Romans Ch. 13. Ver. 2. ‘Whoſoever Reſiſteth the Power, Reſiſt⯑eth the Ordinance of God.’

I. IT is not my Deſign to enquire into the particular Nature of the Government and Conſtitution of theſe Kingdoms; much leſs to pretend to determine con⯑cerning the Merits of the different Parties now reigning in the State. Thoſe Topicks I profeſs to lie out of my Sphere, and they will probably be thought by moſt Men, improper to be Treated of in an Audience almoſt wholly made up of young Perſons, ſet apart from the buſineſs and noiſe of the World, for their more convenient inſtruction in Learning and Piety. But ſurely it is in no re⯑ſpect unſuitable to the circumſtances of this place to inculcate and explain every branch of the Law of Nature; or thoſe Virtues and Duties which are equally binding in every Kingdom or Society of Men under Heaven; and of this kind I take to be that Chriſtian Duty of not Reſiſting the Supreme Power implied in my Text. Whoſoever Reſiſteth the Power, Reſiſteth the Ordinance of God. In Treating on which Words I ſhall obſerve the following Method.

II. Firſt, I ſhall endeavour to prove, That there is an abſolute unlimited Non-Reſiſtance or Paſſive [2] Obedience due to the Supreme Civil Power, where⯑ever placed in any Nation. Secondly, I ſhall en⯑quire into the Grounds and Reaſons of the contra⯑ry Opinion. Thirdly, I ſhall conſider the Obje⯑ctions drawn from the pretended conſequences of Non-Reſiſtance to the Supreme Power. In hand⯑ling theſe Points, I intend not to build on the Au⯑thority of Holy Scripture, but altogether on the Principles of Reaſon common to all mankind; and that, becauſe there are ſome very rational and learned Men, who being verily perſwaded, an ab⯑ſolute paſſive Subjection to any earthly Power, is repugnant to right Reaſon, can never bring them⯑ſelves to admit ſuch an Interpretation of Holy Scripture (however natural and obvious from the words) as ſhall make that a part of Chriſtian Re⯑ligion, which ſeems to them in it ſelf manifeſtly abſurd, and deſtructive of the Original inherent Rights of humane Nature.

III. I do not mean to Treat of that ſubmiſſion, which Men are either in Duty or Prudence obliged to pay inferior or executive Powers; neither ſhall I conſider where, or in what Perſons the Supreme or Legiſlative Power is lodged in this or that Go⯑vernment. Only thus much I ſhall take for gran⯑ted, That there is in every Civil Community, ſome where or other, placed a Supreme Power of making Laws, and enforcing the Obſervation of them. The fulfilling of thoſe Laws, either by a punctual performance of what is enjoyned in them, or, if that be inconſiſtent with Reaſon or Con⯑ſcience, by a patient Submiſſion to whatever Pe⯑nalties the Supreme Power hath annexed to the Neglect or Tranſgreſſion of them, is termed Loyal⯑ty; as on the other hand, the making Uſe of Force and open Violence, either to withſtand the exe⯑cution [3] of the Laws, or ward off the Penalties ap⯑pointed by the Supreme Power, is properly Named Rebellion. Now to make it evident, that every de⯑gree of Rebellion is Criminal in the Subject; I ſhall in the firſt place endeavour to prove that Loy⯑alty is a natural or moral Duty; and Diſloyalty or Rebellion in the moſt ſtrict and proper Senſe, ae Vice or Breach of the Law of Nature. And Se⯑condly, I propoſe to ſhew that the Prohibitions of Vice, or Negative Precepts of the Law of Nature, as, Thou ſhalt not commit Adultery, Thou ſhalt not Forſwear thy ſelf, Thou ſhalt not Reſiſt the Su⯑preme Power, and the like, ought to be taken in a moſt abſolute, neceſſary, and immutable Senſe: Inſomuch, that the attainment of the greateſt Good, or deliverance from the greateſt Evil, that can be⯑fal any Man or number of Men in this Life, may not juſtifie the leaſt Violation of them. Firſt then I am to ſhew that Loyalty is a Moral Duty, and Diſloyalty or Rebellion in the moſt ſtrict and pro⯑per Senſe a Vice, or breach of the Law of Nature.

IV. Tho' it be a Point agreed amongſt all Wiſe Men, that there are certain Moral Rules or Laws of Nature, which carry with them an eternal and indiſpenſable Obligation; yet concerning the pro⯑per Methods for diſcovering thoſe Laws, and di⯑ſtinguiſhing them from others dependent on the Humour and Diſcretion of Men, there are various Opinions; ſome direct us to look for them in the Divine Ideas, others in the natural Inſcriptions on the Mind; ſome derive them from the Authority of Learned Men, and the Univerſal Agreement and Conſent of Nations. Laſtly, others hold that they are only to be diſcovered by the deductions of Reaſon. The three firſt Methods muſt be acknow⯑ledg'd to labour under great Difficulties, and the [4] laſt has not, that I know, been any where diſtinct⯑ly explained, or treated of ſo fully as the impor⯑tance of the Subject doth deſerve. I hope there⯑fore it will be Pardon'd, if in a Diſcourſe of Paſ⯑ſive Obedience, in order to lay the Foundation of that Duty the deeper, we make ſome Enquiry into the Origine, Nature, and Obligation of Moral Duties in general, and the Criterions whereby they are to be known.

V. Self-Love being a Principle of all others the moſt Univerſal, and the moſt deeply engraven in our Hearts, it is natural for us to regard things, as they are fitted to augment or impair our own Hap⯑pineſs; and accordingly we denominate them Good or Evil. Our Judgment is ever employ'd in di⯑ſtinguiſhing between theſe two, and it is the whole buſineſs of our Lives, to endeavour, by a proper application of our Faculties, to procure the one and avoid the other. At our firſt coming into the World, we are entirely guided by the Impreſſions of Senſe, ſenſible Pleaſure being the infallible Cha⯑racteriſtic of preſent Good, as Pain is of Evil. But by degrees, as we grow up in our acquaintance with the Nature of Things, experience informs us that preſent Good is afterwards oft attended with a greater Evil; and on the other ſide, that preſent Evil is not leſs frequently the occaſion of procuring to us a greater future Good. Beſides, as the No⯑bler Faculties of the human Soul begin to diſplay themſelves, they diſcover to us Goods far more excellent than thoſe which affect the Senſes. Hence an alteration is wrought in our Judgments, we no longer comply with the firſt ſolicitations of Senſe, but ſtay to conſider the remote conſequences of an Action, what Good may be hoped, or what Evil feared from it, according to the wonted Courſe of [5] things. This obliges us frequently to overlook preſent momentary Enjoyments, when they come in competition with greater and more laſting Goods, tho' too far off, or of too refin'd a Nature to affect our Senſes.

VI. But as the whole Earth, and the entire du⯑ration of thoſe periſhing Things contained in it, is altogether inconſiderable, or in the Prophet's ex⯑preſſive Stile, leſs than nothing in reſpect of Eternity, who ſees not that every reaſonable Man ought ſo to frame his Actions, as that they may moſt effe⯑ctually contribute to promote his Eternal Intereſt? And ſince it is a Truth evident by the Light of Na⯑ture, that there is a Sovereign Omniſcient Spirit, who alone can make us for ever Happy, or for ever Miſerable; it plainly follows, that a Confor⯑mity to his Will, and not any Proſpect of Tem⯑poral Advantage, is the ſole Rule whereby every Man who acts up to the Principles of Reaſon, muſt Govern and Square his Actions. The ſame Concluſion doth likewiſe evidently Reſult from the Relation which God bears to his Creatures. God alone is Maker and Preſerver of all Things. He is therefore with the moſt undoubted Right the great Legiſlator of the World; and Mankind are by all the Ties of Duty, no leſs than Intereſt, bound to Obey his Laws.

VII. Hence we ſhould above all things endea⯑vour to trace out the Divine Will, or the general deſign of Providence with regard to Mankind, and the Methods moſt directly tending to the accom⯑pliſhment of that deſign, and this ſeems the ge⯑nuine and proper way for diſcovering the Laws of Nature. For Laws being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legiſlator, in [6] order to attain the Knowledge of God's Laws, we ought firſt to enquire what that end is, which he deſigns ſhould be carried on by human Actions. Now, as God is a Being of Infinite Goodneſs, it is plain the end he propoſes is Good. But God en⯑joying in himſelf all poſſible Perfection, it fol⯑lows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themſelves, ſo as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelli⯑gences or reaſonable Creatures: The end there⯑fore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodneſs, which conſiſting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth preſuppoſe the being of ſuch Laws, and Law ever ſuppoſing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end propoſed by God, no diſtinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore it ſelf or general deſign of Providence is not determined or limited by any Reſpect of Perſons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God deſigns ſhould be procured by the con⯑curring Actions of each individual. Having thus diſcover'd the great end, to which all Moral Obli⯑gations are Subordinate; it remains, that we en⯑quire what Methods are neceſſary for the obtain⯑ing that End.

