The Firſt DIALOGUE.

GOOD Morrow, Hylas, I did not expect to find you abroad ſo early.

It is in⯑deed ſomething unuſual, but my Thoughts were ſo taken up with a Sub⯑ject I was diſcourſing of laſt Night, that finding I could not ſleep, I reſolved to riſe and take a turn in the Garden.

It happened well, to let you ſee what innocent and agreeable Pleaſures you loſe every Morning. Can there be a pleaſanter time of the Day, or a more delightful Sea⯑ſon of the Year? That purple Sky, theſe wild but ſweet Notes of Birds, the fra⯑grant Bloom upon the Trees and Flowers, the gentle Influence of the riſing Sun, theſe [2] and a thouſand nameleſs Beauties of Nature inſpire the Soul with ſecret Tranſports; its Faculties too being at this time freſh and lively, are fit for thoſe Meditations, which the Solitude of a Garden and Tranquillity of the Morning naturally diſpoſe us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your Thoughts: for you ſeemed very intent on ſomething.

It is true, I was, and ſhall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go on in the ſame Vein; not that I would by any means deprive myſelf of your Company, for my Thoughts always flow more eaſily in Conver⯑ſation with a Friend, than when I am alone: But my Requeſt is, that you would ſuffer me to impart my Reflexions to you.

With all my Heart, it is what I ſhould have requeſted my ſelf, if you had not pre⯑vented me.

I was conſidering the odd Fate of thoſe Men who have in all Ages, through an Affectation of being diſtinguiſhed from the Vulgar, or ſome unaccountable Turn of Thought, pretended either to believe no⯑thing at all, or to believe the moſt extrava⯑gant Things in the World. This however might be born, if their Paradoxes and Scepti⯑ciſm did not draw after them ſome Conſe⯑quences of general Diſadvantage to Man⯑kind. But the Miſchief lies here; that when Men of leſs Leiſure ſee them who are ſuppo⯑ſed [3] to have ſpent their whole time in the Purſuits of Knowlege, profeſſing an intire Ignorance of all Things, or advancing ſuch Notions as are repugnant to plain and com⯑monly received Principles, they will be tempted to entertain Suſpicions concerning the moſt important Truths which they had hitherto held ſacred and unqueſtionable.

I intirely agree with you, as to the ill Tendency of the affected Doubts of ſome Philoſophers, and fantaſtical Conceits of o⯑thers. I am even ſo far gone of late in this way of Thinking, that I have quitted ſeveral of the ſublime Notions I had got in their Schools for vulgar Opinions. And I give it you on my Word, ſince this Revolt from Me⯑taphyſical Notions to the plain Dictates of Nature and common Senſe, I find my Un⯑derſtanding ſtrangely enlightened, ſo that I can now eaſily comprehend a great many Things which before were all Myſtery and Riddle.

I am glad to find there was nothing in the Accounts I heard of you.

Pray, what were thoſe?

You were repreſented in laſt Night's Converſation, as one who maintained the moſt extravagant Opinion that ever entered into the Mind of Man, viz. That there is no ſuch Thing as material Subſtance in the World.

That there is no ſuch Thing as what Philoſophers call Material Subſtance, I am ſe⯑riouſly perſuaded: But if I were made to ſee any thing Abſurd or Sceptical in this, I ſhould then have the ſame Reaſon to renounce this, that I imagine I have now to reject the con⯑trary Opinion.

What! can any Thing be more fan⯑taſtical, more repugnant to common Senſe, or a more manifeſt Piece of Scepticiſm, than to believe there is no ſuch Thing as Matter?

Softly, good Hylas. What if it ſhould prove, that you, who hold there is, are by Vertue of that Opinion a greater Sceptic, and maintain more Paradoxes and Repug⯑nancies to common Senſe, than I who be⯑lieve no ſuch Thing?

You may as ſoon perſuade me, The Part is greater than the Whole, as that, in order to avoid Abſurdity and Scepticiſm, I ſhould ever be obliged to give up my Opi⯑nion in this Point.

Well then, are you content to admit that Opinion for true, which upon Examina⯑tion ſhall appear moſt agreeable to common Senſe, and remote from Scepticiſm?

With all my Heart. Since you are for raiſing Diſputes about the plaineſt Things in Nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to ſay.

Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a Sceptic?

I mean what all Men mean, one that doubts of every Thing.

He then who entertains no Doubt concerning ſome particular Point, with re⯑gard to that Point, cannot be thought a Sceptic.

I agree with you.

Whether does Doubting conſiſt in embracing the Affirmative or Negative Side of a Queſtion?

In neither; for whoever underſtands Engliſh, cannot but know that Doubting ſig⯑nifies a Suſpenſe between both.

He then that denies any Point, can no more be ſaid to doubt of it, than he who affirms it with the ſame Degree of Aſſu⯑rance.

True.

And conſequently, for ſuch his Denial is no more to be eſteemed a Sceptic than the other.

I acknowlege it.

How comes it then, Hylas, that you pronounce me a Sceptic, becauſe I deny what you affirm, viz. the Exiſtence of Matter? Since, for ought you can tell, I am as perem⯑ptory in my Denial, as you in your Affirma⯑tion.

Hold, Philonous, I have been a lit⯑tle out in my Definition; but every falſe Step a Man makes in Diſcourſe is not to be inſiſted on. I ſaid, indeed, that a Sceptic was one who doubted of every Thing; but I ſhould have added, or who denies the Reality and Truth of Things.

What Things? Do you mean the Principles and Theoremes of Sciences? But theſe you know are univerſal intellectual No⯑tions, and conſequently independent of Mat⯑ter; the Denial therefore of this doth not im⯑ply the denying them.

I grant it. But are there no other Things? What think you of diſtruſting the Senſes, of denying the real Exiſtence of ſen⯑ſible Things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this ſufficient to denominate a Man a Sceptic?

Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the Reality of Senſible Things, or profeſſes the greateſt Ignorance of them; ſince, if I take you rightly, he is to be eſteemed the greateſt Sceptic?

That is what I deſire.

What mean you by Senſible Things?

Thoſe Things which are perceived by the Senſes. Can you imagine that I mean any thing elſe?

Pardon me, Hylas, if I am deſirous clearly to apprehend your Notions, ſince this [7] may much ſhorten our Inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther Queſtion. Are thoſe Things only perceived by the Senſes which are perceived immediately? Or may thoſe Things properly be ſaid to be Senſible, which are perceived mediately, or not with⯑out the Intervention of others?

I do not ſufficiently underſtand you.

In reading a Book, what I immediate⯑ly perceive are the Letters, but mediately, or by means of theſe, are ſuggeſted to my Thoughts the Notions of God, Virtue, Truth, &c. Now, that the Letters are truly Senſi⯑ble Things, or perceived by Senſe, there is no doubt: But I would know whether you take the Things ſuggeſted by them to be ſo too.

No certainly, it were abſurd to think God or Virtue Senſible Things, tho' they may be ſignified and ſuggeſted to the Mind by Senſible Marks, with which they have an arbitrary Connexion.

It ſeems then, that by Senſible Things you mean thoſe only which can be perceived immediately by Senſe.

Right.

Does it not follow from this, that tho' I ſee one part of the Sky Red, and ano⯑ther Blue, and that my Reaſon doth thence evidently conclude there muſt be ſome Cauſe of that Diverſity of Colours, yet that Cauſe [8] cannot be ſaid to be a Senſible Thing, or perceived by the Senſe of Seeing?

It does.

In like manner, tho' I hear Variety of Sounds, yet I cannot be ſaid to hear the Cauſes of thoſe Sounds.

You cannot.

And when by my Touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot ſay with any Truth or Propriety, that I feel the Cauſe of its Heat or Weight.

To prevent any more Queſtions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by Senſible Things I mean thoſe only which are perceived by Senſe, and that in truth the Senſes perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately: for they make no Infe⯑rences. The Deducing therefore of Cauſes or Occaſions from Effects and Appearances, which alone are perceived by Senſe, intirely relates to Reaſon.

This Point then is agreed between us, That ſenſible things are thoſe only which are immediately perceived by Senſe. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by Sight, any thing beſide Light, and Colours, and Figures: or by Hearing, any thing but Sounds: by the Palate, any thing beſide Taſtes: by the Smell, beſide Odors: or by the Touch, more than tangible Quali⯑ties.

We do not.

It ſeems, therefore, that if you take away all ſenſible Qualities, there remains no⯑thing ſenſible.

I grant it.

Senſible things, therefore, are nothing elſe but ſo many ſenſible Qualities, or Com⯑binations of ſenſible Qualities.

Nothing elſe.

Heat then is a ſenſible thing.

Certainly.

Does the Reality of ſenſible things conſiſt in being perceived? or, is it ſome⯑thing diſtinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the Mind?

To exiſt is one thing, and to be per⯑ceived is another.

I ſpeak with regard to ſenſible things only: And of theſe I ask, Whether by their real Exiſtence you mean a Subſiſtence exte⯑rior to the Mind, and diſtinct from their being perceived?

I mean a real, abſolute Being, diſtinct from, and without any relation to, their be⯑ing perceived.

Heat, therefore, if it be allowed a real Being, muſt exiſt without the Mind.

It muſt.

Tell me, Hylas, is this real Exiſtence equally compatible to all Degrees of Heat, which we perceive: or, is there any Reaſon [10] why we ſhould attribute it to ſome, and de⯑ny it others? And if there be, pray let me know that Reaſon.

Whatever Degree of Heat we per⯑ceive by Senſe, we may be ſure, the ſame exiſts in the Object that occaſions it.

What, the greateſt as well as the leaſt?

I tell you, the Reaſon is plainly the ſame in reſpect of both: They are both perceived by Senſe; nay, the greater Degree of Heat is more ſenſibly perceived; and, con⯑ſequently, if there is any Difference, we are more certain of its real Exiſtence than we can be of the Reality of a leſſer Degree.

But is not the moſt vehement and intenſe Degree of Heat a very great Pain?

No one can deny it.

And, is any unperceiving thing ca⯑pable of Pain or Pleaſure?

No, certainly.

Is your material Subſtance a ſenſleſs Being, or a Being endowed with Senſe and Perception?

It is ſenſleſs, without doubt.

It cannot, therefore, be the Subject of Pain.

By no means.

Nor, conſequently, of the greateſt Heat perceived by Senſe, ſince you acknow⯑lege this to be no ſmall Pain.

I grant it.

What ſhall we ſay then of your ex⯑ternal Object; is it a material Subſtance, or no?

It is a material Subſtance with the ſenſible Qualities inhering in it.

How then can a great Heat exiſt in it, ſince you own, it cannot in a material Subſtance? I deſire you wou'd clear this Point.

Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intenſe Heat to be a Pain. It ſhou'd ſeem rather, that Pain is ſomething diſtinct from Heat, and the Conſequence or Effect of it.

Upon putting your Hand near the Fire, do you perceive one ſimple, uniform Senſation, or two diſtinct Senſations?

But one ſimple Senſation.

Is not the Heat immediately per⯑ceived?

It is.

And the Pain?

True.

Seeing, therefore, they are both im⯑mediately perceived at the ſame time, and the Fire affects you only with one ſimple, or uncompounded Idea, it follows, that this ſame ſimple Idea is both the intenſe Heat im⯑mediately perceived, and the Pain; and, con⯑ſequently, that the intenſe Heat immediately [12] perceived, is nothing diſtinct from a particu⯑lar ſort of Pain.

It ſeems ſo.

Again, try in your Thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement Senſation to be without Pain, or Pleaſure.

I cannot.

Or, can you frame to yourſelf an Idea of ſenſible Pain or Pleaſure in general, abſtracted from every particular Idea of Heat, Cold, Taſtes, Smells? &c.

—I do not find that I can.

Does it not, therefore, follow, that ſenſible Pain is nothing diſtinct from thoſe Senſations, or Ideas, in an intenſe Degree?

It is undeniable; and to ſpeak the Truth, I begin to ſuſpect, a very great Heat cannot exiſt but in a Mind perceiving it.

What! are you then in that Sceptical State of Suſpenſe, between Affirming and Denying?

I think I may be poſitive in the Point. A very violent and painful Heat cannot exiſt without the Mind.

It has not, therefore, according to you, any real Being.

I own it.

Is it, therefore, certain, that there is no body in Nature really hot?

I have not denied there is any real Heat in Bodies. I only ſay, there is no ſuch thing as an intenſe real Heat.

But, did you not ſay before, that all Degrees of Heat were equally real: or, if there was any difference, that the Greater were more undoubtedly real than the Leſſer?

True: But it was, becauſe I did not then conſider the Ground there is for diſtin⯑guiſhing between them, which I now plainly ſee. And it is this: Becauſe intenſe Heat is nothing elſe but a particular kind of painful Senſation; and Pain cannot exiſt but in a perceiving Being; it follows, that no intenſe Heat can really exiſt in an unperceiving cor⯑poreal Subſtance. But this is no Reaſon, why we ſhould deny Heat in an inferior Degree, to exiſt in ſuch a Subſtance.

But, how ſhall we be able to diſcern thoſe Degrees of Heat which exiſt only in the Mind, from thoſe which exiſt without it?

That is no difficult matter. You know, the leaſt Pain cannot exiſt unperceived; what⯑ever, therefore, Degree of Heat is a Pain, exiſts only in the Mind. But, as for all other Degrees of Heat, nothing obliges us to think the ſame of them.

I think you granted before, that no unperceiving Being was capable of Pleaſure, any more than of Pain.

I did.

And, is not Warmth, or a more gen⯑tle Degree of Heat than what cauſes Uneaſi⯑neſs, a Pleaſure?

What then?

Conſequently, it cannot exiſt with⯑out the Mind in any unperceiving Subſtance, or Body.

So it ſeems.

Since therefore, as well thoſe Degrees of Heat that are not painful, as thoſe that are, can exiſt only in a Thinking Subſtance, may we not conclude, that external Bodies are abſolutely incapable of any Degree of Heat whatſoever?

On ſecond Thoughts, I do not think it ſo evident that Warmth is a Pleaſure, as that a great Degree of Heat is a Pain.

I do not pretend, that Warmth is as great a Pleaſure as Heat is a Pain. But if you grant it to be even a ſmall Pleaſure, it ſerves to make good my Concluſion.

I cou'd rather call it an Indolence. It ſeems to be nothing more than a Priva⯑tion of both Pain and Pleaſure. And that ſuch a Quality or State as this may agree to an unthinking Subſtance, I hope you will not deny.

If you are reſolved to maintain that Warmth, or a gentle Degree of Heat, is no Pleaſure, I know not how to convince you otherwiſe, than by appealing to your own Senſe. But what think you of Cold?

The ſame that I do of Heat. An in⯑tenſe Degree of Cold is a Pain; for to feel [15] a very great Cold, is to perceive a great Un⯑eaſineſs: It cannot, therefore, exiſt without the Mind; but a leſſer Degree of Cold may, as well as a leſſer Degree of Heat.

Thoſe Bodies, therefore, upon whoſe Application to our own, we perceive a mode⯑rate Degreee of Heat, muſt be concluded to have a moderate Degree of Heat or Warmth in them: And thoſe, upon whoſe Applica⯑tion we feel a like Degree of Cold, muſt be thought to have Cold in them.

They muſt.

Can any Doctrine be true that ne⯑ceſſarily leads a Man into an Abſurdity?

Without doubt, it cannot.

Is it not an Abſurdity to think, that the ſame thing ſhou'd be at the ſame time both cold and warm?

It is.

Suppoſe now, one of your Hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the ſame Veſſel of Water, in an intermediate State; will not the Water ſeem cold to one Hand, and warm to the other?

It will.

Ought we not, therefore, by your Principles to conclude, it is really both cold and warm at the ſame time, that is, accor⯑ding to your own Conceſſion, to believe an Abſurdity.

I confeſs, it ſeems ſo.

Conſequently, the Principles them⯑ſelves are falſe, ſince you have granted, that no true Principle leads to an Abſurdity.

But after all, can any thing be more abſurd than to ſay, there is no Heat in the Fire?

To make the Point ſtill clearer; tell me, whether in two Caſes exactly alike, we ought not to make the ſame Judgment?

We ought.

When a Pin pricks your Finger, does it not rend and divide the Fibres of your Fleſh?

It does.

And when a Coal burns your Fin⯑ger, does it any more?

It does not.

Since, therefore, you neither judge the Senſation itſelf occaſioned by the Pin, nor any thing like it to be in the Pin; you ſhoul'd not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the Senſation, occaſioned by the Fire, or any thing like it, to be in the Fire.

Well, ſince it muſt be ſo, I am con⯑tent to yield this Point, and acknowlege, that Heat and Cold are only Senſations exi⯑ſting in our Minds: But there ſtill remain Qualities enough to ſecure the Reality of external Things.

But, what will you ſay, Hylas, if it ſhall appear that the Caſe is the ſame with regard to all other ſenſible Qualities, and that they can no more be ſuppoſed to exiſt with⯑out the Mind, than Heat and Cold?

Then, indeed, you will have done ſomething to the purpoſe; but that is what I deſpair of ſeeing proved.

Let us examine them in Order. What think you of Taſtes, do they exiſt without the Mind, or no?

Can any Man in his Senſes doubt whether Sugar is ſweet, or Wormwood bit⯑ter?

Inform me, Hylas. Is a ſweet Taſte a particular kind of Pleaſure or pleaſant Sen⯑ſation, or is it not?

It is.

And is not Bitterneſs ſome kind of Uneaſineſs or Pain?

I grant it.

If, therefore, Sugar and Wormwood are unthinking corporeal Subſtances exiſting without the Mind, how can Sweetneſs and Bitterneſs, that is, Pleaſure and Pain, agree to them?

Hold, Philonous, I now ſee what it was deluded me all this time. You asked whether Heat and Cold, Sweetneſs and Bit⯑terneſs, were not particular Sorts of Plea⯑ſure and Pain; to which I anſwered ſimply, [18] that they were. Whereas I ſhould have thus diſtinguiſhed: Thoſe Qualities, as perceived by us, are Pleaſures or Pains, but not as exiſt⯑ing in the external Objects. We muſt not therefore conclude abſolutely, that there is no Heat in the Fire, or Sweetneſs in the Sugar, but only that Heat or Sweetneſs, as perceived by us, are not in the Fire or Sugar. What ſay you to this?

I ſay it is nothing to the Purpoſe. Our Diſcourſe proceeded altogether concern⯑ing Senſible Things, which you defined to be the Things we immediately perceive by our Senſes. Whatever other Qualities, therefore, you ſpeak of, as diſtinct from theſe, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all be⯑long to the Point in Diſpute. You may, in⯑deed, pretend to have diſcovered certain Qualities which you do not perceive, and aſ⯑ſert thoſe inſenſible Qualities exiſt in Fire and Sugar. But, what Uſe can be made of this to your preſent Purpoſe, I am at a Loſs to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowlege that Heat and Cold, Sweet⯑neſs and Bitterneſs, (meaning thoſe Qualities which are perceived by the Senſes) do not exiſt without the Mind.

I ſee it is to no purpoſe to hold out, ſo I give up the Cauſe as to thoſe mentioned Qualities: Though I profeſs it ſounds odly, to ſay that Sugar is not ſweet.

But for your farther Satisfaction, take this along with you: That which at other times ſeems ſweet, ſhall, to a diſtempered Pa⯑late, appear bitter. And nothing can be plainer, than that divers Perſons perceive dif⯑ferent Taſtes in the ſame Food, ſince that which one Man delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the Taſte was ſomething really inherent in the Food?

I acknowlege I know not how.

In the next place, Odors are to be con⯑ſidered. And with regard to theſe, I would fain know, whether what has been ſaid of Taſtes does not exactly agree to them? Are they not ſo many pleaſing or diſpleaſing Sen⯑ſations?

They are.

Can you then conceive it poſſible that they ſhould exiſt in an unperceiving Thing?

I cannot.

Or can you imagine, that Filth and Ordure affect thoſe brute Animals that feed on them out of Choice, with the ſame Smells which we perceive in them?

By no means.

May we not, therefore, conclude of Smells, as of the other forementioned Quali⯑ties, that they cannot exiſt in any but a per⯑ceiving Subſtance or Mind?

I think ſo.

Then as to Sounds, what muſt we think of them: Are they Accidents really in⯑herent in external Bodies, or not?

That they inhere not in the ſonorous Bodies, is plain from hence; becauſe a Bell ſtruck in the exhauſted Receiver of an Air-Pump, ſends forth no Sound. The Air, therefore, muſt be thought the Subject of Sound.

What Reaſon is there for that, Hy⯑las?

Becauſe when any Motion is raiſed in the Air, we perceive a Sound greater or leſ⯑ſer, in Proportion to the Air's Motion; but without ſome Motion in the Air, we never hear any Sound at all.

And, granting that we never hear a Sound but when ſome Motion is produced in the Air, yet I do not ſee how you can infer from thence, that the Sound itſelf is in the Air.

It is this very Motion in the external Air, that produces in the Mind the Senſation of Sound. For, ſtriking on the Drum of the Air, it cauſes a Vibration, which by the Au⯑ditory Nerves being communicated to the Brain, the Soul is thereupon affected with the Senſation called Sound.

What! is Sound then a Senſation?

I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular Senſation in the Mind.

And can any Senſation exiſt with⯑out the Mind?

No certainly.

How then can Sound, being a Sen⯑ſation, exiſt in the Air, if by the Air you mean a ſenſleſs Subſtance exiſting without the Mind?

You muſt diſtinguiſh, Philonous, be⯑tween Sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itſelf; or (which is the ſame thing) between the Sound we immediately perceive, and that which exiſts without us. The for⯑mer, indeed, is a particular kind of Senſa⯑tion, but the latter is merely a Vibrative or Undulatory Motion in the Air.

I thought I had already obviated that Diſtinction, by the Anſwer I gave when you were applying it in a like Caſe before. But to ſay no more of that; Are you ſure then that Sound is really nothing but Motion?

I am.

Whatever therefore agrees to real Sound, may with Truth be attributed to Mo⯑tion.

It may.

It is then good Senſe to ſpeak of Mo⯑tion, as of a thing that is loud, ſweet, acute, grave, &c.

I ſee you are reſolved not to under⯑ſtand me. Is it not evident, thoſe Accidents or Modes belong only to ſenſible Sound, or [22] Sound in the Common Acceptation of the Word, but not to Sound in the Real and Phi⯑loſophic Senſe, which, as I juſt now told you, is nothing but a certain Motion of the Air?

It ſeems then there are two Sorts of Sound, the one Vulgar, or that which is heard, the other Philoſophical and Real.

Even ſo.

And the latter conſiſts in Motion.

I told you ſo before.

Tell me, Hylas, to which of the Senſes, think you, the Idea of Motion be⯑long: To the Hearing?

No certainly, but to the Sight and Touch.

It ſhould follow then, that according to you, real Sounds may poſſibly be ſeen or felt, but never heard.

Look you, Philonous, you may if you pleaſe make a Jeſt of my Opinion, but that will not alter the Truth of Things. I own, indeed, the Inferences you draw me into, ſound ſomething odly; but common Lan⯑guage, you know, is framed by, and for the Uſe of, the Vulgar: we muſt not therefore wonder, if Expreſſions, adapted to exact Phi⯑loſophic Notions, ſeem uncouth and out of the way.

