POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE TEST ACT, M.DCC.XC.

THE purpoſe of this tract is to ſhow the utility of a Teſt Act upon political principles; and to examine ſuch arguments which have been brought againſt it upon theſe grounds, as ſeem more particularly to deſerve conſideration.

Its nature and utility may be proved, by ſhowing

Firſtly. That the teſt act is a part of the Conſtitution, and that in the higher and ſtricter ſenſe of the term, and conſequently, that the Repeal of it will be a material change in the Conſtitution.

Secondly. That it appears from ſuch inſtances of hiſtory as are properly applicable to this ſubject, that when two Religions are ſuffered to exiſt in a free ſtate; it is expedient that the ſtronger of the two ſhould have the excluſive poſſeſſion of the executive powers of the government.

Thirdly. That the repeal of the teſt act would increaſe the power of the popular part of the conſtitution, beſide producing ſome other bad effects; and therefore, that its continuance is neceſſary to preſerve it in its preſent ſtate.

[4]Fourthly. What is to be laid down on theſe heads, will be concluded with ſome ſtrictures on ſuch political arguments brought in favour of the repeal, as ſeem to be moſt intitled to conſideration.

I. THE teſt act is firſt to be ſhown to be a part of the Conſtitution in the higher and ſtricter ſenſe of the term, from the nature of a Conſtitution conſidered in the abſtract; and in addition to this, the conſequences of its original inſtitution, and the benefits attending its ſubſequent extenſion, will be pointed out.

Every Nation, not under a deſpotic Sovereign, is governed by written or by traditional laws called cuſtoms. The laws are diviſible into two claſſes: the firſt of which relates to the governors, and the ſecond to the ſubject: thoſe relating to ſubjects are moral and poſitive, thoſe relating to the governors are called Conſtitutional. The laws therefore which preſcribe firſt who ſhall govern, and ſecondly in what mode, are conſti⯑tutional in the higheſt ſenſe of the term; or fundamental laws of the conſtitution.

The functions of every government not deſpotic, are divided into two great branches, the legiſlative and the executive: and it is determined by the fundamental principles of the conſtitution, to whom the exerciſe of both or either, ſhall be intruſted. And a change of theſe laws is a change of the fun⯑damentals of its conſtitution. As for example, thoſe which determine how the executive power ſhall be formed; which laws by their nature, muſt direct the mode of inveſting parti⯑cular perſons with that power; and define the qualifications of the perſons, capable of being ſo inveſted. And to contract or extend this deſcription, is to make a change in the funda⯑mental parts of the conſtitution. Theſe laws, in England, confide the whole of the executive powers of the ſtate to the Members of the eſtabliſhed Church: and the admiſſion of [5] proteſtant diſſenters to a ſhare in this power, is a change of the deſcription given above, and an alteration of one of the fundamental parts of the conſtitution. Therefore the Repeal of the teſt act would be a fundamental Change in the Con⯑ſtitution.

The benefits of the initial operation of this act, and thoſe accompanying its ſucceſſive extenſions, intitle it likewiſe to be conſidered as conſtitutional; or as an eſſential part of the conſtitution.

At its firſt inſtitution, it gave protection to the liberties and religion of the kingdom, againſt the violent meaſures of James the II. but it ſeems at firſt not to have gone far enough; it was therefore extended by the parliamentary Convention at the Revolution; who ‘in the ſettlement of the crown, included all the proteſtant poſterity of Charles I. except ſuch other iſſue as King James might at any time have,’ (Blackſtone, b. 1, c. 3,) beſide the princeſſes of Orange and Denmark. This limitation of the deſcent of the Crown to the proteſtant poſterity of Charles I. was an extenſion of the principle of the teſt act, preſcribing the Religion of the chief magiſtrate: and the declaration in which it was contained, by placing William upon the throne, gave ſtability to thoſe rights and liberties of the people, then, perhaps for the firſt time, clearly defined by laws.

Upon the proſpect of the failure of the proteſtant deſcen⯑dants of Charles I. thoſe of James I. were called to the ſucceſſion, and it was enacted, that upon the death of William and Anne without iſſue, the princeſs Sophia, or the heirs of her body, (being proteſtants) ſhould ſucceed to the throne: (Blackſtone, b. 1, c, 3.) At the ſame time, the principle of the teſt act was carried to its utmoſt extent; it being enacted, that whoever afterward ſhould come to the poſſeſſion of the crown, ſhould join in the communion of the Church of England as by law eſtabliſhed. By this law, the happy conſe⯑quences of the Revolution were perpetuated.

[6]But I ſhall add a further obſervation, on the nature and conſequences of teſt acts in general. Much more of the ani⯑moſity and ſeverity of religious parties againſt each other, proceeds from mutual fear, than the deſire of mutual oppo⯑ſition: hence the moſt numerous religious party, with the whole executive power in its poſſeſſion, has little to fear, and becomes tolerating. But if it only ſhares that power with its opponents, its anxiety for its own ſafety and dread of their enterpriſes, embitters its ſpirit againſt them; and the idea of ſelf-preſervation, makes it wiſh to reduce or to annihilate this oppoſition. A great eſtabliſhed church, fortified by a teſt act,^* as a legal barrier, confident of its own ſtrength and ſafety, can extend a legal toleration to all ſectaries: and it is highly probable, if the teſt and corporation acts had not exiſted; that the toleration act and its ſubſequent improvements, would not now have occupied a page in our ſtatute books; nor the ſucceſsful example of this kingdom, taught Europe in general, that the rigour of religious perſecution might be with ſafety remitted. Such appear to have been the ultimate conſe⯑quences of theſe laws, whoſe firſt effects clapped manacles upon the hand of a tyrant, raiſed to ſubvert the civil and reli⯑gious liberties of his country: whoſe firſt extenſion delivered [7] the ſtate from anarchy; and removed to a diſtance the return of the evils we had juſt eſcaped: and whoſe principles, when carried to their ultimate perfection, perpetuated thoſe liber⯑ties and that excellent ſyſtem of government, which coſt our anceſtors nearly a century of diſcord, civil wars, and revo⯑lutions to acquire. From its effects therefore, it appears that the principle of a teſt act is conſtitutional.

Part 2. Although it be admitted that the conſtitution of this kingdom has been varied at different times; many of which variations have been improvements: yet the experi⯑ment of one hundred years, of freedom, proſperity, and com⯑parative domeſtic quiet, renders it abſolutely incumbent upon the advocates for the repeal of the teſt act, to give the cleareſt evidence of the advantages to the ſtate which would follow it.

In matters of ſuch general intereſt, the arguments drawn from experience, are juſtly to be eſteemed as the moſt deciſive; and the hiſtories of different nations are to be regarded as regiſters of experiments; from which the great maxims of policy, on ſuch occaſions, are beſt deduced. This mode of reaſoning in political inquiries, poſſeſſes the ſame advantages over all others, which attends the method of experiment and induction in philoſophy: which has enabled it, in little more than a century, to make a much greater progreſs than in all the ages antecedently elapſed. And it is from its conſtant application alone, that the ſcience of legiſlation and govern⯑ment, can receive that ultimate perfection of which it is capable. Accordingly, the examples of many modern ſtates have been alledged to ſhow, that no ill conſequence in fact reſults to ſociety, from intruſting the executive powers of goverment, indiſcriminately, to the different religious ſects it may at any one time contain.

Of theſe examples, ſuch as are applicable, clearly point out a neceſſity that the ſtate ſhould eſtabliſh the religion of the [8] majority, as a national Church, and confide the executive power excluſively to its members: which is the ſecond point propoſed to be ſhown.

Here it will be of uſe to lay down ſome marks, to diſcri⯑minate thoſe hiſtorical examples which are applicable to the ſubject, from thoſe of the oppoſite deſcription.

No concluſions can be drawn againſt the expediency of a teſt act, from the hiſtory of a nation divided into two religious parties, in which the government is arbitrary. Deſpotic power is always at hand to repreſs the turbulence of either; and the efforts of each ſect to diſturb the tranquillity of the ſtate, are debilitated by the external force which depreſſes both. Nor do the tranſactions of thoſe countries, which are much below the reſt of Europe in civilization and improve⯑ment of every kind, furniſh inſtances which can be properly made uſe of, on either ſide of the queſtion. Thoſe nations are likewiſe to be excluded, which do not poſſeſs both the exe⯑cutive and legiſlative power within their own limits: for ſuch a nation differs very much in its political ſituation from a Soverign ſtate; and a teſt act may operate very differently therein. Thoſe ſtates therefore whoſe hiſtories are applicable to the ſubject muſt be free, ſovereign, and enlightened. I ſhall therefore begin with the examination of the hiſtory of thoſe independent Nations which derive their origin from this Iſland.

It is aſſerted by the advocates of the repeal of the teſt act, that the ſtates where no ſuch law takes place, are not expoſed to frequent revolutiens of government by the conteſts of reli⯑gious parties: and the united States of America, who have not adopted a teſt law, are alleged by them as an example, that there is no neceſſity for the impoſition of religious teſts.

To this it may be anſwered, that the inſtance is inappli⯑cable, though not coming under the general deſcriptions given above, becauſe no reaſon for or againſt ſuch a law, can be [9] brought from the hiſtory of a ſtate, during any period in which it has been ſubject to revolutions, the cauſes of which were not religious diſputes. For the advocates for the repeal cannot ſay that the conſtitution of ſuch a ſtate remained unchanged, although the religion of the majority was not eſtabliſhed and guarded by a teſt: nor can it be ſaid in favour of ſuch a law, that theſe revolutions were occaſioned by the want of it. It can only be ſaid, that religious diſputes may ſleep, during the time that other great objects take poſſeſſion of the attention of every ſect. That the American States have neither an eſtabliſhed church nor a teſt act, is a circum⯑ſtance which ſeems therefore to give little ſupport to the arguments on either ſide: when they emancipated themſelves from this country, they erected a new conſtitution: upon a ſhort experience it was found not to be a good one; and they ſet about forming a ſecond, very ſoon after the concluſion of the peace; which is not yet perfectly ſettled. The period of their hiſtory, which has been ſuppoſed to be applicable to the ſubject, muſt certainly commence at the period when they became effectively an independent nation; and a great part of it has been taken up by the changes in their conſtitution. And if it had been otherwiſe, it has not extended to a length, in which it might be expected that the ſpirit of religious diſſention would have ariſen to that height, which produces great effects.

In the earlier periods of their ſubordination to Great Britain, her power was requiſite to keep the different ſects from perſe⯑cuting each other; and as different religious opinions were embraced by different colonies, the bittereſt animoſities ſub⯑ſiſted between them: which were kept from breaking out into action, by the ſame power. This ſpirit, though thus re⯑ſtrained, was not annihilated during that whole period; and it was not the leaſt ſingular event of the beginning of the laſt war, that the terror of foreign arms, and a foreign enemy in [10] poſſeſſion of the moſt important poſt of their country, was able to induce them to a peace.

The caſe of Ireland is brought forward by the moſt eloquent of the parliamentary advocates of the repeal; whoſe argu⯑ments hold forth profeſſions of the ſtrongeſt attachment to our civil and eccleſiaſtical conſtitution, as a concluſive argument in its favour. It is therefore neceſſary to take an hiſtorical review of the tranſactions of that kingdom in regard to the teſt act, its church eſtabliſhment, and civil conſtitution, from the laſt rebellion in Scotland to the preſent time.

With the penalties of the teſt act hanging over their heads, the diſſenters in Ireland at that time took up arms, to be in readineſs to aſſiſt in repreſſing any inſurrection which might be attempted there. This meaſure the ſuperiority of ſtrength of the Catholic party in that kingdom rendered as neceſſary as patriotical; for a great part of their eſtates conſiſted of lands which had been forfeited by the anceſtors of thoſe Catholics,^† for their repeated rebellions: and it might be very well expected that they would embrace the favourable opportunity of a formidable rebellion exiſting in Great Bri⯑tain, then engaged in an unſucceſsful foreign war, to take arms to regain the free exerciſe of their religion, and the poſſeſſion of the lands of their anceſtors.