VIII. The well-being of Mankind muſt neceſ⯑ſarily be carried on one of theſe two ways: Either firſt, without the injunction of any certain uni⯑verſal Rules of Morality, only by obliging every [7] one upon each particular Occaſion, to conſult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him ſhall ſeem in the preſent time and circumſtan⯑ces, moſt to conduce to it. Or Secondly, by en⯑joining the Obſervation of ſome determinate, e⯑ſtabliſh'd Laws, which, if Univerſally practis'd, have from the Nature of things an Eſſential fit⯑neſs to procure the well-being of Mankind; tho' in their particular Application, they are ſome⯑times through untoward accidents, and the per⯑verſe irregularity of human Wills, the occaſions of great Sufferings, and Misfortunes, it may be, to very many good Men. Againſt the former of theſe Methods there lie ſeveral ſtrong Objections. For brevity I ſhall mention only two.

IX. Firſt, it will thence follow, that the Beſt Men for want of Judgment, and the Wiſeſt for want of knowing all the hidden circumſtances and conſequences of an Action, may very often be at a loſs how to behave themſelves; which they would not be, in caſe they judged of each Action, by comparing it with ſome particular Precept, rather than by examining the Good or Evil which in that ſingle inſtance it tends to pro⯑cure: It being far more eaſy to Judge with cer⯑tainty, whether ſuch or ſuch an Action be a Tranſ⯑greſſion of this or that Precept, than whether it will be attended with more good or ill Conſe⯑quences. In ſhort, to calculate the events of each particular Action is impoſſible, and tho' it were not, would yet take up too much time to be of Uſe in the affairs of Life. Secondly, if that Me⯑thod be obſerv'd, it will follow that we can have no ſure Standard, to which comparing the Acti⯑ons of another, we may pronounce them good or bad, Virtues or Vices. For ſince the meaſure and [8] rule of every good Man's Actions is ſuppoſed to be nothing elſe, but his own private diſintereſted Opinion, of what makes moſt for the publick Good at that juncture: And ſince this Opinion muſt unavoidably in different Men, from their parti⯑cular Views and Circumſtances, be very different: It is impoſſible to know, whether any one inſtance of Parricide or Perjury, for example, be Criminal. The Man may have had his Reaſons for it, and that which in me would have been a heinous Sin, may be in him a Duty. Every Man's particular Rule is buried in his own Breaſt, inviſible to all but himſelf, who therefore can only tell whether he Obſerves it or no. And ſince that Rule is fitted to particular Occaſions, it muſt ever change as they do: Hence it is not only various in different Men, but in one and the ſame Man at different times.

X. From all which it follows, there can be no Harmony or Agreement between the Actions of good Men: No apparent Steddineſs or Conſiſten⯑cy of one Man with himſelf, no adhering to Principles: The beſt Actions may be Condemn'd, and the moſt Villanous meet with Applauſe. In a Word, there enſues the moſt horrible confuſion of Vice and Virtue, Sin and Duty, that can poſ⯑ſibly be imagined. It follows therefore that the great end, to which God requires the concurrence of human Actions, muſt of neceſſity be carried on by the ſecond Method propoſed, namely, the obſervation of certain, univerſal, determinate Rules or Moral Precepts, which, in their own Nature, have a neceſſity tendency to promote the Well being of the Sum of Mankind, taking in all Nations and Ages, from the beginning to the end of the World.

[9] XI. Hence upon an equal comprehenſive Sur⯑vey of the general Nature, the Paſſions, Intereſts, and mutual Reſpects of Mankind; whatſoever practical Propoſition doth to right Reaſon evi⯑dently appear to have a neceſſary connexion with the univerſal Well-being included in it, is to be look'd upon as enjoined by the Will of God. For he that willeth the end, doth will the neceſſary means conducive to that end; but it hath been ſhewn, that God willeth the Univerſal Well-be⯑ing of Mankind ſhould be promoted by the con⯑currence of each particular Perſon; therefore e⯑very ſuch practical Propoſition, neceſſarily tend⯑ing thereto, is to be eſteemed a Decree of God, and is conſequently a Law to Man.

XII. Theſe Propoſitions are called Laws of Na⯑ture, becauſe they are univerſal, and do not de⯑rive their Obligation from any Civil Sanction, but immediately from the Author of Nature him⯑ſelf. They are ſaid to be ſtamped on the Mind, to be engraven on the Tables of the Heart, becauſe they are well known to Mankind, and ſuggeſted and inculcated by Conſcience. Laſtly, they are term⯑ed Eternal Rules of Reaſon, becauſe they neceſſarily reſult from the Nature of Things, and may be demonſtrated by the infallible deductions of Reaſon.

XIII. And notwithſtanding that theſe Rules are too often, either by the unhappy concurrence of events, or more eſpecially by the wickedneſs of perverſe Men, who will not Conform to them, made accidental cauſes of Miſery to thoſe good Men, who do; yet this doth not vacate their Ob⯑ligation, they are ever to be eſteemed the fixed [10] unalterable Standards of Moral Good and Evil; no private Intereſt, no Love of Friends, no Re⯑gard to the publick Good, ſhould make us depart from them. Hence, when any doubt ariſes con⯑cerning the Morality of an Action, 'tis plain, this cannot be determined by computing the publick Good, which in that particular Caſe it is attend⯑ed with, but only by comparing it with the Eter⯑nal Law of Reaſon. He who ſquares his actions by this Rule, can never do amiſs, tho' thereby he ſhould bring himſelf to Poverty, Death, or Diſ⯑grace: No, not tho' he ſhould involve his Fami⯑ly, his Friends, his Country in all thoſe Evils, which are accounted the Greateſt, and moſt inſup⯑portable to human Nature. Tenderneſs and Be⯑nevolence of Temper are often motives to the beſt and greateſt Actions; but we muſt not make them the ſole Rule of our Actions; they are Paſ⯑ſions rooted in our nature, and like all other Paſ⯑ſions muſt be reſtrain'd and kept under, other⯑wiſe they may poſſibly betray us into as great Enor⯑mities, as any other unbridled Luſt. Nay, they are more dangerous than other Paſſions, inſomuch as they are more plauſible, and apt to dazzle, and corrupt the Mind, with the appearance of Good⯑neſs and Generoſity.

XIV. For the Illuſtration of what has been ſaid, it will not be amiſs, if from the Moral we turn our Eyes on the Natural World. Homo ortus eſt (ſays Balbus in Cicero ^*) ad Mundum contem⯑plandum, & imitandum: And ſurely, it is not poſ⯑ſible for free intellectual Agents to propoſe a no⯑bler Pattern for their imitation than Nature, which [11] is nothing elſe but a ſeries of free Actions produced by the beſt and wiſeſt Agent. But it is evident that thoſe Actions are not adapted to particular Views, but all conformed to certain general Rules, which being collected from Obſervation, are by Philoſophers termed Laws of Nature. And theſe indeed are excellently ſuited to promote the gene⯑ral well-being of the Creation: But what from caſual combinations of events, and what from the voluntary motions of Animals, it often falls out, that the natural good not only of private Men, but of entire Cities and Nations, wou'd be better pro⯑moted by a particular Suſpenſion, or Contradicti⯑on, than an exact Obſervation of thoſe Laws. Yet for all that, Nature ſtill takes its courſe; nay, it is plain that Plagues, Famines, Inundations, Earth⯑quakes, with an infinite variety of Pains and Sor⯑rows; in a word all kinds of Calamities publick and private do ariſe from a uniform ſteddy obſer⯑vation of thoſe general Laws, which are once eſta⯑bliſh'd by the Author of Nature, and which he will not change or deviate from upon any of thoſe Ac⯑counts, how wiſe or benevolent ſoever it may be thought by fooliſh Men to do ſo. As for the Mi⯑racles Recorded in Scripture, they were always wrought for Confirmation of ſome Doctrine or Miſſion from God, and not for the ſake of the particular natural goods, as Health or Life, which ſome Men might have reaped from them. From all which it ſeems ſufficiently plain, that we can⯑not be at a loſs, which way to determine, in caſe we think God's own Methods the propereſt to ob⯑tain his ends, and that it is our Duty to Copy af⯑ter them, ſo far as the frailty of our Nature will permit.

