Political Diſcourſes.

DISCOURSE I. Of Commerce.

THE greateſt part of mankind may be di⯑vided into two claſſes; that of ſhallow thinkers, who fall ſhort of the truth, and that of abſtruſe thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter claſs are by far the moſt uncommon, and I may add, by far the moſt uſeful and valuable. They ſuggeſt hints, at leaſt, and ſtart difficulties, which they want, perhaps, ſkill to purſue, but which may produce very fine diſcoveries, when handled by men who have a more juſt way of thinking. At worſt, what they ſay is uncom⯑mon; and if it ſhould coſt ſome pains to compre⯑hend it, one has, however, the pleaſure of hear⯑ing ſomething that is new. An author is little to be valu'd, who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-houſe converſation.

ALL people of ſhallow thought are apt to decry even thoſe of ſolid underſtanding as abſtruſe think⯑ſcience [2] ers and metaphyſicians and refiners; and never will allow any thing to be juſt, which is beyond their own weak conceptions. There are ſome caſ⯑es, I own, where an extraordinary refinement affords a ſtrong preſumption of falſhood, and where no reaſoning is to be truſted but what is na⯑tural and eaſy. When a man deliberates concern⯑ing his conduct in any particular affair, and forms ſchemes in politics, trade, oeconomy, or any buſi⯑neſs in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of conſequen⯑ces together. Something is ſure to happen, that will diſconcert his reaſoning, and produce an e⯑vent different from what he expected. But when we reaſon upon general ſubjects, one may juſtly affirm, that our ſpeculations can ſcarce ever be too fine, provided they be juſt; and that the diffe⯑rence betwixt a common man and a man of ge⯑nius, is chiefly ſeen in the ſhallowneſs or depth of the principles, upon which they proceed. Gene⯑ral reaſonings ſeem intricate, merely becauſe they are general; nor is it eaſy for the bulk of mankind to diſtinguiſh, in a great number of particulars, that common circumſtance, in which they all a⯑gree, or to extract it, pure and unmixt, from the other ſuperfluous circumſtances. Every judgment or concluſion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to thoſe univerſal pro⯑poſitions, which comprehend under them an infi⯑nite number of individuals, and include a whole [3] in a ſingle theorem. Their eye is con⯑founded with ſuch an extenſive proſpect, and the concluſions deriv'd from it, even tho' clearly ex⯑preſt, ſeem intricate and obſcure. But however intricate they may ſeem, 'tis certain, that general principles, if juſt and ſound, muſt always prevail in the general courſe of things, tho' they may fail in particular caſes; and 'tis the chief buſineſs of philoſophers to regard the general courſe of things. I may add, that 'tis alſo the chief buſineſs of poli⯑ticians; eſpecially in the domeſtic government of the ſtate, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concur⯑rence of a multitude of caſes; not, as in foreign po⯑litics, upon accidents, and chances, and the ca⯑prices of a few perſons. This therefore makes the difference betwixt particular deliberations and ge⯑neral reaſonings, and renders ſubtilty and refine⯑ment much more ſuitable to the latter than to the former.

I THOUGHT this introduction neceſſary before the following diſcourſes on commerce, luxury, money, intereſt, &c. where, perhaps, there will occur ſome principles, which are uncommon, and which may ſeem too refin'd and ſubtile for ſuch vulgar ſubjects. If falſe, let them be rejected: but no one ought to entertain a prejudice againſt them, merely becauſe they are out of the common road.

[4] THE greatneſs of a ſtate and the happineſs of its ſubjects, however independent they may be ſup⯑pos'd in ſome reſpects, are commonly allow'd to be inſeparable with regard to commerce; and as pri⯑vate men receive greater ſecurity, in the poſſeſſion of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, ſo the public becomes powerful in propor⯑tion to the riches and extenſive commerce of pri⯑vate men. This maxim is true in general; tho' I cannot forbear thinking, that it may poſſibly admit of ſome exceptions, and that we often eſta⯑bliſh it with too little reſerve and limitation. There may be ſome circumſtances, where the commerce and riches and luxury of individuals, inſtead of adding ſtrength to the public, may ſerve only to thin its armies, and diminiſh its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being and ſuſceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found falſe, when he has embrac'd an oppoſite ſet of manners and opinions.