When this danger was happily overcome, it was voted, ‘that any perſon whatever, who ſhould bring an action againſt a diſſenter under the teſt act, ſhould be deemed an enemy to this country and a Jacobite.’ As this does not run in the technical language of legiſlation, it is moſt probable [11] that it was what it is called above, a vote of one or both houſes: it is ſaid however, in the public paper from which it is copied, to have been ſo "enacted," or paſſed into a law: but this, the bare inſpection of the matter it contains, proves to be impoſſible; it admits the teſt act ſtill to have legal exiſtence, but fulminates the ſevereſt cenſures againſt thoſe who ſhould put it in force; generally; that is, at that time, or any future period. It includes therefore a tacit con⯑feſſion, that it is not an act of the whole legiſlature; whoſe declarations run, ‘we grant indemnity for the paſt, and we repeal for the future.’ It therefore was a vote, and not part of a law. And the reaſon of its appearing in this ſhape was, that if reduced into a law, the parties thought it muſt be negatived in England; but that in its preſent ſhape, it would be full as effective.

It appears to have been neceſſary to ſhow, that after this declaration againſt the principles of the teſt act, the Iriſh parliament, in no ſubſequent point of time, had attacked the eſtabliſhment of the church of Ireland; of which, the revenues appointed for the ſupport of the clergy form a material part. But the contrary is true.

It is very well known, that a great part of the tithes of that kingdom, ariſe from Kine, and grazing Beaſts; Iriſh Beef, and Butter, being among its ſtaple commodities. Mr. A. Young's tour in Ireland was publiſhed in 1780; he began it in the year 1776: and he informs us, that the Iriſh houſe of Com⯑mons, ſome years previous to his writing, paſſed a vote, ‘declaring every lawyer an enemy to his country, who in any way whatever, was concerned in any caſe of tithe for fat bullocks and cows.’ ‘And that without this becoming a law, it was ſo completely obeyed, that it has regulated the buſineſs ever ſince.’ (v. 2, p. 186, 187.) The effect of that regulation appears in the preceding page, where he gives the average value of the tithe, of all the greater arti⯑cles [12] produced by the Iriſh farmer, as paid in that kingdom. It contains no charge of cows, calves, or fatted bullocks. But as it includes the value of the tithe of Sheep, if in his tour he had found inſtances of ſuch payments, the average of them would have been inſerted in his general account: the produc⯑tions of the paſture lands of Ireland, being ſo much more con⯑ſiderable, in proportion to the arable, than that of any other nation; the eſtabliſhed church was thus deprived of a very con⯑ſiderable part of its revenue. There are ſome concluſions, which may be drawn from theſe two meaſures of the Iriſh Parliament.

The firſt is a pointed declaration againſt the teſt act in Ireland, though not an actual repeal of it: it was followed at a certain interval of time, by a vote which effectively ſtripped the clergy of a conſiderable part of their revenues: and it may be taken as a proof, deduced from experience, that when a party in a public aſſembly, has influence enough to weaken the ſupport a teſt act gives to an eſtabliſhed church; one conſtituent part of it, its revenues, are in danger.

It has been remarked above, that the firſt of theſe decla⯑rations is not in the ſtyle of an act of Parliament: and there is ſo great a ſimilitude in the expreſſion of both, that they are to be taken as acts of the ſame nature.

Each of theſe declarations was an attempt of the Commons alone, to aſſume ſovereign legiſlative power: it was the pub⯑lication of one of its own ordinances, to controul or ſuperſede the law of the land; the machine employed by the long Par⯑liament to overturn the ſtate; after the conceſſions of the unfortunate Charles had peaceably eſtabliſhed the national liberty, or the little more then wanted to its perfection might have been eaſily obtained.

Both of them likewiſe cloſely follow the ſpirit and form of thoſe acts of that uſurping and tyrannical democracy. For whereas theſe included ſeveral claſſes of men, under the unde⯑fined criminal titles of malignants and delinquents; in the [13] ordinances of the Iriſh houſe of Commons, they are deſcribed in terms rather more ſevere, as enemies to their country. Thus far the matter and nature of theſe two declarations, common to both, have been conſidered: but the compariſon of that, againſt the revenues of the eſtabliſhed church and the edicts of the long Parliament, preſents us with ſome further and material points of diſcuſſion. This ſingular difference is to be obſerved between them, the cenſures of the Engliſh republicans were directed againſt thoſe who either had, or were ſuppoſed to have ſtretched their delegated powers to a criminal extent; and againſt their abettors: but the Iriſh ordinance effectively deprived a claſs of men of their pro⯑perty, to which, as it appears by the very terms of it, they had not forfeited their right, by any criminality, or ſuſpicion of criminality. As far as the effect of this order extended, and the obedience to it was complete, the clergy of Ireland were outlawed, ipſo facto, by the houſe of Commons. This fact fortifies an old obſervation with one inſtance more: that there is a great ſimilitude in the conduct of all invaders of the rights and privileges of the ſubject, whether they be indi⯑viduals or public bodies. The end of law is to protect rights and puniſh wrongs. James, in his attempt to degrade him⯑ſelf from a ſovereign to a tyrant, began by the ſuſpenſion of laws; but theſe were penal laws: the ſuſpenſion of laws, protecting the property of a claſs of men, by one branch of the legiſlature, is a much more grievous exertion of uſurped and unconſtitutional power; the illegality which reſcues indi⯑viduals or bodies of men from puniſhment, being generally looked upon in a leſs atrocious light, than that which diveſts them of their rights and properties.

It was further ſtated, in the debate on the teſt act, that it was formally repealed in Ireland about eleven years ago, which, as may be gathered from the paſſage quoted from Mr. Young, was ſome years after this vote of the Iriſh houſe of [14] Commons; but when it was upon that occaſion added, that the Church is in a flouriſhing ſtate in that kingdom, as the fact given above demonſtrates the contrary; the vote againſt the teſt act, at a due interval of time, having been followed by a vote effectively diminiſhing the revenues of the Church; third in order came the legal repeal of that act; ſince which, as the attention of the nation was for ſome years directed to the perfecting a great revolution; during which it was neceſ⯑ſary, not to proceed too far againſt the clergy; the time elapſed had not been ſufficient, much to diminiſh the appre⯑henſions that church may entertain, of ſome fourth meaſure affecting her eſtabliſhment: and the concluſion of the advo⯑cates for the repeal, drawn from its preſent condition, that it is therefore a meaſure proper to be copied in England, muſt be rejected.

Among the Swiſs republics, it muſt be admitted, that there are to be found inſtances of free ſtates, whoſe governments are not fluctuating in their principles, or diſtracted by the conteſts of religious parties; and where the eſtabliſhed church flouriſhes, without the ſupport of religious teſts. But Dr. Adam Smith, in his inquiry into the cauſe of the wealth of nation▪ gives us a fact, from which the ſolution of this poli⯑tical phoenomenon is eaſily derived. ‘In the greater part of the proteſtant cantons, there is not a ſingle perſon to be found, who does not profeſs himſelf to be of the eſtabliſhed church: if he profeſſes himſelf of any other indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton.’

But the rank the United Provinces hold among the States of Europe, render their hiſtory the moſt ſtriking of thoſe, not excluded by the general exceptions at firſt laid down, and it is in every reſpect the moſt perfect example to be found, to decide the queſtion. The opponents of the teſt act appeal to it in their favour: but, when examined, it will ſhow, as far as the inſtance can extend, that it is neceſſary for a ſtate to [15] eſtabliſh the religion of the moſt numerous ſect it contains; by giving to it the privileges attending a national church; and intruſting the executive power excluſively to its members.

In the evidence now to be brought in ſupport of this propo⯑ſition, I ſhall follow the account of the tranſactions of the Dutch Republic, as given in the modern univerſal hiſtory;^* the only authority to which I have acceſs. As the author ex⯑hibits in every particular, the moſt liberal attachment to the principles of civil and eccleſiaſtical liberty; the facts he has delivered, will be received by thoſe who concur with him in thoſe principles, with the credit due to ſuch a relator.

The United Provinces obtained external peace, and an acknowledgement of their independence, in the year 1609: but the cauſes which were to interrupt their internal tranquil⯑lity, from that time to the preſent period, were already in action; though the fear of a foreign enemy had prevented their breaking forth in open violence. The diviſion of the national church into two ſects was already begun; the leaders of whom were Gomarus, who was a rigid Calviniſt, and Arminius, whoſe followers derive their name from him: and the latter were ſtigmatized as deſerters from Calviniſm.

It is a general obſervation, that the externals of religion, its rites and ceremonies, afford moſt frequently the occaſion of the breaking out of diſſention, render it moſt acrimonious, and keep it longeſt alive: but the two contending ſects in Holland were not diſtinguiſhed by any differences of this kind, as the church of England and the diſſenters have been. A declara [...]ion of the States general ſets forth, that ‘both parties were of the ſame religion, had the ſame form of worſhip, the ſame public ceremonies, the ſame manner of [16] expoſing vice and cheriſhing virtue; and differed only in a few points, of little conſequence to ſalvation, or indeed to ſociety,’ (p. 44.)

It is evident, that one principal cauſe of the exiſtence, the acrimony, and continuation of religious diſputes, the differ⯑ence of external forms and rites, did not take place in Hol⯑land; and that they fully take place here. If therefore, the State do not ſolicitouſly guard itſelf againſt the effects of the hoſtility of religious parties, the calamities they will probably bring upon this country will be proportionally greater, and of longer duration than thoſe which afflicted the republic, upon the ſurvey of which we are now entering.

No religious teſt excluded the followers of either ſyſtem from the magiſtracy. It will be ſhown, that the violence and diſſention which prevailed in every diſtrict, repeated revo⯑lutions in the form of government, and at certain intervals, the moſt humiliating degree of national abaſement, muſt be aſcribed to this cauſe. The inſtances of the firſt kind, having more reſemblance to calamities of a private nature, will be conſidered by themſelves; and the two laſt, as affecting the whole ſtate, in conjunction. Theſe articles will be run over, with all the brevity their importance to this argument will permit.

The whole country, ſoon after the truce with Spain, be⯑came a ſcene of violence and confuſion: in towns, where the magiſtrates were of the Arminian party, the miniſters of the Calviniſts were ſuſpended, expelled, or impriſoned. And where the party of the Calviniſts had the aſcendant, the Arminians ſhared the ſame fate. (p. 39.) This diſtraction was increaſed by the populace aſſuming the ſame powers: ‘Wherever either of the factions happened to be the moſt powerful, they ſeized on the churches, and excluded their opponents. (p. 45.) And ſuch was the mutual animoſity of the two ſects, that the Arminians were obliged to meet [17] privately in ſome towns, and the Calviniſts in others.’ (p. 44.) The Arminians of Amſterdam, having procured a miniſter from Leyden, met in a large warehouſe belonging to a merchant, to hold their religious aſſemblies: the appli⯑cation of the Calviniſts to ſuppreſs this meeting, being diſ⯑regarded by the magiſtrates, the doors of the warehouſe were forced, the miniſter abuſed, and the lives of the congregation threatened. The Arminians in their turn complained to the magiſtrates; but were anſwered, that ‘the beſt method to ſecure themſelves, would be to avoid ſuch meetings as in⯑curred the reſentment of their fellow citizens.’ (p. 46.) In the magiſtracy of Amſterdam, the Arminian party formed generally, though not always, the majority: the feeble and irreſolute inclination to favour that ſect, on the firſt appli⯑cation, appears from ſome circumſtances, to have given way to a feeble inclination to diſcountenance them, upon the ſecond: and on both occaſions, the executive power betrayed a ſenſe of its own weakneſs, ariſing from the diviſion in reli⯑gious ſentiments, of the individuals who compoſed it.

In ſuch a diſtracted ſtate of ſociety, it is evident that each of the religious parties would frequently diſobey thoſe magiſ⯑trates, whoſe tenets oppoſed their own. Some burghers of Amſterdam, having refuſed obedience to certain Arminian magiſtrates of that city, the populace eſpouſed their cauſe: the riot was ſuppreſſed by a detachment of the army: and the States, at their next meeting, paſſed an ordinance, ‘whereby the people were required to obey the magiſtrates, of what⯑ever ſect or religion they happened to profeſs themſelves.’ (p 95) The ordinance itſelf is very ſingular; but the diſ⯑turbance which occaſioned it, was ſuppreſſed without great difficulty: and the iſſuing ſuch a general edict, after its ſuppreſſion, ſeems to indicate, that diſturbances of this kind were very general; and the bonds of government nearly diſſolved.

