SECT. I. A Definition of the SOUL, as given by Philoſo⯑phers, and a Concluſion of its Immortality drawn from it.

IT is neceſſary before we form one Objec⯑tion to ſo general an Opinion, as the Im⯑mortality of the Soul, that we ſhould con⯑ſider how far we agree, as to its eſſential Exiſtence, with thoſe ^*, who ſupport this important Doctrine.

[2] Firſt then—We allow that the Soul is an intellectual Being, not at all ſubject to the Ac⯑cidents and Properties of Matter, in general; ſuch as Solidity, Extenſion, Contraction, Ex⯑panſion, or any Quality whereby it is render'd local ^*, or in a Capacity to take up the leaſt or the moſt infinite Space.

II. That this intellectual Being is acting on, only, a particular Part of Matter, i. e. the Body, by certain inexplicable Means, as utterly unknown to us as the Means how the Planets act in their Orbits, by wonderful Dependen⯑cies on their proper Centers of Gravitation; all which we can attribute to nothing but the Will of the Great Creator, from whom they have received ſuch neceſſary Laws as are ſtiled the Laws of Nature.

III. That the Soul is nothing but that Power in Man, or rather acting on the Body of Man, that enables him to perceive, to re⯑flect and to will.

IV. That the Soul is a perpetual or con⯑ſtant Power of Thinking, and that upon its [3] ceaſing to be active it muſt immediately ceaſe to be.

It is from theſe ſtated Principles that a late Philoſopher, who (if we ſet aſide his irrational Attachment to ſome particular Syſtems) had of all Mankind the greateſt Perſpicuity and Juſtneſs of Reaſoning, draws theſe two Co⯑rollaries.

1ſt. ‘That the Soul is in its own Nature immortal; for nothing but the Power which hath given it this active Life and Being can deſtroy it: It is entirely out of the Reach of the material World to hurt it: It cannot lay aſide its own Thinking, it cannot put itſelf out of Being: Nor can we conceive how any other Spirit can make it ceaſe to act, i. e. ceaſe to be: Such an active Being as a Spirit cannot be deſtroy'd but by Annihilation; and ſurely God, whoſe Right and Prerogative it is to create or give Being to a Creature, hath not put it into the Power of any Creature to annihilate his Works, or take away their Being.’

2dly. ‘That, when the human Body dies, the Soul exiſts and continues to think and act in a ſeparate State: And, when it is freed from all the Avocations of Senſa⯑tions of ſenſible Things, it will live more entirely in the Reflexion on its own Ope⯑rations, and will commence a State of Happineſs or Miſery, according to its own former Conduct; either rejoicing in the [4] Teſtimony of a good Conſcience, or under inward Anguiſh and bitter Self-Reproaches, from the Conſciouſneſs of its own Guilt.’

Perhaps this Author, from an earneſt Per⯑ſuaſion of the Truth of his Aſſertions, drew theſe Concluſions before his Argument had gained ſufficient Ground for ſuch weighty Inferences: For, upon ſumming up the Evi⯑dence of his Reaſons, we find he is obliged to uſe his not being able to conceive how one Spirit can be ſo prevalent as to annihilate an⯑other, as a Proof of the Impoſſibility of it.

Hence, we might conclude, that our Au⯑thor could not conceive how God himſelf, who is a Spirit, could annihilate the Soul; but if this is not his Meaning, as certainly we muſt infer it is not, from what he ſays pre⯑ceding, that it is in the Power of no other Being to deſtroy it; by which he muſt imply, that it is in the Power of God to deſtroy it;—it is needleſs then to ſay, ſurely God has not impowered any of his Creatures to annihi⯑late his Works; before we have ſufficient Reaſon to conclude, that the Creator himſelf will not put an end to them. Thus what doth it argue in Favour of the Soul's Immor⯑tality, to ſay no Creature or Power but God can annihilate the Soul, before we have proved that God himſelf will not deſtroy it, on the Diſſolution of the Body, i. e. that he has not created the Soul of ſuch a Nature, that it cannot poſſibly exiſt without the ne⯑ceſſary [5] Organs of the Body. Here then is the Point to be diſputed on; for, as to the ſecond Corollary, it is nothing more than a pretty rational Conſequence of the firſt; and if the firſt is prov'd of no Force, that of itſelf muſt neceſſarily fall.

But before we proceed immediately to ex⯑amine the Juſtneſs of the above Inferences, let us take a little Notice of the Univerſality of this Opinion of the Soul's Immortality, be⯑cauſe many have taken this as a preſumptive Proof of its Veracity.

SECT. II. The Univerſality of the Opinion of the Soul's Immortality conſider'd; its Foundation and inſufficient Conſequence.

NOT only the Chriſtian of every Sect, the Mahometan and the Perſian Be⯑lievers, but the unletter'd Indians have, as it were naturally implanted, this Sentiment in their Minds; and the latter, very rationally (tho' ſo often laugh'd at and exploded a Con⯑ceit) believes alſo, that his Dog ſhall keep Company with his Maſter in the Regions of Immortality.

Let us examine then whether this is an in⯑nate Idea, explicitly wrought into the Na⯑ture of the Soul of Man, and born with us; [6] or whether it be an Idea formed in the Soul, by its Reflexion on itſelf, or if it be not an Idea communicated to the Soul, in its Com⯑munion or Converſe with Souls of the ſame Nature; which Converſe, it is plain our Souls hold together when they acquaint each other with our Thoughts, by the Means of Senſation. Now if we could conclude it of the former Nature, there might ſeem ſome plauſible Reaſon for thinking it a preſumptive Proof of the Soul's Immortality, and eſteem⯑ing it a Sort of an Evidence given us by our Creator: But we cannot conclude it ſuch an innate Idea, becauſe Mr. Locke has manifeſtly diſproved the Poſſibility of there being any ſuch innate Ideas implanted in the Soul; but proves that all Ideas muſt be formed by Re⯑flection or Reaſon, that is, by the Soul's acting on itſelf. Now, in this Caſe, it is ab⯑ſolutely impoſſible that the Soul ſhould be in a Capacity of forming a juſt Judgment on ſo abſtruſe a Point, at a Time when it is almoſt incapable of forming any very rational Ideas of Things daily occurring to the Senſes: For I imagine no Body can tell how they firſt im⯑bibed the Notion of the Soul's Immortality: But if there be ſome who can, they can eaſily aſcertain whether it is an Idea form'd in the Mind by Reflection, or whether it is not (as I conclude it is) an Opinion communicated to the Soul with its earlieſt Notions of Mo⯑rality: And therefore ſo deeply impreſſed in [7] the Tenderneſs of the Mind, when no Act of Reaſon was powerful enough to withſtand the Impreſſion, or to judge of the Truth of ſuch an Impreſſion; that it requires all the Efforts of Reaſon, afterwards, to eradi⯑cate it.

As to Mr. Watts's Doctrine of innate I⯑deas—I believe none will contend, that the Syſtem of Immortality is ſo conſonant with the Nature, Frame, and Make of the ratio⯑nal Mind, as that two and two make four—a Part is leſs than the Whole, and other Axioms according to which the rational Mind, of Neceſſity muſt and will judge, and therefore, theſe, ſays Watts, may be called innate Ideas.

The philoſophical Antients, it is true, be⯑lieved, as much as the Moderns, a future Exiſtence of the Soul; of which, Socrates was a noble Inſtance: But their Ideas ſeem plainly to have ariſen from their abſtracted Notions of Virtue and Vice, and the Neceſ⯑ſity, they imagin'd, of future Rewards and Puniſhments; and tho' this Circumſtance makes ſtrongly for the Immortality of the Soul, yet there appears no Proof of ſuch a Neceſſity; ſince they themſelves allowed that Virtue was its own Reward, and Vice its own Puniſhment; the one rendering Man⯑kind happy, and the other occaſioning them to be miſerable, even in this World. But this we will conſider preſently.

[8]You will ſay then, Whence aroſe this Idea at firſt? Even ſuppoſing it to have been communicated from Father to Son ever ſince the Beginning (if ever there was a Begin⯑ning, as in all Probability there was) of Man's Exiſtence—it muſt then of Neceſſity be ei⯑ther explicitly implanted in the Soul, or the Effect of the Soul's acting on itſelf, i. e. of Reaſon or Reflection.

To this I ſay,—it is probable that a Man, who had never heard of the Soul's being im⯑mortal, might nevertheleſs be of that Opi⯑nion: Yet this Belief is occaſioned more by the Will influencing, or as it were bribing, the Reaſon ſo to conclude, than from the na⯑tural Power of judging of Truth, which is eſſential to the Soul. For, from the Plea⯑ſure ariſing from our own Ideas, it is natural for the Soul to will or deſire never to be robb'd of that Pleaſure which muſt ceaſe in its Non-Exiſtence.

But here you will ſay, perhaps, the Rea⯑ſon is not ſubject to the Will, but the Will to Reaſon. For you cannot perceive or think what you will.—This is true.—Yet tho' the Will is not the Director of Reaſon, it can, and plainly doth, impoſe falſe and ſpecious Propoſitions on the Judgment in favour of its own Cauſe; and the Concluſion form'd by the Judgment, in Conſequence of theſe, is called, Partiality: For the Power of Rea⯑ſon, [9] in itſelf, will from all Propoſitions judge impartially.

Here comes the Difficulty of perſuading People to what they are unwilling to believe; and the eaſy Concurrence to the Belief of any thing by People impartial and unbias'd: And this the Divines are ſenſible of, when they ſay, there is more Hopes of converting a Man of no Religion at all, than of a bi⯑gotted Heretick.

Now that all, or the greateſt Part of Man⯑kind, ſeem to have the Deſire of Immorta⯑lity, is plain; and we may juſtly aſk, as Cato is repreſented ſaying,

From whence he infers,

But this Inference is not evident; neither is our Deſire of a future Exiſtence any Proof at all of it; unleſs the Caſe is fairly ſtated before thoſe Powers of Reaſon, whereby we naturally and infallibly judge of Truth; and they join to direct the Will, to maintain and ſupport that Doctrine. For it is plain that the [10] Will, when not acting from this innate Knowledge of Truth, or the innate Cauſe of Virtue (of which we ſhall ſpeak hereafter) directs us oftentimes to Things ſtupid, falſe, and immoral. Hence it is evident, that the moſt firm Belief in Man, ariſing from his own Reflections of a future Exiſtence, is ex⯑actly the ſame with the Belief of a Man in the following Caſe.

Suppoſe a Man had a Friend whom he lov'd as himſelf, and it ſhould be told him, by one whoſe Word equally might or might not be depended on, that a moſt uncommon Misfortune had happen'd to this Friend.— Now his being unwilling that ſuch a Thing ſhould be, would immediately awake all the Reaſons or Cauſes he could think of, to en⯑courage him to conclude, that it really was not; and if, upon examining all that ſhould occur, he finds no Juſtice to think the Pro⯑bability or the Poſſibility of ſuch a Misfortune, will he not believe is Friend is ſafe?—Un⯑doubtedly he will.—But is this Belief a Proof that he is ſo?—Certainly no; for after all, there may be a Cauſe, which thro' the Per⯑plexity of his Hopes and Fears, never ap⯑pear'd in a juſt Light to his Reaſon, or per⯑haps was never ſuggeſted, or perhaps a Cauſe that he did not know exiſted in Nature, which may have occaſion'd ſuch a Misfor⯑tune, and which Cauſe, when he comes to be ſenſible of, he will no longer doubt of [11] the Truth of ſuch an Effect, and of his Friend's Misfortune.

