(A) PATRONAGE.

" Patronage in the hands of the Company—"] The purpoſes to which the Board of Controul may ap⯑ply their power, and the connexion of that power with Patrouage, is ſtrongly exemplified in their diſpute with the Directors, relative to the ſettle⯑ment of the Nabob of Arcot's debts to individuals, amounting to nearly four millions ſterling. The Directors, in purſuance of ‘the poſitive injunc⯑tions of Mr. Pitt's Bill,’ conceiving themſelves ‘indiſpenſably bound to direct an inquiry to be inſtituted into the juſtice and origin of theſe debts,’ draw up their Orders to the Preſidency of Madras accordingly. They ſoon learn, howe⯑ver, that they have another maſter ſtronger than the law; for the Board of Controul compel them to admit the whole of theſe debts without any ſuch inveſtigation as the law directed. The Directors remonſtrate in vain. Contrary to what they de⯑clare to be their ſenſe of the truſt repoſed in them, contrary to what they conceive to be their duty under the law, they are compelled to execute the orders of the Board of Controul, as if they had been grounded on their own judg [...]ts and con⯑viction.—The Commiſſioners further adding—

" Nominating or Appointing—"] IT has been urged, that Mr. Pitt's Bill had the merit of ex⯑preſsly directing a reduction of the eſtabliſhments in India, and of reſtricting both the Directors and the Board of Controul from ſending out new ſer⯑vants. Not even a Cadet beyond what was ‘ac⯑tually neceſſary to keep up the proper comple⯑ment of officers upon the reduced eſtabliſhment,’ was to be permitted to ſail from England.—No ſuch reſtriction undoubtedly was impoſed upon the Directors to be appointed under Mr. Fox's Bill. Parliament conceived that they had a better ſecurity; and the event has ſhewn that they could not have taken a worſe. This cannot be placed in a ſtronger light than by ſuppoſing that Lord Fitz⯑william, and his aſſociates in the new arrangement, had called aloud for checks to be impoſed upon them; had ſolicited to be reſtrained from the power of diſſipating the Company's revenue, and creating a Military Patronage at their expence; had taken credit for tying up their own hands in their own Bill; and—within a ſhort time after, while the Company had ſix hundred officers reduced by the Peace eſtabliſhment in India, had created an op⯑portunity for ſending out eighty ſix NEW officers, APPOINTED BY THEMSELVES, at an expence to the Company of 50,000l per annum in peace, and 86,000l. per annum in war, without a ſingle plea or pretence which would not have been better an⯑ſwered by ſending out the man without the officers!

A right of recalling every Perſon.] IN October 1784, the Directors inform the Board of Con⯑troul, that they have appointed John Holland, Eſq an old ſervant of the Company, to ſucceed to the Government of Fort St. George, upon the death, removal, or reſignation of Lord Macartney.

The Board of Controul [...] the Directors' right of appointment, but remonſtrate againſt the nomi⯑nation [24] upon certain grounds; giving Mr. Holland, however, due praiſe, they add, that it is their ‘wiſh to enforce to the Directors, the propriety in every appointment, not only of avoiding blameable appointments, but ſuch as may be open to plauſible miſrepreſentation.’

The Directors maintain their right, and obſerve that the Board are interfering in matters, ‘to which their controul profeſſedly does not ex⯑tend’ The Board of Controul withdraw their oppoſition with ſaying, ‘if the reaſons which we have aſſigned do not ſatisfy the Court of Direc⯑tors, we have certainly no right to controul their opinion.’ Mr. Holland, however is pe⯑remptorily informed, that if he ſails for India under the Directors appointment, he will be re⯑called the inſtant he arrives there.—The diſpute ends; and Sir Archibald Campbell, the friend of Mr. DUNDAS, by a due exertion of the avowed weight of influence, is appointed in his place!

Cenſure and applauſe.] IN July 1785, the Di⯑rectors reprimanded Colonel Roſs, for what they maintained to be an outrageous contempt of their authority. The Board of Controul alter the diſ⯑patch, and refuſe to let the reprimand ſtand. The Directors remonſtrate, and declare that ‘the pre⯑ſent occaſion appears to them ſo momentous, and a ſubmiſſion on their part, ſo deſtructive of all order and ſubordination in India, that they muſt take the liberty of informing the Right Honourable Board, that no diſpatch can be ſent to India which does not contain their (the Directors) final deciſion on Lieutenant Colonel Roſs.’

The matter is compromiſed—with a declaration on the part of the Board of Controul, in theſe words:—

Suſpending and rewarding.] IN July 1787, the Court of Directors diſapprove of certain allowan⯑ces, or gratuities, made to Sir John Dalling by the Government of Fort St. George; and tell their Preſident, that, upon a full examination of the matter, they think he has acted improperly. The Board of Controul new model the diſpatch, and oblige the Directors to ſay, that upon mature conſi⯑deration they are perfectly ſatisfied: aſſuring them, that if they will peruſe their own papers again, they, (the Board of Controul,) are perſuaded ‘you will be diſpoſed to alter your opinion even more than we have altered your diſpatch.’

The Court of Directors, "alarmed," (as they expreſs themſelves, in a caſe of a ſimilar nature reſpecting Colonel Geils's allowances,) ‘at the Board's exerciſing a power over their purſe, not conceiving it to have been the intention of the Act to give the Board ſuch a power,’ re⯑monſtrate reſpectfully upon the occaſion, and de⯑clare, that ‘they have endeavoured to adhere to a ſyſtem of oeconomy which the condition of their finances require, and the Legiſlature has thought fit to command, and ſhould be happy to meet the approbation and ſupport of the Right Ho⯑nourable Board therein. The Act of Parliament,’ they add, ‘we conceive, meant to veſt in your Right Honourable Board, a controuling power, reſpecting the great objects of the government of [26] the Company's affairs, and to leave the liquida⯑tion of accounts for ſervices performed, and all ſuch details, in the Court of Directors.’