[18]At Leuwarde and Utrecht the populace uſurped the right of civil government; by depoſing their legal magiſtrates, the Burgomaſters, and ſubſtituting others in their ſtead by vio⯑lence. The promiſe of a ſpeedy redreſs to their complaints by the old Burgomaſters of Utrecht, was not ſufficient to appeaſe them. And the exceſſes of the faction ran to ſo dangerous a height in that city, that the Stadtholder Prince Maurice, going to repreſs them, was groſsly inſulted, and forced to a precipitate retreat. (p. 42.) It appears, in the ſubſequent part of the hiſtory, that the inſurgents were of the Arminian party.

The internal commotions in particular diſtricts here men⯑tioned, oc [...]urred in the period of the firſt twenty years after the commencement of the diſpute. They exhibit a picture of the mutual violence of the two ſects, approaching very nearly to anarchy: and are the conſequences of the erroneous ſyſtems of their laws relating to religion.

It is a matter not only intereſting to the curioſity of poli⯑tical inveſtigation, but intimately connected with the preſent ſubject, to inquire, whether, if the Engliſh ſyſtem of religious laws had at that time taken place in Holland, that country would not, in its conſtitution, have poſſeſſed an adequate pre⯑ventative to theſe internal diſorders.

By the law of England, the religion of the majority is eſtabliſhed, and that eſtabliſhment is guarded by a religious teſt; but the diſſenters from the church are tolerated.

The greater part of the inhabitants of Holland being Cal⯑viniſts, their religion would have been eſtabliſhed: it would likewiſe have been the religion of all the magiſtrates. There would have therefore been no expulſion of Arminian miniſters from the public churches; becauſe there would have been none of the clergy of that ſect in poſſeſſion of them.

If by a teſt act, none but the members of the eſtabliſhed Church, the Calviniſts, had been able to act as magiſtrates; [19] the Arminian magiſtrates could not have expelled the clergy of the Calviniſtic belief from their churches; becauſe there would have been no ſuch magiſtrates.

If beſides, a toleration had been granted; neither ſect could have deprived or moleſted the other in the free exerciſe of its religion; for the one would have been eſtabliſhed, and the other tolerated.

Neither would the members of the ſmaller ſect, in thoſe diſtricts where they were the moſt numerous, have been ſo ready to deny obedience to the magiſtrates of the oppoſite ſect; or to diſplace them and ſet up others, contrary to law. For ſuch a denial muſt have amounted to a refuſal to obey the total magiſtracy of the ſtate: it is a total diſavowal of all civil ſubjection, or rebellion. But, as there were other magiſtrates of their own ſect, the diſobedience appeared to them to be only partial. Beſide, the appearance of force in readineſs to reduce them to their duty, would be much greater in one caſe than in the other: in the one, it would be the total civil power of the country, in union with the majority of the people; in the other, that civil power would be diſ⯑united; by which, the offenders might perhaps hope for indemnity, if not ſucceſs, in their boldeſt attempts.

This univerſal ſcene of tumult, which ſeems to have per⯑vaded every province, every city, every town, produced correſpondent effects in the government and conſtitution: and has been the cauſe of the repeated revolutions, which have at certain intervals taken place in the republic, from the year 1609 to the preſent time. ‘The diſpute between Arminius and Gomarus,’ ſays the hiſtorian here exclu⯑ſively followed, ‘laid the firſt conception of a humour, that has ever ſince laid lurking in the conſtitution of the ſtate, breaking out upon all revolutions, and laying the foun⯑dation of that diſunion and diſcord, which will probably terminate one day in the total ſubverſion of the republic.’ [20] (p. 36.) We are now to trace its initial and continued operation upon the conſtitution.

For ſome time previous to the concluſion of the twelve years truce, by which the independence of the United Pro⯑vinces was admitted by Spain, a political party began to entertain apprehenſions of the ambition of Maurice, the ſecond Stadtholder, and to form a declared oppoſition to him: the great Barneveldt was impreſſed with the ſame fears; and ſome ſtates in the union were much influenced by his authority. (p. 22.)

Oppoſition excited mutual reſentment between theſe two leaders of the republic: the partiſans of Maurice ſupported the cauſe of the Calviniſts, the moſt numerous ſect; which alſo, at ſome periods, ſeems to have been favoured by the ſtates: Barneveldt, and ſome of his cities, inclined to the Arminian party. Encouraged by the expectation of ſupport from theſe powerful patrons, the magiſtrates of each ſect, in their ſeveral diſtricts, proceeded to ſuſpend thoſe miniſters, whoſe religious opinions differed from their own. Theſe meaſures drew on an inundation of writings, in which, the conſtitution of every branch of the executive government was called into queſtion. As they directly ‘led to an inquiry into the rights and powers of the magiſtrates; this into the prerogative of the Stadtholder of the ſeveral Provinces; and that into the ſovereign right of the provincial States, and States general.’ (p. 39.) Topics not likely, during ſuch a univerſal ferment, to be candidly diſcuſſed, or to tend to allay it.

Prince Maurice, at the head of an army devoted to him, knew how to derive the greateſt advantage from the ſtrength of a religious party, conſtituting a great majority of the people; and who regarded him likewiſe as their chief, though not yet avowedly ſo. The ignominious expulſion of Giſelius, a ſeditious preacher of the Calviniſts, from Rotterdam, fur⯑niſhed [21] occaſion to their adverſaries, to ſtigmatize the body of the Arminians, as ſecret friends to Spain, and enemies to the liberties of their country. By what means this event could produce ſuch an effect, ſeems difficult to conceive: but ‘the paſſions of the people being thus inflamed againſt them, Maurice ventured on ſome bold and dangerous alterations in the civil government; changing the magiſtrates of the cities at pleaſure, ſo as to maintain a majority in the provin⯑cial States; and conſequently in the States general.’ (p. 43.) Thus he was enabled to advance one great ſtep, to carry his authority beyond the bounds marked out by the conſtitution.

When two religious parties are in a ſtate of hoſtility, the ſupreme magiſtrate will generally be able to increaſe his ſtrength, by the acceſſion of that of the greater; and convert a conſiderable part of their religious fervour into the means of carrying on his deſigns; if he be able to impoſe upon them, with the ſlighteſt appearance of ſervice to the common cauſe. The truth of this principle appears in the tranſaction juſt recited. Such a ſect being attacked, or any of its ſupports attempted to be taken away, a very intimate junction of this nature will probably be formed; and its occaſion continuing, it may acquire ſuch ſtrength, as ultimately to produce bad effects. But if a legal ſupport, in which it acquieſces, be granted to ſuch a powerful church; that too intimate degree of connection with the ſupreme magiſtrate, will by degrees die away; and his civil power be ſupported by its members upon civil conſiderations only. Thus in England, after the failure of ſome attempts to repeal the teſt act, had given an appearance of permanent ſecurity to the eſtabliſhment; the apprehenſions of the national church for its ſecurity died away; and thoſe principles, which perhaps at one time attached its members too much to monarchical power, died away with them. What ſyſtem of new meaſures will naturally tend to revive them, is very evident.

[22]Men intent upon obtaining illegal power, and on trampling on the laws and liberties of their country, will, in ſimilar ſituations, purſue ſimilar plans. It was about thirty-ſix years after this time, that Cromwell carried both parts of this meaſure of prince Maurice into execution, but upon a larger ſcale: the firſt, when he impriſoned forty members of the houſe of Commons, and by Sir Hardreſs Waller demanded the excluſion of ninety more; to obtain a majority in that aſſembly, upon the vote to receive no meſſages from the King; and for an act, to erect a court to bring him to trial. And the ſecond, when he inveſted a few miſerable fanatics, by his own commiſſion, with the name and authority of a Parliament. It is not ſtepping much out of the way to have drawn this parallel: for, as far as the civil war in England was a reli⯑gious war, it was kindled by the theological diſputes of Arminius and Gomarus: for the principles of the former being brought over into England, excited as fierce com⯑motions between the Calviniſts and Arminians, as had taken place in Holland.

From the conduct of the cities of Leuwarde and Utrecht, it may be imagined, that the Arminians themſelves indirectly aided the Prince in his plan of uſurpation; by their illegal violences in expelling their lawful magiſtrates, and inſulting his perſon when he came to reſtore them.

The Prince having, by theſe changes in the magiſtracy, obtained a majority in the States general, the Calviniſts ſoli⯑cited for a national ſynod to ſit under their authority; which was carried, but not unanimouſly; the meaſure being oppoſed by the provincial ſtates of Holland and Utrecht. (p. 42.) Two alliances, offenſive and defenſive, were thus contracted: the firſt, between the Calviniſts and the majority of the States; the ſecond, between the Arminians, Utrecht, and the powerful province of Holland. The diviſion, formed at this juncture, has already ſubſiſted much more than a century [23] and a half, has occaſioned many revolutions, and alternately brought the republic very near to a ſtate of anarchy, and a ſtate of deſpotiſm.

A little pauſe enſued, before the parties, thus regularly eſtabliſhed and oppoſed to each other, came into action; during which, Barneveldt endeavoured to appeaſe the national diſſentions by different expedients: one of which was, that "certain eccleſiaſtical laws ſhould be confirmed by the ſtates." (p. 42.) Theſe were to contain a confeſſion of faith, com⯑prehending only fundamental points.^* The aſſumption of a power by the civil magiſtrates to draw up articles of religion, without their deliberations being aſſiſted by an aſſembly of the national clergy, would perhaps never be tolerated at any enlightened period of time, or in any government: much leſs in the circumſtances which then took place. Barneveldt was unſucceſsful: many of the ſtates refuſed their ſanction to any ſyſtem of religious opinions, which had not previouſly been debated in a convocation of divines.

Much of the bitterneſs with which the two factions were animated againſt each other, certainly aroſe from the inflam⯑matory publications, ſo abundantly at that time circulated. Barneveldt, in order to allay the inveterate ſpirit of hoſtility derived from this ſource, was guilty of another error; he propoſed reſtraining the liberty of the preſs: this was wiſely oppoſed by the magiſtrates of Amſterdam; ‘notwithſtanding that their own conduct was the ſubject of the ſevereſt ſatires and paſquinades, which had yet appeared.’ (p. 45.) His intention was certainly good; although the mean by which [24] he attempted to effect it, was bad. He might probably think, that there were certain times, at which it might become neceſſary to impoſe a temporary reſtraint upon the freedom of the preſs, by an act of the legiſlature; as in England, under certain circumſtances, it is expedient to ſuſpend the Habeas Corpus. This is given as the apology of the man, not of the meaſure. But as nothing is more hoſtile to the peace of man⯑kind, than religious rancour: and as a contemptuous repre⯑ſentation, or miſrepreſentation, of the tenets of any religious ſociety, are the infallible means of carrying its virulence to the moſt noxious exceſs; ſociety has no greater enemies, than thoſe who thus exerciſe their perverted abilities: the ſevere and liberal indignation of the wiſe and good of their own party, ſeems the juſt, the proper, and the adequate puniſh⯑ment of ſuch offenders. It may be added, that moſt of the poiſonous animals are to be found in that contemptible claſs, called reptiles by the naturaliſts; though there are ſome of a ſuperior denomination.^† But to return to the inflammatory writings then circulated in Holland: in what we have handed down to us upon this ſubject, in the hiſtory here followed; there is no mention of either of the two religious parties making catechiſms for young children, vehicles for libels upon the religious opinions of their opponents; or turning them into eccleſiaſtical paſquinades: and by making, and ſyſtemati⯑cally making, the contempt and deriſion of the opinion of their adverſaries one of the firſt principles of education; to add to the future inveteracy of religious rancour, all the ſtrength [25] that diſcipline and art can give it. This is apparently a new improvement in polemical tactics, for which the future har⯑mony of ſociety, in the different ſtates of the Chriſtian world, will be indebted to ſome Engliſh Diſſenters.