So tho' a Man, out of a Deſire of being immortal, may think he has ever ſo many Reaſons to believe it; yet if afterwards he becomes ſenſible of a Cauſe why it cannot be ſo, that Power of Reaſon whereby he judges of Truth, will infallibly convince him of it: And the only Cauſe that makes a Man remain not convinc'd by a juſt Argument is, that he either wants Capacity or Penetration to underſtand the Juſtice of its Propoſitions: For it is plain, if a Man ſees and knows two and two are added together, that he muſt conclude the Sum is four.

But to apply the foregoing Suppoſition to the Effects of the Prejudice of Education. Suppoſe a Man in thoſe Circumſtances was told of a Misfortune befalling his Friend by a thouſand Witneſſes, whoſe Veracity in other Reſpects he had Reaſon to depend on; or even tho' ſome of them were the greateſt Lyars, yet they being all in the ſame Story, would he form one Doubt of the Truth of it, even tho' he ſaw no Reaſon to believe it? —Certainly no; or if he did, his Belief and his Doubts would be of the ſame Kind ex⯑actly, as that which a Man entertains con⯑cerning the Immortality of the Soul, that has been told of it a thouſand Times, by a thouſand People, and has never impartially examin'd the Probability or Poſſibility of the [12] Truth of ſuch a Belief.—Here then is, I think, clearly demonſtrated the Source of the Opinion concerning the Soul of Man being immortal; and it is plain from it, that we may juſtly aſſert, that the Univerſality of that Belief, is not the leaſt Proof of the Truth of it.

Now we will conſider then, firſt, the Vali⯑dity of the Proofs brought by the above-quot⯑ed Philoſopher of the Doctrine in diſpute, and then examine the Reaſons that may be given to think ſuch an Immortality neceſſary, and then proceed to give other Reaſons for thinking there is no ſuch a Neceſſity, and for our believing the Soul incapable of ex⯑iſting after the Deceaſe of the Body.

SECT. III. Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul examined.

FIRST, then, the Soul is immortal, ſays our Philoſopher, becauſe nothing but the Power which hath given it this active Life and Being, can deſtroy it.

This Reaſon, granting it true, has no Weight at all relating to the Aſſertion, un⯑leſs it had been before prov'd, that the Au⯑thor of the Soul's Being would not deſtroy it; which is the moſt material Point in que⯑ſtion: And this is what this Philoſopher has omitted to mention, as if the divine Volition [13] or Will was leſs neceſſary or leſs doubtful in this Caſe, than that Power which is only the Conſequence of that Volition. But as this Suggeſtion would have quite diſconcerted his Hypotheſis, he has ſumm'd up the Cauſe without it.

2dly, It is entirely out of the Reach of the material World to hurt it.

If our Author here means, that the Soul (as a Power not at all ſubject to Matter's Pro⯑perties, as at firſt allow'd) cannot be affected by Matter in itſelf conſider'd as a Subſtance that has no Power at all, his Aſſertion is as ridiculous and as childiſh, as 'twould be to ſay, if any Thing is out of our Reach, we can't reach it. But if he means, as he certainly does, that the Soul, conſider'd as a Power and an exiſtent Being in itſelf, cannot be affected by that Power, which acts upon all Matter in general in ſome Degree or other, and is call'd the Law of Nature, I muſt en⯑ter a little into the Truth of his Aſſertion.

If we conſider the Soul abſtracted from the Body, as having nothing at all to do with Matter, we may then ſay, neither Matter, or the Powers acting upon Matter in general, can affect it. But if we conſider the Soul acting in conjunction with the Body, it may, and will, be affected by the Power acting upon Matter in general, by Means peculiar to that Part of Matter or Body to which it is united; that is, on which it acts: As if [14] a Stone ſhould fall on my Head, the Power acting on the Stone would, by means of the Organs of Senſation, affect my Soul.

The ſame in Caſes of Diſeaſes, broken Limbs, and the like, the Soul is affected with extream Pain, which without, the Soul would not be felt; and this Pain muſt pro⯑ceed from ſome Cauſe to which Matter in general is ſubjected, as no Man has a Pain peculiar to himſelf; but it is poſſible a Man of the ſame Conſtruction may be liable to it as well as he. It is true, indeed, he becomes ſenſible of this Power acting upon Matter in general, by the Means of Senſation iden⯑tically particular to himſelf; for one Man doth not feel the Pain of another, as each is affected with his own.

Now there are Inſtances of the rational Faculties being impair'd and render'd uſeleſs to the neceſſary Offices of Life, from the Diſeaſes of the Body: As in Caſes of Luna⯑cy; at which Time the ſenſative Faculties, or the Powers of Senſation, which are more immediately acting on the Body, ſeem much leſs affected than the Reaſon or the Soul's Power of acting upon itſelf: Since a Lunatic, that cannot remember, reflect or judge, is often very ſenſible that he ſees, hears and feels.

Now if the Soul is ſo liable to be affect⯑ed, even in that Part in which it is ſaid its Immortality conſiſts, viz. that of acting upon itſelf, by the ſlighter Accidents of the Body; [15] ſurely, when the Body receives the Shock of Death, when the Blood ceaſes to flow, the Eyes to ſee, the Ears to hear, and all the whole Body to move, certainly the Soul muſt be ſo affected as to ceaſe altogether to be.

We ſee a Man wounded and maim'd, ſo that he cannot ſupport himſelf; yet may ſo recover, as to be as uſeful and agreeable to himſelf and others as before:—We ſee a Lunatic, oftentimes, entirely incapable of reaſoning, yet may be ſo reſtor'd, as to re⯑flect and judge as nicely and juſtly as ever.

Again: A Man may be ſo wounded, or by Diſeaſes render'd incapable of putting his Limbs to their former Uſe, but muſt be forc'd to ſupport an inſufficient Body till it drops into the Grave. The Soul of a Lunatic may be ſo affected, that it ſhall ſupport the In⯑ſufficiency of Reaſon till it ſhall we not ſay, till it ceaſes to act at all; conſequently ceaſes to be.

For if it is allow'd that thoſe Powers of the Soul, which are call'd the Powers of Senſation, immediately become inactive when the Body dies, according to the ſecond Co⯑rollary, the Soul, in a ſeperate State, is freed from all the Avocations of Senſations and ſen⯑ſible Things, &c. And if it is evident, as I have prov'd it is, that the Power of the Soul's acting on itſelf, is full as ſubject to be affected by Accidents peculiar to Matter, as the Power [16] of Senſation is, have we the leaſt Shadow of Reaſon to infer, that the Powers of Reflection can exiſt without the Aſſiſtance of the Body, any more than the Powers of Senſation? I think not.

But you will ſay, perhaps, this is no de⯑monſtrative Proof. Well, tho' it be not, and we ſhould allow, in favour of this Arti⯑cle, that it is out of the Power of the whole material World, or the Power acting upon all Matter, to hurt the Soul, conſider'd ſe⯑perate from the Body; yet we muſt firſt know that it can exiſt in this Seperation, before we allow this a Reaſon for its Im⯑mortality. (In other Words)—We muſt know the Soul's Immortality from ſome other Cauſe, for this is an Argument of no Moment at all.

3dly. It cannot lay aſide its own thinking; it cannot put itſelf out of Being.

It is poſſible for a Man to take a Piſtol and ſhoot out his Brains, by which Action he at once annihilates the Powers of Senſa⯑tion, no inconſiderable Eſſence of the Soul: But whether the Soul is altogether render'd inactive by Death or no, this Aſſertion of the Impoſſibility of the Soul being able to deſtroy itſelf, is no Reaſon to conclude its Immortality; unleſs you will ſay, that a Man's being unable to walk, is a Proof he never ſhall depart from the Spot he is in, [17] before you have prov'd the Impoſſibility of his being carried.

4thly. We cannot conceive how any other Spirit can make the Soul ceaſe to act, i. e. ceaſe to be.

This is the leaſt of a Reaſon that can poſ⯑ſibly be given: For if our not conceiving how any thing could be, is a Reaſon why it is not or cannot be, we have the ſame Rea⯑ſon to conclude that the Soul and Body do not act in Conjunction, becauſe we cannot conceive by what Means; tho' we have daily ſuch evident Demonſtrations of the Veracity of ſuch mutual acting.

Theſe then are the great Proofs of our Philoſopher, deduc'd from the beſt and moſt rational Arguments of his own, and of others, in favour of the Immortality of the Soul.

We will now examine the Reaſons that may be given to think ſuch an Immortality neceſſary.

SECT. IV. Reaſons to think the Immortality of the Soul neceſſary.

1ſt. IT may be thought neceſſary, to the Ho⯑nour and Wiſdom of our great Crea⯑tor, that a Soul, poſſeſs'd of rational Faculties in ſo high a Degree, and capable of ſuch ex⯑traordinary [18] Attainments, ſhould be continued longer in Being, than the ſhort Space of Time allotted for the Life of the Body.

As to this, we are incapable of forming any true Judgment of thoſe high, noble, and extraordinary Attainments we may imagine the Soul poſſeſs'd of: For nothing is high, great, or noble but by Compariſon; and as we are ſo ignorant of the eſſential Greatneſs of the Deity, we cannot form any juſt Idea of what Conſequence we are of, in reſpect to its wonderful and incomprehenſible Nature.

It is therefore highly probable, that we entertain a much greater Opinion of our Be⯑ings, than is ſtrictly conſonant to the Nature of Things, and the Extenſiveneſs of God.

This Suppoſition then, argues nothing of a Neceſſity for the Immortality of the Soul.

2dly. It may be thought neceſſary from the ſeeming Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments.

This has, for many Ages, been eſteem'd, by the Rationaliſts of almoſt all Perſuaſions, as a ſufficient Reaſon to expect, if not an ab⯑ſolute Proof of, a future State:—We will therefore conſider it very impartially.

This Principle can have no other ſolid Foundation than the abſtracted Notions of Virtue and Vice; for if our Actions were neither Good or Evil, where is the Neceſſity of Rewards or Puniſhments? We muſt then, [19] firſt, conſider what is Virtue and what its oppoſite, Vice.

SECT. V. Virtue and Vice, their Foundation and Eſſence examin'd.

THERE has been nothing, in all the Syſtems of Philoſophers, ſo much con⯑teſted as this.—What are Virtue and Vice? —The Man of Faith will tell me, that it is plainly reveal'd in the Word of God, the only true Standard of Wrong and Right.