Is it come to that? I aſſure you I imagine myſelf to have gained no ſmall [23] Point, ſince you make ſo light of departing from common Phraſes and Opinions; it be⯑ing a main Part of our Inquiry, to examine whoſe Notions are wideſt of the common Road, and moſt repugnant to the general Senſe of the World. But, can you think it no more than a Philoſophical Paradox, to ſay that real Sounds are never heard, and that the Idea of them is obtained by ſome other Senſe. And is there nothing in this contrary to Nature, and the Truth of Things?

To deal ingenuouſly, I do not like it. And after the Conceſſions already made, I had as good grant that Sounds too have no real Being without the Mind.

And, I hope, you will make no Dif⯑ficulty to acknowlege the ſame of Colours.

Pardon me: the Caſe of Colours is very different. Can any thing be plainer, than that we ſee them on the Objects?

The Objects you ſpeak of are, I ſup⯑poſe, corporeal Subſtances exiſting without the Mind.

They are.

And, have true and real Colours in⯑hering in them?

Each viſible Object has that Colour which we ſee in it.

How! Is there any thing viſible but what we perceive by Sight?

There is not.

And, do we perceive any thing by Senſe, which we do not perceive imme⯑diately?

How often muſt I be obliged to re⯑peat the ſame thing? I tell you, we do not.

Have Patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is any thing immediately perceived by the Senſes, except ſenſible Qualities. I know, you aſſerted there was not: But I wou'd now be inform⯑ed, whether you ſtill perſiſt in the ſame Opi⯑nion.

I do.

Pray, is your corporeal Subſtance either a ſenſible Quality, or made up of ſen⯑ſible Qualities?

What a Queſtion that is! who ever thought it was?

My Reaſon for asking was, becauſe in ſaying, each viſible Object has that Colour which we ſee in it, you make viſible Objects to be corporeal Subſtances; which implies either that corporeal Subſtances are ſenſible Qualities, or elſe, that there is ſomething be⯑ſide ſenſible Qualities perceived by Sight: But, as this Point was formerly agreed be⯑tween us, and is ſtill maintained by you, it is a clear Conſequence, that your corporeal Subſtance is nothing diſtinct from ſenſible Qualities.

You may draw as many abſurd Con⯑ſequences as you pleaſe, and endeavor to perplex the plaineſt things; but you ſhall ne⯑ver perſuade me out of my Senſes. I clearly underſtand my own Meaning.

I wiſh you would make me under⯑ſtand it too. But, ſince you are unwilling to have your Notion of corporeal Subſtance exa⯑mined, I ſhall urge that Point no farther. Only be pleaſed to let me know, whether the ſame Colours which we ſee, exiſt in exter⯑nal Bodies, or ſome other.

The very ſame.

What! are then the beautiful Red and Purple we ſee on yonder Clouds, really in them? Or, do you imagine, they have in themſelves any other Form, than that of a dark Miſt, or Vapour?

I muſt own, Philonous, thoſe Colours are not really in the Clouds, as they ſeem to be at this Diſtance. They are only apparent Colours.

Apparent call you them; how ſhall we diſtinguiſh theſe apparent Colours from real?

Very eaſily. Thoſe are to be thought apparent, which, appearing only at a diſtance, vaniſh upon a nearer Approach.

And thoſe, I ſuppoſe, are to be thought real, which are diſcovered by the moſt near and exact Survey.

Right.

Is the neareſt and exacteſt Survey, made by help of a Microſcope, or by the naked Eye?

By a Microſcope, doubtleſs.

But a Microſcope often diſcovers Co⯑lours in an Object different from thoſe per⯑ceived by the unaſſiſted Sight. And in caſe we had Microſcopes, magnifying to any aſ⯑ſigned Degree; it is certain, that no Object whatſoever, viewed thro' them, wou'd appear in the ſame Colour which it exhibits to the naked Eye.

And, what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue, that there are really and naturally no Colours on Objects: becauſe, by artificial Managements they may be altered, or made to vaniſh.

I think it may evidently be concluded from your own Conceſſions, that all the Co⯑lours we ſee with our naked Eyes, are only apparent as thoſe on the Clouds, ſince they vaniſh upon a more cloſe and accurate In⯑ſpection, which is afforded us by a Micro⯑ſcope. Then, as to what you ſay by way of Prevention: I ask you, whether the real and natural State of an Object is better diſcovered by a very ſharp and piercing Sight, or by one which is leſs ſharp?

By the former, without doubt.

Is it not plain from Dioptrics, that Microſcopes make the Sight more penetra⯑ting, [27] and repreſent Objects as they wou'd appear to the Eye, in caſe it were naturally endowed with a moſt exquiſite Sharpneſs?

It is.

Conſequently, the Microſcopical Re⯑preſentation is to be thought that which beſt ſets forth the real Nature of the Thing, or what it is in itſelf. The Colours, therefore, by it perceived, are more genuine and real, than thoſe perceived otherwiſe.

I confeſs, there is ſomething in what you ſay.

Beſides, it is not only poſſible, but manifeſt, that there actually are Animals, whoſe Eyes are by Nature framed to per⯑ceive thoſe things, which, by reaſon of their Minuteneſs, eſcape our Sight. What think you of thoſe inconceivably ſmall Animals, perceived by Glaſſes? Muſt we ſuppoſe they are all ſtark blind? or, in caſe they ſee, can it be imagined, their Sight has not the ſame Uſe in preſerving their Bodies from Injuries, which appears in That of all other Animals? and if it hath, is it not evident, they muſt ſee Particles leſs than their own Bodies, which will preſent them with a far different View in each Object, from that which ſtrikes our Sen⯑ſes? Even our own Eyes do not always re⯑preſent Objects to us after the ſame manner. In the Jaundice, every one knows that all things ſeem yellow. Is it not, therefore, [28] highly probable, thoſe Animals, in whoſe Eyes we diſcern a very different Texture from that of ours, and whoſe Bodies abound with different Humors, do not ſee the ſame Colours in every Object that we do? From all which, ſhou'd it not ſeem to follow, that all Colours are equally apparent, and that none of thoſe which we perceive are really inherent in any outward Object?

It ſhou'd.

The Point will be paſt all doubt, if you conſider, that in caſe Colours were real Properties or Affections inherent in external Bodies, they cou'd admit of no Alteration, without ſome Change wrought in the very Bodies themſelves: But, is it not evident from what has been ſaid, that, upon the Uſe of Microſcopes, upon a Change happening in the Humors of the Eye, or a Variation of Diſtance, without any manner of real Alte⯑ration in the Thing itſelf, the Colours of any Object are either changed, or totally diſap⯑pear? Nay, all other Circumſtances remain⯑ing the ſame, change but the Situation of ſome Objects, and they ſhall preſent different Colours to the Eye. The ſame thing hap⯑pens upon viewing an Object in various De⯑grees of Light. And what is more known, than that the ſame Bodies appear differently coloured by Candle-light, from what they do in the open Day? Add to theſe, the Ex⯑periment [29] of a Priſm, which, ſeparating the heterogeneous Rays of Light, alters the Co⯑lour of any Object; and will cauſe the Whiteſt to appear of a deep Blue, or Red, to the na⯑ked Eye. And now tell me, whether you are ſtill of Opinion, that every Body has its true real Colour inhering in it; and if you think it has, I would fain know farther from you, what certain Diſtance and Poſition of the Object, what peculiar Texture and For⯑mation of the Eye, what Degree or Kind of Light is neceſſary for aſcertaining that true Colour, and diſtinguiſhing it from apparent ones.

I own myſelf intirely ſatisfied, that they are all equally apparent; and that there is no ſuch thing as Colour really inhering in external Bodies, but that it is altogether in the Light. And what confirms me in this Opinion is, that in proportion to the Light, Colours are ſtill more or leſs vivid; and if there be no Light, then are there no Colours perceived. Beſides, allowing there are Co⯑lours on external Objects, yet, how is it poſ⯑ſible for us to perceive them? For no exter⯑nal Body affects the Mind, unleſs it act firſt on our Organs of Senſe. But the only Action of Bodies is Motion; and Motion cannot be communicated otherwiſe than by Impulſe. A diſtant Object, therefore, can⯑not act on the Eye, nor, conſequently, make [30] itſelf, or its Properties perceivable to the Soul. Whence it plainly follows, that it is immediately ſome contiguous Subſtance, which operating on the Eye, occaſions a Perception of Colours: And ſuch is Light.

How! is Light then a Subſtance?

I tell you, Philonous, external Light is nothing but a thin, fluid Subſtance, whoſe minute Particles being agitated with a brisk Motion, and in various Manners reflected from the different Surfaces of outward Ob⯑jects to the Eyes, communicate different Mo⯑tions to the Optick Nerves; which being pro⯑pagated to the Brain, cauſe therein various Impreſſions: And theſe are attended with the Senſations of Red, Blue, Yellow, &c.

It ſeems then, the Light does no more than ſhake the Optick Nerves.

Nothing elſe.

And conſequent to each particular Motion of the Nerves, the Mind is affected with a Senſation, which is ſome particular Colour.

Right.

And theſe Senſations have no Exi⯑ſtence without the Mind.

They have not.

How then do you affirm, that Co⯑lours are in the Light, ſince by Light you underſtand a corporeal Subſtance external to the Mind?

Light and Colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot exiſt without the Mind. But in themſelves, they conſiſt in⯑tirely in the Motions and Configurations of certain inſenſible Particles of Matter.

Colours then, in the vulgar Senſe, or taken for the immediate Objects of Sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving Sub⯑ſtance.

That is what I ſay.

Well then, ſince you give up the Point as to thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which are alone thought Colours by all Mankind beſide, you may hold what you pleaſe with regard to thoſe inviſible ones of the Philoſo⯑phers. It is not my Buſineſs to diſpute about them; only I would adviſe you to think, whether, conſidering the Inquiry we are up⯑on, it be prudent for you to affirm, the Red and Blue which we ſee are not real Colours, but certain unknown Motions and Figures which no Man ever did or can ſee are truly ſo. Are not theſe ſhocking Notions, and are not they ſubject to as many ridiculous Inferences, as thoſe you before renounced in the Caſe of Sounds?

I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to ſtand out any longer. Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, in a word, all thoſe term⯑ed Secondary Qualities, have certainly no Exiſtence without the Mind. But by this [32] Acknowlegement, I muſt not be ſuppoſed to derogate any thing from the Reality of Mat⯑ter, or external Objects, ſeeing it is no more than ſeveral Philoſophers maintain, who ne⯑vertheleſs are the fartheſt imaginable from de⯑nying Matter. For the clearer Underſtanding of this, you muſt know, ſenſible Qualities are by Philoſophers divided into Primary and Se⯑condary. The former are Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Reſt; and theſe they hold exiſt really in Bodies. The latter are thoſe above enumerated; or, briefly, all ſenſible Qualities beſide, the Primary, which they aſſert are only ſo many Senſa⯑tions or Ideas exiſting no where but in the Mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are al⯑ready appriſed of. For my part, I have been a long time ſenſible there was ſuch an Opi⯑nion current among Philoſophers, but was never thorowly convinced of its Truth till now.

You are ſtill then of Opinion, that Extenſion and Figures are inherent in exter⯑nal unthinking Subſtances.

I am.

But, what if the ſame Arguments which are brought againſt Secondary Quali⯑ties, will hold good againſt theſe alſo?

Why, then I ſhall be obliged to think, they too exiſt only in the Mind.

Is it your Opinion, the very Figure and Extenſion which you perceive by Senſe, exiſt in the outward Object or material Sub⯑ſtance?

It is.

Have all other Animals as good Grounds to think the ſame, of the Figure and Extenſion which they ſee and feel?

Without doubt, if they have any Thought at all.

Anſwer me, Hylas. Think you the Senſes were beſtowed upon all Animals for their Preſervation and Well-Being in Life? or, were they given to Men alone for this End?

I make no queſtion but they have the ſame Uſe in all other Animals.

If ſo, is it not neceſſary they ſhould be enabled by them to perceive their own Limbs, and thoſe Bodies which are capable of harming them?

Certainly.

A Mite therefore muſt be ſuppoſed to ſee his own Foot, and Things equal, or even leſs than it, as Bodies of ſome conſider⯑able Dimenſion; tho at the ſame time they appear to you ſcarce diſcernible, or, at beſt, as ſo many viſible Points.

I cannot deny it.

And to Creatures leſs than the Mite they will ſeem yet larger.

They will.

Inſomuch that what you can hardly diſcern, will to another extremely minute Animal appear as ſome huge Mountain.

All this I grant.

Can one and the ſame thing be at the ſame time in itſelf of different Dimenſions?

That were abſurd to imagine.

But from what you have laid down it follows, that both the Extenſion by you perceived, and that perceived by the Mite it⯑ſelf, as likewiſe all thoſe perceived by leſſer Animals, are each of them the true Exten⯑ſion of the Mite's Foot; that is to ſay, by your own Principles you are led into an Ab⯑ſurdity.

There ſeems to be ſome Difficulty in the Point.

Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent Property of any Object can be changed, without ſome Change in the thing itſelf?

I have.

But as we approach to or recede from an Object, the viſible Extenſion varies, being at one Diſtance ten or an hundred times greater than at another. Does it not there⯑fore follow from hence likewiſe, that it is not really inherent in the Object?

I own I am at a Loſs what to think.

Your Judgment will ſoon be deter⯑mined, if you will venture to think as freely with relation to this Quality, as you have done in reſpect of the reſt. Was it not ad⯑mitted as a good Argument, that neither Heat nor Cold was in the Water, becauſe it ſeemed warm to one Hand, and cold to the other?

It was.

Is it not the very ſame Reaſoning to conclude, there is no Extenſion or Figure in an Object, becauſe to one Eye it ſhall ſeem little, ſmooth, and round, when at the ſame time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and angular?

The very ſame. But does this latter Fact ever happen?

You may at any time make the Ex⯑periment, by looking with one Eye bare, and with the other thro a Microſcope.

I know not how to maintain it, and yet I am loath to give up Extenſion, I ſee ſo many od Conſequences following upon ſuch a Conceſſion.

Od, ſay you? After the Conceſſions already made, I hope you will ſtick at no⯑thing for its Odneſs.

I give up the Point for the pre⯑ſent, reſerving ſtill a Right to retract my Opi⯑nion, in caſe I ſhall hereafter diſcover any falſe Step in my Progreſs to it.

That is a Right you cannot be de⯑nied. Figures and Extenſion being diſpatch⯑ed, we proceed next to Motion. Can a real Motion in any external Body be, at the ſame time, both very ſwift and very ſlow?

It cannot.

Is not the Motion of a Body ſwift in a reciprocal Proportion to the time it takes up in deſcribing any given Space? Thus a Body that deſcribes a Mile in an Hour, moves three times faſter than it would in caſe it de⯑ſcribed only a Mile in three Hours.

I agree with you.

And is not Time meaſured by the Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds?

It is.

And is it not poſſible Ideas ſhould ſucceed one another twice as faſt in your Mind, as they do in mine, or in that of ſome Spirit of another Kind.

I own it.

Conſequently the ſame Body may to another ſeem to perform its Motion over any Space, in half the time that it does to you. And the ſame Reaſoning will hold as to any other Proportion: That is to ſay, according to your Principles (ſince the Motions per⯑ceived are both really in the Object) it is poſ⯑ſible one and the ſame Body ſhall be really moved, the ſame way, at once, both very ſwift, and very ſlow. How is this conſiſtent [37] either with common Senſe, or what you juſt now granted?

I have nothing to ſay to it.

Then as for Solidity; either you do not mean any ſenſible Quality by that Word, and ſo it is beſide our Inquiry: Or if you do, it muſt be either Hardneſs or Reſiſtance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our Senſes: It being evident, that what ſeems hard to one Animal, may appear ſoft to another, who hath greater Force and Firm⯑neſs of Limbs. Nor is it leſs plain, that the Reſiſtance I feel is not in the Body.

I own, the very Senſation of Reſi⯑ſtance, which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the Body, but the Cauſe of that Sen⯑ſation is.

But, the Cauſes of our Senſations are not Things immediately perceived, and there⯑fore not ſenſible. This Point I thought had been already determined.

I own it was; but you will pardon me if I ſeem a little embarraſſed: I know not how to quit my old Notions.

To help you out, do but conſider, that if Extenſion be once acknowleged to have no Exiſtence without the Mind, the ſame muſt neceſſarily be granted of Motion, Soli⯑dity, and Gravity, ſince they all evidently ſuppoſe Extenſion. It is therefore ſuperfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of [38] them. In denying Extenſion, you have de⯑nied them all to have any real Exiſtence.

I wonder, Philonous, if what you ſay be true, why thoſe Philoſophers who de⯑ny the Secondary Qualities any real Exiſtence, ſhould yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no Difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

It is not my Buſineſs to account for every Opinion of the Philoſophers. But a⯑mong other Reaſons which may be aſſigned for this, it ſeems probable, that Pleaſure and Pain being rather annexed to the former, than the latter, may be one. Heat and Cold, Taſtes, Smells, &c. have ſomething more vividly pleaſing or diſagreeable than the Ideas of Extenſion, Figure, and Motion, affect us with. And, it being too viſibly abſurd to hold, that Pain or Pleaſure can be in an un⯑perceiving Subſtance, Men are more eaſily weaned from believing the external Exiſtence of the Secondary, than the Primary Qualities. You will be ſatisfied there is ſomething in this, if you recollect the Difference you made be⯑tween an intenſe and more moderate Degree of Heat, allowing the one a real Exiſtence, while you denied it to the other. But after all, there is no rational Ground for that Di⯑ſtinction; for ſurely an indifferent Senſation is as truly a Senſation, as one more pleaſing or painful; and, conſequently, ſhould not [39] any more than they be ſuppoſed to exiſt in an unthinking Subject.

It is juſt come into my Head, Philo⯑nous, that I have ſomewhere heard of a Di⯑ſtinction between abſolute and ſenſible Ex⯑tenſion. Now, though it be acknowledged that great and ſmall, conſiſting meerly in the Relation which other extended Beings have to the Parts of our own Bodies, do not re⯑ally inhere in the Subſtances themſelves, yet nothing obliges us to hold the ſame with re⯑gard to abſolute Extenſion, which is ſomething abſtracted from great and ſmall, from this or that particular Magnitude or Figure. So likewiſe as to Motion, ſwift and ſlow are al⯑together relative to the Succeſſion of Ideas in our own Minds. But it does not follow, be⯑cauſe thoſe Modifications of Motion exiſt not without the Mind, that therefore abſolute Motion abſtracted from them does not.

Pray, what is it that diſtinguiſhes one Motion, or Part of Extenſion, from another, is it not ſomething ſenſible, as ſome Degree of Swiftneſs or Slowneſs, ſome certain Mag⯑nitude or Figure peculiar to each?

I think ſo.

Theſe Qualities, therefore, ſtripped of all ſenſible Properties, are without all ſpe⯑cific and numerical Differences, as the Schools call them.

They are.

That is to ſay, they are Extenſion in general, and Motion in general.

Let it be ſo.

But it is an univerſally received Maxim, that, Every thing which exiſts, is par⯑ticular. How then can Motion in general, or Extenſion in general, exiſt in any corporeal Subſtance?

I will take time to ſolve your Diffi⯑culty.

But I think the Point may be ſpeedi⯑ly decided. Without doubt you can tell, whether you are able to frame this or that Idea. Now, I am content to put our Diſ⯑pute on this Iſſue. If you can frame in your Thoughts a diſtinct abſtract Idea of Motion or Extenſion, diveſted of all thoſe ſenſible Modes, as ſwift and ſlow, great and ſmall, round and ſquare, and the like, which are acknowleged to exiſt only in the Mind, I will then yield the Point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreaſonable on your Side, to inſiſt any longer upon what you have no Notion of.

To confeſs ingenuouſly, I cannot.

Can you even ſeparate the Ideas of Extenſion and Motion, from the Ideas of Light and Colours, hard and ſoft, hot and cold, with the reſt of thoſe Qualities which they who make the Diſtinction, term Secon⯑dary.

What! Is it not an eaſy Matter, to conſider Extenſion and Motion by themſelves, abſtracted from all other ſenſible Qualities? Pray, how do the Mathematicians treat of them?

I acknowlege, Hylas, it is not diffi⯑cult to form general Propoſitions and Reaſon⯑ings about thoſe Qualities, without mention⯑ing any other; and in this Senſe, to conſider or treat of them abſtractedly. But, how does it follow, that becauſe I can pronounce the Word Motion, by itſelf, I can form the Idea of it in my Mind excluſive of Body? or, be⯑cauſe Theoremes may be made of Exten⯑ſion and Figures, without any mention of Great, or Small, or any other ſenſible Mode or Quality? That, therefore, it is poſſible ſuch an abſtract Idea of Extenſion, without any particular Size, Colour, &c. ſhou'd be di⯑ſtinctly formed, and apprehended by the Mind? Mathematicians treat of Quantity, without regarding what other ſenſible Qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their Demonſtrations. But, when laying aſide the Words, they contemplate the bare Ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abſtracted Ideas of Extenſion.

But, what ſay you to pure Intellect? may not abſtracted Ideas be framed by that Faculty?

Since I cannot frame abſtract Ideas at all, it is plain, I cannot frame them by the Help of pure Intellect, whatſoever Faculty you underſtand by thoſe Words. Beſides, not to inquire into the Nature of pure Intellect, and its ſpiritual Objects, as Vertue, Reaſon, God, or the like; thus much ſeems manifeſt, that ſenſible Things are only to be perceived by Senſe, or repreſented by the Imagination. Figures, therefore, and Extenſion, being ori⯑ginally perceived by Senſe, do not belong to pure Intellect. But, for your farther Satisfaction, try if you can frame the Idea of any Figure, abſtracted from all Particularities of Size, or even from other ſenſible Qualities.

Let me think a little—I do not find that I can.

And can you think it poſſible, that ſhou'd really exiſt in Nature, which implies a Repugnancy in its Conception?

By no means.

Since, therefore, it is impoſſible, even for the Mind, to diſunite the Ideas of Exten⯑ſion and Motion from all other ſenſible Qua⯑lities, does it not follow, that where the one exiſt, there, neceſſarily, the other exiſt likewiſe?

It ſhould ſeem ſo.

Conſequently, the very ſame Argu⯑ments which you admitted, as concluſive a⯑gainſt the Secondary Qualities, are, without [43] any farther Application of Force, againſt the Primary too. Beſides, if you will truſt your Sen⯑ſes; is it not plain, all ſenſible Qualities coexiſt, or, to them, appear as being in the ſame Place? Do they ever repreſent a Motion, or Figure, as being diveſted of all other viſible and tangible Qualities?

You need ſay no more on this Head. I am free to own, if there be no ſecret Error, or Overſight, in our Proceedings hitherto, that all ſenſible Qualities are alike to be denied Exiſtence without the Mind. But my Fear is, that I have been too liberal in my former Conceſſions, or overlooked ſome Fallacy or other. In ſhort, I did not take time to think.

For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you pleaſe, in reviewing the Pro⯑greſs of our Inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any Slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted, which makes for your firſt Opinion.

One great Overſight I take to be this: That I did not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh the Object from the Senſation. Now, tho this lat⯑ter may not exiſt without the Mind, yet it will not thence follow, that the former can⯑not.

What Object do you mean? the Ob⯑ject of the Senſes?

The ſame.

It is then immediately perceived.

Right.

Make me to underſtand the Difference between what is immediately perceived, and a Senſation.

The Senſation I take to be an Act of the Mind perceiving; beſide which, there is ſomething perceived; and this I call the Ob⯑ject. For Example, there is Red and Yellow on that Tulip. But then, the Act of percei⯑ving thoſe Colours is in me only, and not in the Tulip.

