THOMAS PAINE, TO GEORGE WASHINGTON,

AS cenſure is but awkwardly ſoftened by apology, I ſhall offer you no apology for this letter. The eventful criſis to which your double politics have con⯑ducted the affairs of your country requires an inveſti⯑gation uncramped by ceremony.

There was a time when the fame of America, moral and political, ſtood fair and high in the world. The luſtre of her revolution extended itſelf to every indi⯑vidual; and to be a citizen of America gave a title to reſpect in Europe. Neither meanneſs nor ingratitude had then mingled itſelf into the compoſition of her character. Her reſiſtance to the attempted tyranny of England left her unſuſpected of the one, and her open acknowledgment of the aid ſhe received from [4]France precluded all ſuſpicion of the other. The Waſh⯑ington of politics had not then appeared.

At the time I left America (April 1787) the conti⯑nental convention that formed the federal conſtitution was on the point of meeting. Since that time new ſchemes of politics and new diſtinctions of parties, have ariſen. The term Antifederaliſt has been applied to all thoſe who combated the defects of that conſtitution, or oppoſed the meaſures of your adminiſtration. It was only to the abſolute neceſſity of eſtabliſhing ſome federal authority, extending equally over all the States, that an inſtrument, ſo inconſiſtent as the preſent fede⯑ral conſtitution is, obtained a ſuffrage. I would have voted for it myſelf, had I been in America, or even for a worſe rather than have had none; provided it con⯑tained the means of remedying its defects by the ſame appeal to the people by which it was to be eſtabliſhed. It is always better policy to leave removeable errors to expoſe themſelves, than to hazard too much in con⯑tending againſt them theoretically.

I have introduced thoſe obſervations, not only to mark the general difference between antifederaliſt and anti-conſtitutionaliſt, but to preclude the effect, and even the application, of the former of thoſe terms to myſelf. I declare myſelf oppoſed to ſeveral matters in the conſtitution, particularly to the man⯑ner in which, what is called the Executive, is form⯑ed, and to the long duration of the Senate; and [5]if I live to return to America I will uſe all my en⯑deavours to have them altered.^* I alſo declare my⯑ſelf oppoſed to almoſt the whole of your adminiſtra⯑tion; for I know it to have been deceitful, if not even perfidious, as I ſhall ſhew in the courſe of this letter. But as to the point of conſolidating the ſtates into a federal government, it ſo happens, that the pro⯑poſition for that purpoſe came originally from myſelf. I propoſed it in a letter to Chancellor Livingſton in the ſpring of the year 1782, whilſt that gentleman was mi⯑niſter for foreign affairs. The five per cent. duty re⯑commended by Congreſs had then fallen through, having been adopted by ſome of the States, altered by others, rejected by Rhode Iſland, and repealed by Virginia after it had been conſented to. The propo⯑ſal in the letter I allude to was to get over the whole difficulty at once, by annexing a continental legiſlative body to Congreſs; for, in order to have any law of the Union uniform, the caſe could only be, that either Congreſs, as it then ſtood, muſt frame the law, and the States ſeverally adopt it without alteration, or, the States muſt elect a Continental Legiſlature for the purpoſe. Chancellor Livingſton, Robert Morris, Go⯑verneur [6]Morris and myſelf had a meeting at the houſe of Robert Morris on the ſubject of that letter. There was no diverſity of opinion on the propoſition for a Continental Legiſlature. The only difficulty was on the manner of bringing the propoſition forward. For my own part, as I conſidered it as a remedy in reſerve, that could be applied at any time, when the States ſaw themſelves wrong enough to be put right (which did not appear to me to be the caſe at that time) I did not ſee the propriety of urging it precipitately, and declined being the publiſher of it myſelf. After this account of a fact, the leaders of your party will ſcarcely have the hardineſs to apply to me the term of antifederaliſt. But I can go to a date and to a fact beyond this; for the propoſition for electing a Continental Convention to form the Continental Government is one of the ſub⯑jects treated of in the pamphlet Common Senſe.

Having thus cleared away a little of the rubbiſh that might otherwiſe have lain in my way, I return to the point of time at which the preſent Federal Conſtitu⯑tion and your adminiſtration began. It was very well ſaid by an anonymous writer in Philadelphia, about a year before that period, that "thirteen ſtaves and ne'er a hoop will not make a barrel," and as any kind of hoop⯑ing the barrel, however defectively executed, would be better than none, it was ſcarcely poſſible but that conſiderable advantages muſt ariſe from the federal hooping of the States. It was with pleaſure that every [7]ſincere friend to America beheld, as the natural effect of union, her riſing proſperity; and it was with grief they ſaw that proſperity mixed, even in the bloſſom, with the germ of corruption. Monopolies of every kind marked your adminiſtration almoſt in the moment of its commencement. The lands obtained by the re⯑volution were laviſhed upon partizans; the intereſt of the diſbanded ſoldier was ſold to the ſpeculator; in⯑juſtice was acted under the pretence of faith; and the chief of the army became the patron of the fraud. From ſuch a beginning what could be expected, but what has happened? A mean and ſervile ſubmiſſion to the inſults of one nation, treachery and ingratitude to another.

Some vices make their approach with ſuch a ſplen⯑did appearance, that we ſcarcely know to what claſs of moral diſtinctions they belong. They are rather vir⯑tues corrupted, than vices originally. But meanneſs and ingratitude, than vices originally. But meanneſs and ingratitude have nothing equivocal in their cha⯑racter. There is not a trait in them that renders them doubtful. They are ſo originally vice, that they are generated in the dung of other vices, and crawl into exiſtence with the filth upon their back. The fugi⯑tives have found protection in you, and the levee-room is their place of rendezvous.

As the Federal Conſtitution is a copy, not quite ſo baſe as the original, of the form of the Britiſh govern⯑ment, an imitation of its vices was naturally to be ex⯑pected. [8]So intimate is the connection between form and practice, that to adopt the one is to invite the other. Imitation is naturally progreſſive, and is rapidly ſo in matters that are vicious.

Soon after the Federal Conſtitution arrived in England, I received a letter from a female literary correſpondent (a native of New York) very well mixed with friendſhip, ſentiment and politics. In my anſwer to that letter I permitted myſelf to ram⯑ble into the wilderneſs of imagination, and to antici⯑pate what might hereafter be the condition of Ame⯑rica. I had no idea that the picture then drew was realizing ſo faſt, and ſtill leſs that, Mr. Waſhington was hurrying it on. As the extract I allude to is congenial with the ſubject I am upon, I here tran⯑ſcribe it.

‘You touch me on a very tender point when you ſay, that my friends on your ſide the water cannot be reconciled to the idea of my abandoning America, even for my native England. They are right. I had rather ſee my horſe Button eating the graſs of Bor⯑dentown or Morriſenia, than ſee all the pomp and ſhew of Europe.’

‘A thouſand years hence, for I muſt indulge a few thoughts, perhaps in leſs, America may be what England now is. The innocence of her cha⯑racter, that won the hearts of all nations in her fa⯑vour, may ſound like a romance, and her inimita⯑ble [9]virtue as if it had never been. The ruins of that liberty, which thouſands bled to obtain, may juſt furniſh materials for a village tale, or ex⯑tort a ſigh from ruſtic ſenſibility; whilſt the faſhion⯑able of that day, enveloped in diſſipation, ſhall de⯑ride the principle and deny the fact.’

