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ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL.

Tros Rutuluſve fuat, nullo diſcrimine habebo.
VIRG.

EDINBURGH, Printed by R. FLEMING and A. ALISON, for A. KINCAID Bookſeller, and Sold at his Shop above the Croſs. MDCCXLI.

Advertiſement.

[iii]

MOST of theſe ESSAYS were wrote with a View of being publiſh'd as WEEKLY-PAPERS, and were intended to comprehend the Deſigns both of the SPECTATORS and CRAFTSMEN. But having dropt that Undertaking, partly from LAZINESS, partly from WANT of LEISURE, and being willing to make Trial of my Talents for Writing, before I ventur'd upon any more ſerious Compoſitions, I was induced to commit theſe Trifles to the [iv] Judgment of the Public. Like moſt new Authors, I muſt confeſs, I feel ſome Anxiety concerning the Succeſs of my Work: But one Thing makes me more ſecure; That the READER may condemn my Abilities, but muſt approve of my Moderation and Impartiality in my Method of handling POLITICAL SUBJECTS: And as long as my Moral Character is in Safety, I can, with leſs Anxiety, abandon my Learning and Capacity to the moſt ſevere Cenſure and Examination. Public Spirit, methinks, ſhou'd engage us to love the Public, and to bear an equal Affection to all our Country-Men; not to hate one Half of them, under Pretext of loving the Whole. [v] This PARTY-RAGE I have endeavour'd to repreſs, as far as poſſible; and I hope this Deſign will be acceptable to the moderate of both Parties; at the ſame Time, that, perhaps, it may diſpleaſe the Bigots of both.

THE READER muſt not look for any Connexion among theſe ESSAYS, but muſt conſider each of them as a Work apart. This is an Indulgence that is given to all ESSAY-WRITERS, and is an equal Eaſe both to WRITER and READER, by freeing them from any tireſome Stretch of Attention or Application.

CONTENTS.

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  • Eſſay, I. Of the Delicacy of Taſte and Paſſion, Page, 1
  • II. Of the Liberty of the Preſs, 9
  • III. Of Impudence and Modeſty, 19
  • IV. That Politicks may be reduc'd to a Science, 27
  • V. Of the firſt Principles of Government, 49
  • VI. Of Love and Marriage, 59
  • VII. Of the Study of Hiſtory, 69
  • VIII. Of the Independency of Parliament, 79
  • IX. Whether the British Government inclines more to abſolute Monarchy, or to a Republick, 93
  • X. Of Parties in general, 105
  • XI. Of the Parties of Great Britain, 119
  • XII. Of Superſtition and Enthuſiaſm, 141
  • XIII. Of Avarice, 153
  • XIV. Of the Dignity of Human Nature, 161
  • XV. Of Liberty and Deſpotiſm, 173

ESSAY I. Of the DELICACY of TASTE and PASSION.

[1]

THERE is a certain Delicacy of Paſſion, to which ſome People are ſubject, that makes them extremely ſenſible to all the Accidents of Life, and gives them a lively Joy upon every proſperous Event, as well as a piercing Grief, when they meet with Croſſes and Adverſity. Favours and Good-offices eaſily engage their Friendſhip; while the ſmalleſt Injury provokes their Reſentment. Any Honour or Mark of Diſtinction elevates them above Meaſure; but they are as ſenſibly touch'd with Contempt. People of this Character have, no doubt, much more lively Enjoyments, as well as more pungent Sorrows, than Men of [2] more cool and ſedate Tempers: But, I believe, when every Thing is balanc'd, there is no one, that wou'd not rather chuſe to be of the latter Character, were he entirely Maſter of his own Diſpoſition. Good or ill Fortune is very little at our own Diſpoſal: And when a Perſon, that has this Senſibility of Temper, meets with any Misfortune, his Sorrow or Reſentment takes intire Poſſeſſion of him, and deprives him of all Reliſh in the common Occurrences of Life, the right Enjoyment of which forms the greateſt Part of our Happineſs. Great Pleaſures are much leſs frequent than great Pains; ſo that a ſenſible Temper muſt meet with fewer Trials in the former Way than in the latter. Not to mention, that Men of ſuch lively paſſions are apt to be tranſported beyond all Bounds of Prudence and Diſcretion, and take falſe Steps in the Conduct of Life, which are often irretrievable.

THERE is a Delicacy of Taſte obſervable in ſome Men, which very much reſembles this Delicacy of Paſſion, and produces the ſame Senſibility to Beauty and Deformity of every Kind, as that does to Proſperity and Adverſity, Obligations and Injuries. When you [3] preſent a Poem or a Picture to a Man poſſeſt of this Talent, the Delicacy of his Feeling or Sentiments makes him be touched very ſenſibly by every Part of it; nor are the maſterly Strokes perceived with a more exquiſite Reliſh and Satisfaction, than the Negligences or Abſurdities with Diſguſt and Uneaſineſs. A polite and judicious Converſation affords him the higheſt Entertainment. Rudeneſs or Impertinence is as great a Puniſhment to him. In ſhort, Delicacy of Taſte has the ſame Effect as Delicacy of Paſſion: It enlarges the Sphere both of our Happineſs and Miſery, and makes us ſenſible of Pains, as well as Pleaſures, that eſcape the reſt of Mankind.

I BELIEVE, however, there is no one, who will not agree with me, that notwithſtanding this Reſemblance, a Delicacy of Taſte is as much to be deſir'd and cultivated as a Delicacy of Paſſion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if poſſible. The good or ill Accidents of Life are very little at our Diſpoſal: But we are pretty much Maſters what Books we ſhall read, what Diverſions we ſhall partake of, and what Company we ſhall keep. The ancient Philoſophers endeavour'd to render [4] Happineſs intirely independent of every Thing external. That is impoſſible to be attain'd: But every wiſe Man will endeavour to place his Happineſs on ſuch Objects as depend moſt upon himſelf: And that is not to be attain'd ſo much by any other Means as by this Delicacy of Sentiment. When a Man is poſſeſt of that Talent, he is more happy by what pleaſes his Taſte than by what gratifies his Appetites, and receives more Enjoyment from a Poem or a Piece of Reaſoning than the moſt expenſive Luxury can afford.

HOW far the Delicacy of Taſte and that of Paſſion are connected together in the original Frame of the Mind, it is hard to determine. To me there appears to be a very conſiderable Connexion betwixt them. For we may obſerve, that Women, who have more delicate Paſſions than Men, have alſo a more delicate Taſte of the Ornaments of Life, of Dreſs, Equipage, and the ordinary Decencies of Behaviour. Any Excellency in theſe hits their Taſte much ſooner than Ours; and when you pleaſe their Taſte, you ſoon engage their Affections.

[5] BUT whatever Connexion there may be originally betwixt theſe Diſpoſitions, I am perſuaded, that nothing is ſo proper to cure us of this Delicacy of Paſſion as the cultivating of that higher and more refined Taſte, which enables us to judge of the Characters of Men, of Compoſitions of Genius, and of the Productions of the nobler Arts. A greater or leſs Reliſh of thoſe obvious Beauties, that ſtrike the Senſes, depends intirely upon the greater or leſs Senſibility of the Temper: But with regard to the Liberal Arts, a fine Taſte is really nothing but ſtrong Senſe, or at leaſt depends ſo much upon it, that they are inſeparable. To judge aright of a Compoſition of Genius, there are ſo many Views to be taken in, ſo many Circumſtances to be compared, and ſuch a Knowledge of human Nature requiſite, that no Man, who is not poſſeſt of the ſoundeſt Judgment, will ever make a tolerable Critic in ſuch Performances. And this is a new Reaſon for cultivating a Reliſh in the Liberal Arts. Our Judgment will ſtrengthen by this Exerciſe: We ſhall form truer Notions of Life: Many Things, which rejoice or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our Attention: And we [6] ſhall loſe by Degrees that Senſibility and Delicacy of Paſſion, which is ſo incommodious.

BUT perhaps I have gone too far in ſaying, that a cultivated Taſte for the Liberal Arts extinguiſhes the Paſſions, and renders us indifferent to thoſe Objects, which are ſo fondly purſued by the reſt of Mankind. When I reflect a little more, I find, that it rather improves our Senſibility for all the tender and agreeable Paſſions; at the ſame Time, that it renders the Mind incapable of the rougher and more boiſt'rous Emotions.

Ingenuas didiciſſe fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec ſinit eſſe feros.

FOR this, I think there may be aſſigned two very natural Reaſons. In the firſt Place, nothing is ſo improving to the Temper as the Study of the Beauties, either of Poetry, Eloquence, Muſick, or Painting. They give a certain Elegance of Sentiment, which the reſt of Mankind are intire Strangers to. The Emotions they excite are ſoft and tender. They draw the Mind off from the Hurry of Buſineſs and Intereſt; cheriſh Reflection; diſpoſe to Tranquility; and produce an agreeable Melancholy, [7] which, of all Diſpoſitions of the Mind, is the beſt ſuited to Love and Friendſhip.

IN the ſecond Place, a Delicacy of Taſte is favourable to Love and Friendſhip, by conſining our Choice to few People, and making us indifferent to the Company and Converſation of the greateſt Part of Men. You will very ſeldom find, that mere Men of the World, whatever ſtrong Senſe they may be endowed with, are very nice in diſtinguiſhing of Characters, or in marking thoſe inſenſible Differences and Gradations, which make one Man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent Senſe, is ſufficient for their Entertainment. They talk to him of their Pleaſures and Affairs, with the ſame Frankneſs as they would to any other: And finding many, that are fit to ſupply his Place, they never feel any Vacancy or Want in his Abſence. But to make uſe of the Alluſion of a famous * French Author: The Judgment may be compared to a Clock or Watch, where the moſt ordinary Machine is ſufficient to tell the Hours; but [8] the moſt elaborate and artificial only can point out the Minutes and Seconds, and diſtinguiſh the ſmalleſt Differences of Time. One that has well digeſted his Knowledge both of Books and Men, has little Enjoyment but in the Company of a few ſelect Companions. He feels too ſenſibly, how much all the reſt of Mankind falls ſhort of the Notions he has entertained. And his Affections being thus confined in a narrow Circle, no Wonder he carries them further, than if they were more general and undiſtinguiſhed. The Gaiety and Frolick of a Bottle-Companion improves with him into a ſolid Friendſhip: And the Ardours of a youthful Appetite become an elegant Paſſion.

ESSAY II. Of the LIBERTY of the PRESS.

[9]

THERE is nothing more apt to ſurpriſe a Foreigner, than the extreme Liberty we enjoy in this Country, of communicating whatever we pleaſe to the Publick, and of openly cenſuring every Meaſure which is enter'd into by the King or his Miniſters. If the Adminiſtration reſolve upon War, 'tis affirm'd, that either wilfully or ignorantly they miſtake the Intereſt of the Nation, and that Peace, in the preſent Situation of Affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the Paſſion of the Miniſters be for Peace, our Political Writers breathe nothing but War and Devaſtation, and repreſent the pacifick Conduct of the Government as mean and puſillanimous. As this Liberty is not indulg'd in any other Government, either Republican [10] or Monarchical; in Holland and Venice, no more than in France or Spain; it may very naturally give Occaſion to theſe two Queſtions, How it happens that Great Britain enjoys ſuch a peculiar Privilege? and, Whether the unlimited Exerciſe of this Liberty be advantageous or prejudicial to the Publick?

AS to the firſt Queſtion, Why the Laws indulge us in ſuch an extraordinary Liberty? I believe the Reaſon may be deriv'd from our mixt Form of Government, which is neither wholly Monarchical, nor wholly Republican. 'Twill be found, if I miſtake not, to be a true Obſervation in Politicks, That the two Extremes in Government, of Liberty and Slavery, approach neareſt to each other; and, that as you depart from the Extremes, and mix a little of Monarchy with Liberty, the Government becomes always the more free; and, on the other Hand, when you mix a little of Liberty with Monarchy, the Yoke becomes always the more grievous and intolerable. In a Government, ſuch as that of France, which is entirely abſolute, and where Laws, Cuſtom, and Religion, all concur to make the People fully ſatisfi'd with their Condition, the [11] Monarch cannot entertain the leaſt Jealouſy againſt his Subjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great Liberties both of Speech and Action. In a Government altogether Republican, ſuch as Holland, where there is no Magiſtrate ſo eminent as to give Jealouſy to the State, there is alſo no Danger in intruſting the Magiſtrates with very large diſcretionary Powers; and tho' many Advantages reſult from ſuch Powers, in the Preſervation of Peace and Order; yet they lay a conſiderable Reſtraint on Mens Actions, and make every private Subject pay a great Reſpect to the Government. Thus it is evident, that the two Extremes, of abſolute Monarchy and of a Republic, approach very near to each other in the moſt material Circumſtances. In the firſt, the Magiſtrate has no Jealouſy of the People: In the ſecond, the People have no Jealouſy of the Magiſtrate: Which want of Jealouſy begets a mutual Confidence and Truſt in both Caſes, and produces a Species of Liberty in Monarchies, and of arbitrary Power in Republics.

To juſtify the other Part of the foregoing Propoſition, that in every Government the [12] Means are moſt wide of each other, and that the Mixtures of Monarchy and Liberty render the Yoke either more eaſy or more grievous. I muſt take Notice of a Remark of Tacitus with regard to the Romans under their Emperors, that they neither could bear total Slavery nor total Liberty, Nec totam ſervitutem nec totam libertatem pati poſſunt. This Remark a famous Poet has tranſlated and applied to the Engliſh in his admirable Deſcription of Queen Elizabeth's Policy and happy Government.

Et fit aimer ſon joug a l'Anglois indompté,
Qui ne peut ni ſervir, ni vivre en liberté
HENRIADE, Liv. 1.

ACCORDING to theſe Remarks, therefore, we are to conſider the Roman Government as a Mixture of Deſpotiſm and Liberty, where the Deſpotiſm prevailed; and the Engliſh Government as a Mixture of the ſame Kind, but where the Liberty predominates. The Conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing Obſervation; and ſuch as may be expected from thoſe mixed Forms of Government, which beget a mutual Watchfulneſs and Jealouſy. The Roman Emperors were, many [13] of them, the moſt frightful Tyrants that ever diſgraced Humanity; and 'tis evident their Cruelty was chiefly excited by their Jealouſy, and by their obſerving, that all the great Men of Rome bore with Impatience the Dominion of a Family, which, but a little before, was nowiſe ſuperior to their own. On the other Hand, as the Republican Part of the Government prevails in England, tho' with a great Mixture of Monarchy, 'tis obliged, for its own Preſervation, to maintain a watchful Jealouſy over the Magiſtrates, to remove all diſcretionary Powers, and to ſecure every one's Life and Fortune by general and inflexible Laws. No Action muſt be deemed a Crime but what the Law has plainly determined to be ſuch: No Crime muſt be imputed to a Man but from a legal Proof before his Judges: And even theſe Judges muſt be his Fellowſubjects, who are obliged by their own Intereſt to have a watchful Eye over the Encroachments and Violence of the Miniſters. From theſe Cauſes it proceeds, that there is as much Liberty, and even, perhaps, Licence in Britain, as there was formerly Slavery and Tyranny in Rome.

[14] THESE Principles account for the great Liberty of the Preſs in theſe Kingdoms, beyond what is indulg'd in any other Government. 'Tis ſufficiently known, that deſpotic Power wou'd ſoon ſteal in upon us, were we not extreme watchful to prevent its Progreſs, and were there not an eaſy Method of conveying the Alarum from one End of the Kingdom to the other. The Spirit of the People muſt frequently be rouz'd to curb the Ambition of the Court; and the Dread of rouzing this Spirit muſt be employ'd to prevent that Ambition. Nothing is ſo effectual to this Purpoſe as the Liberty of the Preſs, by which all the Learning, Wit, and Genius of the Nation may be employ'd on the Side of Liberty, and every one be animated to its Defence. As long, therefore, as the Republican Part of our Government can maintain itſelf againſt the Monarchical, it muſt be extreme jealous of the Liberty of the Preſs, as of the utmoſt Importance to its Preſervation.

SINCE therefore the Liberty of the Preſs is ſo eſſential to the Support of our mixt Government; this ſufficiently decides the ſecond Queſtion, Whether this Liberty be advantageous [15] or prejudicial; there being nothing of greater Importance in every State than the Preſervation of the ancient Government, eſpecially if it be a free one. But I wou'd fain go a Step farther, and aſſert, that ſuch a Liberty is attended with ſo few Inconveniencies, that it may be claim'd as the common Right of Mankind, and ought to be indulg'd them almoſt in every Government; except the Eccleſiaſtical, to which indeed it wou'd be fatal. We need not dread from this Liberty any ſuch ill Conſequences as follow'd from the Harangues of the popular Demagogues of Athens and Tribunes of Rome. A Man reads a Book or Pamphlet alone and coolly. There is none prefent from whom he can catch the Paſſion by Contagion. He is not hurry'd away by the Force and Energy of Action. And ſhou'd he be wrought up to never ſo ſeditious a Humour, there is no violent Reſolution preſented to him, by which he can immediately vent his Paſſion. The Liberty of the Preſs, therefore, however abus'd, can ſcarce ever excite popular Tumults or Rebellion. And as to thoſe Murmurs or ſecret Diſcontents it may occaſion, 'tis better they ſhou'd get Vent in Words, that they may come to the Knowledge [16] of the Magiſtrate before it be too late, in order to his providing a Remedy againſt them. Mankind, 'tis true, have always a greater Propenſion to believe what is ſaid to the Diſadvantage of their Governors than the contrary; but this Inclination is inſeparable from them, whether they have Liberty or not. A Whiſper may fly as quick, and be as pernicious as a Pamphlet. Nay it will be more pernicious, where Men are not accuſtom'd to think freely, or diſtinguiſh betwixt Truth and Falſhood.

IT has alſo been found, as the Experience of Mankind increaſes, that the People are no ſuch dangerous Monſter as they have been repreſented, and that 'tis in every Reſpect better to guide them, like rational Creatures, than to lead or drive them, like brute Beaſts. Before the united Provinces ſet the Example, Toleration was deem'd incompatible with good Government, and 'twas thought impoſſible, that a Number of religious Sects cou'd live together in Harmony and Peace, and have all of them an equal Affection to their common Country, and to each other. England has ſet a like Example of civil Liberty; and tho' this [17] Liberty ſeems to occaſion ſome mall Ferment at preſent, it has not as yet produced any pernicious Effects, and it is to be hoped, that Men, being every Day more accuſtomed to the free Diſcuſſion of public Affairs, will improve in their Judgment of them, and be with greater Difficulty ſeduced by every idle Rumor and popular Clamour

'TIS a very comfortable Reflection to the Lovers of Liberty, that this peculiar Privilege of Britain is of a Kind that cannot eaſily be wreſted from us, and muſt laſt as long as our Government remains, in any Degree, free and independent. 'Tis ſeldom, that Liberty of any Kind is loſt all at once. Slavery has ſo frightful an Aſpect to Men accuſtom'd to Freedom, that it muſt ſteal in upon them by Degrees, and muſt diſguiſe itſelf in a thouſand Shapes, in ordet to be received. But if the Liberty of the Preſs ever be loſt, it muſt be loſt at once. The general Laws againſt Sedition and Libelling are at preſent as ſtrong as they poſſibly can be made. Nothing can impoſe a farther Reſtraint, but either the clapping an IMPRIMATUR upon the Preſs, or the giving very large diſcretionary Powers to the [18] Court to puniſh whatever diſpleaſes them. But theſe Conceſſions would be ſuch a bare-fac'd Violation of Liberty, that they will probably be the laſt Efforts of a deſpotic Government. We may conclude, that the Liberty of Britain is gone for ever, when theſe Attempts ſhall ſucceed.

ESSAY III. Of IMPUDENCE and MODESTY.

[19]

I HAVE always been of Opinion, that the Complaints againſt Providence have been ill-grounded, and that the good or bad Qualities of Men are the Cauſes of their good or bad Fortune, more than what is generally imagined. There are, no doubt, Inſtances to the contrary, and pretty numerous ones too; but few, in Compariſon of the Inſtances we have of a right Diſtribution of Proſperity and Adverſity: Nor indeed could it be otherwiſe from the common Courſe of human Affairs. To be endowed with a benevolent Diſpoſition, and to love others will almoſt infallibly procure Love and Eſteem; which is the chief Circumſtance in Life, and facilitates every Enterprize and Undertaking; beſides the Satisfaction, which immediately [20] reſults from it. The Caſe is much the ſame with the other Virtues. Proſperity is naturally, tho' not neceſſarily attached to Virtue and Merit; as Adverſity is to Vice and Folly.

I MUST, however, confeſs, that this Rule admits of an Exception with regard to one moral Quality; and that Modeſty has a natural Tendency to conceal a Man's Talents, as Impudence diſplays them to the utmoſt, and has been the only Cauſe why many have riſen in the World, under all the Diſadvantages of low Birth and little Merit. Such Indolence and Incapacity is there in the Generality of Mankind, that they are apt to receive a Man for whatever he has a Mind to put himſelf off for; and admits his over-bearing Airs as Proofs of that Merit, which he aſſumes to himſelf. A decent Aſſurance ſeems to be the natural Attendant of Virtue; and few Men can diſtinguiſh Impudence from it: As, on the other Hand, Diffidence, being the natural Reſult of Vice and Folly, has drawn Diſgrace upon Modeſty, which in outward Appearance ſo nearly reſembles it.

[21] I WAS lately lamenting to a Friend of mine, who loves a Conceit, that popular Applauſe ſhould be beſtowed with ſo little Judgment, and that ſo many empty forward Coxcombs ſhould riſe up to a Figure in the World: Upon which he ſaid there was nothing ſurpriſing in the Caſe. Popular Fame, ſays he, is nothing but Breath or Air; and Air very naturally preſſes into a Vacuum.

As Impudence, tho' really a Vice, has the ſame Effects upon a Man's Fortune, as if it were a Virtue; ſo it is remarkable that it is almoſt as difficult to be attain'd, and is, in that reſpect, diſtinguiſh'd from all the other Vices, which are acquired with little Pains, and continually encreaſe upon Indulgence: Many a Man, being ſenſible that Modeſty is extremely prejudicial to him in the making his Fortune, has reſolved to be impudent and to put a bold Face upon the Matter: But 'tis obſervable, that ſuch People have ſeldom ſucceeded in the Attempt, but have been obliged to relapſe into their primitive Modeſty. Nothing carries a Man thro' the World like a true genuine natural Impudence. Its Counterfeit is good for nothing, nor can ever ſupport itſelf. In any [22] other Attempt, whatever Faults a Man commits and is ſenſible of, he is ſo much the nearer his End. But when he endeavours at Impudence, if he ever fail'd in the Attempt, the Remembrance of it will make him bluſh, and will infallibly diſconcert him: After which every Bluſh is a Cauſe for new Bluſhes, 'till he be found out to be an arrant Cheat, and a vain Pretender to Impudence.

