſe the means by which Engliſhmen are taught to love it? I ſay, if this man was ſtained with blood, inſtead of ink, if he was covered over with crimes at which human nature would ſhudder, ſtill he is equally intitled to that hearing allowed him, and which he has a right to as a member of the conſtitution. gentlemen, I ſtand here as an advocate for this man; an perhaps if I had not a conſiderable degree of preſence of mind, ariſing from conſiderable experience, I ſhould have been beat down long ago, not but that you have given me a moſt painful and obliging attention, but becauſe I know every avenue is choaked up againſt me; I know the whole preſs is pointed againſt me, and this man by name; all the engines of govern⯑ment have been employed againſt him; and in the Commons Houſe of Parliament they have named him, and prejudged his work.

I gave my ſentiments as an Engliſh Lawyer; which was conſiſtent with that dignity of character which I hold in that aſſembly. I have nothing to hope or fear from doing my duty, which I [104]will not ſhrink from, but will perſevere in it t the laſt. Gentlemen, it is ſaid, that the man I alluded to, who has written any thing like it, is as great a thief, and as obſcure a ruffian, as this man. Gentlemen, this Mr. Harrington, this low black⯑guard, this murderer of Princes, this blood-ſtained ruffian, is deſcended (you will ſee it for Six-Pence at the Herald's office) from Eight Dukes, Three Marquiſſes, Seventy Earls, Twenty-ſeven Baronets, Thirty-ſix Barons, of which number Sixteen were Knights of the Garter. If this cauſe was tried in Germany inſ⯑tead of England (I have a right to be heard) what was he? Beſides he lived in the reign of Charles I. Oh brutal ignorance of he history of this country, and this is his moſt affectionate ſervant; and it is obſerved he was a republican, by what the hiſtorian ſays. Toland ſays, I cannot too much boaſt of the man the king's favourite: I know not which moſt to commend, the king for truſting an honeſt man, though of republican principles, or Harrington for owning his principles while he ſerved the king. How did he ſerve him? May all men who profeſs mo⯑narchy ſo ſerve their monarchs! He ſtaid with him in the Iſle of Wight, to watch the fortune of his royal maſter; he came up by ſtealth; he hid himſelf in the boot of the coach, to take a laſt farewell of him, and fell into his arms; and afterwards fainted on the ſcaffold, at the feet of his expiring maſter, After the death of Charles he wrote his famous Oceana; and after paying tribute to a virtuous and [105]unfortunate maſter, he contended it was not Charles I. that brought on his own death, but the evil nature of monarchies. Gentlemen, then it was the ſeizure of books began, by that tyrant Cromwell; and you firſt begin to learn what a wiſe man Cromwell was. Harrington begged his book from Cromwell's favorite daughter; and ſeeing her infant at her ſide, he ſnatched it up in his arms, and ran away. Alarmed for its fate, the mother followed him. Says he, ‘I have taken your child, and I know what you feel for its loſs; your father has got my child,’ meaning his publication, ‘I reſtore to you your child — ſupplicate your father to reſtore mine.’ The daughter petitioned her father, and Cromwell yielded. Says he, ‘I will give it you; for, if my government is made to ſtand, it will never be hurt by this paper-ſhot.’ Nor will any government, as Milton ſays. Let another man read it; let him anſwer it—that is another way; let him do as Mr. Adams did. I contend, that out of a coalition of writers truth is to come. I do not quarrel with Mr. Adams for writing his opinions; ſo ſaid a celebrated perſon, who was an ornament to his country, the Preſident Monteſquieu. Says he, ‘It is not ma⯑terial, in a free country, how men reaſon; it is enough that they do reaſon: the coalition of rea⯑ſoning brings forth the truth, and that truth is the baſis of the beſt and ſureſt government, as long as people are capable of knowing its value.’ Gen⯑tlemen, let me then addreſs you in, I think, language [106]the moſt affectionate it is poſſible to hear, here or any where; an extract from the ſame author I men⯑tioned before, where he raiſes at once, in that ſublime and glorious manner of writing and thinking, ſo pecu⯑liar to that mighty poet Milton; a man—how ſhall I deſcribe him?—no copier of any thing that is human; he looked up to that ſublime Source, as he deſcribes it, the univerſal God and Father of the world, who, as he expreſſes it, is the ſource of all wiſdom, and who ſendeth out his ſun, and touches with the hal⯑lowed fire of his altar thoſe lips which he pleaſes to inſpire. Methinks I ſee it ſo;—I think I ſee not the diſtinction of the Engliſh conſtitution;—but I think I ſee what Milton thought at thoſe times he ſaw; but which unfortunately never came to paſs. The country is forſooth in danger by the publication of a ſix-penny pamphlet, but the auſpices of the greateſt ſtateſman are eminently ſo. A man whom to name is to honor and to admire; a man whom to hiſtory can ſhew a greater, nor any private acquaintance more dear; a man who is loved with the affection of a friend; a man who put to its hazard his eaſe and darling popularity, for the benefit of the people of the land, that he was born by his mighty talents to cultivate and reduce to order. This is the character given to Mr. Fox by Mr. Burke; and this is the man with whom, ſays he, I have lived in the greateſt friendſhip, and whom I may ſay I have lived to ſee treated in the manner I have unfortunately witneſſed. Gentlemen, I have but a few words more to trouble [107]you with, if you will have the goodneſs to hear me; and that is this: I wiſh that this man may be judged of by you in the manner I have been propoſing; that all this freedom, though it is not any other freedom than belongs to the conſtitution of the country. Re⯑member, I am not aſking the verdict for him, on any other inſtitution than the law of England. I am not deſiring your deciſion on any other conſtitution. The policy of Great Britain is not to have a jealouſy over her ſubjects, to know what is for the benefit of the whole community. The ſubjects of England are affected to whatever is right and honeſt; and let reaſon be reaſon, let truth and falſehood oppoſe and fight one another, but it is better to purſue this courſe with reſpect to Engliſhmen, which was pro⯑poſed by Lord Chatham. Do not think they are to be bent to your purpoſe by a froward conduct.

