THE RIGHT AND CAPACITY OF THE PEO⯑PLE TO JUDGE OF GOVERNMENT.

From CATO'S LETTERS.

HONESTY and plainneſs go together, and the makers and multipliers of myſteries, in the political way, are ſhrewdly to be ſuſpected of dark de⯑ſigns. Cincinatus was taken from the plough to ſave and defend the Roman State; an office which he executed honeſtly and ſucceſsfully, without the grimace and gains of a ſtateſman. Nor did he afterwards continue obſti⯑nately at the head of affairs, to form a party, raiſe a fortune, and ſettle himſelf in power: As he came into it with univerſal conſent, he reſigned it with univerſal applauſe.

It ſeems that government was not in thoſe days become a trade, at leaſt a gainful trade—honeſt Cin⯑cinatus was but a farmer: and happy had it been for the Romans, if, when they were enſlaved, they could have taken the adminiſtration out of the hands of the emperors, and their refined politicians, and com⯑mitted it to ſuch farmers, or any farmers. It is certain, that many of their imperial governors acted more ridiculouſly than a board of ploughmen would have done, and more barbarouſly than a club of butchers could have done.

But ſome have ſaid, it is not the buſineſs of private men to meddle with government. A bold, falſe, and diſhoneſt ſaying; and whoever ſay it, either knows not what he ſays, or cares not, or ſlaviſhly ſpeaks the ſenſe of others. It is a cant now almoſt forgot in England, and which never prevailed but when liberty and the conſtitution were attacked, and never can prevail but upon the like occaſion.

It is a vexation to be obliged to anſwer nonſenſe, and confute abſurdities: but ſince it is and has been the great deſign of this paper to maintain and explain the [4]glorious principles of liberty, and to expoſe the arts of thoſe who would darken or deſtroy them; I ſhall here particularly ſhew the wickedneſs and ſtupidity or the above ſaying; which is fit to come from no m [...]ath but that of a tyrant, or a ſlave, and can never be h [...]d by any man of an honeſt and free ſoul with⯑out ho [...] and indignation: It is, in ſhort a ſaying, which ought to [...]ender the man, who utters it for ever incapable of place or credit in a free country, as it ſhews the m [...]lignity of his heart, and the baſeneſs of his nature, and as it is the pronouncing of a doom upon our conſtitution—a crime, or rather a compli⯑cation of crimes, for which a laſting infamy ought to be but part of the puniſhment.

But to the falſhood of the thing: Public truths ought never to be kept ſecrets; and they who do it, are guilty of a ſoleciſm, and a contradiction: Every man ought to know what it concerns all to know. Now, nothing upon earth is of a more univerſal na⯑ture th [...]n government; and every private man upon ea [...]ch has a concern in it, becauſe in it is concerned, and nearly and immediately concerned, his virtue, his p [...]erty, and the ſecurity of his perſon: And where all theſe are beſt [...]eſerved and advanced, the government is beſt adm [...]iſtred; and where they are not, the government is impotent, wicked or unfor⯑tu [...]; [...]d where the government is ſo, the people [...] there being always and every where a cer⯑tain ſympathy and analogy [...]etween the nature of the government and the nature of the pe [...]ple. This holds true in every inſtance. Public men [...]re the patterns of private; and the virtues and vices of the governors become quickly the virtues and vices of the go⯑verned.

Nor is it example alone that does it. Ill govern⯑ments, ſu [...]ſi [...]ting by vice and rapine, are jealous of private virtue, and enemies to private property. Th [...] muſt be wicked and miſchievous to be what they are; not are they ſecure while any thing good [5]and valuable is ſecure. Hence it is, that to drain, worry, and debauch their ſubjects, are the ſteady maxims of their politics, their favourite arts of reigning. In this wretched ſituation, the people, to be ſafe, muſt be poor and lewd: there will be but little induſtry, where property is precarious; ſmall honeſty, where virtue is dangerous.

Profuſeneſs, or frugality, and the like virtues or vices, which affect the public, will be practiſed in the city, if they be practiſed in the court; and in the country, if they be in the city. Even Nero (that royal monſter in man's ſhape) was adored by the common herd at Rome, as much as he was flattered by the great; and both the little and the great ad⯑mired, or pretended to admire his manners, and many to imitate them. Tacitus tells us, that thoſe ſort of people long lamented him, and rejoiced in the choice of a ſucceſſor that reſembled him, even the profligate Otho.

Good government does, on the contrary, pro⯑duce great virtue, much happineſs, and many peo⯑ple. Greece and Italy, while they continued free, were each of them, for the number of inhabitants, like one continued city; for virtue, knowledge, and great men, they were the ſtandards of the world; and that age and country that could come neareſt to them, has ever ſince been reckoned the happieſt. Their government, their free government, was the root of all theſe advantages, and of all this felicity and renown; and in theſe great and fortunate ſtates, the people were the principals in the govern⯑ment; laws were made by their judgment and au⯑thority, and by their voice and commands were ma⯑giſtrates made and condemned. The city of Rome could conquer the world; nor could the great Perſian Monarch, the greateſt then upon earth, ſtand before the face of one Greek City.

But what are Greece and Italy now? Rome has in it a herd of pampered monks, and a few ſtarving lay [6]inhabitants; the Campania of Rome, the fineſt ſpot of earth in Europe, is a deſart. And for the modern Greeks, they are a few abject contemptible ſlaves, kept under ignorance, chains, and vileneſs, by the Turkiſh Monarch, who keeps a great part of the globe intenſely miſerable, that he may ſeem great without being ſo.

Such is the difference between one government and another, and of ſuch important concernment is the nature and adminiſtration of government to a people. And to ſay that private men have nothing to do with government, is to ſay that private men have nothing to do with their own happineſs and miſery.

One man, or a few men, have often pretended the public, and meant themſelves, and conſulted their own perſonal intereſt, in inſtances eſſential to its well-being; but the whole people, by con⯑ſulting their own intereſt, conſult the public, and act for the public by acting for themſelves: this is particularly the ſpirit of our conſtitution, in which the whole nation is repreſented; and our records afford inſtances, where the houſe of commons have declined entering upon a queſtion of importance, till they had gone into the country, and conſulted their principles, the people: ſo far were they from think⯑ing that private men had no right to meddle with government. In truth; our whole worldly happineſs and miſery (abating for accidents and diſeaſes) are owing to the order and miſmanagement of govern⯑ment; and he who ſays that private men have no concern with government, does wiſely and modeſtly tell us, that men have no concern in that which con⯑cerns them moſt; it is ſaying that people ought not to concern themſelves whether they be naked or clothed, fed or ſtarved. deceived or inſtructed, and whether they be protected or deſtroyed: What non⯑ſenſe and ſervitude in a free and wiſe nation!

[7]For myſelf, who have thought pretty much on theſe matters, I am of opinion that a whole nation are like to be as much attached to themſelves, as one man or a few men are like to be. who may be many means be detached from the intereſt of a nation. It is certain that one man, and ſeveral men, may be bribed into an intereſt, oppoſite to that of the public; but it is as certain, that a whole country can never find an equi⯑valent for itſelf, and conſequently a whole country can never be bribed. It is the eternal intereſt of every nation, that their government ſhould be good; but they who direct it, frequently reaſon a contrary way, and find their own account in plunder and oppreſſion; and while the public voice is pretended to be de⯑clared, by one or a few, for vile and private ends, the public knows nothing what is done, till they feel the terrible effects of it.

By the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement at the Revolution, a right is aſſerted to the people of applying to the King and to the parliament by peti⯑tion and addreſs, for a redreſs of public grievances and miſmanagements, when ſuch there are, of which They are left to judge: and the difference between free and enſlaved countries lies principally here, that in the former, their magiſtrates muſt conſult the voice and intereſt of the people: but in the latter, the private will, intereſt, and pleaſure of the governors, are the ſole end and motives of their adminiſtration.

Such is the difference between England and Turky; which difference, they who ſay that private men have no right to concern themſelves with government, would abſolutely deſtroy; they would convert ma⯑giſtrates into baſhaws, and introduce popery into politics. The late revolution ſtands upon the [...]very oppoſite maxim; and that any man dares to contra⯑dict it ſince the Revolution, would be amazing, did we not know that there are, in every country, hire⯑lings who would betray it for a ſop.

EXAMPLES OF SAFE PRINTING.

TO prevent miſrepreſentation in theſe proſecuting times, it ſeems neceſſary to publiſh every thing relating to Tyranny and Oppreſſion, though only among brutes, in the moſt guarded manner.

The following are meant as Specimens:—

Let us thus, O ye Britons, ſhew what we do not mean, that the Attorney General may not, in his Indict⯑ments, do it for us.

CHARACTER OF AN EVIL MAGISTRATE, From ALGERNON SIDNEY, Eſq.

WHEN a Magiſtrate fancies he is not made for the people, but the people for him; that he does not govern for them, but for himſelf; that the people live only to encreaſe his glory, or to furniſh matter for his pleaſure; he does not enquire what he may do for them, but what he may draw from them: by this means he ſets up an intereſt of profit, pleaſure, or pomp in himſelf, repugnant to the good of the public, for which he is made to be what he is. Theſe contrary ends certainly divide the nation into parties; and while every one endeavours to advance that to which he is addicted, occaſions of hatred, for injuries every day do [...]e, or thought to be [...] re⯑ceived, muſt neceſſarily ariſe. This creaces a moſt ſ [...]er [...]e and irreconcilable enmity: becauſe the occaſions are frequent, important, and univerſal, and the cauſes thought to be moſt juſt. The people think it to be the greateſt of all crimes to convert that power to their h [...]t, which was inſtituted for their good; and that the injuſtice is aggravated by perjury and in⯑gratitude, which comprehend all manner of ill; and the Magiſtrate gives the name of ſedition and rebel⯑lion to whatſoever they do for the preſervation of themſelves and their rights. When men's ſpirits are thus prepared, a ſmall matter ſets them on fire; but if no acc [...]nt happens to bl [...] them into a flame, the courſe of juſtice is certainly interrupted, the public [...] its are neglected; and when any occaſion, whether foreign or domeſtic, ariſes in which the Magiſtrate ſtands in need of the people's aſſiſtance, they whoſe affections are alienated; not only ſhew an [...] to ſerve him with their perſons and eſtates, but fear that by delivering him from his diſtreſs they ſtrong then their enemy, and enable him [17]to oppreſs them; and he fancying his will to be un⯑juſtly oppoſed, or his due more unjuſtly denied, is filled with a diſlike of what he ſees, and a fear of worſe for the future. Whilſt he endeavours to eaſe himſelf of the one, and to provide againſt the other, he uſually encreaſes the evils of both; and jealouſies are on both ſides multiplied. Every man knows that the governed are in a great meaſure under the power of the governor; but as no man or number of men is willingly ſubject to thoſe that ſeek their ruin, ſuch as fall into ſo great a misfortune, continue no longer under it, than force, fear, or neceſſity may be able to oblige them. But ſuch a neceſſity can hardly be longer upon a great people, than till the evil be fully diſcovered and comprehended, and their virtue, ſtrength, and power be united to expell it: The ill Magiſtrate looks upon all things that may conduce to that end, as ſo many preparatives to his ruin; and by the help of thoſe who are of his party, will endeavour to prevent that union, and diminiſh that ſtrength, virtue, power, and courage, which he knows to be bent againſt him. And as truth, faithful dealing, and integrity of manners are bands of union, and helps to good, he will always, by tricks, artifices, cavils, and all means poſſible, en⯑deavour to eſtabliſh falſhood and diſhoneſty; whilſt other emiſſaries and inſtruments of iniquity, by cor⯑rupting the youth, and ſuch as can be brought to le [...]dneſs and debauchery, bring the people to ſuch a paſs, that they may neither care nor dare to vindi⯑cate their rights; and that thoſe who would do it may ſo far ſuſpect each other, as not to confer upon, much leſs to join in, any action tending to the public deliverance.

This diſtinguiſhes the good from the bad Magi⯑ſtrate, the faithful from the unfaithful; and thoſe that adhere to either, living in the ſame principle, muſt wa [...] in the ſame ways. They who uphold the rightful power of a juſt Magiſtracy, encourage virtue [18]and juſtice, and teach men what they ought to do, ſuffer, or expect from others; they fix them upon principles of honeſty, and generally advance every thing that tend [...] to the encreaſe of the valour, ſtrength, greatneſs, and happineſs of the nation, creating a good anion among them, and bringing every man to an enact underſtanding of his own and the public rights. On the other ſide, he that would introduce an ill Magiſtrate, make one evil who was good, or preſerve him in the adminiſtration of injuſtice when he is corrupted, muſt always open the way for him by vitiating the people, corrupting their manners, deſtroying the validity of oaths, teaching ſuch eva⯑ſions, equivocations, and fraud, as are inconſiſtant with the thoughts that become men of virtue and courage; and overthrowing the confidence they ought to have in each other, make it impoſſible for them to unite amongſt themſelves. The like arts muſt be uſed with the Magiſtrate: He cannot be for their turns, till he is perſuaded to believe he has no dependence upon, and owes no duty to the people; that he is of himſelf, and not by their inſtitution: that no man ought to enquire into, nor be judge of his actions; that all obedience is due to him, whe⯑ther he be good or bad, wiſe or fooliſh, a father or an enemy to his country. This being calculated for his perſonal intereſt, he muſt purſue the ſame deſigns, or his kingdom is divided within itſelf, and cannot ſubſiſt. By this means, thoſe who flatter his hu⯑m [...]ur, court to be accounted his friends, and the only men that are thought worthy of great truſts; while ſuch as are of another mind are expoſed to all p [...]r [...]e [...]tion. Theſe are always ſuch as excell in virtue, wiſdom, and greatneſs of ſpirit: They have eyes, and they will always ſee the way they go; and h [...]a [...]ing fools no be guided by implicit faith, will diſtinguiſh between good and evil, and chaſe that which is beſt: they will judge of men by their actions, and by them diſcovering whoſe ſervant every [19]man is, know whether he is to be obeyed or nor. Thoſe who are ignorant of all good, careleſs, or enemies to it, take a more compendious way: their ſlaviſh, vicious, and baſe natures inclining them to ſeek only private and preſent advantage, they eaſily ſlide into a blind dependence upon one who has wealth and power; and deſiring only to know his will, care not what injuſtice they do if they may be rewarded. They worſhip what they find in the temple, though it be the vileſt of idols; and always like that beſt which is worſt, becauſe it agrees with their inclinations and principles. When a party comes to be erected upon ſuch a foundation, de⯑bauchery, lewdneſs, and diſhoneſty are the true badges of it; ſuch as wear them are cheriſhed; but the principal marks of favour are reſerved for them who are the moſt induſtrious in miſchief, either by ſeducing the people with the allurements of ſenſual pleaſures, or corrupting their underſtandings with falſe and ſlaviſh doctrines.

THE POOR WE [...]P UNHEEDED.
From the Citizen of the World, by Dr. Goldſmith,

WHO are thoſe who make the ſtreets their couch, and find a ſhort repoſe from wretched⯑neſs at the doors of the opulent? Theſe are ſtrang⯑ers, wanderers, and orphans, whoſe circumſtances are too humble to expect redreſs, and whoſe diſtreſſes are too great even for pity. Their wretchedneſs ex⯑cites rather horror than pity. Some are without the covering even of rags, and others emaciated with diſeaſe; the world has diſclaimed them; ſociety turns its back upon their diſtreſs, and has given them up to nakedneſs and hunger. Theſe poor ſhivering females have once ſeen happier days, and been flat⯑tered into beauty. They have been proſtituted to THE GAY LUXURIOUS VILLAIN, and are now turned out to meet the ſeverity of winter. Perhaps, now lying at the doors of their betrayers, they ſue to wretches whoſe hearts are inſenſible, or debau⯑chee; who may curſe, but will not relieve them.

Why, why was I born a man, and yet ſee the ſufferings of wretches I cannot relieve! Poor houſe⯑leſs creatures! the world will give you reproaches, but will not give you relief. The ſlighteſt misfor⯑tunes of the great, the moſt imaginary uneaſineſs of [23]the rich, are aggravated with all the power of elo⯑quence, and held up to engage our attention and ſympathetic ſorrow. The poor weep unheeded, per⯑ſecuted by every ſubordinate ſpecies of tyranny; and every law which gives others ſecurity becomes an enemy to them.

A LESSON FOR THE SHEEPISH MULTI⯑TUDE.
Being QUERIES of Importance.
From a Pamphlet, entitled "The Poor Man's Advo⯑cate," publiſhed at Neweaſtle, by T. SPENCE, in the Year 1779.

WHETHER it would not be very pleaſant to ſee one horſe claiming all the paſture as his, and ordering all the reſt to depart the ſame, unleſs they fulfilled certain conditions which he chuſed to impoſe? and whether to ſee thoſe poor beaſts gather⯑ing the herbage with unceaſing anxiety and diligence eating only the worſt, but ſacredly refraining from the heſt and bringing it in large bundles with all humi⯑lity and diſſidence to the gentle-horſe, who receives it with the higheſt air of ſuperiority and unthank⯑fulneſs; [33]and who, though they bring him more than he can deſtroy, yet is ſo far from mitigating their taſks, that he takes frequent occaſions to encreaſe them: I ſay, whether to ſee all this would not be to ſee too favourable a picture of landlord and te⯑nant?

Whether if every paſture of the earth were thus claimed and monopolized by ſome or other gentle⯑horſe as they are by ſome or other gentle-man, it would not be a moſt miſerable thing to be a landleſs horſe?

Whether if one of thoſe unfortunate landleſs horſes ſhould offer to convince his fellow-ſufferers, that it was the moſt deſpicable ſillineſs, to drudge thus con⯑tinually for permiſſion to live on the earth which they had as good a right to as their oppreſſors, and ſhould adviſe them to throw off ſuch ignominious ſervitude; and that, if their aſſuming lords would not give up all thoughts of ſuperiority and tyranny over their fellow-creatures, that they ſhould have their brains kicked out. I fay, whether this poor beaſt could be blamed for ſo doing, or juſtly branded with improper ſelfiſhneſs, levelling, turbulency, ſedition, or other hard names?

Whether there would not be more reaſon for ſuſ⯑pecting ſuch as took part with the gentle horſes of ſelfiſhneſs, as none certainly would, but from hopes of ſharing in the plunder, or of becoming gentry ſometime or other themſelves, and exempted from the labour of cutting their own graſs, whereas the poor levelling horſe could expect nothing from his impartial ſcheme but his bare natural due, which it is the higheſt honour to claim, and prevent all en⯑croachments upon?

Whether thoſe brutes who would not join ſin⯑cerely with this honeſt horſe for the recovery of their rights, for themſelves and poſterity, from any cauſe, but eſpecially from being bribed or hired by their oppreſſors, ought not to be deemed unworthy of every privilege of nature, and ſpurned from the face of the earth?

[34]Whether one man has a natural right to rule over, or demand rent of another man, more than one horſe has a right to rule over, or demand rent of another horſe?

Whether man is not rightful lord of the whole world, namely, of lands, animals, plants, minerals, &c.?

Whether to attempt to deprive any man of this his birth-right, is not attempting to make him leſs than man?

Whether fathers have a right to waſte or alienate that, which their poſterity can not be men without? and, whether if they did, their ſons have not a right to claim and re-poſſes, themſelves of the [...]ame?

Whether buying and felling land is not as illegal and unjuſt, according to the law of nature as buying and ſelling ſtolen goods?

Whether in Spenſonia, where the land is entirely public property, a perſon with much money would have more reaſon to complain, that he could not pur⯑chaſe land with his money, than one that has little?

Whether if a perſon grows rich in money, which he has a right to do by his induſtry, trading, or other lawful means, he ought therefore to complain that he cannot reduce his fellow-creatures to a ſtate of dependence upon him, by purchaſing their land?