IF any thing can give a modeſt Man more Aſſurance, it muſt be ſome Advantages of Fortune, which Chance procures to him. Riches naturally gain a Man a favourable Reception in the World, and give Merit a double Luſtre, when a Perſon is endowed with it; and ſupply its Place, in a great Meaſure, when it is abſent. 'Tis wonderful to obſerve what Airs of Superiority Fools and Knaves, with large Poſſeſſions, give themſelves above Men of the greateſt Merit in Poverty. Nor do the Men of Merit make any ſtrong Oppoſition to theſe Uſurpations; or rather ſeem to favour them by the Modeſty of their Behaviour. Their Good Senſe and Experience make them diffident of their Judgment, and cauſe them to examine every thing with the greateſt Accuracy: As [23] on the other Hand, the Delicacy of their Sentiments makes them timorous leſt they commit Faults, and loſe in the Practice of the World that Integrity of Virtue, of which they are ſo jealous. To make Wiſdom agree with Confidence is as difficult as to reconcile Vice to Modeſty.

THESE are the Reflections that have occur'd to me upon this Subject of Impudence and Modeſty; and I hope the Reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee them wrought into the following Allegory.

JUPITER, in the Beginning, joined VIRTUE, WISDOM and CONFIDENCE together; and VICE, FOLLY, and DIFFIDENCE: And in that Society ſet them upon the Earth. But though he thought he had matched them with great judgment, and ſaid that Confidence was the natural Companion of Virtue, and that Vice deſerved to be attended with Diffidence, they had not gone far before Diſſenſion aroſe among them. Wiſdom, who was the Guide of the one Company, was always accuſtomed, before ſhe ventured upon any Road, however beaten, to examine it carefully; [24] to enquire whither it led; what Dangers, Difficulties and Hindrances might poſſibly or probably occur in it. In theſe Deliberations ſhe uſually conſum'd ſome Time; which Delay was very diſpleaſing to Confidence, who was always inclin'd to hurry on, without much Forethought or Deliberation, in the firſt Road he met. Wiſdom and Virtue were inſeparable: But Confidence one Day, following his impetuous Nature, advanc'd a conſiderable Way before his Guides and Companions; and not feeling any Want of their Company, he never enquir'd after them, nor ever met with them more. In like Manner, the other Society, tho' join'd by Jupiter, diſagreed and ſeparated. As Folly ſaw very little Way before her, ſhe had nothing to determine concerning the Goodneſs of Roads, nor cou'd give the Preference to one above another; and this Want of Reſolution was encreas'd by Diffidence, who with her Doubts and Scruples always retarded the Journey. This was a great Annoyance to Vice, who lov'd not to hear of Difficulties and Delays, and was never ſatisfy'd without his full Career, in whatever his Inclinations led him to. Folly, he knew, tho' ſhe hearken'd to Diffidence, wou'd be eaſily manag'd when alone; [25] and therefore, as a vicious Horſe throws his Rider, he openly beat away this Controller of all his Pleaſures, and proceeded in his Journey with Folly, from whom he is inſeparable. Confidence and Diffidence being, after this Manner, both thrown looſe from their reſpective Companies, wander'd for ſome Time; till at laſt Chance led them at the ſame Time to one Village. Confidence went directly up to the great Houſe, which belong'd to WEALTH, the Lord of the Village; and without ſtaying for a Porter, intruded himſelf immediately into the innermoſt Apartments, where he found Vice and Folly well receiv'd before him. He join'd the Train; recommended himſelf very quickly to his Landlord; and enter'd into ſuch Familiarity with Vice, that he was enliſted in the ſame Company along with Folly. They were frequent Gueſts of Wealth, and from that Moment inſeparable. Diffidence, in the mean Time, not daring to approach the Great Houſe, accepted of an Invitation from POVERTY, one of the Tenants; and entering the Cottage, found Wiſdom and Virtue, who being repuls'd by the Land-lord had retir'd thither. Virtue took Compaſſion of her, and Wiſdom found, from [26] her Temper, that ſhe wou'd eaſily improve: So they admitted her into their Society. Accordingly, by their Means, ſhe alter'd in a little Time ſomewhat of her Manner, and becoming much more amiable and engaging, was now call'd by the Name of MODESTY. As ill Company has a greater Effect than good, Confidence, tho' more refractory to Counſel and Example, degenerated ſo far by the Society of Vice and Folly, as to paſs by the Name of IMPUDENCE. Mankind, who ſaw theſe Societies as Jupiter firſt join'd them, and knew nothing of theſe mutual Deſertions, are led into ſtrange Miſtakes by thoſe Means; and wherever they ſee Impudence, make account of Virtue and Wiſdom, and wherever they obſerve Modeſty call her Attendants Vice and Folly.

ESSAY IV. That POLITICS may be reduc'd to a SCIENCE.

[27]

IT is a great Queſtion with ſeveral, Whether there be any eſſential Difference betwixt one Form of Government and another? and, Whether every Form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill adminiſtred? Were it once admitted, that all Governments are alike, and that the only Difference conſiſts in the Character and Conduct of the Governors, moſt political Diſputes wou'd be at an End, and all Zeal for one Conſtitution above another muſt be eſteem'd mere Bigotry and Folly. But though I be a profeſt [28] Friend to Moderation, I cannot forbear condemning this Sentiment, and ſhould be ſorry to think, that human Affairs admit of no greater Stability, than what they receive from the caſual Humours and Characters of particular Men.

'TIS true, thoſe who maintain, that the Goodneſs of all Government conſiſts in the Goodneſs of the Adminiſtration, may cite many particular Inſtances in Hiſtory where the very ſame Government, in different Hands, varies ſuddenly into the two oppoſite Extremes of good and bad. Compare the French Government under Henry III. and under Henry IV. Cruelty, Oppreſſion, Levity, Artifice on the Part of the Rulers; Faction, Sedition, Treachery, Rebellion, Diſloyalty on the Part of the Subjects: Theſe compoſe the Character of the former miſerable Aera. But when the Patriot and heroic Prince, who ſucceeded, was once firmly ſeated on the Throne, the Government, the People, every Thing ſeem'd to be totally chang'd, and all from the Change of the Temper and Sentiments of one ſingle Man. An equal Difference of a contrary Kind, may be found in comparing the [29] Reigns of Eliſabeth and James, at leaſt with Regard to foreign Affairs; and Inſtances of this Kind may be multiply'd, almoſt without Number, from antient as well as modern Hiſtory.

BUT here I wou'd beg Leave to make a Diſtinction. All abſolute Governments (and ſuch the Engliſh Government was, in a great Meaſure, till the Middle of the laſt Century) muſt very much depend on the Adminiſtration; and this is one of the great Inconveniencies of that Form of Government. But a Republican and free Government wou'd be a moſt glaring Abſurdity, if the particular Checks and Controuls, provided by the Conſtitution, had really no Influence, and made it not the Intereſt, even of bad Men, to operate for the public Good. Such is the Intention of theſe Forms of Government; and ſuch is the real Effect, where they are wiſely conſtituted: As on the other Hand, they are the Sources of all Diſorder, and of the blackeſt Crimes, where either Skill or Honeſty has been wanting in their original Frame and Inſtitution. So great is the Force of Laws, and of particular Forms of Government, and ſo little Dependence have they [30] on the Humours and Temper of Men, that Conſequences as general and as certain may be deduced from them, on moſt Occaſions, as any which the Mathematical Sciences can afford us.

THE Roman Government gave the whole Legiſlative Power to the Commons, without allowing a Negative, either to the Nobility, or Conſuls. This unbounded Power the Commons poſſeſſed in a collective Body, not in a Repreſentative. The Conſequences were, When the People, by Succeſs and Conqueſt had become very numerous, and had ſpread themſelves to a great Diſtance from the Capital, the City-Tribes, tho' the moſt contemptible, carried almoſt every Vote: They were, therefore, moſt cajol'd by every one who affected Popularity: They were ſupported in Idleneſs by the general Diſtribution of Corn, and by particular Bribes, which they received from almoſt every Candidate: By this Means they became every Day more licentious, and the Campus Martius was a perpetual Scene of Tumult and Sedition: Armed Slaves were introduced among theſe raſcally Citizens; ſo that the whole Government fell into Anarchy, and the greateſt Happineſs the Romans could [31] look for, was the deſpotic Power of the Caeſars. Such are the Effects of Democracy without a Repreſentative.

A NOBILITY may poſſeſs the whole or any Part of the legiſlative Power of a State after two different Ways. Either every Nobleman ſhares the Power as part of the whole Body, or the whole Body enjoys the Power as compoſed of Parts; which have each a diſtinct Power and Authority. The Venetian Nobility are an Inſtance of the firſt kind of Government: The Poliſh of the ſecond. In the Venetian Government the whole Body of Nobility poſſeſſes the whole Power, and no Nobleman has any Authority, which he receives not from the Whole. In the Poliſh Government every Nobleman, by Means of his Fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary Authority over his Vaſſals, and the whole Body has no Authority but what it receives from the Concurrence of its Parts. The diſtinct Operations and Tendencies of theſe two Species of Government might be made moſt apparent even a priori. A Venetian Nobility is infinitely preferable to a Poliſh, let the Humours and Education of Men be ever ſo much vary'd. A [32] Nobility, who poſſeſs their Power in common, will preſerve Peace and Order, both among themſelves, and their Subjects; and no Member can have Authority enough to controul the Laws for a Moment. They will preſerve their Authority over the People, but without any grievous Tyranny, or any Breach of private Property; becauſe ſuch a tyranninical Government is not the Intereſt of the whole Body, however it may be the Intereſt of ſome Individuals. There will be a Diſtinction of Rank betwixt the Nobility and People, but this will be the only Diſtinction in the State. The whole Nobility will form one Body, and the whole People another, without any of thoſe private Feuds and Animoſities, which ſpread Ruin and Deſolation everywhere. 'Tis eaſy to ſee the Diſadvantages of a Poliſh Nobility in every one of theſe Particulars.

'TIS poſſible ſo to conſtitute a free Government, as that a ſingle Perſon, call him Duke, Prince or King, ſhall poſſeſs a very large Share of the Power, and ſhall form a proper Ballance or Counterpoiſe to the other Parts of the Legiſlature. This chief Magiſtrate may be either elective or hereditary; and tho' the [33] former Inſtitution may, to a ſuperficial View, appear moſt advantageous; yet a more accurate Inſpection will diſcover in it greater Inconveniencies than in the latter, and ſuch as are founded on Cauſes and Principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the Throne, in ſuch a Government, is a Point of too great and too general Intereſt not to divide the whole People into Factions: From whence a Civil War, the greateſt of Ills, may be apprehended, almoſt with Certainty, upon every Vacancy. The Prince elected muſt be either a Foreigner or a Native: The former will be ignorant of the People whom he is to govern; ſuſpicious of his new Subjects, and ſuſpected by them; giving his Confidence entirely to Strangers, who will have no other Thoughts but of enriching themſelves in the quickeſt Manner, while their Maſter's Favour and Authority is able to ſupport them. A Native will carry into the Throne all his private Animoſities and Friendſhips, and will never be regarded, in his Elevation, without exciting the Sentiments of Envy in thoſe who formerly conſider'd him as their Equal. Not to mention, that a Crown is too high a Reward ever to be given to Merit alone, and will always [34] induce the Candidates to employ Force, or Money, or Intrigue, to procure the Votes of the Electors: So that ſuch a Choice will give no better Chance for a ſuperior Merit in the Prince, than if the State had truſted to Birth alone to determine their Sovereign.

IT may therefore be pronounced as an univerſal Axiom in Politics, That an hereditary Prince, a Nobility without Vaſſals, and a People voting by their Repreſentatives, form the beſt MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that Politics admit of general Truths, which are invariable by the Humour or Education either of Subject or Sovereign, it may not be amiſs to obſerve ſome other Principles of this Science, which may ſeem to deſerve that Character.

IT may eaſily be obſerv'd, that though free Governments have been commonly the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their Freedom; yet are they the moſt ruinous and oppreſſive for their Provinces: And this Obſervation may, I believe, be fix'd as a Maxim of the kind we are here ſpeaking of. When a [35] Monarch extends his Dominions by Conqueſt, he ſoon learns to conſider his old and his new Subjects as on the ſame Footing; becauſe in reality all his Subjects are to him the ſame, except the few Friends and Favourites, with whom he is perſonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any Diſtinction betwixt them in his general Laws; and at the ſame Time is no leſs careful to prevent all particular Acts of Oppreſſion in the one as in the other. But a free State neceſſarily makes a great Diſtinction, and muſt always do ſo, 'till Men learn to love their Neighbours as well as themſelves. The Conquerors, in ſuch a Government, are all Legiſlators, and will be ſure ſo to contrive Matters, by Reſtrictions of Trade and by Taxes, as to draw ſome private, as well as public, Advantage from their Conqueſts. Provincial Governors have alſo a better Chance in a Republick, to eſcape with their Plunder, by means of Bribery or Intereſt; and their Fellow-Citizens, who find their own State to be inriched by the Spoils of their Subject-Provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate ſuch Abuſes. Not to mention, that 'tis a neceſſary Precaution in a free State to change the Governors [36] frequently; which obliges theſe temporary Tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate ſufficient Wealth before they give place to their Succeſſors. What cruel Tyrants were the Romans over the World during the Time of their Common-wealth! 'Tis true, they had Laws to prevent Oppreſſion in their Provincial Magiſtrates; but Cicero informs us, that the Romans could not better conſult the Intereſt of the Provinces than by repealing theſe very Laws. For, ſays he, in that Caſe our Magiſtrates, having entire Impunity, would plunder no more than would ſatisfy their own Rapaciouſneſs: Whereas, at preſent, they muſt alſo ſatisfy that of their Judges, and of all the great Men of Rome, whoſe Protection they ſtand in need of. Who can read of the Cruelties and Oppreſſions of Verres without Horror and Aſtoniſhment? And, who is not touched with Indignation to hear, that after Cicero had exhauſted on that abandoned Criminal all the Thunders of the moſt divine Eloquence, and had prevailed ſo far as to get him condemned to the utmoſt Extent of the Laws; yet that cruel Tyrant lived peaceably to old Age, in Opulence and Eaſe, and, thirty Years afterward, [37] was put into the Proſcription by Mark Anthony, upon account of his exorbitant Wealth, where he fell, along with Cicero himſelf, and all the moſt virtuous Men of Rome? After the Diſſolution of the Common-wealth, the Roman Yoke became eaſier upon the Provinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be obſerved, that many of the worſt Emperors, Domitian, for inſtance, were very careful to prevent all Oppreſſion of the Provinces. In Veſpaſian's Time, Gaul was eſteemed richer than Italy itſelf: Nor do I find, during the whole Time of the Roman Monarchy, that the Empire became leſs rich or populous in any of its Provinces; though indeed its Valour and military Diſcipline were always upon the Decline. If we paſs from antient to modern Times, we ſhall find the ſame Obſervation to hold true. The Provinces of obſolute Monarchies are always better treated than thoſe of free States. Compare the Pais conquis of France with Ireland, and you'll be convinced of this Truth; though this latter Kingdom, being almoſt entirely peopled from England, poſſeſſes ſo many Rights and Privileges as ſhould naturally make it challenge better Treatment than that of a [38] conquered Province. Corſica is alſo an obvious Inſtance to the ſame Purpoſe.

THERE is an Obſervation of Machiavel, with regard to the Conqueſts of Alexander the Great, which, I think, may be regarded as one of thoſe eternal political Truths, which no Time or Accidents can vary. It may ſeem ſtrange, ſays that Politician, that ſuch ſudden Conqueſts as thoſe of Alexander, ſhou'd be poſſeſt ſo peaceably by his Succeſſors, and that the Perſians, during all the Confuſions and civil Wars of the Greeks, never made the ſmalleſt Effort towards the Recovery of their former independent Government. To ſatisfy us concerning the Cauſe of this remarkable Event, we may conſider, that a Monarch may govern his Subjects after two different Ways. He may either follow the Maxims of the Eaſtern Princes, and ſtretch his Power ſo far as to leave no Diſtinction of Ranks among his Subjects, but what proceeds immediately from himſelf; no Advantages of Birth; no hereditary Honours and Poſſeſſions: And, in a Word, no Credit among the People, except from his Commiſſion alone. Or a Monarch may exert his Power in a milder Manner, like our European [39] Princes; and leave other Sources of Honour, beſide his Smile and Favour: Birth, Titles, Poſſeſſions, Valour, Integrity, Knowledge, or brave and fortunate Atchievements. In the former Species of Government, after a Conqueſt, 'tis impoſſible ever to ſhake off the Yoke; ſince no one poſſeſſes among the People ſo much perſonal Credit and Authority as to begin ſuch an Enterprize: Whereas in the latter Species of Government, the leaſt Misfortune or Diſcord of the Victors, will encourage the Vanquiſh'd to take Arms, who have Leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every Undertaking.

SUCH is the Reaſoning of Machiavel, which ſeems to me very ſolid and concluſive; tho' I wiſh he had not mixt Falſhood with Truth, in aſſerting that Monarchies govern'd according to the Eaſtern Policy, tho' more eaſily kept when once they are ſubdued, yet are the moſt difficult to be ſubdued; ſince they cannot contain any powerful Subject, whoſe Diſcontent and Faction may facilitate the Enterprizes of an Enemy. For beſides, that ſuch a tyrannical Government enervates the Courage of Men, and renders them indifferent [40] concerning the Fortunes of their Sovereign; beſides this, I ſay, we find by Experience, that even the temporary and delegated Authority of the Generals and Magiſtrates, being always, in ſuch Governments, as abſolute within its Sphere as that of the Prince himſelf, is able, with Barbarians, accuſtom'd to a blind Submiſſion, to produce the moſt dangerous and fatal Revolutions. So that, in every Reſpect, a gentle Government is preferable, and gives the greateſt Security to the Sovereign as well as to the Subject.

LEGISLATORS, therefore, ſhou'd not truſt the future Government of a State entirely to Chance, but ought to provide a Syſtem of Laws to regulate the Adminiſtration of public Affairs to the lateſt Poſterity. Effects will always correſpond to Cauſes; and wiſe Regulations in any Common-wealth are the moſt valuable Legacy, which can be left to future Ages. In the ſmalleſt Court or Office, the ſtated Forms and Methods, by which Buſineſs muſt be conducted, are found to be a conſiderable Check on the natural Depravity of Mankind. Why ſhou'd not the Caſe be the ſame in public Affairs? Can we aſcribe the [41] Stability and Wiſdom of the Venetian Government, thro' ſo many Ages, to any Thing but their Form of Government? And is it not eaſy to point out thoſe Defects in the original Conſtitution, which produc'd the tumultuous Governments of Athens and Rome, and ended at laſt in the Ruin of theſe two famous Republics? And ſo little Dependence has this Affair on the Humours and Education of particular Men, that one Part of the ſame Republic may be wiſely conducted, and another weakly, by the very ſame Men, merely by Reaſon of the Difference of the Forms and Inſtitutions, by which theſe Parts are regulated. Hiſtorians inform us, that this was actually the Caſe with Genoa. For while the State was always full of Sedition, and Tumult, and Diſorder, the Bank of St. George, which had become a conſiderable Part of the People, was conducted for ſeveral Ages with the utmoſt Integrity and Wiſdom.

[42] HERE then is a ſufficient Inducement to maintain, with the utmoſt ZEAL, in every free State, thoſe Forms and Inſtitutions, by which Liberty is ſecured, the Publick Good conſulted, and the Avarice or Ambition of private Men reſtrained and puniſhed. Nothing does more Honour to human Nature, than to ſee it ſuſceptible of ſo noble a Paſſion; as nothing can be a greater Indication of Meanneſs of Heart in any Man, than to ſee him devoid of it. A Man who loves only himſelf, without Regard to Friendſhip or Merit, is a deteſtable Monſter; and a Man, who is only ſuſceptible of Friendſhip, without publick Spirit, or a Regard to the Community, is deficient in the moſt material Part of Virtue.

BUT this is a Subject that need not be longer inſiſted on at preſent. There are enough of Zealots on both Sides to kindle up the Paſſions of their Partizans, and under the Pretence of publick Good, purſue the Intereſts [43] and Ends of their particular Faction. For my Part, I ſhall always be more fond of promoting Moderation than Zeal; though perhaps the ſureſt Way of producing Moderation in every Party is to encreaſe our Zeal for the Public. Let us, therefore, try, if it be poſſible, from the foregoing Doctrine, to draw a Leſſon of Moderation, with regard to the Parties, in which our Country is at preſent divided; at the ſame Time that we allow not this Moderation to abate the Induſtry and Paſſion with which every Individual is bound to purſue the Good of his Country.

THOSE who either attack or defend a Miniſter in ſuch a Government as ours, where the utmoſt Liberty is allowed, always carry Matters to Extremes, and exaggerate his Merit or Demerit with regard to the Publick. His Enemies are ſure to charge him with the greateſt Enormities, both in domeſtic and foreign Management; and there is no Meanneſs or Crime, of which, in their Account, he is not capable. Unneceſſary Wars, ſcandalous Treaties, Profuſion of public Treaſure, oppreſſive Taxes, every kind of Male-adminiſtration is aſcribed to him. To aggravate the [44] Charge, his pernicious Conduct, it is ſaid, will extend its baneful Influence even to Poſterity, by undermining the beſt Conſtitution in the World, and diſordering that wiſe Syſtem of Laws, Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, by which our Anceſtors, for ſo many Centuries, have been ſo happily governed. He is not only a wicked Miniſter in himſelf, but has removed every Security provided againſt wicked Miniſters for the future.

ON the other Hand, the Partizans of the Miniſter make his Panegyric run as high as the Accuſation againſt him, and celebrate his wiſe, ſteady, and moderate Conduct in every Part of his Adminiſtration. The Honour and Intereſt of the Nation ſupported abroad, public Credit maintain'd at home, Perſecution reſtrain'd, Faction ſubdu'd; the Merit of all theſe Bleſſings is aſcrib'd ſolely to the Miniſter. At the ſame Time, he crowns all his other Merits, by a religious Care of the beſt Conſtitution in the World, which he has preſerv'd inviolate in all its Parts, and has tranſmitted entire, to be the Happineſs and Security of the lateſt Poſterity.

