[]THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER.

I.

I Flattered my ſelf, Theages, that before this time I might have been able to have ſent you an agreeable Account of the Succeſs of the Affair, which brought me into this remote corner of the Country. But inſtead of this, I ſhou'd now give you the Detail of its Miſcarriage, [2] if I did not rather chooſe to entertain you with ſome amuſing Incidents, which have helped to make me eaſy under a Circumſtance I cou'd neither obviate nor foreſee. Events are not in our power; but it always is, to make a good uſe even of the very worſt. And I muſt needs own, the Courſe and Event of this Affair gave opportunity for Reflections, that make me ſome amends for a great loſs of Time, Pains, and Expence. A Life of Action, which takes its Iſſue from the Coun⯑ſels, Paſſions, and Views of other Men, if it doth not draw a Man to imitate, will at leaſt teach him to ob⯑ſerve. And a Mind at liberty to reflect on its own Ob⯑ſervations, if it produce nothing uſeful to the World, ſeldom fails of Entertainment to it ſelf. For ſeveral Months paſt I have enjoy'd ſuch Liberty and Leiſure in this diſtant Retreat, far beyond the Verge of that great Whirlpool of Buſineſs, Faction, and Plea⯑ſure, which is called the World. And a Retreat in it ſelf agreeable, after a long Scene of Trouble and Diſ⯑quiet, was made much more ſo by the Converſation and good Qualities of my Hoſt Euphranor, who unites in his own Perſon the Philoſopher and the Farmer, two Characters not ſo inconſiſtent in nature as by Cu⯑ſtom they ſeem to be. Euphranor, from the time he left the Univerſity, hath lived in this ſmall Town, where he is poſſeſſed of a convenient Houſe with a hundred Acres of Land adjoining to it; which being improved by his own Labour, yield him a plentiful Subſiſtence. He hath a good Collection, chiefly of old Books, left him by a Clergyman his Uncle, under whoſe Care he was brought up. And the Buſineſs of his Farm doth not hinder him from making good uſe of it. He hath read much, and thought more; his Health and Strength of Body enabling him the better to bear Fatigue of Mind. He is of opinion that he cou'd not carry on his Studies with more Advantage in the Cloſet than the Field, where his Mind is ſeldom idle while he prunes the Trees, follows the Plough, or looks after his Flocks. In the Houſe of this honeſt [3] Friend I became acquainted with Crito, a neighbour⯑ing Gentleman of diſtinguiſhed Merit and Eſtate, who lives in great Friendſhip with Euphranor. Laſt Summer, Crito, whoſe Pariſh-Church is in our Town, dining on a Sunday at Euphranor's, I happened to in⯑quire after his Gueſts, whom we had ſeen at Church with him the Sunday before. They are both well, ſaid Crito, but, having once occaſionally conformed, to ſee what ſort of Aſſembly our Pariſh cou'd afford, they had no farther Curioſity to gratify at Church, and ſo choſe to ſtay at home. How, ſaid Euphranor, are they then Diſſenters? No, replied Crito, they are Free-thinkers. Euphranor, who had never met with any of this Species or Sect of Men, and but little of their Writings, ſhew'd a great Deſire to know their Principles or Syſtem. That is more, ſaid Crito, than I will undertake to tell you. Their Writers are of dif⯑ferent Opinions. Some go farther, and explain them⯑ſelves more freely than others. But the current gene⯑ral Notions of the Sect are beſt learned from Conver⯑ſation with thoſe who profeſs themſelves of it. Your Curioſity may now be ſatisfy'd, if you and Dion wou'd ſpend a Week at my Houſe with theſe Gentlemen, who ſeem very ready to declare and propagate their O⯑pinions. Alciphron is above Forty, and no ſtranger either to Men or Books. I knew him firſt at the Temple, which, upon an Eſtate's falling to him, he quitted, to travel through the polite parts of Europe. Since his Return he hath lived in the Amuſements of the Town, which being grown ſtale and taſteleſs to his Palate, have flung him into a ſort of ſplenetic Indo⯑lence. The young Gentleman, Lyſicles, is a near Kinſ⯑man of mine, one of lively Parts, and a general Inſight into Letters, who, after having paſſed the Forms of Education, and ſeen a little of the World, fell into an Intimacy with Men of Pleaſure, and Free-thinkers, I am afraid much to the damage of his Conſtitution and his Fortune. But what I moſt regret, is the Corruption of his Mind by a Set of pernicious Prin⯑ciples, [4] which, having been obſerved to ſurvive the Paſſions of Youth, foreſtal even the remote Hopes of Amendment. They are both Men of Faſhion, and wou'd be agreeable enough, if they did not fancy themſelves Free-thinkers. But this, to ſpeak the Truth, has given them a certain Air and Manner, which a little too viſibly declare they think them⯑ſelves wiſer than the reſt of the World. I ſhou'd therefore be not at all diſpleaſed if my Gueſts met with their Match, where they leaſt expected it, in a Country Farmer. I ſhall not, replied Euphranor, pre⯑tend to any more than barely to inform my ſelf of their Principles and Opinions. For this end I propoſe to⯑morrow to ſet a Week's Task to my Labourers, and accept your Invitation, if Dion thinks good. To which I give conſent. Mean while, ſaid Crito, I ſhall prepare my Gueſts, and let them know that an honeſt Neighbour hath a mind to diſcourſe them on the Subject of their Free-thinking. And, if I am not much miſtaken, they will pleaſe themſelves with the Proſpect of leaving a Convert behind them, even in a Country Village. Next Morning Euphanor roſe early, and ſpent the Forenoon in ordering his Affairs. After Dinner we took our Walk to Crito's, which lay through half a dozen pleaſant Fields planted round with Plane-trees, that are very common in this part of the Country. We walked under the delicious Shade of theſe Trees for about an Hour before we came to Crito's Houſe, which ſtands in the middle of a ſmall Park, beautify'd with two fine Groves of Oak and Walnut, and a winding Stream of ſweet and clear Water. We met a Servant at the Door with a ſmall Basket of Fruit which he was carrying into a Grove, where he ſaid his Maſter was with the two Strangers, we found them all three ſitting under a Shade. And af⯑ter the uſual Forms at firſt meeting, Euphranor and I ſat down by them. Our Converſation began upon the Beauty of this rural Scene, the fine Seaſon of the Year, and ſome late Improvements which had been [5] made in the adjacent Country by new Methods of A⯑griculture. Whence Alciphron took occaſion to ob⯑ſerve, That the moſt valuable Improvements came lateſt. I ſhould have ſmall Temptation, ſaid he, to live where Men have neither poliſhed Manners, nor improved Minds, though the Face of the Country were ever ſo well improved. But I have long obſer⯑ved, that there is a gradual Progreſs in humane Af⯑fairs. The firſt Care of Mankind is to ſupply the Cravings of Nature; in the next place they ſtudy the Conveniencies and Comforts of Life. But the ſub⯑duing Prejudices, and acquiring true Knowledge, that Herculean Labour is the laſt, being what demands the moſt perfect Abilities, and to which all other Ad⯑vantages are preparative. Right, ſaid Euphranor, Al⯑ciphron hath touched our true Defect. It was always my Opinion, That as ſoon as we had provided Sub⯑ſiſtence for the Body, our next Care ſhould be to im⯑prove the Mind. But the Deſire of Wealth ſteps be⯑tween and engroſſeth Mens Thoughts.

II.

ALC. Thought is that which we are told diſtinguiſheth Man from Beaſt; and Freedom of Thought makes as great a difference between Man and Man. It is to the noble Aſſerters of this Privilege and Perfection of humane Kind, the Free-thinkers I mean, who have ſprung up and multiplied of late Years, that we are indebted for all thoſe important Diſcoveries, that Ocean of Light which hath broke in and made its way, in ſpight of Slavery and Super⯑ſtition. Euphranor, who is a ſincere Enemy to both, teſtified a great Eſteem for thoſe Worthies who had preſerved their Country from being ruined by them, having ſpread ſo much Light and Knowledge over the Land. He added, That he liked the Name and Character of a Free-thinker: but in his Senſe of the Word, every honeſt Inquirer after Truth in any Age or Country was intitled to it. He therefore deſired to know what this Sect was that Alciphron had ſpoken [6] of as newly ſprung up; what were their Tenets; what were their Diſcoveries; and wherein they em⯑ploy'd themſelves, for the benefit of Mankind? Of all which, he ſhou'd think himſelf obliged, if Alci⯑phron wou'd inform him. That I ſhall very eaſily, re⯑plied Alciphron, for I profeſs my ſelf one of the num⯑ber, and my moſt intimate Friends are ſome of the moſt conſiderable among them. And perceiving that Euphranor heard him with reſpect, he proceeded very fluently. You muſt know, ſaid he, that the mind of Man may be fitly compared to a piece of Land. What ſtubbing, plowing, digging and harrowing is to the one, that thinking, reflecting, examining is to the other. Each hath its proper culture; and as Land that is ſuffered to lie waſte and wild for a long tract of time will be overſpread with bruſh-wood, brambles, thorns and ſuch vegetables which have neither uſe nor beauty; even ſo there will not fail to ſprout up in a neglected uncultivated mind, a great number of pre⯑judices and abſurd opinions, which owe their origin partly to the Soil it ſelf, the paſſions and imperfecti⯑ons of the mind of Man, and partly to thoſe Seeds which chance to be ſcattered in it by every wind of Doctrine, which the cunning of Stateſmen, the ſin⯑gularity of Pedants, the ſuperſtition of Fools or the impoſture of Prieſts ſhall raiſe. Repreſent to your ſelf the mind of Man or humane Nature in general, that for ſo many ages had lain obnoxious to the frauds of deſigning and the follies of weak Men. How it muſt be over-run with prejudices and errors, what firm and deep Roots they muſt have taken, and con⯑ſequently how difficult a task it muſt be to extirpate them? And yet this work no leſs difficult than glo⯑rious is the employment of the modern Free-thinkers. Alciphron having ſaid this made a pauſe, and looked round on the Company. Truly, ſaid I, a very lauda⯑ble undertaking! We think, ſaid Euphranor, that it is praiſe-worthy to clear and ſubdue the earth, to tame brute Animals, to faſhion the outſides of Men, pro⯑vide [7] ſuſtenance for their Bodies, and cure their Mala⯑dies. But what is all this in compariſon of that moſt excellent and uſeful undertaking to free Mankind from their errors, and to improve and adorn their minds? For things of leſs merit towards the world, Altars have been raiſed and Temples built in antient times. Too many in our days, replied Alciphron, are ſuch Fools as not to know their beſt Benefactors from their worſt Enemies. They have a blind reſpect for thoſe who enſlave them, and look upon their Deli⯑verers as a dangerous ſort of Men that wou'd under⯑mine received Principles and Opinions. EUPH. It were a great pity ſuch worthy ingenious Men ſhou'd meet with any diſcouragement. For my part I ſhou'd think, a Man who ſpent his time in ſuch a painful im⯑partial ſearch after Truth a better friend to Mankind than the greateſt Stateſman or Hero, the advantage of whoſe Labours is confined to a little part of the world, and a ſhort ſpace of time, whereas a Ray of Truth may enlighten the whole world and extend to future ages. ALC. It will be ſome time I fear before the common herd think as you do. But the better ſort, the Men of parts and polite Education pay a due re⯑gard to the Patrons of Light and Truth.

III.

EUPH. The Clergy no doubt are on all oc⯑caſions ready to forward and applaud your worthy en⯑deavours. Upon hearing this Lyſicles cou'd hardly re⯑frain from laughing. And Alciphron with an air of pity told Euphranor that he perceived he was unac⯑quainted with the real character of thoſe Men. For, ſaith he, you muſt know that of all Men living they are our greateſt Enemies. If it were poſſible they wou'd extinguiſh the very light of nature, turn the world into a dungeon, and keep mankind for ever in Chains and darkneſs. EUPH. I never imagined any thing like this of our Proteſtant Clergy, particularly thoſe of the eſtabliſhed Church, whom, if I may be allowed to judge by what I have ſeen of them and [8] their writings, I ſhou'd have thought lovers of lear⯑ning and uſeful knowledge. ALC. Take my word for it, Prieſts of all Religions are the ſame, wherever there are Prieſts there will be Prieſtcraft, and where⯑ever there is Prieſtcraft there will be a perſecuting Spirit, which they never fail to exert to the utmoſt of their power againſt all thoſe who have the courage to think for themſelves, and will not ſubmit to be hoodwinked and manacled by their Reverend Leaders. Thoſe great Maſters of Pedantry and Jargon have coined ſeveral Syſtems, which are all equally true and of equal importance to the world. The contending Sects are each alike fond of their own, and alike prone to diſcharge their fury upon all who diſſent from them. Cruelty and Ambition being the darling vices of Prieſts and Churchmen all the world over, they endeavour in all Countries to get an aſcendant over the reſt of mankind, and the Magiſtrate having a joint intereſt with the Prieſt in ſubduing, amuſing, and ſcaring the People, too often lends a hand to the Hie⯑rarchy, who never think their authority and poſſeſſi⯑ons ſecure, ſo long as thoſe who differ from them in opinion are allowed to partake even in the common rights belonging to their birth or ſpecies. To repre⯑ſent the matter in a true light, figure to your ſelves a monſter or ſpectre made up of Superſtition and En⯑thuſiaſm, the joint iſſue of Statecraft and Prieſtcraft, rattling chains in one hand and with the other bran⯑diſhing a flaming Sword over the Land, and menacing deſtruction to all who ſhall dare to follow the dictates of Reaſon and common Senſe. Do but conſider this, and then ſay if there was not danger as well as difficul⯑ty in our undertaking. Yet, ſuch is the generous ar⯑dour that Truth inſpires, our Free-thinkers are nei⯑ther overcome by the one nor daunted by the other. In ſpight of both we have already made ſo many Pro⯑ſelytes among the better ſort, and their numbers in⯑creaſe ſo faſt, that we hope we ſhall be able to carry all before us, beat down the Bulwarks of all Tyranny, [9] Secular of Eccleſiaſtical, break the Fetters and Chains of our Countrymen, and reſtore the original inherent Rights, Liberties, and Prerogatives of Mankind. Euphranor heard this diſcourſe with his mouth open and his eyes fixed upon Alciphron, who, having utter⯑ed it with no ſmall emotion, ſtopt to draw breath and recover himſelf; But finding that no body made an⯑ſwer he reſumed the thread of his diſcourſe, and tur⯑ning to Euphranor ſpoke in a lower note what follows. The more innocent and honeſt a Man is, the more li⯑able is he to be impoſed on by the ſpecious pretences of other Men. You have probably met with certain writings of our Divines that treat of grace, virtue, goodneſs and ſuch matters fit to amuſe and deceive a ſimple honeſt mind. But believe me when I tell you they are all at bottom (however they may gild their deſigns) united by one common principle in the ſame Intereſt. I will not deny there may be here and there a poor half-witted Man that means no miſchief; but this I will be bold to ſay that all the Men of Senſe a⯑mong them are true at bottom to theſe three purſuits of ambition, avarice and revenge.

IV.

While Alciphron was ſpeaking, a Servant came to tell him and Lyſicles, that ſome Men who were go⯑ing to London waited to receive their orders. Where⯑upon they both roſe up and went towards the houſe. They were no ſooner gone, but Euphranor addreſſing himſelf to Crito ſaid, he believed that poor Gentle⯑man had been a great ſufferer for his Free-thinking, for that he ſeemed to expreſs himſelf with the paſſion and Reſentment natural to Men who have received very bad uſage. I believe no ſuch thing, anſwered Crito, but have often obſerved thoſe of his Sect run into two faults of converſation, declaiming and ban⯑tering, juſt as the tragic or the comic humour pre⯑vails. Sometimes they work themſelves into high paſſions and are frightened at Spectres of their own raiſing. In thoſe fits every Country Curate paſſes [10] for an Inquiſitor. At other times they affect a ſly fa⯑cetious manner, making uſe of hints and alluſions, ex⯑preſſing little, inſinuating much, and upon the whole ſeeming to divert themſelves with the Subject and their Adverſaries. But if you wou'd know their opi⯑nions you muſt make them ſpeak out and keep cloſe to the point. Perſecution for Free-thinking is a topic they are apt to enlarge on though without any juſt cauſe, every one being at full liberty to think what he pleaſes, there being no ſuch thing in England that I know as Perſecution for opinion, ſentiment, or thought. But in every Country, I ſuppoſe, ſome care is taken to reſtrain petulant Speech, and, what⯑ever Mens inward thoughts may be, to diſcourage an outward contempt of what the public eſteemeth Sa⯑cred. Whether this care in England hath of late been ſo exceſſive, as to diſtreſs the Subjects of this once free and eaſy Government, whether the Free-thinkers can truly complain of any hardſhip upon the ſcore of conſcience or opinion, you will better be able to judge, when you hear from themſelves an account of the numbers, progreſs and notions of their Sect: which I doubt not they will communicate fully and freely, provided no body preſent ſeem ſhocked or of⯑fended. For in that caſe it is poſſible good manners may put them upon ſome reſerve. Oh! ſaid Euphra⯑nor, I am never angry with any Man for his opinion whether he be Jew, Turk or Idolater, he may ſpeak his mind freely to me without fear of offending. I ſhou'd even be glad to hear what he hath to ſay, pro⯑vided he ſaith it in an ingenuous candid manner. Who⯑ever digs in the Mine of Truth I look on as my Fel⯑low-labourer, but if, while I am taking true pains, he diverts himſelf with teizing me and flinging Duſt in mine Eyes, I ſhall ſoon be tired of him.

V.

In the mean time Alciphron and Lyſicles having diſpatched what they went about returned to us. Ly⯑ſicles ſate down where he had been before. But Alci⯑phron [11] ſtood over-againſt us, with his arms folded a⯑croſs, and his head reclined on the left ſhoulder in the poſture of a Man meditating. We ſate ſilent not to diſturb his thoughts; and after two or three Minutes he uttered theſe words, oh Truth! oh Liberty! after which he remained muſing as before. Upon this Eu⯑phranor took the freedom to interrupt him. Alciphron, ſaid he, it is not fair to ſpend your time in Soliloquies. The converſation of learned and knowing Men is rarely to be met with in this corner, and the opportunity you have put into my Hands I value too much, not to make the beſt uſe of it. ALC. Are you then in ear⯑neſt a Votary of Truth, and is it poſſible you ſhou'd bear the liberty of a fair Inquiry? EUPH. It is what I deſire of all things. ALC. What! upon every Subject? upon the notions you firſt ſucked in with your Milk, and which have been ever ſince nur⯑ſed by parents, paſtors, tutors, religious aſſemblies, books of Devotion and ſuch methods of pre-poſſeſ⯑ſing Mens minds. EUPH. I love information up⯑on all Subjects that come in my way, and eſpecially upon thoſe that are moſt important. ALC. If then you are in earneſt hold fair and ſtand firm, while I probe your prejudices and extirpate your principles.

Having ſaid thus, Alciphron knit his brows and made a ſhort pauſe, after which he proceeded in the fol⯑lowing manner. If we are at the pains to dive and penetrate into the bottom of things, and analyſe Opinions into their firſt principles, we ſhall find that thoſe Opinions which are thought of greateſt conſe⯑quence have the ſlighteſt original, being derived either from the caſual cuſtoms of the Country where we live, or from early inſtruction inſtilled into our tender minds, before we are able to diſcern between right and wrong, true and falſe. The Vulgar (by whom I underſtand all thoſe who do not make a free [12] uſe of their Reaſon) are apt to take theſe prejudices for things ſacred and unqueſtionable, believing them to be imprinted on the hearts of men by God himſelf, or convey'd by Revelation from Heaven, or to carry with them ſo great light and evidence as muſt force an aſſent without any inquiry or examination. Thus the ſhallow Vulgar have their heads furniſhed with ſun⯑dry conceits, principles and doctrines, religious, mo⯑ral and political, all which they maintain with a zeal proportionable to their want of Reaſon. On the other hand, thoſe who duly employ their faculties in the ſearch of Truth, take eſpecial care to weed out of their minds and extirpate all ſuch notions or pre⯑judices as were planted in them before they arrived at the free and intire uſe of Reaſon. This difficult task hath been ſucceſsfully performed by our modern Free-thinkers, who have not only diſſected with great Sagacity the received Syſtems, and traced every eſta⯑bliſhed prejudice to the fountain-head, the true and genuine motives of aſſent: But alſo, having been able to embrace in one comprehenſive view the ſeveral parts and ages of the World, they obſerved a wonder⯑ful variety of Cuſtoms and Rites, of Inſtitutions Re⯑ligious and Civil, of Notions and Opinions very un⯑like and even contrary one to another: A certain ſign they cannot all be true. And yet they are all main⯑tained by their ſeveral Partiſans with the ſame poſitive air and warm zeal, and if examined will be found to bottom on one and the ſame Foundation, the ſtrength of prejudice. By the help of theſe Remarks and Diſcoveries, they have broke through the bands of popular Cuſtom, and having freed themſelves from Impoſture do now generouſly lend a hand to their Fellow Subjects, to lead them into the ſame paths of Light and Liberty. Thus, Gentlemen, I have given you a ſummary account of the views and endeavours of thoſe Men who are called Free-thinkers. If in the courſe of what I have ſaid or ſhall ſay hereafter, there be ſome things contrary to your pre-conceived Opi⯑nions, [13] and therefore ſhocking and diſagreeable, you will pardon the freedom and plainneſs of a Philoſo⯑pher, and conſider that, whatever diſpleaſure I give you of that kind, I do it in ſtrict regard to Truth and Obedience to your own commands. I am very ſenſible, that Eyes long kept in the dark cannot bear a ſudden view of noon day light, but muſt be brought to it by degrees. It is for this Reaſon, the ingenious Gentlemen of our Profeſſion are accuſtomed to pro⯑ceed gradually, beginning with thoſe prejudices to which Men have the leaſt Attachment, and thence proceeding to undermine the reſt by ſlow and inſenſi⯑ble degrees, till they have demoliſhed the whole Fa⯑bric of Human Folly and Superſtition. But the little time I can propoſe to ſpend here obligeth me to take a ſhorter courſe, and be more direct and plain than poſſibly may be thought to ſuit with Prudence and good Manners. Upon this, we aſſured him he was at full liberty to ſpeak his mind of Things, Perſons and Opinions without the leaſt reſerve. It is a liberty, re⯑plied Alciphron, that we Free-thinkers are equally wil⯑ling to give and take. We love to call things by their right Names, and cannot endure that Truth ſhou'd ſuffer through Complaiſance. Let us therefore lay it down for a Preliminary, that no offence be taken at any thing whatſoever ſhall be ſaid on either ſide. To which we all agreed.

VI.

In order then, ſaid Alciphron, to find out the Truth, we will ſuppoſe that I am bred up, for in⯑ſtance in the Church of England. When I come to maturity of Judgment and reflect on the particular Worſhip and Opinions of this Church, I do not re⯑member when or by what means they firſt took poſ⯑ſeſſion of my mind, but there I find them from time immemorial. Then caſting an Eye on the Educati⯑on of Children, from whence I can make a judgment of my own, I obſerve they are inſtructed in religious matters before they can reaſon about them, and con⯑ſequently [14] that all ſuch inſtruction is nothing elſe but filling the tender mind of a Child with prejudices. I do therefore reject all thoſe religious notions, which I conſider as the other Follies of my Childhood. I am confirmed in this way of thinking, when I look a⯑broad into the World, where I obſerve Papiſts and ſe⯑veral Sects of Diſſenters which do all agree in a gene⯑ral profeſſion of Belief in Chriſt, but differ vaſtly one from another in the particulars of Faith and Wor⯑ſhip. I then enlarge my View ſo as to take in Jews and Mahometans, between whom and the Chriſtians I perceive indeed ſome ſmall agreement in the Belief of one God; but then they have each their diſtinct Laws and Revelations, for which they expreſs the ſame regard. But extending my view ſtill further to Heatheniſh and Idolatrous Nations I diſcover an end⯑leſs variety, not only in particular Opinions and Modes of Worſhip, but even in the very notion of a Deity, wherein they widely differ one from another, and from all the forementioned Sects. Upon the whole, inſtead of Truth ſimple and uniform I perceive no⯑thing but Diſcord, Oppoſition and wild Pretenſions, all ſpringing from the ſame ſource to wit the prejudice of Education. From ſuch reaſonings and reflections as theſe, thinking Men have concluded that all Reli⯑gions are alike falſe and fabulous. One is a Chriſtian, another a Jew, a third a Mahometan, a fourth an Ido⯑latrous Gentile, but all from one and the ſame reaſon, becauſe they happen to be bred up each in his reſpec⯑tive Sect. In the ſame manner, therefore, as each of theſe contending Parties condemns the reſt, ſo an un⯑prejudiced ſtander-by will condemn and reject them all together, obſerving that they all draw their origin from the ſame fallacious Principle, and are carried on by the ſame Artifice to anſwer the ſame ends of the Prieſt and the Magiſtrate.

VII.

EUPH. You hold then that the Magi⯑ſtrate concurs with the Prieſt in impoſing on the Peo⯑ple. [15] ALC. I do, and ſo muſt every one who con⯑ſiders things in a true light. For you muſt know, the Magiſtrates principal aim is to keep the People under him in awe. Now the public Eye reſtrains Men from open Offences againſt the Laws and Govern⯑ment. But to prevent ſecret Tranſgreſſions a Magi⯑ſtrate finds it expedient, that Men ſhou'd believe there is an Eye of Providence watching over their private Actions and Deſigns. And, to intimidate thoſe who might otherwiſe be drawn into Crimes by the proſ⯑pect of Pleaſure and Profit, he gives them to under⯑ſtand, that whoever eſcapes Puniſhment in this Life will be ſure to find it in the next, and that ſo heavy and laſting as infinitely to over-balance the Pleaſure and Profit accruing from his Crimes. Hence the Be⯑lief of a God, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future ſtate of Rewards and Puniſhments have been eſteemed uſeful Engines of Government. And to the end that theſe notional airy Doctrines might make a ſenſible impreſſion, and be retained on the minds of Men, skilful Rulers have in the ſeveral civilized Na⯑tions of the Earth deviſed Temples, Sacrifices, Churches, Rites, Ceremonies, Habits, Muſic, Prayer, Preaching, and the like ſpiritual trumpery, whereby the Prieſt maketh temporal gains, and the Magiſtrate findeth his account in frightening and ſub⯑duing the People. This is the original of the Combi⯑nation between Church and State, of Religion by Law eſtabliſhed, of rights, immunities and incomes of Prieſts all over the World: There being no Go⯑vernment but wou'd have you fear God that you may honour the King or civil Power. And you will ever obſerve that politic Princes keep up a good under⯑ſtanding with their Clergy, to the end that they in re⯑turn, by inculcating Religion and Loyalty into the minds of the People, may render them tame, timorous and ſlaviſh. Crito and I heard this Diſcourſe of Alci⯑phron with the utmoſt attention, though without any appearance of ſurprize, there being indeed nothing [16] in it to us new or unexpected. But Euphranor, who had never before been preſent at ſuch Converſation, cou'd not help ſhewing ſome Aſtoniſhment, which Lyſicles obſerving, asked him with a lively Air, how he liked Alciphron's Lecture. It is, ſaid he, the firſt I believe that you ever heard of the kind, and requireth a ſtrong Stomach to digeſt it. EUPH. I will own to you that my Digeſtion is none of the quickeſt; but it hath ſometimes, by degrees, been able to maſter things which at firſt appeared indigeſtible. At pre⯑ſent I admire the free Spirit and Eloquence of Alci⯑phron, but, to ſpeak the Truth, I am rather aſtoni⯑ſhed, than convinced of the Truth of his Opinions. How (ſaid he turning to Alciphron) is it then poſſible you ſhou'd not believe the Being of a God? ALC. To be plain with you, I do not.

VIII.

But this is what I foreſaw, a Flood of Light let in at once upon the Mind being apt to dazzle and diſorder, rather than enlighten it. Was I not pinched in Time, the regular way would be to have begun with the Circumſtantials of Religion, next to have attacked the Myſteries of Chriſtianity, after that proceeded to the practical Doctrines, and in the laſt place to have extirpated that which of all other reli⯑gious Prejudices, being the firſt taught, and Baſis of the reſt, hath taken the deepeſt root in our Minds, I mean the Belief of a God. I do not wonder it ſticks with you, having known ſeveral very ingenious Men who found it difficult to free themſelves from this Prejudice. EUPH. All Men have not the ſame Alacrity and Vigour in thinking: for my own part, I find it a hard matter to keep pace with you. ALC. To help you, I will go a little way back, and reſume the Thread of my Reaſoning. Firſt I muſt acquaint you, That having applied my Mind to contemplate the Idea of Truth, I diſcovered it to be of a ſtable, permanent, and uniform nature; not various and changeable, like Modes or Faſhions, and things de⯑pending [17] on Fancy. In the next place, having obſerved ſeveral Sects and Subdiviſions of Sects eſpouſing very different and contrary Opinions, and yet all profeſſing Chriſtianity, I rejected thoſe Points wherein they diffe⯑red, retaining only that which was agreed to by all, and ſo became a Latitudinarian. Having afterwards, up⯑on a more enlarged View of things, perceived that Chriſtians, Jews, and Mahometans had each their dif⯑ferent Syſtems of Faith, agreeing only in the Belief of one God, I became a Deiſt. Laſtly, extending my View to all the other various Nations which inhabit this Globe, and finding they agreed in no one Point of Faith, but differed one from another, as well as from the forementioned Sects, even in the Notion of a God, in which there is as great Diverſity as in the Methods of Worſhip, I thereupon became an Atheiſt: it being my Opinion that a Man of Courage and Senſe ſhou'd follow his Argument wherever it leads him, and that nothing is more ridiculous than to be a Free-thinker by halves. I approve the Man who makes thorough Work, and not content with lop⯑ping off the Branches, extirpates the very Root from which they ſprung.

IX.

Atheiſm therefore, that Bugbear of Women and Fools, is the very Top and Perfection of Free-thinking. It is the grand Arcanum to which a true Genius naturally riſeth, by a certain Climax or Gra⯑dation of Thought, and without which he can never poſſeſs his Soul in abſolute Liberty and Repoſe. For your thorough Conviction in this main Article, do but examine the Notion of a God with the ſame Freedom that you would other Prejudices. Trace it to the fountain-head, and you ſhall not find that you had it by any of your Senſes, the only true means of diſ⯑covering what is real and ſubſtantial in Nature: You will find it lying amongſt other old Lumber in ſome obſcure corner of the Imagination, the proper Re⯑ceptacle of Viſions, Fancies, and Prejudices of all [18] kinds; and if you are more attached to this than the reſt, it is only becauſe it is the oldeſt. This is all, take my Word for it, and not mine only, but that of many more the moſt ingenious Men of the Age, who, I can aſſure you, think as I do on the Subject of a Deity. Though ſome of them hold it proper, to proceed with more Reſerve in declaring to the World their Opinion in this Particular, than in moſt others. And it muſt be owned, there are ſtill too many in Eng⯑land who retain a fooliſh Prejudice againſt the Name of Atheiſt. But it leſſens every Day among the bet⯑ter ſort: and when it is quite worn out, our Free-thinkers may then, (and not till then) be ſaid to have given the finiſhing Stroke to Religion; it being evi⯑dent that ſo long as the Exiſtence of God is believed, Religion muſt ſubſiſt in ſome Shape or other. But the Root being once plucked up, the Scions which ſhot from it will of courſe wither and decay. Such are all thoſe whimſical Notions of Conſcience, Duty, Principle, and the like, which fill a Man's Head with Scruples, awe him with Fears, and make him a more thorough Slave than the Horſe he rides. A Man had better a thouſand times be hunted by Bailiffs or Meſ⯑ſengers than haunted by theſe Spectres, which emba⯑raſs and embitter all his Pleaſures, creating the moſt real and ſore Servitude upon Earth. But the Free-thinker, with a vigorous flight of Thought breaks through thoſe airy Springes, and aſſerts his original Independency. Others indeed may talk, and write, and fight about Liberty, and make an outward Pre⯑tence to it, but the Free-thinker alone is truly free. Alciphron having ended this Diſcourſe with an Air of Triumph, Euphranor ſpoke to him in the following Manner. You make clear Work. The Gentlemen of your Profeſſion are, it ſeems, admirable Weeders. You have rooted up a world of Notions, I ſhou'd be glad to ſee what fine things you have planted in their ſtead. ALC. Have Patience, good Euphranor. I will ſhew you in the firſt place, That whatever was [19] ſound and good we leave untouched, and encourage it to grow in the Mind of Man. And ſecondly, I will ſhew you what excellent things we have planted in it. You muſt know then, that purſuing our cloſe and ſevere Scrutiny, we do at laſt arrive at ſomething ſolid and real, in which all Mankind agree, to wit, the Appetites, Paſſions, and Senſes: Theſe are found⯑ed in Nature, are real, have real Objects, and are at⯑tended with real and ſubſtantial Pleaſures; Food, Drink, Sleep, and the like animal Enjoyments be⯑ing what all Men like and love. And if we extend our view to the other kinds of Animals, we ſhall find them all agree in this, that they have certain na⯑tural Appetites and Senſes, in the gratifying and ſatiſ⯑fying of which they are conſtantly employ'd. Now theſe real natural good things which include nothing of Notion or Fancy, we are ſo far from deſtroying, that we do all we can to cheriſh and improve them. According to us, every wiſe Man looks upon him⯑ſelf, or his own bodily Exiſtence in this preſent World, as the Center and ultimate End of all his Ac⯑tions and Regards. He conſiders his Appetites as na⯑tural Guides directing to his proper Good, his Paſſi⯑ons and Senſes as the natural true Means of enjoying this Good. Hence he endeavours to keep his Appe⯑tites in high Reliſh, his Paſſions and Senſes ſtrong and lively, and to provide the greateſt Quantity and Va⯑riety of real Objects ſuited to them, which he ſtudi⯑eth to enjoy by all poſſible means, and in the higheſt Perfection imaginable. And the Man who can do this without Reſtraint, Remorſe, or Fear, is as hap⯑py as any other Animal whatſoever, or as his Nature is capable of being. Thus I have given you a ſuc⯑cinct View of the Principles, Diſcoveries, and Te⯑nets of the ſelect Spirits of this enlightned Age.

X.

Crito remarked, that Alciphron had ſpoke his Mind with great Clearneſs. Yes, replied Euphranor, we are obliged to the Gentleman for letting us at once [20] into the Tenets of his Sect. But, if I may be allow⯑ed to ſpeak my Mind, Alciphron, though in compli⯑ance with my own Requeſt, hath given me no ſmall Uneaſineſs. You need, ſaid Alciphron, make no A⯑pology for ſpeaking freely what you think to one who profeſſeth himſelf a Free-thinker. I ſhou'd be ſorry to make one, whom I meant to oblige, uneaſy. Pray let me know wherein I have offended. I am half a⯑ſhamed, replied Euphranor, to own that I who am no great Genius have a Weakneſs incidental to little ones. I wou'd ſay that I have favourite Opinions, which you repreſent to be Errors and Prejudices. For In⯑ſtance, the Immortality of the Soul is a Notion I am fond of, as what ſupports the Mind with a very plea⯑ſing Proſpect. And if it be an Error, I ſhou'd per⯑haps be of Tully's Mind, who in that Caſe profeſſed he ſhou'd be ſorry to know the Truth, acknowledg⯑ing no ſort of Obligation to certain Philoſophers in his Days, who taught the Soul of Man was mortal. They were, it ſeems, Predeceſſors to thoſe who are now called Free-thinkers; which Name being too general and indefinite, inaſmuch as it comprehends all thoſe who think for themſelves, whether they agree in Opinon with theſe Gentlemen or no, it ſhou'd not ſeem amiſs to aſſign them a ſpecific Appellation or peculiar Name, whereby to diſtinguiſh them from other Philoſophers, at leaſt in our preſent Conference. For I cannot bear to argue againſt Free-thinking and Free-thinkers. ALC. In the Eyes of a wiſe Man Words are of ſmall moment. We do not think Truth attached to a Name. EUPH. If you pleaſe then, to avoid Confuſion, let us call your Sect by the ſame Name that Tully (who underſtood the force of Lan⯑guage) beſtow'd upon them. ALC. With all my heart. Pray what may that Name be? EUPH. Why, he calls them Minute Philoſophers. Right, ſaid Crito, the modern Free-thinkers are the very ſame with thoſe Cicero called Minute Philoſophers, which Name admirably ſuits them, they being a ſort [21] of Sect which diminiſh all the moſt valuable things, the thoughts, views, and hopes of Men; all the Knowledge, Notions, and Theories of the Mind they reduce to Senſe; Humane Nature they contract and degrade to the narrow low Standard of Animal Life, and aſſign us only a ſmall pittance of Time in⯑ſtead of Immortality. Alciphron very gravely re⯑mark'd, That the Gentlemen of his Sect had done no injury to Man, and that if he be a little, ſhort-lived, contemptible Animal, it was not their ſaying it made him ſo: And they were no more to blame for what⯑ever defects they diſcover, than a faithful Glaſs for making the wrinkles which it only ſhews. As to what you obſerve, ſaid he, of thoſe we now call Free-thinkers having been anciently termed Minute Philo⯑ſophers, it is my opinion this Appellation might be derived from their conſidering things minutely, and not ſwallowing them in the groſs, as other Men are uſed to do. Beſides, we all know the beſt Eyes are neceſſary to diſcern the minuteſt Objects: It ſeems therefore, that Minute Philoſophers might have been ſo called from their diſtinguiſhed perſpicacity. EUPH. O Alciphron! theſe Minute Philoſophers (ſince that is their true Name) are a ſort of Pirates who plunder all that come in their way. I conſider my ſelf as a Man left ſtript and deſolate on a bleak Beach.

XI.

But who are theſe profound and learned Men that of late Years have demoliſhed the whole Fabric which Law-givers, Philoſophers and Divines had been erecting for ſo many Ages? Lyſicles hearing theſe words, ſmiled, and ſaid he believed Euphranor had figured to himſelf Philoſophers in ſquare caps and long gowns: but, thanks to theſe happy Times, the Reign of Pedantry was over. Our Philoſophers, ſaid he, are of a very different kind from thoſe auk⯑ward Students, who think to come at Knowledge by poring on dead Languages, and old Authors, or [22] by ſequeſtring themſelves from the Cares of the World to meditate in Solitude and Retirement. They are the beſt bred Men of the Age, Men who know the World, Men of pleaſure, Men of faſhion, and fine Gentlemen. EUPH. I have ſome ſmall notion of the People you mention, but ſhou'd never have taken them for Philoſophers. CRI. Nor wou'd any one elſe till of late. The World it ſeems was long under a miſtake about the way to Knowledge, think⯑ing it lay through a tedious courſe of Academical E⯑ducation and Study. But among the Diſcoveries of the preſent Age, one of the principal is the finding out that ſuch a Method doth rather retard and ob⯑ſtruct, than promote Knowledge. ALC. Acade⯑mical Study may be compriſed in two points, Read⯑ing and Meditation. Their Reading is chiefly em⯑ploy'd on ancient Authors in dead Languages: ſo that a great part of their Time is ſpent in learning Words; which, when they have maſtered with infinite pains, what do they get by it but old and obſelete Notions, that are now quite exploded and out of uſe? Then, as to their Meditations, what can they poſſibly be good for? He that wants the proper Materials of Thought, may think and meditate for ever to no purpoſe: Thoſe Cobwebs ſpun by Scholars out of their own Brains being alike unſerviceable, either for Uſe or Ornament. Proper Ideas or Materials are on⯑ly to be got by frequenting good Company. I know ſeveral Gentlemen, who, ſince their Appearance in the World, have ſpent as much time in rubbing off the ruſt and pedantry of a College Education, as they had done before in acquiring it. LYS. I'll un⯑dertake, a Lad of fourteen, bred in the modern way, ſhall make a better Figure, and be more conſidered in any Drawing-Room or Aſſembly of polite People, than one of four and twenty, who hath lain by a long time at School and College. He ſhall ſay better things, in a better manner, and be more liked by good Judges. EUPH. Where doth he pick up all this Improve⯑ment? [23] CRI. Where our grave Anceſtors wou'd ne⯑ver have look'd for it, in a Drawing-Room, a Coffee-Houſe, a Chocolate-Houſe, at the Tavern, or Groom-Porter's. In theſe and the like faſhionable Places of Reſort, it is the Cuſtom for polite Perſons to ſpeak freely on all Subjects, religious, moral, or political. So that a young Gentleman who frequents them is in the way of hearing many inſtructive Lec⯑tures, ſeaſoned with Wit and Raillery, and uttered with Spirit. Three or four Sentences from a Man of quality ſpoke with a good Air, make more Impreſſi⯑on, and convey more Knowledge, than a dozen Diſ⯑ſertations in a dry Academical way. EUPH. There is then no Method or Courſe of Studies in thoſe Places. LYS. None but an eaſy free Converſation, which takes in every thing that offers, without any Rule or Deſign. EUPH. I always thought that ſome Order was neceſſary to attain any uſeful degree of Knowledge, that Haſte and Confuſion begat a conceited Ignorance, that to make our Advances ſure, they ſhou'd be gradual, and thoſe Points firſt learned which might caſt a light on what was to follow. ALC. So long as Learning was to be obtained only by that ſlow formal courſe of Study, few of the bet⯑ter ſort knew much of it; but now it is grown an Amuſement, our young Gentry and Nobility imbibe it inſenſibly amidſt their Diverſions, and make a con⯑ſiderable Progreſs. EUPH. Hence probably the great number of Minute Philoſophers. CRI. It is to this that Sect is owing for ſo many ingenious Pro⯑ficients of both Sexes. You may now commonly ſee (what no former Age ever ſaw) a young Lady, or a Petit Maitre nonplus a Divine or an old-faſhioned Gentleman, who hath read many a Greek and Latin Author, and ſpent much Time in hard methodical Study. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem then that Method, Exactneſs, and Induſtry are a Diſadvantage. Here Alciphron, turning to Lyſicles, ſaid he cou'd make the point very clear, if Euphranor had any notion of [24] Painting. EUPH. I never ſaw a firſt-rate Picture in my Life, but have a tolerable Collection of Prints, and have ſeen ſome good Drawings. ALC. You know then the difference between the Dutch and the Italian manner. EUPH. I have ſome notion of it. ALC. Suppoſe now a Drawing finiſhed by the nice and laborious Touches of a Dutch Pencil, and ano⯑ther off hand ſcratched out in the free manner of a great Italian Maſter. The Dutch Piece, which hath coſt ſo much pains and time will be exact indeed, but without that Force, Spirit, or Grace, which appear in the other, and are the Effects of an eaſy free Pen⯑cil. Do but apply this, and the Point will be clear. EUPH. Pray inform me, did thoſe great Italian Ma⯑ſters begin and proceed in their Art without any choice of Method or Subject, and always draw with the ſame eaſe and freedom? Or did they obſerve ſome Method, beginning with ſimple and elementary parts, an Eye, a Noſe, a Finger, which they drew with great pains and care, often drawing the ſame thing, in order to draw it correctly, and ſo proceeding with Patience and Induſtry, till after a conſiderable length of Time they arrived at the free maſterly manner you ſpeak of. If this were the Caſe, I leave you to make the Application. ALC. You may diſpute the Mat⯑ter if you pleaſe. But a Man of parts is one thing, and a Pedant another. Pains and Method may do for ſome ſort of People. A Man muſt be a long time kindling wet Straw into a vile ſmothering Flame, but Spirits blaze out at once. EUPH. The Minute Philoſophers have, it ſeems, better Parts than other Men, which qualifies them for a different Education. ALC. Tell me, Euphranor, what is it that gives one Man a better Mien than another; more Politeneſs in Dreſs, Speech, and Motion? Nothing but frequen⯑ting good Company. By the ſame means Men get inſenſibly a delicate Taſte, a refined Judgment, a cer⯑tain Politeneſs in thinking and expreſſing one's ſelf. No wonder if you Countrymen are ſtrangers to the [25] Advantage of polite Converſation, which conſtant⯑ly keeps the Mind awake and active, exerciſing its Faculties, and calling forth all its Strength and Spirit on a thouſand different Occaſions and Subjects, that never came in the way of a Book-worm in a College, no more than of a Ploughman. CRI. Hence thoſe lively Faculties, that quickneſs of Apprehenſion, that ſlyneſs of Ridicule, that egregious Talent of Wit and Humour which diſtinguiſh the Gentlemen of your Profeſſion. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem then that your Sect is made up of what you call fine Gen⯑tlemen. LYS. Not altogether, for we have among us ſome contemplative Spirits of a coarſer Education, who, from obſerving the Behaviour and Proceedings of Apprentices, Watermen, Porters, and the Aſ⯑ſemblies of Rabble in the Streets, have arrived at a profound Knowledge of Humane Nature, and made great Diſcoveries about the Principles, Springs, and Motives of moral Actions. Theſe have demoliſhed the received Syſtems, and done a world of good in the City. ALC. I tell you we have Men of all Sorts and Profeſſions, plodding Citizens, thriving Stockjobbers, skilful Men in Buſineſs, polite Cour⯑tiers, gallant Men of the Army; but our chief Strength and Flower of the Flock are thoſe promiſing young Men who have the Advantage of a modern Educati⯑on. Theſe are the growing Hopes of our Sect, by whoſe Credit and Influence in a few Years we expect to ſee thoſe great things accompliſhed that we have in view. EUPH. I cou'd never have imagined your Sect ſo conſiderable. ALC. There are in Eng⯑land many honeſt Folk as much in the dark about theſe matters as your ſelves.

XII.

To judge of the prevailing Opinion among People of faſhion, by what a Senator ſaith in the Houſe, a Judge upon the Bench, or a Prieſt in the Pulpit, who all ſpeak according to Law, that is, to the reverend prejudices of our Fore-fathers, wou'd [24] [...] [25] [...] [26] be wrong. You ſhould go into good Company, and mind what Men of parts and breeding ſay, thoſe who are beſt heard and moſt admired as well in public places of reſort, as in private viſits. He only who hath theſe opportunities, can know our real ſtrength, our numbers and the figure that we make. EUPH. By your account there muſt be many Minute Philoſo⯑phers among the Men of Rank and Fortune. ALC. Take my word for it, not a few, and they do much contribute to the ſpreading our notions. For he who knows the World muſt obſerve, that faſhions con⯑ſtantly deſcend. It is therefore the right way to pro⯑pagate an Opinion from the upper end. Not to ſay that the Patronage of ſuch Men is an encouragement to our Authors. EUPH. It ſeems then you have Authors among you. LYS. That we have ſeveral, and thoſe very great Men who have obliged the World with many uſeful and profound diſcoveries. CRI. Moſchon for inſtance hath proved that Man and Beaſt are really of the ſame nature: That conſe⯑quently a Man need only indulge his Senſes and Ap⯑petites to be as happy as a Brute. Gorgias hath gone further, demonſtrating Man to be a piece of Clock⯑work or Machine: and that Thought or Reaſon are the ſame thing as the impulſe of one Ball againſt ano⯑ther. Cimon hath made noble uſe of theſe diſcove⯑ries, proving as clearly as any propoſition in Mathe⯑matics, that conſcience is a whim and morality a pre⯑judice: and that a Man is no more accountable for his actions than a Clock is for ſtriking. Tryphon hath written irrefragably on the uſefulneſs of vice. Thra⯑ſenor hath confuted the fooliſh prejudice Men had a⯑gainſt Atheiſm, ſhewing that a republick of Atheiſts might live very happily together. Demylus hath made a jeſt of Loyalty, and convinced the World there is nothing in it: To him and another Philoſo⯑pher of the ſame ſtamp this age is indebted for diſco⯑vering, that public Spirit is an idle Enthuſiaſm which ſeizeth only on weak minds. It wou'd be endleſs to [27] recount the Diſcoveries made by writers of this Sect. LYS. But the Maſter-piece and finiſhing Stroke is a learned Anecdote of our great Diagoras, containing a demonſtration againſt the Being of God; which it is convinced the public is not yet ripe for. But I am aſſured by ſome judicious Friends who have ſeen it, that it is as clear as Day-light, and will do a world of good, at one blow demoliſhing the whole Syſtem of Religion. Theſe diſcoveries are publiſhed by our Philoſophers, ſometimes in juſt Volumes, but often in Phamphlets and looſe Papers for their readier con⯑veyance through the Kingdom. And to them muſt be aſcribed that abſolute and independent freedom, which groweth ſo faſt to the terrour of all Bigots. Even the dull and ignorant begin to open their Eyes, and be influenced by the example and authority of ſo many ingenious Men. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem by this account that your Sect extend their diſcoveries beyond Religion; and that Loyalty to his Prince or Reverence for the Laws are but mean things in the Eye of a Minute Philoſopher. LYS. Very mean, we are too wiſe to think there is any thing Sacred either in King or Conſtitution, or indeed in any thing elſe. A Man of Senſe may perhaps ſeem to pay an occaſional regard to his Prince, but this is no more at bottom than what he pays to God when he kneels at the Sacrament to qualify himſelf himſelf for an Office. Fear God, and honour the King, are a pair of ſlaviſh maxims, which had for a long time crampt Human Nature, and awed not on⯑ly weak minds but even Men of good Underſtanding, till their Eyes, as I obſerved before, were opened by our Philoſophers. EUPH. Methinks I can eaſily comprehend that, when the fear of God is quite ex⯑tinguiſhed, the mind muſt be very eaſy with reſpect to other Duties, which become outward pretences and formalities, from the moment that they quit their hold upon the Conſcience, and Conſcience al⯑ways ſuppoſeth the Being of a God. But I ſtill [28] thought that Engliſhmen of all denominations (how widely ſoever they differ as to ſome particular points) agreed in the Belief of a God, and of ſo much at leaſt, as is called natural Religion. ALC. I have alrea⯑dy told you my own Opinion of thoſe matters, and what I know to be the Opinion of many more. CRI. Probably, Euphranor, by the title of Deiſts, which is ſometimes given to Minute Philoſophers, you have been miſ-led to imagine they believe and worſhip a God according to the light of Nature: but by living among them, you may ſoon be convinced of the con⯑trary. They have neither time nor place, nor form of Divine worſhip; they offer neither Prayers nor Praiſes to God in public; and in their private prac⯑tice ſhew a contempt or diſlike even of the Duties of natural Religion. For inſtance, the ſaying Grace before and after meals is a plain point of natural worſhip, and was once univerſally practiſed, but in proportion as this Sect prevailed it hath been laid aſide, not only by the Minute Philoſophers them⯑ſelves, who wou'd be infinitely aſhamed of ſuch a weakneſs as to beg God's bleſſing, or give God thanks for their daily Food; but alſo by others who are afraid of being thought Fools by the Minute Phi⯑loſophers. EUPH. Is it poſſible that Men, who really believe a God, ſhou'd yet decline paying ſo eaſy and reaſonable a Duty for fear of incurring the contempt of Atheiſts? CRI. I tell you there are many, who believing in their Hearts the truth of Re⯑ligion, are yet afraid or aſhamed to own it, leſt they ſhou'd forfeit their Reputation with thoſe who have the good luck to paſs for great wits and Men of genius. ALC. O Euphranor, we muſt make allow⯑ance for Crito's prejudice: he is a worthy Gentle⯑man and means well. But doth it not look like pre⯑judice to aſcribe the reſpect that is paid our ingenious Free-thinkers rather to good luck than to merit? EUPH. I acknowledge their merit to be very won⯑derful, and that thoſe Authors muſt needs be great [29] Men who are able to prove ſuch Paradoxes: for ex⯑ample, That ſo knowing a Man as a Minute Philoſo⯑pher ſhou'd be a meer Machine, or at beſt no better than a Brute. ALC. It is a true maxim, that a Man ſhou'd think with the Learned and ſpeak with the Vulgar. I ſhou'd be loth to place a Gentleman of merit in ſuch a light, before prejudiced and ignorant Men. The tenets of our Philoſophy have this in com⯑mon with many other Truths, in Metaphyſics, Geo⯑metry, Aſtronomy and natural Philoſophy, that vul⯑gar ears cannot bear them. All our diſcoveries and notions are in themſelves true and certain; but they are at preſent known only to the better ſort, and wou'd ſound ſtrange and odd among the Vulgar. But this, it is to be hoped, will wear off with time. EUPH. I do not wonder that vulgar minds ſhou'd be ſtartled at the notions of your Philoſophy. CRI. Truly a very curious ſort of Philoſophy, and much to be admired!