Now I think it abſurd to imagine, that the great Creator permitted Mankind to act for ſo many hundred Years, as, according to chrono⯑logical Account, were elaps'd before the Bible was wrote, without a juſt Standard for their Actions. But be that as it will.—I allow that the Syſtem of Morality, to be found in the ſa⯑cred Writings, abſtracted from that Heap of Abſurdities wherewith it is inculcated, is a Syſtem as truly perfect, juſt and noble, as is to be met with in any Writings whatever. Yet ſhall we not think this rather the Syſtem of the philoſophic Heathens improv'd, than a new one immediately reveal'd to us from our Creator.

What are more noble and juſt (according to our Notions of Juſtice) than the Senti⯑ments deliver'd under that allegorical Heap [20] of Abſurdities in the Heathen Theology; and it is evident, theſe Sentiments were as capable of influencing moral Practices: For where have we had one Inſtance of a Chri⯑ſtian being a better Man than Socrates?— Shall we not think then, that theſe two Sy⯑ſtems of Morality ſpring from the ſame Source in the rational Mind? And ſhall we not caſt aſide the Heap of Abſurdities taught us by Revelation, as Socrates, Plato, and other Philoſophers of thoſe Days, did thoſe of the antient Mythology; which, nevertheleſs, were as much and as literally believ'd by thoſe who were incapable of thinking then, as the Scriptures by the Generality of Chriſtians are now?

It is poſſible the Man of Faith may ſee no manner of Reaſon in all this: I ſhall there⯑fore leave him to the Vanity of his own Imagination, and confine my Diſcourſe to the Man of Reaſon, who is the only juſt Diſputant.

We will examine then firſt what Vice and Virtue appear to be, and then proceed to conſider their Cauſe or Foundation.

As to the former, it will be needleſs for me to enter into the Subject in my own Words, when it is already ſo juſtly expreſs'd, and ſo clearly demonſtrated by the truly in⯑genious Mr. Brown, who, in his ſecond Eſſay on the Characteriſtics, after having fully prov'd the Imperfection of the Definitions of Virtue, [21] laid down by Clarke, Wollaſton, and Lord Shafteſbury, aſſerts—That Happineſs is the laſt Criterion or Teſt, to which the moral Beauty, Truth, or Rectitude of our Affections is to be re⯑ferred, which he thus demonſtrates, by two Circumſtances.

1. ‘Thoſe very Affections and Actions, which in the ordinary Courſe of Things are approved of as Virtues, do change their Nature and become vicious, in the ſtricteſt Senſe, when they contradict this fundamen⯑tal Law of the greateſt public Happineſs.’

‘Thus, altho' in general, it is a Parent's Duty to prefer a Child's Welfare to that of another Perſon, yet if this natural and juſt Affection gain ſuch Strength, as to tempt the Parent to violate the public for his Child's particular Welfare, what was be⯑fore a Duty, by this becomes immoderate and criminal.’

2. ‘Actions which are, in their own Na⯑ture moſt ſhocking to every humane Af⯑fection, loſe at once their moral Defor⯑mity, when they become ſubſervient to the general Welfare, and aſſume both the Name and Nature of Virtue. For what is more contrary to every gentle and kind Af⯑fection of the human Breaſt, than to take away the Life of a Man: Yet, when the Neceſſity of public Example compels us to make a Sacrifice of this Kind, tho' we may lament the Occaſion, we cannot con⯑demn [22] the Fact: So far are we from brand⯑ing it as Murder that we approve it as Juſ⯑tice, and always defend it on this great Principle alone, that it was neceſſary for the public Good.’

‘Hence, therefore, we may obtain a juſt and adequate Definition of Virtue, which is no other, than the Conformity of our Af⯑fections with the public Good, or the volun⯑tary Production of the greateſt Happineſs.’ Whoever will read this Author's whole Eſ⯑ſay, will ſee with what Juſtneſs he proceeds to this Definition of Virtue.

We will go on now to conſider the Founda⯑tion or Source of Virtue in the rational Mind.

Dr. Watts allows, that the Foundation of moral Virtue is naturally implanted in the Soul of Man; and that this Foundation is the innate Knowledge of Truth, which is eſ⯑ſential to the Soul: For hence it is, ſays he, that the Soul rationally judges of Right and Wrong, of Fitneſs and Unfitneſs—that two and two make four—that when a Globe is fitted into an exact round Caſe, there is a Fitneſs of thoſe Things to each other; and then proceeds to ſay, that thus the Soul ra⯑tionally concludes, Contracts are rather to be kept than broken. Now, ſuppoſing that by the ſame Rule that, two and two make four, we ſhould ſee that Contracts are rather to be kept than broken; yet if the Deſire of pro⯑moting Happineſs, as has been proved, is Virtue and Happineſs the Effect of it; we [23] ſhould, in this Caſe, often find that keeping ſome Sort of Contracts, raſhly and inconſi⯑derately made, would render miſerable all the Parties engaged in it, and be not at all inſtrumental to the public Good: And there⯑fore breaking ſuch a Contract would be a Means of Happineſs, and as every Means to mutual Happineſs is Virtue, even acting ac⯑cording to Truth would then be Vice.

We ſee then here is an evident Proof of the Falſity of Dr. Watts adjudging the Foun⯑dation of Virtue to the innate Knowledge of Truth, as well as of Mr. Wollaſton's Defini⯑tion of Virtue; who affirms, that ‘no Act whether Word or Deed of any Being, to whom moral Good and Evil are imputable, that interferes with any true Propoſition, or denies any Thing to be as it is, can be right. That, on the Contrary, every Act is right, which does not contradict Truth; but treats every Thing as being what it is.’

But I refer the Reader to Mr. Brown, to ſee a beautiful and fair Confutation of that Definition; and conclude that, however eſ⯑ſential the Knowledge of Truth is to the Soul, it is that Faculty of the Soul which Watts calls pathetic Inſtinct and Diſpoſition toward Goodneſs, and what I term Goodneſs of Heart, and not the Knowledge of Truth that is the Cauſe of moral Virtue: And of this, as Watts obſerves, there are ſome few Inſtances in moſt Perſons, which appear [24] chiefly in the working of Benevolence and Compaſſion in us towards ſenſible Creatures, inward Averſions to Cruelty, and perhaps, ſays he, a natural Reverence to that Almighty Power, whom we call God, when we come to know him.

Neither is it any ways more accountable how more or leſs of this Diſpoſition is im⯑planted in each Individual of Mankind, than it is by what Means one Man has more or leſs the Capacity of Reaſoning, Genius, or elevated Ideas than another.

Now if from this Source ariſes moral Vir⯑tue, every Man will be naturally more or leſs virtuous, as he has more or leſs Good⯑neſs of Heart naturally implanted in him: And tho' ſome Men, who may perhaps have but little of this innate Principle, may do Actions tending to the Happineſs of their Fellow-Creatures, either from the Influence of moral Precepts, imagining thereby to ac⯑quire the Favour of their Creator, or out of Fear of what they are told are the Conſe⯑quences of Vice; and tho' others, entirely diſregarding every Sentiment of this Kind, and deaf to whatever little they have of this natural Goodneſs, go on to the greateſt Lengths in Actions that render the World miſerable; yet this does not at all hinder us from rationally fixing here the Foundation of Virtue.

[25]And if acting from this innate Principle of Goodneſs or Deſire of prom [...]ting univerſal Happineſs be Virtue, acting from the im⯑mediate Want of it muſt neceſſarily be Vice.

Now, where is the Juſtice or Neceſſity that Men ſhould be puniſhed or rewarded, for acting from Principles which they nei⯑ther gave themſelves, nor can poſſibly diveſt themſelves of?

For if the Soul can diveſt itſelf of this Inſtinct or Faculty, why cannot it diveſt it⯑ſelf of all its other Faculties, and ſo annihi⯑late itſelf?—Dr. Watts allows that the Soul cannot think otherwiſe than that two and two make four —a Part is leſs than the Whole, and ſuch like.—Now is this innate Idea, the Knowledge of Truth, of more Conſequence, or leſs eaſy for the Soul to diveſt itſelf of, than that great Spring from which our Hap⯑pineſs evidently derives? I think it ſhould not be thought ſo — for it appears that this Knowledge of Truth doth not immediately occaſion us to do Good or Ill, but acts ſub⯑ſervient to our Deſire of promoting Happi⯑neſs, by forming Propoſitions of the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things; whereby the Soul becomes ſenſible when to exert that Inſtinct, it is poſſeſſed of, in favour of Virtue. So that we ſee this innate Knowledge of Truth is a ſecondary and not the primary Cauſe of moral Virtue, only aſſiſting the natural Diſ⯑poſition to Goodneſs in its Offices.

[26]But here it may be objected—That the Soul may be diveſted of this Faculty or Diſpo⯑ſition, for there are many Men, who have been poſſeſſed of a great Share of it; who, by be⯑coming familiar to inhuman Sights and Deeds of Cruelty, have loſt a great deal of this Diſ⯑poſition: As is evident, in Surgeons, Butchers, and the like. So that thoſe, who at firſt might be almoſt ready to ſwoon at the Amputation of a Limb, or at the Death of a Sheep, ſhall, after ſome Time, think no more of the Cruelty of their Profeſſion than thoſe whoſe Concerns are with inanimate Things.

Now, however plauſible this Objection may ſeem, it is nevertheleſs falſe; for they have not a jot leſs of this natural Diſpoſition in them, than before they ever practiſed thoſe Profeſſions: And it is only that innate Knowledge of Truth, whereby they judge of the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things, that is vitiated or miſled by a Practice, the Neceſ⯑ſity of which impoſes ſpecious Propoſitions on the Mind, from which their Reaſon con⯑cludes, that this Inſtinct or innate Goodneſs of Heart need not be exerted on ſuch Occaſions; and thus from being accuſtomed to the Sights and Actions of Cruelty, without feeling an uneaſy Senſation; the Diſtreſſes and Suffer⯑ings of Humanity do not awake this natural Diſpoſition in them as they did before.

And yet, ſuppoſe you tell a compaſſionate Man, that is a Surgeon, of the Diſtreſſes of [27] a poor Creature who is ſtarving in Priſon; this will affect him fifty Times more than your telling him of a Man that is expiring with both his Thighs broke: While the Keeper of a Priſon, perhaps, would be leſs affected to ſee the Condition of a Man ex⯑piring beneath all the complicated Miſeries of Want and Confinement, than at the Sight of a fractured Skull or a broken Arm.

But the Reaſon why we find, among thoſe People who are daily familiar to Scenes of Miſery, ſo little Appearances of this In⯑ſtinct to Goodneſs, is perhaps from their be⯑ing naturally more void of it than others, which may be ſuppoſed one great Reaſon, why they ſhould chuſe or endure to be of ſuch Profeſſions.

In the ſame Manner, many People run into Vice, by becoming familiar to Actions which at firſt a ſeeming Neceſſity for im⯑poſes upon the Reaſon to conclude in ſome Meaſure juſtifiable. As a Man, that is ſtarv⯑ing, might poſſibly prevail on his Reaſon to conclude, that his Condition alleviates the Crime of his robbing on the Highway, and he may ſilence his natural Diſpoſition to Pity or Goodneſs of Heart, from the ſpecious Suppoſition that the Looſers may not be in a Condition to want, and therefore Miſery may not be the Conſequence of ſuch an Ac⯑tion; and thus he goes on, from one Step [28] to another, till this natural Inſtinct is not apprehenſive when to exert itſelf.