The Board of Controul inform them—that they ‘continue to be of their former opinion’—they are at a loſs to underſtand the grounds of objection ‘to their right of controul in this buſineſs, as the claims of Sir John Dalling, though he is now out of your ſervice, are founded upon his right when he was in your ſervice, and are to be paid out of the Revenues of India; and of courſe, your opinions upon them muſt be ſubject to our revi⯑ſion.’ The Directors finding themſelves without a remedy, anſwer,—‘We feel ourſelves under the neceſſity of acquieſcing in the determination of your Right Honourable Board. But we truſt upon further conſideration your Right Honou⯑rable Board will not make ſuch allowances, a perpetual charge upon the Company.’

With theſe inſtances, thus briefly ſtated, ſelected from a number of ſimilar caſes, and relating to the powers exerciſed by the Board of Controul, with reſpect to civil appointments, cenſure and ap⯑plauſe, reward and puniſhment, military promotion, and the purſe of the Company; will it be credited, that any many ſhould have been ſtout enough to aſſert in the Houſe of Commons, that ‘the whole buſineſs of Patronage was left excluſively in the hands of the Company, and that the Board of Controul would not even take it if it were offer⯑ed to them!!!’

In truth, the queſtion, ‘Whether or not the preſent Board of Controul poſſeſs the whole, or any ſhare of the Patronage in India?’ has lately been placed in a plainer light by the unguarded confeſſions of thoſe who ſupported the Declaratory Bill, than by any thing that could be ſaid by thoſe who oppoſed it. Some gentlemen defined the au⯑thority [27] of the Board on this head to be, ‘a power of circuitous nomination;’ others, ‘appointment by the weight of influence;’ others, ‘the right of authoritative recommendation;’ but by whatever name it is called, or however the exerciſe of it may be diſclaimed, theſe facts are plain, 1ſt, That all the unbounded means of Patronage and Protec⯑tion which the Governor General and the Preſidents of the different Councils poſſeſs, belong to thoſe to whom in reality they owe their appointments, and to whom only in fact they owe obedience. 2dly, That the Board of Controul are obviouſly ſeizing the whole of the Military Patronage into their own hands, the intention of extinguiſhing the Company's ſervice being plainly avowed. 3dly, That no perſon can look for protection to any quarter but to the Board, or think of accepting any appointment againſt their will, in the civil line.

One diſtinction, however, is conſtantly taken upon this ſubject, namely, that Mr. Pitt's Com⯑miſſioners do not meddle with the Patronage at home, which it is affirmed would have been at the diſpoſal of Lord Fitzwilliam's Board, under Mr. Fox's Bill. This Patronage, whatever it is, is always magnified, and never explained. As far as it means the nomination of Clerks, and other of⯑ficers at the India Houſe, it is not an object very much worth diſpute: but as far as it relates to contracts, and money laid out in ſhipping and trade at home, it ſhould not be forgotten, that the ma⯑nagement of theſe matters was not placed in Lord Fitzwilliam's Board, by Mr. Fox's Bill, but in a Board of Aſſiſtant Directors, appointed by Parlia⯑ment from among the then exiſting Directors or Proprietors of India Stock, for that ſpecial pur⯑poſe. Theſe Aſſiſtant Directors, however, being bound to obey the orders of the Superior Board, Lord Fitzwilliam might have commanded their [28] Patronage, and perverted their commercial deal⯑ings to his own political purpoſes—granted—there was certainly no ſecurity againſt ſo flagrant an abuſe of truſt, but in the character of the perſon truſted; and what reaſon is there to think that the preſent Board of Controul have no weight of in⯑fluence with reſpect to this very Patronage, if they choſe to act as they ſuppoſe Lord Fitzwilliam would have done? Or, who is there that does not ſee that the Court of Directors are becoming every day mere inſtruments in the hands of this Board, and that there can be nothing of excluſive Patronage belonging to them, more than would have belong⯑ed to the Aſſiſtant Directors under Mr. Fox's Bill? In plain ſenſe, the whole and only difference, in point of Patronage, between the two Boards, is, that by Mr. Fox's Bill it was given directly, and muſt have been exerciſed openly; by Mr. Pitt's Bill it is given circuitouſly, and may be exerciſed ſecretly.

(C)

" Appeal to the King.—"] The application to the King in Council, which Mr. Pitt's Bill declares it ſhall be lawful for the Court of Directors to make, whenever they conceive the orders of the Board not to relate to points connected with the Civil or Military Government and Revenues in India, is a ſtrange mockery, when gravely held out to the Company as a ſecurity againſt encroachment or interference in Commercial matters, on the part of the Board of Controul. It proves, however, how perfectly diſtinct, in theory at leaſt, the fra⯑mers of this Bill conſidered the Board of Controul, from the general executive government of the country:—the limits of the authority of the Di⯑rectors are circumſcribed within certain bounds, and if they tranſgreſs them, or refuſe obedience [29] where the law has commanded them to pay it, re⯑dreſs is provided in the common courſe of law. The law alſo preſcribes limits to the authority and controul of the Commiſſioners; but it provides no redreſs ſhould they tranſgreſs them. The moſt flagrant abuſe of their truſt under their own Bill, would be in any inſtance to aſſume the management of the Company's Commerce; yet if they can craftily effect this, they may do it with impunity; and whenever they are oppoſed, if they can pro⯑cure the ſanction of the Council on their ſide, that is, fairly ſpeaking, of themſelves in a different character—they have the law on their ſide alſo!

But there is nothing more curious than to obſerve the prepoſterous and degrading office which theſe zealous advocates for the dignity and prerogatives of the Crown, have provided for the Monarch, were ever ſuch an appeal to be made.—His Majeſty, in Council, ſhall decide, ‘whether the diſpatch, or order, referred to his Royal judgment, be, or be not, connected with the Civil or Military Go⯑vernment and Revenues of the territories and poſſeſſions in India;’ and this deciſion is to be made upon ſuch ſtatements and information as the parties ſhall condeſcend to favour him with, upon ſubjects wholly removed from the ordinary con⯑templation of his Majeſty's Government. Mr. Dundas aſſerts, that the meaſure propoſed belongs to his department excluſively—being a meaſure relat⯑ing to war, or peace, or negociation or revenue; and that therefore his will and pleaſure ought to have been implicitly obeyed. The Directors humbly contend, without preſuming to queſtion the ſove⯑reignity of the Board of Controul, that the mea⯑ſure is of a Commercial nature merely.—His Majeſty ſits the unprincely umpire between his contending [30] ſubjects, deciding upon the extent of Imperial prerogatives, in the exerciſe of which he has nei⯑ther will nor voice.