XIII.

The profound Thinkers of this way have taken a direct contrary courſe to all the great Philo⯑ſophers of former ages, who made it their Endea⯑vour to raiſe and refine Humane Kind, and remove it as far as poſſible from the Brute; to moderate and ſubdue Mens Appetites; to remind them of the dig⯑nity of their nature; to awaken and improve their ſuperior Faculties and direct them to the nobleſt Ob⯑jects; to poſſeſs Mens minds with a high Senſe of the Divinity, of the ſupreme Good, and the Immortali⯑ty of the Soul. They took great pains to ſtrengthen the Obligations to Virtue, and upon all thoſe Sub⯑jects have wrought out noble Theories, and treated with ſingular force of Reaſon. But it ſeems our Minute Philoſophers act the reverſe of all other wiſe and thinking Men; it being their end and aim to eraſe the Principles of all that is great and good from the mind of Man, to unhinge all order of civil Life, to undermine the foundations of morality, and, in⯑ſtead [30] of improving and ennobling our natures, to bring us down to the maxims and way of thinking of the moſt uneducated and barbarous nations, and even to degrade Humane Kind to a level with Brute Beaſts. And all the while they wou'd paſs upon the World for Men of deep Knowledge. But in effect what is all this negative Knowledge better than downright ſa⯑vage Ignorance? That there is no Providence, no Spi⯑rit, no future State, no moral Duty: truly a fine Sy⯑ſtem for an honeſt Man to own, or an ingenious Man to value himſelf upon! Alciphron who heard this diſcourſe with ſome uneaſineſs very gravely replied. Diſputes are not to be decided by the weight of Au⯑thority, but by the force of Reaſon. You may paſs, indeed, general reflexions on our notions and call them brutal and barbarous if you pleaſe: But it is ſuch brutality and ſuch barbariſm as few cou'd have attained to if Men of the greateſt Genius had not broke the Ice, there being nothing more difficult than to get the better of Education, and conquer old prejudices. To remove and caſt off a heap of Rub⯑biſh that has been gathering upon the Soul from our very infancy, requires great courage and great ſtrength of Faculties. Our Philoſophers therefore, do well deſerve the name of Eſprits forts, Men of ſtrong heads, Free-thinkers and ſuch like Appellations betokening great force and liberty of mind. It is very poſſible, the Heroic Labours of theſe Men may be repreſented (for what is not capable of miſrepre⯑ſentation?) as a piratical plundering and ſtripping the mind of its wealth and ornaments, when it is in truth the diveſting it only of its prejudices, and re⯑ducing it to its untainted original State of Nature. Oh Nature! the genuine Beauty of pure Nature! EUPH. You ſeem very much taken with the Beau⯑ty of Nature. Be pleaſed to tell me, Alciphron, what thoſe things are which you eſteem natural, or by what mark I may know them.

XIV.

ALC. For a thing to be natural, for inſtance to the mind of Man, it muſt appear originally there⯑in, it muſt be univerſally in all Men, it muſt be inva⯑riably the ſame in all Nations and Ages. Theſe limi⯑tations of original, univerſal and invariable exclude all thoſe notions found in the Humane Mind, which are the effect of Cuſtom and Education. The caſe is the ſame with reſpect to all other Species of Beings. A Cat, for example, hath a natural inclination to pur⯑ſue a Mouſe, becauſe it agrees with the forementioned marks. But if a Cat be taught to play tricks, you will not ſay thoſe tricks are natural. For the ſame reaſon if upon a Plumbtree, Peaches and Apricots are engrafted, no body will ſay they are the natural growth of the Plumbtree. EUPH. But to return to Man: It ſeems you allow thoſe things alone to be natural to him, which ſhew themſelves upon his firſt entrance into the World; to wit the Senſes and ſuch Paſſions and Appetites as are diſcovered upon the firſt applica⯑tion of their reſpective objects. ALC. That is my opinion. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, if from a young Apple-tree after a certain period of time there ſhou'd ſhoot forth Leaves, Bloſſoms and Apples; wou'd you deny theſe things to be natural, becauſe they did not diſcover and diſplay themſelves in the tender bud? ALC. I wou'd not. EUPH. And ſuppoſe that in a Man after a certain ſeaſon, the Ap⯑petite of Luſt or the Faculty of Reaſon ſhall ſhoot forth, open and diſplay themſelves as Leaves and Bloſſoms do in a Tree; wou'd you therefore deny them to be natural to him, becauſe they did not ap⯑pear in his original infancy? ALC. I acknowledge I wou'd not. EUPH. It ſeems therefore, that the firſt mark of a thing's being natural to the mind was not warily laid down by you; to wit, that it ſhou'd appear originally in it. ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Again, inform me, Alciphron, whether you do not think it natural for an Orange-plant to produce O⯑ranges? ALC. I do. EUPH. But plant it in the [32] North end of Great Britain, and it ſhall with care pro⯑duce, perhaps, a good Sallad; in the Southern parts of the ſame Iſland, it may with much pains and cul⯑ture thrive and produce indifferent Fruit; but in Portugal or Naples it will produce much better with little or no pains. Is this true or not? ALC. It is true. EUPH. The Plant being the ſame in all pla⯑ces doth not produce the ſame Fruit, Sun, Soil, and Cultivation making a difference. ALC. I grant it. EUPH. And ſince the caſe is, you ſay the ſame with reſpect to all Species; why may we not conclude by a parity of reaſon that things may be natural to Hu⯑man Kind, and yet neither found in all Men, nor in⯑variably the ſame where they are found? ALC. Hold, Euphranor, you muſt explain yourſelf further. I ſhall not be over haſty in my conceſſions. LYS. You are in the right, Alciphron, to ſtand upon your guard. I do not like theſe enſnaring Queſtions. EUPH. I deſire you to make no conceſſions in com⯑plaiſance to me, but only to tell me your opinion upon each particular, that we may underſtand one another, know wherein we agree, and proceed joint⯑ly in finding out the Truth. But (added Euphranor turning to Crito and me) if the Gentlemen are againſt a free and fair inquiry, I ſhall give them no further trouble. ALC. Our Opinions will ſtand the teſt. We fear no trial, proceed as you pleaſe. EUPH. It ſeems then that from what you have granted it ſhou'd follow, Things may be natural to Men, al⯑though they do not actually ſhew themſelves in all Men, nor in equal perfection; there being as great difference of culture and every other advantage with reſpect to Humane Nature, as is to be found with re⯑ſpect to the vegetable nature of Plants, to uſe your own ſimilitude, Is it ſo or not? ALC. It is. EUPH. Anſwer me, Alciphron, do not Men in all times and places when they arrive at a certain Age expreſs their Thoughts by Speech? ALC. They do. EUPH. Shou'd it not ſeem then that Language is natural? [33] ALC. It ſhou'd. EUPH. And yet there is a great variety of Languages. ALC. I acknowledge there is. EUPH. From all this will it not follow a thing may be natural and yet admit of variety? ALC. I grant it will. EUPH. Shou'd it not ſeem there⯑fore to follow, that a thing may be natural to Man⯑kind, though it have not thoſe marks or conditions aſſigned; though it be not original, univerſal and in⯑variable? ALC. It ſhou'd. EUPH. And that conſequently religious Worſhip and civil Govern⯑ment may be natural to Man, notwithſtanding they admit of ſundry forms and different degrees of Per⯑fection? ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. You have granted already that Reaſon is natural to Mankind. ALC. I have. EUPH. Whatever therefore is a⯑greeable to Reaſon is agreeable to the nature of Man. ALC. It is. EUPH. Will it not follow from hence that Truth and Virtue are natural to Man? ALC. Whatever is reaſonable I admit to be natu⯑ral. EUPH. And as thoſe Fruits which grow from the moſt generous and mature ſtock, in the choiceſt, ſoil, and with the beſt culture, are moſt eſteemed; even ſo ought we not to think, thoſe ſublime Truths which are the Fruits of mature Thought, and have been rationally deduced by Men of the beſt and moſt improved underſtandings, to be the choiceſt productions of the rational nature of Man? And if ſo, being in fact reaſonable, natu⯑ral and true, they ought not to be eſteemed unnatu⯑ral whims, errors of education and groundleſs pre⯑judices, becauſe they are raiſed and forwarded by manuring and cultivating our tender minds, becauſe they take early root and ſprout forth betimes by the care and diligence of our Inſtructors. ALC. Agreed, provided ſtill they may be rationally dedu⯑ced: But to take this for granted, of what Men vulgarly call the Truths of Morality and Religion wou'd be begging the queſtion. EUPH. You are in the right, I do not, therefore, take for gran⯑ted [34] that they are rationally deduced. I only ſup⯑poſe that, if they are, they muſt be allowed natu⯑ral to Man, or in other words agreeable to, and growing from, the moſt excellent and peculiar part of Humane Nature. ALC. I have nothing to ob⯑ject to this. EUPH. What ſhall we think then of your former Aſſertions? That nothing is natural to Man but what may be found in all Men, in all Nations and Ages of the World: That to obtain a genuine view of Humane Nature, we muſt extir⯑pate all the effects of Education and Inſtruction, and regard only the Senſes, Appetites and Paſſions which are to be found originally in all Mankind: That, therefore, the notion of a God can have no foundation in nature, as not being originally in the mind, nor the ſame in all Men; Be pleaſed to recon⯑cile theſe things with your late conceſſions, which the force of Truth ſeems to have extorted from you.

XV.

ALC. Tell me, Euphranor, whether Truth be not one and the ſame uniform invariable thing, and, if ſo, whether the many different and incon⯑ſiſtent notions which Men entertain of God and Duty be not a plain proof there is no Truth in them. EUPH. That Truth is conſtant and uni⯑form I freely own, and that conſequently Opinions repugnant to each other cannot be true; but I think it will not hence follow they are all alike falſe. If among various Opinions about the ſame thing, one be grounded on clear and evident Reaſons, that is to be thought true, and others only ſo far as they conſiſt with it. Reaſon is the ſame, and rightly applied will lead to the ſame concluſions in all times and places. Socrates two thouſand years ago ſeems to have reaſoned himſelf into the ſame noti⯑on of a God, which is entertained by the Philoſo⯑phers of our days, if you will allow that name to any who are not Atheiſts. And the remark of Con⯑fucius, That a Man ſhou'd guard in his youth againſt [35] Luſt, in manhood againſt Faction, and in old age againſt Covetouſneſs is as current morality in Europe as in China. ALC. But ſtill it wou'd be a ſatiſ⯑faction if all Men thought the ſame way, difference of Opinions implying uncertainty. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, what you take to be the cauſe of a Lunar Eclipſe. ALC. The ſhadow of the Earth interpoſing between the Sun and Moon. EUPH. Are you aſſured of this? ALC. Undoubtedly. EUPH. Are all Mankind agreed in this Truth? ALC. By no means. Ignorant and barbarous Peo⯑ple aſſign different ridiculous cauſes of this appear⯑ance. EUPH. It ſeems then there are different Opinions about the nature of an Eclipſe. ALC. There are. EUPH. And nevertheleſs one of theſe Opinions is true. ALC. It is. EUPH. Diver⯑ſity therefore of Opinions about a thing doth not hinder, but that the thing may be, and one of the Opinions concerning it may be true. ALC. I ac⯑knowledge it. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem, therefore, that your Argument againſt the Belief of a God from the variety of Opinions about his nature is not concluſive. Nor do I ſee how you can con⯑clude againſt the truth of any moral or religious tenet, from the various Opinions of Men upon the ſame Subject; might not a Man as well argue, that no hiſtorical account of a matter of fact can be true, when different relations are given of it? Or may we not as well infer, that becauſe the ſeveral Sects of Philoſophy maintain different opinions, none of them can be in the right, not even the Minute Philoſophers themſelves? During this converſation Lyſicles ſeemed uneaſy, like one that wiſhed in his heart there was no God. Alciphron, ſaid he, me-thinks you ſit by very tamely, while Euphranor ſaps the foundation of our Tenets. Be of good courage, replied Alciphron, a skilful gameſter has been known to ruin his adverſary by yielding him ſome advantage at firſt. I am glad, ſaid he turning to Euphranor, that you are drawn in [36] to argue and make your appeals to Reaſon. For my part, wherever Reaſon leads I ſhall not be afraid to follow. Know then, Euphranor, that I freely give up what you now contend for. I do not value the ſucceſs of a few crude notions thrown out in a looſe diſcourſe, any more than the Turks do the loſs of that vile infantry they place in the front of their armies, for no other end but to waſte the powder and blunt the ſwords of their enemies. Be aſſured I have in re⯑ſerve a body of other-gueſs arguments, which I am ready to produce. I will undertake to prove—EUPH. O Alciphron! I do not doubt your faculty of proving. But before I put you to the trouble of any farther proofs, I ſhou'd be glad to know whether the notions of your Minute Philoſophy are worth proving. I mean, whether they are of uſe and ſer⯑vice to Mankind?

XV.

ALC. As to that, give me leave to tell you, a thing may be uſeful to one Man's Views, and not to another's: but Truth is Truth whether uſeful or not, and muſt not be meaſured by the Convenience of this or that Man, or Party of Men. EUPH. But is not the general Good of Mankind to be regarded as a rule and meaſure of moral Truths, of all ſuch Truths as direct or influence the moral Actions of Men? ALC. That Point is not clear to me. I know, indeed, that Legiſlators, and Divines, and Politicians have always alledged, That it is neceſſary to the well⯑being of Mankind, that they ſhou'd be kept in awe by the ſlaviſh Notions of Religion and Morality. But granting all this, how will it prove theſe Notions to be true? Convenience is one thing, and Truth is ano⯑ther. A genuine Philoſopher, therefore, will over⯑look all Advantages and conſider only Truth it ſelf as ſuch. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, is your genuine Philoſopher a wiſe Man, or a Fool? ALC. Without queſtion, the wiſeſt of Men. EUPH. Which is to be thought the wiſe Man, he who acts with deſign, [37] or he who acts at random? ALC. He who acts with deſign. EUPH. Whoever acts with deſign, acts for ſome end. Doth he not? ALC. He doth. EUPH. And a wiſe Man for a good end? ALC. True. EUPH. And he ſheweth his Wiſdom in making choice of fit means to obtain his end. ALC. I acknowledge it. EUPH. By how much therefore the end propoſed is more excellent, and by how much fitter the means employ'd are to obtain it, ſo much the wiſer is the Agent to be eſteemed. ALC. This ſeems to be true. EUPH. Can a rational Agent propoſe a more excellent end than Happineſs? ALC. He cannot. EUPH. Of good things, the greater Good is moſt excellent. ALC. Doubtleſs. EUPH. Is not the general happineſs of Mankind a greater Good, than the private happineſs of one Man, or of ſome certain Men? ALC. It is. EUPH. Is it not therefore the moſt excellent end? ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Are not then thoſe who purſue this end by the propereſt methods to be thought the wiſeſt Men? ALC. I grant they are. EUPH. Which is a wiſe Man govern'd by, wiſe or fooliſh Notions? ALC. By wiſe, doubtleſs. EUPH. It ſeems then to follow, that he who promotes the general well-being of Mankind by the proper neceſ⯑ſary means, is truly wiſe, and acts upon wiſe grounds. ALC. It ſhou'd ſeem ſo. EUPH. And is not Fol⯑ly of an oppoſite nature to Wiſdom? ALC. It is. EUPH. Might it not therefore be inferred, that thoſe Men are fooliſh who go about to unhinge ſuch Principles as have a neceſſary connexion with the ge⯑neral good of Mankind? ALC. Perhaps this might be granted: but at the ſame time I muſt obſerve, that it is in my power to deny it. EUPH. How! you will not ſurely deny the Concluſion, when you admit the Premiſes. ALC. I wou'd fain know upon what terms we argue; whether in this progreſs of Queſtion and Anſwer, if a Man makes a ſlip it be utterly ir⯑retrievable? For if you are on the catch to lay hold [38] of every advantage, without allowing for ſurpriſe or inattention, I muſt tell you this is not the way to con⯑vince my Judgment. EUPH. O Alciphron! I aim not at Triumph, but at Truth. You are therefore at full liberty to unravel all that hath been ſaid, and to recover or correct any ſlip you have made. But then you muſt diſtinctly point it out: otherwiſe it will be impoſſible ever to arrive at any concluſion. ALC. I agree with you upon theſe terms jointly to proceed in ſearch of Truth, for to that I am ſincerely devoted. In the progreſs of our preſent Inquiry I was, it ſeems, guilty of an overſight, in acknowledging the general happineſs of Mankind to be a greater Good than the particular happineſs of one Man. For in fact, the individual happineſs of every Man alone, conſtitutes his own entire Good. The happineſs of other Men making no part of mine, is not with reſpect to me a Good: I mean a true natural Good. It cannot there⯑fore be a reaſonable end to be propoſed by me in Truth and Nature, (for I do not ſpeak of political pretences) ſince no wiſe Man will purſue an end which doth not concern him. This is the voice of Nature. Oh Nature! thou art the fountain, original, and pattern of all that is good and wiſe. EUPH. You wou'd like then to follow Nature, and propoſe her as a guide and pattern for your imitation. ALC. Of all things. EUPH. Whence do you gather this reſpect for Na⯑ture? ALC. From the excellency of her Produc⯑tions. EUPH. In a Vegetable, for inſtance, you ſay there is uſe and excellency, becauſe the ſeveral parts of it are ſo connected and fitted to each other, as to protect and nouriſh the whole, make the indi⯑vidual grow, and propagate the kind, and becauſe in its fruits or qualities it is adapted to pleaſe the Senſe, or contribute to the benefit of Man. ALC. Even ſo. EUPH. In like manner, do you not infer the excellency of Animal Bodies from obſerving the frame and fitneſs of their ſeveral parts, by which they mutually conſpire to the well-being of each o⯑ther [39] as well as of the whole? Do you not alſo obſerve a natural union and conſent between Animals of the ſame kind, and that even different kinds of Animals have certain qualities and inſtincts whereby they con⯑tribute to the exerciſe, nouriſhment, and delight of each other? Even the inanimate unorganized Ele⯑ments ſeem to have an excellence relative to each o⯑ther. Where was the excellency of Water if it did not cauſe Herbs and Vegetables to ſpring from the Earth, and put forth flowers and fruits? And what wou'd become of the beauty of the Earth, if it was not warmed by the Sun, moiſtened by Water, and fanned by Air? Throughout the whole Syſtem of the viſible and natural World, do you not perceive a mutual connexion and correſpondence of parts? And is it not from hence that you frame an Idea of the perfection, and order, and beauty of Nature? ALC. All this I grant. EUPH. And have not the Stoics heretofore ſaid (who were no more Bigots than you are) and did you not your ſelf ſay, this pat⯑tern of Order was worthy the imitation of rational Agents? ALC. I do not deny this to be true. EUPH. Ought we not therefore to infer the ſame Union, Order, and Regularity in the moral World that we perceive to be in the natural? ALC. We ought. EUPH. Shou'd it not therefore ſeem to follow that reaſonable Creatures were, as the philoſo⯑phical Emperor ^† obſerves, made one for another; and conſequently that Man ought not to conſider himſelf as an independent Individual, whoſe happi⯑neſs is not connected with that of other Men? but rather as the part of a whole, to the common good of which he ought to conſpire, and order his Ways and Actions ſuitably, if he wou'd live according to Nature. ALC. Suppoſing this to be true, what then? EUPH. Will it not follow that a wiſe Man [40] ſhou'd conſider and purſue his private Good, with regard to, and in conjunction with, that of other Men? in granting of which, you thought your ſelf guilty of an overſight. Though, indeed, the ſym⯑pathy of pain and pleaſure, and the mutual affections by which Mankind are knit together, have been al⯑ways allowed a plain proof of this point: And though it was the conſtant Doctrine of thoſe, who were e⯑ſteemed the wiſeſt and moſt thinking Men among the Ancients, as the Platoniſts, Peripatetics, and Stoics; to ſay nothing of Chriſtians, whom you pronounce to be an unthinking prejudiced ſort of people. ALC. I ſhall not diſpute this point with you. EUPH. Since therefore we are ſo far agreed, ſhou'd it not ſeem to follow from the Premiſes; That the belief of a God, of a future State, and of moral Duties, are the only wiſe, right, and genuine Principles of Humane Conduct, in caſe they have a neceſſary con⯑nection with the well-being of Mankind? This Concluſion you have been led to by your own con⯑ceſſions and by the analogy of Nature. ALC. I have been drawn into it ſtep by ſtep through ſeveral Preliminaries, which I cannot well call to mind; but one thing I obſerve, that you build on the neceſſary connection thoſe Principles have with the well-being of Mankind, which is a point neither proved nor granted. LYS. This I take to be a grand fundamen⯑tal Prejudice, as I doubt not, if I had time I cou'd make appear. But it is now late, and we will, if you think fit, defer this Subject till to-morrow. Up⯑on which Motion of Lyſicles we put an end to our converſation for that Evening.

I.

NEXT Morning, Alciphron and Lyſicles ſaid the Weather was ſo fine they had a mind to ſpend the Day abroad, and take a cold Dinner under a Shade in ſome pleaſant part of the Country. Where⯑upon, after Breakfaſt, we went down to a Beach a⯑bout [42] half a mile off; where we walked on the ſmooth ſand, with the Ocean on one hand, and on the other wild broken Rocks, intermixed with ſhady Trees and Springs of Water, till the Sun began to be uneaſy. We then withdrew into a hollow Glade, between two Rocks, where we had no ſooner ſeated our ſelves but Lyſicles addreſſing himſelf to Euphranor, ſaid: I am now ready to perform what I undertook laſt E⯑vening, which was to ſhew, there is nothing in that neceſſary Connection which ſome Men imagine be⯑tween thoſe Principles you contend for, and the pub⯑lic Good. I freely own, that if this Queſtion was to be decided by the authority of Legiſlators or Phi⯑loſophers, it muſt go againſt us. For thoſe Men ge⯑nerally take it for granted, that Vice is pernicious to the Public; and that Men cannot be kept from Vice but by the fear of God, and the ſenſe of a future State; whence they are induced to think the belief of ſuch things neceſſary to the well-being of humane Kind. This falſe notion hath prevailed for many ages in the World, and done an infinite deal of miſchief, being in truth the cauſe of religious Eſtabliſhments, and gaining the protection and encouragement of Laws and Magiſtrates to the Clergy and their Superſtitions. Even ſome of the wiſeſt among the Ancients, who agreed with our Sect in denying a Providence and the Immortality of the Soul, had nevertheleſs the weak⯑neſs to lie under the common prejudice that Vice was hurtful to Societies of Men. But England hath of late produced great Philoſophers who have undecei⯑ved the world, and proved to a demonſtration that private Vices are public Benefits. This Diſcovery was reſerved to our times, and our Sect hath the glory of it. CRI. It is poſſible ſome Men of fine Underſtanding might in former ages have had a glimpſe of this important Truth; but it may be pre⯑ſumed they lived in ignorant times and bigotted coun⯑tries, which were not ripe for ſuch a diſcovery. LYS. Men of narrow capacities and ſhort ſight being able [43] to ſee no further than one link in a chain of Conſe⯑quences, are ſhocked at ſmall evils which attend up⯑on Vice. But thoſe who can enlarge their view, and look through a long ſeries of events, may behold Happineſs reſulting from Vice, and Good ſpringing out of Evil in a thouſand inſtances. To prove my point I ſhall not trouble you with Authorities or far⯑fetched Arguments, but bring you to plain Matter of Fact. Do but take a view of each particular Vice, and trace it through its Effects and Conſequences, and then you will clearly perceive the advantage it brings to the Public.

II.

Drunkenneſs, for inſtance, is by your ſober Moraliſts thought a pernicious Vice; but it is for want of conſidering the good effects that flow from it. For in the firſt place it increaſes the Malt-Tax, a principal branch of his Majeſty's Revenue, and thereby promotes the ſafety, ſtrength, and glory of the Nation. Secondly, it employs a great number of hands, the Brewer, the Malſter, the Plough⯑man, the dealer in Hops, the Smith, the Carpenter, the Braſier, the Joiner, with all other artificers ne⯑ceſſary to ſupply thoſe enumerated, with their re⯑ſpective inſtruments and utenſils. All which advan⯑tages are procured from Drunkenneſs in the vulgar way, by ſtrong Beer. This point is ſo clear it will admit of no diſpute. But while you are forced to al⯑low thus much, I foreſee you are ready to object a⯑gainſt Drunkenneſs occaſion'd by Wine and Spirits, as exporting wealth into foreign countries. But you do not reflect on the number of hands which even this ſets on work at home: The Diſtillers, the Vint⯑ners, the Merchants, the Sailors, the Shipwrights, with all thoſe who are employ'd towards victualling and fitting out Ships, which upon a nice computation will be found to include an incredible variety of Trades and Callings. Then for freighting our Ships to anſwer theſe foreign importations, all our manufactures [44] throughout the Kingdom are employ'd, the Spinners, the Weavers, the Dyers, the Wool-combers, the the Carriers, the Packers. And the ſame may be ſaid of many other manufactures, as well as the wool⯑len. And if it be further conſidered, how many Men are enriched by all the forementioned ways of trade and buſineſs, and the expences of theſe Men, and their families, in all the ſeveral articles of conve⯑nient and faſhionable living, whereby all ſorts of trades and callings, not only at home, but through⯑out all parts wherever our commerce reaches, are kept in employment, you will be amazed at the wonderfully extended ſcene of benefits which ariſe from the ſingle vice of Drunkenneſs, ſo much run down and declaimed againſt by all grave Reformers. With as much judgment your half-witted folk are accuſtomed to cenſure Gaming. And indeed (ſuch is the ignorance and folly of Mankind) a Gameſter and a Drunkard are thought no better than public nuſances, when in truth, they do each in their way greatly conduce to the public benefit. If you look only on the furface and firſt appearance of things, you will no doubt think playing at Cards a very idle and fruitleſs occupation. But dive deeper, and you ſhall perceive this idle amuſement employs the Card-maker, and he ſets the Paper-mills at work, by which the poor Rag-man is ſupported; not to mention the Builders and Workers in wood and iron that are em⯑ploy'd in erecting and furniſhing thoſe Mills. Look ſtill deeper, and you ſhall find that Candles and Chair-hire employ the induſtrious and the poor, who by theſe means come to be relieved by Sharpers and Gen⯑tlemen, who wou'd not give one penny in charity. But you will ſay that many Gentlemen and Ladies are ruin⯑ed by play, without conſidering that what one Man loſes another gets, and that conſequently as many are made as ruined; money changeth hands, and in this circulation the life of buſineſs and commerce conſiſts. When money is ſpent, it is all one to the Public who [45] ſpends it. Suppoſe a fool of quality becomes the dupe of a Man of mean birth and circumſtance, who has more wit. In this caſe what harm doth the Public ſuſtain? Poverty is relieved, Ingenuity is rewarded, the Money ſtays at home, and has a lively circulation, the ingenious Sharper being enabled to ſet up an equi-page and ſpend handſomely, which cannot be done without employing a world of people. But you will perhaps object, that a Man reduced by play may be put upon deſperate courſes hurtful to the Public. Sup⯑poſe the worſt, and that he turns Highwayman, ſuch Men have a ſhort life and a merry. While he lives, he ſpends, and for one that he robs makes twenty the better for his expence. And when his time is come, a poor Family may be relieved by fifty or a hundred Pounds ſet upon his Head. A vulgar eye looks on many a Man as an idle or miſchievous fellow, whom a true Philoſopher viewing in another light, conſi⯑ders as a Man of pleaſant occupation who diverts himſelf, and benefits the Public: And that with ſo much eaſe, that he employs a multitude of Men, and ſets an infinite Machine in motion, without knowing the good he does, or even intending to do any; which is peculiar to that Gentleman-like way of doing good by Vice. I was conſidering Play, and that in⯑ſenſibly led me to the advantages, which attend rob⯑bing on the high-way. Oh the beautiful and never e⯑nough admired connection of Vices! It wou'd take too much time to ſhew how they all hang together, and what an infinite deal of good takes its riſe from every one of them. One word for a favourite Vice, and I ſhall leave you to make out the reſt your ſelf, by applying the ſame way of reaſoning to all other vices. A poor Girl, who might not have the ſpend⯑ing of half a Crown a week in what you call an ho⯑neſt way, no ſooner hath the good fortune to be a kept Miſtreſs, but ſhe employs Milliners, Laundreſſes, Tire-women, Mercers, and a number of other trades to the benefit of her Country. It wou'd be endleſs [46] to trace and purſue every particular Vice through its conſequences and effects, and ſhew the vaſt advan⯑tage they all are of to the Public. The true Springs that actuate the great Machine of Commerce, and make a flouriſhing State have been hitherto little un⯑derſtood. Your Moraliſts and Divines have for ſo many ages been corrupting the genuine Senſe of man⯑kind, and filling their heads with ſuch abſurd princi⯑ples, that it is in the power of few Men to contem⯑plate real life with an unprejudiced Eye. And fewer ſtill have ſufficient Parts and Sagacity to purſue a long train of conſequences, relations and dependences, which muſt be done in order to form a juſt and entire notion of the public weal. But, as I ſaid before, our Sect hath produced Men capable of theſe diſcoveries, who have diſplayed them in a full light, and made them public for the benefit of their Country.

III.

Oh! Said Euphranor, who heard this diſ⯑courſe with great attention, you Lyſicles are the very Man I wanted, eloquent and ingenious, knowing in the principles of your Sect, and willing to impart them. Pray tell me, do theſe principles find an eaſy admiſſion in the World? LYS. They do among ingenious Men and People of faſhion, though you will ſometimes meet with ſtrong prejudices againſt them in the middle ſort, an effect of ordinary Talents and mean Breeding. EUPH. I ſhou'd wonder if Men were not ſhocked at notions of ſuch a ſurpriſing nature, ſo contrary to all Laws, Education, and Re⯑ligion. LYS. They wou'd be ſhocked much more if it had not been for the skilful addreſs of our Philo⯑ſophers, who, conſidering that moſt Men are influ⯑enced by names rather than things, have introduced a certain polite way of ſpeaking, which leſſens much of the abhorrence and prejudice towards Vice. EUPH. Explain me this. LYS. Thus in our Di⯑alect a vicious Man is a Man of pleaſure, a Sharper is one that plays the whole game, a Lady is ſaid to have [47] an affair, a Gentleman to be a gallant, a Rogue in buſi⯑neſs to be one that knows the World. By this means we have no ſuch things as Sots, Debauchees, Whores, Rogues, or the like in the beau monde, who may en⯑joy their vices without incurring diſagreeable Appel⯑lations. EUPH. Vice then is, it ſeems, a fine thing with an ugly name. LYS. Be aſſured it is. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem then, that Plato's fearing leſt youth might be corrupted, by thoſe Fables which repreſented the Gods vicious, was an effect of his weakneſs and ignorance. LYS. It was, take my word for it. EUPH. And yet Plato had kept good Company and lived in a Court. And Cicero who knew the World well had a profound eſteem for him. CRI. I tell you, Euphranor, that Plato and Tully might perhaps make a figure in Athens or Rome: But were they to revive in our days, they wou'd paſs but for underbred Pedants, there being at moſt Coffee⯑houſes in London, ſeveral able Men who cou'd con⯑vince them they knew nothing in, what they are va⯑lued ſo much for, Morals and Politics. LYS. How many long-headed Men do I know both in the Court⯑end and the City with five times Plato's Senſe, who care not one ſtraw what notions their Sons have of God or Virtue.

IV.

CRI. I can illuſtrate this Doctrine of Lyſicles by examples that will make you perceive its force. Cleophon, a Minute Philoſopher, took ſtrict care of his Son's Education and entered him betimes in the prin⯑ciples of his Sect. Callicles (that was his Son's name) being a Youth of parts made a notable progreſs; in⯑ſomuch that before he became of age he killed his old covetous Father with vexation, and ruined the Eſtate he left behind him; or, in other words, made a pre⯑ſent of it to the Public, ſpreading the Dung-hill col⯑lected by his Anceſtors over the face of the Nation, and making out of the overgrown Eſtate ſeveral pretty fortunes for ingenious Men, who live by the [48] vices of the Great. Teleſilla, though a Woman of Quality and Spirit, made no figure in the World, till ſhe was inſtructed by her Husband in the tenets of the Minute Philoſophy, which he wiſely thought wou'd prevent her giving any thing in Charity. From that time ſhe took a turn towards expenſive Diverſions, particularly deep Play, by which means ſhe ſoon transferred a conſiderable ſhare of his fortune to ſeve⯑ral acute Men skilled in that Myſtery, who wanted it more, and circulate it quicker than her Husband wou'd have done, who in return hath got an Heir to his Eſtate, having never had a Child before. That ſame Teleſilla, who was good for nothing as long as ſhe believed her Catechiſm, now ſhines in all public places, is a Lady of gallantry and faſhion, and has by her extravagant parade in Lace and fine Clothes raiſed a Spirit of expence in other Ladies, very much to the public benefit, though it muſt be owned to the mortification of many frugal Husbands. While Cri⯑to related theſe facts with a grave face, I cou'd not forbear ſmiling, which Lyſicles obſerving, ſuperfici⯑al minds, ſaid he, may perhaps find ſomething to ri⯑dicule in theſe accounts; but all who are Maſters of a juſt way of thinking muſt needs ſee that thoſe max⯑ims, the benefit whereof is univerſal, and the damage only particular to private Perſons or Families, ought to be encouraged in a wiſe Commonwealth. For my part, ſaid Euphranor, I confeſs my ſelf to be rather dazzled and confounded than convinced by your rea⯑ſoning; which, as you obſerved you ſelf, taking in the connection of many diſtant points requires great extent of thought to comprehend it. I muſt there⯑fore intreat you to bear with my defects, ſuffer me to take to pieces what is too big to be received at once; and where I cannot keep pace with you, permit me to follow you ſtep by ſtep, as faſt as I can. LYS. There is reaſon in what you ſay. Every one cannot ſuddenly take a long concatenation of Arguments.

V.

EUPH. Your ſeveral Arguments ſeem to cen⯑ter in this, that vice circulates money and promotes induſtry, which cauſeth a People to flouriſh: Is it not ſo? LYS. It is. EUPH. And the reaſon that vice produceth this effect is, becauſe it cauſeth an extravagant conſumption which is the moſt bene⯑ficial to the Manufactures, their encouragement con⯑ſiſting in a quick demand and high price. LYS. True. EUPH. Hence you think a Drunkard moſt beneficial to the Brewer and the Vintner, as cauſing a quick conſumption of Liquor, inaſmuch as he drinks more than other Men. LYS. Without doubt. EUPH. Says, Lyſicles, who drinks moſt a ſick Man or a healthy? LYS. A healthy. EUPH. And which is healthieſt a ſober Man or a Drunkard? LYS. A Sober Man. EUPH. A Sober Man therefore in health may drink more than a Drunkard when he is ſick. LYS. He may. EUPH. What think you, will a Man conſume more Meat and Drink in a long life or a ſhort one? LYS. In a long. EUPH. A Sober healthy Man, therefore, in a long life may circulate more Money by eating and drinking, than a Glutton or Drunkard in a ſhort one. LYS. What then? EUPH. Why then it ſhou'd ſeem, that he may be more beneficial to the Public even in this way of eating and drinking. LYS. I ſhall never own that temperance is the way to promote drinking. EUPH. But you will own that ſickneſs leſſens, and death puts an end to all drinking. The ſame Argu⯑ment will hold, for ought I can ſee, with reſpect to all other vices that impair Mens health and ſhorten their lives. And if we admit this, it will not be ſo clear a point that vice hath merit towards the public. LYS. But admitting that ſome Artificers or Traders might be as well encouraged by the ſober Men as the vicious; what ſhall we ſay of thoſe who ſubſiſt al⯑together by Vice and Vanity? EUPH. It ſuch there are, may they not be otherwiſe employ'd with⯑out [50] loſs to the Public? Tell me, Lyſicles, is there any thing in the nature of Vice, as ſuch that renders it a public bleſſing, or is it only the conſumption it occa⯑ſions? LYS. I have already ſhewn how it benefits the nation by the conſumption of its Manufactures. EUPH. And you have granted that a long and heal⯑thy life conſumes more than a ſhort and ſickly one; and you will not deny that many conſume more than one. Upon the whole then compute and ſay, which is moſt likely to promote the induſtry of his Country⯑men, a virtuous married Man with a healthy nume⯑rous Offspring, and who feeds and cloaths the Or⯑phans in his Neighbourhood, or a faſhionable Rake about Town. I wou'd fain know whether Money ſpent innocently, doth not circulate as well as that ſpent upon Vice. And if ſo, whether by your own rule it doth not benefit the Publick as much? LYS. What I have proved, I proved plainly, and there is no need of more words about it. EUPH. You ſeem to me, to have proved nothing, unleſs you can make it out that it is impoſſible to ſpend a fortune innocently. I ſhou'd think the publick weal of a Nation conſiſts in the number and good condition of its Inhabitants; have you any thing to object to this? LYS. I think not. EUPH. To this end which would moſt conduce, the employing Men in open air and manly exerciſe, or in ſedentary buſineſs within doors? LYS. The former I ſuppoſe. EUPH. Shou'd it not ſeem therefore, that building, gardening, and agriculture would employ Men more uſefully to the Public, than if Tailors, Barbers, Per⯑fumers, Diſtillers and ſuch arts were multiplied. LYS. All this I grant; but it makes againſt you. For what moves Men to build and plant but vanity, and what is vanity but vice? EUPH. But if a Man ſhou'd do thoſe things for his convenience or pleaſure, and in proportion to his fortune, without a fooliſh oſtenta⯑tion or over-rating them beyond their due value, they would not then be the effect of vice; and how do you know but this may be the caſe? CRI. One thing [51] I know that the readieſt way to quicken that ſort of induſtry, and employ Carpenters, Maſons, Smiths, and all ſuch trades wou'd be to put in practice the hap⯑py hint of a celebrated Minute Philoſopher, who by profound thinking has diſcovered, that burning the City of London wou'd be no ſuch bad action, as ſilly prejudiced People might poſſibly imagine; inaſmuch as it wou'd produce a quick circulation of property, transferring it from the rich to the poor, and employ⯑ing a great number of Artificers of all kinds. This at leaſt cannot be denied that it hath opened a new way of thinking to our Incendiaries, of which the Public hath of late begun to reap the benefit. EUPH. I cannot ſufficiently admire this ingenious thought.

VI.

But methinks it wou'd be dangerous to make it public. CRI. Dangerous to whom? EUPH. In the firſt place to the publiſher. CRI. That is a miſtake; for the notion hath been publiſhed and met with due applauſe, in this moſt wiſe and happy age of Free-thinking, Free-ſpeaking, Free-writing, and Free-acting. EUPH. How! may a Man then publiſh and practiſe ſuch things with impunity? CRI. To ſpeak the truth, I am not ſo clear as to the practic part. An unlucky accident now and then be⯑fals an ingenious Man. The Minute Philoſopher Magirus, being deſirous to benefit the Public, by cir⯑culating an Eſtate poſſeſſed by a near Relation who had not the heart to ſpend it, ſoon convinced him⯑ſelf upon theſe principles, that it wou'd be a very worthy action to diſpatch out of the way ſuch a uſe⯑leſs fellow, to whom he was next heir. But for this laudable attempt, he had the misfortune to be hanged by an under-bred Judge and Jury. Could any thing be more unjuſt? EUPH. Why unjuſt? CRI. Is it not unjuſt to puniſh actions, when the principles from which they directly follow are tolerated and ap⯑plauded by the Public? Can any thing be more in⯑conſiſtent [52] than to condemn in practice what is appro⯑ved in ſpeculation. Truth is one and the ſame, it be⯑ing impoſſible a thing ſhould be practically wrong and ſpeculatively right. Thus much is certain, Magirus was perfect Maſter of all this Theory, and argued moſt acutely about it with a Friend of mine, a little before he did the fact for which he died. LYS. The beſt on't is the World every day grows wiſer. CRI. You miſtake, Euphranor, if you think the Minute Philoſophers idle Theoriſts; They are Men of prac⯑tical views. EUPH. As much as I love Liberty, I ſhou'd be afraid to live among ſuch People; it would be, as Seneca ſomewhere expreſſeth it, in libertate bel⯑lis ac tyrannis ſaeviore. LYS. What do you mean by quoting Plato and Seneca? Can you imagine a Free-thinker is to be influenced by the Authority of ſuch old faſhioned Writers? EUPH. You, Lyſicles, and your Friend have often quoted to me ingenious Moderns, profound fine Gentlemen, with new names of Authors in the Minute Philoſophy, to whoſe merits I am a perfect ſtranger. Suffer me in my turn to cite ſuch Authorities as I know, and have paſſed for many ages upon the World.

VII.

But, Authority apart, what do you ſay to Experience? My Obſervation can reach as far as a private Family; and ſome wiſe Men have thought, a Family may be conſidered as a ſmall Kingdom, or a Kingdom as a great Family. Do you admit this to be true? LYS. If I ſay yes, you'll make an inference, and if I ſay no, you'll demand a reaſon. The beſt way is to ſay nothing at all. There is, I ſee, no end of anſwering. EUPH. If you give up the point you undertook to prove, there is an end at once: But if you hope to convince me you muſt anſwer my queſtions, and allow me the liberty to argue and infer. LYS. Well, ſuppoſe I admit that a Kingdom may be conſidered as a great Family. EUPH. I ſhall ask you then, whether ever you knew private Fami⯑lies [53] thrive by thoſe vices, you think ſo beneficial to the Public? LYS. Suppoſe I have not. EUPH. Might not a Man therefore by a parity of reaſon ſuſ⯑pect their being of that benefit to the Public? LYS. Fear not; the next age will thrive and flouriſh. EUPH. Pray tell me, Lyſicles; ſuppoſe you ſaw a fruit of a new untried kind; would you recommend it to your own Family to make a full meal of? LYS. I would not. EUPH. Why then would you try upon your own Country theſe maxims which were never admitted in any other? LYS. The experi⯑ment muſt begin ſomewhere; and we are reſolved our own Country ſhall have the honour and advan⯑tage of it. EUPH. O Lyſicles, hath not old Eng⯑land ſubſiſted for many ages without the help of your notions? LYS. She has. EUPH. And made ſome figure? LYS. I grant it. EUPH. Why then ſhou'd you make her run the riſque of a new ex⯑periment, when it is certain ſhe may do without it? LYS. But we would make her do better. We wou'd produce a change in her that never was ſeen in any Nation. EUPH. Salluſt obſerves, that a little be⯑fore the downfal of the Roman Empire, avarice (the effect of Luxury) had eraſed the good old principles of probity and juſtice, had produced a contempt for Religion, and made every thing venal, while ambi⯑tion bred diſſimulation, and cauſed Men to unite in clubs, and parties, not from honourable motives, but narrow and intereſted views. The ſame Hiſtorian obſerves of that great Free-thinker Catiline, that he made it his buſineſs to inſinuate himſelf into the ac⯑quaintance of young Men, whoſe minds unimproved by years and experience were more eaſily ſeduced. I know not how it happens, but theſe paſſages have occurred to my Thoughts more than once during this Converſation. LYS. Salluſt was a ſententious Pe⯑dant. EUPH. But conſult any Hiſtorian, look in⯑to any Writer. See, for inſtance, what Xenophon and Livy ſay of Sparta and Rome, and then tell me if [54] Vice be not the likelieſt way to ruin and enſlave a Peo⯑ple. LYS. When a point is clear by its own evi⯑dence, I never think it worth while to conſult old Authors about it. CRI. It requires much thought and delicate obſervation to go to the bottom of things. But one who hath come at Truth with diffi⯑culty can impart it with eaſe. I will therefore, Eu⯑phranor, explain to you in three words (what none of your old Writers ever dreamt of) the true cauſe of ruin to thoſe States. You muſt know that Vice and Vir⯑tue, being oppoſite and contradictory Principles, both working at once in a ſtate, will produce contra⯑ry effects, which inteſtine diſcord muſt needs tend to the diſſolution and ruin of the whole. But it is the deſign of our Minute Philoſophers, by making Men wicked upon principle, a thing unknown to the An⯑cients, ſo to weaken and deſtroy the force of virtue, that its effects ſhall not be felt in the Public. In which caſe Vice being uncontrolled without let or impedi⯑ment of principle, pure and genuine without allay of virtue, the Nation muſt doubtleſs be very flouriſhing and triumphant. EUPH. Truly, a noble Scheme! CRI. And in a fair way to take effect. For our young proficients in the Minute Philoſophy, having, by a rare felicity of Education, no tincture of bigo⯑try or prejudice, do far outgo the old ſtanders and profeſſors of the Sect; who, though Men of admi⯑rable parts, yet, having had the misfortune to be im⯑bued in their Childhood with ſome religious Noti⯑ons, cou'd never after get intirely rid of them; but ſtill retain ſome ſmall grains of conſcience and ſuper⯑ſtition, which are a check upon the nobleſt Genius. In proof of this, I remember that the famous Minute Philoſopher old Demodicus came one day, from con⯑verſation upon buſineſs with Timander, a young Gen⯑tleman of the ſame Sect, full of aſtoniſhment. I am ſurpriſed, ſaid he, to ſee ſo young, and withal ſo com⯑pleat a Villain, and, ſuch was the force of prejudice, ſpoke of Timander with abhorrence, not conſidering [55] that he was only the more egregious and profound Philoſopher of the two.

VIII.

EUPH. Though much may be hoped from the unprejudiced education of young Gentle⯑men, yet it ſeems we are not to expect a ſettled and intire Happineſs, before Vice reigns pure and unmix⯑ed: till then, much is to be feared from the dange⯑rous ſtruggle between Vice and Virtue, which may perchance overturn and diſſolve this Government, as it hath done others. LYS. No matter for that, if a better comes in its place. We have cleared the land of all Prejudices towards Government or Conſtituti⯑on, and made them fly like other Phantaſms before the light of Reaſon and good Senſe. Men who think deeply cannot ſee any reaſon, why Power ſhou'd not change hands as well as Property; or why the faſhi⯑on of a Government ſhou'd not be changed as eaſy as that of a Garment. The perpetual circulating and revolving of Wealth and Power, no matter through what or whoſe hands, is that which keeps up Life and Spirit in a State. Thoſe who are even ſlightly read in our Philoſophy, know that of all Prejudices the ſillieſt is an attachment to forms. CRI. To ſay no more upon ſo clear a point, the overturning a Go⯑vernment may be juſtified upon the ſame Principles as the burning a Town, wou'd produce parallel ef⯑fects, and equally contribute to the public good. In both caſes, the natural ſprings of Action are forcibly exerted: and in this general Induſtry what one loſes another gets, a quick circulation of Wealth and Power making the Sum Total to flouriſh. EUPH. And do the Minute Philoſophers publiſh theſe things to the World? LYS. It muſt be confeſſed our Wri⯑ters proceed in Politics with greater caution than they think neceſſary with regard to Religion. CRI. But thoſe things plainly follow from their Principles, and are to be admitted for the genuine Doctrine of the Sect, expreſſed perhaps with more freedom and per⯑ſpicuity, [56] than might be thought prudent by thoſe who wou'd manage the Public, or not offend weak brethren. EUPH. And pray, is there not need of caution, a Rebel, or Incendiary being Characters that many Men have a prejudice againſt? LYS. Weak People of all ranks have a world of abſurd Pre⯑judices. EUPH. But the better ſort, ſuch as Stateſ⯑men and Legiſlators; do you think they have not the ſame Indiſpoſition towards admitting your Princi⯑ples? LYS. Perhaps they may; but the reaſon is plain. CRI. This puts me in mind of that ingenious Philoſopher, the Gameſter Glaucus, who uſed to ſay, that Stateſmen and Lawgivers may keep a ſtir about right and wrong, juſt and unjuſt, but that, in truth, Property of every kind had ſo often paſſed from the right owners by fraud and violence, that it was now to be conſidered as lying on the common, and with equal right belonged to every one that cou'd ſeize it. EUPH. What are we to think then of Laws and Regulations relating to Right and Wrong, Crimes and Duties? LYS. They ſerve to bind weak minds, and keep the Vulgar in awe: But no ſooner doth a true Genius ariſe, but he breaks his way to Greatneſs through all the trammels of Duty, Conſcience, Re⯑ligion, Law; to all which he ſheweth himſelf infi⯑nitely ſuperior.