THE bulk of every ſtate may be divided into husbandmen and manufacturers. The former are employ'd in the culture of the land. The latter work up the materials furniſh'd by the former, in⯑to all the commodities, which are neceſſary or or⯑namental to human life. As ſoon as men quit their ſavage ſtate, where they live chiefly by hunt⯑the [5] ing and fiſhing, they muſt fall into theſe two claſſ⯑es; tho' the arts of agriculture employ at firſt the moſt numerous part of the ſociety ^*. Time and experience improve ſo much theſe arts, that the land may eaſily maintain a much greater number of men, than thoſe who are immediately em⯑ploy'd in its cultivation, or who furniſh the more neceſſary manufactures to ſuch as are ſo employ'd.

IF theſe ſuperfluous hands be turn'd towards the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of luxury, they add to the happineſs of the ſtate; ſince they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherways have been unacquainted. But may not another ſcheme be propos'd for the employment of theſe ſuperfluous hands? May not the ſovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increaſe the dominions of the ſtate a⯑broad, and ſpread its fame over diſtant nations? 'Tis certain, that the fewer deſires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ; and conſequently [6] ſuperfluities of the land, inſtead of maintain⯑ing tradeſmen and manufacturers, may ſupport fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than where a great many arts are requir'd to miniſter to the luxury of particular perſons. Here there⯑fore ſeems to be a kind of oppoſition betwixt the greatneſs of the ſtate and the happineſs of the ſub⯑jects. A ſtate is never greater than when all its ſuperfluous hands are employ'd in the ſervice of the public. The eaſe and convenience of private perſons require, that theſe hands ſhould be em⯑ploy'd in their ſervice. The one can never be ſatis⯑fied, but at the expence of the other. As the am⯑bition of the ſovereign muſt entrench on the luxury of individuals; ſo the luxury of individuals muſt di⯑miniſh the force, and check the ambition of the ſo⯑vereign.

NOR is this reaſoning merely chimerical; but is founded on hiſtory and experience. The repub⯑lic of Sparta was certainly more powerful than any ſtate now in the world, conſiſting of an equal number of people; and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. The Helotes were the labourers: The Spartans were the ſoldi⯑ers or gentlemen. 'Tis evident, that the labour of the Helotes could not have maintain'd ſo great a number of Spartans, had theſe latter liv'd in eaſe and delicacy, and given employment to a great va⯑riety of trades and manufactures. The like poli⯑cy may be remark'd in Rome; and indeed, thro' [7] all antient hiſtory, 'tis obſervable, that the ſmall⯑eſt republics rais'd and maintain'd greater armies than ſtates, conſiſting of triple the number of in⯑habitants, are able to ſupport at preſent. 'Tis computed that, in all European nations, the propor⯑tion betwixt ſoldiers and people does not exceed one to a hundred. But we read, that the city of Rome alone, with its ſmall territory, rais'd and maintain'd, in early times, ten legions againſt the Latins. Athens, whoſe whole dominions were not larger than Yorkſhire, ſent to the expedition againſt Sicily near forty thouſand men^*. Dionyſius the elder, 'tis ſaid, maintain'd a ſtanding army of a hundred thouſand foot and ten thouſand horſe, be⯑ſide a large fleet of four hundred ſail;^† tho' his territories extended no farther than the city of Sy⯑racuſe, about a third part of the iſland of Sicily, and ſome ſea-port towns or garriſons on the coaſt of I⯑taly and Illyricum. 'Tis true, the antient armies, in time of war, ſubſiſted much upon plunder: But did not the enemy plunder in their turn? which was a more ruinous way of levying a tax, than a⯑ny other that could be devis'd. In ſhort, no prob⯑able reaſon can be given for the great power of the more antient ſtates above the modern, but their [8] want of commerce and luxury. Few artizans were maintain'd by the labour of the farmers, and there⯑fore more ſoldiers might live upon it. Titus Li⯑vius ſays, that Rome, in his time, would find it dif⯑ficult to raiſe as large an army as that which, in her early days, ſhe ſent out againſt the Gauls and Latins ^*. Inſtead of thoſe ſoldiers who fought for liberty and empire in Camillus's time, there were, in Auguſtus's days, muſicians, painters, cooks, play⯑ers and taylors. And if the land was equally cul⯑tivated at both periods, 'tis evident it could main⯑tain equal numbers in the one profeſſion as in the other. They added nothing to the mere neceſſa⯑ries of life, in the latter period more than in the former.