[45] WHEN this Accuſation and Panegyric are receiv'd by the Partizans of each Party, no Wonder they engender a moſt extraordinary Ferment on both Sides, and fill the whole Nation with the moſt violent Animoſities. But I wou'd fain perſwade theſe Party-Zealots, that there is a flat Contradiction both in the Accuſation and Panegyric, and that it were impoſſible for either of them to run ſo high, were it not for this Contradiction; if our Conſtitution be really that noble Fabric, the pride of Britain, the Envy of our Neighbours, rais'd by the Labour of ſo many Centuries, repair'd at the Expence of ſo many Millions, and cemented by ſuch a Profuſion of Blood; I ſay, if our Conſtitution does in any Degree deſerve theſe Elogiums, it wou'd never have endur'd a wicked and a weak Miniſter to govern triumphantly for a Courſe of Twenty Years, when oppos'd by the greateſt Geniuſes of the Nation, who exercis'd the utmoſt Liberty of Tongue and Pen, in Parliament, and in their frequent Appeals to the People. But if the Miniſter be wicked and weak, to the Degree ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on, the Conſtitution [46] muſt be faulty in its original Principles, and the Miniſter cannot conſiſtently be charg'd with undermining the beſt Conſtitution of the World. A Conſtitution is only ſo far good, as it provides a Remedy againſt Male-adminiſtration; and if the Britiſh Conſtitution, when in its greateſt Vigour, and repair'd by two ſuch remarkable Events, as the Revolution and Acceſſion, by which our antient Royal Family was ſacrificed to it; if our Conſtitution, I ſay, with ſo great Advantages, does not, in Fact, provide any ſuch Remedy againſt Male-adminiſtration, we are rather beholden to any Miniſter, that undermines it, and affords us an Opportunity of erecting a better Conſtitution in its Place.

I WOU'D make Uſe of the ſame Topics to moderate the Zeal of thoſe who defend the Miniſter. If our Conſtitution be ſo excellent, a Change of Miniſtry can be no ſuch dreadful Event; ſince 'tis eſſential to ſuch a Conſtitution, in every Miniſtry, both to preſerve itſelf from Violation, and to prevent all Enormities in the Adminiſtration. If our Conſtitution be bad, ſo extraordinary a Jealouſy and Apprehenſion, on Account of Changes, is illplac'd; [47] and a Man ſhou'd no more be anxious in this Caſe, than a Husband, who had marry'd a Woman from the Stews, ſhou'd be watchful to prevent her Infidelity. Public Affairs, in ſuch a Conſtitution, muſt neceſſarily go to Confuſion by whatever Hands they are conducted; and the Zeal of Patriots is much leſs requiſite in that Caſe than the Patience and Submiſſion of Philoſophers. The Virtue and good Intentions of Cato and Brutus are highly laudable; But to what Purpoſe did their Zeal ſerve? To nothing, but to haſten the fatal Period of the Roman Government, and render its Convulſions and dying Agonies more violent and painful.

I WOU'D not be underſtood to mean, that public Affairs deſerve no Care and Attention at all. Wou'd Men be moderate and conſiſtent, their Claims might be admitted; at leaſt, might be examin'd. The Country Party might ſtill aſſert, that our Conſtitution, tho' excellent, will admit of Male-adminiſtration to a certain Degree; and therefore, if the Miniſter be bad, 'tis proper to oppoſe him with a ſuitable Degree of Zeal. And on the other Side, the Court-Party may be allow'd, upon [48] the Suppoſition, that the Miniſter were good, to defend, and with ſome Zeal too, his Adminiſtration. I wou'd only perſwade Men not to contend, as if they were fighting pro aris & focis, and change a good Conſtitution into a bad one, by the Violence of their Factions.

I HAVE not here conſider'd any Thing that is perſonal in the preſent Controverſy. In the beſt Conſtitution of the World, where every Man is reſtrain'd by the moſt rigid Laws; 'tis eaſy to diſcover either the good or bad Intentions of a Miniſter, and to judge, whether his perſonal Character deſerves Love or Hatred. But ſuch Queſtions are of little Importance to the Public, and ly under a juſt Suſpicion either of Malevolence or Flattery in thoſe who employ their Pens upon them.

ESSAY V. Of the firſt PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT.

[49]

NOTHING is more ſurpriſing to thoſe, who conſider human Affairs with a Philoſophical Eye; than to ſee the Eaſineſs with which the many are governed by the few, and to obſerve the implicite Submiſſion with which Men reſign their own Sentiments and Paſſions to thoſe of their Rulers. When we enquire by what Means this Wonder is brought about, we ſhall find, that as FORCE is always on the Side of the Governed, the Governors have nothing to ſupport them but OPINION. 'Tis therefore, on Opinion only that Government is founded; and this Maxim extends to the moſt deſpotick and moſt military Governments, as well as to the moſt free and moſt popular. The Soldan of Aegypt, or [50] the Emperor of Rome, might drive his harmleſs Subjects, like brute Beaſts, againſt their Sentiments and Inclination: But he muſt, at leaſt, have led his Mamalukes, or Praetorian Bands, like Men, by their Opinion.

OPINION is of two Kinds, viz. Opinion of INTEREST, and Opinion of RIGHT. By Opinion of Intereſt, I chiefly underſtand the Senſe of the public Advantage which is reapt from Government; along with the Perſwaſion, that the particular Government, which is eſtabliſh'd, is equally advantageous with any other that cou'd eaſily be ſettled. When this Opinion prevails among the Generality of a State, or among thoſe who have the Force in their Hands, it gives great Security to any Government.

RIGHT is of two Kinds, Right to POWER, and Right to PROPERTY. What Prevalence Opinion of the firſt Kind has over Mankind, may eaſily be underſtood by obſerving the Attachment, which all Nations have to their antient Government, and even to thoſe Names, which have had the Sanction of Antiquity. Antiquity always begets the Opinion of Right; [51] and whatever diſadvantageous Sentiment we may entertain of Mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of Blood and Treaſure, in the Maintenance of public Right. This Paſſion we may denominate Enthuſiaſm, or may give it what Appellation we pleaſe; but a Politician, who wou'd overlook its Influence on human Affairs, wou'd prove himſelf to have but a very limited Underſtanding.

'TIS ſufficiently underſtood, that the Opinion of Right to Property is of the greateſt Moment in all Matters of Government. A noted Author has made Property the Foundation of all Government; and moſt of our political Writers ſeem inclin'd to follow him in that Particular. This is carrying the Matter too far; but ſtill it muſt be own'd, that the Opinion of Right to Property has a great Influence in this Subject.

UPON theſe three Opinions, therefore, of Intereſt, of Right to Power, and of Right to Property, are all Governments founded, and all Authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other Principles, which add Force to theſe, and determine, limit, or alter their [52] Operation; ſuch as Self-Intereſt, Fear, and Affection: But ſtill I aſſert, that theſe other Principles can have no Influence alone, but ſuppoſe the antecedent Influence of thoſe Opinions above-mention'd. They are, therefore, to be eſteem'd the ſecondary, not the original Principles of Government.

FOR firſt, as to Self-Intereſt, by which I mean the Expectation of particular Rewards, diſtinct from the general Protection which we receive from Government; 'tis evident, that the Magiſtrate's Authority muſt be antecedently eſtabliſh'd, or at leaſt be hop'd for, in order to produce this Expectation. The Expectation of Reward may augment the Authority with regard to ſome particular Perſons; but can never give Birth to it with regard to the Public. Men naturally look for the greateſt Favours from their Friends and Acquaintance; and therefore, the Hopes of any conſiderable Number of the State, wou'd never center in any particular Set of Men, if theſe Men had no other Title to Magiſtracy, and had no Influence over the Opinions of Mankind. The ſame Obſervation may be extended to the other two Principles of Fear and [53] Affection. No Man wou'd have any Reaſon to fear the Fury of a Tyrant, if he had no Authority over any but from Fear; ſince, as a ſingle Man, his bodily Force can reach but a ſmall Way, and whatever Power he has beyond, muſt be founded either on our own Opinion, or on the preſum'd Opinion of others. And tho' Affection to Wiſdom and Virtue in a Sovereign extends very far, and has great Influence; yet he muſt be antecedently ſuppos'd to be inveſted with a publick Character, otherwiſe the public Eſteem will ſerve him in no Stead, nor will his Virtue have any Influence beyond his private Sphere.

A GOVERNMENT may endure for ſeveral Ages, though the Ballance of Power, and the Ballance of Property do not agree. This chiefly happens, where any Member of the State has acquired a large Share of the Property; but from the original Conſtitution of the Government has no Share of the Power. Under what Pretext would any Individual of that Order pretend to intermeddle in public Affairs? As Men are commonly much attacht to their antient Government, it is not to be expected, that the Public would ever favour [54] ſuch Uſurpations. But where the original Conſtitution allows any Share of the Power, though ſmall, to an Order of Men, that poſſeſſes a large Share of Property, 'tis eaſy for them gradually to ſtretch their Authority, and bring the Ballance of Power to coincide with that of Property. This has been the Caſe with the Houſe of Commons in England.

MOST Writers, that have treated of the Britiſh Government, have ſuppoſed, that as the Houſe of Commons repreſents all the Commons of Great-Britain; ſo its Weight in the Scale is proportioned to the Property and Power of all whom they repreſent. But this Principle muſt not be received as abſolutely true. For though the People are apt to attach themſelves more to the Houſe of Commons than to any other Member of the Conſtitution, that Houſe being choſen by them as their Repreſentatives, and as the public Guardians of their Liberty; yet are there Inſtances where the Houſe, even when in Oppoſition to the Crown, has not been follow'd by the People; as we may particularly obſerve in the Tory Houſe of Commons in the Reign of King William. Were the Members [55] of the Houſe obliged to receive Inſtructions from their Conſtituents, like the Dutch Deputies, this would entirely alter the Caſe; and if ſuch immenſe Power and Riches, as thoſe of the whole Commons of Britain, were brought into the Scale, 'tis not eaſy to conceive, that the Crown could either influence that Multitude of People, or withſtand that Over-ballance of Property. 'Tis true, the Crown has great Influence over the collective Body of Britain in the Elections of Members; but were this Influence, which at preſent is only exerted once in ſeven Years, to be employ'd in bringing over the People to every Vote, it would ſoon be waſted; and no Skill, Popularity or Revenue could ſupport it. I muſt, therefore, be of Opinion, that an Alteration in this particular would introduce a total Alteration in our Government, and would ſoon reduce it to a pure Republic; and perhaps, to a Republic of no inconvenient Form. For though the People collected in a Body, like the Roman Tribes, be quite unfit for Government, yet when diſperſed in ſmall Bodies, they are more ſuſceptible both of Reaſon and Order; the Force of popular Currents and Tides is, in ſome Meaſure, broke; and the [56] public Intereſt may be purſued with Method and Conſtancy. But 'tis needleſs to reaſon any farther concerning a Form of Government, which is never likely to have place in Britain, and which ſeems not to be the Aim of any Party amongſt us. Let us cheriſh and improve our antient Government as much as poſſible, without encouraging a Paſſion for ſuch dangerous Novelties.

I SHALL conclude this Subject with obſerving, that the preſent political Controverſy, with regard to Inſtructions, is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any Deciſion, as it is managed by both Parties. The Country-Party do not pretend, that a Member is abſolutely bound to follow ſuch Inſtructions, as an Ambaſſador or General is confined by his Orders, and that his Vote is not to be received in the Houſe but ſo far as it is conformable to them. The Court-Party, again, do not pretend, that the Sentiments of the People ought to have no Weight with every Member; much leſs that he ought to deſpiſe the Sentiments of thoſe whom he repreſents, and with whom he is more particularly connected. And if their Sentiments be [57] of Weight, why ought they not to expreſs theſe Sentiments? The Queſtion, then, is only concerning the Degrees of Weight, which ought to be plac'd on Inſtructions. But ſuch is the Nature of Language, that 'tis impoſſible for it to expreſs diſtinctly theſe different Degrees; and if Men will carry on a Controverſy on this Head, it may well happen, that they may differ in their Language, and yet agree in their Sentiments; and differ in their Sentiments, and yet agree in their Language. Beſides, how is it poſſible to fix theſe Degrees, conſidering the Variety of Affairs that come before the Houſe, and the Variety of Places, which Members repreſent? Ought the Inſtructions of Totneſs to have the ſame Weight as thoſe of London? Or Inſtructions, with regard to the Convention, which reſpected foreign Politics, to have the ſame Weight as thoſe with regard to the Exciſe, which reſpected only our domeſtic Affairs?

ESSAY VI. Of LOVE and MARRIAGE.

[59]

I Know not whence it proceeds, that Women are ſo apt to take amiſs every Thing that is ſaid in Diſparagement of the married State; and always conſider a Satyr upon Matrimony as a Satyr upon themſelves. Do they mean by this, that they are the Parties principally concerned, and that if a Backwardneſs to enter into that State ſhould prevail in the World, they would be the greateſt Sufferers? Or, are they ſenſible, that the Miſfortunes and Miſcarriages of the married State are owing more to their Sex than to ours? I hope they do not intend to confeſs either of theſe two Particulars, or to give ſuch an Advantage to their Adverſaries, the Men, as even to allow them to ſuſpect it.

[60] I HAVE often had Thoughts of complying with this Humour of the Fair Sex, and of writing a Panegyric upon Marriage: But, in looking around for Materials, they ſeem'd to be of ſo mix'd a Nature, that at the Concluſion of my Reflections, I found I was as much diſpos'd to write a Satyr, which might be plac'd on the oppoſite Pages of my Panegyrick: And I am afraid, that as Satyr is, on moſt Occaſions, thought to have more Truth in it than Panegyric, I ſhou'd have done their Cauſe more Harm than Good by this Expedient. To miſrepreſent Facts is what, I know, they will not require of me. I muſt be more a Friend to Truth, than even to them, where their Intereſts are oppoſite.

I SHALL tell the Women what it is our Sex complains of moſt in the married State; and if they be diſpoſed to ſatisfy us in this Particular, all the other Differences will be eaſily accomodated. If I be not miſtaken, 'tis their Love of Dominion which is the Ground of the Quarrel; though 'tis very likely, that they will think it an unreaſonable Love of it in us, which makes us inſiſt ſo much upon that Point. However this may be, no Paſſion [61] ſeems to have more Influence on female Minds than this for Power; and there is a remarkable Inſtance in Hiſtory of its prevailing above another Paſſion, which is the only one that can be ſuppoſed a proper Counter-poiſe for it. We are told, that all the Women in Scythia once conſpired againſt the Men, and kept the Secret ſo well, that they executed their Deſign before they were ſuſpected. They ſurpriſed the Men in Drink, or aſleep, bound them all faſt in Chains, and having called a ſolemn Council of the whole Sex, it was debated what Expedient ſhould be uſed to improve the preſent Advantage, and prevent their falling again into Slavery. To kill all the Men did not ſeem to the Reliſh of any Part of the Aſſembly, notwithſtanding the Injuries formerly receiv'd; and they were afterwards pleaſed to make a great Merit of this Lenity of theirs. It was, therefore, agreed to put out the Eyes of the whole male Sex, and thereby reſign for ever after all the Vanity they could draw from their Beauty, in order to ſecure their Authority. We muſt no longer pretend to dreſs and Show, ſay they; but then we ſhall be free from Slavery. We ſhall hear no more tender [62] Sighs; but in return we ſhall hear no more imperious Commands. Love muſt for ever leave us; but he will carry Subjection along with him.

'TIS regarded by ſome as an unlucky Circumſtance, ſince the Women were reſolved to main the Men, and deprive them of ſome of their Senſes, in order to render them humble and dependent, that the Senſe of hearing could not ſerve their Purpoſe, ſince 'tis probable the Females would rather have attack'd that than the Sight: And I think it is agreed among the Learned, that, in a married State, 'tis not near ſo great an Inconvenience to loſe the former Senſe as the latter. However this may be, we are told by modern Anecdotes, that ſome of the Scythian Women did ſecretly ſpare their Husbands Eyes; preſuming, I ſuppoſe, that they could govern them as well by means of that Senſe as without it. But ſo incorrigible and intractable were theſe Men, that their Wives were all obliged in a few Years, as their Youth and Beauty decay'd, to imitate the Example of their Siſters; which it was no difficult Matter to do in a State where the female Sex had once got the Superiority.

[63] I KNOW not if our Scotiſh Ladies derive any Thing of this Humour from their Scythian Anceſtors; but I muſt confeſs, that I have often been ſurpriz'd to ſee a Woman very well pleas'd to take a Fool for her Mate, that ſhe might govern with the leſs Controul; and cou'd not but think her Sentiments, in this Reſpect, ſtill more barbarous than thoſe of the Scythian Women above-mention'd, as much, as the Eyes of the Underſtanding are more valuable than thoſe of the Body.

BUT to be juſt, and to lay the Blame more equally, I am afraid it is the Fault of our Sex, if the Women be ſo fond of Rule, and that if we did not abuſe our Authority, they wou'd never think it worth while to diſpute it. Tyrants, we know, produce Rebels; and all Hiſtory informs us, that Rebels, when they prevail, are apt to become Tyrants in their Turn. For this Reaſon, I cou'd wiſh there were no Pretenſions to Authority on either Side; but that every Thing was carry'd on with perfect Equality, as betwixt two equal Members of the ſame Body. And to induce both Parties to embrace thoſe amicable Sentiments, I ſhall [64] deliver to them Plato's Account of the Origin of Love and Marriage.

MANKIND, according to that fanciful Philoſopher, were not, in their Original, divided into Male and Female, as at preſent; but each individual Perſon was a Compound of both Sexes, and was in himſelf both Husband and Wife, melted down into one living Creature. This Union, no Doubt, was very entire, and the Parts very well adjuſted together, ſince there reſulted a perfect Harmony betwixt the Male and Female, altho' they were oblig'd to be inſeparable Companions. And ſo great was the Harmony and Happineſs flowing from it, that the ANDROGYNES (for ſo Plato calls them) or MEN-WOMEN, became inſolent upon their Proſperity, and rebell'd againſt the Gods. To puniſh them for this Temerity, Jupiter cou'd contrive no better Expedient, than to divorce the Male-Part from the Female, and make two imperfect Beings of the Compound, which was before ſo perfect. Hence the Origin of Men and Women, as diſtinct Creatures. But notwithſtanding this Diviſion, ſo lively is our Remembrance of the Happineſs we enjoy'd in our primaeval State, that we [65] are never at Reſt in this Situation; but each of theſe Halves is continually ſearching thro' the whole Species to find the other Half, which was broken from it: And when they meet, they join again with the greateſt Fondneſs and Sympathy. But it often happens, that they are miſtaken in this Particular; that they take for their Half what no Way correſponds to them; and that the Parts do not meet nor join in with each other, as is uſual in Fractures. In this Caſe the Union is ſoon diſſolv'd, and each Part is ſet looſe again to hunt for its loſt Half, joining itſelf to every one it meets by Way of Trial, and enjoying no Reſt, till its perfect Sympathy with its Partner ſhews that it has at laſt been ſucceſsful in its Endeavours.

WERE I diſpos'd to carry on this Fiction of Plato, which accounts for the mutual Love betwixt the Sexes in ſo agreeable a Manner, I wou'd do it by the following Allegory.

WHEN Jupiter had ſeparated the Male from the Female, and had quell'd their Pride and Ambition by ſo ſevere an Operation, he cou'd not but repent him of the Cruelty of his Vengeance, [66] and take Compaſſion on poor Mortals, who were now become incapable of any Repoſe or Tranquility. Such Cravings, ſuch Anxieties, ſuch Neceſſities aroſe, as made them curſe their Creation, and think Exiſtence itſelf a Puniſhment. In vain had they Recourſe to every other Occupation and Amuſement. In vain did they ſeek after every Pleaſure of Senſe, and every Refinement of Reaſon. Nothing cou'd fill that Void, which they felt in their Hearts, or ſupply the Loſs of their Partner, who was ſo fatally ſeparated from them. To remedy this Diſorder, and to beſtow ſome Comfort, at leaſt, on human Race in their forelorn Situation, Jupiter ſent down LOVE and HYMEN to collect the broken Halves of human Kind, and piece them together, in the beſt Manner poſſible. Theſe two Deities found ſuch a prompt Diſpoſition in Mankind to unite again in their primitive State, that they proceeded on their Work with wonderful Succeſs for ſome Time; till at laſt, from many unlucky Accidents, Diſſenſion aroſe betwixt them. The chief Counſellor and Favourite of Hymen was CARE, who was continually filling his Patron's Head with Proſpects of Futurity; a Settlement, Family, Children, Servants; ſo [67] that little elſe was regarded in all the Matches they made. On the other Hand, Love had choſen PLEASURE for his Favourite, who was as pernicious a Counſellor as the other, and wou'd never allow Love to look beyond the preſent momentary Gratification, or the ſatiſfying of the prevailing Inclination. Theſe two Favourites became, in a little Time, irreconcilable Enemies, and made it their chief Buſineſs to undermine each other in all their Undertakings. No ſooner had Love fixt upon two Halves, which he was cementing together, and forming to a cloſe Union, but Care inſinuates himſelf, and bringing Hymen along with him, diſſolves the Union produc'd by Love, and joins each Half to ſome other Half, which he had provided for it. To be reveng'd of this, Pleaſure creeps in upon a Pair already join'd by Hymen; and calling Love to his Aſſiſtance, they Under-hand contrive to join each Half, by ſecret Links, to Halves, which Hymen was wholly unacquainted with. It was not long before this Quarrel was felt in its pernicious Conſequences; and ſuch Complaints aroſe before the Throne of Jupiter, that he was oblig'd to ſummon the offending Parties to appear before him, in order to give [68] an Account of their Proceedings. After hearing the Pleadings on both Sides, he order'd an immediate Reconcilement betwixt Love and Hymen, as the only Expedient for giving Happineſs to Mankind: And that he might be ſure this Reconcilement ſhou'd be durable, he laid his ſtrict Injunctions on them never to join any Halves without conſulting their Favourites, Care and Pleaſure, and obtaining the Conſent of both to the Conjunction. Where this Order is ſtrictly obſerv'd, the Androgyne is perfectly reſtor'd, and human Race enjoy the ſame Happineſs as in their primaeval State. The Seam is ſcarce perceiv'd, that joins the two Beings together; but both of them combine to form one perfect and happy Creature.