Whether the public, and the hirer of a poor la⯑bouring man, are not ſaid to be clear with him upon paying him his wages? and whether the public ought not to be accounted as clear with a rich man upon paying him his due in money, though they ſuffer him not to purchaſe their land?

Whether it is not enough that he be allowed to trade, lend, ſpend, or lay up, give away, or do what he will with his riches, buying land, or men's perſons excepted?

Whether if trafficking in land be pleaded as a great and laudable incitement to induſtry, trafficking in the perſons of men may not as juſtly be pleaded for the ſame reaſon?

[35]Whether thoſe who live by their rents, may not be ſaid to live on the pariſh more properly than moſt of the poor people who are ſaid to do ſo? becauſe thoſe locuſts get what they get from the public for nothing; whereas, the moſt of the poor have, by their for [...]er labour, laid up an ample ſtock in the hands of the public, to ſubſiſt on in their old age, and under in⯑firmities?

Whether the poor ought not to be allowed one perſon or book to plead their intereſt, when the rich have ſo many of both to plead theirs?

Whether if the right honourable the gentlemen will not accept of our lands and labours without our reaſon too, they do not deſerve to want all?

Whether if they thought it for their intereſt that we ſhould not fee, we ought therefore to put out our eyes to oblige them?

Whether the landed men do not take upon them⯑ſelves the ſole lordſhip of this world, even to the power of killing a hare, and treat the reſt of men as a ſpecies of the brute creation, made for their ſervice and convenience? and whether when theſe creatures are not ſpoiled by thinking on things too high and, as they ſay, out of their ſphere, they are not the moſt tractable and uſeful animals to their maſters that can be?

Whether truth ought to be diſcouraged or hid through fear of danger? and, if ſo, whether the moſt important truths have not enemies, who, to have them ſmothered would pronounce them dan⯑gerous?

Whether we would not laugh at any profeſſion, trade, or intereſt, that ſhould call thoſe principles dangerous, by which it could be proved, that they defrauded and robbed the public of millions annually, and were combined together for that purpoſe? and, whether we have not as good reaſon to laugh at the profeſſion of gentlemen, when they call levelling principles dangerous?

Whether though the members of the body for their own benefit muſt maintain the belly, they may not lawfully deſtroy all the worms therein?

On the [...]ational Sin of Involving ſucceeding generations in Debt.
From a pamphlet, entitled "Sins of the Nation."

EXTRAVAGANCE is a ſin, to which the nati⯑ons as well as private perſons are [...]y prone, and the conſequences to both, are exactly ſimilar. If a private man lives beyond his income, the con⯑ſequence will be lo [...]s of independence diſgrace⯑ [...]l perplexity, and in the end, certoir ruin. The [...]taſtrophies of ſtates, are flower m [...]ipening, but, [43]like cauſes, muſt in the end produce like effects. If you are acquainted with any individual, who, from inattention to his affairs, miſplaced confidence fooliſh law-ſuits, anticipation of his rents and pro⯑feſſion in his family expences, has involved him⯑ſelf in debts, that eat away his income, what would you ſay to ſuch a one? Would you not tell him, contract your expences; look yourſelf into your affairs, inſiſt upon exact accounts from your ſtew⯑ard and bailiffs, keep no ſervants for mere ſhow and parade; mind only your own affairs, and keep at peace with your neighbours; ſet religiouſly apart an annual ſum, for diſcharging the mortgages on your eſtate. If this be good advice for one man, it is good adviſe for nine-million of men. If this individual ſhould perſiſt in his courſe of unthrifty proſuſſion, ſaying to himſelf, the ruin will not come in my time; the miſery will not fall upon me; let poſterity take care of itſelf! would you not pro⯑nounce him at once very weak, and very ſelfeſh? my friends, a nation that ſhould purſue the ſame conduct, would be equally reprehenſible.

ON SACRILEGE.
From Cato's Letters.

SACRILEGE we are told by ſome, ſignifies the robbing or ſtealing from God any thing which is peculiarly his. Now nothing can be ſtolen from God, nor can any thing be conceal⯑ed from him. Every thing being his, it is as much his in the hands of one man as in the hands of ano⯑ther; for, let who will have the uſe of it, the pro⯑perty cannot be altered: God who has all things, can never be put out of poſſeſſion of any thing, and as nothing can be taken from him, ſo neither can anything be given to him, becauſe all the world and every thing in it is aheady his: and it is ab⯑ſurd [47]to imagine that any form of words, or change of place or poſition, can enlarge or leſſen his pro⯑perty in any thing. All that we have, we have from him: and to return him his own gifts back again, which we want and he does not, is no com⯑pliment, nor any part of religion or reaſon: It is ſhewing ourſelves wiſer than he, in ſetting apart for his uſe thoſe things which he has graciouſly created and ſet apart for ours. Can we feed him? or can we cloath, adorn or enrich him? Can we build him a city to dwell in, or furniſh him with guards for the ſecurity of his perſon?

Sacrilege therefore is either the robbing of men, or no robbery at all. And this crime is greater or leſs, according to the meaſure or miſchief done. To rob a poor man of his loaf, is a greater crime, in foro conſcientiae, than to rob a rich man of an Ox: To rob a man of a ſmall part of a thing that is neceſſary to him, is a greater crime, than the rob⯑bing him of a great ſuperfluity; and if I rob a man of a thing that will do him hurt, I hope I do him leſs an injury, than if I robbed him of a thing which does him good. But if I take a thing which no man has a right to, I myſelf have a right to it, by poſſeſſing it.

To apply all this to the buſineſs of Sacrilege; if a man take away any of the books, veſtments, or utenſils, made uſe of in devotion, he only robs the congregation, who muſt buy more; and many be⯑ing more able than one to bear the loſs, the offence, as to its effects, is leſs than if he robbed but one man. But if he take away from a Heathen Tem⯑ple, plate, or hidden treaſure, laid up there, but not uſed, he indeed does an action that he has no right to do, but an action that however does good to the world, by turning into uſe, that which was of none, or of bad uſe.

Dead treaſure, firſt drawn from the people in ſu⯑perſtitious offerings, and then laid up in a Hea⯑then [48]Temple, and kept and uſed for impious and idolatrous ends, but never to return again into the world, for the neceſſary purpoſes of life and com⯑merce, is the plunder of mankind; and the worſt of all plunders, becauſe it never circulates; and people are greatly the worſe for it, in reſpect both of ſoul and body, but never can be the better, it is firſt taking from them and afterwards denying them the great and chief means of life and convenience. He therefore, whoever he be, that takes it from thence, let him take it in what manner he will, does a better and more public thing, than he who keeps it there.

No man can be robbed of a thing in which he has no property. Of this ſort was Apollo's wealth; and nobody was robbed in taking it away. So that whoever takes away golden images, or other dead wealth the means and objects of falſe adoration, is guilty of no other crime, than that of diſturbing erroneous conſciences: Nor need ſuch conſciences be much diſturbed, ſince the crime being commit⯑ted without their conſent, they have no ſhare in it. And therefore if ſuch idolatrous images, and ſuch ſuperſtitious, uſeleſs, and pe [...]nic ous riches be taken away by a lawful authority, or in a lawful war. it is no crime at all. So that in every ſenſe Byennus committed a greater crime in plundering one village, than he could have committed had he plundered, as he intended, the Temple of Delphos.

THE PROGRESS OF TAXATION.
From the Morning Chronicle.

WHEN the common people of any ſtate can ſupply the exorbitant demands of their Prince no longer, the eſtates of the Nobility will be the next reſource, and like the maſtiff dog in the beehive, when he has ſucked up all the honey, [49]he will ſwallow the comb; and then the greater part of Europe will be in the condition of Turkey, —moſt of its Princes will be ſole proprietors of the land, as they now make themſelves of its produce, which is very near the ſame thing. When the te⯑nants exhauſted by taxes, are unable to pay rent, the land yielding no profit, is as bad as none, and in ſome inſtances worſe than none, as we are par⯑ticularly told by the noble author of the account of Denmark, where ſome landlords have begged of the King, upon their knees, to eaſe them of their land, by taking it from them for good and all, for it was taxed more than it was worth.

A VINDICATION OF BRUTUS, For having killed CAESAR.

[From CATO'S Letters.]

CAESAR had uſurped the Roman world, and was cantoning it out to his creatures as be⯑came a tyrant, and paying his perſonal favourites with the public bounty. As the worſt tyrants muſt have ſome friend; and as the beſt men do them the moſt credit, and bring them the moſt ſup⯑port [...] if ſuch can be got: Caeſar had ſenſe enough to know, that he could never buy Brutus too dear, and ſo paid him great court. But Brutus ſaw the tyrant's deſign, and his own ſhame; and every ci⯑vility was a freſh provocation. It was as if a thief [55]breaking into a houſe to rob a lady of her jewels, ſpoke thus to her ſon: Sir, pray permit me, or aſſist me to cut your mother's throat, and ſeize her treaſure and I will generouſly reward you with your life, and lend you one or two of her diamonds to ſparkle in as long as I think fit. Could ſuch a villainous civility as this engage the ſon, eſpecially a virtuous ſon, to any thing but revenge? And would not the only way that he could take it, be the beſt way?

Caeſar took from Brutus his liberty, and his legal title to his life and his eſtate, and gave him in lieu of it a precarious one during his own arbitrary will and pleaſure. Upon the ſame terms he gave him ſome mercenary employments, as hire for that great man's aſſiſtance to ſupport his tyranny. Could the great and free ſoul of Brutus brook this? Could Brutus be the inſtrument or confederate of lawleſs juſt? Brutus receive wages from an oppreſſor! That great, virtuous, and popular Brutus: who, if the common wealth had ſubſiſted, might from his repu⯑tation, birth, abilities, and his excellent worth, have challenged the moſt honourable and advan⯑tageous offices in it, without owing thanks to Caeſar.

So that the injuries done by Caeſar to Brutus were great, heinous, and many: and the favours none. All the mercy ſhewn by Caeſar was art and affecta⯑tion, and pure ſelf-love. He had found in the Roman people ſo univerſal a deteſtation of the bloody meaſures of Marius, Cinna, and Sylla. He ſaw the whole empire ſo reduced and enervated by repeated proſcriptions and maſſacres, that he thought [...]t his intereſt to eſtabliſh his new-erected domi⯑nion by different meaſures; and to reconcile. by a falſe and hypocritical ſhew of clemency, the minds of men, yet bleeding with the late and former wounds, to his uſurpation, that Caeſar, the uſurp⯑ing and deſtructive Caeſar, who had ſlaughtered millions. and wantonly made havock of human race, had any other ſort of mercy, than the mercy [56]of policy and deceit, will not be pretended by any man, that knows his and the Roman ſtory.

Brutus therefore being the moſt reverenced and popular man in Rome, it became the craſt of the tyrant to make Brutus his friend; it was adding a ſort of ſanctity to a wicked cauſe. Whereas the death of Brutus by Caeſar would have made Caeſar odious and dreadful even amongſt his own follow⯑ers.

But it is ſaid, that Brutus ſubmitted to Caeſar, and was bound by his own act. Here the allegation is true, but the conſequence falſe. Did not Brutus ſubmit to Caeſar, as innocent men are often forced to ſubmit to the gallies, the wheel, and the gibbet? He ſubmitted as a man robbed and bound, ſubmits to a houſe-breaker, who with a piſtol at his heart, forces from him a diſcovery of his trea⯑ſure, and a promiſe not to proſecute him. Such engagements are not only void in themſelves, but aggravate the injuries, by the law of nature and rea⯑ſon, as well as by the poſitive inſtitutions of every country, all promiſes, bonds, or oaths, extorted by dureſs, that is, by unlawful impriſonments or menaces, are not obligatory. It is, on the contrary, a crime to fulfil them; becauſe an acquieſcence in the impoſitions of lawleſs villains, is abetting law⯑leſs villains.

Beſides it was not in the power of Brutus to alter his allegiance, which he had already engaged to the Commonwealth, which had done nothing to forfeit the ſame. For how lawful ſoever it be for ſubjects to transfer their obedience to a con⯑queror in foreign war, when the former civil pow⯑er can no longer protect them; or to a new magiſ⯑trate made by conſent, when the old had forfeited or reſigned: It is ridiculous to ſuppoſe, that they can transfer it to a domeſtic traitor and robbet; who is under the ſame ties and allegiance with themſelves, and by all acts of violence, treaſon, [57]and uſurpation, extorts a ſubmiſſion from his op⯑preſſed maſters and fellow ſubjects. At leaſt ſuch allegiance can never be re-engaged, whilſt any means [...] nature are left to rid the world of ſuch a mon⯑ [...]ter.

It is a poor charge againſt Brutus that Caeſar in⯑ [...]ended him for his heir and ſucceſſor. Brutus ſcorn⯑ [...]d to ſucceed a tyrant. And what more glorious for Brutus, than thus to own that the dangerous and bewitching proſpect of the greateſt power that ever mortal man poſſeſſed, could not ſhake the firm and virtuous heart of Brutus, nor corrupt his integrity? To own that no perſonal conſiderations, not even the higheſt upon earth, could reconcile him to a tyrant; and that he preferred the liberty of the world to the empire of the world!

The above charges therefore againſt Brutus, can hardly come from any but thoſe, who, like the profane and ſlaviſh Eſau, would ſell their birth⯑right for a meſs of pottage, would ſacrifice their duty to their intereſt; and, unconcerned what be⯑comes of the reſt of mankind, would promote ty⯑ranny, if they might but ſhine in its trappings. But an honeſt mind, a mind great and virtuous, ſcorns and hates all ambition, but that of doing good to men, and to all men; it deſpiſes momen⯑tary riches, and ill-gotten power; it enjoys no vi⯑cious and hard-hearted pleaſures, ariſing from the miſeries of others. But it wiſhes and endeavours to procure impartial, diffuſive, and univerſal hap⯑pineſs to the whole earth.

This is the character of a great and good mind; and this was the great and ſublime ſoul of the im⯑mortal Brutus.

THE MARINE REPUBLIC.

A Certain man having many ſons all bred to a ſeafaring life, was deſirous that they ſhould live together in a juſt, brotherly, and ſocial man⯑ner; and that though he wiſhed to encourage in⯑dividual induſtry, and improvement in abilities, by providing that every one ſhould reap the fruits of the ſame, yet was he determined to form their plan of union in ſuch a manner that none, not even their children, ſhould be ſo depreſſed as to be excluded from the common benefits of their birth-right and of an equal token of the impartial regard of their common parent. Wherefore one day having called his ſons together, he addreſſed them to this effect. ‘My dear boys, my beha⯑viour and conduct towards you, has always been ſuch as to convince you, I was ſtrictly, juſt, and impartial. You were all equally my delight and care in your infancy, you have been equally provided with the means of education, and with every comfort and convenience. I have [69]ſhewn no partiality to any, as being older or younger, I have been in all reſpects your common parent, and I wiſh you and your children to live together as my common children for ever, for I extend my parental regard to your offspring through every generation—Behold, then, this gallant ſhip, equipt and provided with every thing neceſſary for ſea, her rigging and tackle all of the beſt materials, and admirably adapted to the ocean you have to occupy; amply provid⯑ed with ſtores and proviſions for a long voyage, and waiting only for intelligent and ſkilful agents to conduct her whitherſoever they will. You my dear boys, are ſuch agents, ſufficiently qualified for the adventurous taſk. Accept, then my ſons of this my precious gift, but remember, I do not give it to one, or two, or a ſelect few, but to you all, and as many of your poſterity as ſhall ſail therein, as a COMMON PROPERTY You ſhall be all EQUAL OWNERS, and shall share the profits of every voyage equally among you. You ſhall chuſe from among yourſelves, one fit to be captain, another to be mate, another carpenter, &c.—Theſe officers ſhall continue in office while you pleaſe, and and when you pleaſe you ſhall change them for others, that your affairs may be conducted in the beſt manner poſſible. At the end of the voy⯑age, or at other ſtated times agreed upon, you ſhall ſettle your accounts; and after paying the captain, the mate, and every other officer and man his wages, according to ſtation and agree⯑ment, and all bills for upholding wear and tear, proviſions, &c. then the remainder, which is the neat profit of the voyage, and which would been mine had I retained the property of the ſhip in my own hands, is now your common property, and muſt be ſhared equally among you all, without reſpect to any office any any one may have held. For as I make you all [70]equal owners, ſo ſhall you be equal ſharers in the profits of each voyage. You are all equal to me, and you ſhall be all equal in this reſpect to each other. Let not the captain, who re⯑ceives the wages of a captain, or any other offi⯑cer, who receives the wages of his ſtation, mur⯑mer that his brethren before the maſt, and who receive only the wages of common men, ſhould receive ſhare and ſhare alike with himſelf of the profits. No my dear children, let no ſuch un⯑juſt and unbrotherly grudging ever he found among you.’

‘Again my ſons, as I have been juſt and im⯑partial to you, be ye the ſame to your children. And when they ſhall multiply ſo that you can⯑not all ſail together in the ſame veſſel, provide another ſhip out of your common profits, for ſuch of yourſelves and your ſons as ſhall chuſe to ſail together, which ſhall be their common property in the ſame manner as this ſhip is yours. This do, and live like men and brethren through all generations. And as a ſwarm of bees, when grown too numerous for one hive, ſend off colonies to people new ones, ſo when the [...]e [...]s of your ſhips become too numerous, let new ſhips be built, and manned on the ſame equitable plan that I have done, and my bleſſing go with you.’

Theſe injunctions were received by the young men with inexpreſſible joy. And having wrote them, they were called the conſtitution of their MARINE REPUBLIC, and ſwore to maintain them inviolate to the end of time. They then choſe a captain, and other officers, and proceeded on a trading voyage, and being proſperous they ſhared very conſiderable dividends both at the end of this, and many future voyages.

In proceſs of time, however, it ſo happened that theſe marine republicans were diſſatisfied with [71]the government of the country, in which they reſided. Wherefore taking all their families and all their effects on board, they ſet ſail for America, where they expected to ſee government adminiſter⯑ed more agreeably to their notions of equality and equity. But a violent ſtorm ariſing, they were driven far out of their courſe, and at laſt arrived at an uninhabited iſland of a luxurious ſoil, and an agreeable climate. Here they gladly landed after much danger, and their ſhip being ſo damaged as to be no more fit for ſea, they determined to ſettle on the iſland. The ſhip was now broke up, and houſes built with the materials, and preparations were made to cultivate the ſoil, as they muſt now think of living by gardening and agriculture. But they foreſaw that if they did not apply the Marine Conſtitution, given them by their father, to their landed property, they would ſoon experience in⯑expreſſible inconveniences. They therefore de⯑clared the property of the iſland to be the proper⯑ty of them all collectively in the ſame manner as the ſhip had been, and that they ought to ſhare the profits thereof in the ſame way. The iſland they named Spenſonia, after the name of the ſhip which their father had given them. They next choſe officers to mark out ſuch portions of land, as every perſon or family deſired to occupy, for which they were to receive for the uſe of the public, a certain rent according to its value. This rent was applied to public uſes, or divided among themſelves as they thought proper, But in order to keep up the remembrance of their rights, they decreed that they ſhould never fail to ſhare at rent-time, an equal dividend though ever ſo ſmall, and though public demands ſhould be ever ſo urgent.

They now ſpread conſiderably over the country, and houſes and workſhops were built at the public expence. The ſpace inhabited became too exten⯑ſive for one diſtrict, wherefore they divided it into [72]many, and called them pariſhes. As they had de⯑termined, when ſeamen, that every ſucceeding ſhip they ſhould build, and man, ſhould, according to their father's maxim, be the property of the crew, ſo, in conformity therewith, they decreed, that every diſtrict or pariſh which they ſhould people, ſhould be the property of the inhabitants, and the rents and police of the ſame at their diſpoſal. Thus they live in union and equality on land, as their father intended they ſhould do on ſea, and frame and people new pariſhes at the public ex⯑pence, as he deſigned they ſhould build new ſhips. A national aſſembly or congreſs conſiſting of dele⯑gates from all the pariſhes, takes care of their na⯑tional concerns, and defrays the expences of ſtate, and matters of common utility, by a pound rate from each pariſh, without any other tax.