It was from a Knowledge of the Truth of this, that Mr. Pope ſays,

Thus it is, that a Man, who naturally has a great Share of this Goodneſs of Heart, may be brought, from one Action to another, to commit the moſt horrid of all Vices, Mur⯑der. But how often do we ſee that, how⯑ever powerful have been the Motives that have induced them to ſuch an Action, yet this Inſtinct, awaking in them, has ſo ſtrong⯑ly reſiſted and made ſuch a terrible Conflict in the Soul, that ſome have ſtood, without being able to exert an Act of Volition, to move their Hands to commit the Fact.— Others have begun, and have been unable to perform the Murder effectually: And very few but that the Moment the Fact has been perpetrated, have had no manner of Thought of the Motives that led them to it, but have been ſtruck with inexpreſſible Horror, which has been the Effect of that Goodneſs of Heart implanted in the Soul.

And it is plain, that the Deſire of gratify⯑ing our Appetites and Inclinations, which impoſes itſelf on the Reaſon as a rational Ne⯑ceſſity, [29] is the Cauſe why the Powers of judg⯑ing of moral Fitneſs and Unfitneſs draw falſe Concluſions; from which the Will influences the Body to commit Acts of Vice: For a Man that has naturally a greater Share of Anger and Pride than a Love of Gain, will ſooner kill or offend another out of Reſent⯑ment, than out of a Proſpect of Intereſt; while the Man whoſe Soul is more ſtrongly influenced by Avarice, an Inclination natu⯑rally implanted in the Soul, than by any other Paſſion, will ſooner kill or offend a Man, out of a Proſpect of Gain than out of Reſentment.

Thus it is evident, that the Paſſions, to which the Soul acting in Conjunction with the Body is ſubject, do, by impoſing on the Reaſon, make it direct the Will to influence us to Actions of Vice: For, as has been before obſerved, the Will is a Power directed by the Reaſon, as it appears in the moſt abandoned Caſes.

For when do we ſee a Man attempt to ſtab, or cut the Throat of another, with a Straw? Never—unleſs he be a Madman or an Idiot; and then we think there is no Juſtice in puniſhing him for his Actions.— It is plain then, by the rational Means taken to perpetrate Scenes of Villany, that Reaſon is in Action at that Time. Whence is it then that any Vice is acted, unleſs the Power of judging of moral Fitneſs or Unfitneſs is not vitiated and abus'd? and this Power, it is [30] plain, is more or leſs influenced according to that Goodneſs of Heart found in ſome De⯑gree, perhaps, in every Man.

But if there be a Man, who, without He⯑ſitation, from no Cauſe either of Reſentment or Intereſt, can go and ſtab another and feel no Remorſe at what he has done; that Man is either a Madman or an Idiot, entirely in⯑capable of Reaſon at all, or elſe he is a Man that has not, nor ever had, any Goodneſs of Heart in his Nature.

Hence it appears, that tho' natural Inſtinct or Diſpoſition to Goodneſs is the Source of moral Virtue, yet it is directed to virtuous Actions by the Reaſon; and that it may be influenced to remain ſeemingly inactive by thoſe Concluſions which Reaſon naturally draws from ſpecious and deluding Propoſi⯑tions, offer'd to it by the Will or the Deſire of gratifying our Inclinations: So that either the Want of this natural Inſtinct, or the vi⯑tiated Power of Reaſon, which Men have in Proportion to their Knowledge, may occaſion Men to fall into Vice. And it is plain, that a Man that has a greater Share of this Inſtinct join'd to his Reaſon, or a greater Share of Reaſon join'd to this Inſtinct, will ſupport the ſame Misfortunes much longer, without endeavouring to relieve himſelf by Actions of Vice, than that Man who has leſs of both.

And it is plain, that Men, who deſervedly bear the Character of the ſtricteſt Virtue, [31] might, in the ſame Situation, have been no more able, either by Goodneſs of Heart or Reaſon, to reſiſt the Deſire of gratifying their Paſſions; than thoſe that have been remark⯑able for the moſt glaring Actions of Vice.— For there is no Man can be certain what he ſhould or ſhould not have done, if under Circumſtances which he never experienced.

And now it is plain alſo, that Men cannot give or take away from the Soul the Powers of Reaſon or Inſtinct: and it is as entirely owing to the Cauſe of the univerſal Power or the Law of Nature, that one Man is inbe⯑nevolent, as that another is dull.

And as I hold it entirely commendable, that the Law ſhould puniſh or execute a Man who ſhews he either wants Juſtneſs of Reaſon or Goodneſs of Heart to direct his Actions; ſo I hold it as juſt, that an Idiot or a Madman ſhould equally be puniſhed or executed, as they are found to want theſe alſo.—So that while there remains the leaſt Reaſon to hope a Madman may recover his Reaſon, to influ⯑ence his Goodneſs of Heart, whereby he may be of Service to Community, I would have him only confin'd to Meaſures neceſſary to reſtore him. So I would, for the Safety of Mankind, have all Men, who are found to want either of theſe, whether from the greater Want of Reaſon, as in Idiots, or the greater Want of Goodneſs of Heart, as in Villains, of which ſome are greater Fools and others [32] greater Knaves, only confined to Meaſures neceſſary to reſtore them, if poſſible to be of Service to Mankind: But, if they are found to be, from more flagrant and repeated Ac⯑tions of Vice, incapable of ſuch a Reſtaura⯑tion; I would have them legally ^* put to Death, and commend it as a virtuous Action neceſſary to the public Good, whether they be Madmen, Fools, or Villains.

But tho' here appears Juſtice in this Ac⯑tion; it is becauſe Vice and Virtue are Ac⯑tions that affect only Mankind; but it would be ſtupid to imagine the original Cauſe of all Things, or God would eternally puniſh the Souls of Men, for not acting otherwiſe than they were influenced to do, from Powers which he is the Cauſe of: and it is juſt as ſtupid, to think it Injuſtice in the Creator, to leave unrewarded a Man, for doing what the Frame, Make and Nature of his Soul obliges him to do.

There appears then no Neceſſity for future Rewards and Puniſhments, from the ab⯑ſtracted Notions of Virtue and Vice.

SECT. VI. Certain Reaſons for the Neceſſity of future Re⯑wards and Puniſhments examined.

THERE may appear, perhaps, a Neceſ⯑ſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments, from the Sickneſs, Anguiſh, and Perſecution of the Virtuous in their Life Time; while many of the Wicked ſeem to be entirely free from theſe Inconveniencies.

As to this, it is impoſſible for us to trace how much Trouble or Miſery one ſingle vitious Action of our Lives may, by a thou⯑ſand unſeen and unaccountable Accidents, inflict on the World: So if Miſery is the Conſequence of Vice, as has been prov'd, it is impoſſible to tell what Man occaſions moſt Miſery; ſince one ſingle Act of Vice, com⯑mitted on ſome particular Occaſions by one Man, may occaſion a thouſand Times more Miſery in the World, than the ſame Act a thouſand Times repeated by another, and in other Circumſtances.

Now in the ſtricteſt Notions of Juſtice, no Man ſhould bear more Miſery than he has been the Occaſion of to others; but ſhould bear his Share in proportion to that: For if a Man is only to bear ſo much Miſe⯑ry as he intends to inflict by a vitious Act, perhaps he did not intend to be the Occa⯑ſion [34] of a thouſandth Part of that which may happen by that Act;—who then muſt ſuffer for occaſioning that Miſery?—Perhaps you will ſay, that Man who intended ſo much Unhappineſs by doing an Act, by which it may ſo happen from the Nature of Things, none at all ſhall be effected.

But I believe Experience ſufficiently con⯑vinces us, that very few, if any, of Mankind intend the Miſery which is the Conſequence of Vice: But that, if that Conſequence ap⯑pear'd to them in a juſt Light, perhaps the worſt of Men would tremble with Horror at the Thought of committing ſuch an Act.— Yet tho' we ſuppoſe that Men ſhould, in ſtrict Juſtice, be anſwerable for all the Mi⯑ſery their Actions may be the Occaſion of, each muſt be anſwerable as an Individual; for one Man cannot be ſuppos'd to ſupport the Miſeries of a thouſand People put toge⯑ther, tho' one ſingle Act of his may offend ſo many.—He muſt therefore pay in Pro⯑portion to himſelf as a ſingle Being, what he owes to Mankind: And if ſo, who knows how much of this Debt the Pains and Dif⯑ficulties, daily attendant on the human Body and Mind, do hourly diſcharge? Or who can tell how much committed Miſery is a⯑ton'd for, by a terrifying Dream, or a raging Fit of the Gout or the Tooth-Ach? Add to this, the Pleaſure and Pain always in ſome [35] degree concomitant to the Actions of Vice and Virtue.

Hence, then, why may we not infer that the ſupreme Being doth actually diſpenſe Juſtice to all the human Race, tho' by Means inexplicable to us, in this World; and that the Ballance of Happineſs and Miſery, is ad⯑juſted at the Death of every Man.

But you may call this abſtruſe or perhaps idle Reaſoning. Yet we may, by looking round to the ſenſible Creatures about us, and by making ſome juſt Compariſons, ac⯑quire a better Idea of ourſelves, and the In⯑ſufficiency of this Reaſon to expect a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments.

In whatſoever Degree we are pleas'd to conſider ourſelves above the Brute Creation, no body will deny, but that the great Cre⯑ator acts with impartial Juſtice towards every one, even the moſt minute and inſignificant of his Creatures. Why is it then a Horſe, a Dog, or Cat, ſhall be nouriſh'd and fed with all the Neceſſaries of Life, while others of their Species ſhall be ſubject to continual hard Labour, to whipping, or being worried to Death.

Can we ſuppoſe this or that Horſe, Dog or Cat, has deſerv'd more or leſs from the Hands of its Creator than another? If not, certainly there muſt be, according to our Notions of Juſtice with reſpect to ourſelves, a State in which the Sufferers ſhall be re⯑compenced [36] for the Pains and Fatigues of Life.

But this ſeems to argue the Immortality of Brutes, which we ſhall not now conſider, or that, by Means utterly unknown to us, the Creator diſpenſes Juſtice to theſe Creatures in their Life time; and if to them, why is it not probable that, by ſome ſuch like Means, he may act with us.

This, however, ſhews how imperfect are our Notions of what we call Divine Juſtice; and how little from them is our Reaſon to expect a future State of Rewards and Puniſh⯑ments, when we cannot tell, whether we have Juſtice done us in this World or no.

Having now conſider'd the Proofs of the Philoſophers in favour of the Soul's Immor⯑tality, and the Reaſons that might induce us to think ſuch an Immortality neceſſary; and as we find, in their pretended Proofs, no evident Demonſtration of any ſuch Doctrine; and as from the ſeeming Reaſons of its Ne⯑ceſſity we can draw no rational Concluſions to expect it, we will now proceed to exa⯑mine the Reaſons that induce us to think the Soul cannot be immortal.