But, if any thing further were wanting to ſhew the falacy of this pretended ſecurity to the rights of the Company, we find it amply made out in the notable device of compelling the Directors to eſtabliſh a Secret Committee, to be ſolely under the orders of the Board of Controul. The Secret Committee was accordingly ſoon employed contrary to the profeſſed purpoſe of its inſtitution; and it was as ſoon pre⯑dicted, that the whole affair of an appeal to the King in Council, might at once be evaded by the Board of Controul directing, through their Secret Agents, as matter connected with revenue or negotia⯑tion, whatever commercial arrangement they pleaſed.—But it occurred to no man, that the Board would be ſo unwary, at leaſt till the ſyſtem ſhould be more fully eſtabliſhed, as to endeavour to adopt a precedent for a right of direct controul and manage⯑ment over commercial matters, without cover or pre⯑tence, by means of or in colluſion with, the Secret Committee: yet has this already been the caſe. The Secret Committee, (to whom, however, no intentional ill-conduct is meant to be imputed,) on the firſt of June 1786, aſſume, in concert with the Board of Controul, powers from which both by law and the nature of their truſt, they were equally excluded. They take upon themſelves to direct a purchaſe of cotton to be made at Bombay, for expor⯑tation to China, and order five ſhips to receive the cargo; and direct the remittance of a conſiderable ſum from home, to anſwer the expence, all with⯑out the authority or knowledge of the Directors. The Board of Controul approve the meaſure, and the diſpatch, in the following terms, unguardedly called in the Houſe of Commons,—"blindly lending their name in the uſual form."

The meaſure itſelf alſo was ſo far from being univerſally approved of by the Court of Directors, when made known to them, as was alſo unguardedly inſinuated, that a very ſtrong Proteſt againſt the whole proceeding, was entered upon the records of the Company, in which it was declared to be a tranſaction

[32]It is plain, that no proceeding could be more unwarrantable in all its parts. The Board of Controul gave an illegal ſanction to an illegal tran⯑ſaction. And both parties ſeem to have been ſur⯑prized into a ſmall neglect of the ſpirit of their oath of office. The Members of the Secret Committee take an oath, that ‘they will, according to the beſt of their ſkill and judgment, faithfully exe⯑cute the ſeveral truſts and powers repoſed in them as Members of the Secret Committee, ap⯑pointed by the Directors of the United Company of Merchants trading to the Eaſt Indies.’—They alſo ſwear ſecrecy to the Board of Controul; but the truſt required by their oath to the Directors, is clearly to confine themſelves to the purpoſes of their appointment; and thoſe purpoſes are accurately de⯑fined by the Act that authorizes their inſtitution, to be the executing of the ſecret orders and inſtruc⯑tions of the Board of Controul, concerning the levying of war, or making of peace, or treating or ne⯑gotiating with any of the native Princes or States of India. The Board of Controul alſo ſwear to ex⯑ecute faithfully the ſeveral powers and truſts re⯑poſed in them; by the ſpirit of which oath they are unqueſtionably precluded from circumventing the Court of Directors in the management of their Commerce. Whether the tranſaction itſelf was likely to be profitable, or otherwiſe, to the Com⯑pany, is nothing to the purpoſe, the conſequences to which the principles and the precedent lead, muſt be obvious to every one.

" Power over the territorial revenues."] THE Court of Directors, in the laſt ſtatement of their affairs laid before Parliament, directed the atten⯑tion of the Houſe of Commons to the two funds from which their reſources are to ariſe, and from which they are to derive the means of extricating themſelves from their difficulties. Theſe are, the [33] profits of their trade with India and China; and the ſurplus of their territorial revenues. The formet they ſtate upon a very ſanguine calculation of their probable amount, as ſufficient, beſides providing for the China inveſtment, to pay the debts then engaged to be diſcharged at home, and the debts propoſed to be brought home from India, to which purpoſe their faith is engaged. The latter, the ſurplus of their territorial revenue, as the fund upon which their India inveſtment is to depend; and over THIS FUND THE BOARD OF CONTROUL CLAIM AN ABSOLUTE POWER.

(D)

Expoſtulation and Remonſtrances of the Directors.] The differences which have ſubſiſted between the Court of Directors and the Board of Controul, have not been upon meaſures, or upon matters of opinion, or upon trivial points; but all of them upon queſ⯑tions of right, of law, and upon the nature and limits of their reſpective powers. Such differences, however, will probably no more be heard of.—The laſt ineffectual ſtruggle of the Company ap⯑pears to have been made. In one diſpute they tried in vain to obtain the Miniſter's countenance to apply to the Repreſentatives of the People to arbitrate between them and the Board of Controul. In another, they requeſted to be permitted to ap⯑ply to the King;—this was alſo refuſed. In the laſt, they looked for redreſs in an appeal to the Courts of Juſtice; in this they were fruſtrated by the Legiſlature being induced to think it proper to decide the point, and declare the law againſt them. Thus circumſtanced, ſhut out from Law, Parlia⯑ment, and the Throne, it is but reaſonable to be⯑lieve that the Court of Directors will no more be heard of, but as an inſtrument to ſerve the [34] ambition, or to ſkreen the miſconduct of their maſters.

(E) FOURTH ESTATE.

" New Eſtate or Department—"] The purpoſes and characters of men have been often miſrepre⯑ſented and miſunderſtood through the efforts and prejudices of party; but it is a moſt ſingular cir⯑cumſtance that nearly a whole nation ſhould have been perſuaded to underſtand a Bill paſſed in the Houſe of Commons, and given to the public in print, in a manner directly contrary to its plain meaning and expreſs proviſions; and that even ſober and rational men ſhould have joined in the outcry againſt it, without giving themſelves the trouble to examine whether it really was the mea⯑ſure which it was repreſented to be.

Whatever other faults were found with Mr. Fox's Bill, nothing certainly operated more in the clamour that was raiſed againſt it, than a con⯑fuſed notion that it ſome way or other attacked the prerogatives of the Crown, and aimed to take from the King certain powers and authorities which of right belonged to him. This idea, whether urged by the mob as ‘an attempt to take the Crown from the King's head,’ or, in the politer jargon, of a ‘fourth eſtate,’ and ‘imperium in imperio,’ was certainly a main ingredient in the deluſion which pervaded the country at the laſt general election. Yet is it utterly impoſſible for any man of common ſenſe to read the Bill attentively, without being puzzled to gueſs at the ground upon which ſuch a deception could ſo long have been maintained.