ESSAY VII. Of the STUDY of HISTORY.

[69]

THERE is nothing I would recommend more earneſtly to my female Readers than the Study of Hiſtory, as an Occupation, of all others, the beſt ſuited both to their Sex and Education; much more inſtructive than their ordinary Books of Amuſement, and more entertaining than thoſe ſerious Compoſitions, which are uſually to be found in their Cloſets. Among other important Truths, which they may learn from Hiſtory, they may be informed of two Particulars, the Knowledge of which may contribute very much to their Quiet and Repoſe; That our Sex, as well as theirs, are far from being ſuch perfect Creatures as they are apt to imagine, and, That Love is not the only Paſſion, that governs the Male-World, but is often overcome [70] by Avarice, Ambition, Vanity, and a thouſand other Paſſions. Whether they be the falſe Repreſentations of Mankind in thoſe two Particulars, that endear Romances and Novels ſo much to the fair Sex, I know not; but muſt confeſs I am ſorry to ſee them have ſuch an Averſion to Matter of Fact, and ſuch an Appetite for Falſhood. I remember I was once deſired by a young Beauty, for whom I had ſome Paſſion, to ſend her ſome Novels and Romances for her Amuſement in the Country; but was not ſo ungenerous as to take the Advantage, which ſuch a Courſe of Reading might have given me, being reſolved not to make Uſe of poiſoned Arms againſt her. I therefore ſent her Plutarch's Lives, aſſuring her at the ſame Time, that there was not a Word of Truth in them from Beginning to End. She peruſed them very attentively, 'till ſhe came to the Lives of Alexander and Caeſar, whoſe Names ſhe had heard of by Accident: and then returned me the Book, with many Reproaches for deceiving her.

I MAY indeed be told, that the fair Sex have no ſuch Averſion to Hiſtory, as I have repreſented, provided it be ſecret Hiſtory, and [71] contain ſome memorable Tranſaction proper to excite their Curioſity. But as I do not find that Truth, which is the Baſis of Hiſtory, is at all regarded in thoſe Anecdotes, I cannot admit of this as a Proof of their Paſſion for that Study. However this may be, I ſee not why the ſame Curioſity might not receive a more proper Direction, and lead them to deſire Accounts of thoſe who lived in paſt Ages as well as of their Contemporaries. What is it to Cleora, whether Fulvia entertains a ſecret Commerce of Love with Philander or not? Has ſhe not equal Reaſon to be pleaſed, when ſhe is informed, (what is whiſpered about among Hiſtorians) that Cato's Siſter had an Intrigue with Caeſar, and palmed her Son, Marcus Brutus, upon her Husband for his own, though in Reality he was her Gallant's? And are not the Loves of Meſſalina or Julia as proper Subjects of Diſcourſe as any Intrigue, that this City has produced of late Years.

BUT I know not whence it comes, that I have been thus ſeduced into a kind of Raillery againſt the Ladies: Unleſs, perhaps, it proceed from the ſame Cauſe, that makes the Perſon, who is the Favourite of the Company, [72] be often the Object of their good-natur'd Jeſts and Pleaſantries. We are pleaſed to addreſs our ſelves after any manner to a Perſon that is agreeable to us; and at the ſame Time preſume, that nothing will be taken amiſs by one who is ſecure of the good Opinion and Affections of every one preſent. I ſhall now proceed to handle my Subject more ſeriouſly, and ſhall point out the many Advantages, that flow from the Study of Hiſtory, and ſhow how well ſuited it is to every one, but particularly to thoſe who are debarred the ſeverer Studies by the Tenderneſs of their Complexion and the Weakneſs of their Education. The Advantages found in Hiſtory ſeem to be of three kinds, as it amuſes the Fancy, as it improves the Underſtanding, and as it ſtrengthens Virtue.

IN reality, what more agreeable Entertainment to the Mind, than to be tranſported into the remoteſt Ages of the World, and to obſerve human Society in its Infancy, making the firſt faint Eſſays towards the Arts and Sciences: To ſee the Policy of Government, and the Civility of Converſation refining by Degrees, and every thing that is ornamental to [73] human Life advancing towards its Perfection. To remark the Riſe, Progreſs, Declenſion and final Extinction of the moſt flouriſhing Empires: The Virtues, which contributed to their Greatneſs; and the Vices, which drew on their Ruin. In ſhort, to ſee all human Race, from the Beginning of Time, paſs, as it were, in Review before us, appearing in their true Colours, without any of thoſe Diſguiſes, which, during their Life-time, ſo much perplexed the Judgments of the Beholders. What Spectacle can be imagined ſo magnificent, ſo various, ſo intereſting? What Amuſement, either of the Senſes or Imagination, can be compared with it? Shall thoſe trifling Paſtimes, which engroſs ſo much of our Time, be preferr'd as more ſatisfactory, and more fit to engage our Attention? How perverſe muſt that Taſte be, which is capable of ſo wrong a Choice of Pleaſures?

BUT Hiſtory is a moſt improving Part of Knowledge, as well as an agreeable Amuſement; and indeed, a great Part of what we commonly call Erudition, and value ſo highly, is nothing but an Acquaintance with hiſtorical Facts. An extenſive Knowledge of this [74] kind belongs to Men of Letters; but I muſt think it an unpardonable Ignorance in Perſons of whatever Sex or Condition, not to be acquainted with the Hiſtory of their own Country, along with the Hiſtories of antient Greece and Rome. A Woman may behave herſelf with good Manners, and have even ſome Vivacity in her Turn of Wit; but where her Mind is ſo unfurniſh'd, 'tis impoſſible her Converſation can afford any Entertainment to Men of Senſe and Reflection.

I MUST add, that Hiſtory is not only a valuable Part of Knowledge, but opens the Door to many other Parts of Knowledge, and affords Materials to moſt of the Sciences. And indeed, if we conſider the Shortneſs of human Life, and our limited Knowledge even of what paſſes in our own Time, we muſt be ſenſible, that we ſhould be for ever Children in Underſtanding, were it not for this Invention, which extends our Experience to all paſt Ages, and to the moſt diſtant Nations; making them contribute as much to our Improvement in Wiſdom, as if they had actually lain under our Obſervation. A Man acquainted with Hiſtory may, in ſome reſpect, [75] be ſaid to have lived from the Beginning of the World, and to have been making continual Additions to his Stock of Knowledge in every Century.

THERE is alſo an Advantage in that Knowledge, which is acquired by Hiſtory, above what is learned by the Practice of the World, that it brings us acquainted with human Affairs, without diminiſhing in the leaſt from the moſt delicate Sentiments of Virtue. And to tell the Truth, I know not any Study or Occupation ſo unexceptionable as Hiſtory in this particular. Poets can paint Virtue in the moſt charming Colours; but as they addreſs themſelves entirely to the Paſſions, they often become Advocates for Vice. Even Philoſophers are apt to bewilder themſelves in the Subtilty of their Speculations; and we have ſeen ſome go ſo far as to deny the Reality of all moral Diſtinctions. But I think it a Remark worthy the Attention of the ſpeculative Reader, that the Hiſtorians have been, almoſt without Exception, the true Friends of Virtue, and have always repreſented it in its proper Colours, however they may have erred in their Judgments of particular Perſons. Machiavel [76] himſelf diſcovers a true Sentiment of Virtue in his Hiſtory of Florence. When he talks as a Politician, he conſiders Poiſoning, Aſſaſſination and Perjury as lawful Arts of Power; but when he ſpeaks as an Hiſtorian, he ſhows ſo keen an indignation againſt Vice, and ſo warm an Approbation of Virtue in many Paſſages, that I could not forbear applying to him that Remark of Horace, That if you chace away Nature, though with never ſo great Indignity, ſhe will always return upon you. Nor is this Combination of Hiſtorians in favour of Virtue at all difficult to be accounted for. When a Man of Buſineſs enters into Life and Action, he is more apt to conſider the Characters of Men, as they have Relation to his Intereſt, than as they ſtand in themſelves; and has his Judgment warped on every Occaſion by the Violence of his Paſſion. When a Philoſopher contemplates Characters and Manners in his Cloſet, the general abſtract View of the Objects leaves the Mind ſo cold and unmoved, that the Sentiments of Nature have no Room to play, and he ſcarce feels the Difference betwixt Vice and Virtue. Hiſtory keeps in a juſt Medium betwixt theſe Extremes, and places the Objects in their true [77] Point of View. The Writers of Hiſtory, as well as the Readers, are ſufficiently intereſted in the Characters and Events, to have a lively Sentiment of Blame or Praiſe; and at the ſame Time have no particular Intereſt or Concern to pervert their Judgment.

Verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo Eliciuntur.

ESSAY VIII. Of the INDEPENDENCY of PARLIAMENT.

[79]

I HAVE frequently obſerv'd, in comparing the Conduct of the Court and Country Party, that the former are commonly leſs aſſuming and dogmatical in Converſation, more apt to make Conceſſions, and tho' not, perhaps, more ſuſceptible of Conviction; yet more able to bear Contradiction than the latter; who are apt to fly out upon any Oppoſition, and to regard one as a mercenary deſigning Fellow, if he argues with any Coolneſs and Impartiality, or makes any Conceſſions to their Adverſaries. This is a Fact, which, I believe, every one may have obſerv'd, who has been much in Companies, where political Queſtions have been diſcuſs'd; tho', were one to ask the Reaſon of this Difference, [80] every Party wou'd be apt to aſſign a different Reaſon. Gentlemen in the Oppoſition will aſcribe it to the very Nature of their Party, which, being founded on public Spirit, and a Zeal for the Conſtitution, cannot eaſily endure ſuch Doctrines, as are of pernicious Conſequence to Liberty. The Courtiers, on the other Hand, will be apt to put us in Mind of the Clown mention'd by Lord Shaftsbury. ‘"A Clown, ſays that excellent Author, once took a Fancy to hear the Latin Diſputes of Doctors at an Univerſity. He was askt what Pleaſure he cou'd take in viewing ſuch Combatants, when he cou'd never know ſo much, as which of the Parties had the better."’ For that Matter, reply'd the Clown, ‘"I a'n't ſuch a Fool neither, but I can ſee who's the firſt that puts to'other into a paſſion. Nature herſelf dictated this Leſſon to the Clown, that he who had the better of the Argument wou'd be eaſy and well-humour'd: But he who was unable to ſupport his Cauſe by Reaſon, wou'd naturally loſe his Temper, and grow violent."’

[81] To which of theſe Reaſons ſhall we adhere? To neither of them, in my Opinion: Unleſs we have a-mind to inliſt ourſelves, and become Zealots in either Party. I believe I can aſſign the Reaſon of this different Conduct of the two Parties, without offending either. The Country-Party are plainly moſt popular at preſent, and perhaps have been ſo in moſt Adminiſtrations: So that, being accuſtom'd to prevail in Company, they cannot endure to hear their Opinions controverted, but are as confident on the publick Favour, as if they were ſupported in all their Sentiments by the moſt infallible Demonſtration. The Courtiers, on the other Hand, are commonly ſo run down by your popular Talkers, that if you ſpeak to them with any Moderation, or make them the ſmalleſt Conceſſions, they think themſelves extremely oblig'd to you, and are apt to return the Favour by a like Moderation and Facility on their Part. To be furious and paſſionate, they know, wou'd only gain them the Character of ſhameleſs Mercenaries; not that of zealous Patriots, which is the Character that ſuch a warm Behaviour is apt to acquire to the other Party.

[82] IN all Controverſies, we find, without regarding the Truth or Falſhood on either Side, that thoſe who defend the eſtabliſht and popular Opinions are always moſt dogmatical and imperious in their Stile: While their Adverſaries affect a moſt extraordinary Gentleneſs and Moderation, in order to ſoften, as much as poſſible, any Prejudices, that may ly againſt them. Conſider the Behaviour of our Free-thinkers of all Denominations, whether they be ſuch as decry all Revelation, or only oppoſe the exorbitant Power of the Clergy; Collins, Tindal, Foſter, Hoadley. Compare their Moderation and Good-manners with the furious Zeal and Scurrility of their Adverſaries, and you will be convinc'd of the Truth of my Obſervation. A like Difference may be obſerv'd in the Conduct of thoſe French Writers, who maintain'd the Controverſy with regard to antient and modern Learning. Boileau, Monſieur & Madame Dacier, l'Abbe de Bos, who defended the Party of the Antients, mixt their Reaſonings with Satyre and Invective: While Fontenelle, la Motte, Charpentier, and even Perrault never tranſgreſs'd the Bounds of Moderation and [83] Good-breeding; tho' provok'd by the moſt injurious Treatment of their Adverſaries.

I MUST, however, obſerve, that this Remark, with regard to the ſeeming Moderation of the Court Party, is entirely confin'd to Converſation, and to Gentlemen, who have been engag'd by Intereſt or Inclination in that Party. For as to the Court-Writers, being commonly hir'd Scriblers, they are altogether as ſcurrilous as the Mercenaries of the other Party, nor has the Gazeteer any Advantage, in this Reſpect, above Common Senſe. A Man of Education will, in any Party, diſcover himſelf to be ſuch, by his Good-breeding and Decency; as a Scoundrel will always betray the oppoſite Qualities. The falſe Accuſers accus'd, &c. is very ſcurrillous; tho' that Side of the Queſtion, being leaſt popular, ſhou'd be defended with moſt Moderation. When L—d B—e, L—d M—t, Mr. L—n take the Pen in Hand, tho' they write with Warmth, they preſume not upon their Popularity ſo far as to tranſgreſs the Bounds of Decency.

I AM led into this Train of Reflection, by conſidering ſome Papers wrote upon that [84] grand Topic of Court-Influence, and Parliamentary Dependence, where, in my humble Opinion, the Country-Party ſhow too rigid an Inflexibility, and too great a Jealouſy of making Conceſſions to their Adverſaries. Their Reaſonings loſe their Force, by being carry'd too far; and the Popularity of their Opinions has ſeduc'd them to neglect, in ſome Meaſure, their Juſtneſs and Solidity. The following Reaſoning will, I hope, ſerve to juſtify me in this Opinion.

POLITICAL Writers have eſtabliſh'd it as a Maxim, That in contriving any Syſtem of Government, and fixing the ſeveral Checks and Controuls of the Conſtitution, every Man ought to be ſuppos'd a Knave, and to have no other End, in all his Actions, but private Intereſt. By this Intereſt we muſt govern him, and by Means of it, make him co-operate to public Good, notwithſtanding his inſatiable Avarice and Ambition. Without this, ſay they, we ſhall in vain boaſt of the Advantages of any Conſtitution, and ſhall find, in the End, that we have no Security for our Liberties or Poſſeſſions, except the Good-will [85] of our Rulers; that is, we ſhall have no Security at all.

'TIS therefore a juſt political Maxim, That every Man muſt be ſuppoſed a Knave: Tho' at the ſame Time, I muſt own it appears ſomewhat ſtrange, that a Maxim ſhould be true in Politics, which is falſe in Fact. But to ſatisfy us on this Head, we may conſider, that Men are generally more honeſt in their private than in their public Character, and will go greater Lengths to ſerve a Party than where their own private Intereſt is alone concerned. Honour is a great Check upon Mankind: But where a conſiderable Body of Men act together, this Check is, in a great meaſure, removed; ſince a Man is ſure to be approved of by his own Party for what promotes the common Intereſt, and ſoon learns to deſpiſe the Clamours of his Adverſaries. To which we may add, that every Court or Senate is determined by the Majority; ſo that if Self-Intereſt influences only the Majority (as it will always do in the preſent depraved State of Mankind) the whole Senate follows the Allurements of this ſeparate Intereſt, and acts [86] as if it contained not one Member, who had any Regard to public Intereſt and Liberty.

WHEN, therefore, there offers to my Cenſure and Examination any Plan of Government, real or imaginary, where the Power is diſtributed among ſeveral Courts, and ſeveral Orders of Men, I always conſider the private Intereſt of each Court, and each Order; and if I find, that, by the artful Diviſion of the Power, the private Intereſt muſt neceſſarily, in its Operation, concur with the public, I pronounce that Government to be wiſe and happy. If, on the contrary, the private Intereſt of each Order be not check'd, and be not directed to publick Intereſt, I ſhall look for nothing but Faction, Diſorder, and Tyranny from ſuch a Government. In this Opinion I am juſtified by Experience, as well as by the Authority of all Philoſophers and Politicians, both antient and modern.

HOW much, therefore, would it have ſurpriſed ſuch a Genius, as Cicero, or Tacitus, to have been told, that in a future Age there ſhould ariſe a very regular Syſtem of mixt Government, where the Power was [87] ſo diſtributed, that one Rank, whenever it pleaſed, might ſwallow up all the reſt, and engroſs the whole Power of the Conſtitution. Such a Government, they would have been apt to ſay, will not be a mixt Government. For ſo great is the natural Ambition of Men, that they are never ſatisfied with Power; and if one Order of Men, by purſuing the Intereſt of their Order, can uſurp upon every other Order, it will certainly do ſo, and render itſelf, as far as poſſible, abſolute and uncontroulable.

BUT in this Opinion, Experience ſhows they would have been miſtaken. For this is actually the Caſe with the Britiſh Conſtitution. The Share of Power allotted by our Conſtitution to the Houſe of Commons is ſo great, that it abſolutely commands all the other Parts of our Government. The King's legiſlative Power is plainly no proper Check to it. For though the King has a Negative in the paſſing of all Laws; yet this, in Fact, is eſteemed of ſo little Moment, that whatever paſſes the two Houſes is always ſure to be paſs'd into a Law, and the Royal Aſſent is little beter than a mere Form. The principal [88] Weight of the Crown lies in the executive Power: But beſides that the executive Power, in every Government, is altogether ſubordinate to the legiſlative; beſides this, I ſay, the Exerciſe of this Power requires an immenſe Expence, and the Commons have aſſumed to themſelves the ſole Power of diſpoſing of public Money: How eaſy, therefore, would it be for that Houſe to wreſt from the Crown all theſe Powers, one after another, by making every Grant of Money conditional, and chooſing their Time ſo well, that their Refuſal of Subſidies ſhould only diſtreſs the Government, without giving foreign Powers any Advantage over us? Did the Houſe of Commons depend in the ſame manner on the King, and had none of the Members any Property but from his Gift, would not he command all their Reſolutions, and be from that Moment abſolute? As to the Houſe of Lords, they are a very powerful Support to the Crown as long as they are, in their Turn, ſupported by it; but both Experience and Reaſon ſhow us, that they have no Force nor Authority ſufficient to maintain themſelves alone, without any ſuch Support.

[89] How, therefore, ſhall we ſolve this Paradox? And by what Means is this Member of our Conſtitution confin'd within its proper Limits; ſince, from our very Conſtitution, it muſt neceſſarily have as much Power as it demands, and can only be confin'd by itſelf? How is this conſiſtent with our conſtant Experience of human Nature? I anſwer, that the Intereſt of the Body is here reſtrain'd by the Intereſt of the Individuals, and that the Houſe of Commons ſtretches not its Power, becauſe ſuch an Uſurpation would be contrary to the Intereſt of the Majority of its Members. The Crown has ſo many Offices at its Diſpoſal, that when aſſiſted by the honeſt and diſintereſted Part of the Houſe, it will always command the Reſolutions of the whole; ſo far at leaſt, as to preſerve the antient Conſtitution from Danger. We may, therefore, give to this Influence what Name we pleaſe; we may call it by the invidious Appellations of Corruption and Dependence; but ſome Degree and ſome Kind of it are inſeparable from the very Nature of the Conſtitution, and neceſſary to the Preſervation of our mixt Government.

[90] INSTEAD then of aſſerting * abſolutely, that the Dependence of Parliament, in every Degree, is an Infringement of Britiſh Liberty, the Country-Party would have done better to have made ſome Conceſſions to their Adverſaries, and have only examined what was the proper Degree of this Dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to Liberty. But ſuch a Moderation is not to be expected of Partymen of any kind. After a Conceſſion of this Nature, all Declamation muſt be abandoned; and a ſerious calm Enquiry into the proper Degrees of Court-Influence, and Parliamentary Dependence would have been expected by the Readers. And tho' the Advantage, in ſuch a Controverſy, might poſſibly remain to the Country-Party; yet the Victory would not have been ſo compleat as they wiſh for, nor would a true Patriot have given an entire Looſe to his Zeal, for fear of running Matters into a contrary Extreme, by diminiſhing too far the Influence of the Crown. 'Twas, therefore, [91] thought beſt to deny, that this Extreme could ever be dangerous to the Conſtitution, or that the Crown could ever have too little Influence over Members of Parliament.

ALL Queſtions concerning the proper Medium betwixt any two Extremes are very difficult to be decided; both becauſe it is difficult to find Words proper to fix this Medium, and becauſe the Good and Ill, in ſuch Caſes, run ſo gradually into each other, as even to render our Sentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar Difficulty in the preſent Caſe, which would embarraſs the moſt knowing and moſt impartial Examiner. The Power of the Crown is always lodged in a ſingle Perſon, either King or Miniſter; and as this Perſon may have either a greater or leſs Degree of Ambition, Capacity, Courage, Popularity or Fortune, the Power, which is too great in one Hand, may become too little in another. [92] In pure Republics, where the Power is diſtributed among ſeveral Aſſemblies or Senates, the Checks and Controuls are more regular in their Operation; becauſe the Members of ſuch numerous Aſſemblies may be preſumed to be always nearly equal in Capacity and Virtue; and 'tis only their Number, Riches, or Authority, that enter into Conſideration. But a limited Monarchy admits not of any ſuch Stability; nor is it poſſible to aſſign to the Crown ſuch a determinate Degree of Power, as will, in every Hand, form a proper Counter-ballance to the other Parts of the Conſtitution. This is an unavoidable Diſadvantage, among the many Advantages attending that Species of Government.

ESSAY IX. Whether the BRITISH GOVERNMENT inclines more to ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, or to a REPUBLIC.

[93]

IT affords a violent Prejudice againſt almoſt every Art and Science, that no prudent Man, however ſure of his Principles, dare propheſy concerning any Event, or foretell the remote Conſequences of Things. No Phyſician will venture to pronounce concerning the Condition of his Patient a Fortnight or Month after: And ſtill leſs dare a Politician foretell the Situation of public Affairs a few Years hence. Harrington thought himſelf ſo ſure of his general Principle, That the Ballance of Power depends on that of Property, that he ventured to pronounce it impoſſible ever to re-eſtabliſh Monarchy in England. [94] But his Book was ſcarce publiſhed when the King was reſtored; and we ſee that Monarchy has ever ſince ſubſiſted upon the ſame Footing as before. Notwithſtanding of this unlucky Example, I will venture to examine a very important Queſtion, viz. Whether the Britiſh Government inclines more to Abſolute Monarchy, or to a Republic? and in which of theſe two Species of Government it will moſt probably terminate? As there ſeems not to be any great Danger of a ſudden Revolution either Way, I ſhall at leaſt eſcape the Shame attending my Temerity, if I ſhould be found to have been miſtaken.