Another plan propoſed by the Penſionary for the reſto⯑ration of public tranquillity, was that of an edict of toleration.^‡ It obtained the aſſent of the States general, but not that of the Cities: and no mention was made in it, of any puniſhment againſt thoſe who ſhould tranſgreſs it. By one of its clauſes, ‘the clergy on each ſide, who were ſuſ⯑pended, were to be reſtored to their functions.’ (p. 44.) A meaſure, which was certain to meet the moſt determined oppoſition of the zealots of both parties, that is, in ſuch times of confuſion, the greater part of each. Many of the ſuſpended clergy, both Calviniſts and Arminians, in whoſe favour this edict was apparently iſſued, would reſiſt its execution with their whole influence: for a conſiderable number of each ſect, who had been expelled by their adverſaries from their churches, were doubtleſs invited by their own party, to fill other benefices; in which they had made vacancies for them, by purſuing the ſame violent ſteps: to all ſuch, a return to their former reſidence, muſt have been an object of ſettled averſion; if a difference of profit did not reconcile them to it. But ſuch is the equality of the ſtipends of the miniſters in Holland, that they would have leſs frequently been ſo induced to accept of the terms of the edict, than at firſt might be imagined: and the States, as ſoon as it was iſſued, were virtually obliged to diſpenſe with the obſervance of it.

Such were the meaſures applied by the mild patriotiſm of Barneveldt, to heal the diſorders of the ſtate, which were continually increaſing. By the vices of its original conſti⯑tution, they had already become too violent for palliatives: the total authority of government being placed in the hand [26] of the contending parties themſelves, there no where exiſted a force to repreſs the outrages of either; which could termi⯑nate only by ſome dangerous criſis. Prince Maurice deter⯑mined to profit by the occaſion, and probably to uſurp the ſovereignty: but, as he foreſaw that this would be much eaſier, if he could gain over Barneveldt to his party, he determined to attempt it: his attempts failed. Some mea⯑ſures of the Penſionary, and ſome ſtrong proceedings of the Arminian party, he had the addreſs to perſuade the populace to be renewed proofs of their being partiſans of Spain, and enemies of public liberty: this adding to the ſtrength of a party already almoſt triumphant, he pulled off the maſk; and, as he had before ſecretly favoured the Calviniſts only, he now openly ſet himſelf at their head.

Encouraged by this declaration, the Calviniſts in Holland threw off all reſpect for Barneveldt and the provincial States, breaking out into open violence; and they were obliged to apply to the Prince for troops for their protection. He eluded their application, and forbad the ſoldiery even to aſſiſt the magiſtrates of the towns of Holland in ſuppreſſing ſedition: upon which, they determined to augment the guards and garriſons by their own authority. (p. 47.)

This ſtep Maurice pretended to reſent, as an encroachment upon his prerogative, as governor of the province; and ſeizes, in a hoſtile manner, on the Briel, Delft, and Scheidam; changes the magiſtrates of Nimeguen, and the province of Guelderland enters cordially into his meaſures. And al⯑though certain cities had refuſed him admittance; (p. 47.) and Barneveldt, aſſiſted by the embaſſador of France, had been able to appeaſe the diſputes in the provincial States of Holland; (p. 49.) yet, after ſome feeble attempts ‘to prevail with the Prince, to ſuffer the garriſons to be under the direction of the magiſtrates, and to relinquiſh his project for the retrenching the privileges of the cities.’ [27] (p. 53.) ‘Unable to oppoſe his further deſigns, his oppo⯑nents determined to connive at his meaſures.’ (p. 54.) ‘They perceived that the leaſt tumult would furniſh a pre⯑text for ſimilar treſpaſſes on the conſtitution; and the means of rendering himſelf abſolute in the Cities, and conſequently in the provincial States.’ (p. 55.)

Maurice now, by the aſſiſtance of the military, ſeized the city of Utrecht, diſarmed the garriſon, degraded the magiſ⯑trates, and cauſed new ones to be appointed in their places; changed the form of government, (p 54.) and expelled the Arminian clergy from their churches. The ‘cities of Hol⯑land were afterwards ſerved in a ſimilar manner.’ (p. 55.)

It ſtill remained neceſſary to the ultimate completion of the deſigns of the Prince, to gain or to deſtroy Barneveldt: and it ſeems to have been greatly his wiſh to ſucceed in the firſt of theſe ways. For at this very time, he was loading his relations with favours; and conferred upon his two ſons, two of the moſt conſiderable poſts of the republic: but he was unſucceſsful: and the national ſynod, ſo long the object of apprehenſion to Barneveldt and the Arminians, met at Dor⯑drecht. (p. 56.)

The Arminians refuſing to appear, to defend themſelves before this aſſembly, as the perſons who muſt be their judges there, were actually parties in the diſpute; they were of courſe condemned in their abſence. The paſſions of the popu⯑lace were wrought up to the higheſt violence againſt them, by the eloquent and flagitious Aerſens: and Maurice, by ‘order of the States, "ſeized upon Barneveldt, Grotius, Hoogenberts, and the other leaders of the Arminians, whom he impriſoned in the caſtle of Louveſtien: whence that party has ever ſince borrowed the appellation.’ (p. 57.)

Judges were appointed to try Barneveldt for ſedition, and harbouring deſigns deſtructive to liberty: he was condemned [28] and executed. The fruits Maurice reaped from this exe⯑cution, were very different from thoſe with which he had flattered himſelf. The man, whom, when alive, the populace had execrated as the enemy of his country, as ſoon as he was dead, was revered as the martyr of the conſtitution. Two of his deſcendants, a ſon, (p. 58.) and a grandſon, at different times attempted to revenge the legal murder of Barneveldt, by the aſſaſſination of Maurice. The latter, in his criminal enterpriſe, was aſſiſted by a number of the Arminians; (p. 63) which involved the whole ſect in a new perſecution. By a particular ordinance, pecuniary rewards were offered to thoſe, who ſhould ACCUSE any of the Louveſtien party with deſigns againſt the government or the prince. (p. 64.) ‘And ſeveral perſons were beheaded, only becauſe they were Arminians, and conſequently ſuppoſed favourers of the violent meaſures, upon which, ſome turbulent and bigotted individuals of the ſame faction had entered.’ (p. 65.) A renewal of the Spaniſh war, which broke out with great violence after the expiration of the long truce, and threatened even the exiſtence of the republic as a ſovereign ſtate; pre⯑vented Maurice from taking advantage of theſe circumſtances, who ſurvived his eſcape from the laſt of theſe attempts two years.

He was ſucceeded in his authority by his brother Henry▪ and the Arminians, who were now generally poſſeſſed with an implacable hatred to the houſe of Orange, reanimated by his death, formed a deſign of revenging their late ſufferings. They were reſtrained by the more moderate men among them; and ſome lenient declarations of Henry ſeconded their conciliating interpoſitions. But at this juncture, he does not appear to have acted with ſincerity: he flattered the abilities of Grotius, the ſecond man in the party during the life of Barneveldt; but he compelled him to linger out the remain⯑der of his life in exile: he permitted a new perſecution of [29] theſe ſectaries; and it was even propoſed wholly to ſuppreſs Arminianiſm, by compelling all its profeſſors to ſubſcribe to certain articles of faith, drawn up by the Calviniſts: a meaſure, which muſt have been followed by more fatal effects, than thoſe which already had afflicted the republic during this diſpute: but the apprehenſions of a foreign invaſion occaſioned it to be laid aſide. (p. 85.)

During the war which enſued, a few indulgencies were extended to the Louveſtien party: ſome of them appear to have been admitted into the magiſtracy of Amſterdam: and it was on account of the oppoſition made to them, that the ſtate found it neceſſary to iſſue the ſingular ordinance men⯑tioned above.

Henry conducted the war with ability, and after its con⯑cluſion, governed the republic with moderation: which ſo far engaged the gratitude of the people, that they made the Stadtholderſhip hereditary in his family. This event imme⯑diately followed the abortive attempt of Cardinal Richelieu to ſeize the city of Orange, the patrimony of the Prince, ſituated in an interior part of France; which laid the foun⯑dation of the oppoſition to that nation, which the houſe of Orange has on all occaſions ſhown: and, as its ſecondary conſequence, threw the Arminian party into the arms of that powerful kingdom. (p. 108.)

It was thus, that a bad ſyſtem of religious laws, which had for a long ſeries of years filled the provinces with diſcord, violences, and atrocious crimes; after having been nearly deſtructive to public liberty, ultimately gave birth to a foreign faction in their domeſtic councils: a new and fertile ſource of national degradation and calamity. This junction, however, did not take place early enough to produce any appa⯑rent effect, during the remainder of the ſplendid and fortunate adminiſtration of this Prince; which laſted on the whole [30] twenty-two years: at the end of which term, he was ſucceeded by his ſon William, the ſecond Stadtholder of that name.

His acceſſion did not take place, without a delay to it being interpoſed, on the part of ſome of the Provinces. (p. 160.) The Arminians had already recovered ſtrength enough to begin on their ſide, to make encroachments on the conſti⯑tution. The peace of Munſter, which was then negociating, followed ſoon after: and it appeared, when the debate con⯑cerning the reduction of the land-forces of the republic came on in the aſſembly of the ſtates, that the Louveſtien party had re-acquired a total aſcendancy in the great province of Hol⯑land. The difference of the military peace eſtabliſhments, propoſed to be kept up by both parties, was ſo minute, as to make it evident, that the matter taken up was only the oſtenſible ground of diviſion; while the real ſubject of diſpute was kept out of ſight. Animoſities ran to a great height: and the States general, determined to bear down the oppo⯑ſition of the refractory Provinces, ſent expreſs orders to the officers of the army, not to obey any requiſition they might receive from the States of Holland. (p. 170.)

That Province remaining fixed in its oppoſition, the Prince, ſeconded by the council of ſtate, obtained a reſolution from the States general, that a deputation ſhould be ſent to the towns of Holland, ‘to oblige the magiſtrates to alter their ſentiments.’ (p. 170.) He put himſelf at the head of the deputies, and they were refuſed admiſſion at Amſterdam, and moſt of the other towns; and in ſome with inſult and con⯑tempt. On his return to the States, he arraigned the conduct of the cities with ſeverity: the ſpeech he made on this occa⯑ſion was printed, to inflame the minds of the clergy and populace of his party; and was anſwered by a manifeſto of the States of Holland.

To theſe cauſes of mutual animoſity, was ſuperadded an incident, which cauſed a civil war immediately to break out. [31] A fleet, under Admiral De Wit, returned at this time from an unſucceſsful expedition to the Brazils: and the conduct of the commander and his officers was ſtrongly impeached, De Wit was arreſted, and the States general ordered ſix of the captains of the fleet, who had received their commiſſions from them, into confinement in the priſon of the admiralty of Amſterdam. In this they had all ancient precedents in their favour: but the province of Holland remonſtrated againſt the order, as a violation of its local ſovereignty; it was carried into execution notwithſtanding that oppoſition: but the priſon doors were forced by the magiſtrates of Amſterdam, and the priſoners ſet at liberty. (p. 172.)

William immediately confined the ſix deputies of the pro⯑vince, and marched a body of troops towards that capital; which, but for ſome unforeſeen accidents, muſt have fallen into his hands without ſtriking a blow. The city was however terrified into a humiliating treaty; by which the deputies of Holland, though releaſed from their confinement, were de⯑prived of their employment: as were two popular magiſtrates of Amſterdam, who deſerved and acquired the admiration of their country, by inſiſting to be made ſacrifices, by being deprived of their offices, and declared incapable of holding any dignity in the republic, rather than involve it in a civil war.

Whatever further enterpriſes this Prince might have in contemplation, his ſudden death, at the age of twenty-four, put a ſtop to them. His widow, the Princeſs Mary of England, was delivered of a ſon a few days after.