The time is now come for men to be provided with prin⯑ciples of practical utility.
[From a Pamphlet, entitled Sins of the Nation.]

THE courſe of events in this country has now for a number of generations for a long reach as it were of the ſtream of time run ſmooth, and our political duties have been proportionably eaſy; but it may not always be ſo. A ſudden bend may change the direction of the current, and open ſcenes leſs calm. It becomes every man, therefore to examine his principles, whether they are of that firmneſs and texture, as ſuits the occaſion, he may have for them. If we want a light gondola to float upon a ſummer lake, we look at the form and gilding; but if a veſſel to ſteer through ſtorms, [83]we examine the ſtrength of the timbers, and the ſoundneſs of the bottom. We want principles not to figure in a Book of Ethies, or to delight us with "grand and ſwelling ſentiments:" but principles by which we may act▪ and by which we may ſuffer. Principles of ben volence, to diſpoſe us to real ſacrifices; political principles, of practi⯑cal utility: principles of religion, to comfort and ſupport us under all the trying viciſſitudes we ſee around us, and which we have no ſecurity, that we ſhall be long exempt from. How many are there now ſuffering under ſuch overwhelming diſ⯑treſſes, as a ſhort time ago, we ſhould have thought it was hardly within the verge of poſſibility that they ſhould experience! Above all let us keep our hearts pure, and our hand clean. Whatever part we take in public affairs, much will undoubt⯑edly happen which we could by no means foreſee, and much which we ſhall not be able to juſtify; the only way therefore by which we can avoid deep remorſe, is to act with ſimplicity and ſingle⯑neſs of intention, and not to ſuffer ourſelves to be warped, though by ever ſo little, from the path which honour and conſcience approve.

OF THE HERIDITARY NOBILITY.

THE third and laſt ſort of men that ſeem by their intereſt prompted to an enmity to, and oppoſition of an equal Commonwealth, is the he⯑riditary Nobility, whoſe apprehenſions being ſwell⯑ed and elated with the greatneſs of their titles, and cheriſhing a fond opinion of the gallantry of their blood, think it below them to ſtand on an equal level with the reſt of their breth [...]en: I confeſs were there on the face of the earth (according to the fictions of the poets) a race of heroes that were of the kindred of Jupiter, and could deduce their [84]pedigrees from the Gods, whoſe natures had eſ⯑caped the general po [...]tion, or been leſs tainted with human infirmities than other mortals, whoſe bodies had been framed by Titan, of better clay, and a more refined mould than the reſt of the rude moſs of mankind▪ and whoſe parts and intellects (as its ſaid of [...]a [...]) were higher by the head and ſhoulders than the reſt of the people, whereby it might be envidenced nature had deſigned them unto rule and empire; there were then ſome plea, ſome ground, for that diſtinction the tyranny of cuſtom hath introduced among the children of men.

But if theſe pyramids of greatneſs were at firſt erected by the hands of monarchy, only for the better ſupport and on ament of the thrones of princes, and are, (if well underſtood) no other than golden trophies made of the ſpoils and ruins of the people's liberties, that not only in fair cha⯑racters preſerve the memories of their oppreſſors, but alſo upb [...]d them with their former (if not preſent, ſe [...]vi [...]de and ſlavery: I cannot but think it might [...] con [...]uce to the ſecurity of the peace and [...]ty of the nation▪ to have them removed out of the people's eves, that they may neither longer continue the objects of their envy who hate them, or by d [...]z [...]ling with their gawdy ſplendor, the weak eves of food a [...]rers▪ revive and awaken the memories and deſires of what they ſometime were the appurtenances and appendix: or if they are [...]s by ſome pretended, the very pillars and buttreſſes of [...], the ba [...]warks and citadels of pri [...] and ty [...]ny▪ and [...]t notwithſtanding the ſ [...]rd of r [...]al po [...]er be taken down^†, the pence and [...]o [...]rty of the [...]tion ſeems not ſuffici⯑ently [...] [...]or to [...]e [...]ine [...] a full and per⯑fect conq [...] [...] oppreſ [...]n, while any of the for [...]es [...] which it hath formerly been ingarri⯑ſon [...] o [...] not [...] [...]iſ [...]antled; it were bet⯑ter that theſe ſhould [...]b [...]te ſomething of their [85]height and grandeur, that ſeems to over-top and threaten ruin to the public liberty, than that the nation ſhould be put in danger of relapſing into ſlavery, or to have their controverſy ſo lately de⯑cided by the umpire of heaven again diſputed in fields of blood.

Or if theſe ſwelling tumours and unhandſome wens of greatneſs do ill become the face of a com⯑monwealth, and ſpoil the ſymmetry and beauty of its proportions; were it not better they ſhould be pared off, than our ſtate rendered of a monſtrous and prodigious ſhape? If after all our expence of blood and treaſure for purchaſe of our liberty, our title and pretenſions to a free ſtate may juſtly be called in queſtion, ſo long as we remain pupils and under wardſhip to our hereditary lords and antient guardians, is it not time we were emancipated? or if that may not in truth be admitted for an equal commonwealth, in which there is any other path known to the temple of honour, than what paſſes through that of virtue? Is it not prudence to hedge up all thoſe bye-ways of birth and fortunes? Were it not better the ſyſtem of our polity and govern⯑ment ſhould be plainly penned without the flou⯑riſhes and ornaments of ſuch capitals, which being admitted, may either ſeem ſuperfluous, or through miſconſtruction endanger marring the ſenſe, or rendering the nature of our conſtitution dubious and ambiguous, than by a contrary practice miniſter occaſion of entangling men's judgments with ſuch ſcruples, knots and difficulties, that the beſt ſtate critics being unable to untie, nothing but the ſharpeſt ſword can out inſ [...]nder; I would not wil⯑lingly be underſtood to plead againſt all diſtinction of ranks and degrees amongſt men, in which con⯑ſiſts the harmony, grace and beauty of the world, and which cannot be proſcribed or aboliſhed, with⯑out confounding the oeconomy and order of all ſo⯑cieties, without unlinking the chain of nature, [86]without cancelling and reverſing the law of the univerſe, and unrolling the world into its firſt chaos of confuſion; nor ſhould I ſpeak a ſyllable againſt honours being hereditary, could the valour, religion, and prudence of anceſtors be as eaſily entailed on a line or family, as their honours and riches, could but their gallantry be made hereditary as well as their fortunes? Could they tranſmit their virtues as well as names unto their poſterity, I ſhould willingly become the advocate of ſuch a nobility, and ſuffer my ears to be bored to the poſts of their doors; and rather acknowledge them our perpetual maſters and dictators, than hazard the choice of worſe, upon the doubtful election of the people, with whom the beſt men are not always in greateſt reputation.

But ſince no choice can be more perilous and unſafe, than the caſual lot of nature, I had rather ſtand to any election, than mere chance; by rea⯑ſon we have oftener known fools the ſons of wiſe men by nature, than of the peoples choice or adop⯑tion. Honour is the crown and reward of virtue; is it not then unſeemly they ſhould wear the badge and livery, that were never admitted within the utmoſt court of her temple, that are the very ſlaves and vaſſals of vice and wickedneſs? I cannot but pay a greater tribute of reſpect and honour in my thoughts, to the worth of ſuch as have raiſed themſelves to a high degree and pitch of emi⯑nence, by the wings of their own merits, than to ſuch as are only borne up by thoſe the credit and reputation of their anceſtors hath bequeathed unto them; wherefore that honour may be a ſpur to valour, and the reward of virtue, let it not be proſtrated to every rich and ſordid miſer, who by abandoning all virtue, hoſpitality and humanity, hath with much oppreſſion and grinding the face of the poor, ſcraped much wealth together; but rather on ſuch as by their valour and prudence, [87]have brought moſt credit and reputation to the commonwealth: wherefore if the parliament pleaſe out of ſuch to create knights, or make the chiefeſt miniſters of ſtate lords by office, or during life, I ſhould account it no ſoleciſm in a commonwealth, but an ornament thereto.

Now the reaſon I look upon the divine, the lawyer, and hereditary nobility, as ſuch irrecon⯑cileable antagoniſts to a free ſtate, is not grounded ſingly on the real prejudice they either have, or are like to receive therefrom; but rather, on what their fears and jealouſies are apt to ſuggeſt upon their apprehenſions, being conſcious that their pri⯑vate intereſts ſtand in oppoſition to that of the pub⯑lic; which could they be content to let go, and wave the advantages an injurious preſcription hath given them over their brethren, their concerns would be equally interwoven and wound up with others in that of a commonwealth; and might find it alike propitious to themſelves with any other of like parts and ingenuity: but ſuch is the evil na⯑ture of man, that to have done an injury, is a ſuf⯑ficient ground for future enmity, and rather to pro⯑ſecute, than any way compenſate thoſe that are in⯑debted for a former diſcourteſy: therefore the beſt and the ſooneſt way to be reconciled to ſuch, is quickly to requite their injury; for meaſuring others thirſt of revenge, by the ſtandard of their own malice, they can never believe any one is friends with them, ſo long as he is in arrears to them for an ill turn: ſo that their fear of revenge breeds diſtance, and that encreaſes alienation and diſaffection, which brings forth farther hoſtility, with encreaſe of injuries. In analogy to which doctrine, the beſt way to give the antagoniſts of the commonwealth eaſe, and its ſelf ſecurity, is, by cauſing their fears to fall upon them, and thereby deliver them from further pain, and the public from its jealouſies and future danger; for it can [88]never be expected, they ſhould eſpouſe the intereſt of the public, before they have buried that of their private; that they ſhould embark themſelves in the ſame bottom with that of the commonwealth, ſo long as they have ſo many of their own to look after; till theſe are ſhipwrecked, they will not be much concerned in the ſafety and proſperity of the commonwealth.

We ſhall never be ſo well united in our affec⯑tions and deſigns for public good, as when we are become all of one piece, and to have but one com⯑mon intereſt: for it is nothing but the diverſity of intereſts that breaks us in pieces, and crumbles us into ſo many different factions and deſigns; which as it was good policy in our monarchs, ſo but bad prudence in a commonwealth: the intereſt of a prince being to break the ſtrength of his people, that one faction being balanced by another, he may with more eaſe and facility render himſelf maſter of all; according to the advice of the old maxim, Divide and Rule. But the ſtrength and glory of a commonwealth is its union. And indeed it had otherwiſe been impoſſible, that ever princes ſhould have been able to have tied up the hands of na⯑tions, and bound the ſtrength of Sampſon in cords, and bands of withies, had not their policy like that of the Philiſtines firſt ſhorn their locks, and de⯑prived them of their ſtrength, had they not firſt according to the fable of the faggot, looſed their bond of union, by ſtarting many intereſts, and kindling divers animoſities among them, they had never faſtened the cords of ſlavery and bondage on them. The Philistines had never ſported them⯑ſelves with Sampſon, or Uliſſes with Polyphemas, had they not firſt put out their eyes. Nor had Princes ever put a hook into the noſtrils of the Leviathan, or played with the mighty Whale, had they not made uſe of a like ſtratagem.

[89]Men complain much, and ſeem to have a great ſenſe of the many factions and diviſions in religion, as they are pleaſed to term them; but how incon⯑ſiderable are theſe to the grand national or civil factions. I confeſs thoſe of religion may ſometime be made uſe of to palliate, but there are other fac⯑tions, that are the bitter root of all our breaches and diviſions: were there not one intereſt of the no⯑bility, another of the commonalty; one of the cler⯑gy, another of the laity; one of the lawyer, another of the countryman; one of the ſoldier, another of the citizen; one of the elder, another of the younger brethren, we might ſoon ſee an end of the other.

Theſe are the intereſts that claſh ſo much one againſt another, and make ſuch tumults in the world; and were theſe once cancelled and for⯑gotten, the other of Preſbyterian and independent, Quaker and Anabaptiſt, &c. would ſoon vaniſh, or at leaſt, make little noiſe or diſturbance in the world. How happy might all men be, did it pleaſe God they might recover the ſight of their common intereſt, and their ſtrength which conſiſts in union. How eaſily might all the nations of the earth ſhake off the iron yokes the tyranny of princes hath put upon them by this means? and with how great facility might this be done! with how little pre⯑judice and det [...]ent to any man's particular, might all be made happy, if laying aſide all animoſities and jealouſies, men would but lend an ear to rea⯑ſon, rather than paſſion. But to proceed, ſince it hath pleaſed God once more to put a price into our hands, and cauſe another opportunity of recover⯑ing our native rights and liberties to dawn upon us, I deſire we may not be as fools, not knowing how to uſe it; but that all ways that are ſafe and honourable may be taken for the ſecuring and im⯑provement of it; and therefore that the builders of our ſtate may be furniſhed with a ſpirit of wiſ⯑dom [90]from above, that they may become the repairers of our breaches, and, the reſtorers of paths to dwell in; that they may not deceive themſelves, or the na⯑tion, by thinking to patch up a ſorry half-potched commonwealth, upon the old, crazy, and rotten foundations of monarchy as heretofore; having had experience, that it will not, it cannot ſtand. They that are beſt read in politics, and have been moſt converſant in the hiſtories of antiquity, know, that as a commonwealth is the beſt and moſt abſo⯑late form of government: ſo it is a nice and tick⯑ [...]ſh thing, and hath been difficult to fix in nations under leſs diſadvantage than we, who have been ſo long uſed to a contrary way of government; which I ſpeak not to diſcourage, but rather awaken the endeavours and reſolutions of our ſenators; to watch and ſecure our liberties. The ancient com⯑monwealths have been neceſſitated to make uſe ſometimes of violent phyſic, to purge and evacuate the rank humours of the body politic, and ſuch as I would not have preſcribed a chriſtian ſtate, ſup⯑poſing there may be found out ſuch as are more [...]e and gentle. It was the unhappineſs of the Grecian and Roman republic, to be often guilty of the gre [...]teſt ingratitude towards them that beſt de⯑ſerved of them; and not unoften to ſtain their hands with their bloods, whoſe former merits ſeemed to challenge a crown, rather than a croſs from them. How often hath Greece, for the ſecu⯑rity of her liberty, ſacrificed that life, by which ſhe hath formerly been preſerved from ruin and deſtruction? Who hath not heard of the unhappy tragedy of that valiant captain, that more than once preſerved the capitol, and ſnatched Rome, as a prey, out of the very tecth of the Gauls, its barba⯑rous, and at laſt fatal enemies? And how often hath Greece rewarded her captains victories with baniſhment, inſtead of triumphs? and that upon the ſingle account of ſome ſmall ſuggeſtion of jea⯑louſy, [91]or weak argument of too great magnificence or popularity; ſo jealous were thoſe republics of their liberty, that the general of an army durſt not make uſe of a little plate in his houſe, leſt it ſhould cauſe envy, or render him ſuſpected of too much grandeur and ambition, and that he endeavoured to ſupplant the commonwealth, and render himſelf their lord and maſter. Others have been conſtrained to level their palaces with the ground, leſt the ſumptuouſneſs and magnificence of their ſtructure, ſhould become the object of the people's envy and hatred. When theſe things come into my mind, I cannot but wonder any ſhould think it ſo eaſy and facile a thing to erect a commonwealth, as that it may be done with a wet finger, and requires no more then inſerting, the keepers of the liberties, in⯑ſtead of the name king, and that then the work is finiſhed, without any farther trouble or alteration, as may ſeem to be of opinion. I confeſs, had we not at ſo dear a rate bought experience to inform us of the contrary, this miſtake might have paſt for venial, but that makes it an unpardonable error.

FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL APHORISMS OR MAXIMS.
[From Harrington's System of Politics.]

WHERE a people cannot live upon their own, the government is either monarchy, or ariſ⯑tocracy; where a people can live upon their own, the government may be democracy.

A man that could live upon his own, may, yet, to ſpare his own, and live upon another, be a ſer⯑vant: but a people that can live upon their own, cannot ſpare their own, and live upon another; but (except they be no ſervants, that is, except they come to a democracy) they muſt waſte their own by maintaining their maſters, or by having others to live upon them.

[107]Where a people that can live upon their own, imagine that they can be governed by others, and not lived upon by ſuch governors, it is not the genius of the people, it is the miſtake of the people.

Where a people that can live upon their own, will not be governed by others, leſt they be lived upon by others, it is not the miſtake of the peo⯑ple, it is the genius of the people.

If a man has ſome eſtate, he may have ſome ſer⯑vants or a family, and conſequently ſome govern⯑ment, or ſomething to govern; if he has no eſtate, he can have no government.

Where the eldeſt of many brothers has all, or ſo much that the reſt of their livelihood ſtand in need of him, that brother is as it were prince in that family.

Where of many brothers, the eldeſt has but an equal ſhare, or not ſo inequal as to make the reſt to ſtand in need of him for their livelihood, that family is as it were a commonwealth.

The parts of form in government are as the offices in a houſe; and the orders of a form of go⯑vernment are as the orders of a houſe or family.

Good orders make evil men good, and bad orders make good men evil.

The intereſt of arbitrary monarchy is the abſo⯑luteneſs of the monarch; the intereſt of regulated monarchy is the greatneſs of the nobility; the in⯑tereſt of democracy is the felicity of the people; for in democracy the government is for the uſe of the people, and in monarchy, the people are for the uſe of the government, that is, of one lord or more.

A ſole legiſlator, proceeding according to art or knowledge, produces government in the whole piece at once and in perfection. But a council (proceeding not according to art, or what in a new caſe is neceſſary or fit for them, but according to that which they call the genius of the people ſtill [108]hankering after the things they have been uſed to, or their old cuſtoms, how plain ſoever it may be made in reaſon that they can no longer fit them) make patching work, and are ages about that which is very ſeldom or never brought by them to any perfection; but commonly comes by the way to ruin, leaving the nobleſt attempt under reproach, and the authors of them expoſed to the greateſt miſeries while they live, if not their me⯑mories when they are dead and gone to the greateſt infamy.

A parliament of phyſicians would never have found out the circulation of the blood, nor could a parliament of poets have written VLRGIL's Aeneas; of this kind therefore in the formation of government is the proceeding of a ſole legiſlator. But if the people without a legiſlator ſet upon ſuch a work by a certain inſtinct that is in them, they never go further than to chuſe a council; not con⯑ſidering that the formation of government is as well a work of invention as of judgment; and that a council, though in matters laid before them they may excel in judgment, yet invention is as contrary to the nature of a council, as it is to muſi⯑cians in conſort, who can play and judge of any air that is laid before them, though to invent a part of muſic they can never well agree.

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS MAY PLAN MO⯑DELS OF GOVERNMENT,
[From Harrington's Oceana.]

ONE that has written conſiderations upon OCEANA, ſpeaks the prologue in this man⯑ner; I beſeech you gentlemen, are not we the writers of politics, ſomewhat a ridiculous ſort of people? Is it not a fine piece of folly for private [109]men ſitting in their cabinets to rack their braine about models of government? Certainly our la⯑bours make a very pleaſant recreation for thoſe great perſonages, who, ſitting at the helm of af⯑fairs, have by their large experience not only ac⯑quired the art of ruling, but have attained alſo to the comprehenſion of the nature and foundation of government." In which egregious compliment the conſiderer has loſt his conſidering cap.

