THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR, AND THE NECESSITY OF AN Augmentation CONSIDER'D.

THE French are certainly the moſt im⯑placable, and the moſt dangerous E⯑nemys of the Britiſh Nation. Their Form of Government, their Religion, their Jealouſy of the Britiſh Power, as well as their Proſecutions of Commerce, and Pur⯑ſuits [2] of Univerſal Monarchy, will fix them for ever in their Animoſities and Averſions towards us, and make them catch at all Opportunities of ſubverting our Conſtitu⯑tion, deſtroying our Religion, ruining our Trade, and ſinking the Figure which we make among the Nations of Europe: Not to mention the particular Ties of Honour that lie on their preſent King to impoſe on us a Prince, who muſt prove fatal to our Coun⯑try if he ever reigns over us.

As we are thus in a natural State of War, if I may ſo call it, with the French Nation; it is our Misfortune, that they are not only the moſt inveterate, but moſt formidable of our Enemies; and have the greateſt Power, as well as the ſtrongeſt Inclination to ruin us. No other State equals them in the Force of their Fleets and Armies, in the Nearneſs and Conveniency of their Situation, and in the Number of Friends and Well⯑wiſhers, which, it is to be fear'd, they have among us.

For theſe Reaſons our Wars with France have always affected us in our moſt tender Intereſts, and concern'd us more than thoſe we have had with any other Nation; but I [3] may venture to ſay, This Kingdom was ne⯑ver yet engag'd in a War of ſo great con⯑ſequence, as that which now lies upon our hands. Our All is at ſtake, and irretrie⯑vably loſt, if we fail of Succeſs. At other times, if a War ended in a diſhonourable Peace, or with equal Loſs, we cou'd com⯑fort our ſelves with the hopes of a more favourable Juncture, that might ſet the Bal⯑lance right, or turn it to our Advantage. We had ſtill the proſpect of forming the ſame Alliance, or perhaps ſtrengthning it with new Confederacies, and by that means of trying our Fortune a ſecond time, in caſe the Injuſtice or Ambition of the Enemy forc'd us into the Field. At preſent, if we make a Drawn Game of it, or procure but Mode⯑rate advantages, we are in a Condition which every Britiſh Heart muſt tremble at the thought of. There are no ſecond Tri⯑als, no Wars in reſerve, no new Schemes of Alliance to which we can have recourſe. Should the French King be able to bear down ſuch an united Force as now makes head againſt him, at a time when Spain af⯑fords him no greater Aſſiſtance; what will he do when the Trade of the Levant lies at [4] his Mercy; when the whole Kingdom of Spain is ſupply'd with his Manufactures, and the Wealth of the Indies flows into his Coffers; and what is yet worſe, when this additional Strength muſt ariſe in all its particulars from a proportionable Decay in the States that now make War upon him? It is no wonder therefore that our late King of Glorious Memory, who by the Confeſſion of his greateſt Enemies, was a Prince that perfectly underſtood the Intereſts of Europe, ſhould in his laſt Speech recommend to his Parliament the declaring War againſt France in thoſe memorable Words: You have yet an Opportunity, by God's bleſſing, to ſecure to you and your Poſterity the quiet Enjoyment of your Religion and Liberties, if you are not wanting to your ſelves, but will exert the antient Vigour of the Engliſh Nation: but I tell you plainly, my Opinion is, if you do not lay hold on this occaſion, you have no reaſon to hope for another.

We have already a dreadful Proof of the Increaſe of Power that accrues to France from its Conjunction with Spain. So expenſive a War as that which the French Monarchy hath [5] been carrying on in ſo many and ſo remote Parts at once, muſt long ſince have drain'd and exhauſted all its Subſtance, had there not been ſeveral ſecret Springs, that ſwell'd their Treaſury from time to time, in proportion as the War has ſunk it. The King's Coffers have been often reduced to the loweſt Ebb, but have ſtill been ſea⯑ſonably refreſh'd by frequent and unexpected Supplies from the Spaniſh America. We hear indeed of the Arrival but of very few Ships from thoſe Parts; but as in every Veſſel there is Stowage for immenſe Treaſures, when the Cargo is pure Bullion, or Merchandize of as great a Value; ſo we find by Expe⯑rience they have had ſuch prodigious Sums of Money convey'd to them by theſe ſecret Channels, that they have been enabled to pay more numerous Armies, than they ever had on foot before; and that at a time when their Trade fails in all its other Branches, and is diſtreſs'd by all the Arts and Con⯑trivances of their neighbouring Nations. Du⯑ring the laſt four Years, by a modeſt Com⯑putation there have been brought into Breſt above ſix Millions of Pounds Sterling in Bullion. What then ſhall we ſuppoſe wou'd [6] be the effect of this Correſpondence with America, might the Wealth of thoſe Parts come to them on Squadrons of Men of War, and Fleets of Galeons? If theſe little By⯑currents, that creep into the Country by Stealth, have ſo great a Force, how ſhall we ſtem the whole Torrent, when it breaks in upon us with its full Violence? And this certainly will be our Caſe, unleſs we find a Means to diſſolve the Union between France and Spain. I have dwelt the longer on this Conſideration, becauſe the preſent War hath already furniſh'd us with the Experiment, and ſenſibly convinc'd us of the Increaſe of Power, which France has receiv'd from its In⯑tercourſe with the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies.

As there are many who look upon every thing which they don't actually ſee and feel as bare Probability and Speculation, I ſhall only touch on thoſe other Reaſons of which we have already alſo had ſome Experience, for our preventing this Coalition of Intereſts and Deſigns in the two Monarchies.