‘When we contemplate the fall of empires & the extinction of the nations of the ancient world, we ſee but little more to excite our regret than the mouldering ruins of pompous palaces, magnificent monuments, lofty pyramids, and walls and towers of the moſt coſtly workmanſhip: But when the empire of America ſhall fall, the ſubject for con⯑templative ſorrow will be infinitely greater than crumbling braſs or marble can inſpire. It will not then be ſaid, here ſtood a temple of vaſt antiquity, here roſe a babel of inviſible height, or there a pa⯑lace of ſumptuous extravagance; but here ah pain⯑ful thought! the nobleſt work of human wiſ⯑dom, the grandeſt ſcene of human glory, the fair cauſe of freedom roſe and fell. Read this, and then aſk, if I forget America?’

Impreſſed, as I was, with apprehenſions of this kind, I had America conſtantly in mind in all the publica⯑tions I afterwards made. The firſt, and ſtill more, the ſecond part of Rights of Man bear evident marks of this watchfulneſs; and the Diſſertation on Firſt Principles of Government goes more directly to the [10]point than either of the former. I now paſs on to other ſubjects.

It will be ſuppoſed by thoſe into whoſe hands this letter may fall, that I have ſome perſonal reſentment againſt you; I will therefore ſettle this point before I proceed farther.

If I have any reſentment, you muſt acknowledge that I have not been haſty in declaring it; neither would it be now declared (for what are private re⯑ſentments to the public) if the cauſe of it did not unite itſelf as well with your public as your private charac⯑ter, and with the motives of your political conduct.

The part I acted in the American revolution is well known; I ſhall not here repeat it. I know alſo that had it not been for the aid received from France in men, money and ſhips, that your cold and unmi⯑litary conduct (as I ſhall ſhew in the courſe of this letter) would, in all probability, have loſt America; at leaſt ſhe would not have been the independent na⯑tion ſhe now is. You ſlept away your time in the field till the finances of the country were completely exhauſted, and you have but little ſhare in the glory of the final event. It is time, fir, to ſpeak the un⯑diſguiſed language of hiſtorical truth.

Elevated to the chair of the Preſidency you aſſu⯑med the merit of every thing to yourſelf, and the na⯑tural ingratitude of your conſtitution began to ap⯑pear. You commenced your Preſidential carreer by [11]encouraging and ſwallowing the groſſeſt adulation, and you travelled America from one end—to the other, to put yourſelf in the way of receiving it. You have as many addreſſes in your cheſt as James the II. As to what were your views, for if you are not great enough to have ambition you are little enough to have vanity, they cannot be directly inferred from expreſſions of your own; but the partizans of your politics have divulged the ſecret.

John Adams has ſaid (and John, it is known, was always a ſpeller after places and offices, and never thought his little ſervices were highly enough paid) John has ſaid, that as Mr. Waſhington had no child, that the Preſidency ſhould be made hereditary in the family of Lund Waſhington. John might then have counted upon ſome ſine-cure for himſelf and a proviſion for his deſcendants. He did not go ſo far as to ſay alſo, that the Vice Preſidency ſhould be he⯑reditary in the family of John Adams. He prudent⯑ly left that to ſtand upon the ground, that one good turn deſerves another.^*

John Adams is one of thoſe men who never con⯑templated the origin of government, or compre⯑hended any thing of firſt principles. If he had, he muſt have ſeen that the right to ſet up and eſtabliſh hereditary government never did, and never can, [12]exiſt in any generation, at any time whatever; that it is of the nature of treaſon; becauſe it is an at⯑tempt to take away the rights of all the minors living at that time, and of all ſucceeding generations. It is of a degree beyond common treaſon. It is a ſin againſt nature. The equal right of generations is a right fixed in the nature of things. It belongs to the ſon when of age, as it belonged to the father before him. John Adams would himſelf deny the right that any former deceaſed generation could have to decree authoritatively a ſucceſſion of Governors over him, or over his children; and yet he aſſumes the pretended right, treaſonable as it is, of acting it himſelf. His ignorance is his beſt excuſe.

John Jay has ſaid (and this John was always the ſycophant of every thing in power, from Mr. Girard in America to Grenville in England) John Jay has ſaid, that the Senate ſhould have been appointed for life. He would then have been ſure of never wanting a lucrative appointment for himſelf, nor have had any ſears about impeachments. Theſe, are the diſguiſed traitors that call themſelves federaliſts.^*

Could I have known to what degree of corruption & perfidy the adminiſtrative part of the government in America had deſcended, I could have been at no loſs to have underſtood the reſervedneſs of Mr. [13]Waſhington towards me, during my impriſonment in the Luxembourg. There are caſes in which ſi⯑lence is loud language.

I will here explain the cauſe of my impriſonment, and return to Mr. Waſhington afterwards.

In the courſe of that rage, terror and ſuſpicion, which the brutal letter of the Duke of Brunſwick firſt ſtarted into exiſtence in France, it happened, that almoſt every man who was oppoſed to violence, or who was not violent himſelf, became ſuſpected. I had conſtantly been oppoſed to every thing which was of the nature, or of the appearance, of violence; but as I had always done it in a manner that ſhew⯑ed it to be a principle founded in my heart, and not a political manoeuvre, it precluded the pretence of accuſing me. I was reached, however, under ano⯑ther pretence.

A decree was paſſed to impriſon all perſons born in England; but as I was a member of the Conven⯑tion, and had been complimented with the honorary ſtile of Citizen of France, as Mr. Waſhington and ſome other Americans had been, this decree fell ſhort of reaching me. A motion was afterwards made and carried, ſupported chiefly by Bourdon de l'Oiſe, for expelling foreigners from the Conven⯑tion. My expulsion being thus effected, the two committees of Public Safety and of General Sure⯑ty, [14]of which Robeſpierre was the dictator, put me in arreſtation under the former decree for impriſon⯑ing perſons born in England. Having thus ſhewn under what pretence the impriſonment was effected, I come to ſpeak of ſuch parts of the caſe as apply between me and Mr. Waſhington, either as Preſi⯑dent or as an individual.

I have always conſidered that a foreigner, ſuch as I was in fact with reſpect to France, might be a member of a Convention for forming a conſtitu⯑tion, without affecting his right of citizenſhip in the country to which he belongs, but not a member of a government after a conſtitution is formed; and I have uniformly acted upon this diſtinction. To be a member of a government requires that a perſon be in allegiance to that government and to the country locally. But a conſtitution being a thing of princi⯑ple and not of action, and which, after it be formed, is to be referred to the people for their approbation or rejection, does not require allegiance in the per⯑ſons forming and propoſing it; and beſides this, it is only to the thing after it be formed and eſtabliſhed, and to the country after its governmental character is fixed by the adoption of a conſtitution, that alle⯑giance can be given. No oath of allegiance or of citizenſhip was required of the members who com⯑poſed the Convention; there was nothing exiſting in form to ſwear allegiance to. If any ſuch condition [15]had been required I could not,as Citizen of America in fact, though Citizen of France by compliment, have accepted a ſeat in the Convention.