THOSE who aſſert, that the Ballance of our Government inclines towards Abſolute Monarchy may ſupport their Opinion by the following Reaſons. That Property has a great Influence on Power cannot poſſibly be denied; but yet the general Maxim, That the Ballance of the one depends upon the Ballance of the other, muſt be received with ſeveral Limitations. 'Tis evident, that much leſs Property in a ſingle Hand will be able to counter-ballance a greater Property in ſeveral Hands; not only becauſe it is difficult to make many [95] Perſons combine in the ſame Views and Meaſures; but alſo becauſe Property, when united, cauſes much greater Dependence, than the ſame Property, when diſperſed. An hundred Perſons of 1000 a Year apiece, can conſume all their Income, and no Body ſhall ever be the better for them, except their Servants and Tradeſmen, who juſtly regard their Profits as the Product of their own Labour. But a Man poſſeſt of 100,000 a Year, if he has either any Generoſity, or any Cunning, may create a great Dependence by Obligations, and ſtill a greater by Expectations. Hence we find, that in all free Governments any Subject exorbitantly rich has always created Jealouſy, even tho' his Riches bore no manner of Proportion to the Riches of the State. Craſſus's Fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to *Three Thouſand Talents a Year; and yet we find, that though his Genius was nothing extraordinary, he was able, by Means of his Riches alone, to counter-ballance, during his Lifetime, the Power of Caeſar, who afterwards became Maſter of the World. The Wealth of [96] the Medicis made them Maſters of Florence; tho', 'tis probable, it was very inconſiderable, compared to the united Property of that opulent Republic.

THESE Conſiderations are apt to make one entertain a very magnificent Idea of the Britiſh Spirit and Love of Liberty; ſince we cou'd maintain our free Government, during ſo many Centuries, againſt our Sovereigns, who, beſides the Power and Dignity and Majeſty of the Crown, have always been poſſeſt of much more Property, than any Subject has ever enjoy'd in any Common-wealth. But it may be ſaid, that this Spirit, however great, will never be able to ſupport itſelf againſt that immenſe Property, which is now lodg'd in the King, and which is ſtill increaſing. Upon a moderate Computation, there are near three Millions at the Diſpoſal of the Crown. The civil Liſt amounts to near a Million. The Collection of all Taxes to another Million. And the Employments in the Army and Navy, along with Eccleſiaſtical Preferments above a third Million; a monſtruous Sum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth Part of the whole Income and Labour [97] of the Kingdom. When we add to this immenſe Property, the increaſing Luxury of the Nation, our Proneneſs to Corruption, along with the great Power and Prerogatives of the Crown, and the Command of ſuch numerous military Forces, there is no one but muſt deſpair, without extraordinary Efforts, of being able to ſupport our free Government much longer under all theſe Diſadvantages.

ON the other Hand, thoſe who maintain, that the Byaſs of the Britiſh Government leans towards a Republic, may ſupport their Opinion by very ſpecious Arguments. It may be ſaid, that though this immenſe Property in the Crown, be join'd to the Dignity of firſt Magiſtrate, and to many other legal Powers and Prerogatives, which ſhould naturally give it a greater Influence; yet it really becomes leſs dangerous to Liberty upon that very Account. Were Britain a Republic, and were any private Man poſſeſs'd of a Revenue, a third, or even a tenth Part as large as that of the Crown, he would very juſtly excite Jealouſy; becauſe he would infallibly have great Authority in the Government: And ſuch an irregular Authority, not avowed by the Laws, [98] is always more dangerous than a much greater Authority, which is derived from them. A *Man poſſeſs'd of uſurp'd Authority can ſet no Bounds to his Pretenſions: His Partizans have Liberty to hope for every thing in his Favours: His Enemies provoke his Ambition, along with his Fears, by the Violence of their Oppoſition: And the Government being thrown into a Ferment, every corrupted Humour in the State naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal Authority, though very great, has always ſome Bounds, which terminate both the Hopes and Pretenſions of the Perſons poſſeſs'd of it: The Laws muſt have provided a Remedy againſt its Exceſſes: Such an eminent Magiſtrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his Uſurpations: And as his legal Authority is quietly ſubmitted to, he has little Temptation and little Opportunity of extending it farther. Beſides, it happens, with regard to ambitious Aims and Projects, what may be obſerved with regard to Sects of Philoſophy and Religion. A new Sect excites ſuch a Ferment, [99] and is both oppoſed and defended with ſuch Vehemence, that it ſpreads always faſter, and multiplies its Partizans with greater Rapidity, than any old eſtabliſhed Opinion, recommended by the Sanction of the Laws and of Antiquity. Such is the Nature of Novelty, that where any thing pleaſes, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new, but, if it diſpleaſes, it is doubly diſpleaſing, upon that very Account. And, in moſt Caſes, the Violence of Enemies is favourable to ambitious Projects, as well as the Zeal of Partizans.

IT may farther be ſaid, That tho' Men be very much govern'd by Intereſt; yet even Intereſt itſelf, and all human Affairs are merely govern'd by Opinion. Now, there has been a very ſudden and a very ſenſible Change in the Opinions of Men within theſe laſt Fifty Years, by the Progreſs of Learning and of Liberty. Moſt People, in this Iſland, have diveſted themſelves of all ſuperſtitious Reverence to Names and Authority: The Clergy have entirely loſt their Credit: Their Pretenſions and Doctrines have been ridicul'd; and even Religion can ſcarce ſupport itſelf in the World. The mere Name of King commands little Reſpect; and [100] to talk of him as GOD's Vicegerent upon Earth, or to give him any of thoſe magnificent Titles, which formerly dazl'd Mankind, wou'd but excite Laughter in every one. Tho' the Crown, by Means of its large Revenue, may maintain its Authority in Times of Tranquility, upon private Intereſt and Influence; yet, as the leaſt Shock or Convulſion muſt break all theſe Intereſts to Pieces, the kingly Power, being no longer ſupported by the ſettled Principles and Opinions of Men, will immediately diſſolve. Had Men been in the ſame Diſpoſition at the Revolution, as they are at preſent, Monarchy wou'd have run a great Riſque of being entirely loſt in this Iſland.

DURST I venture to deliver my own Sentiments amidſt theſe oppoſite Arguments, I wou'd aſſert, that unleſs there happen ſome extraordinary Convulſion, the Power of the Crown, by Means of its large Revenue, is rather upon the Increaſe; tho', at the ſame Time, I own, that its Progreſs ſeems to me very ſlow and almoſt inſenſible. The Tide has run long, and with ſome Rapidity, to [101] the Side of popular Government, and is juſt beginning to turn towards Monarchy.

'TIS well known, that every Government muſt come to a Period, and that Death is unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal Body. But, as one Kind of Death may be preferable to another, it may be enquir'd, Whether it be more diſirable for the Britiſh Conſtitution to terminate in a popular Government, or in abſolute Monarchy? Here I wou'd declare frankly, that tho' Liberty be infinitely preferable to Slavery, in almoſt every Caſe; yet I wou'd much rather wiſh to ſee an abſolute Monarch than a Republic in this Iſland: For, let us conſider, what Kind of Republic we have Reaſon to expect. The Queſtion is not concerning any fine imaginary Republic, which a Man may form a Plan of in his Cloſet. There is no Doubt, but a popular Government may be imagin'd more perfect than abſolute Monarchy, or even than our preſent Conſtitution: But what Reaſon have we to expect that any ſuch Government will ever be eſtabliſh'd in Britain, upon the Diſſolution of our Monarchy? If any ſingle Perſon acquire Power enough to take our Conſtitution to Pieces, [102] and put it up anew, he is really an abſolute Monarch; and we have had already an Inſtance of this Kind, ſufficient to convince us, that ſuch a Perſon will never reſign his Power, or eſtabliſh any free Government. Matters, therefore, muſt be truſted to their natural Progreſs and Operation; and the Houſe of Commons, according to its preſent Conſtitution, muſt-be the only Legiſlature in ſuch a popular Government. The Inconveniencies, attending ſuch a Situation of Affairs, preſent themſelves by Thouſands. If the Houſe of Commons, in ſuch a Caſe, ever diſſolves itſelf, which is not to be expected, we may look for a Civil War every Election. If it continues itſelf, we ſhall ſuffer all the Tyranny of a Faction, ſub-divided into new Factions: And as ſuch a violent Government cannot long ſubſiſt, we ſhall, at laſt, after infinite Convulſions and Civil Wars, find Repoſe in abſolute Monarchy, which it wou'd have been happier for us to have eſtabliſh'd peaceably from the Beginning. Abſolute Monarchy, therefore, is the eaſieſt Death, the true Euthanaſia of the Britiſh Conſtitution.

[103] THUS, if we have Reaſon to be more jealous of Monarchy, becauſe the Danger is more imminent from that Quarter; we have alſo Reaſon to be more jealous of popular Government, becauſe that Danger is more terrible. This may teach us a Leſſon of Moderation in all our political Controverſies.

ESSAY X. Of PARTIES in general.

[105]

OF all Men, that diſtinguiſh themſelves by memorable Atchievements, the firſt Place of Honour, in my Opinion, is due to LEGISLATORS, and Founders of States, who tranſmit a Syſtem of Laws and Inſtitutions to ſecure the Peace, Happineſs and Liberty of future Generations. The Influence of uſeful Inventions in the Arts and Sciences may, perhaps, extend farther than thoſe of wiſe Laws, whoſe Effects are limited both in Time and Place; but the Benefit ariſing from the former is not ſo ſenſible as that which proceeds from the latter. Speculative Sciences, do, indeed, improve the Mind; but this Advantage reaches only to a few Perſons, who have Leiſure to apply themſelves to them. And as to practical [106] Arts, which encreaſe the Commodities and Enjoyments of Life; 'tis well known, that Men's Happineſs conſiſts not ſo much in an Abundance of theſe, as in the Peace and Security with which they poſſeſs them: And theſe Bleſſings can only be derived from good Government. Not to mention, that general Virtue and good Morals in a State, which are ſo requiſite to Happineſs, can never ariſe from the moſt refined Precepts of Philoſophy, or even the ſevereſt Injunctions of Religion; but muſt proceed entirely from a virtuous Education, the Effect of wiſe Laws and Inſtitutions. I muſt, therefore, be of a different Opinion from my Lord BACON in this Particular, and muſt regard Antiquity as ſomewhat unjuſt in in its Diſtribution of Honour, when it made Gods of all the Inventors of uſeful Arts, ſuch as Ceres, Bacchus, Aeſculapius; and dignified Legiſlators, ſuch as Romulus and Theſeus, only with the Appellation of Demi-Gods and Heroes.

As much as Legiſlators and Founders of States ought to be honoured and reſpected among Men, as much ought the Founders of Sects and Factions to be deteſted and hated; becauſe [107] the Influence of Factions is directly contrary to that of Laws. Factions ſubvert Government; render Laws impotent, and beget the fierceſt Animoſities among Men of the ſame Nation, who ought to give mutual Aſſiſtance and Protection to each other. And what ſhou'd render the Founders of Factions more odious is the Difficulty of extirpating Factions, when once they have taken riſe in any State. They naturally propagate themſelves for many Centuries, and ſeldom end but by the total Diſſolution of that Government, in which they are planted. They are, beſides, Seeds, which grow moſt plentifully in the richeſt Soils; and though deſpotic Governments be not entirely free from them, it muſt be confeſs'd, that they riſe more eaſily, and propagate themſelves faſter in free Governments, where they always infect the Legiſlature itſelf, which alone cou'd be able, by the ſteady Application of Rewards and Puniſhments, to eradicate them.

FACTIONS or Parties may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into Factions founded on perſonal Friendſhip or Animoſity among thoſe who compoſe the Factions, [108] and into thoſe founded on ſome real Difference of Sentiment or Intereſt. The Reaſon of this Diſtinction is obvious; though I muſt acknowledge, that Parties are ſeldom found pure and unmixt, either of the one kind or the other. 'Tis not often ſeen, that a Government divides into Factions, where there is no Difference in the Views of theſe Factions, either real or apparent, trivial or material: And in thoſe Factions, which are founded on the moſt real and moſt material Difference, there is always found to be a great deal of perſonal Animoſity or Affection. But notwithſtanding of this Mixture, a Party may be denominated either perſonal or real, according to that Principle which is predominant, and is obſerved to have the greateſt Influence.

PERSONAL Factions ariſe moſt eaſily in ſmall Republics. Every domeſtic Quarrel becomes an Affair of State. Love, Vanity, Emulation, any Paſſion begets public Diviſion, as well as Ambition and Reſentment. The Neri and Bianchi of Florence, the Fregoſi and Adorni of Genoa, the Colonneſi and Orſini of modern Rome, were Parties of this kind.

[109] MEN have ſuch a Propenſity to divide into perſonal Factions, that the ſmalleſt Appearance of real Difference will beget them. What can be imagined more trivial than the Difference betwixt one Colour of Livery and another in Horſe-Races? And yet this Difference begot two moſt inveterate Factions in the Greek Empire, the Praſini and Veneti, who never ſuſpended their Animoſities, 'till they ruined that unhappy Government.

NOTHING is more uſual than to ſee Parties, which have begun upon a real Difference, continue even after that Difference is loſt. When Men are once inliſted on different Sides, they contract an Affection to the Perſons with whom they are united, and an Animoſity againſt their Antagoniſts: And theſe Paſſions they often tranſmit to their Poſterity. The real Difference betwixt Guelf and Ghibbelline was long loſt in Italy, before theſe Factions were extinguiſhed. The Guelfs adher'd to the Pope, the Ghibbellines to the Emperor; and yet the Family of Sforſa, who were in Alliance with the Emperor, though they were Guelfs, being expelled Milan by the King* of [110] France, aſſiſted by Jacomo Trivulzio and the Ghibbellines, the Pope concurred with them, and they form'd Leagues with the Pope againſt the Emperor.

THE Civil Wars lately ariſen in Morocco betwixt the Blacks and Whites, merely on account of their Complexion, are founded on a very pleaſant Difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were Things rightly examin'd, we afford much more Occaſion of Ridicule to the Moors. For pray, what are all the Wars of Religion, which have prevail'd in this polite and knowing Part of the World? They are, in my Opinion, more abſurd than the Mooriſh Civil Wars. The Difference of Complexion is a ſenſible and a real Difference: But the Difference about an Article of Faith, which is utterly abſurd and unintelligible, is not a real Difference of Sentiments, but only a Difference of a few Phraſes and Expreſſions, which one Party accepts of, without underſtanding them; and the other refuſes, in the ſame Manner. Beſides, I do not find, that the Whites in Morocco ever impos'd on the Blacks any Neceſſity of altering their Complexion, or threaten'd them with Inquiſitions [111] and penal Laws in caſe of Obſtinacy: Nor have the Blacks been more unreaſonable in this Particular. But is a Man's Opinion, where he is able to form a real Opinion, more at his Diſpoſal than his Complexion? And can one be induc'd by Force or Fear to do more than paint and Diſguiſe in the one Caſe as well as in the other?

REAL Factions may be divided into Factions from Intereſt, from Principle, and from Affection. Of all Factions, thoſe from Intereſt are the moſt reaſonable and the moſt excuſable. Where two Orders of Men, ſuch as the Nobles and People, have a diſtinct Authority in a Government, which is not very accurately ballanc'd and modell'd, they naturally follow a diſtinct Intereſt; nor can we reaſonably expect a different Conduct from that Degree of Selfiſhneſs, which is implanted in human Nature. It requires very great Skill in a Legiſlator to prevent ſuch Factions; and many Philoſophers are of Opinion, that this Secret, like the Grand Elixir, or Perpetual Motion, may amuſe Men in Theory, but can never poſſibly be reduc'd to Practice. In deſpotick Governments, indeed, Factions often [112] do not appear; but they are never the leſs real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very Account. The diſtinct Orders of Men, Nobles and People, Soldiers and Merchants, have all a diſtinct Intereſt; but the more Powerful oppreſſes the Weaker with Impunity, and without Reſiſtance; which begets a ſeeming Tranquillity in ſuch Governments.

THERE has been an Attempt to divide the landed and trading Intereſt in England; but without Succeſs. The Intereſt of theſe two Bodies is not really diſtinct, and never will be ſo, till our public Debts increaſe to ſuch a Degree, as to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable.

PARTIES from Principles, eſpecially abſtract ſpeculative Principles, are known only to modern Times, and are, perhaps, the moſt extraordinary and unaccountable Phaenomena, that have ever yet appear'd in human Affairs. Where different Principles beget a Contrariety of Conduct, as all different political Principles do, the Matter may be more eaſily explain'd. A Man, who eſteems the true Right [113] of Government to ly in one Man, or one Family, cannot eaſily agree with his Fellow-Citizen, who thinks, that another Man or Family is poſſeſt of this Right. Each naturally wiſhes that Right may take Place, according to his own Notions of it. But where the Difference of Principles begets no Contrariety of Action, but each may follow his own Way, without interfering with his Neighbour, as happens in all religious Controverſies; what Madneſs, what Fury can beget ſuch unhappy and ſuch fatal Diviſions?

TWO Men, travelling on the High-way, of whom one goes Eaſt, the other Weſt, can eaſily paſs each other, if the Way be broad enough: But two Men, reaſoning upon oppoſite Principles of Religion, cannot ſo eaſily paſs, without ſhocking; tho' one ſhou'd think, that the Way were alſo, in that Caſe, ſufficiently broad, and that each might proceed, without Interruption, in his own Way. But ſuch is the Nature of the human Mind, that it always takes hold of every Mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully ſtrengthen'd and corroborated by an Unanimity of Sentiments, ſo it is ſhock'd and diſturb'd by [114] any Contrariety. Hence the Eagerneſs, which moſt People diſcover in a Diſpute; hence their Impatience of Oppoſition, even in the moſt ſpeculative and indifferent Opinions.

THIS Principle, however frivolous it may appear, ſeems to have been the Origin of all religious Wars and Diviſions. But, as this Principle is univerſal in human Nature, its Effects wou'd not have been confin'd to one Age, and to one Sect of Religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental Cauſes, which raiſe it to ſuch a Height, as to cauſe the higheſt Miſery and Devaſtation. Moſt Religions of the antient World aroſe in the unknown Ages of Government, when Men were as yet barbarous and uninſtructed, and the Prince, as well as Peaſant, were diſpos'd to receive, with implicite Faith, every pious Tale or Fiction that was offer'd them. The Magiſtrate embrac'd the Religion of the People, and entering cordially into the Care of ſacred Matters, naturally acquir'd an Authority in them, and united the Eccleſiaſtical with the Civil Power. But the Chriſtian Religion ariſing, while Principles directly oppoſite to it were firmly eſtabliſh'd in the polite Part [115] of the World, who deſpis'd the Nation that firſt broach'd this Novelty; no Wonder, that Chriſtianity, in ſuch Circumſtances, was but little countenanc'd by the Civil Magiſtrate, and that the Chriſtian Prieſthood were allowed to engroſs all the Authority in the new Sect. So bad a Uſe did they make of this Power, even in thoſe early Times, that the Perfecutions of Chriſtianity may, perhaps, in Part, be aſcrib'd to the Violence inſtill'd by them into their Followers. And the ſame Principles of Prieſtly Government continuing, after Chriſtianity became the eſtabliſh'd Religion, they have engender'd a Spirit of Perſecution, which has ever ſince been the Poiſon of human Society, and the Source of the moſt inveterate Factions in every Government. Such Factions, therefore, on the Part of the poor People, may juſtly be eſteem'd Factions of Principle; but on the Part of the Prieſts, who are the prime Movers, they are really Factions of Intereſt.

THERE is another Cauſe (beſide the Authority of the Prieſts, and the Separation of the Eccleſiaſtical and Civil Powers) that has contributed to render Chriſtendom the Scene [116] of religious Wars and Diviſions. Religions, that ariſe in Ages totally ignorant and barbarous, conſiſt moſtly of traditional Tales and Fictions, which may be very different in every Sect, without being contrary to each other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the Tradition of his own Sect, without much Reaſoning or Diſputation. But as Philoſophy was widely ſpread over the World, at the Time that Chriſtianity aroſe, the Teachers of the new Sect were oblig'd to form a Syſtem of ſpeculative Opinions; to divide, with ſome Accuracy, their Articles of Faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and confirm with all the Subtility of Argument and Science. From hence naturally aroſe Keenneſs in Diſpute, when Chriſtianity came to be ſplit into new Diviſions and Hereſies: And this Keenneſs aſſiſted the Prieſts in their pernicious Policy, of begetting a mutual Hatred and Antipathy among their deluded Followers. Sects of Philoſophy, in the antient World, were more zealous than Parties of Religion; but, in modern Times, Parties of Religion are more furious and enrag'd than the moſt cruel Factions, that ever aroſe from Intereſt and Ambition.

[117] I HAVE mention'd Parties from Affection as a kind of real Parties, beſide thoſe from Intereſt and Principle. By Parties from Affection, I underſtand thoſe which are founded on the different Affections of Men towards particular Families and Perſons, whom they deſire to rule over them. Theſe Parties are often very violent, though I muſt own it is ſomewhat unaccountable, that Men ſhou'd attach themſelves ſo ſtrongly to Perſons, whom they are no way acquainted with, whom perhaps they never ſaw, and from whom they never received nor can ever hope for any Favour. Yet this we find often to be the Caſe, and even with Men, who, on other Occaſions, diſcover no great Generoſity of Spirit, nor are found to be eaſily tranſported by Friendſhip beyond their own Intereſt. We are apt, I know not how, to think the Relation betwixt us and our Sovereign very cloſe and intimate. The Splendor of Majeſty and Power beſtows an Importance on the Fortunes even of a ſingle Perſon. And when a Man's Good-nature does not give him this imaginary Intereſt, his Ill-nature will do it, from Spite and Oppoſition to Perſons, whoſe Sentiments are different from his own.

ESSAY XI. Of the PARTIES of GREAT-BRITAIN.