To this End, we will conſider our rela⯑tion to ſenſible Creatures, whoſe Souls are eſteem'd by Philoſophers at beſt, but Souls of another and an inferior Nature, and which they don't ſcruple to pronounce have no Title to Immortality.

SECT. VII. Our Relation to the Brute Creation conſidered.

IT is the Inference of ſimilar and equal Cauſes, from ſimilar and equal Effects, that leads us to the moſt juſt and rational Knowledge; and which, as Watts obſerves, conſtitutes a great Part of the Science of Mankind.

Who doubts, nay, is it not commonly laid down as the moſt evident of all Truths, that we ſhall all die?—But whence do we draw this Truth?—Why, from Reaſon,—from this Manner of Compariſon: We daily ſee that Creatures of ſimilar Form, Organs and Faculties to ourſelves, are ſubject to Death; and meet with none whoſe length of Years are ſo far beyond the common Account of our Lives, as to give us the leaſt Room to think them exempt from it; becauſe we find their growing up, their Maturity and Decay, exactly reſemble thoſe that went before them.—We ſee alſo this ſame Decay and Death happen to every Animal in the Brute Creation; and tho' we ſhould meet with a Creature of ſo extraordinary a Kind as to have lived for two or three Centuries, and to have been tranſmitted from Father to Son, we ſhould admire it as an Animal of exceſſive long Life, but ſhould not in the leaſt [38] doubt but that it would die ſome Time or other; tho' we never ſaw or heard of any ſuch a one's dying in our Lives.

Now this Accident, as well as many others, Mankind have in common with the Brutes. —We cannot live without Suſtenance any more than they;—are as liable in our Na⯑ture to Hurts, Pains and Diſeaſes as they are: And if it ſhould be prov'd we are poſ⯑ſeſs'd of the ſame Kind of a Soul, however ſuperior, (tho' it may perhaps be ſhewn in ſome Caſes to be eſſentially equal) is it not as indiſputable a Truth that our Souls muſt ceaſe to exiſt like theirs, or if we ſuppoſe ourſelves immortal, that their Immortality muſt be ſimilar to ours.

I hope no one will, too raſhly, think this Manner of reaſoning a Diſparagement to the Dignity of human Nature, before he has well conſider'd the Dignity and Wiſdom of an Horſe, a Fox, and an Elephant.

Let us then now examine how nearly we are allied to the Animal Creation;—and firſt, as to the Body.

Philoſophers agree, that all Matter is eſ⯑ſentially the ſame, and differs only in its Mo⯑dification; but that the different Modifica⯑tion of Matter, gives it no ſuperior or infe⯑rior Degree of Merit, in itſelf conſider'd.— For whether the Clay be converted into the moſt pompous and ſuperb Figure, with re⯑ſpect to us, it is exactly the ſame Clay, con⯑ſider'd [39] in itſelf, as that which is converted to the meaneſt and vileſt Uſes.

But ſhould we bring the moſt plauſible Reaſons, from Experience or Philoſophy, to prove the Bodies either of Men or Brutes ſuperior, we muſt give the Cauſe entirely againſt ourſelves. Experience tells us, that the human Body, diveſted of the Soul, is to us more nauſeous and deteſtable, than that of moſt Brutes: And if, from Philoſophy, we ſhould agree that Beaſts have no Thought or Liberty at all, but are only Pieces of finely organiz'd Matter, capable of many ſubtile Motions communicated to them by outward Objects, we, by this, yield them the Superi⯑ority; ſince we own the Matter of our Bo⯑dies is not capable of ſuch Senſation, but that our Senſation is the Faculty of the Soul. We find alſo, that by a ſucceſſive Revolution of Particles of Matter, that ſame Matter which is at one Time Graſs, becomes part of a Beaſt, and from thence to be part of a Man, by Means of the Suſtenance of Life.

Neither doth the Form of Man give him any Pre-eminence in the Order of Beings, as it is no more ſerviceable to him in the Offices of his Life, than are the Forms of the Brutes to them; and tho' we diſtinguiſh a Man from a Brute rather by his outward Form than by the Dignity of his Soul, of which we cannot ſo immediately judge, yet it is poſſible there are, nay, there have been, many [40] Inſtances of Creatures more reſembling in their Form the Human than the Brute Spe⯑cies; ſuch as the Chimpanzee, and which for want of underſtanding Speech and Talk⯑ing, have yet been eſteem'd Brutes.

On the other Hand, I never heard any body preſume to ſay, that a wild Boy, I re⯑member to have ſeen, was not of the Human Species, tho' he could not ſpeak, nor under⯑ſtand Speech any otherwiſe than a Dog might do, and was beſide all over hairy like a Dog or a Monkey; tho' his Features were almoſt as regular as I ever ſaw thoſe of a Man.

It is plain then, from ſuch Inſtances as theſe, that it is poſſible, by an intermixing of Species, that there are Creatures in the World whoſe Form and Intellects are ſo join'd, that no body can pretend to deter⯑mine juſtly whether they are Men or Brutes.

Now if this be, as certainly it is, the Caſe, there is no other true Diſtinction in the Or⯑der of Beings, than by that Power which is their Life;— that which directs them to ſeek Happineſs or ſhun Miſery, to wit, the Soul.

We will now then conſider what is the Soul of a Brute, and how far it reſembles the Soul of Man.

SECT. VIII. The Souls of Brutes, what Philoſophers agree they are.

IF Mr. Locke's Suppoſition be true, ^* that Spirit may be only a Property of Matter; and that it is poſſible for the Creator to join ſuch an Influence to Matter, as to make it ca⯑pable of all we ſee it act, the ſame Syſtem is as juſtly applicable to the Man as the Brute: And that Man has a Soul conſider'd not as a Property of Matter, but as a Being in itſelf, was at firſt agreed on.—We muſt conclude then, that the acting Principle in the Brute, is of the ſame Kind with that of Man; and if of the ſame Kind, what poſſible Degree of Inferiority, ſuppoſe the loweſt, can affect any Being ſo much as to make it mortal, while another Being, acting in in the ſame Manner, is immortal.

Take the moſt ignorant and ſtupid of all the human Species, and compare his intel⯑lectual Faculty or Soul to that of a Locke, a Newton, or a Boyle,—what a wonderful Dif⯑ference! how weak, how inſignificant, how mean are the Ideas on one Side! how ſtrong, [42] how copious, and how elevated on the other! and yet we don't ſcruple in the leaſt to al⯑low the one a Soul as immortal as the other.

Is it becauſe they reſemble each other in their outward Form that we do this; if ſo, how exceſſively, how poorly, ridiculous do we judge of the Order of Beings!

Now ſince from ſuch an Inferiority in the Faculties of the Soul, we draw no Inference of the want of Immortality, we ſhall cer⯑tainly find, by comparing the actuating Power of ſome Brutes with that of ſome Men, that there being not ſo much Difference between Brutes and Men as there is between Men and Men, that we have no Ground to ſuppoſe one more immortal than the other.

But to confirm the Juſtice of ſuch a Man⯑ner of reaſoning, we will quote a Paſſage from the learned Biſhop Burnet, wherein he advances more than could, from him, be ex⯑pected in favour of the Brute Creation.

This Writer, after ſuppoſing that human Nature can hardly receive or bear the No⯑tion of Beaſts having no Senſation or Thought at all about them, becauſe there are ſuch evident Indications of even high Degrees of Reaſon among the Beaſts, he therefore con⯑cludes, ‘That it is more reaſonable to ima⯑gine there may be Spirits, of a lower Or⯑der, in Brutes, that have in them a Ca⯑pacity of thinking and chuſing, but that 'tis ſo entirely under the Impreſſions of [43] Matter, that they are not capable of that Largeneſs either of Thought or Liberty, that is neceſſary to make them capable of Good or Evil, of Rewards or Puniſhments; but that, therefore, they may be perpetu⯑ally rolling about from one Body to ano⯑ther;’ that is, by Tranſmigration.

Dr. Watts, having quoted this Paſſage, ſtates the Caſe on both Sides the Queſtion; and for want of one ſingle Argument to pro⯑ceed further (without injuring that Syſtem, to the Promotion of which, however ab⯑ſurdly, he wanted to reduce all his philoſo⯑phical Arguments) very fairly gives it up, and ſays he can make nothing at all of it. And yet, after this Confeſſion, he goes on to tell you, no Concluſions can be drawn from the Nature of Beaſts, let the Caſe be decided how it will, that can affect the Na⯑ture, Reaſon, or Religion of Mankind.

This, however, you are to take upon the Credit of his Word only, and are to believe the Immortality of the Soul, from the Ne⯑ceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments, which, he ſays, it is the Glory and Intereſt of the ſupreme Ruler of the Univerſe to ap⯑point. For tho' he ſo frankly owns, he knows ſo little of the eſſential Dignity of a Brute, yet he does not at all ſcruple to de⯑cide what is the Glory and intereſt of a GOD, whoſe eſſential Perfections, it is impoſſible, [44] after all our Searches, to know any thing at all about.

As to the Biſhop's Concluſion, that the Soul of a Brute muſt be more ſubject to Mat⯑ter than that of a Man, it is merely a Con⯑jecture, the Force of which will appear when we come to conſider the Actions of Brutes in Compariſon with thoſe of Men.

Yet to infer, that (ſuppoſing it prov'd) becauſe they are incapable of Rewards and Puniſhments, they muſt be tranſmigrated from one Body to another, is exceſſively ſtupid; for the Diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſh⯑ments, ſeems more applicable to this Syſtem than any other.

As that Soul that ſuffer'd exceſſive Toil and Drudgery in one Beaſt, and was in itſelf of a harmleſs Nature, might, by Tranſmi⯑gration, be converted into another Body, the Buſineſs of whoſe Life might be nothing but Eaſe and Pleaſure; ſo, on the contrary, the Soul that in one Life and Form had taſted all the Sweets and Enjoyments in its Kind, and was an offenſive Animal, might have a ſuitable Retaliation in ſome other Body.

Thus we ſee, that thoſe Philoſophers who moſt ſtrenuouſly inſiſt on the Immortality of the Soul of Man, are neceſſitated to conclude, that Brutes have Souls capable of Senſation and Reflection: And we find, that upon granting this, when they endeavour to di⯑ſtinguiſh it from the Soul of Man in ſo im⯑portant [45] a Point as its Immortality, what egre⯑gious Blunders they fall into.

This Watts ſaw; and rather than make any Blunder that might prejudice his Cauſe from a Concluſion in this Point, very judi⯑ciouſly, doth not decide any thing at all about it; tho' in avoiding this, he unluckily falls into that Miſtake I have above expos'd.

We will now come to compare the De⯑grees of Underſtanding in Men and Brutes.

SECT. IX. The Powers of Underſtanding in Men and Brutes compared.

WE have conſider'd the Soul of Man as eſſentially conſiſting in the Fa⯑culties of Senſation, Reflection, and, what is directed by theſe, the Will.

Firſt, then, as to Perception or Senſation.

We have a thouſand Inſtances wherein the nice Diſtinctions of Senſation are more rea⯑dily communicated to the Soul of the Brute than the Man.

