CHAP. I. Of the Power of Time.

THE firſt attack Princes make upon the public liberty, is not the violating audaciouſly the laws, but the cauſing them to fall into oblivion. To enchain their ſubjects, they begin by ſetting them aſleep.

[5]Whilſt men have their heads heated with ideas of liberty, and whilſt the bloody image of Tyranny is ſtill before their eyes, they deteſt deſpotiſm, and watch with inquietude every motion of the Miniſtry. The Prince at that time is cautious not to form any attacks upon public freedom; he appears the father of his people, and his reign the aera of juſtice. At firſt his adminiſtration is ſo mildly conducted, that it might be apprehended he has a deſign of extending Liberty, far from having any intent of ruining it.

Having nothing to diſpute relating to their privi⯑leges, which are not conteſted, nor to their liberty which is not attacked, the people gradually become leſs watchful over the conduct of their rulers, they inſenſibly diſcontinue to be upon their guard, and finally lay aſide all ſolicitude, reſting tranquil beneath the ſhade of the laws.

Thus in proportion as the people recede from the ſtormy times, in which the conſtitution took its riſe; they gradually loſe ſight of Liberty. To ſet their minds at reſt, there is occaſion only to let things proceed in their natural order. But Princes do not always rely on the power of time alone.

CHAP. II. Of Public Entertainments.

THE entrance of Deſpotiſm is ſometimes pleaſing and joyous: plays, feaſts, dances and ſongs being its chearful attendants^* But in theſe feaſts and plays, the people perceive not the evils prepared for them; they reſign themſelves to pleaſure, and their joy is unbounded. But whilſt the inconſiderate multitude is abandoned to joy, the wiſe foreſee the remote calamities threatening their country, and by which it is at laſt to be overwhelmed: they perceive the chains concealed with flowers, ready to be fixed on the arms of their countrymen.

CHAP. III. Of Public Enterprizes.

TO the power of time and influence of enter⯑tainments, is joined an attention to national affairs. Some war^† is undertaken, public edifices [7]are built, highways are made, &c. The multitude, judging from appearances alone, believe the Prince is attentive to the welfare of the ſtate only, whilſt he is wholly taken up with his projects; they grow careleſs more and more, and at laſt they ceaſe to be watchful over their enemy.

While the minds of the people ceaſe to be engaged, the defects of the conſtitution begin to unfold: the Prince, ever intent upon his own intereſts, is ſeeking means to extend his power; but now takes care not to give the leaſt room for diſturbing that profound ſecurity.

CHAP. IV. Of gaining the Affections and Confidence of the Subjects.

AMUSING the people is not ſufficient, the prince endeavours to have them well affected towards him: and what ſome do to divert the attention of their ſubjects, others do to gain their affection.

[8]The Roman people, thoſe abſolute maſters of the earth, were extremely fond of public ſhows; and the magnificence of entertainments was a mean made uſe of, to captivate them, by thoſe who deprived them of their power and liberty.

When Charles II. aſcended the throne of Spain, the firſt buſineſs of the miniſter was to reſtore plenty to the kingdom, and to indulge the people with ſhows; never in that country were ſeen ſo many bull-fights, plays, and other entertainments after the taſte of the nation^*.

To conciliate the affections of the people, princes have recourſe ſometimes to grants, &c.^†

Caeſar uſed to confer largeſſes on the people; and the eaſy multitude, not perceiving the ſnare, ex⯑hauſted their groſs imaginations in beſtowing enco⯑miums on the deſpot.

Louis XIV. applied himſelf to win the hearts of his ſubjects, by his engaging manners, his prodigality and [9]magnificence. He was careful no one ſhould depart diſſatisfied from his preſence, he ſecured by lucrative employments thoſe whom he ſuſpected, and by favours gained to himſelf even the inſatiate croud of courtiers. At court, he amuſed the people with feaſts, fireworks, balls, maſquerades, tournaments, ſhews of every kind. In his campaigns, he repeated the feaſts, he viſited in his wonted pageantry the towns that had ſubmitted to his power; he invited to his table women of quality, conferred gratifications on the military, ſcattered gold among the populace, and was applauded to the ſkies. But it is not by grants only^*, that Princes attempt to gain the affections of their ſubjects.

Louis I. of Spain ſignalized the beginning of his reign by loading with kindneſs all thoſe who ap⯑proached him.

Ferdinand VI. on aſcending the throne, endeavoured to gain popularity by apparent airs of goodneſs: he ordered the priſons to be opened to all who had been committed for no capital crimes; he granted a general amneſty to deſerters and ſmugglers, and appointed two [10]days a week for receiving petitions and hearing griev⯑ances^*, &c.

Princes often-times apply themſelves by an affected condeſcenſion to win the hearts of the ſubjects.

The people of Venice admire the goodneſs of their maſters, when they ſee the Doge at the head of the Senate making the yearly proceſſion to St. Maria Formoſa, to diſcharge a promiſe of one of his pre⯑deceſſors, and not ſcorning to accept of a ſtraw hat and two bottles of wine, that the artiſans of the pariſh preſent him for his trouble: when they ſee the Doge on the 1ſt of Auguſt accepting of a few melons pre⯑ſented to him by the gardeners, and allowing them to kiſs him: when they ſee the Senators aſſiſting with the Doge on Shrove-Tueſday at the ſlaughter of a bull, or at ſome other popular entertainment: when they ſee the grand-council on Corpus Chriſti day paſſing in proceſſion through St. Mark's place, each Noble yielding the right hand to a beggar.

How ſtrange ſoever it may appear, Princes ſome⯑times attain to deſpotiſm by means which in appear⯑ance tend to produce a contrary effect. In order to encreaſe their authority, ſome by a refinement of policy aſſume the character of juſtice, goodneſs and mercy; to deceive others, they take the outſide of [11]plain dealing. Ximenes, became the idol of the Caſtillians by an apparent purity of manners, by his charity and munificence: the people not ſuſpecting him, left him to make what attempts upon their liberty he pleaſed, to keep in pay out of the revenue of his benefices mercenary troops, and augment the regal authority^*.

The people of Terra Ferma boaſt of the lenity of the government of the Seignory, when they ſee the popularity of the podeſtates, and the attention given by the inquiſitors of ſtate to their complaints againſt the nobles they hate; and from the opinion they entertain that the whole is done for their advantage alone, they bleſs the equity of their maſters.

At other times, thoſe who govern, that they might conceal their own corruption, attempt to corrupt others; that they might conceal their own ambition, they flatter that of the people, they ſpeak to them perpetually of their rights, affect an extreme zeal for their intereſts, and raiſe themſelves to tyranny by affecting to protect them.

But in order to enſlave mankind, Princes have even affected an averſion to Empire: Some have laboured to promote the public happineſs; and taking [12]advantage of that moment when the ſubjects exulted in their well-being, they pretended themſelves tired of the ſceptre, and reſolved to abdicate; expecting to be importuned to hold the reins of the Empire. The greateſt of evils this, ſince the Prince has the blind confidence of his people, and the means of abuſing it.

CHAP. V. Of the Pomp of Power.

THE Majeſty of Princes conſtitutes part of their power^*. Hence moſt of them have aſſumed a majeſtic gravity, an imperious air, a pompous at⯑tendance^†.

Whenever they appear in public, it is with the attributes of ſovereign power. Sometimes they have [13]the faſcia, the ſceptre, the ſword of juſtice carried before them: oftentimes they are attended in pomp by all the great officers of the crown or a multitude of courtiers, and always by a formidable band of ſa⯑tellites^*.

They are ſolicitous likewiſe to maintain the ſplen⯑dour of their houſhold; and fearing if they ceaſed to act the maſters, the great who approach their preſence would ceaſe to act the ſubjects, they ever affect an im⯑perious tone. To teach the people to approach them with ceremony, and render themſelves more and more the object of reſpect, they have all introduced a degree of ſtate dignity into their court. Some have even prohibited any from either ſerving them or ſpeaking to them unleſs on their knees^†.

The eagerneſs of being reſpected, Princes have ex⯑tended to their civil officers; leſs attentive to diſplay in the perſons of magiſtrates, the miniſters of the laws, than men conſtituted in dignities.

[14]Among the regulations which James I. enacted in the year 1613, in the council of Scotland, the coun⯑cellors were ordered either to ride in the ſtreets with foot-cloths, or to go in coaches; but never to be ſeen on foot^*.

Philip II. of Spain ordered, by a particular decree, all the members of his councils and the chancellors of his kingdoms, never to appear in public unleſs cloathed with a long robe and unſhaven^†.

Princes are not leſs attentive, reciprocally to ſupport their dignity out of their dominions.

Whenever they viſit each other, they are received with pomp, treated with magnificence, indulged with every honour; and that the people might be the more ſtruck with the importance of a Prince, great marks of diſtinction are ever ſhewn to any individual of a royal family.

CHAP. VI. To abaſe the People.

WHEN once the minds of the people are ſe⯑duced and given up to diſſipation, an attempt is made to abaſe them.

[15]Vigilance, frugality, diſintereſtedneſs, love of glory and one's patria^*, are the virtues by which people preſerve their liberty: accordingly that they might enſlave their ſubjects, Princes who aſpired to deſpo⯑tiſm, have obliged them to renounce thoſe virtues.

In order to ſubject the necks of the Spartans to the yoke, Philopaemen forced them to quit the auſtere way of educating their children, and to adopt an effeminating one: Thus he ſucceeded to extinguiſh^† that elevation of ſpirit, that greatneſs of ſoul, which he ſo much dreaded.

After Edward I. had united the principality of Wales to his dominions, from a conviction that nothing contributed ſo much in maintaining the warlike genius and eagerneſs after glory of his new ſubjects, as the poetical traditions of their proweſs, which were ſung in their martial feaſts, he ordered a ſtrict perquiſition to be made after the Welſh poets, and put them to death^‡.

[16]From a like conviction, and actuated by the ſame motives, did the miniſtry during the laſt reign oblige the Highlanders to throw aſide their ancient dreſs, and renounce their martial feaſts.

CHAP. VII. Of the Fine Arts and Sciences.

BY encouraging the fine arts and the ſciences among the Romans, Auguſtus ſubjected them to the yoke; and by the ſame method, his ſucceſſors ſubdued the barbarians they had vanquiſed^*.

No people was ever ſo independent as the ancient Germans. Without fixed eſtabliſhments, continually engaged in ſome expedition for pillaging, exceſſively fond of liberty, and ever continuing in arms, they were but little reſtrained by laws, their Princes had [21]but little authority over them; and even that autho⯑rity was but little reſpected. But, when once they had ſecured their conqueſts, their Princes in order to extending and ſecuring their power, laboured to in⯑ſpire them with the love of tranquil employments, to acquaint them with the ſweet fruits of induſtry, to engage them to cultivate the arts of peace, and devote themſelves to a contemplative life.

As ſoon as the crown of England was ſecured on the head of Alfred, this Prince took great care to inſpire his ſubjects with the love of arts and ſciences; and the better to encourage them to apply themſelves to ſtudy, he ſet them the example, and was attentive to reward merit^*.

Spain, almoſt continually torn by factions, ſedition and civil wars, was, till the reign of Ferdinand V. ſunk into barbarity, its inhabitants being only ſuper⯑ficially acquainted with war and politics: but in order to extend his power, Ferdinand begun to introduce into his dominions the love of letters, by diſtributing favours to thoſe who addicted themſelves thereto^†.

Philip II. and Philip III. both eager after abſolute command, befriended with all their power the arts and [22]ſciences, and a great number of Spaniards cultivated them.

Not ſatisfied with encouraging letters by his libe⯑rality, Philip IV. recommended the ſtudy of them by his example. And as ſoon as Philip V. was firmly eſtabliſhed on the throne, he erected univerſities, pa⯑tronized the literati, and rewarded thoſe who were diſtinguiſhed for eminent talents.

Francis I. of France encouraged the ſciences, erected univerſities, and attracted men of learning to his kingdom; his ſucceſſors, chiefly Louis XIV. have followed his example.

CHAP. VIII. Of corrupting the People.

NO conſtitution maintains itſelf unaltered but by virtue. If this ſpring be long unbent, adieu liberty. Inſtead of concurring to the public welfare, every one ſeeks his own intereſts only; the laws fall into contempt, and the magiſtrates themſelves are the firſt in violating them. Thus the people being abaſed, an attempt is made to corrupt them.

CHAP. IX. Of procuring Opulence.

EVER by ways ſtrewed with flowers, Princes have begun to drive their ſubjects to ſlavery.

At firſt the ſubjects are indulged with feaſts and ſhows, but as theſe entertainments cannot long con⯑tinue, unleſs the Prince has the diſpoſal of the ſpoils of the whole world, a laſting ſource of corruption is then opened to the people: induſtry is encouraged, and commerce rendered flouriſhing^*, in order to pro⯑cure opulence. Now opulence is always attended by luxury.

CHAP. X. Of Luxury.

ONE effect of luxury is the extinguiſhing the heroic virtues; for, when men can attract notice by ſumptuous equipages, coſtly dreſs, long retinue of ſervants, they are no more ſolicitous of attracting it by upright manners, noble ſentiments, glorious deeds.

Luxury is immediately attended by a looſeneſs of manners, which is the beginning of their depravation: both ſexes meet together in order to render their intercourſe more agreeable, and corrupt themſelves reciprocally; gallantry is introduced; this produces a frivolous turn of mind, puts a value on trifles, de⯑preſſes whatever is of any concern; and duty is ſoon forgotten.

The arts which luxury maintains, and the pleaſures it promiſes, rendering ſociety delightful, hurry us away to effeminacy; they ſoften our manners, and [25]enervate that haughtineſs which endures neither fetters nor reſtraint.

By concealing with flowers the chains which are prepared for us, they extinguiſh in our ſouls the ſenſe of liberty, and make us in love with ſervitude.

Hence Princes generally neglect nothing which may bring luxury into eſteem: they recommend it by their^* example; they diſplay every where page⯑antry and magnificence, and are the firſt to ſow in the minds of their ſubjects thoſe ſeeds of corruption^†.

[26]If Princes recommend not luxury by their example, they at leaſt countenance it, or refuſe to reſtrain it. The Roman Senate, ſtill compoſed of grave Magiſtrates, propoſed to Auguſtus the reformation of the manners and of the luxury of women; but though obliged by his office of Cenſor to attend to it, he ever artfully avoided the importunate requeſt of the Se⯑nators^†.

Some have gone even ſo far as to force their ſubjects to ſink into effeminacy. In order to ſubdue the inha⯑bitants of Cuma, Ariſtomenes laboured to enervate the courage of the youth: he ordered the boys to let their hair grow, to adorn their heads with flowers, and, like girls, to wear long gowns of various colours; he commanded them, when going to their dancing or ſinging maſters, to be attended by women with umbrellas and fans; in the bath they were to be ſerved with looking-glaſſes, combs and perfumes: this way of education was continued till they were twenty years of age^‡.

Thus by enervating and corrupting the people, luxury ſubdues them without reſiſtance to the will of [27]an imperious Maſter, and forces them to purchaſe, at the price of their liberty, the quiet life and ſoft pleaſures they are permitted to enjoy.

CHAP. XI. To cheriſh the People's Avarice.

WHENEVER riches are the price of every thing which attracts conſideration, they ſoon ſup⯑ply the place of birth, virtue, and talents, and are ſought after as the ſummum bonum. Thus, in order to corrupt the ſubjects, thoſe at the helm are careful to cheriſh the people's avarice by keeping up the ſpirit of gaming among them.

Such is the craft of the cabinet in France, England, Holland, but chiefly at Venice^*.

By this artifice people are alſo prevented from re⯑flecting and knowing their ſituation.

CHAP. XII. Of Debauchery.

ANOTHER method, put in practice for ſubdu⯑ing the ſubjects, is the keeping them in idle⯑neſs, and not controuling their pleaſures. They then, careleſs of liberty, take no concern in public affairs, [31]and are ever buſied in contriving the means of in⯑dulging their baſe paſſions.

When once the people become fond of money, if none is to be got but by giving up their birth-rights, they ſubmit to the yoke, and impatiently wait for their ſalary.

If the Prince is moreover attentive at times to entertain them, they are baſe enough to bleſs their tyrant.

In order to render the Perſians good ſlaves, Cyrus kept them in idleneſs, plenty, and luxury; and theſe effeminate men called him their father^*.

The Roman emperors, uſing this crafty policy, oftentimes entertained the people with feaſts or ſhews, and then the deluded multitude exerted themſelves in exalting the goodneſs of their maſters^†.

The Venetians take great care to maintain their ſubjects in plenty, to ſet them free from moral reſtraint, and indulge them with ſhews. Far from controuling the pleaſures of the citizens, they give encouragement to lewdneſs, by publicly protecting houſes of ill fame; and thus divert the ſubjects from taking any concern in matters of ſtate. The clergy [32]themſelves they allow to be diſſolute, and ſo greatly countenance their ſcandalous manners^*, that theſe wretches highly praiſe the mild government of the Seignory.

Thus this idle and lewd life, which the people call liberty, is one of the chief cauſes of their ſlavery.

CHAP. XIII. Falſe Ideas of Liberty.

WHILE ſports, feſtivals, merriments, ſhews, entertainments of every kind, engroſs the mind, people by degrees loſe ſight of liberty, and think not of it any more. By entirely neglecting to think of liberty, the true idea of it is obliterated, and falſe notions take place. To men always engroſſed by their pleaſures or private affairs, liberty is ſoon no more than the mean of amaſſing wealth without ob⯑ſtacles, of poſſeſſing it with ſafety, and making merry without oppoſition. Thus the love of independency, for want of fuel, is extinguiſhed in every breaſt.

CHAP. XIV. Of getting Creatures.

IN a country, where the Prince diſpoſes of benefices, places and dignities, though by their means he ever gets friends, he at firſt grants none but to deſerv⯑ing perſons; but when once he has ſucceeded in abaſ⯑ing and depraving his ſubjects, he thinks of getting creatures.

The great, being maſters of the lower claſſes of people, are ſo in ſome ſort of the ſtate; and with them the Prince begins to ſhare authority: he dazzles the ſight of one by a ribbon, ſeduces another by an employment, temptations are offered every one accord⯑ing to his favourite paſſions, and men eagerly preſent their necks to the yoke.

Beſides the ſmall number of powerful men, who fill up the firſt places of the ſtate, he holds by hope thoſe ambitious men who continually ſeek after favour and preferment. Thoſe he cannot draw in by reali⯑ties, he prevails upon by promiſes, regards and careſſes; he cajoles his courtiers, who, proud of theſe marks of conſideration, endeavour by their ſervility to ſecure them.

[34]To the number of the creatures of Princes, muſt be added the multitude which courtiers and placemen ſupport by their credit, or captivate by their fortune.

Thus deficient of every principle of honour, and careleſs of their duty, thoſe at the helm are ever ſeek⯑ing to court the Prince, that they might ſhare his authority; and ſubmit themſelves to the yoke, that they might impoſe it on others. Theſe likewiſe ſeek after favour, every one aims to be exalted; men of a mean condition themſelves wiſh to riſe, that they might aſſume an imperious air.

CHAP. XV. Of rooting out the Love of Glory.

WHILST the deſire of acquiring fame burns in the breaſt of the ſubjects, and they are greedy after glory alone, liberty is never more ſecure. They ſtand unſhaken at dangers, diſheartened by no obſta⯑cle, and reſtrained by no conſideration; leſs fear⯑ing [36]the moſt horrid torture, than the opprobrium of betraying their country to a tyrant.

Princes accordingly loſe no opportunity of changing the object of glory. For fame, which the public diſpenſes, they ſubſtitute honours which they alone diſtribute; and inſtead of making dignities the reward of ſervices done the patria, they make honours the ſalary of ſervices tendered to them. Thus their crea⯑tures are covered both with infamy and marks of dig⯑nity, and theſe marks of note are ſoon valued at the expence of merit, virtue and talents.

Hence ariſe two oppoſite effects: men of abject principles ſeek after dignities, men of an elevated mind deſpiſe them. Diſgraced by the uſe they are made of, and the perſons on whom they are beſtowed, to become worthy of them is no more the purſuit of noble ſouls. When once honours are diſcredited, an incentive to generous actions, to great deeds, is want⯑ing; and the love of glory, for want of fewel, is extinguiſhed in every heart.

CHAP. XVI. Of encouraging Servility.

WHEN the Prince is the only ſource of conſide⯑ration, favour becomes the object of every one's deſires. To be accounted ſomething, thoſe who approach him exert themſelves to pleaſe him; the ineſtimable advantage of being free is therefore ſacri⯑ficed on all ſides to dazzling ſervitude, and the love of one's patria to ignominious marks of note.