IX.

EUPH. You are, it ſeems, for bringing a⯑bout a thorough Reformation. LYS. As to what is commonly called the Reformation, I cou'd never ſee how or wherein the World was the better for it. It is much the ſame as Popery, with this difference, that it is the more prude-like and diſagreeable thing of the two. A noted Writer of ours makes it too great a compliment, when he computes the benefit of Hooped-petticoats to be nearly equal to that of the Reformation. Thorough Reformation is thorough Liberty. Leave Nature at full freedom to work her own way, and all will be well. This is [57] what we aim at, and nothing ſhort of this can come up to our Principles. Crito, who is a zealous Prote⯑ſtant, hearing theſe words, cou'd not refrain. The worſt effect of the Reformation, ſaid he, was the reſcuing wicked Men from a darkneſs which kept them in awe. This, as it hath proved, was holding out Light to Robbers and Murderers. Light in it ſelf is good, and the ſame Light which ſhews a Man the folly of Superſtition, might ſhew him the truth of Religion, and the madneſs of Atheiſm. But to make uſe of Light, only to ſee the Evils on one ſide, and never to ſee, but to run blindly upon the worſe extreme, this is to make the beſt of things produce Evil, in the ſame ſenſe that you prove the worſt of things to produce Good, to wit, accidentally or in⯑directly: and by the ſame method of arguing, you may prove that even Diſeaſes are uſeful: but whate⯑ver benefit ſeems to accrue to the Public, either from diſeaſe of Mind or Body, is not their genuine offspring, and may be obtained without them. Ly⯑ſicles was a little diſconcerted by the affirmative air of Crito; but after a ſhort pauſe replied briskly, That to contemplate the public good was not every one's talent. True, ſaid Euphranor, I queſtion whether every one can frame a notion of the public good, much leſs judge of the means to promote it.

X.

But you, Lyſicles, who are maſter of this ſub⯑ject, will be pleaſed to inform me, whether the public good of a Nation doth not imply the parti⯑cular good of its Individuals? LYS. It doth. EUPH. And doth not the good or happineſs of a Man conſiſt, in having both Soul and Body ſound and in good condition, enjoying thoſe things which their reſpective Natures require, and free from thoſe things which are odious or hurtful to them. LYS. I do not deny all this to be true. EUPH. Now it ſhou'd ſeem worth while to conſider, whether the regular decent life of a virtuous Man may not [58] as much conduce to this end, as the mad ſallies of Intemperance and Debauchery. LYS. I will ac⯑knowledge that a Nation may meerly ſubſiſt, or be kept alive, but it is impoſſible it ſhou'd flouriſh without the aid of Vice. To produce a quick cir⯑culation of traffick and wealth in a State, there muſt be exorbitant and irregular motions in the Appetites and Paſſions. EUPH. The more peo⯑ple a Nation contains, and the happier thoſe peo⯑ple are, the more that Nation may be ſaid to flou⯑riſh. I think we are agreed in this point. LYS. We are. EUPH. You allow then that Riches are not an ultimate end, but ſhou'd only be conſidered as the means to procure Happineſs. LYS. I do. EUPH. It ſeems, that means cannot be of uſe without our knowing the end, and how to apply them to it. LYS. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Will it not follow, that in order to make a Nation flouriſh, it is not ſufficient to make it wealthy, without knowing the true end and happineſs of Mankind, and how to apply wealth towards attaining that end? In proportion as theſe points are known and practiſed, I think the Nation ſhou'd be likely to flouriſh. But for a people who neither know nor practiſe them, to gain riches, ſeems to me the ſame advantage that it wou'd be for a ſick Man to come at plenty of meat and drink, which he cou'd not uſe but to his hurt. LYS. This is meer ſophiſt⯑ry; it is arguing without perſuading. Look into common Life; examine the purſuits of Men; have a due reſpect for the conſent of the World; and you will ſoon be convinced, that Riches alone are ſufficient to make a Nation flouriſhing and happy. Give them Riches and they will make themſelves happy, without that political Invention, that Trick of Staſemen and Philoſophers, called Virtue.

XI.

EUPH. Virtue then, in your account, is a Trick of Stateſmen. LYS. It is. EUPH. [59] Why then do your ſagacious Sect betray and divulge that Trick or Secret of State, which wiſe Men have judged neceſſary for the good Government of the World? Lyſicles heſitating, Crito made anſwer, That he preſumed it was becauſe their Sect, being wiſer than all other wiſe Men, diſdained to ſee the World governed by wrong Maxims, and wou'd ſet all things on a right bottom. EUPH. Thus much is certain. If we look into all inſtitutions of Government, and the political Writings of ſuch as have heretofore paſſed for wiſe Men, we ſhall find a great regard for Virtue. LYS. You ſhall find a ſtrong tincture of Prejudice: But, as I ſaid before, conſult the Multitude if you wou'd find Nature and Truth. EUPH. But among Country Gentlemen, and Farmers, and the better ſort of Tradeſmen, is not Virtue a reputable thing? LYS. You pick up Authorities among Men of low life and vile education. EUPH. Perhaps we ought to pay a decent reſpect to the Authority of Mi⯑nute Philoſophers. LYS. And I wou'd fain know whoſe Authority ſhou'd be more conſidered, than that of thoſe Gentlemen who are alone above Pre⯑judice, and think for themſelves. EUPH. How doth it appear that you are the only unprejudiced part of Mankind? May not a Minute Philoſopher, as well as another Man, be prejudiced in favour of the leaders of his Sect? May not an atheiſtical E⯑ducation prejudice towards Atheiſm? What ſhou'd hinder a Man's being prejudiced againſt Religion, as well as for it? Or can you aſſign any reaſon why an attachment to Pleaſure, Intereſt, Vice, or Vanity, may not be ſuppoſed to prejudice Men againſt Virtue? LYS. This is pleaſant? What! Suppoſe thoſe very Men influenced by Prejudice, who are always diſpu⯑ting againſt it, whoſe conſtant aim it is to detect and demoliſh Prejudices of all kinds! Except their own, replied Crito, for you muſt pardon me, if I cannot [60] help thinking they have ſome ſmall Prejudice, though not in favour of Virtue.

XII.

I obſerve, Lyſicles, that you allowed to Eu⯑phranor, the greater number of happy People are in a State, the more that State may be ſaid to flouriſh; it follows therefore, That ſuch methods as multi⯑ply Inhabitants are good, and ſuch as diminiſh them are bad for the Public. And one wou'd think no body need be told, that the ſtrength of a State con⯑ſiſts more in the number and ſort of People, than in any thing elſe. But in proportion as Vice and Lu⯑xury, thoſe public bleſſings encouraged by this Mi⯑nute Philoſophy, prevail among us, fewer are diſ⯑poſed to marry, too many being diverted by Plea⯑ſure, diſabled by Diſeaſe, or frightned by Expence. Nor doth Vice only thin a Nation, but alſo de⯑baſeth it by a puny degenerate Race. I might add, that it is ruinous to our Manufactures, both as it makes labour dear, and thereby enables our more frugal Neighbours to underſel us; and alſo as it diverts the lower ſort of People from honeſt Cal⯑lings to wicked Projects. If theſe and ſuch conſidera⯑tions were taken into the account, I believe it wou'd be evident to any Man in his ſenſes, that the imaginary benefits of Vice bear no proportion to the ſolid real woes that attend it. Lyſicles, upon this, ſhook his head, and ſmiled at Crito, without vouchſafing any other anſwer. After which, addreſſing himſelf to Euphra⯑nor, There cannot, ſaid he, be a ſtronger inſtance of Prejudice, than that a Man ſhou'd at this time of day preſerve a reverence for that idol Virtue, a thing ſo effectually expoſed and exploded by the moſt knowing Men of the age, who have ſhewn, that a Man is a meer engine, play'd upon and driven about by ſenſible objects; and that moral Virtue is only a Name, a Notion, a Chimaera, an Enthuſiaſm, or at beſt a Faſhion, uncertain and changeable, like all o⯑ther Faſhions. EUPH. What do you think, Lyſicles, [61] of Health; doth it depend on Fancy and Caprice, or is it ſomething real in the bodily compoſition of a Man? LYS. Health is ſomething real, which re⯑ſults from the right Conſtitution and Temperature of the Organs and the Fluids circulating through them. EUPH. This you ſay is health of Body. LYS. It is. EUPH. And may we not ſuppoſe an healthy conſtitution of Soul, when the Notions are right, the Judgments true, the Will regular, the Paſſions and Appetites directed to their proper ob⯑jects, and confined within due bounds? This, in regard to the Soul, ſeems what Health is to the Bo⯑dy. And the Man whoſe mind is ſo conſtituted, is he not properly called virtuous? And to produce this healthy diſpoſition in the minds of his Countrymen, ſhou'd not every good Man employ his endeavours? If theſe things have any appearance of Truth, as to me they ſeem to have, it will not then be ſo clear a point that Virtue is a meer whim or faſhion, as you are pleaſed to repreſent it: I muſt own ſomething un⯑expectedly, after what had been diſcourſed in laſt E⯑vening's Conference, which if you wou'd call to mind, it might perhaps ſave both of us ſome trouble. LYS. Wou'd you know the truth, Euphranor? I muſt own I have quite forgot all your diſcourſe about Virtue, Duty, and all ſuch Points, which, being of an airy notional nature, are apt to vaniſh, and leave no trace on a mind accuſtomed only to receive Impreſ⯑ſion from Realities.

XIII.

Having heard theſe words, Euphranor look⯑ed at Crito and me, and ſaid ſmiling, I have miſtaken my part; it was mine to learn, and his to inſtruct. Then addreſſing himſelf to Lyſicles, Deal faithfully, ſaid he, and let me know whether the public Benefit of Vice be in truth that which makes you plead for it? LYS. I love to ſpeak frankly what I think. Know then, that private Intereſt is the firſt and prin⯑cipal conſideration with Philoſophers of our Sect. [62] Now of all Intereſts Pleaſure is that which hath the ſtrongeſt charms, and no Pleaſures like thoſe which are heightened and enlivened by licence. Herein conſiſts the peculiar excellency of our Principles, that they ſhew People how to ſerve their Country by diverting themſelves, cauſing the two ſtreams of public Spirit and Self-love to unite and run in the ſame channel. I have told you already, that I admit a Nation might ſubſiſt by the rules of Virtue. But give me leave to ſay, it will barely ſubſiſt, in a dull joyleſs inſipid ſtate, whereas the ſprightly exceſſes of Vice inſpire Men with joy: And where Particulars rejoice, the Public, which is made up of Particulars, muſt do ſo too; that is, the Public muſt be happy. This I take to be an irrefragable argument. But to give you its full force, and make it as plain as poſ⯑ſible, I will trace things from their original. Hap⯑pineſs is the end to which created beings naturally tend, but we find that all Animals, whether Men or Brutes, do naturally and principally purſue real Pleaſure of Senſe, which is therefore to be thought their ſupreme Good, their true End and Hap⯑pineſs. It is for this Men live, and whoever under⯑ſtands Life muſt allow that Man to enjoy the top and flower of it, who hath a quick ſenſe of Pleaſure, and withal Spirit, Skill, and Fortune ſufficient to gratify every appetite and every taſte. Niggards and Fools will envy or traduce ſuch a one becauſe they cannot equal him. Hence, all that ſober trifling in diſpa⯑ragement of what every one wou'd be maſter of if he cou'd, a full freedom and unlimited ſcope of Plea⯑ſure. EUPH. Let me ſee whether I underſtand you. Pleaſure of Senſe, you ſay, is the chief Plea⯑ſure. LYS. I do. EUPH. And this wou'd be crampt and diminiſhed by Virtue. LYS. It wou'd. EUPH. Tell me, Lyſicles, is Pleaſure then at the height when the Appetites are ſatisfied? LYS. There is then only an Indolence, the lively ſenſe of [63] Pleaſure being paſt. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem there⯑fore, that the appetites muſt be always craving to pre⯑ſerve Pleaſure alive. LYS. That is our ſenſe of the matter. EUPH. The Greek Philoſopher therefore was in the right, who conſidered the body of a Man of pleaſure as a leaky Veſſel, always filling and never full. LYS. You may divert your ſelf with Allego⯑ries, if you pleaſe. But all the while ours is literally the true taſte of Nature. Look throughout the U⯑niverſe, and you ſhall find Birds and Fiſhes, Beaſts and Inſects, all kinds of Animals, with which the Crea⯑tion ſwarms, conſtantly engaged by inſtinct in the purſuit of ſenſible Pleaſure. And ſhall Man alone be the grave fool who thwarts, and croſſes, and ſubdues his appetites, while his fellow-creatures do all moſt joyfully and freely indulge them? EUPH. How! Lyſicles! I thought that being governed by the Senſes, Appetites, and Paſſions, was the moſt grievous Sla⯑very; and that the proper buſineſs of Free-thinkers, or Philoſophers, had been to ſet Men free from the power of Ambition, Avarice, and Senſuality. LYS. You miſtake the point. We make Men reliſh the World, attentive to their Intereſts, lively and luxuri⯑ous in their Pleaſures, without fear or reſtraint either from God or Man. We deſpiſe thoſe preaching Writers, who uſed to diſturb or cramp the pleaſures and amuſements of Human Life. We hold, that a wiſe Man who meddles with buſineſs, doth it alto⯑gether for his intereſt, and refers his intereſt to his pleaſure. With us it is a maxim, that a Man shou'd ſeize the moments as they fly. Without Love, and Wine, and Play, and late hours, we hold Life not to be worth living. I grant, indeed, that there is ſomething groſs and ill-bred in the vices of mean Men, which the genteel Philoſopher abhors. CRI. But to cheat, whore, betray, get drunk, do all theſe things decently, this is true wiſdom, and elegance of taſte.

XIV.

EUPH. To me, who have been us'd to another way of thinking, this new Philoſophy ſeems difficult to digeſt. I muſt therefore beg leave to ex⯑amine its Principles, with the ſame freedom that you do thoſe of other Sects. LYS. Agreed. EUPH. You ſay, if I miſtake not, that a wiſe Man purſues only his private intereſt, and that this conſiſts in ſen⯑ſual pleaſure, for proof whereof you appeal to Na⯑ture. Is not this what you advance? LYS. It is. EUPH. You conclude therefore, that as other Ani⯑mals are guided by natural inſtinct, Man too ought to follow the dictates of ſenſe and appetite. LYS. I do. EUPH. But in this, do you not argue as if Man had only ſenſe and appetite for his guides, on which ſuppoſition there might be truth in what you ſay? But what if he hath intellect, reaſon, a higher in⯑ſtinct and a nobler life? If this be the caſe, and you being Man, live like a Brute, is it not the way to be defrauded of your true happineſs? to be mortified and diſappointed? Conſider moſt ſorts of Brutes; you ſhall perhaps find them have a greater ſhare of ſenſual happineſs than Man. LYS. To our ſorrow we do. This hath made ſeveral Gentlemen of our Sect envy Brutes, and lament the lot of Humane Kind. CRI. It was a conſideration of this ſort which inſpired Erotylus, with the laudable ambition of wiſhing himſelf a ſnail, upon hearing of certain particularities diſcovered in that animal by a modern Virtuoſo. EUPH. Tell me, Lyſicles, if you had an inexhauſtible fund of gold and ſilver, ſhou'd you envy another for having a little more copper than you? LYS. I ſhou'd not. EUPH. Are not Rea⯑ſon, Imagination, and Senſe, Faculties differing in kind, and in rank higher one than another. LYS. I do not deny it. EUPH. Their acts therefore dif⯑fer in kind. LYS. They do. EUPH. Conſequent⯑ly the pleaſures perfective of thoſe acts are alſo diffe⯑rent. LYS. They are. EUPH. You admit therefore three ſorts of pleaſure; pleaſure of Reaſon, [65] pleaſure of imagination, and pleaſure of Senſe. LYS. I do. EUPH. And, as it is reaſonable to think, the operation of the higheſt and nobleſt faculty to be attended with the higheſt pleaſure, may we not ſup⯑poſe the two former to be as gold or ſilver, and the latter only as copper? Whence it ſhou'd ſeem to fol⯑low, that Man need not envy or imitate a Brute. LYS. And nevertheleſs there are very ingenious Men who do. And ſurely every one may be allowed to know what he wants, and wherein his true happi⯑neſs conſiſts. EUPH. Is it not plain that different Animals have different pleaſures? Take a Hog from his ditch or dunghil, lay him on a rich bed, treat him with ſweet-meats, and muſic, and perfumes. All theſe things will be no entertainment to him. Do not a Bird, a Beaſt, a Fiſh, amuſe themſelves in vari⯑ous manners, inſomuch that what is pleaſing to one may be death to another? Is it ever ſeen that one of theſe Animals quits its own element or way of living, to adopt that of another? And ſhall Man quit his own Nature to imitate a Brute? LYS. But Senſe is not only natural to Brutes; is it not alſo natural to Man? EUPH. It is, but with this difference, it maketh the Whole of a Brute, but is the loweſt part or faculty of a Humane Soul. The nature of any thing is peculiarly that which doth diſtinguiſh it from other things, not what it hath in common with them. Do you allow this to be true? LYS. I do. EUPH. And is not Reaſon that which makes the principal difference between Man and other Animals? LYS. It is. EUPH. Reaſon therefore being the princi⯑pal part of our Nature, whatever is moſt reaſonable ſhou'd ſeem moſt natural to Man. Muſt we not therefore think rational Pleaſures more agreeable to Human Kind, than thoſe of Senſe? Man and Beaſt having different Natures, ſeem to have different Fa⯑culties, different Enjoyments, and different ſorts of Happineſs. You can eaſily conceive, that the ſort of Life which makes the happineſs of a Mole or a [66] Bat, wou'd be a very wretched one for an Eagle. And may you not as well conceive that the happineſs of a Brute can never conſtitute the true happineſs of a Man? A Beaſt, without Reflection or Remorſe, without Foreſight or Appetite of Immortality, without notion of Vice or Virtue, or Order, or Rea⯑ſon, or Knowledge! What motive, what grounds can there be for bringing down Man, in whom are all theſe things, to a level with ſuch a creature? What merit, what ambition in the Minute Philoſopher to make ſuch an Animal a guide or rule for Humane Life?

XV.

LYS. It is ſtrange, Euphranor, that one who admits freedom of thought as you do, ſhou'd yet be ſuch a ſlave to prejudice. You ſtill talk of order and virtue, as of real things, as if our Philoſophers had never demonſtrated, that they have no foundation in Nature, and are only the effects of Education. I know, ſaid Crito, how the Minute Philoſophers are accuſtomed to demonſtrate this point. They conſi⯑der the animal nature of Man, or Man ſo far forth as he is animal; and it muſt be owned that conſidered in that light, he hath no ſenſe of Duty, no notion of Virtue. He therefore, who ſhou'd look for Virtue among meer animals, or Human Kind as ſuch, wou'd look in the wrong place. But that Philoſopher who is attentive only to the animal part of his Being, and raiſeth his Theorys from the very dregs of our Spe⯑cies, might probably upon ſecond thoughts find him⯑ſelf miſtaken. Look you, Crito, ſaid Lyſicles, my argument is with Euphranor to whom addreſſing his diſcourſe; I obſerve, ſaid he, that you ſtand much upon the dignity of Humane Nature. This thing of dignity is an old worn-out notion, which depends on other notions old and ſtale, and worn-out, ſuch as an immaterial Spirit, and a Ray derived from the Di⯑vinity. But in theſe days Men of Senſe make a jeſt of all this Grandeur and Dignity; and many there [67] are wou'd gladly exchange their ſhare of it for the re⯑poſe and freedom, and ſenſuality of a Brute. But compariſons are odious: waving therefore all inquiry concerning the reſpective excellencies of Man and Beaſt, and whether it is beneath a Man to follow or imitate Brute Animals, in judging of the chief good and conduct of Life and Manners, I ſhall be content to appeal to the Authority of Men themſelves, for the truth of my notions. Do but look abroad into the World, and ask the common run of Men, whe⯑ther pleaſure of Senſe be not the only true, ſolid, ſub⯑ſtantial good of their kind? EUPH. But might not the ſame vulgar ſort of Men prefer a piece of Sign-poſt Painting to one of Raphael's, or a Grub⯑ſtreet Ballad to an Ode of Horace? Is there not a real difference between good and bad Writing? LYS. There is. EUPH. And yet you will allow there muſt be a maturity and improvement of underſtanding to diſcern this difference, which doth not make it there⯑fore leſs real. LYS. I will. EUPH. In the ſame manner what ſhou'd hinder, but there may be in na⯑ture a true difference between Vice and Virtue, al⯑though it require ſome degree of reflexion and judg⯑ment to obſerve it? In order to know whether a thing be agreeable to the rational nature of Man, it ſeems one ſhou'd rather obſerve and conſult thoſe who have moſt employ'd or improved their Reaſon. LYS. Well, I ſhall not inſiſt on conſulting the com⯑mon herd of mankind. From the ignorant and groſs Vulgar, I might my ſelf appeal in many caſes to Men of rank and faſhion. EUPH. They are a ſort of Men I have not the honour to know much of by my own Obſervation. But I remember a remark of Ari⯑ſtotle, who was himſelf a Courtier and knew them well. ‘Virtue, ſaith he, ^* and good Senſe are not [68] the property of high Birth or a great Eſtate. Nor if they who poſeſs theſe advantages, wanting a taſte for rational pleaſures, betake themſelves to thoſe of Senſe; ought we therefore to eſteem them eligible, any more than we ſhou'd the toys and paſ⯑times of Children, becauſe they ſeem ſo to them?’ And indeed one may be allowed to queſtion, whether the trueſt eſtimate of things was to be expected from a mind intoxicated with Luxury, and dazzled with the ſplendor of high living.

Hor. Crito upon this obſerved, that he knew an Engliſh Nobleman who in the prime of Life profeſſeth a li⯑beral art, and is the firſt Man of his profeſſion in the World; and that he was very ſure, he had more pleaſure from the exerciſe of that elegant art, than from any ſenſual enjoyment within the power of one of the largeſt fortunes, and moſt bountiful Spirits in Great Britain.

XVI.

LYS. But why need we have recourſe to the judgment of other Men in ſo plain a caſe? I ap⯑peal to your own breaſt, conſult that, and then ſay if ſenſible pleaſure be not the chief good of Man. EUPH. I, for my part, have often thought thoſe pleaſures which are higheſt in the eſteem of ſenſualiſts, ſo far from being the chiefeſt good, that it ſeemed doubtful upon the whole, whether they were any good at all, any more than the meer removal of pain. Are not our wants and appetites uneaſy? LYS. They are. EUPH. Doth not ſenſual pleaſure conſiſt in ſatisfying them? LYS. It doth. EUPH. But the cravings are tedious, the ſatisfaction momentary. Is it not ſo? LYS. It is, but what then? EUPH. Why then it ſhou'd ſeem that ſenſual pleaſure is but a ſhort deliverance from long pain. A long avenue [69] of uneaſineſs leads to a point of pleaſure, which ends in diſguſt or remorſe. CRI. And he who purſues this ignis fatuus imagines himſelf a Philoſopher and Free-thinker. LYS. Pedants are governed by words and notions, while the wiſer Men of pleaſure follow Fact, Nature and Senſe. CRI. But what if notion⯑al pleaſures ſhould in fact prove the moſt real and laſt⯑ing? Pure pleaſures of Reaſon and Imagination nei⯑ther hurt the health, nor waſte the fortune, nor gall the conſcience. By them the mind is long entertain⯑ed without loathing or ſatiety. On the other hand a notion (which with you it ſeems paſſeth for nothing) often embitters the moſt lively ſenſual pleaſures, which at bottom will be found alſo to depend upon notion more than perhaps you imagine, it being a vulgar remark, that thoſe things are more enjoyed by hope and foretaſte of the Soul than by poſſeſſion. Thus much is yielded, that the actual enjoyment is very ſhort, and the alternative of Appetite and Diſguſt long as well as uneaſy. So that, upon the whole, it ſhould ſeem thoſe Gentlemen, who are called Men of pleaſure from their eager purſuit of it, do in reality with great expence of fortune, eaſe, and health pur⯑chaſe pain. LYS. You may ſpin out plauſible Ar⯑guments, but will after all find it a difficult matter to convince me that ſo many ingenious Men ſhou'd not be able to diſtinguiſh between things ſo directly op⯑poſite as pain and pleaſure. How is it poſſible to ac⯑count for this? CRI. I believe a reaſon may be aſ⯑ſigned for it, but to Men of pleaſure no truth is ſo pa⯑latable as a fable. Jove once upon a time having or⯑dered, that pleaſure and pain ſhou'd be mixed in equal proportions in every doſe of Humane Life, upon a complaint, that ſome Men endeavoured to ſeparate what he had joined, and taking more than their ſhare of the ſweet, wou'd leave all the ſour for others, com⯑manded Mercury to put a ſtop to this evil, by fixing on each Delinquent a pair of inviſible Spectacles, which ſhou'd change the appearance of things, mak⯑ing [70] pain look like pleaſure, and pleaſure like pain, labour like recreation, and recreation like labour. From that time the Men of Pleaſure are eternally mi⯑ſtaking and repenting. LYS. If your Doctrine takes place I wou'd fain know what can be the advantage of a great fortune, which all mankind ſo eagerly purſue? CRI. It is a common ſaying with Eucrates, That a great fortune is an edged tool, which a hundred may come at, for one who knows how to uſe it, ſo much eaſier is the art of getting than that of ſpend⯑ing. What its advantage is I will not ſay, but I will venture to declare what it is not. I am ſure that where abundance excludes want, and enjoyment pre⯑vents appetite, there is not the quickeſt ſenſe of thoſe pleaſures we have been ſpeaking of, in which the Footman hath often a greater ſhare than his Lord, who cannot enlarge his Stomach in proportion to his Eſtate.

XVII.

Reaſonable and well-educated Men of all Ranks have, I believe, pretty much the ſame amuſe⯑ments, notwithſtanding the difference of their for⯑tunes: But thoſe who are particularly diſtinguiſhed as Men of pleaſure ſeem to poſſeſs it in a very ſmall degree. EUPH. I have heard that among Perſons of that character, a game of Cards is eſteemed a chief diverſion. LYS. Without Cards there cou'd be no living for People of faſhion. It is the moſt delight⯑ful way of paſſing an Evening when Gentlemen and Ladies are got together, who wou'd otherwiſe be at a loſs what to ſay or do with themſelves. But a pack of Cards is ſo engaging, that it doth not only em⯑ploy them when they are met, but ſerves to draw them together. Quadrille gives them pleaſure in proſpect during the dull hours of the day, they re⯑flect on it with delight, and it furniſhes diſcourſe when it is over. CRI. One wou'd be apt to ſuſpect theſe People of condition paſs their time but heavily, and are but little the better for their fortunes, whoſe [71] chief amuſement is a thing in the power of every Por⯑ter or Footman, who is as well qualified to receive pleaſure from Cards as a Peer. I can eaſily conceive that when People of a certain turn are got together, they ſhou'd prefer doing any thing to the ennui of their own converſation; but it is not eaſily to con⯑ceive there is any great pleaſure in this. What a Card-table can afford requires neither parts nor fortune to judge of. LYS. Play is a ſerious amuſement that comes to the relief of a Man of pleaſure, after the more lively and affecting enjoyments of Senſe. It kills time beyond any thing, and is a moſt admirable Anodyne to divert or prevent thought, which might otherwiſe prey upon the mind. CRI. I can eaſily comprehend, that no Man upon Earth ought to prize Anodynes for the Spleen, more than a Man of faſhi⯑on and pleaſure. An ancient Sage ſpeaking of one of that character, ſaith he is made wretched by diſap⯑pointments and appetites, [...]. And if this was true of the Greeks who lived in the Sun, and had ſo much Spirit, I am apt to think it is ſtill more ſo of our modern Engliſh. Something there is in our climate and complexion, that makes idleneſs no where ſo much its own puniſhment as in England, where an uneducated fine Gentleman pays for his mo⯑mentary pleaſures, with long and cruel intervals of Spleen; for relief of which he is driven into ſenſual exceſſes, that produce a proportionable depreſſion of Spirits, which, as it createth a greater want of plea⯑ſures, ſo it leſſens the ability to enjoy them. There is a caſt of Thought in the Complexion of an Eng⯑liſhman, which renders him the moſt unſucceſsful Rake in the World. He is (as Ariſtotle expreſſeth it) at variance with himſelf. He is neither Brute enough to enjoy his appetites, nor Man enough to govern them. He knows and feels that what he purſues is not his true good, his reflexion ſerving only to ſhew him that miſery which his habitual ſloth and indo⯑lence will not ſuffer him to remedy. At length being [72] grown odious to himſelf, and abhorring his own Com⯑pany, he runs into every idle Aſſembly, not from the hopes of pleaſure, but meerly to reſpite the pain of his own mind. Liſtleſs and uneaſy at the preſent, he hath no delight in reflecting on what is paſt, or in the proſpect of any thing to come. This Man of pleaſure, when after a wretched Scene of vanity and woe his animal nature is worn to the Stumps, wiſhes and dreads Death by turns, and is ſick of living, without having ever tried or known the true life of Man. EUPH. It is well this ſort of Life, which is of ſo little benefit to the owner, conduceth ſo much to that of the Public. But pray tell me, do theſe Gentlemen ſet up for Minute Philoſophers? CRI. That Sect you muſt know contains two ſorts of Phi⯑loſophers, the wet and the dry. Thoſe I have been deſcribing are of the former kind. They differ ra⯑ther in Practice than in Theory. As an older, graver or duller Man from one that is younger, and more ca⯑pable or fond of pleaſure. The dry Philoſopher paſ⯑ſeth his time but drily. He has the honour of pimp⯑ing for the Vices of more ſprightly Men, who in re⯑turn offer ſome ſmall incenſe to his Vanity. Upon this encouragement, and to make his own mind eaſy when it is paſt being pleaſed, he employs himſelf in juſtifying thoſe exceſſes he cannot partake in. But to return to your queſtion, thoſe miſerable Folk are mighty Men for the Minute Philoſophy. EUPH. What hinders them then from putting an end to their lives? CRI. Their not being perſuaded of the Truth of what they profeſs. Some indeed in a fit of deſpair do now and then lay violent hands on themſelves. And as the Minute Philoſophy prevails, we daily ſee more examples of Suicide. But they bear no propor⯑tion to thoſe who wou'd put an end to their lives if they durſt. My friend Clinias, who had been one of them, and a Philoſopher of rank, let me into the ſe⯑cret Hiſtory of their doubts and fears and irreſolute reſolutions of making away with themſelves, which [73] laſt he aſſures me is a frequent topic with Men of pleaſure, when they have drunk themſelves into a little Spirit. It was by virtue of this mechanical va⯑lour, the renowned Philoſopher Hermocrates ſhot himſelf through the head. The ſame thing hath ſince been practiſed by ſeveral others to the great re⯑lief of their friends. Splenetic, worried, and frigh⯑tened out of their wits, they run upon their doom, with the ſame courage as a Bird runs into the mouth of a Rattle Snake, not becauſe they are bold to die, but becauſe they are afraid to live. Clinias endeavour⯑ed to fortify his irreligion, by the diſcourſe and opini⯑on of other Minute Philoſophers, who were mutu⯑ally ſtrengthened in their own unbelief by his. After this manner, authority working in a circle, they en⯑deavoured to atheize one another. But though he pretended even to a demonſtration againſt the Being of a God, yet he cou'd not inwardly conquer his own Belief. He fell ſick, and acknowledged this truth, is now a ſober Man and a good Chriſtian; owns he was never ſo happy as ſince he became ſuch, nor ſo wretched as while he was a Minute Philoſopher. And he who has tried both conditions may be allowed a proper judge of both. LYS. Truly a fine account of the brighteſt and braveſt Men of the Age. CRI. Bright and brave are fine attributes. But our Curate is of opinion, that all your Free-thinking Rakes are either Fools or Cowards. Thus he argues; if ſuch a Man doth not ſee his true Intereſt, he wants Senſe, if he doth but dare not purſue it, he wants Courage. In this manner from the defect of Senſe and Courage, he deduceth that whole Species of Men, who are ſo apt to value themſelves upon both thoſe qualities. LYS. As for their Courage they are at all times ready to give proof of it; and for their underſtand⯑ing, thanks to nature, it is of a ſize not to be meaſur⯑ed by Country Parſons.

XVIII.

EUPH. But Socrates, who was no Coun⯑try Parſon, ſuſpected your Men of pleaſure were ſuch through ignorance. LYS. Ignorance of what? EUPH. Of the art of computing. It was his opi⯑nion that Rakes cannot reckon ^*. And that for want of this skill they make wrong judgments about pleaſure, on the right choice of which their happi⯑neſs depends. LYS. I do not underſtand you. EUPH. Do you grant that Senſe perceiveth only ſenſible things? LYS. I do. EUPH. Senſe per⯑ceiveth only things preſent. LYS. This too I grant. EUPH. Future pleaſures, therefore, and pleaſures of the underſtanding, are not to be judged of by ac⯑tual Senſe. LYS. They are not. EUPH. Thoſe therefore who judge of pleaſure by Senſe, may find themſelves miſtaken at the foot of the account.

To make a right computation, ſhou'd you not con⯑ſider all the faculties and all the kinds of Pleaſure, ta⯑king into your account the future as well as the pre⯑ſent, and rating them all according to their true va⯑lue? CRI. The Epicureans themſelves allowed, that Pleaſure which procures a greater Pain, or hin⯑ders a greater Pleaſure, ſhou'd be regarded as a Pain; and, that Pain which procures a greater Pleaſure, or prevents a greater Pain, is to be accounted a Pleaſure. In order therefore to make a true eſtimate of Plea⯑ſure, the great ſpring of action, and that from whence the conduct of Life takes its bias, we ought to compute intellectual Pleaſures and future Pleaſures, [75] as well as preſent and ſenſible: We ought to make allowance in the valuation of each particular Plea⯑ſure, for all the Pains and Evils, for all the Diſguſt, Remorſe, and Shame that attend it: We ought to regard both kind and quantity, the ſincerity, the in⯑tenſeneſs, and the duration of Pleaſures. EUPH. And all theſe points duly conſidered, will not Socrates ſeem to have had reaſon of his ſide, when he thought ignorance made Rakes, and particularly their being ignorant of what he calls the Science of more and leſs, greater and ſmaller, equality and compariſon, that is to ſay of the art of Computing? LYS. All this diſcourſe ſeems notional. For real abilities of e⯑very kind it is well known we have the brighteſt Men of the age among us. But all thoſe who know the World do calculate that what you call a good Chri⯑ſtian, who hath neither a large Conſcience, nor un⯑prejudiced Mind, muſt be unfit for the affairs of it. Thus you ſee, while you compute your ſelves out of pleaſure, others compute you out of buſineſs. What then are you good for with all your computation? EUPH. I have all imaginable reſpect for the abilities of Free-thinkers. My only fear was, their parts might be too lively for ſuch ſlow talents as Forecaſt and Computation, the gifts of ordinary Men.

XIX.

CRI. I cannot make them the ſame com⯑pliment that Euphranor does. For though I ſhall not pretend to characterize the whole Sect, yet thus much I may truly affirm, That thoſe who have fallen in my way have been moſtly raw Men of pleaſure, old Sharpers in buſineſs, or a third ſort of lazy Scio⯑liſts, who are neither Men of buſineſs, nor Men of ſpeculation, but ſet up for judges or critics in all kinds, without having made a progreſs in any. Theſe, among Men of the World paſs for profound Theoriſts, and among ſpeculative Men wou'd ſeem to know the World; a conceited race, equally uſeleſs to the affairs and ſtudies of Mankind. Such as theſe, for the moſt [76] part, ſeem to be Sectaries of the Minute Philoſophy. I will not deny that now and then you may meet with a Man of eaſy manners, that, without thoſe faults and affectations, is carried into the party by the meer ſtream of Education, Faſhion, or Company; all which do in this age prejudice Men againſt Religion, even thoſe who mechanically rail at Prejudice. I muſt not forget that the Minute Philoſophers have alſo a ſtrong party among the Beaux and fine Ladies, and, as affectations out of character are often the ſtrongeſt, there is nothing ſo dogmatical and incon⯑vincible as one of theſe fine things, when it ſets up for Free-thinking. But, be theſe profeſſors of the Sect never ſo dogmatical, their authority muſt needs be ſmall with Men of ſenſe: For who wou'd chooſe for his guide in the ſearch for Truth, a Man whoſe Thoughts and Time are taken up with Dreſs, Viſits, and Diverſions? Or whoſe Education hath been be⯑hind a Counter, or in an Office? Or whoſe Specu⯑lations have been employed on the forms of buſi⯑neſs, who are only well read in the ways and com⯑merce of Mankind, in ſtock-jobbing, purloining, ſupplanting, bribing? Or wou'd any Man in his ſenſes give a fig for Meditations and Diſcoveries made over a bottle? And yet it is certain, that inſtead of Thought, Books, and Study, moſt Free-thinkers are the Proſelytes of a drinking Club. Their Prin⯑ciples are often ſettled, and deciſions on the deepeſt Points made, when they are not fit to make a bargain. LYS. You forget our Writers, Crito. They make a world of Proſelytes. CRI. So wou'd worſe Wri⯑ters in ſuch a cauſe. Alas! how few read! and of theſe, how few are able to judge? How many wiſh your notions true? How many had rather be diver⯑ted than inſtructed? How many are convinced by a title? I may allow your reaſons to be effectual, without allowing them to be good. Arguments, in themſelves of ſmall weight, have great effect, when [77] they are recommended by a miſtaken intereſt, when they are pleaded for by paſſion, when they are coun⯑tenanced by the humour of the age; and above all, with ſome ſort of Men, when they are againſt Law, Government, and eſtabliſhed Opinions, things which, as a wiſe or good Man wou'd not depart from without clear evidence, a weak or a bad Man will affect to diſparage on the ſlighteſt Grounds. LYS. And yet the arguments of our Philoſophers alarm. CRI. The force of their reaſoning is not what a⯑larms, their contempt of Laws and Government is alarming, their application to the young and igno⯑rant is dangerous. EUPH. But without diſputing or diſparaging their talent at Ratiocination, it ſeems very poſſible their ſucceſs might not be owing to that alone. May it not in ſome meaſure be aſcribed to the defects of others, as well as to their own perfections? My friend Eucrates uſed to ſay, that the Church wou'd thrive and flouriſh beyond all oppoſition, if ſome certain perſons minded Piety more than Politics, Practics than Polemics, Fundamentals than Conſec⯑taries, Subſtance than Circumſtance, Things than Notions, and Notions than Words. LYS. What⯑ever may be the cauſe, the effects are too plain to be denied. And when a conſidering Man obſerves that our Notions do, in this moſt learned and knowing age, ſpread and multiply, in oppoſition to eſtabliſh⯑ed Laws, and every day gain ground againſt a body ſo numerous, ſo learned, ſo well ſupported, protected, encouraged for the ſervice and defence of Religion: I ſay, when a Man obſerves and conſiders all this, he will be apt to aſcribe it to the force of Truth, and the merits of our cauſe; which, had it been ſup⯑ported with the revenues and eſtabliſhments of the Church and Univerſities, you may gueſs what a fi⯑gure it wou'd make, by the figure that it makes without them. EUPH. It is much to be pitied, that the learned profeſſors of your Sect do not meet with the encouragement they deſerve. LYS. All in [78] due time. People begin to open their eyes. It is not impoſſible but thoſe revenues that in ignorant times were applied to a wrong uſe, may hereafter in a more enlightned age, be applied to a better. CRI. But why profeſſors and encouragement for what needs no teaching? An acquaintance of mine has a moſt ingenious Footman that can neither write nor read, who learned your whole Syſtem in half an hour, he knows when and how to nod, ſhake his head, ſmile, and give a hint as well as the ableſt Scep⯑tic, and is in fact a very Minute Philoſopher. LYS. Pardon me, it takes time to unlearn religious Preju⯑dices, and requires a ſtrong head. CRI. I do not know how it might have been once upon a time. But in the preſent laudable education, I know ſeve⯑ral who have been imbued with no religious notions at all; and others who have had them ſo very ſlight, that they rubbed off without the leaſt pains.

XX.

Panope, young and beautiful, under the care of her Aunt, an admirer of the Minute Philoſophy, was kept from learning the Principles of Religion, that ſhe might not be accuſtomed to believe with⯑out a reaſon, nor aſſent to what ſhe did not compre⯑hend. Panope was not indeed prejudiced with reli⯑gious notions, but got a notion of Intriguing, and a notion of Play, which ruined her reputation by four⯑teen, and her fortune by four and twenty. I have often reflected on the different fate of two Brothers in my neighbourhood. Cleon the elder being deſigned an accompliſh'd Gentleman, was ſent to town, had the firſt part of his education in a great School: What Religion he learned there was ſoon unlearned in a cer⯑tain celebrated Society, which, till we have a better, may paſs for a nurſery of Minute Philoſophers. Cleon dreſſed well, cou'd cheat at cards, had a nice palate, underſtood the myſtery of the Die, was a mighty Man in the Minute Philoſophy. And having ſhined a few years in theſe accompliſhments, he died before [79] thirty, childleſs, and rotten, expreſſing the utmoſt indignation that he cou'd not out-live that old dog his Father; who, having a great notion of polite man⯑ners, and knowledge of the World, had purchaſed them to his favourite Son, with much expence, but had been more frugal in the education of Chaerephon, the younger Son, who was brought up at a Country-School, and entered a Commoner in the Univerſity, where he qualified himſelf for a Parſonage in his Fa⯑ther's gift, which he is now poſſeſſed of, together with the Eſtate of the Family, and a numerous Off⯑ſpring. LYS. A pack of unpoliſh'd cubbs, I war⯑rant. CRI. Leſs poliſhed, perhaps, but more ſound, more honeſt, and more uſeful than many who paſs for fine Gentlemen. Crates, a worthy Juſtice of the Peace in this County, having had a Son miſcarry at London, by the converſation of a Minute Philoſo⯑pher, uſed to ſay with a great air of complaint, If a Man ſpoils my Corn, or hurts my Cattle, I have a re⯑medy againſt him; but if he ſpoils my Children, I have none. LYS. I warrant you, he was for penal me⯑thods; he wou'd have had a Law to perſecute tender Conſciences. CRI. The tender Conſcience of a Minute Philoſopher! He who tutored the Son of Crates, ſoon after did juſtice on himſelf. For he taught Lycidas, a modeſt young Man, the Principles of his Sect. Lycidas, in return, debauched his Daugh⯑ter, an only child, upon which, Charmides that was the Minute Philoſopher's Name) hanged himſelf. Old Bubalion in the City is carking, and ſtarving, and cheating, that his Son may drink and game, keep Miſtreſſes, Hounds, and Horſes, and die in a Jail. Bubalion nevertheleſs thinks himſelf wiſe, and paſſeth for one that minds the main chance. He is a Minute Philoſopher, which learning he acquired behind the counter, from the works of Prodicus and Tryphon. This ſame Bubalion was one night at ſupper, talking againſt the Immortality of the Soul, with two or three grave Citizens, one of whom the next day de⯑clared [80] himſelf bankrupt, with five thouſand Pound of Bubalion's in his hands, and the night following he received a note from a Servant, who had during his lecture waited at table, demanding the ſum of fifty guineas to be laid under a ſtone, and concluding with moſt terrible threats and imprecations. LYS. Not to repeat what hath been already demonſtrated, That the Public is at bottom no ſuffer by ſuch accidents, which in truth are inconvenient only to private per⯑ſons, who in their turn too may reap the benefit of them; I ſay, not to repeat all that hath been demon⯑ſtrated on that head, I ſhall only ask you whether there wou'd not be Rakes and Rogues, although we did not make them? Believe me, the World always was, and always will be the ſame, as long as Men are Men. CRI. I deny that the World is always the ſame. Humane Nature, to uſe Alciphron's compari⯑ſon, is like Land, better or worſe, as it is improved, and according to the Seeds or Principles ſown in it. Though no body held your Tenets, I grant there might be bad Men by the force of corrupt appetites and irregular paſſions: But where Men, to the force of appetite and paſſion, add that of opinion, and are wicked from Principle, there will be more Men wicked, and thoſe more incurably and outrageouſly ſo. The error of a lively Rake lies in his paſſions, and may be reformed: But the dry Rogue who ſets up for judgment, is incorrigible. It is an obſerva⯑tion of Ariſtotle's, That there are two ſorts of De⯑bauchees, the [...], and the [...], of which the one is ſo againſt his judgment, the other with it, and that there may be hopes of the former, but none of the latter. And in fact I have always obſerved, that a Rake who is a Minute Philoſopher, when grown old becomes a ſharper in buſineſs. LYS. I cou'd name you ſeveral ſuch who have grown moſt noted Patriots. CRI. Patriots! ſuch Patriots as Catiline and Marc Antony. LYS. And what then? Thoſe famous Romans were brave though unſucceſsful. [81] They wanted neither Senſe nor Courage, and if their Schemes had taken effect, the brisker part of their Countrymen had been much the better for them.

XXI.

The wheels of Government go on, though wound up by different hands; if not in the ſame form, yet in ſome other, perhaps a better. There is an endleſs variety in nature, weak Men, indeed, are prejudiced towards Rules and Syſtems in Life and Government; and think if theſe are gone all is gone: But a Man of a great Soul and free Spirit delights in the noble experiment of blowing up Syſtems and diſſolving Governments, to mold them anew upon other principles and in another ſhape. Take my word for it; there is a plaſtic nature in things that ſeeks its own end. Pull a State to pieces, jumble, confound, and ſhake together the particles of Humane Society, and then let them ſtand a while, and you ſhall ſoon ſee them ſettle of themſelves in ſome convenient order, where heavy heads are loweſt and Men of genius up⯑permoſt. EUPH. Lyſicles, ſpeaks his mind freely. LYS. Where was the advantage of Free-thinking if it were not attended with Free-ſpeaking, or of Free-ſpeaking if it did not produce Free-acting? We are for abſolute, independent, original freedom in thought, word, and deed. Inward freedom without outward, is good for nothing but to ſet a Man's judg⯑ment at variance with his practice. CRI. This free way of Lyſicles may ſeem new to you; it is not ſo to me. As the Minute Philoſophers lay it down for a maxim, that there is nothing ſacred of any kind, no⯑thing but what may be made a jeſt of, exploded, and changed like the faſhion of their Clothes, ſo nothing is more frequent than for them to utter their ſchemes and principles, not only in ſelect Companies, but even in public. In a certain part of the World, where ingenious Men are wont to retail their Specu⯑lations, I remember to have ſeen a Valetundinarian in a long Wig and a Cloak ſitting at the upper end of a [82] Table, with half a dozen of Diſciples about him. After he had talked about Religion in a manner, and with an air that wou'd make one think, Atheiſm eſ⯑tabliſhed by Law, and Religion only tolerated, he en⯑tered upon Civil Government, and obſerved to his Audience, that the natural World was in a perpetu⯑al circulation: Animals, ſaid he, who draw their ſuſ⯑tenance from the Earth, mix with that ſame Earth, and in their turn become Food for Vegetables, which again nouriſh the Animal kind: The Vapours that aſcend from this Globe deſcend back upon it in ſhow⯑ers: The Elements alternately prey upon each other: That which one part of nature loſeth another gains, the ſum total remaining always the ſame, being nei⯑ther bigger nor leſſer, better nor worſe for all theſe inteſtine changes. Even ſo, ſaid this learned Profeſ⯑ſor, the revolutions in the civil World are no detri⯑ment to Human Kind, one part whereof riſes as the other fails, and wins by another's loſs. A Man there⯑fore who thinks deeply, and hath an eye on the whole Syſtem, is no more a Bigot to Government than to Religion. He knows how to ſuit himſelf to occaſi⯑ons, and make the beſt of every event: For the reſt, he looks on all tranſlations of power and property from one hand to another with a philoſophic indiffer⯑ence. Our Lecturer concluded his diſcourſe with a moſt ingenious Analyſis of all political and moral Virtues into their firſt principles and cauſes, ſhewing them to be meer faſhions, tricks of State, and illuſi⯑ons on the Vulgar. LYS. We have been often told of the good effects of Religion and Learning, Chur⯑ches and Univerſities: But I dare affirm, that a dozen or two ingenious Men of our Sect have done more towards advancing real knowledge, by extemporane⯑ous Lectures in the compaſs of a few years, than all the Eccleſiaſtics put together for as many Centuries. EUPH. And the Nation no doubt thrives accor⯑dingly: But, it ſeems, Crito, you have heard them diſcourſe. CRI. Upon hearing this and other Lec⯑tures [83] of the ſame tendency, methought it was need⯑leſs to eſtabliſh Profeſſors for the Minute Philoſophy in either Univerſity, while there are ſo many ſpon⯑taneous Lecturers in every corner of the Streets, rea⯑dy to open Mens Eyes, and rub off their prejudices a⯑bout Religion, Loyalty, and public Spirit. LYS. If wiſhing was to any purpoſe, I cou'd wiſh for a Teleſcope that might draw into my view things fu⯑ture in time, as well as diſtant in place. Oh! that I cou'd but look into the next age, and behold what it is that we are preparing to be, the glorious harveſt of our Principles, the ſpreading of which hath pro⯑duced a viſible tendency, in the Nation towards ſome⯑thing great and new. CRI. One thing I dare ſay you wou'd expect to ſee, be the changes and agitati⯑ons of the Public what they will, that is, every Free-thinker upon his legs. You are all Sons of Nature, who chearfully follow the fortunes of the common Maſs. LYS. And it muſt be owned we have a max⯑im, that each ſhou'd take care of one. CRI. Alas, Lyſicles, you wrong your own Character. You wou'd fain paſs upon the World and upon your ſelves for in⯑tereſted cunning Men: But can any thing be more diſintereſted than to ſacrifice all regards to the ab⯑ſtracted Speculation of Truth? Or can any thing be more void of all cunning than to publiſh your diſco⯑veries to the World, teach others to play the whole game, and arm Mankind againſt your ſelves?

