A CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE SEVERAL PETITIONING COUNTIES, CITIES, AND TOWNS, Addreſſed to their reſpective general Meet⯑ings, againſt the late Propoſition for a triennial Election of REPRESENTATIVES, By GRANVILLE SHARP.
SECOND EDITION.
To the Gentlemen, Clergy, Freeholders, and other Inhabitants, of the
[]THE laſt general meeting of the County of York having adopted a propoſition ‘to ſhorten the duration of parliament to a term not exceeding three years,’ the worthy gentlemen of your own committee may probably have been induced, by the laudable deſire of preſerving unanimity with that reſpecta⯑ble county, to recommend the ſame pro⯑poſition for your adoption. Be pleaſed, therefore, previouſly to conſider, whe⯑ther it is probable that a majority of the freeholders, &c. of the Yorkſhire meet⯑ing did really mean to prefer triennial elections to the ancient legal uſage and conſtitution of annual parliaments, or whether they may not rather have been induced to poſtpone the open declara⯑tion of their loyal attachment to that an⯑cient law for frequent parliaments, (viz. [4] every year once, and more often if need be,) merely through a deſire to preſerve the unanimity of their own meeting, by yield⯑ing a little, for the preſent, to the preju⯑dices of a few particular gentlemen a⯑mong them, (perſons, indeed, of great worth and eſteem, in many reſpects, and whoſe ſentiments in general deſerve the utmoſt attention and regard, but) who unhappily, in this point, are apt to conceive, that annual elections, and ‘more often if need be,’ would be attended with ſome inconveniences to themſelves.
You have undoubtedly, in your own county, alſo, ſeveral worthy gentlemen of fortune, to whom great reſpect is due from the people, on account of their known independence, and ſteady oppo⯑ſition to bad meaſures in general, who nevertheleſs, perhaps, may entertain the ſame erroneous conceptions of frequent e⯑lections; and therefore you can, by your own feelings, (I mean your reſpect and [5] eſteem for ſuch worthy men,) more ea⯑ſily judge of the effect which the ſame kind of laudable influence muſt neceſſa⯑rily have cauſed in the Yorkſhire meet⯑ing; which is the beſt reaſon, I believe, that can be aſſigned for their having adopted that unconſtitutional meaſure.
You are therefore moſt earneſtly re⯑queſted to conſider the following plain propoſitions.
I. That, though great deference and reſpect be certainly due to ſuch worthy and independent gentlemen as I have deſcribed, yet your condeſcenſion to them ought to have ſome due limitation.
II. That the bounds of the ancient parliamentary conſtitution of the king⯑dom ought ſurely to mark out the ut⯑moſt extent of your compliance with the worthy part of the ariſtocratical intereſt.
III. That if, on the contrary, your endeavours to preſerve UNANIMITY [6] ſhould carry you beyond theſe legal bounds, you will really injure thoſe very gentle⯑men whom you wiſh to oblige, as well as the whole ariſtocratical intereſt (the crown, the lords, the country gentle⯑men in general); becauſe there is but one true common intereſt, which the fun⯑damental laws of the conſtitution alone can preſerve. Conſider alſo,
IV. That unanimity is as baneful in a bad meaſure as it is ſalutary in a good one: and,
V. That, if any compliance in proceed⯑ings is to be made at all ‘for the ſake of unanimity,’ it ought certainly to be made where a compliance is moſt due; viz. to the conſtitutional reſolutions of a ſelect body of intelligent gentlemen, deputed to a national conference, by freely-elected committees from a very conſiderable pro⯑portion of the counties and moſt populous cities and towns in England;—to reſolu⯑tions, which were unanimouſly agreed upon by the ſaid deputies; and, therefore, [7] "a compliance, for the ſake of unanimity," was moſt juſtly due to them; and, the more eſpecially, as it appears that they formed their concluſions by the funda⯑mental laws and uſages of the conſtitu⯑tion. ‖ The ſtriking, ſimilarity alſo of this deputation, in many reſpects, to an anci⯑ent example of a national deputation from all the counties, cited, on this occaſion, by lord Carysfort,* from Hoveden, adds great weight to the reſolutions in queſ⯑tion, as well as to the importance of that unanimity with which they were formed.