What Tulip do you ſpeak of? is it that which you ſee?

The ſame.

And, what do you ſee, beſide Colour, Figure, and Extenſion?

Nothing.

What you would ſay then is, that the Red and Yellow are coexiſtent with the Ex⯑tenſion; is it not?

That is not all; I wou'd ſay, They have a real Exiſtence without the Mind, in ſome unthinking Subſtance.

That the Colours are really in the Tulip which I ſee, is manifeſt. Neither can it be denied, that this Tulip may exiſt inde⯑pendent of your Mind, or mine; but that any immediate Object of the Senſes, i. e. any Idea, or Combination of Ideas, ſhould exiſt in an unthinking Subſtance, or exterior to all [45] Minds, is in itſelf an evident Contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows, from what you ſaid juſt now, viz. that the Red and Yellow were on the Tulip you ſaw, ſince you do not pretend to ſee that unthinking Subſtance.

You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our Inquiry from the Subject.

I ſee you have no mind to be preſ⯑ſed that way. To return then to your Di⯑ſtinction between Senſation and Object; if I take you right, you diſtinguiſh in every Per⯑ception two things, the one an Action of the Mind, the other not.

True.

And this Action cannot exiſt in, or belong to any unthinking thing; but, what⯑ever beſide is implied in a Perception, may.

That is my Meaning.

So that if there was a Perception without any Act of the Mind, it were poſſi⯑ble ſuch a Perception ſhould exiſt in an un⯑thinking Subſtance.

I grant it. But it is impoſſible there ſhould be ſuch a Perception.

When is the Mind ſaid to be active?

When it produces, puts an end to, or changes any thing.

Can the Mind produce, diſcontinue, or change any thing but by an Act of the Will?

It cannot.

The Mind, therefore, is to be accoun⯑ted active in its Perceptions, ſo far forth as Volition is included in them.

It is.

In plucking this Flower, I am active, becauſe I do it by the Motion of my Hand, which was conſequent upon my Volition; ſo likewiſe, in applying it to my Noſe. But, is either of theſe Smelling?

No.

I act too, in drawing the Air thro my Noſe; becauſe my Breathing ſo, rather than otherwiſe, is the Effect of my Volition. But, neither can this be called Smelling: For if it were, I ſhou'd ſmell every time I brea⯑thed in that manner.

True.

Smelling then is ſomewhat conſe⯑quent to all this.

It is.

But I do not find my Will concer⯑ned any farther. Whatever more there is, as that I perceive ſuch a particular Smell, or any Smell at all, this is independent of my Will, and therein I am altogether paſſive. Do you find it otherwiſe with you, Hylas?

No, the very ſame.

Then, as to Seeing, is it not in your Power to open your Eyes, or keep them ſhut; to turn them this, or that way?

Without doubt.

But does it, in like manner, depend on your Will, that in looking on this Flower, you perceive White rather than any other Co⯑lour? or, directing your open Eyes toward yonder Part of the Heaven, can you avoid ſeeing the Sun? or, is Light or Darkneſs the Effect of your Volition?

No, certainly.

You are then, in theſe Reſpects, alto⯑gether Paſſive.

I am.

Tell me now, whether Seeing con⯑ſiſts in perceiving Light and Colours, or in opening and turning the Eyes?

Without doubt, in the former.

Since, therefore, you are in the very Perception of Light and Colours altogether paſſive, what is become of that Action you were ſpeaking of, as an Ingredient in every Senſation? And, does it not follow from your own Conceſſions, that the Perception of Light and Colours, including no Action in it, may exiſt in an unperceiving Subſtance? And, is not this a plain Contradiction?

I know not what to think of it.

Beſides, ſince you diſtinguiſh the Active and Paſſive in every Perception, you muſt do it in that of Pain. But, how is it poſſible, that Pain, be it as little active as you pleaſe, ſhould exiſt in an unperceiving Sub⯑ſtance? [48] In ſhort, do but conſider the Point, and then confeſs ingenuouſly, whether Light, and Colours, Taſtes, Sounds, &c. are not all equally Paſſions, or Senſations in the Soul. You may, indeed, call them external Objects, and give them in Words what Subſiſtence you pleaſe. But examine your own Thoughts, and then tell me, whether it be not as I ſay.

I acknowlege, Philonous, that upon a fair Obſervation of what paſſes in my Mind, I can diſcover nothing elſe, but that I am a thinking Being, affected with Variety of Sen⯑ſations; neither is it poſſible to conceive, how a Senſation ſhould exiſt in an unperceiving Sub⯑ſtance. But then, on the other hand, when I look on ſenſible Things in a different View, conſidering them as ſo many Modes and Qua⯑lities, I find it neceſſary to ſuppoſe a material Subſtratum, without which they cannot be conceived to exiſt.

Material Subſtratum call you it? Pray, by which of your Senſes came you acquain⯑ted with that Being?

It is not itſelf ſenſible; its Modes and Qualities only being perceived by the Sen⯑ſes.

I preſume then, it was by Reflexion and Reaſon you obtained the Idea of it.

I do not pretend to any proper, po⯑ſitive Idea of it. However, I conclude it exiſts, becauſe Qualities cannot be conceived to exiſt without a Support.

It ſeems then you have only a rela⯑tive Notion of it, or that you conceive it not otherwiſe than by conceiving the Relation it bears to ſenſible Qualities.

Right.

Be pleaſed therefore to let me know wherein that Relation conſiſts.

Is it not ſufficiently expreſſed in the Term Subſtratum, or Subſtance?

If ſo, the Word Subſtratum ſhould import, that it is ſpread under the ſenſible Qualities or Accidents.

True.

And conſequently under Extenſion.

I own it.

It is, therefore, ſomewhat in its own Nature intirely diſtinct from Extenſion.

I tell you, Extenſion is only a Mode, and Matter is ſomething that ſupports Modes. And is it not evident the Thing ſupported is different from the thing ſupporting?

So that ſomething diſtinct from, and excluſive of, Extenſion, is ſuppoſed to be the Subſtratum of Extenſion.

Juſt ſo.

Anſwer me, Hylas. Can a thing be ſpread without Extenſion: or is not the Idea of Extenſion neceſſarily included in Spread⯑ing?

It is.

Whatſoever, therefore, you ſuppoſe ſpread under any thing, muſt have in itſelf an Extenſion diſtinct from the Extenſion of that Thing under which it is ſpread.

It muſt.

Conſequently every corporeal Sub⯑ſtance, being the Subſtratum of Extenſion, muſt have in itſelf another Extenſion by which it is qualified to be a Subſtratum: And ſo on to Infinity. And I ask whether this be not abſurd in itſelf, and repugnant to what you granted juſt now, viz. that the Subſtra⯑tum was ſomething diſtinct from, and exclu⯑ſive of, Extenſion.

Ay, but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is ſpread in a groſs literal Senſe under Extenſion. The Word Subſtratum is uſed only to expreſs, in general, the ſame thing with Subſtance.

Well then, let us examine the Rela⯑tion implied in the Term Subſtance. Is it not that it ſtands under Accidents?

The very ſame.

But that one thing may ſtand under, or ſupport another, muſt it not be extended?

It muſt.

Is not therefore this Suppoſition lia⯑ble to the ſame Abſurdity with the former?

You ſtill take Things in a ſtrict lite⯑ral Senſe: That is not fair, Philonous.

I am not for impoſing any Senſe on your Words: You are at Liberty to explain them as you pleaſe. Only I beſeech you, make me underſtand ſomething by them. You tell me, Matter ſupports or ſtands under Accidents. How! is it as your Legs ſupport your Body?

No; that is the literal Senſe.

Pray let me know any Senſe, literal or not literal, that you underſtand it in.—How long muſt I wait for an Anſwer, Hy⯑las?

I declare I know not what to ſay. I once thought I underſtood well enough what was meant by Matter's ſupporting Accidents. But now the more I think on it, the leſs can I comprehend it; in ſhort, I find that I know nothing of it.

It ſeems then you have no Idea at all, neither relative nor poſitive of Matter; you know neither what it is in itſelf, nor what Relation it bears to Accidents.

I acknowlege it.

And yet you aſſerted, that you could not conceive, how Qualities or Accidents ſhould really exiſt, without conceiving at the ſame time a material Support of them.

I did.

That is to ſay, when you conceive the real Exiſtence of Qualities, you do with⯑al [52] conceive ſomething which you cannot con⯑ceive.

It was wrong I own. But ſtill I fear there is ſome Fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is juſt come into my Head, that the Ground of all our Miſtake lies in your treating of each Quality by it⯑ſelf. Now, I grant that each Quality cannot ſingly ſubſiſt without the Mind. Colour can⯑not without Extenſion, neither can Figure without ſome other ſenſible Quality. But, as the ſeveral Qualities united or blended toge⯑ther form intire ſenſible Things, nothing hinders why ſuch things may not be ſuppoſed to exiſt without the Mind.

Either, Hylas, you are jeſting, or have a very bad Memory. Though, indeed, we went through all the Qualities by Name, one after another; yet my Arguments, or ra⯑ther your Conceſſions, no where tended to prove, that the Secondary Qualities did not ſubſiſt each alone by itſelf, but, that they were not at all without the Mind. Indeed, in treating of Figure and Motion, we con⯑cluded, they could not exiſt without the Mind, becauſe it was impoſſible, even in Thought, to ſeparate them from all Secon⯑dary Qualities, ſo as to conceive them exiſt⯑ing by themſelves. But then this was not the only Argument made Uſe of upon that Occaſion. But (to paſs by all that hath been [53] hitherto ſaid, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it ſo) I am content to put the whole upon this Iſſue. If you can conceive it poſſible for any Mixture or Combination of Qualities, or any ſenſible Object whatever, to exiſt without the Mind, then I will grant it actually to be ſo.

If it comes to that, the Point will ſoon be decided. What more eaſy than to conceive a Tree or Houſe exiſting by itſelf, independent of, and unperceived by, any Mind whatſoever? I do, at this preſent time, con⯑ceive them exiſting after that Manner.

How ſay you, Hylas, can you ſee a thing which is at the ſame time unſeen?

No, that were a Contradiction.

Is it not as great a Contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is uncon⯑ceived?

It is.

The Tree or Houſe, therefore, which you think of, is conceived by you.

How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

And what is conceived, is ſurely in the Mind.

Without Queſtion, that which is con⯑ceived is in the Mind.

How then came you to ſay, you con⯑ceived a Houſe or Tree exiſting independent and out of all Minds whatſoever?

That was, I own, an Overſight; but ſtay, let me conſider what led me into it.—It is a pleaſant Miſtake enough. As I was thinking of a Tree in a ſolitary Place, where no one was preſent to ſee it, methought that was to conceive a Tree as exiſting unperceived or unthought of, not conſidering that I my⯑ſelf conceived it all the while. But now I plainly ſee, that all I can do is to frame Ideas in my own Mind. I may, indeed, conceive in my own Thoughts the Idea of a Tree, or a Houſe, or a Mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving, that I can conceive them exiſting out of the Minds of all Spirits.

You acknowlege then that you cannot poſſibly conceive, how any one corporeal ſen⯑ſible Thing ſhould exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind.

I do.

And yet, you will earneſtly contend for the Truth of that which you cannot ſo much as conceive.

I profeſs I know not what to think, but ſtill there are ſome Scruples remain with me. Is it not certain, I ſee Things at a Di⯑ſtance; do we not perceive the Stars and Moon, for Example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I ſay, manifeſt to the Senſes?

Do you not in a Dream too perceive thoſe or the like Objects?

I do.

And have they not then the ſame Ap⯑pearance of being diſtant?

They have.

But you do not thence conclude the Apparitions in a Dream to be without the Mind.

By no means.

You ought not, therefore, to conclude that ſenſible Objects are without the Mind from their Appearance, or Manner wherein they are perceived.

I acknowlege it. But doth not my Senſe deceive me in thoſe Caſes?

By no Means. The Idea or Thing which you immediately perceive, neither Senſe nor Reaſon informs you that it actually exiſts without the Mind. By Senſe you only know that you are affected with ſuch certain Senſations of Light and Colours, &c. And theſe you will not ſay are without the Mind.

True. But beſide all that, do you not think the Sight ſuggeſts ſomething of Out⯑neſs or Diſtance?

Upon approaching a diſtant Object, do the viſible Size and Figure change perpe⯑tually, or do they appear the ſame at all Diſtances?

They are in a continual Change.

Sight therefore does not ſuggeſt, or any way inform you, that the viſible Object you immediately perceive exiſts at a Diſtance, [56] or will be perceived when you advance far⯑ther onward, there being a continued Series of viſible Objects ſucceeding each other, du⯑ring the whole Time of your Approach.

It does not; but ſtill I know, upon ſeeing an Object, what Object I ſhall perceive after having paſſed over a certain Diſtance: No matter whether it be exactly the ſame or no: There is ſtill ſomething of Diſtance ſug⯑geſted in the Caſe.

Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the Point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this. From the Ideas you actually perceive by Sight, you have by Ex⯑perience learned to collect what other Ideas you will (according to the ſtanding Order of Nature) be affected with, after ſuch a certain Succeſſion of Time and Motion.

Upon the Whole, I take it to be no⯑thing elſe.

Now, is it not plain, that if we ſup⯑poſe a Man born blind was on a ſudden made to ſee, he could at firſt have no Experience of what may be ſuggeſted by Sight.

It is.

He would not then, according to you, have any Notion of Diſtance annexed to the Things he ſaw; but would take them for a new Sett of Senſations exiſting only in his Mind.

It is undeniable.

But to make it ſtill more plain: is not Diſtance a Line turned endwiſe to the Eye.

It is.

And, can a Line, ſo ſituated, be per⯑ceived by Sight?

It cannot.

Does it not, therefore, follow, that Diſtance is not properly and immediately perceived by Sight?

It ſhould ſeem ſo.

Again, is it your Opinion, that Co⯑lours are at a Diſtance?

It muſt be acknowleged, they are on⯑ly in the Mind.

But, do not Colours appear to the Eye as coexiſting in the ſame place with Extenſion and Figures.

They do.

How can you then conclude from Sight, that Figures exiſt without, when you acknowlege Colours do not; the ſenſible Appearance being the very ſame with regard to both?

I know not what to anſwer.

But, allowing that Diſtance was tru⯑ly and immediately perceived by the Mind, yet it wou'd not thence follow, it exiſted out of the Mind. For, whatever is imme⯑diately perceived, is an Idea: And, can any Idea exiſt out of the Mind?

To ſuppoſe that, were abſurd. But inform me, Philonous, can we perceive, or know nothing beſide our Ideas?

As for the rational deducing of Cau⯑ſes from Effects, that is beſide our Inquiry. And by the Senſes, you can beſt tell, whe⯑ther you perceive any thing, which is not im⯑mediately perceived. And I ask you, whe⯑ther the Things immediately perceived, are other than your own Senſations, or Ideas? You have, indeed, more than once, in the Courſe of this Converſation, expreſſed your⯑ſelf on thoſe Points; but you ſeem, by this laſt Queſtion, to have departed from what you then thought.

To ſpeak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two Kinds of Objects, the one per⯑ceived immediately, which are likewiſe cal⯑led Ideas; the other are real Things, or ex⯑ternal Objects, perceived by the Mediation of Ideas, which are their Images and Repre⯑ſentations. Now I own, Ideas cannot exiſt without the Mind; but the latter ſort of Ob⯑jects do. I am ſorry I did not think of this Diſtinction ſooner; it would, probably, have cut ſhort your Diſcourſe.

Are thoſe external Objects perceived by Senſe, or by ſome other Faculty?

They are perceived by Senſe.

How! Is there any thing perceived by Senſe, which is not immediately percei⯑ved?

Yes, Philonous, in ſome ſort there is. For Example, when I look on a Picture, or Statue of Julius Caeſar, I may be ſaid, after a manner, to perceive him (tho' not imme⯑diately) by my Senſes.

It ſeems then, you will have our Ideas, which alone are immediately percei⯑ved, to be Pictures of external Things: And, that theſe alſo, are perceived by Senſe, inaſ⯑much as they have a Conformity or Reſem⯑blance to our Ideas.

That is my Meaning.

And, in the ſame way that Julius Caeſar, in himſelf inviſible, is, nevertheleſs, perceived by Sight; real Things, in them⯑ſelves imperceptible, are perceived by Senſe.

In the very ſame.

Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the Picture of Julius Caeſar, do you ſee with your Eyes any more than ſome Colours and Fi⯑gures, with a certain Symmetry and Compo⯑ſition of the whole?

Nothing elſe.

And wou'd not a Man, who had ne⯑ver known any thing of Julius Caeſar, ſee as much?

He wou'd.

Conſequently, he hath his Sight, and the Uſe of it, in as perfect a Degree as you.

I agree with you.

Whence comes it then, that your Thoughts are directed to the Roman Emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the Senſations, or Ideas of Senſe, by you then perceived; ſince you acknowlege, you have no Advantage over him in that reſpect. It ſhould ſeem, therefore, to proceed from Reaſon and Memory: ſhou'd it not?

It ſhou'd.

Conſequently, it will not follow from that Inſtance, that any thing is perceived by Senſe, which is not immediately perceived. Tho' I grant, we may, in one Acceptation, be ſaid to perceive ſenſible Things mediately by Senſe: That is, when from a frequently per⯑ceived Connexion, the immediate Perception of Ideas by one Senſe, ſuggeſts to the Mind others, perhaps belonging to another Senſe, which are wont to be connected with them. For inſtance, when I hear a Coach drive along the Streets, immediately I perceive only the Sound; but from the Experience I have had, that ſuch a Sound is connected with a Coach, I am ſaid to hear the Coach. It is, neverthe⯑leſs, evident, that, in Truth and Strictneſs, nothing can be heard but Sound: And the Coach is not then properly perceived by Senſe, but ſuggeſted from Experience. So likewiſe, when we are ſaid to ſee a red-hot Bar of Iron; the Solidity and Heat of the Iron are not the Objects of Sight, but ſuggeſted to the [61] Imagination by the Colour and Figure, which are properly perceived by that Senſe. In ſhort, thoſe things alone are actually perceived by any Senſe, which would have been perceived, in caſe that ſame Senſe had then been firſt conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain, they are only ſuggeſted to the Mind by Experience, grounded on former Percep⯑tions. But, to return to your Compariſon of Caeſar's Picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you muſt hold, the real Things, or Arche⯑types of our Ideas, are not perceived by Senſe, but by ſome internal Faculty of the Soul, as Reaſon, or Memory. I wou'd, therefore, fain know, what Arguments you can draw from Reaſon, for the Exiſtence of what you call real Things, or material Objects. Or, whe⯑ther you remember to have ſeen them former⯑ly, as they are in themſelves; or, if you have heard, or read of any one that did.

I ſee, Philonous, you are diſpoſed to Raillery; but that will never convince me.

My Aim is only to learn from you, the way to come at the Knowlege of thoſe material Beings. Whatever we perceive, is perceived, either immediately, or mediately: By Senſe, or by Reaſon and Reflexion. But, as you have excluded Senſe, pray, ſhew me what Reaſon you have to believe their Exi⯑ſtence; or, what medium you can poſſibly make uſe of, to prove it either to mine, or your own Underſtanding.

To deal ingenuouſly, Philonous, now I conſider the Point, I do not find I can give you any good Reaſon for it. But, thus much ſeems pretty plain, that it is at leaſt poſſible, ſuch things may really exiſt. And as long as there is no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing them, I am reſolved to believe as I did, till you bring good Reaſons to the contrary.

What! Is it come to this, that you only believe the Exiſtence of material Ob⯑jects, and that your Belief is founded barely on the Poſſibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring Reaſons againſt it: Tho another would think it reaſonable, the Proof ſhould lie on him, who holds the Affir⯑mative, And after all, this very Point which you are now reſolved to maintain, without any Reaſon, is, in effect, what you have, more than once, during this Diſcourſe, ſeen good Reaſon to give up. But to paſs over all this; if I underſtand you rightly, you ſay, our Ideas do not exiſt without the Mind; but that they are Copies, Images, or Repreſentations of certain Originals, that do.

You take me right.

They are then like external Things.

They are.

Have thoſe Things a ſtable and per⯑manent Nature independent of our Senſes; or are they in a perpetual Change, upon our producing any Motions in our Bodies, ſuſ⯑pending, [63] exerting, or altering our Faculties or Organs of Senſe.

Real Things, it is plain, have a fixed and real Nature, which remains the ſame, notwithſtanding any Change in our Senſes, or in the Poſture and Motion of our Bodies; which, indeed, may affect the Ideas in our Minds, but it were abſurd to think they had the ſame Effect on Things exiſting without the Mind.

How then is it poſſible, that Things perpetually fleeting and variable, as our Ideas, ſhould be Copies or Images of any thing fixed and conſtant? Or, in other Words, ſince all ſenſible Qualities, as Size, Figure, Colour, &c. i. e. our Ideas, are continually changing upon every Alteration in the Di⯑ſtance, Medium, or Inſtruments of Senſa⯑tion; how can any determinate material Ob⯑ject be properly repreſented or painted forth by ſeveral diſtinct Things, each of which is ſo different from and unlike the reſt? Or, if you ſay, it reſembles ſome one only of our Ideas, how ſhall we be able to diſtinguiſh the true Copy from all the falſe ones?

I profeſs, Philonous, I am at a Loſs. I know not what to ſay to this.

But neither is this all. Which are material Objects in themſelves, Perceptible or Imperceptible?

Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but Ideas. All material Things, therefore, are in themſelves inſenſi⯑ble, and to be perceived only by their Ideas.

Ideas then are ſenſible, and their Ar⯑chetypes or Originals inſenſible.

Right.

But how can that which is ſenſible be like that which is inſenſible? Can a real thing in itſelf inviſible, be like a Colour; or a real thing which is not audible, be like a Sound? In a word; Can any thing be like a Senſa⯑tion or Idea, but another Senſation or Idea?

I muſt own, I think not.

Is it poſſible there ſhould be any Doubt in the Point? Do you not perfectly know your own Ideas?

I know them perfectly; ſince what I do not perceive, or know, can be no Part of my Idea.

Conſider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be any thing in them which can exiſt without the Mind: or if you can conceive any thing like them exiſting without the Mind.

Upon Inquiry, I find it is impoſſible for me to conceive or underſtand how any thing but an Idea can be like an Idea. And it is moſt evident, that no Idea can exiſt with⯑out the Mind.

You are, therefore, by your Prin⯑ciples, forced to deny the Reality of ſenſible Things, ſince you made it to conſiſt in an ab⯑ſolute Exiſtence, exterior to the Mind. That is to ſay, you are a downright Sceptic. So I have gained my Point, which was to ſhew, your Principles led to Scepticiſm.

For the preſent I am, if not intirely convinced, at leaſt ſilenced.

I wou'd fain know what more you wou'd require in order to a perfect Con⯑viction. Have you not had the Liberty of ex⯑plaining yourſelf all manner of ways? Were any little Slips in Diſcourſe laid hold and in⯑ſiſted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce any thing you had offered, as beſt ſerved your Purpoſe? Has not every thing you could ſay been heard and examined with all the Fairneſs imaginable? In a word, have you not in every Point been convinced out of your own Mouth? And if you can at preſent diſcover any Flaw in any of your former Con⯑ceſſions, or think of any remaining Subter⯑fuge, any new Diſtinction, Colour, or Com⯑ment whatſoever, why do you not produce it?