'TIS natural on this occaſion to ask, whether ſovereigns may not return to the maxims of anti⯑ent policy, and conſult their own intereſt, in this reſpect, more than the happineſs of their ſubjects? I anſwer, that it appears to me almoſt impoſſible; and that becauſe antient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and uſual courſe of things. 'Tis well known with what peculiar laws Sparta was govern'd, and what a prodigy that re⯑public is juſtly eſteem'd by every one, who has conſider'd human nature, as it has diſplay'd itſelf in other nations and other ages. Were the teſti⯑mony [9] of hiſtory leſs poſitive and circumſtantial, ſuch a government wou'd appear a mere philoſo⯑phical whim or fiction, and impoſſible ever to be reduc'd to practice. And tho' the Roman and o⯑ther antient republics were ſupported on princi⯑ples ſomewhat more natural, yet was there a very extraordinary concurrence of circumſtances to make them ſubmit to ſuch grievous burthens. They were free ſtates; they were ſmall ones; and the age be⯑ing martial, all the neighbouring ſtates were con⯑tinually in arms. Freedom naturally begets pu⯑blic ſpirit, eſpecially in ſmall ſtates; and this pu⯑blic ſpirit, this amor patriae, muſt increaſe, when the public is almoſt in continual alarm, and men are oblig'd, every moment, to expoſe themſelves to the greateſt dangers for its defence. A continu⯑al ſucceſſion of wars makes every citizen a ſoldi⯑er: They take the field in their turn; and during their ſervice are chiefly maintain'd by themſelves. And, notwithſtanding that this ſervice is equivalent to a very ſevere tax, 'tis leſs felt by a people addict⯑ed to arms, who fight for honour and revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and in⯑duſtry as well as pleaſure.^* Not to mention the [10] great equality of fortunes amongſt the inhabitants of the antient republics, where every field, belong⯑ing to a different proprietor, was able to maintain a family, and render'd the numbers of citizens very conſiderable, even without trade and manufactures.

BUT tho' the want of trade and manufactures, amongſt a free and very martial people, may ſome⯑times have no other effect than to render the public more powerful; 'tis certain, that, in the common courſe of human affairs, it will have a quite con⯑trary tendency. Sovereigns muſt take mankind as they find them, and cannot pretend to introduce a⯑ny violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long courſe of time, with a variety of accidents and circumſtances, are requiſite to pro⯑duce thoſe great revolutions, which ſo much diver⯑ſify the face of human affairs. And the leſs natu⯑ral any ſet of principles are, which ſupport a par⯑ticular ſociety, the more difficulty will a legiſlator [11] meet with in raiſing and cultivating them. 'Tis his beſt policy to comply with the common bent of man⯑kind, and give it all the improvements, of which it is ſuſceptible. Now, according to the moſt natural courſe of things, induſtry and arts and trade in⯑creaſe the power of the ſovereign as well as the happineſs of the ſubjects; and that policy is vio⯑lent, which aggrandizes the public by the poverty of individuals. This will eaſily appear from a few conſiderations, which will preſent to us the conſe⯑quences of ſloth and barbarity.

WHERE manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of the people muſt apply themſelves to agriculture; and if their skill and in⯑duſtry increaſe, there muſt ariſe a great ſuperfluity from their labour beyond what ſuffices to maintain them. They have no temptation, therefore, to in⯑creaſe their ſkill and induſtry; ſince they cannot ex⯑change that ſuperfluity for any commodities, which may ſerve either to their pleaſure or vanity. A ha⯑bit of indolence naturally prevails. The greater part of the land lyes uncultivated. What is culti⯑vated, yields not its utmoſt, for want of ſkill or aſ⯑ſiduity in the farmers. If at any time, the public exigencies require, that great numbers ſhou'd be employed in the public ſervice, the labour of the people furniſhes now no ſuperfluities, by which theſe numbers can be maintain'd. The labourers can⯑not increaſe their ſkill and induſtry on a ſudden. [12] Lands uncultivated cannot be brought into tillage for ſome years. The armies, mean while, muſt either make ſudden and violent conqueſts, or diſ⯑band for want of ſubſiſtence. A regular attack or defence, therefore, is not to be expected from ſuch a people, and their ſoldiers muſt be as ignorant and unſkilful as their farmers and manufacturers.