His death deprived his party of a head, and filled them with deſpondency; and all the towns of Holland with exul⯑tation and feſtivity. The States of that province, after having abrogated many of the powers before poſſeſſed by the Stadt⯑holder, eluded all applications to nominate the infant Prince to that dignity; with a lieutenant to perform the functions [32] of it during his minority. By this conduct, they evinced an early determination to lay aſide the office intirely. And although, during their unſucceſsful war with the Engliſh com⯑monwealth, there were perpetual commotions and inſurrections of the populace, who demanded the creation of a Stadtholder, a meaſure ſtrongly preſſed by Van Trump the elder, and ſome of the Provinces; every interpoſition to this end was rejected by the governing party, who ‘aſſerted, that the reſtoration of that dignity would be the ruin of liberty.’ (p. 191.)

The celebrated De Wit was now raiſed to the office of Penſionary of Holland: he put an end to the Engliſh war by a treaty with Cromwell; one great article of which was, that a ſolemn act ſhould be paſſed by the States general, to exclude the young Prince of Orange from the Stadtholderſhip; and the other offices poſſeſſed by his anceſtors. As during the ſubſequent part of his life, the Penſionary conſtantly oppoſed the re-eſtabliſhment of that office; the great oppoſition which he affected to give to this condi [...]ion of the treaty, ſeems to have been calculated only to conciliate the Orange party to him: and to make him appear compelled to accept of an article, ſo agreeable to his own views, and the intereſt of his party. It was by the edict paſſed in conſequence of this treaty, that the firſt revolution of the Dutch conſtitution, which before had effectively taken place, was completed by the formality of a law.

The term of the commotions hitherto deſcribed, extended to forty-five years. Their principal cauſe has been ſhown to have been the committing of the executive power indifferently to the individuals of two ſects, diſagreeing about abſtract opinions only; yet, having no external badges or marks of diſtinction in their rites and ceremonies; a ſource of diſſen⯑tion generally more fatal and more permanent. In conſe⯑quence of this erroneous ſyſtem, and the internal diſorders occaſioned by it, we have ſeen the foederal Chief of the United [33] Provinces, twice in that period, upon the very point of ſub⯑duing the liberties of his country: and the Louveſtien party at length able to annihilate that office; and leave the States, of which the Republic is compoſed, without a common head: that center of union of councils and execution, which to their divided and equal powers, is ſo vitally neceſſary.

We are now arrived at that juncture, when the Louveſtien party, the leaſt numerous and powerful, whether they be con⯑ſidered as a religious ſect, or a political faction; aſſumed the reins of government, in oppoſition to the majority of the nation, and the national church. The Penſionary De Wit guided their councils: and the ſpirit of his adminiſtration was ſuch as his ſituation rendered neceſſary; and what ap⯑pears the conſequence of the executive power being inveſted in the weaker party. His ſyſtem of meaſures is to be con⯑ſidered with reſpect to the church, the navy, the army, and the foreign connections of the ſtate.

It does not appear, that the Calviniſts were treated with that violence, with which both ſects mutually harraſſed each other, before the ſynod of Dordretcht: to have added ſtrength and acrimony to their oppoſition by impolitic ſeverities, might ſoon have been fatal to the new conſtitution. Yet the clergy of Holland, the enemies of De Wit's adminiſtration, declaimed againſt it violently from the pulpit, and ‘the States were under a neceſſity of prohibiting them to med⯑dle with public affairs; however they perſiſted, and ſome of them were ſuſpended.’ (p. 260.)

The marine of the Provinces was ſupported upon a reſpect⯑able footing; and the firſt of their war with Charles II. did not terminate either to their diſgrace or di [...]advantage. Yet the diviſions of the ſtate affected its operations: Op [...]am, who conducted the firſt action, was in oppoſition to the Penſionary: and ‘ſeveral captains had been promoted, by the intereſt of the governing party, to be ſpies upon his conduct, without [34] any regard to merit.’ (p. 257.) While the engagement was yet undecided, they withdrew themſelves from the line; which decided the fate of the day, at that time perhaps doubt⯑ful. Toward the concluſion of the war, great animoſities broke out between De Ruyter and Van Tromp the younger, the two beſt admirals of the republic, who were of different parties: and ‘the ſeamen, entering into the quarrel of their commanders, formed two oppoſite factions, came to blows, and threatened the diſſolution of the government.’ (p. 269.)

Theſe alarming ſymptoms had been juſt diſpelled by ſu⯑perſeding Van Tromp; when the Republic, at that time dejected by recent defeat and diſappointment, was menaced by a new revolution; which, by the aſſiſtance of the public enemy, was to have reſtored the former authority of the houſe of Orange. An inferior agent in this deſign was apprehended and executed: but the conſpirators were ſo numerous, and their party ſo powerful, that it was found neceſſary to ſuppreſs the diſcoveries made by him. The weakneſs of the party in adminiſtration had ſo far annihilated the power of the law, that they were obliged to affect to believe a body of men calumniated; againſt whom they had convincing proofs of entering into a conſpiracy with the enemy in time of war, becauſe they dared not bring them to public juſtice. (p. 270)

The rotal ruin of the army was another conſequence of the debility of the party, who then conducted public affairs. They were obliged to diminiſh the influence of the oppoſition, and increaſe their own, by means the moſt deſtructive to public ſecurity: hence, although De Wit found himſelf com⯑pelled to reduce the military eſtabliſhment, for reaſons which will be afterward explained, yet, in the proſecution of this plan, ‘while the old experienced officers were laid aſide, on account of their attachment to the Prince of Orange; under whoſe anceſtors they had acquired all their know⯑ledge.’ [35](p. 279.) ‘For ſome years, all military employ⯑ments had been held by the children of Burgomaſters; becauſe they were generally in the intereſt of the Pen⯑ſioner:’ (p. 279.) ‘the ſons and kindred of his own friends, raw, inexperienced youths, who had never beheld the face of an enemy.’ (p. 287.) During the firſt war with Charles II. the Biſhop of Munſter invaded the Provinces at the head of 8000 men: (p. 263.) an adverſary and a force intirely unequal to a conteſt with the armies of the Republic, in the time of her former elevation and power: her troops were now found to be "perfectly uſeleſs;" (p. 279) "Terror diffuſed itſelf through all the Provinces," upon this inſignificant invaſion: and it was only by the aſſiſtance of 6000 men, with which France was by treaty obliged to furniſh the States, that they were able to repel this attack.

In the ſyſtem of policy which De Wit embraced, with regard to foreign ſtates, the criminality and weakneſs of his meaſures at leaſt equalled that of ruining the army. The natural ſtrength of his party, increaſed by the influence he had ſo acquired, was not found to be ſufficient to retain the reins of government in his hands: to effect this, the inter⯑poſition of a foreign power in the domeſtic concerns of the ſtate, became neceſſary: which, as far as it is admitted, is always virtually a partial ſurrender of national independence; and a tacit ſubmiſſion to a foreign ſovereign. Though it was already become evident, that Lewis XIV. was ‘more dan⯑gerous as an ally, than as an open enemy; the Penſioner engaged himſelf deeply with that Prince; and his coun⯑tenance afforded him the beſt ſupport againſt the houſe of Orange.’ (p. 274.) He felt all the conſequences which his own ſituation and that of his party brought upon the nation, whoſe ‘ſecurity could not be provided for without a military force; and that ſuch a force could not be raiſed, paid, and diſciplined, while the republic was divided; and the more [36] popular party excluded from all public employments.’ (p. 283.) In ſuch a ſituation, what was the line of con⯑duct he ſyſtematically purſued? ‘His complaiſance for the court of France, occaſioned his extinguiſhing every ſpark of military ſpirit in the republic, by diſbanding the greater part of the army;’ (p. 287.) and he ruined the remainder, which was inadequate to any purpoſe of defence, by the conduct ſtated before. This reduction of the army was probably made at the requiſition of Lewis XIV. as the price of his protection: for when Charles II. had rendered himſelf dependant upon that prince for an annual penſion, a ſimilar propoſal was urged to him, which he rejected with vivacity.

When De Wit had thus diſarmed Holland, Lewis XIV. thought the opportunity of converting his influence over the Provinces into a direct ſovereignty, too flattering to be paſſed by. This was his motive for attacking the republic in the year 1672. At the juncture that his intention became evident, the union of the two parties in Holland, could apparently have oppoſed but an inſufficient barrier to the power of France, as the country was without an army, and without fortifications: (p. 287.) yet ‘neither ſide appeared to have any thoughts of preſerving the republic by a coalition, or even a ſuſpenſion of their ani⯑moſity; perhaps from a conviction that it was imprac⯑ticable.’ (p. 284.) The Louveſtien faction foreſaw, that a war would transfer a great part, or the whole of their power to their opponents; and they made the moſt abject ſubmiſſions to the king of France to retain it. ‘They pro⯑miſed immediately to redreſs all his Majeſty's complaints, to remove from their councils every perſon who had in⯑curred his diſpleaſure, and to ſquare their conduct intirely by his royal will.’ (p. 284.) Thus the weaker of the two ſects which prevailed in this country, becoming poſſeſſed of the executive power, reduced it to the loweſt degradation, that of offering to confer, by a ſolemn treaty, an effective [37] ſovereignty upon an invader; ‘by ſtipulating to ſquare their conduct intirely by his royal will:’ and as they had deter⯑mined not to try the experiment of ſurrendering a ſhare of the adminiſtration to the majority, it is not eaſy to conceive any third meaſure, which they could have adopted with any probability of ſucceſs. Great as theſe offers were, they did not ſatisfy the rapacious ambition of Lewis: perhaps he thought, that they added but little, beſide legality and form, to the influence he before poſſeſſed in their government. But the power of the Louveſtien faction, and the humiliation of the States, were now approaching to their end.

William, the young Prince of Orange, had been already ſet at the head of their ruined army. (p. 287.) He deſpiſed a tributary ſovereignty of the Provinces remaining uncon⯑quered, which had been offered him by the enemy, as his ſhare of the plunder of his country. But while he infuſed life and vigour into its councils, ‘he inflamed the populace againſt the Penſioner and his brother:’ (p. 293.) Thus excited, they ran to arms in the greater cities, and inviting the Prince of Orange, compel the magiſtrates to inveſt him with all the dignities which had been poſſeſſed by his anceſtors. ‘They purged the public offices of all diſagreeable perſons; called upon the Prince to fill the vacancies; introduced into the magiſtracy, all the adherents of his family; and inſiſted that their own deputies ſhould have ſeats in the adminiſ⯑tration; contrary to the fundamental laws of the conſti⯑tution.’ (p. 294.) The two De Wits were maſſacred by them; and the Prince of Orange was now placed at the head of the republic. At Amſterdam, the pretenſions of the populace, which amounted to little leſs than the ſubverſion of the conſtitution, were inforced by the moſt dreadful menaces: ‘and the great deſign ſeems to have been, to ſhare the government between the Stadtholder and the populace: whatever demands were made by the people, the Stadt⯑holder [38] immediately granted:^* the power of the nobility was every where the object of jealouſy: all authority was veſted in his Highneſs; the States were ſcarce ever named; the legiſlative and executive powers were wholly at his mercy; and the conſtitution ſeemed intirely unhinged.’ (p. 296.) That ſuch a violent transfer of power did not pro⯑duce effects, as bad as thoſe from which it had delivered the State; and that this tumultuary ſpirit died away, without any further conſequences, than elevating William to the legi⯑timate conſtitutional powers of ſupreme magiſtrate; is to be aſcribed to his moderation. His ſubſequent good fortune and conduct, and that of the States, compelled Lewis XIV. to evacuate his ſudden conqueſts; and procured an honourable peace. The Louveſtien party was for a time ſuppreſſed; and the Stadtholderſhip made hereditary to William's deſ⯑cendants.

Upon the return of peace, that party again gathered ſtrength enough, being aſſiſted by the intrigues of France, to under⯑mine the popularity of the Prince, and diminiſh his intereſt and credit with the States; although he was ſupported by the Penſionary of Holland. And in this ſtruggle, William, the conſtant victim or principal actor in revolutions, who by one had loſt his hereditary dignities in his cradle, and to which he had been reſtored by a ſecond; was very near being deprived of them again by a third: a danger, from which his fortune, and the fortune of this iſland preſerved him; to effect a fourth of ſtill greater magnitude: by recovering our liberties, and placing them on a baſis, which Providence ſeems to have deſigned to be as permanent as our wiſdom, and our virtues.