In order to be in favour with the monarch, they ſpeak emphatically of his little merit; they allow him to poſſeſs virtues of every kind, and extol the happineſs of being under his empire^*.

[38]More than that, all who approach him abaſe them⯑ſelves, are earneſt to cringe at his feet, diſdain all thoſe who ſcorn to imitate them; and proud of their chains, ſeek for the diſgracing privilege of being his laughing ſtock.

Deſtitute of virtue, they cannot bear it in others; and exert all their addreſs in ridiculing them: on all occaſions they depreſs glorious deeds, aſperſe good men, and by the moſt humiliating epithets ſtigmatize the lovers of liberty.

At firſt, their baſe diſcourſes are deſpiſed; but, by conſtantly repeating the ſame without bluſhing, they amaze their adverſaries, and humble them by deſpiſ⯑ing their blows. Beſides, as ſuch effrontery in facing ridicule impoſes upon the multitude, incapable of appraiſing things at their juſt value, contempt ends and admiration begins.

On his part, the Prince ſcarcely riſes any to dig⯑nities but in proportion as they prove ſervile. Never [39]ſure of his favour, unleſs ever ready to betray their engagements, they are diſgraced from the moment they remember their duty. Mean flatterers, and thoſe wretches who ſell their conſcience that they might ſell their protection, are therefore the only perſons who can bear themſelves up in ſuch a thorny place. Thus all vices reign at courts; there flattery, perjury, and contempt of all duty, parade with effrontery.

Not being allowed to live as one might wiſh, every one lives according to the times, men, and affairs; even the wiſeſt have but a frigid admiration for virtue, and the beſt patriots are but little concerned for the public good.

CHAP. XVII. Of turning virtuous Men out of Places.

IN a free, but newly eſtabliſhed government, men who have beſt ſerved their country, are ever ſeated at the helm; and men of avowed honeſty ever ſit on the bench. If the Prince is truſted with the power of diſpoſing of places for the future, it is on condition that he ſhall prefer none but deſerving perſons. But in order to become abſolute, far from calling to him [40]talents and virtue, he imperceptibly removes from office men that are popular, wiſe, and incorruptible, and puts in their places men of eaſy terms.

CHAP. XVIII. Of diſuniting the People.

HAVING engaged the people to loſe fight of their patria, an attempt is made to annihilate the love of it in their hearts. Men united by liberty and for liberty muſt remain free, as long as they re⯑main united; to be enſlaved they therefore ought to be divided, and time never fails to offer an opportu⯑nity for it.

Almoſt in every ſtate, there are from its foundation various ranks of people; nobles ever diſdain the ple⯑beians, and plebeians ever hate the nobles, or rather, every one who belongs to any rank, hates or deſpiſes thoſe who belong to another: theſe baſe paſſions Princes make uſe of to ſow diſſention, and alienate the affections of the people from their patria.

If there is originally no diverſity of ranks, thoſe at the helm labour to introduce it: they divide the people into different claſſes, and to every one aſſign [41]particular employments, rights or privileges. The one is appointed to magiſtracies, the other to military ſervices; this to eccleſiaſtical benefices, that to trade and mechanical arts.

Till the ſeceſſion of the Romans, the patricians only were nominated to the magiſtracy; and till the emperors, every order of citizens was not admitted to military ſervice.

None but noblemen were to be admitted into the order of knights templars, and none are to be admitted into that of knights of Malta, but thoſe whoſe nobility can be proved by many deſcents.

In France, noblemen, military men, and the king's honorary councellors alone, are free from a land-tax, called la taille.

In order to incite jealouſy among his ſubjects, Philip II. of Spain, ſettled in 1586, by proclamation, a ceremonial to be obſerved in regard to the grandees, miniſters, and prelates; he likewiſe fixed the titles by which the citizens were to be ſtiled, and ordered the refractory to be proſecuted by law.

At Venice, the different orders of^* cytadini are diſtinguiſhed the one from the other, and all from [42]the vulgar, by peculiar privileges. The firſt order is appointed to the reſidentſhip of foreign courts, and to the ſecretaryſhip of counſels and embaſſies; into their families patricians are permitted to marry; ſome⯑times ſome of them are incorporated into the body of the nobility, inſtead of thoſe families which become extinct: the other cytadini are permitted to take the gown of the nobles. Thus they are all engaged to unite with the maſters of the commonwealth againſt the reſt of the people.

But as if this craft was ſtill inſufficient, the admi⯑niſtration ſows diſſention among the rabble of the different wards of the city, and conſtantly keeps up two oppoſite parties^* by ſecretly encouraging fighting among them on one particular day of the year.

Of their ſubjects of Terra Ferma, the burgeſſes are treated with indulgency, the nobles with ſeverity.

Looking upon the Paduans as the antient maſters of Venice, the ſeignory took particular care to keep them diſunited. For that purpoſe, the moſt powerful families were tranſported to Venice, and ſuch privileges granted to the ſtudents of the univer⯑ſity as to incenſe the jealouſy of the citizens.

[43]Princes, not ſatisfied with dividing the people into various orders, enjoying divers privileges, artfully incite diſcord in every order by means of odious diſ⯑tinctions^*. They grant peculiar prerogatives to individuals, and give penſions to courteous officers, to adulatory academicians, poets, comedians, &c.

CHAP. XIX. Of multiplying the Tools of Power.

TO increaſe their power, Princes increaſe the number of placemen.

Under thoſe Princes of the Auſtrian houſe who mounted the Spaniſh throne, the number of civil and military places was prodigious. There were thou⯑ſands of titulars, and ſcarcely any man of ſome conſi⯑deration without an office, or dignity^*.

Hitherto the attempts made againſt liberty have not alarmed the ſubjects. As theſe changes have been gradual, and as theſe new manners have taken place without offending the minds of the people; far from entertaining any ſiniſter ſuſpicion, they believe their well-being to be augmented. But an alteration is ſoon to follow. Already there are no more public feaſts, no more mirthful ſhews. Sad ſcenes ſucceed, the ſubjects feel their grievous ſituation, and futurity offers them but an afflicting perſpective.

Full of himſelf, and conſcious of his force, the Prince grows every day impatient at the idea of his dependency, and haſtes to rid himſelf of it.

CHAP. XX. Of placing corrupted Men at the Helm.

PRINCES cannot alone ruin liberty, they abſo⯑lutely want ſome aid; and as their miniſters are to be their chief tools of tyranny, they commit the execution of their dark deſigns to crafty men, to men without honour, honeſty, and conſcience. Some of the moſt artful confer no office, no place of any autho⯑rity, but to men of new families, who being ſenſible that they owe every thing to royal favour, are content to ſupport the power of the crown, though at the ex⯑pence of juſtice and national privileges; and the better to ſecure their projects, they even admit but few into the cabinet.

Henry VII. ever ruled by a faction, and that by the leſſer faction. To give full ſcope to his tyrannical rapacity, he nominated for his miniſters Empſon and Dudley, two profligate men, equally enabled by their knowledge in the law to pervert the forms of juſtice to the oppreſſion of the innocent, and perfectly quali⯑fied to prey upon the defenceleſs people.

Louis XI. truſted none with the firſt places of go⯑vernment, but men that were corrupt and of baſe [47]extraction: theſe were his ſole confidents, and the miniſters of his ambitious deſigns.

To become abſolute, Charles II. eſtabliſhed a ca⯑binet council, known by the name of the Cabal, com⯑poſed but of few men, equally deſtitute of honour, and virtue, even boaſting of their own vices.

When we conſider what ſort of men Princes gene⯑rally make choice of for their ſervants, what are we to think of the maſters themſelves?

CHAP. XXI. Of ſecuring the Tools of Power from the Sword of Juſtice.

FAVOUR always proves ſufficient to render mini⯑ſters zealous, but impunity alone renders them audaciouſly enterpriſing. Princes take care therefore to protect them againſt the laws, and free them from puniſhment, whatever be the crimes they are guilty of.

Henry VIII. granted to Wolſey the following par⯑don: ‘"THAT THE KING, OUT OF HIS MERE MOTION AND ESPECIAL FAVOUR, DID PARDON ALL AND ALL MANNER OF TREASON, MISPRISION OF TREASON, MURDERS, FELO⯑NIES, AND OUTRAGES WHATSOEVER, BY THE SAID WOL⯑SEY COMMITTED, OR TO BE HEREAFTER COMMITTED."’

[48]Such was the pardon granted to the Earl of Somer⯑ſet by James I. and ſuch the pardon granted to the Earl of Danby by Charles II.

What did not Charles I. to free Strafford from pu⯑niſhment? At firſt he refuſed to ſign the death-war⯑rant; next he interceded by tears and ſupplications; then demanded that the puniſhment ſhould be com⯑muted into perpetual impriſonment; afterwards prayed for a reſpite, and in fine reluctantly ſubmitted.

Has not Louis XV. lately ſnatched out of the hands of juſtice the Duc d'Aguillon, charged with having made an attempt to poiſon that troubleſome patriot —M. de la Chalotaye?

CHAP. XXII. Of filling the Courts of Judicature with corrupted Men.

LIBERTY is eſtabliſhed on the laws alone; but as the laws ever ſpeak by the mouths of men, in order to render them deluſive and uſeleſs, Princes ſet on the benches corrupted judges, or they corrupt thoſe who are ſitting.

The conſtant policy of Henry VII. conſiſted in no⯑minating to every place of truſt, churchmen, lawyers, and new men, who were all more dependant on him than the great.

[49]Louis XI. ſtudiouſly filled all the departments of government with men of baſe extraction.

Under James I. the Star-chamber, the Council of York, the High Commiſſion-court, &c. were wholly compoſed of the King's creatures, and all cauſes of any concern brought before them.

Charles I. bribed the judges of the high-court of juſtice; and not content with this, under colour of reforming abuſes, granted a commiſſion to the Arch⯑biſhop of Canterbury, and other members of the privy-council, for regulating the juriſdiction of all the courts of judicature in the kingdom. Theſe com⯑miſſioners were to examine all queſtions, controver⯑ſies, and debates, ariſing about the juriſdiction of the courts, civil and eccleſiaſtical. They were conſti⯑tuted with power to call before them, as often as they would, any of the judges of the ſaid courts, or con⯑tending parties; to examine upon oath the officers and clerks; to hear and debate the queſtions and cauſes; to conſider and adviſe on the ſubject: then to lay before the King the ſaid conſiderations, that he might determine by his authority the matter in diſpute^*.

After the diſſolution of the parliament held in 1634, all the magiſtrates, judges, juſtices of peace, governors [50]and lords-lieutenants, were changed, and the moſt violent tories put in their places.

Charles II. uſed to cloſet the judges, to ſerve him his own way^†.

The accounts of Graham and Burton, the wicked ſolicitors of James the Second's illegal proſecutions, having been inſpected by the committee appointed in relation to the ſtate priſoners, it appeared, "that, from the year 1679 to the year 1688, they had re⯑ceived near 40,000 pounds out of the Exchequer, which they alleged to have paid to witneſſes, jurors, ſolicitors, counſellors, and other perſons concerned in their proſecutions of indictments, informations, and trials of perſons in capital and other pretended crimi⯑nal cauſes, and in the name and on behalf of the King."

CHAP. XXIII. Of ſecret Practices.

WHILST the ſubjects abandon themſelves to diſ⯑ſipation, the Prince, ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded with men careleſs of watching his motions, attempts to attack liberty. But he firſt drops ſome propoſals [51]calculated to ſupport his ſecret views. If the propoſals paſs, they form a baſis upon which he haſtens to build. If they paſs not, and yet the oppoſition be not ſtrong, he takes advantage of the circumſtance, has recourſe to craft, endeavours to varniſh over his deſigns with the pretence of promoting the public good^*, and begs they would rely on his word; then, without being aſhamed of baſely perjuring himſelf, he takes God to witneſs the uprightneſs of his intentions, and his re⯑verence for the laws he is about to infringe: and the people are ſo ſilly as to truſt to ſuch proteſtations.

At other times, thoſe at the helm induce ſome of their tools to propoſe, in the name of the public, the projects in view; deceived by appearance, the people again fall into the ſnare.

Thus the miniſtry, during Pitt's adminiſtration, had propoſed, by ſome pretended patriots, the ſet⯑tling of the militia; and the project was executed.

Thus the Court has ſince propoſed, by other pre⯑tended patriots, the ſettling of the militia on the ſame [52]footing with regular troops; but God forbid that this project ſhould likewiſe be put in execution.

The Prince, being about to make an open attempt, in order to caſt a miſt before the eyes of the public, repeats feaſts and ſhews; he gains the public confi⯑dence by performing ſome engagement of his own, or he keeps up the ſpirit of gaming^*.

In order to prepare the people to receive Mazarin, the very day that this miniſter was to return to Paris, Louis XIV. iſſued out a proclamation, commanding the immediate payment of all arrears on the rentes viagéres ſur l' Hotel de Ville ^†.

The very day of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, this monarch exhibited a magnificent tour⯑nament^‡; and he uſed to be laviſh of feaſts and ſhews, whenever he intended to invade ſome important branch of government, or to incroach upon the ſubjects.

If the Prince is making any hazardous attempt, he is ever careful to reſerve ſome means of juſtification.

Charles II. having formed a deſign of rendering himſelf abſolute, engaged, through the intrigues of [53]the Duke of Lauderdale, the parliament of Scotland, held in 1669, to paſs an act approving the raiſing of the militia, and ordering that it might be employed in any county of the crown's dominions, without any application to the king for his expreſs order; and that it ſhould be obliged to obey any order from the Scotch council. Thus, taking in appearance the militia out of the royal hands to put it into thoſe of the council, it was in the king's power to order them whenever he had occaſion for them, without his appearing openly to call them into England; and any complaint, in caſe of a miſcarriage, would be brought againſt the council^*.

CHAP. XXIV. Of making Innovations.

IN no political conſtitution are the rights of the people well enough eſtabliſhed, to prevent the arbitrary proceedings of adminiſtration: In no poli⯑tical conſtitution has the legiſlature been wary enough to render innovations unneceſſary; and it is by means of theſe innovations that Princes lay the foun⯑dation of tyranny.

[54]On any plauſible pretence they begin by creating ſome office, ſome dignity, or erecting a new court of juſtice. At firſt they have this court regulated as the old ones, they then alter its form of proceeding, and gradually make it arbitrary.

The power of creating peers without the aſſent of parliament was contrary to the ancient laws of the realm: this power was uſurped by Henry III.^†

Under colour of clearing the kingdom of banditti, Edward I. eſtabliſhed the Commiſſion of Trial-Baton, with a power to reſearch and puniſh all kind of diſ⯑orders and crimes. Theſe commiſſioners took their turn in the ſeveral counties, and without diſtinguiſh⯑ing the innocent from the guilty, they proſecuted on the moſt trifling ſuſpicion, condemned on the ſlighteſt charge, and filled the gaols with pretended malefactors, who were permitted afterwards to redeem their liberty by paying heavy fines, with which the king's treaſury was filled^‡.

Under the ſpecious pretence of eaſing thoſe ſubjects, who had no money to proſecute their ſuits in the courts of Weſtminſter, Henry VIII. without any au⯑thority from parliament, erected a council at York, [55]the judicature of which extended over ſeveral ſhires. At firſt this unconſtitutional court acted according to the rules of other criminal courts; but James I. from the very beginning of his reign, made it dependant on the King's inſtructions. Charles I. afterwards made it independant of every rule of law in the kingdom, and ordered thoſe who ſhould fly from that bloody tribunal to be dragged before it from any part of the realm.

If the Prince erects no court of juſtice, he changes the eſtabliſhed forms of law, alters the tenure by which the judges hold their places, ſets them above the cenſure of the legiſlative powers, makes their judgments arbitrary, and calls before them all cauſes.

In a ſtatute of Henry IV. it is enacted, that the judgments given in the King's courts ſhall not be exa⯑mined in Parliament or elſewhere, unleſs^* made by attaint and error.

Having made the power of the Star-Chamber arbi⯑trary, Charles I. ordered all civil cauſes between him⯑ſelf and his ſubjects to be brought before that court: —a bloody tribunal, where right and courage were uſeleſs; where bribery and villainy were ſeated on the bench, holding the balance of juſtice; where reſent⯑ment and ferocity quenched their thirſt in the blood of innocent victims.

[56]It is not, however, by open and violent attacks that Princes commonly begin to overturn the conſti⯑tution; they rather undermine it; they innovate by degrees, and make things yield inſenſibly to their will. If ſometimes they follow violent meaſures, it is only in relation to ſome notorious villain, whoſe puniſh⯑ment, though arbitrarily inflicted, is always agreeable to the people, more mindful of their own intereſts than jealous of their liberty, and ever ready to confirm the unjuſt power which is at laſt to oppreſs them.

CHAP. XXV. Of diſarming the Subjects.

TO become abſolute, craft without force avails but little^*.

In a free country, it is with his ſubjects as volun⯑teers, that the Prince attacks the enemy; with them [57]he makes a conqueſt or defends the ſtate. But at the head of men wedded to their country he dares not make any attempt againſt liberty; mercenary troops are therefore thought neceſſary to ſubvert the govern⯑ment. Princes accordingly have all laboured, as ſoon as it was in their power, to have ſuch troops; and in order to ſucceed, they have employed many artifices.

Charles VII. of France, availing himſelf of the reputation which he had acquired in expelling the Engliſh out of his kingdom, and taking advantage of the impreſſion of terror which the enemy had left on the minds of his ſubjects, effected the^* eſtabliſhment of a ſtanding army. Under pretence of putting the ſtate in a poſture of defence on any ſudden invaſion, he re⯑tained in his ſervice a body of ſixteen thouſand infantry and nine thouſand cavalry; he appointed officers to command them, and ſtationed them at his pleaſure in different parts of the kingdom. Thus, inſtead of the auxiliary tenants of the barons, attached only to the chieftain whoſe banner they followed, and accuſtomed to obey no other command, the King had troops that were taught to acknowledge a maſter, to obey his orders, and expect from him the reward of their ſervices.

[58]Under the pious pretence of keeping always on foot a force ſufficient to oppoſe the frequent incurſions of the Moors from Africa, and to reſiſt the progreſs of the infidels, Ximenes, regent of Caſtile, iſſued out a proclamation commanding every city in that kingdom to enroll a certain number of its burgeſſes; he or⯑dered them to be trained to the uſe of arms, engaged officers to command them, and took this new militia into his ſervice^*.

While we were under feodal government, the mili⯑tary power was lodged in the hands of the barons; but as it always proved but very little ſerviceable to the crown, and ſometimes dangerous, Henry V. exchanged,^† under various pretences, military ſervice for pecu⯑niary contribution, and ſubſtituted to the military [59]tenants of the nobles a new militia, much more diſ⯑poſed to execute his orders. Henry's ſucceſſors pur⯑ſued his plan; ſome of them even attempted to have a ſtanding army, and at laſt ſucceeded. Immediately after Monmouth's invaſion, James II. demanded a ſub⯑ſidy for keeping on foot ſome regular troops, under pretence of being ready at any time to face a new danger^*. But a ſtanding army, properly ſpeaking, was unknown in England till the acceſſion of the houſe of Brunſwick. Through the very earneſt deſire of George I. a conſiderable body of troops was taken into conſtant pay, to maintain the tranquillity of the kingdom, and anſwer the ends of the treaty of Ha⯑nover.

In the other ſtates of Europe, the ſcheme of ſtand⯑ing armies has likewiſe been purſued with eagerneſs, and executed with ſuch ſucceſs, that, the Swiſs excepted, there are no patriotic ſoldiery; every where merce⯑naries ſtand armed by tyranny againſt liberty.

As theſe troops were raiſed under the ſpecious pre⯑tence of defending the ſtate, men tied to their country by ſome eſtabliſhment were at firſt enrolled. Such ſoldiers proved but little ſubmiſſive: in order to get ſoldiers more devoted, Princes were ſenſible that their [60]armies ought to be compoſed of men, who having no property, no principle, might be ever as ready to march againſt their countrymen as againſt the enemy.

In proportion as induſtry increaſes and commerce flouriſhes, inequality extends itſelf; part of the people ſwallows up all the riches, the remainder, abaſed by miſery or contemptible employments, ſubſiſts only by the vices or follies of the opulent, and poſſeſſes an induſtry which weds them to no country. Of this abject populace, deſtitute of all knowledge, of every virtue, of every principle of honour, without patri⯑mony, and aſhamed of their indigence, Princes com⯑poſe their armies.

But as if national mercenaries were not ſufficiently devoted to tyranny, Princes, to oppreſs their ſub⯑jects, have recourſe to foreigners.

In France, there are in the regal armies, Swiſs, Cor⯑ſicans, Italians, Scotch, Iriſh, &c.