XXII.

If a Man may venture to ſuggeſt ſo mean a thought as the love of their Country, to Souls fired with the love of Truth, and the love of Liberty, and graſping the whole extent of Nature, I wou'd hum⯑bly propoſe it to you, Gentlemen, to obſerve the caution practiſed by all other diſcoverers, projectors, and makers of experiments, who never hazard all on the firſt trial. Wou'd it not be prudent to try the ſucceſs of your principles on a ſmall model in ſome remote corner? For inſtance ſet up a Colony of Athe⯑iſts [84] in Monomotapa, and ſee how it proſpers before you proceed any further at home: Half a dozen Ship-load of Minute Philoſophers might eaſily be ſpread upon ſo good a deſign. In the mean time, you Gentlemen, who have found out that there is nothing to be hoped or feared in another Life, that Conſcience is a Bugbear, that the bands of Government, and the cement of Human Society are rotten things, to be diſſolved and crumbled into nothing, by the ar⯑gumentation of every Minute Philoſopher, be ſo good as to keep theſe ſublime diſcoveries to your ſelves: Suffer us, our Wives, our Children, our Servants and our Neighbours to continue in the Belief and way of Thinking eſtabliſhed by the Laws of our Country. In good earneſt, I wiſh you wou'd go try your experiments among the Hottentots or Turks. LYS. The Hottentots we think well of, believing them to be an unprejudiced People; but it is to be feared their diet and cuſtoms wou'd not agree with our Philoſophers: As for the Turks they are Bigots who have a notion of God and a reſpect for Jeſus Chriſt. I queſtion whether it might be ſafe to ven⯑ture among them. CRI. Make your experiment then in ſome other part of Chriſtendom. LYS. We hold all other Chriſtian Nations to be much under the power of prejudice; even our Neighbours the Dutch are too much prejudiced in favour of their Re⯑ligion by Law eſtabliſhed, for a prudent Man to at⯑tempt innovations under their Government. Upon the whole it ſeems, we can execute our Schemes no where with ſo much ſecurity and ſuch proſpect of ſucceſs as at home. Not to ſay that we have already made a good progreſs. Oh! That we cou'd but once ſee a Parliament of true, ſtaunch, libertine Free-thinkers! CRI. God forbid. I ſhou'd be ſorry to have ſuch Men for my Servants, not to ſay, for my Maſters. LYS. In that we differ.

XXIII.

But you will agree with me that the right way to come at this, was to begin with extirpating the prejudices of particular Perſons. We have carried on this work for many years with much art and in⯑duſtry, and at firſt with ſecrecy, working like Moles under ground, concealing our progreſs from the Public, and our ultimate views from many, even of our own Proſelytes, blowing the Coals between polemical Divines, laying hold on and improving every incident, which the paſſions and folly of Churchmen afforded, to the advantage of our Sect. As our principles obtained, we ſtill proceeded to farther inferences; and as our numbers multiplied, we gra⯑dually diſcloſed our ſelves and our Opinions; where we are now I need not ſay. We have ſtubbed and weeded and cleared Humane Nature to that degree, that in a little time, leaving it alone without any la⯑bouring or teaching, you ſhall ſee natural and juſt Ideas ſprout forth of themſelves. CRI. But I have heard a man, who had lived long and obſerved much, remark that the worſt and moſt unwholeſom weed was this ſame Minute Philoſophy. We have had, ſaid he, divers epidemical diſtempers in the State, but this hath produced of all others the moſt deſtructive Plague. Enthuſiaſm had its day, its effects were vio⯑lent and ſoon over: This infects more quietly but ſpreads widely: The former bred a fever in the State, this breeds a conſumption and final decay. A Rebel⯑lion or an Invaſion alarms and puts the Public upon its defence, but a corruption of principles works its ruin more ſlowly perhaps, but more ſurely. This may be illuſtrated by a Fable I ſomewhere met with in the writings of a Swiſs Philoſopher, ſetting forth the original of Brandy and Gun-powder. The Govern⯑ment of the North being once upon a time vacant, the Prince of the power of the air convened a Coun⯑cil in Hell, wherein upon competition between two Daemons of rank, it was determined they ſhou'd both [86] make trial of their abilities, and he ſhou'd ſucceed who did moſt miſchief. One made his appearance in the ſhape of Gunpowder, the other in that of Bran⯑dy: The former was a declared Enemy and roared with a terrible noiſe, which made folks afraid, and put them on their guard: The other paſſed as a Friend and a Phyſician through the World, diſguiſed himſelf with Sweets and Perfumes and Drugs, made his way into the Ladies Cabinets, and the Apothe⯑caries Shops, and under the notion of helping dige⯑ſtion, comforting the Spirits, and checring the Heart, produced direct contrary effects; and having inſenſi⯑bly thrown great numbers of Humane Kind into a lingring but fatal decay, was found to people Hell and the Grave ſo faſt as to merit the Governemnt which he ſtill poſſeſſes.

XXIV.

LYS. Thoſe who pleaſe may amuſe them⯑ſelves with Fables and Allegories. This is plain Eng⯑liſh: Liberty is a good thing, and we are the ſupport of Liberty. CRI. To me it ſeems that Liberty and Virtue were made for each other. If any Man wiſh to enſlave his Country, nothing is a fitter preparative than Vice; and nothing leads to Vice ſo ſurely as Ir⯑religion. For my part I cannot comprehend or find out, after having conſidered it in all lights, how this crying down Religion ſhou'd be the effect of honeſt views towards a juſt and legal Liberty. Some ſeem to propoſe an indulgence in Vice. Others may have in proſpect the advantages which needy and ambitious Men are uſed to make in the ruin of a State: One may indulge a pert petulant Spirit; another hope to be eſteemed among Libertines, when he wants wit to pleaſe or abilities to be uſeful. But, be Mens views what they will, let us examine what good your prin⯑ciples have done; who has been the better for the in⯑ſtructions of theſe Minute Philoſophers? Let us compare what we are in reſpect of Learning, Loyalty, Honeſty, Wealth, Power and Public Spirit with [87] what we have been. Free-thinking (as it is called) hath wonderfully grown of late years. Let us ſee what hath grown up with it, or what effects it hath produced. To make a catalogue of ills is diſagree⯑able; and the only bleſſing it can pretend to is Luxu⯑ry: That ſame bleſſing which revenged the World upon old Rome: That ſame Luxury that makes a Na⯑tion like a diſeaſed pampered body, look full and fat with one foot in the Grave. LYS. You miſtake the matter. There are no People who think and argue better about the public good of a State than our Sect; who have alſo invented many things tending to that end, which we cannot as yet conveniently put in practice. CRI. But one point there is from which it muſt be owned the Public hath already received ſome advantage, which is the effect of your princi⯑ples flowing from them, and ſpreading as they do; I mean that old Roman practice of Self-murder which at once puts an end to all diſtreſs, ridding the World and themſelves of the miſerable. LYS. You were pleaſed before to make ſome reflexions on this Cuſ⯑tom, and laugh at the irreſolution of our Free-think⯑ers: But I can aver for matter of fact, that they have often recommended it by their example as well as arguments, and that it is ſoley owing to them that a practice, ſo uſeful and magnanimous, hath been taken out of the hands of Lunatics, and reſtored to that credit among Men of ſenſe, which it anciently had. In whatever light you may conſider it, this is in fact a ſolid Benefit: But the beſt effect of our prin⯑ciples is that light and truth ſo viſibly ſhed abroad in the World. From how many prejudices, errors, perplexities and contradictions have we freed the minds of our Fellow-Subjects? How many hard words and intricate abſurd notions had poſſeſſed the minds of Men before our Philoſophers appeared in the World? But now even Women and Children have right and ſound notions of things. What ſay you to this, Crito? CRI. I ſay, with reſpect to [88] theſe great advantages of deſtroying Men and Noti⯑ons, that I queſtion whether the Public gains as much by the latter as it loſeth by the former. For my own part I had rather my Wife and Children all believed what they had no notion of and daily pronounced words without a meaning, than that any one of them ſhou'd cut his Throat, or leap out of a Window. Errors and nonſenſe as ſuch are of ſmall concern in the eye of the Public, which conſider not the metaphy⯑ſical Truth of notions, ſo much as the tendency they have to produce good or evil. Truth it ſelf is valued by the Public, as it hath an influence, and is felt in the courſe of Life. You may confute a whole ſhelf of Schoolmen, and diſcover many ſpeculative Truths, without any great merit towards your Country. But if I am not miſtaken, the Minute Philoſophers are not the Men to whom we are moſt beholden for diſ⯑coveries of that kind: This I ſay muſt be allowed ſuppoſing, what I by no means grant, your notions to be true. For, to ſay plainly what I think, the tendency of your opinions is ſo bad, that no good Man can endure them, and your arguments for them ſo weak that no wiſe Man will admit them. LYS. Has it not been proved as clear as the Meridian Sun, that the politer ſort of Men lead much happier lives, and ſwim in pleaſure ſince the ſpreading of our Prin⯑ciples? But, not to repeat or inſiſt further on what has been ſo amply deduced, I ſhall only add that the advantages flowing from them, extend to the tender⯑eſt Age and the ſofter Sex: Our principles deliver Children from terrors by night, and Ladies from ſplenetic hours by day. Inſtead of theſe old faſhion⯑ed things, Prayers and the Bible, the grateful amuſe⯑ments of Drams, Dice, and Billets-doux have ſuc⯑ceeded. The fair Sex have now nothing to do but dreſs and paint, drink and game, adorn and divert themſelves, and enter into all the ſweet Society of Life. CRI. I thought, Lyſicles, the argument from pleaſure had been exhauſted; but ſince you have not [89] done with that point, let us once more by Euphranor's rule caſt up the account of pleaſure and pain, as cre⯑dit and debt under diſtinct Articles. We will ſet down in the life of your fine Lady, rich clothes, dice, cordials, ſcandal, late hours againſt vapours, diſtaſte, remorſe, loſſes at play, and the terrible diſtreſs of ill ſpent age increaſing every day; ſuppoſe no cruel ac⯑cident of jealouſy, no madneſs or infamy of love, yet at the foot of the account you ſhall find that empty, giddy, gaudy, fluttering thing, not half ſo happy as a butterfly, or a graſhopper on a Summer's day: And for a Rake or Man of pleaſure, the reckoning will be much the ſame, if you place liſtleſneſs, ignorance, rottenneſs, loathing, craving, quarrelling, and ſuch qualities or accompliſhments over againſt his little circle of fleeting amuſements, long woe againſt mo⯑mentary pleaſure; and if it be conſidered that, when Senſe and Appetite go off, though he ſeek refuge from his Conſcience in the Minute Philoſophy, yet in this you will find, if you ſift him to the bottom, that he affects much, believes little, knows nothing. Upon which Lyſicles turning to me, obſerved, that Crito might diſpute againſt fact if he pleaſed, but that every one muſt ſee the Nation was the merrier for their principles. True, anſwered Crito, we are a merry Nation indeed: Young Men laugh at the old; Chil⯑dren deſpiſe their Parents; and Subjects make a jeſt of the Government; happy effects of the Minute Phi⯑loſophy!

XXV.

LYS. Infer what effects you pleaſe that will not make our principles leſs true. CRI. Their truth is not what I am now conſidering. The point at preſent is the uſefulneſs of your principles; and to decide this point we need only take a ſhort view of them fairly propoſed and laid together: That there is no God or Providence; that Man is as the Beaſts that periſh; that his Happineſs as theirs conſiſts in obeying animal inſtincts, appetites and paſ⯑ſions; [90] that all ſtings of conſcience and ſenſe of guilt are prejudices and errors of Education; that Religion is a State trick; that Vice is beneficial to the Public; that the Soul of Man is corporeal and diſſolveth like a flame or vapour; that Man is a Ma⯑chine actuated according to the Laws of motion; that conſequently he is no agent or ſubject of guilt; that a wiſe Man will make his own particular indi⯑vidual intereſt in this preſent life, the rule and mea⯑ſure of all his actions: Theſe and ſuch Opinions are, it ſeems, the Tenets of a Minute Philoſopher, who is himſelf according to his own principles an Organ play'd on by ſenſible objects, a Ball bandied about by appetites, and paſſions; ſo ſubtle is he as to be able to maintain all this by artful reaſonings; ſo ſharp⯑ſighted and penetrating to the very bottom of things as to find out, that the moſt intereſted occult cunning is the only true wiſdom. To compleat his Character, this curious piece of Clockwork, having no princi⯑ple of Action within it ſelf, and denying that it hath or can have any one Free Thought or Motion, ſets up for the Patron of Liberty, and earneſtly contends for Free-thinking. Crito had no ſooner made an end, but Lyſicles addreſſed himſelf to Euphranor and me; Crito, ſaid he, has taken a world of pains, but con⯑vinced me only of one ſingle point, to wit, That I muſt deſpair of Convincing him. Never did I in the whole courſe of my life meet with a Man ſo deeply immerſed in Prejudice; let who will pull him out for me. But I entertain better hopes of you. I can an⯑ſwer, ſaid I, for my ſelf, that my eyes and ears are al⯑ways open to Conviction: I am attentive to all that paſſes, and upon the whole ſhall form, whether right or wrong, a very impartial judgment. Crito, ſaid Euphranor, is a more enterpriſing Man than I, thus to rate and lecture a Philoſopher. For my part, I al⯑ways find it eaſier to learn than to teach. I ſhall therefore beg your aſſiſtance to rid me of ſome ſcru⯑ples about the tendency of your Opinions; which [91] I find my ſelf unable to maſter, though never ſo willing. This done, though we ſhou'd not tread exactly in the ſame ſteps, nor perhaps go the ſame road; yet we ſhall not run in all points diametrically oppoſite one to another.

XXVI.

Tell me now, Lyſicles, you who are a mi⯑nute obſerver of things, whether a ſhade be more a⯑greeable at morning or evening or noon-day. LYS. Doubtleſs at noon-day. EUPH. And what diſpo⯑ſeth Men to reſt? LYS. Exerciſe. EUPH. When do Men make the greateſt fires? LYS. In the cold⯑eſt weather. EUPH. And what creates a love for icid Liquors? LYS. Exceſſive heat. EUPH. What if you raiſe a Pendulum to a great height on one ſide? LYS. It will, when left to it ſelf, aſcend ſo much the higher on the other. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem, there⯑fore, that Darkneſs enſues from Light, Reſt from Mo⯑tion, Heat from Cold, and in general that one Extreme is the conſequence of another. LYS. It ſhou'd ſeem ſo. EUPH. And doth not this obſervation hold in the civil as well as natural World? Doth not Power produce Licence, and Licence Power? Do not Whigs make Tories, and Tories Whigs? Bigots make Atheiſts, and Atheiſts Bigots? LYS. Grant⯑ing this to be true. EUPH. Will it not hence fol⯑low, that as we abhor Slaviſh Principles, we ſhou'd avoid running into Licentious ones? I am and always was a ſincere lover of Liberty, Legal Engliſh Liber⯑ty; which I eſteem a chief bleſſing, ornament, and comfort of Life, and the great Prerogative of an Engliſhman. But is it not to be feared, that upon the Nation's running into a Licentiouſneſs which hath never been endured in any civilized Country, Men feeling the intolerable evils of one extreme may na⯑turally fall into the other? You muſt allow, the bulk of Mankind are not Philoſophers like you and Alci⯑phron. LYS. This I readily acknowledge. EUPH. I have another ſcruple about the tendency of your [92] Opinions. Suppoſe you ſhou'd prevail and deſtroy this Proteſtant Church and Clergy: How cou'd you come at the Popiſh? I am credibly informed there is a great number of Emiſſaries of the Church of Rome diſguiſed in England: who can tell what harveſt a Clergy ſo numerous, ſo ſubtle, and ſo well furniſhed with arguments to work on vulgar and uneducated minds, may be able to make in a Country deſpoiled of all Religion, and feeling the want of it? Who can tell whether the Spirit of Free-thinking ending with the Oppoſition, and the Vanity with the Diſ⯑tinction, when the whole Nation are alike Infidels, who can tell, I ſay, whether in ſuch a juncture the Men of Genius themſelves may not affect a new Diſ⯑tinction, and be the firſt converts to Popery? LYS. And ſuppoſe they ſhou'd. Between friends it wou'd be no great matter. Theſe are our maxims. In the firſt place we hold it wou'd be beſt to have no Religi⯑on at all. Secondly, we hold that all Religions are indifferent. If therefore upon trial we find the Coun⯑try cannot do without a Religion, why not Popery as well as another? I know ſeveral ingenious Men of our Sect, who, if we had a Popiſh Prince on the Throne, wou'd turn Papiſts to-morrow. This is a Paradox, but I ſhall explain it. A Prince whom we compliment with our Religion, to be ſure muſt be grateful. EUPH. I underſtand you. But what becomes of Free-thinking all the while? LYS. Oh! we ſhou'd have more than ever of that, for we ſhou'd keep it all to our ſelves. As for the amuſement of retailing it, the want of this wou'd be largely com⯑penſated by ſolid advantages of another kind. EUPH. It ſeems then, by this account, the Ten⯑dency you obſerved in the Nation towards ſome⯑thing great and New proves a Tendency towards Popery and Slavery. LYS. Miſtake us not, good Euphranor. The thing firſt in our intention is Con⯑ſummate Liberty: But if this will not do, and there muſt after all be ſuch things tolerated as Religion [93] and Government, we are wiſely willing to make the beſt of both. CRI. This puts me in mind of a thought I have often had, That Minute Philoſo⯑phers are Dupes of the Jeſuits. The two moſt a⯑vowed, profeſſed, buſy, propagators of Infidelity in all companies, and upon all occaſions, that I ever met with were both Bigotted Papiſts, and being both Men of conſiderable eſtates, ſuffered conſiderably on that ſcore; which, it is wonderful their Thinking Diſciples ſhou'd never reflect upon. Hegemon, a moſt diſtinguiſhed Writer among the Minute Philoſophers, and Hero of the Sect, I am well aſſured, was once a Papiſt, and never heard that he profeſſed any other Religion. I know that many of the Church of Rome abroad, are pleaſed with the growth of Infidelity a⯑mong us, as hoping it may make way for them. The Emiſſaries of Rome are known to have perſonated ſeveral other Sects, which from time to time have ſprung up amongſt us, and why not this of the Mi⯑nute Philoſophers, of all others the beſt calculated to ruin both Church and State? I my ſelf have known a Jeſuit abroad talk among Engliſh Gentlemen like a Free-thinker. I am credibly informed, that Jeſuits, known to be ſuch by the Minute Philoſo⯑phers at home, are admitted into their Clubs: And I have obſerved them to approve, and ſpeak better of the Jeſuits, than of any other Clergy whatſoever. Thoſe who are not acquainted with the ſubtle Spirit, the refined Politics, and wonderful Occonomy of that renowned Society, need only read the account given of them by the Jeſuit Inchofer, in his Book De Mo⯑narchia Solipſorum; and thoſe who are, will not be ſurprized they ſhou'd be able to make Dupes of our Minute Philoſophers: Dupes, I ſay, for I can never think they ſuſpect they are only tools to ſerve the ends of cunninger Men than themſelves. They ſeem to me drunk and giddy with a falſe notion of Liberty, and ſpur'd on by this principle to make mad Expe⯑riments on their Country, they agree only in pulling [94] down all that ſtands in their way; without any con⯑certed Scheme, and without caring or knowing what to erect in its ſtead. To hear them, as I have often done, deſcant on the moral Virtues, reſolve them in⯑to Shame, then laugh at Shame as a weakneſs, ad⯑mire the unconfined lives of Savages, deſpiſe all order and decency of Education, one wou'd think the in⯑tention of theſe Philoſophers was, when they had pruned and weeded the notions of their fellow-ſub⯑jects, and diveſted them of their Prejudices, to ſtrip them of their Clothes, and fill the country with na⯑ked Followers of Nature, enjoying all the Privileges of Brutality. Here Crito made a pauſe, and fixed his eyes on Alciphron, who during this whole coverſation had ſate thoughtful and attentive, without ſaying a word, and with an air, one while diſſatisfied at what Lyſicles advanced, another, ſerene and pleaſed, ſeem⯑ing to approve ſome better thought of his own. But the day being now far ſpent, Alciphron propoſed to adjourn the Argument till the following; when, ſaid he, I ſhall ſet matters on a new Foundation, and in ſo full and clear a Light, as, I doubt not, will give in⯑tire Satisfaction. So we changed the diſcourſe, and after a repaſt upon cold proviſions, took a walk on the Strand, and in the cool of the evening returned to Crito's.

I.

THE following day as we ſate round the Tea⯑table, in a Summer-Parlour which looks into the Garden, Alciphron after the firſt diſh turned down his cup, and reclining back in his Chair proceeded as follows. Above all the Sects upon earth it is the pe⯑culiar Privilege of ours, not to be tied down by any Principles. While other Philoſophers profeſs a ſer⯑vile adherence to certain Tenets, ours aſſert a noble freedom, differing not only one from another, but very often the ſame Man from himſelf. Which me⯑thod of proceeding, beſide other advantages, hath this annexed to it, that we are of all Men the hardeſt to confute. You may, perhaps, confute a particu⯑lar [96] Tenet, but then this affects only him who main⯑tains it, and ſo long only as he maintains it. Some of our Sect dogmatize more than others, and in ſome more than other points. The Doctrine of the uſe⯑fulneſs of Vice is a point wherein we are not all a⯑greed. Some of us are great admirers of Virtue. With others the points of Vice and Virtue are pro⯑blematical. For my own part, though I think the Doctrine maintained yeſterday by Lyſicles an inge⯑nious ſpeculation; yet, upon the whole, there are divers Reaſons which incline me to depart from it, and rather to eſpouſe the Virtuous ſide of the queſti⯑on; with the ſmalleſt, perhaps, but the moſt contem⯑plative and laudable part of our Sect. It ſeemeth, I ſay, after a nice inquiry and balancing on both ſides, that we ought to prefer Virtue to Vice; and that ſuch preference wou'd contribute both to the public Weal, and the reputation of our Philoſophers. You are to know then, we have among us ſeveral that, without one grain of Religion, are Men of the niceſt Honour, and therefore Men of Virtue be⯑cauſe Men of Honour. Honour is a noble unpollu⯑ted Source of Virtue, without the leaſt mixture of Fear, Intereſt or Superſtition. It hath all the ad⯑vantages without the evils which attend Religion. It is the mark of a great and fine ſoul, and is to be found among Perſons of Rank and Breeding. It af⯑fects the Court, the Senate, and the Camp, and in general every Rendezvous of people of faſhion. EUPH. You ſay then that honour is the Source of Virtue. ALC. I do. EUPH. Can a thing be the ſource of it ſelf? ALC. It cannot. EUPH. The Source, therefore, is diſtinguiſhed from that of which it is the Source. ALC. Doubtleſs. EUPH. Honour then is one thing and Virtue another. ALC. I grant it. Virtuous actions are the effect, and Ho⯑nour is the Source or Cauſe of that effect. EUPH. Tell me. Is Honour the Will producing thoſe acti⯑ons, or the final Cauſe for which they are produced, [97] or right Reaſon which is their rule and limit, or the Object about which they are converſant? Or do you by the word Honour underſtand a Faculty or Ap⯑petite? All which are ſuppoſed, in one ſenſe or other, to be the Source of humane actions. ALC. Nothing of all this. EUPH. Be pleaſed then to give me ſome notion or definition of it. Alciphron having muſed a while anſwered, that he defined Honour to be a Principle of virtuous Actions. To which Eu⯑phranor replied; if I underſtand it rightly the word Principle is variouſly taken. Sometimes by Princi⯑ples we mean the parts of which a whole is compoſed, and into which it may be reſolved. Thus the Ele⯑ments are ſaid to be principles of compound bodies. And thus words, ſyllables, and letters are the princi⯑ples of Speech. Sometimes by Principle we mean a ſmall particular ſeed, the growth or gradual unfolding of which doth produce an Organized Body, animal or vegetable, in its proper ſize and ſhape. Princi⯑ples at other times are ſuppoſed to be certain funda⯑mental Theorems in Arts and Sciences, in Religion and Politics. Let me know in which of theſe ſenſes, or whether it be in ſome other ſenſe that you under⯑ſtand this word, when you ſay, Honour is a Princi⯑ple of Virtue. To this Alciphron replied, that for his part he meant it in none of thoſe ſenſes, but defi⯑ned Honour to be a certain Ardour or Enthuſiaſm that glowed in the breaſt of a gallant Man. Upon this, Euphranor obſerved, it was always admitted to put the Definition in place of the thing defined. Is this allowed, ſaid he, or not? ALC. It is. EUPH. May we not therefore ſay, that a Man of Honour is a warm Man, or an Enthuſiaſt? Alciphron hearing this declared that ſuch exactneſs was to no purpoſe; that Pedants, indeed, may diſpute and define, but cou'd never reach that high ſenſe of Honour which diſtinguiſhed the fine Gentleman, and was a thing ra⯑ther to be felt than explained.

II.

[98] Crito, perceiving that Alciphron cou'd not bear being preſſed any farther on that article, and willing to give ſome ſatisfaction to Euphranor, ſaid that of himſelf indeed he ſhould not undertake to explain ſo nice a point, but he wou'd retail to them part of a converſation he once heard between Nicander a Mi⯑nute Philoſopher and Menecles a Chriſtian, upon the ſame ſubject, which was for ſubſtance as follows. M. From what principle are you Gentlemen virtuous? N. From Honour. We are Men of Honour. M. May not a Man of Honour debauch another's wife, or get drunk, or ſell a vote, or refuſe to pay his debts, without leſſening or tainting his Honour? N. He may have the vices and faults of a Gentleman: But is obliged to pay debts of Honour, that is, all ſuch as are contracted by Play. M. Is not your Man of Ho⯑nour always ready to reſent Affronts and engage in Duels? N. He is ready to demand and give Gentle⯑man's ſatisfaction upon all proper occaſions. M. It ſhou'd ſeem by this account, that to Ruin tradeſmen, Break faith to one's own wife, Corrupt another Man's, Take bribes, Cheat the Public, Cut a Man's throat for a word, are all points conſiſtent with your principle of Honour. N. It cannot be denied that we are Men of gallantry, Men of fire, Men who know the world, and all that. M. It ſeems therefore that Honour among Infidels is like Honeſty among Pirates: ſomething confined to themſelves, and which the Fraternity perhaps may find their account in, but every one elſe ſhou'd be conſtantly on his guard againſt. By this Dialogue, continued Crito, a Man, who lives out of the grand Monde, may be enabled to form ſome notion of what the world calls Honour and men of Honour. EUPH. I muſt in⯑treat you not to put me off with Nicander's opi⯑nion, whom I know nothing of, but rather give me your own judgment, drawn from your own obſerva⯑tion upon Men of Honour. CRI. If I muſt pro⯑nounce, [99] I can very ſincerely aſſure you that by all I have heard or ſeen, I cou'd never find, that Honour, conſidered as a principle diſtinct from Conſcience, Religion, Reaſon, and Virtue, was more than an empty name. And I do verily believe, that thoſe who build upon that notion have leſs Virtue than other Men; and that what they have or ſeem to have is owing to Faſhion, (being of the reputable kind) if not to a Conſcience early imbued with religious prin⯑ciples, and afterwards retaining a Tincture from them without knowing it. Theſe two principles ſeem to account for all that looks like Virtue in thoſe Gentle⯑men. Your Men of Faſhion in whom animal life abounds, a ſort of Bullies in Morality, who diſdain to have it thought they are afraid of Conſcience; theſe deſcant much upon Honour, and affect to be called Men of Honour, rather than conſcientious or honeſt Men. But, by all that I cou'd ever obſerve, this ſpecious Character, where there is nothing of Conſcience or Religion underneath, to give it life and ſubſtance, is no better than a meteor or painted cloud. EUPH. I had a confuſed notion that Ho⯑nour was ſomething nearly connected with truth, and that Men of Honour were the greateſt enemies to all Hypocriſy, Fallacy, and Diſguiſe. CRI. So far from that, an Infidel who ſets up for the niceſt Honour ſhall, without the leaſt grain of Faith or Religion, pre⯑tend himſelf a Chriſtian, take any teſt, join in any act of worſhip, kneel, pray, receive the Sacrament to ſerve an intereſt. The ſame perſon, without any impeachment of his Honour, ſhall moſt ſolemnly declare and pro⯑miſe in the face of God and the World, that he will love his Wife, and forſaking all others keep only to her, when at the ſame time it is certain, he intends never to perform one tittle of his vow; and convin⯑ceth the whole world of this as ſoon as he gets her in his power, and her fortune, for the ſake of which this Man of untainted Honour makes no ſcruple to cheat and lye. EUPH. We have a notion here in the [100] Country, that it was of all things moſt odious, and a matter of much riſque and hazard, to give the Lye to a Man of Honour. CRI. It is very true. He ab⯑hors to take the Lye but not to tell it.

III.

Alciphron, having heard all this with great compoſure of mind and countenance, ſpake as fol⯑lows. You are not to think, that our greateſt ſtrength lies in our greateſt Number, Libertines and meer Men of Honour. No: we have among us Philoſophers of a very different character, Men of curious con⯑templation, not governed by ſuch groſs things as Senſe and Cuſtom, but of an abſtracted Virtue and ſublime Morals: and the leſs religious the more virtu⯑ous. For Virtue of the high and diſintereſted kind no Man is ſo well qualified as an Infidel, it being a mean and ſelfiſh thing to be virtuous through fear or hope. The notion of a Providence and future State of Re⯑wards and Puniſhments, may indeed tempt or ſcare Men of abject ſpirit into practices contrary to the na⯑tural bent of their Souls, but will never produce a true and genuine Virtue. To go to the bottom of things, to analyſe Virtue into its firſt principles, and fix a ſcheme of Duty on its true baſis, you muſt un⯑derſtand, that there is an idea of Beauty natural to the mind of Man. This all Men deſire, this they are pleaſed and delighted with for its own ſake, purely from an Inſtinct of Nature. A Man needs no argu⯑ments to make him diſcern and approve what is beau⯑tiful; it ſtrikes at firſt ſight and attracts without a reaſon. And as this Beauty is found in the ſhape and form of corporeal things; ſo alſo is there analogous to it a Beauty of another kind, an order, a ſymmetry, and comelineſs in the moral world. And as the Eye perceiveth the one, ſo the Mind doth by a certain in⯑terior ſenſe perceive the other, which ſenſe, talent, or faculty is ever quickeſt and pureſt in the nobleſt Minds. Thus as by ſight I diſcern the Beauty of a Plant or an Animal, even ſo the mind apprehends the [101] moral Excellence, the Beauty, and Decorum of Juſ⯑tice and Temperance. And as we readily pronounce a Dreſs becoming or an Attitude graceful, we can, with the ſame free untutored judgment, at once de⯑clare, whether this or that Conduct or Action be comely and beautiful. To reliſh this kind of Beauty, there muſt be a delicate and fine Taſte: But where there is this natural Taſte, nothing further is wanting, either as a principle to convince, or as a motive to induce Men to the love of Virtue. And more or leſs there is of this Taſte or Senſe in every creature that hath Reaſon. All Rational Beings are by nature ſo⯑cial. They are drawn one towards another by natu⯑ral affections: they unite and incorporate into fami⯑lies, clubs, parties, and commonwealths by mutual Sympathy. As by means of the ſenſitive Soul, our ſeveral diſtinct parts and members do conſent towards the animal Functions, and are connected in one Whole: even ſo, the ſeveral parts of theſe Rational Syſtems or Bodies Politic, by virtue of this moral or interior Senſe, are held together, have a fellow-feel⯑ing, do ſuccour and protect each other, and jointly cooperate towards the ſame end. Hence that joy in Society, that propenſion towards doing good to our Kind, that gratulation and delight in beholding the virtuous deeds of other Men, or in reflecting on our own. By contemplation of the fitneſs and order of the parts of a moral Syſtem, regularly operating, and knit together by benevolent affections, the Mind of Man attaineth to the higheſt notion of Beauty, Ex⯑cellence, and Perfection: Seized and rapt with this ſublime idea, our Philoſophers do infinitely deſpiſe and pity, whoever ſhall propoſe or accept any other motive to Virtue. Intereſt is a mean ungenerous thing, deſtroying the merit of Virtue, and Falſhood of every kind is inconſiſtent with the genuine ſpirit of Philoſophy. CRI. The Love therefore that you bear to moral Beauty, and your paſſion for ab⯑ſtracted Truth, will not ſuffer you to think with pa⯑tience [102] of thoſe fraudulent Impoſitions upon Man⯑kind, Providence, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future Retribution of rewards and puniſhments; which under the notion of promoting do, it ſeems, deſtroy all true Virtue, and at the ſame time contra⯑dict and diſparage your noble Theories, manifeſtly tending to the perturbation and diſquiet of Mens minds, and filling them with fruitleſs hopes and vain terrors. ALC. Mens firſt Thoughts and natural Notions are the beſt in moral matters. And there is no need, that Mankind ſhou'd be preached, or rea⯑ſoned, or frightened into Virtue, a thing ſo natural and congenial to every Human Soul. Now if this be the caſe, as it certainly is, it follows that all the ends of Society are ſecured without Religion, and that an Infidel bids fair to be the moſt virtuous Man, in a true, ſublime and heroic Senſe.

IV.

EUPH. O Alciphron, while you talk, I feel an affection in my ſoul like the trembling of one lute, upon ſtriking the uniſon ſtrings of another. Doubt⯑leſs there is a Beauty of the mind, a Charm in Virtue, a Symmetry and Proportion in the moral world. This moral Beauty was known to the ancients by the name of Honeſtum or [...]. And in order to know its force and influence, it may not be amiſs to inquire, what it was underſtood to be, and what light it was placed in by thoſe who firſt conſidered it, and gave it a name: [...] according to Ariſtotle is the [...] or laudable, according to Plato it is the [...] or [...], pleaſant or profitable, which is meant with reſpect to a reaſonable mind and its true intereſt. Now I wou'd fain know whether a mind, which conſiders an action as laudable, be not carried beyond the bare action it ſelf, to regard the opinion of others concerning it? ALC. It is. EUPH. And whether this be a ſuf⯑ficient ground or principle of Virtue, for a Man to act upon, when he thinks himſelf removed from the eye and obſervation of every other intelligent Being? [103] ALC. It ſeems not. EUPH. Again, I ask whether a Man who doth a thing pleaſant or profitable as ſuch, might not be ſuppoſed to forbear doing it, or even to do the contrary, upon the proſpect of greater plea⯑ſure or profit? ALC. He might. EUPH. Doth it not follow from hence, that the Beauty of Virtue or [...], in either Ariſtotle's or Plato's ſenſe, is not a ſufficient principle or ground, to engage ſenſual and worldly-minded Men in the practice of it? ALC. What then? EUPH. Why then, it will follow that Hope of reward and Fear of puniſhment are highly expedient, to caſt the balance of pleaſant and profitable on the ſide of virtue, and thereby very much conduce to the benefit of Human Society. Alciphron upon this appealed; Gentlemen, ſaid he, you are witneſſes of this unfair proceeding of Eu⯑phranor, who argues againſt us, from explications given by Plato and Ariſtotle of the Beauty of Virtue, which are things we have nothing to ſay to; the Philoſophers of our Sect abſtracting from all Praiſe, Pleaſure, and Intereſt, when they are enamoured and tranſported with that ſublime Idea. I beg pardon, re⯑plied Euphranor, for ſuppoſing the Minute Philoſo⯑phers of our days think like thoſe ancient Sages. But you muſt tell me, Alciphron, ſince you do not think fit, to adopt the ſenſe of Plato or Ariſtotle, what ſenſe it is in which you underſtand the Beauty of Vir⯑tue? Define it, explain it, make me to underſtand your meaning, that ſo we may argue about the ſame thing, without which we can never come to a con⯑cluſion.

V.

ALC. Some things are better underſtood by definitions and deſcriptions, but I have always obſer⯑ved that thoſe who wou'd define, explain, and diſ⯑pute about this point, make the leaſt of it. Moral Beauty is of ſo peculiar and abſtracted a nature, ſome⯑thing ſo ſubtile, fine, and fugacious, that it will not bear being handled and inſpected, like every groſs [104] and common ſubject. You will, therefore, pardon me, if I ſtand upon my Philoſophic liberty; and chooſe rather to intrench my ſelf, within the general and indefinite ſenſe, rather than, by entering into a preciſe and particular explication of this Beauty, per⯑chance loſe ſight of it, or give you ſome hold where⯑on to cavil, and infer, and raiſe doubts, queries, and difficulties about a point as clear as the Sun when no body reaſons upon it. EUPH. How ſay you, Al⯑ciphron, is that notion cleareſt when it is not conſi⯑dered? ALC. I ſay it is rather to be felt than under⯑ſtood, a certain je ne ſçay quoy. An object, not of the diſcurſive faculty, but of a peculiar ſenſe which is properly called the moral ſenſe, being adapted to the preception of moral Beauty, as the Eye to colours, or the Ear to ſounds. EUPH. That Men have cer⯑tain inſtinctive Senſations or Paſſions from nature, which make them amiable and uſeful to each other, I am clearly convinced. Such are a Fellow-feeling with the diſtreſſed, a Tenderneſs for our offspring, an Affection towards our friends, our neighbours, and our country, an Indignation againſt things baſe, cruel, or unjuſt. Theſe Paſſions are implanted in the Human Soul, with ſeveral other fears and appetites, averſions and deſires, ſome of which are ſtrongeſt and uppermoſt in one mind, others in another. Shou'd it not therefore ſeem a very uncertain guide in morals, for a Man to follow his paſſion or inward feeling? and wou'd not this rule infallibly lead different Men dif⯑ferent ways, according to the prevalency of this or that appetite or paſſion? ALC. I do not deny it. EUPH. And will it not follow from hence, that Duty and Virtue are in a fairer way of being practiſed, if Men are led by Reaſon and Judgment, balancing low and ſenſual pleaſures with thoſe of a higher kind, comparing preſent loſſes with future gains, and the uneaſineſs and diſguſt of every Vice with the delight⯑ful practice of the oppoſite Virtue, and the pleaſing reflexions and hopes which attend it? Or can there [105] be a ſtronger motive to Virtue, than the ſhewing that conſidered in all lights it is every Man's true in⯑tereſt?

VI.

ALC. I tell you, Euphranor, we contemn the Virtue of that Man, who computes and delibe⯑rates, and muſt have a reaſon for being virtuous. The refined Moraliſts of our Sect are raviſhed and tranſ⯑ported with the abſtract Beauty of Virtue. They diſdain all forinſecal motives to it; and love Virtue only for Virtue's ſake. Oh Rapture! Oh Enthuſi⯑aſm! Oh the Quinteſſence of Beauty! Methinks I cou'd dwell for ever on this Contemplation: But ra⯑ther than entertain my ſelf, I muſt endeavour to con⯑vince you. Make an experiment on the firſt Man you meet. Propoſe a villanous or unjuſt action. Take his firſt ſenſe of the matter, and you ſhall find he deteſts it. He may, indeed, be afterwards miſled by Arguments or overpowered by Temptation, but his original unpremeditated and genuine thoughts are juſt and orthodox. How can we account for this but by a moral ſenſe, which, left to it ſelf, hath as quick and true a perception of the Beauty and Defor⯑mity of Human Actions, as the Eye hath of Co⯑lours? EUPH. May not this be ſufficiently ac⯑counted for, by Conſcience, Affection, Paſſion, Education, Reaſon, Cuſtom, Religion, which principles and habits, for ought I know, may be what you metaphorically call a Moral Senſe. ALC. What I call a moral ſenſe is ſtrictly, properly, and truly ſuch, and in kind different from all thoſe things you enumerate. It is what all men have though all may not obſerve it. Upon this Euphranor ſmiled and ſaid, Alciphron has made diſcoveries where I leaſt expected it. For, ſaid, he, in regard to every other point, I ſhou'd hope to learn from him, but for the know⯑ledge of my ſelf, or the faculties and powers of my own mind, I ſhou'd have looked at home. And there I might have looked long enough, without [106] finding this new talent, which even now after being tutored I cannot comprehend. For Alciphron, I muſt needs ſay, is too Sublime and Aenigmatical upon a point, which of all others ought to be moſt clearly underſtood. I have often heard that your deepeſt adepts and oldeſt profeſſors in ſcience are the obſcu⯑reſt. Lyſicles is young and ſpeaks plain. Wou'd he but favour us with his ſenſe of this point, it might perhaps prove more upon a level with my apprehen⯑ſion.

VII.

Lyſicles ſhook his head, and in a grave and earneſt manner addreſſed the Company. Gentlemen, ſaid he, Alciphron ſtands upon his own legs. I have no part in theſe refined notions he is at preſent enga⯑ged to defend. If I muſt ſubdue my paſſions, ab⯑ſtract, contemplate, be enamoured of Virtue; in a word, if I muſt be an Enthuſiaſt, I owe ſo much deference to the laws of my Country, as to chooſe being an Enthuſiaſt in their way. Beſides, it is bet⯑ter being ſo for ſome end than for none. This Doc⯑trine hath all the ſolid inconveniences, without the amuſing hopes and proſpects of the Chriſtian. ALC. I never counted on Lyſicles for my Second in this point; which after all doth not need his aſſiſtance or explication. All ſubjects ought not to be treated in the ſame manner. The way of Definition and Divi⯑ſion is dry and pedantic. Beſides, the ſubject is ſometimes too obſcure, ſometimes too ſimple for this method. One while we know too little of a point, another too much, to make it plainer by diſ⯑courſe. CRI. To hear Alciphron talk, puts me in mind of that Ingenious Greek, who having wrapt a man's brother up in a cloak, asked him whether he knew that perſon? being ready, either by keeping on, or pulling off the cloak, to confute his anſwer whatever it ſhou'd be. For my part I believe, if matters were fairly ſtated, that rational ſatisfaction, that peace of mind, that inward comfort, and con⯑ſcientious [107] joy, which a good Chriſtian finds in good actions, wou'd not be found to fall ſhort of all the Ecſtaſy, Rapture, and Enthuſiaſm ſuppoſed to be the effect of that high and undeſcribed principle. In earneſt can any Ecſtaſy be higher, any Rapture more affecting, than that which ſprings from the love of God and Man, from a Conſcience void of offence, and an inward diſcharge of Duty, with the ſecret delight, truſt, and hope that attends it? ALC. O Euphranor, we Votaries of Truth do not envy, but pity, the groundleſs joys and miſtaken hopes of a Chriſtian. And, as for Conſcience and rational Plea⯑ſure, how can we allow a Conſcience without allow⯑ing a vindictive Providence? Or how can we ſuppoſe, the charm of Virtue conſiſts in any pleaſure, or be⯑nefit attending virtuous actions, without giving great advantages to the Chriſtian Religion, which, it ſeems excites its believers to Virtue by the higheſt Intereſts and Pleaſures in reverſion. Alas! ſhou'd we grant this, there wou'd be a door opened to all thoſe ruſty Declaimers upon the neceſſity and uſefulneſs of the great points of Faith, the Immortality of the Soul, a Future State, Rewards and Puniſhments, and the like exploded Conceits; which, according to our ſyſtem and principles, may perhaps produce a low, popular, intereſted kind of Virtue, but muſt abſolutely deſtroy and extinguiſh it in the ſublime and heroic ſenſe.

VIII.

EUPH. What you now ſay is very intelli⯑ble: I wiſh I underſtood your main principle as well. ALC. And are you then in earneſt at a loſs? Is it poſſible you ſhou'd have no notion of Beauty, or that having it you ſhou'd not know it to be amiable, amiable I ſay, in it ſelf, and for it ſelf? EUPH. Pray tell me, Alciphron, are all mankind agreed in the notion of a beauteous face? ALC. Beauty in Hu⯑man Kind ſeems to be of a more mixt and various nature; foraſmuch as the paſſions, ſentiments, and [108] qualities of the Soul being ſeen through and blend⯑ing with the features, work differently on different minds, as the ſympathy is more or leſs. But with regard to other things is there no ſteady principle of Beauty? Is there upon earth a Human mind without the idea of order, harmony, and proportion? EUPH. O Alciphron, it is my weakneſs that I am apt to be loſt and bewildered in abſtractions and ge⯑neralities, but a particular thing is better ſuited to my faculties. I find it eaſy to conſider and keep in view the objects of ſenſe, let us therefore try to diſ⯑cover what their Beauty is, or wherein it conſiſts; and ſo, by the help of theſe ſenſible things, as a ſcale or ladder, aſcend to moral and intellectual Beauty. Be pleaſed then to inform me, what it is we call Beauty in the objects of ſenſe? ALC. Every one knows Beauty is that which pleaſes. EUPH. There is then Beauty in the ſmell of a Roſe, or the taſte of an Apple. ALC. By no means. Beauty is, to ſpeak properly, perceived only by the eye. EUPH. It cannot therefore be defined in general that which pleaſeth. ALC. I grant it cannot EUPH. How then ſhall we limit or define it? Alci⯑phron, after a ſhort pauſe, ſaid, that Beauty conſiſted in a certain ſymmetry or proportion pleaſing to the eye. EUPH. Is this proportion one and the ſame in all things, or is it different in different kinds of things? ALC. Different doubtleſs: The propor⯑tions of an Ox wou'd not be beautiful in a Horſe. And we may obſerve alſo in things inanimate, that the Beauty of a Table, a Chair, a Door, conſiſts in different proportions. EUPH. Doth not this pro⯑portion imply the relation of one thing to another? ALC. It doth. EUPH. And are not theſe relations founded in ſize and ſhape? ALC. They are. EUPH. And to make the proportions juſt, muſt not thoſe mu⯑tual relations of ſize and ſhape in the parts be ſuch, as ſhall make the whole compleat and perfect in its kind? ALC. I grant they muſt. EUPH. Is not a thing ſaid [109] to be perfect in its kind, when it anſwers the end for which it was made? ALC. It is. EUPH. The parts, therefore, in true proportions muſt be ſo re⯑lated, and adjuſted to one another, as that they may beſt conſpire to the uſe and operation of the whole. ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. But the comparing Parts one with another, the conſidering them as be⯑longing to one Whole, and the referring this whole to its uſe or end, ſhou'd ſeem the work of Reaſon: Shou'd it not? ALC. It ſhou'd. EUPH. Pro⯑portions therefore are not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, percei⯑ved by the ſenſe of Sight, but only by Reaſon through the means of Sight. ALC. This I grant. EUPH. Conſequently Beauty, in your ſenſe of it, is an ob⯑ject, not of the eye, but of the mind. ALC. It is. EUPH. The Eye, therefore, alone cannot ſee that a Chair is handſom, or a Door well proportioned. ALC. It ſeems to follow; but I am not clear as to this point. EUPH. Let us ſee if there be any dif⯑ficulty in it. Cou'd the Chair you ſit on, think you, be reckon'd well proportioned or handſom, if it had not ſuch a height, breadth, wideneſs, and was not ſo far reclinedas to afford a convenient ſeat? ALC. It cou'd not. EUPH. The Beauty, therefore, or Symmetry of a Chair cannot be apprehended but by knowing its uſe, and comparing its figure with that uſe, which cannot be done by the Eye alone, but is the effect of Judgment. It is therefore, one thing to ſee an Object, and another to diſcern its Beauty. ALC. I admit this to be true.

IX.