[39]The cauſe and the progreſs of this convulſion, which at firſt threatened to replunge the Provinces into calamities, as great as thoſe from which they had ſo lately emerged, were as follows. The French having renewed the troubles of Europe, by invading the Spaniſh Netherlands, the Prince moved, in the aſſembly of the States, that an addition of 16,000 new raiſed troops ſhould be made to the army: by the articles of the union of Utrecht, ſuch a motion can be carried by a unanimous vote only: though he had a majority upon the queſtion, there were ſome diſſenting voices: and when he found himſelf not able to bring over his opponents, he ‘determined that the plurality of voices ſhould be a ſufficient authority.’ (p. 317.) The Louveſtien party in general, apprehended more dreadful conſequences from the power of the Stadtholder, than from the arms of the French Monarch: many of the magiſtrates of Amſterdam, and of the deputies, had been bribed by his reſident; which was diſcovered by his intercepted letters: and the party againſt the Prince was ſo ſtrong and determined, as to protect theſe offenders from legal inquiry. This conduct of the oppoſition was, for the preſent, of ſervice to William; by covering the illegality of the power he aſſumed, with ſome colour of that urgent neceſ⯑ſity which diſpenſes with law. He purſued his determination; and was greatly advanced in the buſineſs of the levies, when an accommodation between France and Spain took place. To mortify the Prince, theſe troops were immediately diſ⯑charged: and his enemies found themſelves ſtrong enough, to proceed to diveſt him of his dignities, and confer them upon another Prince of his houſe. Prince Caſimer of Naſſau was already in poſſeſſion of the government of Frieſland, and Groningen: and the inhabitants of Amſterdam, ‘invited him and his court to their city, with an intent to confer on him the Stadtholderſhip, in the room of his couſin the Prince of Orange: the project was baffled by the harmony [40] ſubſiſting between the two Princes.’ (p. 321.) But the magiſtrates determined to compenſate their diſappointment, "by ſome other method of revenge," no leſs ſignal and mortifying. And by means of the Louveſtien party, Lewis XIV. was ſtill able to ‘maintain the Provinces in a kind of ſubjection; to limit the authority of the Stadtholder, and prevent all vigorous reſolutions.’

But theſe threatening appearances paſſed away ſooner than might be expected: we are left to conjecture how they were diſpelled: but probably, the reſtleſs ambition of the French cabinet; the attention of James II. to his army and navy; and the declarations of his prieſts, that the force of the two monarchies would again be joined againſt the republic, revived the popularity and influence of the Prince; and induced the States, to lend the moſt cordial aſſiſtance to his ſucceſsful expedition into England; which ſeated him upon the throne of theſe kingdoms: and it may be added, which inſured to him the peaceable poſſeſſion of his dignities in the republic, which before ſeemed dubious. ‘For that party, which had ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the Prince of Orange, reſigned itſelf intirely to the direction of the King of Great Britain: ſuch influence had he acquired ſince his acceſſion to that throne.’ (p. 343.)

But the Louveſtien party, or the Arminians, ſtill continued to endeavour to maintain and extend their natural foundation of power, by a diligent propagation of their religious opi⯑nions. And it was at the particular inſtance of King William, that the States of Holland and Frieſland publiſhed an edict in September, 1694; ordering all the clergy, in their ſermons, to preach no other doctrine than that approved by the ſynod of Dordrecht: ‘to introduce no uncommon axioms, no novel opinions or doctrines in their writings; and not to examine by the light of reaſon, what was intended by the author of our being to exceed reaſon.’ (p. 346.)

[41]The difference with which William treated the diſ⯑ſenters of England and Holland, is eaſily explained; an enmity to France was his ruling principle: the diſſenters in Holland were blindly attached to that nation; he meant therefore, at leaſt, to reſtrain their increaſe by this edict: thoſe of England were actuated againſt it by reſentments equal to his own; ‘they were willing and able to ſerve him’ in his favourite views: and it was with reluctance he ſaw himſelf deprived of their ſervices, by the operation of the teſt act. Whether the diſſenters in either country, were to be admitted to the ſame privileges as the reſt of the ſubjects, or to be refuſed a toleration; depended with him upon the anſwer to this queſtion; are they enemies or friends to the French intereſt? It is eaſy to ſee, this is not the point upon which the queſtion ought to turn: but the perſecutions of his youth are an apology for the errors of his judgment upon this ſubject: his ſentiments however add no weight to the argument againſt the Teſt act.

It is at this period, that the work, which has been hitherto followed, breaks off: but it appears, from the laſt extract, that the religious diſputes were revived; and the Arminians were again gaining ground in the Provinces. And the events which followed the death of William, ſhow that the Louveſ⯑tien party immediately obtained poſſeſſion of the government, and effected a third change in its form; the office of Stadt⯑holder being ſuppreſſed a ſecond time. In the year 1747, it was again reſtored in a tumultuous manner by the people; whoſe attachment to the houſe of Orange has always ſub⯑ſiſted unaltered. Under the adminiſtration of the preſent Stadtholder, we have ſeen the Louveſtien party once more revive, and acquire ſuch a degree of ſtrength, as in the year 1787, to deprive him of many of the powers annexed to his office, expel him from the Hague, and almoſt effect another revolution; which they manifeſtly intended: when the inter⯑poſition [42] of Pruſſia and Great Britain, reſtored the Prince to all the prerogatives of which he had been diveſted.

This ſketch of the hiſtory of the civil commotions of Hol-Holland, comprehends a term of 178 years: in this time, four revolutions have been effected: the Stadtholderſhip having been twice ſuppreſſed by edict, and twice reſtored by popular inſurrections. Four other revolutions were upon the very point of taking place: Maurice, and his grandſon William, had each of them very nearly erected an abſolute ſovereignty in the Provinces: a third was very probably avoided by the moderation of Prince Caſimer; who declined the invitation of the powerful city of Amſterdam, to ſet up as Stadtholder againſt his couſin William III. and the weakneſs of France, in the year 1787, is the probable cauſe why the Provinces are not, at this inſtant, over-run with the forces of England, France, and Pruſſia; and hoſtile armies of their own inha⯑bitants.

The longeſt interval, during which Holland enjoyed a form of government which had the appearance of being fixed, was from the death of King William to the year 1747; or about 45 years: if we deduct from the former part of it, the time, during which jealouſy, diſquiet, and diſorder, muſt have pre⯑vailed, after the demolition of the old government; and from the latter, that period of inteſtine confuſion, which muſt have preceded its tumultuary reſtoration; the middle of the term, in which ſome little domeſtic quiet may be ſuppoſed to have been enjoyed, will be found to be very ſhort.

From the length of time, during which theſe confuſions ſubſiſted, there is another obſervation which ſuggeſts itſelf to us: Holland certainly had not advanced in refinement, in liberality of ideas, and in ſcience, leſs than the other States of Europe: yet nearly two centuries have elapſed, ſince reli⯑gious antipathies, which afterward became cloſely connected with political diſputes, excited the two parties againſt each [43] other: an error in their laws put equal arms into the hands of both; and their animoſities are not yet at an end. A ſpace of time conſiderably leſs has intervened, ſince the diſſenters and the eſtabliſhed church of England were engaged in the moſt deſtructive civil hoſtilities: and it may properly be eſteemed, even at this juncture, too raſh to riſk the ſafety of the ſtate upon a probability, that time has wrought greater effect on one ſide of the water, than on the other.

The conſtitution of Holland, under the government of an hereditary Stadtholder, is effectively a ſpecies of mixed mo⯑narchy: and if it be compared to that of Great Britain, they will be found to bear more reſemblance to each other, than either of them does to an unlimited monarchy, or pure republic. Therefore, when our inquiries are directed to the effect of adopting or abrogating any law, upon the conſti⯑tution; as far as the propriety or impropriety of ſuch a meaſure is to be judged of from the experience of other ſtates, the examples drawn from the hiſtory of Holland, are the moſt concluſive. And the uniform tenor of the annals of that country, ſince it has acquired a ſettled independence, forms a connected maſs of evidence of the ſuperiority of the Engliſh ſyſtem of eccleſiaſtical laws, relating to the eſtabliſhment, over that adopted in the United Provinces: and particularly illuſtrates this poſition; that when the inhabitants of a ſtate are divided in their religious opinions, the executive power ought to be excluſively intruſted to members of the moſt numerous and powerful church.

III. The laſt propoſition to be treated of is, that the repeal of the teſt act would increaſe the power of the popular part of the conſtitution; and therefore, that its continuance is neceſſary to preſerve it in its preſent ſtate.

[44]To what is to be brought in proof of this, I ſhall premiſe one obſervation upon the preſent ſtate of the Britiſh conſti⯑tution. It is now very generally admitted, that more liberty is actually enjoyed under a mixed monarchy, than under a republic: the conſequence of which is, that when ſuch a monarchy approaches to a republican form of government, nearer than by a certain diſtance, be that what it may, liberty itſelf begins to be diminiſhed, independent of the additional loſs of ſecreſy in its councils, and celerity in their execution. Therefore, when it is in the ſituation deſcribed, to decreaſe the democratic power by degrees or otherwiſe, or to diminiſh that of the other two branches, is inimical to the ſtate.

I preſume it may be aſſerted, that the beſt friends of this country concur in thinking, that our conſtitution is arrived to that point; or ſo near to it, that the aberration is too minute to be aſcertained, and it cannot be determinately fixed on which ſide it falls.^‡ I ſhall therefore ſhow, in the firſt place, that the tenets of the Engliſh diſſenters, with reſpect to eccle⯑ſiaſtical polity, biaſs them perpetually to increaſe the weight of the popular part of the civil conſtitution, and decreaſe that of the ſovereign.

[45]While the government of the eſtabliſhed church is extremely analogous to the conſtitution of the ſtate, a circumſtance, per⯑haps of ſome conſiderable advantage to the ſtability of the latter, the body of the diſſenters have choſen to adopt a repub⯑lican polity: and the mode in which this influences their political opinions, is to be examined.

It is natural to ſtudy with our beſt attention, the arguments in favour of thoſe opinions, which we are moſt frequently obliged to defend; and againſt thoſe which we are moſt frequently called upon to oppoſe, or ſet ourſelves to combat. And if a diligent application of this kind produce no change in our tenets, an event little to be expected; we naturally become more attached to them, than to thoſe, in defence of which we have not prepared ourſelves with ſo much ſolicitude, or contended for with ſuch vigour and perſeverance. It is thus moſt probably, that the Engliſh diſſenters have become ſo firmly wedded to their republican form of church govern⯑ment, and their oppoſition to epiſcopacy. With what a pecu⯑liar degree of ſtrength they are devoted to theſe principles, we may judge from this ſingular circumſtance; that at the beginning of the preſent century, it was ſufficient to draw upon them the cenſures of the Calviniſtic divines of the church of Charenton, who are the head of the French Pro⯑teſtants; that of the divinity profeſſor of the Dutch Univer⯑ſity of Leyden; and of the Univerſity of Geneva itſelf; which, by a letter to that of Oxford, profeſſed the moſt unqualified diſapprobation to their oppoſition to the diſcipline of the church of England; which it does not appear, that the intervention of fourſcore years has at all diminiſhed. The conſequences of their particular attachment to this republican polity, deſerves and requires a particular conſi⯑deration, with reſpect to the ſubject before us.