It was in the time of Alexander, the greateſt prince and commander of his age, that Ariſtotle, with ſcarce inferior applauſe and equal ſame, being a private man, wrote that excellent piece of prudence in his cabinet, which is called his poli⯑tics, going upon far other principles than thoſe of Alexander's government, which it has long out⯑lived. The like did Titus Livius in the time of Auguſtus, Sir Thomas More in the time of Henry the Eighth, and Machiavel when Italy was under princes that afforded him not the ear. Theſe works, nevertheleſs, are all of the moſt eſteemed and applauded in this kind; nor have I found any [...]an, whoſe like endeavours have been perſecuted hace Plato by Dionyſius. I ſtudy not without great examples, nor out of my calling; either arms or this art being the proper trade of a gentleman. A man may be entruſted with a ſhip, and a good pilot too, yet not underſtand how to make ſea⯑charts. To ſay that a man may not write of go⯑vernment except he be a magiſtrate, is as abſurd as to ſay, that a man may not make a ſea-chart, unleſs he be a pilot. It is known that Chriſtopher Columbus made a chart in his cabinet, that found out the Indies. The magiſtrate that was good at his ſteer⯑age never took it ill of him that brought him a chan, ſeeing whether he would uſe it or no, was at his own choice; and if flatterers, being the worſt ſort of crows, did not pick out the eyes of the living, the ſhip of government at this day [110]throughout chriſtendom had not ſtruck ſo often as ſhe has done. To treat of affairs, ſays Machiavel, which as to the conduct of them appertain to others, may be thought a great boldneſs; but if I commit errors in writing, theſe may be known without danger; whereas if they commit errors in acting, ſuch come not otherwiſe to be known, than in the ruin of the commonwealth.

THE CAUSES OF ENGLISH MISERY.
[From the Critic Philoſopher.]

ENGLAND produces every article neceſſary for the ſupport of mankind; and might, by proper cultivation extended, produce treble the quantity, The lower claſs of the people reap very little benefit from profuſion, becauſe every device is made uſe of to enhance the value of the commo⯑dities requiſite for their ſubſiſtence. Methinks, one half of the inhabitants of this kingdom are dying of hunger and concomitant miſery, while the other half, from wallowing in abundance, are dying of indigeſtion. The ſpirit of gaming has ſo diffuſed itſelf through every rank, that the no⯑bleman riſks his thouſands on the out of a card, or the turn of a die; the tradeſman ventures his hun⯑dreds on the riſe and fall of ſtocks; whilſt the me⯑chanic and ſervant loſe their guineas on the draw⯑ing of a lottery ticket. Hence the penſioned peer, the bankrupt tradeſman, and the crowded priſons.

Our trading juſtices, our pettifoggers, and our affidavit men, are the locuſts which conſume our property and deſtroy our peace. We have been king-ridden, and prieſt-ridden, but what is much worſe than either, we are at this enlightened age, as is termed, law-ridden, by a ſet of as honeſt fel⯑lows [111]as ever graced civil ſociety. They ſerve us with, nevertheleſs, notwithſtanding, howbeit, ſaid and aforeſaid, thoſe and that, demiſed, ſet and let, plaintiff and appellant, defendant and reſpondent, and ſuch other jargon, by way of break faſt; next come, by way of dinner, a writ of error, judg⯑ment by default, a non-proceſs, a latitat, a habeas, a bail bond, a ſubpoena, a cognovit, and ſuch other comfortable diſhes; and to conclude the day, an elegant ſupper is prepared of verdicts, non-ſuits, bills of coſts, the hallowed touch of a bum-bailiff, a [...]ſpunging-houſe, or priſon; and ſuch is the boaſted liberty of England! the land of freedom!

But to be more ſerious, let me aſk the firſt law⯑yer in this kingdom, whether he can truly ſay he perfectly underſtands our laws, nay, whether he has read them; for I am ſure, it would require the ſpace of a whole century, added to an extraordinary memory and ſound underſtanding to read and pro⯑perly comprehend one half of the law-books which our peers, commons, &c. have cauſed to be uſhered into the world. If the laws are made for the good and obſervance of the ſubject, why are they not brought within the compaſs of common under⯑ſtanding; and given to him to guide his moral conduct? For, how can a man, injuſtice, be held amenable to laws, fabricated by men, with whom he has no intercourſe, and from whom he conſe⯑quently cannot receive any information? And why ought he to be puniſhed for the violation of a law, with which he was never made previouſly acquainted? 'Tis true, there are certain plain rules laid down for man's conduct, in his walks through life; and theſe he may learn by reading his catechiſm; we will there find that the deca⯑logue compriſes the duty we owe to God and our⯑ſelves; and I will venture to affirm that a few comments, if neceſſary, on each command, would be quite ſufficient for the regulation of the reci⯑procal [112]duties we are bound to obſerve in our in⯑tercourſe with each other. The ſtudy of law can⯑not be deemed a ſcience; as it really ſhould be no more than equity founded on reaſon; and when it deviates from that, it becomes quibbling chicanery, All the laws neceſſary for the regulation of ſo⯑ciety, may be comprized in a volume of leſs ſize than the Critic Philoſopher; and this I intend clearly to prove at a future period. But I ſuppoſe, as we have too much law, and very little goſpel, becauſe the generality of us love that which is moſt like ourſelves, both clergy and lawyers will unite in reprobating any writer who may diminiſh the emoluments of the one, or invade the province of the other.

IN WHAT CASES WAR IS JUSTIFIABLE, &C.
[From the Perſian Letters.]

THE magiſtrate ought to do juſtice between citizen and citizen: every nation ought to do the ſame between themſelves and another na⯑tion. This ſecond diſtribution of juſtice requires no maxim but what are uſed in the firſt.

Between nation and nation there is ſeldom any want of a third to be umpire; becauſe the grounds of diſpute are almoſt always clear and eaſy to be determined. The intereſts of two nations are ge⯑nerally ſo far ſeparated, that it requires nothing but to be a true lover of juſtice to find it out.

It is not the ſame with regard to the differences that ariſe between private perſons. As they live in ſociety, their intereſts are ſo mingled and con⯑founded, and there are ſo many different ſorts of them, that it is neceſſary for a third perſon to un⯑tangle what the covetouſneſs of the parties ſtrives to tie knots in,

[113]There are but two ſorts of juſtifiable wars: that which we enter into for the repelling an enemy that attacks us; and that which we undertake in defence of an ally that is attacked.

There would be no equity in making war upon a prince's private quarrel; unleſs the caſe were of that heinous nature as to deſerve the death of the prince or people that committed it. Thus a prince ſhould not make war, for being denied ſome honour which was [...] r [...]ght, or for any diſreſpect to his ambaſſa [...] [...] or th [...] like trif [...]es: no more than a private [...] ough [...] to kill one that refuſes him the wal [...] [...] the reaſon is, that as a declaration of was i [...] an act of juſtice wherein the puniſhment [...] always bear proportion to the fault we [...]hould con [...]ider, whether the perſon we declare war againſt, is worthy of death. For to make war upon any one is to ſeek to puniſh him with death.

The moſt ſevere act of juſtice in the law of na⯑tions is war; its end being the deſtruction of ſociety,

Repriſals are of the ſecond degree. To pro⯑portion the penalty to the crime, is a method which no tribunal could ever help obſerving.

A third act of juſtice is to deprive a prince of the advantages he reaps from our commerce, ſtill meaſuring the puniſhment by the offence.

The fourth act of juſtice, which ought to be the moſt frequent, is a renunciation of the al⯑liance of the people againſt whom we have cauſe of complaint. This penalty is anſwerable to that of baniſhment in common tribunals, which cuts off the criminal from ſociety. So a prince whoſe alliance we renounce, is thereby cut off from our ſociety, and is no longer one of our members.

There can be no greater affront done to a prince than to renounce his alliance, and no greater honour than to court it. There is nothing among [114]men more glorious nor more uſeful, than to have others concerned as watchful for their preſer⯑vation.

But in order to make an alliance binding it muſt be juſt: ſo that an alliance made between two na⯑tions to oppreſs a third, is not lawful, and may honourably and innocently be broke.

Neither does it become the dignity and reputa⯑tion of a prince to enter into an alliance with a tyrant [...]. We read that a certain Egyptian monarch ſent to reprehend the king of Samos for his cruelty and tyranny, calling upon him to amend: and upon his not doing it, he gave him to know that he renounced his friendſhip and alliance.

The right of conqueſt is no right at all. A ſo⯑ciety can never be founded upon any thing but the free conſent of all the members: if it is deſtroyed by conqueſt, the people are thereby freed from their old engagements: it does not make a new ſociety; and if the conqueror goes about to do it, he acts the tyrant.

As to treaties of peace, they are never lawful when they ordain a ceſſion or reparation more conſiderable than the damage done: this is mere violence, and may at any time be lawfully ſet aſide; unleſs in order to recover what we have loſt, we are obliged to have recourſe to ſuch vio⯑lent methods as will create miſchiefs greater than the advantage ſought after.

This my dear Rhedi, is what I call the law of nations, which may be called more properly the law of reaſon.

ON PERVERSION OF TERMS.
[From the Independent Whig.]

IT is a ſhameful inſult upon our underſtandings that of ſanctifying the moſt wicked purpoſes [115]and moſt cruel actions with the moſt honeſt and innocent names; and yet nothing is more fre⯑quently practiſed. Thus the worthy name of RULER ſhall be proſtituted and pronounced aloud, to palliate and even to juſtify the barbarities of a TYRANT; and that peaceable word obedience ſhall be forced to ſignify an unmanly and unnatural pa⯑tience of ſervitude: LAWS, which were intended to protect and encourage good men, and to re⯑ſtrain and puniſh ill ones, are often perverted into deadly inſtruments in the hands of robbers and uſurpers, againſt the virtuous and the harmleſs; and the means of preſervation are turned into en⯑gines of deſtruction. The Lord's anointed, a phraſe which at firſt ſignified only a man approved and choſen by God himſelf to be the ruler of his peo⯑ple, has been ſince wreſted to mean an over-grown plunderer, who choſe himſelf to be a deſtroyer of God's people.

ON THE UTILITY OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
[From Cooper's Reply to Burke.]

THIS outcry againſt the exiſtence and mutual correſpondence of political ſocieties, foreign and domeſtic, is no ſlight argument of their utility. It amounts to proof that this means of communi⯑cating knowledge to the public, is likely to be at⯑tended with beneficial effects to the beſt intereſts of mankind, or it would not be an object of ſo much alarm to the penſioned advocates of ariſto⯑cracy. The people now ſee the great importance of political enquiries, and extenſive influence of the maxims of government; which operate directly or indirectly on every moment of our exiſtence, and every action of our lives. They perceive much to learn, and much to unlearn on the queſtion of civil government; they expect as their right, a free acceſs to all peaceable means of information, and exclaim with reaſon, ‘we will be kept in the trammels of implicit belief no longer.’

However plain and ſimple the true principles of government may be, when diveſted of that garb of complication and myſtery in which ſtate-craft has enveloped them, it is certain that they are not yet fully ſettled among thoſe who profeſs to write, and reaſon on the ſubject. The beſt political writers of the preſent day, among the Engliſh and French, are not agreed on points of conſiderable moment; and Mr. Burke himſelf has taken no ſmall pains to magnify the difficulties attending a branch of knowledge, of which, he dreads while he promotes the public diſcuſſion. Difficulties there are; ſuch as ignorance and artifice have created; but if they exiſt, (of whatever kind they may be) why throw obſtacles in the way of enquiry, and deny the means of removing them? At any rate, Mr. Burke, whoſe time for two years paſt, has been [130]chiefly occupied in publiſhing diſcourſes of poli⯑tical myſticiſin, ought to be the laſt to cry out againſt any ſource of information on a ſubject which he has laboured ſo indefatigably to obſcure. —Equally aware, that public ignorance is the in⯑tereſts of courts, and public information the in⯑tereſt of the people, the patriotic ſocieties of France and England, profeſs the ſame general principles of equal liberty, and have preciſely the ſame general object in view, viz. the improvement and propagation of political knowledge. In France, as is natural, they diſcuſs the temporary occurrences of their own country; we, thoſe of ours; but the ſame ſcience and the ſame principles are equally applicable to both. Theſe ſocieties, in each kingdom, entertaining therefore the ſame general deſign of extending the bounds of know⯑ledge on the moſt important of all ſubjects of en⯑quiry, can it be deemed improper or unbecoming, that they ſhould mutually communicate for a com⯑mon purpoſe? Is there any impropriety in the philoſephical ſocieties of London, Paris, or Stock⯑holm, correſponding for the improvement of che⯑miſtry, or experimental philoſophy? On the con⯑trary, do they not all court correſpondencies, as the moſt effectual means of diffuſing information? Why then ſhould ſocieties inſtituted for the pro⯑motion of political knowledge, be debarred from the common means of improvement? If it be a crime to enlighten the people upon the ſubject of politics, why do not our adverſaries ſay ſo at once, and take that ground of accuſation: if it be no crime, why deny the common methods of com⯑munication permitted and adopted in every other branch of human ſcience.

But after all, why this anxiety among the go⯑vernments of Europe (our own among the reſt) to ſtop the progreſs of knowledge, and cut off the ſources of political information? Why this dread [131]leſt the people (the ſwiniſh multitude, as their friend, Mr. Burke, calls them) ſhould think too much, and reaſon too much on their own rights, and their own intereſts; leſt the deep veil of myſtery, which ſtate-craft has thrown over the ſcience of government, ſhould perchance be with⯑drawn, and the tranſactions of court-polities be expoſed to public obſervation? If the foundations of theſe gaudy ſuperſtructures be unſound, this conduct is eaſily explained: but if governments do actually mean well, if their principles and actions will bear examination, why this general dread of inveſtigation? Why give room to ſuſpect that "Men love darkneſs rather than light—be⯑cauſe their deeds are evil."

ON THE COMMON PEOPLE.
(From Roſſeau's Emilius.)

IT is the populace which compoſe the bulk of mankind: thoſe which are not in this claſs are ſo few in number, that they are hardly worth no⯑tice. Man is the ſame creature in every ſtate; therefore that which is the moſt numerous ought to be moſt reſpected. To a man capable of reflec⯑tion, all civil diſtinctions are nothing: he obſerves, the ſame paſſions, the ſame feelings, in the clown and the man of quality; the principal differ⯑ence between them conſiſts in the language they ſpeak; in a little refinement of expreſſion: but if there be any real diſtinction, it is certainly to the diſadvantage of the leaſt ſincere. The common people appear as they really are, and they are not amiable: if thoſe in high-life were equally undiſ⯑guiſed, their appearance would make us ſhudder with horror.

There is, ſay our philoſophers, an equal allot⯑ment of happineſs and miſery to every rank of men; a maxim as dangerous as it is abſurd. If all man⯑kind [136]are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give ourſelves any trouble to promote their felici⯑ty. Let each remain in his ſituation: let the ſlave endure the laſh, the lame his infirmity, and let the beggar periſh, ſince they would gain nothing by a change of ſituation. The ſame philoſophers enu⯑merate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the v [...]mity of their pleaſures; was there ever ſo palpa⯑ble a ſophiſm! the pangs of a rich man are not eſ⯑ſential to riches, but to the abuſe of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deſerve no compaſſion, becauſe he is the creator of his own miſery, and happineſs was in his power. But the ſufferings of the indigent are the natural conſequences of his ſtate; he feels the weight of his hard lot; no length of time, no habit can ever render him inſenſible of fatigue and hunger; nei⯑ther wiſdom nor good humour can annihilate the evils which are inſeparable from his ſituation.—What avails it an Epictetus to forſee that his maſ⯑ter is going to break his leg? Doth that prevent the evil! on the contrary, his fore knowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wiſe as we ſuppoſe them ſtupid, how could they act otherwiſe than they do? Study thi [...] order of men, and you will find that in another language they will utter as much wit and more good ſenſe than yourſelf. Learn therefore to reſpect your ſpecies. Remember that the common people compoſe the moſt conſiderable part of mankind and that if all the kings and philoſophers were to be taken away, the chaſm would be imperceptible and things would go on juſt as well without them

COMMONWEALTHS capable of raiſing the greateſt Armies in Proportion to Territory.
[From Harrington's Oceana.]

WHERE the arms in bulk are proper, and conſiſting of citizens, they have other trades, and therefore are no ſoldiers of fortune; and yet becauſe the commonwealth has arms for her trades (in regard ſhe is a magiſtrate given for the good of mankind, and bears not her ſword in vain) they are all educated as well in military as civil diſci⯑pline, taking their turns in ſervice of either na⯑ture according to the occaſion, and the orders of the commonwealth, as in Iſrael, Athens, Lacedemon, and Rome, which had (if their territories permit⯑ted, and ſometimes as I may ſay whether their ter⯑ritories permitted or no, as in Iſrael,) the vaſteſt, the higheſt tempered, and the beſt diſciplined mi⯑litia, that is to be found in the whole compaſs of ſtory. Some armies of Iſrael have conſiſted of three or four hundred thouſand men: Rome upon the ru⯑mour of a Gallic tumult, armed in Italy only, with⯑out foreign aid, ſeventy thouſand horſe and ſeven hundred thouſand foot; things in our days (when the Turk can hardly arm half ſo many) not to be credited.

Hence that a commonwealth, which had not firſt broken herſelf, or been broken by ſome other com⯑monwealth, ſhould not be found to have been conquered by the arms of any monarch, is not miraculous, but a natural effect of an apparent cauſe.

ON WAR.
[From Voltaire's Philoſophical Dictionary.]

FAMINE, the plague, and war, are the three moſt famous ingredients in this lower world. Under famine may be claſſed all the noxious foods, which want obliges us to have recourſe to; thus ſhortening our life, whilſt we hope to ſupport it.

In the plague are included all contagious diſtem⯑pers; and theſe are not leſs than two or three thou⯑ſand. Theſe two gifts we hold from providence; but war, in which all thoſe gifts are concentered, we owe to the fancy of three or four hundred per⯑ſons ſcattered over the ſurface of the globe, under the name of princes and miniſters; and on this ac⯑count it may be, that in ſeveral dedications, they are called the living images of the Deity.

The moſt hardened flatterer will allow, that war is ever attended with plague and famine, eſpecially if he has ſeen the military hoſpitals in Germany, or paſſed through any villages where ſome notable feat of arms has been performed.

It is unqueſtionably a very noble art to ravage countries, deſtroy dwellings, and communibus annis, out of a hundred thouſand men to cut off forty thouſand. This invention was originally cultivated by nations, aſſembled for their common good; for inſtance, the diet of the Greeks ſent word to the diet of Phrygia and its neigbours, that they were putting to ſea in a thouſand fiſhing-boats, in order to do their beſt to cut them off root and branch.

The Roman people, in a general aſſembly, re⯑ſolved that it was their intereſt to go and fight the Vejentes or the Volſcians before harveſt; and ſome years after, all the Romans being angry with all the Carthaginians, fought a long time both by ſea and land. It is otherwiſe in our time.

[148]A genealogiſt ſets forth to a prince that he is deſcended in a direct line from a count, whoſe kindred, three or four hundred years ago, had made a family compact with a houſe, the very me⯑mory of which is extinguiſhed. That houſe had ſome diſtant claim to a province, the laſt proprietor of which died of an apoplexy. The prince and his council inſtantly reſolve, that this province belongs to him by divine right. The province, which is ſome hundred leagues from him, proteſts that it does not ſo much as know him; that it is not diſpoſed to be governed by him; that before preſcribing laws to them, their conſent, at leaſt, was neceſſary: theſe allegations do not ſo much as reach the prince's ears; it is inſiſted on that his right is inconteſtable. He inſtantly picks up a multitude of men, who have nothing to do, nor nothing to loſe; cloaths them with coarſe blue cloth, one ſou to the ell; puts them on hats bound with coarſe white worſted; makes them turn to the right and left; and thus marches away with them to glory.

Other princes on this armament, take part in it to the beſt of their ability, and ſoon cover a ſmall extent of country, with more hireling murderers than Gengis-Kan, Tamerlane, and Bajazet had at their heels.