A little Patience, Philonous. I am at preſent ſo amazed to ſee myſelf enſnared, and as it were impriſoned, in the Labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the ſuddain it cannot be expected I ſhould find my Way [66] out. You muſt give me Time to look about me, and recollect myſelf.

Hark; Is not this the College Bell?

It rings for Prayers.

We will go in then, if you pleaſe, and meet here again to Morrow Morning. In the mean time, you may employ your Thoughts on this Morning's Diſcourſe, and try if you can find any Fallacy in it, or in⯑vent any new Means to extricate yourſelf.

Agreed.

The Second DIALOGUE.

I BEG your Pardon, Phi⯑lonous, for not meeting you ſooner. All this Morning my Head was ſo filled with our late Converſation, that I had not Leiſure to think of the Time of the Day, or, indeed, of any thing elſe.

I am glad you were ſo intent upon it, in Hopes if there were any Miſtakes in your Conceſſions, or Fallacies in my Rea⯑ſonings from them, you will now diſcover them to me.

I aſſure you, I have done nothing ever ſince I ſaw you, but ſearch after Miſtakes and Fallacies, and with that View have minutely examined the whole Series of Yeſterday's Diſcourſe: but all in vain, for the Notions it led me into, upon Review, appear ſtill more [68] clear and evident; and the more I conſider them, the more irreſiſtibly do they force my Aſſent.

And is not this, think you, a Sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from Nature, and are conformable to right Rea⯑ſon? Truth and Beauty are in this alike, that the niceſt Survey ſets them both off to Advan⯑tage. Whilſt the falſe Luſtre of Error and Diſguiſe cannot endure being review'd, or too nearly inſpected.

I own there is a great deal in what you ſay. Nor can any one be more intirely ſatisfied of the Truth of thoſe od Conſe⯑quences, ſo long as I have in View the Rea⯑ſonings that lead to them. But when theſe are out of my Thoughts, there ſeems, on the other hand, ſomething ſo ſatisfactory, ſo na⯑tural and intelligible in the modern Way of explaining things, that I profeſs I know not how to reject it.

I know not what Way you mean.

I mean the Way of accounting for our Senſations or Ideas.

How is that?

It is ſuppoſed the Soul makes her Re⯑ſidence in ſome Part of the Brain, from which the Nerves take their Riſe, and are thence extended to all Parts of the Body. And that outward Objects, by the different Impreſſions they make on the Organs of Senſe, communi⯑cate [69] certain vibrative Motions to the Nerves, and theſe being filled with Spirits, propagate them to the Brain or Seat of the Soul, which, according to the various Impreſſions or Traces thereby made in the Brain, is variouſly affect⯑ed with Ideas.

And call you this an Explication of the Manner whereby we are affected with Ideas?

Why not, Philonous, have you any thing to object againſt it?

I wou'd firſt know whether I rightly underſtand your Hypotheſis. You make cer⯑tain Traces in the Brain to be the Cauſes or Occaſions of our Ideas. Pray tell me, whe⯑ther by the Brain you mean any ſenſible Thing.

What elſe think you I cou'd mean?

Senſible Things are all immediately perceivable; and thoſe Things which are im⯑mediately perceivable, are Ideas; and theſe exiſt only in the Mind. Thus much you have, if I miſtake not, long ſince agreed to.

I do not deny it.

The Brain, therefore, you ſpeak of, being a ſenſible Thing, exiſts only in the Mind. Now, I wou'd fain know whether you think it reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that one Idea or Thing exiſting in the Mind, occaſions all other Ideas. And if you think ſo, pray [70] how do you account for the Origine of that Primary Idea or Brain itſelf?

I do not explain the Origine of our Ideas by that Brain which is perceivable to Senſe, this being itſelf only a Combination of ſenſible Ideas, but by another which I imagine.

But, are not Things imagined as truly in the Mind as Things perceived?

I muſt confeſs they are.

It comes therefore to the ſame thing; and you have been all the while accounting for Ideas, by certain Motions or Impreſſions in the Brain, i. e. by ſome Alterations in an Idea, whether ſenſible or imaginable, it mat⯑ters not.

I begin to ſuſpect my Hypotheſis.

Beſide Spirits, all that we know or conceive, are our own Ideas. When, there⯑fore, you ſay, all Ideas are occaſioned by Impreſſions in the Brain, do you conceive this Brain or no? If you do, then you talk of Ideas imprinted in an Idea, cauſing that ſame Idea, which is abſurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, inſtead of forming a reaſonable Hypotheſis.

I now clearly ſee it was a meer Dream. There is nothing in it.

You need not be much concerned at it: for, after all, this way of explaining Things, as you called it, could never have [71] ſatisfied any reaſonable Man. What Con⯑nexion is there between a Motion in the Nerves, and the Senſations of Sound or Co⯑lour in the Mind? or how is it poſſible theſe ſhould be the Effect of that?

But I cou'd never think it had ſo little in it, as now it ſeems to have.

Well then, are you at length ſatiſ⯑fied that no ſenſible Things have a real Exi⯑ſtence; and that you are in truth an errant Sceptic?

It is too plain to be denied.

Look! are not the Fields covered with a delightful Verdure? Is there not ſome⯑thing in the Woods and Groves, in the Ri⯑vers and clear Springs, that ſooths, that ſof⯑tens, that tranſports the Soul? At the Pro⯑ſpect of the wide and deep Ocean, or ſome huge Mountain whoſe Top is loſt in the Sky, or of an old gloomy Forreſt, are not our Minds filled with a pleaſing Horror? Even in Rocks and Deſerts, is there not an agreeable Wildneſs? How ſincere a Pleaſure is it to behold the natural Beauties of the Earth! To preſerve and renew our Reliſh for them, is not the Veil of Night alternate⯑ly drawn over her Face, and does ſhe not change her Dreſs with the Seaſons? How aptly are the Elements diſpoſed? What Va⯑riety and Uſe in Stones and Minerals? What Delicacy, what Beauty, what Contrivance, [72] in animal and vegetable Bodies? How ex⯑quiſitely are all things ſuited, as well to their particular Ends, as to conſtitute appo⯑ſite Parts of the Whole! And while they mutu⯑ally aid and ſupport, do they not alſo ſet off and illuſtrate each other? Raiſe now your Thoughts from this Ball of Earth, to all thoſe glorious Luminaries that adorn the high Arch of Heaven. The Motion and Situation of the Planets, are they not admirable for Uſe and Order? Were thoſe (miſcalled Erratique) Globes once known to ſtray, in their repeated Journeys thorow the pathleſs Void? Do they not meaſure Areas round the Sun, ever proportioned to the Times? So fixed, ſo im⯑mutable are the Laws by which the unſeen Author of Nature actuates the Univerſe. How vivid and radiant is the Luſtre of the fixed Stars! How magnificent and rich that negli⯑gent Profuſion, with which they appear to be ſcattered thorow the whole Azure Vault! Yet, if you take the Teleſcope, it brings into your Sight a new Hoſt of Stars that eſcape the naked Eye. Here they ſeem contiguous and minute, but, to a nearer View, immenſe Orbs of Light at various Diſtances far ſunk in the Abyſs of Space. Now, you muſt call Imagination to your Aid. The feeble, nar⯑row Senſe, cannot deſcry innumerable Worlds revolving round the central Fires; and, in thoſe Worlds, the Energy of an all-perfect [73] Mind diſplay'd in endleſs Forms. But, nei⯑ther Senſe nor Imagination are big enough, to comprehend the boundleſs Extent, with all its dazzling Furniture. Tho the labor⯑ing Mind exert and ſtrain each Power to its utmoſt Reach, there ſtill ſtands our ungraſped, a Surpluſage immeaſurable. Yet all the vaſt Bodies that compoſe this mighty Frame, how diſtant and remote ſoever, are by ſome ſe⯑cret Mechaniſm, ſome divine Art and Force, linked in a mutual Dependence and Inter⯑courſe with each other, even with this Earth, which almoſt ſlipt from my Thoughts, and was loſt in the Croud of Worlds. Is not the whole Syſtem immenſe, beautiful, glorious, beyond Expreſſion and beyond Thought! What treatment then do thoſe Philoſophers deſerve, who wou'd deprive theſe noble and delightful Scenes of all Reality? How ſhou'd thoſe Principles be entertained, that lead us to think all the viſible Beauty of the Creation a falſe imaginary Glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticiſm of yours will not be thought extravagantly abſurd by all Men of Senſe?

Other Men may think as they pleaſe: But for your Part, you have nothing to re⯑proach me with. My Comfort is, you are as much a Sceptic as I am.

There, Hylas, I muſt beg Leave to differ from you.

What! Have you all along agreed to the Premiſes, and do you now deny the Concluſion, and leave me to maintain thoſe Paradoxes by myſelf which you led me into? This, ſurely, is not fair.

I deny that I agreed with you in thoſe Notions that led to Scepticiſm. You, indeed, ſaid, the Reality of ſenſible Things conſiſted in an abſolute Exiſtence out of the Minds of Spirits, or diſtinct from their being perceived. And purſuant to this Notion of Reality, you are obliged to deny ſenſible Things any real Exiſtence: That is, accor⯑ding to your own Definition, you profeſs yourſelf a Sceptic. But I neither ſaid nor thought, the Reality of ſenſible Things was to be defined after that Manner. To me it is evident, for the Reaſons you allow of, that ſenſible Things cannot exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind or Spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real Exiſtence, but that ſee⯑ing they depend not on my Thought, and have an Exiſtence diſtinct from being percei⯑ved by me, there muſt be ſome other Mind wherein they exiſt. As ſure, therefore, as the ſenſible World really exiſts, ſo ſure is there an infinite omnipreſent Spirit who contains and ſupports it.

What! This is no more than I and all Chriſtians hold; nay, and all others too [75] who believe there is a God, and that he knows and comprehends all Things.

Ay, but here lies the Difference. Men commonly believe that all Things are known or perceived by God, becauſe they believed the Being of a God, whereas I, on the other ſide, immediately and neceſſarily conclude the Being of a God, becauſe all ſenſible Things muſt be perceived by Him.

But ſo long as we all believe the ſame thing, what matter is it how we come by that Belief?

But neither do we agree in the ſame Opinion. For Philoſophers, tho they ac⯑knowlege all corporeal Beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an abſo⯑lute Subſiſtence diſtinct from their being per⯑ceived by any Mind whatever, which I do not. Beſides, is there no Difference between ſay⯑ing, There is a God, therefore he perceives all Things: and ſaying, Senſible Things do really exiſt: and if they really exiſt, they are neceſ⯑ſarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an infinite Mind, or God. This fur⯑niſhes you with a direct and immediate De⯑monſtration, from a moſt evident Principle, of the Being of a God. Divines and Philoſo⯑phers had proved, beyond all Controverſy, from the Beauty and Uſefulneſs of the ſeveral Parts of the Creation, that it was the Work⯑manſhip of God. But that, ſetting aſide all [76] Help of Aſtronomy and natural Philoſophy, all Contemplation of the Contrivance, Order, and Adjuſtment of Things, an infinite Mind ſhould be neceſſarily inferred from the bare Exiſtence of the ſenſible World, is an Advan⯑tage peculiar to them only who have made this eaſy Reflexion: That the ſenſible World is that which we perceive by our ſeveral Senſes; and that nothing is perceived by the Senſes beſide Ideas; and that no Idea, or Ar⯑chetype of an Idea, can exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind. You may now, without any labori⯑ous Search into the Sciences, without any Subtilty of Reaſon, or tedious Length of Diſ⯑courſe, oppoſe and baffle the moſt ſtrenuous Advocate for Atheiſm. Thoſe miſerable Re⯑fuges, whether in an eternal Succeſſion of unthinking Cauſes and Effects, or in a for⯑tuitous Concourſe of Atoms; thoſe wild Imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spino⯑ſa; in a word, the whole Syſtem of Atheiſm, is it not intirely overthrown, by this ſingle Reflexion on the Repugnancy included in ſuppoſing the Whole, or any Part, even the moſt rude and ſhapeleſs of the viſible World, to exiſt without a Mind? Let any one of thoſe Abettors of Impiety but look into his own Thoughts, and there try if he can con⯑ceive how ſo much as a Rock, a Deſert, a Chaos, or confuſed Jumble of Atoms; how any thing at all, either ſenſible or imagina⯑ble, [77] can exiſt independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his Folly. Can any thing be fairer than to put a Diſpute on ſuch an Iſſue, and leave it to a Man himſelf to ſee if he can conceive, even in Thought, what he holds to be true in Fact, and from a Notional to allow it a Real Exiſtence?

It cannot be denied, there is ſome⯑thing highly ſerviceable to Religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a Notion entertained by ſome emi⯑nent Moderns, of ſeeing all things in God.

I wou'd gladly know that Opinion; pray explain it to me.

They conceive that the Soul, being im⯑material, is incapable of being united with material Things, ſo as to perceive them in themſelves, but that ſhe perceives them by her Union with the Subſtance of God, which being ſpiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate Object of a Spirit's Thought. Beſides, the Divine Eſ⯑ſence contains in it Perfections correſpondent to each created Being; and which are, for that Reaſon, proper to exhibit or repreſent them to the Mind.

I do not underſtand how our Ideas, which are Things altogether paſſive and inert, can be the Eſſence, or any Part (or like any Part) of the Eſſence or Subſtance of God, who is an impaſſive, indiviſible, purely active [78] Being. Many more Difficulties and Obje⯑ctions there are, which occur at firſt View a⯑gainſt this Hypotheſis; but I ſhall only add, that it is liable to all the Abſurdities of the common Hypotheſes, in making a created World exiſt otherwiſe than in the Mind of a Spirit. Beſide all which it has this peculiar to itſelf; that it makes that material World ſerve to no Purpoſe. And if it paſs for a good Argument againſt other Hypotheſes in the Sciences, that they ſuppoſe Nature or the Divine Wiſdom to make ſomething in vain, or do that by tedious round-about Methods, which might have been performed in a much more eaſy and compendious way, what ſhall we think of that Hypotheſis which ſuppoſes the whole World made in vain?

But what ſay you, are not you too of Opinion that we ſee all Things in God? If I miſtake not, what you advance comes near it.

I intirely agree with what the Holy Scripture ſaith, That in God we live, and move, and have our Being. But that we ſee Things in his Eſſence after the manner above ſet forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my Meaning. It is evident that the Things I perceive are my own Ideas, and that no Idea can exiſt, unleſs it be in a Mind. Nor is it leſs plain that theſe Ideas or Things by me perceived, either themſelves or their Archetypes exiſt independently of my Mind, [79] ſince I know myſelf not to be their Author, it being out of my Power to determine at Pleaſure, what particular Ideas I ſhall be af⯑fected with upon opening my Eyes or Ears. They muſt therefore exiſt in ſome other Mind, whoſe Will it is they ſhould be exhi⯑bited to me. The Things, I ſay, immedi⯑ately perceived, are Ideas or Senſations, call them which you will. But how can any Idea or Senſation exiſt in, or be produced by, any thing but a Mind or Spirit? This, indeed, is inconceivable: and to aſſert that which is inconceivable, is to talk Nonſenſe: Is it not?

Without doubt.

But on the other hand, it is very con⯑ceivable that they ſhould exiſt in, and be pro⯑duced by, a Spirit; ſince this is no more than I daily experience in myſelf, inaſmuch as I perceive numberleſs Ideas; and by an Act of my Will can form a great Variety of them, and raiſe them up in my Imagination: Tho' it muſt be confeſſed, theſe Creatures of the Fancy are not altogether ſo diſtinct, ſo ſtrong, vivid, and permanent, as thoſe perceived by my Senſes, which latter are called Real Things. From all which I conclude, there is a Mind which affects me every Moment with all the ſenſible Impreſſions I perceive. And from the Variety, Order, and Manner of theſe, I conclude the Author of them to be wiſe, powerful, and good, beyond Comprehenſion. [80] Mark it well; I do not ſay, I ſee Things by perceiving that which repreſents them in the intelligible Subſtance of God. This I do not underſtand; but I ſay, The Things by me perceived are known by the Underſtanding, and produced by the Will, of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this moſt plain and evident? Is there any more in it, than what a little Obſervation of our own Minds, and that which paſſes in them not only enables us to conceive, but alſo obliges us to acknow⯑lege?

I think I underſtand you very clearly; and own the Proof you give of a Deity ſeems no leſs evident, than it is ſurprizing. But allowing that God is the ſupreme and Univerſal Cauſe of all Things, yet may not there ſtill be a Third Nature beſide Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a ſubordinate and limited Cauſe of our Ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be Matter?

How often muſt I inculcate the ſame thing? You allow the Things immediately perceived by Senſe to exiſt no where without the Mind: But there is nothing perceived by Senſe, which is not perceived immediately: therefore there is nothing ſenſible that exiſts without the Mind. The Matter, therefore, which you ſtill inſiſt on, is ſomething intelli⯑gible, I ſuppoſe; ſomething that may be diſ⯑covered by Reaſon, and not by Senſe.

You are in the right.

Pray, let me know what Reaſoning your Belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is in your preſent Senſe of it.

I find myſelf affected with various Ideas, whereof, I know, I am not the Cauſe; neither are they the Cauſe of themſelves, or of one another, or capable of ſubſiſting by themſelves, as being altogether inactive, fleet⯑ing, dependent Beings. They have, there⯑fore, ſome Cauſe diſtinct from me and them: Of which I pretend to know no more, than that it is the Cauſe of my Ideas. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.

Tell me, Hylas, has every one a Li⯑berty to change the current, proper Signifi⯑cation, annexed to a common Name in any Language? For Example, ſuppoſe a Tra⯑veller ſhou'd tell you, that, in a certain Coun⯑try, Men might paſs unhurt thorow the Fire; and, upon explaining himſelf, you found he meant by the Word Fire that which others call Water: Or, if he ſhou'd aſſert, there are Trees which walk upon two Legs, meaning Men by the Term Trees. Wou'd you think this reaſonable?

No; I ſhou'd think it very abſurd. Common Cuſtom is the Standard of Pro⯑priety in Language. And for any Man to affect ſpeaking improperly, is to pervert the Uſe of Speech, and can never ſerve to a [82] better purpoſe, than to protract and multi⯑ply Diſputes where there is no Difference in Opinion.

And does not Matter, in the com⯑mon current Acceptation of the Word, ſigni⯑fy an extended, ſolid, moveable, unthinking, inactive Subſtance?

It does.

And has it not been made evident, that no ſuch Subſtance can poſſibly exiſt? And tho it ſhou'd be allowed to exiſt, yet how can that which is inactive be a Cauſe; or that which is unthinking be a Cauſe of Thought? You may, indeed, if you pleaſe, annex to the Word Matter, a contrary Meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me, you un⯑derſtand by it, an unextended, thinking, active Being, which is the Cauſe of our Ideas. But what elſe is this, than to play with Words, and run into that very Fault you juſt now condemned with ſo much Reaſon? I do by no means find fault with your Reaſoning, in that you collect a Cauſe from the Phaenomena. But I deny, that the Cauſe deducible by Rea⯑ſon, can properly be termed Matter.

There is, indeed, ſomething in what you ſay. But I am afraid, you do not tho⯑rowly comprehend my Meaning. I wou'd by no means be thought to deny, that God, or an Infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cauſe of all things. All I contend for, is, that ſub⯑ordinate [83] to the Supreme Agent, there is a Cauſe of a limited and inferior Nature, which concurs in the Production of our Ideas, not by any Act of Will, or Spiritual Efficiency, but by that Kind of Action which belongs to Matter, viz. Motion.

I find, you are at every Turn relap⯑ſing into your old exploded Conceit, of a moveable, and, conſequently, an extended Subſtance exiſting without the Mind. What! Have you already forgot you were convinced, or are you willing I ſhou'd repeat what has been ſaid on that Head? In truth, this is not fair Dealing in you, ſtill to ſuppoſe the Being of that which you have ſo often acknowleged to have no Being. But, not to inſiſt farther on what has been ſo largely handled, I ask, whether all your Ideas are not perfectly paſ⯑ſive and inert, including nothing of Action in them?

They are.

And are ſenſible Qualities any thing elſe but Ideas?

How often have I acknowledged that they are not?

But is not Motion a ſenſible Qua⯑lity?

It is.

Conſequently, it is no Action.

I agree with you. And, indeed, it is very plain, that when I ſtir my Finger, it re⯑mains [84] paſſive; but my Will, which produ⯑ced the Motion, is active.

Now I deſire to know, in the firſt place, whether Motion being allowed to be no Action, you can conceive any Action be⯑ſide Volition: And in the ſecond place, whe⯑ther to ſay ſomething, and conceive nothing, be not to talk Nonſenſe: And, laſtly, whe⯑ther having conſidered the Premiſes you do not perceive, that to ſuppoſe any efficient or active Cauſe of our Ideas, other than Spirit, is highly abſurd and unreaſonable?

I give up the Point intirely. But tho' Matter may not be a Cauſe, yet what hin⯑ders its being an Inſtrument ſubſervient to the Supreme Agent, in the Production of our Ideas?

An Inſtrument, ſay you; pray, what may be the Figure, Springs, Wheels, and Mo⯑tions of that Inſtrument?

Thoſe I pretend to determine nothing of, both the Subſtance and its Qualities be⯑ing intirely unknown to me.

What? You are then of Opinion, it is made up of unknown Parts, that it hath unknown Motions and an unknown Shape.

I do not believe it hath any Figure or Motion at all, being already convinced, that no ſenſible Qualities can exiſt in an un⯑perceiving Subſtance.

But what Notion is it poſſible to frame of an Inſtrument void of all ſenſible Qualities, even Extenſion itſelf?

I do not pretend to have any Notion of it.

And what reaſon have you to think, this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat does exiſt? Is it that you imagine, God cannot act as well without it, or that you find by Experience, the Uſe of ſome ſuch thing, when you form Ideas in your own Mind?

You are always teizing me for Rea⯑ſons of my Belief. Pray, what Reaſons have you not to believe it?

It is to me a ſufficient Reaſon not to believe the Exiſtence of any thing, if I ſee no Reaſon for believing it. But not to inſiſt on Reaſons for believing, you will not ſo much as let me know what it is you wou'd have me believe; ſince you ſay, you have no manner of Notion of it. After all, let me intreat you to conſider, whether it be like a Philoſopher, or even like a Man of common Senſe, to pretend to believe, you know not what, and you know not why.

Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an Inſtrument, I do not mean alto⯑gether Nothing. It is true, I know not the particular Kind of Inſtrument; but, how⯑ever, [86] I have ſome Notion of Inſtrument in ge⯑neral, which I apply to it.

But what if it ſhou'd prove that there is ſomething, even in the moſt general Notion of Inſtrument, as taken in a diſtinct Senſe from Cauſe, which makes the Uſe of it incon⯑ſiſtent with the Divine Attributes?

Make that appear, and I ſhall give up the Point.

What mean you by the general Na⯑ture or Notion of Inſtrument?

That which is common to all parti⯑cular Inſtruments compoſeth the general No⯑tion.

Is it not common to all Inſtruments, that they are applied to the doing thoſe things only, which cannot be performed by the meer Act of our Wills. Thus, for inſtance, I ne⯑ver uſe an Inſtrument to move my Finger, be⯑cauſe it is done by a Volition. But I ſhou'd uſe one, if I were to remove part of a Rock, or tear up a Tree by the Roots. Are you of the ſame Mind? or, can you ſhew any Ex⯑ample where an Inſtrument is made uſe of, in producing an Effect immediately depend⯑ing on the Will of the Agent?