In Spain, there are Italians, Swiſs, Germans, &c.

In Pruſſia, half of the troops are French or Poliſh.

In England, there are indeed no foreign ſoldiery, but ſeveral Scotch regiments are conſtantly ſtationed there, and from the good harmony which reigns between the two nations, the king reſigns to them the odious part of oppreſſing his Engliſh ſubjects.

[61]Some Princes are not ſatisfied with having at their command foreign troops, but will even keep no others.

In all their expeditions, offenſive or defenſive, the ſenate of Venice have avoided, with the greateſt care, arming the citizens, even on the moſt urgent occa⯑ſions^*.

Moſt Princes have carried their policy ſo far as to diſarm their ſubjects on different pretences; fear⯑ing they ſhould ever be made ſenſible of their own force, and ſhould uſe it to repel oppreſſion.

Under colour of public ſafety, the regency of Spain in 1669, iſſued out a proclamation, forbidding the citizens of Madrid keeping fire-arms^†.

In France the peaſants have been diſarmed under pretence of preventing their hunting; and in the whole kingdom, the capital excepted, only noblemen, military men, and honorary officers of the king are permitted to wear arms.

At Venice, the wearing of arms is prohibited by the moſt ſevere law.

Thus Princes, having armed mercenary troops againſt the people; under pretence of ſecuring public tranquillity, tie the hands of their ſubjects, the more eaſily to enſlave them.

CHAP. XXVI. Of providing for the Pay of the Military.

TO eſtabliſh ſtanding armies avails but little, if the means of keeping them are wanting. Ac⯑cordingly Princes, whilſt they laboured to get merce⯑nary troops, have applied themſelves to appropriate funds for the regular payment of them; and they needed only the ſame pretences.

CHAP. XXVII. Of Acts of Power againſt Law, and of Judgments of Law againſt Liberty.

THE Prince, having now grounded his autho⯑rity, forms attempts upon liberty with leſs caution. As it is ſeldom the caſe that a whole nation is concerned for an injured ſubject^*, the Prince [63]attacks the privileges of the people by incroaching upon the rights of individuals.

If the injured parties make any expoſtulation about the violence offered them, awed by power, too fee⯑ble to conteſt with the miniſter, or unable to bear the charges of a law-ſuit; they are obliged to ſuffer the injury, and ſubmit to oppreſſion. Thus the queſtion not being determined, the outrages of the Prince paſs unrepreſſed; and, inſtead of appearing firmly in ſup⯑port of thoſe who ſuffer in the public cauſe, the others baſely deſert them, and the unfortunate fall like vic⯑tims devoted to their ill fate.

If the Prince has to do with men able to conteſt with him, he attempts to prevail over them. If his efforts prove unſucceſsful, he lets ſlip no opportunity to weary the adverſe parties by formality, adjourn⯑ment, and expences; he is intent in perplexing them by cavilling at law, in order, if poſſible, to prevent the matter being finally decided.

When he cannot diſmiſs the adverſe parties, he ſometimes makes an attempt upon their lives.

[64]If ſword and poiſon prove ineffectual, how many reſources ſtill remain? Intereſt, fear, hope, pride, prejudice, craft, ſeduction, calumny, perjury, all are in favour of the man arrayed with honours and con⯑ſtituted in power.

To defend his own rights, a private man has no reſource but to make application to a court of judi⯑cature, almoſt always preſided over, and oftentimes wholly compoſed of miniſterial tools^*. Let his claim be ever ſo legal; juſtice and law, too weak againſt power and ſecret practices, are impotent ſupporters of his rights. Even thoſe who argue, generally re⯑ſtrained by fear or reſpect, are not ſo bold as to make [65]good his title with ſpirit^*; whilſt the counſel of the adverſe party, ſafe under the royal banners, and emboldened by favour, extenuate it, or put upon it a falſe conſtruction. Cunning is oppoſed to juſtice, ſophiſm to reaſon, falſehood to truth; no pains are wanting to ſeduce the judges in favour of tyranny. The judges themſelves, ſeduced or cor⯑rupted, run into oppreſſive vengeance; and, to gratify their intereſted views, proſtitute juſtice to power^†. So that the unhappy ſufferer is almoſt always, not only deprived of redreſs, but meets with new oppreſ⯑ſion, even ſometimes without having been ſuffered to offer any thing in his defence^‡.

[66]Thus men, fated to command, cruſh thoſe who have ſpirit enough to inform againſt arbitrary acts of power; make^* ſophiſtry and clamour triumph over the moſt ſacred privileges, and raſhly complete, under the form of juſtice, the deſtruction of their enemies.

Would the evil had been circumſcribed here! But theſe acts of injuſtice ſoon produce many others: whilſt any newly injured perſon complains againſt oppreſſion, he is ironically anſwered, What do you complain of? We do you no wrong.—See the precedents. Thus out⯑rages paſs into uſe; and, as if tyranny became lawful [67]becauſe it remained unpuniſhed, they alledge antient uſurpations as ſacred prerogatives, and plead violences formerly offered to the laws, in vindication of thoſe violences which are now offered to them^†.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of Unconcernedneſs.

THE people ſeldom foreſee their fate. Render their birthrights illuſive, undermine their liberty; they perceive their miſerable ſervitude only when they feel it, when they hear the names of the proſcribed, when they ſee the blood of their fellow ſubjects, or when cruſhed under the yoke, they, trembling, expect the puniſhment they are to undergo.

The ſubjects, in order to maintain their liberty, ought to watch the motions of the miniſtry with a jealous eye. Men are never ſo eaſily undone, as when they ſuſpect no danger; and too great ſecurity in a nation is almoſt always the forerunner of ſlavery.

[68]But as a continual attention to public affairs is above the reach of the multitude; in a ſtate jealous of its liberty, there never ſhould be wanting ſome men to watch the tranſactions of the miniſters, unveil their ambitious projects, givean alarm at the approach of the ſtorm, rouſe the people from their lethargy, diſ⯑cloſe the abyſs open before them, and point out thoſe on whom the public indignation ought to fall. The greateſt misfortune, therefore, which can attend a free country, where the Prince is powerful and enter⯑priſing, is, that no party, no commotion, no faction agitate the minds of the ſubjects. All is undone, when the people are unconcerned for public affairs; on the contrary, liberty conſtantly ſprings up out of the fires of ſedition.

CHAP. XXIX. To wear out the Zeal of the People by falſe Alarms.

BUT in order that the efforts of watchful patriots may be attended with ſucceſs, great care ought to be taken, not to alarm the people cauſeleſsly;— made dupes to many falſe alarms, they become at laſt unconcerned at real dangers.

[69]Great care ought to be taken likewiſe not to alarm them upon ſlight occaſions. If the grievances are not ſo apparent as to be univerſally aſſented to, there is but little hope of ſeeing them redreſſed: ſince the multitude are perſuaded by evidence alone, and by the efforts of the multitude only are the projects of tyranny confounded.

Great care ought to be taken chiefly not to incite them to the purſuit of a falſe, or even doubtful object. When the ſubjects proceed ſo far as to put themſelves in a poſture of defending their rights, it is of great concern to liberty that they be not overcome. By checks, the victory of adminiſtration is only delayed; but by checks, the people is diſheartened and abaſed.

CHAP. XXX. Of ill grounded Writings.

WHEN adminiſtration is cenſured, the charges againſt it ought conſtantly to be ſupported by incontrovertible facts. If the ſubjects, in a juſt cauſe, make any inconſiderate ſtep, it ſuffices to ruin their affairs. The Prince, who at firſt trembled under the laſh of the malcontents, while they confined [70]themſelves within the bounds of prudence, triumphs as ſoon as they go beyond; he complains in his turn, he proſecutes thoſe who have handled the pen; and leaving the public grievances for his private injuries, he oftentimes ſucceeds in making the people loſe ſight of the principal object. Thus the friends of liberty, who, by cautious proceedings, might have been vic⯑torious, loſe by a ſingle act of imprudence the fruit of their paſt efforts.

Of this truth we have a convincing proof before us. While the author of the North Briton contented him⯑ſelf with cenſuring the government, with diſcloſing the ſecret views of the favourite, with purſuing and proſecuting him cloſely, he kept the miniſtry in per⯑petual alarm, and made them tremble under the laſh of his ſpirited writings. But when he diſgraced his pen, by employing it in groſsly aſperſing the cha⯑racter of a certain Princeſs, inſtead of attacking arbi⯑trary power, he furniſhed his enemies with weapons to his own deſtruction.

CHAR. XXXI. Of Satirical Writings.

THE manner in which the cauſe of the public is defended, is not of little concern to liberty. When tyranny is complained of, let it be always in a grave and animated ſtile. Satirical writers attack indeed the tyrant, but not tyranny; and far from reminding him of his duty, they mortally wound his pride, they exaſperate and incenſe him the more.

Satirical ſtrokes avail not but to promote ſervitude: and although ſenſible men might look upon them not as upon exaggerated charges, they go not the leſs againſt the aim intended. For by affording fewel to public malignity^*, they eaſe the people's griefs, weaken the ſenſe of their injuries, and prevent their reſentment; they make them laugh at their own misfortunes, and patiently ſuffer tyranny.

CHAP. XXXII. Of Invectives.

THE want of decency likewiſe prejudices the cauſe of the public. Groſs invectives indiſpoſe [72]peaceable men, ſcandalize well bred men, and alienate all thoſe cool patriots, who are tied but by a thread to the cauſe of liberty.

CHAP. XXXIII. Of bad Writings.

IF it is of great concern that the public cauſe be not defended but in a ſerious ſtile, it is of no leſs concern that it be pleaded in a maſterly manner. All thoſe ſtupid writers, who ſtand forth as the champions of liberty, only prejudice it. Their languid pro⯑ductions do not awaken, do not perſuade, do not animate the reader; and the languor they inſpire prevents any ſpirited attempt.

CHAP. XXXIV. Of too great a Multiplicity of Writings.

IT has been ſaid, that in a ſtate jealous of its liberty, ſome men ought never to be wanting to reclaim the laws when violated by the Prince, to rouſe the people from their lethargy, to guide them in difficult caſes, and bring them back to their rights. But as [73]the human mind, when too long intent upon any object, becomes weary of it; all is undone, if in exciting the patriotic zeal of the people, their ſpirits be exhauſted, and their zeal rendered extinct.

This unfortunately has happened to us in our late diſſenſions. Plagued with ſo many writings, and exhauſted by our own efforts, we are at preſent reduced to ſuch an apathy that nothing is able to fix our attention.

CHAP. XXXV. Of the exceſſive Moderation of the People.

TO overturn the conſtitution, Princes commonly undermine it, they innovate by degrees, ſeldom in a flagrant manner. But the people are neither attentive nor ſagacious enough to obſerve thoſe innovations, nor foreſee the conſequences of them; and if they were, they have not ſpirit enough to oppoſe them. The firſt innovations, however, ought to be ſtrongly oppoſed, in order to maintain liberty. When once abuſes are grown inveterate, with the more difficulty are they reformed, they even many times admit of no remedy.

[74]To maintain themſelves free, the people ought readily to eſpouſe the cauſe of any individual oppreſſed by the Prince. When ſubjects ſeparate their intereſts, they are ſubdued one after another, and liberty is undone. Far from being ready to protect the rights of others, every one muſt have ſeen his own rights many times flagrantly attacked, before he reſolves to defend them; and it is difficult to conceive how great advantage the government takes from that want of ſpirit to oppoſe its criminal attempts, and how much it concerns liberty that ſubjects be not ſo patient.

When Charles I. began to put his impure hands into the purſes of his ſubjects, or to offer them the ſhocking ſcene of a ſavage cruelty in the perſons of the unfortunate wretches who were doomed to de⯑ſtruction, had the people taken arms, marched againſt the tyrant, and condemned the miniſters of his ven⯑geance to the ſcaffold, they never had ſo long groaned under the moſt odious oppreſſion.

Yet I would not adviſe a people to have recourſe at every inſtant to violent meaſures: but under colour of not diſturbing the public tranquillity, quiet men do not perceive that they gain nothing by their indul⯑gence, but to be oppreſſed with more impunity; that they encourage tyranny, and that when they at [75]laſt undertake to ſtop its progreſs, it often proves too late.

The ſacrilegious ambition of Princes prompts them to make attempts upon liberty; but the cowardice of the people alone permits their fetters to be forged. Ambitious as they are, Princes would be leſs enter⯑prizing if they were always to make themſelves a way to abſolute power by force and violence. When we peruſe attentively the hiſtory of deſpotiſm, we ſome⯑times behold with aſtoniſhment an handful of men^*, keeping in awe a whole nation. That inconſiderate moderation of the people, that timidity, that fatal propenſity to ſeparate their common intereſts, are the true cauſes of this ſurpriſing phenomenon; for where is the voice of the public, when every one continues ſilent?

CHAP. XXXVI. Of concealing public Grievances.

WHEN the clamours of the oppreſſed ſubjects are at length excited, the Prince ſtrives to prevent the voice of the public from being heard: [76]he ſends his emiſſaries every where to ſeduce the meaneſt claſs of the people, and engage them to pre⯑ſent flattering addreſſes, which are artfully put in oppoſition to the juſt remonſtrances of the nation; then adding mockery to injury, he boaſts of the lenity of his government, and endeavours to make the mul⯑titude of the malcontents paſs for an handful of ill⯑minded people^*.

But the better to conceal national grievances, the Prince kindly receives thoſe addreſſes which approve of his conduct, and diſtinguiſhes the bringers with parti⯑cular marks of favour; whilſt thoſe who venture to preſent addreſſes in a contrary ſtile are received with evident^* tokens of diſpleaſure, if they are not even denied admittance.

Not ſatisfied with diſcouraging thoſe who might have preſented diſagreeable addreſſes, the Prince ſilences the printers of news who are not devoted to him, whilſt others are allowed to publiſh daily in⯑vectives againſt the patriotic party, and beſtow enco⯑miums on the adminiſtration.

[77]If theſe meaſures do not ſucceed, the leaders of the malcontents are bribed, and engaged to extinguiſh the zeal of their own adherents^†

CHAP. XXXVII. Of preventing the Redreſs of public Grievances.

IT is a maxim in the cabinet, that the injuries offered to the people, if they remain unredreſſed, acquire to the crown the prerogative of offering them new ones. Accordingly, when public grievances are brought before a ſupreme tribunal, the prince makes uſe of every poſſible artifice to prevent its taking cog⯑nizance of them; he attempts to divert therefrom the attention of the judges, by laying before them new objects^‡, or prevails upon the preſident to diſſolve [78]the aſſembly when about taking any ſpirited reſo⯑lution^*.

If theſe artifices prove abortie, he labours to ſet the ſenate at variance, by exciting jealouſies among its^† members, by bribing ſome and intimidating others^‡.

[79]If this proves not ſufficient, he removes the patri⯑otic members by nominating them to places^* which incapacitate them from having a ſeat in the ſenate; or if there be no other mean, he ſtops all proceedings by proroguing the ſeſſion.

When the Prince dares not prorogue it, from a conſideration of the adminiſtration being charged with miſdemeanors, if called to an account, he attempts to clear himſelf, endeavours to extend a veil over all his illegal tranſactions, by exempting his miniſters from appearing before any judge^†.

If the Prince entertains ſome ſuſpicions of his crea⯑tures, leſt they ſhould reveal the fatal ſecret they have been truſted with, he is before-hand with them, and himſelf charges them with miſdemeanors^‡.

[80]If any fatal diſcovery is made, the Prince throws all the blame upon bad counſellors, and requeſts the judges to be tender of his honour. To prepare them in his favour, he affects to reform his adminiſtration^*, endeavours to clear himſelf, promiſes redreſs of griev⯑ances, entreats them to confide in his word, and without ſhame of being guilty of perjury, calls God to witneſs the ſincerity of his intentions^†.

If they refuſe to yield to his vague promiſes, he offers ſome equivalent to the deſired ſatisfaction, or makes ſome ſpecious conceſſions.

After ſo many fruitleſs attempts to prevent the redreſs of public grievances, if the Prince is at laſt obliged to yield, he ſubmits; but as ſoon as he diſcovers the conſequence of his conceſſions, he endeavours to recal [81]what has been done^‡, and again gives ſull ſcope to his illegal proceedings.

CHAP. XXXVIII. Of the Artifices made uſe of in order to ſuppreſs public Clamours.

THE ſubjects, to keep themſelves free, have no other means but watchfulneſs, ſpirit and virtue; the Prince, to ſubdue them, has ſo many means that he is embarraſſed only in his choice of them: that, however, which he moſtly makes uſe of is cunning. People are eaſily deceived in many things, and thoſe at the helm take advantage of it.

When the oppreſſed ſubjects are about taking ſome reſolution in order to oppoſe the progreſs of tyranny, they always meet with ſome obſtacle. Let them form what deſign they pleaſe, the Prince prevents the execution of it immediately. Let them entreat the redreſs of grievances, their petitions are fruitleſs; the Prince alledges his ſcruples, refuſes to comply, and oftentimes returns mockery to their complaints; he anſwers, "That he is always ready to hear the griev⯑ances of his ſubjects; that he is never ſo much concerned as about the well-being of his people," and diſmiſſes them with fair words.

If the ſubjects perſiſt in their reſolution, the Prince perſiſts in his conduct. Ever applying their minds to [83]the maxims of a fraudulent policy, thoſe at the helm learn the art of not being diſheartened by difficulties, of taking advantage of the weakneſs of men, of ca⯑jolling into acquieſcence the eaſy multitude; and as it is their method, when they mean to prevail over the people, to promiſe them every thing, with a view of performing none; whilſt the malcontents are earneſt in their requeſt, the Prince amuſes their credulity with fair promiſes, and without any ſhame of break⯑ing his word, repeats this mean artifice.

In the time of la Fronde, public ſafety having been attacked by many arbitrary exiles and impriſonments, the parliament of Paris at laſt obtained from the king a law^* for ſecuring the liberty of the ſubject; but ſoon after this law was infringed in the perſon of Chavigni. When the parliament remonſtrated againſt this infraction, they were anſwered by the Queen Re⯑gent, "That the impriſonment complained of ought to deter no body, that ſhe paſſed her word for public ſafety, and that her word would be inviolable." She broke, however, that inviolable word not long after, in reſpect to the Princes of Condé and Conti. The parliament remonſtrated again, and again the Regent [84]aſſured them, "That for the future the law ſhould be ſtrictly obſerved ^*." Thus Princes mock the people.

If incenſed at ſo many falſe promiſes, and weary with ſeeing their hopes ſo many times baffled, the malcontents exclaim loudly for juſtice, the Prince even then attempts to delay; he ſends them deputies to amuſe them, he ſtops the provoked multitude, diverts their fury, or cools it by vain conſultations, till the moment when he can without danger encoun⯑ter them^†.

If he is forced to treat, he at firſt makes them ſuch offers as he knows will be rejected, next he makes propoſals more reaſonable but expreſſed in a vague manner, calculated to conceal his duplicity, and which binding him to no particular obligations, leaves him always maſter of the terms of accommodation; or he adds to clear conceſſions ſome obſcure clauſe which renders them void, if falſe engagements rather are not taken.

Alarmed at the ſeceſſion of the people to the Sacred Mount, the Senate of Rome ſeeing themſelves obliged [85]to treat, made it their only buſineſs to ſtipulate in a vague manner the rights of the tribunes who had been juſt elected, in order to make no grant to the Ple⯑beians, or rather to ſecure a pretence for recovering their grants at more favourable junctures.

In 1641, Charles I. wanting to find, for the legiſ⯑lative body, employment of ſuch conſequence as ſhould engroſs their whole attention, and make the people believe he was willing to conſent to whatever ſhould be productive of a perfect reconciliation be⯑tween him and his parliament, whilſt he was making preparations to vindicate his own terms, ſent them the following meſſage: "That they would with all ſpeed fall into conſideration of all thoſe particulars which they ſhould hold neceſſary, as well for the up⯑holding and maintaining his Majeſty's juſt and regal authority, and for the ſettling his revenues, as for the preſent and future eſtabliſhment of their privileges, the free and quiet enjoying their eſtates and fortunes, the liberty of their perſons, the ſecurity of the true religion now profeſſed in the Church of England, and the ſettling of ceremonies in ſuch a manner as ſhould take away all juſt cauſe of offence. Which when they had digeſted and compoſed into one entire body, that ſo his Majeſty and themſelves might be able to make the more clear judgment on them, it ſhould [86]then appear, by what his Majeſty ſhould do, how far he had been from intending and deſigning any of thoſe things which the too great fears and jealouſies of ſome perſons apprehended, and how ready he would be to exceed the greateſt examples of the moſt indulgent Princes in their acts of grace and favour to their people^*."