[12] XV. Thus far in general, of the nature and ne⯑ceſſity of moral Rules, and the Criterion or Mark whereby they may be known. As for the particu⯑lars, from the foregoing Diſcourſe, the principal of them may without much difficulty be deduced. It hath been ſhewn that the Law of Nature is a Syſtem of ſuch Rules or Precepts, as that if they be all of them, at all times, in all places, and by all Men obſerved, they will neceſſarily promote the well-being of Mankind, ſo far as it is attainable by human Actions. Now, let any one who hath the uſe of Reaſon, take but an impartial Survey of the general frame and circumſtances of human Na⯑ture, and it will appear plainly to him, that the conſtant obſervation of Truth, for inſtance, of Juſtice, and Chaſtity, hath a neceſſary connexion with their univerſal well-being, that therefore they are to be eſteemed Virtues or Duties, and that, Thou ſhalt not Forſwear thy ſelf, Thou ſhalt not Commit Adultery, Thou ſhalt not Steal, are ſo many unaltera⯑ble Moral Rules, which to violate in the leaſt de⯑gree is Vice or Sin. I ſay, the agreement of theſe particular practical Propoſitions, with the Defini⯑tion, or Criterion premiſed, doth ſo clearly reſult from the nature of Things, that it were a needleſs digreſſion, in this place to enlarge upon it. And from the ſame Principle, by the very ſame Rea⯑ſoning, it follows that Loyalty is a moral Virtue, and, Thou ſhalt not Reſiſt the Supreme Power, a Rule or Law of Nature, the leaſt breach whereof hath the inherent ſtain of Moral Turpitude.

XVI. The Miſeries inſeparable from a State of Anarchy are eaſily imagined. So inſufficient is the Wit or Strength of any ſingle Man, either to avert the Evils, or procure the Bleſſings of Life, and ſo [13] apt are the Wills of different Perſons to contradict and thwart each other, that it is abſolutely neceſſa⯑ry, ſeveral independent Powers be combin'd toge⯑ther, under the Direction (if I may ſo ſpeak) of one and the ſame Will, I mean the Law of the Society. Without this there is no Politeneſs, no Order, no Peace among Men, but the World is one great heap of Miſery and Confuſion; the Strong as well as the Weak, the Wiſe as well as the Fooliſh, ſtanding on all ſides expoſed to all thoſe Calamities, which Man can be liable to in a State where he has no other Security, than the not being poſſeſſed of any thing which may raiſe Envy or Deſire in another. A State! by ſo much more in⯑eligible than that of Brutes, as a reaſonable Crea⯑ture hath a greater reflexion and foreſight of Mi⯑ſeries than they. From all which it plainly fol⯑lows, that Loyalty or Submiſſion to the Supreme Civil Authority, hath, if univerſally practis'd in conjunction with all other Virtues, a neceſſary con⯑nexion with the well-being of the whole Sum of Mankind; and by conſequence, if the Criterion we have laid down, be True, it is, ſtrictly ſpeak⯑ing, a Moral Duty, or branch of Natural Reli⯑gion. And therefore, the leaſt degree of Rebel⯑lion is with the utmoſt ſtrictneſs and propriety, a Sin: Not only in Chriſtians, but alſo in thoſe who haxe the Light of Reaſon alone for their Guide. Nay, upon a thorough and impartial View, this Submiſſion will, I think, appear one of the very firſt and fundamental Laws of Nature, inaſmuch as it is Civil Government which ordains and marks out the various Relations between Men, and regulates Property, thereby giving Scope and lay⯑ing a foundation for the exerciſe of all other Du⯑ties. And in Truth, whoever conſiders the Con⯑dition of Man, will ſcarce conceive it poſſible that [14] the practice of any one Moral Virtue ſhou'd Ob⯑tain, in the naked, forlorn State of Nature.

XVII. But ſince it muſt be confeſs'd, that in all Caſes our Actions come not within the Direction of certain fixed Moral Rules, it may poſſibly be ſtill queſtioned, whether Obedience to the Su⯑preme Power be not one of thoſe exempted Caſes, and conſequently to be regulated by the Prudence and Diſcretion of every ſingle Perſon, rather than adjuſted to the Rule of abſolute Non-Reſiſtance. I ſhall therefore endeavour to make it yet more plain, that, Thou ſhalt not Reſiſt the Supreme Power, is an undoubted Precept of Morality; as will appear from the following Conſiderations. Firſt then, Submiſſion to Government is a Point important enough to be eſtabliſhed by a Moral Rule. Things of inſignificant and trifling Concern are, for that very Reaſon, exempted from the Rules of Mora⯑lity. But Government, on which ſo much depend the Peace, Order, and Well-being of Mankind, cannot ſurely be thought of too ſmall Importance to be Secur'd and Guarded by a Moral Rule. Go⯑vernment, I ſay, which is it ſelf the principal Source under Heaven, of thoſe particular Advan⯑tages, for the procurement and conſervation whereof, ſeveral unqueſtionable Moral Rules were preſcribed to Men.

XVIII. Secondly, Obedience to Government is a Caſe Univerſal enough to fall under the Di⯑rection of a Law of Nature. Numberleſs Rules there may be for regulating Affairs of great Con⯑cernment, at certain Junctures, and to ſome parti⯑cular Perſons or Societies, which notwithſtanding are not to be eſteemed Moral or Natural Laws, but may be either totally abrogated or diſpenſed with; [15] becauſe the private Ends they were intended to promote, reſpect only ſome particular Perſons, as engaged in Relations not founded in the general Nature of Man, who on various Occaſions, and in different Poſtures of Things, may proſecute their own Deſigns by different Meaſures, as in Humane Prudence ſhall ſeem convenient. But what rela⯑tion is there more extenſive and univerſal than that of Subject and Law? This is confin'd to no particular Age or Climate, but univerſally obtains at all Times, and in all Places, wherever Men live in a ſtate exalted above that of Brutes. It is there⯑fore evident, that the Rule forbidding Reſiſtance to the Law or Supreme Power, is not upon pre⯑tence of any defect in point of Univerſality, to be excluded from the Number of the Laws of Nature.

XIX. Thirdly, There is another Conſideration, which confirms the Neceſſity of admitting this Rule for a Moral or Natural Law; namely, becauſe the Caſe it regards is of too Nice and Difficult a Na⯑ture to be left to the Judgment and Determination of each private Perſon. Some Caſes there are ſo plain and obvious to judge of, that they may ſafely be truſted to the Prudence of every reaſonable Man; but in all Inſtances, to determine, whether a Civil Law is fitted to promote the Publick Intereſt; or whether Submiſſion or Reſiſtance will prove moſt advantageous in the Conſequence; or when it is, that the general Good of a Nation may require an Alteration of Government, either in its Form, or in the Hands which Adminiſter it: theſe are Points too arduous and intricate, and which require too great a degree of Parts, Leiſure, and liberal Edu⯑cation, as well as Diſintereſtedneſs and thorough Knowledge in the particular State of a Kingdom, for every Subject to take upon him the Determi⯑nation [16] of them. From which it follows, that up⯑on this account alſo, Non-Reſiſtance, which, in the main, no body can deny to be a moſt profita⯑ble and wholſome Duty, ought not to be limited by the Judgment of private Perſons to particular Occaſions, but eſteemed a moſt Sacred Law of Nature.

XX. The foregoing Arguments do, I think, make it manifeſt, that the Precept againſt Rebel⯑lion is on a Level with other Moral Rules. Which will yet farther appear from this fourth and laſt Conſideration. It cannot be denied, that Right Reaſon doth require ſome common ſtated Rule or Meaſure, whereby Subjects ought to ſhape their Submiſſion to the Supreme Power. Since any claſhing or diſagreement in this Point muſt una⯑voidably tend to weaken, and diſſolve the Society And it is unavoidable, that there ſhou'd be great claſhing, where it is left to the breaſt of each In⯑dividual to ſuit his Fancy with a different meaſure of Obedience. But this common ſtated Meaſure muſt be either the general Precept forbidding Re⯑ſiſtance, or elſe the publick Good of the whole Nation: Which laſt, tho' it is allowed to be in it ſelf ſomething certain and determinate; yet, for⯑aſmuch as Men can regulate their Conduct only by what appears to them, whether in Truth it be what it appears or no; and ſince the Proſpects Men form to themſelves of a Country's publick Good, are commonly as various as its Landſchapes which meet the Eye in ſeveral Situations: It clear⯑ly follows, that to make the publick Good the Rule of Obedience, is in effect, not to eſtabliſh any de⯑terminate, agreed, common Meaſure of Loyalty, but to leave every Subject to the Guidance of his own particular mutable Fancy.