I own, I cannot.

How, therefore, can you ſuppoſe, that an All-perfect Spirit, on whoſe Will all things have an abſolute and immediate De⯑pendence, ſhou'd need an Inſtrument in his [87] Operations, or not needing it, make uſe of it? Thus, it ſeems to me, that you are ob⯑liged to own the Uſe of a lifeleſs, inactive Inſtrument, to be incompatible with the In⯑finite Perfection of God; that is, by your own Confeſſion, to give up the Point.

It does not readily occur what I can anſwer you.

But methinks you ſhou'd be ready to own the Truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are Be⯑ings of Finite Powers, are forced to make uſe of Inſtruments. And the Uſe of an In⯑ſtrument ſheweth, the Agent to be limited by Rules of another's Preſcription, and that he cannot obtain his End, but in ſuch a Way, and by ſuch Conditions. Whence it ſeems a clear Conſequence, that the ſupreme, unli⯑mited Agent, uſeth no Tool or Inſtrument at all. The Will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no ſooner exerted than executed, without the Application of Means, which, if they are imployed by inferior Agents, it is not upon account of any real Efficacy that is in them, or neceſſary Aptitude to produce any Effect, but meerly in compliance with the Laws of Nature, or thoſe Conditions preſcribed to them by the firſt Cauſe, who is Himſelf a⯑bove all Limitation or Preſcription what⯑ſoever.

I will no longer maintain, that Mat⯑ter is an Inſtrument. However, I wou'd not be underſtood to give up its Exiſtence nei⯑ther; ſince, notwithſtanding what hath been ſaid, it may ſtill be an Occaſion.

How many Shapes is your Matter to take? or, how often muſt it be proved not to exiſt, before you are content to part with it? But to ſay no more of this (tho by all the Laws of Diſputation, I may juſt⯑ly blame you, for ſo frequently changing the Signification of the principal Term) I wou'd fain know what you mean by affirming, that Matter is an Occaſion, having already de⯑nied it to be a Cauſe. And when you have ſhewn in what Senſe you underſtand Occa⯑ſion, pray, in the next place, be pleaſed to ſhew me what Reaſon induceth you to be⯑lieve, there is ſuch an Occaſion of our Ideas.

As to the firſt Point: By Occaſion, I mean an inactive, unthinking Being; at the Preſence whereof, God excites Ideas in our Minds.

And what may be the Nature of that inactive, unthinking Being?

I know nothing of its Nature.

Proceed then to the ſecond Point, and aſſign ſome Reaſon why we ſhould allow an Exiſtence to this inactive, unthinking, un⯑known thing.

When we ſee Ideas produced in our Minds after an orderly and conſtant Manner, it is natural to think they have ſome fixed and regular Occaſions, at the Preſence of which they are excited.

You acknowlege then God alone to be the Cauſe of our Ideas, and that he cauſes them at the Preſence of thoſe Occaſions.

That is my Opinion.

Thoſe Things which you ſay are pre⯑ſent to God, without doubt He perceives.

Certainly; otherwiſe they could not be to Him an Occaſion of acting.

Not to inſiſt now on your making Senſe of this Hypotheſis, or anſwering all the puzzling Queſtions and Difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the Order and Regularity obſervable in the Series of our Ideas, or the Courſe of Nature, be not ſuffi⯑ciently accounted for by the Wiſdom and Power of God; and whether it does not de⯑rogate from thoſe Attributes, to ſuppoſe He is influenced, directed, or put in Mind, when and what He is to act, by any unthinking Subſtance. And, laſtly, whether, in caſe I gran⯑ted all you contend for, it wou'd make any thing to your Purpoſe, it not being eaſy to con⯑ceive, how the external or abſolute Exiſtence of an unthinking Subſtance, diſtinct from its be⯑ing perceived, can be inferred from my al⯑lowing that there are certain things perceived [90] by the Mind of God, which are to Him the Occaſion of producing Ideas in us.

I am perfectly at a Loſs what to think, this Notion of Occaſion ſeeming now altoge⯑ther as groundleſs as the reſt.

Do you not at length perceive, that in all theſe different Acceptations of Matter, you have been only ſuppoſing you know not what, for no manner of Reaſon, and to no kind of Uſe?

I freely own myſelf leſs fond of my Notions, ſince they have been ſo accurately examined. But ſtill, methinks, I have ſome confuſed Perception that there is ſuch a thing as Matter.

Either you perceive the Being of Mat⯑ter immediately, or mediately. If imme⯑diately, pray inform me by which of the Senſes you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what Reaſoning it is inferred from thoſe Things which you perceive immediate⯑ly. So much for the Perception. Then for the Matter itſelf, I ask whether it is Object, Subſtratum, Cauſe, Inſtrument, or Occaſion? You have already pleaded for each of theſe, ſhifting your Notions, and making Matter to appear ſometime in one Shape, then in ano⯑ther. And what you have offered, has been diſapproved and rejected by yourſelf. If you have any thing new to advance, I wou'd glad⯑ly hear it.

I think I have already offered all I had to ſay on thoſe Heads. I am at a Loſs what more to urge.

And yet you are loath to part with your old Prejudice. But to make you quit it more eaſily, I deſire that, beſide what has been hitherto ſuggeſted, you will farther conſider, whether upon Suppoſition that Mat⯑ter exiſts, you can poſſibly conceive how you ſhou'd be affected by it? Or ſuppoſing it did not exiſt, whether it be not evident, you might for all that be affected with the ſame Ideas you now are, and conſequently have the very ſame Reaſons to believe its Exiſtence that you now can have?

I acknowlege it is poſſible we might perceive all things juſt as we do now, tho there was no Matter in the World; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it ſhou'd produce any Idea in our Minds. And I do farther grant, you have intirely ſatisfied me, that it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be ſuch a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing Ac⯑ceptations. But ſtill I cannot help ſuppoſing that there is Matter in ſome Senſe or other. What that is I do not indeed pretend to de⯑termine.

I do not expect you ſhou'd define ex⯑actly the Nature of that unknown Being. On⯑ly be pleaſed to tell me, whether it is a Sub⯑ſtance: And if ſo, whether you can ſuppoſe [92] a Subſtance without Accidents; or, in caſe you ſuppoſe it to have Accidents or Qualities, I deſire you will let me know what thoſe Qualities are, at leaſt, what is meant by Mat⯑ter's ſupporting them.

We have already argued on thoſe Points. I have no more to ſay to them. But to prevent any farther Queſtions, let me tell you, I at preſent underſtand by Matter nei⯑ther Subſtance nor Accident, thinking nor ex⯑tended Being, neither Cauſe, Inſtrument, nor Occaſion, but ſomething intirely unknown, diſtinct from all theſe.

It ſeems then, you include in your preſent Notion of Matter, nothing but the ge⯑neral Abſtract Idea of Entity.

Nothing elſe, ſave only that I ſuper⯑add to this general Idea, the Negation of all thoſe particular Things, Qualities, or Ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in any wiſe ap⯑prehend.

Pray where do you ſuppoſe this un⯑known Matter to exiſt?

Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me, for if I ſay it exiſts in Place, then you will inferr that it exiſts in the Mind, ſince it is agreed, that Place or Ex⯑tenſion exiſts only in the Mind: But I am not aſhamed to own my Ignorance. I know not where it exiſts; only I am ſure it exiſts not in Place. There is a negative Anſwer for [93] you: And you muſt expect no other to all the Queſtions you put for the future about Matter.

Since you will not tell me where it exiſts, be pleaſed to inform me after what Manner you ſuppoſe it to exiſt, or what you mean by its Exiſtence.

It neither thinks nor acts, neither per⯑ceives, nor is perceived.

But, what is there poſitive in your abſtracted Notion of its Exiſtence?

Upon a nice Obſervation, I do not find I have any poſitive Notion or Meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not aſhamed to own my Ignorance. I know not what is meant by its Exiſtence, or how it exiſts.

Continue, good Hylas, to act the ſame ingenuous Part, and tell me ſincerely, whether you can frame a diſtinct Idea of En⯑tity in general, preſcinded from, and exclu⯑ſive of, all thinking and corporeal Beings, all particular things whatſoever.

Hold, let me think a little—I pro⯑feſs, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At firſt Glance methought I had ſome dilute and airy Notion of pure Entity in Abſtract; but upon cloſer Attention it has quite vaniſhed out of Sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent Reſolu⯑tion of giving none but negative Anſwers, and not pretending to the leaſt Degree of any [94] poſitive Knowlege or Conception of Matter, its Where, its How, its Entity, or any thing belonging to it.

When, therefore, you ſpeak of the Exiſtence of Matter, you have not any Notion in your Mind.

None at all.

Pray tell me if the Caſe ſtands not thus: At firſt, from a Belief of Material Sub⯑ſtance, you would have it that the immediate Objects exiſted without the Mind; then that their Archetypes; then Cauſes; next Inſtru⯑ments; then Occaſions: Laſtly, ſomething in general, which being interpreted, proves no⯑thing. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair Summary of your whole Proceeding.

Be that as it will, yet I ſtill inſiſt up⯑on it, that our not being able to conceive a Thing, is no Argument againſt its Ex⯑iſtence.

That from a Cauſe, Effect, Opera⯑tion, Sign, or other Circumſtance, there may reaſonably be inferred the Exiſtence of a Thing not immediately perceived, and that it were abſurd for any Man to argue againſt the Exiſtence of that Thing, from his having no direct and poſitive Notion of it, I freely own. But where there is nothing of all this; where neither Reaſon nor Revelation induceth us to believe the Exiſtence of a Thing; where [95] we have not even a relative Notion of it; where an Abſtraction is made from perceiving, and being perceived, from Spirit and Idea: In fine, where there is not ſo much as the moſt inadequate or faint Idea pretended to. I will not, indeed, thence conclude againſt the Reality of any Notion, or Exiſtence of any thing: But my Inference ſhall be, that you mean nothing at all: That you employ Words to no manner of Purpoſe, without any Deſign or Signification whatſoever. And I leave it to you to conſider how meer Jargon ſhou'd be treated.

To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your Arguments ſeem in themſelves unan⯑ſwerable, but they have not ſo great an Ef⯑fect on me, as to produce that intire Con⯑viction, that hearty Acquieſcence which at⯑tends Demonſtration. I find myſelf ſtill re⯑lapſing into an obſcure Surmiſe of, I know not what, Matter.

But are you not ſenſible, Hylas, that two Things muſt concur to take away all Scruple, and work a plenary Aſſent in the Mind? Let a viſible Object be ſet in never ſo clear a Light, yet if there is any Imper⯑fection in the Sight, or if the Eye is not di⯑rected towards it, it will not be diſtinctly ſeen. And tho a Demonſtration be never ſo well grounded and fairly propoſed, yet if there is withal a Stain of Prejudice, or a [96] wrong Biaſs on the Underſtanding, can it be expected on a ſuddain to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the Truth? No, there is need of Time and Pains: The Attention muſt be awakened and detained by a frequent Repeti⯑tion of the ſame Thing placed oft in the ſame, oft in different Lights. I have ſaid it already, and find I muſt ſtill repeat and in⯑culcate, that it is an unaccountable Licence you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what Rea⯑ſon, to you know not what Purpoſe? Can this be paralleled in any Art or Science, any Sect or Profeſſion of Men? Or is there any thing ſo barefacedly groundleſs and unrea⯑ſonable to be met with, even in the loweſt of common Converſation? But perhaps you will ſtill ſay Matter may exiſt, tho' at the ſame time you neither know what is meant by Matter, or by its Exiſtence. This indeed is ſurprizing, and the more ſo, becauſe it is altogether voluntary and of your own Head, you not being led to it by any one Reaſon, for I challenge you to ſhew me that Thing in Nature, which needs Matter to explain or account for it.

The Reality of Things cannot be maintained without ſuppoſing the Exiſtence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good Reaſon why I ſhou'd be earneſt in its Defence?

The Reality of Things! What Things, ſenſible or intelligible?

Senſible Things.

My Glove, for Example?

That, or any other thing perceived by the Senſes.

But to fix on ſome particular thing; is it not a ſufficient Evidence to me of the Exiſtence of this Glove, that I ſee it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it poſſible I ſhou'd be aſſured of the Reali⯑ty of this Thing, which I actually ſee in this Place, by ſuppoſing that ſome unknown Thing, which I never did or can ſee, exiſts after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the ſuppoſed Reality of that which is intangible, be a Proof that any thing tangible really exiſts? or, of that which is inviſible, that any viſible thing, or, in general, of any thing which is imperceptible, that a Perceptible exiſts? Do but explain this, and I ſhall think nothing too hard for you.

Upon the whole, I am content to own the Exiſtence of Matter is highly improba⯑ble; but the direct and abſolute Impoſſibility of it does not appear to me.

But granting Matter to be poſſible, yet, upon that account meerly, it can have no more Claim to Exiſtence than a Golden Mountain, or a Centaur.

I acknowlege it; but ſtill you do not deny it is poſſible; and that which is poſſible, for ought you know, may actually exiſt.

I deny it to be poſſible: And have, if I miſtake not, evidently proved, from your own Conceſſions, that it is not. In the com⯑mon Senſe of the Word Matter, is there any more implied, than an extended, ſolid, figu⯑red, moveable Subſtance exiſting without the Mind? And, have not you acknow⯑leged over and over, that you have ſeen evi⯑dent Reaſon for denying the Poſſibility of ſuch a Subſtance?

Ay, but that is only one Senſe of the Term Matter.

But, is it not the only proper, ge⯑nuine, received Senſe? And if Matter, in ſuch a Senſe, be proved impoſſible, may it not be thought, with good Grounds, abſo⯑lutely impoſſible? Elſe, how cou'd any thing be proved impoſſible? Or, indeed, how cou'd there be any Proof at all, one way or other, to a Man who takes the Liberty to unſettle and change the common Signification of Words?

I thought Philoſophers might be al⯑lowed to ſpeak more accurately than the Vul⯑gar, and were not always confined to the common Acceptation of a Term.

But this now mentioned, is the com⯑mon received Senſe among Philoſophers them⯑ſelves. But not to inſiſt on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what Senſe you pleaſed? And, have you not uſed this Privilege in the utmoſt Extent, ſometimes intirely changing, at others leaving out, or putting into the Definition of it whatever, for the preſent, beſt ſerved your Deſign, contra⯑ry to all the known Rules of Reaſon and Logic? And, hath not this ſhifting, unfair Method of yours, ſpun out our Diſpute to an unneceſſary Length; Matter having been par⯑ticularly examined, and, by your own Con⯑feſſion, refuted, in each of thoſe Senſes? And, can any more be required, to prove the ab⯑ſolute Impoſſibility of a Thing, than the pro⯑ving it impoſſible in every particular Senſe, that either you, or any one elſe, underſtands it in?

But I am not ſo thorowly ſatisfied that you have proved the Impoſſibility of Matter, in the laſt moſt obſcure, abſtracted, and indefinite Senſe.

When is a thing ſhewn to be im⯑poſſible?

When a Repugnancy is demonſtrated between the Ideas comprehended in its Defi⯑nition.

But where there are no Ideas, there no Repugnancy can be demonſtrated between Ideas.

I agree with you.

Now, in that which you call the ob⯑ſcure, indefinite Senſe of the Word Matter, it is plain, by your own Confeſſion, there was included no Idea at all, no Senſe, ex⯑cept an unknown Senſe, which is the ſame thing as none. You are not, therefore, to ex⯑pect I ſhou'd prove a Repugnancy between Ideas, where there are no Ideas; or the Im⯑poſſibility of Matter taken in an unknown Senſe, i. e. no Senſe at all. My buſineſs was only to ſhew, you meant nothing; and this you were brought to own. So that in all your various Senſes, you have been ſhew'd either to mean nothing at all, or, if any thing, an Abſurdity. And if this be not ſuf⯑fient to prove the Impoſſibility of a Thing, I deſire you will let me know what is.

I acknowledge, you have proved that Matter is impoſſible; nor do I ſee what more can be ſaid in defence of it. But at the ſame time that I give up this, I fuſpect all my o⯑ther Notions. For, ſurely, none cou'd be more ſeemingly evident than this once was: And yet it now ſeems as falſe and abſurd as ever it did true before. But, I think we have diſcuſſed the Point ſufficiently for the pre⯑ſent. The remaining Part of the Day I [101] wou'd willingly ſpend, in running over in my Thoughts the ſeveral Heads of this Morning's Converſation, and to Morrow ſhall ſhall be glad to meet you here again about the ſame time.

I will not fail to attend you.

The Third DIALOGUE.

SO, Hylas, What are the Fruits of Yeſter⯑day's Meditation? Has it confirmed you in the ſame Mind you were in at parting? or have you ſince ſeen Cauſe to change your Opinion?

Truly my Opinion is, that all our Opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to Day, we condemn to Morrow, We keep a Stir about Knowlege, and ſpend our Lives in the Purſuit of it, when, alas! we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it poſſible for us ever to know any thing in this Life. Our Faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for Speculation.

What! ſay you, we can know no⯑thing, Hylas?

There is not that ſingle thing in the World whereof we can know the real Na⯑ture, or what it is in itſelf.

Will you tell me I do not really know what Fire or Water is?

You may indeed know that Fire ap⯑pears hot, and Water fluid: But this is no more than knowing, what Senſations are produced in your own Mind, upon the Ap⯑plication of Fire and Water to your Organs of Senſe. Their internal Conſtitution, their true and real Nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that.

Do I not know this to be a real Stone that I ſtand on, and that which I ſee before my Eyes to be a real Tree?

Know? no, it is impoſſible you or any Man alive ſhou'd know it. All you know, is, that you have ſuch a certain Idea or Appearance in your own Mind. But what is this to the real Tree or Stone? I tell you, that Colour, Figure, and Hardneſs, which you perceive, are not at all the real Natures of thoſe Things, or in the leaſt like them. The ſame may be ſaid of all other real Things or corporeal Subſtances which com⯑poſe the World. They have none of them any thing in themſelves, like thoſe ſenſible Qualities by us perceived. We ſhou'd not therefore pretend to affirm or know any [104] thing of them, as they are in their own Na⯑ture.

But ſurely, Hylas, I can diſtinguiſh Gold, for Example, from Iron: And how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

Believe me, Philonous, you can only diſtinguiſh between your own Ideas. That Yellowneſs, that Weight, and other ſenſible Qualities, think you they are really in the Gold? They are only relative to the Senſes, and have no abſolute Exiſtence in Nature. And in pretending to diſtinguiſh the Species of real Things, by the Appearances in your Mind, you may, perhaps, act as wiſely as he that ſhou'd conclude two Men were of a dif⯑ferent Species, becauſe their Cloaths were not of the ſame Colour.

It ſeems then we are altogether put off with the Appearances of Things, and thoſe falſe ones too. The very Meat I eat, and the Cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I ſee and feel.

Even ſo.

But is it not ſtrange the whole World ſhou'd be thus impoſed on, and ſo fooliſh as to believe their Senſes? And yet I know not how it is, but Men eat, and drink, and ſleep, and perform all the Offices of Life, as comfortably and conveniently, as if they [105] really knew the Things they are converſant about.

They do ſo: But, you know, ordinary Practice does not require a Nicety of ſpecu⯑lative Knowlege. Hence the Vulgar retain their Miſtakes, and for all that, make a Shift to buſtle thorow the Affairs of Life. But Phi⯑loſophers know better things.

You mean, they know that they know nothing.

That is the very Top and Perfection of Humane Knowlege.

But, are you all this while in earneſt, Hylas; and are you ſeriouſly perſuaded that you know nothing real in the World? Sup⯑poſe you were going to write, wou'd you not call for Pen, Ink, and Paper, like another Man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

How often muſt I tell you, that I know not the real Nature of any one thing in the Univerſe? I may, indeed, upon Occaſion, make uſe of Pen, Ink, and Paper. But what any one of them is in its own true Nature, I declare poſitively I know not. And the ſame is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real Nature of Things, but even of their Exiſtence. It can⯑not be denied that we perceive ſuch certain Appearances or Ideas; but it cannot be con⯑cluded [106] from thence that Bodies really exiſt. Nay, now I think on it, I muſt, agreeably to my former Conceſſions, farther declare, that it is impoſſible any real corporeal Thing ſhou'd exiſt in Nature.

You amaze me. Was ever any thing more wild and extravagant than the Notions you now maintain: And is it not evident you are led into all theſe Extravagan⯑cies, by the Belief of material Subſtance? This makes you dream of thoſe unknown Natures in every thing. It is this occaſions your diſtinguiſhing between the Reality and ſenſible Appearances of Things. It is to this you are indebted, for being ignorant of what every Body elſe knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: You are not only ignorant of the true Nature of every Thing, but you know not whether any thing really exiſts, or whe⯑ther there are any true Natures at all; foraſ⯑much as you attribute to your material Be⯑ings an abſolute or external Exiſtence, where⯑in you ſuppoſe their Reality conſiſts. And as you are forced in the end to acknowlege, ſuch an Exiſtence means either a direct Re⯑pugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows, that you are obliged to pull down your own Hypotheſis of material Subſtance, and poſi⯑tively to deny the real Exiſtence of any Part of the Univerſe. And ſo you are plunged in⯑to the deepeſt and moſt deplorable Scepticiſm [107] that ever Man was. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I ſay?

I agree with you. Material Subſtance was no more than an Hypotheſis, and a falſe and groundleſs one too. I will no longer ſpend my Breath in Defence of it. But what⯑ever Hypotheſis you advance, or whatſoever Scheme of Things you introduce in its ſtead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as falſe: Let me but be allowed to queſtion you upon it: That is, ſuffer me to ſerve you in your own Kind, and I warrant it ſhall conduct you thorow as many Perplexities and Contra⯑dictions, to the very ſame State of Scepticiſm that I myſelf am in at preſent.

I aſſure you, Hylas, I do not pre⯑tend to frame any Hypotheſis at all. I am of a vulgar Caſt, ſimple enough to believe my Senſes, and leave Things as I find them. To be plain, it is my Opinion, that the real Things are thoſe very Things I ſee and feel, and perceive by my Senſes. Theſe I know, and finding they anſwer all the Neceſſities and Purpoſes of Life, have no reaſon to be ſolici⯑tous about any other unknown Beings. A Piece of ſenſible Bread, for Inſtance, wou'd ſtay my Stomach better than ten thouſand times as much of that inſenſible, unintelligi⯑ble, real Bread you ſpeak of. It is likewiſe my Opinion, that Colours and other ſenſible Qualities are on the Objects. I cannot for [108] my Life help thinking that Snow is white, and Fire hot. You, indeed, who by Snow and Fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving Subſtances, are in the right to deny Whiteneſs or Heat to be Affections in⯑herent in them. But I, who underſtand by thoſe Words the Things I ſee and feel, am obliged to think like other Folks. And, as I am no Sceptic with regard to the Nature of Things, ſo neither am I as to their Exiſtence. That a thing ſhou'd be really perceived by my Senſes, and at the ſame time not really exiſt, is to me a plain Contradiction; ſince I cannot preſcind or abſtract, even in Thought, the Exiſtence of a ſenſible Thing from its be⯑ing perceived. Wood, Stones, Fire, Water, Fleſh, Iron, and the like Things, which I name and diſcourſe of, are Things that I know; otherwiſe I ſhou'd never have thought of them, or named them. And I ſhou'd not have known them, but that I perceived them by my Senſes; and Things perceived by the Senſes are immediately perceived; and Things immmediately perceived are Ideas; and Ideas cannot exiſt without the Mind; their Exiſtence, therefore, conſiſts in being per⯑ceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived, there can be no Doubt of their Exiſtence. Away then with all that Scepti⯑ciſm, all thoſe ridiculous Philoſophical Doubts. What a Jeſt is it for a Philoſopher to queſtion [109] the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things, till he has it proved to him from the Veracity of God: Or to pretend our Knowlege in this Point falls ſhort of Intuition or Demonſtration? I might as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thoſe Things I actually ſee and feel.