EVERY thing in the world is purchas'd by la⯑bour; and our paſſions are the only cauſes of la⯑bour. When a nation abounds in manufactures and mechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the farmers, ſtudy agriculture as a ſcience, and redouble their induſtry and attention. The ſuper⯑fluity, which ariſes from their labour, is not loſt; but is exchang'd with the manufacturers for thoſe commodities, which mens luxury now makes them covet. By this means, land furniſhes a great deal more of the neceſſaries of life, than what ſuffices for thoſe who cultivate it. In times of peace and tranquillity, this ſuperfluity goes to the maintenance of manufacturers and the improvers of liberal arts. But 'tis eaſy for the public to convert many of theſe manufacturers into ſoldiers, and maintain them by that ſuperfluity, which ariſes from the labour of the farmers. Accordingly we find, that this is the caſe in all civiliz'd governments. When the ſove⯑reign raiſes an army, what is the conſequence? He impoſes a tax. This tax obliges all the people to retrench what is leaſt neceſſary to their ſubſiſtence. [13] Thoſe, who labour in ſuch commodities, muſt ei⯑ther enliſt in the troops, or turn themſelves to a⯑griculture, and thereby oblige ſome labourers to enliſt for want of buſineſs. And to conſider the matter abſtractly, manufactures increaſe the power of the ſtate only as they ſtore up ſo much labour, and that of a kind, which the public may lay claim to, without depriving any one of the neceſſaries of life. The more labour, therefore, is employ'd beyond mere neceſſaries, the more powerful is any ſtate; ſince the perſons engag'd in that labour may eaſily be converted to the public ſervice. In a ſtate without manufactures, there may be the ſame number of hands; but there is not the ſame quantity of labour, nor of the ſame kind. All the labour is there beſtow'd upon neceſſaries, which can admit of little or no abatement.

THUS the greatneſs of the ſovereign and the happineſs of the ſtate are, in a great meaſure, u⯑nited with regard to trade and manufactures. 'Tis a violent method, and in moſt caſes impracticable, to oblige the labourer to toil, in order to raiſe from the land more than what ſubſiſts himſelf and fami⯑ly. Furniſh him with manufactures and commo⯑dities, and he will do it of himſelf. Afterwards, you will find it eaſy to ſeize ſome part of his ſu⯑perfluous labour, and employ it in the public ſer⯑vice, without giving him his wonted return. Be⯑ing accuſtom'd to labour, he will think this leſs [14] grievous, than if, at once, you oblig'd him to an augmentation of labour without any reward. The caſe is the ſame with regard to the other members of the ſtate. The greater is the ſtock of labour of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken from the heap, without making any ſenſible alteration upon it.

A PUBLIC granary of corn, a ſtore-houſe of cloth, a magazine of arms; all theſe muſt be al⯑low'd to be real riches and ſtrength in any ſtate. Trade and induſtry are really nothing; but a ſtock of labour, which, in time of peace and tranquillity, is employ'd for the eaſe and ſatisfaction of indivi⯑duals, but in the exigencies of ſtate, may, in part, be turn'd to public advantage. Could we con⯑vert a city into a kind of fortified camp; and in⯑fuſe into each breaſt ſo martial a genius, and ſuch a paſſion for public good as to make every one willing to undergo the greateſt hardſhips for the ſake of the public; theſe affections might now, as in antient times, prove alone a ſufficient ſpur to induſtry, and ſupport the community. It would then be advan⯑tageous, as in camps, to baniſh all arts and luxury; and, by reſtrictions on equipage and tables, make the proviſions and forage laſt longer than if the ar⯑my were loaded with a number of ſuperfluous re⯑tainers. But as theſe principles are too diſintereſt⯑ed and too difficult to ſupport, 'tis requiſite to go⯑vern men by other paſſions, and animate them with [15] a ſpirit of avarice and induſtry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this caſe, loaded with a ſuper⯑fluous retinue; but the proviſions flow in pro⯑portionably larger. The harmony of the whole is ſtill ſupported; and the natural bent of mens minds being more complied with, individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the obſer⯑vance of thoſe maxims.