Do not limit their conception; and do not imagine with the Attorney General, that they are to be led away either by argument, or by ſarcaſm: but it is to operate by degrees, it is to engage their affections, convince their reaſon, and they will be loyal from the only principle that can make loyalty ſincere, vi⯑gorous or rational; a conviction which will operate by degrees, that it is their trueſt intereſt, and that their [108]form of government is for their common good: conſtraint is the natural parent of reſiſtance, and this doctrine is by no means novel. In all hiſtories of former times, it has always been expreſs and con⯑vincing, that where one ſide has been tyrannical, the other ſide, that was in oppoſition to it, has been refractory: on the other hand, all nations have conſi⯑dered the contrary even as long ago as Lucian. You all remember, Gentlemen, the pleaſant ſtory in that fable of his reſpecting the Countryman and Jupiter; they were converſing with great freedom and fami⯑liary on the ſubjects of heaven and earth; and coun⯑tryman liſtened with great attention, and acquieſced in the converſation ſo long as Jupiter tried only to convince him by reaſon and argument; but the Countryman happening to hint a doubt as to the truth and propriety of ſomething which Jupiter had advanced, he inſtantly turned round and threatened him with his thunder: No, ſays the Countryman, if you up with your thunder, I believe you are in the wrong; you are always wrong when you appeal to your thunder; as long as you have reaſon on your ſide, I believe you may be right, but I cannot fight againſt thunder. So, Gentlemen, I cannot fight againſt the united voice of the people of England, and God forbid I ſhould; I am an obedient ſubject and ſervant of the law—to that rule of action I ſhall ever give my voice, opinion, and conduct. You may condemn my con⯑duct, but I ſhall ever do as I have been doing to⯑day; [109]I hope, with confidence, that I am not tranſ⯑greſſing thoſe rules in doing the duties of my ſitua⯑tion which are accidentally caſt upon me.

The Attorney General roſe to reply, but Mr. Campbell, the foreman of the Jury, ſaid he was inſctructed by his brother jurors to ſay that he might ſave himſelf the trouble of any obſervations, unleſs he thought otherwiſe himſelf, for that they were ſatisfied.—The Jury immediately gave their verdict Guilty.