Mr. Fox's Bill enacted in fact nothing new of any ſort with reſpect to the Royal Authority; nor did it contain any one thing in derogation of any one pre⯑rogative of the Crown. If the exiſtence of Direc⯑tors for the management of the affairs of the Eaſt India [35] Company conſtituted a fourth Eſtate, that fourth eſtate exiſted before; and this very phraſe is to be found in pamphlets written againſt this very Com⯑pany twenty years ſince. If a parliamentary no⯑mination of perſons to be concerned in the govern⯑ment of India, was an attack upon the conſtitution, the conſtitution had ſuſtained and ſurvived a ſimilar attack in the Regulating Act of 1773, and in the ſubſequent Bills which repeated thoſe Parliamentary appointments. If the employing the Patronage of the Company, without the King's authority, was an invaſion of his prerogative, it was of a prerogative never heard of, for the Crown had never had the grant of a ſingle office, civil or military, belonging to the ſervice of the Eaſt India Company. In fact ſo far as the Crown was concerned at all, it acquir⯑ed, in the right of nominating to the vacant offices in the new commiſſion, a power the King had ne⯑ver poſſeſſed before. Whether the new Directors for the affairs of India were likely to make a better government than the old, is not the queſtion; the extraordinary circumſtance is, that this Bill, which left the Crown in the full poſſeſſion of its prerogatives of war, peace, and negotiation in India, ſhould have been repreſented as depriving it of its juſt rights, and raiſing a Parliamentary commuſſion above its authority; and that Mr. Pitt's Bill, which actually ſtrips the Throne of thoſe main enſigns of Imperial authority; ſhould have been univerſally admitted at leaſt to have the merit of a due deference to the rights and perſon of the Sovereign!

However, when people are preſſed to explain what their meaning is—they are compelled to own, that when they ſpeak of a fourth eſtate, and an over⯑throwing of the conſtitution, and an attack upon the pre⯑rogative, they do not mean that all this was done, or attempted by the Bill, but—that theſe things might have come to paſs in conſequence of it;—[36] becauſe, ſay they, a great political party having got poſſeſſion of the Patronage of India for four years, they would inſtantly have become ſo ſtrong, that the King could not eaſily have diſmiſſed them; and ſo the prerogative would have been invaded. This party would alſo in time, by means of this Patro⯑nage, have been able to obtain a predominant par⯑ty in Parliament; and ſo the conſtitution would have been deſtroyed. Now, to make any ſenſe of the firſt objection, it is neceſſary to aſſert, as all violent people did, that, although the King ſhe ſhould have thought proper to have diſmiſſed the Duke of Port⯑land's Adminiſtration, and had been equally deſirous of changing the Indian Adminiſtration, yet that Lord Fitzwilliam, and his Board, could have held com⯑plete and independent poſſeſſion of the Government of India for four years, in ſpight of his Royal wiſhes, and have applied all the Patronage and in⯑fluence of their ſituation to the ſupport of the ex⯑miniſters. This is literally what every man meant who meant any thing, or who had any ſincere alarm on the ſubject. That the mere vulgar, or very ignorant people, ſhould have adopted this notion, is not very ſtrange, conſidering the pains which were taken to circulate it; but that a perſon of LORD CAMDEN'S character, accuſtomed to conſider laws with temper and deliberation, ſhould now again have gravely detailed all this ſort of argument in the Houſe of Lords, have warned them againſt this fourth eſtate, this imperium in imperio aſſerting, as is reported,‘that had his Majeſty thought proper, by virtue of his undoubted prerogative, to have diſ⯑miſſed Mr. Fox and his party from his ſervice, we might have ſeen the King of Great Britain, and the King of Bengal, contending in Parliament for ſupe⯑riority,’ is a matter altogether ſurpriſing!—It is ſurpriſing, becauſe the whole of the [...], if ſe⯑riouſly urged, muſt ariſe from a perfect miſappre⯑henſion of the Bill, and be founded upon the falſe [37] and perverſe notion before ſtated, that the Board appointed by it, was placed out of the reach, and above the controul, of the King's Miniſters for the time being. Two gentlemen of the Houſe of Commons, of great ability and character, Mr. SCOTT and Mr. HARDING—confeſſed very can⯑didly that they had been in a miſtake with reſpect to this part of the Bill; they ſtill, however, per⯑ſiſted to argue upon concluſions founded upon ac⯑knowledged error.

What is the real caſe?—Mr. Fox's Bill enacts, ‘that the ſaid Directors hereby appointed, or any three of them, ſhall have, uſe, poſſeſs, exerciſe, all and ſingular the powers and authorities which have been, at any time heretofore, veſted in, or lawfully exerciſed by, the ſaid Directors hereby diſcontinued, or Proprietors, or by the General Court of Proprietors of the ſaid United Compa⯑ny, and all ſuch farther and other powers and authorities, and under ſuch directions, and ſubject to ſuch limitations and reſtrictions as in this act, or in ANY OTHER ACT, the proviſions where of ARE NOT HEREBY ALTERED OR REPEALED, are con⯑tained for the government and management of the ſaid territorial poſſeſſions, revenues, and commerce, of the ſaid United Company, or in any wiſe relative thereto. And further, that in all caſes whatſoever, where any act, matter, or thing, is directed to be done or conſented to, or any accounts or writings to be ſigned by the Di⯑rectors hereby diſcontinued; ſuch act, matter, or thing, ſhall, from and after the commerce⯑ment of this act, be done or conſented to; and ſuch accounts or writings ſhall be ſigned by three of the Directors hereby appointed.’