VI. That the members of the late depu⯑tation have unanimouſly declared, in their [8] memorial, that ‘annual parliaments are the ancient conſtitution of this kingdom, and the birthright of Engliſhmen;’ and, in the three laſt paragraphs of their memo⯑rial, which are highly worthy your moſt careful attention, have not only proved that the old laws, requiring ‘a par⯑liament to be holden every year once, and more often if need be,’ meant a new parliament every year, &c. (by the inſtan⯑ces of writs iſſued ‘two or three times in the ſame year, for new elections,’) but they alſo prove, from the experience of former ages, that theſe very frequent elec⯑tions were not attended with any ſuch in⯑conveniences, as the advocates for long parliaments commonly pretend, but, on the contrary, recommend them, "as conſiſtent with the greateſt peace," &c.—* [9] And, therefore, you are deſired to conſi⯑der,
[10]VII. That the Yorkſhire propoſition for ſhortening ‘the duration of parlia⯑ments to a term, not exceeding three years,’ is totally different from the ſhortening of duration, explained and re⯑commended by the ſaid deputies, as ‘the ancient conſtitution of the kingdom, and the birthright of Engliſhmen;’ and, what is worſe, has been adopted without the leaſt mention of that birthright in any ſaving clauſe, to aſſert and preſerve your juſt claim to it for a future time: where⯑by it is manifeſt, that the promoters of this triennial ſcheme have really been the firſt [11] offenders againſt that deſirable unanimity, which the conference of deputies was in⯑tended to effect; and, therefore, the cry of "neceſſary unanimity," by which alone that unconſtitutional propoſition is at pre⯑ſent recommended, deſerves not the leaſt attention. What! would you be unani⯑mous againſt the ancient legal parliamen⯑tary conſtitution of the kingdom, which the triennial ſcheme is manifeſtly calcu⯑lated to ſupplant? You ought never to forget,
VIII. That the people have already been betrayed by a triennial parliament! That the repreſentatives of the people, in a triennial parliament, uſurped the le⯑giſlative authority of their conſtituents for a longer time than it was delegated; and treacherouſly preſumed, ‘without con⯑ſulting their countries,’ to prolong the duration of parliaments to the preſent unreaſonable term of ſeven years; where⯑by [12] by they eſtabliſhed the baſis of that de⯑teſtable ſyſtem of corruption which has been the true ſource of all your preſent grievances! And, therefore, be pleaſed to conſider, —
IX. That triennial parliaments, as well as ſeptennial, are manifeſtly dangerous to the ſtate, and ſo groſſly inconſiſtent with the ancient legal parliamentary con⯑ſtitution of this kingdom, that the moſt eſſential laws and uſages, by which that conſtitution is declared and known, are really ſuſpended by them. You cannot, therefore, without notorious diſloyalty, (in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word,) adopt the propoſition for triennial parliaments: ſo that you have a moſt ample excuſe for not concurring with a few particular gentle⯑men, (whom you would otherwiſe wiſh to oblige,) viz. that your compliance with them, in this matter would exceed the conſtituti⯑onal bounds of condeſcenſion, (mentioned [13] in the three firſt propoſitions,) and would really tend to ſubvert the people's juſt right to more frequent elections. — Be⯑cauſe it is manifeſt, —
X. That the conceſſion of a popular right, made by the people themſelves in their collective capacity, at their ſeveral county-meetings, is infinitely more bind⯑ing upon them (to exclude any future claim to the ceded right) than the ſame conceſſion would be, if made merely by their repreſentatives in parliament, with⯑out the inſtruction or concurrence of the people. And, therefore, you ought to be particularly thankful, —
XI. That the people themſelves, the great body of conſtituents, have never yet, by any ſuch conceſſion, betrayed that valuable birthright, (as the deputies call it,) the ancient law for annual parlia⯑ments. It has too often been ſuſpended indeed; ſometimes through the diſloyalty [14] of kings, and laſtly even by the diſloyalty of parliament itſelf, (of which the tyran⯑nical triennial and ſeptennial acts are la⯑mentable inſtances); yet, as the ſuſpen⯑ſion of it has never been promoted by the requiſition or inſtruction of the peo⯑ple at large, their right to it remains in⯑tire. The preſumption and treachery of their repreſentatives, in conſenting to the triennial and ſeptennial acts, cannot in⯑jure their juſt title to it; becauſe, in both theſe inſtances, the repreſentatives pre⯑ſumed to act contrary to an eſtabliſhed rule of parliament, by adopting a new device, (which even affected a fundamen⯑tal law of the kingdom,) ‘without con⯑ſulting their countries,’ which the con⯑ſtitution abſolutely requires in ſuch an important caſe; ſo that even that unwar⯑rantable preſumption of the repreſenta⯑tives (in neglecting to conſult the people) is the very circumſtance which ſtill pre⯑ſerves [15] that fundamental and eſſential law as a part of the conſtitution, and as a juſt right of the people, which they are en⯑titled to demand and reſume whenever they ſhall be pleaſed to inſtruct their re⯑preſentatives for that purpoſe; and to charge all perſons with diſloyalty, and e⯑ven treaſon to the conſtitution, who ſhall dare to oppoſe them! But if, on the contrary, the people themſelves, in their ſeveral county-courts, or aſſemblies, ſhould be ſo inconſiderate, or ſo depraved, as to conſent indiſcriminately to the propoſi⯑tion for a triennial election, without a ſa⯑ving clauſe to aſſert their birthright and reſerve their title to more frequent elec⯑tions, (which the Yorkſhire meeting has unwarily done,) know, for a certainty,—