In the inſurrection of 1647 at Naples, as the people entreated the delivery of the charter of their privileges, the Viceroy, ſolely intent on diſſipating the impend⯑ing ſtorm, ordered a copy of it to be forged, which he tendered for the original^†.

To the fury of the inſurgents empty ſounds only are oftentimes oppoſed. Some men, ſkilled in the art of ſeducing the people, preach to them, and the eaſy multitude yielding to fair words, become the ſport of a few florid orators.

Even a ſingle tale is ſometimes ſufficient to baffle the deſigns of revolted ſubjects.

Weary of the oppreſſion of the Senate, the Roman people had juſt abandoned their Lares to go in ſearch of an aſylum far from their cruel country, when Menennius Agrippa, by command of the ſenate, goes to the malcontents on the Sacred Mount, delivers [87]them a tale, and brings them back to their native city^*.

CHAP. XXXIX. Of the Hypocriſy of Princes.

THERE is no artifice, however ſtrange, which thoſe at the helm have not made uſe of to ruin liberty, even turning againſt the ſubjects their nobleſt ſentiments.

When the Prince foreſees that he will be over⯑powered, he ſometimes feigns to lay down arms, he expreſſes much concern for the public diſtractions, makes a ſhew of diſintereſtedneſs, demands leave to reſign; and oftentimes the eaſy multitude, deceived by this act of hypocriſy, yield to their generous emotions. The Prince being then entreated to continue to hold the [91]reins of empire, at firſt wavers, affects reluctance, aſks time to conſider it, then accepts upon certain terms, and at laſt lays new chains upon the people or adds to their former ones.

CHAP. XL. Of Ignorance.

DESPOTISM owes its ſupport greatly to igno⯑rance.

It is ignorance which, by obſtructing the ſight of the people, prevents them from being acquainted with their own rights, and vindicating them.

It is ignorance which, concealing from them the am⯑bitious deſigns, the ſecret practices, the low artifices of Princes, prevents them from obviating tyranny, from ſtopping the progreſs of lawleſs power, and ruining it entirely.

It is ignorance which, enforcing obedience to many falſe maxims, ties the hands of the people, ſubjects their necks to the yoke, and makes them ſubmit with reverence to arbitrary commands.

[99]It is ignorance, in a word, which induces the peo⯑ple to pay willingly to tyrants all thoſe duties they arrogantly require, and the credulous vulgar to reve⯑rence them as if they were Gods.

In order to ſubdue his ſubjects, the Prince labours to blind them. Conſcious of the unlawfulneſs of his own deſigns, and ſenſible of what he has to fear from clear-ſighted men, he endeavours to deprive the people of every means of acquiring knowledge.

How many crafty devices have not Princes employed to oppoſe the progreſs of learning? Some baniſh ſci⯑ence out of their dominions; others prohibit their ſubjects from travelling into^* foreign countries; others again divert the people from reflecting, by con⯑tinually [100]entertaining them^† with feaſts and ſhews, or keeping up among them the ſpirit of gaming^† and all ſtand up againſt men of ſpirit, who dedicate either their voice or their pen to defend the cauſe of liberty.

When Princes cannot reſtrain the people from freely ſpeaking or writing, they oppoſe error to truth. If any exclaim againſt their outrageous enterprizes, they at firſt endeavour to bribe the clamorous patriots, and to extinguiſh their zeal by gifts, but chiefly by promiſes.

If the virtue of the patriots be incorruptible, they oppoſe to them proſtituted ſcribblers, who, ever ready to vindicate tyranny, abuſe, from their obſcure cells, the friends of liberty, exert all their malice in blackening the views of the ſupporters of the rights of the people, and cauſing them to be looked upon as diſturbers of the public tranquillity.

If theſe artifices prove ineffectual, in order to ſilence the protectors of liberty, the moſt horrid expe⯑dients are made uſe of—dungeons, ſword, poiſon.

To ſilence the malcontents is indeed to prevent the people from awaking out of their lethargy; [101]but the chief point is to remove the means of ex⯑tending the complaints, by ſuppreſſing all corre⯑ſpondence between the ſeveral parts of the ſtate: Princes accordingly labour to reſtrain the liberty of the preſs.

At firſt, not daring to attack it openly, they wait till the ſubjects have furniſhed a plauſible pretence for it; and as ſoon as ſuch a pretence is offered, they ſeize it eagerly.

When a book contains very ſtriking notions reſpect⯑ing the rights of the people, any bold reflections on the bounds of the regal power, ſome violent ſtrokes againſt tyranny, they immediately prohibit the read⯑ing or ſelling of it, under pretence that it contains per⯑nicious maxims againſt religion and good manners^*.

They riſe up againſt all writings calculated to keep up the ſpirit of liberty, and denominate libels all performances wherein is attempted to diſcloſe the myſteries of adminiſtration, and under colour of [102]repreſſing licentiouſneſs^*, proſecute authors of ſpirit. They go farther: in order to keep the people in ignorance, and to leave no way open to important truths, they appoint inſpectors, cenſors, reviſors, li⯑cenſers of the preſs;—thoſe baſe Arguſes who con⯑ſtantly guard tyranny.

When any writings againſt their oppreſſive govern⯑ment appear in foreign countries, Princes cauſe the edition of them^† to be ſuppreſſed, and let no book be expoſed to ſale in their dominions^‡, unleſs it has been previouſly examined by their creatures.

CHAP. XLI. Falſe Idea of Tyranny.

IN proportion as knowledge diſappears, deſpotiſm makes its progreſs.

If the want of a true idea of liberty be a cauſe of ſlavery, the want of a true idea of tyranny is likewiſe a cauſe of it.

[104]Hiſtory ought to celebrate only the moderation of Princes, their wiſdom, their ſteadineſs in enforcing obe⯑dience to the laws, zeal in promoting public happineſs, and tenderneſs for the people; but it celebrates almoſt always only their magnificent follies, their villai⯑nous attempts and their outrages. Hiſtory ought to beſtow encomiums on thoſe Princes alone who are ſtudious of governing the people in peace; but it ſeldom applauds any but Princes ſkilled in the art of deſolating the world.

Abaſed by fear, ſeduced by hope, or corrupted by avarice, thoſe who write hiſtory inculcate no averſion to abſolute power, excite in us no horror againſt tyranny; they expatiate on the undertakings of a prince, when great or bold, however pernicious they be to the wel⯑fare of mankind, and however wickedly ſupported; they beſtow encomiums on deeds for which the voice of all ages ſhould brand with infamy the names of the authors, and baſely inſinuate the maxims of ſlavery^†.

[105]When they treat of governments, they declaim againſt the popular and extol the monarchical. They repreſent the people in a democracy, as being ever ready to yield to the ſeditious ſpeeches of orators earneſt in deceiving them for private views, and the ſtate as a ſhip without anchor on a ſtormy ſea, continu⯑ally toſſed by contrary winds; whilſt they compare the ſubjects of a powerful monarch, as a numerous family, which reſts happy under the wings of a good father.

When it ſo happens that a province ſhakes off the yoke, they term the inhabitants, rebels, or revolted ſlaves, who ought to be again put into fetters. They deſcribe the ſpirited efforts of a people againſt oppreſ⯑ſion as a rebellion, a guilty revolt, and the friends of liberty as perturbators of the public peace; they wreſt the views of good patriots, blaſt their reputation, and brand their memory inſtead of reſpecting their virtues^*.

If a bad Prince is informed againſt by a virtuous miniſter, according to them, he is an unfortunate maſter, betrayed by a perfidious ſervant ^†.

[106]But on the Prince whoſe actions they record they always beſtow exaggerated praiſes; they emphatically ſpeak of his little deſerts, extol his pretended penetra⯑tion, his concern for the glory of the ſtate, and his liberalities; they account a conqueſt as a very fortu⯑nate event, and deſcribe it as the greateſt epoch of his reign. Whilſt writing the hiſtory of a great villain, although from the mere force of truth, they make now and then ſome diſagreeable conceſſions; they ever ſpeak ſo faintly of his defects, they ſo greatly palliate his vices, ſo artfully extenuate his criminal attempts, that from their deſcriptions no one can diſtinguiſh the tyrant who ſo much diſgraced human nature.

The miſeries of the people, during any fatal reign, they generally attribute, not to the follies or outrages of thoſe who command, but to the irre⯑ſiſtible influence of deſtiny^*.

They never give to things the real names. They term the art of governing, that of ſpreading every where terror and deſolation; they call magnificence pageantry and odious prodigality; they cover uſurpa⯑tions [107]under the fair names of extenſion of power, addi⯑tion of privileges, and new prerogatives acquired by the crown; extortions, rapacity, robberies, under that of conqueſt; craft, duplicity, treachery, perfidiouſneſs, treaſon, under that of the art of negociating; and outrages, murders, poiſoning, under that of acts of great policy. Thus they ſucceed in deſtroying that impreſſion of horror, which the bare ſight of thoſe actions ever excites in the ſpectator.

But as if the falſe pictures offered in hiſtory were not ſufficient, there is every where a multitude of writers who, actuated by their baſe paſſions, are ever ready to vindicate tyranny. Authors in their dedica⯑tions, poets in their verſes, orators in their ſpeeches, every one with emulation baſely offers his incenſe; they give Princes the moſt flattering appellations, they call them fathers of the people, benefactors of mankind, the glory of the age, and we are ſo ſilly as to credit them.

It is not my deſign here to unveil the groſs impoſ⯑tures of thoſe writers, it is ſufficiently obvious to readers not prepoſſeſſed; but I ſhall offer a few words on their ignorance or inſincerity in thoſe very encomiums, which even men of ſenſe have credited.

Popular government is repreſented by penſioned ſo⯑phiſts as ever ſtormy and unſettled. A people is reſt⯑leſs [108]and ſeditious only when leading an idle life, as the Greeks and Romans did; becauſe, for want of private affairs, men are then always prompted to meddle with matters of ſtate: but men, wholly en⯑gaged in private employments, are unfortunately al⯑ready but too much unconcerned about the affairs of adminiſtration.

However, let this falſe aſſertion paſs. Undoubt⯑edly there are now and then ſome diſturbances in a democratical government; but is there none in ariſto⯑cratical and monarchical ones?

Beſides, theſe diſturbances ariſe leſs from a popular conſtitution than from its corruption; for if the peo⯑ple are generally inconſiderate, if they oftentimes en⯑gage themſelves in falſe ſteps, and ſometimes eagerly purſue their miſery, they are likewiſe, when not bribed, always ready to yield to men whoſe virtue and judgment they reſpect. It is the fault of the conſtitution if ſuch men are not conſtantly ſet at the helm, if ſubjects are deprived of the means of being acquainted with their true intereſts, and if any indivi⯑dual is permitted to be powerful enough to bribe a multitude.

We are told of the frequent factions, ſeditions, and rebellions, in popular governments; but has a people [109]ever took arms but to ſecure their liberty, to oppoſe the pernicious deſigns of ambitious men, and to free themſelves from oppreſſion?

We are terrified at public diſſenſions. From the fires of diſcord, however, all thoſe laws, which were made formerly at Rome in favour of liberty, took their origin; and from the fires of diſcord liberty has ariſen among us.

Men are too eaſily impoſed upon by the noiſe of civil diſcords. During the long diſturbances which agitated Rome from the Tarquins to the Gracchi, there were but few baniſhments, but few impriſon⯑ments, and almoſt no blood ſhed; but from thoſe tranquil reigns, which are ſo much boaſted of, let as long a period leſs fertile in tragic ſcenes be pointed out; how many were incomparably more ſo! What miſchiefs were ever cauſed at Rome by the diſſenſions of the Forum, to be compared with the horrors of the calm reigns of Tiberius, Nero, Cali⯑gula? What evils were ever ſuffered by any people under popular government, to be compared with thoſe we ſuffered under Henry VII. Mary, Charles I. and James II. And that ſo much extolled calm of mo⯑narchical ſtates, what is it, but the ſad ſilence of an unfortunate people, who dare not vent their griefs?

[110]Thus the praiſes beſtowed on governments, where the Prince is too powerful, are ſo many traits which point out their deformity.

Conqueſts are ever repreſented as the moſt happy events in a reign. But not to ſpeak of thoſe acts of violence and injuſtice which are inſeparable therefrom, what generally are conqueſts, but the ruin of nations, even of conquerors themſelves? How dear the con⯑queſt of a new province to the ancient ones? If the pride of a monarch is ſometimes indulged by the glory of being accounted a conqueror, how much is the well-being of the ſubjects leſſened thereby! Let the benefits that a ſtate receives from that vain glory be put in compariſon with the evils it is productive of.

What did the ambition of a Charles V. avail, but to deſolate Europe, to ruin his ſubjects, to ſee the conquered provinces wreſted from his hands, and to force him at laſt to bury in a monaſtery his grief and ſhame?

What the ambition of a Philip II. but to kindle war every where, to ſhed torrents of the blood of his ſubjects, to cauſe the ocean to ſwallow up his nume⯑rous fleets, to allow no reſt to his people, to ſquander the immenſe treaſures of Spain and India, to ruin his extenſive dominions, and to bury with himſelf the eclat of his crown.

[111]What the ambition of a Charles XII. but to carry terror over Europe, to enlarge his empire, to loſe in a few hours the fruits of nine years victories, and to abandon his own dominions to the ſword of the enemy?

Such are almoſt conſtantly the fruits of the ambi⯑tion of Princes:—a plague the moſt fatal with which Heaven puniſhes thoſe nations that dare not free them⯑ſelves therefrom.

Writers emphatically praiſe the magnificence and liberalities of monarchs; why not rather cenſure thoſe odious prodigalities, which in order that pageantry be diſplayed, and that a few individuals may abound in riches, oblige the greateſt part of the nation to live ſparingly, or linger in miſery. But even were the people the conſtant objects of royal munificence, how is it poſſible to give them much without taking much more from them?

Writers exhauſt themſelves in praiſing the gene⯑roſity of Princes; but can Princes even poſſeſs that virtue? What are gifts which coſt nothing but the trouble of a command?

That which is gained with difficulty and labour, or deducted from conveniency and neceſſity, when given with diſcernment; that alone, I ſay, is to be [112]accounted a valuable gift. But let Princes be ever ſo much laviſh of their favours, are they the leſs at eaſe for it? Do they repoſe the leſs on the pillows of luxury? Are they the leſs clad with purple? Is their table the leſs delicate? Are their palaces the leſs magnificent? their groves the leſs volup⯑tuous?

When an hungry ſcribbler gets a penſion, all is well; but the oppreſſed multitude groan in ſilence: and whilſt the ſighs of the unhappy ſufferers remain incloſed within the walls of their wretched habi⯑tations, the praiſes given to bad Princes by proſti⯑tuted ſycophants fly through every climate on the wings of Fame.

CHAP. XLII. Of Superſtition.

IT is not poſſible to conſider the progreſs of power to deſpotiſm, without conſidering at the ſame time the force of opinion. How great its influence on the human mind!

[113]Opinion formerly made the intrepid Roman ſhiver at the ſight of the ſacred chickens refuſing to eat.

Opinion, penetrating the Pagan with the fear of the Gods, made him tremble, when looking at the idol he had juſt framed.

Opinion, reflecting the Stoick within himſelf, ſur⯑rounds his heart with ice, prevents it from palpitat⯑ing with joy amidſt pleaſures, from being moved to pity at the hearing of doleful cries, from ſhaking for fear among dangers; it concenters all his paſ⯑ſions in pride, and, confirming him in his paſſive vir⯑tue, cauſes him to live without ties, and die without weakneſs.

Opinion, in a word, obſtructing our ſight with the bandage of ſuperſtition, ſubjects our necks to the yoke of prieſts; and its power Princes make uſe of in order to enchain us.

If we turn our ſight upon antiquity, we ſhall every where ſee the Prince labouring to make the ſub⯑jects look upon himſelf as upon a favourite of Heaven. Zoroaſter publiſhed his law under the name of Oro⯑maſis; Triſmegiſtes, under that of Mercury; Minos made uſe of the name of Jupiter; Lycurgus that of Apollo; Numa that of Egeria, &c. &c.

[114]Every polity has ſome Deity at its head, and how many times has a ridiculous reſpect for the Gods again plunged the people into ſlavery^*?

In order to re-enter the citadel of Athens, whence he had been expelled, Piſiſtrates dreſſed a woman like Minerva, then mounted on a chariot with that goddeſs of his own making, he traverſed the city, whilſt ſhe, holding him by the hand, cried aloud to the people, "Here is Piſiſtrates; I bring him back to you, and I command you to receive him:" hearing theſe words, the Athenians again ſubmitted to the tyrant.

At preſent few Princes affect to be inſpired; but many have recourſe to the voice of the miniſters of religion to ſubdue their ſubjects.

Ambitious, timid, or ignorant prieſts, cauſe Princes to be looked upon as the repreſentatives of Deity on the earth, at whoſe feet other men ought to proſtrate themſelves in ſilence; then confounding obedience to the laws with obedience to arbitrary mandates, they continually preach in the name of the Gods paſſive ſubmiſſion and ſervitude.

Thus, to ſtamp on their authority a ſacred cha⯑racter, and ſecure their empire, all Princes cauſe Heaven to interpoſe.

CHAP. XLIII. Of the Confederacy between Princes and Prieſts.

BUT as if it did not ſuffice, that the ſubjects ſhould learn from the Goſpel to kiſs the rod of power with devotion, in order to render them more ſervile from principle, there is a confederacy between prieſts and Princes. Theſe borrow the tongue of the divine, to ſubject the people to deſpotiſm: the others borrow the arm of the magiſtrate, to ſubject them to ſuperſtition.

Under the Princes of the houſe of Stuart who mount⯑ed the throne of England, prieſts were inſtructed to teach ſpeculative deſpotiſm, and graft on religious affections ſyſtems of civil tyranny.

In 1622, orders were given by James I. "That no preacher, of what title or denomination ſoever, from henceforth ſhould preſume in any auditory within this kingdom, to declare, limit or bound out by way of poſitive doctrine, the power, prerogative, and juriſ⯑diction of ſovereigns, or otherwiſe meddle with matters of ſtate, and the differences between Princes and the people, than as they are inſtructed by precedents in the homilies of obedience."

[120]In order to render his authority abſolute in Scot⯑land, Charles I. reſtored epiſcopacy; and by his command, prieſts publiſhed ſeveral canons contain⯑ing ſuperſtitious and arbitrary matter; among which ſome aſſerted "That the king's power and prero⯑gative were in every thing equal to thoſe of the Jewiſh kings, abſolute and unlimited; that no one ſhould teach ſchools without a licence from the biſhop of the dioceſe, and that no perſon ſhould be admitted into holy orders, or perform any eccleſiaſtical function, without firſt ſubſcribing theſe canons."

A conformity to ſuch doctrines was exacted through the whole kingdom, and diſobedience was liable to be puniſhed by the High-Commiſſion Court, with deprivation, fines, confiſcation, impriſonment, &c.

Any word or writing which tended towards ſchiſm was puniſhed by the Commiſſioners. Theſe inquiſi⯑tors were not limited to proceed by legal information; rumour, and ſuſpicions were ſufficient grounds. To the party cited before them they adminiſtered an oath by which they were bound to anſwer any queſtion that ſhould be propoſed to them, and a refuſal was puniſhed with impriſonment.

CHAP. XLIV. Fruitleſs Efforts of the People.

MEAN while deſpotiſm makes its progreſs, and the chains of ſlavery become heavier.

When deſpotiſm eſtabliſhes itſelf by ſlow ſteps, the longer it is eſtabliſhed, the leſs it is felt: it at laſt arrives, however, to ſuch a degree as to force the people to open their eyes. Whenever the Prince audaciouſly attacks rights ſacred to all^* mankind; whenever he tramples under foot the objects of public veneration, or exhibits too frequently ſcenes of blood, the minds of men are affected with indignation, ſighs are changed into complaints, a refractory ſpirit pre⯑vails among perſons of all ranks, confuſion begins to reign, and murmurs, clamours, and ſeditious ſpeeches are to be heard every where. Then the authority of government every inſtant diminiſhes, its orders are diſregarded, in theſe moments of confuſion no act ſeems illicit, and the Prince in appearance retains a [122]vain title only. But how many means ſtill remain to ſupport his overgrown power?

If the ſubjects, driven to deſpair, at length take a tragic reſolution, it ſeldom avails but to expoſe them. Whilſt the inſurgents loudly crave juſtice, the Prince in his turn vents his complaints againſt them, ſends them deputies, magiſtrates, ſatellites, has the moſt audacious apprehended, treats them as diſturbers of the public peace, and oftentimes the diſorder is hereby ſuppreſſed.