Not ſo faſt, Philonous: you ſay you cannot conceive how ſenſible Things ſhou'd exiſt without the Mind. Do you not?

I do.

Suppoſing you were annihilated, can⯑not you conceive it poſſible, that Things per⯑ceivable by Senſe, may ſtill exiſt?

I can; but then it muſt be in ano⯑ther mind. When I deny ſenſible Things an Exiſtence out of the Mind, I do not mean my Mind in particular, but all Minds. Now it is plain, they have an Exiſtence exterior to my Mind, ſince I find them, by Expe⯑rience, to be independent of it. There is, therefore, ſome other Mind wherein they exiſt, during the Intervals between the Times of my perceiving them: As, likewiſe, they did before my Birth, and wou'd do after my ſuppoſed Annihilation. And, as the ſame is true, with regard to all other finite, created Spirits; it neceſſarily follows, there is an Omnipreſent, Eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our View in ſuch a manner, and according [110] to ſuch Rules as He Himſelf has ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of Nature.

Anſwer me, Philonous. Are all our Ideas perfectly inert Beings? or, have they any Agency included in them?

They are altogether paſſive and inert.

And is not God an Agent, a Being purely active?

I acknowlege it.

No Idea, therefore, can be like unto, or repreſent the Nature of God.

It cannot.

Since, therefore, you have no Idea of the Mind of God, how can you conceive it poſſible, that things ſhou'd exiſt in His Mind? Or, if you can conceive the Mind of God with⯑out having an Idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the Exiſtence of Matter, notwithſtanding that I have no Idea of it?

As to your firſt Queſtion; I own I have properly no Idea, either of God or any other Spirit; for, theſe being active, cannot be repreſented by things perfectly inert, as our Ideas are. I do, nevertheleſs, know, that I, who am a Spirit or thinking Subſtance, exiſt as certainly, as I know my Ideas exiſt. Farther, I know what I mean by the Terms I and Myſelf; and I know this immediately, or intuitively, tho I do not perceive it as I per⯑ceive a Triangle, a Colour, or a Sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul, is that indiviſible un⯑extended [111] Thing, which thinks, acts, and per⯑ceives. I ſay, indiviſible, becauſe unextend⯑ed; and unextended, becauſe extended, figu⯑red, moveable Things, are Ideas; and that which perceives Ideas, which thinks, and wills, is plainly itſelf no Idea, nor like an Idea. Ideas are Things inactive, and per⯑ceived. And Spirits a ſort of Beings, alto⯑gether different from them. I do not, there⯑fore, ſay, my Soul is an Idea, or like an Idea. However, taking the Word Idea in a large Senſe, my Soul may be ſaid to furniſh me with an Idea, that is, an Image, or Likeneſs of God, tho, indeed, extremely inadequate. For all the Notion I have of God, is obtained by reflecting on my own Soul, heightning its Powers, and removing its Imperfections. I have, therefore, tho not an inactive Idea, yet, in myſelf, ſome ſort of an active, thinking Image of the Deity. And tho I perceive Him not by Senſe, yet I have a Notion of Him, or know Him by Reflexion and Rea⯑ſoning. My own Mind, and my own Ideas, I have an immediate Knowlege of; and by the Help of theſe, do mediately apprehend the Poſſibility of the Exiſtence of other Spi⯑rits and Ideas. Farther, from my own Be⯑ing, and from the Dependency I find in my⯑ſelf, and my Ideas, I do, by an Act of Rea⯑ſon, neceſſarily infer the Exiſtence of a God, and of all created Things in the Mind of [112] God. So much for your firſt Queſtion. For the ſecond: I ſuppoſe, by this time you can anſwer it yourſelf. For you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive Be⯑ing, or Idea, nor know it, as you do your⯑ſelf, by a reflex Act: Neither do you me⯑diately apprehend it by Similitude of the one or the other: Nor yet collect it by Reaſoning, from that which you know imme⯑diately. All which makes the Caſe of Mat⯑ter widely different from that of the Deity.

I own myſelf ſatisfied in this Point. But do you in earneſt think, the real Exi⯑ſtence of ſenſible Things conſiſts in their be⯑ing actually perceived? If ſo; How comes it that all Mankind diſtinguiſh between them? Ask the firſt Man you meet, and he ſhall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exiſt is another.

I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common Senſe of the World for the Truth of my Notion. Ask the Gardiner, why he thinks yonder Cherry-Tree exiſts in the Gar⯑den, and he ſhall tell you, becauſe he ſees and feels it; in a word, becauſe he perceives it by his Senſes. Ask him, why he thinks an Orange-Tree not to be there, and he ſhall tell you, becauſe he does not perceive it. What he perceives by Senſe, that he terms a real Being, and ſaith it is, or exiſts; but that [113] which is not perceivable, the ſame, he ſaith, has no Being.

Yes, Philonous, I grant the Exiſtence of a ſenſible Thing conſiſts in being perceiva⯑ble, but not in being actually perceived.

And what is perceivable but an Idea? And can an Idea exiſt without being actually perceived? Theſe are Points long ſince agreed between us.

But, be your Opinion never ſo true: Yet, ſurely, you will not deny it is ſhocking, and contrary to the common Senſe of Men. Ask the Fellow, whether yonder Tree has an Exiſtence out of his Mind: What An⯑ſwer think you he wou'd make?

The ſame that I ſhou'd myſelf, viz. That it does exiſt out of his Mind. But then to a Chriſtian, it cannot ſurely be ſhock⯑ing to ſay, The real Tree exiſting without his Mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is, exiſts in) the infinite Mind of God. Probably he may not at firſt Glance be aware of the direct and immediate Proof there is of this, inaſmuch as the very Being of a Tree, or any other ſenſible Thing, implies a Mind wherein it is. But the Point itſelf he cannot deny. The Queſtion between the Materia⯑liſts and me is, not whether Things have a real Exiſtence out of the Mind of this or that Perſon, but whether they have an abſo⯑lute Exiſtence, diſtinct from being perceived [114] by God, and exterior to all Minds. This, indeed, ſome Heathens and Philoſophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains Notions of the Deity ſuitable to the Holy Scriptures, will be of another Opinion.

But, according to your Notions, what Difference is there between real Things, and Chimeras formed by the Imagination, or the Viſions of a Dream, ſince they are all equally in the Mind?

The Ideas formed by the Imagina⯑tion, are faint and indiſtinct; they have, be⯑ſides, an intire Dependence on the Will. But the Ideas perceived by Senſe, i. e. real Things, are more vivid and clear, and being imprint⯑ed on the Mind by a Spirit diſtinct from us, have not a like Dependence on our Will. There is, therefore, no Danger of confound⯑ing theſe with the foregoing: And there is as little of confounding them with the Viſions of a Dream, which are dim, irregular, and confuſed. And tho they ſhou'd happen to be never ſo lively and natural, yet by their not being connected, and of a Piece, with the pre⯑ceding and ſubſequent Tranſactions of our Lives, they might eaſily be diſtinguiſhed from Realities. In ſhort, by whatever Me⯑thod you diſtinguiſh Things from Chimeras on your own Scheme, the ſame, it is evident, will hold alſo upon mine. For it muſt be, I preſume, by ſome perceived Difference, and [115] I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

But ſtill, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the World but Spirits and Ideas. And this, you muſt needs acknowlege, ſounds very odly.

I own the Word Idea, not being com⯑monly uſed for Thing, ſounds ſomething out of the way. My Reaſon for uſing it was, becauſe a neceſſary Relation to the Mind is underſtood to be implied by that Term; and it is now commonly uſed by Philoſophers, to denote the immediate Objects of the Under⯑ſtanding. But however odly the Propoſition may ſound in Words, yet it includes nothing ſo very ſtrange or ſhocking in its Senſe, which in effect amounts to no more than this, viz. that there are only Things perceiving, and Things perceived; or that every un⯑thinking Being is neceſſarily, and from the very Nature of its Exiſtence, perceived by ſome Mind; if not by any finite, created Mind, yet certainly by the infinite Mind of God, in whom we live, and move, and have our Being. Is this as ſtrange as to ſay, The ſenſible Qualities are not on the Objects: Or, That we cannot be ſure of the Exiſtence of Things, or know any thing of their real Natures, tho we both ſee and feel them, and perceive them by all our Senſes?

And in Conſequence of this, muſt we not think there are no ſuch Things as Phyſi⯑cal or Corporeal Cauſes: But that a Spirit is the immediate Cauſe of all the Phaenomena in Nature? Can there be any thing more extra⯑vagant than this?

Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to ſay, A thing which is inert, operates on the Mind, and which is unperceiving, is the Cauſe of our Perceptions, without any regard ei⯑ther to Conſiſtency, or the old known Axiom: Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itſelf. Beſides, that which to you, I know not for what Reaſon, ſeems ſo extra⯑vagant, is no more than the Holy Scriptures aſſert in a hundred Places. In them God is repreſented as the ſole and immediate Author of all thoſe Effects, which ſome Heathens and Philoſophers are wont to aſcribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking Princi⯑ple. This is ſo much the conſtant Language of Scripture, that it were needleſs to confirm it by Citations.

You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate Author of all the Motions in Nature, you make him the Au⯑thor of Murder, Sacrilege, Adultery, and the like heinous Sins.

In Anſwer to that, I obſerve firſt, that the Imputation of Guilt is the ſame, whether a Perſon commits an Action with or without [117] an Inſtrument. In caſe, therefore, you ſup⯑poſe God to act by the Mediation of an Inſtru⯑ment, or Occaſion, called Matter, you as truly make Him the Author of Sin as I, who think Him the immediate Agent in all thoſe Operations vulgarly aſcribed to Nature. I farther obſerve, that Sin or moral Turpitude does not conſiſt in the outward Phyſical Action or Motion, but in the internal Devia⯑tion of the Will from the Laws of Reaſon and Religion. This is plain, in that the kil⯑ling an Enemy in a Battel, or putting a Cri⯑minal legally to Death, is not thought ſinful, tho the outward Act be the very ſame with that in the Caſe of Murder. Since, therefore, Sin does not conſiſt in the Phyſical Action, the making God an immediate Cauſe of all ſuch Actions, is not making Him the Author of Sin. Laſtly, I have no where ſaid, that God is the only Agent who produces all the Mo⯑tions in Bodies. It is true, I have denied there are any other Agents beſide Spirits: But this is very conſiſtent with allowing to Thinking, Rational Beings, in the Production of Motions, the Uſe of limited Powers, ulti⯑mately, indeed, derived from God, but im⯑mediately under the Direction of their own Wills, which is ſufficient to intitle them to all the Guilt of their Actions.

But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Subſtance; there is the Point. [118] You can never perſuade me that this is not repugnant to the univerſal Senſe of Man⯑kind. Were our Diſpute to be determined by moſt Voices, I am confident you wou'd give up the Point, without gathering the Votes.

I wiſh both our Opinions were fairly ſtated, and ſubmitted to the Judgment of Men, who had plain common Senſe, without the Prejudices of a learned Education. Let me be repreſented as one who truſts his Senſes, who thinks he knows the Things he ſees and feels, and entertains no Doubts of their Exiſtence; and you fairly ſet forth with all your Doubts, your Paradoxes, and your Scepticiſm about you, and I ſhall willingly acquieſce in the Determination of any indiffe⯑rent Perſon. That there is no Subſtance wherein Ideas can exiſt beſide Spirit, is to me evident. And that the Objects immediately perceived, are Ideas, is on all Hands agreed. And that ſenſible Qualities are Objects imme⯑diately perceived, no one can deny. It is therefore evident, there can be no Subſtratum of thoſe Qualities, but Spirit, in which they exiſt, not by way of Mode or Property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is any un⯑thinking Subſtratum of the Objects of Senſe, and, in that Acceptation, that there is any material Subſtance. But, if by material Sub⯑ſtance is meant only ſenſible Body, that which [119] is ſeen and felt, (and the unphiloſophical Part of the World I dare ſay mean no more) then I am more certain of Matter's Exiſtence than you, or any other Philoſopher, pretend to be. If there be any thing which makes the Generality of Mankind averſe from the Notions I eſpouſe: It is a Miſapprehenſion that I deny the Reality of ſenſible Things: But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows, that in truth their Averſion is againſt your Notions, and not mine. I do therefore aſſert, that I am as certain as of my own Being, that there are Bodies or corpo⯑real Subſtances, (meaning the Things I per⯑ceive by my Senſes) and that, granting this, the Bulk of Mankind will take no Thought about, nor think themſelves at all concerned in the Fate of, thoſe unknown Natures, and Philoſophical Quiddities, which ſome Men are ſo fond of.

What ſay you to this: Since, accor⯑ding to you, Men muſt judge of the Reality of Things by their Senſes, how can a Man be miſtaken, in thinking the Moon a plain lucid Surface, about a Foot in Diameter; or a ſquare Tower, ſeen at a diſtance, round; or an Oar, with one End in the Water, crooked?

He is not miſtaken, with regard to the Ideas he actually perceives; but in the Infe⯑rences he makes from his preſent Percep⯑tions. [120] Thus, in the Caſe of the Oar, what he immediately perceives by Sight, is cer⯑tainly crooked; and ſo far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the Oar out of the Water, he ſhall perceive the ſame Crookedneſs; or, that it wou'd af⯑fect his Touch, as crooked things are wont to do: In that he is miſtaken. In like man⯑ner, if he ſhall conclude from what he per⯑ceives in one Station, that, in caſe he advan⯑ced toward the Moon, or Tower, he ſhou'd ſtill be affected with the like Ideas, he is mi⯑ſtaken. But his Miſtake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at preſent, (it be⯑ing a manifeſt Contradiction to ſuppoſe, he ſhou'd err in reſpect of that) but, in the wrong Judgment he makes, concerning the Ideas he apprehends to be connected with thoſe im⯑mediately perceived: Or, concerning the Ideas that, from what he perceives at preſent, he imagines wou'd be perceived in other Cir⯑cumſtances. The Caſe is the ſame, with re⯑gard to the Copernican Syſtem. We do not here perceive any Motion of the Earth: But it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in caſe we were placed at as great a Diſtance from that, as we are now from the other Planets, we ſhou'd not then perceive its Mo⯑tion.

I underſtand you; and muſt needs own, you ſay things plauſible enough: But [121] give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not for⯑merly as poſitive that Matter exiſted, as you are now that it does not?

I was. But here lies the Difference. Before, my Poſitiveneſs was founded without Examination upon Prejudice; but now, af⯑ter Inquiry, upon Evidence.

After all, it ſeems our Diſpute is ra⯑ther about Words than Things. We agree in the Thing, but differ in the Name. That we are affected with Ideas from without, is evident; and it is no leſs evident, that there muſt be (I will not ſay Archetypes, but) Powers without the Mind, correſponding to thoſe Ideas. And, as theſe Powers cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves, there is ſome Subject of them neceſſarily to be admitted, which I call Matter, and you call Spirit. There is all the Difference.

Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or Subject of Powers, extended?

It hath not Extenſion; but it has the Power to raiſe in you the Idea of Exten⯑ſion.

It is, therefore, itſelf unextended.

I grant it.

Is it not alſo active?

Without doubt: Otherwiſe, how cou'd we attribute Powers to it?

Now, let me ask you Two Que⯑ſtions: Firſt, Whether it be agreeable to the Uſage either of Philoſophers or others, to give the Name Matter to an unextended, active Being? And, Secondly, Whether it be not ridiculouſly abſurd, to miſapply Names contrary to the common Uſe of Language?

Well then, let it not be called Matter, ſince you will have it ſo, but ſome Third Nature diſtinct from Matter and Spirit. For, what reaſon is there, why you ſhou'd call it Spirit; does not the Notion of Spirit imply, that it is thinking, as well as active and un⯑extended?

My Reaſon is this: Becauſe I have a mind to have ſome Notion or Meaning in what I ſay, but I have no Notion of any Action diſtinct from Volition, neither can I conceive Volition to be any where but in a Spirit: therefore, when I ſpeak of an active Being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. Beſide, what can be plainer, than that a thing which hath no Ideas in itſelf, cannot impart them to me; and if it hath Ideas, ſurely it muſt be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the Point ſtill more clearly, if it be poſſible: I aſſert as well as you, that, ſince we are affected from without, we muſt allow Powers to be with⯑out, in a Being diſtinct from ourſelves. So far we are agreed. But then, we differ as to the Kind of this powerful Being. I will have [123] it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spi⯑rit. From the Effects I ſee produced, I con⯑clude, there are Actions; and becauſe Acti⯑ons, Volitions; and becauſe there are Voli⯑tions, there muſt be a Will. Again, the Things I perceive, muſt have an Exiſtence, they or their Archetypes, out of my Mind: But be⯑ing Ideas, neither they, nor their Archetypes, can exiſt, otherwiſe than in an Underſtand⯑ing: There is, therefore, an Underſtanding. But Will and Underſtanding conſtitute, in the ſtricteſt Senſe, a Mind or Spirit. The power⯑ful Cauſe, therefore, of my Ideas, is in ſtrict Propriety of Speech a Spirit.

And now, I warrant, you think you have made the Point very clear, little ſu⯑ſpecting, that what you advance leads direct⯑ly to a Contradiction. Is it not an Abſurdi⯑ty, to imagine any Imperfection in God?

Without doubt.

To ſuffer Pain, is an Imperfection.

It is.

Are we not ſometimes affected with Pain, and Uneaſineſs, by ſome other Be⯑ing?

We are.

And have you not ſaid, that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God?

I grant it.

But you have aſſerted, that whatever Ideas we perceive from without, are in the Mind which affects us. The Ideas, there⯑fore, of Pain and Uneaſineſs are in God; or, in other Words, God ſuffers Pain: That is to ſay, there is an Imperfection in the Di⯑vine Nature, which, you acknowleged, was abſurd. So you are caught in a plain Con⯑tradiction.

That God knows or underſtands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what Pain is, even every ſort of painful Senſation, and what it is for His Creatures to ſuffer Pain, I make no que⯑ſtion. But that God, tho' He knows, and ſometimes cauſes painful Senſations in us, can Himſelf ſuffer Pain, I poſitively deny. We, who are limited and dependent Spirits, are liable to Impreſſions of Senſe, the Effects of an external Agent, which, being produced againſt our Wills, are ſometimes painful and uneaſy. But God, whom no external Being can affect, who perceives nothing by Senſe as we do, whoſe Will is abſolute, and inde⯑pendent, cauſing all things, and liable to be thwarted, or reſiſted by nothing; it is evi⯑dent, ſuch a Being as this, can ſuffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful Senſation, or, indeed, any Senſation at all. We are chained to a Body, that is to ſay, our Per⯑ceptions are connected with corporeal Mo⯑tions. [125] By the Law of our Nature, we are affected upon every Alteration in the nervous Parts of our ſenſible Body: Which ſenſible Body, rightly conſidered, is nothing but a Complexion of ſuch Qualities, or Ideas, as have no Exiſtence diſtinct from being percei⯑ved by a Mind: So that this Connexion of Senſations with corporeal Motions, means no more, than a Correſpondence in the Or⯑der of Nature, between two Setts of Ideas, or Things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure Spirit, diſengaged from all ſuch Sympathy, or natural Ties. No corpo⯑real Motions are attended with the Senſati⯑ons of Pain, or Pleaſure, in his Mind. To know every thing knowable, is certainly a Perfection; but to endure, or ſuffer, or feel any thing by Senſe, is an Imperfection. The former, I ſay, agrees to God, but not the lat⯑ter. God knows, or hath Ideas; but His Ideas are not convey'd to Him by Senſe, as ours are. Your not Diſtinguiſhing, where there is ſo manifeſt a Difference, makes you fancy, you ſee an Abſurdity where there is none.

But, all this while, you have not con⯑ſidered, that the Quantity of Matter has been demonſtrated to be proportional to the Gra⯑vity of Bodies. And, what can withſtand Demonſtration?

Let me ſee how you demonſtrate that Point.

I lay it down for a Principle, that the Moments, or Quantities of Motion in Bo⯑dies, are in a direct, compounded Reaſon, of the Velocities and Quantities of Matter con⯑tained in them. Hence, where the Velocities are equal, it follows, the Moments are di⯑rectly, as the Quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by Experience, that all Bo⯑dies (bating the ſmall Inequalities, ariſing from the Reſiſtance of the Air) deſcend with an equal Velocity; the Motion, therefore, of deſcending Bodies, and, conſequently, their Gravity, which is the Cauſe or Principle of that Motion, is proportional to the Quan⯑tity of Matter, which was to be demonſtra⯑ted.

You lay it down as a ſelf-evident Principle, that the Quantity of Motion in any Body, is proportional to the Velocity and Matter, taken together: And this is made uſe of to prove a Propoſition, from whence the Exiſtence of Matter is inferred. Pray, is not this arguing in a Circle?

In the Premiſe, I only mean, that the Motion is proportional to the Velocity, joint⯑ly with the Extenſion and Solidity.

But allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow, that Gravity is pro⯑portional to Matter, in your Philoſophic Senſe [127] of the Word; except you take it for granted, that unknown Subſtratum, or whatever elſe you call it, is proportional to thoſe ſenſible Quali⯑ties; which to ſuppoſe, is plainly begging the Queſtion. That there is Magnitude and Soli⯑dity, or Reſiſtance, perceived by Senſe, I readi⯑ly grant; as likewiſe that Gravity may be pro⯑portional to thoſe Qualities, I will not diſpute. But that either theſe Qualities, as perceived by us, or the Powers producing them, do exiſt in a material Subſtratum; this is what I deny, and you, indeed, affirm, but, not⯑withſtanding your Demonſtration, have not yet proved.

I ſhall inſiſt no longer on that Point. Do you think, however, you ſhall perſuade me the natural Philoſophers have been dream⯑ing all this while; pray, what becomes of all their Hypotheſes and Explications of the Phae⯑nomena, which ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of Mat⯑ter?

What mean you, Hylas, by the Phae⯑nomena?

I mean the Appearances which I per⯑ceive by my Senſes.

And the Appearances perceived by Senſe, are they not Ideas?

I have told you ſo a hundred times.

Therefore, to explain the Phaenomena, is to ſhew how we come to be affected with Ideas, in that Manner and Series, wherein [128] they are imprinted on our Senſes. Is it not?

It is.

Now if you can prove, that any Phi⯑loſopher has explained the Production of any one Idea in our Minds, by the Help of Mat⯑ter, I ſhall for ever acquieſce and look on all that has been ſaid againſt it as nothing: But if you cannot, it is in vain to urge the Expli⯑cation of Phaenomena. That a Being endow⯑ed with Knowlege and Will, ſhou'd produce or exhibit Ideas, is eaſily underſtood. But that a Being which is utterly deſtitute of theſe Faculties ſhou'd be able to produce Ideas, or in any Sort to affect an Intelligence, this I can never underſtand. This, I ſay, tho we had ſome poſitive Conception of Matter, tho we knew its Qualities, and cou'd compre⯑hend its Exiſtence, wou'd yet be ſo far from explaining Things, that it is itſelf the moſt inexplicable thing in the World. And, for all this, it will not follow, that Philoſophers have been doing nothing neither; for, by obſerving and reaſoning upon the Connexion of Ideas, they diſcover the Laws and Methods of Na⯑ture, which is a part of Knowlege both uſeful and entertaining.