As my citizenſhip in America was not altered or diminiſhed, by any thing I had done in Europe (on the contrary it ought to have been conſidered as ſtrengthened, for it was the American principle of government that I was endeavouring to ſpread in Europe) and as it is the duty of every government to charge itſelf with the care of any of its citizens who may happen to fall under an arbitrary perſecution a⯑broad, and is alſo one of the reaſons for which Am⯑baſſadors or Miniſters are appointed,—it was the duty of the executive department in America to have made (at leaſt) ſome enquiries about me, as ſoon as it heard of my impriſonment. But if this had not been the caſe, that government owed it to me on e⯑very ground and principle of honor and gratitude. Mr. Waſhington owed it to me on every ſcore of private acquaintance, I will not now ſay, firend⯑ſhip; for it has for ſome time been known, by thoſe who know him, that he has no friendſhips; that he is incapable of forming any; he can ſerve or deſert a man or a cauſe with conſtitutional indifference; and it is this cold hermophrodite faculty that impoſed it⯑ſelf upon the world, and was credited for a while by enemies as by friends, for prudence, moderation and impartiality.

[16]Soon after that I was put in arreſtation and im⯑priſoned in the Luxembourg, the Americans who were then in Paris went in a body to the bar of the Convention to reclaim me. They were anſwered by the, then, Preſident, Vadier, who has ſince abſcond⯑ed, that I was born in England; and it was ſignified to them by ſome of the Committee of surety Gene⯑ral, to whom they were referred (I have been told it was Billaud Varrennes) that their reclamation of me was only that act of individuals without any autho⯑rity from the American government.

A few days after this, ail communication from perſons impriſoned to any perſon without the priſon was cut off by an order of the Police. I neither ſaw, nor heard from, any body for ſix months; and the only hope that remained to me was, that a new miniſter would arrive from America to ſuper-cede Morris, and that he would be authoriſed to en⯑quire into the cauſe of my impriſonment. But even this hope, in the ſtate to which matters were daily arriving, was too remote to have any conſolatory ef⯑fect, and I contented myſelf with the thought, that I might be remembered when it would be too late. There is perhaps no condition from which a man conſcious of his own uprightneſs cannot derive con⯑ſolation; for it is in itſelf a conſolation for him to find that he can bear that condition with calmneſs and fortitude.

[17]From about the middle of March (1794) to the fall of Robeſpierre, 29th July, (9th of Thermidor) the ſtate of things in the priſon was a continued ſcene of horror. No man could count upon life for twen⯑ty hours. To ſuch a pitch of rage and ſuſpicion was Robeſpierre and his committee arrived, that it ſeem⯑ed as if they feared to leave a man to live. Scarce⯑ly a night paſſed but in which ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty or more were taken out of the priſon, carried before a pretended tribunal in the morning, and guillotined before night. One hundred and ſix⯑ty nine were taken out of the Luxembourg in one night in the month of July and one hundred and ſixty of them guillotined. A liſt of two hundred more, according to the report in the priſon, was preparing a few days before Robeſpierre fell. In this laſt liſt I have good reaſon to believe I was included. A memorandum, in the hand writing of Robeſpierre, was afterwards produced in the Con⯑vention, by the committee to whom the papers of Robeſpierre were referred, in theſe words:

I had then been impriſoned ſeven months, and the [18]ſilence of the executive government of America, Mr. Waſhington, upon the caſe and upon every thing reſpecting me, was explanation enough to Robeſpierre that he might proceed to extremities.

A violent fever which had nearly terminated my exiſtence, was I believe, the circumſtance that preſerved it. I was not in a condition to be remov⯑ed, or to know of what was paſſing, or of what had paſſed for more than a month. It makes a blank in my remembrance of life. The firſt thing I was in⯑formed of was the fall of Robeſpierre.

About a week after this Mr. Monroe arrived to ſupercede Gouverneur Morris, and as ſoon as I was able to write a note legible enough to be read, I found a way to convey one to him, by means of the man who lighted the lamps in the priſon; and whoſe unabated friendſhip to me, from whom he had never received any ſervice, and with difficulty accepted any recompence, puts the character of Mr. Waſhington to ſhame.

In a ſaw days I received a meſſage from Mr. Monroe, conveyed to me in a note from an inter⯑mediate perſon, with aſſurance of his friendſhip, and expreſſing a deſire that I would reſt that caſe in his hands. After a fortnight or more had paſſed and hearing nothing further, I wrote to a friend who was then in Paris, a citizen of Philadelphia, requeſting him to inform me what was the true [19]ſituation of things with reſpect to me. I was ſure that ſomething was the matter. I began to have hard thoughts of Mr. Waſhington; but I was un⯑willing to encourage them.

In about ten days I received an anſwer to my let⯑ter in which the writer ſays: ‘Mr. Monroe has told me that he has no orders (meaning from the preſident, Mr. Waſhington) reſpecting you, but that he (Mr. Monroe) will do every thing in his power to liberate you; but from what I learn from the Americans lately arrived in Paris, you are not conſidered, either by the American govern⯑ment or by the individuals, as an American citizen.’

I was now at no loſs to underſtand Mr. Waſh⯑ington and his new fangled faction, and that their policy was ſilently to leave me to fall in France. They were ruſhing as faſt as they could venture, without awakening the jealouſy of America, into all the vices and corruptions of the Britiſh govern⯑ment; and it was no more conſiſtent with the po⯑licy of Mr. Waſhington, and thoſe who immedi⯑ately ſurrounded him, than it was with that of Ro⯑beſpierre or of Pitt, that I ſhould ſurvive. They have however, miſſed the mark and the reaction is upon themſelves.

Upon the receipt of the letter juſt alluded to, I ſent a memorial to Mr. Monroe which the reader will find in the appendix, and I received from him [20]the following anſwer. It is dated the 18th of Sep⯑tember, but did not come to hand till about the 10th of October. I was then falling into a relapſe, the weather was becoming damp and cold, fuel was not to be had, and the abſceſs in my ſide, the conſequence of theſe things, and of the want of air and exerciſe, was beginning to form and which has continued im⯑moveable ever ſince. Here follows Mr. Monroe's letter.

The part in Mr. Monroe's letter in which he ſpeaks of the Preſident (Mr. Waſhington) is put in ſoft lan⯑guage. Mr. Monroe knew what Mr. Waſhington had ſaid formerly, and he was willing to keep that in view. But the fact is, not only that Mr. Waſhing⯑ton had given no orders to Mr. Monroe, as the letter ſtated; but he did not ſo much as ſay to him, en⯑quire if Mr. Paine be dead or alive, in priſon or out, or ſee if there is any aſſiſtance we can given him.

While theſe matters were paſſing the liberations from the priſons were numerous; from twenty to forty in the courſe of almoſt every twenty four hours. [24]The continuance of my impriſonment, after a new miniſter had arrived immediately from America, which was now more than two months, was a mat⯑ter ſo obviouſly ſtrange, that I found the character of the American government ſpoken of in very unqua⯑lified terms of reproach; not only by thoſe who ſtill remained in priſon, but by thoſe who were liberated, and by perſons who had acceſs to the priſon from without. Under theſe circumſtances I wrote again to Mr. Monroe, and found occaſion, among o⯑ther things to ſay: ‘It will not add to the popula⯑rity of Mr. Waſhington to have it believed in Ame⯑rica, as it is believed here, that he connives at my impriſonment.’