Of this there needs no other Example than that wonderful Power in the Dog, whereby he ſhall trace, by the ſubtle Efflu⯑vias of Smell, not only an Animal, but a human Creature:—We daily ſee this, and are ſurpriz'd at that extraordinary Inſtinct which [46] we find ourſelves ſo void of; that a Man, with all the Faculties of his Soul engaged, ſhall not be able to tell which Path, among twenty, his Friend hath taken; while we ſee his Dog, without any other Advan⯑tage from external Objects, in themſelves con⯑ſider'd, ſhall purſue the right Track after him.

Thus, in every Article of Senſation, there remains not the leaſt Doubt but that, among ſome or other of the Brute Creation, they are found to have Perception equal, and, in many Caſes, ſuperior to Man.

Now then, we muſt conſider in what De⯑gree they have Reflection or Reaſon; and un⯑der this Head, we will juſt ſpeak of the Will. It is plain that the Power of Volition is, in ſome Caſes, influenc'd by Senſation;—as, when the Senſes are acting, we cannot chuſe but ſee, hear, feel, &c. Now in other Caſes, it is plainly influenc'd by the Powers of Sen⯑ſation, acting with thoſe of Reaſon:—As ſuppoſing a Man ſhould ſee a prodigious Weight falling towards his Head, the Ap⯑prehenſion occaſion'd by the Senſation at that Time, which makes the Will direct the Body to get out of Danger, is partly the Effect of Reaſon: For if a Man was to ſee a Feather falling down, he would perhaps entirely diſregard it, tho' he may be as ſenſible of the Deſcent of the Feather as of the Weight.

[47]And this Power of Volition, Brutes have in common with Men; for by this, their Bodies move and act, equally wiſe for their own Uſe and Safety as we do.

Now Reflection or Reaſon is a Faculty ſo neceſſary to the Soul's eſſential Exiſtence, that, without it, we ſhould not be capable of acting for our Preſervation.—This we find alſo in a great Degree eſſential to the Souls of Brutes; for it is plain that Animals remember Perſons and Things, Acts of Kindneſs and Diſkind⯑neſs, of which we have daily ten thouſand Inſtances.

Some Animals ſtand in Dread of what has offended them; others again remember to re⯑ſent the Offence receiv'd.—A Horſe ſtands in fear of a Whip and the Smack of it, becauſe he remembers the Smart he felt at the Time he ſaw the ſame Object, or heard the ſame Sound.—A Horſe naturally ſtarts at the Sound of a Drum, becauſe it occaſions a Sen⯑ſation he is a Stranger to, and therefore he doth not know the Conſequence of it; but after hearing it ſeveral Times repeated, and feeling no Hurt ariſe from it, he takes no more Notice of that than of any other fami⯑liar Sound.

So a Man is equally ſtartled at an unuſual Noiſe, but when he finds no hurtful Conſe⯑quence ariſe from it, the Repetition of the ſame Accident will leſs and leſs affect him, [48] till it comes at laſt to have no other Effect than that of confirming him when there is ſuch a Noiſe.

A Man is alſo afraid of a Thruſt from a Sword, becauſe either he has felt the Smart it can occaſion, or from Information or Re⯑flection on the Effects of a ſimilar Cauſe, he juſtly imagines it can hurt him: So if you could inform a Horſe that had never felt the Whip, that it would hurt like ſomething he had felt, he would ſtand in the ſame Fear.

Neither doth the Difficulty of informing the Horſe this, argue any thing of his want of Reflection or Reaſon: For if you were to ſhew a Man, whoſe Language you were a Stranger to, an Inſtrument, the Effects of which he had never ſeen, or the Effects of any thing ſimilar to it, you would find per⯑haps as much Difficulty in communicating the Knowledge of its Effects to him by In⯑formation, as the Effect of a Whip to a Horſe.

For ſuppoſing the Horſe entirely ignorant of the Whip, the Sound attending it, and the Action accompanying the Blow, yet if you take another Horſe and laſh him with it, the Animal that ſtands by will be immediately apprehenſive of ſomething from it; but not becauſe he hears the Sound, or ſees the Blow, but by the Agitation and Concern in which he ſees and hears his fellow Creature at that Time, and of this he is naturally a Judge.

[49]Now to this Apprehenſion are join'd the Circumſtances of the Blow, the Whip, and the Sound, which are inſeparable Ideas; and therefore when he hears or ſees the one, he is immediately apprehenſive of the other. So, in the former Caſe, you muſt ſhew the Man its Effects upon ſomething whoſe Na⯑ture and Properties he is acquainted with, and then he can be juſtly apprehenſive of the true Effect of ſuch an Inſtrument.

Hence it is evident, that the Soul of a Brute has, beſides all the Properties of Sen⯑ſation, the Powers of Volition, and that of retaining ſimple Ideas equal to Man, and of acting as rationally from thoſe Ideas.—But we will conſider this further.

The Rule Mr. Pope lays down is evident. ‘We cannot reaſon but from what we know.’ A Man cannot form any Ideas of Things whoſe Nature he is entirely ignorant of, and of any thing ſimilar thereto, (for the moſt abſtracted and metaphyſical Idea, muſt have its Foundation from the Knowledge of phy⯑ſical and natural Cauſes.)

A Man who never had the Senſe of hear⯑ing, cannot reaſon of Sound, or of any thing ſimilar to it; if of ſeeing he can form no Idea relative to Form or Colours.

Reaſon then is the Power of drawing In⯑ferences from Ideas acquir'd by Senſation, which Inferences are Ideas form'd purely by [50] the Soul's Reflection, or Power of compar⯑ing Effects and Properties within itſelf, tho' the Cauſe of thoſe Effects, and the Things poſſeſs'd of thoſe Properties, may perhaps be ten thouſand Miles withdrawn from any of the Organs of Senſation.

In what Degree then are ſome Men poſ⯑ſeſs'd of this Power of Reaſon?—We find here, that while we have had Men whoſe profound Capacities have been able to com⯑prehend and retain almoſt every Kind of Knowledge, we have had others who have been capable of entering but into one or two Branches of Science; and others again en⯑tirely incapacitated to comprehend or retain any thing at all of Science. Thus we ſee ſome Men ſo deeply enter into mathemati⯑cal Learning and the Science of Algebra, while others can't imagine in the leaſt what they are about, who talk of ſome Quantities leſs than nothing, and of others not quite ſo much leſs than nothing.

And yet thoſe who can't comprehend this, perhaps may very well underſtand that two and two make four, and that three times three make nine; becauſe theſe are Ideas, the Truth of which may, by the Organs of Sen⯑ſation, be demonſtrated: And whenever the Mind doth judge, it can judge no otherwiſe; and yet there are ſome Men ſo dull and void of the Power of thinking, that they cannot comprehend by what Means or how this [51] Axiom is true, without ſuch a ſenſative De⯑monſtration.

I ſhall not pretend to aſſert that a Beaſt, of any Kind, is capable of this Knowledge; otherwiſe than that a Horſe muſt feel that the Weight or Power of one is leſs than that of two, of two leſs than three, &c.—This appears by his Act of Volition, in putting out an additional Strength to reſiſt in pro⯑portion to ſuch an added Force.—Neither is it any ways material to the Purpoſes of that Beaſt, or doth it argue againſt the eſſential Power of Reaſon in the Brute, that this Truth does not come to him in the Form of a Propo⯑ſition, ſince he is as ſenſible of the Juſtice of the Axiom, as a Man who is convinc'd by his Senſes, that the ſame Thing or Accident is ſo many Times repeated, and cannot judge of it without the Evidence of his Senſes, or the Remembrance of that Evidence.

Now, tho' ſuch an Evidence is the Teſt of the moſt ſublime Reaſoning, yet the Man of Science, taking ſuch certain Axioms for granted, goes on, thro' a thouſand complex, ſimilar, and diſſimilar Ideas, without ever having occaſion to examine the ſenſative Truth of any one of thoſe Ideas.

Now ſuch a Manner of Reaſoning, I will not pretend the Brutes to be poſſeſs'd of;— and yet at the ſame Time Experience tells us, that ſuch a Manner of Reaſoning is as little inherent to ſome of the human Species.

[52]Either then we muſt deny the Souls of theſe Men to be of the ſame Nature with thoſe of a ſuperior Capacity of receiving Knowledge, or by admitting that the Souls of Brutes are eſſentially the ſame with Men of an inferior Capacity, we muſt allow that they are of the ſame Nature with thoſe of the moſt elevated Genius.

But perhaps it is not ſufficiently evident that the Souls of Men of narrow and weak Underſtandings, are as incapable of Reaſon as the Brutes, we will then compare their Intellects more particularly.

There can be no Inſtance of the want of Reaſon in Man or Brute, but what muſt ef⯑fect them either in Speculation or Practice.

Firſt then as to Practice, we can have no Cauſe to imagine the Brute wants Reaſon as to its Actions, if it provides as wiſely for itſelf in its own Nature, as Man doth for himſelf in his; neither is the Effect of rational Propo⯑ſitions of any Moment in this Caſe: For we don't ſay that Man wants Reaſon, who avoids or chuſes any thing that is agreeable or de⯑trimental to his Nature, from his Knowledge of its Properties immediately by Senſation, any more than another who avoids or chuſes the ſame Thing, becauſe, from a long Train of Examinations into the Nature of Beings, their Effects, Modes and Properties, he is ſenſible why ſuch a Thing is agreeable or de⯑trimental to his Nature.

[53]The Philoſopher will not run his Head againſt a Wall, becauſe he is ſenſible of the Motion and Properties of Matter, and the Conſtruction of his own Organs, Fibres, &c. by which Knowledge he is ſenſible he ſhall feel Pain by ſuch an Action.

A Man that is no Philoſopher, will not run his Head againſt a Wall, becauſe, tho' he knows nothing at all concerning the Pro⯑perties of Matter, or the Conſtruction of him⯑ſelf, yet he knows, by the Means of Senſa⯑tion, and the rational Concluſions he of ne⯑ceſſity draws from thoſe Senſations, that ſuch an Action will hurt him.

Now for ſome Reaſon or other, a Horſe will not run his Head againſt a Wall, any ſooner than a Man or a Philoſopher.

Again, we ſee with Wonder the great Improvement Men have made toward the mutual Benefit and Advantage of each other by the Arts of Navigation, Commerce, &c. Yet theſe Improvements, we are ſenſible, muſt be made by Men of the moſt refin'd or extenſive Talents, and not by Men of mean or narrow Capacities.

We ſee, on the Side of Brutes, the won⯑derful Means they have taken, and daily take, for the mutual Intereſt and Preſervation of their Species, equal, perhaps, in their Nature and Knowledge of Things, to ours.