[17] XXI. From all which Arguments and Conſide⯑rations it is a moſt evident Concluſion, That the Law prohibiting Rebellion is in ſtrict Truth a Law of Nature, Univerſal Reaſon, and Morality. But to this, it will perhaps be objected by ſome, that whatever may be concluded with regard to Reſi⯑ſtance, from the tedious Deductions of Reaſon, yet there is I know not what turpitude and de⯑formity in ſome Actions, which at firſt Bluſh, ſhews them to be vicious; but they, not finding them⯑ſelves ſtruck with ſuch a ſenſible and immediate Horror at the thought of Rebellion, cannot think it on a level with other Crimes againſt Nature. To which I anſwer, that it is True, there are cer⯑tain natural Antipathies implanted in the Soul, which are ever the moſt laſting and inſurmounta⯑ble; but as Cuſtom is a ſecond Nature, whatever Averſions are from our early Childhood continu⯑ally infuſed into the Mind, give it ſo deep a ſtain as is ſcarce to be diſtinguiſhed from natural Com⯑plexion. And as it doth hence follow, that to make all the inward horrors of Soul, paſs for in⯑fallible marks of Sin, were the way to eſtabliſh Error and Superſtition in the World: So, on the other hand, to ſuppoſe all Actions lawful, which are unattended with thoſe ſtarts of Nature, wou'd prove of the laſt dangerous conſequence to Vir⯑tue and Morality. For theſe pertaining to us as Men, we muſt not be directed in reſpect of them, by any emotions in our Blood and Spirits, but by the dictates of ſober and impartial Reaſon. And if there be any, who find they have a leſs Abhor⯑rence of Rebellion than of other Villanies, all that can be inferred from it, is, that this part of their Duty was not ſo much reflected on, or ſo early and frequently inculcated into their Hearts, as it ought [18] to have been. Since without queſtion there are other Men who have as thorough an Averſion for that, as for any other Crime^*.

XXII. Again, it will probably be objected, that Submiſſion to Government differs from moral Du⯑ties, in that it is founded in a Contract, which up⯑on the Violation of its Conditions doth of courſe become void, and in ſuch Caſe Rebellion is law⯑ful; it hath not therefore the Nature of a Sin or Crime, which is in it ſelf abſolutely unlawful, and muſt be committed on no Pretext whatſoever. Now, paſſing over all Enquiry and Diſpute con⯑cerning the firſt obſcure Riſe of Government, I obſerve its being founded on a Contract, may be underſtood in a twofold Senſe, either, firſt, that ſeveral independent Perſons finding the unſuffera⯑ble Inconvenience of a State of Anarchy, where every one was governed by his own Will, conſent⯑ed and agreed together to pay an abſolute Submiſ⯑ſion, to the Decrees of ſome certain Legiſlative; which, tho ſometimes they may bear hard on the Subject, yet, muſt ſurely prove eaſier to be go⯑verned by, than the violent Humours, and unſted⯑dy oppoſite Wills of a multitude of Savages. And in caſe we admit ſuch a Compact to have been the original Foundation of Civil Government; it muſt even on that Suppoſition be held Sacred and Invi⯑olable.

[19] XXIII. Or Secondly, it is meant that Subjects have contracted with their reſpective Sovereigns or Legiſlators, to pay, not an abſolute, but conditi⯑onal and limited Submiſſion to their Laws, that is, upon Condition, and ſo far forth, as the Obſerva⯑tion of them ſhall contribute to the publick Good: Reſerving ſtill to themſelves a Right of Superin⯑tending the Laws, and Judging whether they are fitted to promote the publick Good or no. And (in caſe they or any of them think it needful) of Re⯑ſiſting the higher Powers, and changing the whole Frame of Government by Force; which is a Right that all Mankind, whether ſingle Perſons or Socie⯑ties, have over thoſe that are deputed by them. But in this Senſe a Contract cannot be admitted for the Ground and Meaſure of civil Obedience, except one of theſe two Things be clearly ſhewn: Either, Firſt, That ſuch a Contract is an expreſs known Part of the Fundamental Conſtitution of a Nati⯑on, equally allowed and unqueſtioned by all as the common Law of the Land. Or, Secondly, If it be not expreſs, that it is at leaſt neceſſarily im⯑plied in the very Nature or Notion of Civil Poli⯑ty, which ſuppoſes it is a thing manifeſtly abſurd, that a Number of Men ſhou'd be oblig'd to live under an unlimited Subjection to Civil Law, rather than continue wild and independent of each other. But to me it ſeems moſt evident, that neither of thoſe Points will ever be proved.

XXIV. And till they are proved beyond all Contradiction, the Doctrine built upon them, ought to be rejected with Deteſtation. Since to repreſent the Higher Powers as Deputies of the People, manifeſtly tends to diminiſh that Awe and Reverence, which all good Men ſhould have for [20] the Laws and Government of their Countrey. And to ſpeak of a conditioned, limited Loyalty, and I know not what vague and undetermined Contracts, is a moſt effectual Means to looſen the Bands of Civil Society; than which nothing can be of more miſchievous Conſequence to Mankind. But after all, if there be any Man, who either cannot or will not ſee the Abſurdity and pernici⯑ouſneſs of thoſe Notions, he wou'd, I doubt not, be convinced with a Witneſs, in caſe they ſhould once become current, and every private Man take it in his Head to believe them true, and put them in practice.

XXV. But there ſtill remains an Objection, which hath the Appearance of ſome Strength againſt what has been ſaid. Namely, That where⯑as Civil Polity is a thing entirely of human Inſti⯑tution, it ſeems contrary to Reaſon, to make Sub⯑miſſion to it part of the Law of Nature, and not rather of the Civil Law. For how can it be ima⯑gin'd that Nature ſhou'd dictate or preſcribe a na⯑tural Law about a thing, which depends on the Arbitrary Humour of Men, not only as to its Kind or Form, which is very various and mutable, but even as to its Exiſtence; there being no where to be found a Civil Government ſet up by Nature. In anſwer to this, I obſerve firſt, that moſt Moral Precepts do preſuppoſe ſome voluntary Actions, or Pacts of Men, and are nevertheleſs eſteemed Laws of Nature. Property is aſſigned, the Signification of Words aſcertained, and Matrimony contracted by the Agreement and Conſent of Mankind; and for all that it is not doubted, whether Theft, Falſe⯑hood and Adultery be prohibited by the Law of Nature. Loyalty, therefore, tho it ſhould ſup⯑poſe and be the Reſult of human Inſtitutions, may, [21] for all that, be of natural Obligation. I ſay, Se⯑condly, that, notwithſtanding particular Societies are formed by Men, and are not in all Places alike, as Things eſteemed natural are wont to be, yet there is implanted in Mankind a natural Tendency or Diſpoſition to a ſocial Life. I call it natural, be⯑cauſe it is univerſal, and becauſe it neceſſarily re⯑ſults from the Differences which diſtinguiſh Man from Beaſt: The peculiar Wants, Appetites, Fa⯑culties, and Capacities of Man, being exactly cal⯑culated, and framed for ſuch a State, inſomuch that without it, it is impoſſible he ſhould live in a Condition in any Degree ſuitable to his Nature. And ſince the Bond and Cement of Society is a Submiſſion to its Laws, it plainly follows, that this Duty hath an equal Right with any other to be thought a Law of Nature. And, ſurely that Pre⯑cept which enjoyns Obedience to Civil Laws, cannot it ſelf with any Propriety be accounted a Civil Law; it muſt therefore either have no Obli⯑gation at all on the Conſcience, or if it hath, it muſt be derived from the univerſal Voice of Na⯑ture and Reaſon.

XXVI. And thus the firſt Point propoſed ſeems clearly made out. Namely, That Loyalty is a Virtue or Moral Duty; and Diſloyalty or Rebelli⯑on, in the moſt ſtrict and proper Senſe, a Vice or Crime againſt the Law of Nature. We are now come to the Second Point, which was to ſhew, that the Prohibitions of Vice, or negative Precepts of Morality, are to be taken in a moſt abſolute, neceſſary, and immutable Senſe; inſomuch that the Attainment of the greateſt Good, or Delive⯑rance from the greateſt Evil, that can befal any Man or Number of Men in this Life, may not ju⯑ſtify the leaſt Violation of them. But in the firſt [22] place, I ſhall explain the Reaſon of diſtinguiſhing between Poſitive and Negative Precepts, the lat⯑ter only being included in this general Propoſition. Now the Ground of that Diſtinction may be re⯑ſolved into this; namely, that very often, either through the Difficulty or Number of Moral Acti⯑ons, or their Inconſiſtence with each other, it is not poſſible for one Man to perform ſeveral of them at the ſame time; whereas it is plainly con⯑ſiſtent and poſſible, that any Man ſhou'd, at the ſame time, abſtain from all manner of poſitive Actions whatſoever. Hence it comes to paſs, that Prohibitions or Negative Precepts muſt by every one, in all Times and Places, be all actually obſer⯑ved: Whereas thoſe which enjoin the Doing of an Action, allow room for Human Prudence and Diſcretion, in the Execution of them: it for the moſt part depending on various accidental Circum⯑ſtances; all which ought to be conſider'd, and Care taken that Duties of leſs Moment do not in⯑terfere with, and hinder the fulfilling of thoſe which are more important. And for this Reaſon, if not the Poſitive Laws themſelves, at leaſt the Exerciſe of them admits of Suſpenſion, Limitati⯑on, and Diverſity of Degrees. As to the Indiſpen⯑ſibleneſs of the Negative Precepts of the Law of Nature, I ſhall in its Proof offer Two Arguments, the Firſt from the Nature of the Thing, and the Second from the Imitation of God in his Govern⯑ment of the World.