After all, can it be ſuppoſed God wou'd deceive all Mankind; do you ima⯑gine, He wou'd have induced the whole World to believe the Being of Matter, if there was no ſuch thing?

That every epidemical Opinion ariſing from Prejudice, or Paſſion, or Thoughtleſneſs, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe, you will not affirm. Whatſoever Opi⯑nion we father on Him, it muſt be, either be⯑cauſe He has diſcovered it to us by ſuperna⯑tural Revelation, or, becauſe it is ſo evident to our natural Faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impoſſible we ſhou'd with-hold our Aſſent from it. But, where is the Revelation? or, where is the Evidence that extorts the Belief of Matter? Nay, How does it appear, that Matter, taken for ſomething diſtinct from what we perceive by our Senſes, is thought to exiſt by all Man⯑kind, or, indeed, by any, except a few Phi⯑loſophers, who do not know what they wou'd be at? Your Queſtion ſuppoſes, theſe Points are clear; and when you have cleared them, I ſhall think myſelf obliged to give you ano⯑ther Anſwer. In the mean time, let it ſuf⯑fice that I tell you, I do not ſuppoſe God has deceived Mankind at all.

But the Novelty, Philonous, the No⯑velty! There lies the Danger. New No⯑tions ſhou'd always be diſcountenanced; they unſettle Mens Minds, and no body knows where they will end.

Why the Rejecting a Notion that has no Foundation, either in Senſe, in Reaſon, or in Divine Authority, ſhou'd be thought to unſettle [130] the Belief of ſuch Opinions as are grounded on all or any of theſe, I cannot imagine. That Innovations in Government and Religion, are dangerous, and ought to be diſcountenanced, I freely own. But, is there the like Reaſon why they ſhou'd be diſcouraged in Philoſo⯑phy? The making any thing known which was unknown before, is an Innovation in Knowledge: And, if all ſuch Innovations had been forbidden, Men wou'd have made a no⯑table Progreſs in the Arts and Sciences. But, it is none of my buſineſs to plead for Novel⯑ties and Paradoxes. That the Qualities we perceive, are not on the Objects: That we muſt not believe our Senſes: That we know nothing of the real Nature of Things, and can never be aſſured even of their Exiſtence: That real Colours and Sounds, are nothing but certain unknown Figures and Motions: That Motions are, in themſelves, neither ſwift nor ſlow: That there are in Bodies, abſolute Extenſions, without any particular Magnitude or Figure: That a Thing ſtupid, thoughtleſs, and inactive, operates on a Spi⯑rit: That the leaſt Particle of a Body, con⯑tains innumerable extended Parts. Theſe are the Novelties, theſe are the ſtrange Notions which ſhock the genuine, uncorrupted Judg⯑ment of all Mankind; and, being once ad⯑mitted, embarraſs the Mind with endleſs Doubts and Difficulties. And, it is againſt [131] theſe, and the like Innovations, I endeavor to vindicate common Senſe. It is true, in doing this, I may, perhaps, be obliged to uſe ſome Ambages, and Ways of Speech not com⯑mon. But, if my Notions are once thorow⯑ly underſtood, that which is moſt ſingular in them, will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this: That it is abſolutely im⯑poſſible, and a plain Contradiction to ſuppoſe, any unthinking Being ſhou'd exiſt, without being perceived by a Mind. And if this No⯑tion be ſingular, it is a ſhame it ſhou'd be ſo at this time of day, and in a Chriſtian Coun⯑try.

As for the Difficulties other Opinions may be liable to, thoſe are out of the Que⯑ſtion. It is your Buſineſs to defend your own Opinion. Can any thing be plainer, than that you are for changing all things into Ideas? You, I ſay, who are not aſhamed to charge me with Scepticiſm. This is ſo plain, there is no denying it.

You miſtake me. I am not for chan⯑ging Things into Ideas, but rather Ideas into Things; ſince thoſe immediate Objects of Perception, which, according to you, are only Appearances of Things, I take to be the real Things themſelves.

Things! you may pretend what you pleaſe; but it is certain, you leave us nothing [132] but the empty Forms of Things, the Outſide only, which ſtrikes the Senſes.

What you call the empty Forms and Outſide of Things, ſeem to me, the very Things themſelves. Nor are they empty or incomplete otherwiſe, than upon your Sup⯑poſition, that Matter is an eſſential Part of all corporeal Things. We both, therefore, a⯑gree in this, that we perceive only ſenſible Forms: But herein we differ, you will have them to be empty Appearances, I real Be⯑ings. In ſhort, you do not truſt your Sen⯑ſes, I do.

You ſay, you believe your Senſes; and ſeem to applaud youſelf, that in this you agree with the Vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true Nature of a Thing is diſcovered by the Senſes. If ſo, whence comes that Diſagreement? Why is not the ſame Figure, and other ſenſible Qualities, percei⯑ved all manner of Ways? and, why ſhou'd we uſe a Microſcope, the better to diſcover the true Nature of a Body, if it were diſco⯑verable to the naked Eye?

Strictly ſpeaking, Hylas, we do not ſee the ſame Object that we feel; neither is the ſame Object perceived by the Micro⯑ſcope, which was by the naked Eye. But, in caſe every Variation was thought ſufficient to conſtitute a new Kind or Individual, the endleſs Number or Confuſion of Names wou'd render Language impracticable. Therefore, [133] to avoid this, as well as other Inconvenien⯑cies, which are obvious upon a little Thought, Men combine together ſeveral Ideas, appre⯑hended by divers Senſes, or by the ſame Senſe at different Times, or in different Cir⯑cumſtances, but obſerved, however, to have ſome Connexion in Nature, either with re⯑ſpect to Coexiſtence or Succeſſion; all which they refer to one Name, and conſider as one Thing. Hence it follows, that when I exa⯑mine by my other Senſes a Thing I have ſeen, it is not, in order to underſtand better the ſame Object which I had perceived by Sight, the Object of one Senſe not being per⯑ceived by the other Senſes. And, when I look thro a Microſcope, it is not that I may per⯑ceive more clearly, what I perceived already with my bare Eyes, the Object perceived by the Glaſs being quite different from the for⯑mer. But in both caſes, my Aim is only to know, what Ideas are connected together; and the more a Man knows of the Connexion of Ideas, the more he is ſaid to know of the Nature of Things. What, therefore, if our Ideas are variable; what if our Senſes are not in all Circumſtances affected with the ſame Appearances? It will not thence fol⯑low, they are not to be truſted, or, that they are inconſiſtent either with themſelves, or any thing elſe, except it be with your preconceived Notion of (I know not what) one ſingle, un⯑changed, unperceivable, real Nature, marked [134] by each Name: Which Prejudice ſeems to have taken its Riſe, from not rightly under⯑ſtanding the common Language of Men, ſpeak⯑ing of ſeveral diſtinct Ideas, as united in⯑to one thing by the Mind. And, indeed, there is Cauſe to ſuſpect, ſeveral erroneous Conceits of the Philoſophers are owing to the ſame Original: While they began to build their Schemes, not ſo much on Notions as Words, which were framed by the Vulgar, meerly for Conveniency and Diſpatch in the common Actions of Life, without any regard to Speculation.

Methinks, I apprehend your Mean⯑ing.

It is your Opinion, the Ideas we per⯑ceive by our Senſes, are not real Things, but Images, or Copies of them. Our Knowlege, therefore, is no farther real, than as our Ideas are the true Repreſentations of thoſe Origi⯑nals. But, as theſe ſuppoſed Originals are in themſelves unknown, it is impoſſible to know how far our Ideas reſemble them; or, whether they reſemble them at all. We can⯑not, therefore, be ſure we have any real Knowlege. Farther, as our Ideas are perpe⯑tually varied, without any Change in the ſup⯑poſed real Things, it neceſſarily follows, they cannot all be true Copies of them: Or, if ſome are, and others are not, it is impoſſible to diſtinguiſh the former from the latter. [135] And, this plunges us yet deeper in Uncer⯑tainty. Again, when we conſider the Point, we cannot conceive how any Idea, or any thing like an Idea, ſhou'd have an abſolute Exiſtence out of a Mind: Nor, conſequent⯑ly, according to you, how there ſhou'd be any real Thing in Nature. The Reſult of all which is, that we are thrown into the moſt hopeleſs and abandoned Scepticiſm. Now give me leave to ask you, Firſt, Whether your referring Ideas to certain abſolutely exiſting, unperceived Subſtances, as their Originals, be not the Source of all this Scepticiſm? Se⯑condly, Whether you are informed, either by Senſe or Reaſon, of the Exiſtence of thoſe un⯑known Originals? And in caſe you are not, Whether it be not abſurd to ſuppoſe them? Thirdly, Whether, upon Inquiry, you find there is any thing diſtinctly conceived or meant by the abſolute or external Exiſtence of unperceiving Subſtances? Laſtly, Whether the Premiſes conſidered, it be not the wiſeſt way to follow Nature, truſt your Senſes, and, laying aſide all anxious Thought about unknown Natures or Subſtances, admit, with the Vulgar, thoſe for real Things which are perceived by the Senſes?

For the preſent, I have no Inclination to the Anſwering Part. I wou'd much ra⯑ther ſee how you can get over what follows. Pray, are not the Objects perceived by the [136] Senſes of one, likewiſe perceivable to all o⯑thers preſent? If there were an hundred more here, they wou'd all ſee the Garden, the Trees, and Flowers, as I ſee them. But they are not in the ſame manner affected with the Ideas I frame in my Imagination. Does not this make a Difference, between the for⯑mer ſort of Objects and the latter?

I grant, it does. Nor have I ever denied a Difference between the Objects of Senſe and thoſe of Imagination. But, what wou'd you infer from thence? You cannot ſay, that ſenſible Objects exiſt unperceived, becauſe they are perceived by many.

I own, I can make nothing of that Objection: But, it has led me into another. Is it not your Opinion, that by our Senſes we perceive only the Ideas exiſting in our Minds?

It is.

But the ſame Idea which is in my Mind, cannot be in yours, or in any other Mind. Doth it not, therefore, follow from your Principles, that no Two can ſee the ſame thing? And, is not this highly ab⯑ſurd?

If the Term ſame be taken in the vulgar Acceptation, it is certain, (and not at all repugnant to the Principles I maintain) that different Perſons may perceive the ſame Thing; or, the ſame Thing or Idea exiſt in [137] different Minds. Words are of arbitrary Im⯑poſition; and ſince Men are uſed to apply the Word ſame where no Diſtinct on or Va⯑riety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their Perceptions; it follows, that as Men have ſaid before, ſeveral ſaw the ſame thing, ſo they may, upon like Occaſions, ſtill continue to uſe the ſame Phraſe, without any Deviation either from Propriety of Language, or the Truth of Things. But, if the Term ſame be uſed in the Acceptation of Philoſo⯑phers, who pretend to an abſtracted Notion of Identity, then, according to their ſundry Definitions of this Notion, (for it is not yet agreed, wherein that Philoſophic Identity conſiſts) it may, or may not, be poſſible for divers Perſons to perceive the ſame thing. But, whether Philoſophers ſhall think fit to call a thing the ſame, or no, is, I conceive, of ſmall Importance. Let us ſuppoſe ſeveral Men together, all endued with the ſame Fa⯑culties, and, conſequently, affected, in like ſort, by their Senſes, and who had yet ne⯑ver known the Uſe of Language; they wou'd, without queſtion, agree in their Perceptions. Tho, perhaps, when they came to the Uſe of Speech, ſome, regarding the Uniformneſs of what was perceived, might call it the ſame thing: Others, eſpecially, regarding the Di⯑verſity of Perſons, who perceived, might chooſe the Denomination of different things. [138] But, who ſees not that all the Diſpute is about a Word? Viz. Whether what is per⯑ceived by different Perſons, may, yet, have the Term ſame applied to it: Or, ſuppoſe a Houſe, whoſe Walls or outward Shell remain⯑ing unaltered, the Chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you ſhou'd call this the ſame, and I ſhou'd ſay it was not the ſame Houſe, Wou'd we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our Thoughts of the Houſe, conſidered in itſelf? and, wou'd not all the Difference conſiſt in a Sound? If you ſhou'd ſay, We differed in our Notions; for that you ſuperadded to your Idea of the Houſe, the ſimple abſtracted Idea of Identity, whereas I did not; I wou'd tell you, I know not what you mean by that abſtracted Idea of Identity; and ſhou'd deſire you to look into your own Thoughts, and be ſure you underſtood yourſelf.—Why ſo ſilent, Hylas? Are you not yet ſatisfied, Men may diſpute about Identity and Diver⯑ſity, without any real Difference in their Thoughts and Opinions, abſtracted from Names? Take this farther Reflexion with you: That, whether Matter be allowed to exiſt, or no, the Caſe is exactly the ſame as to the Point in hand. For the Materialiſts themſelves acknowlege, what we immediate⯑ly perceive by our Senſes, to be our own Ideas. Your Difficulty, therefore, that no [139] two ſee the ſame thing, makes equally a⯑gainſt the Materialiſts and me.

Ay, Philonous, but they ſuppoſe an external Archetype, to which, referring their ſeveral Ideas, they may truly be ſaid to per⯑ceive the ſame thing.

And (not to mention your having diſcarded thoſe Archetypes) ſo may you ſup⯑poſe, an external Archetype on my Principles, external, I mean, to your own Mind; tho, indeed, it muſt be ſuppoſed to exiſt in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this ſerves all the Ends of Identity, as well as if it exiſted out of a Mind. And, I am ſure, you yourſelf will not ſay, It is leſs intelligible.

You have, indeed, clearly ſatisfied me, either, that there is no Difficulty at Bottom in this Point; or, if there be, that it makes equally againſt both Opinions.

But that which makes equally againſt two contradictory Opinions, can be a Proof againſt neither.

I acknowlege it. But after all, Phi⯑lonous, when I conſider the Subſtance of what you advance againſt Scepticiſm, it amounts to no more than this. We are ſure, that we really ſee, hear, feel; in a Word, that we are affected with ſenſible Impreſſions.

And, how are we concerned any far⯑ther? I ſee this Cherry, I feel it, I taſte it: [140] And, I am ſure, nothing cannot be ſeen, or felt, or taſted: It is therefore real. Take away the Senſations of Softneſs, Moiſture, Redneſs, Tartneſs, and you take away the Cherry. Since it is not a Being diſtinct from thoſe Senſations; a Cherry, I ſay, is nothing but a Congeries of ſenſible Impreſſions, or Ideas perceived by various Senſes: Which Ideas are united into one thing (or have one Name given them) by the Mind; becauſe they are obſerved to attend each other. Thus, when the Palate is affected with ſuch a parti⯑cular Taſte, the Sight is affected with a red Colour, the Touch with Roundneſs, Soft⯑neſs, &c. Hence, when I ſee, and feel, and taſte, in ſuch ſundry, certain Manners, I am ſure, the Cherry exiſts, or is real; its Reality being, in my Opinion, nothing abſtracted from thoſe Senſations. But if by the Word Cherry, you mean an unknown Nature, di⯑ſtinct from all thoſe ſenſible Qualities; and, by its Exiſtence, ſomething diſtinct from its being perceived: Then, indeed, I own, nei⯑ther you, nor I, nor any one elſe, can be ſure it exiſts.

But what wou'd you ſay, Philo⯑nous, if I ſhou'd bring the very ſame Rea⯑ſons againſt the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things in a Mind, which you have offered againſt their Exiſting in a material Subſtratum?

When I ſee your Reaſons, you ſhall hear what I have to ſay to them.

Is the Mind extended, or unexten⯑ded?

Unextended, without doubt.

Do you not ſay, the Things you per⯑ceive are in your Mind?

They are.

Again, have I not heard you ſpeak of ſenſible Impreſſions?

I believe you may.

Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is poſſible, there ſhou'd be room for all thoſe Trees and Houſes to exiſt in your Mind. Can extended Things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine Impreſſions made on a Thing void of all Solidity? You cannot ſay, Objects are in your Mind, as Books in your Study: Or, that Things are imprinted on it, as the Figure of a Seal upon Wax. In what Senſe, therefore, are we to underſtand thoſe Expreſſions? Ex⯑plain me this if you can: And I ſhall then be able to anſwer all thoſe Queries you for⯑merly put to me, about my Subſtratum.

Look you, Hylas, when I ſpeak of Objects, as exiſting in the Mind, or imprint⯑ed on the Senſes; I wou'd not be underſtood in the groſs, literal Senſe, as when Bodies are ſaid to exiſt in a place, or a Seal to make an Impreſſion upon Wax. My Meaning is [142] only, that the Mind comprehends, or per⯑ceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by ſome Being diſtinct from it⯑ſelf. This is my Explication of your Diffi⯑culty; and, how it can ſerve to make your Tenent of an unperceiving, material Subſtra⯑tum intelligible, I wou'd fain know.

Nay, if that be all, I confeſs, I do not ſee what Uſe can be made of it. But, are you not guilty of ſome Abuſe of Language in this?

None at all: It is no more than common Cuſtom, which, you know, is the Rule of Language, has authorized: Nothing being more uſual, than for Philoſophers to ſpeak of the immediate Objects of the Un⯑derſtanding, as Things exiſting in the Mind. Nor is there any thing in this, but what is conformable to the general Analogy of Lan⯑guage; moſt part of the mental Operations being ſignified by Words borrowed from ſen⯑ſible Things; as is plain, in the Terms Com⯑prehend, Reflect, Diſcourſe, &c. which, being applied to the Mind, muſt not be taken in their groſs, original Senſe.

You have, I own, ſatisfied me in this Point: But there ſtill remains one great Dif⯑ficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of ſuch Importance, that if you cou'd ſolve all others, without be⯑ing able to find a Solution for this, you muſt [143] never expect to make me a Proſelyte to your Principles.

Let me know this mighty Diffi⯑culty.

The Scripture Account of the Crea⯑tion, is, what appears to me, utterly irre⯑concilable with your Notions. Moſes tells us of a Creation: A Creation of what? of Ideas? No, certainly, but of Things, of real Things, ſolid, corporeal Subſtances. Bring your Principles to agree with this, and I ſhall the ſooner agree with you.

Moſes mentions the Sun, Moon, and Stars, Earth and Sea, Plants and Animals: That all theſe do really exiſt, and were, in the Beginning, created by God, I make no queſtion. If by Ideas, you mean Fictions, and Fancies of the Mind, then theſe are no Ideas. If by Ideas, you mean immediate Objects of the Underſtanding, or ſenſible Things, which cannot exiſt unperceived, or out of a Mind, then theſe Things are Ideas. But, whether you do, or do not call them Ideas, it matters little. The Difference is on⯑ly about a Name. And, whether that Name be retained or rejected, the Senſe, the Truth and Reality of Things, continues the ſame. In common Talk, the Objects of our Senſes are not termed Ideas, but Things. Call them ſo ſtill: Provided you do not attribute to them any abſolute, external Exiſtence, and [144] I ſhall never quarrel with you for a Word. The Creation, therefore, I allow to have been a Creation of Things, of Real Things. Nei⯑ther is this, in the leaſt, inconſiſtent with my Principles, as is evident from what I have now ſaid; and wou'd have been evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been ſo often ſaid before. But, as for ſolid, corporeal Subſtances, I deſire you to ſhew where Moſes makes any mention of them; and, if they ſhou'd be mentioned by him, or any other inſpired Writer, it wou'd ſtill be incumbent on you to ſhew, thoſe Words were not taken in the vulgar Accep⯑tation, for Things falling under our Senſes, but in the Philoſophic Acceptation, for Mat⯑ter, or an unknown Quiddity, with an abſo⯑lute Exiſtence. When you have proved theſe Points, then (and not till then) may you bring the Authority of Moſes into our Di⯑ſpute.

It is in vain to diſpute about a Point ſo clear. I am content to refer it to your own Conſcience. Are you not ſatisfied, there is ſome peculiar Repugnancy between the Mo⯑ſaic Account of the Creation, and your No⯑tions?

If all poſſible Senſe, which can be put on the Firſt Chapter of Geneſis, may be con⯑ceived as conſiſtently with my Principles as any other, then it has no peculiar Repugnan⯑cy [145] with them. But there is no Senſe you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, beſide Spirits, all you conceive are Ideas; and the Exiſtence of theſe I do not deny. Neither do you pretend, they exiſt without the Mind.

Pray, let me ſee any Senſe you can underſtand it in.

Why, I imagine, that, if I had been preſent at the Creation, I ſhould have ſeen Things produced into Being; that is, become perceptible, in the Order deſcribed by the Sa⯑cred Hiſtorian. I ever before believed the Moſaic Account of the Creation, and now find no Alteration in my Manner of believing it. When Things are ſaid to begin or end their Exiſtence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but His Creatures. All Ob⯑jects are eternally known by God, or, which is the ſame thing, have an eternal Exiſtence in his Mind: But, when Things, before un⯑perceptible to Creatures, are, by a Decree of God, made perceptible to them; then are they ſaid to begin a relative Exiſtence, with reſpect to created Minds. Upon reading, therefore, the Moſaic Account of the Crea⯑tion, I underſtand, that the ſeveral Parts of the World became gradually perceivable to finite Spirits, endowed with proper Faculties; ſo that, whoever ſuch were preſent, they were, in truth, perceived by them. This is the li⯑teral, [146] obvious Senſe ſuggeſted to me, by the Words of the Holy Scripture: In which is included, no Mention, or no Thought, either of Subſtratum, Inſtrument, Occaſion, or abſo⯑lute Exiſtence. And, upon Inquiry, I doubt not, it will be found, that moſt plain, honeſt Men, who believe the Creation, never think of thoſe things any more than I. What me⯑taphyſical Senſe you may underſtand it in, you only can tell.

But, Philonous, you do not ſeem to be aware, that you allow created Things, in the Beginning, only a relative, and, conſequent⯑ly, hypothetical, Being: That is to ſay, up⯑on Suppoſition, there were Men to perceive them, without which they have no Actuality of abſolute Exiſtence, wherein Creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impoſſible, the Creation of any inanimate Creatures ſhou'd precede that of Man? And, is not this directly contrary to the Moſaic Account?

In Anſwer to that, I ſay, Firſt, Crea⯑ted Beings might begin to exiſt, in the Mind of other created Intelligences, beſide Men. You will not, therefore, be able to prove any Contradiction between Moſes and my No⯑tions, unleſs you firſt ſhew, there was no other Order of finite created Spirits in Being, before Man. I ſay farther, in caſe we conceive the Creation, as we ſhou'd at [147] this time a Parcel of Plants or Vegetables of all ſorts, produced by an inviſible Power, in a Deſert where no body was preſent: That this Way of explaining or conceiving it, is conſiſtent with my Principles, ſince they deprive you of nothing, either ſenſible, or imaginable: That it exactly ſuits with the common, natu⯑ral, undebauched Notions of Mankind: That it manifeſts the Dependence of all Things on God; and, conſequently, has all the good Ef⯑fect or Influence, which it is poſſible that im⯑portant Article of our Faith ſhou'd have, in making Men humble, thankful, and reſigned to their great Creator. I ſay, moreover, that in this naked Conception of Things, diveſted of Words, there will not be found any No⯑tion of what you call the Actuality of abſo⯑lute Exiſtence. You may, indeed, raiſe a Duſt with thoſe Terms, and ſo lengthen our Di⯑ſpute to no purpoſe. But I intreat you calm⯑ly to look into your own Thoughts, and then tell me, if they are not an uſeleſs and unintel⯑ligible Jargon.