EUPH. The Architects judge a Door to be of a beautiful Proportion, when its height is double of the breadth. But if you ſhou'd invert a well-pro⯑portion'd Door making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth, the figure would ſtill be the ſame, but without that Beauty in one Situation, which it had in another. What can be the cauſe of this, but that in the forementioned Suppoſition, the Door [110] wou'd not yield a convenient entrance to Creatures of a Human Figure? But, if in any other part of the Univerſe, there ſhou'd be ſuppoſed rational ani⯑mals of an inverted Stature, they muſt be ſuppoſed to invert the Rule for Proportion of Doors; and to them that wou'd appear beautiful, which to us was diſagreeable. ALC. Againſt this I have no Objec⯑tion. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, is there not ſomething truly decent and beautiful in Dreſs? ALC. Doubtleſs there is. EUPH. Are any like⯑lier to give us an Idea of this Beauty in Dreſs, than Painters and Sculptors, whoſe proper buſineſs and ſtudy it is, to aim at graceful Repreſentations? ALC. I believe not. EUPH. Let us then exa⯑mine the Draperies of the great Maſters in theſe Arts: How, for inſtance, they uſe to clothe a Ma⯑tron or a Man of Rank. Caſt an eye on thoſe Figures (ſaid he, pointing to ſome Prints after Raphael and Guido, that hung upon the Wall) what appearance, do you think, an Engliſh Courtier or Magiſtrate, with his Gothic, ſuccinct, plaited Garment, and his full-bottom'd Wig, or one of our Ladies in her unnatu⯑ral Dreſs pinched, and ſtiffened, and enlarged with Hoops and Whale-bone and Buckram, muſt make, among thoſe Figures ſo decently clad in Draperies that fall into ſuch a variety of natural, eaſy, and ample Folds, that appear with ſo much dignity and ſimpli⯑city, that cover the Body without encumbering it, and adorn without altering the Shape? ALC. Truly I think they muſt make a very ridiculous ap⯑pearance. EUPH. And what do you think this proceeds from? Whence is it that the Eaſtern Nati⯑ons, the Greeks, and the Romans, naturally ran into the moſt becoming Dreſſes, while our Gothic Gentry, after ſo many Centuries racking their Inventions, mending, and altering, and improving, and whirling, about in a perpetual rotation of Faſhions, have ne⯑ver yet had the luck to ſtumble on any that was not abſurd and ridiculous? It is not from hence, that in⯑ſtead [111] of conſulting Uſe, Reaſon, and Convenience, they abandon themſelves to irregular Fancy, the un⯑natural Parent of Monſters? Whereas the Ancients, conſidering the uſe and end of Dreſs, made it ſubſer⯑vient to the Freedom, Eaſe, and Convenience of the Body, and, having no Notion of mending or changing the natural Shape, they aimed only at ſhewing it with decency and advantage. And, if this be ſo, are we not to conclude that the Beauty of Dreſs depends on its ſubſerviency to certain Ends and Uſes? ALC. This appears to be true. EUPH. This ſubordinate relative nature of Beauty, perhaps will be yet plainer, if we examine the reſpective Beauties of a Horſe and a Pillar. Virgil's Deſcrip⯑tion of the former is,

Now I wou'd fain know, whether the perfections and uſes of a Horſe may not be reduced to theſe three points, Courage, Strength, and Speed; and whether each of the Beauties enumerated doth not occaſion, or betoken, one of theſe Perfections? Af⯑ter the ſame manner, if we inquire into the Parts and Proportions of a beautiful Pillar, we ſhall perhaps find them anſwer to this ſame Idea. Thoſe who have conſidered the Theory of Architecture, tell us ^*, the Proportions of the three Grecian Orders were taken from the Human Body, as the moſt beautiful and perfect Production of Nature. Hence were derived thoſe graceful Ideas of Columns, which had a Character of Strength without clumſineſs, or of Delicacy without weakneſs. Thoſe beautiful Proportions were, I ſay, taken originally from Na⯑ture, which, in her Creatures, as hath been already obſerved, referreth them to ſome end, uſe, or deſign. [112] The Gonſiezza alſo, or ſwelling, and the diminution of a Pillar, is it not in ſuch proportion as to make it appear ſtrong and light at the ſame time? In the ſame manner muſt not the whole Entablature, with its Projections be ſo proportioned, as to ſeem great but not heavy, light but not little, inaſmuch as a Devia⯑tion into either extreme wou'd thwart that reaſon and uſe of Things, wherein their Beauty is founded, and to which it is ſubordinate? The Entablature and all its Parts and Ornaments, Architrave, Freeze, Cornice, Triglyphs, Metopes, Modiglions, and the reſt, have each an uſe or appearance of uſe, in giving firmneſs and union to the Building, in protecting it from the Weather, and caſting off the Rain, in re⯑preſenting the Ends of Beams with their intervals, the production of Rafters, and ſo forth. And if we conſider the graceful Angels in Frontiſpieces, the Spaces between the Columns, or the Ornaments of their Capitels, ſhall we not find, that their Beauty riſeth from the appearance of Uſe, or the imitation of natural Things, whoſe Beauty is originally found⯑ed on the ſame Principle? which is, indeed, the grand diſtinction between Graecian and Gothic Ar⯑chitecture, the latter being fantaſtical, and for the moſt part founded neither in Nature nor in Reaſon, in Neceſſity nor Uſe, the appearance of which ac⯑counts for all the Beauty, Grace, and Ornament of the other. CRI. What Euphranor has ſaid confirms the Opinion I always entertained, that the Rules of Architecture were founded, as all other Arts which flouriſhed among the Greeks, in Truth, and Nature, and good Senſe. But the Ancients, who, from a thorough conſideration of the Grounds and Princi⯑ples of Art, formed their Idea of Beauty, did not always confine themſelves ſtrictly to the ſame Rules and Proportions: But, whenever the particular Di⯑ſtance, Poſition, Elevation, or Dimenſion of the Fabric or its Parts ſeemed to require it, made no ſcruple to depart from them, without deſerting the [113] original Principles of Beauty, which governed what⯑ever Deviations they made. This latitude or licence might not, perhaps, be ſafely truſted with moſt mo⯑dern Architects, who in their bold Sallies ſeem to act without aim or deſign, and to be governed by no Idea, no Reaſon or principle of Art, but pure Caprice, joined with a thorough contempt of that noble Sim⯑plicity of the Ancients, without which there can be no unity, gracefulneſs, or grandeur in their Works; which of conſequence muſt ſerve only to disfigure and diſhonour the Nation, being ſo many Monu⯑ments to future Ages of the opulence and ill taſte of the preſent; which, it is to be feared, wou'd ſuc⯑ceed as wretchedly, and make as mad work in other Affairs, were Men to follow, inſtead of rules, pre⯑cepts and models, their own taſte and firſt thoughts of Beauty. ALC. I ſhou'd now, methinks, be glad to ſee a little more diſtinctly the uſe and tendency of this Digreſſion upon Architecture. EUPH. Was not Beauty the very thing we inquired after? ALC. It was. EUPH. What think you, Alciphron, can the appearance of a thing pleaſe at this time, and in this place, which pleaſed two thouſand Years ago, and two thouſand Miles off, without ſome real prin⯑ciple of Beauty? ALC. It cannot. EUPH. And is not this the caſe with reſpect to a juſt piece of Ar⯑chitecture? ALC. No body denies it. EUPH. Architecture, the noble Offspring of judgment and fancy, was gradually formed in the moſt polite and knowing Countries of Aſia, Egypt, Greece, and Ita⯑ly. It was cheriſhed and eſteemed by the moſt flou⯑riſhing States, and moſt renowned Princes, who with vaſt expence improved and brought it to perfection. It ſeems, above all other Arts, peculiarly converſant about Order, Proportion and Symmetry. May it not therefore be ſuppoſed on all accounts, moſt likely to help us to ſome rational Notion of the je ne ſçay quoy in Beauty? And, in effect, have we not learned from this Digreſſion, that as there is no Beauty without [114] Proportion, ſo Proportions are to be eſteem'd juſt and true, only as they are relative to ſome certain uſe or end, their Aptitude and Subordination to which end is, at bottom, that which makes them pleaſe and charm? ALC. I admit all this to be true.

X.

EUPH. According to this Doctrine, I wou'd fain know what Beauty can be found in a moral Sy⯑ſtem, formed connected and governed by Chance. Fate, or any other blind unthinking Principle; for⯑aſmuch as without thought there can be no end or de⯑ſign, and without an end there can be no uſe, and without uſe there is no aptitude or fitneſs of Propor⯑tion, from whence Beauty ſprings? ALC. May we not ſuppoſe a certain vital Principle of Beauty, Order, and Harmony diffuſed throughout the World, without ſuppoſing a Providence inſpecting, puniſh⯑ing, and rewarding the moral Actions of Men? Without ſuppoſing the Immortality of the Soul, or a Life to come, in a word, without admitting any part of what is commonly called Faith, Worſhip, and Religion? CRI. Either you ſuppoſe this Prin⯑ciple intelligent, or not intelligent: If the latter, it is all one with Chance or Fate which was juſt now argued againſt: If the former, let me intreat Alci⯑phron to explain to me, wherein conſiſts the Beauty of a moral Syſtem, with a ſupreme Intelligence at the head of it, which neither protects the innocent, puniſhes the wicked, nor rewards the virtuous? To ſuppoſe indeed a Society of rational Agents acting under the Eye of Providence, concurring in one deſign to promote the common benefit of the whole, and conforming their Actions to the eſtabliſhed Laws and Order of the Divine Parental Wiſdom: Where⯑in each particular Agent ſhall not conſider himſelf apart, but as the Member of a great City, whoſe Author and Founder is God: In which the Civil Laws are no other, than the Rules of Virtue, and the Duties of Religion: And where every one's [115] true Intereſt is combined with his Duty: To ſuppoſe this wou'd be delightful: on this Suppoſition a Man need be no Stoic or Knight-errant, to account for his Virtue. In ſuch a Syſtem Vice is Madneſs, Cun⯑ning is Folly, Wiſdom and Virtue are the ſame thing, where, notwithſtanding all the crooked Paths and By-roads, the wayward Appetites and Inclinations of Men, ſovereign Reaſon is ſure to reform whatever ſeems amiſs, to reduce that which is devious, make ſtraight that which is crooked, and in the laſt Act wind up the whole Plot, according to the exacteſt Rules of Wiſdom and Juſtice. In ſuch a Syſtem or Society, governed by the wiſeſt precepts, enforced by the higheſt rewards and diſcouragements, it is de⯑lightful to conſider, how the regulation of Laws, the diſtribution of Good and Evil, the aim of moral Agents, do all conſpire in due Subordination to pro⯑mote the nobleſt End, to wit, the compleat Happi⯑neſs or Well-being of the whole. In contemplating the Beauty of ſuch a moral Syſtem, we may cry out with the Pſalmiſt, Very excellent Things are ſpoken of thee, thou City of God.

XI.

In a Syſtem of Spirits, ſubordinate to the Will, and under the Direction, of the Father of Spi⯑rits, governing them by Laws, and conducting them by Methods ſuitable to wiſe and good Ends, there will be great Beauty. But in an incoherent, fortuitous Syſtem governed by Chance, or in a blind Syſtem governed by Fate, or in any Syſtem where Providence doth not preſide, how can Beauty be, which cannot be without order, which cannot be without deſign? When a Man is conſcious that his will is inwardly conformed to the Divine Will, pro⯑ducing Order and Harmony in the Univerſe, and conducting the whole by the juſteſt Methods to the beſt End: This gives a beautiful Idea. But on the other hand, a Conſciouſneſs of Virtue overlooked, neglected, diſtreſſed by Men, and not regarded or [116] rewarded by God, ill-uſed in this World, without Hope or Proſpect of being better uſed in another, I wou'd fain know, where is the Pleaſure of this Re⯑flection, where is the Beauty of this Scene? Or how cou'd any Man, in his Senſes, think the ſpreading ſuch Notions the way to ſpread or propagate Virtue in the World? Is it not, I beſeech you an ugly Syſtem in which you can ſuppoſe no Law and prove no Duty, wherein Men thrive by Wickedneſs and ſuffer by Virtue? Would it not be a diſagreeable Sight to ſee an honeſt Man peeled by Sharpers, to ſee virtuous Men injured and deſpiſed while Vice triumph'd? An Enthuſiaſt may entertain himſelf with Viſions and fine Talk about ſuch a Syſtem; but when it comes to be conſidered by Men of cool Heads, and cloſe Rea⯑ſon, I believe they will find no Beauty nor Perfection in it; nor will it appear, that ſuch a moral Syſtem can poſſibly come from the ſame Hand, or be of a piece with the natural, throughout which there ſhines ſo much Order, Harmony, and Proportion. ALC. Your Diſcourſe ſerves to confirm me in my Opinion. You may remember, I declared, that touching this Beauty of Morality in the high Senſe, a Man's firſt Thoughts are beſt; and that, if we pre⯑tend to examine, and inſpect, and reaſon, we are in danger to loſe ſight of it. That in Fact there is ſuch a thing cannot be doubted, when we conſider that in theſe Days ſome of our Philoſophers have a high Senſe of Virtue, without the leaſt Notion of Religion, a clear Proof of the Uſefulneſs and Efficacy of our Principles!

XII.

CRI. Not to diſpute the Virtue of Minute Philoſophers, we may venture to call its Cauſe in queſtion, and make a doubt, whether it be an inex⯑plicable Enthuſiaſtic Notion of Moral Beauty, or rather, as to me it ſeems, what was already aſſigned by Euphranor, Complexion, Cuſtom, and Religious Education? But, allowing what Beauty you pleaſe [117] to Virtue in an Irreligious Syſtem, it cannot be leſs in a Religious, unleſs you will ſuppoſe that her Charms diminiſh as her Dowry increaſeth. The Truth is, a Believer hath all the Motives from the Beauty of Vir⯑tue in any ſenſe whatſoever that an Unbeliever can poſſibly have, beſides other Motives which an Unbe⯑liever hath not. Hence it is plain, thoſe of your Sect, who have Moral Virtue, owe it not to their peculiar Tenets, which ſerve only to leſſen the Motives to Virtue. Thoſe therefore, who are good, are leſs good, and thoſe who are bad are more bad, than they wou'd have been were they Believers. EUPH. To me it ſeems, thoſe heroic infidel Inamorato's of ab⯑ſtracted Beauty are much to be pitied, and much to be admired. Lyſicles hearing this, ſaid with ſome Im⯑patience; Gentlemen, You ſhall have my whole Thoughts upon this Point plain and frank. All that is ſaid about a Moral Senſe, or Moral Beauty, in any ſignification, either of Alciphron or Euphranor, or any other, I take to be at bottom meer Bubble and Pretence. The [...] and the [...], the beautiful and decent, are Things outward, relative, and ſuperfici⯑al, which have no Effect in the dark, but are ſpeci⯑ous Topics to diſcourſe and expatiate upon, as ſome formal Pretenders of our Sect, though in other Points very Orthodox, are uſed to do. But ſhou'd one of them get into Power, you wou'd find him no ſuch Fool as Euphranor imagines. He wou'd ſoon ſhew he had found out, that the Love of one's Coun⯑try is a Prejudice: That Mankind are Rogues and Hypocrites, and that it were Folly to ſacrifice one's ſelf for the ſake of ſuch: That all Regards center in this Life, and that, as this Life is to every Man his own Life, it clearly follows that Charity begins at Home. Benevolence to Mankind is perhaps pretend⯑ed, but Benevolence to himſelf is practiſed by the Wiſe. The livelier ſort of our Philoſophers do not ſcruple to own theſe Maxims; and as for the graver, if they are true to their Principles, one may gueſs [118] what they muſt think at the Bottom. CRI. What⯑ever may be the Effect of pure Theory upon certain ſelect Spirits, of a peculiar Make, or in ſome other Parts of the World, I do verily think that in this Country of ours, Reaſon, Religion, Law, are all together little enough to ſubdue the Outward to the Inner Man; and that it muſt argue a wrong Head and weak Judgment to ſuppoſe, that without them Men will be enamoured of the golden Mean. To which my Countrymen perhaps are leſs inclined than others, there being in the Make of an Engliſh Mind a certain Gloom and Eagerneſs, which carries to the ſad Ex⯑treme; Religion to Fanaticiſm; Free-thinking to Atheiſm; Liberty to Rebellion: Nor ſhou'd we ven⯑ture to be governed by Taſte, even in matters of leſs Conſequence. The Beautiful in Dreſs, Furniture, and Building, is, as Euphranor hath obſerved, ſome⯑thing real and well grounded: And yet our Engliſh do not find it out of themſelves. What wretched Work do they and other Northern People make, when they follow their own Taſte of Beauty in any of theſe Particulars, inſtead of acquiring the true, which is to be got from ancient Models and the Prin⯑ciples of Art, as in the Caſe of Virtue from great Models and Meditation, ſo far as natural Means can go? But in no Caſe is it to be hoped, that [...] will be the leading Idea of the many, who have quick Senſes, ſtrong Paſſions, and groſs Intellects.

XIII.

ALC. The fewer they are, the more ought we eſteem and admire ſuch Philoſophers, whoſe Souls are touched and tranſported with this ſublime Idea. CRI. But then one might expect from ſuch Philoſo⯑phers, ſo much good Senſe and Philanthropy, as to keep their Tenets to themſelves, and conſider their weak Brethren, who are more ſtrongly affected by certain Senſes and Notions of another kind, than that of the Beauty of pure diſintereſted Virtue. Cra⯑tylus, a Man prejudiced againſt the Chriſtian Religi⯑on, [119] of a crazy Conſtitution, of a Rank above moſt Mens Ambition, and a Fortune equal to his Rank, had little Capacity for ſenſual Vices, or Temptation to diſhoneſt ones. Cratylus having talked himſelf, or imagined that he had talked himſelf, into a Stoical Enthuſiaſm about the Beauty of Virtue, did, under the Pretence of making Men heroically virtuous, en⯑deavour to deſtroy the Means of making them reaſon⯑ably and humanly ſo: A clear Inſtance, that neither Birth nor Books nor Converſation can introduce a Knowledge of the World into a conceited Mind, which will ever be its own Object, and contemplate Mankind in its own Mirrour! ALC. Cratylus was a Lover of Liberty, and of his Country, and had a mind to make Men incorrupt and virtuous, upon the pureſt and moſt diſintereſted Principles. CRI. His Conduct ſeems juſt as wiſe, as if a Monarch ſhou'd give out, that there was neither Jayl nor Executioner in his Kingdom to enforce the Laws, but that it wou'd be beautiful to obſerve them, and that in ſo doing Men wou'd taſte the pure Delight which reſults from Order and Decorum. ALC. After all, is it not true that certain ancient Philoſophers, of great Note, held the ſame Opinion with Cratylus, declaring that he did not come up to the Character, or deſerve the Title of a good Man, who practiſed Virtue for the ſake of any thing but its own Beauty? CRI. I be⯑lieve, indeed, that ſome of the Ancients ſaid ſuch Things as gave Occaſion for this Opinion. Ariſtotle ^* diſtinguiſheth between two Characters of a good Man, the one he calleth [...], or ſimply good, the other [...], from whence the Compound Term [...], which cannot, perhaps, be render'd by any one Word in our Language. But his Senſe is plainly this: [...] he defineth to be that Man to whom the [120] good Things of Nature are good; for, according to him, thoſe Things, which are vulgarly eſteemed the greateſt Goods, as Riches, Honours, Power, and bodily Perfections, are indeed good by Nature, but they happen nevertheleſs to be hurtful and bad to ſome Perſons, upon the account of evil Habits: Inaſmuch as neither a Fool, nor an unjuſt Man, nor an Intem⯑perate can be at all the better for the Uſe of them, any more than a ſick Man for uſing the Nouriſhment pro⯑per for theſe who are in Health. But [...]; is that Man in whom are to be found all Things worthy and decent and laudable, purely as ſuch, and for their own ſake, and who practiſeth Virtue from no other Motive but the ſole Love of her own innate Beauty. That Philoſopher obſerves likewiſe, that there is a certain political Habit, ſuch as the Spartans and o⯑thers had, who thought Virtue was to be valued and practiſed on account of the natural Advantages that attend it. For which Reaſon he adds, They are in⯑deed good Men, but they have not the [...], or ſupreme conſummate Virtue. From hence it is plain that, according to Ariſtotle, a Man may be a good Man without believing Virtue its own Reward, or being only moved to Virtue by the Senſe of Moral Beauty. It is alſo plain, that he diſtinguiſheth the political Virtues of Nations, which the Publick is every where concerned to maintain, from this ſublime and ſpeculative kind. It might alſo be obſerved, that his exalted Idea did conſiſt with ſuppoſing a Pro⯑vidence which inſpects and rewards the Virtues of the beſt Men. For ſaith he in another Place ^*, if the Gods have any Care of Human Affairs, as it appears they have, it ſhou'd ſeem reaſonable to ſuppoſe, they are moſt delighted with the moſt excellent Nature, and moſt approaching their own, which is the Mind, and that they will reward thoſe who chiefly love and cul⯑tivate [121] what is moſt dear to them. The ſame Philoſo⯑pher obſerves ^*, that the Bulk of Mankind are not naturally diſpoſed to be awed by Shame, but by Fear; nor to abſtain from vicious Practices, on account of their Deformity, but only of the Puniſhment which attends them. And again ^†, he tells us that Youth, being of it ſelf averſe from Abſtinence and Sobriety, ſhou'd be under the Reſtraint of Laws regulating their Education and Employment, and that the ſame Diſcipline ſhou'd be continued even after they be⯑came Men. For which, ſaith he, we want Laws, and, in one word, for the whole ordering of Life, inaſ⯑much as the Generality of Mankind obey rather Force than Reaſon, and are influenced rather by Pe⯑nalties than the Beauty of Virtue; [...]. From all which it is very plain, what Ariſtotle wou'd have thought of thoſe, who ſhou'd go about to leſſen or deſtroy the Hopes and Fears of Mankind, in order to make them virtuous on this ſole Principle of the Beau⯑ty of Virtue.

XIV.

ALC. But, whatever the Stagirite and his Peripatetics might think, is it not certain that the Stoics maintained this Doctrine in its higheſt Senſe, aſſerting the Beauty of Virtue to be all-ſufficient, that Virtue was her own Reward, that this alone cou'd make a Man happy, in ſpight of all thoſe Things which are vulgarly eſteemed the greateſt Woes and Miſeries of Human Life? And all this they held at the ſame time that they believed, the Soul of Man to be of a corporeal Nature, and in Death diſſipated like a Flame or Vapour. CRI. It muſt be owned, the Stoics ſometimes talk, as if they believed the Morality of the Soul. Seneca in a Letter of his to Lucilius, ſpeaks much like a Minute Philoſopher, in this Particular. But in ſeveral other Places, he de⯑clares [122] himſelf of a clear contrary Opinion, affirming that the Souls of Men after Death mount aloft into the Heavens, look down upon Earth, entertain them⯑ſelves with the Theory of coeleſtial Bodies, the Courſe of Nature, and the Converſation of wiſe and excellent Men, who having lived in diſtant Ages and Countries upon Earth, make one Society in the other World. It muſt alſo be acknowledged, that Mar⯑cus Antoninus ſometimes ſpeaks of the Soul as periſh⯑ing, or diſſolving into its Elementary Parts: But it is to be noted, that he diſtinguiſheth three Principles in the Compoſition of Human Nature, the [...], ^* Body, Soul, Mind, or as he otherwiſe expreſ⯑ſeth himſelf, [...] and [...], Fleſh, Spirit, and governing Principle. What he calls the [...], or Soul, containing the brutal Part of our Nature, is indeed repreſented as a Compound diſſoluble, and actually diſſolved by Death: But the [...] or [...], the Mind or ruling Principle he held to be of a pure coeleſtial Nature, [...] a Particle of God, which he ſends back intire to the Stars and the Divini⯑ty. Beſides, among all his magnificent Leſſons and ſplendid Sentiments, upon the Force and Beauty of Virtue, he is poſitive as to the Being of God, and that not meerly as a plaſtic Nature, or Soul of the World, but in the ſtrict Senſe of a Providence in⯑ſpecting and taking care of Human Affairs ^†. The Stoics therefore, though their Style was high, and often above Truth and Nature, yet, it cannot be ſaid, that they ſo reſolved every Motive to a virtuous Life into the ſole Beauty of Virtue, as to endeavour to deſtroy the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul and a diſtributive Providence. After all, allowing the diſintereſted Stoics (therein not unlike our mo⯑dern Quietiſts) to have made Virtue its own ſole Re⯑ward, [123] in the moſt rigid and abſolute Senſe, yet what is this to thoſe who are no Stoics? If we adopt the whole Principles of that Sect, admitting their Noti⯑ons of Good and Evil, their celebrated Apathy, and, in one word, ſetting up for compleat Stoics, we may poſſibly maintain this Doctrine with a better Grace; at leaſt it will be of a piece and conſiſtent with the whole. But he who ſhall borrow this ſplendid Patch from the Stoics, and hope to make a Figure by inſer⯑ting it into a Piece of modern Compoſition, ſeaſoned with the Wit and Notions of theſe Times, will in⯑deed make a Figure, but perhaps it may not be in the Eyes of a wiſe Man the Figure he intended.

XV.

Though it muſt be owned, the preſent Age is very indulgent to every thing that aims at profane Raillery; which is alone ſufficient to recommend any fantaſtical Compoſition to the Public. You may behold the Tinſel of a modern Author paſs upon this knowing and learned Age for good Writing; affec⯑ted Strains for Wit; Pedantry for Politeneſs; Obſcu⯑rities for Depths; Ramblings for Flights; the moſt aukward Imitation for original Humour; and all this upon the ſole Merit of a little artful Profaneneſs. ALC. Every one is not alike pleaſed with Writings of Humour, nor alike capable of them. It is the fine Irony of a Man of Quality, ‘That certain Re⯑verend Authors, who can condeſcend to Lay-wit, are nicely qualified to hit the Air of Breeding and Gentility, and that they will in time, no doubt, refine their Manner to the Edification of the polite World; who have been ſo long ſeduced by the way of Raillery and Wit.’ The Truth is, the va⯑rious Taſte of Readers requireth various Kinds of Writers. Our Sect hath provided for this with great Judgment. To proſelyte the graver ſort we have certain profound Men at Reaſon and Argument. For the Coffee-houſes and Populace we have Declaimers of a copious Vein. Of ſuch a Writer it is no Re⯑proach [124] to ſay, fluit lutulentus; he is the fitter for his Readers. Then, for Men of Rank and Politeneſs we have the fineſt and wittieſt Railleurs in the World, whoſe Ridicule is the ſureſt Teſt of Truth. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, are thoſe ingenious Railleurs Men of Knowledge? ALC. Very knowing. EUPH. Do they know for Inſtance the Copernican Syſtem, or the Circulation of the Blood? ALC. One wou'd think you judged of our Sect, by your Country Neighbours: There is no body in Town but knows all thoſe Points. EUPH. You believe then Antipodes, Mountains in the Moon, and the Motion of the Earth. ALC. We do. EUPH. Suppoſe, five or ſix Centuries ago, a Man had main⯑tained theſe Notions among the beau Eſprits of an Engliſh Court; how do you think they would have been received? ALC. With great Ridicule. EUPH. And now it wou'd be ridiculous to ridicule them. ALC. It wou'd. EUPH. But Truth was the ſame then and now. ALC. It was EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem, therefore, that Ridicule is no ſuch ſovereign Touchſtone and Teſt of Truth, as you Gentlemen imagine. ALC. One thing we know: Our Rail⯑lery and Sarcaſms gall the black Tribe, and that is our Comfort. CRI. There is another thing it may be worth your while to know: That Men in a Laugh⯑ing Fit may applaud a Ridicule, which ſhall appear contemptible when they come to themſelves; wit⯑neſs the Ridicule of Socrates by the Comic Poet, the Humour and Reception it met with no more proving that, than the ſame will yours, to be juſt, when calmly conſidered by Men of Senſe. ALC. After all, thus much is certain, our ingenious Men make Converts by deriding the Principles of Religion. And, take my word, it is the moſt ſucceſsful and plea⯑ſing Method of Conviction. Theſe Authors laugh Men out of their Religion, as Horace did out of their Vices; Admiſſi circum praecordia ludunt. But a Bigot cannot reliſh or find out their Wit.

XVI.

CRI. Wit without Wiſdom, if there be ſuch a thing, is hardly worth finding. And as for the Wiſdom of theſe Men, it is of a kind ſo peculiar one may well ſuſpect it. Cicero was a Man of Senſe, and no Bigot, nevertheleſs he makes Scipio own himſelf much more vigilant and vigorous in the Race of Virtue, from ſuppoſing Heaven the Prize ^*. And he introduceth Cato declaring, he wou'd never have undergone thoſe virtuous Toils for the Service of the Public, if he had thought his Being was to end with this Life ^†. ALC. I acknowledge Cato, Scipio, and Cicero, were very well for their Times, but you muſt pardon me, if I do not think they ar⯑rived at the high conſummate Virtue of our mo⯑dern Free-thinkers. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem then that Virtue flouriſheth more than ever among us. ALC. It ſhou'd. EUPH. And this abundant Vir⯑tue is owing to the Method taken by your profound Writers to recommend it. ALC. This I grant. EUPH. But you have acknowledged, that the En⯑thuſiaſtic Lovers of Virtue are not the many of your Sect, but only a few ſelect Spirits. To which Alci⯑phron making no Anſwer, Crito addreſſed himſelf to Euphranor: To make, ſaid he, a true Eſtimate of the Worth and Growth of modern Virtue, you are not to count the virtuous Men, but rather to conſi⯑der the quality of their Virtue. Now you muſt know, the Virtue of theſe refined Theoriſts is ſome⯑thing ſo pure and genuine, that a very little goes far, and is in truth invaluable. To which that reaſona⯑ble intereſted Virtue, of the old Engliſh or Spartan kind, can bear no proportion. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, are there not Diſeaſes of the Soul, as well as of the Body? ALC. Without doubt. EUPH. And are not thoſe Diſeaſes vicious Habits? ALC. [126] They are. EUPH. And, as bodily Diſtempers are cured by Phyſic, thoſe of the Mind are cured by Philoſophy; are they not? ALC. I acknow⯑ledge it. EUPH. It ſeems, therefore, that Philo⯑ſophy is a Medicine for the Soul of Man. ALC. It is. EUPH. How ſhall we be able to judge of Medicines, or know which to prefer? Is it not from the Effects wrought by them? ALC. Doubtleſs. EUPH. Where an Epidemical Diſtemper rages, ſuppoſe a new Phyſician ſhou'd condemn the known eſtabliſhed Practice, and recommend another Method of Cure, wou'd you not, in proportion as the Bills of Mortality increaſed, be tempted to ſuſpect this new Method, notwithſtanding all the plauſible Diſ⯑courſe of its Abettors? ALC. This ſerves only to amuſe and lead us from the queſtion. CRI. It puts me in mind of my Friend Lamprocles, who needed but one Argument againſt Infidels. I ob⯑ſerved, ſaid he, that, as Infidelity grew, there grew Corruption of every kind, and new Vices. This ſimple Obſervation on matter of Fact was ſufficient to make him, notwithſtanding the Remonſtrance of ſeveral ingenious Men, imbue and ſeaſon the Minds of his Children betimes with the Principles of Reli⯑gion. The new Theories, which our acute Mo⯑derns have endeavoured to ſubſtitute in place of Religion, have had their full Courſe in the preſent Age, and produced their Effect on the Minds and Manners of Men. That Men are Men is a ſure Max⯑im: But it is as ſure that Engliſhmen are not the ſame Men they were; whether better or worſe, more or leſs virtuous, I need not ſay. Every one may ſee and judge. Though, indeed, after Ariſtides had been baniſhed, and Socrates put to death at Athens, a Man, without being a Conjurer, might gueſs what the Beauty of Virtue cou'd do in England. But there is now neither room nor occaſion for gueſſing. We have our own Experience to open our Eyes; which yet if we continue to keep ſhut, till the Remains [127] of religious Education are quite worn off from the Minds of Men, it is to be feared we ſhall then open them wide, not to avoid, but to behold and lament our Ruin. ALC. Be the Conſequences what they will, I can never bring my ſelf to be of a mind with thoſe, who meaſure Truth by Convenience. Truth is the only Divinity that I adore. Wherever Truth leads I ſhall follow. EUPH. You have then a Paſ⯑ſion for Truth? ALC. Undoubtedly. EUPH. For all Truths? ALC. For all. EUPH. To know or to publiſh them? ALC. Both. EUPH. What! wou'd you undeceive a Child that was ta⯑king Phyſic? Wou'd you officiouſly ſet an Enemy right, that was making a wrong Attack? Wou'd you help an enraged Man to his Sword? ALC. In ſuch Caſes, common Senſe directs one how to behave. EUPH. Common Senſe, it ſeems then, muſt be conſulted whether a Truth be ſalutary or hurtful, fit to be declared or concealed. ALC. How! you wou'd have me conceal and ſtifle the Truth, and keep it to my ſelf? Is this what you aim at? EUPH. I only make a plain Inference from what you grant. As for my ſelf, I do not believe your Opinions true. And although you do, you ſhou'd not therefore, if you wou'd appear con⯑ſiſtent with yourſelf, think it neceſſary or wiſe to publiſh hurtful Truths. What Service can it do Man⯑kind to leſſen the Motives to Virtue, or what Da⯑mage to increaſe them? ALC. None in the World. But I muſt needs ſay, I cannot reconcile the recei⯑ved Notions of a God and Providence to my Un⯑derſtanding, and my Nature abhors the Baſeneſs of conniving at a Falſhood. EUPH. Shall we there⯑fore appeal to Truth, and examine the Reaſons by which you are withheld from believing theſe Points? ALC. With all my Heart, but enough for the pre⯑ſent. We will make this the Subject of our next Conference.

I.

EARLY the next Morning, as I looked out of my Window, I ſaw Alciphron walking in the Garden with all the Signs of a Man in deep Thought. Upon which I went down to him. Al⯑ciphron, ſaid I, this early and profound Meditation puts me in no ſmall Fright. How ſo! Becauſe I ſhou'd be ſorry to be convinced there was no God. The Thought of Anarchy in Nature is to me more ſhocking than in Civil Life; inaſmuch as Natural Concerns are more important than Civil and the Baſis of all others. I grant, replied Alciphron, that ſome Inconvenience may poſſibly follow from diſproving a God, but as to what you ſay of Fright and Shocking, all that is nothing but mere Prejudice. Men frame an Idea or Chimaera in their own Minds, and then fall down and worſhip it. Notions govern Man-kind, but of all Notions, that of God's governing the World hath taken the deepeſt Root and ſpread the fartheſt: It is therefore in Philoſophy an heroi⯑cal Atchievement to diſpoſſeſs this imaginary Mo⯑narch of his Government, and baniſh all thoſe Fears and Spectres which the Light of Reaſon alone can diſpel;

My Part, ſaid I, ſhall be to ſtand by, as I have hi⯑therto done, and take Notes of all that paſſeth du⯑ring this memorable Event, while a Minute Philoſo⯑pher not ſix Foot high attempts to dethrone the Mo⯑narch of the Univerſe. Alas! replied Alciphron, Arguments are not to be meaſured by Feet and Inches. One Man may ſee more than a Million; and a ſhort Argument, managed by a Free-thinker, may be ſuffi⯑cient [130] to overthrow the moſt Gigantic Chimaera. As we were engaged in this Diſcourſe, Crito and Eu⯑phranor joined us. I find you have been beforehand with us to day, ſaid Crito to Alciphron, and taken the Advantage of Solitude and early Hours, while Eu⯑phranor and I were aſleep in our Beds. We may therefore expect to ſee Atheiſm placed in the beſt Light, and ſupported by the ſtrongeſt Arguments.

II.

ALC. The Being of a God is a Subject upon which there has been a world of Common-place, which it is needleſs to repeat. Give me leave there⯑fore to lay down certain Rules and Limitations, in order to ſhorten our preſent Conference. For as the End of debating is to perſuade, all thoſe Things which are foreign to this End ſhou'd be left out of our Debate. Firſt then, let me tell you, I am not to be perſuaded by Metaphyſical Arguments; ſuch for Inſtance as are drawn from the Idea of an All-perfect Being, or the Abſurdity of an infinite Pro⯑greſſion of Cauſes. This ſort of Arguments I have always found dry and jejune; and, as they are not ſuited to my way of Thinking, they may perhaps puzzle, but never will convince me. Secondly, I am not to be perſuaded by the Authority either of paſt or preſent Ages, of Mankind in general, or of particular wiſe Men, all which paſſeth for little or nothing with a Man of ſound Argument and free Thought. Thirdly, All Proofs drawn from Utility or Convenience are foreign to the purpoſe. They may prove indeed the Uſefulneſs of the Notion, but not the Exiſtence of the Thing. Whatever Legiſla⯑tors or Stateſmen may think, Truth and Convenience are very different Things to the rigorous Eyes of a Philoſopher. And now, that I may not ſeem par⯑tial, I will limit myſelf alſo not to object, in the firſt place, from any thing that may ſeem irregular or un⯑accountable in the Works of Nature, againſt a Cauſe of infinite Power and Wiſdom; becauſe I already [131] know the Anſwer you wou'd make, to wit, That no one can judge of the Symmetry and Uſe of the Parts of an infinite Machine, which are all relative to each other, and to the whole, without being able to comprehend the intire Machine or the whole U⯑niverſe. And in the ſecond place, I ſhall engage my ſelf not to object againſt the Juſtice and Provi⯑dence of a Supreme Being, from the Evil that befals good Men, and the Proſperity which is often the Portion of wicked Men in this Life, becauſe I know that, inſtead of admitting this to be an Objection a⯑gainſt a Deity, you wou'd make it an Argument for a future State; in which there ſhall be ſuch a Retri⯑bution of Rewards and Puniſhments, as may vindi⯑cate the Divine Attributes, and ſet all Things right in the End. Now theſe Anſwers, though they ſhou'd be admitted for good ones are in truth no Proofs of the Being of God, but only Solutions of certain Difficulties which might be objected, ſup⯑poſing it already proved by proper Arguments. Thus much I thought fit to premiſe, in order to ſave Time and Trouble both to you and myſelf. CRI. I think that, as the proper End of our Conference ought to be ſuppoſed the Diſcovery and Defence of Truth, ſo Truth may be juſtified, not only by per⯑ſuading its Adverſaries, but, where that cannot be done, by ſhewing them to be unreaſonable. Argu⯑ments, therefore, which carry Light, have their Ef⯑fect, even againſt an Opponent who ſhuts his Eyes, becauſe they ſhew him to be obſtinate and prejudiced. Beſides, this Diſtinction between Arguments that puzzle and that convince, is leaſt of all obſerved by Minute Philoſophers, and need not therefore be ob⯑ſerved by others in their favour. But, perhaps Euphra⯑nor may be willing to encounter you on your own Terms, in which Caſe I have nothing farther to ſay.

III.

EUPH. Alciphron acts like a skilful Gene⯑ral, who is bent upon gaining the Advantage of the [132] Ground, and alluring the Enemy out of their Trench⯑es. We, who believe a God, are intrenched within Tradition, Cuſtom, Authority, and Law. And ne⯑vertheleſs, inſtead of attempting to force us, he pro⯑poſes that we ſhou'd voluntarily abandon theſe In⯑trenchments, and make the Attack, when we may act on the defenſive with much Security and Eaſe, leaving him the Trouble to diſpoſſeſs us of what we need not reſign. Thoſe Reaſons (continued he, ad⯑dreſſing himſelf to Alciphron) which you have muſter⯑ed up in this Morning's Meditation, if they do not weaken, muſt eſtabliſh our Belief of a God; for the utmoſt is to be expected from ſo great a Maſter in his Profeſſion, when he ſets his Strength to a Point. ALC. I hold the confuſed Notion of a Deity, or ſome inviſible Power, to be of all Prejudices the moſt unconquerable. When half a dozen ingenious Men are got together over a Glaſs of Wine, by a chear⯑ful Fire, in a Room well lighted, we baniſh with eaſe all the Spectres of Fancy or Education, and are very clear in our Deciſions. But, as I was taking a ſolitary Walk before it was broad Day-light in yonder Grove, me thought the Point was not quite ſo clear; nor cou'd I readily recollect the Force of thoſe Argu⯑ments, which uſed to appear ſo concluſive at other Times. I had I know not what Awe upon my Mind, and ſeemed haunted by a ſort of Panic, which I can⯑not otherwiſe account for, than by ſuppoſing it the Effect of Prejudice: For you muſt know, that I, like the reſt of the World, was once upon a Time catechiſed and tutored into the Belief of a God or Spirit. There is no ſurer Mark of Prejudice, than the believing a Thing without Reaſon. What Ne⯑ceſſity then can there be that I ſhou'd ſet myſelf the difficult Task of proving a Negative, when it is ſuf⯑ficient to obſerve that there is no Proof of the Affir⯑mative, and that the admitting it without Proof is unreaſonable? Prove therefore your Opinion, or, if you cannot, you may indeed remain in poſſeſſion of [133] it, but you will only be poſſeſſed of a Prejudice. EUPH. O Alciphron, to content you we muſt prove, it ſeems, and we muſt prove upon your own Terms. But, in the firſt place, let us ſee what ſort of Proof you expect. ALC. Perhaps I may not expect it, but I will tell you what ſort of Proof I wou'd have: And that is in ſhort, ſuch Proof as every Man of Senſe requires of a Matter of Fact, or the Exiſtence of any other particular Thing. For Inſtance, ſhou'd a Man ask why I believe there is a King of Great Britain? I might anſwer becauſe I had ſeen him; Or a King of Spain? becauſe I had ſeen thoſe who ſaw him. But as for this King of Kings, I neither ſaw him myſelf, nor any one elſe that ever did ſee him. Surely if there be ſuch a Thing as God, it is very ſtrange, that he ſhou'd leave himſelf without a Wit⯑neſs; that Men ſhou'd ſtill diſpute his Being; and that there ſhou'd be no one evident, ſenſible, plain Proof of it without recourſe to Philoſophy or Meta⯑phyſics. A Matter of Fact is not to be proved by Notions, but by Facts. This is clear and full to the Point. You ſee what I wou'd be at. Upon theſe Principles I defy Superſtition. EUPH. You be⯑lieve then as far as you can ſee. ALC. That is my Rule of Faith. EUPH. How! will you not be⯑lieve the Exiſtence of Things which you hear, un⯑leſs you alſo ſee them? ALC. I will not ſay ſo nei⯑ther. When I inſiſted on ſeeing I wou'd be under⯑ſtood to mean perceiving in general: Outward Ob⯑jects make very different Impreſſions upon the ani⯑mal Spirits, all which are compriſed under the com⯑mon Name of Senſe. And whatever we can perceive by any Senſe we may be ſure of.

IV.

EUPH. What! do you believe then there are ſuch Things as animal Spirits? ALC. Doubt⯑leſs. EUPH. By what Senſe do you perceive them? ALC. I do not perceive them immediately by any of my Senſes. I am nevertheleſs perſuaded of their [134] Exiſtence, becauſe I can collect it from their Effects and Operations. They are the Meſſengers, which run⯑ning to and fro in the Nerves, preſerve a Communi⯑cation between the Soul and outward Objects. EUPH. You admit then the Being of a Soul. ALC. Provided I do not admit an immaterial Sub⯑ſtance, I ſee no Inconvenience in admitting there may be ſuch a Thing as a Soul. And this may be no more than a thin fine Texture of ſubtile Parts or Spirits reſiding in the Brain. EUPH. I do not ask about its Nature. I only ask whether you admit that there is a Principle of Thought and Action, and whether it be perceivable by Senſe. ALC. I grant that there is ſuch a Principle, and that it is not the Object of Senſe itſelf, but inferred from Appearances which are perceived by Senſe. EUPH. If I underſtand you rightly, from animal Functions and Motions you in⯑fer the Exiſtence of animal Spirits, and from reaſon⯑able Acts you infer the Exiſtence of a reaſonable Soul. Is it not ſo? ALC. It is. EUPH. It ſhou'd ſeem, therefore, that the Being of Things impercep⯑tible to Senſe may be collected from Effects and Signs, or ſenſible Tokens. ALC. It may. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, is not the Soul that which makes the principal Diſtinction between a real Perſon and a Shadow, a living Man and a Carcaſe? ALC. I grant it is. EUPH. I cannot, therefore, know that you for Inſtance are a diſtinct thinking Individual, or a living real Man, by ſurer or other Signs than thoſe from which it can be inferred that you have a Soul. ALC. You cannot. EUPH. Pray tell me, are not all acts immediately and properly perceived by Senſe re⯑ducible to Motion? ALC. They are EUPH. From Motions therefore you infer a Mover or Cauſe: and from reaſonable Motions (or ſuch as appear calcula⯑ted for a reaſonable End) a rational Cauſe, Soul, or Spirit. ALC. Even ſo.

V.

EUPH. The Soul of Man actuates but a ſmall Body, an inſignificant Particle, in reſpect of the great Maſſes of Nature, the Elements, and hea⯑venly Bodies, and Syſtem of the World. And the Wiſdom that appears in thoſe Motions, which are the Effect of Human Reaſon, is incomparably leſs than that which diſcovers it ſelf, in the ſtructure and uſe of organized natural Bodies, Animal or Vegeta⯑ble. A Man with his Hand can make no Machine ſo admirable as the hand it ſelf: Nor can any of thoſe Motions, by which we trace out Human Rea⯑ſon, approach the skill and contrivance of thoſe wonderful Motions of the Heart and Brain and other vital parts, which do not depend on the Will of Man. ALC. All this is true. EUPH. Doth it not follow then that from natural Motions, indepen⯑dent of Man's Will, may be inferred both Power and Wiſdom incomparably greater than that of the Human Soul? ALC. It ſhou'd ſeem ſo. EUPH. Fur⯑ther, is there not in natural Productions and Effects a viſible Unity of counſel and deſign? Are not the Rules fixed and immoveable? Do not the ſame Laws of Motion obtain throughout? The ſame in China and here, the ſame two thouſand years ago and at this day? ALC. All this I do not deny. EUPH. Is there not alſo a Connexion or Relation between Ani⯑mals and Vegetables, between both and the Ele⯑ments, between the Elements and Heavenly Bodies; ſo that from their mutual Reſpects, Influences, Sub⯑ordinations, and Uſes, they may be collected to be parts of one whole, conſpiring to one and the ſame end, and fulfilling the ſame deſign? ALC. Suppo⯑ſing all this to be true. EUPH. Will it not then follow, that this vaſtly great or infinite Power and Wiſdom muſt be ſuppoſed in one and the ſame Agent, Spirit, or Mind, and that we have, at leaſt, as clear, full and immediate Certainty of the being of this in⯑finitely wiſe and powerful Spirit, as of any one Hu⯑man [136] Soul whatſoever beſides our own? ALC. Let me conſider; I ſuſpect we proceed too haſtily. What! Do you pretend you can have the ſame Aſſu⯑rance of the Being of a God, that you can have of mine whom you actually ſee ſtand before you and talk to you? EUPH. The very ſame, if not grea⯑ter. ALC. How do you make this appear? EUPH. By the perſon Alciphron is meant an indivi⯑dual thinking thing, and not the Hair, Skin or viſi⯑ble Surface, or any part of the outward Form, Co⯑lour, or Shape of Alciphron. ALC. This I grant. EUPH. And in granting this, you grant that in a ſtrict Senſe, I do not ſee Alciphron, i. e. that indi⯑vidual thinking thing, but only ſuch viſible ſigns and tokens, as ſuggeſt and infer the Being of that inviſible thinking Principle or Soul. Even ſo, in the ſelf ſame manner it ſeems to me, that though I cannot with Eyes of Fleſh behold the Inviſible God; yet I do in the ſtricteſt Senſe behold and perceive by all my Senſes ſuch Signs and Tokens, ſuch Effects and Operations, as ſuggeſt, indicate, and demon⯑ſtrate an inviſible God, as certainly and with the ſame Evidence, at leaſt, as any other Signs, percei⯑ved by Senſe, do ſuggeſt to me the Exiſtence of your Soul, Spirit, or thinking Principle; which I am con⯑vinced of only by a few Signs or Effects, and the Motions of one ſmall organized Body: Whereas I do, at all times and in all places, perceive ſenſible Signs, which evince the Being of God. The point, therefore, doubted or denied by you at the beginning now ſeems manifeſtly to follow from the Premiſes. Throughout this whole Inquiry, have we not conſi⯑dered every ſtep with care, and made not the leaſt ad⯑vance without clear Evidence? You and I examined and aſſented ſingly to each foregoing Propoſition: What ſhall we do then with the Concluſion? For my part, if you do not help me out, I find my ſelf under an abſolute neceſſity of admitting it for true. You [137] muſt therefore be content, henceforward to bear the blame, if I live and die in the Belief of a God.

VI.

ALC. It muſt be confeſt, I do not readily find an anſwer. There ſeems to be ſome Foundati⯑on for what you ſay. But on the other hand, if the point was ſo clear as you pretend, I cannot conceive how ſo many ſagacious Men of our Sect ſhou'd be ſo much in the dark, as not to know or believe one Syl⯑lable of it. EUPH. O Alciphron, it is not our pre⯑ſent buſineſs to account for the Overſights, or vindi⯑cate the Honour of thoſe great Men the Free-think⯑ers, when their very Exiſtence is in danger of being called in queſtion. ALC. How ſo? EUPH. Be pleaſed to recollect the Conceſſions you have made, and then ſhew me, if the Arguments for a Deity be not concluſive, by what better Argument you can prove the Exiſtence of that thinking Thing, which in ſtrictneſs conſtitutes the Free-thinker. As ſoon as Euphranor had uttered theſe Words, Alciphron ſtopt ſhort and ſtood in a poſture of Meditation, while the reſt of us continued our walk and took two or three turns, after which he joined us again with a ſmiling Countenance, like one who had made ſome Diſcove⯑ry. I have found, ſaid he, what may clear up the point in diſpute, and give Euphranor intire ſatisfacti⯑on; I wou'd ſay an Argument which will prove the Exiſtence of a Free-thinker, the like where⯑of cannot be applied to prove the Exiſtence of a God. You muſt know then, that your Notion of our perceiving the Exiſtence of God, as cer⯑tainly and immediately as we do that of a Human Perſon, I cou'd by no means digeſt, though I muſt own it puzzled me, till I had conſidered the matter. At firſt methought, a particular Structure, Shape, or Motion was the moſt certain Proof of a thinking, reaſonable Soul. But a little attention ſatisfied me, that theſe things have no neceſſary Connexion with Reaſon, Knowledge, and Wiſdom. And that al⯑lowing them to be certain Proofs of a living Soul, [138] they cannot be ſo of a thinking and reaſonable one. Upon ſecond Thoughts, therefore, and a minute Exa⯑mination of this point, I have found that nothing ſo much convinces me of the Exiſtence of another Per⯑ſon as his ſpeaking to me. It is my hearing you talk that, in ſtrict and philoſophical Truth, is to me the beſt Argument for your Being. And this is a pecu⯑liar Argument inapplicable to your purpoſe: for you will not, I ſuppoſe, pretend that God ſpeaks to Man in the ſame clear and ſenſible manner, as one Man doth to another.

VII.