The efforts made by the people for ſecuring their liberty are commonly fruitleſs^†. When the violent ſymptoms of univerſal diſſatisfaction break out, unleſs the inſurgents be headed by ſome great perſonage, unleſs the meaſures of an unruly and fluctuating mul⯑titude be planned by wiſe men, and carried into execu⯑tion by ſpirited and audacious ones, the inſurrection inſtead of being a revolt, is but a ſedition—ever eaſily ſuppreſſed, and ever unſucceſsful.

[123]But the engaging as a leader of the inſurgents is dangerous; to head a faction is to draw upon oneſelf all the ſtorm; and the uncertainty of the ſucceſs or the apprehenſions of a miſcarriage, always reſtrain the moſt reſolute^*.

Beſides, how difficult oftentimes to excite a people to take up arms! When Manlius endeavoured to free the Romans from the oppreſſion of the ſenate, full of zeal as long as danger was remote, they diſplayed the greateſt audacity; but no ſooner was Manlius apprehended and brought before the dictator, but they loſt all reſolution. In vain did this unfortu⯑nate leader entreat their aſſiſtance; neither the ſight of thoſe wounds he had received for the ſake of their country, neither the view of the capitol he had deli⯑vered, neither reverence for thoſe temples which he had prevented being prophaned, nor piety for the gods, moved them; they remained inactive ſpectators, and beheld calmly their chief dragged into a dungeon.

If much is ever wanting to excite an inſurrection, very little is commonly wanted to ſuppreſs it.

[124]When the Sicilians, weary of groaning under the oppreſſive domination of the viceroy Los Velos, had revolted; the inhabitants of Palermo placed at their head one Alexis; but terrified by the warlike prepara⯑tions of Spain, they baſely attempted to purchaſe their pardon by murdering their captain.

On the day of the firſt Barricades, as the populace flocked together to ſurround the hotel of the preſident Molé,—a traitor to his country, and prepared to break open his doors; Molé himſelf immediately had them opened, and without emotion appeared before the inſurgents. Amazed at this bold ſtep, they retired without noiſe, and ſuffered themſelves to be diſ⯑armed^*.

He muſt be very little acquainted with hiſtory who knows no inſtance of ſuch want of courage in almoſt every revolt.

When ſubjects prove ſo little reſolute, the Prince diſregards their clamours, or rather ſilences their com⯑plaints by perſiſting in the ſame conduct which raiſed them; and their reſentment exhales in vain murmurs.

But ſuppoſe the ſubjects want not reſolution, their riſing avails little, unleſs it be general. When a city takes arms to defend its privileges, if its example is not followed by the reſt of the nation, mercenary [125]troops ſubdue it, the Prince treats the inhabitants as rebels, and they feel their yoke lay heavier upon them^*.

Notwithſtanding the inſurrection be general, yet how ſeldom is there any union between the ſubjects? Commonly the people is divided into many parties, and this want of union is one of the greateſt reſources of tyranny. The Prince then counterballances the reſpective forces of the different parties by each other, he equally avails himſelf of their weakneſs and jealouſies, and cruſhes them with their own hands.

If the people is not divided into factions, it is the craft of adminiſtration to ſow diſcord among them, and foment diſſention.

When the repreſentatives of the people of Venice uſurped the ſupreme authority, as the moſt powerful families were divided between empire and ſervitude, and this uſurpation had raiſed a ſpirit of univerſal diſſatisfaction, to diſunite the malcontents, the uſurp⯑ers [126]opened anew the door of the council to ſeveral families that had been ſhut out, reſtrained many others by hope, and then audaciouſly faced the reſt.

When the Caſtilians took arms to vindicate their rights violated by their deputies in the Cortes aſſem⯑bled in Gallicia, and to obtain ſatisfaction for the outrages committed by the Flemiſh miniſters, Charles V. with a view of dividing the malcontents, iſſued circular letters to all the cities of Caſtile that had revolted, exhorting them in moſt gentle terms to lay down their arms, publiſhed a general amneſty, pro⯑miſed ſuch cities as had continued faithful, or ſhould return to obedience, not to exact from them the ſub⯑ſidy granted in the late Cortes, and engaged that no office of government ſhould be conferred for the future upon foreigners. On the other hand, he wrote to the nobles, exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, againſt the exorbi⯑tant claims of the people, and inſtigating them, by a mean jealouſy of that ſpirit of independance which they ſaw riſing among the commons, to vin⯑dicate the prerogative of the crown^*.

In the Commotions of la Fronde, Mazarine ma⯑naged for the king, by his intrigues with the mar⯑ſhall d'Aumont, the party of the great army, and [127]engaged them to depute the earl of Quincé to aſſure his Majeſty, in the name of all the officers, of their devotion to his commands^*.

In our civil wars of the laſt century, it was the conſtant artifice of the court, to ſow diſſention among the tories and whigs; among papiſts, anglicans and preſbyterians.

If the intrigues of the cabinet to ſet the malcon⯑tents at variance prove fruitleſs; the meaſures fixed upon by the malcontents themſelves to ſecure their liberties, oftentimes produce the deſired effect. For although the ſubjects be all united againſt tyranny, all have not the ſame views. Every claſs among them has peculiar claims, the ſeveral provinces, even the towns of the ſame province have peculiar intereſts. And all theſe different pretenſions are ſo many ſources of diſcord^†.

Subjects, though united againſt tyranny, agree very ſeldom in the choice of a chief; but what is more ſurpriſing, that which ought to render them unanimous, ſerves oftentimes to ſet them at variance; and this want of harmony ever ruins the intereſts of the people^‡.

[128]Let us ſuppoſe, however, that the malcontents are unanimous in their choice, and that they make a good one; how many reſources ſtill remain againſt the people?

At firſt, attempts are made to bribe their leaders, which are always ſucceſsful, unleſs they be proof againſt every temptation.

If they prove incorruptible, the Prince endeavours to have them delivered up to him, or labours to ſeduce their adherents; and how many times have inſurgents attempted to obtain pardon, or regain favour, with the head of their chief in their hands?

If theſe meaſures are fruitleſs, Princes are acquainted with others,—ſword and poiſon^*.

[129]Not ſatisfied with exterminating the leaders, ſome Princes have involved even the whole party in the ſame fate.

Charles IX. of France, by inceſſantly perſecuting his proteſtant ſubjects, forced them to revolt: as their party encreaſed every day, and terrified the tyrant, too puſillanimous to encounter the inſurgents at the head of his army, he took the reſolution of exterminating them any way, and meditated this horrid project for two years. Having at laſt fixed on the meaſures to carry it into execution, he concluded with them a fraudulent peace, amuſed their chiefs by falſe careſſes, neglected no pains to lull them into a fatal ſecurity, and had them, with ſixty thouſand of their adherents, murdered on the night of St. Bartholomew.

Popular leaders themſelves ſometimes ruin their own party. The great care they take to repreſs licentiouſ⯑neſs, and to prevent pillaging, ever renders them odi⯑ous [130]to the rabble, who having thus no profit by the revolt, are ſoon weary of bearing arms for the ſake of liberty alone^‡.

If a popular leader has much to dread from his ſeverity, he has no leſs to dread from his ill ſucceſs. The people, who obeyed him with zeal as long as his efforts were ſucceſsful, loſe their ſpirits, and deſert him as ſoon as fortune declares againſt him.

But ſuppoſing the leaders of the malcontents well manage their party, and victory befriends them, yet this avails little, unleſs they take advantage of every juncture.

Delay conſtantly ruins bold undertakings. When once the moment which was to fix fortune is let ſlip, all is loſt; the enemy has time for recovering from his fears, and preparing himſelf againſt the intended ſtroke; and, even in theſe critical moments, the party of tyranny has great advantage over the party of liberty.

Although the Prince has levied war againſt his peo⯑ple, if he finds himſelf unable to attack them, in order to get time, he makes propoſals of accommo⯑dation, and, whilſt preparing to cruſh them, com⯑plains of being compelled to have recourſe to violence, [131]makes the moſt ſolemn proteſtations of love for the public, and diſplays marks of concern for the na⯑tional diſturbances^*. The people, ſtill dazzled by ſome remains of reſpect for royal Majeſty, or ſeduced by an appearance of grief, almoſt always feel a return of affection, and oftentimes, as children who dare not lift up the hand againſt their parent, let their arms fall out of their hands. The Prince, on the contrary, has ſcarcely ever the tender mercy of a father; but conſidering his oppoſing ſubjects as revolted ſlaves, as ſoon as he has the power in his hands, he makes them feel the moſt terrible effects of his vengeance.

To avail themſelves of favourable junctures is not yet enough, unleſs the inſurgents unite their councils and arms.

When Charles V. aſcended the Spaniſh throne, not⯑withſtanding the ſpirit of diſſatisfaction which univer⯑ſally prevailed, as the inhabitants of the different kingdoms in Spain ſtill maintained the prejudices of their ancient rivalſhip, and as the remembrance of their long hoſtilities was ſtill recent, their national antipathy prevented their acting in concert. Each kingdom chuſing rather to depend on its own efforts, [132]formed a ſeparate plan, followed ſeparate meaſures, and each party combated for its own liberties. Thus, for want of harmony, all their efforts proved impotent^*.

Nay, although the patriots all unite in a common plan, their party is not always triumphant. Who would believe, had not experience proved it, that ſub⯑jects oftentimes combat with leſs courage for their patria, than mercenary ſoldiers for a tyrant?

If ſubjects oftentimes combat with leſs courage for their patria than mercenary ſoldiers for a tyrant, they generally combat with leſs ſucceſs^†; for with what diſadvantage muſt undiſciplined citizens, under chiefs unexperienced in war, take the field againſt regular troops, under experienced captains?

But was the Prince's party defeated, all reſources are not exhauſted.

Subjects, ſeldom animated with a high ſenſe of their rights, fight but to free themſelves from actual oppreſ⯑ſion; never willing to purchaſe dearly the ineſtimable advantages of liberty^‡. Hence oftentimes, after a few [133]efforts, they lay down their arms; ſoon tired of their own agitations, they long for repoſe, and, in the tran⯑quil leiſure they are permitted to enjoy, they recollect liberty but with the ideas of heavy contributions, fatigues and ſlaughter. The Prince, on the contrary, ever animated with a violent deſire of ſecuring his power and enlarging his authority, combats with ſteadineſs, and ſtands till the laſt extremity.

The efforts made by the people to ſecure their liberty, when fruitleſs, ſerve only to confirm their ſervitude^*.

Notwithſtanding his repeated defeats, the Prince oftentimes loſes nothing. Though vanquiſhed and at the mercy of his ſubjects, he maintains that haughti⯑neſs, that imperious air, that arrogance, which he diſplays in his proſperity; he ſpeaks only of his pre⯑rogatives, he ſtill preſumes to give law, and generally the people ſuffer themſelves to be deprived of the fruits of their victory^†. But if once vanquiſhed, how [134]different the fate of ſubjects! After many vain at⯑tempts to ſhake off their yoke, they are treated as ſubdued enemies; the unmerciful Prince dictates his orders with a menacing tone, and the unfortunate wretches ever patiently ſuffer themſelves to be enſlaved; they oftentimes preſent their necks to the yoke, and are earneſt to regain the favour of their Maſter by ignominious ſubmiſſions^*.

CHAP. XLV. Of Treachery.

HOWEVER, if in a critical moment, the Prince makes any conceſſion to the people, it is gene⯑rally deluſive;—too jealous of his authority not to reaſſume with one hand what he grants with the other.

Amidſt the diſſenſions of the Forum, the people having obtained that a conſul ſhould be elected from among them, the Patricians prevented any cauſe being brought before him, and thus rendered his magiſ⯑tracy uſeleſs.

[135]To calm his angry ſubjects, the Prince ſometimes orders his miniſters to retire into ſome port during the ſtorm, or even ſacrifices them to public vengeance; but^* the ſame plan of operations is ſtill laid down. In the place of thoſe diſmiſſed or ſacrificed miniſters, others of the ſame ſtamp have been ſubſtituted, and the ſimple multitude is ſatisfied.

But if ſubjects obtain any real conceſſion, the Prince is at the ſame time conſidering only how to deprive them of the fruits of it.

The Plebeians had juſt obtained the privilege of ſharing with the Patricians the honour of the Faſcia, when, Rome being afflicted with a famine, Coriolanus made a motion in full ſenate not to aſſiſt the people, unleſs they renounced the rights granted them on the Sacred Mount^†.

King John, being obliged by his Barons to ſign Magna Charta, concealed his reſentment till he had found a favourable juncture for annulling his conceſ⯑ſions. [136]The better to deceive the people, he publicly declared that his adminiſtration was henceforth to run in ſuch a tenor as to give his people no cauſe of com⯑plaint, he ſent writs to all his ſheriffs, ordering them to conſtrain every one to ſwear obedience to the twenty⯑five Barons appointed to ſecure the execution of the ſeveral articles of the great Charter, and then retired into the iſle of Wight to plan the meaſures of a fatal ven⯑geance: from his retreat he ſecretly ſent abroad his emiſ⯑ſaries to enliſt foreign ſoldiers, and to invite the rapa⯑cious Brabançons into his ſervice by the proſpect of ſharing the ſpoils of England: he diſpatched a meſ⯑ſenger to Rome in order to be abſolved from all his oaths of maintaining the liberties granted to his ſub⯑jects. When the foreign forces arrived, he pulled off the maſk, repealed all his grants to the ſubjects, marched at the head of ravenous mercenaries, laid waſte the lands of the nobles, pillaged their houſes, carried every where fire and ſword, and ſpread devaſ⯑tation all over the face of the kingdom^*.

Edward I. on his return to England from his expe⯑dition into France againſt Philip, being requeſted to ratify ſolemnly the confirmation of the charters to which he had affixed his ſeal, evaded as long as poſ⯑ſible: [137]at length, being obliged again to comply, he expreſsly added a ſalvo for his royal prerogative,—a clauſe which enervated the force of the whole Char⯑ter^*. But after ſo many ſolemn engagements con⯑tracted, whilſt he could not give full ſcope to his ambition, and whilſt his ſubjects flattered themſelves with having ſecured their liberties, he applied to Rome, and procured an abſolution from all his oaths.

Charles I. having given his aſſent to the petition of rights, repaired in haſte to parliament, and proteſted that he had not intended to give away the profit of tonnage and poundage; ordered this proteſt to be entered in the Journal of the Commons; and again proceeded to ſeize the goods of merchants for deny⯑ing the arbitrary impoſition of tonnage and pound⯑age. In the next ſeſſion, he ended his ſpeech by blaming the Commons for enquiring into the infrac⯑tion of the petition of rights, and engaged the Speaker to interrupt all debates on the ſubject. Not ſatisfied with this, and incenſed that parliament had circumſcribed royal power within ſo narrow limits, he reſolved to overthrow them, and to accompliſh his deſign, employed the meaneſt artifices. Accordingly the patriotic party, by the intrigues of the court, dimi⯑niſhed [138]every day. As ſoon as the King had ſecured a majority in the Houſe of Commons, and had at his de⯑votion almoſt the whole Houſe of Lords, elated at the accounts of his courtiers reſpecting public affairs, he pulled off the maſk, filled anew the firſt places of go⯑vernment^* with his creatures, attempted to ſtrike the fatal blow to his half-vanquiſhed enemies; and in order to abrogate at once all his conceſſions to the people, charged a member of the upper houſe and five of the lower houſe, with miſdemeanor, high⯑treaſon, and with having extorted by fear all the^† acts made to ſecure public liberty, which being proved, as he pretended, rendered them null ipſo facto. This ſcheme proving abortive, Charles ſpared no pains to incite diſcord between the Engliſh and the Scots. To accompliſh this, he at firſt ſtrove to outvie the parliament in courteſy towards the Scots; he for⯑warded every motion which had been made in their favour; every thing that they demanded for the ſecu⯑rity of their civil rights was granted them: he after⯑wards endeavoured to corrupt their army. Hender⯑ſon, the popular covenanting preacher, was appointed his chaplain; the great officers of the army were treated with high marks of favour, and the com⯑miſſaries [139]themſelves bribed. He then ſet out for Scotland, attempted in his journey to engage the army to prove refractory, ſecured a ſtrong party in the Scotch parliament by the intrigues of his creatures, and laboured to induce the Iriſh catholics to riſe againſt England.

Charles II. under colour that there were many con⯑ſpirators againſt him, and that there were men who, under pretence that the parliament was at an end by virtue of ſome clauſe in the triennial bill, fancied they might aſſemble themſelves to chuſe new members, deſired the parliament held in 1663, not to leave an act in being which was ſuch a diſgrace to the crown, and they baſely complied with his requeſt.

What a trifling cauſe ſometimes ſuffices to give thoſe at the helm an opportunity for repealing their con⯑ceſſions, and again aſſuming the power into their hands!

Whilſt M. AEmilius and Q. Fabius laid waſte the enemies lands, the tribunes M. Furius and Cn. Cor⯑nelius, in order to make the Agrarian laws paſs, re⯑fuſed to levy the tribute, and incited the people to riſe. But although the army, buſy without, was in want of every thing, and the ſenate dreaded a revolt within, the people at that juncture, in appearance ſo favourable to their claims, obtained only that a con⯑ſular-tribune [140]ſhould be ſelected from among the ple⯑beians. Elated with this little ſucceſs, the popular leaders with eagerneſs urged on the execution of their ſcheme, and ſucceeded in having at the next comitia chiefly plebeians elected conſular-tribunes. But while the people reſigned themſelves to joy, and boaſted of their victory, the ſenate was taking ſteps to deprive them of the advantage of it^*. At firſt, it engaged ſome of the moſt illuſtrious patricians to ſet up as can⯑didates, expecting that the people would not be ſo daring as to except againſt them; afterwards, exert⯑ing their utmoſt efforts to carry on that ſcheme, they vented clamours againſt the paſt comitia, they ſaid the gods were incenſed that the magiſtracies had been proſtituted by rendering them vulgar, and alledged in proof, the ſharpneſs of winter that had juſt been felt, and the plague which raged over the city and the fields. The people, dazzled with the eclat of the candidates, and terrified at the idea of the wrath of the gods, elected conſular-tribunes patricians only, [141]renounced the ſupreme power, and put it, trembling, into the hands of the ſenate.

Soon after, the waters of the lake in the foreſt Albana being much increaſed without any apparent cauſe, this phenomenon engaged the public atten⯑tion, and the oracle at Delphos was conſulted. Mean while the ſenate induſtriouſly propagated a rumour that the gods were incenſed that the ranks in the common⯑wealth had been confounded, and that the only means of diſarming their wrath was the abdication of the military tribunes; and an interregnum followed^*.

CHAP. XLVI. Conſtant Purſuit of the ſame Deſigns.

IN every government, a favourable juncture for the recovery of liberty ſometimes offers; people let it generally ſlip, not perceiving it: but the juncture for eſtabliſhing ſlavery, thoſe at the helm ſeize very often. To avail themſelves of the opportunity is their chief care, and their firſt maxim in politics.

I and Time, ſaid Charles V. defy any two others ^†.

The people have but momentary leaders, and as ſoon as they are deprived of them, their forces are [142]diſperſed; but the council of Princes is laſting: always ſet up againſt liberty, it employs its time in forming projects, concerting meaſures, contriving means of execution; and this is a peculiar advantage.

By watchfulneſs, people ſucceed ſometimes in mak⯑ing the attempts of Princes prove abortive; but how can they conſtantly oppoſe their various attacks? The miniſtry having their eyes ever fixed on the people, ſeize, at length, a favourable moment, and this ſuf⯑fices to accompliſh their deſigns.

CHAP. XLVII. Of Corrupting the Legiſlature.

THE moſt fatal blow Princes ſtrike at liberty, is the ſubduing their ſubjects in the name of the law; and the expedient they moſt willingly employ for it, is the moſt analogous to their vile character—bribery.

Conſidering the legiſlature as a formidable cenſor of his conduct, the Prince labours to have them his dependents, or rather, earneſt to ſee the Sovereign^* made his ſlave, he endeavours to have its repreſenta⯑tives at his diſpoſal. Thus all the arts, which influ⯑ence popular aſſemblies, are employed to win thoſe members who oppoſe his projects. Temptations are offered to the vain, the ambitious, the needy, accord⯑ing to their deſires: all thoſe who chuſe to eſpouſe the party of the crown, may now have their price; and the rulers of the empire ſoon proſtitute them⯑ſelves to power, ſell the cauſe of liberty to indulge their baſe paſſions, betray their country in contempt of their moſt ſacred engagements, and the legiſlature themſelves become the contemptible tools of tyranny.

[146]As ſoon as a ſenator was elected at Sparta, Ageſi⯑laus preſented him with an ox^*.