The Woollen Manufacture is the Britiſh Strength, the ſtaple Commodity and pro⯑per Growth of our Country; if this fails us, our Trade and Eſtates muſt ſink together, [7] and all the Caſh of the Nation be conſumed on Foreign Merchandize. The French at preſent gain very much upon us in this great Article of our Trade, and ſince the Acceſ⯑ſion of the Spaniſh Monarchy, ſupply with Cloath of their own making the very beſt Mart we had in Europe. And what a melan⯑choly Proſpect have we, if ever a Peace gives them leave to enrich their Manufacture with Mixtures of Spaniſh Wool to multiply the Hands employ'd in it, to improve themſelves in all the Niceties of the Art, and to vend their Wares in thoſe Places where was the greateſt Conſumption of our Woollen Works, and the moſt conſiderable Gain for the Bri⯑tiſh Merchant. Notwithſtanding our many ſeaſonable Recruits from Portugal, and our Plantations, we already complain of our want of Bullion; and muſt at laſt be re⯑duc'd to the greateſt Exigencies, if this great Source be dry'd up, and our Traffick with Spain continue under its preſent Diſ⯑couragement.

The Trade of the Levant muſt likewiſe flouriſh or decay in our Hands, as we are Friends or Enemies of the Spaniſh Monar⯑chy. The late Conqueſt of Naples will [8] very little alter the caſe, though Sicily ſhould follow the Fate of her Siſter Kingdom. The Streight's Mouth is the Key of the Levant, and will be always in the Poſſeſſion of thoſe who are Kings of Spain. We may only add, that the ſame Cauſes which ſtreighten the Britiſh Commerce, will naturally enlarge the French; and that the Naval Force of either Nation will thrive or languiſh in the ſame degree as their Commerce gathers or loſes Strength. And if ſo powerful and populous a Nation as that of France be⯑come ſuperior to us by Sea, our whole is loſt, and we are no more a People. The Conſideration of ſo narrow a Channel be⯑twixt us, of ſuch Numbers of regular Troops on the Enemy's ſide, of ſo ſmall a ſtand⯑ing Force on our own, and that too in a Country deſtitute of all ſuch Forts and ſtrong Places as might ſtop the Progreſs of a victorious Army, hath ſomething in it ſo terrifying, that one does not care for ſetting it in its proper Light. Let it not therefore enter into the Heart of any one that hath the leaſt Zeal for his Religion, or Love of Liberty, that hath any regard either to the Honour or Safety of his Country, or a well [9] Wiſh for his Friends or Poſterity, to think of a Peace with France, till the Spaniſh Monarchy be entirely torn from it, and the Houſe of Bourbon diſabled from ever giving the Law to Europe.

Let us ſuppoſe that the French King would grant us the moſt advantageous Terms we can deſire; without the Separation of the two Monarchies they muſt infallibly end in our De⯑ſtruction. Shou'd he ſecure to us all our pre⯑ſent Acquiſitions; ſhou'd he add two or three Frontier-Towns to what we have already in Flanders; ſhou'd he join the Kingdoms of Si⯑cily and Sardinia to Milan and Naples; ſhou'd he leave King Charles in the peaceable Poſſeſ⯑ſion of Catalonia; ſhou'd he make over to Great Britain the Town and Harbour of Ca⯑dis, as well as that of Gibraltar, and at the ſame time reſign his Conqueſts in Portugal; it wou'd all be of no effect towards the com⯑mon Safety of Europe, while the Bulk of the Spaniſh Continent, and the Riches of America remain in the Poſſeſſion of the Bourbon Fa⯑mily.

Boccalini when he weighs the States of Eu⯑rope in his Political Balance, after having laid France in one Scale, throws Spain into the [10] other, which wanted but very little of being a Counter-poiſe. The Spaniards upon this, ſays he, begun to promiſe themſelves the Ho⯑nour of the Ballance; reckoning that if Spain of it ſelf weigh'd ſo well, they cou'd not fail of Succeſs when the ſeveral Parts of the Monarchy were lump'd in the ſame Scale. Their Surpriſe was very great when upon the throwing in of Naples they ſaw the Scale riſe, and was greater ſtill when they found that Milan and Flanders had the ſame effect. The truth of it is, theſe parts of the Spaniſh Mo⯑narchy are rather for Ornament than Strength. They furniſh out Vice-royalties for the Gran⯑dees, and Poſts of Honour for the Noble Fa⯑milies; but in a time of War are Incumbran⯑ces to the main Body of the Kingdom, and leave it naked and expos'd by the great num⯑ber of Hands they draw from it to their De⯑fence. Shou'd we therefore continue in the Poſſeſſion of what we have already made our ſelves Maſters, with ſuch Additions as have been mentioned, we ſhou'd have little more than the Excreſcencies of the Spaniſh Monarchy. The Strength of it will ſtill join it ſelf to France, and grow the cloſer to it by its Diſunion from the reſt. And in this caſe [11] the Advantages which muſt ariſe to that Peo⯑ple from their intimate Alliance with the re⯑maining part of the Spaniſh Dominions, wou'd in a very few Years not only repair all the Da⯑mages they have ſuſtained in the preſent War, but fill the Kingdom with more Riches than it hath yet had in its moſt flouriſhing Periods.

The French King hath often enter'd on ſe⯑veral expenſive Projects, on purpoſe to diſſi⯑pate the Wealth that is continually gathering in his Coffers in times of Peace. He hath employ'd immenſe Sums on Architecture, Gardening, Water-Works, Painting, Statua⯑ry, and the like, to diſtribute his Treaſures among his People, as well as to humour his Pleaſures and his Ambition: But if he once engroſſes the Commerce of the Spaniſh In⯑dies, whatever Quantities of Gold and Silver ſtagnate in his private Coffers, there will be ſtill enough to carry on the Circulation among his Subjects. By this means in a ſhort ſpace of time he may heap up greater Wealth than all the Princes of Europe join'd together; and in the preſent Conſtitution of the World, Wealth and Power are but different Names for the ſame thing. Let us therefore ſuppoſe that after eight or ten Years of Peace, he hath [12] a mind to infringe any of his Treaties, or in⯑vade a neighbouring State; to revive the Pre⯑tenſions of Spain upon Portugal, or attempt the taking thoſe Places which were granted us for our Security; what Reſiſtance, what Oppoſi⯑tion can we make to ſo formidable an Ene⯑my? Shou'd the ſame Alliance riſe againſt him that is now in War with him, what cou'd we hope for from it, at a time when the States engag'd in it will be comparatively weaken'd, and the Enemy who is now able to keep them at a ſtand, will have receiv'd ſo many new Acceſſions of Strength.