THE ſame method of reaſoning will let us ſee the advantage of foreign commerce, in augmenting the power of the ſtate, as well as the riches and happineſs of the ſubjects. It increaſes the ſtock of labour in the nation; and the ſovereign may convert what ſhare of it he finds neceſſary to the ſervice of the public. Foreign trade, by its im⯑ports, furniſhes materials for new manufactures. And by its exports, it produces labour in particu⯑lar commodities, which could not be conſum'd at home. In ſhort, a kingdom, that has a large im⯑port and export, muſt abound more with labour, and that upon delicacies and luxuries, than a king⯑dom, which reſts contented with its native com⯑modities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and happier. The individuals reap the benefit of theſe commodities, ſo far as they gra⯑tify the ſenſes and appetites. And the public is alſo a gainer, while a greater ſtock of labour is, by this means, ſtor'd up againſt any public exigen⯑cy; that is, a greater number of laborious men are [16] maintain'd, who may be diverted to the public ſer⯑vice, without robbing any one of the neceſſaries, or even the chief conveniencies of life.

IF we conſult hiſtory, we ſhall find, that in moſt nations foreign trade has preceded any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domeſ⯑tic luxury. The temptation is ſtronger to make uſe of foreign commodities, which are ready for uſe, and which are entirely new to us, than to make improvements on any domeſtic commodity, which always advance by ſlow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is alſo very great, in exporting what is ſuperfluous at home, and what bears no price, to foreign nations, whoſe ſoil or climate is not favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the pleaſures of lux⯑ury and the profits of commerce; and their delicacy and induſtry, being once awaken'd, carry them to farther improvements, in every branch of domeſ⯑tic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage, which ariſes from a com⯑merce with ſtrangers. It rouſes men from their lethargic indolence; and preſenting the gayer and more opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before dream'd of, raiſes in them a deſire of a more ſplendid way of life than what their anceſtors enjoy'd. And, at the ſame time, the few merchants, who poſſeſs the ſecret of this importation and exportation, make exorbitant [17] profits; and becoming rivals in wealth to the antient nobility, tempt other adventurers to become their rivals in commerce. Imitation ſoon diffuſes all thoſe arts; while domeſtic manufacturers emulate the foreign in their improvements, and work up e⯑very home-commodity to the utmoſt perfection, of which it is ſuſceptible. Their own ſteel and iron, in ſuch laborious hands, become equal to the gold and rubies of the Indies.

WHEN the affairs of the ſociety are once brought to this ſituation, a nation may loſe moſt of its fo⯑reign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people. If ſtrangers will not take any particular commodity of ours, we muſt ceaſe to labour in it. The ſame hands will turn themſelves towards ſome refinement in other commodities, which may be wanted at home. And there muſt always be ma⯑terials for them to work upon; till every perſon in the ſtate, who poſſeſſes riches, poſſeſſes as great plen⯑ty of home-commodities, and thoſe in as great per⯑fection, as he deſires; which can never poſſibly hap⯑pen. China is repreſented as one of the moſt flou⯑riſhing empires in the world; tho' it has very little commerce beyond its own territories.

IT will not, I hope, be conſidered as a ſuperflu⯑ous digreſſion, if I here obſerve, that, as the multi⯑tude of mechanical arts is advantageous, ſo is the great number of perſons, to whoſe ſhare the pro⯑ductions [18] of theſe arts fall. A too great diſpropor⯑tion among the citizens weakens any ſtate. Every perſon, if poſſible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his la⯑bour, in a full poſſeſſion of all the neceſſaries, and many of the conveniencies of life. No-one can doubt, but ſuch an equality is moſt ſuitable to hu⯑man nature, and diminiſhes much leſs from the happineſs of the rich than it adds to that of the poor. It alſo augments the power of the ſtate, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impoſitions be paid with much more chearfulneſs. Where the riches are engroſs'd by a few, theſe muſt contribute very large⯑ly to the ſupplying the public neceſſities. But when the riches are diſperſt among multitudes, the bur⯑then feels light on every ſhoulder, and the taxes make not a very ſenſible difference on any one's way of living.