It is well known, with what aſſiduity and diligence the peculiar doctrines of the diſſenters are inſtilled into the minds [46] of their children, at the earlieſt time of life: and the atten⯑tion paid to inform them of all the arguments in behalf of thoſe points, in which they hold opinions diametrically oppo⯑ſite to the eſtabliſhed church, will naturally, as hath been obſerved, form that part of their religious lectures, which will be with the greateſt care impreſſed upon their minds. Now the defence of the republican ſyſtem of church government, in oppoſition to that of the eſtabliſhment, (which they perſiſt in, after the cenſures of the great foreign Calviniſtic churches) is chiefly grounded upon arguments, equally applicable to the defence of a republican conſtitution; therefore, when they grow up into men, if they be ſincerely attached to their religious principles, every thing connected with them becomes venerable; and arguments eſteemed concluſive, when applied to the conſtitution of the church, will have part of the weight of religious reverence added to them, when applied to the conſtitution of the ſtate: for it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that a conſcientious man, who to-day holds a principle, in reſpect and approbation, as connected with his religion, and neceſſary to the defence of it; will, when to-morrow it is applied to another ſubject, condemn the legitimate deductions from it, as the maxims of turbulence and licentiouſneſs. Hence we may naturally expect to find many of the diſſenters, who will determinately follow theſe principles their full length: and that a great majority of their whole number will be ſo far biaſſed by them, as perpetually to endeavour to add new weight and power to the popular part of the government, or to diminiſh the efficacy of the two other branches; and yet be able to deceive themſelves into a belief, that they continue friends to liberty and a limited monarchy: though, in a conſtitution ſo well balanced as our own, any nearer ap⯑proach to a popular form of government, muſt be inimical to both. It is upon theſe accounts, that we find ſo many avowed republicans among the diſſenters; and that a very [47] great majority of them are diſſatisfied; from a conception, that the people poſſeſs too little power, and the ſovereign too much.

Let us now, in the ſecond place, proceed to trace the conſequences of the political principles of the diſſenters, upon a ſuppoſition, that they may be in future ſuffered to acquire a greater power in the ſtate, than they now enjoy. Its effect will be proportioned to its increaſe; and new ſtrength will accrue to the democratical part of the conſtitution, at the expence of the other two eſtates.

If the teſt act be aboliſhed, their power will be increaſed directly; by the influence they will acquire, from being admitted into all judicial offices, and many others, and the dependance they will be able to create, by providing eſta⯑bliſhments for many of the lower members of their ſeveral communions, at the expence of the ſtate. And it is to be added, that all the power they will thus acquire, will be a deduction from that at preſent poſſeſſed by the members of the eſtabliſhed church: for it is not to be ſuppoſed, that new offices will be created for them. In this caſe, the proportion of executive power, of offices and influence, which will fall into their hands, will greatly exceed that of their numbers and property: for although their numbers are ſtill much inferior to that of the national church; yet, whatever ſhades of difference of opinion may prevail among them, they are much more united in their political plans and exertions; purſue them with much greater diligence and addreſs; and in all political conteſts, or other competitions, with the members of the eſtabliſhment, they poſſeſs the advantage of a body of regular troops, acting againſt a numerous but undiſciplined militia. Theſe are qualities, I am not diſpoſed to blame in them, though the want of them elſewhere is an object of regret. But the calumny with which thoſe of their [48] opponents are loaded, who defend the cauſe of the conſtitution with the ſame vigour with which it is attacked, deſerves a ſevere cenſure.

If credit be given to the accounts of the ſtrength of this party, their numbers and their proportion to the whole people, have been increaſing ever ſince the revolution. For, to remove all apprehenſions of their ſtrength, the great advo⯑cate for the repeal repreſented them as being one-tenth^* part of the people. In his argument on this ſubject, he certainly did not overſtate their proportion: but, even upon this ground, it appears, that their relative ſtrength has been ſomething more than doubled, ſince the year 1689;^§ when an actual enumeration of the different religious ſects in the kingdom was made, by order of King William.

But their own calculations exhibit a much more formidable view of their progreſs: they affirm, that they are already one-fifth of the kingdom; and if ſo, as their influence in the corporations, and in the counties at large, together with their activity and ſkill in political management, has already given them poſſeſſion of an effective power in the ſtate, conſiderably greater than in proportion to their natural weight, or than one-fifth of the whole: repeal the teſt laws; admit them into the magiſtracy; add offices, and the power of providing for their lower dependants; and it muſt be increaſed in an [49] alarming degree;^† and they will get two-fifths of the power of the ſtate into their hands; which will be at leaſt as effective as the remaining three-fifths, in the hands of the members of the church of England. Hence it appears, that Dr. Prieſtley's aſſertion, that it will not ſurvive the repeal of the teſt act ten years, may be found to be eventually true. But if theſe conſequences do not hold, yet, their own calcu⯑lations being juſt, the proportion of their numbers to that of the eſtabliſhed church is four times, and their relative ſtrength five times, what it was at the revolution. And, after a repeal of the act, our eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment, in ſuch circumſtances, will be able to ſtand its ground but a very few years.

But, whatever may be the accuracy of theſe ſtatements, or the juſtice of this elucidation of Dr. Prieſtley's prophecy; it appears very clearly, that a repeal of the teſt acts would have greatly increaſed the power of the diſſenters in the ſtate. That their religious tenets, and the political principles they have conſtantly held, which are in ſtrict analogy to them, would have made them throw the greater part of this newly acquired weight into the popular ſcale, which would have deſtroyed the preſent balance of power in the government: a government, under which the ſtate has ſubſiſted an hundred years, without convulſions ariſing from the attempt of any one power of which it is compoſed, to uſurp upon the privi⯑leges and prerogatives of the other: or without any abuſe of them, enough to juſtify a wiſh for an alteration.

It is alleged, that the repeal of the act will not affect the conſtitution, either in church or ſtate; ſome conſequences of it to the civil conſtitution have been already conſidered. And in theſe, the church will be at leaſt equally involved: but it [50] muſt likewiſe be attended with dangers of another kind to our religious eſtabliſhment; the nature of which is now to be explained.

If the acts had been aboliſhed, the diſſenters would, as judges of the ſupreme courts, and as magiſtrates of the counties and corporations, have acquired juriſdiction; in all caſes relating to the doctrines and worſhip of the church, as eſtabliſhed by ſtatute, and in thoſe relating to its income: together with the patronage incident to theſe offices: the conſequences of which are to be examined.

It may be laid down, as one abſolute and neceſſary con⯑dition of the admiſſibility of any man to a civil office, that ‘he ſhould not be in principle, either religious or political, inimical to the execution of any one branch of it.’ The effect of laws by no means depends upon their dead letter: it is ſometimes almoſt totally derived from the ſpirit with which they are adminiſtered: that is, from the principles of thoſe who carry them into execution; or at leaſt it is much tinctured by them. And this is more particularly true of religious laws. Long before the ſevere ſtatutes againſt Ca⯑tholics were abrogated, the judges favoured every evaſion of them: yet this certainly did not ariſe from any favour they bore to the doctrines of that ſect. And as it cannot be imagined, that thoſe laws would have been more effective, if there had been ſome Catholic judges upon the bench; in like manner, the ſanctions of every ſtatute, by which the doctrine and diſcipline of the church of England is noW protected, will be rendered nugatory, when diſſenting judges are admitted into Weſtminſter Hall: unleſs we ſuppoſe, that they will act with more vigour to ſuppreſs religious principles they approve, than their predeceſſors did againſt thoſe they condemned. Now, as by the term 'eſtabliſhment of the church,' its eſta⯑bliſhment by law is meant on both ſides; and the repeal of the [51] teſt act ſtrongly tends to render thoſe laws nugatory, it tends, in the ſame degree, to ſubvert the eſtabliſhment.

How the repeal would naturally affect the revenue of the eſtabliſhed church, requires very little explanation. Its prin⯑cipal income is derived from the tithes, a tax originally granted by the ſtate for the maintenance of the clergy. And juries being formed out of the body of the people, whoſe intereſt is affected by that tax, the influence and authority of a judge, not hoſtile to its principle, will be frequently no more than is abſolutely neceſſary, to guard againſt thoſe errors of judgment, into which an able advocate may lead them. But if he ſhould think the ſtipends of the clergy, the wages of propagating ſuperſtition and error; or an invaſion of the property of individuals, under the colour of laws, obtained in an age of darkneſs and ignorance, one or both of which muſt be the belief of every diſſenting judge, he will not frequently think himſelf obliged to act againſt his religious principles; by removing miſconceptions, which he firmly believes innocent in themſelves, and uſeful to religion, and the ſtate: but imagine he has done his full duty, if he paſſively leave the jury to that bias, with which an habitual ſentiment of general intereſt may influence their deciſions; though in a manner, perhaps at the time unperceived by themſelves: a bias, againſt which, our excellent inſtitution of trials by jury, in every other caſe, has ſo ſucceſsfully guarded; but which, in this, perhaps admits no cure; and can only be counteracted, by the attention of the judge to anticipate its effects.

Theſe exceptions likewiſe extend to the admiſſion of diſ⯑ſenters into the magiſtracy of corporations or counties, as far as by theſe offices, they would gain a juriſdiction in matters relating either to the diſcipline or revenue of the church: moreover, as an incident to theſe offices, they would likewiſe [52] acquire a conſiderable eccleſiaſtical patronage; the conſe⯑quence of which deſerves ſome attention.

The magiſtrates in the counties at large, have ſome eccle⯑ſiaſtical benefices in their gift, but there are more belonging to particular corporations. And although the ſtate has thought it improper to injure the freehold of the diſſenting patron, by taking from him the right of preſentation; yet no new ſole or joint right of nomination to an office, ought to be created by law, for the purpoſe of being inveſted in any man, who is either upon political or religious principles, inimical to the legal exerciſe of that office. For, in the latter caſe, which is the only one treated of here; the civil and religious duty of the diſſenting magiſtrate, are ſet in oppoſition to each other: his civil duty obliges him to give a preference to the candidate for a benefice, who he thinks will beſt fulfil all the purpoſes of the office conferred on him; one of which is, to diminiſh, by all proper means, the extent and influence of the magiſ⯑trate's religious tenets: but his religious duty will draw him in an abſolutely contrary direction.

Hence it appears, that it is a very difficult taſk to prove, that a diſſenter can, with due regard to his moral and reli⯑gious obligations, take the oath required by law of every magiſtrate. For that oath, conſtrued without evaſion, obliges him certainly to execute every function of his office, according to the true intent and meaning of the legiſlator. If his nomi⯑nation to the preferments of the church, according to that intent and meaning, be given to thoſe who are moſt likely to draw back to the eſtabliſhment, the members of the diſſenting congregations, and, among the reſt, his own; he has volun⯑tarily accepted a ſituation, in which he muſt betray and injure the intereſts of what he eſteems the true religion; that is, he voluntarily determines upon occaſion, ſo to injure it. If he follow the contrary conduct, he executes an incidental function of his office, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the [53] legiſlator: and if, which is the third and only remaining caſe, he take the office, with a general determination not to act upon ſuch occaſions; this predetermined Non-feaſance is contrary to the general tenor of oaths of office: which does not permit the magiſtrate, "to let for any cauſe," to perform the whole functions of that office. In this caſe, the oath, by which a diſſenting magiſtrate muſt bind himſelf to ſociety and the laws, is contradictory to his antecedent religious duties. He would find himſelf likewiſe under the ſame diffi⯑culties, in carrying into execution many of the laws relating to the eſtabliſhed church; and perhaps we ſhall not advance too far, if we conclude, that any man's willingneſs to involve himſelf in ſuch a ſituation, amounts to a ſufficient moral diſqualification to office.

IV. I now come to examine the merits of ſome of the political arguments, which are urged in favour of the repeal of the teſt act: ſelecting for this review, thoſe only, in which a greater degree of confidence ſeems to have been repoſed by the friends of that meaſure.

The firſt is, that of the two great functions of government, legiſlation and the execution of laws; the former is the ſupe⯑rior: and as no injury to the ſtate reſults, or has reſulted, from the diſſenters poſſeſſing legiſlative power, in common with the members of the eſtabliſhed church; no evil can ariſe from ſuffering them to enjoy a ſhare in the executive power; a department, in its nature inferior, and of leſs confidence than the other.

This argument tacitly ſuppoſes a principle, as univerſally true, which no one can admit as ſuch, when it is laid ſimply before him: that is, that thoſe who are able to take the ſupreme direction in any buſineſs, poſſeſs every qualification to carry it into execution, in all its inferior parts. But it is matter of daily experience, that theſe two diſtinct depart⯑ments [54] may call for different qualifications: and that there may be qualities abſolutely neceſſary in the ſubor⯑dinate agent, which thoſe in the ſupreme direction do not want to poſſeſs; and if they did, that they could not avail themſelves of the uſe of them.