People, at no ſmall diſtance, on hearing that fighting is going forward, and that if they would make one, there are five or fix ſous a day for them, immediately divide into two bands, like reapers, and go and ſell their ſervices to the firſt bidder.

Theſe multitudes furiouſly butcher one another, not only without having any concern in the quar⯑r [...]l, but without ſo much as knowing what it is about.

Sometimes five or fix powers are engaged, three againſt three, two againſt four, ſometimes even one [149]againſt five, all equally deteſting one another; and friends and foes, by turns, agreeing only in one thing, to do all the miſchief poſſible.

An odd circumſtance in this infernal enterprize is, that every chief of theſe ruffians has his colours conſecrated; and ſolemnly prays to God before he goes to deſtroy his neighbour. If the ſlain in a battle do not exceed two or three thouſand, the for⯑tunate commander does not think it worth thank⯑ing God for; but if, beſides killing ten or twelve thouſand men, he has been ſo far favoured by hea⯑ven, as totally to deſtroy ſome remarkable place, then a verboſe hymn is ſung in four parts, com⯑poſed in a language unknown to all the combatants, and beſides ſtuffed with barbariſms^† The ſame ſong does for marriages and births, as for maſſa⯑cres; which is ſcarce pardonable, eſpecially in a nation of all others the moſt noted for new ſongs.

All countries pay a certain number of orators to celebrate theſe ſanguinary actions; ſome in a long black coat, and over it a ſhort docked cloak; others in a gown with a kind of ſhirt over it; ſome again over their ſhirts have two pieces of a mot⯑ley-coloured ſtuff hanging down. They are all very long-winded in their harangues, and to il⯑luſtrate a battle fought in Weteravia, bring up what paſſed thouſands of years ago in Paleſtine.

At other times theſe gentry declaim againſt vice; they prove by ſyllogiſms and antitheſes, that ladies, for ſlightly heightening the hue of their cheeks with a little carmine, will aſſuredly be the eternal ob⯑jects of eternal vengeance; that Polyeucte and Athalia^‡ are the devil's works; that he, whoſe table, on a day of abſtinence, is loaded with fiſh to the amount of two hundred crowns, is infalli⯑bly ſaved; and that a poor man, for eating two [150]penny-worth of mutton, goes to the devil for ever and ever.

Among five or ſix thouſand ſuch declamations, there may be, and that is the moſt, three or four, written by a Gaul named Maſſillon, which a gen⯑tleman may bear to read; but in not one of all thoſe diſcourſes has the orator the ſpirit to animad⯑vert on war, that ſcourge and crime which in⯑cludes all others. Theſe groveling ſpeakers are continually prating againſt love, mankind's only ſolace, and the only way of repairing it: not a word do they ſay of the deteſtable endeavours of the mighty for its deſtruction.

Bourdaloue^§ a very bad ſermon have you made againſt impurity, but not one either bad or good on thoſe various kinds of murders, on thoſe rob⯑beries, on thoſe violences, that univerſally rage, by which the world is laid waſte! Put together all the vices of all ages and places, and never will they come up to the miſchiefs and enormities of only one campaign.

Ye bungling ſoul-phyſicians, to bellow for an hour and more againſt a few flea-bites, and not ſay a word about that horrid diſtemper, which tears us to pieces. Burn your books, ye mora⯑lizing philoſophers! Whilſt the humour of a few ſhall make it an act of loyalty to butcher thouſands of our fellow-creatures, the part of mankind deci⯑cated to heroiſm will be the moſt execrable and deſtructive monſters in all nature. Of what avail is humanity, benevolence, modeſty, temperance, mildneſs, diſcretion, and piety; when half a pound of lead diſcharged at the diſtance of ſix hundred paces ſhatters my body; when I expire at the age of twenty under pains unſpeakable, and amidſt thouſands in the ſame miſerable condition; when my eyes at their laſt opening ſee my native town [151]all in a blaze; and the laſt ſounds I hear are the ſhrieks and groans of women and children expiring among the ruins, and all for the pretended intereſt of a man who is a ſtranger to us!

Reaſons which the Poor have to wiſh for a Reform in Parliament.
[From Cooper's Reply to Burke.]

BY an EFFECTUAL Reform, however, I do not mean the paltry manoeuvre of disfranchiſ⯑ing the Boroughs, and adding to the County Mem⯑bers: nor the equally objectionable meaſure of ad⯑mitting only taxable houſeholders to vote, altho' formerly I had doubts upon this ſubject. But it cannot be denied that, by this means, the larger part of the community, the moſt important part of the community, the moſt oppreſſed, the moſt induſtrious part of the community, thoſe who [166]having the moſt reaſon to complain, complain the leaſt: the cottager, the mechani [...], and the day labourer, (or, as that inveterate enemy of human kind, Mr. B [...]e would call them, the Swiniſs Mu [...]i [...]ude) are placed in perpetual ſubjection to a corporation—an ariſtocracy of property, mor [...] leſs extended. I do not mean this. It is im [...] ⯑ble to defend the ſyſtem of diſfranchiſing a f [...]y citizen, becauſe he is not ſo rich as his more fa⯑voured neighbour. Under any ſtate of ſociety, pro⯑perty always has had, and will have, full as much influence as it ought; and it is groſs ignorance in politics, to and ſo many artificial to the natural inequalities among men. Neither am I prepared to believe that public ſpirit and independence is excluſively confined to the rich: ſo far as my ex⯑perience goes, the direct contrary is the fact; and I almoſt ſuſpect that ‘it is as eaſy for a cable to go thro' the eye of a needle,’ as for a man of large property to be a thorough patriot. I am not pre⯑pared to believe that public ſpirit is not among the poor man's virtues, I know and confeſs the temp⯑tations he is ſometimes under, to ſacrifice his po⯑litical opinions for his daily bread; but, ſo far as I have been able to judge, it is not from want of principle that the poor give way, but from want of knowledge; kept as they are, in the moſt de⯑plorable ignorance of their political rights—en⯑couraged to work hard and to drink hard, but to think little, and to read nothing; no wonder they ſhould barter their birth right for a meſs of pot⯑tage, when they know too well the value of the one, and know nothing about the other. Suppoſ⯑ing, however, that the want of independence may be a crime attached to poverty, is it not evident that the way to create it, if it does not exiſt, and to confirm it if it does, is to take for granted its exiſtence; Alas; among other robberies committed upon the poor, they are robbed of their good fame, [167]and their honeſt character, by proud and privileg⯑ed law givers: "depart, (it is in fact ſaid by the [...]hall part of a nation to the larger)" depart ye wretches, ye Swiniſh Multitude, ye Rif-Raf, ye Scum of the earth; ye are guilty of that epi⯑tome of all the crimes of the decalogue, ye are convicted of POVERTY! What rights can ye pre⯑tend to, who have not a penny in your pockets? Away to your diſmal habitations, and your ſcanty fair; go work and be contented." How [...]poſite are the ſentiments of ſcripture and mo⯑ [...]ern politicians! The Bible (in the text above [...]uoted) declares that riches are an obſtacle in the [...]ay to the kingdom of heaven; while, among Eu⯑opean legiſlators, poverty and virtue are deemed [...]ncompatible! Degrade a man in his own opinion, [...]igmatize him by legal ſuſpicion, take for granted [...]hat he has no character to loſe; and you go the are way to work to make him in reality what you elieve him to be. We have done ſo by the Jews. [...] the contrary, let him know that you place con⯑ [...]dence in his integrity; that he has a character to [...]ſe by improper behaviour, and that you expect [...] a matter of courſe that he will act as he ought— [...]e chances are, that he will feel his own dignity, [...]nd juſtify the expectations you entertain of his [...]ood conduct. Laws make manners. It is a crime, [...]e, and a foul crime againſt human nature, ſyſte⯑matically to debaſe in the eye of the public, and their own opinion, ſo large a portion of mankind [...] THE POOR unhappily form.

Morcover, thoſe who have little, deſerve to have [...]at little the more carefully protected; the leſs a [...]an poſſeſſes, the leſs he can ſpare from his nar⯑ [...]ow ſtore; and, at any rate, even the pooreſt are [...]oſſeſſors of the moſt invalu [...]hle ſpecies of pro⯑perty, life. liberty, and labour. To infringe upon [...]eſe directly or indirectly, without the conſent of [...]e owner, is neither more nor leſs than tyranny [168]in the law that enacts it, and ſlavery in the object who is compelled to ſubmit to it.

Neither can it be truly ſaid, that the poor ma [...] pays no taxes; for he expends the produce of his labour in the moſt productive articles of modern taxation, the neceſſaries of life. The fire with which he warms his frozen limbs, and dreſſes his ſcanty morſel—the candle that enables his family to toil at the ſpinning-wheel, or the loom, during thoſe hours which the middling claſſes devote [...] relaxation from buſineſs, and the great to the zenith of their pleaſurable career—the ſmall-beer tha [...] waſhes down his homely repaſt—every morſel o [...] his food, every article of his apparel, and eve [...] the ſcanty furniture of his cottage, are all affected by the extravagance and miſmanagement of tho [...] who govern. The more taxes are required, t [...] more hours he muſt labour to ſupply his wants, and the more diſtant his proſpect of obtaining the com⯑forts and conveniences of exiſtence.

How little the intereſts of the poor are taken ca [...] of, and how neceſſary it is that the voice of th [...] poor man ſhould be heard with attention and re [...] ⯑pect in the houſe of commons, the numerous incl [...] ſure bills are pregnant inſtances, where, as in t [...] fable of Nathan the prophet, the poor man's lan [...] is ſeized, to encreaſe the numerous herds of [...] richer and more powerful neighbours. Whereas inſtead of dividing the commons and waſtes amo [...] the rich, natural juſtice and good policy wou [...] teach us to diſtribute them among the poor.^† B [...] we take good care to fulfil, with the moſt ſcrupu⯑lous orthodoxy, that text of ſcripture, ‘Ur [...] every one that hath, ſhall be given, and he ſh [...] ¹⁸ [169]have abundance; but from him that hath not, ſhall be taken away, even that which he hath.’

A ſtill more flagrant inſtance of cruelty and in⯑juſtice toward the poor, is the practice of impreſſing. The labour of the poor man conſtitutes the whole of his wealth, and his domeſtic connections almoſt the whole of his happineſs. But on a ſudden, un⯑der the dubious authority of a preſs-warrant, he is cut off from his peaceful habitation and domeſtic ſociety, and forcibly dragged on board the floating priſon of a tender: he is compelled to labour in the dreadful ſervice of murdering his fellow-creatures at the command of his ſuperiors, and paid ſuch ſcanty wages, not as he can earn or deſerves, but as the niggardly ſyſtem of government finance thinks fit to allow. His family, mean while, who look up to him for comfort and ſubſiſtence, igno⯑rant of his misfortune, are anxiouſly expecting his wonted return; perhaps their homely repaſt for the night depended on his earnings for the day: but his uſual hour of return to his family is gone by; each paſſing footſtep, each noiſe of diſtant ſimilarity, is eagerly liſtened to in vain: Hope ſtill draws out the lengthened evening, till a ſleepleſs night of lamentation and deſpair ſucceeds the dreary melancholy hours of ſucceſſive diſappointment and fruitleſs expectation. The next, or ſucceeding day, brings the mournful tidings of his deſtiny; and leaves the widowed wife (perhaps the pregnant mother) to eke out a comfortleſs exiſtence, unde: the accumulated preſſure of want, and labour, an ſorrow, and diſeaſe.

Innumerable are the caſes of this nature, that muſt of neceſſity attend the practice of impreſſing for ſoldiers and mariners. But the miſeries of the lower claſſes of ſociety are borne in torpid ſilence, and patient reſignation, The feeble voice of ſuf⯑fering poverty can ſeldom extend beyond the hum⯑ble [170]limits of her own habitation; ſtill leſs can it pe⯑netrate the joyous manſions of the great, or intrude on the pompous occupations of the ſtateſman:—otherwiſe, it might truly ſuggeſt, that even if WARS be neceſſary, this tyrannical ſyſtem of violence and robbery is not ſo. It is the offspring of ſtate-par⯑ſimony alone. Why not add a fourth▪ or a half, to the common wages, to induce volunteers? Why not double the pay?—Why not?—Becauſe the over-grown fortunes of the rich land-holders, the monopolizers of waſtes and commons, would ex⯑perience an almoſt imperceptible diminution. While, by the good old faſhion of dragging away the poor, by means of a preſs-gang, no taxes are laid upon the wealthy; and a due portion of the Swiniſh multitude, the ſcum of the earth, are pe⯑riodically ſwept away as food for powder.

Such are ſome among the numerous hardſhips of which the Britiſh poor have too much reaſon to complain. Indigence, one would think, is of it⯑ſelf a ſufficient evil to an inhabitant of ſociety, without being held out as a reproach, or converted into a crime. Why then ſhould ſlavery be added to poverty, and the rights of man be emerged in the misfortunes of the citizen? A citizen, indeed, is an improper appellation; the poor man is not a citizen: for being denied, even by the ſpirit of the conſtitution, the privilege of repreſentation, he is ſubjected to the will of thoſe who make, and the power of thoſe who execute the laws; and he is at beſt but an inhabitant of his native land, for the benefit of his richer neighbour.

Hence I cannot help regarding any ſcheme of reform as inſignificant, to ſay no worſe of it, which ſhall not include in the ſcheme itſelf (without truſt⯑ing to diſtant promiſes and fair profeſſions) ſome effectual means of raiſing and meliorating the con⯑dition of what are called the lower claſſes of the people. Patriots (as Dr. Johnſon very ſhrewdly [171]and ſarcaſtically remarked) are fond of levelling down to themſelves, but they ſeldom propoſe to level up to them⯑ſelves. It is fit that this reproach ſhould be done away from the advocates of a good cauſe. It is the people, the lower claſſes of ſociety, that conſtitute the bulk of mankind, that form the great maſs of capability, and preſent to the politician the moſt important object of national improvement. For my own part, I care little in compariſon for a re⯑form that ſhall ſerve merely to diminiſh the taxes paid by the rich, or gratify the wiſhes of ſenatorial orators or would-be ſtateſmen, whether in or out of parliament. Away with ſuch half-meaſured re⯑formers—men of rank and reſpectability, as they ſometimes call themſelves; who deſire no farther reform than to extend the ariſtocratic monopoly of power to that circle in which themſelves are in⯑cluded; who make the people the ſtalking-horſe to their deſigns, and the ſtep-ladder to the official ſituations which they aſpire to obtain; who have temperance and moderation in their mouths, and pride and ambition in their hearts; and who raiſe the hue and cry of violence, innovation, and re⯑publicaniſm, againſt every man who looks beyond the petty intereſts of a party, or includes in his notions of patriotiſm a deſire to promote not the privileges of a corporation, but the rights of man.

Hence, alſo, it is to me no matter of ſurprize that the people, the multitude, feel no intereſt in the repeated outcries for parliamentary reform, when the evils they feel are hardly touched upon, and advantages held out which they have no am⯑bition to enjoy. Who has yet talked of dividing the waſtes and the commons—of aboliſhing tythes—of rewarding population—of comfortably pro⯑viding for the old age of the labourer, the manus facturer, the artificer—of exonerating the poor from the indirect taxes which they pay without [172]knowing it; as well as from the direct impoſition, which miniſters ſecretly lay on—and above all of providing ample means of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, that the poor man may know what his rights are, and what is the object of government, and what are the duties of the ſervants of the people. That he may become if he chuſes a human creature, and not a machine; and having the capacity of mental improvement given to him by his Maker, that he may me as he ought the talent thus committed to his care. Why ſhould the truth be concealed? There is among us too much inequality of rank—too much inequality of riches—too much inequa⯑lity of labour. The poor work too much, and know too little: inceſſant labour ſtupifies the mental fa⯑culties, and produces an inclination to ſatisfy the cravings of nature beyond the neceſſities of nature. Hence the amuſements of the poor are groſs; their hours of relaxation intemperate, and habits of drunkenneſs and expence are inſenſibly formed, till the whole man is degraded, and ignorance and poverty linked with him as companions for life. I wiſh it were not true that theſe habits are rather encouraged than ſuppreſſed, that nine tenths of the nation may be mere machines to execute the la⯑bour, of which the other tenth enjoys the profit.

My notions then of an effectual reform in the repreſentation of the people would take in the whole of that ariſtocratical apoſtate the Duke of Richmond's idea, in his Letter to Colonel Sharman. I would have the man, whoſe ſtake in the commu⯑nity conſiſts of life, and liberty, and labour, with a penny in his pocket, to have an equal voice in the choice of legiſlators, by whoſe laws that ſtake is to be protected, with another man who has life, and liberty, and labour, with a hundred thouſand pounds in his pocket. In compariſon with the three firſt articles of the catalogue, which are cotm⯑mon to all men, (and which are the means to ihe [173]acquiſition of the reſt) the laſt is of trifling mo⯑ment; it is the ſmall duſt of the balance, an acci⯑dent of exiſtence; of artificial, and not of natural importance; which when weighed againſt the ſolid gifts of nature to her common offspring, will kick the beam.

ON EQUALITY.
[From Cato's Letters.]

AS liberty can never ſubſiſt without equality, nor equality be long preſerved without an Agrarian law, or ſomething like it; ſo when men's riches are become immeaſurably or ſurprizingly great, a people, who regard their own ſecurity, ought to make a ſtrict enquiry how they came by them, and oblige them to take down their own ſize, for fear of terrifying the community, or maſtering it. In every country and under every government, particular men may be too rich.

If the Romans had well obſerved the Agrarian law, by which the extent of every citizen's eſtate was aſcertained, ſome citizens could never have riſen ſo high as they did above others; and con⯑ſequently, one man could never have been ſet above all the reſt, and have eſtabliſhed, as Caeſar did at laſt, a tyranny in that great and glorious ſtate. I have always thought that an enquiry into men's fortunes, eſpecially monſtrous fortunes raiſed out of the public, like Milton's infernal palace, as it were in an inſtant, was of more importance to a nation, than ſome other enquiries which I have heard of.

But, will ſome ſay, is it a crime to be rich? Yes, certainly, at the public expence, or to the danger of the public. A man may be too rich for a ſubject; even the revenues of kings may be too [174]large. It is one of the effects of arbitrary power, that the prince has too much, and the people too little; and ſuch inequality may be the cauſe too of arbitrary power. It is as aſtoniſhing as it is melancholy, to travel through a whole country, as one may through many in Europe, gaſping under endleſs impoſts, groaning under dragoons and po⯑verty, and all to make a wanton and luxurious court, filled for the moſt, with the worſt and vileſt of all men. Good God! What hard-heartedneſs and barbarity, to ſtarve perhaps half a province, to make a gay garden! And yet ſometimes even this groſs wickedneſs is called public ſpirit, be⯑cauſe forſooth a few workmen and labourers are maintained out of the bread and the blood of half a million.

In thoſe countries, were the judgment of the people conſulted, things would go better; but they are deſpiſed, and eſteemed by their governors happy enough, if they do not eat graſs; and having no re⯑preſentatives, or ſhare in the government, they have no remedy. Such indeed is their miſery, that their caſe would be greatly mended, if they could change conditions with the beaſts of the field; for then being deſtined to be eaten, they would be bet⯑ter fed: ſuch a misfortune is it to them that their governors are not cannibals! Oh HAPPY Britain may'ſt thou continue ever ſo!

For a concluſion: As the preſervation of pro⯑perty is the ſource of national happineſs, whoever violates property, or leſſens or endangers it, com⯑mon ſenſe ſays, that he is an enemy to his country, and public ſpirit ſays, that he ſhould feel its ven⯑geance. As yet in England, we can ſpeak ſuch BOLD truths; and we never dread to ſee the day, when it will be ſafer for one man to be a traytor, than for another man, or for a whole people, to call him ſo. Wherever public ſpirit is found dangerous, she will ſoon be found dead.