ADD to this, that where the riches are in few hands, theſe muſt enjoy all the power, and will readily conſpire to lay the whole burthen on the poor, and oppreſs them ſtill farther, to the diſcou⯑ragement of all induſtry.

IN this circumſtance conſiſts the great advantage of England above any nation at preſent in the world, or that appears in the records of any ſtory. 'Tis true, the Engliſh feel ſome diſadvantages in foreign trade by the high price of labour, which is in part the effect of the riches of their artizans, as well as of [19] the plenty of money: But as foreign trade is not the moſt material circumſtance, 'tis not to be put in competition with the happineſs of ſo many milli⯑ons. And if there were no more to endear to them that free government, under which they live, this alone were ſufficient. The poverty of the com⯑mon people is a natural, if not an infallible conſe⯑quence of abſolute monarchy; tho' I doubt, whe⯑ther it be always true, on the other hand, that their riches are an infallible conſequence of liberty. That ſeems to depend on particular accidents and a certain turn of thinking, in conjunction with li⯑berty. My lord Bacon, accounting for the great advantages obtain'd by the Engliſh in their wars with France, aſcribes them chiefly to the ſuperior eaſe and plenty of the common people, amongſt the former; yet the governments of the two king⯑doms were, at that time, pretty much alike. Where the labourers and artizans are accuſtom'd to work for low wages, and to retain but a ſmall part of the fruits of their labour, 'tis difficult for them, even in a free government, to better their condition, or conſpire among themſelves to heighten their wages. But even where they are accuſtom'd to a more plentiful way of life, 'tis eaſy for the rich, in a deſ⯑potic government, to conſpire againſt them, and throw the whole burthen of the taxes on their ſhoulders.

[20] IT may ſeem an odd poſition, that the poverty of the common people in France, Italy, and Spain is, in ſome meaſure, owing to the ſuperior riches of the ſoil and happineſs of the climate; and yet there want not many reaſons to juſtify this pa⯑radox. In ſuch a fine mold or ſoil as that of thoſe more ſouthern regions, agriculture is an eaſy art; and one man, with a couple of ſorry horſes, will be able, in a ſeaſon, to cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty conſiderable rent to the proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his ground fallow for a year, as ſoon as it is ex⯑hauſted; and the warmth of the ſun alone and temperature of the climate enrich it, and reſtore its fertility. Such poor peaſants, therefore, require only a ſimple maintenance for their labour. They have no ſtock nor riches, which claim more; and at the ſame time, they are for ever dependent on their landlord, who gives no leaſes, nor fears that his land will be ſpoil'd by the ill methods of culti⯑vation. In England, the land is rich, but coarſe; muſt be cultivated at a great expence; and pro⯑duces ſlender crops, when not carefully manag'd, and by a method, which gives not the full profit but in a courſe of ſeveral years. A farmer, there⯑fore, in England muſt have a conſiderable ſtock and a long leaſe; which beget proportional profits. The fine vineyards of Champagne and Burgundy, that oft yield to the landlord above five pounds per [21] acre, are cultivated by peaſants, who have ſcarce bread: And the reaſon is, that ſuch peaſants need no ſtock but their own limbs, along with inſtru⯑ments of husbandry, which they can buy for 20 ſhillings. The farmers are commonly in ſome better circumſtances in thoſe countries. But the graziers are moſt at their eaſe of all thoſe, who cultivate the land. The reaſon is ſtill the ſame. Men muſt have profits proportionable to their ex⯑pence and hazard. Where ſo conſiderable a num⯑ber of the labouring poor as the peaſants and farm⯑ers, are in very low circumſtances, all the reſt muſt partake of their poverty, whether the government of that nation be monarchical or republican.

WE may form a ſimilar remark with regard to the general hiſtory of mankind. What is the rea⯑ſon, why no people living betwixt the tropics cou'd ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach e⯑ven any police in their government and any mili⯑tary diſcipline; while few nations in the temperate climates have been altogether depriv'd of theſe ad⯑vantages? 'Tis probable, that one cauſe of this phaenomenon is the warmth and equality of wea⯑ther in the torrid zone, that render cloaths and houſes leſs requiſite for the inhabitants, and there⯑by remove, in part, that neceſſity, which is the great ſpur to induſtry and invention. Curis acuens mortalia corda. Not to mention, that the fewer goods or poſſeſſions of this kind any people enjoy, [22] the fewer quarrels are likely to ariſe amongſt them; and the leſs neceſſity will there be for a ſettled po⯑lice or regular authority to protect and defend them from foreign enemies or from each other.