The caſe, ſo far as it reſpected Mr. Monroe was, that having to get over the difficulties which the ſtrange conduct of Gouverneur Morris had thrown in the way of a ſucceſſor, and having no authority from the American government to ſpeak officially upon any thing relating to me, he found himſelf obliged to proceed by unofficial means with individual mem⯑bers; for though Robeſpierre was overthrown, the Robeſpierrian members of the Committee of Public Safety ſtill remained in conſiderable force, and had they found out that Mr. Monroe had no official au⯑thority upon the caſe, they would have paid little or no regard to his reclamation of me. In the mean time my health was ſuffering exceedingly, the dreary [25]proſpect of winter was coming on, and impriſon⯑ment was ſtill a thing of danger.

After the Robeſpierrian members of the Committee were removed by the expiration of their time of ſerving, Mr. Monroe reclaimed me, and I was libe⯑rated the 4th of November. Mr. Monroe arrived in Paris the beginning of Auguſt before. All the pe⯑riod of my impriſonment, at leaſt, I owe not to Ro⯑beſpierre, but to his colleague in projects, George Waſhington. Immediately upon my liberation Mr. Monroe invited me to his houſe, where I remained more than a year and an half; and I ſpeak of his aid and his friendſhip, as an open hearted man will al⯑ways do in ſuch a caſe, with reſpect and gratitude.

Soon after my liberation the Convention paſſed an unanimous vote to invite me to return to my ſeat among them. The times were ſtill unſettled and dangerous, as well from without as from within, for the coalition was unbroken, and the conſtitution not ſettled. I choſe, however, to accept the invi⯑tation; for as I undertake nothing but what I be⯑lieve to be right, I abandon nothing that I under⯑take; and I was willing alſo to ſhew, that, as I was not of a caſt of mind to be deterred by proſpects or retro-proſpects of danger, ſo neither were my prin⯑ciples to be weakened by misfortune, or perverted by diſguſt.

[26]Being now once more abroad in the world I be⯑gan to find that I was not the only one who had conceived an unfavourable opinion of Mr. Waſh⯑ington. It was evident that his character was on the decline as well among Americans as among fo⯑reigners of different nations. From being the chief of a government, he had made himſelf the chief of a party; and his integrity was queſtioned, for his politics had a doubtful appearance. The miſſion of Mr. Jay to London, notwithſtanding there was an American miniſter there already, had then taken place, and was beginning to be talked of. It ap⯑peared to others, as it did to me, to be enveloped in myſtery, which every day ſerved either to en⯑creaſe or to explain into matter of ſuſpicion.

In the year 1790, or about that time, Mr. Waſh⯑ington as Preſident had ſent Gouverneur Morris to London as his ſecret agent to have ſome communi⯑cation with the Britiſh miniſtry. To cover the a⯑gency of Morris it was given out, I know not by whom, that he went as an agent from Robert Mor⯑ris to borrow money in Europe, and the report was permitted to paſs uncontradicted. The event of Mor⯑ris's negociation was, that Mr. Hammond was ſent miniſter from England to America, and Pinckney from America to England, and himſelf miniſter to France. If while Morris was miniſter in France he was not an emiſſary of the Britiſh miniſtry and the [27]coaleſced powers, he gave ſtrong reaſons to ſuſpect him of it. No one who ſaw his conduct, and heard his converſation, could doubt his being in their in⯑tereſt; and had he not got off at the time he did, after his recall, he would have been in arreſtation. Some letters of his had fallen into the hands of the Committee of Public Safety, and enquiry was mak⯑ing after him.

A great buſtle has been made by Mr. Waſhing⯑ton about the conduct of Genet in America; while that of his own miniſter, Morris, in France was in⯑finitely more reproachable. If Genet was impru⯑dent or raſh, he was not treacherous; but Morris was all three. He was the enemy of the French re⯑volution in every ſtage of it. But, notwithſtanding this conduct on the part of Morris, and the known profligacy of his character, Mr. Waſhington, in a let⯑ter he wrote to him at the time of recalling him on the complaint and requeſt of the Committee of Public Safety, aſſures him, that though he had complied with that requeſt, he ſtill retained he ſame eſteem and friendſhip for him as before. This letter Mor⯑ris was fooliſh enough to tell of; and, as his own character and conduct were notorious, the telling of it could have but one effect, which was that of im⯑plicating the character of the writer. Morris ſtill loiters in Europe, chiefly in England; and Mr. Waſhington is ſtill in correſpondence with him; [28]Mr. Waſhington ought therefore to expect, eſpeci⯑ally ſince his conduct in the affair of Jay's treaty, that France muſt conſider Morris and Waſhington as men of the ſame deſcription. The chief differ⯑ence, however, between the two is (for in politics there is none) that the one is profligate enough to profeſs an indifference about moral principles, and the other is prudent enough to conceal the want of them.

About three months after I was at liberty, the official note of Jay to Grenville on the ſubject of the capture of American veſſels by Britiſh cruiſers appeared in the American papers that arrived at Paris. Every thing was of a-piece. Every thing was mean. The ſame kind of character went to all circumſtances public or private. Diſguſted at this national degradation, as well as at the particu⯑lar conduct of Mr. Waſhington to me, I wrote to him (Mr. Waſhington) on the 22d of February (1795) under cover to the then Secretary of State (Mr. Randolph) and entruſted the letter to Mr. Letombe, who was appointed French conſul to Phi⯑ladelphia, and was on the point of taking his de⯑parture. When I ſuppoſed Mr. Letombe had ſailed, I mentioned the letter to Mr. Monroe, and as I was then in his houſe, I ſhewed it to him. He expreſſed a wiſh that i would recall it, which he ſuppoſed migh be done, as he had learned that Mr. Letombe [29]had not then failed. I agreed to do ſo, and it was returned by Mr. Letombe under cover to Mr. Mon⯑roe.

The letter, however, will now reach Mr. Waſh⯑ington publicly in the courſe of this work.

About the month of September following, I had a ſevere relapſe, which gave occaſion to the report of my death. I had felt it coming on a conſiderable time before, which occaſioned me to haſten the work I had then on hand, the Second part of the Age of Reaſon. When I had finiſhed that work, I beſtowed another letter on Mr. Waſhington, which I ſent under cover to Mr. Benj. Franklin Bache of Philadelphia. The letter is as follows.

Here follows the letter above alluded to, which I had ſtopped in complaiſance to Mr. Monroe.

That this letter was not written in very good tem⯑per is very evident; but it was juſt ſuch a letter as his conduct appeared to me to merit, and every thing on his part ſince has ſerved to confirm that opinion. Had I wanted a commentary on his ſilence with reſpect to my impriſonment in France, ſome of his faction has furniſhed me with it. What I here allude to is a publication in a Philadelphia paper, copied afterwards into a New York paper, both under the patronage of the Waſhington faction, in which the writer, ſtill ſuppoſing me in priſon in France, wonders at my lengthy reſpite from the ſcaffold; and he marks his politics ſtill further by ſaying: ‘It appears moreover, that the people of England did not reliſh his (Thomas Paine's) opinions quite ſo well as he expected, and that for one of his laſt pieces, as deſtructive to the peace and happineſs of their country, (meaning, I ſuppoſe, the Rights of Man) they threatened our knight-errant with ſuch ſerious vengeance, that, to avoid a trip to Botany-bay, he fled over to France, as a leſs dangerous voyage.’