[119]

WERE the Britiſh Government propoſed as a Subject of Speculation to a ſtudious Man, he wou'd immediately perceive in it a Source of Diviſion and Party, which it wou'd be almoſt impoſſible for it, in any Adminiſtration, to avoid. The juſt Ballance betwixt the Republican and Monarchical Part of our Conſtitution is really, in itſelf, ſo extreme delicate and uncertain, that when join'd to Men's Paſſions and Prejudices, 'tis impoſſible but different Opinions muſt ariſe concerning it, even among Perſons of the beſt Underſtanding. Thoſe of mild Tempers, who love Peace and Order, and deteſt Sedition and Civil Wars, will always entertain more favourable Sentiments [120] of Monarchy, than Men of bold Spirits, who are paſſionate Lovers of Liberty, and think no Evil comparable to Subjection and Slavery. And though all reaſonable Men agree in general to preſerve our mixt Government; yet when they come to Particulars, ſome will incline to truſt larger Powers to the Crown, to beſtow on it more Influence, and to guard againſt its Encroachments with leſs Caution, than others who are terrified at the moſt diſtant Approaches of Tyranny and deſpotic Power. Thus there are Parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very Nature of our Conſtitution, which may properly enough be denominated *COURT and COUNTRY Parties. The [121] Strength and Violence of each of theſe Parties will much depend upon the particular Adminiſtration. An Adminiſtration may be ſo bad as to throw a great Majority into the Country Party; as a good Adminiſtration will reconcile to the Court many of the moſt paſſionate Lovers of Liberty. But, however the Nation may fluctuate betwixt theſe two Parties, the Parties will always ſubſiſt, as long as we are govern'd by a limited Monarchy.

BUT, beſides this Difference of Principle, thoſe Parties are very much fomented by a Difference of INTEREST, without which they cou'd ſcarce ever be dangerous or violent. The Crown will naturally beſtow all its Truſt and Power upon thoſe, whoſe Principles, real or pretended, are moſt favourable to Monarchical Government; and this Temptation will naturally engage them to go greater Lengths than their Principles wou'd otherwiſe carry them. Their Antagoniſts, who are diſappointed in their ambitious Aims, throw themſelves into the Party, whoſe Principles incline them to be moſt jealous of Royal Power, and naturally carry thoſe Principles to a greater Length than ſound Politics will juſtify. Thus, the [122] Court and Country Parties, which are the genuine Factions of the Britiſh Government, are a kind of mixt Parties, and are influenced partly by Principle, partly by Intereſt. The Heads of the Parties are commonly moſt governed by the latter Motive; the inferior Members of them, by the former. I muſt be underſtood to mean this of Perſons who have any Motive for taking Party on any Side. For, to tell the Truth, the greateſt Part are commonly Men who aſſociate themſelves they know not why; from Example, from Paſſion, from Idleneſs. But ſtill it is requiſite there be ſome Source of Diviſion, either in Principle or Intereſt; otherwiſe ſuch Perſons wou'd not find Parties, to which they cou'd aſſociate themſelves.

AS to Eccleſiaſtical Parties; we may obſerve, that, in all Ages of the World, Prieſts have been Enemies to Liberty; and 'tis certain, that this ſteady Conduct of theirs muſt have been founded on fixt Reaſons of Intereſt and Ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expreſſing our Thoughts, is always fatal to Prieſtly Power, and to thoſe pious Frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and by [123] an infallible Connexion, which is found among every Species of Liberty, this Privilege can never be enjoy'd, at leaſt, has never yet been enjoy'd, but in a free Government. Hence it muſt happen, in ſuch a Government as Britain, that the eſtabliſh'd Clergy will always be of the Court-Party; as, on the contrary, Diſſenters of all kinds will be of the Country-Party; ſince they can never hope for that Toleration they ſtand in need of, but by Means of our free Government. All Princes, that have aimed at deſpotic Power, have known this important Intereſt of gaining the eſtabliſh'd Clergy: As the Clergy, on their Side, have ſhewn a great Facility of entering into the Views of ſuch Princes. Guſtavus Vaza was, perhaps, the only ambitious Monarch, that ever depreſs'd the Church, at the ſame Time, that he diſcouraged Liberty. But the exorbitant Power of the Biſhops in Sweden, who at that Time overtop'd the Crown, along with their Attachment to a foreign Family, was the Reaſon of his embracing ſuch an unuſual Piece of Politics.

THIS Obſervation concerning the Propenſity of Clergymen to deſpotic Power, and to [124] the Government of a ſingle Perſon, is not true with regard to one Sect only: The Presbyterian and Calviniſtic Clergy in Holland were always profeſs'd Friends to the Power of the Family of Orange; as the Arminians, who were eſteem'd Heretics, were always of the Loveſtein Faction, and zealous for Liberty. But if a Prince has the Choice of both, 'tis eaſy to ſee, that he will prefer the Epiſcopal to the Presbyterian Form of Government; both becauſe of the greater Affinity betwixt Monarchy and Epiſcopacy, and becauſe of the Facility which a Prince finds in ſuch a Government, of ruling the Clergy, by Means of their Eccleſiaſtical Superiors.

IF we conſider the firſt Riſe of Parties in England, during the Civil Wars, we ſhall find, that they were exactly conformable to this general Theory, and that the Species of the Government gave Birth to them, by a regular and infallible Operation. The Engliſh Conſtitution, before that Time, had lain in a Kind of Confuſion; yet ſo, as that the Subjects poſſeſs'd many noble Privileges, which, though not, perhaps, exactly bounded and ſecur'd by Law, were univerſally deem'd, from long [125] Poſſeſſion, to belong to them as their Birth-Right. An ambitious, or rather an ignorant, Prince aroſe, who eſteem'd all theſe Privileges to be Conceſſions of his Predeceſſors, revocable at Pleaſure; and in Proſecution of this Principle, he openly acted in Violation of Liberty, during the Courſe of ſeveral Years. Neceſſity, at laſt, conſtrain'd him to call a Parliament: The Spirit of Liberty aroſe: The Prince, being without any Support, was obliged to grant every Thing requir'd of him: And his Enemies, jealous and implacable, ſet no Bounds to their Pretenſions. Here then begun thoſe Conteſts, in which it was no Wonder, that Men of that Age were divided into different Parties; ſince, even at this Day, the Impartial are at a Loſs to decide concerning the Juſtice of the Quarrel. The Pretenſions of the Parliament, if yielded to, broke the Ballance of our Conſtitution, by rendering the Government almoſt entirely Republican. If not yielded to, we were, perhaps, ſtill in Danger of deſpotic Power, from the ſettled Principles and inveterate Habits of the King, which had plainly appear'd in every Conceſſion, that he had been conſtrain'd to make to his People. In this Queſtion, ſo delicate [126] and uncertain, Men naturally fell to the Side, which was moſt conformable to their uſual Principles; and thoſe, who were the moſt paſſionate Favourers of Monarchy, declar'd for the King; as the zealous Friends of Liberty ſided with the Parliament. The Hopes of Succeſs being nearly equal on both Sides, Intereſt had little Influence in this Conteſt: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were merely Parties of Principle; neither of which diſown'd either Monarchy or Liberty; but the former Party inclin'd moſt to the Republican Part of our Government, and the latter to the Monarchial. In which reſpect they may be conſider'd as Court and Country-Party enflam'd into a Civil War, by an unhappy Concurrence of Circumſtances, and by the turbulent Spirit of the Age. The Commonwealth's-Men, and the Partizans of deſpotic Power, lay conceal'd in both Parties, and form'd but an inconſiderable Part of them.

THE Clergy had concurr'd, in a ſhameleſs Manner, with the King's arbitrary Deſigns, according to their uſual Maxims in ſuch Caſes: And, in Return, were allow'd to perſecute their Adverſaries, whom they call'd Heretics [127] and Schiſmatics. The eſtabliſh'd Clergy was Epiſcopal; the Non-conformiſts Presbyterians: So that all Things concurr'd to throw the former, without Reſerve, into the King's Party; and the latter into that of the Parliament. The Cavaliers being the Court-Party, and the Round-heads the Country-Party, the Union was infallible betwixt the former and the eſtabliſh'd Prelacy, and betwixt the latter and Presbyterian Non-conformiſts. This Union is ſo natural, according to the general Principles of Politics, that it requires ſome very extraordinary Concurrence of Circumſtances to break it.

EVERY one knows the Event of this Quarrel; fatal to the King firſt, and to the Parliament afterwards. After many Confuſions and Revolutions, the Royal Family was at laſt reſtor'd, and the Government eſtabliſh'd on the ſame Footing as before. Charles II. was not made wiſer by the dreadful Example of his Father; but proſecuted the ſame Meaſures, tho' with more Secrecy and Caution. New Parties aroſe, under the Appellations [...] WHIG and TORY, which have continued ever ſince to confound and diſtract our Government. [128] What the Nature is of theſe Parties, is, perhaps, one of the moſt difficult Queſtions that can be met with, and is a Proof, that Hiſtory may contain Problems, as uncertain as any that are to be found in the moſt abſtract Sciences. We have ſeen the Conduct of theſe two Parties, during the Courſe of Seventy Years, in a vaſt Variety of Circumſtances, poſſeſs'd of Power, and depriv'd of it, during Peace and during War: We meet with Perſons, who profeſs themſelves of one Side or t'other, every Hour, in Company, in our Pleaſures, in our ſerious Occupations: We ourſelves are conſtrain'd, in a Manner, to take Party; and living in a Country of the higheſt Liberty, every one may openly declare all his Sentiments and Opinions: And yet we are at a Loſs to tell the Nature, Pretenſions, and Principles of the two Parties. The Queſtion is, perhaps, in itſelf, ſomewhat difficult; but has been render'd more ſo, by the Prejudices and Violence of Party.

WHEN we compare the Parties of Whig and Tory, to thoſe of Round-head and Cavalier, the moſt obvious Difference, that appears betwixt them, conſiſts in the Doctrines [129] of paſſive Obedience and indefeaſible Right, which were but little heard of among the Cavaliers, but became the univerſal Doctrine, and was the true Characteriſtic, of a Tory. Were theſe Principles puſh'd into their moſt obvious Conſequences, they imply a formal Renunciation of all our Liberties, and an Avowal of abſolute Monarchy; ſince nothing can be a greater Abſurdity than a limited Power, which muſt not be reſiſted, even when it exceeds its Limitations. But as the moſt rational Principles are often but a weak Counterpoiſe to Paſſion; 'tis no Wonder, that theſe abſurd Principles, ſufficient, according to a juſtly celebrated *Author, to ſhock the common Senſe of a HOTTENTOT or SAMOIEDE, were found too weak for that Effect. The Tories, as Men, were Enemies to Oppreſſion; and alſo, as Engliſhmen, they were Enemies to deſpotick Power. Their Zeal for Liberty, was, perhaps, leſs fervent than that of their Antagoniſts; but was ſufficient to make them forget all their general Principles, when they ſaw themſelves openly threaten'd with a Subverſion of the antient Government. [130] From theſe Sentiments aroſe the Revolution; an Event of mighty Conſequence, and the firmeſt Foundation of Britiſh Liberty. The Conduct of the Tories, during that Event, and after it, will afford us a true Inſight into the Nature of that Party.

IN the firſt Place, They appear to have had the Sentiments of true Britons in their Affection to Liberty, and their determin'd Reſolution not to ſacrifice it to any abſtract Principles whatſoever, or to any imaginary Rights of Princes. This Part of their Character might juſtly have been doubted of before the Revolution, from the obvious Tendency of their avow'd Principles, and from their almoſt unbounded Compliances with a Court, that made little Secret of its arbitrary Deſigns. The Revolution ſhow'd them to have been, in this Reſpect, nothing but a genuine Court-Party, ſuch as might be expected in a Britiſh Government: That is, Lovers of Liberty, but greater Lovers of Monarchy. It muſt, however, be confeſt, that they carry'd their monarchical Principles further, even in Practice, [131] but more ſo in Theory, than was, in any Degree, conſiſtent with a limited Government.

Secondly. NEITHER their Principles nor Affections concurr'd with the Settlement made at the Revolution, or with that which has ſince taken Place. This Part of their Character may ſeem contradictory to the former; ſince any other Settlement, in thoſe Circumſtances of the Nation, muſt have been dangerous, if not fatal to Liberty. But the Heart of Man is made to reconcile the moſt glaring Contradictions; and this Contradiction abovemention'd is not greater than that betwixt Paſſive Obedience, and the Reſiſtance employ'd at the Revolution. A Tory, therefore, ſince the Revolution, may be defin'd in a few Words to be a Lover of Monarchy, tho' without abandoning Liberty; and a Partizan of the Family of STUART. As a Whig may be defin'd to be a Lover of Liberty, tho' without renouncing Monarchy; and a Friend to the Settlement in the Proteſtant Line.

THE celebrated Writer above cited, has aſſerted, that the REAL Diſtinction betwixt Whig and Tory was loſt at the Revolution, and that [132] ever ſince they have continued to be mere perſonal Parties, like the Guelfs and Ghibbellines, after the Emperors had loſt all Authority in Italy. Such an Opinion, were it received, wou'd turn our whole Hiſtory into an Aenigma; and is, indeed, ſo contrary to the ſtrongeſt Evidence, that a Man muſt have a great Opinion of his own Eloquence to attempt the proving of it.

I SHALL firſt mention, as an irreſiſtible Proof of a real Diſtinction betwixt theſe Parties, what every one may have obſerv'd or heard concerning the Conduct and Converſation of all his Friends and Acquaintance on both Sides. Have not the Tories always bore an avowed Affection to the Family of Stuart, and have not their Adverſaries always oppoſed with Vigour the Succeſſion of that Family?

THE Tory Principles are confeſſedly the moſt favourable to Monarchy. Yet the Tories have almoſt always oppoſed the Court theſe fifty Years; nor were they cordial Friends to King William, even when employ'd by him. Their Quarrel, therefore, cannot be ſuppoſed [133] to have lain with the Throne, but with the Perſon, who ſat on it.

THEY concurr'd heartily with the Court during the four laſt Years of Queen Anne. But is any one at a loſs to find the Reaſon?

'TIS monſtrous to ſee an eſtabliſh'd Epiſcopal Clergy in declar'd Oppoſition to the Court, and a Nonconformiſt Presbyterian Clergy in Conjunction with it. What can produce ſuch an unnatural Conduct in both? Nothing but that the former have eſpouſed Monarchical Principles too high for the preſent Settlement, which is founded on Principles of Liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the Prevalence of thoſe high Principles, adhere to that Party, from whom they have Reaſon to expect Liberty and Toleration.

THE different Conduct of the two Parties, with regard to foreign Politics, is alſo a Proof to the ſame Purpoſe. Holland has always been moſt favour'd by one, and France by the other. In ſhort, the Proofs of this kind are ſo palpable and evident, that one is almoſt aſham'd to collect them.

[134] A Tory is a Lover of Monarchy, though without abandoning Liberty; and a Partizan of the Family of STUART. A Whig is a Lover of Liberty, though without renouncing Monarchy; and a Friend to the Settlement in the Proteſtant Line. Theſe different Views, with regard to the Settlement of the Crown, are accidental, but natural Additions to the Principles of the Court and Country Parties, which are the genuine Parties of the Britiſh Government. A paſſionate Lover of Monarchy is apt to be diſpleaſed at any Change of this Succeſſion; as ſavouring too much of a Commonwealth: A paſſionate Lover of Liberty is apt to think that every Part of the Government ought to be ſubordinate to the Intereſts of Liberty. 'Tis however remarkable, that though the Principles of Whig and Tory be both of them of a compound Nature; yet the Ingredients, which predominated in both, were not correſpondent to each other. A Tory loved Monarchy, and bore an Affection to the Family of Stuart; but the latter Affection was the predominant Inclination of the Party. A Whig loved Liberty, and was a Friend to the Settlement in the Poteſtant Line; but the Love of Liberty was profeſſedly his predominant Inclination. [135] The Tories have frequently acted as Republicans, where either Policy or Revenge has engag'd them to that Conduct; and there was none of that Party, who, upon the Suppoſition, that they were to be diſappointed in their Views with regard to the Succeſſion, would not have deſired to impoſe the ſtricteſt Limitations on the Crown, and to bring our Form of Government as near Republican as poſſible, in order to depreſs the Family, that, according to their Apprehenſion, ſucceeded without any juſt Title. The Whigs, 'tis true, have alſo taken Steps dangerous to Liberty, under Pretext of ſecuring the Succeſſion and Settlement of the Crown, according to their Views: But as the Body of the Party had no Paſſion for that Succeſſion, otherwiſe than as the Means of ſecuring Liberty, they have been betray'd into theſe Steps by Ignorance or Frailty, or the Intereſt of their Leaders. The Succeſſion of the Crown was, therefore, the chief Point with the Tories: The Security of our Liberties with the Whigs.

'Tis Difficult to penetrate into the Thoughts and Sentiments of any particular Man; but 'tis almoſt impoſſible to diſtinguiſh thoſe of a [136] whole Party, where it often happens, that no two Perſons agree preciſely in the ſame Way of thinking. Yet I will venture to affirm, that it was not ſo much PRINCIPLE, or an Opinion of indefeazible Right, that attach'd the Tories to the antient Royal Family, as AFFECTION, or a certain Love and Eſteem for their Perſons. The ſame Cauſe divided England formerly betwixt the Houſes of York and Lancaſter, and Scotland, betwixt the Families of Bruce and Baliol; in an Age, when political Diſputes were but little in Faſhion, and when political Principles muſt of Courſe have had but little Influence on Mankind. The Doctrine of paſſive Obedience is ſo abſurd in itſelf, and ſo oppoſite to our Liberties, that it ſeems to have been chiefly left to Pulpit Declaimers, and to their deluded Followers among the Mob. Men of better Senſe were guided by Affection; and as to the Leaders of this Party, it's probable, that Intereſt was their ſole Motive, and that they acted more contrary to their private Sentiments, than the Leaders of the oppoſite Party.

SOME, who will not venture to aſſert, that the real Difference betwixt Whig and Tory was [137] loſt at the Revolution, ſeem inclin'd to think, that the Difference is now aboliſh'd, and that Affairs are ſo far return'd to their natural State, that there are at preſent no other Parties amongſt us but Court and Country; that is, Men, who by Intereſt or Principle are attach'd either to Monarchy or to Liberty. It muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that the Tory Party has, of late, decay'd much in their Numbers; ſtill more in their Zeal; and I may venture to ſay, ſtill more in their Credit and Authority. There is no Man of Knowledge or Learning, who wou'd not be aſham'd to be thought of that Party; and in almoſt all Companies the Name of OLD WHIG is mention'd as an unconteſtable Appellation of Honour and Dignity. Accordingly, the Enemies of the Miniſtry, as a Reproach, call the Courtiers, the true Tories; and as an Honour, denominate the Gentlemen in the Oppoſition the true Whigs. The Tories have been ſo long oblig'd to talk in the Republican Stile, that they ſeem to have made Converts of themſelves by their Hypocriſy, and to have embrac'd the Sentiments, as well as Language of their Adverſaries. There are, however, very conſiderable Remains of that Party in England, [138] with all their old Prejudices; and a demonſtrative Proof, that Court and Country are not our only Parties, is, that almoſt all the Diſſenters ſide with the Court, and the lower Clergy, at leaſt, of the Church of England, with the Oppoſition.

ISHALL conclude this Subject with obſerving, that we never had any Tories in Scotland, according to the proper Signification of the Word, and that the Diviſion of Parties in this Country was really into Whigs and Jacobites. A Jacobite ſeems to be a Tory, who has no Regard to the Conſtitution, but is either a zealous Partizan of abſolute Monarchy, or at leaſt willing to ſacrifice our Liberties to the obtaining the Succeſſion in that Family, to which he is attach'd. The Reaſon of the Difference betwixt England and Scotland I take to be this. Our political and our religious Diviſions in this Country, have been, ſince the Revolution, regularly correſpondent to each other. The Presbyterians were all Whigs without Exception: The Epiſcopalians, of the oppoſite Party. And as the Clergy of the latter Sect were turn'd out of their Churches at the Revolution, they had no Motive [139] to make any Compliances with the Government in their Oaths or Forms of Prayer, but openly avow'd the higheſt Principles of their Party; which is the Cauſe, why their Followers have been more bare-fac'd and violent than their Brethren of the Tory Party in England. As violent Things have not commonly ſo long a Duration as moderate, we actually find, that the Jacobite Party is almoſt entirely vaniſh'd from among us, and that the Diſtinction of Court and Country, which is but creeping in at London, is the only one that is ever mention'd in this Kingdom. Beſide the Violence and Openneſs of the Jacobite Party, another Reaſon has, perhaps, contributed to produce ſo ſudden and ſo viſible an Alteration in this Part of Britain. There are only two Ranks of Men among us; Gentlemen, who have ſome Fortune and Education, and the meaneſt ſlaving Poor; without any conſiderable Number of that middling Rank of Men, which abounds more in England, both in Cities and in the Country, than in any other Part of the World. The ſlaving Poor are incapable of any Principles: Gentlemen may be converted to true Principles, by Time and Experience: The middling Rank of [140] Men have Curioſity and Knowledge enough to form Principles, but not enough to form true Ones, or correct any Prejudices that they may have imbib'd: And 'tis among the middling Rank of People, that Tory Principles do at preſent prevail moſt in England.

ESSAY XII. Of SUPERSTITION and ENTHUSIASM.

[141]

THAT the Corruption of the beſt Things produces the worſt, is grown into a Maxim, and is verify'd, among other Inſtances, by the pernicious Effects of Superſtition and Enthuſiaſm, the Corruptions of true Religion.

THESE two Species of falſe Religion, tho' both pernicious, yet are of a very different, and even of a contrary Nature. The Mind of Man is ſubject to certain unaccountable Terrors and Apprehenſions, proceeding either from the unhappy Situation of private or public Affairs, from ill Health, from a gloomy and melancholy Diſpoſition, or from the Concurrence of all theſe Circumſtances. In ſuch [142] a State of Mind, infinite unknown Evils are dreaded from unknown Agents; and where real Objects of Terror are wanting, the Soul, active to its own Prejudice, and foſtering its predominant Inclination, finds imaginary Ones, to whoſe Power and Malevolence it ſets no Limits. As theſe Enemies are inviſible and unknown, the Methods taken to appeaſe them are as unaccountable, and conſiſt in Ceremonies, Obſervances, Mortifications, Sacrifices, Preſents, or in any Practice, however abſurd and frivolous, which either Folly or Knavery recommends to a blind and terrify'd Credulity. Weakneſs, Fear, Melancholy, along with Ignorance, are, therefore, the true Sources of SUPERSTITION.