But I think it is not to be imagin'd that in ſuch a Conjuncture as we here ſuppoſe, the ſame Confederates, or any other of equal Force cou'd be prevail'd upon to join their Arms and endeavour at the pulling down ſo exorbitant a Power. Some might be bought into his Intereſts by Money, others drawn over by Fear, and thoſe that are liable to nei⯑ther of theſe Impreſſions, might not think their own Intereſt ſo much concern'd as in the preſent War; or if any appear'd in a diſ⯑poſition to enter into ſuch a Confederacy, they might be cruſh'd ſeparately before they cou'd concert Meaſures for their mutual Defence.

[13] The keeping together of the preſent Al⯑liance can be aſcribed to nothing elſe but the clear and evident Conviction which every Member of it is under, that if it ſhou'd once break without having had its effect, they can never hope for another Opportunity of reuni⯑ting, or of prevailing by all the joint Efforts of ſuch an Union. Let us therefore agree on this as a fixt Rule, and an inviolable Maxim, never to lay down our Arms againſt France, till we have utterly disjoyn'd her from the Spaniſh Monarchy. Let this be the firſt Step of a publick Treaty, the Baſis of a general Peace.

Had the preſent War indeed run againſt us, and all our Attacks upon the Enemy been vain, it might look like a degree of Frenzy, or a Mixture of Obſtinacy and Deſpair, to be determin'd on ſo impracticable an Underta⯑king. But on the contrary, we have already done a great part of our Work, and are come within view of the End that we have been ſo long driving at. We remain victorious in all the Seats of War. In Flanders we have got into our hands ſeveral open Countries, rich Towns, and fortified Places. We have driven the Enemy out of all his Alliances, diſpoſſeſt him of his Strong Holds, and [14] ruin'd his Allies in Germany. We have not only recover'd what the Beginning of the War had taken from us, but poſſeſt ourſelves of the Kingdom of Naples, the Dutchy of Mi⯑lan, and an Avenue of France in Italy. The Spaniſh War hath given us a Haven for our Ships, and the moſt populous and wealthy Province of that Kingdom. In ſhort, we have taken all the outlying parts of the Spaniſh Monarchy, and made Impreſſions upon the very Heart of it. We have beaten the French from all their advanc'd Poſts in Europe, and driven them into their laſt Entrench⯑ments. One vigorous Puſh on all ſides, one general Aſſault will force the Enemy to cry out for Quarter, and ſurrender themſelves at diſcretion. Another Blenheim or Ramillies will make the Confederates Maſters of their own Terms, and Arbitrators of a Peace.

But notwithſtanding the Advantages already gain'd are very conſiderable if we purſue them, they will be of no effect unleſs we improve them towards the carrying of our main point. The Enemy ſtaggers; if you follow your Blow, he falls at your Feet; but if you allow him reſpite, he will recover his Strength, and come upon you with greater Fury. We have given [15] him ſeveral repeated Wounds that have en⯑feebl'd him, and brought him low; but they are ſuch as time will heal, unleſs you take advantage from his preſent Weakneſs to re⯑double your Attacks upon him. It was a cele⯑brated part in Caeſar's Character, and what comes home to our preſent purpoſe, that he thought nothing at all was done, while any thing remain'd undone. In ſhort, we have been tugging a great while againſt the Stream, and have almoſt weather'd our point; a Stretch or two more will do the Work; but if in⯑ſtead of that we ſlacken our Arms, and drop our Oars, we ſhall be hurried back in a mo⯑ment to the place from whence we firſt ſet out.

After having ſeen the Neeceſſity of an en⯑tire Separation of the Kingdoms of France and Spain, our Subject naturally leads us into the Conſideration of the moſt proper means for effecting it.

We have a great while flatter'd ourſelves with the proſpect of reducing France to our own Terms by the want of Money among the People, and the Exigencies of the publick Treaſury; but have been ſtill diſappointed by the great Sums imported from America, [16] and the many new Expedients which the Court hath found out for its Relief. A long conſumptive War is more likely to break the Grand Alliance, than diſable France from maintaining ſufficient Armies to oppoſe it. An arbitrary Government will never want Money; ſo long as the People have it; and ſo active a People will always have it, whilſt they can ſend what Merchandiſes they pleaſe to Mexico and Peru. The French ſince their Alliance with Spain keep thirty Ships in con⯑ſtant Motion between the Weſtern Ports of France and the South Seas of America. The King himſelf is an Adventurer in this Traffick, and beſides the Share that he receives out of the Gains of his Subjects, has immenſe Sums that come directly from it into his own Hands.

We may further conſider, that the French ſince their abandoning Bavaria and Italy have very much retrench'd the Expence of the War, and lay out among themſelves all the Money that is conſumed in it.

Many are of Opinion, that the moſt probable way of bringing France to Reaſon wou'd be by the making an Attempt upon the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, and by that means to cut off all Com⯑munication [17] with this great Source of Riches, or turn the Current of it into our own Coun⯑try. This I muſt confeſs carries ſo promiſing an appearance, that I would by no means diſcou⯑rage the Attempt: But at the ſame time I think it ſhould be a collateral Project, rather than our principal Deſign. Such an Undertaking (if well concerted, and put into good Hands) would be of infinite Advantage to the Common Cauſe: but certainly an Enter⯑priſe that carries in it the Fate of Europe, ſhould not turn upon the Uncertainty of Winds and Waves, and be liable to all the Accidents that may befal a Naval Expedition.