XII. That, in ſuch an unhappy inat⯑tention to their own rights, (which, I pray to God, they may never be curſed with,) they would betray the conſtitution [16] of the kingdom! — they would betray a fundamental law of their anceſtors; which would mark their character with an eternal ſtain of diſloyalty! And as they may, perhaps, never have again ſo fa⯑vourable an opportunity, as the preſent, of recovering their ancient birthright of annual elections, it would probably be loſt, irretrievably loſt, for ever! Your new triennial repreſentatives (in ſuch a caſe) would moſt likely behave as former triennial repreſentatives have heretofore done, — betray and enſlave you by another ſeptennial ſyſtem of corruption! And (what is worſe) you yourſelves would moſt juſtly deſerve it!
But I hope better things of you; and I truſt alſo that you will excuſe the ſeve⯑rity of my expreſſions in this addreſs, as being prompted merely by an ardent zeal for your proſperity.
‘The fact is, (ſay the deputies from the ſeveral peti⯑tioning counties, &c.) during the whole of that reign, (king Edw. III.) and for the firſt eighteen years of the following one, writs were annually iſſued, and, in ſome inſtances, two or three times in the ſame year, for new elections, till Richard II. made himſelf abſolute. And various were the occaſions, in thoſe times, when the commons gave for anſwer, to any new propoſitions of magnitude, that THEY DARED NOT AGREE WITH⯑OUT CONFERENCE WITH THEIR COUNTRIES. At what period then was it, that the conſent of the people was aſked and obtained to ſo momentous a propoſal as that of diveſting them of their expected controul over their repreſentatives? in fact, of changing the terms on which the delegation had paſſed from their hands? AN⯑NUAL PARLIAMENTS are, therefore, the ANCIENT CONSTITUTION of England, and the BIRTHRIGHT of Engliſhmen.’
‘Nor are they leſs beneficial in policy than unalienable in right. In the language of ancient times, before the prejudices of habit had thrown falſe colours over names and things, they were ever deſcribed as conſiſtent with the greateſt peace, and moſt peaceably conducted. And, in par⯑liamentary records, for more than two hundred years together, from 49 Hen. III. till 22 Edw. IV. we find not ſo much as one double return, nor more than two or three inſtances of elections queſtioned on any ground;— a circumſtance ſurely moſt inviting, when put in contraſt with that multitude of perplexing enquiries which, of late years, hath conſumed ſo much time in committees, to the great hindrance of the national buſineſs. The plain reaſon is founded not in the time, but in the na⯑ture, of the thing; the duration of the ſeat was not an object for a violent conteſt. This will alſo diſpel the objection ariſing from the probability of tumult and ex⯑penſiveneſs; to remove which it will farther contribute not a little, if we would give attention to what paſſes now among thoſe large bodies of electors, who annual⯑ly chooſe their corporate officers. But the argument a⯑gainſt corruption ſurmounts every thing elſe. Nothing can give ſo much aſſurance of defeating it as this limita⯑tion. A ſeat for three years might induce a man's at⯑tention to a bribe. He that ſits but for one is very un⯑likely to experience ſuch an offer, or will certainly re⯑ject it, if he would not wiſh to put all his future expec⯑tations to an imminent riſque.’
‘When once the conſtitution of parliament is improved in theſe leading points, every thing elſe, that may ap⯑pear to have its ſhare in reformation, muſt be ſubordi⯑nate in its claſs, and muſt follow in its time. And, the more effectually to inſure theſe, we entreat you, nei⯑ther at the next or any future election, to engage your ſupport to any candidate, before you are ſatisfied that he will give his aſſiſtance, in parliament, to the eſta⯑bliſhment of ſo much of theſe reforms as may not then be accompliſhed.’
- Zitationsvorschlag für dieses Objekt
- TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 5410 A circular letter to the several petitioning counties cities and towns addressed to their respective general meetings against the late proposition for a triennial election of representatives By G. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5E1C-D