EUPH. How! is then the Impreſſion of Sound ſo much more evident than that of other Senſes? Or, if it be, is the voice of Man louder than that of Thunder? ALC. Alas! You miſtake the point. What I mean is not the Sound of Speech meerly as ſuch, but the arbitrary uſe of ſenſible Signs, which have no Similitude or neceſſary Connexion with the things ſignified, ſo as by the appoſite Ma⯑nagement of them, to ſuggeſt and exhibit to my mind an endleſs variety of things, differing in nature, time and place, thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to act, not only with re⯑gard to things near and preſent, but alſo with regard to things diſtant and future. No matter, whether theſe Signs are pronounced or written, whether they enter by the Eye or the Ear: they have the ſame uſe, and are equally Proofs of an intelligent, thinking, deſigning Cauſe. EUPH. But what if it ſhou'd appear that God really ſpeaks to Man; wou'd this content you? ALC. I am for admitting no inward Speech, no holy Inſtincts, or Suggeſtions of Light or Spirit. All that, you muſt know, paſſeth with Men of Senſe for nothing. If you do not make it plain to me, that God ſpeaks to Men by outward ſenſible Signs, of ſuch ſort and in ſuch manner, as I have de⯑fined, you do nothing. EUPH. But if it ſhall ap⯑pear plainly, that God ſpeaks to Men, by the inter⯑vention [139] and uſe of arbitrary, outward, ſenſible Signs, having no Reſemblance or neceſſary Connexion with the things they ſtand for and ſuggeſt: if it ſhall ap⯑pear, that by innumerable Combinations of theſe Signs, an endleſs variety of things is diſcovered and made known to us; and that we are thereby inſtruc⯑ted or informed in their different Natures; that we are taught and admoniſhed what to ſhun, and what to purſue; and are directed how to regulate our Mo⯑tions, and how to act with reſpect to things diſtant from us, as well in time as place; will this content you? ALC. It is the very thing I wou'd have you make out; for therein conſiſts the force and uſe and nature of Language.

VIII.

EUPH. Look, Alciphron, do you not ſee the Caſtle upon yonder Hill? ALC. I do. EUPH. Is it not at a great Diſtance from you? ALC. It is. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, is not Diſtance a Line turned End-wiſe to the Eye? ALC. Doubtleſs. EUPH. And can a Line, in that Situation, project more than one ſingle Point on the Bottom of the Eye? ALC. It cannot. EUPH. Therefore the Appear⯑ance of a long and of a ſhort Diſtance is of the ſame Magnitude, or rather of no Magnitude at all, being in all Caſes one ſingle Point. ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Shou'd it not follow from hence, that Di⯑ſtance is not immediately perceived by the Eye? ALC. It ſhou'd. EUPH. Muſt it not then be per⯑ceived by the mediation of ſome other Thing? ALC. It muſt. EUPH. To diſcover what this is, let us exa⯑mine what Alteration there may be in the Appearance of the ſame Object, placed at different Diſtances from the Eye. Now I find by Experience that, when an Object is removed ſtill farther and farther off in a direct Line from the Eye, its viſible Appearance ſtill grows leſſer and fainter, and this Change of Appear⯑ance, being proportional and univerſal, ſeems to me to be that by which we apprehend the various De⯑grees [140] of Diſtance. ALC. I have nothing to object to this. EUPH. But Littleneſs or Faintneſs, in their own Nature, ſeem to have no neceſſary Con⯑nexion with greater Length of Diſtance. ALC. I admit this to be true. EUPH. Will it not follow then, that they cou'd never ſuggeſt it but from Expe⯑rience? ALC. It will. EUPH. That is to ſay, we perceive Diſtance, not immediately, but by me⯑diation of a Sign, which hath no Likeneſs to it, or neceſſary Connexion with it, but only ſuggeſts it from repeated Experience as Words do Things. ALC. Hold, Euphranor; now I think of it, the Writers in Optics tell us of an Angle made by the two Optic Axes, where they meet in the viſible Point or Ob⯑ject; which Angle the obtuſer it is the nearer it ſhews the Object to be, and by how much the acuter by ſo much the farther off; and this by a neceſſary demon⯑ſtrable Connexion. EUPH. The Mind then finds out the Diſtance of Things by Geometry. ALC. It doth. EUPH. Shou'd it not follow therefore that no body cou'd ſee but thoſe who had learned Geometry, and knew ſomething of Lines and Angles? ALC. There is a ſort of natural Geometry which is got without Learning. EUPH. Pray inform me, Alciphron, in or⯑der to frame a Proof of any kind, or deduce one Point from another, is it not neceſſary, that I perceive the Connexion of the Terms in the Premiſes, and the Connexion of the Premiſes with the Concluſion; and, in general, to know one Thing by means of another, muſt I not firſt know that other Thing? when I per⯑ceive your Meaning by your Words, muſt I not firſt perceive the Words themſelves? and muſt I not know the Premiſes before I infer the Concluſion? ALC. All this is true. EUPH. Whoever therefore col⯑lects a nearer Diſtance from a wider Angle, or a far⯑ther Diſtance from an acuter Angle, muſt firſt per⯑ceive the Angles themſelves. And he who doth not perceive thoſe Angles, can infer nothing from them. Is it ſo or not? ALC. It is as you ſay. [141] EUPH. Ask now the firſt Man you meet, whether he perceives or knows any thing of thoſe Optic An⯑gles? Or whether he ever thinks about them, or makes any Inferences from them, either by natural or artificial Geometry? What Anſwer do you think he wou'd make? ALC. To ſpeak the Truth, I believe his Anſwer wou'd be, that he knew nothing of thoſe Matters. EUPH. It cannot therefore be, that Men judge of Diſtance by Angles: Nor conſequent⯑ly can there be any Force in the Argument you drew from thence, to prove that Diſtance is perceived by means of ſomething which hath a neceſſary Connexi⯑on with it. ALC. I agree with you.

IX.

EUPH. To me it ſeems, that a Man may know whether he perceives a Thing or no; and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately or medi⯑ately: And if mediately, whether by means of ſome⯑thing like or unlike, neceſſarily or arbitrarily con⯑nected with it. ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. And is it not certain, that Diſtance is perceived only by Experience, if it be neither perceived immediately by itſelf, nor by means of any Image, nor of any Lines and Angles, which are like it, or have a neceſ⯑ſary Connexion with it? ALC. It is. EUPH. Doth it not ſeem to follow from what hath been ſaid and allowed by you; that before all Experience a Man wou'd not imagine, the Things he ſaw were at any Diſtance from him? ALC. How! let me ſee. EUPH. The Littleneſs or Faintneſs of Appearance, or any other Idea or Senſation, not neceſſarily con⯑nected with, or reſembling Diſtance, can no more ſuggeſt different Degrees of Diſtance, or any Diſtance at all, to the Mind, which hath not experienced a Connexion of the Things ſignifying and ſignified, than Words can ſuggeſt Notions before a Man hath learned the Language. ALC. I allow this to be true. EUPH. Will it not thence follow, that a Man born blind, and made to ſee, wou'd, upon firſt [142] receiving his Sight, take the Things he ſaw, not to be at any Diſtance from him, but in his Eye, or rather in his Mind? ALC. I muſt own it ſeems ſo; and yet, on the other hand, I can hardly perſuade myſelf, that, if I were in ſuch a State, I ſhou'd think thoſe Objects, which I now ſee at ſo great Diſtance, to be at no Diſtance at all. EUPH. It ſeems then, that you now think the Objects of Sight are at a Diſ⯑tance from you. ALC. Doubtleſs I do. Can any one queſtion but yonder Caſtle is at a great Diſtance? EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, can you diſcern the Doors, Windows, and Battlements of that ſame Caſtle? ALC. I cannot. At this Diſtance it ſeems only a ſmall round Tower. EUPH. But I, who have been at it, know that it is no ſmall round Tower, but a large ſquare Building with Battlements and Turrets, which it ſeems you do not ſee. ALC. What will you infer from thence? EUPH. I wou'd in⯑fer, that the very Object, which you ſtrictly and properly perceive by Sight, is not that Thing which is ſeveral Miles diſtant. ALC. Why ſo? EUPH. Becauſe a little round Object is one thing, and a great ſquare Object is another. Is it not? ALC. I can⯑not deny it. EUPH. Tell me, is not the viſible Appearance alone the proper Object of Sight? ALC. It is. What think you now (ſaid Euphranor pointing towards the Heavens) of the viſible Appearance of yonder Planet? Is it not a round luminous Flat, no bigger than a Sixpence? ALC. What then? EUPH. Tell me then, what you think of the Planet itſelf. Do you not conceive it to be a vaſt Opaque Globe, with ſeveral unequal Riſings and Vallies? ALC. I do. EUPH. How can you therefore conclude, that the proper Object of your Sight ex⯑iſts at a Diſtance? ALC. I confeſs I know not. EUPH. For your farther Conviction, do but con⯑ſider that crimſon Cloud. Think you that if you were in the very Place where it is, you wou'd per⯑ceive any Thing like what you now ſee? ALC. By [143] no means. I ſhou'd perceive only a dark Miſt. EUPH. Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the Caſtle, the Planet, nor the Cloud, which you ſee here, are thoſe real ones which you ſuppoſe exiſt at a Diſtance?

X.

ALC. What am I to think then? Do we ſee any thing at all, or is it altogether Fancy and Illuſion? EUPH. Upon the whole, it ſeems the proper Ob⯑jects of Sight are Light and Colours, with their ſe⯑veral Shades and Degrees, all which, being infinite⯑ly diverſified and combined, do form a Language wonderfully adapted to ſuggeſt and exhibit to us the Diſtances, Figures, Situations, Dimenſions, and various Qualities of tangible Objects; not by Simi⯑litude, nor yet by Inference of neceſſary Connexion, but by the arbitrary Impoſition of Providence, juſt as Words ſuggeſt the Things ſignified by them. ALC. How! Do we not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, perceive by Sight ſuch Things as Trees, Houſes, Men, Ri⯑vers, and the like? EUPH. We do, indeed, per⯑ceive or apprehend thoſe Things by the Faculty of Sight. But will it follow from thence, that they are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, any more than that all thoſe Things are the proper and immedi⯑ate Objects of Hearing, which are ſignified by the Help of Words or Sounds? ALC. You wou'd have us think then, that Light, Shades, and Colours, variouſly combined, anſwer to the ſeveral Articula⯑tions of Sound in Language, and that, by means thereof, all ſorts of Objects are ſuggeſted to the Mind through the Eye, in the ſame manner as they are ſuggeſted by Words or Sounds through the Ear; that is, neither from neceſſary Deduction to the Judgment, nor from Similitude to the Fancy, but purely and ſolely from Experience, Cuſtom, and Ha⯑bit. EUPH. I wou'd not have you think any thing, more than the Nature of Things obligeth you to think, nor ſubmit in the leaſt to my Judgment, but only to the Force of Truth, which is an Impoſition [144] that I ſuppoſe the freeſt Thinkers will not pretend to be exempt from. ALC. You have led me, it ſeems, Step by Step, till I am got I know not where. But I ſhall try to get out again, if not by the Way I came, yet by ſome other of my own finding. Here Alci⯑phron, having made a ſhort Pauſe, proceeded as follows.

XI.

Anſwer me, Euphranor, ſhou'd it not follow from theſe Principles, that a Man born blind, and made to ſee, wou'd at firſt Sight, not only not per⯑ceive their Diſtance, but alſo not ſo much as know the very Things themſelves which he ſaw, for In⯑ſtance, Men or Trees? which ſurely to ſuppoſe muſt be abſurd. EUPH. I grant, in conſequence of thoſe Principles, which both you and I have admit⯑ted, that ſuch a one wou'd never think of Men, Trees, or any other Objects that he had been accuſtomed to perceive by Touch, upon having his Mind filled with new Senſations of Light and Colours, whoſe various Combinations he doth not yet underſtand, or know the Meaning of, no more than a Chineſe, upon firſt hearing the Words Man and Tree, wou'd think of the Things ſignified by them. In both Caſes, there muſt be Time and Experience, by repeated Acts, to acquire a Habit of knowing the Connexion between the Signs and Things ſignified, that is to ſay, of un⯑derſtanding the Language, whether of the Eyes or of the Ears. And I conceive no Abſurdity in all this. ALC. I ſee therefore, in ſtrict Philoſophical Truth, that Rock only in the ſame Senſe that I may be ſaid to hear it, when the Word Rock is pronounced. EUPH. In the very ſame. ALC. How comes it to paſs then, that every one ſhall ſay he ſees, for Inſtance, a Rock or a Houſe, when thoſe things are before his Eyes; but no body will ſay he hears a Rock or a Houſe, but only the words or ſounds themſelves, by which thoſe things are ſaid to be ſignified or ſuggeſted, but not heard? Beſides, if Viſion be only a Language ſpeaking to the Eyes, it may be asked; When did [145] Men learn this Language? To acquire the know⯑ledge of ſo many Signs, as go to the making up a Language, is a work of ſome difficulty. But will any Man ſay he hath ſpent time, or been at pains, to learn this Language of Viſion? EUPH. No wonder, we cannot aſſign a time beyond our remoteſt Memo⯑ry. If we have been all practiſing this Language, ever ſince our firſt entrance into the World: If the Author of Nature conſtantly ſpeaks to the Eyes of all Mankind, even in their earlieſt Infancy, whenever the Eyes are open in the Light, whether alone or in Company: It doth not ſeem to me at all ſtrange, that Men ſhou'd not be aware they had ever learned a Language, begun ſo early, and practiſed ſo conſtant⯑ly, as this of Viſion. And, if we alſo conſider that it is the ſame throughout the whole World, and not, like other Languages, differing in different places, it will not ſeem unaccountable, that Men ſhou'd miſ⯑take the Connexion between the proper Objects of Sight and the things ſignified by them, to be founded in neceſſary Relation, or Likeneſs, or that they ſhou'd even take them for the ſame things. Hence it ſeems eaſy to conceive, why Men, who do not think, ſhou'd confound in this Language of Viſion the Signs with the things ſignified, otherwiſe than they are wont to do, in the various particular Languages formed by the ſeveral Nations of Men.

XII.

It may be alſo worth while to obſerve, that Signs being little conſidered in themſelves, or for their own ſake, but only in their relative Capacity, and for the ſake of thoſe things whereof they are Signs, it comes to paſs, that the mind often over⯑looks them, ſo as to carry its Attention immediately on to the things ſignified. Thus, for example, in read⯑ing we run over the Characters with the ſlighteſt re⯑gard, and paſs on to the meaning. Hence it is fre⯑quent for Men to ſay, they ſee Words, and Notions, and Things in reading of a Book; whereas in ſtrict⯑neſs, [146] they ſee only the Characters, which ſuggeſt Words, Nations, and Things. And by parity of Reaſon, may we not ſuppoſe, that Men, not reſting in, but overlooking, the immediate and proper Ob⯑jects of Sight, as in their own Nature of ſmall mo⯑ment, carry their Attention onward to the very things ſignified, and talk as if they ſaw the ſecondary Ob⯑jects? which, in truth and ſtrictneſs, are not ſeen but only ſuggeſted and apprehended by means of the proper Objects of Sight, which alone are ſeen. ALC. To ſpeak my mind freely, this Diſſertation grows te⯑dious, and runs into points too dry and minute for a Gentleman's Attention. I thought ſaid Crito, we had been told, the Minute Philoſophers loved to conſider things cloſely and minutely. ALC. That is true, but in ſo polite an Age who wou'd be a meer Philoſo⯑pher? There is a certain ſcholaſtic Accuracy which ill ſuits the freedom and caſe of a well-bred Man. But, to cut ſhort this Chicane, I propound it fairly to your own Conſcience, whether you really think, that God himſelf ſpeaks every day and in every place to the Eyes of all Men? EUPH. That is really and in truth my Opinion; and it ſhou'd be yours too, if you are conſiſtent with your ſelf, and abide by your own Definition of Language. Since you cannot deny, that the Great Mover and Author of Nature con⯑ſtantly explaineth himſelf to the Eyes of Men, by the ſenſible intervention of arbitrary Signs, which have no Similitude or Connexion with the things ſig⯑nified; ſo as by compounding and diſpoſing them, to ſuggeſt and exhibit an endleſs variety of Objects dif⯑fering in nature, time, and place, thereby informing and directing Men, how to act with reſpect to things diſtant and future, as well as near and preſent. In conſequence, I ſay, of your own Sentiments and Con⯑ceſſions, you have as much reaſon to think, the uni⯑verſal Agent or God ſpeaks to your Eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular Perſon ſpeaks to your Ears. ALC. I cannot help thinking, that ſome [147] Fallacy runs throughout this whole Ratiocination, though perhaps I may not readily point it out. Hold! let me ſee. In Language the Signs are arbitrary, are they not? EUPH. They are. ALC. And conſe⯑quently, they do not always ſuggeſt real matters of Fact. Whereas this natural Language, as you call it. or theſe viſible Signs do always ſuggeſt things, in the ſame uniform way, and have the ſame conſtant regu⯑lar Connexion with matters of Fact: whence it ſhou'd ſeem, the Connexion was neceſſary, and therefore, according to the Definition premiſed, it can be no Language. How do you ſolve this Objection? EUPH. You may ſolve it your ſelf, by the help of a Picture or Looking-glaſs. ALC. You are in the right. I ſee there is nothing in it. I know not what elſe to ſay to this Opinion, more than that it is ſo odd and contrary to my way of thinking, that I ſhall ne⯑ver aſſent to it.

XIII.

EUPH. Be pleaſed to recollect your own Lectures upon Prejudice, and apply them in the pre⯑ſent caſe. Perhaps they may help you to follow where Reaſon leads, and to ſuſpect Notions which are ſtrong⯑ly riveted, without having been ever examined. ALC. I diſdain the ſuſpicion of Prejudice. And I do not ſpeak only for my ſelf. I know a Club of moſt in⯑genious Men, the freeſt from Prejudice of any Men alive, who abhor the Notion of a God, and I doubt not wou'd be very able to untie this knot. Upon which Words of Alciphron, I, who had acted the part of an indifferent ſtander-by, obſerved to him, that it misbecame his Character and repeated Profeſ⯑ſions, to own an Attachment to the Judgment, or build upon the preſumed Abilities of other Men how ingenious ſoever: and that this proceeding might en⯑courage his Adverſaries to have recourſe to Authori⯑ty, in which perhaps they wou'd find their account more than he. Oh! ſaid Crito, I have often obſerv⯑ed the Conduct of Minute Philoſophers. When one [148] of them has got a ring of Diſciples round him, his method is to exclaim againſt Prejudice, and recom⯑mend thinking and reaſoning, giving to underſtand that himſelf is a Man of deep Reſearches and cloſe Argument, one who examines impartially and con⯑cludes warily. The ſame Man in other Company, if he chance to be preſſed with Reaſon, ſhall laugh at Logic and aſſume the lazy ſupine Airs of a fine Gen⯑tleman, a Wit, a Railleur, to avoid the dryneſs of a regular and exact Inquiry. This double Face of the Minute Philoſopher is of no ſmall uſe to propagate and maintain his Notions. Though to me it ſeems a plain Caſe, that if a fine Gentleman will ſhake off Authority, and appeal from Religion to Reaſon, un⯑to Reaſon he muſt go: And if he cannot go without leading ſtrings, ſurely he had better be led by the Au⯑thority of the Public, than by that of any knot of Minute Philoſophers. ALC. Gentlemen, this Diſ⯑courſe is very irkſome and needleſs. For my part, I am a friend to Inquiry. I am willing Reaſon ſhou'd have its full and free Scope. I build on no Man's Au⯑thority. For my part I have no intereſt in denying a God. Any Man may believe or not believe a God as he pleaſes for me. But after all, Euphranor muſt al⯑low me to ſtare a little at his Concluſions. EUPH. The Concluſions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own Conceſſions.

XIV.

You it ſeems ſtare to find, that God is not far from every one of us, and that in him we live and move and have our Being. You, who in the begin⯑ning of this Morning's Conference, thought it ſtrange, that God ſhou'd leave himſelf without a witneſs, do now think it ſtrange the witneſs ſhou'd be ſo full and clear. ALC. I muſt own I do. I was aware, indeed, of a certain Metaphyſical Hypothe⯑ſis, of our ſeeing all things in God by the union of the Humane Soul with the intelligible Subſtance of the Deity, which neither I nor any one elſe cou'd [149] make ſenſe of. But I never imagined it cou'd be pre⯑tended, that we ſaw God with our fleſhly Eyes as plain as we ſee any Human Perſon whatſoever, and that he daily ſpeaks to our Senſes in a manifeſt and clear Dialect. CRI. This Language hath a neceſ⯑ſary Connexion with Knowledge, Wiſdom and Good⯑neſs. It is equivalent to a conſtant Creation, be⯑tokening an immediate act of Power and Providence. It cannot be accounted for by mechanical Principles, by Atoms, Attractions, or Effluvia. The inſtanta⯑neous Production and Reproduction of ſo many Signs combined, diſſolved, tranſpoſed, diverſified, and adapted to ſuch an endleſs variety of purpoſes, ever ſhifting with the occaſions and ſuited to them, being utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the Laws of Motion, by Chance, by Fate, or the like blind Principles, doth ſet forth and teſtify the immediate Operation of a Spirit or thinking Being; and not meerly of a Spirit, which every Motion or Gravita⯑tion may poſſibly infer, but of one wiſe, good and provident Spirit, who directs and rules and governs the World. Some Philoſophers, being convinced of the Wiſdom and Power of the Creator, from the make and contrivance of organized Bodies and or⯑derly Syſtem of the World, did nevertheleſs imagine, that he left this Syſtem with all its parts and contents well adjuſted and put in motion, as an Artiſt leaves a Clock, to go thenceforward of it ſelf for a certain Period. But this viſual Language proves, not a Cre⯑ator meerly, but a provident Governor actually and intimately preſent and attentive to all our Intereſts and Motions; who watches over our Conduct, and takes care of our minuteſt Actions and Deſigns, throughout the whole courſe of our lives, informing, admoniſhing, and directing inceſſantly, in a moſt e⯑vident e⯑vident and ſenſible manner. This is truly wonderful. EUPH. And is it not ſo, that Men ſhou'd be en⯑compaſſed by ſuch a wonder, without reflecting on it?

XV.

Something there is of Divine and Admirable in this Language, addreſſed to our Eyes, that may well a waken the Mind, and deſerve its utmoſt Atten⯑tion; it is learned with ſo little pains, it expreſſeth the Differences of Things ſo clearly and aptly, it in⯑ſtructs with ſuch Facility and Diſpatch, by one Glance of the Eye conveying a greater Variety of Advices, and a more diſtinct Knowledge of Things, than cou'd be got by a Diſcourſe of ſeveral Hours. And, while it informs, it amuſes and entertains the Mind with ſuch ſingular Pleaſure and Delight. It is of ſuch excellent Uſe in giving a Stability and Permanen⯑cy to Humane Diſcourſe, in recording Sounds and be⯑ſtowing Life on dead Languages, enabling us to con⯑verſe with Men of remote Ages and Countries. And it anſwers ſo appoſite to the Uſes and Neceſſities of Man⯑kind, informing us more diſtinctly of thoſe Objects, whoſe Nearneſs and Magnitude qualify them to be of greateſt Detriment or Benefit to our Bodies, and leſs exactly, in Proportion as their Littleneſs or Diſtance make them of leſs Concern to us. ALC. And yet theſe ſtrange Things affect Men but little. EUPH. But they are not ſtrange, they are familiar, and that makes them be overlooked. Things which rarely happen ſtrike; whereas Frequency leſſens the Admiration of Things, though in themſelves ever ſo admirable. Hence a common Man, who is not uſed to think and make Reflexions, wou'd probably be more convin⯑ced of the Being of a God, by one ſingle Sentence heard once in his life from the Sky, than by all the Experience he has had of this viſual Language, con⯑trived with ſuch exquiſite skill, ſo conſtantly ad⯑dreſſed to his Eyes, and ſo plainly declaring the Near⯑neſs, Wiſdom, and Providence of him with whom we have to do. ALC. After all, I cannot ſatiſ⯑fy my ſelf, how Men ſhou'd be ſo little ſurpriſed or amazed about this viſive Faculty, if it was really of a nature ſo ſurpriſing and amazing. EUPH. But [151] let us ſuppoſe a Nation of Men blind from their Infan⯑cy, among whom a Stranger arrives, the only Man who can ſee in all the Country: Let us ſuppoſe this Stranger travelling with ſome of the Natives, and that one while he foretels to them, that, in caſe they walk ſtraight forward, in half an Hour they ſhall meet Men or Cattle or come to a Houſe; that if they turn to the right and proceed, they ſhall in a few Minutes be in danger of falling down a Precipice; that ſhaping their courſe to the left, they will in ſuch a time arrive at a River, a Wood, or a Mountain. What think you? Muſt they not be infinitely ſurpri⯑ſed, that one, who had never been in their Country before, ſhou'd know it ſo much better than them⯑ſelves? And wou'd not thoſe Predictions ſeem to them as unaccountable and incredible, as Prophecy to a Minute Philoſopher? ALC. I cannot deny it. EUPH. But it ſeems to require intenſe thought, to be able to unravel a Prejudice that has been ſo long forming, to get over the vulgar Error of Ideas com⯑mon to both Senſes, and ſo to diſtinguiſh between the Objects of Sight and Touch ^*, which have grown (if I may ſo ſay) blended together in our Fancy, as to be able to ſuppoſe our ſelves exactly in the State, that one of thoſe Men wou'd be in, if he were made to ſee. And yet this I believe is poſſible, and might ſeem worth the pains of a little thinking, eſpecially to thoſe Men whoſe proper Employment and Profeſſi⯑on it is to think, and unravel Prejudices, and confute Miſtakes. I frankly own I cannot find my way out of this Maze, and ſhou'd gladly be ſet right by thoſe who ſee better than my ſelf. CRI. The purſuing this Subject in their own Thoughts wou'd poſſibly open a new Scene, to thoſe ſpeculative Gentlemen of [152] the Minute Philoſophy. It puts me in mind of a paſſage in the Pſalmiſt, where he repreſents God to be covered with Light as with a Garment, and wou'd methinks be no ill Comment on that ancient Notion of ſome Eaſtern Sages: That God had Light for his Body, and Truth for his Soul. This Converſa⯑tion laſted till a Servant came to tell us the Tea was ready: Upon which we walked in, and found Lyſi⯑cles at the Tea-table.

XVI.

As ſoon as we fate down, I am glad, ſaid Alciphron, that I have here found my Second, a freſh Man to maintain our common Cauſe, which, I doubt, Lyſicles will think hath ſuffered by his abſence. LYS. Why ſo? ALC. I have been drawn into ſome Con⯑ceſſions you won't like. LYS. Let me know what they are? ALC. Why, that there is ſuch a thing as a God, and that his Exiſtence is very certain. LYS. Bleſs me! How came you to entertain ſo wild a Notion? ALC. You know we profeſs to follow Reaſon wherever it leads. And in ſhort I have been reaſoned into it. LYS. Reaſoned? You ſhou'd ſay amuſed with Words, bewildered with Sophiſtry. EUPH. Have you a mind to hear the ſame Reaſon⯑ing that led Alciphron and me Step by Step, that we may examine whether it be Sophiſtry or no? LYS. As to that I am very eaſy. I gueſs all that can be ſaid on that Head. It ſhall be my Buſineſs to help my Friend out, whatever Arguments drew him in. EUPH. Will you admit the Premiſes and deny the Concluſions? LYS. What if I admit the Conclu⯑ſion? EUPH. How! will you grant there is a God? LYS. Perhaps I may. EUPH. Then we are agreed. LYS. Perhaps not. EUPH. O Lyſi⯑cles, you are a ſubtle Adverſary. I know not what you wou'd be at. LYS. You muſt know then, that at bottom the Being of a God is a Point in it ſelf of ſmall conſequence, and a Man may make this Con⯑ceſſion without yielding much. The great Point [153] is what Senſe the word God is to be taken in. The very Epicureans allowed the Being of Gods; but then they were indolent Gods, unconcerned with Human Affairs. Hobbes allowed a corporeal God; and Spinoſa held the Univerſe to be God. And yet no body doubts they were ſtaunch Free-thinkers. I cou'd wiſh indeed the word God were quite omitted, be⯑cauſe in moſt minds it is coupled with a ſort of ſu⯑perſtitious Aw, the very Root of all Religion. I ſhall not, nevertheleſs, be much diſturbed though the name be retained, and the Being of God allowed in any Senſe but in that of a Mind, which knows all things, and beholds Human Actions, like ſome Judge or Magiſtrate with infinite Obſervation and Intelli⯑gence. The Belief of a God in this Senſe fills a Man's Mind with Scruples, lays him under Con⯑ſtraints and imbitters his very Being: But in another Senſe, it may be attended with no great ill Conſe⯑quence. This I know was the Opinion of our great Diagoras, who told me he wou'd never have been at the pains, to find out a Demonſtration that there was no God, if the received Notion of God had been the ſame with that of ſome Fathers and Schoolmen. EUPH. Pray what was that?

XVII.

LYS. You muſt know, Diagoras, a Man of much reading and inquiry, had diſcovered that once upon a time, the moſt profound and ſpeculative Divines finding it impoſſible to reconcile the Attri⯑butes of God, taken in the common Senſe, or in any known Senſe, with Human Reaſon, and the Appear⯑ances of things, taught that the words Knowledge, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and ſuch like, when ſpoken of the Deity, muſt be underſtood in a quite different Senſe, from what they ſignify in the vulgar Accepta⯑tion, or from any thing that we can form a Notion of, or conceive. Hence, whatever Objections might be made againſt the Attributes of God they eaſily [154] ſolved, by denying thoſe Attributes belonged to God, in this or that or any known particular Senſe or No⯑tion; which was the ſame thing as to deny they be⯑longed to him at all. And thus denying the Attri⯑butes of God they in effect deny'd his Being, though perhaps they were not aware of it. Suppoſe, for in⯑ſtance, a Man ſhou'd object, that future Contin⯑gencies were inconſiſtent with the Fore-knowledge of God, becauſe it is repugnant that certain Know⯑ledge ſhou'd be of an uncertain thing: it was a rea⯑dy and an eaſy anſwer to ſay, that this may be true, with reſpect to Knowledge taken in the common Senſe, or in any Senſe that we can poſſibly form any Notion of; but that there wou'd not appear the ſame Inconſiſtency, between the contingent Nature of Things and Divine Foreknowledge, taken to ſignify ſomewhat that we know nothing of, which in God ſupplies the place of what we underſtand by Know⯑ledge; from which it differs not in Quantity or De⯑gree of Perfection, but altogether, and in kind, as Light doth from Sound; and even more, ſince theſe agree in that they are both Senſations: whereas Knowledge in God hath no ſort of Reſemblance or Agreement with any Notion, that Man can frame of Knowledge. The like may be ſaid of all the other Attributes, which indeed may by this means be e⯑qually reconciled with every thing or with nothing: But all Men who think muſt needs ſee, this is cutting knots and not untying them. For how are things re⯑conciled with the Divine Attributes, when theſe At⯑tributes themſelves are in every intelligible Senſe de⯑nied; and conſequently the very Notion of God ta⯑ken away, and nothing left but the Name, without any meaning annexed to it? In ſhort, the Belief that there is an unknown Subject of Attributes abſolutely unknown is a very innocent Doctrine; which the acute Diagoras well ſaw, and was therefore wonder⯑fully delighted with this Syſtem.

XVIII.

For, ſaid he, if this cou'd once make its way and obtain in the World, there wou'd be an end of all natural or rational Religion, which is the Ba⯑ſis both of the Jewiſh and the Chriſtian: for he who comes to God, or enters himſelf in the Church of God, muſt firſt believe that there is a God in ſome intelligible Senſe; and not only that there is ſome⯑thing in general without any proper Notion, though never ſo inadequate, of any of its Qualities or Attri⯑butes; for this may be Fate, or Chaos, or Plaſtic Na⯑ture, or any thing elſe as well as God. Nor will it avail to ſay, there is ſomething in this unknown Be⯑ing analogous to Knowledge and Goodneſs; that is to ſay, which produceth thoſe Effects, which we cou'd not conceive to be produced by Men in any De⯑gree, without Knowledge and Goodneſs. For this is in Fact to give up the Point in diſpute between Theiſts and Atheiſts, the Queſtion having always been, not whether there was a Principle, (which Point was allowed by all Philoſophers as well before as ſince Anaxagoras) but whether this Principle was a [...], a thinking intelligent Being: That is to ſay, whether that Order and Beauty and Uſe, viſible in Natural Effects, cou'd be produced by any thing but a Mind or Intelligence, in the proper Senſe of the Word; and whether there muſt not be true, real, and proper Knowledge in the firſt Cauſe. We will therefore acknowledge, that all thoſe natural Effects which are vulgarly aſcribed to Knowledge and Wiſ⯑dom, proceed from a Being in which there is, proper⯑ly ſpeaking, no Knowledge or Wiſdom at all, but only ſomething elſe, which, in reality, is the Cauſe of thoſe things which Men, for want of knowing better, aſcribe to what they call Knowledge and Wiſ⯑dom and Underſtanding. You wonder perhaps to hear a Man of Pleaſure, who diverts himſelf as I do, philoſophize at this rate. But you ſhou'd conſider that much is to be got by converſing with ingenious [156] Men, which is a ſhort way to Knowledge, that ſaves a Man the drudgery of Reading and Thinking. And now we have granted to you that there is a God in this indefinite Senſe, I wou'd fain ſee what uſe you can make of this Conceſſion. You cannot argue from unknown Attributes, or which is the ſame thing, from Attributes in an unknown Senſe. You cannot prove, that God is to be loved for his Good⯑neſs, or feared for his Juſtice, or reſpected for his Knowledge: All which Conſequences, we own, wou'd follow from thoſe Attributes admitted in an intelligible Senſe. But we deny, that thoſe or any other Conſequences can be drawn from Attributes ad⯑mitted in no particular Senſe, or in a Senſe which none of us underſtand. Since therefore nothing can be inferred from ſuch an Account of God, about Conſcience, or Worſhip, or Religion, you may e'en make the beſt of it; and, not to be ſingular, we will uſe the Name too, and ſo at once there is an end of A⯑theiſm. EUPH. This Account of a Deity is new to me. I do not like it, and therefore ſhall leave it to be maintain'd by thoſe who do.

XIX.

CRI. It is not new to me. I remember not long ſince to have heard a Minute Philoſopher triumph upon this very Point; which put me on in⯑quiring what Foundation there was for it in the Fa⯑thers or Schoolmen. And, for ought that I can find, it owes its Original to thoſe Writings, which have been publiſhed under the Name of Dionyſius the Areopagite. The Author of which, it muſt be own⯑ed, hath written upon the Divine Attributes in a very ſingular Style. In his Treatiſe of the Coeleſtial Hie⯑rarchy ^* he ſaith, that God is ſomething above all Eſſence and Life, [...]; and again in his Treatiſe of the Divine Names ^†, that he is above [157] all Wiſdom and Underſtanding, [...], ineffable and innominable, [...]; the Wiſ⯑dom of God he terms an unreaſonable, unintelligent, and fooliſh Wiſdom; [...]. But then the Reaſon he gives, for expreſſing himſelf in this ſtrange manner, is, that the Divine Wiſdom is the Cauſe of all Reaſon, Wiſdom, and Underſtand⯑ing, and therein are contained the Treaſures of all Wiſdom and Knowledge. He calls God [...] and [...]; as if Wiſdom and Life were Words not wor⯑thy to expreſs the Divine Perfections: And he adds, that the Attributes unintelligent and unperceiving muſt be aſcribed to the Divinity, not [...] by way of Defect, but [...] by way of Eminency; which he explains by our giving the Name of Dark⯑neſs to Light inacceſſible. And, notwithſtanding the Harſhneſs of his Expreſſions in ſome Places, he affirms over and over in others, that God knows all Things; not that he is beholden to the Creatures for his Knowledge, but by knowing himſelf, from whom they all derive their Being, and in whom they are contained as in their Cauſe. It was late before theſe Writings appear to have been known in the World; and although they obtained Credit during the Age of the Schoolmen, yet ſince critical Learning hath been cultivated, they have loſt that Credit, and are at this Day given up for ſpurious, as containing ſeveral evi⯑dent Marks of a much later Date than the Age of Dionyſius. Upon the whole, although this Method of growing in Expreſſion, and dwindling in Notion, of clearing up Doubts by Nonſenſe, and avoiding Difficulties by running into affected Contradictions, may perhaps proceed from a well-meant Zeal; yet it appears not to be according to Knowledge, and in⯑ſtead of reconciling Atheiſts to the Truth, hath, I doubt, a Tendency to confirm them in their own Perſuaſion. It ſhou'd ſeem, therefore, very weak and raſh in a Chriſtian to adopt this harſh Language of an Apocryphal Writer, preferably to that of the [158] Holy Scriptures. I remember, indeed, to have read of a certain Philoſopher, who lived ſome Centuries ago, that uſed to ſay, if theſe ſuppoſed Works of Dionyſius had been known to the Primitive Fathers, they wou'd have furniſhed them admirable Weapons againſt the Hereticks, and wou'd have ſaved a world of Pains. But the Event ſince their Diſcovery hath by no means confirmed his Opinion. It muſt be owned, the celebrated Picus of Mirandula, among his Nine Hundred Concluſions (which that Prince, being very young, propoſed to maintain by public Diſputation at Rome) hath this for one; to wit, that it is more improper to ſay of God, he is an Intellect or intelligent Being, than to ſay of a reaſonable Soul that it is an Angel: Which Doctrine it ſeems was not reliſhed. And Picus, when he comes to defend it, ſupports himſelf altogether by the Example and Authority of Dionyſius, and in effect explains it away into a meer verbal Difference, affirming, that neither Dionyſius nor himſelf ever meant to deprive God of Knowledge, or to deny that he knows all Things: But that, as Reaſon is of kind peculiar to Man, ſo by Intellection he underſtands a kind or manner of Knowing peculiar to Angels: And that the Know⯑ledge, which is in God, is more above the Intellecti⯑on of Angels, than Angel is above Man. He adds that, as his Tenet conſiſts with admitting the moſt perfect Knowledge in God, ſo he wou'd by no means be underſtood to exclude from the Deity Intellection it ſelf, taken in the common or general Senſe, but only that peculiar ſort of Intellection proper to An⯑gels, which he thinks ought not to be attributed to God any more than Human Reaſon ^*. Picus, there⯑fore, though he ſpeaks as the Apocryphal Dionyſius, yet when he explains himſelf, it is evident he ſpeaks like other Men. And although the forementioned [159] Books of the Coeleſtial Hierarchy and of the Divine Names, being attributed to a Saint and Martyr of the Apoſtolical Age, were reſpected by the Schoolmen, yet it is certain they rejected or ſoftned his harſh Ex⯑preſſions, and explained away or reduced his Doctrine to the received Notions taken from Holy Scripture, and the Light of Nature.

XX.

Thomas Aquinas expreſſeth his Senſe of this Point in the following manner. All Perfections, ſaith he, derived from God to the Creatures are in a certain higher Senſe, or (as the Schoolmen term it) eminently in God. Whenever, therefore, a Name borrowed from any Perfection in the Creature is at⯑tributed to God, we muſt exclude from its Significa⯑tion every thing that belongs to the imperfect Man⯑ner, wherein that Attribute is found in the Creature. Whence he concludes, that Knowledge in God is not an Habit, but a pure Act ^*. And again the ſame Doctor obſerves, that our Intellect gets its Notions of all ſorts of Perfections from the Creatures, and that as it apprehends thoſe Perfections, ſo it ſigni⯑fies them by Names. Therefore, ſaith he, in at⯑tributing theſe Names to God, we are to conſider two Things; firſt, The Perfections themſelves as Goodneſs, Life, and the like, which are properly in God; and, ſecondly, The Manner which is pecu⯑liar to the Creature, and cannot, ſtrictly and proper⯑ly ſpeaking, be ſaid to agree to the Creator ^†. And although Suarez, with other Schoolmen, teacheth, that the Mind of Man conceiveth Knowledge and Will to be in God as Faculties or Operations, by A⯑nalogy only to created Beings; yet he gives it plainly as his Opinion, that when Knowledge is ſaid not to be properly in God, it muſt be underſtood in a Senſe in⯑cluding [160] Imperfection, ſuch as diſcurſive Knowledge, or the like imperfect kind found in the Creatures: And that, none of thoſe Imperfections in the Knowledge of Men or Angels belonging to the formal Notion of Knowledge, or to Knowledge as ſuch, it will not thence follow that Knowledge, in its proper formal Senſe, may not be attributed to God: And of Know⯑ledge taken in general for the clear evident underſtan⯑ding of all Truth, he expreſly affirms that it is in God, and that this was never denied by any Philoſo⯑pher who believed a God ^*. It was, indeed, a cur⯑rent Opinion in the Schools, that even Being itſelf ſhou'd be attributed analogically to God and the Creatures. That is, they held that God, the ſu⯑preme, independent, ſelf-originate Cauſe and Source of all Beings, muſt not be ſuppoſed to exiſt in the ſame Senſe with created Beings, not that he exiſts leſs truly, properly, or formally than they, but only be⯑cauſe he exiſts in a more eminent and perfect Manner.

XXI.

But to prevent any Man's being led, by miſ⯑taking the Scholaſtic Uſe of the Terms Analogy and Analogical, into an Opinion that we cannot frame in any Degree, a true and proper Notion of Attributes applied by Analogy, or, in the School Phraſe, pre⯑dicated analogically, it may not be amiſs to inquire in⯑to the true Senſe and Meaning of thoſe Words. Every one knows, that Analogy is a Greek Word uſed by Mathematicians, to ſignify a Similitude of Proportions. For Inſtance, when we obſerve that Two is to Six, as Three is to Nine, this Similitude or Equality of Proportion is termed Analogy. And although Proportion ſtrictly ſignifies the Habitude or Relation of one Quantity to another, yet, in a looſer and tranſlated Senſe, it hath been applied to ſignify every other Habitude; and conſequently the Term Analogy comes to ſignify all Similitude of Re⯑lations, [161] or Habitudes whatſoever. Hence, the School⯑men tell us there is Analogy between Intellect and Sight; foraſmuch as Intellect is to the Mind, what Sight is to the Body? And that he who governs the State is analogous to him who ſteers a Ship. Hence a Prince is analogically ſtiled a Pilot, being to the State as a Pilot is to his Veſſel ^*. For the farther clearing of this Point it is to be obſerved, that a two⯑fold Analogy is diſtinguiſhed by the Schoolmen, me⯑taphorical and proper. Of the firſt Kind there are frequent Inſtances in Holy Scripture, attributing Human Parts and Paſſions to God. When he is re⯑preſented as having a Finger, an Eye, or an Ear, when he is ſaid to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one ſees the Analogy is meerly metaphorical. Becauſe thoſe Parts and Paſſions, taken in the proper Signification, muſt in every Degree neceſſarily, and from the formal Nature of the Thing, include Im⯑perfection. When therefore it is ſaid, the Finger of God appears in this or that Event, Men of common Senſe mean no more, but that it is as truly aſcribed to God, as the Works wrought by Human Fingers are to Man: and ſo of the reſt. But the caſe is different, when Wiſdom and Knowledge are attributed to God. Paſſions and Senſes as ſuch imply Defect; but in Knowledge ſimply, or as ſuch, there is no Defect. Knowledge therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the Word, may be attributed to God proportiona⯑bly, that is preſerving a Proportion to the infinite Nature of God. We may ſay, therefore, that as God is infinitely above Man, ſo is the Knowledge of God infinitely above the Knowledge of Man, and this is what Cajetan calls Analogia propriè facta. And after this ſame Analogy, we muſt underſtand all thoſe Attributes to belong to the Deity, which in them⯑ſelves ſimply, and as ſuch, denote Perfection. We [162] may therefore conſiſtently with what hath been pre⯑miſed, affirm that all ſorts of Perfection, which we can conceive in a finite Spirit, are in God, but with⯑out any of that allay which is found in the Creatures. This Doctrine therefore of Analogical Perfections in God, or our knowing God by Analogy, ſeems very much miſunderſtood and miſapplied by thoſe who wou'd infer from thence, that we cannot frame any direct or proper Notion, though never ſo inadequate, of Knowledge or Wiſdom, as they are in the Deity, or underſtand any more of them than one born blind can of Light and Colours.

XXII.

And now, Gentlemen, it may be expected I ſhou'd ask your Pardon, for having dwelt ſo long on a point of Metaphyſics, and introduced ſuch un⯑poliſhed and unfaſhionable Writers as the Schoolmen into good Company: but as Lyſicles gave the occaſi⯑on, I leave him to anſwer for it. LYS. I never dreamt of this dry Diſſertation. But, if I have been the occaſion of diſcuſſing theſe Scholaſtic Points, by my unluckily mentioning the Schoolmen, it was my firſt fault of the kind, and I promiſe it ſhall be the laſt. The meddling with crabbed Authors of any ſort is none of my taſte. I grant one meets now and then with a good Notion in what we call dry Wri⯑ters, ſuch an one for example as this I was ſpeaking of, which I muſt own ſtruck my Fancy. But then for theſe we have ſuch as Prodicus or Diagoras, who look into obſolete Books, and ſave the reſt of us that trou⯑ble. CRI. So you pin your Faith upon them. LYS. It is only for ſome odd Opinions, and matters of Fact, and critical Points. Beſides, we know the Men to whom we give credit: They are judicious and honeſt, and have no end to ſerve but Truth. And I am confident ſome Author or other has maintained the forementioned Notion in the ſame Senſe as Dia⯑goras related it. CRI. That may be. But it never was a received Notion, and never will, ſo long as [163] Men believe a God; the ſame Arguments that prove a firſt Cauſe proving an intelligent Cauſe: Intelligent, I ſay, in the proper Senſe: Wiſe and Good in the true and formal Acceptation of the Words. Otherwiſe it is evident, that every Syllogiſm brought to prove thoſe Attributes, or (which is the ſame thing) to prove the Being of a God, will be found to conſiſt of four terms, and conſequently can conclude no⯑thing. But for your part, Alciphron, you have been fully convinced, that God is a thinking intelligent Being in the ſame ſenſe with other Spirits, though not in the ſame imperfect manner or degree.

XXIII.

ALC. And yet I am not without my Scruples: For with Knowledge you infer Wiſdom, and with Wiſdom Goodneſs. But how is it poſſible, to conceive God ſo good, and Man ſo wicked? It may perhaps with ſome Colour be alledged, that a little ſoft ſhadowing of Evil ſets off the bright and luminous parts of the Creation, and ſo contributes to the Beauty of the whole Piece: But, for Blots ſo large and ſo black it is impoſſible to account by that Principle. That there ſhou'd be ſo much Vice and ſo little Virtue upon Earth, and that the Laws of God's Kingdom ſhou'd be ſo ill obſerved by his Sub⯑jects, is what can never be reconciled with that ſur⯑paſſing Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the ſupreme Mo⯑narch. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, wou'd you argue that a State was ill adminiſtred, or judge of the manners of its Citizens, by the Diſorders com⯑mitted in the Goal or Dungeon? ALC. I wou'd not. EUPH. And for ought we know, this Spot with the few Sinners on it, bears no greater Propor⯑tion to the Univerſe of Intelligences, than a Dun⯑geon doth to a Kingdom. It ſeems we are led not on⯑ly by Revelation but by common Senſe, obſerving and inferring from the Analogy of viſible Things, to conclude there are innumerable Orders of intelli⯑gent Beings more happy and more perfect than Man, [164] whoſe Life is but a Span, and whoſe place this earth⯑ly Globe is but a Point, in reſpect of the whole Syſ⯑tem of God's Creation. We are dazzled indeed with the Glory and Grandeur of Things here below, be⯑cauſe we know no better. But I am apt to think, if we knew what it was to be an Angel for one hour, we ſhou'd return to this World, though it were to ſit on the brighteſt Throne in it, with vaſtly more loathing and reluctance, than we wou'd now deſcend into a loathſome Dungeon or Sepulchre.

XXIV.

CRI. To me it ſeems natural, that ſuch a weak paſſionate and ſhort-ſighted Creature as Man, ſhou'd be ever liable to Scruples of one kind or o⯑ther. But, as this ſame Creature is apt to be over poſitive in judging, and over haſty in concluding, it falls out, that theſe Difficulties and Scruples about God's Conduct are made Objections to his Being. And ſo Men come to argue from their own Defects againſt the Divine Perfections. And, as the Views and Humours of Men are different and often oppo⯑ſite, you may ſometimes ſee them deduce the ſame a⯑theiſtical Concluſion from contrary Premiſes. I knew an Inſtance of this, in two Minute Philoſophers of my Acquaintance, who uſed to argue each from his own Temper againſt a Providence. One of them, a Man of a choleric and vindictive Spirit, ſaid he cou'd not believe a Providence, becauſe London was not ſwallowed up or conſumed by Fire from Heaven, the Streets being as he ſaid full of People, who ſhew no other Belief or Worſhip of God, but perpetually praying that he wou'd damn, rot, ſink, and confound them. The other, being of an indolent and eaſy Temper, concluded there cou'd be no ſuch thing as a Providence, for that a Being of conſummate Wiſ⯑dom muſt needs employ himſelf better, than in mind⯑ing the Prayers, and Actions, and little Intereſts of Mankind. ALC. After all, if God have no Paſſi⯑ons, how can it be true that Vengeance is his? Or [165] how can he be ſaid to be jealous of his Glory? CRI. We believe that God executes Vengeance without Revenge, and is jealous without Weakneſs, juſt as the mind of Man ſees without Eyes, and apprehends without Hands.

XXV.