POPULAR LICENTIOUSNESS, OR ANARCHY BUT OF SHORT DURATION.
[From Dr. Price on Civil Liberty.]

GOVERNMENT is an inſtitution for the be⯑nefit of the people governed, which they have power to model as they pleaſe; and to ſay, that they can have too much of this power, is to ſay, that there ought to be a power in the ſtate ſu⯑perior to that which gives it Being, and from which all juriſdiction in it is derived. Licentiouſ⯑neſs, which has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its oppoſite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals in oppoſition to the will of the community, made known and declared in the laws. A free ſtate, at the ſame time that it is free itſelf, makes all its members free by excluding licentiouſneſs, and guarding their perſons and property and good name againſt inſult. It is the end of all juſt govern⯑ment, at the ſame time that it ſecures the liberty of the public againſt foreign injury, to ſecure the liberty of the individual againſt private injury. I do not, therefore, think it ſtrictly juſt to ſay, that it belongs to the nature of government to entrench on private liberty. It ought never to do this, ex⯑cept as far as the exerciſe of private liberty en⯑croaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is licentiouſneſs it reſtrains, and liberty itſelf only when uſed to deſtroy liberty.

It appears from hence, that licentiouſneſs and deſpotiſm are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined. They are both alike inconſiſtent with liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other difference between them, than that the one is the licentiouſneſs of great men, and the other the licentiouſneſs of little men; or that, by the one, the perſons and property of a people are [176]ſubject to outrage and invaſion from a king, or a lawleſs body of grandees; and that, by the other, they are ſubject to the like outrage from a lawleſs mob.—In avoiding one of theſe evils, mankind have often run into the other. But all well con⯑ſtituted governments guard equally againſt both. Indeed of the two, the laſt is, on ſeveral accounts, the leaſt to be dreaded, and has done the leaſt miſ⯑chief. It may be truly ſaid, that if licentiouſneſs has deſtroyed its thouſands, deſpotiſm has de⯑ſtroyed its millions. The former, having little power, and no ſyſtem to ſupport it, neceſſarily finds its own remedy; and a people ſoon get out of the tumult and anarchy attending it. But a deſpotiſm, wearing the form of government, and being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered with⯑out dreadful ſtruggles. It goes on from age to age, debaſing the human faculties, levelling all diſtinc⯑tions, and preying on the rights and bleſſings of ſociety.—It deſerves to be added, that in a ſtate diſturbed by licentiouſneſs, there is an animation which is favourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in [...] ſtate habituated to a deſpotiſm, all is ſtill and tor⯑pid. A dark and ſavage tyranny ſtifles every ef⯑fort of genius; and the mind loſes all its ſpirit and dignity.

POPULAR LICENTIOUSNESS OR ANARCHY BUT OF SHORT DURATION.
(From Dr. Price on Civil Liberty.)

GOVERNMENT is an inſtitution for the be⯑nefit of the people governed, which they [183]have power to model as they pleaſe; and to ſay, that they can have too much of this power, is to ſay, that there ought to be a power in the ſtate ſu⯑perior to that which gives it being, and from which all juriſdiction in it is derived.—Licentiouſ⯑neſs, which has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its oppoſite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in oppoſition to the will of the community, made known and declared in the laws. A free ſtate, at the ſame time that it is free itſelf, makes all its members free by excluding licentiouſneſs, and guarding their perſons and property and good name againſt inſult. It is the end of all juſt government, at the ſame time that it ſecures the liberty of the public againſt foreign injury, to ſecure the liberty of the individual againſt private injury. I do not therefore, think it ſtrictly juſt to ſay, that it be⯑longs to the nature of government to entrench on private liberty. It ought never to do this, except as far as the exerciſe of private liberty encroaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is licentiouſ⯑neſs it reſtrains, and liberty itſelf only when uſed to deſtroy liberty.

It appears from hence, that licentiouſneſs and deſpotiſm are more nearly allied than is common⯑ly imagined. They are both alike inconſiſtent with liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other difference between them, than that the one is the Licentiouſneſs of great men, and the other the Licentiouſneſs of little men; or that, by the one, the perſons and property of a people are ſubject to outrage and invaſion from a king, or a lawleſs body of grandees; and that, by the other, they are ſubject to the like outrage from a lawleſs mob.—In avoiding one of theſe evils, mankind have often run into the other. But all well conſtituted go⯑vernments guard equally againſt both. Indeed of the two, the laſt is, on ſeveral accounts, the leaſt [184]to be dreaded, and has done the leaſt miſchief. It may be truly ſaid, that if licentiouſneſs has deſtroy⯑ed its thouſands, deſpotiſm has deſtroyed its mil⯑lions. The former, having little power, and no ſyſtem to ſupport it, neceſſarily finds its own re⯑medy; and a people ſoon get out of the tumult and anar⯑chy attending it. But a deſpotiſm, wearing the form of government, and being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered without dreadful ſtrug⯑gles. It goes on from age to age, debaſing the human faculties, levelling all diſtinctions, and preying on the rights and bleſſings of Society.—It deſerves to be added, that in a ſtate diſturbed by licentiouſneſs, there is an animation which is fa⯑vourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in a ſtate habit⯑uated to a deſpotiſm, all is ſtill and torpid, a dark and ſavage tyranny ſtifles every effort of ge⯑nius; and the mind loſes all its ſpirit and dignity.

The probable Influence of the French Revolution on the Liberties of Europe.
From a Letter to Mr. Pitt, on his Apoſtacy from the cauſe of Parliamentary Reform.

NOTHING indeed can be more evident, than that a mighty change in the direction of the public ſentiments of Europe, is likely to ariſe from that revolution, whether it be ſucceſsful or un⯑ſucceſsful. If it be ſucceſsful, the ſpirit of extreme democracy, is likely to ſpread over all Europe, and to ſwallow up in a volcanic eruption, every rem⯑nant of monarchy and of nobility in the civilized world. The probability of ſuch effects is ſo ſtrong⯑ly believed by the enemies of that revolution, that it is the ground of their alarm, the ſubject of their invective, and the pretext of their hoſtilities. It [185]was to prevent ſuch conſequences, that Mr. Burke ſo benevolently counſelled the princes of Europe to undertake that cruſade in which they are now ſo piouſly engaged.

If, on the other hand, the efforts of France be unſucceſsful; if her liberties be deſtroyed, there can be little doubt that ſuch a ſhock will moſt pow⯑erfully impel the current of opinion to the ſide of monarchy: a direction in which it will be likely for ſeveral ages to continue. The example of the deſtruction of the great French Republic would diffuſe, diſmay, and ſubmiſſion among a multi⯑tude, who only judge by events; and the bloody ſcenes which muſt attend ſuch a deſtruction, would indeed be ſufficient to appal the ſterneſt and moſt ardent champions of liberty. The ſpirit of Eu⯑rope would crouch under the dark ſhade of deſ⯑potiſm, in dead repoſe and fearful obedience. The royal confederacy which had effected this ſubver⯑ſion, would doubtleſs continue its concert and its efforts. The principle of maintaining the inter⯑nal independence of nations, being deſtroyed by the example of France, no barrier would any long⯑er be oppoſed to the arbitrary will of kings. The internal laws of all the European ſtates would be d [...]ctated by a council of deſpots, and thus the in⯑fluence of moral cauſes on public opinion, co-ope⯑rating with the combined ſtrength and policy of princes, "every faint veſtage and looſe remnant" of free government will be ſwept from the face of the earth.

A RECEIPT TO MAKE A KING.
From Common ſenſe; or, the Engliſhman's journal, for May, 28, 1737.
(Suppoſed to be written by the late Henry Fielding Eſq.)

IF I were a Corſican, I ſhould certainly be a re⯑bel; that is, I ſhould hazard my life and eſtate to recover my liberty; but if after all I muſt ſub⯑mit to be a ſlave, I would be a ſlave to Baron Nieuhoff^†, or even to a Ruſſian Bojar, rather than to my old taſk maſters of Genoa.

The Corfican chiefs, if they would be adviſed by me, ſhould form the plan of their future govern⯑ment, even while their affairs are low, and the event uncertain, leſt, hereafter, they ſuffer great⯑er evils than ever yet they have felt, by inteſtine diviſions; and are prompted by a ſpirit of jealouſy or ambition to deſtroy one another, when they have no other enemies to conquer. Were I to [195]preſide in their council, and the direction of this important affair were to be left to my judgment, I would not make choice of any form of government which is now adminiſtered in the world: neither would I borrow my ſyſtem from Plato's republic, or Sir Thomas More's Utopia, which ſound well in theory, but can never be reduced to practice. In ſhort, I would preſerve the rank and dignity of my country, by reſtoring the ancient form of go⯑vernment, which was kingly or monarchial. A king I would have, and a king with a crown on his head, and a ſcepter in his hand; to whom ſhould be given the title of royal or imperial ma⯑jeſty. But my king ſhould not be a tyrant. He ſhould be even incapable of committing any acts of violence, or oppreſſion. He ſhould be entirely free from pride, avarice, and ambition. He ſhould neither injure himſelf, or his ſubjects, through the heat and intemperance of youth, or the folly and dotage of old age. Love which has made one king a fool, and another mad, ſhould never per⯑plex his head, or hurt his conſtitution. His man⯑ners ſhould be without blemiſh; and his greateſt enemies (if undeſervedly he muſt have enemies) ſhould not be able to impute to him any impurity of mind, any unfriendly diſpoſition, or unevenneſs of temper. In a word, I would have ſuch a king as Jupiter firſt gave to the frogs^†; who, by the way poſſeſſed his empire by divine right, and therefore his ſubjects were juſtly puniſhed by his ſucceſſor for the inſults which they offered to his perſon and character. However, I would not have a plain unfaſhionable Log. My prince ſhould be made of the heart of oak, and wrought into the ſhape and figure of a man by the moſt ſkilful artiſts in Eu⯑rope.

To ſpeak intelligibly, I would have an image or ſtatue as big as the life, well ſhaped, and finely [196]painted; with a diadem on his head, a royal mantle on his ſhoulders, and a ſcepter in his right hand. He ſhould be placed under a rich canopy, and ſeated on a magnificent throne. A guard of an hundred halberdeers ſhould be ap⯑pointed to attend him, not ſo much for the ſecu⯑rity of his perſon, as to ſerve for pomp and ſhew at the audience of ambaſſadors. This guard ſhould be the only ſtanding army in Corſica. For as there could be no uſe for ſoldiers, but to defend the country in caſe of an invaſion, ſo, in that caſe, every man ſhould be a ſoldier. There ſhould be an eſtabliſhed militia, in which all the male inha⯑bitants, from eighteen to fifty years of age, capa⯑ble of bearing arms, ſhould be inrolled, as is prac⯑tiſed at this day among the Swiſs-Cantons. This militia ſhould be provided with good arms, and regularly exerciſed. The generals, colonels, and regularly exerciſed. The generals, colonels, and all inferior officers, ſhould be named by the ſenate, as well as all other officers military and civil; among the reſt I include all the great officers of the crown, &c. But then it ſhould not be lawful for any officer to excerciſe the employment confer⯑red on him, till his nomination had been con⯑firmed by the king, who ſhould always be allowed a negative voice.

In like manner, new laws ſhould be of no force till they had received his majeſty's approbation, which ſhould always be ſignified by his ſilence. But whenever he refuſed his aſſent, he muſt be obliged to pronounce the word VETO three times with an audible voice, ſo that it might be diſtinct⯑ly heard by all the people.

Having thus ſecured the liberties of the ſubject, I think it in the next place incumbent on me, as a Corſican legiſlator, to maintain the dignity of the crown. I would not indeed ordain it as an article of faith, that the king held the reins of his govern⯑ment by a divine indefeaſible right; but yet I would [197]have his perſon ſacred and inviolable. His ſub⯑jects of all degrees and orders ſhould approach him with the greateſt reverence. Thoſe who were it i [...]troduced to him for a confirmation of their pri⯑vileges and employments, ſhould be obliged to proſ⯑trate themſelves, and kiſs the hem of his garment. No perſon ſhould preſume to ſit, or ſpit, or cough, or be covered in his preſence; unleſs it might here⯑after be thought proper, as a reward for great merit and ſervices to create a claſs of grandees. ^†

Foreign miniſters, who are ſent to compliment the king on his acceſſion, muſt obſerve the cere⯑monial eſtabliſhed at the court of Turin, when the King of Sardinia was acknowledged in that quality. All proper laws ſhould be deviſed for his ſecurity. And therefore, if any one ſhould be ſo audacious as to ſteal away his majeſty, or to maim, or disfigure his perſon, or to rob him of his crown or ſceptre, or any part of his robes, the of⯑fender ſhould be guilty of treaſon, and be puniſh⯑ed with death.

If any perſon ſhould propoſe in writing, or con⯑verſation, to aboliſh the preſent form of govern⯑ment, by depoſing his wooden majeſty, and ſub⯑ſtituting in his ſtead a monarch of fleſh and blood, whether man, woman, or beaſt, the offender ſhould likewiſe be guilty of high-treaſon. Provided always, that the words be expreſs and ſufficiently proved, and that no free Corſican be vexed or puniſhed by innuendos, and forced conſtructions; or for any figurative, allegorical, or ambiguous ſpeeches. Provided likewiſe, that this law ſhall not extend to reſtrain the freedom of debate in the ſenate and council.

But now I deſire it may be underſtood, that in this new ſcheme of government, which I have in⯑vented for the good people of Corſica, I only re⯑quire [198]the ſubſtance of the king's perſon to be of oak. I do not abſolutely inſiſt that he muſt al⯑ways retain a human form. Let it be varied accord⯑ing to the exigencies of the ſtate, or the humours of the people.

For the matter, I prefer the oak to all other tim⯑ber, on account of its duration; and becauſe that tree, conſidered only as a ſimple vegetable, bears ſome analogy to a crown'd head: it having been held ſacred in all countries and ages of the world, The ancient Druids paid a greater veneration to the oak, than to the moſt illuſtrious of the ſons of Adam. And even among us Engliſhmen, in a very inquiſitive and polite age, I mean about the mid⯑dle of the laſt century, this tree obtained the title of royal.—The Greeks and Romans had ſo great a reverence for this tree, as to imagine, that every oak was the habitation of a divinity; and there was an oaken grove, within one of the gates of Rome, where all the trees were worſhipped as ſo many nymphs and goddeſſes.

But the moſt renowned of all their ſpecies were the Epirotick oaks, the illuſtrious natives of Dodo⯑na; who were not only endued with human ſpeech, but were prophets and poets, the moſt exalted characters of mankind; and by which two of the greateſt princes in the world have been ſo eminent⯑ly diſtinguiſhed.

If the compaſs of my paper would allow it, I would add much more in honour of the oak. But what I have ſaid may ſuffice, to prevent the ridi⯑cule of political writers, and the objections and indignities, which they might otherwiſe offer to my wooden king.

I am fully perſuaded, there is not a monarch now living upon the earth, who would not think himſelf very happy, and bleſſed above all his bre⯑thren, to be heart of oak; eſpecially if he be turned of fifty. And the bleſſing would be dou⯑bled, [199]if by this change he might be allowed to de⯑rive his pedigree from the houſe of Dodona. In truth, an oak of this family is capable of governing the greateſt kingdoms, even the vaſt empire of China and Japan. How would the people of thoſe countries admire his eminent qualities, and the faculties of his mind! And I am ſure they would not preſume to find fault with his perſon and fa⯑mily, who was deſcended from as ancient a ſtock, and formed of as good ſtuff as their gods. How⯑ever, I ingenuouſly confeſs, that the oaks of this race are not for my purpoſe, and muſt therefore be excluded from my ſcheme of government. Prophets of all complections, nations, and religi⯑ons, whether great or ſmall, whether falſe or true, when they are once made kings, will claim an ab⯑ſolute independent ſovereignty. The hiſtory of all ages, and the actions of all the royal prophets, from King David down to King Mahomet, ſufficiently verify my aſſertion. For that reaſon I recommend the oaks of Dodona to the government of the eaſt, where every king and every vice-king is a tyrant.

As for the monarchs of Corſica, according to my eſtabliſhment, they muſt not have the uſe of ſpeech, and then they will have no uſe for power. Wherefore I adviſe thoſe iſlanders to content them⯑ſelves with kings that are the growth of their own woods, if they have any woods left. If not, they may import a good ſtout king of any ſize, well ſhaped and poliſhed, and faſhionably dreſſed, from any great city on the continent^† I muſt ſubmit to the conſideration of the ſenate, whether they will be at the charge of a queen. For as ſhe can contribute nothing to the ſucceſſion, the expence of the ſculpture, her royal veſtments, ſervants and [200]officers will be an unneceſſary incumbrance on the civil liſt; beſides I can prove from ancient hiſtory, that a wooden queen, hath ſometimes done as much miſchief as a wooden horſe, and overturned mighty kingdoms.

I would certainly provide by the ſtrongeſt laws, that no prieſt ſhould have a vote in the ſenate or council, nor any employment about the perſon of his Corſican majeſty. I ſhould be under dreadful apprehenſions, leſt thoſe teeming heads exalt my king into a god, and then tax the people to fur⯑niſh proviſions for his table. Seeſt thou not how he eateth and drinketh, and thinkeſt thou not that he is a god? In which caſe, the theocracy of the wood⯑en god would prove the worſt kind of tyranny. For this little iſland would ſoon be devoured to manifeſt the power of the governor, and ſupport the luxury of his miniſters; who are better craftſ⯑men than to be diſcovered, like thoſe idiot prieſts of Bel, by a trap door, and a ſack of aſhes ſtrewed upon the pavement.

Whilſt I am writing this, I am informed by the Holland mail, that King Theodore has abdicated the crown of Corſica, and is now impriſoned for debt at Amſterdam^†, Though I am as truly con⯑cerned for the misfortune of this enterpriſing mo⯑narch, as any of his loving ſubjects, yet I muſt own, it leſſens my grief to conſider, that this ſud⯑den revolution will make way for my propoſal, and facilitate the acceſſion of my wooden king. For which reaſon, I will direct theſe ſhort hints to be tranſlated into Italian, for the uſe of the Cor⯑ſican chiefs, and the people now in arms under their command.

How ſhall I rejoice to be the inſtrument of giv⯑ing [201]them a king, who, to ſpeak without a figure, can do no wrong! a ſucceſſion of ſuch princes would not be leſs glorious for themſelves, than be⯑neficial to their country. They would be univer⯑ſally eſteemed during their reigns, and their me⯑mories ſweet and precious. Happy had it been for the world, if the long catalogue of Roman emperors (three or four only excepted) had been of the wooden ſpecies!

Reaſon, which is the diſtinguiſhing excellence of human nature, can only prove a bleſſing to thoſe whether princes or private perſons, who are men of honour and virtue.

EQUAL GOVERNMENTS WILL TEND TO MAKE MEN BETTER.
From Barlow's Advice to the privileged Orders.

AS an apology for the exiſting deſpotiſms, it is ſaid, That all men are by nature tyrants, and will exerciſe their tyrannies whenever they find opportunity. Allowing this aſſertion to be true, it is ſurely cited by the wrong party. It is an apology for equal, and not for unequal govern⯑ments: and the weapon belongs to thoſe who contend for the republican principle. If govern⯑ment be founded on the vices of mankind, it [...] buſineſs is to reſtrain thoſe vices in all, rathe [...] [205]than to foſter them in a few. The diſpoſition to tyrannize is effectually reſtrained under the exer⯑ciſe of the Equality of Rights; while it is not only rewarded in the few, but invigorated in the many, under all other forms of the ſocial connexion. But it is almoſt impoſſible to decide, among moral propenſities, which of them belong to Nature, and which are the offspring of Habit; how many of our vices are chargeable on the permanent quali⯑ties of man, and how many reſult from the mutable energies of ſtate:

If it be in the power of a bad government to render men worſe than nature has made them, why ſhould we ſay it is not in the power of a good one to render them better? And if the latter be capa⯑ble of producing this effect in any perceivable de⯑gree, where ſhall we limit the progreſs of human wiſdom and the force of its inſtitutions, in ameli⯑orating not only the ſocial condition, but the con⯑trolling principles of man?

ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS IN HANOVER.

THOUGH we in England do not reliſh the in⯑terference of government in our ſtudies, yet it would be highly indecent in us to trouble our heads with what is a-doing in Scotland, or Hano⯑ver. For ſurely our moſt gracious ſovereign and his patriotic counſellors know better what his ſub⯑jects [221]in every country ought to read and think than they themſelves!

Read then with reſpectful ſilence, the auguſt, proceedings of his majeſty's government in Hano⯑ver reſpecting the Liberty of the Preſs.

Jena Journal: Hanover Jan. 18. 1794.

"The deſtructive poiſon of impious infidelity, irregulation, and all licentiouſneſs," to uſe the well-known expreſſions of the Augſburg vacariat, has been of late powerfully ſpread through our country, probably by means of circulating libraries, book-clubs, reading ſocieties, and clubs for peri⯑odical publications.

To remedy this evil, ſeveral propoſals have been made to the government by patriotic men,^† of w [...]ch the three principal are, firſt, Bookſellers ſhall be obliged to give a complete account of eve⯑ry book, before they expoſe it to ſale or ſecondly, The managers of reading ſocieties, ſhall be made anſwerable for all books and periodical papers they permit to be circulated: or thirdly, At leaſt a cata⯑logue of the books belonging to reading ſocieties, ſhall be ſent in from time to time.

The laſt was immediately reſolved, and here⯑upon the following ROYAL ordinance, reſpecting ſocieties and circulating libraries, as they are cal⯑led, was diſperſed through the whole electorate!!!

"George the Third, by the grace of God, King of Great is [...]tain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, Duke of is runſwick Lunenburg, Arch Treaſurer, and Elector of the holy Roman em⯑pire, &c.

"The continual increaſe of reading ſocieties [222]and circulating libraries, as they are called, renders it neceſſary, that ſuch eſtabliſhments ſhould be ſubject to a ſtricter police: We find ourſelves on this account moved to eſtabliſh and ordain as fol⯑lows:

"All Antiquarians, and others, who keep li⯑braries for reading or letting out books for hire, ſhall, immediately after publication of this ordi⯑nance, deliver to the police office of the place where they reſide a complete catalogue of all and every of the books and pamphlets, that they at any time purchaſe, before they lend them. Whoever refuſes this, or lends a book or pamphlet not mentioned in the catalogue, ſhall pay, for the firſt offence, a fine of ten rix-dollars, and for the ſe⯑cond, a double fine, and be prohibited from lend⯑ing books any more; half the fine to go to the in⯑former.

"Second. All managers of reading ſocieties ſhall likewiſe be obliged to deliver to the police-office, of the place where they reſide, without ex⯑ception, and without plea of a privileged court, immediately after publication of this ordinance, a complete catalogue of the books and pamphlets at preſent circulating, or which may hereafter cir⯑culate in their ſocieties; and they who are guilty of refuſal or neglect, ſhall pay, without exception of perſons, a fine of twenty rix-dollars; half to go to the informer.

We accordingly command all our police officers [...]rictly to execute the above ordinance, to ſend a copy of the catalogues from time to time delivered to them, to our regency, alſo immediately to ſeize ſuch writings mentioned in the catalogues as are known to be dangerous, or are prohibited: but in doubtful caſes, to apply to our regency for further inſtruc⯑tions."

Strictures o [...] the Second Part of Paine's Rights of Man, with copious Extracts.
(From the Analytical Review for March, 1792.)

COURTEOUS reader, we announce to thee, the publication of the Second part of the Rights of Man. Wert thou pleaſed with the firſt part? Thou wilt be delighted with the ſecond. Didſt thou ſay of the former, ſuch a work deſerves no other conſutation than that of criminal juſtice? Thou wilt ſay of this, the only way to anſwer it is to hang the author.

For our parts, we wiſh neither to kindle thy hopes, nor to provoke thy horrors. Lo! we in⯑troduce thee to the author, and leave thoe and him to ſettle the proper mode of confutation. Only keep your tempers. We will ſit by; and as re⯑viewers of the controverſy, will occaſionally break ſilence. We will alſo take the liberty of dropping at the cloſe a few remarks, to qualify your tem⯑pers, if you ſhould chance to diſagree.

Thou wilt perceive, reader, at the outſet, that Mr. P: ſo far from thinking he has received any defeat from the replies made to his former publica⯑tion, conceives himſelf to ſtand on an eminence, aſſerts a victory, and claims a triumph. p. vii.

'Several other reaſons contributed to produce this determination (of deferring the remainder of his work.) I wiſhed to know the manner in which a work, written in a ſtyle of thinking and expreſſion different to what had been cuſtomary in England, would be received before I proceeded farther. A great field was opening to the view of mankind by means of the French Revolution. Mr. Burke's outrageous oppoſition thereto brought the controverſy into England. He attacked prin⯑ciples which he knew (from information) I would conteſt with him, becauſe they are principles I believe to be good, and which I have contributed [224]to eſtabliſh, and conceive myſelf bound to defend, Had he not urged the controverſy, I had moſt probably been a ſilent man.

'Another reaſon was, that Mr. Burke promiſed in his firſt publication to renew the ſubject at ano⯑ther opportunity, and to make a compariſon of what he called the Engliſh and French Conſtitu⯑tions. I therefore held myſelf in reſerve for him, He has publiſhed two works ſince, without doing this; which he certainly would not have omitted, had the compariſon been in his favour.

'In his laſt work, "His appeal from the new to the old Whigs," he has quoted about ten pages from the Rights of Man, and having given himſelf the trouble of doing this, ſays, ‘he ſhall not attempt in the ſmalleſt degree to refute them,’ meaning the principles therein contained. I am enough ac⯑quainted with Mr. Burke to know, that he would if he could. But inſtead of conteſting them, he immediately after conſoles himſelf with ſaying, that "he has done his part."—He has not done his part. He has not performed his promiſe of a compariſon of conſtitutions. He ſtarted the con⯑troverſy, he gave the challenge, and has fled from it; and he is now a caſe in point with his own opi⯑nion, that, "the age of chivalry is gone!"

'The title, as well as the ſubſtance of his l [...]ſt work, his "Appeal," is his condemnation. Prin⯑ciples muſt ſtand on their own merits, and if they are good, they certainly will. To put them un⯑der the ſhelter of other men's authority, as Mr. Burke has done, ſerves to bring them into ſuſpi⯑cion. Mr. Burke is not very fond of dividing [...]s honours, but in this caſe he is artfully dividing the diſgrace.

'But who are thoſe to whom Mr. Burke has made his appeal? A ſet of childiſh thi [...]kers and half-way politicians born in the laſt century; men who went no farther with any principle than as it [225]ſuited their purpoſe as a party; the nation was al⯑ways leſt out of the queſtion; and this has been the character of every party from that day to this. The nation ſees nothing in ſuch works, or ſuch politics worthy its attention. A little matter will move a party, but it muſt be ſomething great that moves a nation.

'Though I ſee nothing in Mr. Burke's Appeal worth taking notice of, there is, however, one expreſſion upon which I ſhall offer a few remarks. After quoting largely from the Rights of Man, and declining to conteſt the principles contained in that work, he ſays, ‘this will moſt probably be done (if ſuch writings shall be thought to deſerve any other refutation than that of criminal juſtice) by others, who may think with Mr. Burke, and with the ſame zeal,’

'In the firſt place, it has not yet been done by any body. Not leſs I believe, than eight or ten pamphlets intended as anſwers to the former part of the "Rights of Man" have been publiſhed by different perſons, and not one of them, to my knowledge, has extended to a ſecond edition, nor are even the titles of them ſo much as generally remembered. As I am averſe to unneceſſarily mul⯑tiplying publications, I have anſwered none of them. And as I believe that a man may write himſelf out of reputation when nobody elſe can do it, I am careful to avoid that rock.

'But as I would decline unneceſſary publicati⯑ons on the one hand, ſo would I avoid every thing that might appear like ſullen pride on the other. If Mr, Burke, or any other perſon on his ſide the queſtion, will produce an anſwer to the "Rights of Man," that ſhall extend to an half, or even to a fourth part of the number of copies to which the Rights of Man extended, I will reply to his work. But untill this be done, I ſhall ſo far take the ſenſe of the public for my guide, (and the world knows [226]I am not a flatterer) that what they do not think worth while to read, is not worth mine to anſwer, I ſuppoſe the number of copies to which the firſt part of the Rights of Man extended, taking En⯑gland, Scotland, and fieland, is not leſs than be⯑tween forty and fifty thouſand.

Mr. P. taking the common notion of the excel⯑lency of the Engliſh conſtitution (Mr. P. will ex⯑cuſe our uſing that expreſſion) to be fallacious, and aiming to prepare his readers for remarks on its imperfections, proceeds as follows. P. XIV.

'As to the prejudices which men have from education and habit, in favour of any particular form or ſyſtem of government, thoſe prejudices have yet to ſtand the teſt of reaſon and reflection. In fact, ſuch prejudices are nothing. No man is prejudiced in favour of a thing, knowing it to be wrong. He is attached to it on the belief of its being right; and when he ſees it is not ſo, the prejudice will be gone. We have but a defective idea of what prejudice is. It might be ſaid, that until men think for themſelves the whole is pre⯑judice, and not opinion; for that only is opinion which is the reſult of reaſon and reflection. I offer this remark, that Mr. Burke may not conſide too much in what has been the cuſtomary preju⯑dices of the country.

'I do not believe that the people of England have ever been fairly and candidly dealt by. They have been impoſed upon by parties, and by men aſſuming the character of leaders. It is time that the nation ſhould riſe above thoſe trifles. It is time to diſmiſs that inattention which has ſo long been the encouraging cauſe of ſtretching taxation to exceſs. It is time to diſmiſs all thoſe ſongs and toaſts which are calculated to enſlave, and ope⯑rate to ſuffocate reflection. On all ſuch ſubjects men have but to think, and they will neither act wrong, nor be miſled. To ſay that any people are [227]not fit for freedom, is to make poverty their choice, and to ſay they had rather be loaded with taxes than not. If ſuch a caſe could be proved, it would equally prove, that thoſe who govern are not fit to govern them, for the [...] are a part of the ſame national maſs.

'But admiſſing government [...]o be changed all over Europe; it certainly [...] be done without convulſion or revenge. It is not worth making changes or revolations, unleſs it be for ſo ne great national benefit; and when this ſhall appear to a nation, the danger will be, as in America and France, to thoſe who oppoſe.'

Speaking of the expectations to be formed from the prevailing bias towards revolutions in different nations, our author of ſerves, P. 4.

'As revolutions have begun, (and as the proba⯑bility is always greater againſt a thing beginning than of proceeding after it has begun), it is natural to expect that other revolutions will follow. The amazing and ſtill encreaſing expences with which old governments are conducted, the numerous wars they engage in or provoke, the embarraſſments they throw in the way of univerſal civilization and commerce, and the oppreſſion and uſurpation they act at home have wearied out the patience, and exhauſted the property of the world. In ſuch a ſituation, and with the examples already exiſt⯑ing, revolutions are to be looked for. They are become ſubjects of univerſal converſation, and may be conſidered as the Order of the day.

'If ſyſtems of government can be introduced, leſs expenſive, and more productive of general happineſs, than thoſe which have exiſted, all at⯑tempts to oppoſe their progreſs will in the end be fruitleſs. Reaſon, like time, will make its own way, and prejudice will fall in a combat with in⯑tereſt. If univerſal peace, civilization, and com⯑merce, are ever to be the happy lot of man, it [228]cannot be accompliſhed but by a revolution in the ſyſtem of governments. All the monarchical go⯑vernments are military. War is their trade, plun⯑der and revenue their objects. While ſuch go⯑vernments continue, peace has not the abſolute ſecurity of a day. What is the hiſtory of all mo⯑narchical governments, but a diſguſtful picture of human wretchedneſs, and the accidental reſpite of a few years repoſe? Wearied with war, and tired with human butchery, they ſat down to reſt, and called it peace. This certainly is not the con⯑dition that Heaven intended for man; and if this be monarchy, well might monarchy be reckoned among the ſins of the Jews.

'The revolutions which formerly took place in the world, had nothing in them that intereſted the bulk of mankind. They extended only to a change of perſons and meaſures, but not of principles, and roſe or ſell among the common transactions of the moment. What we now behold, may not impro⯑perly be called a "counter revolution" Conqueſt and tyranny, at ſome early period, diſpoſſeſſed man of his rights, and he is now recovering them. And as the tide of all human affairs has its ebb and flow in directions contrary to each other, ſo alſo is it in this. Government ſounded on a moral theory, on a ſyſtem of univerſal peace, on the indefea⯑ſible hereditary Rights of Man, is now revolving from weſt to eaſt, by a ſtronger impulſe than the government of the ſword revolved from eaſt to weſt. It intereſts not particular individuals, but nations, in its progreſs, and promiſes a new aera to the human race.'

This work is divided into five chapters, preſent⯑ing remarks on ſociety and civilization—on the origin of the preſent old Governments (among the old governments comes poor old England)—on the old and new ſyſtems of governments—on conſtitu⯑tions— [229]ways and means of improving the condition of Europe.

With reſpect to the chapter on civilization, we cannot help expreſſing our admiration of many re⯑marks, which betray great political capacity, and much originality of thought. Mr. Paine ſuppoſes, from the intereſt men have in ſociety, that the in⯑ſtances in which a formal government has any real benefit are few, and that the more perfect civili⯑zation is, the ſeſs occaſion there is for government. Our author obſerves, P. 11.

'If we look back to the riots and tumults, which at various times have happened in England, we ſhall find, that they did not proceed from the want of a government, but that government was itſelf the generating cauſe; inſtead of conſolidating ſo⯑ciety, it divided it: it deprived it of its natural coheſion, aud engendered diſcontents and diſorders, which otherwiſe would not have exiſted. In thoſe aſſociations which men promiſcuouſly form for the purpoſe of trade, or of any concern, in which government is totally out of the queſtion, and in which they act merely on the principles of ſociety, we ſee how naturally the various parties unite; and this ſhews, by compariſon, that go⯑vernments, ſo far from being always the cauſe or means of order, are often the deſtruction of it. The riots of 1780 had no other ſource than the re⯑mains of thoſe prejudices, which the government itſelf had encouraged. But with reſpect to En⯑gland there are alſo other cauſes.

'Exceſs and inequality of taxation, however diſguiſed in the means, never fail to appear in their effects. As a great maſs of the community are thrown hereby into poverty and diſcontent, they are conſtantly on the brink of commotion; and deprived, as they unfortunately are, of the means of information are eaſily heated to outrage. What⯑ever the apparent cauſe of any riots may be, the [230]real one is always want of happineſs. It ſhews that ſomething is wrong in the ſyſtem of govern⯑men, that injures the felicity by which ſociety is to be preſerved.

In ſpeaking of the origin of the old governments, Mr. P. traces monarchy to a banditti of Ruffians! Do but hear him! p. 15.

'It is impoſſible that ſuch governments as have hitherto exiſted in the world, could have com⯑menced by any other means than a total violation of every principle ſacred and moral. The obſcu⯑rity in which the origin of all the preſent old go⯑vernments is buried, implies the iniquity and diſ⯑grace with which they began. The origin of the preſent government of America and France will ever be remembered, becauſe it is honourable to record it; but with reſpect to the reſt, even flat⯑tery has conſigned them to the tomb of time, with⯑out an inſpiration.

'It could have been no difficult thing in the early and ſolitary ages of the world, while the chief employment of men was that of attending flocks and herds, for a banditti of ruffians to over⯑run a country, and lay it under contributions. Their power being thus eſtabliſhed, the chief of the band contrived to loſe the name of robber in that of monarch; and hence the origin of monar⯑chy and kings.

'The origin of the government of England, ſo far as relates to what is called its line of monarchy, being one of the lateſt, is perhaps the beſt record⯑ed. The hatred which the Norman invaſion and tyranny begat, muſt have been deeply rooted in the nation, to have outlived the contrivance to obliterate it. Though not a courtier will talk of the curfeu bell, not a village in England has for⯑gotten it.'

Theſe remarks, however, though they will ap⯑ply [231]to moſt of the monarchies which have been eſtabliſhed, will certainly not apply to all,

When treating on the origin of the old and new ſyſtems of government, our author makes the fol⯑lowing ſevere reflections on hereditary govern⯑ment, p. 21.

'Government ought to be a thing always in full maturity. It ought to be ſo conſtructed as to be ſuperior to all the accidents to which individual man is ſubject; and therefore, hereditary ſucceſſi⯑on, by being ſubject to them all, is the moſt irregu⯑lar and imperfect of all the ſyſtems of government.

'We have heard the Rights of Man called a le⯑telling ſyſtem; but the only ſyſtem to which the word levelling is truly applicable, is the hereditary monarchical ſyſtem. It is a ſyſtem of mental level⯑ling. It indiſcriminately admits every ſpecies of character to the ſame authority. Vice and virtue. ignorance and wiſdom, in ſhort, every quality, good or bad, is put on the ſame level. Kings ſucceed each other, not as ra [...]ionals, but as ani⯑mals. It ſignifies not what their mental or moral characters are. Can we then be ſurprited at the abject ſtate of the human mind in monarchial countries, when the government itſelf is formed on ſuch an abject levelling ſyſtem?—It has no fixed character. To day it is one thing; to-morrow it is ſomething elſe. It changes with the temper of every ſucceeding individual, and is ſ [...]bject to all the varieties of eaeh. It is government through the medium of paſſions and accident. It appears under all the various characters of childhood, de⯑crepitude, dotage, a thing at nurſe, in leading-ſtrings, or in crutches. It reverſes the wholeſome order of nature. It occaſionally puts children over men, and the conceits of non-age over wiſ⯑dom and experience. In ſhort, we cannot con⯑ceive a more ridiculous figure of government, than hereditary ſucceſſion, in all its caſes preſents.

'Could it be made a degree in nature, or an [232]adict regiſtered in heaven, and man could know in that virtue and wiſdom ſhould invariably appertain to hereditary ſucceſſion, the objections to it would be removed; but when we ſee that nature acts as if ſhe diſowned and ſported with the hereditary ſyſtem: that the mental characters of ſucceſſors, in all countries, are below the average of human underſtanding; that one is a tyrant, another an ideot, a third inſane, and ſome all three together, it is impoſſible to attach confidence to it, when reaſon in man has power to act.'

In ſpeaking on the tendency of elective govern⯑ments, many political writers have ſpoken of them as the cauſe of civil wars. Mr. Paine on the other hand contends, that civil wars, which have origi⯑nated from conteſted hereditary claims, are more numerous, and have been more dreadful, and of longer continuance, than thoſe which have been occaſioned by elective governments. Mr. Paine's views here correſpond to the reflections made on the ſame ſubject by the illuſtrious ſufferer Algernon Sidney.

One hardly can help ſmiling at the following remark, p. 36.

'Whether I have too little ſenſe to ſee, or too much to be impoſed upon; whether I have too much or too little pride, or of any thing elſe, I leave out of the queſtion; but certain it is, that what is called monarchy, always appears to me a filly, contemptible thing. I compare it to ſome⯑thing kept behind a curtain, about which there is a great deal of buſtle and fuſs, and a wonderful air of ſeeming ſolemnity; but when, by any accident, the curtain happens to be opened, and the com⯑pany ſee what it is, they burſt into laughter.'

Whether the remark be true or falſe, we do not determine; fed riſum teneatis amici?