To bring this general obſervation to the particular point before us: to the objection ſtated above, it is anſwered, that the diſſenters do not poſſeſs the qualifications, which intitle them to have a ſhare in the executive part of government: or in other words, that they hold principles which disqualify them therefrom. But that theſe principles do not render it inexpedient, to confer upon them a ſhare of the legiſlative power.

As to the firſt of theſe propoſitions, it may be laid down as a univerſal maxim, that no meaſure, no ſyſtem of meaſures, or ſyſtem of laws, will be duly carried into execution, by thoſe who are enemies to them upon principle, either in the whole, or in part: in which latter deſcription, it has been already ſhown, that every ſect of the diſſenters are involved.

But when a law is to be made or amended, every thing which can be alleged, for or againſt the principle of that law or amendment, and on its ſeveral parts, ought to be heard with equal advantage. That is, when a queſtion is properly before an aſſembly, competent to the deciſion of it, the advo⯑cate and opponents of it ought to be heard at the ſame time, that their oppoſite arguments may be fairly compared; and that they ſhould be enabled to ſupport their principles in the ſame manner, that is, by vote, as well as by argument. And in the diſcuſſions of this nature in our legiſlative aſſem⯑blies, thoſe whoſe education biaſſes them too much to the popular part of the conſtitution, or to reduce the dignity and power of the church; may form, in either houſe, no more than a proper counterpoiſe to thoſe, who are diſpoſed to the [55] oppoſite unconſtitutional errors. Exclude either of them, and the conſtitution will be in danger of inclining too much to the oppoſite extreme. Hence, a part of the two eſtates of the legiſlature may very properly be diſſenters from the eſta⯑bliſhment; although, as it has been ſhown before, perſons of that deſcription ought not to be intruſted with executive power.

It is not only in debates on the principle of a law, that it is expedient not to ſuppreſs oppoſition of opinion; its prin⯑ciple may be excellent, yet, in all probability, many of its parts may be greatly improved, by the vigilance of thoſe who entertain very different ſentiments of it. The perfection of the outline will frequently conceal the faults of the ſubor⯑dinate parts, from the obſervation of the ſanguine favourers of the general tendency of a law: and they will moſtly eſcape all detection, but that of the watchful jealouſy of an adverſe party: for it is equally the fate of improvements of legiſ⯑lation, and of new diſcoveries in every other ſcience; to receive much of their ultimate perfection, from the objections of thoſe who are eager in oppoſition to them.

There is another argument, which is very ſtrongly alleged in favour of the proteſtant diſſenters; derived from the ſupport they have, on different occaſions, given to the conſtitution: which is urged as a deciſive proof, that they hold no prin⯑ciples dangerous to its ſtability, but, on the contrary, are intitled to the total confidence of the ſtate; and an equal ſhare in all honours and offices, with the members of the eſtabliſhed church.

This is ſuppoſed to be abundantly ſufficient to outweigh the preſumption, that an admiſſion of their claims, would increaſe too much the ſtrength of the popular part of the government: it is neceſſary, therefore, that we ſhould be able to find in their conduct, on the occaſion referred to, [56] ſufficient ground to diſprove the truth of this apprehenſion.

Now let the merit of their tardy concurrence to that oppo⯑ſition to James II. which produced the revolution; and their leſs ambiguous deſerts in joining chearfully with the majority of the nation, in placing the preſent royal family upon the throne, and oppoſing two rebellions, be eſtimated at any amount they may chuſe; it does not in the leaſt invalidate the objection laid down againſt their admiſſibility to office: ſuch conduct being as perfectly coincident with the diſquali⯑fying principle alleged againſt them, as with thoſe more ſober maxims of civil liberty, which are the guards, upon which our free government muſt depend, for the effective part of its ſupport. If the efforts of the ſtate had been unſucceſsful in any one of theſe ſtruggles, the principal weight of the blow would have fallen upon the popular part of the conſtitution. Can their zealous defence of it at theſe times, be wrought up into a proof, that they do not wiſh its aggrandizement, at the expence of the other two? In ſuch a national calamity, they themſelves would probably have been the firſt victims. And is it a political merit, that, ſtanding firſt in danger, they determined to arm with their fellow citizens in ſelf-defence? But, in their zeal for the common cauſe, did they not hazard themſelves, on one ſide, to the bitter and increaſ⯑ing reſentments of the enemy? and did they not expoſe themſelves, on the other, to the rigour of the penal laws of that eſtabliſhment, whoſe battles they fought? the anſwer lies in a very ſmall compaſs: ‘with an act of indemnity in their pockets.’ Under the joint influence of political prin⯑ciple and ſelf-defence, the moſt decided republican muſt have acted as they did: their conduct therefore cannot be brought in proof, that their ſentiments do not incline them too much to the popular part of the conſtitution: and neither proof, nor ſhadow of proof, ariſes from it, that it is expedient to [57] take off their diſqualifications. Reverſe the caſe, and it may very well be left to their own deciſion. Suppoſe, that in any point of time, there had exiſted in the kingdom, a conſider⯑able party, deſirous of increaſing the royal power, at the expence of that of the other two eſtates; ſuch as the Catho⯑lics may be eſteemed formerly to have been; and like them, excluded from all offices by a teſt act: and ſuppoſe an attempt to be made by a republican army to ſubvert the conſtitution; that this is oppoſed, its true and real ſupporters, men, who though friends to a limited kingly government, would not lay the liberties of the nation at the foot of the throne; the part that will be taken by the monarchical faction is certain, they will join the latter: and if, by this junction, the conſtitution is preſerved, can it be ſaid, that their principles are thus proved to be conſtitutional, or that they are leſs objects of political jealouſy than before?

It is further ſaid, that the national church ſtands, in ſome degree, engaged to concur with the diſſenters in the repeal of the act: its object having been, at a time of particular dan⯑ger, to diſqualify the Catholics to hold civil offices. And, as it was not probable, that an act, directed excluſively againſt that ſect, would at that time have paſſed; the diſſenters ſuffered themſelves to be included in it, upon an expectation, that, at a ſubſequent period, an act would be made for their relief.

In this account we are left to conjecture, whether their expectation was founded on a promiſe, made by ſome mem⯑bers of the eſtabliſhed church, or not. It is moſt probable, if there had been any explicit engagement, it would have been explicitly cited; for there is little doubt, but ſome account of it would have been preſerved: if not, it amounts to no more, than that the diſſenters expected the repeal above a century ago; and therefore, they demand it now.

[58]Let us ſuppoſe an engagement of this kind was entered into by a private junto of churchmen and diſſenters: if we paſs by the preſumption of a few unauthoriſed individuals, clandeſtinely giving and receiving an engagement, by which, the determinations of the legiſlature were undertaken for: it bound thoſe who were pledged, to exert themſelves to the utmoſt, to carry it into effect: but it could not bind the legiſ⯑lative bodies, who were not parties to the agreement: and, if it had, the obligation would have been diſſolved with the parliament; it could not bind parliaments not then in being; who, if they found the law unrepealed, and judged it to be good, were in duty obliged to continue it; and, even if it had been repealed before the date of their exiſtence, to have reenacted it.

The teſt act, like all other laws, muſt ſtand and fall by its own merit; and not upon that of the conduct and deſigns of its original framers; their motives, or the mode in which it was brought forward. Our law books contain ſome excellent ſtatutes, for which the firſt authors are intitled to very little praiſe. The animoſity of the long parliament againſt the Dutch, was their principal motive to paſs the navigation act: a motive at leaſt impolitic; but the act itſelf is one of the beſt that exiſts, in the European codes of mercantile laws. The habeas corpus act ſtands as high, among thoſe laws which ſecure the liberties of the ſubject: James II. whoſe infor⯑mation was probably better than that of any private hiſtorian, informs us, that it was projected by Lord Shafteſbury, when, being engaged in the proſecution of his ſeditious meaſures, he was apprehenſive of being impriſoned, by the diſcretionary power the King then exerciſed. The impolitic animoſity, which dictated one law, and the treaſonable motives of the other, will not be thought a ſufficient argument for their repeal: and the like may be ſaid of the teſt act, if it were improperly obtained.

[59]The diſſenters further contend, that their excluſion from office by the religious teſt laws, is a deprivation of their natural rights, as men; to which they ought to be reſtored, by their being repealed.

This argument ſeems not only erroneous, but to contain an error of a very particular kind. In its terms, it appears to be an appeal to the principles of freedom and natural equality; but, when it comes to be conſidered, it will be found to reſt upon a principle, repugnant to the firſt great canon of civil liberty; and which has always been revered by them, as a principle of the higheſt importance.

Rights may be divided into two claſſes, natural and con⯑ventional. The latter are acquired by compact only; and have no exiſtence previous to the compact, but ſolely in conſequence of it. The right to the powers of magiſtracy, is founded on a compact between the magiſtrate and the people, or the majority of the people; and the right cannot exiſt prior to the contract. And no man is eligible, or can hold ſuch an office, only by ſuch a contract de facto, or the ſuppoſition of the exiſtence of ſuch a contract: but no ſuch ſuppoſition can be admitted, where the law (the voice of the people) declares it not to exiſt. This is the foundation of all freedom in civil government; the baſis on which all authority, from that of the loweſt officer in the ſtate, to that of the ſupreme magiſtrate, is mediately or immediately founded. And when the people have de⯑clared, by the voices of perſons properly authoriſed by them, that they will not enter into ſuch compacts, with perſons of a certain deſcription, (an act, which, it will not be diſputed, but they are fully competent to) they can be in poſſeſſion of no right to office, without a contra⯑diction to theſe principles: and, as there exiſts no natural right to a civil office, the diſſenters cannot ſay that by the teſt act they are deprived of ſuch rights.

[60]The laſt of the arguments urged by the diſſenters which I ſhall conſider, is founded upon the ſame principles with the former: that to be diſqualified from holding an office is pe⯑nal; and the penalty inflicted by law, upon ſome of the greateſt offenders againſt ſociety. And, that all penalties upon account of religion, are but ſo many modifications of abſolute perſecution. The pretenſions of this argument to weight and validity are very minute indeed. The bare non-poſſeſſion of any deſireable thing cannot be conſidered as pe⯑nal: to make it ſo there muſt have exiſted ſome antecedent right to the thing; now the rights of perſons, are either natu⯑ral or founded on compact: a natural right to a civil office cannot exiſt, the right muſt be founded on compact; and no claim to a right by compact can be ſet up, while the teſti⯑mony of the ſociety to the non exiſtence of ſuch contract, ſubſiſts in the letter of the law: or, which is the ſame thing, when it is denied by the voice of the people, ſpeaking in their political capacity: and when ſuch a queſtion ariſes ‘it muſt be decided by the voice of the ſociety itſelf: there is not upon earth any other tribunal to reſort to.’ ^* The diſſenters therefore are diveſted of no right, and no actual poſſeſſion, by not being eligible to office, it is therefore no penal infliction or penalty.

I conclude this eſſay, by an obſervation on the two laſt ar⯑guments in favour of the repeal, here conſidered: upon a ſuppoſition that there exiſts a right in the ſtate, to eſtabliſh [61] the religion of the majority of its members by law (and the body of the diſſenters have not thought it proper to ground their application againſt the teſt acts, upon a denial of this aſſumption) theſe abſtract doctrines of the rights of individuals, will aſſiſt us in proving the direct contrary of the principle, they were brought to ſupport and furniſh us with a new argu⯑ment, that it is the duty of all legiſlators to guard an eſta⯑bliſhed religion by a teſt law.

For it muſt be admitted to be the duty of the legiſlature, to enact every regulation, which is expedient for the due and entire execution of the laws; which does not violate the rights of individuals; that is, their natural or conventional rights. But it is expedient, in order to enſure that due execution, to exclude every claſs of men from a ſhare of the executive power, whoſe principles, religious or civil, are ini⯑mical to the whole or any part of the laws which are entruſt⯑ed to their execution; while any other perſons are to be found, againſt whom ſuch a material objection does not lie. Now this does not violate any natural or conventional right, as hath been ſhown above: It is therefore the duty of the legiſlature to eſtabliſh that principle by a poſitive law: and the diſſenters, being by their religious principles inimi⯑cal to that great branch of the laws, which eſtabliſhes the national church, they ought to be excluded from the magiſ⯑tracy by law.