ALC. To put a Period to this Diſcourſe, we will grant, there is a God in this diſpaſſionate Senſe; but what then? What hath this to do with Religion or Divine Worſhip? To what purpoſe, are all theſe Prayers, and Praiſes, and Thanks-givings, and Singing of Pſalms, which the fooliſh Vulgar call ſerving God? What ſenſe or uſe or end is there in all theſe things? CRI. We worſhip God, we praiſe and pray to him: not becauſe we think that he is proud of our Worſhip, or fond of our Praiſe or Prayers, and affected with them as Mankind are, or that all our Service can contribute in the leaſt De⯑gree to his Happineſs or Good: But becauſe it is good for us, to be ſo diſpoſed towards God: becauſe it is juſt and right and ſuitable to the Nature of Things, and becoming the Relation we ſtand in to our ſu⯑preme Lord and Governor. ALC. If it be good for us to worſhip God; it ſhou'd ſeem that the Chri⯑ſtian Religion, which pretends to teach Men the Knowledge and Worſhip of God, was of ſome uſe and benefit to Mankind. CRI. Doubtleſs. ALC. If this can be made appear, I ſhall own my ſelf very much miſtaken. CRI. It is now near Dinner time. Wherefore if you pleaſe, we will put an end to this Converſation for the preſent, and to-morrow mor⯑ning reſume our Subject.

I.

WE amuſed ourſelves next Day every one to his Fancy, till Nine of the Clock, when Word was brought that the Tea-table was ſet in the Library, which is a Gallery on a Ground-floor, with an arch⯑ed Door at one End opening into a Walk of Limes; where, as ſoon as we had drank Tea, we were tempt⯑ed by fine Weather to take a Walk which led us to a ſmall Mount of eaſy Aſcent, on the Top whereof we found a Seat under a ſpreading Tree. Here we had a Proſpect on one hand of a narrow Bay or Creek of the Sea, incloſed on either Side by a Coaſt beautified with Rocks and Woods, and green Banks and Farm-houſes. At the End of the Bay was a ſmall Town placed upon the Slope of a Hill, which from the Ad⯑vantage of its Situation made a conſiderable Figure. Several Fiſhing-boats and Lighters gliding up and down on a Surface as ſmooth and bright as Glaſs en⯑livened the Proſpect. On the other Side we looked down on green Paſtures, Flocks, and Herds, basking beneath in Sun-ſhine, while we in our ſuperior Situ⯑ation enjoy'd the Freſhneſs of Air and Shade. Here we felt that ſort of joyful Inſtinct which a rural Scene and fine Weather inſpire; and propoſed no ſmall Plea⯑ſure, in reſuming and continuing our Conference without Interruption till Dinner: But we had hard⯑ly ſeated ourſelves, and looked about us, when we ſaw a Fox run by the Foot of our Mount into an ad⯑jacent Thicket. A few Minutes after, we heard a confuſed Noiſe of the opening of Hounds, the winding of Horns, and the roaring of Country Squires. While our Attention was ſuſpended by this [168] Event, a Servant came running out of Breath and told Crito, that his Neighbour Cteſippus, a Squire of Note, was fallen from his Horſe attempting to leap over a Hedge, and brought into the Hall, where he lay for dead. Upon which we all roſe and walked haſtily to the Houſe, where we found Cteſippus juſt come to himſelf, in the midſt of half a dozen Sun-burnt Squires in Frocks and ſhort Wigs and Jockey-Boots. Being asked how he did? he anſwered it was only a broken Rib. With ſome Difficulty Crito per⯑ſuaded him to lie on a Bed till the Chirurgeon came. Theſe Fox-hunters, having been up early at their Sport, were eager for Dinner, which was according⯑ly haſtened. They paſſed the Afternoon in a loud ruſtic Mirth, gave Proof of their Religion and Loy⯑alty by the Healths they drank, talked of Hounds and Horſes and Elections and Country Affairs till the Chi⯑rurgeon, who had been employed about Cteſippus, de⯑ſired he might be put into Crito's Coach, and ſent home, having refuſed to ſtay all Night. Our Gueſts being gone, we repoſed ourſelves after the Fatigue of this tumultuous Viſit, and next Morning aſſembled again at the Seat on the Mount. Now Lyſicles, being a nice Man, and a bel eſprit, had an infinite Contempt for the rough Manners and Converſation of Fox-hunters, and cou'd not reflect with Patience that he had loſt, as he called it, ſo many Hours in their Com⯑pany. I flattered myſelf, ſaid he, that there had been none of this Species remaining among us: Strange that Men ſhou'd be diverted with ſuch un⯑couth Noiſe and Hurry, or find Pleaſure in the Soci⯑ety of Dogs and Horſes! How much more elegant are the Diverſions of the Town! There ſeems, re⯑plied Euphranor, to be ſome Reſemblance between Fox-hunters and Free-thinkers; the former exerting their animal Faculties in purſuit of Game, as you Gentlemen employ your Intellectuals in the purſuit of Truth. The kind of Amuſement is the ſame, al⯑though [169] the Object be different. LYS. I had rather be compared to any Brute upon Earth than a rational Brute. CRI. You wou'd then have been leſs diſ⯑pleaſed with my Friend Pythocles, whom I have heard compare the common ſort of Minute Philoſophers, not to the Hunters, but the Hounds. For, ſaid he, you ſhall often ſee among the Dogs a loud Babler, with a bad Noſe, lead the unskilful part of the Pack, who join all in his Cry without following any Scent of their own, any more than the Herd of Free-thinkers follow their own Reaſon.

II.

But Pythocles was a blunt Man, and muſt never have known ſuch Reaſoners among them as you Gen⯑tlemen, who can ſit ſo long at an Argument, diſpute every Inch of Ground, and yet know when to make a reaſonable Conceſſion. LYS. I don't know how it comes to paſs, but methinks Alciphron makes Conceſ⯑ſions for himſelf and me too. For my own part, I am not altogether of ſuch a yielding Temper: But yet I don't care to be ſingular neither. CRI. Truly, Al⯑ciphron, when I conſider where we are got, and how far we are agreed, I conceive it probable we may a⯑gree altogether in the end. You have granted that a Life of Virtue is upon all Accounts eligible, as moſt conducive both to the general and particular Good of Mankind: And you allow, that the Beauty of Virtue alone is not a ſufficient Motive with Mankind to the Practice of it. This led you to acknowledge, that the Belief of a God wou'd be very uſeful in the World; and that conſequently you ſhou'd be diſpoſed to admit any reaſonable Proof of his Being: Which Point hath been proved, and you have admitted the Proof. If then we admit a Divinity, why not Divine Worſhip? And if Worſhip, why not Religion to teach this Worſhip? And if a Religion, why not the Chriſti⯑an, if a better cannot be aſſigned, and it be already eſtabliſhed by the Laws of our Country, and handed [170] down to us from our Fore-fathers? Shall we believe a God, and not pray to him for future Benefits nor thank him for the paſt? Neither truſt in his Protec⯑tion, nor love his Goodneſs, nor praiſe his Wiſdom, nor adore his Power? And if theſe Things are to be done, can we do them in a Way more ſuitable to the Dignity of God or Man, than is preſcribed by the Chriſtian Religion? ALC. I am not perhaps alto⯑gether ſure that Religion muſt be abſolutely bad for the Public: But I cannot bear to ſee Policy and Reli⯑gion walk hand in hand: I do not like to ſee Human Rights attached to the Divine: I am for no Pontifex Maximus, ſuch as in ancient or in modern Rome: No High Prieſt, as in Judaea: No Royal Prieſts, as in Aegypt and Sparta: No ſuch Things as Dairos of Ja⯑pan, or Lamas of Tartary.

III.

I knew a late witty Gentleman of our Sect, who was a great Admirer of the ancient Druids. He had a mortal Antipathy to the preſent eſtabliſhed Re⯑ligion, but uſed to ſay he ſhou'd like well to ſee the Druids and their Religion reſtored, as it anciently flouriſhed in Gaul and Britain; for it wou'd be right enough that there ſhou'd be a Number of contem⯑plative Men ſet apart to preſerve a Knowledge of Arts and Sciences, to educate Youth, and teach Men the Immortality of the Soul and the moral Virtues. Such, ſaid he, were the Druids of old, and I ſhou'd be glad to ſee them once more eſtabliſhed among us. CRI. How wou'd you like, Alciphron, that Prieſts ſhou'd have Power to decide all Controverſies, adjudge Pro⯑perty, diſtribute Rewards and Puniſhments; that all who did not acquieſce in their Decrees ſhou'd be ex⯑communicated, held in Abhorrence, excluded from all Honours and Privileges, and deprived of the com⯑mon Benefit of the Laws; and that now and then, a Number of Lay-men ſhou'd be crammed together in a Wicker-idol, and burnt for an Offering to their Pa⯑gan Gods? How ſhou'd you like living under ſuch [171] Prieſts and ſuch a Religion? ALC. Not at all. Such a Situation wou'd by no means agree with Free-think⯑ers. CRI. And yet ſuch were the Druids and ſuch their Religion, if we may truſt Caeſar's Account of them ^*. LYS. I am now convinced more than ever, there ought to be no ſuch Thing as an eſtabliſhed Re⯑ligion of any kind. Certainly all the Nations of the World have been hitherto out of their Wits. Even the Athenians themſelves, the wiſeſt and freeſt People upon Earth, had, I know not what, fooliſh Attach⯑ment to their eſtabliſhed Church. They offered it ſeems a Talent as a Reward to whoever ſhou'd kill Diagoras the Melian, a Free-thinker of thoſe Times who derided their Myſteries: And Protagoras, ano⯑ther of the ſame Turn, narrowly eſcaped being put to Death, for having wrote ſomething that ſeemed to contradict their received Notions of the Gods. Such was the Treatment our generous Sect met with at Athens. And I make no doubt, but theſe Druids wou'd have ſacrificed many a Holocauſt of Free-thinkers. I wou'd not give a ſingle Farthing to ex⯑change one Religion for another. Away with all together, Root and Branch, or you had as good do nothing. No Druids or Prieſts of any ſort for me: I ſee no occaſion for any of them.

IV.

EUPH. What Lyſicles ſaith puts me in mind of the Cloſe of our laſt Conference, wherein it was agreed, in the following to reſume the Point we were then entered upon, to wit, the Uſe or Benefit of the Chriſtian Religion, which Alciphron expected Crito ſhou'd make appear. CRI. I am the readier to un⯑dertake this Point, becauſe I conceive it to be no dif⯑ficult one, and that one great Mark of the Truth of Chriſtianity is, in my mind, its Tendency to do good, which ſeems the North Star to conduct our Judgment [172] in moral Matters, and in all Things of a practic Na⯑ture; Moral or practical Truths being ever connect⯑ed with univerſal Benefit. But to judge rightly of this Matter, we ſhou'd endeavour to act like Lyſicles upon another Occaſion, taking into our View the Sum of Things, and conſidering Principles as branch⯑ed forth into Conſequences to the utmoſt Extent we are able. We are not ſo much to regard the Humour or Caprice, or imaginary Diſtreſſes of a few idle Men, whoſe Conceit may be offended, though their Con⯑ſcience cannot be wounded; but fairly to conſider the true Intereſt of Individuals as well as of Human Society. Now the Chriſtian Religion, conſidered as a Fountain of Light, and Joy, and Peace, as a Source of Faith, and Hope, and Charity, (and that it is ſo will be evident to whoever takes his Notion of it from the Goſpel) muſt needs be a Principle of Hap⯑pineſs and Virtue. And he who ſees not, that the de⯑ſtroying the Principles of good Actions muſt de⯑ſtroy good Actions, ſees nothing: And he who, ſee⯑ing this, ſhall yet perſiſt to do it, if he be not wick⯑ed, who is?

V.

To me it ſeems the Man can ſee neither deep nor far, who is not ſenſible of his own Miſery, Sin⯑fulneſs, and Dependence; who doth not perceive, that this preſent World is not deſigned or adapted to make rational Souls happy; who wou'd not be glad of getting into a better State, and who wou'd not be overjoy'd to find, that the Road leading thither was the Love of God and Man, the practiſing every Vir⯑tue, the living reaſonably while we are here upon Earth, proportioning our Eſteem to the Value of Things, and ſo uſing this World as not to abuſe it, for this is what Chriſtianity requires. It neither in⯑joyns the Naſtineſs of the Cynic, nor the Inſenſibi⯑lity of the Stoic. Can there be a higher Ambition than to overcome the World, or a wiſer than to ſub⯑due our ſelves, or a more comfortable Doctrine than [173] the Remiſſion of Sins, or a more joyful Proſpect than that of having our baſe Nature renewed and aſſimila⯑ted to the Deity, our being made Fellow-citizens with Angels and Sons of God? Did ever Pythagore⯑ans, or Platoniſts, or Stoics, even in Idea or in Wiſh, propoſe to the Mind of Man purer Means or a nobler End? How great a Share of our Happineſs depends upon Hope! How totally is this extinguiſhed by the Minute Philoſophy! On the other hand, how is it cheriſhed and raiſed by the Goſpel! Let any Man who thinks in earneſt but conſider theſe Things, and then ſay which he thinks deſerveth beſt of Mankind, he who recommends, or he who runs down Chriſti⯑anity? Which he thinks likelier to lead a happy Life, to be a hopeful Son, an honeſt Dealer, a worthy Pa⯑triot, He who ſincerely believes the Goſpel, or He who believes not one Title of it? He who aims at be⯑ing a Child of God, or He who is contented to be thought, and to be, one of Epicurus's Hogs? And in fact do but ſcan the Characters, and obſerve the Be⯑haviour of the common ſort of Men on both ſides: Obſerve and ſay which live moſt agreeably to the Dic⯑tates of Reaſon? How Things ſhou'd be, the Rea⯑ſon is plain; how they are, I appeal to Fact.

VI.

ALC. It is wonderful to obſerve how Things change Appearance, as they are viewed in different Lights, or by different Eyes. The Picture, Crito, that I form of Religion is very unlike yours, when I conſider how it unmans the Soul, filling it with ab⯑ſurd Reveries and ſlaviſh Fears; how it extinguiſhes the gentle Paſſions, inſpiring a Spirit of Malice, and Rage, and Perſecution: When I behold bitter Re⯑ſentments and unholy Wrath in thoſe very Men, who preach up Meekneſs and Charity to others. CRI. It is very poſſible, that Gentlemen of your Sect may think Religion a Subject beneath their Attention; but yet it ſeems that whoever lets up for oppoſing any Doctrine, ſhou'd know what it is he diſputes againſt. [174] Know then, that Religion is the virtuous Mean be⯑tween Incredulity and Superſtition. We do not there⯑fore contend for ſuperſtitious Follies, or for the Rage of Bigots. What we plead for is Religion againſt Profaneneſs, Law againſt Confuſion, Virtue againſt Vice, the Hope of a Chriſtian againſt the Deſpon⯑dency of an Atheiſt. I will not juſtify bitter Reſent⯑ments and unholy Wrath in any Man, much leſs in a Chriſtian, and leaſt of all in a Clergyman. But if Sallies of Human Paſſion ſhou'd ſometimes appear even in the beſt, it will not ſurpriſe any one who re⯑flects on the Sarcaſms and ill Manners with which they are treated by the Minute Philoſophers. For as Cicero ſomewhere obſerves, Habet quendam aculeum Contumelia, quem pati prudentes ac viri boni difficillimè poſſunt. But although you might ſometimes obſerve particular Perſons, profeſſing themſelves Chriſtians, run into faulty Extremes of any kind through Paſ⯑ſion and Infirmity, while Infidels of a more calm and diſpaſſionate Temper ſhall perhaps behave better. Yet theſe natural Tendencies on either ſide prove nothing, either in favour of Infidel Principles, or againſt Chriſtian. If a Believer doth Evil it is owing to the Man not to his Belief. And if an Infidel doth good it is owing to the Man and not to his Infidelity.

VII.

LYS. To cut this Matter ſhort, I ſhall bor⯑row an Alluſion to Phyſic, which one of you made uſe of againſt our Sect. It will not be denied, that the Clergy paſs for Phyſicians of the Soul, and that Religion is a ſort of Medicine which they deal in and adminiſter. If then Souls in great numbers are di⯑ſeaſed and loſt, how can we think the Phyſician skil⯑ful or his Phyſic good? It is a common Complaint, that Vice increaſes, and Men grow daily more and more wicked. If a Shepherd's Flock be diſeaſed or unſound, who is to blame but the Shepherd, for ne⯑glecting or not knowing how to cure them? a Fig therefore for ſuch Shepherds, ſuch Phyſic, and ſuch [175] Phyſicians, who like other Mountebanks, with great Gravity and elaborate Harangues put off their Pills to the People, who are never the better for them. EUPH. Nothing ſeems more reaſonable than this Remark, that Men ſhou'd judge of a Phyſician, and his Phyſic by its Effect on the Sick. But Pray, Lyſicles, wou'd you judge of a Phyſician by thoſe Sick, who take his Phyſic and follow his Preſcriptions, or by thoſe who do not? LYS. Doubtleſs by thoſe who do. EUPH. What ſhall we ſay then, if great numbers refuſe to take the Phyſic, or inſtead of it take Poiſon of a direct contrary Nature preſcribed by others, who make it their Buſineſs to diſcredit the Phyſician and his Medicines, to hinder Men from uſing them, and to deſtroy their Effect by Drugs of their own? Shall the Phyſician be blamed for the miſcarriage of thoſe People? LYS. By no means. EUPH. By a parity of Reaſon ſhou'd it not follow, that the Tendency of religious Doctrines ought to be judged of by the Effects which they produce, not up⯑on all who hear them, but upon thoſe only who re⯑ceive or believe them? LYS. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Therefore to proceed fairly, ſhall we not judge of the Effects of Religion by the Religious, of Faith by Be⯑lievers, of Chriſtianity by Chriſtians?

VIII.

LYS. But I doubt theſe ſincere Believers are very few. EUPH. But will it not ſuffice to juſtify our Principles, if in proportion to the Num⯑bers which receive them, and the degree of Faith with which they are received, they produce good Effects. Perhaps the number of Believers are not ſo few as you imagine; and if they were, whoſe fault is that ſo much as of thoſe who make it their profeſſed Endeavour to leſſen that number? And who are thoſe but the Minute Philoſophers? LYS. I tell you it is owing to the Clergy themſelves, to the Wickedneſs and Corruption of Clergymen. EUPH. And who denies but there may be Minute Philoſophers even a⯑mong [176] the Clergy? CRI. In ſo numerous a Body it is to be preſumed there are Men of all ſorts. But not⯑withſtanding the cruel Reproaches caſt upon that Order by their Enemies, an equal Obſerver of Men and Things will, if I miſtake not, be inclined to think thoſe Reproaches owing as much to other Faults as thoſe of the Clergy, eſpecially if he conſi⯑ders the declamatory manner of thoſe who cenſure them. EUPH. My Knowledge of the World is too narrow for me to pretend to judge of the Virtue and Merit and liberal Attainments of Men in the ſe⯑veral Profeſſions. Beſides, I ſhou'd not care for the odious work of Compariſon: But I may venture to ſay, the Clergy of this Country where I live are by no means a diſgrace to it: on the contrary, the People ſeem much the better for their Example and Doctrine. But ſuppoſing the Clergy to be (what all Men cer⯑tainly are) Sinners and faulty; ſuppoſing you might ſpy out here and there among them even great Crimes and Vices, what can you conclude againſt the Profeſ⯑ſion it ſelf from its unworthy Profeſſors, any more than from the Pride, Pedantry, and bad Lines of ſome Philoſophers againſt Philoſophy, or of Lawyers a⯑gainſt Law?

IX.

It is certainly right to judge of Principles from their Effects, but then we muſt know them to be Effects of thoſe Principles. It is the very Method I have obſerved, with reſpect to Religion and the Mi⯑nute Philoſophy. And I can honeſtly aver, that I never knew any Man or Family grow worſe in pro⯑portion as they grew religious: But I have often ob⯑ſerved that Minute Philoſophy is the worſt thing which can get into a Family, the readieſt way to im⯑poveriſh, divide and diſgrace it. ALC. By the ſame Method of tracing Cauſes from their Effects, I have made it my Obſervation, that the Love of Truth, Virtue, and the Happineſs of Mankind are ſpecious Pretexts, but not the inward Principles that ſet Di⯑vines [177] at work: Elſe why ſhou'd they affect to abuſe Human Reaſon, to diſparage natural Religion, to traduce the Philoſophers as they univerſally do? CRI. Not ſo univerſally perhaps as you imagine. A Chri⯑ſtian, indeed, is for confining Reaſon within its due Bounds; and ſo is every reaſonable Man. If we are forbid meddling with unprofitable Queſtions, vain Philoſophy, and Science falſly ſo called, it cannot be thence inferred, that all Inquiries into profitable Queſtions, uſeful Philoſophy, and true Science, are unlawful. A Minute Philoſopher may indeed im⯑pute, and perhaps a weak Brother may imagine thoſe Inferences, but Men of Senſe will never make them. God is the common Father of Lights; and all Know⯑ledge really ſuch, whether natural or revealed, is de⯑rived from the ſame Source of Light and Truth. To amaſs together Authorities upon ſo plain a Point wou'd be needleſs. It muſt be owned ſome Mens at⯑tributing too much to Human Reaſon, hath, as is natural, made others attribute too little to it. But thus much is generally acknowledged, that there is a natural Religion, which may be diſcovered and prov⯑ed by the light of Reaſon, to thoſe who are capable of ſuch Proofs. But it muſt be withal acknowledged, that Precepts and Oracles from Heaven are incompa⯑rably better ſuited to popular Improvement and the good of Society, than the Reaſonings of Philoſo⯑phers; and accordingly we do not find, that natural or rational Religion ever became the popular national Religion of any Country.

X.

ALC. It cannot be denied, that in all Heathen Countries there have been received under the colour of Religion, a world of Fables and ſuperſtitious Rites. But I queſtion whether they were ſo abſur'd and of ſo bad Influence as is vulgarly repreſented, ſince their reſpective Legiſlators and Magiſtrates muſt, without doubt, have thought them uſeful. CRI. It were needleſs to inquire into all the Rites and Notions of [178] the Gentile World. This hath been largely done when it was thought neceſſary. And whoever thinks it worth while may be eaſily ſatisfied about them. But as to the Tendency and Uſefulneſs of the Heathen Religion in general, I beg leave to mention a Remark of St. Auguſtine's ^*, who obſerves that the Heathens in their Religion had no Aſſemblies for preaching, wherein the People were to be inſtructed what Du⯑ties or Virtues the Gods required, no Place or Means to be taught what Perſius ^† exhorts them to learn.

ALC. This is the true Spirit of the Party, never to allow a Grain of Uſe or Goodneſs to any thing out of their own Pale: But we have had learned Men who have done Juſtice to the Religion of the Gentiles. CRI. We do not deny but there was ſomething uſe⯑ful in the old Religions of Rome and Greece, and ſome other Pagan Countries. On the contrary, we freely own they produced ſome good Effects on the People: But then theſe good Effects were owing to the Truths contained in thoſe falſe Religions, the truer therefore the more uſeful. I believe you will find it a hard Matter to produce any uſeful Truth, any mo⯑ral Precept, any ſalutary Principle or Notion in any Gentile Syſtem, either of Religion or Philoſophy, which is not comprehended in the Chriſtian, and either enforced by ſtronger Motives, or ſupported by better Authority, or carried to a higher Point of Perfection.

XI.

Conſequently you wou'd have us think our ſelves a finer People than the ancient Greeks or Ro⯑mans. [179] CRI. If by finer you mean better, perhaps we are; and if we are not, it is not owing to the Chriſtian Religion, but to the want of it. ALC. You ſay perhaps we are. I do not pique my ſelf on my reading: But ſhou'd be very ignorant to be capa⯑ble of being impoſed on in ſo plain a Point. What! compare Cicero or Brutus to an Engliſh Patriot, or Se⯑neca to one of our Parſons! Then that invincible Con⯑ſtancy and Vigour of Mind, that diſintereſted and noble Virtue, that adorable publick Spirit you ſo much admire, are things in them ſo well known, and ſo different from our Manners, that I know not how to excuſe your perhaps. Euphranor, indeed, who paſ⯑ſeth his Life in this obſcure Corner, may poſſibly miſtake the Characters of our Times, but you who know the World, how cou'd you be guilty of ſuch a Miſtake? CRI. O Alciphron, I wou'd by no means detract from the noble Virtue of ancient Heroes: But I obſerve thoſe great Men were not the Minute Philo⯑ſophers of their Times; that the beſt Principles upon which they acted are common to them with Chriſti⯑ans, of whom it wou'd be no difficult Matter to aſſign many Inſtances, in every kind of Worth and Virtue, publick or private, equal to the moſt celebrated of the Ancients. Though perhaps their Story might not have been ſo well told, ſet off with ſuch fine Lights and colourings of Style, or ſo vulgarly known and conſidered by every School-boy. But though it ſhou'd be granted, that here and there a Greek or Ro⯑man Genius, bred up under ſtrict Laws and ſevere Diſcipline, animated to public Virtue by Statues, Crowns, Triumphal Arches, and ſuch Rewards and Monuments of great Actions, might attain to a Character and Fame beyond other Men, yet this will prove only, that they had more Spirit and lived under a civil Polity more wiſely ordered in certain points than ours; Which advantages of Nature and civil Inſtitution will be no Argument for their Religion or againſt ours. On the contrary, it ſeems an invincible [180] Proof of the Power and Excellency of the Chriſtian Religion, that, without the help of thoſe civil In⯑ſtitutions and Incentives to Glory, it ſhou'd be able to inſpire a Phlegmatic People with the nobleſt Sen⯑timents, and ſoften the rugged Manners of Northern Boors into Gentleneſs and Humanity: and that theſe good Qualities ſhou'd become National, and riſe and fall in proportion to the Purity of our Religion, as it approaches to, or recedes from the Plan laid down in the Goſpel.

XII.

To make a right Judgment of the Effects of the Chriſtian Religion, let us take a ſurvey of the pre⯑vailing Notions and Manners of this very Country where we live, and compare them with thoſe of our Heathen Predeceſſors. ALC. I have heard much of the glorious Light of the Goſpel, and ſhou'd be glad to ſee ſome Effects of it in my own dear Country, which, by the bye, is one of the moſt corrupt and profligate upon Earth, notwithſtanding the boaſted Purity of our Religion. But it wou'd look mean and diffident, to affect a Compariſon with the barbarous Heathen, from whence we drew our Original: If you wou'd do Honour to your Religion, dare to make it with the moſt renowned Heathens of Antiquity. CRI. It is a common Prejudice, to deſpiſe the pre⯑ſent and over-rate remote Times and Things. Some⯑thing of this ſeems to enter into the Judgments Men make of the Greeks and Romans. For though it muſt be allowed, thoſe Nations produced ſome noble Spi⯑rits and great Patterns of Virtue: yet upon the whole, it ſeems to me they were much inferior in point of real Virtue and good Morals, even to this corrupt and Profligate Nation, as you are now pleaſed to call it in diſhonour to our Religion; however you may think fit to characterize it, when you wou'd do ho⯑nour to the Minute Philoſophy. This, I think, will be plain to any one, who ſhall turn off his Eyes from a few ſhining Characters, to view the general [181] Manners and Cuſtoms of thoſe People. Their inſo⯑lent treatment of Captives, even of the higheſt Rank and ſofter Sex, their unnatural expoſing of their own Children, their bloody Gladiatorian Spectacles, com⯑pared with the common Notions of Engliſhmen, are to me a plain Proof, that our Minds are much ſoftened by Chriſtianity. Cou'd any thing be more unjuſt, than the condemning a young Lady to the moſt infa⯑mous Puniſhment and Death for the guilt of her Fa⯑ther, or a whole Family of Slaves, perhaps ſome hundreds for a Crime committed by one? Or more Abominable than their Bacchanals and unbridled Luſts of every kind? which, notwithſtanding all that has been done by Minute Philoſophers to debauch the Nation, and their ſucceſsful Attempts on ſome part of it, have not yet been matched among us, at leaſt not in every circumſtance of Impudence and Ef⯑frontery. While the Romans were poor, they were temperate; but, as they grew rich, they became luxurious to a degree that is hardly believed or con⯑ceived by us. It cannot be denied, the old Roman Spirit was a great one. But it is as certain, there have been numberleſs Examples of the moſt reſolute and clear Courage in Britons, and in general from a Reli⯑gious Cauſe. Upon the whole, it ſeems an inſtance of the greateſt Blindneſs and Ingratitude, that we do not ſee and own the exceeding great Benefits of Chriſ⯑tianity, which, to omit higher conſiderations, hath ſo viſibly ſoftened, poliſhed, and embelliſhed our Manners.

XIII.

ALC. O Crito, we are alarmed at Cruelty in a foreign Shape, but over-look it in a familiar one. Elſe how is it poſſible that you ſhou'd not ſee the In⯑humanity of that barbarous Cuſtom of Duelling, a thing avowed and tolerated and even reputable among us? Or that ſeeing this, you ſhou'd ſuppoſe our Engliſhmen of a more gentle diſpoſition than the old Romans, who were altogether Strangers to it? CRI. [182] I will by no means make an Apology for every Goth that walks the Streets, with a determined purpoſe to murder any Man who ſhall but ſpit in his Face, or give him the Lye. Nor do I think the Chriſtian Re⯑ligion is in the leaſt anſwerable, for a practice ſo di⯑rectly oppoſite to its Precepts, and which obtains only among the idle part of the Nation, your Men of Faſhion; who, inſtead of Law, Reaſon or Reli⯑gion, are governed by Faſhion. Be pleaſed to conſi⯑der that what may be, and truly is, a moſt ſcandalous reproach to a Chriſtian Country, may be none at all to the Chriſtian Religion: For the Pagan encouraged Men in ſeveral Vices, but the Chriſtian in none. ALC. Give me leave to obſerve, that what you now ſay is foreign to the purpoſe. For the queſtion, at preſent, is not concerning the reſpective tendencies of the Pa⯑gan and the Chriſtian Religions, but concerning our Manners, as actually compared with thoſe of ancient Heathens, who I aver had no ſuch barbarous Cuſtom as Duelling. CRI. And I aver that, bad as this is, they had a worſe; and that was Poiſoning. By which we have reaſon to think there were many more Lives deſtroyed, than by this Gothic Crime of Duel⯑ling: Inaſmuch as it extended to all Ages, Sexes, and Characters, and as its Effects were more ſecret and unavoidable; and as it had more Temptations, Intereſt as well as Paſſion, to recommend it to wick⯑ed Men. And for the Fact, not to waſte time, I refer you to the Roman Authors themſelves. LYS. It is very true: Duelling is not ſo general a Nuſance as Poiſoning, nor of ſo baſe a Nature. This Crime, if it be a Crime, is in a fair way to keep its ground in ſpight of the Law and the Goſpel. The Clergy ne⯑ver preach againſt it, becauſe themſelves never ſuffer by it: and the Man of honour muſt not appear againſt the means of vindicating Honour. CRI. Though it be remarked by ſome of your Sect, that the Clergy are not uſed to preach againſt Duelling, yet I neither think the Remark it ſelf juſt, nor the Reaſon aſſigned [183] for it. In effect, one half of their Sermons, all that is ſaid of Charity, Brotherly Love, Forbearance, Meekneſs, and Forgiving Injuries is directly againſt this wicked Cuſtom; by which the Clergy them⯑ſelves are ſo far from never ſuffering, that perhaps they will be found, all things conſidered, to ſuffer oftner than other Men. LYS. How do you make this appear? CRI. An Obſerver of Mankind may remark two kinds of Bully, the Fighting and the Tame, both public Nuſances, the former (who is the more dangerous Animal, but by much the leſs com⯑mon of the two) employs himſelf wholly and ſolely againſt the Laity, while the tame Species exert their Talents upon the Clergy. The Qualities conſtituent of this tame Bully are natural Rudeneſs joined with a delicate ſenſe of Danger. For, you muſt know, the force of inbred Inſolence and ill Manners is not dimi⯑niſhed, though it acquire a new Determination, from the faſhionable cuſtom of calling Men to account for their Behaviour. Hence you may often ſee one of theſe tame Bullies ready to burſt with Pride and ill Humour, which he dares not vent till a Parſon has come in the way to his Relief. And the Man of Raillery, who wou'd as ſoon bite off his Tongue, as break a jeſt on the profeſſion of Arms in the preſence of a military Man, ſhall inſtantly brighten up, and aſſume a familiar Air with Religion and the Church before Eccleſiaſtics. Dorcon, who paſſeth for a Pol⯑tron and ſtupid in all other Company, and really is ſo, when he is got among Clergymen, affects a quite op⯑poſite Character. And many Dorcons there are, which owe their Wit and Courage to this Paſſive Order.

XIV.

ALC. But, to return to the point in hand, can you deny, the old Romans were as famous for Juſ⯑tice and Integrity, as Men in theſe days for the con⯑trary Qualities? CRI. The Character of the Ro⯑mans is not to be taken from the Sentiments of Tully, or Cato's Actions, or a ſhining paſſage here and there [182] [...] [183] [...] [184] in their Hiſtory, but from the prevailing tenor of their Lives and Notions. Now if they and our mo⯑dern Britons are weighed in this ſame equal balance, you will, if I miſtake not, appear to have been pre⯑judiced in favour of the old Romans againſt your own Country, probably becauſe it profeſſeth Chriſtianity. Whatever inſtances of Fraud or Injuſtice may be ſeen in Chriſtians carry their own cenſure with them, in the care that is taken to conceal them, and the ſhame that attends their diſcovery. There is, even at this day, a ſort of Modeſty in all our public Coun⯑cils and Deliberations. And I believe, the boldeſt of our Minute Philoſophers wou'd hardly undertake in a popular Aſſembly, to propoſe any thing paralled to the Rape of the Sabines, the moſt unjuſt uſage of Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, or the ungrateful treat⯑ment of Camillus, which, as a learned Father ob⯑ſerves, were inſtances of Iniquity agreed to by the public body of the Romans. And if Rome in her early days were capable of ſuch flagrant Injuſtice, it is moſt certain ſhe did not mend her Manners, as ſhe grew great in Wealth and Empire, having produced Monſters in every kind of Wickedneſs, as far ex⯑ceeding other Men, as they ſurpaſſed them in power. I freely acknowledge, the Chriſtian Religion hath not had the ſame influence upon the Nation, that it wou'd in caſe it had been always profeſſed in its Puri⯑ty, and cordially believed by all Men. But I will venture to ſay, that if you take the Roman Hiſtory from one end to the other, and impartially compare it with our own, you will neither find them ſo good, nor your Countrymen ſo bad as you imagine. On the contrary an indifferent Eye may, I verily think, per⯑ceive a vein of Charity and Juſtice, the effect of Chriſtian Principles, run through the latter; which, though not equally diſcernible in all parts, yet diſclo⯑ſeth it ſelf ſufficiently to make a wide difference up⯑on the whole in ſpight of the general Appetites and Paſſions of Human Nature, as well as of the particu⯑lar [185] hardneſs and roughneſs of the block out of which we were hewn. And it is obſervable (what the Ro⯑man Authors themſelves do often ſuggeſt) that, even their Virtues and magnanimous Actions roſe and fell with a ſenſe of Providence, and a future State, and a Philoſophy the neareſt to the Chriſtian Religion.

XV.

Crito having ſpoke thus, pauſed. But Alci⯑phron addreſſing himſelf to Euphranor and me, ſaid, It is natural for Men, according to their ſeveral Edu⯑cations and Prejudices, to form contrary Judgments upon the ſame things, which they view in very dif⯑ferent lights. Crito, for inſtance, imagines that none but Salutary Effects proceed from Religion: on the other hand, if you appeal to the general Experi⯑ence and Obſervation of other Men, you ſhall find it grown into a Proverb that Religion is the root of evil.

And this not only among Epicureans or other ancient Heathens, but among Moderns ſpeaking of the Chriſtian Religion. Now methinks it is unreaſona⯑ble to oppoſe againſt the general concurring Opinion of the World, the Obſervation of a particular Per⯑ſon, or particular ſet of Zealots, whoſe Prejudice ſticks cloſe to them, and ever mixeth with their Judgment; and who read, collect, and obſerve with an Eye not to diſcover the Truth, but to defend their Prejudice. CRI. Though I cannot think with Alciphron, yet I muſt own, I admire his Addreſs and Dexterity in Argument. Popular and general Opi⯑nion is by him repreſented, on certain occaſions, to be a ſure mark of Error. But when it ſerves his ends that it ſhou'd ſeem otherwiſe, he can as eaſily make it a Character of Truth. But it will by no means fol⯑low, that a profane Proverb uſed by the Friends and [186] admired Authors of a Minute Philoſopher, muſt therefore be a received Opinion, much leſs a Truth grounded on the Experience and Obſervation of Man⯑kind. Sadneſs may ſpring from Guilt or Superſtition, and Rage from Bigotry, but Darkneſs might as well be ſuppoſed the natural Effect of Sunſhine, as ſullen and furious Paſſions to proceed from the glad Tidings and divine Precepts of the Goſpel. What is the Sum and Subſtance, Scope and End of Chriſt's Religion, but the Love of God and Man? To which all other Points and Duties are relative and ſubordinate, as Parts or Means, as Signs, Principles, Motives, or Effects. Now I wou'd fain know, how it is poſſi⯑ble for Evil or Wickedneſs of any kind to ſpring from ſuch a ſource. I will not pretend, there are no evil Qualities in Chriſtians, nor good in Minute Phi⯑loſophers. But this I affirm, that whatever evil is in us, our Principles certainly lead to Good; and what⯑ever good there may be in you, it is moſt certain your Principles lead to evil.

XVI.

ALC. It muſt be owned there is a fair out⯑ſide, and many plauſible things may be ſaid, for the Chriſtian Religion taken ſimply as it lies in the Goſ⯑pel. But it is the Obſervation of one of our great Writers, that the firſt Chriſtian Preachers very cun⯑ningly began with the faireſt Face and the beſt moral Doctrines in the World. It was all Love, Charity, Meekneſs, Patience and ſo forth. But when by this means they had drawn over the World and got Pow⯑er, they ſoon changed their Appearance, and ſhewed Cruelty, Ambition, Avarice and every bad quality. CRI. That is to ſay, ſome Men very cunningly preached and underwent a world of hardſhips, and laid down their lives to propagate the beſt Principles and the beſt Morals, to the end that others ſome Centuries after might reap the benefit of bad ones. Whoever may be cunning, there is not much Cun⯑ning in the maker of this Obſervation. ALC. And [187] yet ever ſince this Religion hath appeared in the World, we have had eternal Feuds, Factions, Maſ⯑ſacres and Wars, the very reverſe of that Hymn with which it is introduced in the Goſpel: Glory be to God on high, on Earth Peace, Good-will towards Men. CRI. This I will not deny. I will even own that the Goſpel and the Chriſtian Religion have been of⯑ten the Pretexts for theſe Evils; but it will not thence follow they were the Cauſe. On the contrary it is plain they cou'd not be the real proper Cauſe of theſe Evils, becauſe a rebellious, proud, revengeful, quar⯑relſome Spirit is directly oppoſite to the whole Tenor and moſt expreſs Precepts of Chriſtianity: a Point ſo clear that I ſhall not prove it. And ſecondly, becauſe all thoſe Evils you mention were as frequent, nay much more frequent, before the Chriſtian Religion was known in the World. They are the common Product of the Paſſions and Vices of Mankind, which are ſome⯑times covered with the Maſque of Religion by wicked Men, having the Form of Godlineſs without the Power of it. This Truth ſeems ſo plain, that I am ſurpriſed how any Man of Senſe, Knowledge, and Candour can make a doubt of it.

XVII.

Take but a view of Heathen Rome; what a Scene is there of Faction and Fury and civil Rage? Let any Man conſider the perpetual Feuds between the Patricians and Plebeians, the bloody and inhuman Fac⯑tions of Marius and Sylla, Cinna and Octavius, and the vaſt havoc of Mankind, during the two famous Trium⯑virates. To be ſhort, let any Man of common Candour and common Senſe but caſt an Eye, from one end to the other of the Roman Story, and behold that long Scene of Seditions, Murders, Maſſacres, Proſcriptions and Deſolations of every kind, enhanſed by every cruel circumſtance of Rage, Rapine and Revenge, and then ſay, whether thoſe Evils were introduced into the World with the Chriſtian Religion, or whether they are not leſs frequent now than before? ALC. [188] The ancient Romans, it muſt be owned, had a high and fierce Spirit, which produced eager Contentions and very bloody Cataſtrophes. The Greeks, on the other hand, were a polite and gentle ſort of Men, ſoftened by Arts and Philoſophy. It is impoſſible to think of the little States and Cities of Greece, with⯑out wiſhing to have lived in thoſe times, without ad⯑miring their Policy and eavying their Happineſs. CRI. Men are apt to conſider the dark ſides of what they poſſeſs, and the bright ones of things out of their reach. A fine Climate, elegant Taſte, polite Amuſements, love of Liberty, and a moſt ingenious inventive Spirit for Arts and Sciences were indiſpu⯑table Prerogatives of ancient Greece. But as for Peace and Quietneſs, Gentleneſs and Humanity, I think we have plainly the advantage: For thoſe envied Cities compoſed of gentle Greeks were not without their Factions, which perſecuted each other with ſuch Treachery, Rage, and Malice, that in reſpect of them our factious Folk are meer Lambs. To be con⯑vinced of this Truth, you need only look into Thucy⯑dides ^*, where you will find thoſe Cities in general in⯑volved in ſuch bitter Factions, as for Fellow-Citizens without the formalities of War, to murder one ano⯑ther, even in their Senate-houſes and their Temples, no regard being had to Merit, Rank, Obligation, or Nearneſs of Blood. And if Human Nature boiled up to ſo vehement a pitch in the politeſt People, what wonder that ſavage Nations ſhou'd ſcalp, roaſt, tor⯑ture, and deſtroy each other, as they are known to do? It is therefore plain, that without Religion there wou'd not be wanting Pretexts for Quarrels and Debates; all which can very eaſily be accounted for by the natural Infirmities and Corruption of Men. It wou'd not perhaps be ſo eaſy to account for the Blind⯑neſs of thoſe, who impute the moſt helliſh Effects [189] to the moſt divine Principle, if they cou'd be ſup⯑poſed in earneſt, and to have conſidered the Point. One may daily ſee ignorant and prejudiced Men make the moſt abſurd Blunders: But that Free-thinkers, Divers to the Bottom of Things, Fair Inquirers, and Openers of Eyes ſhould be capable of ſuch a groſs Miſtake, is what one would not expect.

XVIII.

ALC. The reſt of Mankind we cou'd more eaſily give up: but as for the Greeks, Men of the moſt refined Genius expreſs an high eſteem of them, not only on account of thoſe Qualities which you think fit to allow them, but alſo for their Virtues. CRI. I ſhall not take upon me to ſay how far ſome Men may be prejudiced againſt their Country, or whether others may not be prejudiced in favour of it. But upon the fulleſt and moſt equal Obſervation that I am able to make, it is my opinion, that, if by Vir⯑tue is meant Truth, Juſtice, Gratitude, there is in⯑comparably more Virtue, now at this day in England, than at any time cou'd be found in ancient Greece. Thus much will be allowed, that we know few Coun⯑tries, if any, where Men of eminent Worth, and famous for deſerving well of the Public, met with harder Fate, and were more ungratefully treated than in the moſt polite and learned of the Grecian States. Though Socrates it muſt be owned wou'd not allow, that thoſe Stateſmen, by adorning the City, augmen⯑ting the Fleet, or extending the Commerce of Athens, deſerved well of their Country; or cou'd with juſtice complain of the ungrateful Returns made by their Fellow-Citizens, whom, while they were in power, they had taken no care to make better Men, by im⯑proving and cultivating their Minds with the Princi⯑ples of Virtue, which if they had done, they need⯑ed not to have feared their Ingratitude. If I were to declare my opinion, what gave the chief Advantage to Greeks and Romans and other Nations, which have made the greateſt Figure in the World, I ſhou'd be [190] apt to think it was a peculiar Reverence for their re⯑ſpective Laws and Inſtitutions, which inſpired them with Steadineſs and Courage, and that hearty gene⯑rous Love of their Country, by which they did not meerly underſtand a certain Language or Tribe of Men, much leſs a particular ſpot of Earth, but inclu⯑ded a certain Syſtem of Manners, Cuſtoms, Notions, Rites, and Laws Civil and Religious. ALC. Oh! I perceive your Drift, you wou'd have us reverence the Laws and religious Inſtitutions of our Country. But herein we beg to be excuſed, if we do not think fit to imitate the Greeks, or to be governed by any Authority whatſoever. But to return: As for Wars and Factions, I grant they ever were and ever will be in the World upon ſome pretext or other, as long as Men are Men.

XIX.

But there is a ſort of War and Warriors pe⯑culiar to Chriſtendom, which the Heathens had no notion of: I mean Diſputes in Theology and Pole⯑mical Divines, which the World hath been wonder⯑fully peſtered with: theſe Teachers of Peace, Meek⯑neſs, Concord, and what not! if you take their word for it: But, if you caſt any eye upon their Practice, you find them to have been in all Ages the moſt contentious, quarrelſome, diſagreeing Crew that ever appeared upon Earth. To obſerve the Skill and Sophiſtry, the Zeal and Eagerneſs, with which thoſe Barbarians, the School Divines, ſplit Hairs and conteſt about Chimaera's, gives me more Indignation, as being more abſurd and a greater ſcan⯑dal to human Reaſon, than all the ambitious Intrigues, Cabals, and Politics of the Court of Rome. CRI. If Divines are quarrelſome, that is not ſo far forth as Divine, but as Undivine and Unchriſtian. Juſtice is a good thing; and the Art of Healing is excellent; nevertheleſs in the adminiſtring of Juſtice or Phyſic Men may be wronged or poiſoned. But as Wrong [191] cannot be Juſtice, or the Effect of Juſtice, ſo Poi⯑ſon cannot be Medicine or the Effect of Medicine, ſo neither can Pride or Strife be Religion or the effect of Religion. Having premiſed this, I acknowledge, you may often ſee hot-headed Bigots engage themſelves in religious as well as civil Parties, without being of cre⯑dit or ſervice to either. And as for the Schoolmen in particular, I do not in the leaſt think the Chriſtian Religion concerned in the Defence of them, their Tenets, or their Method of handling them: but, whatever futility there may be in their Notions, or in⯑elegancy in their Language, in pure juſtice to Truth one muſt own, they neither banter nor rail nor de⯑claim in their Writings, and are ſo far from ſhewing Fury or Paſſion, that perhaps an impartial Judge will think, the Minute Philoſophers are by no means to be compared with them, for keeping cloſe to the Point, or for Temper and good Manners. But after all, if Men are puzzled, wrangle, talk nonſenſe, and quarrel about Religion, ſo they do about Law, Phy⯑ſic, Politics, and every thing elſe of moment. I ask whether in theſe Profeſſions, or in any other, where men have refined and abſtracted, they do not run in⯑to Diſputes, Chicane, Nonſenſe, and Contradictions, as well as in Divinity? And yet this doth not hinder but there may be many excellent Rules, and juſt No⯑tions, and uſeful Truths in all thoſe Profeſſions. In all Diſputes human Paſſions too often mix themſelves, in proportion as the Subject is conceived to be more or leſs important. But we ought not to confound the Cauſe of Men with the Cauſe of God, or make Hu⯑man Follies an Objection to Divine Truths. It is ea⯑ſy to diſtinguiſh what looks like Wiſdom from above, and what proceeds from the paſſion and weakneſs of Men. This is ſo clear a Point, that one wou'd be tempted to think, the not doing it was an Effect, not of Ignorance, but, of ſomething worſe.

XX.