XXVII. Firſt then, from the Nature of the Thing, it hath been already ſhewn, that the great End of Morality can never be carried on, by leaving each particular Perſon to promote the Pub⯑lick Good, in ſuch a manner as he ſhall think moſt convenient, without preſcribing certain determi⯑nate, [23] univerſal Rules to be the common Meaſure of Moral Actions; and, if we allow the Neceſſity of theſe, and at the ſame time think it lawful to tranſgreſs them, whenever the Publick Good ſhall ſeem to require it, what is this, but in Words in⯑deed to enjoin the Obſervation of Moral Rules, but in effect to leave every one to be guided by his own Judgment; than which nothing can be ima⯑gined more pernicious and deſtructive to Mankind, as hath been already proved. Secondly, This ſame Point may be collected from the Example ſet us by the Author of Nature, who, as we have above obſerved, acts according to certain fixed Laws, which he will not tranſgreſs upon the Ac⯑count of Accidental Evils ariſing from them. Suppoſe a Prince, on whoſe Life the Welfare of a Kingdom depends, to fall down a Precipice, we have no Reaſon to think, that the Univerſal Law of Gravitation wou'd be ſuſpended in that Caſe. The like may be ſaid of all other Laws of Nature, which we do not find to admit of Exceptions on particular Accounts.

XXVIII. And, as without ſuch a Steddineſs in Nature, we ſhou'd ſoon, inſtead of this beautiful Frame, ſee nothing but a diſorderly, and confuſed Chaos: So if once it become current, that the Moral Actions of Men are not to be guided by certain definite inviolable Rules, there will be no longer found that Beauty, Order, and Agreement, in the Syſtem of Rational Beings, or Moral World, which will then be all cover'd over with Darkneſs and Violence. It is true, he who ſtands cloſe to a Palace, can hardly make a right Judgment of the Architecture and Symmetry of its ſeveral Parts, the nearer ever appearing diſproportionably great. And if we have a mind to take a fair Proſpect of [24] the Order and general Well-being, which the in⯑flexible Laws of Nature and Morality derive on the World, we muſt, if I may ſo ſay, go out of it, and imagine our ſelves to be diſtant Spectators of all that is tranſacted and contained in it; other⯑wiſe we are ſure to be deceived, by the too near View of the little preſent Intereſts of our Selves, our Friends, or our Country. The right Under⯑ſtanding of what hath been ſaid, will, I think, af⯑ford a clear Solution to the following Difficulties.

XXIX. Firſt, it may perhaps ſeem to ſome, that in Conſequence of the foregoing Doctrine, Men will be left to their own private Judgments as much as ever. For, Firſt, the very being of the Laws of Nature; Secondly, the Criterion whereby to know them; and, Thirdly, the Agreement of any particular Precept with that Criterion, are all to be diſcovered by Reaſon and Argumentation, in which every Man doth neceſſarily judge for himſelf; hence upon that Suppoſition, there is Place for as great Confuſion, Unſteddineſs, and Contrariety of Opinions and Actions, as upon any other. I anſwer, that however Men may dif⯑fer, as to what were moſt proper and beneficial to the Publick to be done or omitted on particular Occaſions, when they have for the moſt part nar⯑row and intereſted Views; yet in general Conclu⯑ſions, drawn from an equal and enlarged View of Things, it is not poſſible there ſhould be ſo great, if any Diſagreement at all amongſt Candid, Ra⯑tional Enquirers after Truth.

XXX. Secondly, The moſt plauſible Pretence of all, againſt the Doctrine we have premiſed concerning a rigid indiſpenſible Obſervation of Moral Rules, is that which is founded on the Con⯑ſideration [25] of the Publick Weal; for ſince the com⯑mon Good of Mankind is confeſſedly the End which God requires ſhou'd be promoted by the free Actions of Men, it may ſeem to follow, that all good Men ought ever to have this in View, as the great Mark to which all their Endeavours ſhould be directed; if therefore in any particular Caſe, a ſtrict keeping to the Moral Rule ſhall prove mani⯑feſtly inconſiſtent with the Publick Good, it may be thought agreeable to the Will of God, that in that Caſe the Rule does not reſtrain an honeſt diſin⯑tereſted Perſon, from acting for that End to which the Rule it ſelf was Ordained. For it is an Axiom, that the End is more Excellent than the Means, which deriving their Goodneſs from the End, may not come in Competition with it.

XXXI. In Anſwer to this, let it be obſerv'd, that nothing is a Law merely becauſe it conduceth to the Publick Good, but becauſe it is decreed by the Will of God, which alone can give the San⯑ction of a Law of Nature to any Precept; neither is any thing, how expedient or plauſible ſoever, to be eſteemed lawful on any other Account, than its being coincident with, or not repugnant to the Laws promulgated by the Voice of Nature and Reaſon. It muſt indeed be allowed, that the ra⯑tional Deduction of thoſe Laws is founded in the intrinſick Tendency they have to promote the Well-being of Mankind, on Condition they are univerſally and conſtantly obſerved. But tho' it afterwards comes to paſs, that they accidentally fail of that End, or even promote the contrary, they are nevertheleſs binding, as hath been already proved. In ſhort, that whole Difficulty may be reſolved by the following Diſtinction. In framing the general Laws of Nature, it is granted, we muſt [26] be entirely guided by the Publick Good of Man⯑kind, but not in the ordinary Moral Actions of our Lives. Such a Rule, if univerſally obſerv'd, hath from the Nature of Things, a neceſſary Fit⯑neſs to promote the general Well-being of Man⯑kind; therefore it is a Law of Nature: This is good Reaſoning. But if we ſhou'd ſay ſuch an Action doth in this Inſtance produce much Good, and no Harm to Mankind; therefore it is lawful: This were wrong. The Rule is framed with re⯑ſpect to the Good of Mankind, but our Practice muſt be always ſhaped immediately by the Rule. They who think the Publick Good of a Nation to be the ſole Meaſure of the Obedience due to the Civil Power, ſeem not to have conſidered this Di⯑ſtinction.

XXXII. If it be ſaid that ſome Negative Pre⯑cepts, e. g. Thou ſhalt not kill, do admit of Limita⯑tion, ſince otherwiſe it were unlawful for the Ma⯑giſtrate, for a Soldier in a Battel, or a Man in his own Defence to kill another: I anſwer, when a Duty is expreſſed in too general Terms, as in this Inſtance, in Order to a diſtinct Declaration of it, either thoſe Terms may be changed for others of a more limited Senſe, as Kill for Murder, or elſe from the general Propoſition remaining in its full Latitude, Exceptions may be made of thoſe preciſe Caſes, which not agreeing with the Notion of Murder, are not prohibited by the Law of Nature. In the former Caſe there is a Limitation, but it is only of the Signification of a ſingle Term too ge⯑neral and improper, by ſubſtituting another more proper and particular in its Place. In the latter Caſe there are Exceptions, but then they are not from the Law of Nature, but from a more general Propoſition, which beſides that Law, includes ſome⯑what [27] more, which muſt be taken away in order to eave the Law by it ſelf clear and determinate. From neither of which Conceſſions will it follow, that any Negative Law of Nature is limited to thoſe Caſes only where its particular Application promotes the Publick Good, or admits all other Caſes to be excepted from it, wherein its being actually obſerved produceth Harm to the Publick. But of this I ſhall have Occaſion to ſay more in the Sequel. I have now done with the firſt Head, which was to ſhew, that there is an Abſolute, Un⯑limited Paſſive Obedience due to the Supreme Power, where-ever placed in any Nation; and come to enquire into the Grounds and Reaſons of the contrary Opinion; which was the Second Thing propoſed.

XXXIII. One great Principle, which the Plead⯑ers for Reſiſtance make the Ground-Work of their Doctrine, is, that the Law of Self-Preſervation is Prior to all other Engagement, being the very firſt and fundamental Law of Nature. Hence, ſay they, Subjects are obliged by Nature, and it is their Duty, to reſiſt the cruel Attempts of Tyrants, however authorized by unjuſt and Bloody Laws, which are nothing elſe but the Decrees of Men, and conſequently muſt give way to thoſe of God, or Nature. But, perhaps, if we narrowly examine this Notion, it will not be found ſo juſt and clear as ſome Men may imagine, or, indeed, as at firſt Sight it ſeems to be. For we ought to diſtinguiſh between a Two-fold Signification of the Terms Law of Nature; which Words do either denote ae Rule or Precept for the Direction of the voluntary Actions of reaſonable Agents, and in that Senſe they imply a Duty; or elſe they are uſed to ſignify any general Rule, which we obſerve to obtain in [28] the Works of Nature, independent of the Wills of Men; in which Senſe no Duty is implied. And in this laſt Acceptation, I grant it is a general Law of Nature, that in every Animal there be implan⯑ted a Deſire of Self-Preſervation, which, tho' it is the earlieſt, the deepeſt, and moſt laſting of all, whether Natural or Acquired Appetites, yet can⯑not with any Propriety be termed a Moral Duty. But if in the former Senſe of the Words, they mean that Self-Preſervation is the firſt and moſt fundamental Law of Nature, which therefore muſt take place of all other Natural or Moral Duties: I think that Aſſertion to be manifeſtly falſe, for this plain Reaſon, becauſe it wou'd thence follow, a Man may lawfully commit any Sin whatſoever to preſerve his Life, than which nothing can be more abſurd.