[39]I am not refuting or contradicting the falſhood of this publication, for it is ſufficiently notorious; neither am I cenſuring the writer; on the contrary I think him for the explanation he has incautiouſly given of the principles of the Waſhington faction. Inſignificant, however, as the piece is, it was capa⯑ble of having had ſome ill effect, had it arrived in France during my impriſonment and in the time of Robeſpierre; and I am not uncharitable in ſuppoſing that this was the intention of the writer. ^*

I have now done with Mr. Waſhington on the ſcore of private affairs. It would have been far more agreeable to me, had his conduct been ſuch as not to have merited theſe reproaches. Errors or caprices of the temper can be pardoned and forgot⯑ten; but a cold deliberate crime of the heart, ſuch as Mr. Waſhington is capable of acting, is not to be waſhed away. I now proceed to other matter.

After Jay's note to Grenville arrived in Paris from America, the character of every thing that was to follow might be eaſily foreſeen; and it was upon this anticipation that my letter of February 22d was founded. The event has proved, that I was not miſtaken, except that it has been much worſe than I expected.

[40]It would naturally occur to Mr. Waſhington, that the ſecrecy of Jay's miſſion to England, where there was already an American miniſter, could not but create ſome ſuſpicion in the French government; eſpecially as the conduct of Morris had been noto⯑rious, and the intimacy of Mr. Waſhington with Morris was known.

The character which Mr. Waſhington has at⯑tempted to act in the world, is a ſort of non-deſcriba⯑ble, cameleon-coloured thing, called prudence. It is, in many caſes, a ſubſtitute for principle, and is ſo nearly allied to hypocriſy, that it eaſily ſlides into it. His genius for prudence furniſhed him in this inſtance with an expedient, that ſerved, as is the natural and general character of all expe⯑dients, to diminiſh the embarraſſments of the moment and multiply them afterwards; for he authoriſed it to be made known to the French go⯑vernment, as a confidential matter (Mr. Waſhington ſhould recollect that I was a member of the Conven⯑tion, & had the means of knowing what I here ſtate) he authorized it, I ſay, to be made known, and that for the purpoſe of preventing any uneaſineſs to France on the ſcore of Mr. Jay's miſſion to England, that the object of that miſſion, and of Mr. Jay's authority, was reſtricted to that of demanding the ſurrender of the weſtern poſts and indemnification for the cargoes captured in American veſſels. Mr. Waſhington knows [41]that this was untrue; and knowing this, he had good reaſon to himſelf for refuſing to furniſh the Houſe of Repreſentatives with copies of the inſtructions given to Jay; as the might ſuſpect, among other things, that he ſhould alſo be called upon for copies of inſtructions given to other miniſters, and that in the contradiction of inſtructions his want of integrity would be detected. Mr. Waſhington may now, per⯑haps, learns, when it is too late, to be of any uſe to him, that a man will paſs better through the world with a thouſand open errors upon his bank, than in being detected in ONE ſly falſhood. When one is detected, a thouſand are ſuſpected.

The firſt account that arrived in Paris of a treaty being negociated by Mr. Jay (for nobody ſuſpected any) came in an Engliſh newſpaper, which announ⯑ced that a treaty offenſive and defenſive had been con⯑cluded between the United States of America and England. This was immediately denied by every American in Paris, as an impoſſible thing; and though it was diſbelieved by the French, it imprinted a ſuſ⯑picion that ſome underhand buſineſs was going for⯑ward. ^* At length the treaty itſelf arrived, and every well-affected American bluſhed with ſhame.

[42]It is curious to obſerve how the appearances of character will change, whilſt the root that produces them remains the ſame. The Waſhington adminiſ⯑tration having waded through the ſlough of negoci⯑ation, and whilſt it amuſed France with profeſſions of friendſhip contrived to injure her, immediately throws off the hypocrite, and aſſumes the ſwagger⯑ing air of a bravado. The party papers of that imbecile adminiſtration were on this occaſion filled with paragraphs about Sovereignty. A paltroon may boaſt of his ſovereign right to let another kick him, and this is the only kind of ſovereignty ſhewn in the treaty with England. But theſe daſhing paragraphs, as Timothy Pickering well knows, were intended for France; without whoſe aſſiſtance in men, money and [43]ſhips, Mr. Waſhington would have cut but a poor figure in the American war. But of his military ta⯑lents I ſhall ſpeak hereafter.

I mean not to enter into any diſcuſſion of any ar⯑ticle of Jay's treaty: I ſhall ſpeak only upon the whole of it. It is attempted to be juſtified on the ground of its not being a violation of any article or articles of the treaty pre-exiſting with France. But the ſo⯑vereign right of explanation does not lie with George Waſhington and his man Timothy; France, on her part, has, at leaſt, an equal right; and when nations diſpute, it is not ſo much about words as about things.

A man, ſuch as the world calls, a ſharper, and verſed, as Jay muſt be ſuppoſed to be, in the quibbles of the law, may find a way to enter into engage⯑ments, and make bargains in ſuch a manner as to cheat ſome other party, without that party being able, as the phraſe is, to take the law of him. This often happens in the cabaliſtical circle of what is called law. But when this is attempted to be acted on the national ſcale of treaties, it is too deſpicable to be defended, or to be permitted to exiſt. Yet this is the trick upon which Jay's treaty is founded, ſo far as it has relation to the treaty pre-exiſting with France. It is a counter-treaty to that treaty, and perverts all the great articles of that treaty to the injury of France, and makes them operate as a bounty to England with whom France is at war.

[44]The Waſhington adminiſtration ſhews great de⯑ſire, that the treaty between France and the United States be preſerved. Nobody can doubt their ſince⯑rity upon this matter. There is not a Britiſh miniſ⯑ter, a Britiſh merchant, or a Britiſh agent or ſailor in America, that does not anxiouſly wiſh the ſame thing. The treaty with France ſerves now as a paſſport to ſupply England with naval ſtores and other articles of American produce, whilſt the ſame articles, when coming to France, are made contraband or ſeizable by Jay's treaty with England. The treaty with France ſays, that neutral ſhips make neutral pro⯑perty on board American ſhips; and Jay's treaty delivers up French property on board American ſhips to be ſeized by the Engliſh. It is too paltry to talk of faith, of national honour, and of the preserva⯑tion of treaties, whilſt ſuch a bare-faced treachery as this ſtares the world in the face.

The Waſhington adminiſtration may ſave itſelf the trouble of proving to the French government its moſt faithful intentions of preſerving the treaty with France; for France has now no deſire chat it ſhould be preſerved. She had nominated an Envoy extra⯑ordinary to America, to make Mr. Waſhington and his government a preſent of the treaty, and to have no more to do with that or with him. It was, at the ſame time, officially declared to the American mi⯑niſter [45]at Paris, that the French Republic had rather have the American government for an open enemy than a treacherous friend. This, ſir, together with the internal diſtractions cauſed in America, and the loſe of character in the world, is the eventful criſis, alluded to in the beginning of this letter, to which your double politics have brought the affairs of your country. It is time that the eyes of America be opened upon you.