Now, in order to underſtand what the real ſitu⯑ation of the new Directors would have been, and what the extent of their powers, it ſhould ſeem [38] that the natural thing was, to examine what were the directions, limitations, and reſtrictions, not ex⯑preſsly repealed, under which they were left? In this caſe it would have appeared,—that Lord FITZ⯑WILLIAM and his Board were bound to communi⯑cate to his Majeſty's Miniſters for the time being, an exact copy of all diſpatches and letters received from India, or propoſed to be ſent thither, which ſhould—‘ANY WAY RELATE to the REVENUES, or to the CIVIL and MILITARY affairs and GOVERNMENT of the ſaid United Company.’—That Lord FITZ⯑WILLIAM and his Board were bound ‘to pay DUE OBEDIENCE to, and to be GOVERNED and BOUND by, ſuch INSTRUCTIONS as they ſhould receive FROM HIS MAJESTY, by one of his Majeſty's prin⯑cipal Secretaries of State, IN ALL THEIR CON⯑DUCT, and TRANSACTIONS, (and in thoſe of their Governors, Preſidents, and Councils reſpectively,) with the COUNTRY POWERS in the Eaſt Indies, and alſo in regard to the LEVYING WAR and MAK⯑ING PEACE.’—That Lord FITZWILLIAM and his Board had no means of uſing the credit of the Eaſt India Company for the relief of the Compa⯑ny's preſſing diſtreſſes, ‘without the CONSENT and ORDER firſt had and obtained of the Commiſſioners of his Majeſty's Treaſury for the time being.’—That Lord FITZWILLIAM and his Board, in mak⯑ing proviſion for the defence of the poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies, were bound to act ‘on the requi⯑ſition, and under the inſpection of the Commiſſioners of his Majeſty's Navy, and Office of Ordnance.’—Upon the whole, it would have appeared that their Board was placed, in every important matter, un⯑der ſo ſtrong a controul of the Miniſters for the time being, and ſo wholly without the power of acting upon their own judgment or diſcretion, in all the more important objects of their inſtitution, that no ſet of men, who were not content from [39] the meaneſt motives, to hold the appearance of power upon the moſt abject conditions, could have remained in their Offices a week, with an Admini⯑ſtration deſirous to get rid of them. Let theſe plain facts be once underſtood, let the ſtate of ſub⯑ordination of the new Directors to the King's Go⯑vernment be fairly examined, and it will be appa⯑rent at once,—that without having recourſe to a Parliamentary addreſs,—the Duke of Portland's Adminiſtration once diſmiſſed, the reſignation of Lord Fitzwilliam's Board muſt have followed in⯑ſtantly; that is, if it was the object of the adviſers of the Crown to change the Indian Government;—if otherwiſe, undoubtedly Lord Fitzwilliam and his aſſociates were at liberty to continue in a labo⯑rious duty, without pay or emolument, and inca⯑pacitated from accepting any place of profit from the Crown, and to ſacrifice their eaſe and their time under Miniſters with whom they had no bond of union, nor habits of regard, from a deſire to do good, and to effect the great pupoſes of their ap⯑pointment—the reform of the abuſes in India, and the re-eſtabliſhment of the Britiſh character. To execute this truſt faithfully, a rigid ſcrutiny into paſt miſconduct, a ſevere oeconomy in future arrangements, a juſt, diſintereſted, and impartial management of Patronage, would have been among the firſt duties expected from them. While they ſo acted, if it was the King's pleaſure, his Mini⯑ſters, whoever they were, might certainly have ab⯑ſtained from the exerciſe of the deciſive controul they poſſeſſed over them; but then, wherein would have conſiſted the attack on the prerogative, or the danger of the Conſtitution? But ſuppoſing a different conduct to have been purſued by the Board;—that forgetting what they owed to their own characters, as well as to the duties of their ſta⯑tion, they had perverted the powers of their truſt, [40] and had endeavoured to employ them ſolely to anſwer party purpoſes at home;—the remedy was at hand, and the firſt application of it muſt have been effectual.

This being the fact, an objection of a different nature may, no doubt, be inſtantly made, namely, that as the King was to nominate to vacancies upon reſignation, the Bill might have been uſed not to deſtroy, but to increaſe the power of the Crown;—the truth is, that it were much to be wiſhed that this objection could be as eaſily anſwered as the other. MR. GRENVILLE was the only perſon connected with the preſent Adminiſtration, who argued the Bill upon this ground, at the time of its paſſing through the Houſe of Commons. The fair anſwer, however, is, that there was every ſecurity taken againſt this worſt of miſchiefs, which the nature of the meaſure itſelf, and the urgent neceſ⯑ſity which called for it, admitted of. The public had a pledge in the characters of the perſons who framed that Bill, in the whole tenor of their poli⯑tical life, and in their recent and honeſt exertions to reduce the influence of the Crown, that it was not their intention at leaſt, to deceive or delude them upon this ſubject.—If theſe Miniſters were diſplaced, there was the ſame ſecurity in the cha⯑racter of the Indian Board, and in the very prin⯑ciple upon which it had been formed. If they too were obliged to abandon their ſituation, theſe ſecurities certainly vaniſhed; and the Crown might, for whatever term remained of the four years, have placed the powers given to the Parliamentary truſ⯑tees, in the hands of its own creatures. But this could not have been done ſecretly or ſilently—not without ſerious diſcuſſion—not without the at⯑tention of the Public being immediately and for⯑cibly drawn to the ſubject and to the characters and principles of the new Board; no new ar⯑rangement [41] could pretend to claim the confidence of a Parliamentary nomination; Parliament muſt therefore have had the matter before them in a new point of view and have become acceſſory to the ſurrender, if they were to be ſurrendered, of thoſe powers and that patronage to the Crown,—which all parties profeſſed ſo much to dread to ſee lodged there.—Againſt ſuch a conduct in Par⯑liament there is certainly no remedy, nor ever will be.

The only thing like an objection on this head re⯑maining, is, that upon a ſuppoſition that his Ma⯑jeſty had been pleaſed to continue the Duke of Portland's Adminiſtration for the term of four years, for which the India Board was appointed, the ſup⯑poſed good underſtanding between the Miniſters and the new India Government, would have given them an opportunity of uſing the Company's influ⯑ence and Patronage, to make friends, and to create an intereſt which might have been of uſe to them at the end of that term. This undoubtedly might have been the caſe, but not without an abuſe of their truſt; and againſt this the public had certainly no ſecurity but in the character of the Board. In a compariſon, however, of the two Bills, it is ob⯑vious to aſk,—what ſecurity have the public againſt the ſame thing now? The means of Patronage and influence to all important purpoſes were before proved to be equal; and if Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dun⯑das have for their object the attaching a powerful Indian intereſt, both at home and abroad, to them⯑ſelves, who that obſerves and underſtands the mea⯑ſures daily purſued, both with regard to the Direc⯑tors, the Proprietors, the Army, and the Governments and Councils abroad, can be ſo duped as not to own, that a very few years more muſt make them as for⯑midable as Indian influence and attachment, ſo concentred and headed, can make any party.