BUT the Mind of Man is alſo ſubject to an unaccountable Elevation and Preſumption, proceeding from proſperous Succeſs, from luxuriant Health, from ſtrong Spirits, and from a bold and confident Diſpoſition. In ſuch a State of Mind, the Imagination ſwells with great, but confus'd Conceptions, to which no ſublunary Beauties or Enjoyments can correſpond. Every Thing mortal and periſhable vaniſhes as unworthy of Attention. [143] And a full Range is given to the Fancy in the inviſible Regions or World of Spirits, where the Soul is at Liberty to indulge itſelf in every Imagination, that may beſt ſuit its preſent Taſte and Diſpoſition. Hence ariſe Raptures, Tranſports, and ſurprizing Flights of Fancy; and Confidence and Preſumption ſtill increaſing, theſe Raptures, being altogether unaccountable, and ſeeming quite beyond the Reach of our ordinary Faculties, are attributed to the immediate Inſpiration of that Divine Being, who is the Object of Devotion. In a little Time, the inſpir'd Perſon comes to regard himſelf as the chief Favourite of the Divinity; and when this Frenzy once takes Place, which is the Summit of Enthuſiaſm, every Whimſy is conſecrated: Human Reaſon, and even Morality are rejected as fallacious Guides: And the fanatic Madman delivers himſelf over, blindly and without Reſerve, to the ſuppos'd Illapſes of the Spirit, and to Inſpirations from above. Hope, Pride, Preſumption, warm Imagination along with Ignorance, are, therefore, the true Sources of ENTHUSIASM.

[144] THESE two Species of falſe Religion might afford Occaſion to many Speculations; but I ſhall confine my ſelf at preſent to a few Reflections concerning their different Influence on Government and Society.

MY firſt Reflection is, that Religions, which partake of Enthuſiaſm are, on their firſt Riſe, much more furious and violent than theſe which partake of Superſtition; but in a little Time become much more gentle and moderate. The violence of this Species of Religion, when excited by Novelty, and animated by Oppoſition, appears from numberleſs Inſtances; of the Anabaptiſts in Germany, the Camiſars in France, the Levellers and other Fanatics in England, and the Covenanters in Scotland. As Enthuſiaſm is founded on ſtrong Spirits, and a preſumptuous Boldneſs of Character, it naturally begets the moſt extreme Reſolutions; eſpecially after it riſes to that Height as to inſpire the deluded Fanatics with the Opinion of Divine Illuminations, and with a Contempt of the common Rules of Reaſon, Morality and Prudence.

[145] 'TIS thus Enthuſiaſm produces the moſt cruel Deſolation in human Society: But its Fury is like that of Thunder and Tempeſt, which exhauſt themſelves in a little Time, and leave the Air more calm and ſerene than before. The Reaſon of this will appear evidently by comparing Enthuſiaſm to Superſtition, the other Species of falſe Religion; and tracing the natural Conſequences of each. As Superſtition is founded on Fear, Sorrow, and a Depreſſion of Spirits, it repreſents the Perſon to himſelf in ſuch deſpicable Colours, that he appears unworthy in his own Eyes of approaching the Divine Preſence, and naturally has Recourſe to any other Perſon, whoſe Sanctity of Life, or, perhaps, Impudence and Cunning, have made him be ſuppoſed to be more favoured by the Divinity. To him they entruſt their Devotions: To his Care they recommend their Prayers, Petitions, and Sacrifices: And by his Means hope to render their Addreſſes acceptable to their incenſed Deity. Hence the Origin of *PRIESTS, who may juſtly be regarded [146] as proceeding from one of the groſſeſt Inventions of a timorous and abject Superſtition, which, ever diffident of itſelf, dares not offer up its own Devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itſelf to the Divinity by the Mediation of his ſuppoſed Friends and Servants. As Superſtition is a conſiderable Ingredient of almoſt all Religions, even the moſt fanatical; there being nothing but Philoſophy able to conquer entirely theſe unaccountable Terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almoſt every Sect of Religion there are Prieſts to be found: But the ſtronger Mixture there is of Superſtition, the higher is the Authority of the Prieſthood. Modern Judaiſm and Popery, eſpecially the latter, being the moſt barbarous and abſurd Superſtitions, that have yet been known in the World, are the moſt enſlav'd by their Prieſts. As the Church of England has a ſtrong Mixture of Popiſh Superſtition, it partakes alſo, in its original Conſtitution, of a Propenſity to Prieſtly Power and Dominion; particularly in [147] the Reſpect it exacts to the Prieſt. And tho', according to the Sentiments of that Church, the Prayers of the Prieſt muſt be accompanied with thoſe of the Laity; yet is he the Mouth of the Congregation, his Perſon is ſacred, and without his Preſence few wou'd think their public Devotions, or the Sacraments and other Rites, acceptable to the Divinity.

ON the other hand, it may be obſerved, that all Enthuſiaſts have been free from the Yoke of Eccleſiaſtics, and have expreſt a great Independence in their Devotion; with a Contempt of Forms, Traditions and Authorities. The Quakers are the moſt egregious, tho' at the ſame Time the moſt innocent, Enthuſiaſts that have been yet known; and are, perhaps, the only Sect, that have never admitted Prieſts amongſt them: The Independents, of all the Engliſh Sectaries, approach neareſt to the Quakers in Fanaticiſm, and in their Freedom from Prieſtly Bondage. The Presbyterians follow after, at an equal Diſtance in both theſe Particulars. In ſhort, this Obſervation is founded on the moſt certain Experience; and will alſo appear to be founded on Reaſon, if we conſider that as Enthuſiaſm ariſes from a preſumptuous [148] Pride and Confidence, it thinks itſelf ſufficiently qualified to approach the Divinity, without any human Mediator. Its rapturous Devotions are ſo ſervent, that it even imagines itſelf actually to approach him, by the Way of Contemplation and inward Converſe; which makes it neglect all thoſe outward Ceremonies and Obſervances, to which the Aſſiſtance of the Prieſt appears ſo requiſite in the Eyes of their ſuperſtitious Votaries. The Fanatic conſecrates himſelf, and beſtows on his own Perſon a ſacred Character, much ſuperior to what Forms and Ceremonious Inſtitions can confer on any other.

'TIS therefore an infallible Rule, that Superſtition is favourable to Prieſtly Power, and Enthuſiaſm as much, or rather more, contrary to it than ſound Reaſon and Philoſophy. The Conſequences are evident. When the firſt Fire of Enthuſiaſm is ſpent, Men naturally, in ſuch fanatical Sects, ſink into the greateſt Remiſsneſs and Coolneſs in Sacred Matters; there being no Body of Men amongſt them, endow'd with ſufficient Authority, whoſe Intereſt is concern'd to ſupport the religious Spirit. Superſtition, on the contrary, ſteals [149] in gradually and inſenſibly; renders Men tame and ſubmiſſive; is acceptable to the Magiſtrate, and ſeems inoffenſive to the People: Till at laſt the Prieſt, having firmly eſtabliſh'd his Authority, becomes the Tyrant and Diſturber of human Society, by his endleſs Contentions, Perſecutions, and religious Wars. How ſmoothly did the Romiſh Church advance in their Acquiſition of Power? But into what diſmal Convulſions did they throw all Europe, in order to maintain it? On the other Hand, our Sectaries, who were formerly ſuch dangerous Bigots, are now become our greateſt Free-thinkers; and the Quakers are, perhaps, the only regular Body of Deiſts in the Univerſe, except the Literati or Diſciples of Confucius in China.

MY ſecond Obſervation, with regard to theſe Species of falſe Religion, is, That Superſtition is an Enemy to Civil Liberty, and Enthuſiaſm a Friend to it. As Superſtition groans under the Dominion of the Prieſts, and Enthuſiaſm is an Enemy to all Eccleſiaſtical Power, this ſufficiently accounts for the preſent Obſervation. Not to mention, that Enthuſiaſm, being the Infirmity of bold and [150] ambitious Tempers, is naturally accompanied with a Spirit of Liberty; as Superſtition, on the contrary, renders Men tame and abject, and fits them for Slavery. We learn from the Engliſh Hiſtory, that, during the Civil Wars, the Independents and Deiſts, tho' the moſt oppoſite in their religious Principles; yet were united in their political Ones, and were alike paſſionate for a Commonwealth. And ſince the Origin of Whig and Tory, the Leaders of the VVhigs have either been Deiſts or profeſt Latudinarians in their Principles; that is, Friends to Toleration, and indifferent to any particular Sect of Chriſtians: While the Sectaries, who have all a ſtrong Tincture of Enthuſiaſm, have always, without Exception, concurr'd with that Party, in the Defence of Civil Liberty. The Reſemblance in their Superſtitions long united the High-Church Tories and the Roman Catholics, in the Support of Prerogative and Kingly Power; tho' Experience of the tolerating Spirit of the VVhigs ſeems of late to have reconcil'd the Catholics to that Party.

THE Moliniſts and Janſeniſts in France have a Thouſand unintelligible Diſputes, which are [151] not worthy the Attention of a Man of Senſe: But what principally diſtinguiſhes theſe two Sects, and alone merits our Attention, is the different Spirit of their Religion. The Moliniſts, conducted by the Jeſuites, are great Friends to Superſtition, rigid Obſervers of external Forms and Ceremonies, and devoted to the Authority of the Prieſts, and to Tradition. The Janſeniſts are Enthuſiaſts, and zealous Promoters of the paſſionate Devotion, and of the inward Life; little influenc'd by Authority; and in a Word, but Half Catholics. The Conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing Reaſoning. The Jeſuites are the Tyrants and the Slaves of the Court: And the Janſeniſts preſerve alive the ſmall Sparks of the Love of Liberty, which are to be found in the French Nation.

ESSAY XIII. Of AVARICE.

[153]

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, That Comic Writers exaggerate every Character, and draw their Fop or Coward, with ſtronger Features than are any where to be met with in Nature. This moral kind of Painting for the Stage has been often compar'd to the Painting for Cupolas and Ceilings, where the Colours are overcharg'd, and every Part is drawn exceſſively large, and beyond Nature. The Figures ſeem monſtrous and diſproportion'd, when ſeen too nigh; but become natural and regular, when ſet at a Diſtance, and placed in that Point of View, in which they are intended to be ſurvey'd. After the ſame manner, when Characters are exhibited in theatrical Repreſentations, the Want of Reality ſets the Perſonages at a Diſtance from us; and rendering them [154] more cold and unentertaining, makes it neceſſary to compenſate, by the Force of Colouring, what they want in Subſtance. Thus, we find in common Life, That when a Man once allows himſelf to depart from Truth in his Narrations, he never can keep within the Bounds of Probability; but adds ſtill ſome new Circumſtance to render his Stories more marvellous, and ſatisfy his Imagination. Two Men in Buckram Suits became eleven to Sir John Falſtaff before the End of his Story.

THERE is only one Vice, which may be found in Life with as ſtrong Features, and as high a Colouring, as need be employ'd by any Satyriſt or Comic Poet; and that is AVARICE. Every Day we meet with Men of immenſe Fortunes, without Heirs, and on the very Brink of the Grave, who refuſe themſelves the moſt common Neceſſaries of Life, and go on heaping Poſſeſſions on Poſſeſſions, under all the real Preſſures of the ſevereſt Poverty. An old Uſurer, ſays the Story, lying in his laſt Agonies, was preſented by the Prieſt with the Crucifix to worſhip. He opens his Eyes a Moment before he expires, conſiders the Crucifix, and cries, Theſe Jewels [155] are not true; I can only lend ten Piſtoles upon ſuch a Pledge. This was probably the Invention of ſome Epigrammatiſt; and yet every one, from his own Experience, may be able to recollect almoſt as ſtrong Inſtances of Perſeverance in Avarice. 'Tis commonly reported of a famous Miſer in this City, that finding himſelf near Death, he ſent for ſome of the Magiſtrates, and gave them a Bill of an hundred Pounds, payable after his Deceaſe; which Sum he intended ſhould be diſpoſed of in charitable Uſes; but ſcarce were they gone, when he orders them to be called back, and offers them ready Money, if they would abate five Pounds of the Sum. Another noted Miſer in the North, intending to defraud his Heirs, and leave his Fortune to the Building an Hoſpital, protracted the drawing of his Will from Day to Day; and 'tis thought, that if thoſe intereſted in it had not paid for the Drawing of it, he would have died inteſtate. In ſhort, none of the moſt furious Exceſſes of Love and Ambition are in any reſpect to be compared to the Extremes of Avarice.

[156] THE beſt Excuſe that can be made for Avarice is, That it generally prevails in old Men, or in Men of cold Tempers, where all the other Affections are extinct; and the Mind being incapable of remaining without ſome Paſſion or Purſuit, at laſt finds out this monſtrous unreaſonable one, which ſuits the Coldneſs and Inactivity of its Temper. At the ſame Time, it ſeems very extraordinary, that ſo froſty ſpiritleſs a Paſſion ſhou'd be able to carry us farther than all the Warmth of Youth and Pleaſure. But if we look more narrowly into the Matter, we ſhall find, that this very Circumſtance renders the Explication of the Caſe more eaſy. When the Temper is warm, and full of Vigour, it naturally ſhoots out more Ways than one, and produces inferior Paſſions to counter-balance, in ſome Degree, its predominant Inclination. 'Tis impoſſible for a Perſon of that Temper, however bent on any Purſuit, to be depriv'd of all Senſe of Shame, or Regard to the Sentiments of Mankind. His Friends muſt have ſome Influence over him: And other Conſiderations are apt to have their Weight. All this ſerves to reſtrain him within ſome Bounds. But 'tis no Wonder the avaritious Man being, from the [157] Coldneſs of his Temper, without regard to Reputation, to Friendſhip, or to Pleaſure, ſhou'd be carried ſo far by his prevailing Inclination, and ſhou'd diſplay his Paſſion in ſuch ſurprizing Inſtances.

ACCORDINGLY we find no Vice ſo irreclaimable as Avarice: And tho' there ſcarcely has been a Moraliſt or Philoſopher, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, who has not levell'd a Stroke at it, we hardly find a ſingle Inſtance of any Perſon's being cur'd of it. For this Reaſon, I am more apt to approve of thoſe, who attack it with Wit and Humour, than of thoſe who treat it in a ſerious Manner. There being ſo little Hopes of doing Good to the People infected with this Vice, I would have the reſt of Mankind, at leaſt, diverted by our Manner of expoſing it: As indeed there is no Kind of Diverſion, of which they ſeem ſo willing to partake.

AMONG the Fables of Monſieur de la Motte, there is one levell'd againſt Avarice, which ſeems to me more natural and eaſy, than moſt of the Fables of that ingenious Author. A Miſer, ſays he, being dead, and fairly interred, [158] came to the Banks of the Styx, deſiring to be ferry'd over along with the other Ghoſts. Charon demands his Fare, and is ſurpriz'd to ſee the Miſer, rather than pay it, throw himſelf into the River, and ſwim over to the other Side, notwithſtanding all the Clamour and Oppoſition that cou'd be made to him. All Hell was in an Uproar; and each of the Judges was meditating ſome Puniſhment, ſuitable to a Crime of ſuch dangerous Conſequence to the infernal Revenues. Shall he be chain'd to the Rock along with Prometheus? Or tremble below the Precipice in Company with the Danaïdes? Oraſſiſt Siſyphus in rolling his Stone? No, ſays Minos, None of theſe. We muſt invent ſome ſeverer Puniſhment. Let him be ſent back to the Earth, to ſee the Uſe his Heirs are making of his Riches.

I HOPE it will not be interpreted as a Deſign of ſetting myſelf in Oppoſition to this famous Author, if I proceed to deliver a Fable of my own, which is intended to expoſe the ſame Vice of Avarice. The Hint of it was taken from theſe Lines of Mr. Pope,

Damn'd to the Mines, an equal Fate betides
The Slave that digs it, and the Slave that hides.

[159] OUR old Mother EARTH once laid an Indictment againſt AVARICE before the Courts of Heaven, for her wicked and malicious Counſel and Advice, in tempting, inducing, perſwading, and traiterouſly ſeducing the Children of the Plaintiff to commit the deteſtable Crime of Parricide upon her, and mangling her Body, in ranſacking her very Bowels for hidden Treaſure. The Indictment was very long and verboſe; but we muſt omit a great Part of the Repetitions and Synonimous Terms. Not to tire our Reader too much with our Tale; Avarice, being call'd before Jupiter, to anſwer to this Charge, had not much to ſay in her own Defence. The Injury was clearly prov'd upon her. The Fact, indeed, was notorious, and the Injury had been frequently repeated. When therefore the Plaintiff demanded Juſtice, Jupiter very readily gave Sentence in her Favour; and his Decree was to this Purpoſe, That ſince Dame Avarice, the Defendant, had thus grievouſly injur'd Dame Earth, the Plaintiff, ſhe was hereby order'd to take that Treaſure, of which ſhe had feloniouſly robb'd the ſaid Plaintiff, by ranſacking her Boſom, and in the ſame Manner, as before, opening her Boſom, reſtore [160] it back to her, without Diminution or Retention. From this Sentence, it ſhall follow, ſays Jupiter to the By-ſtanders, That in all future Ages, the Retainers of Avarice ſhall bury and conceal their Riches, and thereby reſtore to the Earth what they took from her.

ESSAY XIV. Of the DIGNITY of HUMAN NATURE.

[161]

THERE are certain Sects, which ſecretly form themſelves in the learned World, as well as in the political; and tho' ſometimes they come not to an open Rupture, yet they give a different Turn to the Ways of thinking of thoſe who have taken Party on either Side. The moſt remarkable of this Kind are the Sects, that are founded on the different Sentiments, with regard to the Dignity of human Nature; which is a Point, that ſeems to have divided Philoſophers and Poets, as well as Divines, from the Beginning of the World to this Day. Some exalt our Species to the Skies, and repreſent Man as a Kind of human Demi-God, that derives his Origin from Heaven, and retains evident [162] Marks of his Lineage and Deſcent. Others inſiſt upon the blind Sides of human Nature, and can diſcover nothing, except Vanity, in which Man ſurpaſſes the other Animals, whom he affects ſo much to deſpiſe. If an Author poſſeſſes the Talent of Rhetoric, and Declamation, he commonly takes Party with the former: If his Turn lies towards Irony and Ridicule, he naturally throws himſelf into the other Extreme.

I AM far from thinking, that all thoſe, who have depreciated Human Nature, have been Enemies to Virtue, and have expoſed the Frailties of their Fellow-Creatures with any bad Intention. On the contrary, I am ſenſible, that a very delicate Senſe of Virtue, eſpecially when attended with ſomewhat of the Miſanthrope, is apt to give a Man a Diſguſt of the World, and to make him conſider the common Courſe of Human Affairs with too much Spleen and Indignation. I muſt, however, be of Opinion, that the Sentiments of thoſe, who are inclined to think favourably of Mankind, are much more advantageous to Virtue, than the contrary Principles, which give us a mean Opinion of our Nature. When a Man [163] is poſſeſs'd of a high Notion of his Rank and Character in the Creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will ſcorn to do a baſe or vicious Action, which might ſink him below that Figure, which he makes in his own Imagination. Accordingly we find, That all our polite and faſhionable Moraliſts inſiſt upon this Topic, and endeavour to repreſent Vice as unworthy of Man, as well as odious in itſelf.

WOMEN are generally much more flatter'd in their Youth than Men; which may proceed from this Reaſon, among others, that their chief Point of Honour is conſider'd as much more difficult than ours, and requires to be ſupported by all that decent Pride, which can be inſtill'd into them.

WE find very few Diſputes, that are not founded on ſome Ambiguity in the Expreſſion; and I am perſwaded, that the preſent Diſpute concerning the Dignity of Human Nature is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to conſider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this Controverſy.

[164] THAT there is a natural Difference betwixt Merit and Demerit, Virtue and Vice, Wiſdom and Folly, no reaſonable Man will deny: But yet 'tis evident, that in affirming the Term, which denotes either our Approbation or Blame, we are commonly more influenced by Compariſon than by any fixt unalterable Standard in the Nature of Things. In like manner, Quantity, and Extenſion, and Bulk, are by every one acknowledg'd to be real Things: But when we call any Animal great or little, we always form a ſecret Compariſon betwixt that Animal and others of the ſame Species; and 'tis that Compariſon which regulates our Judgment concerning its Greatneſs. A Dog and a Horſe may be of the very ſame Size, while the one is admir'd for the Greatneſs of its Bulk, and the other for the Smallneſs. When I am preſent, therefore, at any Diſpute, I always conſider with myſelf, whether or not it be a Queſtion merely of Compariſon, that is the Subject of the Diſpute; and if it be, whether the Diſputants compare the ſame Objects together, or talk of Things, that are widely different. As this is commonly the Caſe, I have long ſince learnt to neglect ſuch Diſputes as [165] manifeſt Abuſes of Leiſure, the moſt valuable Preſent that cou'd be made to Mortals.

IN forming our Notions of Human Nature, we are very apt to make a Compariſon betwixt Men and Animals, which are the only Creatures endowed with Thought that fall under our Senſes. Certainly this Compariſon is very favourable to Mankind. On the one hand we ſee a Creature, whoſe Thoughts are not limited by any narrow Bounds either of Place or Time; who carries his Reſearches into the moſt diſtant Regions of this Globe, and beyond this Globe, to the Planets and Heavenly Bodies; looks backward to conſider the firſt Origin of Human Race; caſts his Eyes forward to ſee the Influence of his Actions upon Poſterity, and the Judgments, that will be form'd of his Character a thouſand Years hence. A Creature, that traces Cauſes and Effects to a great Length and Intricacy; extracts general Principles from particular Appearances; improves upon his Diſcoveries; corrects his Miſtakes; and makes his very Errors profitable. On the other hand, we are preſented with a Creature the very reverſe of this; limited in its Obſervations and Reaſonings to a few ſenſible Objects [166] that ſurround it; without Curioſity, without Foreſight; blindly conducted by Inſtinct, and arriving in a very ſhort Time at its utmoſt Perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a ſingle Step. What a wide Difference is there betwixt theſe Creatures! And how exalted a Notion muſt we entertain of the former, in Compariſon of the latter!