Charles V. demanding from the cortes of Caſtile a new donative before the time for paying the former was expired, was openly refuſed. But, availing him⯑ſelf of a mean ſpirit of jealouſy, which inſtigated the nobles againſt the commons, whom they ſaw endeavouring to ſecure their independence, he em⯑ployed bribes, promiſes, careſſes, threats, and even force, in order to gain members. Thus having ſecured a majority, he engaged them, in contempt of the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, to vote the grant of the ſubſidy for which he had applied^†.

How frequently have been, and ſtill are, ſuch arts employed among us, to corrupt parliament! In that auguſt aſſembly, wherein none ought to be admitted but the real friends of their country, there is no leſs venality than elſewhere. Part of the members are penſioners of the court, or related to penſioned per⯑ſons; another part are occaſionally bribed by what they call douceurs; a great number ſeek to get into office, and affect to diſplay their rhetoric againſt the court only in order to oblige it to ſtipulate; a greater number, dependent on the tools of the court, are [147]conſtantly devoted to the miniſter; few are faithful to their conſtituents; and the reſt fluctuate alternately according to circumſtances between duty and temp⯑tation. Such are the patres patriae, the rulers of the empire, the guardians of our liberties^*.

CHAP. XLVIII. Of the want of Spirit and Steadineſs in the Repreſen⯑tatives to oppoſe miniſterial Attempts.

IF the repreſentatives are not all infatuated with a luſt of dignities, if there be ſome who caſt not longing looks towards office, if there be a few who have even ſuch greatneſs of ſoul as to diſdain a bribe, yet their want of ſpirit and ſteadineſs in oppoſing the mini⯑ſterial attempts ever renders their virtue fruitleſs.

[148]Whilſt the creatures of the Prince eagerly purſue ſome illegal ſcheme, let the current run ever ſo ſtrongly, if the patriotic members were determined to ſtrive againſt it to the laſt, although they may not be able to ſtop or turn its courſe, their reſiſtance would at leaſt reſtrain its fury. But inſtead of defend⯑ing with indefatigable zeal the cauſe of liberty, the languid patriots give way, ſatisfied with having made a feeble reſiſtance or entered a proteſt.

Diſguſted at their little influence, many of them give not even a conſtant attendance, and let their antagoniſts obtain the advantage of an undefended cauſe over a ſcattered party.

Thus, from a want of ſpirit and ſteadineſs in the unbribed repreſentatives, power advances with rapid ſteps towards deſpotiſm.

CHAP. XLIX. Of preventing Inſurrections.

THE Prince, when his deſigns prove abortive, loſes only his time; but when the efforts of the ſubjects to ſhake off their yoke prove unſucceſſ⯑ful, they generally loſe the means of making a new attempt.

[149]After Princes have plunged their dominions into the calamities of civil war, inſtead of reforming their adminiſtration, and regaining the affections of their injured people, they think only how to ſuppreſs their complaints, and render their efforts fruitleſs: They cannot renounce that ſupreme power, that boundleſs authority, that abſolute empire, which has already coſt them ſo many efforts, ſo many crimes.

From experience, they learn how to prevent inſur⯑rections. In the beginning of a ſtorm, the miſchief is not diſcovered: when it blows with fury, the remedy is not perceived. Thus they have their eyes ever open on the ſlighteſt commotions, careful to appeaſe them as ſoon as raiſed.

Not ſatisfied with this, they oftentimes are intent to extirpate the ſeeds of them. Under colour of ſecuring public tranquillity, they forbid all routs, conventicles, clandeſtine meetings, and tumultuous aſſemblies: Some, even by a more refined craft, will not allow any perſons to crowd about popular men, and are ſo wary as to make away with thoſe who are the darlings of the people.

On his return to Paris, J. J. Rouſſeau uſed to paſs a few moments at a coffee-houſe^* in his neighbourhood; [150]but as his preſence attracted great crowds of curious people, he was forbid by the lieutenant of the police to frequent any coffee-houſe.

The watermen at Venice quarrelling one day with the populace, they came to blows. As the magiſtrates could not ſuppreſs the diſorder, a patrician of the houſe of Lauredano interpoſed, and the mutineers yielded to his entreaties; but the inquiſitors of ſtate, dreading the great influence of this nobleman over the people, diſpatched him ſecretly^†.

Nay, in order to obviate all inſurrection, it is the craft of thoſe who rule at Venice, to perſecute till death the perſons they have once injured; and that the friends of theſe unfortunate perſons, or ſuch as have eſcaped from their hands, might not conſpire, the Council of the Ten iſſues out from time to time certain proclamations^‡, promiſing large ſums to any one who ſhould reveal any crime of ſtate, or bring the head of a proſcript.

CHAP. L. Of ſuppreſſing thoſe Offices which ſhare Power.

TO ſecure their power, Princes multiply offices and dignities: but when once ſecured, to en⯑large its boundaries, they reduce the number of them.

Not content with being at the head of affairs, they are anxious to diſpoſe of every thing. Having filled with their creatures the high places of government, they proceed to inveſt in themſelves all offices which ſhare authority, or to ſuppreſs them^*. Ever fixing [152]their eyes on thoſe on whom high truſts have been conferred, they wait only for an opportunity to diſ⯑poſſeſs them. When an opportunity offers not itſelf, they ſtart it: they raiſe enemies to the high officers of the ſtate to charge them with negligence or miſde⯑meanor. If they find any guilty, they utter loud complaints againſt theſe bad ſervants, and ſuppreſs the functions of their office under pretence of reform⯑ing abuſes^*.

To thoſe, they cannot convict of any miſdemeanor, they give many cauſes of diſguſt, they make them feel the weight of authority, and artfully provoke them to furniſh reaſons for being diſmiſſed, or to reſign a place they can hold no longer: but great care is taken to leave theſe places vacant, or to grant them as com⯑miſſions under pleaſure only^†.

[153]But to veil their deſigns, and not to diſcontent every one, Princes ſubſtitute for offices of truſt places without authority, dignities which flatter avarice or pride without feeding ambition, and thus ſecure the con⯑cerned party. Thoſe they cannot pay with realities, they pay with promiſes.

When the Prince cannot ſeize all offices and dignities which ſhare authority, and veſt them in the crown, he aſſociates himſelf thereto, places him⯑ſelf at the head of orders, corporations, tribunals, and ſoon uſurps all their power^*.

At other times, inſtead of ſuppreſſing offices, he lets them become extinct^†.

At length, to remain the ſole maſter of the ſtate, he boaſts of being the father of his people, and wholly [154]engaged^† with the care of promoting public happi⯑neſs, he takes upon himſelf the management of affairs, orders his ſubjects to addreſs directly his perſon, takes cognizance of every thing, examines every thing, and diſpoſes of every thing. The ſimple multitude then beholds with admiration his air of benevolence, his attendance to public affairs, his zeal for their well-being; they expect their felicity therefrom, but per⯑ceive not that the Prince conceals his ambitious deſigns under this outſide of goodneſs, and ſeeks only to ren⯑der himſelf independent.

CHAP. LI. To incapacitate the People from attempting any Inſurrection.

POWER now advances by rapid ſteps towards deſ⯑potiſm. The Prince, on the point of making any bold attempt, prepares his engines. If he can do [155]without the legiſlature, he carefully abſtains from aſſembling them; if their concurrence is abſolutely neceſſary, he again employs his former arts to influ⯑ence them, and by bribes, promiſes, threats, ſecures a ſtrong party; when ſecured, he ventures to aſſemble this pretended ſovereign, and makes it reſolve what he pleaſes.

The ſubjects, wholly engaged with their private affairs, or careleſs of public intereſts, take no notice of the blind devotion of the ſenate to the court, and the Prince continues with eagerneſs to urge on the execution of his deſigns. Yet if any one ſhould at⯑tempt to open the eyes of the public, the miniſtry, under pretence of maintaining good order, perſecute this zealous patriot; then confounding the cauſe of the crown with that of the laws, they charge him with refractory proceedings, and have him puniſhed as a diſturber of the public peace.

If the public open their eyes and complain, they are amuſed by frivolous objects, calculated only to fix unquiet minds, or their attention is engaged by a politic war.

Under colour of ſecuring national intereſts, or vin⯑dicating the glory of the ſtate, the Prince arraigns a neighbouring power, demands ſubſidies from his peo⯑ple, [156]raiſes new troops, nominates to military^* offices reſtleſs and ſuſpected men, gives ſecret orders to the commanding officers to expoſe them in dangerous ſtations, or has them diſpatched in the dark.

Attentive to what paſſes out of the ſtate, the people perceive not what paſſes within, and the Prince conti⯑nues to enlarge the boundaries of prerogative, or rather to uſurp power.

To carry on the war, new ſubſidies are demanded, a part of which are carefully laid by.

The war being at an end, the people, elated with their victories or depreſſed by their calamities, reſign themſelves to joy, or labour to retrieve their loſſes: and whilſt they, wholly engaged by private affairs, loſe ſight of public ones, the Prince eagerly purſues his ambitious projects.

During the courſe of a long government, liberty is deſtroyed by gradual alterations, and is ever recovered by violent efforts only: but the Prince takes ſuch cautious meaſures that, once ſubdued, the ſubjects may never be enabled to break their yoke again. Under pretence of ſecuring the ſafety of the realm, he undertakes to become abſolute maſter of it. Accord⯑ingly [157]he begins by having the old fortreſſes repaired, then proceeds to have new ones conſtructed^*, at firſt on the borders, afterwards in the interior part of the country; in fine, he orders citadels to be built in every important town, increaſes the garriſons, and renders the military eſtabliſhment numerous and for⯑midable. Thus under the fair name of public good, the Prince ſeizes, by degrees, every poſt which leaves a communication between the inhabitants of the ſeveral parts of the ſtate, and cuts off every means of ever uniting^† their forces again, or appearing in detached [158]parties, without being cut in pieces by mercenary troops^*. When once the people can no longer appear in a body, the ſovereign is conſidered as being anni⯑hilated.

CHAP. LII. Of accuſtoming the People to military Expeditions.

HAVING incapacitated the inhabitants of the ſeveral provinces from ever uniting their efforts for their common defence, and thoſe of the towns from [159]making any attempt for their own ſafety, Princes accuſtom the people to military expeditions; and, under colour of ſecuring public peace, ſoldiery are by degrees ſubſtituted for civil officers.

Soldiers are appointed to arreſt offenders, ſoldiers are appointed to wait on malefactors going to execu⯑tion, ſoldiers are appointed to clear highways. In places of public diverſion, in auction rooms, in places of public exhibition, ſentinels are placed at the doors: in all places where the people meet, ſoldiers watch over them, and for fear of any nocturnal attempt, ſoldiers even then ſerve as guard.^*

CHAP. LIII. Of ſecuring the Fidelity of the Army.

IN order that thoſe men who are placed at the head of the troops, might ſupport the overgrown power of the crown, and not controul it, Princes are not ſatisfied with having ſuppreſſed every military office of too great influence, but divide the army into many ſmall bodies, among which they incite jealouſy [160]by means of peculiar diſtinctions. The command of theſe ſmall bodies they confer on devoted men alone, and the better to ſecure their fidelity, they eſtabliſh in every body ſeveral degrees of command, which officers are promoted to ſlowly by rotation, and rapidly by preferment. Hence every ſubaltern officer not only conſiders him who fills the next ſuperior degree to his own as an obſtacle to advancement, and looks upon him with a jealous eye: but the moſt ambitious among them ſeek to riſe by fawning adulations, vile ſervices, and aſſiduity in courting the Prince; whilſt thoſe who are raiſed labour to ſecure favour by a blind devotion to his commands.

In regard to the high military offices, great care is taken not to confer them on any darling of the peo⯑ple, and never to join them to any civil office. Diſ⯑truſt is ſometimes carried ſo far as to place at the head of the army ſoldiers of fortune only, to change fre⯑quently the general officers, to incite between them competition, to ſet inſpectors over them, and never to allow the troops to be long ſtationed in the ſame place^*.

When the Prince diſpenſes with commanding the army in perſon; in order to truſt the command with⯑out danger into other hands, he gives it to ſeveral, [161]who have never a full power granted them to act as they ſhould think fit; their operations being always inſpected by a council of war, if not directed by the cabinet itſelf. Having modelled the army at will, he careſſes the military, ties them to his intereſt by lar⯑geſſes, and renders them the ſole objects of his favour.

Thus Princes form to themſelves a devoted party, ever on foot againſt the people, and impatiently look for an opportunity of making uſe of it.

CHAP. LIV. To ſecure the military from civil Power.

THE ſoldier, being in a free country ever ſubject to the laws and reſtrained by the magiſtrates, acknowledges his duty, and preſerves in his new ſta⯑tion ſome notions of juſtice; he is taught to reſpect the citizens, and is prevented from being made con⯑ſcious of his influence^*. Hence the Prince, in order to teach the military to depend on^† him only, and [162]render them the devoted inſtruments of his will, ſecures them^* from civil power: they are made accountable to him alone; and if they either plot, mutiny, pillage, commit rapes, or murders; always a Martial Court is appointed to judge the delinquents.

CHAP. LV. To inſpire the Military with Contempt for the Citizens.

AS the military are the inſtruments deſtined to enlarge the Prince's authority, in order to pre⯑pare them to act againſt the people in a favourable juncture, they are ſeparated from them^†, quar⯑tered in barracks; and afterwards inſpired with contempt for every profeſſion except their own. But to render them conſcious of their pre-eminence, many [163]marks of diſtinction are conferred on them^*. Uſed to deſpiſe the citizens, they ſoon become deſirous to oppreſs them, and ever ready to fall upon that part of the realm which ſhould attempt to make an inſur⯑rection^†.

CHAP. LVI. Of Uſury, Exactions, and Extortions.

IT is a favourite maxim with the cabinet, that if the people are too rich, or even too much at eaſe, it will prove impoſſible to keep them ſubmiſ⯑ſive; whilſt men rendered dependent by their wants, deſtitute of the means of oppoſing reſiſtance, and aſhamed of their poverty, are conſcious of their ſub⯑jection, and much more diſpoſed to obey^†. Hence, far from releaſing the people, Princes ever charge them with heavy taxes. But as if this did not ſuffice, among the various means they have recourſe to, in order to impoveriſh their ſubjects, uſury, exactions, and extortions are oftentimes made uſe of.

The Roman ſenate, not ſatisfied with levying the taxes, diſpoſing of the public money, and appropri⯑ating to themſelves the lands of the vanquiſhed ene⯑mies, uſed to prey on the plebeians by uſury.

Such was the craft of the antients, that of the mo⯑derns is much more refined: they borrow at large intereſt the money of the public; and theſe depoſi⯑tums of the fortunes of the ſubjects, like chains, tie the people two ways. On one ſide, they are a badge [165]of ſubjection, the ſubjects being ever afraid to furniſh a pretence for forfeiture from attempting to revolt: on the other ſide, they are arms in the hands of the Prince which enable him to cruſh thoſe who have truſted him therewith.

Beſides, when a favourable juncture offers, the Prince, either by retaining the intereſt for a long time, repaying the capital when the value of money is below par, or even by retaining the capital itſelf, reduces, by a ſingle ſtroke, his ſubjects to that point of miſery which they could not have been reduced to but gradually, by purſuing the former plan.

In theſe points of view, public funds truſted to government in France, Spain, the kingdom of Naples, &c. are to be conſidered.—A truth which thoſe peo⯑ple have but too often ſadly experienced.

In England ſuch ſteps have never been taken, and perhaps never will; yet public loans bind us not the leſs ſtrongly: for by their means the government has intertwined itſelf with the property of the people, in ſuch a manner that it is impoſſible to lay the ax to the root of the former without deſtroying the latter.

As ſoon as the government becomes debtor, thoſe who are creditors, made ſenſible that the ſums intruſted are loſt if government ſecurities fail, are ever ready to ſubſcribe freſh ones, in order to furniſh it with [166]means for defending them. And this newly raiſed money may be employed for a different purpoſe.

If to ſecure a fund for the payment of intereſt, any regulation deſtructive of liberty ſhould be thought abſolutely neceſſary, the party concerned, that is, that part of the nation which is the moſt regarded, would conſent to it, rather than run the riſk of being ruined by a ſtate bankruptcy. If any one ſhould treat this as a chimerical ſuppoſition, let them remem⯑ber the exciſe laws. Moreover, as by the negociation of loans, and the creation or management of funds, the intereſt of moneyed men is intimately connected with that of the court; not only the factors for admi⯑niſtration and thoſe dealers in the funds, who, for the ſake of a lucrative ſhare in ſome contract, are under miniſterial influence, turn courtiers, and cringe at levees, procure themſelves ſeats in parliament, and aſſiſt the Prince to enſlave their country; but the locuſt tribe of ſubſcribers, brokers, ticket-mongers, and all thoſe who act or ſeek to act that dirty part, on all occaſions appear the avowed advocates of every cor⯑rupt miniſter, induce the timid, the weak, the fickle, the ſordid, and the indolent, to follow their example, furniſh their patron with a pretence to urge in excuſe of his miſconduct, raiſes their clamours againſt the com⯑plaints of true patriots, ſmother the voice of the nation, [167]and become a dangerous faction in ſupport of tyranny.

Nor are even theſe the worſt meaſures that are planned by ſome Princes to ruin the people.

Sometimes, in order to impoveriſh their ſubjects and enrich themſelves, they debaſe the coin, that is, reduce its intrinſic value without altering its current one.

At other times, they prey upon the ſubjects by the moſt flagrant extortions; they even commit them to priſon, in order to oblige them to recover their liberty by paying heavy ranſoms.

Thus having induced their ſubjects to contract many wants by encouraging luxury, it is the craft of Princes to deprive them afterwards of the means of indulging them, or rather to drive them from depen⯑dance to ſervitude.

CHAP. LVII. To undermine the Supreme Authority.

THE Prince, having ſecured the army, now labours to ſecure the legiſlature, or to render its power vain. When on the point of making any bold attempt, if he can do without the concurrence of the repreſentatives of the ſovereign, he carefully abſtains from calling them together. If their con⯑currence is abſolutely neceſſary, they are not ſuffered to proceed to any other tranſaction, but that for which they have been aſſembled.

Charles V. having ſummoned the cortes of Caſtile to meet at Compoſtella, engaged them to grant him a ſubſidy. With this grant, the cortes laid before the king a repreſentation of thoſe grievances whereof his people craved redreſs; but he having obtained from them all that he could expect, paid no attention to their petition^*.

Such was the practice of Charles I. When he was in want of money, he aſſembled parliament, and hurried the bill for ſubſidies: then to prevent them from taking cognizance of the public grievances, he lulled them into ſecurity by fair promiſes, aſſured [169]them that he would be ever careful to preſerve the liberties of his people; engaged the ſpeaker to inter⯑rupt every debate foreign to the bill for ſubſidy, ex⯑pelled out of the houſe the warmeſt patriots, by inca⯑pacitating them from ſerving as repreſentatives, or prorogued, if not diſſolved the parliament.

To accompliſh their deſigns, Princes ſometimes again put in practice their former arts, they corrupt the legiſlature, and make it ſpeak as they pleaſe.

At other times they terrify the party in oppoſition by threats, or they have the regiſter of the votes altered.

It was by terror that Henry VIII. kept the parlia⯑ment ſubmiſſive to his will. The members, free only in the ſenate, were, as ſoon as the ſeſſions was pro⯑rogued, left defenceleſs to the mercy of this tyrant.

Charles I. intending to have an act paſſed in the parliament of Scotland, for the reſumption of thoſe church lands and titles, which had been alienated in the minority of the former reign, was careful to be preſent at the debate. But meeting with a great oppoſition, he pulled out of his pocket a liſt of all the members that compoſed the houſe, adding, "Gentlemen, I have all your names on this paper, and I will know who will do me ſervice, and who will not, this day." Notwithſtanding the king's [170]threatenings, the bill was rejected by the majority; but the clerk of the regiſter, who gathered the votes, removed this difficulty by declaring that it was carried in the affirmative^*.

Princes, in order to influence at will the legiſla⯑tive body, oftentimes endeavour to procure a choice of repreſentatives favourable to their deſigns. Thus Henry VIII. and Mary, when they deſired to carry any important point, uſed to write circular letters to the lord lieutenants in the counties, directing a pro⯑per choice of members^†.

Actuated by the ſame views, James II. artfully reſumed the charters of all corporations in the king⯑dom, and granted them new ones, drawn up in ſuch a form that it was in a manner left to the king to nominate the repreſentatives.

If this ſuffices not, Princes have ſometimes recourſe to another method. They ſuffer none to fit in the ſenate but thoſe who are known to have no virtue, after having excluded all others who are ſuſpected to have any.