Others there are that have long deceiv'd themſelves with the hopes of an Inſurre⯑ction in France, and are therefore for laying out all our Strength on a Deſcent. Theſe, I think, do not enough conſider the natural Love which the groſs of Mankind have for the Conſtitution of their Fathers. A Man that is not enlightned by Travail or Reflexion, grows as fond of Arbitrary Power, to which he hath been us'd from his Infancy, as of cold Climates or barren Countries, in which he hath been born and bred. Beſides, there is a kind of ſluggiſh Reſignation, as well as [18] poorneſs and degeneracy of Spirit, in a ſtate of Slavery, that we meet with but very few who will be at the pains or danger of reco⯑vering themſelves out of it; as we find in Hi⯑ſtory Inſtances of Perſons who after their Pri⯑ſons have been flung open, and their Fetters ſtruck off, have choſen rather to languiſh in their Dungeons, than ſtake their miſerable Lives and Fortunes upon the Succeſs of a Re⯑volution. I need not inſtance the general Fate of Deſcents, the Difficulty of ſupplying Men and Proviſions by Sea againſt an Enemy that hath both at hand, and without which it is impoſſible to ſecure thoſe Conqueſts that are often made in the firſt Onſets of an Inva⯑ſion. For theſe and other Reaſons I can never approve the nurſing up Commotions and Inſur⯑rections in the Enemy's Country, which for want of the neceſſary Support are likely to end in the Maſſacre of our Friends and the Ruin of their Families.

The only means therefore for bringing France to our Conditions, and what appears to me, in all human probability, a ſure and in⯑fallible Expedient, is to throw in Multitudes upon 'em, and overpower 'em with Numbers, Would the Confederacy exert it ſelf as much [19] to annoy the Enemy, as they themſelves for their Defence, we might bear them down with the weight of our Armies, and in one Summer overſet the whole Power of France.

The French Monarchy is already exhauſted of its beſt and braveſt Subjects. The Flower of the Nation is conſum'd in its Wars: The Strength of their Armies conſiſts at preſent of ſuch as have ſaved themſelves by flight from ſome or other of the victorious Confederates; and the only proper Perſons to recruit them are but the Refuſe of thoſe who have been al⯑ready pick'd out for the Service. Mareſchal de Vauban, tho' infinitely partial in his Cal⯑culations of the Power of France, reckons that the Number of its Inhabitants was two Mil⯑lions leſs at the Peace of Ryſwick, than in the beginning of the War that was there con⯑cluded: And tho' that War continued Nine Years, and this hath as yet laſted but Six, yet conſidering that their Armies are more ſtrong and numerous; that there hath been much more Action in the preſent War; and that their Loſſes ſuſtain'd in it have been very ex⯑traordinary; we may, by a moderate Com⯑putation, ſuppoſe that the preſent War hath not been leſs prejudicial than the foregoing [20] one in the Ravage which it has made a⯑among the People. There is in France ſo great a diſproportion between the number of Males and Females; and among the former, between thoſe who are capable of bearing Arms, and ſuch as are too young, ſickly, or decrepit for the Service; and at the ſame time ſuch vaſt numbers of Eccleſiaſticks, Se⯑cular and Religious, who live upon the La⯑bours of others, that when the ſeveral Trades and Profeſſions are ſupply'd, you will find moſt of thoſe that are proper for War abſo⯑lutely neceſſary for filling up the laborious part of Life, and carrying on the Under⯑work of the Nation. They have already con⯑tributed all their ſuperfluous Hands, and eve⯑ry new Levy they make muſt be at the Ex⯑pence of their Farms and Vineyards, their Manufactures and Commerce.

On the contrary, the Grand Alliance have innumerable Sources of Recruits, not only in Britain and Ireland, the Ʋnited Provinces, and Flanders; but in all the populous parts of Germany that have little Trade or Manu⯑factures, in proportion to the number of their Inhabitants. We may add, that the French have only Switzerland, beſides their own Country, [21] to recruit in; and we know the Difficulties they meet with in getting thence a ſingle Regiment: Whereas the Allies have not only the ſame Reſſource, but may be ſupply'd for Mony from Denmark and other Neutral States. In ſhort, the Confederates may bring to the Field what Forces they pleaſe, if they will be at the charge of 'em: but France, let her Wealth be what it will, muſt content her⯑ſelf with the Product of her own Country.

The French are ſtill in greater ſtreights for Supplies of Horſe than Men. The Breed of their Country is neither ſo good nor nume⯑rous as what are to be found in moſt of the Countries of the Allies. They had laſt Sum⯑mer about Threeſcore Thouſand in their ſeve⯑ral Armies, and cou'd not perhaps bring into the Field 30000 more, if they were diſpos'd to make ſuch an Augmentation.

The French Horſe are not only few, but weak in compariſon of ours. Their Ca⯑valry in the Battle of Blenheim cou'd not ſuſtain the Shock of the Britiſh Horſe. For this reaſon our late way of attacking their Troops Sword in Hand is very much to the Advantage of our Nation, as our Men are more robuſt, and our Horſes of a ſtronger [22] Make than the French; and in ſuch Attacks it is the Weight of the Forces, ſuppoſing equal Courage and Conduct, that will always carry it. The Engliſh Strength turn'd very much to account in our Wars againſt the French of old, when we us'd to gall them with our long Bows, at a greater Diſtance than they could ſhoot their Arrows: This Advantage we loſt upon the Invention of Fire-Arms, but by the preſent Method our Strength as well as Bravery may again be of uſe to us in the Day of Battle.

We have very great Encouragement to ſend what Numbers we are able into the Field, be⯑cauſe our Generals at preſent are ſuch as are likely to make the beſt uſe of them, without throwing them away on any Raſh Attempts or ill-concerted Projects. The Confederate Ar⯑mies have the Happineſs of being commanded by Perſons who are eſteem'd the greateſt Lea⯑ders of the preſent Age, and are perhaps equal to any that have preceded them. There is a ſort of Reſemblance in their Characters; A particular Sedateneſs in their Converſation and Behaviour, that qualifies them for Coun⯑cil, with a great Intrepidity and Reſolution that fits them for Action. They are all of them [23] Men of conceal'd Fire, that doth not break out with Noiſe and Heat in the ordinary Cir⯑cumſtances of Life; but ſhews it ſelf ſufficient⯑ly in all great Enterpriſes that require it. 'Tis true, the General upon the Rhine hath not had the ſame Occaſions as the others to ſigna⯑lize himſelf; but if we conſider the great Vi⯑gilance, Activity and Courage, with the con⯑ſummate Prudence, and the nice ſenſe of Ho⯑nour which appears in that Prince's Chara⯑cter, we have great reaſon to hope, that as he purchaſed the firſt Succeſs in the pre⯑ſent War, by forcing into the Service of the Confederates an Army that was rais'd againſt them in the very Heart of the Empire, he will give one of the finiſhing Strokes to it, and help to conclude the great Work which he ſo happily begun. The ſudden Check that he gave to the French Army the laſt Campaign, and the good Order he eſtabliſh'd in that of the Germans, look like happy Preſages of what we may expect from his Conduct. I ſhall not pretend to give any Character of the Ge⯑nerals on the Enemy's ſide; but I think we may ſay this, that in the Eyes of their own Nation they are inferior to ſeveral that have formerly commanded the French Armies. If [24] then we have greater Numbers than the French, and at the ſame time better Generals, it muſt be our own Fault if we will not reap the Fruit of ſuch Advantages.