XXXIV. It cannot indeed be denied, that the Law of Nature reſtrains us from doing thoſe Things which may injure the Life of any Man, and conſequently our own. But, notwithſtanding all that is ſaid of the Obligativeneſs and Priority of the Law of Self-Preſervation, yet, for ought I can ſee, there is no particular Law, which oblige; any Man to prefer his own Temporal Good, not even Life it ſelf, to that of another Man, much leſs to the Obſervation of any one Moral Duty. This is what we are too ready to perform of our own Accord; and there is more Need of a Law to curb and reſtrain, than there is of one to excite and inflame our Self-Love.

XXXV. But, Secondly, tho' we ſhou'd grant the Duty of Self-Preſervation to be the firſt and moſt neceſſary of all the Poſitive or Affirmative Laws of Nature; yet, foraſmuch as it is a Maxim [29] allowed by all Moraliſts, that Evil is never to be committed, to the end Good may come of it, it will thence plainly follow, that no Negative Precept ought to be tranſgreſſed for the ſake of obſerving a Poſitive one; and therefore, ſince we have ſhewn, Thou ſhalt not reſiſt the Supreme Power, to be a Nega⯑tive Law of Nature, it is a neceſſary Conſequence, that it may not be tranſgreſſed under pretence of fulfilling the Poſitive Duty of Self-Preſervation.

XXXVI. A ſecond erroneous Ground of our Adverſaries, whereon they lay a main Streſs, is that they hold the Publick Good of a particular Nation to be the Meaſure of the Obedience due from the Subject to the Civil Power, which there⯑fore may be reſiſted whenſoever the Publick Good ſhall verily ſeem to require it. But this Point hath been already conſider'd, and in Truth it can give ſmall Difficulty to whoever underſtands Loyalty to be on the ſame Foot with other Moral Duties en⯑joyned in negative Precepts, all which tho' equally calculated to promote the general Well-being, may not nevertheleſs be limited or ſuſpended un⯑der pretext of giving way to the end, as is plain from what hath been premiſed on that Subject.

XXXVII. A Third Reaſon which they inſiſt on, is to this Effect. All Civil Authority or Right is derived originally from the People; but no Body can transfer that to another, which he hath not himſelf; therefore ſince no Man hath an abſolute unlimited Right over his own Life, the Subject cannot transfer ſuch a Right to the Prince (or Su⯑preme Power) who conſequently hath no ſuch un⯑limited Right to diſpoſe of the Lives of his Sub⯑jects. In caſe therefore a Subject reſiſt his Prince, who acting according to Law, maketh an unjuſt, [30] tho' legal, Attempt on his Life, he does him no Wrong, ſince Wrong it is not, to prevent another from ſeizing what he hath no Right to; whence it ſhou'd ſeem to follow, that agreeably to Reaſon, the Prince or Supreme Power whereſoever placed may be reſiſted. Having thus endeavoured to ſtate their Argument in its cleareſt Light, I make this Anſwer. Firſt, it is granted, no Civil Power hath an unlimited Right to diſpoſe of the Life of any Man. Secondly, in caſe one Man reſiſt another invading that which he hath no Right to, it is granted he doth him no Wrong. But in the Third Place, I deny that it doth thence follow, the Su⯑preme Power may conſonantly to Reaſon be re⯑ſiſted, becauſe that altho' ſuch Reſiſtance wronged not the Prince or Supreme Power whereſoever placed, yet it were injurious to the Author of Na⯑ture, and a Violation of his Law, which Reaſon obligeth us to Tranſgreſs upon no Account what⯑ſoever, as hath been demonſtrated.

XXXVIII. A Fourth Miſtake or Prejudice which influenceth the Impugners of Non-Reſi⯑ſtance, ariſes from the natural Dread of Slavery, Chains, and Fetters which inſpires them with an Averſion for any thing, which even metaphorical⯑ly comes under thoſe Denominations. Hence they cry out againſt us that we wou'd deprive them of their natural Freedom, that we are making Chains for Mankind, that we are for enſlaving them, and the like. But how harſh ſoever the Sentence may appear, yet it is moſt true, that our Appetites, even the moſt natural, as of Eaſe, Plenty, or Life it ſelf, muſt be chain'd and fetter'd by the Laws of Nature and Reaſon. This Slavery, if they will call it ſo, or Subjection of our Paſſions to the im⯑mutable Decrees of Reaſon, though it may be [31] Galling to the ſenſual Part or the Beaſt, yet ſure I am, it addeth much to the Dignity of that which is peculiarly Human in our Compoſition. This leads me to the Fifth fundamental Error:

XXXIX. Namely, the miſtaking the Object of Paſſive Obedience. We ſhou'd conſider, that when a Subject endures the Inſolence and Oppreſſion of one or more Magiſtrates, armed with the Supreme Civil Power, the Object of his Submiſſion is, in ſtrict Truth, nothing elſe but right Reaſon, which is the Voice of the Author of Nature. Think not we are ſo ſenſeleſs, as to imagine Ty⯑rants caſt in a better Mould than other Men: No, they are the worſt and vileſt of Men, and for their own Sakes, have not the leaſt Right to our Obe⯑dience. But the Laws of God and Nature muſt be obey'd, and our Obedience to them is never more acceptable and ſincere, than when it expo⯑ſeth us to Temporal Calamities.

XL. A Sixth falſe Ground of Perſuaſion to thoſe we argue againſt, is their not diſtinguiſhing be⯑tween the Natures of Poſitive and Negative Du⯑ties. For, ſay they, ſince our active Obedience to the Supreme Civil Power is acknowledged to be limited, why may not our Duty of Non-Reſiſtance be thought ſo too? The Anſwer is plain; becauſe Poſitive and Negative Moral Precepts are not of the ſame Nature, the former admitting ſuch Limitati⯑ons and Exceptions as the latter are on no Account liable to, as hath been already proved. It is very poſſible that a Man in obeying the Commands of his lawful Governors, might tranſgreſs ſome Law of God contrary to them; which it is not poſſible for him to do, meerly by a patient Suffering and Non-Reſiſtance for Conſcience ſake. And this [32] furniſhes ſuch a Satisfactory and obvious Solution of the forementioned Difficulty, that I am not a little ſurprized to ſee it inſiſted on, by Men, other⯑wiſe, of good Senſe and Reaſon. And ſo much for the Grounds and Reaſons of the Adverſaries of Non-Reſiſtance. I now proceed to the third and laſt Thing propoſed, Namely, the Conſideration of the Objections drawn from the pretended Con⯑ſequences of Non-Reſiſtance.

XLI. Firſt then it will be objected, that in Con⯑ſequence of that Notion, we muſt believe that God hath, in ſeveral Inſtances, laid the innocent Part of Mankind under an unavoidable Neceſſity of enduring the greateſt Sufferings and Hardſhips without any Remedy; which is plainly inconſiſtent with the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and there⯑fore the Principle from whence that Conſequence flows, ought not to be admitted as a Law of God of Nature. In Anſwer to which I obſerve, we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh between the neceſſary and accidental Conſequences of a Moral Law. The former Kind are thoſe which the Law is in its own Nature calculated to produce, and which have an inſeparable Connexion with the Obſervation of it; and indeed if theſe are bad, we may juſtly conclude the Law to be ſo too, and conſequently not from God. But the accidental Conſequences of a Law, have no intrinſic natural Connexion with, nor do they ſtrictly ſpeaking flow from its Obſervation, but are the genuine Reſult of ſome⯑thing foreign and circumſtantial, which happens to be joyned with it. And theſe accidental Conſe⯑quences of a very good Law, may nevertheleſs be very bad; which Badneſs of theirs is to be char⯑ged on their own proper and neceſſary Cauſe, and not on the Law, which hath no Eſſential Tenden⯑cy [33] to produce them. Now though it muſt be granted, that a Lawgiver infinitely wiſe and good will conſtitute ſuch Laws for the Regulation of human Actions, as have in their own Nature a ne⯑ceſſary inherent Aptneſs to promote the common Good of all Mankind, and that in the greateſt De⯑gree that the preſent Circumſtances and Capacities of human Nature will admit; yet we deny that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Lawgiver are concerned, or may be called in Queſtion, on Ac⯑count of the particular Evils which ariſe, neceſſa⯑rily and properly, from the Tranſgreſſion of ſome one or more good Laws, and but accidentally from the Obſervation of others. But it is plain that the ſeveral Calamities and Devaſtations, which oppreſ⯑ſive Governments bring on the World, are not the genuine neceſſary Effects of the Law, that enjoin⯑eth a Paſſive Subjection to the Supreme Power, neither are they included in the primary Intention thereof, but ſpring from Avarice, Ambition, Cru⯑elty, Revenge, and the like inordinate Affections and Vices raging in the Breaſts of Governors. They may not therefore argue a defect of Wiſdom or Goodneſs in God's Law, but of Righteouſneſs in Men.