In the exigencies of affairs in 1656, a parliament was ſummoned, but Cromwell finding that the majo⯑rity of the members returned would be unfavourable to his intereſts, placed guards at the doors of the [171]houſe; and, under pretence of excluding men of corrupted principles, permitted none to enter but ſuch as produced a warrant from his council.

Some Princes, in order that the legiſlature ſhould be entirely at their diſpoſal, have even by violence altered the conſtitution.

In 1539, Charles V. demanded extraordinary ſub⯑ſidies from the cortes of Caſtile; but having vainly employed entreaties, promiſes, and threats, in order to obtain his demand, he diſmiſſed the aſſembly with indignation, and excluded out of theſe aſſemblies the nobles and prelates, under pretence that ſuch as pay no part of the public taxes had no vote to claim in laying them on. Hence none were admitted to the cortes but the deputies of the towns, who being in too ſmall a number, and too feeble to oppoſe the king, were all at his devotion^*.

Other Princes have divided the legiſlative body, and made the proſtituted part paſs for the whole.

During our civil war of 1641, Charles I. in order to abate the veneration paid to the patriotic repreſen⯑tatives, and avail himſelf of the name of the legiſla⯑ture, with a view of levying the ſums which were neceſſary to carry on the war, ſummoned the parlia⯑ment at Oxford; and having collected there all the [172]members of either houſe, who adhered to his intereſts, he endeavoured to inſinuate, that the two houſes ſitting at Weſtminſter were not a legal convention, attempted to prevail with the earl of Eſſex, general of the par⯑liament, to treat with thoſe proſcripts, and engaged that proſtituted aſſembly to paſs ſeveral acts, to grant him ſubſidies, and to declare the faithful members guilty of high treaſon^*.

The Prince, by engaging the legiſlature to yield conſtantly to his will, and having hereby abaſed them, has no more recourſe to craft; he aſſumes the ſtile of a maſter, and if he ſtill continues to aſſemble them, it is only to give law.

CHAP. LVIII. To uſurp Supreme Power.

ARRIVED to this point, Princes eagerly con⯑ſummate their iniquitous deſigns. Earneſt to ſee the people their ſlaves, to reduce them to ſervi⯑tude, they oftentimes turn againſt them the conſtitu⯑tion itſelf.

In a government wherein the activity of the legiſ⯑lative power depends on the will of the executive one, [173]the legiſlature never can appear but when the Prince gives his orders, and never anſwer but when he inter⯑rogates them: in order, therefore, to annihilate their power, they are no longer called together. When once the legiſlature are ſunk into oblivion, the Prince imperceptibly uſurps their functions: he ventures to iſſue, by his own authority, ſome ordinances, at firſt on trifling objects, afterwards on objects more impor⯑tant; he then by degrees repeats this practice, accuſ⯑toms the people to that uſurpation of authority, and at length finds himſelf inveſted with the power of enact⯑ing laws.

Thus the kings of France have uſurped ſovereignty. At the origin of that monarchy, royal prerogative was limited to the executive power; the ſupreme power reſided in the general aſſemblies^* of the nation, which met annually at ſtated ſeaſons, and in which every freeman had a right^† to aſſiſt. Their authority was extended to every department of government. Such as electing kings, granting ſubſidies, enacting laws, redreſſing national grievances, paſſing judgment in the [174]laſt reſort with reſpect to every cauſe^*, in a word, whatever related to the general welfare of the nation, was ſubmitted to their deliberation, and determined by their ſuffrages^†: the King having only a right to give his aſſent to the public reſolutions, and none to refuſe it^‡. Such was the French government under the monarchs of the firſt race.

Notwithſtanding the power and ſplendor which Charlemagne added to the crown by his conqueſts, the general aſſemblies of the nation continued to poſ⯑ſeſs extenſive authority, under the kings of the ſecond race. They determined which of the royal family ſhould be placed on the throne: the Prince elected, conſulted them regularly with reſpect to every affair of importance to the ſtate, and without their conſent no law was paſſed, and no new tax levied.

Under the degenerate poſterity of Charlemagne, royal authority was reduced almoſt to nothing. Every [175]baron had formed his lands into a ſmall ſtate almoſt independent of the king. The kingdom being thus broken into ſo many ſmall diſtricts, every one of which acknowledged a diſtinct lord, was governed by local cuſtoms, and purſued ſeparate intereſts, hardly any common principle of union remained. Hence the general aſſemblies ſcarcely conſidering the nation as forming one body, could no longer enact common laws; and thus part of the legiſlative power was left inactive.

Under the deſcendants of Hugh Capet, the juriſ⯑diction of theſe aſſemblies extended no further than to the impoſition of new taxes, the determination of the ſucceſſor to the crown, and the ſettling the re⯑gency, when the preceeding monarch had not fixed it by his will.

It was left to the king to ſummon the national aſſemblies; but as the ordinary charges of government were ſupported by the crown demeſns, he called them together but ſeldom, and only when he was com⯑pelled by his wants or his fears to have recourſe to their aid. Thus the obligation of ſummoning them regularly forming no eſſential point of the conſtitution, in order to render their power null, the Prince artfully avoided aſſembling them.

[176]When the functions of this power had been a long while ſuſpended, the kings aſſumed them, but ventured at firſt on acts of legiſlation with great reſerve, and took every precaution that could prevent the people from being alarmed at the exerciſe of a new power. Con⯑cealing their authority as much as they could, they began to iſſue their ordinances, not in a tone of com⯑mand but of requeſt; they appeared to treat with their ſubjects, they pointed out what was beſt, and allured them to comply with it.

As the power of the crown extended, this humble ſtile gave place to an imperious tone; and in the beginning of the fifteenth century the king openly aſſumed the ſtile of a law-giver.

The laſt of the Capitularia collected by Baluze, was iſſued in the year 921, under Charles the Simple. In the middle of the eleventh century, were publiſhed ſome royal ordinances, contained in the collection of Lauriére; but the firſt ordinance extending to the whole kingdom, and being, properly ſpeaking, an act of legiſlation, is that of Philip Auguſtus, iſſued in the year 1190. The eſtabliſhments of St. Louis were not publiſhed as general laws to the whole kingdom, but as a code of laws, to be of authority within the crown domains only. The veneration of the people for this Prince procured this code a favourable recep⯑tion [177]throughout the whole kingdom, and contributed not a little to reconcile the nation to the uſurpation of the legiſlative authority. The people, accuſtomed to ſee their monarch, by his private authority, iſſue ordinances in points of the greateſt importance, were not ſurpriſed when they ſaw him iſſue them for levy⯑ing ſubſidies for the ſupport of the government. When Charles VII. and Louis XI. firſt ventured to exerciſe this new power, the minds of the people were ſo well prepared by the gradual incroachments of the crown, that it ſcarce gave riſe to any murmur.

In proportion as kings continued to exerciſe acts of legiſlation, their ſubjects ceaſed to be ſurpriſed; they forgot at laſt that the crown had uſurped the legiſ⯑lative authority: and at preſent the idea of this autho⯑rity having been veſted in the crown during every period of the monarchy, is ſo univerſal in France, that any aſſertion to the contrary would be deemed abſurd.

CHAP. LIX. Of violent Meaſures.

WHEN the people, incenſed at ſuch outrage⯑ous attempts, make an inſurrection, the Prince orders troops to march againſt them, and if his own forces be not ſufficient, he has recourſe to his neighbours^*; he then exhorts his ſubjects to return to obedience, threatens to employ force in caſe they ſhould oppoſe, and gives them to underſtand that they muſt ſubmit without terms.

Thus Princes begin by craft to reduce their ſub⯑jects to ſubjection, and afterwards enſlave them by violence.

CHAP. LX. Inconſideration and Folly of the People.

NOT only the ambitious projects of Princes, their dark dealings, their villanous attempts, eſtabliſh ſlavery; but the inconſideration and folly of the people alſo prepare the way to tyranny.

[185]In a free government, when care is not taken from time to time to bring back the conſtitution to its firſt principles, in proportion as the epoch of its origin becomes remote, the people loſe ſight of their rights, they ſoon forget them in part, and afterwards retain no notion of them. The people, by long loſing ſight of their rights, by ever ſeeing the Prince at the helm, and by ever obeying his commands, at length con⯑ſider themſelves as mere cyphers, and the Prince as ſole maſter.

The only juſt aim of a political aſſociation, is the happineſs of the people, and whatever be the preten⯑ſions of Princes, all other conſiderations ought to yield to public welfare; but the people are inclined to look upon the Prince's authority alone, as being ſacred; they never believe themſelves authoriſed to oppoſe by force his arbitrary mandates; to prevail with him they believe no means lawful but ſupplica⯑tions^*, and are ever ready to ſubmit to the moſt grievous oppreſſion, rather than puniſh the Lord's anointed.

[186]When ſubjects groan under the yoke of a cruel Prince, hardly any perſon finds fault; but when a whole nation paſſes ſentence upon a tyrant, every one expreſſes his diſapprobation^*.

As ſoon as the Prince can ſecure malefactors from puniſhment, duty is diſregarded, and protection ſought after.

Men, when protected, become proud of the diſ⯑graceful yoke of a deſpot, and are aſhamed of the ho⯑nourable reſtraint of laws^†.

Kings, magiſtrates, commanders of armies, and all thoſe who, adorned with marks of power, hold the reins of the empire or direct public affairs, are objects of public admiration—Like antient idols, ſtupidly admired and adored.

[187]Beſides pageantry, the people reſpect in Princes the advantage of birth^*, a fine^† ſtature, beauty; and theſe frivolous endowments ſerve not leſs to en⯑creaſe their empire, than they do that of love.

The good ſucceſſes of Princes ſupply their want of merit with the people: for although events be ever ſo much accidental, they always conſider brilli⯑ant ſucceſſes as the effects of ability in thoſe who com⯑mand, and this much contributes to increaſe the vene⯑ration the people ſhow to them^‡.

CHAP. LXI. Inconſiderate Vanity of the People.

THE inconſiderate vanity of the ſubjects, like⯑wiſe, gives way to tyranny.

At the death of a deſpot, the only inſtant when ſubjects might diſplay their true ſentiments, inſtead of acclamations, they wear mourning as courtiers.

What hence? will it be ſaid. Alas, is it not ſelf-evident enough! By that inconſiderate vanity, you have deprived yourſelves of the only mean which re⯑mained of being openly revenged of a bad Prince, and the only mean of honouring the memory of a good one; for if you diſplay ſuch marks of reſpect for a Tiberius, a Louis XI. a Henry VIII. what remains for a Marcus Aurelius, a Louis IX. a Henry V.?

By that inconſiderate vanity, you have wreſted from your own hands the only rod which remained to repreſs the audacity of the ſucceſſor to the crown, the only reward to encourage him to the purſuit of virtue^*.

By that abſurd vanity, you have deprived your⯑ſelves of the only mean of diſtinguiſhing the ſecret [228]enemies to their country, you have placed yourſelves upon a level with the creatures of the court, and you blindly act the part of ſervile flatterers.

By ſuch inconſiderate marks of reſpect, you have confounded the real relations of things. For the loſs of a Prince who could ſcarce liſp, the whole ſtate aſſumes a melancholy face, all is mournful, feaſts ceaſe, places of public entertainment are ſhut: whilſt for the loſs of the benefactors of the patria, of thoſe who have defended it at the expence of their blood, of thoſe who have enriched it by their knowledge, of thoſe who have honoured it with their virtues, no marks of public grief are ſeen, feaſts continue, and all appear gay. Nay, when an allied Prince dies, the ſubjects, imitating the court, wear black, whilſt in thoſe public calamities, when the plague lays waſte the provinces, when the fire of heaven conſumes the cities, when famine drives to deſpair uſeful labourers, no mourning, no public marks of affliction are ſeen.

In fine, from that ſervile ſpirit, Princes proceed to enforce, as a duty, thoſe exterior marks of veneration; and eſtabliſhing their tyrannic empire in our very hearts, they command us to bemoan when they bemoan, and to laugh when they laugh.

Henceforth political relations are ſubverted; the Prince is all, the Nation nothing.

CHAP. LXII. Of Flattery.

IN order to obtain their demand, it is the conſtant practice of thoſe who ſolicit any favour from Princes, to tell them, they have a boundleſs power, as God himſelf.

In order to ſhare their authority, it is likewiſe the conſtant cuſtom of the miniſter to tell them that they are abſolute, that every thing muſt yield to their will, that they may diſpoſe of the fortune of their ſubjects, and that every meaſure to render their power irreſiſt⯑able, is permitted when well planned, or attended with ſucceſs.

On another ſide, penſioned lawyers and philoſo⯑phers, confounding all notions of ſound politics, con⯑tinually repeat in their fawning ſpeeches, that Princes alone have a right to command, and ſubjects none but to obey; they build ſyſtems of injuſtice, and baſely proſtitute their incenſe.

Vile authors publiſh theſe odious maxims; and, as if endeavouring to go beyond their own meanneſs, they aſſert that there is no^* covenant between king [230]and people; that Princes^* are ſole ſovereigns; that, being above^† the laws, they forget their dig⯑nity when they exact not that obedience which was ſworn to them at the altar; that being the fathers of their ſubjects, they have a right to do what they think moſt conducive to the intereſts of the public, without taking advice of the nation, nay, in oppoſition to the laws^‡; that they are accountable to God alone, from whom they have received their authority: then ſearch⯑ing into antiquity, they ſhow all nations under the yoke, and alledge thoſe horrid abuſes in vindication of tyranny.

Poets, in their turn, diſplay theſe maxims in their verſes. Men engaged in the conduct of public affairs begin to ſpread them, at firſt with caution, and after⯑wards with effrontery. The creatures of the Prince, and all thoſe villains who build their fortune on the [231]ruins of their country, join their proſtituted voices. Thus dictated by flattery and treaſon, and repeated by intereſt, fear, hope, or ſtupidity, theſe maxims take place.

By continually hearing that Princes are abſolute, the people at laſt believe it. The credulous father gives with devotion theſe leſſons to his children; and children following blindly the prejudices of their father, royal prerogative eſtabliſhes itſelf in every mind, and every one thinks himſelf bound in duty to ſubmit to the yoke.

Thus theſe ſcandalous tenets, ſervilely propagated and ſtupidly received, become the firmeſt ſupport of tyranny.

CHAP. LXIII. The Subjects forge their own Chains.

THE people not only ſuffer themſelves to be enchained, but oftentimes offer their necks to the yoke.

When a crafty man gains their confidence, he inſpires them with what ſentiment he pleaſes, and maſters them at will.

[232]Having aſſiſted at the obſequies of Caeſar, Antony aſcends the roſtra, and holding the bloody gown of the emperor, moves the populace; who inſtantly ran with the torches of the funeral pile in their hands to ſet on fire the houſes of Caſſius and Brutus.

But, conſidering what Mahomet, and other founders of ſects have done, what need is there for any ex⯑ample?

Not ſatisfied with being dupes, the people run ſometimes to ſervitude, and lend their own hands to forge their chains. Never thinking that in a free coun⯑try, every ſubject has a right to inform againſt the ſervants of the public, they ever blindly abandon them⯑ſelves to their zeal for thoſe who have appeared in their defence; and, yielding to gratitude, ever ſtrike at that very liberty, the defender of which they mean to vindicate.

As Timoleon, charged with miſdemeanors by ſome orators of Syracuſa, was ſummoned to appear before the people to clear himſelf, his fellow citizens were on the point of tearing his accuſers to pieces^*.

In order to maintain themſelves free, the people ought never to ſuffer the law to be made deluſive; but they oftentimes obſtinately violate it in favour of thoſe they reſpect. Zaleuchus, legiſlator of the Locrians, having enacted a ſevere law againſt adultery, and his own [233]ſon being ſoon after convicted of that crime, the peo⯑ple moved by the paternal ſorrow, repeatedly entreated his pardon.

How many times, with a view to ſecure their liberty, have the people truſted in the Prince's own hands a tyrannic ſway? The perſecutions of the Proteſtant ſubjects under Mary I. rendered her domination odious. Accordingly, when Elizabeth mounted the throne, as ſhe profeſſed the reformed religion, the people, tranſported by an indiſcreet zeal, veſted her with an extenſive power to extirpate papiſm; but the fear of religious perſecutions was ſoon changed into fear of civil ſlavery, and the proteſtants with regret felt themſelves cruſhed under the weight of that power they had erected to cruſh their enemies.

Nay, in order to reform the government or vindicate the ſtate, they have truſted a few individuals with an abſolute power! Of this the Decemviri, Marius, and Sylla, are famous inſtances. Veſted with the whole power of the commonwealth, Rome beheld with aſtoniſhment the authority it had intruſted them with: in their preſence the people caſt their eyes down, the laws laid in ſilence, the names of the proſcribed re⯑ſounded every where, and blood was ſhed in abun⯑dance.

[234]The Dutch, delivered from the domination of their maſter by the death of William II. again truſted the ſupreme authority into the hands of his ſon, murdered the zealous patriots who oppoſed ſuch a raſh ſtep, and again erected a Prince againſt liberty.

Have we not ourſelves many times forged our chains? When the people, incenſed by the tax of three groats impoſed by Richard II. on every perſon, male or female, above fifteen years of age, had riſen againſt their oppreſſors, reſolutely bent to better their condi⯑tion; they required the abolition of ſlavery, freedom of commerce in market-towns without tolls or im⯑poſts, and a fixed rent on lands, inſtead of the ſer⯑vices due by villenage. All theſe requeſts were com⯑plied with, and charters to that purpoſe were granted them. Soon after the nobility and gentry, hearing of theſe tranſactions, flocked to London with their adhe⯑rents and retainers, Richard took the field, the char⯑ters of enfranchiſement were revoked by parliament, and the inferior claſs of people were reduced to the ſame ſlaviſh condition as before^*.

The parliament, like a vile inſtrument deſtined to enlarge royal authority, ſubjected the whole nation to Henry VIII. in the moſt ſcandalous manner.

[235]At firſt they conferred on the King the title of the only ſupreme head on earth of the church of Eng⯑land, and inveſted him with all the real power belong⯑ing to it, or rather, acknowledged his pretended inherent power "To viſit, repreſs, redreſs, reform, correct, reſtrain, and amend all errors, hereſies, abuſes, offences, contempt, and enormities, which fall under any ſpiritual authority and juriſdiction;" and, as if it was not enough to truſt him with theſe terrible wea⯑pons, they paſſed a law by which they ratified all the tenets which the commiſſion, appointed by the crown to chuſe a religion for the people, ſhould eſta⯑bliſh with the king's conſent, not being aſhamed of expreſly declaring that they had no other rule in reli⯑gious concerns but the arbitrary will of their maſter.

Having thus reſigned all their eccleſiaſtical liberties, they proceeded to an entire ſurrender of their civil rights; and, without ſcruple or deliberation, made, by one act, a total ſubverſion of the Engliſh conſtitu⯑tion;—they gave to the king's proclamations the ſame force as to ſtatutes enacted by parliament^*; they even framed this law as if it were only intended to explain the natural extent of royal authority, and to facilitate the execution of it, appointed that any one of the king's councellors ſhould form a legal court for puniſh⯑ing [236]all diſobedience to proclamations. But to prove the more ready to gratify even the moſt lawleſs paſ⯑ſions of the King, they ratified his divorce from Anne Boleyn, declared the iſſue of their marriage illegiti⯑mate, ſettled the crown on the king's iſſue by his new miſtreſs, and in caſe he ſhould die without children, empowered him, by his will or letters patent, to diſ⯑poſe of the crown. Not ſatisfied with this ſcandalous proſtitution to the will of the monarch, a ſpecies of civil inquiſition was eſtabliſhed over the kingdom. Whoever refuſed to anſwer upon oath to any article of the act of ſettlement, was declared guilty of high treaſon.

But there are in our hiſtory other inſtances of baſe⯑neſs ſtill more humiliating.

When Charles II. was recalled to the crown, with what eagerneſs did every order of the people run to meet him, and endeavour to outvie each other in their aſſurance of loyalty!

The nobility, papiſts, and tories, united in their inſult over an aſſembly, whoſe patriotic ſpirit had hitherto foiled their combined efforts to reduce their country under the yoke of ancient tyranny, and celebrated the happy event. The preſbyterians, ſtupidly imagining they were exulting in their own triumph, cordially joined their voice; the patriotic party themſelves, [237]giving up all thoſe liberties they had purchaſed at the expence of their blood, imitated the crowd.

Every one was buſy in removing whatever might offend the eyes of their new maſter: the arms of the commonwealth were pulled down, and thoſe of the King put up in their place; the Scotch colours taken at Dunbar and Worceſter were removed, and the great ſeals broken: whatever bore any ſtamp of liberty, or revived any idea of independance, was deſtroyed, and public thankſgivings were ordered.