(G)

" Mr. Dundas, with any two more Commiſſioners—"] IN the Committee upon Mr. Pitt's Bill, it was moved that of the three Members of the Board of Controul who were empowered to ſign diſpatches relating to war, peace, &c. ‘one ſhould be the Secretary of State, or the Chancellor of the Exche⯑quer for the time being.’ This was negatived upon a diviſion, "Ayes 7, Noes 92!" Such was the con⯑fidence the Houſe thought this board entitled to, independently of its connexion with the oſtenſible Miniſters!

(H)

In ſpeaking of Mr. Fox's plan, it is a circum⯑ſtance generally overlooked, that it conſiſted of two Bills brought into the Houſe of Commons together, tho' the Bill appointing the new Directors, only reach⯑ed the Houſe of Lords. The other—the Bill for the better Government of the Territorial Poſſeſſi⯑ons, contained many excellent regulations for the relief and protection of the natives of India, and many real guards againſt the abuſe of power, and the means of corrupt patronage in the hands of our Governors;—it alſo contained an undoubted teſti⯑mony that it was not the intention of that Admi⯑niſtration to make Parliament a ready aſylum for thoſe who might be accuſed of delinquencies abroad, or to uſe the influence of their ſituation to create an Indian intereſt for their ſupport.

(I) SECRET COMMITTEE.

THE Secret Committee, created by Mr. Pitt's Bill in the Court of Directors, is an inſtrument of government unlike any thing exiſting in any other country, or any thing to be found in the hiſtory of [43] all paſt governments. A body of men in authority (the Court of Directors) acting under a delegated truſt from their conſtituents, the Eaſt India Com⯑pany) take an oath on their election to ſupport the intereſts and rights of the Company.—Theſe Di⯑rectors are then bound by law to chooſe a Secret Committee from among themſelves, which Secret Committee are to take an oath to be true to the truſt repoſed in them by the Directors; but to obey only ſuch orders and directions as they ſhall receive from the Board of Controul, which orders and di⯑rections they ſwear alſo never to communicate to the Directors, who appoint them, without the con⯑ſent of the ſaid Board of Controul.—This Secret Committee have no power of originating or direc⯑ing any thing to be done of their own authority, ſtill leſs, by ſuggeſtion or inſtruction from the Di⯑rectors; all the Governments and Preſidencies, however, in India, are bound to pay a faithful obe⯑dience to their orders and diſpatches, and to anſwer the ſame upon the ſame terms of ſecrecy, ‘as if ſuch Orders and Directions had been iſſued and tranſmitted by the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company.’

If it were worth reaſoning or arguing upon, it would be no difficult matter to prove that this crooked ſyſtem of involved myſtery and contradic⯑tory duties, could never have been meant for any fair purpoſe of good government. Facts, however, make reaſoning on the ſubject unneceſſary. The inſtitution had ſcarcely taken place, with the addi⯑tion of the [...], added in the Explanatory Act paſſed in 17 [...], before this Committee, appointed for the purpoſe of iſſuing the ſecret inſtructions of the Board of Controul, relating to matters of war and peace, are directed to manage, as a matter of ſe⯑ [...]ecy, the ſettlement of an old debt due from the Nabob of Arcot to the Company.

[44] Nothing could be more clearly out of the ſpirit and meaning of the Act of 1784, than this mea⯑ſure. The Board of Controul had already aſſumed an arbitrary power of ſettling the debts due from the Nabob to individuals, as matter connected with revenue. The Directors conceived they might at leaſt have been permitted to ſettle their own debt, which was their property, and ſtated as part of their effects to Parliament; but this was diſcovered to be—matter connected with negociation. The Board of Controul had no power to iſſue their orders, through the Secret Committee, with reſpect to mat⯑ters of revenue; but with reſpect to treaties with native Princes, they had: accordingly the ſettling a ſufficient ſecurity for an old and public debt to the Company, due from a dependent on their Go⯑vernment, was converted into a negociation of ſtate, deemed a matter of ſecreſy, and withdrawn even from the knowledge of thoſe who alone had any title to the debt. The Directors apply to their Counſel; and they are truly informed by Mr. Rous, that ‘the whole effect of the laſt Regulating Bill, in conſtituting the two Boards of Directors and of Commiſſioners, the one propoſing meaſures, and the other, after repreſentation, finally de⯑ciding, will be loſt, as far as concerns the Go⯑vernment of Madras, if the intercourſe with the Nabob ſhall be confined to the Secret Department; becauſe this intercourſe involves directly, the arrangements reſpecting the military force, and indirectly, every intereſt of that ſettlement.’

The diſpute comes before the Court of Proprie⯑tors, who reſolve, on the 30th of June 1786,—‘that the conſtruction of the Act of the 24th of his preſent Majeſty, under which the Right Honourable Board of Commiſſioners for the Af⯑fairs of India have claimed to exerciſe the pow⯑ers in inſtances before the Court, is ſubverſive [45] of the authority of the Court of Directors, and the Chartered Rights of the Company, recognized and confirmed by the ſaid Act; and tends to eſtabliſh a Secret Syſtem of Government, highly dangerous to the intereſts of the Public and the Company.’

It was farther reſolved unanimouſly, ‘that this General Court do return thanks to the Court of Directors for the firmneſs with which they have maintained the rights of the Company, againſt the claims of the Right Honourable Board of Commi⯑ſioners for the Affairs of India; and that the ſpi⯑rited Proteſt of Mr. Samuel Smith, merits the approbation of his conſtituents.’