It would be loſs of Time to explain any further our Superiority to the Enemy in Num⯑bers of Men and Horſe. We ſee plainly that we have the Means in our Hands, and that nothing but the Application of them is want⯑ing. Let us only conſider what uſe the Ene⯑my would make of the Advantage we have mention'd if it fell on their ſide; and is it not very ſtrange that we ſhou d not be as active and induſtrious for our Security, as they wou'd certainly be for our Deſtruction? But before we conſider more diſtinctly the Method we ought to take in the Proſecution of the War, under this particular View, let us reflect a little upon thoſe we have already taken in the Courſe of it for theſe ſix Years paſt.

The Allies after a ſucceſsful Summer are too apt upon the Strength of it to neglect their Preparations for the enſuing Campaign, while the French leave no Art nor Stratagem untried to fill up the empty Spaces of their Armies, and ſwell 'em to an equal Bulk with thoſe of the Confederates. By this means our Advantage [25] is loſt, and the Fate of Europe brought to a ſecond Deciſion. It is now become an Obſer⯑vation that we are to expect a very indifferent Year after a very ſucceſsful one. Blenheim was follow'd by a Summer that makes no noiſe in the War. Ramillies, Turin, and Barcelona, were the Parents of our laſt Campaign. So many dreadful Blows allarm'd the Enemy, and rais'd their whole Country up in Arms. Had we on our ſide made proportionable Prepara⯑tions, the War by this time had been brought to a happy Iſſue. If after having gain'd the great Victories of Blenheim and Ramillies we had made the ſame Efforts as we ſhould have done had we loſt them, the Power of France could not have withſtood us.

In the beginning of the Winter we uſually get what Intelligence we can of the Force which the Enemy intends to employ in the Campaigns of the ſucceeding Year, and immediately caſt about for a ſufficient number of Troops to face them in the Field of Battle. This, I muſt confeſs, would be a good Method if we were engag'd in a Defenſive War. We might maintain our Ground with an equal Number of Forces; but our Buſineſs is not only to ſecure what we are already in Poſſeſſion of; we are to wreſt the [26] whole Spaniſh Monarchy out of the Hands of the Enemy; and in order to it, to work our Way into the Heart of his Country by dint of Arms. We ſhould therefore put forth all our Strength, and without having any Eye to his Preparations, make the greateſt Puſh that we are able on our own ſide. We are told that the Enemy at preſent thinks of raiſing Three⯑ſcore Thouſand Men for the next Summer; if we regulate our Levies in that View, we do nothing; let us perform our utmoſt, as they do, and we ſhall overwhelm 'em with our Multitudes. We have it in our Power at leaſt to be four times as ſtrong as the French, but if Ten Men are in War with Forty, and the latter detatch only an equal Number to the Engagement, what Benefit do they receive from their Superiority?

It ſeems therefore to be the Buſineſs of the Confederates to turn to their Advantage their apparent Odds in Men and Horſe; and by that means to out-number the Enemy in all Rencounters and Engagements. For the ſame Reaſon it muſt be for the Intereſt of the Al⯑lies to ſeek all Opportunities of Battle, be⯑cauſe all Loſſes on the oppoſite ſide are made up with infinitely more Difficulty than on ours; [27] beſides that the French do their Buſineſs by lying ſtill, and have no other Concern in the War than to hold faſt what they have already got into their Hands.

The Miſcarriage of the nobleſt Project that ever was form'd in Europe, can be aſcrib'd to nothing elſe but our want of Numbers in the ſeveral Quarters of the War. If our Armies on all ſides had begun to buſie and inſult the Enemy, at the ſame time that the Forces march'd out of Piemont, Toulon had been at preſent in the Hands of the Duke of Savoy. But could that Prince ever have imagin'd that the French would have been at liberty to de⯑tatch whole Armies againſt him? Or will it appear credible to Poſterity, that in a War carried on by the joint Force of ſo many po⯑pulous and powerful Nations, France could ſend ſo great a part of its Troops to one Seat of the War, without ſuffering in any of the reſt? Whereas it is well known, that if the Duke of Savoy had continued before Toulon eight Days longer, he had been attack'd by an Army of Sixty Thouſand Men, which was more than double the Number of his own; and yet the Enemy was ſtrong enough every where elſe to prevent the Confederates from making any Im⯑preſſion [28] upon them. However, let us fall into the right Meaſures, and we may hope that the Stroke is only deferr'd. The Duke of Savoy hath ſecur'd a Paſſage into Dauphiny, and if the Allies make ſuch Efforts in all Parts, as we may reaſonably expect from them, that Prince may ſtill make himſelf Maſter of the French Dominions on the other ſide of the Rhone.

There is another part of our Conduct which may perhaps deſerve to be conſider'd. As ſoon as we have agreed with the States Gene⯑ral upon any Augmentation of our Forces, we immediately negotiate with ſome or other of the German Princes, who are in the ſame Confederacy, to furniſh out our Quota in Mercenaries. This may be doubly prejudicial to the Alliance; Firſt, as it may have an ill Influence on the Reſolutions of thoſe Princes in the Diet of the Empire, who may be wil⯑ling to ſettle as ſmall a Quota as they can for themſelves, that they may have more Troops to hire out; and in the next place, as it may hinder them from contributing the whole Quota which they have ſettled. This actually happen'd in the laſt Campaign, when we are told the Germans excus'd themſelves for their [29] want of Troops upon the Rhine, as having alrea⯑dy put moſt of their Forces into the Britiſh and Dutch Service. Such an Excuſe, indeed, is very unjuſt, but it would be better to give them no occaſion of making it; and on ſuch Occaſions to conſider what Men are apt to do, as well as what they may do with Reaſon.