No ſooner was the Prince landed, but the people from every quarter of the kingdom flocked to him; the ſenate of the nation threw themſelves at his feet; he entered the capital in pomp amidſt public acclamations; rejoicings and illuminations were ſeen every where, whilſt in the tranſports of their joy, the ſtupid multi⯑tude curſed the names of thoſe who had ſo long de⯑prived them of a King, threw in the flames the ſad remains of the commonwealth, and racked their groſs imaginations for invention to inſult a government by whoſe paternal regard they could only hope to have been emancipated from that abject ſtate of ſervitude they were ſubject to.

Hardly was the Prince aſcended the throne, but the parliament deemed as the moſt execrable rebels, the oppoſers of Charles the Firſt's uſurpations: they [238]decreed proſcription, confiſcation or impriſonment againſt the members of the tribunal that had ſentenced the tyrant. By their order the bodies of Cromwell, Ireton, Bradſhaw, and Pride, were taken out of their graves, drawn upon an hurdle to Tyburn, hanged there, and then buried under the gallows. By their order, the walls of Glouceſter, Coventry, Northamp⯑ton, Leiceſter,—towns which had diſtinguiſhed them⯑ſelves by their zeal for parliament, were raſed to the ground.

Not ſatisfied with reſtoring Charles to his preroga⯑tive, the parliament proceeded to inveſt him with an unlimited power. Having ſettled on the King a greater revenue than that of his predeceſſor, they paſſed an act declaring the right of diſpoſing of the militia and land forces to be in the king's hands only; recalled, at his deſire, the triennial bill; enacted a law to prevent diſaffected perſons from being admitted into office, to have the ſucceſſion of corporations per⯑petuated in the hands of the creatures of the court, and to oblige all their officers to take a new oath of allegiance and ſupremacy, declaring it unlawful, upon any pretence whatſoever, to riſe in arms againſt the king, or thoſe commiſſioned by him.

They veſted in the crown new prerogatives, and did not ceaſe to enlarge its authority, till they themſelves, [239]cruſhed under the weight of that power they had erected, beheld with trembling the work of their own hands.

But, as if ever fated through want of knowledge or virtue to effect their own miſery, one idol was no ſooner fallen down, but our forefathers erected another, and adored it with greater devotion.

As James II. aſcended the throne, the parliament earneſtly cringed at his feet, and amidſt the ſeveral tokens of zeal they diſplayed for him, it was uncer⯑tain which of both houſes was moſt earneſt to run to ſlavery. The lower houſe voted that all the revenue enjoyed by the late King ſhould be granted to his majeſty during life; and thus ſettling upon him an immenſe revenue, enabled the crown to maintain an army and fleet without the aſſiſtance of the people, and ſubdue thoſe who ſhould dare to oppoſe: whilſt the upper houſe, at the requeſt of the attorney-general, entirely diſcharged the earl of Danby, and the popiſh lords who, upon indictment, had been pri⯑ſoners in the Tower for the plot, annulled their for⯑mer order^*, and brought in a bill to reverſe the attainder of the viſcount Stafford in the year 1680.

On their ſide, all the magiſtrates, judges, juſtices of the peace, ſerved the king his own way, and as if [240]thoſe who were appointed to hold the balance of juſ⯑tice would leave no right in the ſtate, they gave it as their opinion, THAT THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ARE THE KING'S LAWS, AND THAT IT IS A PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN TO DISPENSE WITH THEM.

The clergy of the church of England, likewiſe, diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their devotion to the max⯑ims of the court. The pulpit every where refounded with the doctrine of paſſive obedience; and this doc⯑trine was ſupported in the courts of juſtice by the judges and lawyers to the utmoſt of their power.

At length, to render at once the King abſolute, all the corporations in the kingdom made a general ſurrender of their charters, and abandoned themſelves to his mercy.

Thus, except a few men of a ſound underſtanding, and exalted mind, the people are commonly compoſed of ſimple and timid perſons, ever ready to accelerate their own ſervitude.

CHAP. LXIV. Of Deſpotiſm.

AS ſoon as the Prince has uſurped the ſupreme power, the object of all public undertakings is no more the welfare of the people, but the diſplay of his authority, of the dignity of his crown, or the grati⯑fication of his pride and caprice. Hence he con⯑ſiders the ſtate as his patrimony, and the public money as his revenue; he ſells offices and dignities, traffics away towns, provinces, ſubjects, and diſpoſes at plea⯑ſure of all the national forces.

If incenſed at ſuch outrages, the people utter aloud complaints, the Prince pulls off the maſk, aſſumes the imperious ſtile of a maſter, orders them to be ſubmiſſive, and to their remonſtrances anſwers, Such is our good pleaſure. If he meets with oppoſition; he ſpeaks but of puniſhing the audacity of his ene⯑mies. Complaints are then uſeleſs, and as the Prince has ſecured his authority, whatever be his arbitrary mandates, there remains only paſſive obedience.

Already public liberty exiſts no more, the Prince is all, and the nation nothing; however certain indi⯑viduals, corporations, or orders of people, ſtill retain [242]particular privileges, which ſtand in his way, and as ſo many barriers, confine his power within certain limits.

When once the legiſlative power is veſted in the crown, the Prince labours to become abſolute, be⯑holds with concern the enemies of his iniquitous empire, and makes away with them: he ſees with a jealous eye thoſe who ſtill retain perſonal preeminences, and is earneſt to deprive them of their prerogatives; he reſtrains the privileges of corporations, uſurps thoſe of towns, and adds oftentimes mockery to injury. Thus James II. having extorted from his ſubjects their charters, returned them thanks in a proclamation for the great confidence they had repoſed in him; adding, that he, for that mark of honour, thought himſelf more than ordinarily obliged to continue as he had hitherto begun, to ſhew the greateſt moderation and benignity in the exerciſe of ſo great a truſt.

When the Prince is arrived at this point, his ambi⯑tion has no limits; every day he ventures on new ſteps towards extending his power; every day commits new outrages, and, if he continues to have recourſe to pretences, it is leſs from neceſſity than ſalving appear⯑ances.

CHAP. LXV. Of the Fear of Torments.

THE Prince, having engroſſed every power which can be exerted in government, would that he were juſt; but woe to thoſe who dare ſtill to complain of his tyrannic empire. As he has ſpared no crime to get poſſeſſion of the ſupreme power, he ſpares none to maintain it. Thus, when once the chains of the people are forged, they are afterwards riveted, and riveted ſo cloſe, that the fate of their liberty is ſealed for ever.

The laſt blow Princes ſtrike at liberty, is the over⯑turning the conſtitution under colour of defending it, and the puniſhing as rebels thoſe who ſhould attempt really to defend it.

Armed with the whole public force, inveſted with all authority, and interpreters of the laws, they make of them an arm defenſive and offenſive, which renders them ſacred to their ſubjects, and terrible to their enemies.

If in the courts of judicature, before which the unfortunate victims of his vengeance are dragged, there is ſtill a remain of humanity, they compoſe tribunals [244]of their creatures^*: The ſword of tyranny is ſuſ⯑pended over every head; and if any one dares to mur⯑mur, he is maſſacred in an inſtant. The people then live in perpetual anguiſh, and every one, trembling for his life, beholds in ſilence the outrages of the deſpot.

When the Prince has exterminated all thoſe power⯑ful men who oppoſed his uſurpations, all thoſe ſpirited men who refuſed to ſubmit to his odious empire, all men jealous of their liberty, when he has overthrown all the barriers which ſet bounds to his ambition, ſilenced all the laws, and ſacrificed every thing to his elevation, he gives then a little reſpite to the people, grants rewards to his creatures, beſtows donations on the armies, procures abundance, and indulges the populace with^† ſhews:—A fallacious image of pub⯑lic happineſs!

To riſe, an uſurper depreſſes every one; but to ſup⯑port his overgrown power, he muſt engage the people to be concerned for him; by the mildneſs of his government alone he may attain this end. Accord⯑ingly he ſeems for a while as if he meant to reſtore [245]public liberty^*. He makes ſuch regulations, as may prevent the diſorders which have cauſed the ruin of the ſtate, before he was the ſole maſter of it; he reſtores the magiſtrates to the functions of their office; ſometimes he permits a phantom of the ſovereign to ſubſiſt, and takes its advice on every law he intends to enact, after he has dictated him its anſwer.

If he commits any violence to indulge his paſſions, it is under the forms of juſtice; if he ſacrifices any ſubject to his reſentment, it is by means of the magi⯑ſtrates; and thus gratifies his deſires without being loaded with public hatred. But in order that the tribunals be ever blind inſtruments of his command, he confers no office but to men deſtitute of principle, and fills the courts with deteſtable villains^†

[246]At other times, to calm his fears or indulge his avarice, he engages ruffians to make away with trou⯑bleſome ſubjects, and then, to appeaſe the minds of the people, diſowns the miniſters of his vengeance, lays on them all the blame for the crimes he has com⯑mitted^*, abandons them to their ill fate, or puniſhes them himſelf for having obeyed his orders.

Seduced by ſuch artifices, the people ruſh to ſer⯑vitude, confirm to the Prince his uſurpations, aban⯑don themſelves to his mercy, and confer on him the power of ordering what he thinks moſt conducive to the intereſts of his dominions, without taking advice of any but of himſelf.

But this appearance of juſtice ſoon vaniſhes. When once the deſpot has ſecured his authority, he renounces moderation, he ſinks into pleaſure, and abandons himſelf to every ſort of debauchery and extravagance. The public revenue becomes the prey of this minions, of muſicians, mimicks, curtezans, and even of the rabble, who no longer ſubſiſt but by his ſcandalous prodigalities.

To ſuch odious waſtefulneſs is joined licentiouſneſs, the creatures ſcandalouſly traffick the power of their [247]maſter; they ſell offices, and even diſpenſations from diſcharging the duty of them.

By conſtantly ſquandering public money in indulg⯑ing his paſſions and caprices, the deſpot exhauſts, at laſt, his treaſury; when exhauſted, he labours to fill it again, and recovers by crimes, what he has waſted in extravagances.

Yet he does not begin by violent extortions; he at firſt employs craft, and covering his wants with the exigencies of government, he lays heavy taxes on the ſubjects.

Theſe reſources being drained, he has recourſe to extortions, confiſcations and pillaging^*

In order to have a pretence for preying upon his ſubjects, to the puniſhments of thoſe who are guilty of high-treaſon, he adds the forfeiture of their wealth; and, in order to find a multitude of crimi⯑nals, he denominates high-treaſon an infinite number of guiltleſs actions, and is wholly buſy in contriving new crimes, and finding out informers.

[248]At the ſight of the outrages of the tyrant, murmurs are revived, plots are formed, and again blood is ſhed in abundance^*

As he becomes more odious, his alarms increaſe, and blood is ſhed in greater abundance.

To the care of perſonal ſafety, tyrants join that of ſecuring their empire, and their cruelty augments with their terrors. To ſecure themſelves againſt attempts, they know of no other mean but proſcription, impriſon⯑ment, torture; maintaining one cruelty by another, and waſhing their bloody hands in blood is their ſole employment.

To baniſh their fears, it is not enough to extermi⯑nate all jealous men, all malcontents, all ſuſpected perſons; if their children, their friends, their relations be not butchered. Thus the blood of the ſubjects is continually ſacrificed to the pretended peace of the ſtate.

Seeing none leſs worthy of the empire than them⯑ſelves, they dread ſubjects who ſtill maintain any vir⯑tue, are offended at any one diſplaying any merit, [249]are jealous of thoſe who enjoy the public eſteem, of captains who have any influence over the ſoldiers, of magiſtrates who diſcharge the duties of their office, of placemen who are not deemed infamous; whatever announces a greatneſs of mind is to them matter of anguiſh, whatever appears with eclat offends their eyes, whatever excites admiration awakens their jea⯑louſy; they are alarmed by the very appearance of audacity, and to baniſh their terrors, their baſe hearts ſuggeſt murders only.

Dreading even the ſhadow of independence, they iſſue out proclamations againſt freedom of ſpeech, they ſee with concern thoſe who turn their eyes towards the calamities of their country, are incenſed that any one ſhould dare to recollect the fortunate but paſt days of liberty, or ſpeak with reſpect of good citizens; they rank the love of the patria among crimes, and puniſh it as ſuch.

When any one dares to write againſt tyranny, his performance is ignominiouſly burnt by public autho⯑rity^†, and himſelf puniſhed as a malefactor. If he [250]eſcapes; his head is demanded from foreign powers, and he is perſecuted till death.

Arrived at this point, they carry their ſuſpicious caution farther; they will not allow any one to turn his eyes on matters of ſtate^*, they endeavour to anni⯑hilate all notions of public intereſt, even the very name of the laws.

Not ſatisfied with puniſhing thoſe who complain againſt tyranny, they deter thoſe who might be tempted to follow the ſame example; and, as they [251]dread no leſs private diſcourſes than public ones, they impoſe ſilence on every one.

In order to prevent their conduct from being in⯑quired into, and to reign peaceably in the name of the laws, it is too little, according to them, to have recourſe to terror, but have their eyes ever open on their ſubjects; they have them continually watched, and this baſe employment they reſign to a band of infamous villains.

Thus, under pretence to ſecure public tran⯑quillity, and enforce reſpect to the majeſty of the throne, they maintain legions of ſpies among their ſubjects, they erect ſecret tribunals, and inquiſitions of every kind, the doors of which are ever open to informers.^*

[252]Nay, ſome Princes have carried diſtruſt ſo far as to force their ſubjects to become informers^*, and even to accuſe themſelves, that is to ſay, to become the victims or ſatellites of tyranny. Hence every one entertains ſuſpicions, brothers and friends diſtruſt each other. But if any one is ſo bold as to murmur againſt oppreſſion, he is inſtantly appre⯑hended, loaded with chains, dragged into a dungeon, and all deſert him like a victim devoted to its ill fate. Thus by cruſhing thoſe who reſiſt, and deterring thoſe who have a mind to it, none are willing to defend the patria, and there remain in the ſtate only abject ſlaves, and an inſolent maſter.

[253]Deſpots, in order the more eaſily to tyrannize over the people, endeavour to render them ſtupid. Every diſcourſe or writing which elevates the mind, or tends towards engaging men to reflect, is fatal to its author: as if deſigning to annihilate every thing that bears the ſtamp of genius or virtue, theſe tyrants baniſh out of their dominions diſtinguiſhed orators, celebrated phi⯑loſophers, and brand their works with infamy^*.

Nothing is guiltleſs in the eyes of a deſpot, ever ſurrounded with villains who feed his ſuſpicions, cheriſh his avarice, and incenſe his pride; vil⯑lains, protected and enriched with the ſpoils of unfortunate victims. Henceforth tyranny is unbound⯑ed: all thoſe who become ſuſpected by the deſpot are ſacrificed to his cowardiſe, all thoſe whoſe riches he covets are ſacrificed to his avarice, all thoſe who cringe not at his feet are ſacrificed to his pride. They are charged with having inſulted the majeſty of the Prince, diſregarded his authority, uttered diſ⯑reſpectful words of his miniſters, &c. The ſword is then lifted up againſt every head, and the ſtate exhibits ſcenes of horror and ſlaughter. Thus, at the mercy of a tyrant, every one is ſenſible that he muſt not be talked of, and that his ſafety depends upon his obſcurity. Every one conceals his fears, his hopes, his deſires; murmurs, complaints, ſighs, [254]are no more to be heard; a melancholy ſilence reigns, conſternation ſeizes every heart; ſubjects groan in ſecret, and under the moſt racking anxieties of mind lament, like malefactors, having death ever before their eyes.

After the deſpot has ſacrificed his ſubjects to his fears, avarice and pride, he ſacrifices them to his luſt; he takes away from them their wives, their daughters, their ſons, and abandons himſelf to the moſt odious debauchery.

The ſubjects, once ſubdued, and conſcious of the impoſſibility of ſhaking off the yoke, think only how to render their condition tolerable, and ſeek ſafety in baſeneſs. Unable to be free any longer, they ſoon deſpiſe liberty.

Good patriots, if there are ſtill any, ſenſible that they ſhould be deſerted by every one, venture not on meaſures which would ſerve only to bring deſtruction on them⯑ſelves. Thus reduced to wiſh for a better condition, without daring to attempt any thing to reſcue the ſubjects from their miſery, and to applaud that which it would prove dangerous to blame, they, as the reſt, reſolve to be ſubmiſſive. Hence a baſe ſervility pre⯑vails among the people, and every one offers incenſe to the idol they deteſt^*.

[255]When the Prince is the ſupreme arbiter of the ſtate, to be accounted ſomething every one endeavours to prove the moſt ſervile. The courtiers, vile flatterers of his paſſions and vices, ſeek with eagerneſs the pri⯑vilege of being his ſport.

On pretence of maintaining his authority, but really to pay court to him, all who approach him denominate the love of independance licenciouſneſs, rank among crimes patriotic zeal, torture and become the apologiſts of tyranny.

Writers, on their ſide, repreſent the Prince as a ſovereign maſter, and ſubjects as his ſlaves; they inculcate that every one muſt kiſs the rod, and take pains to ſpread that fatal doctrine; whilſt, in order to ſhow their zeal, ambitious villains ſet up as informers, and look every where for victims whoſe condemnation might be agreeable to the Prince. [256]In fine, to carry infamy to its height, the grave magi⯑ſtrates join their voices to that of the public, and are earneſt to outvie courtiers in ſervility^*.

Reduced to ſuch an abject ſtate, the people ſink ſtill lower. Extreme ignorance ever produces extreme credulity. When once the ſubjects are utterly unac⯑quainted with their rights, and uſed to hear pompous titles, ſublime names, divine honours, ever conferred on the deſpot, they ſoon conſider him as the repre⯑ſentative of Deity, his orders as oracles from hea⯑ven, and they rank blind ſubmiſſion among their duties.

The deſpot, then uncontrouled maſter of his domi⯑nions^†, ceaſes to have recourſe to pretences in order to varniſh over his outrages; but tramples laws under foot, and preys upon the ſubjects at pleaſure. Having taken away their fortunes, their wives, he takes away their children and ſells them by auction^‡, ſtains the [257]courts of judicature, diſgraces the offices^*, forces the magiſtrates to proſtitute themſelves by performing the part of buffoons^†, and cruſhes every one who oppoſes his will.

Deſpots, when their power is no more ſuſcep⯑tible of any increaſe, are only intent how to make their ſubjects feel its weight; they iſſue out as laws the moſt arbitrary mandates; and, far from allowing thoſe they oppreſs to complain, forbid them even tears and ſighs^‡. Whilſt ſentencing them to death, they force the unfortunate victims of their rage to pierce their own hearts, approve^§ of their ſufferings, praiſe their tyrants......I cannot cloſe theſe horrid ſcenes; I ſhudder with horror, and the pen falls out of my hand.

[258]Prompted by a deteſtable pride, the tyrant adds oftentimes inſult to outrage. Applauding himſelf that he inſpires terror, he walks in public places, where conſternation preceeds him. On his appearance, the people caſt down their eyes, fall at his feet, and reſound in his ears the higheſt encomiums, whilſt he inſults without pity over the ſtate he keeps oppreſſed. Nay, vexed at not being able to ſatiate his rage, he often⯑times regrets his not doing more miſchief.

Caligula wiſhed that the Roman people had but one head, that he might have the pleaſure to cut it off at a ſingle ſtroke. But why produce inſtances of this? too many unfortunately are known.

In proportion as tyranny advances to its laſt period, the ſervility of the ſubjects proceeds to its loweſt degree. How many, whilſt cruſhed under the weight of their yoke, are not ſatisfied with kiſſ⯑ing their chains, but become the vileſt apologiſts of tyranny?

Nero having committed a horrid parricide, the citizens of Rome immediately flocked to the temples, to thank the gods for an action which demanded their vengeance: the ſenators themſelves aſcended the capitol, ordered a thankſgiving for the ſafety of the Prince, placed the birth-day of his mother among the days of ill omen, and offered their incenſe for a [259]crime they ought to have puniſhed with the utmoſt ſeverity^*.

But what exceſſes have not tyrants committed?— After they have engroſſed whatever power mortal beings can engroſs, they affect to be more than men, they have the inſolent folly to paſs for gods: and as if the abjection of the people would go beyond its own bounds, theſe ſlaves are heard conferring on the tyrant titles more pompous than he dares to aſſume.

Such are commonly the ſteps by which Princes advance to deſpotiſm. Thus Liberty has the fate of all other human things: It yields to Time which deſtroys every thing, to Vice which corrupts every thing, to Ignorance which confounds every thing, and to Force which cruſhes every thing.