We have Inſtances of many Men that, notwithſtanding all the Advantages of Infor⯑mation, [54] by Means receiv'd from Creatures of their own Kind, yet cannot retain the Method whereby they ſhould know how to ſpell a Word or a Name: And yet we have ſeen a Dog in this Metropolis, that would never miſs to ſpell the Names of Julius Caeſar and others, by only hearing the [...]ounds of them:—And in ſome Dogs, of polite Edu⯑cation, we have found them alſo capacitated to the modiſh Qualifications of dancing a Minuet, which ſome Men perform much more clumſily with the ſame Advantage.—I have alſo a Dog now by me, who, upon hear⯑ing the Name of a Gentleman, who has offend⯑ed him, only mention'd, will immediately begin barking, tho' the Party ſhould be a hundred Miles diſtant. We ſee ſome Par⯑rots and Magpies take off or imitate our Speech articulately.—Is it then becauſe we do not find in the ſame Animal the Power of Speech join'd with the Underſtanding, in the ſame Manner as it is in us, that we conclude its Underſtanding is not eſſentially like ours: —Thus we may object againſt the Parrot for talking what he does not underſtand,— againſt the Dog for not ſpeaking what it un⯑derſtands;—and may not the Parrot or Mag⯑pie laugh at you for not imitating its natural Chatter, or knowing what it means, and perhaps it does, and only takes off human Voice out of Deriſion? And may not the Dog eſteem us a Parcel of ignorant, ſtupid Beings, [55] that cannot trace the Footſteps of each other, as ſagaciouſly as he can thoſe of his Maſter, a Hare or a Fox?

But in Oppoſition to what I would here infer, Mr. Pope ſays,

Mr. Pope here puts the Lamb in the Place of a Man, which is not the Caſe; we are to ſuppoſe the Lamb endow'd with a human Soul:—Yet, as a Lamb, it is yean'd, brought up in the Fields and Paſtures, knows nothing at all, or very little, of the Actions of Man; does not know a Butcher's Knife from a Piece of Wax in that Form; it ſees its Shep⯑herd, indeed, drive it or gently lead it from one Place to another, provide Fodder or a Fold for it at Night; this is all it knows of Mankind.—What Ground has it then to be apprehenſive of Danger, whether it is in⯑clos'd in a Butcher's or a Shepherd's Pen? Since, ſuppoſing it to have a human Soul, it cannot reaſon but from what it knows: And it is very certain the Lamb, with its own Soul, is under terrible Apprehenſions when it hears the Complaint of its Fellow Crea⯑tures, with whom it never fails to ſympa⯑thize, or when he is tied by the Heels for the Slaughter; this appears evident from its ſtruggling to get free, and if it was once looſe, [56] it would make its Eſcape with all poſſible Speed.

Mr. Pope then ſhould have ſaid,—Had he thy KNOWLEDGE, would he ſkip and play? For the Want of more extenſive Knowledge, in any Creature wanting the Opportunity of acquiring more Knowledge, does not in the leaſt argue its Want of the Power of Reaſon⯑ing from the Knowledge it has. And it is alſo plain to me, that if a Lamb knew as much of a Butcher as it does of a Dog, it would ſtand in fear of one as much as it does of the other; and would no ſooner permit itſelf to be drove into a Butcher's Shop, than it would into a River, where it might be drown'd, or into a Ditch where it might be ſmothered.

It is plain then, that a Lamb, tho' perhaps as ſtupid a Creature as moſt of the Brute Species, acts rationally from what it knows, and as wiſely, to anſwer the Ends of its Crea⯑tion, as a Man.

You may perhaps ſay, it is Inſtinct in the one, and the Effects of a rational Mind in the other:—but I will not quarrel with you about Words;—you may call it Inſtinct, Soul, Mind, or what you pleaſe;—but you muſt firſt prove an eſſential Difference in two Beings, before I will allow them to be of a different Kind.—Mr. Pope was very unwilling to go ſo far as to think the Soul of the Brute of the [57] ſame Nature with that of Man, and there⯑fore after ſpeaking of the wonderful Inſtinct of Brutes, he ſays,

This Hair-breadth Difference, this Cob⯑web Partition doth not at all exiſt, but in the Vanity of Imagination; neither doth our Author give us any other Proof of its Being than a bare Aſſertion that it is: But Reaſon feels no ſuch Thing:—Reaſon cannot help telling us, that when two Things are exactly alike, they muſt be of the ſame Nature:— Would it not be ſtupid to ſay, that any thing exactly round, may not be or that it is not a Circle; when all the Idea we have of a Circle is, that it is exactly round?—I believe you will ſay, yes:—certainly then, if the Soul of a Brute is poſſeſt of the ſame eſſential Fa⯑culties as the Soul of a Man, it muſt, poſi⯑tively muſt, be eſteem'd of the ſame Nature.

But let us examine into the Powers of Reaſon in the Brute Creation, relating to Speculation.

There are ſome Points of Speculation ſo immediately applicable to Practice, that per⯑haps they ſhould have been before conſider'd. Theſe are thoſe which are the Foundations [58] of Art, ſuch are the Theories of Arithmetic, Geometry and Government; from which ariſe the Arts of Architecture, Commerce and Law. —Let us turn to the Brutes, and ſee the Effects of thoſe Sciences among them.—The Spider's Web, the Bird's Neſt, the Laws of the Bees, and the Oeconomy of the Piſmire, are wonderful Inſtances:—Then why ſhould not we infer the ſame Effect muſt proceed from the ſame Cauſe?—Or will you ſay this ſeems to be rather Inſtinct than Reaſon, becauſe the Beaſt, Bird, and Inſect vary little in theſe Acts from the reſt of the ſame Kind; whereas ſome Men build one Kind of Houſes, ſome another; ſome have one Method of Commerce, ſome another; ſome one Kind of Laws, ſome another. Yet ſhall not we as rationally account for this by ſaying, that Man, having more Pride and Curioſity, is more whimſical and wavering in his Actions than the Brutes, who ſtudy no more than is neceſſary to the Uſe of Nature; and there⯑fore they are ^* uniform in their Actions: For it is certain the Uſe of a Houſe is not its Form, Advantage is the Deſign of Commerce, and Happineſs the Deſign of Laws, however their Form or Method may vary.—Is it then from the idle Vanity of Curioſity that we [59] adjudge the Actions of Men to proceed from Reaſon; and from the Want of that only, that we allow the Actions of Brutes to be directed by bare Inſtinct. — I think this is ſtupid enough, ſince we allow that Inſtinct performs the Purpoſes of the Animal to the full as well, and in ſome Caſes much better, than Reaſon performs ours.

But to come to pure Speculation.

Is the Brute capable of laying down Pro⯑poſitions, and of forming Concluſions from them, relating to Things perhaps unneceſſary for them to know. Of this we may ever remain ignorant, unleſs the Brutes could in⯑vent a way to communicate to us their Ideas; but here we are as ignorant, with reſpect to our Fellow Creatures, as to the Brutes. For if I meet a Man, or keep him Company for twelve Months, and in all that Time he nei⯑ther ſpeaks, writes, or by any Means com⯑municates his Thoughts to me, I'm entirely ignorant whether he be a Man of Science, or the moſt illiterate of his Species. How⯑ever, if we may gueſs from Phyſiognomy, as we do among Men, I think it quite eaſy to imagine, when a Dog, Cat, or any other Animal is buried in deep Contemplation, and when a Jack-Daw, Magpye or Ape is chat⯑tering, I eſteem them coxcombly Brutes, that cannot think:—And whenever I look at an Owl, I cannot help ſuſpecting but that, from its little Concern ſhewn to external Objects, [60] it is logically weighing ſome very nice Point of Metaphyſics.

But here it is poſſible I may be deceiv'd; —yet if I am, it is nothing more than we are daily in the Appearances of Men,—when we imagine a grave Look and a ſolemn Beha⯑viour, denote Wiſdom and Experience, and that a Man that chatters is a Coxcomb, which is not always the Caſe.

Having now brought all the Reaſons that at preſent occur, and which I think ſufficient to place Mankind in a true Light, with re⯑ſpect to their Fellow Creatures, for ſo now I will preſume to call the Brutes, we muſt draw this Concluſion, that Men of Science are of the higheſt Order of Animals, and that next them, all Creatures, without Diſtinction, muſt take their Places, not according to the Form of their Bodies, but according to the native Greatneſs of their Souls; by which Order it will doubtleſs be found, that ſome Part of Mankind will ſtand not only equal to but below ſome of the Brute Creation.

Now then to apply the Deſign of our Ar⯑guments:—If we allow Immortality to the Soul of the Philoſopher, and every Soul of the like Kind, we muſt allow it to the meaneſt of all Animals; whereby a Mouſe, a Rat, a Louſe and a Flea, will have immortal Souls, —an intolerable Concluſion! or elſe we muſt allow Immortality to the higher Order only, and ſo fix a certain Degree at which it muſt [61] ſtop; and if we fix that ſo low as to take in all and every Soul of an equal Degree to the Souls of the meaneſt of Mankind, it is plain we muſt include ſome of the Brutes in our Syſtem;—or by admitting none of the Brutes, we muſt ſhut out ſome Part of Mankind with them.—We will therefore proceed now to conſider the Poſſibility as well as the Proba⯑bility of the Souls, both of Brutes and Men, being mortal or ceaſing to exiſt, as Beings in themſelves, after the Death of the Body.

SECT. X. The Poſſibility and Probability of the Soul's being Mortal, with a Definition of GOD.

IT was at firſt allow'd, that the Soul is not a material Being, but only a Spirit or Power acting upon Matter by Means entirely unknown; that it is alſo capable of acting on itſelf, as by Reflection; and that upon its ceaſing to act, it muſt immediately ceaſe to be.

Now all Power muſt be eſſentially the ſame, however its Manner of acting may vary; as we muſt allow that that Power which cauſes the Planets to move in their Orbits, is exactly of the ſame Nature as that which induces a Stone thrown upwards, to fall down again towards its proper Centre:— [62] Exactly the ſame that enables a Horſe to draw, a Man to walk, &c. As that may be a Piece of Steel, exactly of the ſame Nature, and capable of the ſame Impreſſions, that lies in a rude Form, and is acting in a very ſimple Manner; as that which is moſt ſur⯑prizingly and ingeniouſly active in a Clock or Watch: So 'tis that Power, called the Law of Nature, that moves the Planets, the ſame that acts upon a Stone, upon a Brute, and upon a Man: For tho' a Man be con⯑ſider'd ever ſo much of a free Agent, and may chuſe and refuſe his Actions, yet he can't go beyond ſuch certains Laws;—he can't walk in the Air, nor move a Limb contrary, nor without an Act of Volition in his Mind, any more than a Watch can ceaſe to go, or can go wrong, when all its Parts are juſtly conſtructed and put together. So that Power, whereby we move Bodies from one Place to another, is ſtill the ſame Power of Nature, notwithſtanding their Motion be upwards, directly contrary to the known Laws of Gravitation; becauſe the Motion of the Arm, whereby ſuch Bodies are impell'd, is the Effect of the ſame Power in a greater Degree; and it is as natural for a Stone to riſe in the Air, when thrown up, as it is for it to fall again of its own accord.

Now ſuppoſe a Man throwing a Ball up⯑wards, it is plain he occaſions a Power to act upon the Ball; for when it is out of his [63] Hand, he doth not aſſiſt its Motion any more, yet the Ball proceeds: The Power therefore acts upon it; but how, or by what Means, we can tell no otherwiſe than by ſaying, it is the Law or Power of Nature. Now it is the ſame Law of Nature that acts upon that Matter, which particularly con⯑ſtructed is call'd Man.—But to our Suppo⯑ſition. We ſee that the Law of Gravitation, which acts without Diſtinction upon all Bodies (whether endow'd with a human Soul or not) leſſens by degrees the Power acting on the Ball till it goes no further; the Power then ceaſes to act, conſequently ceaſes to be.