If thoſe which follow be all true, however, diſ⯑poſed [233]as we were to ſmile, we could not avoid being grave. p. 38.

'That monarchy is all a bubble, a mere court artifice to procure money, is evident (at leaſt to me), in every character in which it can be viewed. It would be impoſſible, on the rational ſyſtem of repreſentative government, to make out a bill of expences to ſuch an enormous amount as this de⯑ception admits. Government is not of itſelf a very chargeable inſtitution. The whole expence of the federal government of America, founded, as I have already ſaid, on the ſyſtem of repreſen⯑tation, and extending over a country ten times as large as England, is but ſix hundred thouſand dol⯑lars, or one hundred and thirty-five thouſand pounds ſterling.

'I preſume, that no man in his ſober ſenſes, will compare the character of any of the kings of Eu⯑rope with that of General Waſhington. Yet, in France, and alſo in England, the expence of the civil liſt only, for the ſupport of one man, is eight times greater than the whole expence of the federal government in America. To aſſign a rea⯑ſon for this, appears almoſt impoſſible. The ge⯑nerality of people in America, eſpecially the poor, are more able to pay taxes, than the generality of people either in France or England.

'But the caſe is, that the repreſentative ſyſtem diffuſes ſuch a body of knowledge throughout a nation, on the ſubject of government, as to explode ignorance, and preclude impoſition. The craft of courts cannot be acted on that ground. There is no place for myſtery; no where for it to begin. Thoſe who are not in the repreſentation, know as much of the nature of buſineſs as thoſe who are. An affectation of myſterious importance would there be ſcouted. Nations can have no, ſecrets; and the ſecrets of courts, like thoſe of individuals, are always their defects.'

[234]'Our author, after ſtating the manner in which America proceeded in forming her conſtitution, ſtill inſiſts on what he had formerly advanced, viz. that England has no conſtitution. Whether truly or no, we leave others to decide. We will juſt quote a word or two on this ſubject.

'In England, (p. 50. 51.) it is not difficult to perceive that every thing has a conſtitution, except the nation. Every ſociety and aſſociation that is eſtabliſhed, firſt agreed upon a number of original articles, digeſted into form, which are its conſti⯑tution. It then appointed its officers, whoſe pow⯑ers and authorities are deſeribed in that conſtituti⯑on, and the government of that ſociety then com⯑menced. Thoſe officers, by whatever name they are called, have no authority to add to, alter, or abridge the original articles. It is only to the con⯑ſtituting power that this right belongs.

'From the want of underſtanding the difference between a conſtitution and a government, Dr. Johnſon, and all writers of his deſcription, have always bewildered themſelves. They could not but perceive, that there muſt neceſſarily be a con⯑trouling power exiſting ſomewhere, and they placed this power in the diſcretion of the perſons exer⯑ciſing the government, inſtead of placing it in a conſtitution formed by the nation. When it is in a conſtitution, it has the nation for its ſupport, and the natural and the political countrouling powers are together. The laws which are enacted by go⯑vernments, countroul men only as individuals, but the nation, through its conſtitution, countrouls the whole government, and has a natural ability ſo to do. The final controuling power, therefore, and the original conſtituting power, are one and the ſame power.'

Having, as he thinks, demoliſhed the doctrine of an 'Engliſh conſtitution,' he then drops a word or two on precedents, &c.

[235]'In numerous inſtances, he ſays (P. 58.) the precedent ought to operate as a warning, and not as an example, and requires to be ſhunned inſtead of imitated; but inſtead of this, precedents are ta⯑ken in the lump, and put at once for conſtitution and for law.

'Either the doctrine of precedents is policy to keep a man in a ſtate of ignorance or is it a prac⯑tical confeſſion that wiſdom degenerates in govern⯑ments, as governments increaſe in age, and can only hobble along by the ſtilts and crutches of precedents. How is it that the ſame perſons who would proudly be thought wiſer than their prede⯑ceſſors, appear at the ſame time only as the ghoſts of departed wiſdom? How ſtrangely is antiquity treated! To anſwer ſome purpoſes it is ſpoken of as the times of darkneſs and ignorance, and to an⯑ſwer others, it is put for the light of the world.

'If the doctrine of precedents is to be followed, the expences of government need not continue the ſame. Why pay men extravagantly, who have but little to do? If every thing that can happen is already in precedent, legiſlation is at an end, and precedent, like a dictionary, determines every caſe. Either, therefore, government has arrived at its dotage, and requires to be renovated, or all the occaſions for exerciſing its wiſdom have oc⯑curred.'

In ſpeaking on the expences of government our author is ſometimes very affecting, and ſometimes very indignant.

P. 68. 'It is inhuman to talk of a million ſter⯑ling a year, paid out of the public taxes of any country, for the ſupport of any individual, whilſt thouſands who are forced to contribute thereto, [...] pining with want, and ſtruggling with miſery. Government does not conſiſt in a contraſt between [...]ons and palaces, between poverty and pomp; it is not inſtituted to rob the needy of his mite, [236]and increaſe the wretchedneſs of the wretched.— But of this part of the ſubject I ſhall ſpeak hereaf⯑ter, and confine myſelf at preſent to political ob⯑ſervations.

'When extraordinary power and extraordinary pay are allotted to any individnal in a government, he becomes the center, round which every kind of corruption generates and forms. Give to any man a million a year, and add thereto the power of creating and diſpoſing of places, at the expence of a country, and the liberties of that country are no longer ſecure. What is called the ſplendor of a throne is no other than the corruption of the ſtate. It is made up of a band òf paraſites, living in luxurious indolence, out of the public taxes.

'When once ſuch a vicious ſyſtem is eſtabliſh⯑ed, it becomes the guard and protection of all in⯑ferior abuſes. The man who is in the receipt of a million a year, is the laſt perſon to promote a ſpirit of reform, leſt, in the event, it ſhould reach to himſelf. It is always his intereſt to defend in⯑ferior abuſes, as ſo many out-works to protect the citadel; and in this ſpecies of political fortification, all the parts have ſuch a common dependence that it is never to be expected they will attack each other ^†

[237]'Monarchy would not have continued ſo many ages in the world, had it not been for the abuſes it protects. It is the maſter-fraud, which ſhelters all others. By admitting a participation of the ſpoil, it makes itſelf friends; and when it ceaſes to do this, it will ceaſe to be the idol of courtiers.'

Every hereditary claim Mr. Paine not only treats as a great abſurdity, but as a ſevere cruelty; as proceeding from a ſyſtem which, while it ag⯑grandizes one branch of a family, impoveriſhes all the reſt, making them either beggars or penſion⯑ers. The younger branches of families thus made needy and dependent, too untaught to purſue a line of induſtry, and too high-ſpirited to ſubmit to poverty, throw themſelves on the mercy of go⯑vernment, and become either tools or knaves.

Whatever ſentiments particular readers may form on ſome part of this work, there are, we appre⯑hend, in the laſt chapter, remarks entitled to the ſerious conſideration of all parties, reſpecting the expences of government, the baneful tendency of charters and corporations—the oppreſſive nature of our taxes on the poor, ariſing from the very formation of our government, and our boaſted ſyſ⯑tem of repreſentation (which many writers, as well as Mr. Paine, ridicule as fallacious and theoretical or deſpiſe as neceſſarily corruptible, and oppreſ⯑ſive)— the progreſs of taxation in England—the neceſſary expences of government—and the means of diſpoſing of the ſurplus taxes.

[238]In remarking on what Mr. Burke ſaid relative to the Houſe of Peers, the following fact is produ⯑ced, which Mr. Paine calls a fact not to be paral⯑leled in the hiſtory of taxation.

P. 100. 'Notwithſtanding taxes have encreaſed and multiplied upon every article of common conſump⯑tion, the land tax, which more particularly affects this 'pillar' has diminiſhed. In 1788, the amount of the land-tax was 1,950,000l. which is half a million leſs than it produced almoſt an hundred years ago ^†, notwithſtanding the rentals are in many inſtances doubled ſince that period.

'Before the coming of the Hanoverians, the taxes were divided in nearly èqual proportions between the land and articles of conſumption, the land bearing rather the largeſt ſhare; but ſince that aera, nearly thirteen millions annually of new taxes have been thrown upon conſumption. The con⯑ſequence of which has been a conſtant encreaſe in the number and wretchedneſs of the poor, and in the amount of the poor-rates. Yet here again the burthens does not fall in equal proportions on the ariſtocracy with the reſt of the community. Their reſidences, whether in town or country, are not mixed with the habitations of the poor. They live apart from diſtreſs, and the expence of reliev⯑ing it. It is in manufacturing towns and labouring villages that thoſe burthens preſs the heavieſt; in many of which it is one claſs of poor ſupport⯑ing another.

'Several of the moſt heavy and productive taxes are ſo contrived, as to give an exemption to this pillar, thus ſtanding in its own defence. The tax upon beer brewed for ſale does not affect the ariſtocracy, who brew their own beer free of this duty. It falls only on thoſe who have not conveni⯑ency or ability to brew, and who muſt purchaſe it in [239]ſmall quantities. But what will mankind think of the juſtice of taxation, when they know, that this tax alone, from which the ariſtocracy are from circum⯑ſtances exempt, is nearly equal to the whole of the land-tax, being in the year 1788, and it is not leſs now, than 1, 666, 152l. and with its proportion of the taxes on malt and hops, it exceeds it.—That a ſingle article, thus partially conſumed, and that chiefly by the working part, ſhould be ſubject to a tax, equal to that on the whole rental of a nation, is, perhaps, a fact not to be parelleled in the hiſtories of re⯑venues.'

'The taxes levied by William the Conqueror, beginning in the year 1066, were 400,000l.—In the year 1466 they had decreaſed to 100,000. Five hundred years after the conqueſt (1566) the annual amount of taxes was 500,000l. Annual amount of taxes in 1791, 17,000,000l. excluſive of the expence of collection, and the drawbacks, which are nearly 2,000,000l. more.' The difference be⯑tween the firſt 400 years and the laſt three, con⯑tinues Mr. P. is ſo aſtoniſhing as to warrant an opinion that the national character of the Engliſh has changed. About 9,000,000l. of this ſum is ap⯑propriated to pay the intereſt of the national debt.

Mr. Paine ſuppoſes, from a variety of circum⯑ſtances taken together, that the annual expenditure might be fixed at 1,500,000l. The ſurplus of more than 6,000,000l. out of the preſent current expen⯑ces, he ſuppoſes, might be diſpoſed of as follows. The poor rates might be aboliſhed, and in lieu of them a remiſſion of taxes might be made to the poor of double the amount of thoſe rates out of the ſurplus taxes. By which means the poor would be benefited 20,000l. and the houſekeepers 20,000l This remiſſion he ſuppoſes to be applied to the edu⯑cation of poor children, and the ſupport of old people paſt their labour; to the education of chil⯑dren of a claſs of people, who, though not ſtrictly [240]poor, are incapable of giving their children educa⯑tion: to the relief of workmen (making the demand) on the birth of a child, and of every new married couple claiming in like manner; and 20.000l. to defray the funeral expences of perſons who, travelling for work, die at a diſtance from their friends; 20,000l. to what he calls 'a world of little caſes,' ariſing particularly in London. To make up the deficiency, neceſſary to ſupply the demand of theſe caſes, he propoſes to add 20,000l. the tax laid on coals in London, 'ſo iniquitouſly and wantonly applied to the ſupport of the Duke of Richmond. The ſum of 2,000,000l. of the current expences, Mr. Paine wonld apply as fol⯑lows: 117,000l. to the relief of diſbanded ſoldiers; additional pay to the remaining ſoldiers 19,500l. To the officers of the diſbanded corps 117,000l. to the diſbanded navy the ſame ſum, amounting to 253,500l. the total 507,000l.; he alſo propoſes, that as any part of this half million falls in, part of the taxes may be taken off. There now remain at leaſt one million and an half of ſurplus taxes: he therefore propoſes that the tax on houſes and win⯑dows may be taken off, amounting to 516, 299l. 6s. 0d. ¼, and the ſurplus of 10,000l. of ſur⯑plus taxes to be kept in reſerve for incidental mat⯑ters.

In this plan of reform Mr. Paine propoſes, that the commutation tax may be taken off, and that there be ſubſtituted in its room a tax on eſtates, ſo regulated as to deſtroy the unnatural law of primo⯑geniture, ſo fruitful of corruptions at elections.

Our author alſo propoſes, that the laws regulat⯑ing workmens wages ſhould be aboliſhed, and the yet remaining ſum of ſurplus taxes (10000l.) he propoſes to be applied to increaſe the ſalary of the inferior revenue officers, and of the inferior clergy.

[241]Though we have already exceeded the bounds of our review, we cannot avoid tranſcribing the following paſſages.

p. 162. 'When a nation changes its opinion and habits of thinking, it is no longer to be go⯑verned as before: but it would not only be wrong, but bad policy, to attempt by force what ought to be accompliſhed by reaſon. Rebellion conſiſts in forcibly oppoſing the general will of a nation, whether by a party or by a government. The [...]e ought, therefore, to be in every nation a method of occaſionally aſcertaining the ſtate of public opi⯑nion with reſpect to government. On this point the old government of France was ſuperior to the preſent government of England, becauſe, on extra⯑ordinary occaſions, recourſe could be had to what was then called the States General: But in Eng⯑land there are no ſuch occaſional bodies; and as to thoſe who are now called Repreſentatives, a great part of them are mere machines of the court, placemen, and dependants.

'I preſume, that though all the people of Eng⯑land pay taxes, not an hundreth part of them are electors, and the members of one of the houſes of parliament repreſent nobody but themſelves. There is, therefore, no power but the voluntary will of the people that has a right to act in any matter reſpecting a general reform; and by the ſame right that two perſons can confer on ſuch a ſubject, a thouſand may. The object, in all ſuch prelimi⯑nary proceedings, is to find out what the general ſenſe of a nation is, and to be governed by it. If it prefer a bad or defective government to a reform, or chuſe to pay ten times more taxes than there is occaſion for, it has a right ſo to do; and ſo long as the majority do not impoſe conditions on the minority, different from what they impoſe on themſelves, though there may be much error, there is no injuſtice. Neither will the error continue [242]long. Reaſon and diſcuſſion will ſoon bring things to rights, however wrong they may begin. By ſuch a progreſs no tumult is to be apprehended. The poor, in all countries, are naturally both peaceable and grateful in all reforms in which their intereſt and happineſs is included. It is only by neglecting and rejecting them that they become tumultuous.'

Mr. P. ſeldom touches upon religion. His rea⯑ſon he aſſigns as follows:

p. 171. 'I have carefully avoided to enlarge upon the ſubject, becauſe I am inclined to believe, that what is called the preſent miniſtry wiſh to ſee contentions about religion kept up, to prevent the nation turning its attention to ſubjects of go⯑vernment. It is, as if they were to ſay, 'Look that way, or any way, but this.'

The people not turbulent, unleſs ſeduced or oppreſſed: Slow to reſiſt oppreſſors: Sometimes mild, even in their juſt vengeance: Brave in defence of their liber⯑ties.
(From Gordon's diſcourſe on Tacitus.)

'TIS owing to the arts and induſtry of Sedu⯑cers, that the people are ſometimes uneaſy and diſcontent under a good government; for un⯑der ſuch a government they are naturally inclined to be quiet and ſubmiſſive, and it muſt be very ill uſage that will tempt them to throw it off, when they are not firſt notoriouſly miſled. There were inſurrections againſt Guſtavus Ericſon, ſo there were againſt Queen Elizabeth; all animated by the ſame ſpirit, ſuperſtition managed and inflamed by prieſts. But when a juſt adminiſtration is once ſettled, and become familiar to the people, and where no violent innovations are attempted, they [279]will not be apt ſo diſturb it, nor to wiſh ill to it. They are in truth very ſlow to reſiſt, and often bear a thouſand hardſhips before they return one. The Romans long ſuffered the encroachments, inſults and tyranny of the laſt tarquin, before they drove him out, nor would they have done it ſo ſoon, but for the rape and tragical fate of Lucretia. The Dutch endured the tyranny of Spain, till that ty⯑ranny grew intolerable. When King Philip had wantonly violated his ſolemn oath, deſtroyed their ancient liberties and laws, ſhed their blood, acted like an implacable enemy, and uſed them like dogs, it was high time to convince him that they were men, and would continue free men in ſpite of his wicked attempts to enſlave them. They did ſo to ſome purpoſe, to their own immortal glory, and eſtabliſhment in perfect independency, to his in⯑finite loſs and laſting ſhame.

The people of Swiſſerland groaned long under the heavy yoke of Auſtria, ſuſtained a courſe of ſufferings and indignities too many and too great for human patience. So inſolent and barbarous were their governors, ſo tame and ſubmiſſive the governed. At laſt they rouſed themſelves, or rather their oppreſſive governors rouſed them, ſo as not to be quelled. Yet they carried their vengeance no farther than was barely neceſſary for their fu⯑ture ſecurity. They ſpilt little or none of the blood of their tyrants and taſk-maſters, the rulers from Auſtria, who had ſo freely ſpilled theirs. They only conducted theſe lawleſs ſpoilers to the bor⯑ders of the country, and there diſmiſſed them in ſafety, under an oath never more to return into their territories. What could be more ſlow to re⯑ſiſt, what more meek in their reſiſtance than that brave and abuſed people? They were indeed ſo brave and had been ſo abuſed, as to reſolve never more to ſubmit to the imperial power. Thence forth they aſſerted their native freedom, and aſ⯑ſerted [280]it with amazing valour. With handfuls of men they overthrew mighty hoſts, and could ne⯑ver be conquered by all the neighbouring powers. Their exploits againſt the imperial armies, againſt thoſe of Lewis the Eleventh, then Dauphin, againſt Charles the bold, Duke of Burgundy are ſcarce credible. Three hundred and fifty Swiſs routed at one time, eight thouſand Auſtrians, ſome ſay ſixteen thouſand. An hundred and thirteen van⯑quiſhed, the arch-duke Leopald's army of twenty thouſand, and killed a great number; an hundred and ſixteen beat another army of near twenty thou⯑ſand, and ſlew him.

It was no ſmall provocation, no caſual miſtakes, or random ſallies of paſſion in their rulers, that drove the Dutch and Swiſs to expel theirs. No; the oppreſſion, the acts of violence were general, conſtant, deliberate and encreaſing. For ſuch is the nature of men in power; that they will rather commit two errors than retract one, as Lord Cla⯑rendon juſtly obſerves. Sometimes they will com⯑mit a ſecond, to ſhew that they are not aſhamed of the firſt, but reſolved to defy reſentment, to de⯑clare their contempt of the people, and how much they are above fear and amendment. Some of them have delighted to heighten cruelty by mirth and deriſion, like him in Swiſſerland, who having long inſulted and abuſed the poor people, and ſtill thinking their ſervitude imperfect, ſet up his cap in the market place, and obliged all that paſſed by to pay it reverence; nay to puniſh one for failing in duty to that cap, he cauſed him to place an ap⯑ple upon his ſon's head, and at ſuch a diſtance to cleave it with an arrow. Was there not cauſe, was it not high time to exterminate ſuch inſtruments of cruelty?

BEWARE OF ORATORS!
From Littleton.

WHEN once it becomes a faſhion to advance men to dignity and power, not for the good [283]councils that they give, but for an agreeable manner of recommending bad ones; it is impoſſible that a government ſo adminiſtered can long ſubſiſt. Is any thing complained of as amiſs?—inſtead of re⯑dreſs, they give you an oration. Have you com⯑poſed a good needful law?—in exchange for that you receive an oration. Has your natural reaſon determined you upon any point?—up gets an ora⯑tor, and ſo confounds you, that you are no longer able to reaſon at all. Is any meaſure to be obſtructed, or wrong one to be advanced?—there is an orator always ready, and it is moſt charmingly performed, to the delight of all the hearers.