Upon this the Court of Directors reſolve, that ‘it is expedient to apply to the Legiſlature for a further explanation, and more correct limita⯑tion of the powers of the Board of Controul.’ At the ſame time, however, with a very natural caution, they think it prudent to aſk Mr. Pitt's permiſſion to do ſo firſt. Accordingly the Chair⯑man, and Deputy Chairman, are directed to wait on the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and propoſe the following queſtion: ‘If the Court of Direc⯑tors, with the authority of the General Court of Proprietors, ſhall think proper to apply to Par⯑liament to explain the powers of the Board of Controul, with regard to the ſecret correſpon⯑dence relative to the country powers of India, will you aſſiſt them in their application?’

Here ſeems to have been a reaſonable caſe made for a Declaratory Law, if (according to Mr. Scott,) ‘a material difference of opinion between the Company and the Board of Controul is a ſuffici⯑ent ground for one.’

The Chancellor of the Exchequer however, af⯑ter due deliberation, anſwers, that ‘he cannot agree in the ſentiments expreſſed in the Reſolu⯑tion concerning the conduct of the Right Ho⯑nourable [46] Board of Commiſſioners for the Affairs of India, and does not ſee any ground for an applica⯑tion to Parliament on the ſubject.’

In a Court of Proprietors, theſe proceedings be⯑ing reported, it was moved, ‘that a Committee be appointed to take into conſideration the ſtate of this Company, under the operation and ef⯑fect of the laſt act of the 24th and 26th of George III.’ Upon this a ballot was demanded, in which (the refractory conduct of the Court of Directors and Proprietors having created a conſi⯑derable alarm) a proper weight of influence was ex⯑erted, and the queſtion paſſed in the negative.

Mr. Samuel Smith's teſtimony on this occaſion, as he has been a zealous friend to the preſent Ad⯑miniſtration in Parliament, muſt be admitted to be at leaſt free from party prejudice. He ſays, in the Proteſt above alluded to, containing the rea⯑ſons of his reſignation,

In fact, this tranſaction eſtabliſhed the power of the Board of Controul to act thro' the Secret Com⯑mittee, UPON ALL MATTERS, and IN ANY MANNER they may think proper, without a poſſibility of check, and with ſcarce a probability of detection.

(K)

Agree upon its Meaning.] THE Declaratory Law was defended by many, upon the ground of its declaring no more power to be in the Board of Controul than it was fit and reaſonable to give them; and that to ſuppoſe that the Original Act had given them leſs, was to admit that Parliament had enacted an abſurd and inconſiſtent law. This argument, altho' a popular one, and ſanctioned—altho' a popu⯑lar one—by LORD HAWKESBURY, is an intolerably bad argument when applied to Parliament, acting in a great meaſure in their judicial capacity: It is to ſet up their pride againſt their juſtice; and to pique them to commit an act of violence, rather than confeſs an act of folly. Other Members, [48] however, in both Houſes of Parliament profeſſed that they ſupported the Declaratory Law, as a true conſtruction of Mr. Pitt's Bill, from a recollection of their own meaning at the time they voted for it. Yet few of theſe Members agreed with each other, as to the powers they conceived they had given to the Board of Controul. LORD CAMDEN having been out of the kingdom when the Act of 1784 paſſed, profeſſed to have nothing to ſay to the inten⯑tions of the Legiſlature in paſſing the Act, but to have formed his opinion upon ‘the plain and ob⯑vious meaning of the clauſes taken collectively.’ The learned Lord was obliged, however, to admit, that there were many words omitted which were neceſſary to make out his inſtruction, and ma⯑ny others inſerted which directly contradict⯑ed it; but this he preſumed to have happen⯑ed through inadvertency; and therefore a whole clauſe coming under the latter deſcription—‘nil operatur.’ A new and moſt extraordinary mode, the moſt unlearned man may venture to aſ⯑ſert, of interpreting laws affecting the rights and property of the ſubject!

But the pleaſanteſt ground was taken by the DUKE of RICHMOND. The noble Duke declared he had voted againſt Mr. Pitt's Bill, becauſe he differed at the time from thoſe who had introduced it with reſpect to its meaning. He thinking that it did actually give thoſe powers to the Board of Con⯑troul, which they aſſerted were not meant to be gi⯑ven. It now therefore appearing that they had come over to his opinion, conſiſtency demanded from him to give vigour and efficacy to a law—which juſtice and policy had convinced him ought never to have exiſted.

It would certainly be a difficult taſk to argue on the intentions of different Members at the time the Act of 1784 paſſed, and a very unfair way of argu⯑ing with reſpect to any but thoſe who publicly gave [49] their enterpretation of the Bill, during its progreſs. Mr. BASTARD'S quotations from the Miniſter's for⯑mer ſpeeches ſeem to have been generally admit⯑ted to have contained a true expoſition of the Mi⯑niſter's former meaning; but there is one deciſive teſt eaſily recurred to, which was very ably argued upon by Mr. POWIS; namely, to compare the Bill in the ſtate in which it was firſt brought into the Houſe by Mr. Pitt, with that to which he altered it, after a diſcuſſion with the Directors, in the Committee. Here it will deciſively appear that many of theſe very powers which are now contend⯑ed to be given to the Board of Controul, by con⯑ſtruction and implication, were directly and plainly given in the Bill as it ſtood on its firſt reading, and were afterwards withdrawn or modified upon con⯑ference and explanation with theſe who objected to them, as intrenching on right which they had not conſented to yield.—This evidence is concluſive.

" Explain the original Act—"] THERE is no inſtance, perhaps, wherein the extraordinary ſpirit in which Mr. Pitt's Bill is worded, appears more plainly than in its bold and irregular manner of re⯑pealing matters ſuppoſed to be inconſiſtent with the new enactments.

In all the former Acts we find a regard to perſpi⯑cuity and fair dealing, expreſſed as in the Act of 21ſt of the preſent King. ‘And be it further en⯑acted by the authority aforeſaid, that all and every the rights, intereſts, powers, privileges, and au⯑thorities, which are now veſted in the ſaid Uni⯑ted Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies, and which are NOT hereby EX⯑PRESSLY TAKEN AWAY, altered, or varied, ſhall remain to, and continue in the ſaid Company, in as full and ample a manner, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as if this Act had never been made.’