THERE are two Means commonly employ'd to deſtroy this Concluſion: Firſt, By making an unfair Repreſentation of the Caſe, and inſiſting only upon the Weakneſſes of Human Nature. And ſecondly, By forming a new and ſecret Compariſon betwixt Man and Beings of the moſt perfect Wiſdom. Among the other Excellencies of Man, there is this remarkable, that he can form a Notion of Perfections much beyond what he has Experience of in himſelf; and is not limited in his Conception of Wiſdom and Virtue. He can eaſily exalt his Notions, and conceive a Degree of Wiſdom, which, when compar'd to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, and will cauſe the Difference betwixt that and the Sagacity of Animals, in a manner, to diſappear and vaniſh. Now this being a Point, in which [167] all the World is agreed, that Human Underſtanding falls infinitely ſhort of perfect Wiſdom, 'tis proper we ſhould know when this Compariſon takes Place, that we may not diſpute where there is no real Difference in our Sentiments. Man falls much more ſhort of perfect Wiſdom, and even of his own Ideas of perfect Wiſdom, than Animals do of Man; but yet the latter Difference is ſo conſiderable, that nothing but a Compariſon with the former, can make it appear of little Moment.

'TIS alſo very uſual to compare one Man with another; and finding very few, that we can call wiſe or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptible Notion of our Species in general. That we may be ſenſible of the Fallacy of this Way of Reaſoning, we may obſerve, that the Honourable Appellations of wiſe and virtuous, are not annex'd to any particular Degree of thoſe Qualities of Wiſdom and Virtue; but ariſe altogether from the Compariſon we make betwixt one Man and another. When we find a Man, who arrives at ſuch a Pitch of Wiſdom as is very uncommon, we pronounce him a wiſe Man: So that [168] to ſay, there are few wiſe Men in the World, is really to ſay nothing; ſince 'tis only by their Scarcity that they merit that Appellation. Were the loweſt of our Species as wiſe as Tully, or my Lord Bacon, we ſhould ſtill have Reaſon to ſay, that there are few wiſe Men. For in that Caſe we ſhould exalt our Notions of Wiſdom, and wou'd not pay a ſingular Honour to any one, that was not ſingularly diſtinguiſh'd by his Talents. In like Manner, I have heard it obſerv'd by thoughtleſs People, that there are few Women poſſeſt of Beauty, in Compariſon of thoſe who want it; not conſidering, that we beſtow the Epithet of Beautiful only on ſuch as poſſeſs a Degree of Beauty, that is common to them with a few. The ſame Degree of Beauty in a Woman is call'd Deformity, which is treated as real Beauty in one of our Sex.

AS 'tis uſual, in forming a Notion of our Species, to compare it with the other Species above or below it, or to compare the Individuals of the Species among themſelves; ſo we often compare together the different Motives or actuating Principles of Human Nature, in order to regulate our Judgment concerning [169] it. And indeed, this is the only Kind of Compariſon, that is worth our Attention, or decides any Thing in the preſent Queſtion. Were the ſelfiſh and vicious Principles of Human Nature ſo much predominant above the Social and Virtuous, as is aſſerted by ſome Philoſophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible Notion of Human Nature. I may, perhaps, treat more fully of this Subject in ſome future Speculation. In the mean Time, I ſhall obſerve, what has been prov'd beyond Queſtion by ſeveral great Moraliſts of the preſent Age, that the ſocial Paſſions are by far the moſt powerful of any, and that even all the other Paſſions receive their Force and Influence from them. Whoever deſires to ſee this Queſtion treated at large, with the greateſt Force of Argument and Eloquence, may conſult my Lord Shaftsbury's Enquiry concerning Virtue.

IN my Opinion, there are two Things, which have led aſtray thoſe Philoſophers, that have inſiſted ſo much on the Selfiſhneſs of Man. In the Firſt Place, they found, that every Act of Virtue or Friendſhip was attended with a ſecret Pleaſure: From whence they [170] concluded, that Friendſhip and Virtue could not be diſintereſted. But the Fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous Sentiment or Paſſion produces the Pleaſure, and does not ariſe from it. I feel a Pleaſure in doing good to my Friend, becauſe I love him; but do not love him for the ſake of that Pleaſure.

IN the ſecond Place, it has always been found, that virtuous Men are far from being indifferent to Praiſe; and therefore they have been repreſented as a Set of vain-glorious Men, that had nothing in View but the Applauſes of others. But this alſo is a Fallacy. 'Tis very unjuſt in the World, when they find any Tincture of Vanity in a laudable Action, to depreciate it upon that Account, or aſcribe it entirely to that Motive. The Caſe is not the ſame with Vanity, as with other Paſſions. Where Avarice or Revenge enters into any ſeemingly virtuous Action, 'tis difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and 'tis natural to ſuppoſe it the ſole actuating Principle. But Vanity is ſo nearly ally'd to Virtue, and to love the Fame of virtuous Actions approaches ſo near the Love of virtuous Actions for their own ſake, that theſe Paſſions are more capable [171] of Mixture, than any other kinds of Paſſion; and 'tis almoſt impoſſible to have the latter without ſome Degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this Paſſion for Glory is always warp'd and varied according to the particular Taſte or Sentiment of the Mind on which it falls. Nero had the ſame Vanity in driving a Chariot, that Trajan had in governing the Empire with Juſtice and Ability. To love the Glory of virtuous Actions is a ſure Proof of the Love of virtuous Actions.

ESSAY XV. Of LIBERTY and DESPOTISM.

[173]

THOSE who employ their Pens on political Subjects, free from Party-Rage, and Party-Prejudices, cultivate a Science, which, of all others, contributes moſt both to public Utility, and to the private Satisfaction of thoſe who addict themſelves to the Study of it. I am apt, however, to entertain a Suſpicion, that the World is ſtill too young to fix any general ſtable Truths in Politics, which will remain true to the lateſt Poſterity. We have not as yet had Experience of above three thouſand Years; ſo that not only the Art of Reaſoning is ſtill defective in this Science, as well as in all others, but we even want ſufficient Materials, upon which we can reaſon. 'Tis not ſufficiently known, what Degrees of Refinement, either in Virtue [174] or Vice, human Nature is ſuſceptible of; nor what may be expected of Mankind from any great Revolution in their Education, Cuſtoms, or Principles. Machiavel was certainly a great Genius; but having confin'd his Study to the furious Tyranny of antient Sovereigns, or the little diſorderly Principalities of Italy, his Reaſonings, eſpecially upon Monarchical Government, have been found extremely defective; and there ſcarce is any Maxim in his Prince, which ſubſequent Experience has not entirely refuted. A weak Sovereign, ſays he, is incapable of receiving good Counſel; for if he conſult with ſeveral, he will not be able to chooſe among their different Counſels. If he abandon himſelf to one, that Miniſter may, perhaps, have Capacity; but he will not be long a Miniſter: He will be ſure to diſpoſſeſs his Maſter, and place himſelf and his own Family upon the Throne. I mention this, among innumerable Inſtances, of the Errors of that Politician, proceeding from his having liv'd in too early an Age of the World, to be a good Judge of political Truth. Almoſt all the Princes of Europe are at preſent governed by their Miniſters, and have been ſo for near two Centuries; and yet no ſuch Event [175] has ever happen'd, or can poſſibly happen. Sejanus might project the dethroning the Caeſars; but Fleury, though ever ſo vicious, could not, while in his Senſes, entertain the leaſt Hopes of diſpoſſeſſing the Bourbons.

TRADE was never eſteem'd an Affair of State, 'till within this laſt Century; nor is there any antient Writer on Politics, who has made mention of it. Even the Italians have kept a profound Silence with regard to it; though it has now excited the chief Attention, as well of Miniſters of State, as of ſpeculative Reaſoners. The great Opulence, Grandeur, and military Archievements of the two Maritime Powers, ſeem firſt to have inſtructed Mankind in the vaſt Importance of an extenſive Commerce.

HAVING, therefore, intended in this Eſſay to have made a full Compariſon of Liberty and Deſpotiſm, and have ſhown the Advantages and Diſadvantages of each, I began to entertain a Suſpicion, that no Man in this Age was ſufficiently qualified for ſuch an Undertaking, and that whatever he ſhould advance on that Head would, in all Probability, be refuted by further [176] Experience, and be rejected by Poſterity. Such mighty Revolutions have happened in human Affairs, and ſo many Events have ariſen contrary to the Expectation of the antients, as are ſufficient to beget the Suſpicion of ſtill farther Changes.

IT had been obſerv'd by the Antients, that all the Arts and Sciences aroſe among free Nations, and that the Perſians and Egyptians, notwithſtanding all their Eaſe, Opulence and Luxury, made but faint Efforts towards a Reliſh in thoſe finer Pleaſures, which were carried to ſuch Perfection by the Greeks, amidſt continual Wars, attended with Poverty, and the greateſt Simplicity of Life and Manners. It had alſo been obſerv'd, that as ſoon as the Greeks loſt their Liberty, tho' they encreaſed mightily in Riches, by Means of the Conqueſts of Alexander; yet the Arts, from that Moment, declin'd among them, and have never ſince been able to raiſe their Head in that Climate. Learning was tranſplanted to Rome, the only free Nation at that Time in the Univerſe; and having met with ſo favourable a Soil, it made prodigious Shoots for above a Century; till the Decay of Liberty produced [177] alſo the Decay of Letters, and ſpread a total Barbarity over the World. From theſe two Experiments, of which each was double in its Kind, and ſhow'd the Fall of Learning in Deſpotic Governments, as well as its Riſe in popular Ones, Longinus thought himſelf ſufficiently juſtified, in aſſerting, That the Arts and Sciences could never flouriſh, but in a free Government: And in this Opinion, he has been followed by ſeveral eminent Writers* in our own Country, who either confin'd their View merely to antient Facts, or entertain'd too great a Partiality in Favour of that Form of Government, which is eſtabliſh'd amongſt us.

BUT what would theſe Writers have ſaid, to the Inſtance of modern Rome and Florence; of which the former carried to Perfection all the finer Arts of Sculpture, Painting and Muſic, as well as Poetry, tho' they groah'd under Slavery, and under the Slavery of Prieſts: While the latter never made any Efforts towards the Arts and Sciences, till they began to loſe their Liberty by the Uſurpations of the [178] Family of the Medicis? Arioſto, Taſſo, Galilaeo, no more than Raphael, or Michael Angelo, were not born in Republics. And tho' the Lombard School was famous as well as the Roman, yet the Venetians have had the ſmalleſt Share in its Honours, and ſeem rather inferior to the other Italians, in their Genius for the Sciences. Rubens eſtabliſh'd his School at Antwerp, not at Amſterdam. Dreſden, not Hamburg, is the Centre of Politeneſs in Germany.

BUT the moſt eminent Inſtance of the flouriſhing of Learning in deſpotic Governments, is that of FRANCE, which never enjoy'd any Shadow of Liberty, and yet has carried the Arts and Sciences nearer Perfection than any other Nationa of the Univerſe. The Engliſh are, perhaps, better Philoſophers; the Italians better Painters and Muſicians; the Romans were better Orators: But the French are the only People, except the Greeks, who have been at once Philoſophers, Poets, Orators, Hiſtorians, Painters, Architects, Sculptors and Muſicians. With regard to the Stage, they have far excell'd the Greeks: And in common Life, have, in a great Meaſure, perfected [179] that Art, the moſt uſeful and agreeable of any, l'Art de Vivre, the Art of Society and Converſation.

IF we conſider the State of the Sciences and polite Arts in our own Country, Horace's Obſervation, with regard to the Romans, may, in a great Meaſure, be applied to the Britiſh.

—Sed in longum tamen aevum
Manſerunt, hodieque manent veſtigia ruris.

THE Elegance and Propriety of Stile have been very much neglected among us. We have no Dictionary of our Language, and ſcarce a tolerable Grammar. The firſt polite Proſe we have, was wrote by a Man* who is ſtill alive. As to Sprat, Temple and Locke, they knew too little of the Rules of Art to be eſteem'd elegant Writers. The Proſe of Bacon, Harrington and Milton, is altogether ſtiff and pedantic; tho' their Senſe be excellent. Men, in this Country, have been ſo much occupied in the Grand Diſputes of Religion, Politics and Philoſophy, that they had [180] no Reliſh for the minute Obſervations of Grammar and Criticiſm. And tho' this Turn of Thinking muſt have conſiderably improv'd our Senſe and Talent of Reaſoning beyond that of other Nations; yet it muſt be confeſt, that even in theſe Sciences, we have not any Standard-Book, which we can tranſmit to Poſterity: And the utmoſt we have to boaſt of, are a few faint Efforts towards a more juſt Philoſophy; which, indeed, promiſe very much, but have not, as yet, reach'd any Degree of Perfection.

IT has become an eſtabliſh'd Opinion, That Commerce can never flouriſh but in a free Government; and this Opinion ſeems to have been founded on a longer and larger Experience than the foregoing, with Regard to the Arts and Sciences. If we trace Commerce in its Progreſs thro' Tyre, Athens, Syracuſe, Carthage, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Holland, England, &c. we ſhall always find it to have fixt its Seat in free Governments. The three greateſt trading Towns now in the World, are London, Amſterdam, and Hamburgh; all free Cities, and Proteſtant Cities; that is, enjoying a double Liberty. It muſt, [181] however, be obſerv'd, that the great Jealouſy entertain'd of late, with regard to the Commerce of France, ſeems to prove, that this Maxim is no more certain and infallible, than the foregoing, and that the Subjects of abſolute Princes may become our Rivals in Commerce, as well as in Learning.

DURST I deliver my Opinion in an Affair of ſo much Uncertainty, I would aſſert, That, notwithſtanding the Efforts of the French, there is ſomething pernicious to Commerce inherent in the very Nature of abſolute Government, and inſeparable from it: Tho' the Reaſon I would aſſign for this Opinion, is ſomewhat different from that which is commonly inſiſted on. Private Property ſeems to me fully as ſecure in a civiliz'd Europaean Monarchy, as in a Republic; nor is any Danger ever apprehended, in ſuch a Government, from the Violence of the Sovereign; no more than we commonly apprehend Danger from Thunder, or Earthquakes, or any Accident the moſt unuſual and extraordinary. Avarice, the Spur of Induſtry, is ſo obſtinate a Paſſion, and works its Way thro' ſo many real Dangers and Difficulties, that 'tis not likely [182] it will be ſcarr'd by an imaginary Danger, which is ſo ſmall, that it ſcarce admits of Calculation. Commerce, therefore, in my Opinion, is apt to decay in abſolute Governments, not becauſe it is there leſs ſecure, but becauſe it is leſs honourable. A Subordination of Ranks is abſolutely neceſſary to the Support of Monarchy. Birth, Titles, and Place, muſt be honour'd above Induſtry and Riches. And while theſe Notions prevail, all the conſiderable Traders will be tempted to throw up their Commerce, in order to purchaſe ſome of theſe Employments, to which Privileges and Honours are annex'd.

SINCE I am upon this Head of the Alterations that Time has produc'd, or may produce in Politics, I muſt obſerve, That all Kinds of Government, free and deſpotic, ſeem to have undergone, in modern Times, a great Change to the better, with regard both to foreign and domeſtic Management. The Balance of Power is a Secret in Politics known only to the preſent Age; and I muſt add, That the internal POLICE of the State has alſo receiv'd great Improvements within this laſt Century. We are inform'd by Salluſt, That [183] Cataline's Army was much augmented by the Acceſſion of the Highway-men about Rome; tho' I believe, that all of that Profeſſion, who are at preſent diſpers'd over Europe, would not amount to a Regiment. In Cicero's Pleadings for Milo, I find this Argument, among others, made Uſe of to prove, that his Client had not aſſaſſinated Clodius. Had Milo, ſays he, intended to have kill'd Clodius, he had not attack'd him in the Day-time, and at ſuch a Diſtance from the City: He had Way-laid him at Night, near the Suburbs, where it might have been pretended, that he was kill'd by Robbers; and the Frequency of the Accident would have favour'd the Deceit. This is a ſurprizing Proof of the looſe Police of Rome, and of the Number and Force of theſe Robbers; ſince Clodius, as we learn from the ſame Oration, was at that Time attended with Sixty Slaves, who were compleatly arm'd, and, by the Roman Laws, anſwerable, upon their own Lives, for the Life of their Maſter.

BUT tho' all Kinds of Government be much improv'd in modern Times, yet Monarchical Government ſeems to have receiv'd the moſt conſiderable Improvements. It may now be [284] affirm'd of civiliz'd Monarchies, what was formerly ſaid in Praiſe of Republics alone, that they are a Government of Laws, not of Men. They are found ſuſceptible of Order, Method, and Conſtancy, to a ſurprizing Degree. Property is ſecure; Induſtry encourag'd; the Arts flouriſh; and the Prince lives ſecure among his Subjects, like a Father among his Children. It muſt, however, be confeſt, that tho' Monarchical Governments have approach'd nearer to popular Ones, in Gentleneſs and Stability; yet they are ſtill much inferior. Our modern Education and Cuſtoms inſtil more Humanity and Moderation than the antient; but have not as yet been able to overcome entirely the Diſadvantages of that Form of Government.

BUT here I muſt beg leave to advance a Conjecture, which ſeems to me very probable, but which Poſterity alone can fully judge of. I am apt to think, that in Monarchical Governments there is a Source of Improvement, and in Popular Governments a Source of Degeneracy, which in Time will bring theſe Species of Government ſtill nearer an Equality. The greateſt Abuſes, which ariſe in France, [185] the moſt perfect Model of pure Monarchy, proceed not from the Number or Weight of the Taxes, beyond what are to be met with in free Countries; but from the Expenſive, unequal, arbitrary, and intricate Method of levying them, by which the Induſtry of the Poor, eſpecially of the Peaſants and Farmers, is, in a great Meaſure, diſcourag'd, and Agriculture render'd a beggarly and a ſlaviſh Employment. But to whoſe Advantage do theſe Abuſes ſerve? If to that of the Nobility, they might be eſteem'd inherent in that Form of Government; ſince the Nobility are the true Supports of Monarchy; and 'tis natural their Intereſt ſhould be more conſulted, in ſuch a Conſtitution, than that of the People. But the Nobility are, in reality, the principal Loſers by this Oppreſſion; ſince it ruins their Eſtates, and beggars their Tenants. The only Gainers by it are the Finançiers, a Race of Men deſpiſed and hated by the Nobility and the whole Kingdom. If a Prince or Miniſter, therefore, ſhould ariſe, endow'd with ſufficient Diſcernment to know his own and the public Intereſt, and of ſufficient Force of Mind to break thro' antient Cuſtoms, we may expect to ſee theſe Abuſes remedied; in which Caſe, the [186] Difference betwixt their abſolute Government and our free one, would be more nominal than real.

The Source of Degeneracy, that may be remark'd in free Governments, conſiſts in the Practice of contracting Debt, and mortaging the public Revenues, by which Taxes may, in Time, become altogether intolerable, and all the Property of the State be brought into the Hands of the Public. This Practice is of modern Date. The Athenians, though a Republic, paid Twenty per Cent. for Money, as we learn from Xenophon. Among the Moderns, the Dutch firſt introduced the Practice of borrowing great Sums at low Intereſt, and have well nigh ruined themſelves by it. Abſolute Princes have alſo contracted Debt; but as an Abſolute Prince may play the Bankrupt when he pleaſes, his People can never be oppreſt by his Debts. In popular Governments, the People, and chiefly thoſe who have the higheſt Offices, being always the public Creditors, 'tis impoſſible the State can ever make uſe of this Remedy, which, however it may be ſometimes neceſſary, is always cruel and barbarous. This, therefore, ſeems to be an [187] Inconvenience, that nearly threatens all free Governments, eſpecially our own, at the preſent Juncture of Affairs. And what a ſtrong Motive is this, to encreaſe our Frugality of the public Money; left, for want of it we be reduced, by the Multiplicity of Taxes, to curſe our free Government, and wiſh ourſelves in the ſame State of Servitude with all the Nations that ſurround us.

FINIS.
Notes
*
Monſ. Fontenelle, Pluralité des Mondes, Soir 6.
For Forms of Government let Fools conteſt:
Whate'er is beſt adminiſter'd is beſt.
Eſſay on Man, Book 3.
‘Eſſempio veramenti raro, & da Filoſofi intante loro imaginate & vedute Republiche mai non trovato, vedere dentro ad un medeſimo cerchio, fra medeſimi cittadini, la liberta, & la tirannide, la vita civile & la corrotta, la giuſtitia & la licenza; perche quella ordine & ſolo manti [...]ne quella citta piena di coſtumi antichi & venerabili. E s'egli auveniſſe (che col tempo in ogni modo auverrà) que San Giorgio tutta quella città occupaſſe, ſarrebbe quella una Republica pin que la Venetiana memorabile.’ Della Hiſt. Fiorentine, Lib. 8.
Diſſertation on Parties, Letter 10.
Miſcellaneous Reflections, Page 107.
*
See Diſſertation on Parties, throughout.
By that Influence of the Crown, which I would juſtify, I mean only, that ariſing from the Offices and Honours, that are at the Diſpoſal of the Crown. As to private Bribery, it may be conſidered in the ſame Light as the Practice of employing Spies, which is ſcarce juſtifiable in a good Miniſter, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a Spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous in all Miniſters, and is to be regarded as a ſhameleſs Proſtitution.
*
About 400,000 l. Sterling.
*
On ne monte jamais ſi haut que quand on ne ſqait pas ou on va, ſaid Cromwell to the Preſident de Bellievre.
*
Lewis XIIth.
*
Theſe Words have become of general Uſe, and therefore I ſhall employ them, without intending to expreſs by them an univerſal Blame of the one Party, or Approbation of the other. The Court-Party may, no doubt, on ſome Occaſions, conſult beſt the Intereſt of the Country, and the Country-Party oppoſe it. In like Manner, the Roman Parties were denominated Optimates and Populares; and Cicero, like a true Partyman, defines the Optimates to be ſuch as, in all their publick Conduct, regulated themſelves by the Sentiments of the beſt and worthieſt of the Romans: Pro Sextio. The Term of Country-Party may afford a favourable Definition or Etymology of the ſame kind: But it would be Folly to draw any Argument from that Head, and I have no Regard to it in employing theſe Terms.
*
Diſſertation on Parties, Letter 2d.
*
By Prieſts, I underſtand only the Pretenders to Power and Dominion, and to a ſuperior Sanctity of Character, diſtinct from Virtue and good Morals. Theſe are very different from Clergymen, who are ſet apart to the Care of ſacred Matters, and the Conducting our public Devotions with greater Decency and Order. There is no Rank of Men more to be reſpected than the latter.
*
Mr. Addiſon, and my Lord Shaftsbury.
*
Doctor Swift.
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Zitationsvorschlag für dieses Objekt
TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 3632 Essays moral and political. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-60F0-8