And it is in vain to deny that this Power is a Soul, becauſe we can't imagine it to be a cogitative or thinking Power, which means no more than a Power which can act on it⯑ſelf as well as on Matter. Neither can we imagine this Power to be communicated from, or to be a Part of the human Soul; becauſe the ſame Power may be occaſion'd by Things call'd inſenſible. Thus it is poſſible for even Man himſelf to be in ſuch Circumſtances, that by the Force occaſion'd by inanimate Things, he may be thrown up an exceſſive Height into the Air by Earthquake, Gun-powder, and the like. Now this Power or Soul that forces him up, is ſuperior in Strength to the Force of all the Faculties of his Soul acting together: For neither his exerting the [64] ſtrongeſt Act of Volition or of Reaſon, can poſſibly prevent his ſubmitting to the Effect, if he reſiſt the Cauſe.

It is plain alſo, that however nearly Mat⯑ter may be inſtrumental in ſuch an Accident, yet as the Soul doth not exiſt till it acts, and is nothing but Action, ſo there is no Soul acting on the Gunpowder or Sulphur, till there be ſuch a particular uniting of Particles of Matter; at which Juncture the Soul imme⯑diately exiſts, acts, and no ſooner ceaſes to act that in ceaſes to be.

The Soul of Man doth not act, i. e. exiſt, till there be form'd ſuch a particular Union of Matter, fram'd into Organs of Senſe, Fi⯑bres, &c. fit for the Soul to act on; juſt then the Soul begins to exiſt, and exiſts acting, till by ſome ^* Accident or other thoſe Parti⯑cles of Matter are broken, impar'd, or diſ⯑united, and then the Soul ceaſes to act. Now it is equally evident, that if a Child is be⯑gotten [65] and naturally form'd in the Womb, with every Organ, Fibre, &c. perfect; it can no more fail of being agitated by a hu⯑man Soul, than a regular conſtructed Clock can forbear moving, or the Gunpowder for⯑bear giving a Concuſſion, when touch'd by a Sparkle of Fire—and in each of theſe Caſes, the Parallel is juſt—for when the Clock is maim'd, or render'd imperfect, its Power ceaſes, and as ſoon as ever the volatile and combuſtible Parts of the Gunpowder are diſ⯑pers'd, the Soul ceaſes to exiſt, there is no more Power left. And thus it is with that free Agent, Man.

Now, from the above Inſtances, we ſee the Poſſibility of Souls being created and de⯑ſtroy'd, as to their Exiſtence as ſeparate Be⯑ings, with Eaſe. For we can't imagine that thoſe Powers, which acted on the Ball, on the Gunpowder, or on the Clock, to exiſt after the Diſperſion or maiming of the U⯑nion of their proper Matter, acting on them⯑ſelves, as the Soul of Man is ſuppoſed to do. If this were the Caſe, almoſt every Action of our Lives would create a new Soul; and we ſhould have the Univerſe ſtrangely ſtock'd with active Beings. We muſt conclude then that thoſe Powers or Souls are annihilated ^*, [66] or if there be any Idea of their exiſting af⯑terwards, they muſt be loſt and mixed with the Power of the Univerſe, the Law of Na⯑ture.

Hence then, it is evident, that thoſe Pow⯑ers which act upon Men, on Brutes, and upon inanimate Things, are nothing more than the Law of Nature which is the Conſequence or the Effect of the divine Volition or Will: And that theſe Powers as ſtill Effects of the ſame Cauſe, whether they act rationally and on themſelves as in Men and Brutes, or by Neceſſity and purely on Matter, as in Things inanimate: And certainly, if they are Effects of the ſame Cauſe, the Effects muſt be all of the ſame Nature. And here then will appear the Probability of the Soul's Mortality or Ceſſation of Being; by conſidering the Af⯑finity of theſe Powers or Souls. We ſee the Soul of a Man, at firſt very weak; not at all capable, or but very faintly, of exerting its rational Faculties: By degrees it grows ſtronger and ſtronger, and acquires extenſive Knowledge; till at length, in Old-age, not⯑withſtanding all its Acquirements, it grows exceſſively weak and childiſh again.—It is true we ſee, in violent Powers, ſuch as throw⯑ing a Ball, nothing but the gradual Decay; but in progreſſive Powers, ſuch as in thoſe of Plants, Trees, &c. Things always deem'd inanimate, we ſee exactly ſuch a Beginning, Progreſs and Decay.—If then we judge juſtly, [67] (and that is certainly the only right Way of judging) from ſimilar Cauſes and Effects, is not here a Probability, nay, do not our Argu⯑ments, all put together, give us a demonſtra⯑tive Proof that the Soul cannot exiſt, as a Being in itſelf, when the Body becomes in⯑active;—in other Words, that it cannot be immortal.

Now from hence to form the moſt juſt Definition of a Deity, we muſt conclude that God is in himſelf, nothing but Volition ^* or a Will, and that that Power which has been called the Soul or Law of Nature, and which Mr. Pope calls God, is nothing more than the Effect of the divine Will or the Deity himſelf; that it is not the Being, but only a Conſequence of the Being of God. So that whatever God wills, is by that Will, actually done: Becauſe Volition being a Spirit, and a Spirit or Soul being nothing but Action, [68] God's Willing and Acting is exactly the ſame Thing. And thus he is the prime Cauſe of all Things: And this is all we can under⯑ſtand, as to the eſſential Being of a God.—For, to ſay the Deity is Power, or the Deity is Space, allows, from what I have proved, that we and every thing in Nature are iden⯑tically Part of the Divine Being; ſince we take up ſome Space, and are poſſeſſed of ſome Power— but it is plain neither Space or Power are, in themſelves, infinite Things; however they may ſurpaſs our Comprehen⯑ſion: For we cannot allow Space to extend any further than God pleaſes; and we ſee evidently that Power cannot exert itſelf a Jot further than the Will of its Creator aſſigns it. —Hence it is plain that Power is a Being capable of Reſtraint, and entirely acted on by the Deity; and is infinite no otherwiſe than, as conſider'd capable of executing the moſt infinite and unbounded Commands of the Deity; and Space is infinite no otherwiſe than that wherever Power is, it there finds Space—But ſuppoſe we give up Space as a Being, and ſay it is nothing—then we ſhall ſay, how extenſive ſoever is Power, it meets with no Obſtruction or Want of Space to act in.

But here now may ariſe an Objection a⯑gainſt this Definition of God, from our hav⯑ing proved the Mortality of the Soul.—For you may ſay, that the Power of Volition or the Will found in Man, muſt be ſimilar to the [69] Nature of the Deity, and may have Immor⯑tality annexed to it.—In Anſwer to this I ſay,

It is evident that Will conſidered as God, and the Will in Man have no eſſential Con⯑nection; for the Volition of God, or, God him⯑ſelf, is the ſole Cauſe of all Power, and the Will in Man is only, as it were, a Property of the ſame Power in a very narrow Degree: For the Will acts ſubſervient to every other Faculty of the Soul. I cannot per⯑ceive what I will—I cannot think what I will, nor how I will—I cannot think two and two make five, tho' I would ever ſo fain; neither can I think any thing doth not ſtand before me, which I ſee and know actually doth ſtand there; tho' I exert the ſtrongeſt Act of Volition I am capable of. So, in forming Propoſitions—I cannot draw what Concluſion I will, from ſuppoſed Conceſſions or known Facts, but muſt draw that which the Power of Reaſon tells me neceſſarily fol⯑lows. Thus not one Act of the Soul is ſub⯑ject to the Will of Man. And we ſee that Brutes and Idiots have often a greater Share of Will than the wiſeſt and beſt Philoſopher. —The Matter of the Body indeed is ſub⯑ject to Will, and that is all—and that, but in ſome Caſes; for if a Man's Leg is broke, he may will long enough before it will move. Shall we then give up the Powers of Reaſon to Annihilation, and ſcruple to give up the Will, the moſt ſenſual and beaſtly Faculty [70] of the Soul, acting ſo much beneath its other Faculties, that it ſeems rather to be a Pro⯑perty annexed to the Soul than any thing eſ⯑ſential to it.—I am ſure you will ſay, No; if we give up the other Powers, the Will muſt neceſſarily follow; for where there is neither Perception or Reflection, there can be no Will.

Thus we ſee that the Will of God or the Deity, is the ſole Cauſe of the moſt extenſive Power; and the Will of Man but, at beſt, the meaneſt Faculty of a very ſmall and li⯑mited Portion of that Power. Where is then the Similarity? Here is neither the Cauſe of the ſame Effect, nor the Effect of the ſame Cauſe.—It is plain then, they are not eſſentially in any degree the ſame. And as this is our only Way of judging rightly, here evidently appears the Reaſon why we cannot judge of the Eſſence of God; becauſe we can⯑not reaſon but from what we know. Now all we know is, that all Power is the Effect of the Being of God. Hence we have God as the Cauſe, and Power the Effect: But do we know the Cauſe of any other Effect ſimilar to Power; if we did, we might then judge of God, and ſay he was like that Cauſe. We may ſay, indeed, God is all-wiſe, all Juſtice, all Goodneſs, and the like.—But what are thoſe Things we call Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Goodneſs—Why, they are Ideas, which are the Effects of a ſmall Part of that moſt ex⯑tenſive [71] Power, which is the Effect of God. Shall we then patch up a God, with the Ef⯑fects of part of a Cauſe, which whole Cauſe is the Effect of himſelf? Is this doing Honour to God? No—Let us ſay then, that God is the Cauſe of all Things, and there put an end to our Enquiries; for we have not Ground to ſtep one Foot further.

This, Reader, is the Effect of my firſt ra⯑tional Enquiry into the Nature and Depen⯑dency of my own Being. The Tendency of inculcating and publiſhing this Doctrine, it is impoſſible I ſhould foreſee: But I cannot think it will at all hurt the Morality of thoſe who underſtand it; but will rather lead them to admire and adore the Infinity of that God, in whom our Ideas and Reaſonings are loſt; as well as excite them to that general Hu⯑manity, that ſhould be extended to every liv⯑ing Creature, to make them encourage thoſe which are inſtrumental, and to deſtroy thoſe which are prejudicial to the greateſt general Good, in whatever Order of Beings they may exiſt. Hence will follow the Idea of Virtue, and the Juſtice will appear evident, in killing a mad Dog, in the lawful Execution of a vil⯑lainous Man, or in deſtroying every offenſive Animal. But after all, I am ſo willing to believe, even to deſire the Immortality of the Soul (that is, a Capacity of retaining thoſe Ideas I am poſſeſſed of in this World) that I [72] heartily and ſincerely wiſh to ſee theſe Rea⯑ſons I have here given, confuted and prov'd erroneous, and promiſe the World, that if ever I ſhould be of a contrary Opinion, I will undoubtedly give them my Reaſons for re⯑nouncing what I have here written.