It might therefore be for our Advantage that all the Foreign Troops in the Britiſh Pay ſhou'd be rais'd in Neutral Countries. Switzerland in particular, if timely applied to, might be of great uſe to us; not only in reſpect of the Reinforcements which we might draw from thence, but becauſe ſuch a Draught of Forces would leſſen the Number of thoſe that might otherwiſe be employ'd in the French Service. The Bulk of our Levies ſhou'd nevertheleſs be rais'd in our own Country, it being impoſſible for the Neutral States to furniſh both the Bri⯑tiſh and Dutch with a ſufficient Number of effective Men; beſides that the Britiſh Sol⯑diers will be more at the Diſpoſal of their Ge⯑neral, and act with greater Vigour under the Conduct of one for whom they have ſo juſt a Value, and whom they do not conſider only as their Leader, but as their Country-Man. [30] We may likewiſe ſuppoſe that the Soldiers of a Neutral State, who are not animated by any National Intereſt, cannot fight for Pay with the ſame Ardour and Alacrity, as Men that fight for their Prince and Country, their Wives and Children.

It may likewiſe be worth while to conſider whether the Military Genius of the Engliſh Nation may not fall by degrees, and become inferior to that of our neighbouring States, if it hath no occaſion to exert it ſelf. Minds that are altogether ſet on Trade and Profit, often contract a certain Narrowneſs of Tem⯑per, and at length become uncapable of great and generous Reſolutions. Shou'd the French ever make an unexpected Deſcent upon us, we might want Soldiers of our own Growth to riſe up in our Defence; and might not have time to draw a ſufficient Number of Troops to our Relief from the remote Corners of Germany. It is generally ſaid, that if King Charles II. had made War upon France in the beginning of his Reign, he might have conquer'd it by the many Veterans which were ſcatter'd up and down this Kingdom, and had been inur'd to Service in the Civil Wars. It is to be hop'd we ſhall never have ſuch another Nur⯑ſery [31] of Soldiers; but if the preſent War gives a more Military Turn to all other Nations of Europe, than to our own, it is to be fear'd we may loſe in Strength, what we gain in Number. We may apply the ſame Con⯑ſideration nearer home. If all our Levies are made in Scotland or Ireland, may not thoſe two Parts of the Britiſh Monarchy, af⯑ter the disbanding of the preſent Army, be too powerful for the reſt, in caſe of a Re⯑volt, tho', God be thank'd, we are not in any danger of one at preſent. However, as theſe Conſiderations don't concern the more eſſential part of our Deſign, it is ſufficient have mention'd them.

The ſparing of our ſelves in ſo important a Conjuncture, when we have but this ſingle Opportunity left for the preſerving every thing that is pretious amongſt us, is the worſt ſort of Management that we can poſſibly fall into. The good Husbandry of one Age may intail an endleſs Expence upon all Poſterity. We muſt venture the ſacrificing a part of our Lives and Fortunes at preſent, if we will effectually ſe⯑cure both for the future. The Britiſh King⯑dom is ſo well ſtock'd with People, and ſo much abounds in Horſe, that we have Power [32] enough in our own Hands, did we make our utmoſt uſe of it, to humble France, and in a Campaign or two to put an end to the War.

There is not a more diſagreeable Thought to the People of Great Britain than that of a ſtanding Army. But if a Peace be made be⯑fore the Diſunion of France and Spain, there are few, perhaps, that will not think the maintaining a ſettled Body of numerous Forces indiſpenſable for the Safety of our Country. We have it therefore in our Choice to raiſe ſuch a ſtrong Reinforcement of Troops as at preſent may be ſufficient in Conjunction with thoſe of the Allies, for breaking the Strength of the Enemy; or when the Peace is conclu⯑ded, to keep on Foot ſuch an Army as will be neceſſary for preventing his Attempts up⯑on us.

It is to be hop'd that thoſe who wou'd be the moſt zealous againſt keeping up a con⯑ſtant Body of Regular Troops after a Gene⯑ral Peace, will the moſt diſtinguiſh themſelves for the promoting an Augmentation of thoſe which are now on Foot; and by that means take care that we ſhall not ſtand in need of ſuch an Expedient.

[33] We are indeed oblig'd by the preſent Situation of our Affairs to bring more Troops into the Field than we have yet done. As the French are retir'd within their Lines, and have collected all their Strength into a narrow Compaſs, we muſt have greater Numbers to charge them in their Entrench⯑ments, and force them to a Battle. We ſaw the laſt Campaign that an Army of Fourſcore Thouſand of the beſt Troops in Europe, with the Duke of Marlborough at the Head of them, cou'd do nothing againſt an Enemy that were too numerous to be aſſaulted in their Camps, or attack'd in their Strong Holds.