XLII. Such is the preſent State of Things, ſo irregular are the Wills, and ſo unreſtrained the Paſ⯑ſions of Men, that we every Day ſee manifeſt Breaches and Violations of the Laws of Nature, which being always committed in Favour of the Wicked, muſt ſurely be ſometimes attended with heavy Diſadvantages and Miſeries, on the Part of thoſe who by a firm Adheſion to his Laws endea⯑vour to approve themſelves in the Eyes of their Creator. There are in ſhort, no Rules of Mora⯑lity, not excepting the beſt, but what may ſubject [34] good Men to great Sufferings and Hardſhips, which neceſſarily follows from the Wickedneſs of thoſe they have to deal with, and but accidentally from thoſe good Rules. And as on the one Hand it were inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God, by ſuffering a retaliation of Fraud, Perjury, or the like on the Head of Offenders, to puniſh one Tranſgreſſion by another: So on the other Hand, it were inconſiſtent with his Juſtice, to leave the Good and Innocent a hopeleſs Sacrifice to the Wicked. God therefore hath appointed a Day of Retribution in another Life, and in this we have his Grace and a good Conſcience for our Support. We ſhou'd not therefore repine at the Divine Laws, or ſhew a frowardneſs or impatience of thoſe tranſient Sufferings they accidentally expoſe us to, which however grating to Fleſh and Blood, will yet ſeem of ſmall moment, if we compare the littleneſs and fleetingneſs of this preſent World with the Glory and Eternity of the next.

XLIII. From what hath been ſaid I think it is plain, that the premiſed Doctrine of Non-Reſi⯑ſtance were ſafe, tho' the Evils incurred thereby ſhou'd be allowed never ſo great. But perhaps upon a ſtrict examination, they will be found much leſs than by many they are thought to be. The miſchievous effects which are charged on that Doctrine may be reduced to theſe two Points. Firſt, that it is an encouragement for all Gover⯑nors to become Tyrants, by the proſpect it gives them of Impunity or Non-Reſiſtance. Secondly, that it renders the Oppreſſion and Cruelty of thoſe who are Tyrants, more inſupportable and violent, by cutting off all Oppoſition, and conſequently all means of Redreſs. I ſhall conſider each of theſe diſtinctly. As to the firſt Point, either you'll ſup⯑poſe [35] the Governors to be good or ill Men. If they are Good, there is no fear of their becoming Ty⯑rants. And if they are ill Men, that is, ſuch as poſtpone the Obſervation of God's Laws to the ſatisfying of their own Luſts, then it can be no Security to them, that others will rigidly obſerve thoſe Moral Precepts, which they find themſelves ſo prone to Tranſgreſs.

XLIV. It is indeed a Breach of the Law of Na⯑ture for a Subject, tho' under the greateſt and moſt unjuſt Sufferings, to lift up his Hand againſt the Supreme Power. But it is a more heinous and in⯑excuſable Violation of it, for the Perſons inveſted with the Supreme Power, to uſe that Power to the Ruin and Deſtruction of the People commit⯑ted to their Charge. What encouragement there⯑fore can any Man have, to think that others will not be puſh'd on by the ſtrong implanted Appe⯑tite of Self-Preſervation, to commit a Crime, when he himſelf commits a more brutiſh and un⯑natural Crime, perhaps without any provocation at all? Or is it to be imagined that they who daily break God's Laws, for the ſake of ſome little Profit or tranſient Pleaſure, will not be tempted by the love of Property, Liberty, or Life it ſelf, to Tranſgreſs that ſingle Precept which forbids Re⯑ſiſtance to the Supreme Power?

XLV. But it will be demanded, to what pur⯑poſe then is this Duty of Non-Reſiſtance Preached and Proved, and Recommended to our Practice, if in all likelihood, when things come to an ex⯑tremity, Men will never obſerve it? I Anſwer, to the very ſame purpoſe that any other Duty is Preached. For what Duty is there which many, too many, upon ſome conſideration or other may [36] not be prevail'd on to Tranſgreſs? Moraliſts and Divines do not Preach the Duties of Nature and Religion, with the View of Gaining Mankind to a perfect Obſervation of them; that they know is not to be done. But, however, our Pains are An⯑ſwered, if we can make Men leſs Sinners than otherwiſe they wou'd be; if by oppoſing the force of Duty to that of preſent Intereſt and Paſſion, we can get the better of ſome Temptations, and Balance others, while the greateſt ſtill remain In⯑vincible.

XLVI. But granting thoſe who are inveſted with the Supreme Power to have all imaginable Security, that no cruel and barbarous Treatment whatever cou'd provoke their Subjects to Rebel⯑lion: Yet I believe it may be juſtly queſtioned, whether ſuch Security would tempt them to more or greater Acts of Cruelty, than Jealouſie, Di⯑ſtruſt, Suſpicion and Revenge may do in a State leſs Secure. And ſo far in conſideration of the firſt Point, Namely, that the Doctrine of Non-Reſiſtance is an encouragement for Governors to become Tyrants.

XLVII. The ſecond Miſchievous Effect it was Charged with, is, that it renders the Oppreſſion and Cruelty of thoſe who are Tyrants more in⯑ſupportable and violent, by cutting off all Oppo⯑ſition, and conſequently all means of Redreſs. But, if things are rightly conſider'd, it will appear, that Redreſſing the Evils of Government by Force, is at beſt, a very hazardous Attempt, and what often puts the Publick in a worſe State than it was before. For either you ſuppoſe the Power of the Rebels to be but ſmall, and eaſily Cruſhed, and then this is apt to inſpire the Governors with Con⯑fidence [37] and Cruelty. Or, in caſe you ſuppoſe it more conſiderable, ſo as to be a Match for the Su⯑preme Power ſupported by the Publick Treaſure, Forts and Armies, and that the whole Nation is engaged in a Civil War; the certain effects of this are Rapine, Bloodſhed, Miſery, and Confuſion to all Orders and Parties of Men, greater and more inſupportable by far, than are known under any the moſt abſolute and ſevere Tyranny upon Earth. And it may be that after much mutual Slaughter, the Rebellious Party will prevail. And if they do prevail to Deſtroy the Government in Being, it may be they will Subſtitute a better in its Place, or change it into better Hands. And may not this come to paſs without the expence, and toil, and blood of War? Is not the Heart of a Prince in the Hand of God? May he not therefore give him a right Senſe of his Duty, or may he not call him out of the World by Sickneſs, Accident, or the Hand of ſome deſperate Ruffian, and ſend a better in his Stead. When I ſpeak as of a Monarchy, I would be underſtood to mean all ſorts of Govern⯑ment, whereſoever the Supreme Power is Lodged. Upon the whole, I think we may cloſe with the Heathen Philoſopher, who thought it the part of a Wiſe Man, never to attempt the Change of Go⯑vernment by Force, when it cou'd not be mended without the Slaughter and Baniſhment of his Countrymen: But to Sit ſtill, and Pray for bet⯑ter Times^*. For this way may do, and the other may not do; there is uncertainty in both Courſes. The difference is, that in the way of Rebellion, we are ſure to increaſe the Publick Calamities, for a time at leaſt, tho' we are not ſure of leſſening them for the future.

[38] XLVIII. But tho' it ſhould be acknowledged, that in the main, Submiſſion and Patience ought to be recommended; yet, Men will be ſtill apt to demand, whether extraordinary Caſes may not require extraordinary Meaſures; and therefore in caſe the Oppreſſion be inſupportable, and the Pro⯑ſpect of Deliverance ſure, whether Rebellion may not be allowed of? I Anſwer, By no means. Per⯑jury, or Breach of Faith, may, in ſome poſſible Caſes, bring great Advantage to a Nation, by free⯑ing it from Conditions inconſiſtent with its Liber⯑ty and Publick Welfare. So likewiſe, may Adul⯑tery, by procuring a Domeſtick Heir, prevent a Kingdom's falling into the Hands of a Foreign Power, which wou'd in all probability prove its Ruin. Yet will any Man ſay, the extraordinary Nature of thoſe Caſes can take away the Guilt of Perjury and Adultery? This is what I will not ſuppoſe. But it hath been ſhewn, that Rebellion is as truly a Crime againſt Nature and Reaſon as either of the foregoing, it may not therefore be Juſtified upon any Account whatever, any more than they.