How France would have conducted herſelf to⯑wards America and American commerce after all treaty ſtipulations had ceaſed, and under the ſenſe of ſervices rendered and injuries received, I know not. It is, however, an unpleaſant reflection, that in all national quarrels, the innocent, and even the friendly, part of the community, become involved with the culpable and the unfriendly; and as the accounts that arrived from America continued to manifeſt an invariable attachment in the general maſs of the people to their original ally, in oppoſition to the new-fangled Waſhington faction,—the reſo⯑lutions that had been taken were ſuſpended. It happened alſo fortunately enough, that Gouverneur Morris was not miniſter at this time.

There is, however, one point that yet remains in embryo, and which, among other things, ſerves to ſhew the ignorance of the Waſhington treaty-mak⯑ers, and their inattention to pre-exiſting treaties [46]when they were employing themſelves in framing of ratifying the new treaty with England.

The ſecond article of the treaty of commerce between the United States and France ſays: ‘The moſt chriſtian king and the United States engage mutually, not to grant any particular favour to other nations in reſpect of commerce and naviga⯑tion that ſhall not immediately become common to the other party, who ſhall enjoy the ſame fa⯑vour freely, if the conceſſion was freely made, or on allowing the ſame compenſation if the con⯑ceſſion was conditional.’

All the conceſſions therefore made to England by Jay's treaty are, through the medium of this ſecond article in the pre-exiſting treaty, made to France, and become engrafted into the treaty with France, and can be exerciſed by her as a matter of right, the ſame as by England.

Jay's treaty makes a conceſſion to England, and that unconditionally, of ſeizing naval ſtores in Ame⯑rican ſhips and condemning them as contraband. It makes alſo a conceſſion to England to ſeize pro⯑viſions and other articles in American ſhips. Other articles are all other articles, and none but an ignoramus, or ſomething worſe, would have put ſuch a phraſe into a treaty. The condition annex⯑ed to this caſe is, that the proviſions and other ar⯑ticles ſo ſeized are to be paid for at a price to be a⯑greed [47]upon. Mr. Waſhington, as Preſident, ratifi⯑ed this treaty after he knew the Britiſh government had recommenced an indiſcriminate ſeizure of pro⯑viſions and of all other articles in American ſhips; and it is now known that thoſe ſeizures were made to fit out the expedition going to Quiberon Bay, and it was known, before hand that they would be made. The evidence goes, alſo, a good way to prove that Jay and Grenville underſtood each other upon that ſubject. Mr. Pinckney, when he paſſed through France on his way to Spain, ſpoke of the recommencement of the ſeizures as a thing that would take place. The French government had by ſome means received information from London to the ſame purpoſe, with the addition, that the re⯑commencement of the ſeizures would cauſe no miſ⯑underſtanding between the Britiſh and American governments. Grenville, in defending himſelf a⯑gainſt the oppoſition in Parliament on account of the ſcarcity of corn, ſaid (ſee his ſpeech at the open⯑ing of the Parliament that met Oct. 29th 1795) that the ſupplies for the Quiberon expedition were fur⯑niſhed out of the American ſhips; and all the accounts received at that time from England ſtated, that thoſe ſeizures were made under the treaty. After the ſupplies for the Quiberon expedition had been pro⯑cured and the expected ſucceſs had failed, the ſeiz⯑ures were counter manded; and, had the French [48]ſeized proviſion veſſels going to England, it is pro⯑bable that the Quiberon expedition could not have been attempted.

In one point of view, the treaty with England o⯑perates as a loan to the Engliſh government. It gives permiſſion to that government to take Ameri⯑can can property at ſea to any amount and pay for it when it ſuits her; and besides this, the treaty is in every point of view a ſurrender of the rights of American commerce and navigation, and a refuſal to France of the rights of neutrality. The Ameri⯑can flag is not now a neutral flag to France: Jay's treaty of ſurrender gives a monopoly of it to Eng⯑land.

On the contrary, the treaty of commerce be⯑tween America and France was formed on the moſt liberal principles, and calculated to give the great⯑eſt encouragement to the infant commerce of Ame⯑rica. France was neither a carrier nor an exporter of naval ſtores or of proviſions. Thoſe articles be⯑longed wholly to America, and they had all the protection in that treaty which a treaty could give. But ſo much has that treaty been perverted, that the liberality of it, on the part of France, has ſerv⯑ed to encourage Jay to form a counter-treaty with England; for the muſt have ſuppoſed the hands of France tied up by her treaty with America, when he was making ſuch large conceſſions in favour of [49]England. The injury which Mr. Waſhington's ad⯑miniſtration has done to the character as well as to the commerce of America is too great to be repair⯑ed by him. Foreign nations will be ſhy of making treaties with a government that has given the faith⯑leſs example of perverting the liberality of a former treaty to the injury of the party with whom it was made.

In what a fraudulent light muſt Mr. Waſhing⯑ton's character appear in the world, when his de⯑clarations and his conduct are compared together! Here follows the letter he wrote to the Committee of Public Safety whilſt Jay was negociating in pro⯑found ſecrecy this treacherous treaty.

Was it by entering into a treaty with England, to ſurrender French property on board American ſhips to be ſeized by the Engliſh, whilſt Engliſh property on board American ſhips was declared by the French treaty not to be ſeizable, that the bonds of friendſhip between America and France were to be drawn the clo⯑ſer? Was it by declaring naval ſtores contraband [51]when coming to France, when by the French treaty they were not contraband when going to England, that the connection between France and America was to be advanced? Was it by opening the American ports to the Britiſh navy in the preſent war, from which ports that ſame navy had been expelled by the aid ſolicited from France in the American war (and that aid gratuitouſly given) that the gratitude of Ameri⯑ca was to be ſhewn, and the ſolicitude ſpoken of in the letter demonſtrated?

As the letter was addreſſed to the Committee of Public Safety, Mr Waſhington did not expect it would get abroad in the world, or be ſeen by any other eye than that of Robeſpierre, or be heard by any other ear than that of the Committee; that it would paſs as a whiſper acroſs the Atlantic, from one dark chamber to the other, and there terminate. It was calculated to remove from the mind of the Committee all ſuſpicion upon Jay's miſſion to England, and, in this point of view, it was ſuited to the cir⯑cumſtances of the moment then paſſing; but as the event of that miſſion has proved the letter to be hy⯑pocritical, it ſerves no other purpoſe of the preſent moment than to ſhew that the writer is not to be credited. Two circumſtances ſerved to make the reading of the letter neceſſary in the Convention. The one was, that thoſe who ſucceeded on the fall of Robeſpierre, found it moſt proper to act with [52]publicity; the other, to extinguiſh the ſuſpicions which the ſtrange conduct of Morris had occaſioned in France.