There is another Conſideration which de⯑ſerves our utmoſt Attention. We know very well, that there is a Prince at the Head of a powerful Army, who may give a turn to the War, in which we are engag'd, if he thinks fit to ſide with either Party. I cannot pre⯑ſume to gueſs how far our Miniſters may be inform'd of his Deſigns: But unleſs they have very ſtrong Aſſurances of his falling in with the Grand Alliance, or not oppoſing it; they cannot be too circumſpect and ſpeedy in taking their Precautions againſt any contrary Reſolution. We ſhall be unpardonable, if [34] after ſuch an Expence of Blood and Treaſure, we leave it in the power of any ſingle Prince to command a Peace, and make us accept what Conditions he thinks fit. It is certain, according to the Poſture of our Affairs in the laſt Campaign, this Prince could have turn'd the Ballance on either ſide; but it is to be hop'd the Liberties of Europe will not de⯑pend any more on the Determination of one Man's Will. I don't ſpeak this becauſe I think there is any Appearance of that Prince's uniting himſelf to France. On the contrary, as he hath an extraordinary Zeal for the Re⯑form'd Religion, and great Sentiments of Ho⯑nour, I think it is not improbable we ſhou'd draw him over to the Confederacy, if we preſs him to it by proper Motives. His Love for Religion, and his Senſe of Glory, will both have their effect on a Prince who hath already diſtinguiſh'd himſelf by being a Patron of Pro⯑teſtants, and Guarantee of the Weſtphalian Treaty. And if his Intereſt hath any part in his Actions, the Allies may make him greater Offers than the French King can do in the pre⯑ſent Conjuncture. There are large Extents of Dominion in the forfeited Principalities of the Empire; doubtful Succeſſions to which [35] the King of Sweden ſeems to have very juſt Pretenſions; and at the ſame time a great Title not yet diſpos'd of, and a Seat of War on the Moſelle, where none of our Generals have ſignaliz'd themſelves. It would be Pre⯑ſumption to be particular in any Propoſals on ſuch an Occaſion; it is enough to have ſhewn in general, that there are fair Opportunies, of which the Wiſdom of the Confederates may make uſe.

Common Senſe will direct us, when we ſee ſo warlike a Prince at the Head of ſo great an Army hovering on the Borders of our Con⯑federates, either to obtain his Friendſhip, or ſecure ourſelves againſt the Force of his Arms. We are ſure, whatever numbers of Troops we raiſe, we ſhall have no Hands but what will turn to account. Nay, we are certain, that extraordinary Funds and Augmentations for one or two Campaigns may ſpare us the Expence of many Years, and put an end to Taxes and Levies for a whole Age; whereas a long parcimonious War will drain us of more Men and Money, and in the end may prove ineffectual.

There is ſtill a great Popular Objection, which will be made to every thing that can [36] be urg'd on this Subject. And indeed 'tis ſuch a one as falls ſo much in with the Pre⯑judices and little Paſſions of the Multitude, that when it is turn'd and ſet off to advan⯑tage by ill-deſigning Men, it throws a Damp on the publick Spirit of the Nation, and gives a check to all generous Reſolutions for its Honour and Safety. In ſhort, we are to be told, that England contributes much more than any other of the Allies, and that there⯑fore it is not reaſonable ſhe ſhou'd make any Addition to her preſent Efforts. If this were true in Fact, I don't ſee any tolerable colour for ſuch a Concluſion. Suppoſing among a Multitude embarqu'd in the ſame Veſſel there are ſeveral that in the fury of a Tempeſt will rather periſh than work for their Pre⯑ſervation; wou'd it not be Madneſs in the reſt to ſtand idle, and rather chuſe to ſink to⯑gether than do more than comes to their ſhare? Since we are engag'd in a Work ſo abſolutely neceſſary for our Welfare, the Remiſneſs of our Allies ſhould be an Argument for us to redouble our Endeavours rather than ſlacken them. If we muſt govern our ſelves by Example, let us rather imitate the Vigilance and Activity of the Common Enemy, than [37] the Supineneſs and Negligence of our Friends.

We have indeed a much greater ſhare in the War than any other part of the Confederacy. The French King makes at us directly, keeps a King by him to ſet over us, and hath very lately augmented the Salary of his Court, to let us ſee how much he hath that Deſign at heart. Few of the Nations in War with him, ſhou'd they ever fall into his hands, wou'd loſe their Religion or Form of Govern⯑ment, or interfere at preſent with him in matters of Commerce. The Dutch, who are likely to be the greateſt Loſers after the Bri⯑tains, have but little Trade to the Levant in compariſon with ours, have no conſiderable Plantations or Commerce in the Weſt-Indies, or any Woollen-Manufactures for Spain; not to mention the ſtrong Barrier they have al⯑ready purchas'd between France and their own Country.

But after all, every Nation in the Confe⯑deracy makes the ſame Complaint, and fancys itſelf the greateſt Sufferer by the War. Indeed in ſo common a Preſſure, let the Weight be never ſo equally diſtributed, eve⯑ry one will be moſt ſenſible of that part which lies on his own Shoulders. We fur⯑niſh, [38] without diſpute, more than any other Branch of the Alliance: but the queſtion is, whether others do not exert themſelves in pro⯑portion according to their reſpective Strength. The Emperor, the King of Pruſſia, the Ele⯑ctor of Hannover, as well as the States of Holland and the Duke of Savoy, ſeem at leaſt to come up to us. The greateſt Powers in Germany are borrowing Mony where they can get it, in order to maintain their ſtated Quota's, and go thorough their part of the Ex⯑pence: and f any of the Circles have been negligent, they have paid for it much more in their late Contributions, than what wou'd have furniſh'd out their Share in the common Charges of the War.

There are others who will object the Po⯑verty of the Nation, and the Difficulties it wou'd find in furniſhing greater Supplies to the War than it doth at preſent. To this we might anſwer, that if the Nation were really as poor as this Objection makes it, it ſhou'd be an Argument for enforcing rather than diminiſhing our preſent Efforts againſt France. The ſinking our Taxes for a few Years wou'd be only a temporary Relief, and in a little time occaſion far greater Impoſi⯑tions, [39] than thoſe which are now laid upon us. Whereas the ſeaſonable Expence of part of our Riches, will not only preſerve the reſt; but by the right uſe of them pro⯑cure vaſt Additions to our preſent Stock. It may be neceſſary for a Perſon languiſhing un⯑der an ill Habit of Body to loſe ſeveral Oun⯑ces of Blood, notwithſtanding it will weaken him for a time, in order to put a new Fer⯑ment into the remaining Maſs, and draw into it freſh Supplies.

But we can by no means make this Con⯑ceſſion, to thoſe who ſo induſtriouſly publiſh the Nation's Poverty. Our Country is not only rich, but abounds in Wealth much more than any other of the ſame Extent in Europe-France, notwithſtanding the Goodneſs of its Climate, the Fertility of its Soil, the Multi⯑tude of its Inhabitants, its convenient Har⯑bours, both for the Ocean and Mediterranean, and its preſent Correſpondence with the Weſt-Indies, is not to compare with Great Britain in this particular. I ſhall tranſcribe word for word the Paſſage of a late celebrated French Author, which will lay this Matter in its full light; and leave the Reader to make the counter-part of the Parallel between the two Nations.