XLIX. What! Muſt we then Submit our Necks to the Sword? And is there no Help, no Refuge againſt extream Tyranny eſtabliſhed by Law? In Anſwer to this, I ſay in the firſt place, it is not to be feared that Men in their Wits ſhou'd ſeek the Deſtruction of their People, by ſuch cruel and un⯑natural Decrees as ſome are forward to ſuppoſe. I ſay, Secondly, that in caſe they ſhou'd, yet moſt certainly the Subordinate Magiſtrates may not, nay, they ought not, in Obedience to thoſe De⯑crees to act any thing contrary to the expreſs Laws of God. And perhaps all things conſidered, it [39] will be thought, that repreſenting this Limitation of their active Obedience by the Laws of God or Nature, as a Duty to the Miniſters of the Supreme Power, may prove in thoſe extravagant ſuppoſed Caſes no leſs effectual for the Peace and Safety of a Nation, than Preaching up the Power of Reſi⯑ſtance to the People.

L. Further, It will probably be Objected as an Abſurdity in the Doctrine of Paſſive Obedience, that it enjoyneth Subjects a blind implicit Submiſ⯑ſion to the Decrees of other Men; which is un⯑becoming the Dignity and Freedom of reaſonable Agents; who indeed ought to pay Obedience to their Superiors, but it ſhou'd be a rational Obedi⯑ence, ſuch as ariſes from a knowledge of the Equi⯑ty of their Laws, and the Tendency they have to promote the Public Good. To which I Anſwer, That it is not likely a Government ſhou'd ſuffer much for want of having its Laws inſpected and amended, by thoſe who are not legally intitled to a ſhare in the management of Affairs of that Na⯑ture. And it muſt be confeſſed, the Bulk of Man⯑kind are by their Circumſtances and Occupations, ſo far unqualified to judge of ſuch Matters, that they muſt neceſſarily pay an implicit deference to ſome or other, and to whom ſo properly as to thoſe inveſted with the Supreme Power?

LI. There is another Objection againſt abſo⯑lute Submiſſion, which I ſhou'd not have mentio⯑ned, but that I find it inſiſted on by Men of ſo great Note, as Grotius and Pufendorf ^*, who think our Non-Reſiſtance ſhou'd be meaſured by the in⯑tention [40] of thoſe who firſt framed the Society. Now, ſay they, if we ſuppoſe the queſtion put to them, Whether they meant to lay every Subject under a Neceſſity of chuſing Death, rather than in any Caſe to Reſiſt the Cruelty of his Superiors, it cannot be imagined, they wou'd Anſwer in the Affirmative. For this were to put themſelves in a worſe Condition, than that which they endea⯑voured to avoid by entring into Society. For al⯑tho' they were obnoxious to the Injuries of many, they had nevertheleſs the Power of Reſiſting them. But now they are bound, without any Oppoſition at all, to endure the greateſt Injuries from thoſe whom they have Armed with their own Strength. Which is by ſo much worſe than the former State, as the undergoing an Execution is worſe than the hazard of a Battle. But (paſſing by all other Ex⯑ceptions which this Method of arguing may be li⯑able to) it is evident, that a Man had better be ex⯑poſed to the abſolute irreſiſtible Decrees, even of one ſingle Perſon, whoſe own and Poſterities true Intereſt it is to preſerve him in Peace and Plenty, and Protect him from the Injuries of all Mankind beſide, than remain an open Prey to the Rage and Avarice of every Wicked Man upon Earth, who either exceeds him in Strength, or takes him at an Advantage. The Truth of this is confirmed, as well by the conſtant Experience of the far greater Part of the World, as by what we have already obſerv'd concerning Anarchy, and the Inconſi⯑ſtence of ſuch a State, with that manner of Life which Human Nature requires. Hence it is plain, the Objection laſt mentioned is Built on a falſe Suppoſition; Viz. That Men, by quitting the Na⯑tural State of Anarchy for that of abſolute Non-Reſiſting Obedience to Government, wou'd put themſelves in a worſe Condition than they were in before.

[41] LII. The laſt Objection I ſhall take Notice of is, that in purſuance of the premiſed Doctrine, where no Exceptions, no Limitations are to be al⯑lowed of, it ſhou'd ſeem to follow, Men were bound to ſubmit without making any Oppoſition to Uſurpers, or even Madmen poſſeſſed of the Su⯑preme Authority. Which is a Notion ſo abſurd and repugnant to common Senſe, that the Founda⯑tion on which it is Built, may juſtly be called in Queſtion. Now, in order to clear this Point, I obſerve the Limitation of Moral Duties may be underſtood in a Twofold Senſe, either firſt as a Diſtinction applied to the Terms of a Propoſition, whereby that which was expreſſed before too ge⯑nerally is limited to a particular Acceptation; and this, in truth, is not ſo properly limiting the Du⯑ty as defining it. Or, Secondly, it may be under⯑ſtood as a Suſpending the Obſervation of a Duty for avoiding ſome extraordinary Inconvenience, and thereby confining it to certain Occaſions. And in this laſt Senſe only, We have ſhewn Ne⯑gative Duties not to admit of Limitation. Name⯑ly, that by Vertue of the Duty of Non-Reſiſtance, We are not obliged to Submit the Diſpoſal of our Lives and Fortunes to the Diſcretion either of Mad⯑men, or of all thoſe who by Craft or Violence in⯑vade the Supreme Power. Becauſe the Object of the Submiſſion enjoyned Subjects by the Law of Nature is, from the Reaſon of the thing, Mani⯑feſtly limited ſo as to exclude both the one and the other. Which I ſhall not go about to prove, be⯑cauſe I believe no Body has denied it. Nor doth the Annexing ſuch Limits to the Object of our Obedience, at all limit the Duty it ſelf, in the Senſe we except againſt.

[42] LIII. In the Various Changes and Fluctuations of Government, it is impoſſible to prevent that Controverſies ſhou'd ſometimes ariſe concerning the Seat of the Supreme Power. And in ſuch Ca⯑ſes Subjects cannot be Denied the Liberty of Judg⯑ing for Themſelves, or of taking part with ſome, and oppoſing others, according to the beſt of their Judgments; all which is Conſiſtent with an exact Obſervation of their Duty, ſo long as, when the Conſtitution is clear in the Point, and the Object of their Submiſſion undoubted, no Pretext of In⯑tereſt, Friends, or the Publick Good, can make them depart from it. In ſhort, it is acknowledged, that the Precept enjoyning Non-Reſiſtance is Li⯑mited to particular Objects, but not to particular Occaſions. And in this it is like all other Moral Negative Duties, which conſider'd as general Pro⯑poſitions, do admit of Limitations and Reſtricti⯑ons, in order to a diſtinct Definition of the Duty; but what is once known to be a Duty of that ſort, can never become otherwiſe by any good or ill Effect, Circumſtance, or Event whatſoever. And in Truth if it were not ſo, if there were no Ge⯑neral Inflexible Rules, but all Negative as well as Poſitive Duties might be Diſpenſed with, and Warpt to Serve particular Intereſts and Occaſions, there were an end of all Morality.

LIV. It is therefore Evident, that as the Obſer⯑vation of any other Negative Moral Law, is not to be limited to thoſe Inſtances only, where it may produce good Effects; ſo neither is the Obſerva⯑tion of Non-Reſiſtance limited in ſuch ſort, as that any Man may Lawfully Tranſgreſs it, whenſoever in his Judgment, the Publick Good of his Particu⯑lar Country ſhall require it. And it is with Re⯑gard [43] to this Limitation by the Effects, that I ſpeak of Non-Reſiſtance, as an abſolute, unconditioned, unlimited Duty. Which muſt inevitably be grant⯑ed, unleſs one of theſe three Things can be prov'd: Either, Firſt, that Non-Reſiſtance is no Moral Duty. Or, Secondly, that other Negative Moral Duties are limited by the Effects. Or, Laſtly, that there is ſomething peculiar in the Nature of Non-Reſiſtance, which neceſſarily ſubjects it to ſuch a Limitation, as no other Negative Moral Duty can admit. The contrary to each of which Points, if I miſtake not, hath been clearly made out.

LV. I have now briefly gone through the Ob⯑jections drawn from the Conſequences of Non-Reſiſtance, which was the laſt General Head I propoſed to Treat of. In handling this and the other Points, I have endeavour'd to be as full and clear, as the uſual length of theſe Diſcourſes would permit, and throughout to conſider the Argument with the ſame Indifference, as I ſhou'd any other part of General Knowledge, being verily perſwa⯑ded that Men, as Chriſtians, are obliged to the Practice of no one Moral Duty, which may not abide the ſevereſt Teſt of Reaſon.