When the Britiſh treaty, and the ratification of it by Mr. Waſhington, was known in France, all fur⯑ther declarations from him of his good diſpoſition, as an ally and a friend, paſſed for ſo many cyphers; but ſtill it appeared neceſſary to him to keep up the farce of declarations. It is ſtipulated in the Britiſh treaty, that commiſſioners are to report at the end of two years on the caſe of neutral ſhips making neu⯑tral property. In the mean time neutral ſhips do not make neutral property, according to the Britiſh treaty, and they do, according to the French treaty. The preſervation, therefore, of the French treaty became of great importance to England, as by that means ſhe can employ American ſhips as carriers, whilſt the ſame advantage is denied to France. whether the French treaty could exiſt as a matter of right after this clandeſtine perverſion of it, could not but give ſome apprehenſions to the partizans of the Britiſh treaty, and it became neceſſary to them to make up, by fine words, what was wanting in good actions.

An opportunity offered to that purpoſe. The Convention, on the public reception of Mr. Mon⯑roe, ordered the American flag and the French flag to be diſplayed unitedly in the hall of the Conven⯑tion. [53]Mr. Monroe made a preſent of an American flag for the purpoſe. The Convention returned this compliment by ſending a French flag to Ame⯑rica, to be preſented by their miniſter, Mr. Adet, to the American government. This reſolution paſ⯑ſed long before Jay's treaty was known or ſuſpect⯑ed; it paſſed in the days of confidence; but the flag was not preſented by Mr. Adet till ſeve⯑ral months after the treaty had been ratified. Mr. Waſhington made this the occaſion of ſaying ſome ſine things to the French Miniſter, and the better to get himſelf into tune to do this, he began by ſaying the fineſt things of himſelf.

‘Born, ſir (ſaid he) in a land of liberty; having early learned its value; having engaged in a peri⯑lous conflict to defend it; having, in a word, de⯑voted the beſt years of my life to ſecure its per⯑manent eſtabliſhment in my own country; my anxious recollections, my ſympathetic feelings, and my beſt wiſhes are irreſiſtibly excited, when⯑ever, in any country, I ſee an oppreſſed people unfurl the banners of freedom.’

Mr. Waſhington having expended ſo many fine phraſes upon himſelf, was obliged to invent a new one for the French, and he calls them "wonder⯑ful people!" The coaleſced powers acknowledge as much.

It is laughable to hear Mr. Waſhington talk of [54]his ſympathetic feelings, who has always been remark⯑ed, even among his friends, for not having any. He has, however, given no proof of any to me. As to the pompous encomiums he ſo liberally pays to himſelf, on the ſcore of the American revolution, the reality of them may be queſtioned; and ſince he has forced them ſo much into notice, it is fair to examine his pretenſions.

A ſtranger might be led to ſuppoſe from the egotiſm with which Mr. Waſhington ſpeaks, that himſelf, and himſelf only, had generated, conduct⯑ed, compleated, and eſtabliſhed the revolution: In fine, that it was all his own doing.

In the firſt place, as to the political part, he had no ſhare in it; and therefore the whole of that is out of the queſtion with reſpect to him. There remains then only the military part, and it would have been prudent in Mr. Waſhington not to have awakened enquiry upon that ſubject. Fame then was cheap; he enjoyed it cheaply; and nobody was diſpoſed to take away the laurels, that, whether they were acquired or not, had been given.

Mr. Waſhington's merit conſiſted in conſtancy. But conſtancy was the common virtue of the revo⯑lution. Who was there that was inconſtant? I know of but one military defection, that of Arnold; and I know of no political defection, among thoſe who made themſelves [...], when the revolu⯑tion [55]was formed by the declaration of independence. Even Silas Deane, though he attempted to defraud, did not betray.

But when we ſpeak of military character, ſome⯑thing more is to be underſtood than conſtancy; and ſomething more ought to be underſtood than the Fabian ſyſtem of doing nothing. The nothing part can be done by any body. Old Mrs. Thompſon, the houſe-keeper of head-quarters (who threatened to make the ſun and the wind ſhine through Riving-ton of New-York) could have done it as well as Mr. Waſhington. Deborah would have been as good as Barak.

Mr. Waſhington had the nominal rank of Com⯑mander in Chief; but he was not ſo fact. He had in reality only a ſeparate command. He had no controul over, or direction of, the army to the northward, under Gates, that captured Burgoyne; nor of that to the ſouth, under Green, that recovered the ſouthern States. The nominal rank, however, of Commander in chief, ſerved to throw upon him the luſtre of thoſe actions, and to make him appear as the ſoul and centre of all the military operations in America.

He commenced his command June 1775, dur⯑ing the time the Maſſachuſetts army lay before Boſton, and after the affair of Bunker-hill. The commencement of his command was the com⯑mencement [56]of inactivity. Nothing was afterwards done, or attempted to be done, during the nine months he remained before Boſton. If we may judge from the reſiſtance made at Concord and af⯑terwards at Bunker-hill, there was a ſpirit of en⯑terpriſe at that time, which the preſence of Mr. Waſhington chilled into cold defence. By the ad⯑vantage of a good exterior, he attracts reſpect, which his habitual ſilence tends to preſerve; but he has not the talent of inſpiring ardour in an army. The enemy removed from Boſton in March 1776, to wait for reinforcements from Europe, and to take a more advantageous poſition at New York.

The inactivity of the campaign of 1775 on the part of General Waſhington, when the enemy had a leſs force than in any future period of the war, and the injudicious choice of poſitions taken by him in the campaign of 1776, when the enemy had its greateſt force, neceſſarily produced the loſſes and misfortunes that marked that gloomy campaign. The poſitions taken were either iſlands or necks of land. In the former, the enemy, by the aid of their ſhips could bring their whole force againſt a part of Gen. Waſhington's, as in the affair of Long-Iſland, and in the latter he might be ſhut up as in the bottom of a bag. This had nearly been the caſe at New York, and it was ſo in part; it was actu⯑ally the caſe at Fort Waſhington; and would have [57]been the caſe at Fort Lee if Gen. Greene had not moved precipitately off, leaving every thing behind, and by gaining Hackinſach bridge, got out of the bag of Bergen neck. How far Mr. Waſhington, as a General, is blameable for theſe matters, I am not undertaking to determine, but they are evidently defects in military geography. The ſucceſsful ſkir⯑miſhes at the cloſe of that campaign (matters that would ſcarcely be noticed in a better ſtate of things) make the brilliant exploits of Gen. Waſhington's ſeven campaigns.—No wonder we ſee ſo much pu⯑ſillanimity in the Preſident when we ſee ſo little en⯑terpriſe in the General.

The campaign of 1777 became famous, not by any thing on the part of Gen. Waſhington, but by the capture of Gen. Burgoyne and the army under his command, by the Northern army at Saratoga under Gen. Gates. So totally diſtinct and uncon⯑nected were the two armies of Waſhington and Gates, and ſo independent was the latter of the authority of the nominal Commander in Chief, that the two Generals did not ſo much as correſpond, and it was only by a letter of Gen. (ſince Gover⯑nor) Clinton, that General Waſhington was inform⯑ed of that event. The Britiſh took poſſeſſion of Philadelphia this year, which they evacuated the next, juſt time enough to ſave their heavy baggage and ſleet of tranſports from capture by the French [58]Admiral d'Eſtaing, who arrived at the mouth of the Delaware ſoon after.