[50] This is the language of laws that mean to be intelligible, and to do juſtice,

Mr. Pitt's Bill ſettles the point in a different man⯑ner:—‘And be it further enacted, that all ſuch powers and authorities given to, or veſted in the Proprietors and Directors of the ſaid United Com⯑pany, or in any General or Special Court there⯑of reſpectively, in, and by any Act of Parlia⯑ment or Charter, as are contrary or REPUGNANT to THIS ACT, or ANY THING HEREIN CON⯑TAINED, ſhall be, and the ſame are hereby REPEALED; any thing contained in any Act or Charter, or any cuſtom or uſage to the contrary notwithſtanding.’ Whether under this looſe and arrogant mandate, ſo unlike the temperate pre⯑ciſion of a Britiſh law upon ſuch a ſubject, there is any one right, power, or property of any ſort, left to the Company, may reaſonably be doubted; indeed ſince the conſtruction given to "THIS ACT," by the Declaratory Law, it is difficult to imagine any power ever exerciſed by them, which might not be proved in a court of juſtice to be repugnant to ſomething contained in Mr. Pitt's Bill.

(L)

" Mr. Pitt's Bill a perpetual law—] IT was pro⯑poſed, both in the Houſe of Lords and in the Houſe of Commons, to limit the duration of the powers of the Board of Controul to the term for which the Company held their charter of excluſive trade. It is ſcarcely to be conceived, that if this queſtion were to be fairly argued upon its own ground, when Miniſters ſhould be graciouſly diſpoſed to allow a little time for its diſcuſſion, that either Mr. PITT or Lord HAWKESBURY could eaſily prevail on either Houſe of Parliament to reject it; becauſe ſuch a conduct would be, in fact, to induce the le⯑giſlature [51] deliberately to violate a ſolemn compact made between Parliament and a body of merchants, not with reſpect to their charter of power and mono⯑poly, which being a truſt, as all power is, might be reſumed upon abuſe; but with reſpect to eſtates, rights and property, which no miſmanagement could forfeit, and for which a valuable conſideration had been paid to the public.

By the Act of the 21ſt of his preſent Majeſty, the Company's charter of excluſive trade will ex⯑pire in 1794, upon previous notice from Parliament.—The 4th and 6th clauſes of this Act repeat the reſervation in favour of the rights and privileges of the Company, independently of their right to the excluſive trade, and ſtating the conſideration paid ‘for the ſervice of the Crown of England, entitling them to theſe advantages,’ conclude in theſe words:—‘Provided always, and it is hereby further en⯑acted, that nothing in the above proviſo, or in any proviſo in the ſaid Act of the ninth year of the reign of his ſaid late Majeſty King William the Third, or in the ſaid charter of the fifth day of September, in the tenth year of his ſaid late Majeſty's reign, or in any other act or charter contained, ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to ex⯑tend, to determine the Corporation of the ſaid United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies; or to hinder, prevent, or exclude the ſaid United Company from carry⯑ing on AT ALL TIMES after ſuch determination of the right to the ſole, whole, and excluſive trade, as aforeſaid, a FREE TRADE in, to, and from the Eaſt Indies, and parts aforeſaid, with all, or any part of their own joint ſtock in trade, goods merchandizes, eſtate, and effects, IN COMMON with OTHER THE SUBJECTS OF HIS MAJESTY, his heirs and ſucceſſors, trading, in, to, or from thoſe parts.’

[52] After this, to enact a law to place them in their corporate capacity as merchants united to trade ‘upon their own joint ſtock and eſtate,’ (without any excluſive right or protection from Government whatever,) under the perpetual controul of certain Commiſſioners named by the Crown, to whom they are bound ‘to communicate all their tranſactions,’ and without whoſe ſignature they can iſſue no one commercial order, is ſurely a moſt flagrant and wanton violation of private property, as well as public faith, and indeed of every right that law or charter can be ſuppoſed to ſecure to any one.

With reſpect to the Company's claim on the terri⯑torial revenues, the breach of faith is the ſame.—The Company paid the public a certain ſum upon the laſt ſettlement on this ſubject, and it was en⯑acted, ‘that all the territorial acquiſitions and re⯑venues lately obtained in the Eaſt Indies ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt In⯑dies, for, and during the term of the excluſive trade granted to the ſaid United Company.’ It was ſtipulated, however, that beſide the ſum paid a further proportion of the ſurplus profits of theſe revenues ſhould be ‘ſet apart, and applied for the uſe of the public,’ with this reſerve, ‘ſo long as the Company ſhall be entitled to the ſole and ex⯑cluſive trade.’—21ſt George III.

Upon theſe terms the queſtion of right between the public and the Company was ſuſpended until the expiration of the charter of monopoly. And the ſaving clauſe which had been inſerted in all former Acts relating to this point was repeated. Clauſe 83. ‘Provided always, and be it enacted, that no⯑thing herein contained ſhall extend, or be con⯑ſtrued to extend, to prejudice or affect the rights, or the claims of the public, or the ſaid United Company, reſpecting the ſaid territorial acquiſi⯑tions and revenues.’

[53] The right of the Company under this compact is—not to the property of the revenues certainly, but to a deciſion upon the ſubject on the expiration of their charter of excluſive trade, or to be placed in the ſame ſituation with reſpect to their claim in which they ſtood when they made their bargain. In lieu of this, a new Claimant is created by Par⯑liament, being neither the public nor the Company, to whom the law gives the perpetual diſpoſal of theſe revenues ſo claimed by the public on one part, and the Company on the other. For it is to be remem⯑bered, (granting the Board of Controul to be act⯑ing for the Crown) that the King is not the re⯑preſentative of the Public, with reſpect to their property and purſe; but that on the contrary the Conſtitution regards with jealouſy, and places no truſt in the Crown upon that head; ſo that the Public would be defrauded, although the re⯑venues were to come under the diſpoſal of the King. But even that is not the caſe; for the Board of Controul can appropriate them without the direction of the Crown, as well as without the di⯑rection of the Company, or of Parliament. Par⯑liament therefore breaks its faith to the Company, without doing juſtice to the Public; and the title and claims of both are extinguiſhed, not in favour of the Crown, but in favour of a FOURTH ESTATE, which acquires the ſtrange and anomalous right ei⯑ther of diſpoſing of the PROPERTY OF INDIVIDU⯑ALS, againſt their conſent, or of applying the PRO⯑PERTY OF THE STATE without the ſanction of Par⯑liament.