The Conduct we object to Minute Philoſo⯑phers is a natural conſequence of their Principles. Whatſoever they can reproach us with is an Effect, not of our Principles, but of Human Paſſion and Frailty. ALC. This is admirable. So we muſt no longer object to Chriſtians the abſurd Contentions of Councils, the Cruelty of Inquiſitions, the Ambition and Uſurpations of Churchmen. CRI. You may object them to Chriſtians but not to Chriſtianity. If the Divine Author of our Religion and his Diſciples have ſowed a good Seed; and together with this good Seed, the Enemies of his Goſpel (among whom are to be reckoned the Minute Philoſophers of all Ages) have ſowed bad Seeds, whence ſpring Tares and Thiſtles; is it not evident, theſe bad Weeds cannot be imputed to the good Seed, or to thoſe who ſowed it? Whatever you do or can object againſt Eccleſiaſ⯑tical Tyranny, Uſurpation, or Sophiſtry, may, with⯑out any blemiſh or diſadvantage to Religion, be ac⯑knowledged by all true Chriſtians; provided ſtill that you impute thoſe wicked effects to their true Cauſe, not blaming any Principles or Perſons for them, but thoſe that really produce or juſtify them. Certainly, as the Intereſts of Chriſtianity are not to be ſupported by unchriſtian Methods, whenever theſe are made uſe of, it muſt be ſuppoſed there is ſome other latent Principle which ſets them at work. If the very Court of Rome hath been known, from Motives of Policy, to oppoſe ſettling the Inquiſition in a Kingdom, where the ſecular Power hath endeavoured to intro⯑duce it in ſpight of that Court ^*: We may well ſup⯑poſe, that elſewhere Factions of State, and political Views of Princes, have given birth to Tranſactions ſeemingly religious, wherein at bottom neither Re⯑ligion, nor Church, nor Churchmen, were at all [193] conſider'd. As no Man of common Senſe and Ho⯑neſty will engage in a general Deſence of Eccleſiaſ⯑tics, ſo I think no Man of common Candour can con⯑demn them in general. Wou'd you think it reaſona⯑ble, to blame all Stateſmen, Lawyers, or Soldiers, for the Faults committed by thoſe of their Profeſſi⯑on, though in other Times, or in other Countries, and influenced by other Maxims and other Diſci⯑pline? And if not, why do you meaſure with one Rule to the Clergy, and another to the Laity? Sure⯑ly the beſt Reaſon that can be given for this is Preju⯑dice. Shou'd any Man rake together all the Miſ⯑chiefs that have been committed in all Ages and Na⯑tions, by Soldiers and Lawyers, you wou'd, I ſup⯑poſe, conclude from thence, not that the State ſhou'd be deprived of thoſe uſeful Profeſſions, but only that their Exorbitances ſhou'd be guarded againſt and pu⯑niſhed. If you took the ſame equitable Courſe with the Clergy, there wou'd indeed be leſs to be ſaid a⯑gainſt you; but then you wou'd have much leſs to ſay. This plain obvious Conſideration, if every one who read conſidered, wou'd leſſen the Credit of your Declaimers. ALC. But when all is ſaid that can be ſaid, it muſt move a Man's Indignation to ſee rea⯑ſonable Creatures, under the Notion of Study and Learning, employ'd in reading and writing ſo many voluminous Tracts, de lanâ caprinâ. CRI. I ſhall not undertake the Vindication of Theological Wri⯑tings, a general Defence, being as needleſs as a gene⯑ral Charge is groundleſs. Only let them ſpeak for themſelves; and let no Man condemn them upon the Word of a Minute Philoſopher. But we will ima⯑gine the very worſt, and ſuppoſe a wrangling Pedant in Divinity diſputes and ruminates and writes upon a refined Point, as uſeleſs and unintelligible as you pleaſe. Suppoſe this ſame Perſon bred a Layman, might he not have employ'd himſelf in tricking Bar⯑gains, vexatious Law-ſuits, Factions, Seditions, and ſuch like Amuſements, with much more Prejudice [194] to the Public? Suffer then curious Wits to ſpin Cob⯑webs; where is the hurt? ALC. The Miſchief is, what Men want in light they commonly make up in Heat: Zeal, and ill Nature, being Weapons conſtantly exerted by the Partiſans, as well as Champions, on either Side: And thoſe perhaps not mean Pedants or Book-worms. You ſhall often ſee even the learned and eminent Divine lay himſelf out in explaining Things inexplicable, or contend for a barren Point of Theory, as if his Life, Liberty, or Fortune were at ſtake. CRI. No doubt all Points in Divinity are not of equal Moment. Some may be too fine ſpun, and others have more Streſs laid on them than they deſerve. Be the Subject what it will, you ſhall often obſerve that a Point by being contro⯑verted, ſingled out, examined, and nearly inſpected, groweth conſiderable to the ſame Eye, that, perhaps, wou'd have overlooked it in a large and comprehen⯑ſive View. Nor is it an uncommon thing, to behold Ignorance and Zeal united in Men, who are born with a Spirit of Party, though the Church or Reli⯑gion have in Truth but ſmall Share in it. Nothing is eaſier than to make a Caricatura (as the Painters call it) of any Profeſſion upon Earth: But at bottom, there will be found nothing ſo ſtrange in all this Charge upon the Clergy, as the Partiality of thoſe who cenſure them, in ſuppoſing the common De⯑fects of Mankind peculiar to their Order, or the Ef⯑fect of religious Principles. ALC. Other Folks may diſpute or ſquabble as they pleaſe, and no Body mind them; but it ſeems, theſe venerable Squabbles of the Clergy paſs for Learning, and intereſt Man-kind. To uſe the Words of the moſt ingenious Characterizer of our Times, ‘A Ring is made, and Readers gather in abundance. Every one takes Party and encourages his own Side. This ſhall be my Champion! This Man for my Money! Well hit on our Side! Again a good Stroke! There he was even with him! Have at him the [195] next Bout! Excellent Sport! ^*’ CRI. Me⯑thinks I trace the Man of Quality and Breeding in this delicate Satyr, which ſo politely ridicules thoſe Arguments, Anſwers, Defences, and Replications which the Preſs groans under. ALC. To the infinite waſte of Time and Paper, and all the while no Body is one whit the wiſer. And who indeed can be the wiſer for reading Books upon Subjects quite out of the way, incomprehenſible, and moſt wretchedly written? What Man of Senſe or Breeding wou'd not abhor the Infection of prolix Pulpit Eloquence, or of that dry, formal, pedantic, stiff, and clumſy Style which ſmells of the Lamp and the College.

XXI.

They who have the Weakneſs to reverence the Univerſities as Seats of Learning, muſt needs think this a ſtrange Reproach; but it is a very juſt one. For the moſt ingenious Men are now agreed, that they are only Nurſeries of Prejudice, Corrupti⯑on, Barbariſm, and Pedantry. LYS. For my part, I find no Fault with Univerſities. All I know is, that I had the ſpending three hundred Pounds a Year in one of them, and think it the chearfulleſt time of my Life. As for their Books and Style I had not lei⯑ſure to mind them. CRI. Whoever hath a mind to weed will never want work; and he that ſhall pick out bad Books on every Subject will ſoon fill his Li⯑brary. I do not know what Theological Writings Alciphron and his Friends may be converſant in; but I will venture to ſay, one may find among our Engliſh Divines many Writers, who for compaſs of Learning, weight of Matter, Strength of Argument, and Pu⯑rity of Style, are not inferiour to any in our Lan⯑guage. It is not my Deſign to apologize for the Uni⯑verſities: whatever is amiſs in them (and what is there perfect among Men?) I heartily wiſh amended. But [196] I dare affirm, becauſe I know it to be true, that any impartial Obſerver, although they ſhou'd not come up to what in Theory he might wiſh or imagine, will nevertheleſs find them much ſuperior to thoſe that in Fact are to be found in other Countries, and far beyond the mean Picture that is drawn of them by Minute Philoſophers. It is natural for thoſe to rail moſt at Places of Education, who have profited leaſt by them. Weak and fond Parents will alſo readily impute to a wrong Cauſe, thoſe Corruptions themſelves have occaſion'd, by allowing their Children more Money than they knew how to ſpend innocently. And too often a Gentleman who has been idle at the College, and kept idle Company, will judge of a whole Uni⯑verſity from his own Cabal. ALC. Crito miſtakes the Point. I vouch the Authority, not of a Dunce or a Rake or abſurd Parent, but of the moſt conſummate Critic this Age has produced. This great Man characterizeth Men of the Church and Univer⯑ſities with the fineſt Touches and moſt maſterly Pencil. What do you think he calls them? EUPH. What? ALC. Why, the black Tribe, Magicians, Formaliſts, Pedants, bearded Boys, and, having ſuf⯑ficiently derided and exploded them and their mean ungenteel Learning, he ſets moſt admirable Models of his own for good Writing: And it muſt be ac⯑knowledged they are the fineſt things in our Lan⯑guage; as I cou'd eaſily convince you, for I am never without ſomething of that noble Writer about me. EUPH. He is then a noble Writer. ALC. I tell you he is a Nobleman. EUPH. But a Nobleman who writes is one thing, and a noble Writer another. ALC. Both Characters are coincident, as you may ſee.

XXII.

Upon which Alciphron pulled a Treatiſe out of his Pocket, entitled a Soliloquy or Advice to an Author. Wou'd you behold, ſaid he, looking round upon the Company, a noble Specimen of fine Wri⯑ting; do but dip into this Book: which Crito open⯑ing read verbatim as follows ^*.

Euphranor, having heard thus far, cried out: What! will you never have done with your Poetry? another time may ſerve: But why ſhou'd we break off our Conference to read a Play? You are miſtaken, it is no Play nor Poetry, replied Alciphron, but a fa⯑mous modern Critic moralizing in Proſe. You muſt know this great Man hath (to uſe his own Words) re⯑vealed a Grand Arcanum to the World, having inſtruc⯑ted Mankind in what he calls Mirrour-writing, Self-diſcourſing Practice, and Author Practice, and ſhew'd ‘That by virtue of an intimate Receſs, we may diſcover a certain Duplicity of Soul, and divide our Self into two Parties, or (as he varies the Phraſe) practically form the Dual Number.’ In conſe⯑quence whereof, he hath found out that a Man may argue with himſelf, and not only with himſelf, but alſo with Notions, Sentiments, and Vices, which by a marvellous Proſopopoeia he converts into ſo ma⯑ny Ladies, and ſo converted, he confutes and con⯑founds them in a Divine Strain. Can any thing be finer, bolder, or more ſublime? EUPH. It is very wonderful. I thought indeed you had been reading a Piece of a Tragedy. Is this he who deſpiſeth our Univerſities, and ſets up for reforming the Style and Taſte of the Age? ALC. The very ſame. This is the admired Critic of our Times. Nothing can [199] ſtand the Teſt of his correct Judgment, which is e⯑qually ſevere to Poets and Parſons. ‘The Britiſh Muſes (ſaith this great Man) liſp as in their Cra⯑dles: and their ſtammering Tongues, which no⯑thing but Youth and Rawneſs can excuſe, have hitherto ſpoken in wretched Pun and Quibble. Our Dramatic Shakeſpear, our Fletcher, Johnſon, and our Epique Milton preſerve this Style. And, according to him, even our later Authors aiming at a falſe Sublime, entertain our raw Fancy and un⯑practiſed Ear, which has not yet had leiſure to form it ſelf, and become truly muſical.’ EUPH. Pray what Effect may the Leſſons of this great Man, in whoſe Eyes our learned Profeſſors are but bearded Boys, and our moſt celebrated Wits but wretched Punſters, have had upon the Public? Hath he rubbed off the College Ruſt, cured the rudeneſs and rawneſs of our Authors, and reduced them to his own Attic Standard? Do they aſpire to his true Sublime, or imi⯑tate his chaſte unaffected Style? ALC. Doubtleſs the Taſte of the Age is much mended: in proof whereof his Writings are univerſally admired. When our Author publiſhed this Treatiſe, he foreſaw the public Taſte wou'd improve apace; that Arts and Letters wou'd grow to great perfection; that there wou'd be a happy Birth of Genius: of all which things he ſpoke, as he ſaith himſelf, in a prophetic Style. CRI. And yet, notwithſtanding the pro⯑phetical Predictions of this Critic, I do not find any Science that throve among us of late, ſo much as the Minute Philoſophy. In this kind, it muſt be confeſ⯑ſed, we have had many notable Productions. But whether they are ſuch Maſter-pieces for good Wri⯑ting, I leave to be determined by their Readers.

XXIII.

In the mean time, I muſt beg to be excu⯑ſed, if I cannot believe your great Man on his bare word; when he wou'd have us think, that Ignorance and ill Taſte are owing to the Chriſtian Religion or [200] the Clergy, it being my ſincere Opinion, that what⯑ever Learning or Knowledge we have among us, is derived from that Order. If thoſe, who are ſo ſaga⯑cious at diſcovering a Mote in other Eyes, wou'd but purge their own, I believe they might eaſily ſee this Truth. For what but Religion cou'd kindle and pre⯑ſerve a Spirit towards Learning, in ſuch a Northern rough People? Greece produced Men of active and ſubtile Genius. The public Conventions and Aemu⯑lations of their Cities forwarded that Genius: And their natural Curioſity was amuſed and excited by lear⯑ned Converſations, in their public Walks and Gar⯑dens and Porticos. Our Genius leads to Amuſements of a groſſer kind: we breathe a groſſer and a colder Air: and that Curioſity which was general in the A⯑thenians, and the gratifying of which was their chief Recreation, is among our People of Faſhion treated like Affectation, and as ſuch baniſhed from polite Aſ⯑ſemblies and places of Reſort; and without doubt wou'd in a little Time be baniſhed the Country, if it were not for the great Reſervoirs of Learning, where thoſe Formaliſts, Pedants, and bearded Boys, as your profound Critic calls them, are maintained by the Li⯑berality and Piety of our Predeceſſors. For it is as evident that Religion was the Cauſe of thoſe Semina⯑ries, as it is that they are the Cauſe or Source of all the Learning and Taſte which is to be found, even in thoſe very Men who are the declared Enemies of our Religion and public Foundations. Every one, who knows any thing, knows we are indebted for our Learning to the Greek and Latin Tongues. This thoſe ſevere Cenſors will readily grant. Perhaps they may not be ſo ready to grant, what all Men muſt ſee, that we are indebted for thoſe Tongues to our Religion. What elſe cou'd have made foreign and dead Lan⯑guages in ſuch requeſt among us? What cou'd have kept in being and handed them down to our times, through ſo many dark Ages in which the World was waſted and disfigured by Wars and Violence? What, [201] but a regard to the Holy Scriptures, and Theological Writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church? And in fact, do we not find that the Learning of thoſe Times was ſolely in the Hands of Eccleſiaſtics, that they alone lighted the Lamp in ſucceſſion one from another, and tranſmitted it down to After-ages; and that ancient Books were collected and preſerved in their Colleges and Seminaries, when all Love and Re⯑membrance of polite Arts and Studies was extinguiſh⯑ed among the Laity, whoſe Ambition intirely turned to Arms?

XXIV.

ALC. There is, I muſt needs ſay, one ſort of Learning undoubtedly of Chriſtian Original, and peculiar to the Univerſities; where our Youth ſpend ſeveral Years in acquiring that myſterious jar⯑gon of Scholaſticiſm; than which there cou'd never have been contrived a more effectual Method, to per⯑plex and confound Human Underſtanding. It is true, Gentlemen are untaught by the World what they have been taught at the College: but then their Time is doubly loſt. CRI. But what if this ſcholaſtic Learning was not of Chriſtian but of Mahomeran Original, being derived from the Arabs? And what if this Grievance of Gentlemen's ſpending ſeveral Years in learning and unlearning this Jargon, be all Grimace and a Specimen only of the truth and can⯑dour of certain Minute Philoſophers, who raiſe great Invectives from ſlight occaſions, and judge too often without inquiring. Surely it wou'd be no ſuch de⯑plorable loſs of Time, if a young Gentleman ſpent a few Months upon that ſo much deſpiſed and decried Art of Logic, a Surfeit of which is by no means the prevailing Nuſance of this Age. It is one thing to waſte one's Time in learning and unlearning the bar⯑barous Terms, wiredrawn Diſtinctions, and prolix Sophiſtry of the Schoolmen, and another to attain ſome exactneſs in Defining and Arguing: Things perhaps not altogether beneath the Dignity even of a [202] Minute Philoſopher. There was indeed a Time, when Logic was conſidered as its own Object: And that Art of Reaſoning, inſtead of being transferred to Things turned altogether upon Words and Abſtrac⯑tions; which produced a ſort of Leproſy in all parts of Knowledge, corrupting and converting them in⯑to hollow verbal Diſputations in a moſt impure Dia⯑lect. But thoſe Times are paſſed; and that, which had been cultivated as the principal Learning for ſome Ages, is now conſidered in another Light, and by no means makes that Figure in the Univerſities, or bears that Part in the Studies of young Gentlemen educa⯑ted there, which is pretended by thoſe admirable Re⯑formers of Religion and Learning, the Minute Phi⯑loſophers.

XXV.

But who were they that encouraged and produced the Reſtoration of Arts and polite Learn⯑ing? What Share had the Minute Philoſophers in this Affair? Matthias Corvinus King of Hungary, Alphon⯑ſus King of Naples, Coſmus de Medicis, Picus of Mi⯑randula, and other Princes and great Men, famous for Learning themſelves, and for encouraging it in others with a munificent Liberality, were neither Turks nor Gentiles nor Minute Philoſophers. Who was it that tranſplanted and revived the Greek Lan⯑guage and Authors, and with them all polite Arts and Literature in the Weſt? Was it not chiefly Beſ⯑ſarion a Cardinal, Marcus Muſurus an Archbiſhop, Theodore Gaza a private Clergyman? Has there been a greater and more renowned Patron, and Reſtorer of elegant Studies in every kind, ſince the days of Au⯑guſtus Caeſar, than Leo the tenth Pope of Rome? Did any Writers approach the Purity of the Claſſics near⯑er than the Cardinals Bembus and Sadoletus, or than the Biſhops Jovius and Vida? not to mention an end⯑leſs Number of ingenious Eccleſiaſtics, who flouri⯑ſhed on the other ſide of the Alpes in the Golden Age (as the Italians call it) of Leo the Tenth, and wrote, [203] both in their own Language and the Latin, after the beſt Models of Antiquity. It is true, this firſt Re⯑covery of Learning preceded the Reformation, and lighted the way to it: But the Religious Con⯑troverſies, which enſued, did wonderfully propagate and improve it in all Parts of Chriſtendom. And ſurely, the Church of England is, at leaſt, as well calculated for the Encouragement of Learning as that of Rome. Experience confirms this Obſervation; and I believe the Minute Philoſophers will not be ſo partial to Rome as to deny it, ALC. It is impoſſible your account of Learning beyond the Alpes ſhou'd be true. The noble Critic in my hands, having com⯑plimented the French, to whom he allows ſome good Authors, aſſerts of other Foreigners, particularly the Italians, ‘That they may be reckoned no better than the Corrupters of true Learning and Eruditi⯑on.’ CRI. With ſome ſorts of Critics, Dogma⯑tical Cenſures and Concluſions are not always the re⯑ſult of perfect Knowledge or exact Inquiry: And if they harangue upon Taſte, truth of Art, a juſt Piece, grace of Style, Attic Elegance and ſuch Topics, they are to be underſtood only as thoſe that would fain talk themſelves into Reputation for Courage. To hear Thraſymachus ſpeak of Reſentment, Duels, and point of Honour, one wou'd think him ready to burſt with Valour. LYS. Whatever Merit this Writer may have as a Demoliſher, I always thought he had very little as a Builder. It is natural for careleſs Writers to run into Faults they never think of: But for an exact and ſevere Critic to ſhoot his Bolt at random, is unpardonable. If he, who profeſſes at every turn an high eſteem for polite Writing, ſhou'd yet deſpiſe thoſe who moſt excel in it; one would be tempted to ſuſpect his Taſte. But if the very Man, who of all Men talks moſt about Art, and Taſte, and critical Skill, and wou'd be thought to have moſt conſidered thoſe Points, ſhou'd often deviate from his own Rules, into [204] the falſe Sublime or the mauvaiſe Plaiſanterie; What reaſonable Man wou'd follow the Taſte and Judgment of ſuch a Guide, or be ſeduced to climb the ſteep Aſ⯑cent, or tread in the rugged Paths of Virtue on his Recommendation?

XXVI.

ALC. But to return, methinks Crito makes no Compliment to the Genius of his Country, in ſup⯑poſing that Engliſhmen might not have wrought out of themſelves, all Art and Science and good Taſte, without being beholden to Church or Univerſities, or ancient Languages. CRI. What might have been is only Conjecture. What has been, it is not dif⯑ficult to know. That there is a Vein in Britain, of as rich an Ore as ever was in any Country, I will not deny; but it lies deep, and will coſt Pains to come at: And extraordinary Pains require an extraordinary Motive. As for what lies next the Surface, it ſeems but indifferent, being neither ſo good nor in ſuch plenty as in ſome other Countries. It was the Com⯑pariſon of an ingenious Florentine, that the celebrated Poems of Taſſo and Arioſto are like two Gardens, the one of Cucumbers, the other of Melons. In the one you ſhall find few bad, but the beſt are not a very Good Fruit, in the other much the greater part are good for nothing, but thoſe that are good are excel⯑lent. Perhaps the ſame Compariſon may hold, be⯑tween the Engliſh and ſome of their Neighbours. ALC. But ſuppoſe we ſhould grant that the Chriſti⯑an Religion and its Seminaries might have been of uſe, in preſerving or retrieving polite Arts and Letters; what then? Will you make this an Argument of its Truth? CRI. I will make it an Argument of Pre⯑judice and Ingratitude in thoſe Minute Philoſophers, who object Darkneſs, Ignorance, and Rudeneſs, as an Effect of that very thing, which above all others hath enlightened and civilized and embelliſhed their Country: which is as truly indebted to it for Arts and Sciences (which nothing but Religion was ever [205] known to have planted in ſuch a Latitude) as for that general Senſe of Virtue and Humanity, and the Belief of a Providence and future State, which all the Ar⯑gumentation of Minute Philoſophers hath not yet been able to aboliſh.

XXVII.

ALC. It is ſtrange you ſhou'd ſtill perſiſt to argue, as if all the Gentlemen of our Sect were Enemies to Virtue, and downright Atheiſts: Though I have aſſured you of the contrary, and that we have among us ſeveral, who profeſs themſelves in the Inte⯑reſts of Virtue and Natural Religion, and have alſo declared, that I my ſelf do now argue upon that Foot. CRI. How can you pretend, to be in the Intereſt of Natural Religion, and yet be profeſ⯑ſed Enemies of the Chriſtian, the only eſtabliſhed Religion which includes whatever is excellent in the Natural, and which is the only means of making thoſe Precepts, Duties, and Notions, ſo called, be⯑come reverenced throughout the World? Would not he be thought weak or inſincere, who ſhou'd go about to perſuade People, that he was much in the Intereſts of an earthly Monarch; that he loved and admired his Government; when at the ſame time he ſhewed himſelf on all occaſions, a moſt bitter Enemy of thoſe very Perſons and Methods, which above all others contributed moſt to his Service, and to make his Dignity known and revered, his Laws obſerved, or his Dominion extended? And is not this what Minute Philoſophers do, while they ſet up for Advo⯑cates of God and Religion, and yet do all they can to diſcredit Chriſtians and their Worſhip? It muſt be owned, indeed, that you argue againſt Chriſtianity, as the Cauſe of Evil and Wickedneſs in the World; but with ſuch Arguments, and in ſuch a manner, as might equally prove the ſame thing of civil Govern⯑ment, of Meat and Drink, of every Faculty and Profeſſion, of Learning, of Eloquence, and even of Human Reaſon it ſelf. After all, even thoſe of [206] your Sect who allow themſelves to be called Deiſts, if their Notions are thoroughly examined, will I fear be found to include little of Religion in them. As for the Providence of God watching over the Con⯑duct of Human Agents, and diſpenſing Bleſſings or Chaſtiſements, the Immortality of the Soul, a final Judgment, and future State of Rewards and Puniſh⯑ments; how few, if any, of your Free-thinkers have made it their Endeavour to poſſeſs Mens Minds with a ſerious ſenſe of thoſe great points of Natural Reli⯑gion! How many, on the contrary, endeavour to render the Belief of them doubtful or ridiculous! LYS. To ſpeak the Truth, I for my part, had ne⯑ver any liking to Religion of any kind, either reveal⯑ed or unrevealed: And I dare venture to ſay the ſame for thoſe Gentlemen of our Sect that I am acquainted with, having never obſerved them guilty of ſo much meanneſs, as even to mention the Name of God with Reverence, or ſpeak with the leaſt regard of Piety or any ſort of Worſhip. There may perhaps be found one or two formal pretenders to Enthuſiaſm and De⯑votion, in the way of Natural Religion, who laugh⯑ed at Chriſtians for publiſhing Hymns and Meditati⯑ons, while they plagued the World with as bad of their own: But the ſprightly Men make a jeſt of all this. It ſeems to us meer Pedantry. Sometimes, indeed, in good Company one may hear a Word dropt in Commendation of Honour and Good-nature: but the former of theſe, by Connoiſſeurs, is always under⯑ſtood to mean nothing but Faſhion, as the latter is no⯑thing but Temper and Conſtitution, which guides a Man juſt as Appetite doth a Brute.

XXVIII.

And after all theſe Arguments and No⯑tions, which beget one another without end; to take the matter ſhort, neither I nor my Friends for our Souls cou'd ever comprehend, why Man might not do very well, and govern himſelf without any Reli⯑gion at all, as well as a Brute which is thought the ſillier Creature of the two. Have Brutes Inſtincts, [207] Senſes, Appetites, and Paſſions, to ſteer and conduct them? So have Men, and Reaſon over and above to conſult upon occaſion. From theſe Premiſes we con⯑clude, the Road of Human Life is ſufficiently light⯑ed without Religion. CRI. Brutes having but ſmall power, limited to things preſent or particular, are ſufficiently oppoſed and kept in order, by the Force or Faculties of other Animals and the Skill of Man, without Conſcience or Religion: But Conſcience is a neceſſary balance to Human Reaſon, a Faculty of ſuch mighty Extent and Power, eſpecially toward Miſchief. Beſides, other Animals are, by the Law of their Nature, determined to one certain end or kind of Being, without Inclination or Means either to deviate or go beyond it. But Man hath in him a Will and higher Principle; by virtue whereof he may purſue different or even contrary ends, and either fall ſhort of or exceed the Perfection natural to his Species in this World, as he is capable either, by giv⯑ing up the Reins to his ſenſual Appetites, of degrad⯑ing himſelf into the condition of Brutes, or elſe, by well ordering and improving his Mind, of being transformed into the ſimilitude of Angels. Man alone of all Animals hath underſtanding to know his God. What availeth this Knowledge unleſs it be to ennoble Man, and raiſe him to an Imitation and Par⯑ticipation of the Divinity? Or what cou'd ſuch En⯑noblement avail if to end with this Life? Or how can theſe things take effect without Religion? But the points of Vice and Virtue, Man and Beaſt, Senſe and Intellect, have been already at large canvaſſed. What! Lyſicles, wou'd you have us go back where we were three or four days ago? LYS. By no means: I had much rather go forward, and make an end as ſoon as poſſible. But to ſave trouble, give me leave to tell you once for all, that, ſay what you can, you ſhall never perſuade me ſo many ingenious agreeable Men are in the wrong, and a pack of ſnarling four Bigots in the right.

XXIX.

CRI. O Lyſicles, I neither look for Reli⯑gion among Bigots, nor Reaſon among Libertines; each kind diſgrace their ſeveral Pretenſions; the one owning no regard even to the plaineſt and moſt im⯑portant Truths, while the others exert an angry Zeal for points of leaſt concern. And ſurely whatever there is of ſilly, narrow, and uncharitable in the Bi⯑got, the ſame is in great meaſure to be imputed to the conceited Ignorance, and petulant Profaneneſs of the Libertine. And it is not at all unlikely that as Liber⯑tines make Bigots, ſo Bigots ſhou'd make Libertines, the Extreme of one party being ever obſerved to pro⯑duce a contrary Extreme of another. And although, while theſe Adverſaries draw the Rope of Conten⯑tion, Reaſon and Religion are often called upon, yet are they perhaps very little conſidered or concerned in the Conteſt. Lyſicles, inſtead of anſwering Crito, turned ſhort upon Alciphron. It was always my Opi⯑nion, ſaid he, that nothing cou'd be ſillier than to think of deſtroying Chriſtianity, by crying up Na⯑tural Religion. Whoever thinks highly of the one can never, with any conſiſtency, think meanly of the other; it being very evident, that Natural Reli⯑gion, without Revealed, never was and never can be eſtabliſhed or received any where, but in the brains of a few idle ſpeculative Men. I was aware what your Conceſſions wou'd come to. The Belief of God, Virtue, a Future State, and ſuch fine Notions are, as every one may ſee with half an eye, the very Baſis and corner Stone of the Chriſtian Religion. Lay but this Foundation for them to build on, and you ſhall ſoon ſee what Superſtructures our Men of Divi⯑nity will raiſe from it. The Truth and Importance of thoſe points once admitted, a Man need be no Conjurer to prove, upon that Principle, the Excel⯑lency and Uſefulneſs of the Chriſtian Religion: And then to be ſure, there muſt be Prieſts to teach and propagate this uſeful Religion. And if Prieſts, a re⯑gular [209] Subordination without doubt in this worthy Society, and a Proviſion for their Maintenance, ſuch as may enable them to perform all their Rites and Ce⯑remonies with Decency, and keep their ſacred Cha⯑racter above Contempt. And the plain conſequence of all this is a Confederacy between the Prince and the Prieſthood to ſubdue the People: So we have let in at once upon us, a long train of Eccleſiaſtical Evils, Prieſtcraft, Hierarchy, Inquiſition. We have loſt our Liberty and Property, and put the Nation to vaſt Expence, only to purchaſe Bridles and Saddles for their own backs.

XXX.

This being ſpoke with ſome Sharpneſs of Tone, and an upbraiding Air, touched Alciphron to the quick, who replied nothing, but ſhew'd Confu⯑ſion in his Looks. Crito ſmiling look'd at Euphranor and me, then, caſting an eye on the two Philoſophers, ſpoke as follows: If I may be admitted to interpoſe good Offices, for preventing a Rupture between old Friends and Brethren in Opinion, I wou'd obſerve, that in this Charge of Lyſicles there is ſomething right and ſomething wrong. It ſeems right to aſſert as he doth, that the real Belief of Natural Religion will lead a Man to approve of Revealed: But it is as wrong to aſſert, that Inquiſitions, Tyranny, and Ruin muſt follow from thence. Your Free-Think⯑ers, without Offence be it ſaid, ſeem to miſtake their Talent. They imagine ſtrongly, but reaſon weakly; mighty at Exaggeration, and jejune in Argument! Can no Method be found, to relieve them from the Terror of that fierce and bloody Animal an Engliſh Parſon? Will it not ſuffice to pair his Talons with⯑out chopping off his Fingers? Then they are ſuch wonderful Patriots for Liberty and Property! When I hear theſe two Words in the mouth of a Minute Philoſopher, I am put in mind of the Teſte di Ferro at Rome. His Holineſs, it ſeems, not having Power to aſſign Penſions on Spaniſh Benefices to any but Na⯑tives [210] of Spain, always keeps at Rome two Spaniards, called Teſte di Ferro, who have the Name of all ſuch Penſions but not the Profit, which goes to Italians. As we may ſee every day, both Things and Notions placed to the account of Liberty and Property, which in reality neither have nor are meant to have any ſhare in them. What! Is it impoſſible for a Man to be a Chriſtian, but he muſt be a Slave; or a Clergyman, but he muſt have the Principles of an Inquiſitor? I am far from ſcreening and juſtifying Appetite of Do⯑mination or Tyrannical Power in Eccleſiaſtics. Some, who have been guilty in that reſpect, have ſorely paid for it, and it is to be hoped they always will. But having laid the Fury and Folly of the ambitious Pre⯑late, is it not time to look about and ſpy whether, on the other hand, ſome Evil may not poſſibly accrue to the State, from the overflowing Zeal of an Indepen⯑dent Whig? This I may affirm, without being at any pains to prove it, that the worſt Tyranny this Nation ever felt was from the Hands of Patriots of that Stamp.

XXXI.

LYS. I don't know. Tyranny is a harſh Word, and ſometimes miſapplied. When ſpirited Men of independent Maxims create a Ferment or make a Change in the State: He that loſeth is apt to conſider things in one light, and he that wins in ano⯑ther. In the mean time this is certainly good Policy, that we ſhou'd be frugal of our Money, and reſerve it for better Uſes, than to expend on the Church and Religion. CRI. Surely the old Apologue of the Belly and Members need not be repeated to ſuch knowing Men. It ſhou'd ſeem as needleſs to obſerve, that all other States, which ever made any Figure in the World for Wiſdom and Politeneſs, have thought Learning deſerved Encouragement as well as the Sword; that Grants for religious Uſes were as fitting as for Knights Service; and Foundations for propaga⯑ting Piety, as neceſſary to the publick Welfare and [211] Defence, as either Civil or Military Eſtabliſhments. But I ask who are at this Expence, and what is this Expence ſo much complained of? LYS. As if you had never heard of Church Lands and Tithes. CRI. But I wou'd fain know, how they can be charged as an Expence, either upon the Nation or private Men. Where nothing is exported the Nation loſeth no⯑thing: and it is all one to the Public, whether Mo⯑ney circulates at Home through the Hands of a Vicar or a Squire. Then as for private Men, who, for want of Thought, are full of Complaint about the pay⯑ment of Tithes; can any Man juſtly complain of it as a Tax, that he pays what never belonged to him? The Tenant rents his Farm with this Condition, and pays his Landlord proportionably leſs, than if his Farm had been exempt from it: So he loſeth nothing; it being all one to him, whether he pays his Paſtor or his Landlord. The Landlord cannot complain that he has not what he hath no Right to, either by Grant, Purchaſe, or Inheritance. This is the Caſe of Tithes; and as for the Church Lands, he ſurely can be no Free-thinker, nor any Thinker at all, who doth not ſee that no Man whether Noble, Gentle, or Plebeian, hath any ſort of Right or Claim to them, which he may not with equal Juſtice pretend to all the Lands in the Kingdom. LYS. At preſent indeed we have no Right, and that is our Complaint. CRI. You wou'd have then what you have no Right to. LYS. Not ſo neither: what we wou'd have is firſt a Right convey'd by Law, and in the next place, the Lands by virtue of ſuch Right. CRI. In order to this, it might be expe⯑dient in the firſt place, to get an Act paſſed for ex⯑communicating from all civil Rights every Man, that is a Chriſtian, a Scholar, and wears a black Coat, as guilty of three capital Offences againſt the public Weal of this Realm. LYS. To deal frankly, I think it wou'd be an excellent good Act. It wou'd provide at once for ſeveral deſerving Men, rare Artificers in Wit and Argument and Ridicule, who have, too ma⯑ny [212] of them, but ſmall Fortunes with a great Arrear of Merit towards their Country, which they have ſo long enlightened and adorned gratis. EUPH. Pray tell me, Lyſicles, are not the Clergy legally poſſeſ⯑ſed of their Lands and Emoluments? LYS. No Body denies it. EUPH. Have they not been poſſeſſed of them from Time immemorial? LYS. This too I grant. EUPH. They claim then by Law and ancient Pre⯑ſcription. LYS. They do. EUPH. Have the oldeſt Families of the Nobility a better Title? LYS. I be⯑lieve not. It grieves me to ſee ſo many overgrown E⯑ſtates in the hands of ancient Families, on account of no other Merit, but what they brought with them in⯑to the World. EUPH. May you not then as well take their Lands too, and beſtow them on the Minute Phi⯑loſophers, as Perſons of more Merit? LYS. So much the better. This enlarges our View, and opens a new Scene: It is very delightful in the Contemplation of Truth, to behold how one Theory grows out of another. ALC. Old Paetus uſed to ſay, that if the Clergy were deprived of their Hire, we ſhou'd loſe the moſt popular Argument againſt them. LYS. But ſo long as Men live by Religion, there will never be wanting Teachers and Writers in Defence of it. CRI. And how can you be ſure they wou'd be want⯑ing though they did not live by it; ſince it is well known Chriſtianity had its Defenders even when Men died by it? LYS. One thing I know, there is a rare Nurſery of young Plants growing up, who have been carefully guarded againſt every Air of Prejudice, and ſprinkled with the Dew of our choiceſt Principles; mean while, Wiſhes are weariſome, and to our infi⯑nite Regret nothing can be done, ſo long as there re⯑mains any Prejudice in favour of old Cuſtoms and Laws and national Conſtitutions, which, at bottom, we very well know and can demonſtrate to be only Words and Notions.

XXXII.

But, I can never hope, Crito, to make you think my Schemes reaſonable. We reaſon each right [213] upon his own Principles, and ſhall never agree till we quit our Principles, which cannot be done by reaſon⯑ing. We all talk of Juſt and Right and Wrong, and public Good, and all thoſe things. The Names may be the ſame, but the Notions and Concluſions very different, perhaps diametrically oppoſite; and yet each may admit of clear Proofs, and be inferred by the ſame way of reaſoning. For inſtance, the Gentlemen of the Club which I frequent, define Man to be a ſo⯑ciable Animal: Conſequently, we exclude from this Definition all thoſe Human Creatures, of whom it may be ſaid, we had rather have their Room than their Company. And ſuch, though wearing the Shape of Man, are to be eſteem'd in all account of Reaſon, not as Men, but only as Human Creatures. Hence it plainly follows, that Men of Pleaſure, Men of Hu⯑mour, and Men of Wit, are alone properly and truly to be conſidered as Men. Whatever therefore condu⯑ceth to the Emolument of ſuch, is for the good of Mankind, and conſequently very juſt and lawful, al⯑though ſeeming to be attended with Loſs or Damage to other Creatures: inaſmuch as no real injury can be done in life or property to thoſe, who know not how to enjoy them. This we hold for clear and well con⯑nected Reaſoning. But others may view things in another light, aſſign different Definitions, draw other Inferences, and perhaps conſider, what we ſuppoſe the very Top and Flower of the Creation, only as a wart or excreſcence of Human Nature. From all which there muſt enſue a very different Syſtem of Morals, Politics, Rights, and Notions. CRI. If you have a mind to argue, we will argue, if you have more mind to jeſt, we will laugh with you. LYS.

This Partition of our kind into Men and Human Crea⯑tures, puts me in mind of another Notion, broached by one of our Club, whom we uſed to call the Pytha⯑gorean.

XXXIII.

[214] He made a threefold Partition of the Hu⯑man Species, into Birds, Beaſts, and Fiſhes, being of Opinion that the Road of Life lies upwards, in a perpetual Aſcent through the Scale of Being: In ſuch ſort, that the Souls of Inſects after death make their ſecond Appearance, in the Shape of perfect Animals, Birds, Beaſts, or Fiſhes; which upon their death are preferred into Human Bodies, and in the next Stage into beings of a higher and more perfect kind. This Man we conſidered at firſt as a ſort of Heretic, be⯑cauſe his Scheme ſeemed not to conſiſt with our fun⯑damental Tenet, the Mortality of the Soul: But he juſtified the Notion to be innocent, inaſmuch as it in⯑cluded nothing of Reward or Puniſhment, and was not proved by any Argument, which ſuppoſed or im⯑plied either incorporeal Spirit or Providence, being only inferred, by way of Analogy, from what he had obſerved in Human Affairs, the Court, the Church, and the Army; wherein the Tendency is always up⯑wards from lower Poſts to higher. According to this Syſtem, the Fiſhes are thoſe Men who ſwim in pleaſure, ſuch as petits maitres, bons vivans, and honeſt Fellows. The beaſts are dry, drudging, covetous, rapacious Folk, and all thoſe addicted to care and buſineſs like Oxen, and other dry land Animals, which ſpend their lives in labour and fatigue. The Birds are airy notional Men, Enthuſiaſts, Projectors, Philoſophers, and ſuch like: in each Species every Individual retaining a Tincture of his former State, which conſtitutes what is called Genius. If you ask me which Species of Human Creatures I like beſt, I anſwer, The flying Fiſh; that is, a Man of animal Enjoyment with a mixture of Whim. Thus you ſee we have our Creeds and our Syſtems, as well as graver Folks; with this Difference, that they are not ſtrait⯑laced but ſit eaſy, to be ſlipped off or on, as humour or occaſion ſerves. And now I can, with the greateſt [215] aequanimity imaginable, hear my Opinions argued a⯑gainſt, or confuted.

XXXIV.

ALC. It were to be wiſhed, all Men were of that mind. But you ſhall find a ſort of Men, whom I need not name, that cannot bear with the leaſt temper, to have their Opinions examined or their Faults cen⯑ſured. They are againſt Reaſon, becauſe Reaſon is againſt them. For our parts we are all for Liberty of Conſcience. If our Tenets are abſurd, we allow them to be freely argued and inſpected; and by parity of Reaſon we might hope to be allowed the ſame Pri⯑vilege, with reſpect to the Opinions of other Men. CRI. O Alciphron, Wares that will not bear the light are juſtly to be ſuſpected. Whatever therefore moves you to make this Complaint, take my Word I never will: But as hitherto I have allowed your Reaſon its full ſcope, ſo for the future I always ſhall. And though I cannot approve of railing or declaiming, not even in my ſelf, whenever you have ſhewed me the way to it: Yet this I will anſwer for, that you ſhall ever be allowed to reaſon as cloſely and as ſtre⯑nuouſly as you can. But for the love of Truth, be candid, and do not ſpend your Strength and our Time, in points of no ſignificancy, or foreign to the pur⯑poſe, or agreed between us. We allow that Tyran⯑ny and Slavery are bad things: but why ſhou'd we apprehend them from the Clergy at this time? Rites and Ceremonies we own are not Points of chief mo⯑ment in Religion: but why ſhou'd we ridicule things in their own Nature, at leaſt Innocent, and which bear the Stamp of ſupreme Authority? That Men in Divinity, as well as other Subjects, are perplexed with uſeleſs Diſputes, and are like to be as ſo long as the World laſts I freely acknowledge: But why muſt all the Human Weakneſs and Miſtakes of Clergymen be imputed to wicked Deſigns? Why indiſcriminate⯑ly abuſe their Character and Tenets? Is this like Can⯑dour, [216] love of Truth, and Free-thinking? It is grant⯑ed there may be found, now and then, ſpleen and ill⯑breeding in the Clergy: But are not the ſame Faults incident to Engliſh Laymen, of a retired Education and Country Life? I grant there is infinite Futility in the Schoolmen: but I deny that a Volume of that doth ſo much Miſchief, as a page of Minute Philo⯑ſophy. That weak or wicked Men ſhou'd, by fa⯑vour of the World, creep into Power and high Sta⯑tions in the Church, is nothing wonderful: and that in ſuch Stations they ſhou'd behave like themſelves, is natural to ſuppoſe. But all the while it is evident, that not the Goſpel but the World, not the Spirit but the Fleſh, not God but the Devil, puts them upon their unworthy Atchievements. We make no diffi⯑culty to grant, that nothing is more infamous than Vice and Ignorance in a Clergyman; nothing more baſe than a Hypocrite, more frivolous than a Pedant, more cruel than an Inquiſitor. But it muſt be alſo granted by you, Gentlemen, that nothing is more ri⯑diculous and abſurd, than for pedantic, ignorant, and corrupt Men to caſt the firſt Stone, at every ſhadow of their own Defects and Vices in other Men.

XXXV.

ALC. When I conſider the deteſtable State of Slavery and Superſtition, I feel my Heart dilate and expand it ſelf to graſp that ineſtimable bleſ⯑ſing of Liberty, abſolute Liberty in its utmoſt unli⯑mited Extent. This is the ſacred and high Preroga⯑tive, the very life and health of our Engliſh Conſtitu⯑tion. You muſt not therefore think it ſtrange, if with a vigilant and curious Eye, we guard it againſt the minuteſt Apperance of Evil. You muſt even ſuffer us to cut round about, and very deep, and make uſe of the magnifying Glaſs, the better to view and extirpate every the leaſt ſpeck, which ſhall diſco⯑ver it ſelf in what we are careful and jealous to pre⯑ſerve, as the Apple of our Eye. CRI. As for un⯑bounded Liberty I leave it to Savages, among whom [217] alone I believe it is to be found: But, for the reaſona⯑ble legal Liberty of our Conſtitution, I moſt hearti⯑ly and ſincerely wiſh it may for ever ſubſiſt and flou⯑riſh among us. You and all other Engliſhmen cannot be too vigilant, or too earneſt, to preſerve this goodly frame, or to curb and diſappoint the wicked Ambition of whoever, Laymen or Eccleſiaſtic, ſhall attempt to change our free and gentle Government in⯑to a ſlaviſh or ſevere one. But what Pretext can this afford for your Attempts againſt Religion, or indeed how can it be conſiſtent with them? Is not the Pro⯑teſtant Religion a main part of our Legal Conſtituti⯑on? I remember to have heard a Foreigner remark, that we of this Iſland were very good Proteſtans, but no Chriſtians. But whatever Minute Philoſophers may wiſh, or Foreigners ſay, it is certain our Laws ſpeak a different Language. ALC. This puts me in mind of the wiſe reaſoning of a certain ſage Magi⯑ſtrate, who, being preſſed by the Raillery and Argu⯑ments of an ingenious Man, had nothing to ſay for his Religion but that, ten Millions of People inhabi⯑ting the ſame Iſland might, whether right or wrong, if they thought good, eſtabliſh Laws for the wor⯑ſhipping of God in their Temples, and appealing to him in their Courts of Juſtice. And that in caſe ten thouſand ingenious Men ſhou'd publickly deride and trample on thoſe Laws, it might be juſt and lawful for the ſaid ten Millions, to expel the ſaid ten thouſand ingenious Men out of their ſaid Iſland. EUPH. And pray, what anſwer wou'd you make to this remark of the ſage Magiſtrate? ALC. The anſwer is plain. By the Law of Nature, which is ſuperior to all poſi⯑tive Inſtitutions, Wit and Knowledge have a right to command Folly and Ignorance. I ſay, ingenious Men have by natural Right a Dominion over Fools. EUPH. What Dominion over the Laws and People of Great Britain, Minute Philoſophers may be entit⯑led to by Nature, I ſhall not diſpute, but leave to be conſidered by the Public. ALC. This Doctrine, it [218] muſt be owned, was never thoroughly underſtood before our own times. In the laſt age Hobbes and his Followers, though otherwiſe very great Men, de⯑clared for the Religion of the Magiſtrate, probably becauſe they were afraid of the Magiſtrate; but times are changed, and the Magiſtrates may now be afraid of us. CRI. I allow the Magiſtrate may well be afraid of you in one ſenſe, I mean, afraid to truſt you. This brings to my Thoughts a Paſſage on the trial of Leander for a capital Offence: That Gentleman hav⯑ing picked out and excluded from his Jury, by peremp⯑tory exception, all but ſome Men of Faſhion and Pleaſure, humbly moved when Dorcon was going to kiſs the Book, that he might be required to declare upon Honour, whether he believed either God or or Goſpel. Dorcon, rather than hazard his Reputati⯑on as a Man of Honour and Free-thinker, openly avowed, that he believed in neither. Upon which the Court declared him unfit to ſerve on a Jury. By the ſame reaſon, ſo many were ſet aſide, as made it neceſſary to put off the Trial. We are very eaſy, re⯑plied Alciphron, about being truſted to ſerve on Juries, if we can be admitted to ſerve in lucrative Employ⯑ments. CRI. But what if the Government ſhou'd injoin, that every one, before he was ſworn into Of⯑fice, ſhou'd make the ſame Declaration which Dor⯑con was required to make? ALC. God forbid! I hope there is no ſuch Deſign on foot. CRI. What⯑ever Deſigns may be on foot, thus much is certain: The Chriſtian Reformed Religion is a principal Part and Corner-ſtone of our free Conſtitution; and I verily think, the only thing that makes us deſerving of Freedom, or capable of enjoying it. Freedom is either a Bleſſing or a Curſe as Men Uſe it. And to me it ſeems, that if our Religion were once deſtroy'd from among us, and thoſe Notions, which paſs for Prejudices of a Chriſtian Education, eraſed from the minds of Britons, the beſt thing that cou'd befal us wou'd be the loſs of our Freedom. Surely a People [219] wherein there is ſuch reſtleſs Ambition, ſuch high Spirits, ſuch Animoſity of Faction, ſo great Inte⯑reſts in Conteſt, ſuch unbounded Licence of Speech and Preſs, amidſt ſo much Wealth and Luxury, no⯑thing but thoſe veteres aviae, which you pretend to extirpate, cou'd have hitherto kept from ruin.

XXXVI.

Under the Chriſtian Religion this Nati⯑on hath been greatly improved. From a ſort of Sa⯑vages, we have grown civil, polite, and learned: we have made a decent and noble Figure both at home and abroad. And, as our Religion decreaſeth, I am afraid we ſhall be found to have declined. Why then ſhou'd we perſiſt in the dangerous Experiment? ALC. One wou'd think, Crito, you had forgot the many Ca⯑lamities occaſioned by Church-men and Religion. CRI. And one wou'd think, you had forgot what was anſwered this very day to that Objection. But, not to repeat eternally the ſame things, I ſhall obſerve in the firſt place, That if we reflect on the paſt State of Chriſtendom, and of our Country in particular, with our Feuds and Factions ſubſiſting while we were all of the ſame Religion, for inſtance, that of the White and Red Roſes, ſo violent and bloody and of ſuch long continuance; we can have no aſſurance that thoſe ill humours, which have ſince ſhewn themſelves under the maſque of Religion, wou'd not have broke out with ſome other Pretext, if this had been want⯑ing. I obſerve in the ſecond place, that it will not follow from any Obſervations you can make on our Hiſtory, that the Evils, accidentally occaſioned by Religion, bear any proportion either to the good Ef⯑fects it hath really produced, or the Evils it hath pre⯑vented. Laſtly, I obſerve, that the beſt things may by accident be the occaſion of Evil; which acciden⯑tal Effect is not, to ſpeak properly and truly, produ⯑ced by the good thing it ſelf, but by ſome evil thing, which, being neither Part, Property, nor Effect of it, happens to be joined with it. But I ſhou'd be aſhamed [220] to inſiſt and enlarge on ſo plain a Point, and ſhall only add that, whatever Evils this Nation might have for⯑merly ſuſtained from Superſtition, no Man of com⯑mon ſenſe will ſay, the Evils felt or apprehended at preſent are from that Quarter. Prieſtcraft is not the reigning Diſtemper at this Day. And ſurely it will be owned, that a wiſe Man, who takes upon him to be vigilant for the public Weal, ſhou'd touch proper things at proper times, and not preſcribe for a Surfeit when the Diſtemper is a Conſumption. ALC. I think we have ſufficiently diſcuſſed the Subject of this day's Conference. And now, let Lyſicles take it as he will, I muſt in regard to my own Character, as a fair impartial Adverſary, acknowledge there is ſomething in what Crito hath ſaid upon the Uſefulneſs of the Chriſtian Religion. I will even own to you that ſome of our Sect are for allowing it a Toleration. I remember, at a meeting of ſeveral ingenious Men, af⯑ter much debate we came ſucceſſively to divers Reſo⯑lutions. The firſt was, that no Religion ought to be tolerated in the State: But this on more mature thought was judged impracticable. The ſecond was that all Religions ſhou'd be tolerated, but none coun⯑tenanced except Atheiſm: But it was apprehended, that this might breed Contentions among the lower ſort of People. We came therefore to conclude in the third place, that ſome Religion or other ſhou'd be eſtabliſhed for the uſe of the Vulgar. And after a long Diſpute what this Religion ſhou'd be, Lyſis a brisk young Man, perceiving no ſigns of Agreement, propoſed that the preſent Religion might be tolerated, till a better was found. But allowing it to be expedi⯑ent, I can never think it true, ſo long as there lie un⯑anſwerable Objections againſt it, which if you pleaſe, I ſhall take the Liberty to propoſe at our next meet⯑ing. To which we all agreed.