The capture of Burgoyne gave an eclat in Europe to the American arms, and facilitated the alliance with France. The eclat, however, was not kept up by any thing on the part of Gen. Waſhington. The ſame unfortunate langour that marked his en⯑trance into the field continued always. Diſcontents began to prevail ſtrongly againſt him, and a party was formed in Congreſs, whilſt ſitting at York-Town, in Pennſylvania, for removing him from the command of the army. The hope, however, of better times, the news of the alliance with France, and the unwillingneſs of ſhewing diſcontent, diſſi⯑pated the matter.

Nothing was done in the campaigns of 1778, 1779, 1780, in the part where Gen. Waſhington commanded, except the taking Stony Point by Gen. Wayne. The Southern States in the mean time were over-run by the enemy. They were af⯑terwards recovered by Gen. Greene, who had in a very great meaſure created the army that accom⯑pliſhed that recovery. In all this Gen. Waſhing⯑ton had not ſhare. The Fabian ſyſtem of war, fol⯑lowed by him, began now to unfold itſelf with all its evils, for what is Fabian war without Fabian means to ſupport it.

[59]The finances of congreſs, depending wholly on emiſſions of paper money, were exhauſted. Its credit was gone. The continental treaſury was not able to pay the expence of a brigade of waggons to tranſport the neceſſary ſtores to the army, and yet the ſole object, the eſtabliſhment of the revolu⯑tion, was a thing of remote diſtance. The time I am now ſpeaking of is the latter end of the year 1780.

In this ſituation of things it was found not only expedient but abſolutely neceſſary for Congreſs to ſtate the whole caſe to its ally. I knew more of this matter (before it came into Congreſs or was known to General Waſhington) of its progreſs, and its iſſue, than I chuſe to ſtate in this letter. Col. John Laurens was ſent to France as Envoy Ex⯑traordinary on this occaſion, and by a private agree⯑ment between him and me I accompanied him. We ſailed from Boſton in the Alliance frigate, Feb. 11th, 1781. France had already done much in accepting and paying bills drawn by Congreſs. She was now called upon to do more. The event of Col. Laurens's miſſion, with the aid of the ve⯑nerable miniſter, Franklin, was, that France gave in money, as a preſent, ſix millions of livres, and ten millions more as a loan, and agreed to ſend a fleet of not leſs than thirty ſail of the line, at her own expence, as an aid to America. Col. Laurens [60]and myſelf returned from Breſt the 1ſt of June following, taking with us two millions and an half of livres (upwards of one hundred thouſand pounds ſterling) of the money given, and convoying two ſhips with ſtores.

We arrived at Boſton the 25th Auguſt following. De Graſſe arrived with the French fleet in the Cheſapeak at the ſame time, and was afterwards joined by that of Barras, making 31 ſail of the line. The money was tranſported in waggons from Boſ⯑ton to the Bank at Philadelphia, of which Mr. Thomas Willing, who has ſince put himſelf at the head of the liſt of petitioners in favour of the Britiſh treaty, was then Preſident, and it was by the aid of this money, and of this fleet, and of Rocham⯑beau's army, that Cornwallis was taken; the law⯑rels of which have been unjuſtly given to Mr. Waſh⯑ington. His merit in that affair was no more than that of any other American officer.

I have had, and ſtill have, as much pride in the American revolution as any man, or as Mr. Waſh⯑ington has a right to have; but that pride has never made me forgetful from whence the great aid came that compleated the buſineſs. Foreign aid (that of France) was calculated upon at the com⯑mencement of the revolution. It is one of the ſub⯑jects treated of in the pamphlet Common Senſe, but [61]as a matter that could not be hoped for, unleſs In⯑dependence was declared.

It is as well the ingratitude as the puſillanimity of Mr. Waſhington and the Waſhington faction, that has brought upon America the loſs of character ſhe now ſuffers in the world, and the numerous evils her commerce has undergone, and to which it is yet expoſed. The Britiſh miniſtry ſoon found out what ſort of men they had to deal with, and they dealt with them accordingly; and if further explanation was wanting, it has been fully given ſince in the ſnivelling addreſs of the New-York Chamber of Commerce to the Preſident, and in that of ſundry merchants of Philadelphia, which was not much better.

When the revolution of America was finally eſ⯑tabliſhed by the termination of the war, the world gave her credit for great character; and ſhe had nothing to do but to ſtand firm upon that ground. The Britiſh miniſtry had their hands too full of trouble to have provoked unneceſſarily a rupture with her, had ſhe ſhewn a proper reſolution to de⯑fend her rights. But encouraged as they were by the ſubmiſſive character of her executive adminiſ⯑tration, they proceeded from inſult to inſult till none more were left to be offered. The propoſals made by Sweden and Denmark to the American [62]adminiſtration were diſregarded. I know not if ſo much as an anſwer has been returned to them. The miniſter penitentiary (as ſome of the Britiſh prints called him) Mr. Jay, was ſent on a pilgri⯑mage to London, to make all up by penance and petition. In the mean time the lengthy and drow⯑ſy writer of the pieces ſigned Camillus held himſelf in reſerve to vindicate every thing; and to ſound, in America, the tocſin of terror upon the inexhauſtible reſources of England. Her reſources, ſays he, are greater than thoſe of all the other powers. This man is ſo intoxicated with fear and finance that he knows not the difference between plus and minus—between an hundred pounds in hand, and an hun⯑dred pounds worſe than nothing.

The commerce of America, ſo far as it had been eſtabliſhed by all the treaties that had been formed prior to that by Jay, was free, and the principles upon which it was eſtabliſhed were good. That ground ought never to have been departed from. It was the juſtifiable ground of right, and no tem⯑porary difficulties ought to have induced an aban⯑donment of it. The caſe now is otherwiſe. The ground, the ſcene, the pretenſions, the every thing, are changed. The commerce of America is, by Jay's treaty, put under foreign dominion. The ſea is not free for her. Her right to navigate it is re⯑duced [63]to the right of eſcaping; that is, until ſome ſhip of England or France, ſtops her veſſels and carries them into port. Every article of American produce, whether from the ſea or the land, fiſh, fleſh, vegetable, or manufacture, is, by Jay's trea⯑ty, made either contraband or ſeizable. Nothing is exempt. In all other treaties of commerce the ar⯑ticle which enumerates the contraband articles, ſuch as fire arms, gun powder, &c. is followed by ano⯑ther article which enumerates the articles not con⯑traband: but it is not ſo in Jay's treaty. There is no exempting article. Its place is ſupplied by the article for ſeizing and carrying into port; and the ſweeping phraſe of "proviſions and other articles," includes every thing. There never was ſuch a baſe and ſervile treaty of ſurrender ſince treaties began to exiſt.

This is the ground upon which America now ſtands. All her rights of commerce and navigation have to commence anew, and that with loſs of character to begin with. If there is ſenſe enough left in the heart to call a bluſh into the cheek, the Waſhington adminiſtration muſt be aſhamed to ap⯑pear.—And as to you, ſir, treacherous in pri⯑vate friendſhip (for ſo you have been to me, and that in the day of danger) and a hypocrite in pub⯑lic life, the world will be puzzled to decide, whe⯑ther [64]you are an apoſtate or an impoſtor; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any?