I own, I have no very clear Notion annexed to them. But, what ſay you to this? Do you not make the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things conſiſt in their being in a Mind? And, were not all Things eternally in the Mind of God? Did they not, therefore, exiſt from all Eternity, according to you? And, how cou'd that, which was Eternal, be crea⯑ted [148] in Time? Can any thing be clearer or better connected than this?

And, are not you too of Opinion, that God knew all Things from Eternity?

I am.

Conſequently, they always had a Be⯑ing in the Divine Intellect.

This I acknowlege.

By your own Confeſſion, therefore, nothing is New, or begins to be, in reſpect of the Mind of God. So we are agreed in that Point.

What ſhall we make then of the Crea⯑tion?

May we not underſtand it to have been intirely in reſpect of finite Spirits; ſo that Things, with regard to us, may proper⯑ly be ſaid to begin their Exiſtence, or be Created, when God decreed, they ſhou'd be⯑come perceptible to intelligent Creatures, in that Order and Manner which He then eſta⯑bliſh'd, and we now call the Laws of Na⯑ture? You may call this a relative, or hypo⯑thetical Exiſtence, if you pleaſe. But, ſo long as it ſupplies us with the moſt natural, ob⯑vious, and literal Senſe of the Moſaic Hiſto⯑ry of the Creation; ſo long as it anſwers all the religious Ends of that great Article; in a Word, ſo long as you can aſſign no other Senſe or Meaning in its ſtead; why ſhou'd we reject this? Is it to comply with a ri⯑diculous, [149] Sceptical Humor, of making every thing Nonſenſe and Unintelligible? I am ſure, you cannot ſay, it is for the Glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing poſſi⯑ble, and conceivable, that the corporeal World ſhou'd have an abſolute Subſiſtence, extrinſi⯑cal to the Mind of God, as well as to the Minds of all created Spirits: Yet, how cou'd this ſet forth either the Immenſity or Om⯑niſcience of the Deity, or the neceſſary and immediate Dependence of all things on Him? Nay, wou'd it not rather ſeem to derogate from thoſe Attributes?

Well, but as to this Decree of God's, for making Things perceptible: What ſay you, Philonous, is it not plain, God did either execute that Decree from all Eternity, or, at ſome certain time, began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only deſigned to will. If the former, then there cou'd be no Creation or Beginning of Exiſtence in finite Things. If the latter, then we muſt acknow⯑lege ſomething new to befall the Deity; which implies a ſort of Change: and all Change argues Imperfection.

Pray, conſider what you are doing. Is it not evident, this Objection concludes equally againſt a Creation in any Senſe; nay, againſt every other Act of the Deity, diſco⯑verable by the Light of Nature: None of which can we conceive, otherwiſe than as per⯑formed [150] in Time, and having a Beginning? God is a Being of tranſcendent and unlimited Perfections: His Nature, therefore, is incom⯑prehenſible to finite Spirits. It is not, there⯑fore, to be expected, that any Man, whether Materialiſt or Immaterialiſt, ſhou'd have ex⯑actly juſt Notions of the Deity, His Attri⯑butes, and Ways of Operation? If then you wou'd infer any thing againſt me, your Diffi⯑culty muſt not be drawn from the Inadequate⯑neſs of our Conceptions of the Divine Na⯑ture, which is unavoidable on any Scheme; but from the Denial of Matter, of which there is not one Word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

I muſt acknowlege, the Difficulties you are concerned to clear, are ſuch only as ariſe from the Non-exiſtence of Matter, and are peculiar to that Notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myſelf to think, there is no ſuch peculiar Re⯑pugnancy between the Creation and your Opinion; tho, indeed, where to fix it, I do not diſtinctly know.

What wou'd you have! do I not ac⯑knowlege a twofold State of Things? the one Ectypal or Natural, the other Archety⯑pal and Eternal. The former was created in Time; the latter exiſted from Everlaſting, in the Mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common Notions of Divines? or, is any more [151] than this neceſſary, in order to conceive the Creation? But you ſuſpect ſome peculiar Repugnancy, tho you know not where it lies. To take away all Poſſibility of Scruple in the caſe, do but conſider this one Point. Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any Hypotheſis whatſoever: And if ſo, there is no ground for Diſlike or Complaint againſt my particular Opinion, on that Score. Or, you are able to conceive it; and if ſo, why not on my Principles, ſince thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full Scope of Senſe, Imagination, and Reaſon. Whatever, there⯑fore, you cou'd before apprehend, either im⯑mediately or mediately, by your Senſes, or by Ratiocination from your Senſes; whatever you cou'd perceive, imagine, or underſtand, re⯑mains ſtill with you. If, therefore, the Notion you have of the Creation, by other Principles, be intelligible, you have it ſtill upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no Notion at all; and ſo there is no Loſs of it. And, indeed, it ſeems to me very plain, that the Suppoſition of Matter, i. e. a thing per⯑fectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot ſerve to make us conceive any thing. And, I hope, it need not be proved to you, that, if the Exiſtence of Matter does not make the Creation conceivable, the Creation's being [152] without it inconceivable, can be no Objection againſt its Non-Exiſtence.

I confeſs, Philonous, you have almoſt ſatisfied me in this Point of the Creation.

I wou'd fain know why you are not quite ſatisfied. You tell me, indeed, of a Re⯑pugnancy between the Moſaic Hiſtory and Immaterialiſm: But you know not where it lies. Is this reaſonable, Hylas? Can you expect I ſhou'd ſolve a Difficulty without knowing what it is. But, to paſs by all that, Wou'd not a Man think you were aſſured, there is no Repugnancy between the received Notions of Materialiſts and the inſpired Wri⯑tings?

And ſo I am.

Ought the Hiſtorical Part of Scripture to be underſtood in a plain, obvious Senſe, or in a Senſe which is metaphyſical, and out of the way?

In the plain Senſe, doubtleſs.

When Moſes ſpeaks of Herbs, Earth, Water, &c. as having been created by God; think you not, the ſenſible Things, common⯑ly ſignified by thoſe Words, are ſuggeſted to every unphiloſophical Reader?

I cannot help thinking ſo.

And are not all Ideas, or Things per⯑ceived by Senſe, to be denied a real Exiſtence by the Doctrine of the Materialiſts?

This I have already acknowleged.

The Creation, therefore, according to them, was not the Creation of Things ſen⯑ſible, which have only a relative Being, but of certain unknown Natures, which have an abſolute Being, wherein Creation might ter⯑minate.

True.

Is it not, therefore, evident, the Aſſer⯑ters of Matter deſtroy the plain, obvious Senſe of Moſes, with which their Notions are utter⯑ly inconſiſtent; and, inſtead of it, obtrude on us I know not what; ſomething equally unintelligible to themſelves, and me?

I cannot contradict you.

Moſes tells us of a Creation. A Crea⯑tion of what? of unknown Quiddities, of Occaſions, or Subſtratums? No, certainly; but of Things obvious to the Senſes. You muſt firſt reconcile this with your Notions, if you expect I ſhou'd be reconciled to them.

I ſee, you can aſſault me with my own Weapons.

Then, as to abſolute Exiſtence; was there ever known a more jejune Notion than that? Something it is, ſo abſtracted and unintelligible, that you have frankly owned, you cou'd not conceive it, much leſs, explain any thing by it. But allowing Matter to exiſt, and the Notion of abſolute Exiſtence to be as clear as Light; yet, was this ever known to make the Creation more credible? Nay, has [154] it not furniſhed the Atheiſts and Infidels of all Ages, with the moſt plauſible Argument a⯑gainſt a Creation? That a corporeal Sub⯑ſtance, which hath an abſolute Exiſtence, with⯑out the Minds of Spirits, ſhou'd be produced out of nothing, by the meer Will of a Spi⯑rit, has been looked upon as a thing ſo con⯑trary to all Reaſon, ſo impoſſible and abſurd, that not only the moſt celebrated among the Ancients, but even divers Modern and Chri⯑ſtian Philoſophers have thought Matter co⯑eternal with the Deity. Lay theſe things to⯑gether, and then judge you, whether Mate⯑rialiſm diſpoſes Men to believe the Creation of Things.

I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the Creation is the laſt Objection I can think of; and I muſt needs own, it has been ſufficiently anſwered as well as the reſt. No⯑thing now remains to be overcome, but a ſort of unaccountable Backwardneſs that I find in myſelf toward your Notions.

When a Man is ſwayed, he knows not why, to one Side of a Queſtion; Can this, think you, be any thing elſe, but the Ef⯑fect of Prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted Notions? And, indeed, in this reſpect, I cannot deny the Belief of Mat⯑ter to have very much the Advantage over the contrary Opinion, with Men of a learned Education.

I confeſs, it ſeems to be as you ſay.

As a Balance, therefore, to this Weight of Prejudice, let us throw into the Scale the great Advantages that ariſe from the Belief of Immaterialiſm, both in regard to Religion and Humane Learning. The Being of a God, and Incorruptibility of the Soul, thoſe great Articles of Religion, are they not pro⯑ved with the cleareſt and moſt immediate Evi⯑dence? When I ſay the Being of a God, I do not mean an obſcure, general Cauſe of Things, whereof we have no Conception, but God, in the ſtrict and proper Senſe of the Word. A Being, whoſe Spirituality, Omni⯑preſence, Providence, Omniſcience, Infinite Power and Goodneſs, are as conſpicuous, as the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things, of which (notwithſtanding the fallacious Pretences and affected Scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reaſon to doubt, than of our own Being. Then, with relation to Humane Sciences; in Natural Philoſophy, what Intricacies, what Obſcurities, what Contradictions, has the Be⯑lief of Matter led Men into! To ſay nothing of the numberleſs Diſputes about its Extent, Continuity, Homogeneity, Gravity, Diviſibi⯑lity, &c. do they not pretend to explain all things by Bodies operating on Bodies, accor⯑ding to the Laws of Motion? and, yet, are they able to comprehend, how any one Body ſhou'd move another? Nay, admitting there [156] was no Difficulty, in reconciling the Notion of an inert Being with a Cauſe; or in con⯑ceiving, how an Accident might paſs from one Body to another; yet, by all their ſtrain⯑ed Thoughts and extravagant Suppoſitions, have they been able to reach the mechanical Production of any one Animal or Vegetable Body? Can they account, by the Laws of Motion, for Sounds, Taſtes, Smells, or Co⯑lours, or for the regular Courſe of Things? In fine, have they accounted, by Phyſical Prin⯑ciples, for the Aptitude and Contrivance, even of the moſt inconſiderable Parts of the Uni⯑verſe? But, laying aſide Matter and corpo⯑real Cauſes, and admitting only the Efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the Effects of Nature eaſy and intelligible? If the Phae⯑nomena are nothing elſe but Ideas; God is a a Spirit, but Matter an unintelligent, unper⯑ceiving Being. If they demonſtrate an unli⯑mited Power in their Cauſe; God is Active and Omnipotent, but Matter an inert Maſs. If the Order, Regularity, and Uſefulneſs of them, can never be ſufficiently admired; God is infinitely Wiſe and Provident, but Matter deſtitute of all Contrivance and Deſign. Theſe, ſurely, are great Advantages in Phy⯑ſics. Not to mention, that the Apprehenſion of a diſtant Deity, naturally diſpoſes Men to a Negligence in their moral Actions, which they wou'd be more cautious of, in caſe they [157] thought Him immediately preſent, and acting on their Minds without the Interpoſition of Matter, or unthinking Second Cauſes. Then in Metaphyſics; what Difficulties concerning Entity in Abſtract, Subſtantial Forms, Hylar⯑chic Principles, Plaſtic Natures, Subjects and Adjuncts, Principles of Individuation, Poſſibility of Matter's thinking, Origine of Ideas, the Man⯑ner how two independent Subſtances, ſo wide⯑ly different as Spirit and Matter, ſhou'd mu⯑tually operate on each other? What Diffi⯑culties, I ſay, and endleſs Diſquiſitions con⯑cerning theſe, and innumerable other the like Points, do we eſcape, by ſuppoſing only Spi⯑rits and Ideas? Even the Mathematics them⯑ſelves, if we take away the abſolute Exiſtence of extended Things, become much more clear and eaſy; the moſt ſhocking Paradoxes and intricate Speculations, in thoſe Sciences, de⯑pending on the infinite Diviſibility of finite Extenſion, which depends on that Suppoſi⯑tion. But, what need is there to inſiſt on the particular Sciences: Is not that Oppoſition to all Science whatſoever, that Frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the ſame Foundation? Or, can you produce ſo much as one Argument againſt the Reality of cor⯑poreal Things, or in behalf of that avowed utter Ignorance of their Natures, which does not ſuppoſe their Reality to conſiſt in an ex⯑ternal, abſolute Exiſtence? Upon this Sup⯑poſition, [158] indeed, the Objections from the Change of Colours in a Pigeon's Neck, or the Appearances of a broken Oar in the Wa⯑ter, muſt be allowed to have Weight. But thoſe, and the like Objections, vaniſh, if we do not maintain the Being of abſolute, exter⯑ternal Originals, but place the Reality of Things in Ideas, fleeting, indeed, and change⯑able; however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed Order of Nature. For, herein conſiſts that Conſtancy and Truth of Things, which ſecures all the Concerns of Life, and diſtinguiſhes that which is real from the irregular Viſions of the Fancy.

I agree to all you have now ſaid, and muſt own, that nothing can incline me to em⯑brace your Opinion, more than the Advan⯑tages I ſee it is attended with. I am by Na⯑ture lazy; and this wou'd be a mighty A⯑bridgment in Knowlege. What Doubts, what Hypotheſes, what Labyrinths of Amuſement, what Fields of Diſputation, what an Ocean of falſe Learning, may be avoided by that ſingle Notion of Immaterialiſm?

After all, is there any thing farther remaining to be done? You may remember, you promiſed to embrace that Opinion, which, upon Examination, ſhou'd appear moſt agree⯑able to common Senſe, and remote from Sce⯑pticiſm. This, by your own Confeſſion, is that which denies Matter, or the abſolute [159] Exiſtence of corporeal Things. Nor is this all; The ſame Notion has been proved ſeve⯑ral Ways, viewed in different Lights, pur⯑ſued in its Conſequences, and all Objections againſt it cleared. Can there be a greater Evidence of its Truth? or, is it poſſible, it ſhou'd have all the Marks of a true Opinion, and yet be falſe?

I own myſelf intirely ſatisfied, for the preſent, in all reſpects. But what Security can I have, that I ſhall ſtill continue the ſame full Aſſent to your Opinion, and that no un⯑thought-of Objection or Difficulty will occur hereafter?

Pray, Hylas, do you in other Caſes, when a Point is once evidently proved, with⯑hold your Aſſent on account of Objections or Difficulties it may be liable to? Are the Difficulties that attend the Doctrine of incom⯑menſurable Quantities, of the Angle of Con⯑tact, of the Aſymptotes to Curves, or the like, ſufficient to make you hold out againſt Ma⯑thematical Demonſtration? Or, will you diſ⯑believe the Providence of God, becauſe there may be ſome particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are Difficulties attending Immaterialiſm, there are, at the ſame time, direct and evident Proofs for it. But, for the Exiſtence of Mat⯑ter, there is not one Proof, and far more nu⯑merous and inſurmountable Objections lie [160] againſt it. But, where are thoſe mighty Dif⯑ficulties you inſiſt on? Alas! you know not where, or what they are; ſomething which may poſſibly occur hereafter. If this be a ſufficient Pretence for withholding your full Aſſent, you ſhou'd never yield it to any Pro⯑poſition, how free ſoever from Exceptions, how clearly and ſolidly ſoever demonſtra⯑ted.

You have ſatisfied me, Philonous.

But, to arm you againſt all future Objections, do but conſider, That which bears equally hard on two contradictory Opinions, can be a Proof againſt neither. Whenever, therefore, any Difficulty occurs, try if you can find a Solution for it on the Hypotheſis of the Materialiſts. Be not deceived by Words; but ſound your own Thoughts. And, in caſe you cannot conceive it eaſier by the Help of Materialiſm, it is plain, it can be no Objection againſt Immaterialiſm. Had you proceeded all along by this Rule, you wou'd probably have ſpared yourſelf abun⯑dance of trouble in objecting; ſince, of all your Difficulties, I challenge you to ſhew one that is explained by Matter, nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that Suppoſition, and, conſequently, makes rather againſt than for it. You ſhou'd con⯑ſider, in each Particular, whether the Diffi⯑culty ariſes from the Non-exiſtence of Matter. [161] If it does not, you might as well argue from the infinite Diviſibility of Extenſion againſt the Divine Preſcience, as from ſuch a Diffi⯑culty againſt Immaterialiſm. And, yet, upon Recollection, I believe, you will find this to have been often, if not always, the Caſe. You ſhou'd, likewiſe, take heed not to ar⯑gue on a petitio Principii. One is apt to ſay, The unknown Subſtances ought to be eſteemed real Things, rather than the Ideas in our Minds: And, who can tell but the unthinking external Subſtance may concurr, as a Cauſe or Inſtrument in the Production of our Ideas? But is not this, proceeding on a Suppoſition that there are ſuch external Subſtances? And to ſuppoſe this, is it not Begging the Queſtion? But, above all things, you ſhou'd beware of impoſing on your⯑ſelf, by that vulgar Sophiſm which is cal⯑led Ignoratio Elenchi. You talked often, as if you thought I maintained the Non-exi⯑ſtence of ſenſible Things: Whereas, in truth, no one can be more thorowly aſſured of their Exiſtence than I am: And it is you who doubt; I ſhou'd have ſaid, poſitively deny it. Every thing that is ſeen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the Senſes, is, on the Principles I embrace, a real Being, but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for, is an unknown ſomewhat, (if, [162] indeed, it may be termed ſomewhat) which is quite ſtripped of all ſenſible Qualities, and can neither be perceived by Senſe, nor ap⯑prehended by the Mind. Remember, I ſay, that it is not any Object which is hard or ſoft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or ſquare, &c. For all theſe things, I affirm, do exiſt. Tho, indeed, I deny, they have an Exiſtence diſtinct from being perceived; or, that they exiſt out of all Minds whatſoever. Think on theſe Points; let them be attentively conſider⯑ed, and ſtill kept in view. Otherwiſe, you will not comprehend the State of the Queſtion; without which, your Objections will always be wide of the Mark, and, inſtead of mine, may poſſibly be directed (as more than once they have been) againſt your own No⯑tions.

I muſt needs own, Philonous, nothing ſeems to have kept me from agreeing with you, more than this ſame miſtaking the Que⯑ſtion. In denying Matter, at firſt glympſe, I am tempted to imagine, you deny the Things we ſee and feel; but, upon Reflexion, find there is no Ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the Name Matter, and applying it to ſenſible Things? This may be done without any Change in your Senti⯑ments: And, believe me, it wou'd be a Means of reconciling them to ſome Perſons, [163] who may be more ſhocked at an Innovation in Words, than in Opinion.

With all my Heart: Retain the Word Matter, and apply it to the Ob⯑jects of Senſe, if you pleaſe, provided you do not attribute to them any Subſi⯑ſtence diſtinct from their being perceived. I ſhall never quarrel with you for an Expreſ⯑ſion. Matter, or material Subſtance, are Terms introduced by Philoſophers; and, as uſed by them, imply a ſort of Independen⯑cy, or a Subſiſtence diſtinct from being per⯑ceived by a Mind: But, are never uſed by common People; or, if ever, it is to ſignify the immediate Objects of Senſe. One wou'd think, therefore, ſo long as the Names of all particular Things, with the Terms, ſenſible Subſtance, Body, Stuff, and the like, are re⯑tained, the Word Matter ſhou'd be never miſſed in common Talk. And, in Philo⯑ſophical Diſcourſes, it ſeems the beſt way to leave it quite out; ſince there is not, per⯑haps, any one thing that hath more favo⯑red and ſtrengthened the depraved Bent of the Mind toward Atheiſm, than the Uſe of that general confuſed Term.

Well, but, Philonous, ſince I am con⯑tent to give up the Notion of an unthink⯑ing Subſtance exterior to the Mind, I think you ought not to deny me the Privilege of [164] uſing the Word Matter as I pleaſe, and an⯑nexing it to a Collection of ſenſible Quali⯑ties ſubſiſting only in the Mind. I freely own, there is no other Subſtance, in a ſtrict Senſe, than Spirit. But I have been ſo long accuſtomed to the Term Matter, that I know not how to part with it. To ſay, There is no Matter in the World, is ſtill ſhocking to me. Whereas, to ſay, There is no Matter, if, by that Term be meant, an unthinking Subſtance exiſting without the Mind: But, if by Matter is meant ſome ſenſible Thing, whoſe Exiſtence conſiſts in being perceived, then there is Matter. This Diſtinction gives it quite another Turn: And Men will come into your Notions, with ſmall Difficulty, when they are propoſed in that manner. For, after all, the Controverſy about Matter, in the ſtrict Acceptation of it, lies altoge⯑ther between you and the Philoſophers; whoſe Principles, I acknowlege, are not near ſo natural, or ſo agreeable to the com⯑mon Senſe of Mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either de⯑ſire or ſhun, but as it makes, or is appre⯑hended to make, ſome Part of our Happi⯑neſs or Miſery. But what has Happineſs, or Miſery, Joy or Grief, Pleaſure or Pain, to do with abſolute Exiſtence, or with un⯑known Entities, abſtracted from all Relation [165] to us? It is evident, Things regard us only as they are pleaſing or diſpleaſing: And they can pleaſe or diſpleaſe, only ſo far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far, you leave things as you found them. Yet, ſtill there is ſomething new in this Doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the Philoſophers, nor yet altogether with the Vulgar. I wou'd know how the Caſe ſtands in that reſpect: Preciſely, what you have added to, or altered in my former Notions.

I do not pretend to be a Setter-up of New Notions. My Endeavors tend on⯑ly to unite, and place in a clearer Light, that Truth which was before ſhared between the Vulgar and the Philoſophers: The former being of Opinion, that thoſe Things they im⯑mediately perceive are the real Things; and the latter, that the Things immediately perceived, are Ideas which exiſt only in the Mind. Which Two Notions, put together, do, in effect, conſtitute the Subſtance of what I ad⯑vance.

I have been a long time diſtruſting my Senſes; methought I ſaw things by a dim Light, and thro falſe Glaſſes. Now, the Glaſſes are removed, and a new Light breaks in upon my Underſtanding. I am clearly convinced, that I ſee things in their [166] native Forms; and am no longer in Pain a⯑bout their unknown Natures, or abſolute Exiſtence. This is the State I find myſelf in at preſent: Tho, indeed, the Courſe that brought me to it, I do not yet thorowly com⯑prehend. You ſet out upon the ſame Prin⯑ciples, that Academics, Carteſians, and the like Sects, uſually do; and, for a long time, it looked as if you were advancing their Philo⯑ſophical Scepticiſm; but, in the End, your Concluſions are directly oppoſite to theirs.

You ſee, Hylas, the Water of yonder Fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round Column, to a certain Height; at which it breaks, and falls back into the Baſon, from whence it roſe: Its Aſcent, as well as De⯑ſcent, proceeding from the ſame uniform Law or Principle of Gravitation. Juſt ſo, the ſame Principles which, at firſt View, lead to Scepticiſm, purſued to a certain Point, bring Men back to common Senſe.