[40] ‘"According to all the Inquiries that I have been able to make during ſeveral Years, in which I have apply'd my ſelf to this ſort of Remarks, I have obſerv'd, that about a Tenth part of the People of this King⯑dom are reduc'd to Beggary, and are a⯑ctual Beggars. That among the Nine other parts, Five are not in a condition to give Alms or Relief to thoſe aforemention'd, being very near reduc'd themſelves to the ſame miſerable Condition. Of the Four other remaining Parts, Three are very uneaſy in their Circumſtances, and embaraſs'd with Debts and Law-Suits. In the Tenth part, I reckon the Soldiers, Lawyers, Eccleſiaſticks, Merchants and ſubſtantial Citizens, which cannot make up more than a Hundred Thouſand Fami⯑lies. And I believe I ſhould not be miſtaken, if I ſhou'd ſay, that there are not above Ten Thouſand of theſe Families, who are very much at their eaſe: and if out of theſe Ten Thouſand we ſhou'd take the Men that are employ'd in Publick Buſi⯑neſs, with their Dependents and Adhe⯑rents, as alſo thoſe whom the King ſup⯑ports by his Bounty, with a few Mer⯑chants, [41] the number of thoſe who remain will be ſurpriſingly little." Dixme Royale.’

What a dreadful Account is this of Nine⯑teen Millions of People; for ſo many the Au⯑thor reckons in that Kingdom. How can we ſee ſuch a Multitude of Souls caſt under ſo many Subdiviſions of Miſery, without re⯑flecting on the Abſurdity of a Form of Go⯑vernment that ſacrifices the Eaſe and Happineſs of ſo many reaſonable Beings to the Glory of one of their Fellow-Creatures. But this is not our Affair at preſent.

If we run over the other Nations of Eu⯑rope that have any part in the preſent War, we ſhall only paſs through ſo many different Scenes of Poverty. Spain, Portugal, and Savoy are reduc'd to great Extremities. Ger⯑many is exhauſted to the laſt degree in many parts of it, and in others plundered of all ſhe had left. Holland indeed flouriſhes a⯑bove the reſt in Wealth and Plenty: But if we conſider the infinite Induſtry and Penuri⯑ouſneſs of that People, the Coarſeneſs of their Food and Raiment, their little Indulgences of Pleaſure and Exceſs, it is no wonder that not⯑withſtanding they furniſh as great Taxes as their Neighbours, they make a better figure [42] under them. In a Commonwealth there are not ſo many overgrown Eſtates as in Monar⯑chies, the Wealth of the Country is ſo equal⯑ly diſtributed, that moſt of the Community are at their Eaſe, though few are plac'd in extraordinary Points of Splendour and Magni⯑ficence. But notwithſtanding theſe Circum⯑cumſtances may very much contribute to the ſeeming Proſperity of the Ʋnited Provinces, we know they are indebted many Millions more than their whole Republick is worth, and if we conſider the variety of Taxes and Impoſitions they groan under at a time when their private Diſſenſions run high, and ſome of the wealthieſt parts of the Government re⯑fuſe to bear their ſhare in the publick Expence, we ſhall not think the Condition of that Peo⯑ple ſo much to be envied as ſome amongſt us would willingly repreſent it.

Nor is Great Britain only rich as ſhe ſtands in compariſon with other States, but is really ſo in her own intrinſick Wealth. She had never more Ships at Sea, greater quantities of Merchandiſe in her Warehouſes, larger Re⯑ceipts of Cuſtomes, or more numerous Com⯑modities riſing out of her Manufactures than ſhe has at preſent. In ſhort, ſhe ſits in the [43] midſt of a mighty Affluence of all the Neceſ⯑ſaries and Conveniencies of Life. If our Sil⯑ver and Gold diminiſhes, our publick Credit continues unimpair'd, and if we are in want of Bullion, it lies in our own power to ſup⯑ply our ſelves. The old Roman General, when he heard his Army complain of Thirſt, ſhew'd 'em the Springs and Rivers that lay be⯑hind the Enemy's Camp. It is our own caſe: The Rout of a Spaniſh Army would make us Maſters of the Indies.

If Prince Eugene takes upon him the Com⯑mand of the Confederate Forces in Catalonia, and meets with that Support from the Al⯑liance which they are capable of giving him, we have a fair Proſpect of reducing Spain to the entire Obedience of the Houſe of Au⯑ſtria. The Sileſian Fund (to the immortal Reputation of thoſe generous Patriots who were concern'd in it) enabled that Prince to make a Conqueſt of Italy, at a time when our Affairs were more deſperate there, than they are at preſent in the Kingdom of Spain.

When our Parliament has done their ut⯑moſt, another publick ſpirited Project of the ſame nature, which the Common Enemy cou'd not foreſee nor prepare againſt, might in all [44] probability ſet King Charles upon the Throne for which he hath ſo long contended. One pitcht Battle wou'd determine the Fate of the Spaniſh Continent.

Let us therefore exert the united Strength of our whole Iſland, and by that means put a new Life and Spirit into the Confederates, who have their Eyes fixt upon us, and will abate or increaſe their Preparations according to the Example that is ſet them. We ſee the Neceſſity of an Augmentation if we intend to bring the Enemy to Reaſon, or reſcue our Country from the Miſeries that may befal it; and we find our ſelves in a condition of making ſuch an Aug⯑mentation as, by the Bleſſing of God, can⯑not but prove effectual. If we carry it on vigorouſly we ſhall gain for our ſelves and our Poſterity a long a glorious and a laſting Peace; but if we neglect ſo fair an Opportunity, we may be willing to employ all our Hands, and all our Treaſures when it will be too late, and ſhall be tormented with one of the moſt me⯑lancholy Reflexions of an afflicted Heart, That it was once in our Power to have made our ſelves and our Children happy.