DISCOURSE II. Of Luxury.

LUXURY is a word of a very uncertain ſigni⯑fication, and may be taken in a good as well as a bad ſenſe. In general, it means great refine⯑ment in the gratification of the ſenſes; and any de⯑gree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age or country or condition of the perſon. The bounds betwixt the virtue and the vice can⯑not here be fixt exactly, more than in other moral ſubjects. To imagine, that the gratifying any of the ſenſes, or the indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel is, of itſelf, a vice, can never en⯑ter into any head, that is not diſorder'd by the frenzies of a fanatical enthuſiaſm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, becauſe the win⯑dows of his cell open'd upon a very noble pro⯑ſpect, made a covenant with his eyes never to turn that way, or receive ſo ſenſual a gratification. And ſuch is the crime of drinking Champagne or Bur⯑gundy, preferably to ſmall beer or porter. Theſe indulgences are only vices, when they are purſu'd at the expence of ſome virtue, as liberality or cha⯑rity: In like manner, as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himſelf to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon [24] no virtue, but leave ample ſubject, whence to pro⯑vide for friends, family, and every proper object of generoſity or compaſſion, they are entirely inno⯑cent, and have in every age been acknowledg'd ſuch by almoſt all moraliſts. To be entirely oc⯑cupy'd with the luxury of the table, for inſtance, without any reliſh for the pleaſures of ambition, ſtu⯑dy or converſation, is a mark of groſs ſtupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or ge⯑nius. To confine one's expence entirely to ſuch a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart entirely devoid of huma⯑nity or benevolence. But if a man reſerve time ſufficient for all laudable purſuits, and money ſuf⯑ficient for all generous purpoſes, he is free from e⯑very ſhadow of blame or reproach.

SINCE luxury may be conſider'd, either as in⯑nocent or blameable, one may be ſurpris'd at thoſe prepoſterous opinions, which have been entertain'd concerning it; while men of libertine principles beſtow praiſes even on vitious luxury, and repre⯑ſent it as highly advantageous to ſociety; and on the other hand, men of ſevere morals blame even the moſt innocent luxury, and repreſent it as the ſource of all the corruptions, diſorders, and facti⯑ons, incident to civil government. We ſhall here endeavour to correct both theſe extremes, by prov⯑ing, firſt, that the ages of refinement and luxury are both the happieſt and moſt virtuous; ſecondly, [25] that wherever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial, and when carry'd a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, tho' perhaps not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

To prove the firſt point, we need but conſider the effects of luxury both on private and on public life. Human happineſs, according to the moſt re⯑ceiv'd notions, ſeems to conſiſt in three ingredients, action, pleaſure, and indolence; and tho' theſe in⯑gredients ought to be mixt in different proportions, according to the particular diſpoſitions of the per⯑ſon, yet no one ingredient can be entirely want⯑ing, without deſtroying, in ſome meaſure, the re⯑liſh of the whole compoſition. Indolence or re⯑poſe, indeed, ſeems not, of itſelf, to contribute much to our enjoyment; but like ſleep, is requiſite as an indulgence to the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſupport an uninterrupted courſe of buſineſs or pleaſure. That quick march of the ſpirits, which takes a man from himſelf, and chief⯑ly gives ſatisfaction, does in the end exhauſt the mind, and requires ſome intervals of repoſe, which, tho' agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolong'd, be⯑get a languor and lethargy, that deſtroy all enjoy⯑ment. Education, cuſtom, and example have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of theſe purſuits; and it muſt be own'd, that, where they promote a reliſh for action and pleaſure, they are ſo far favourable to human happineſs. In times, [26] when induſtry and arts flouriſh, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itſelf, as well as thoſe pleaſures, which are the fruits of their labour. The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and facul⯑ties; and by an affiduity in honeſt induſtry, both ſatisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly ſpring up, when nouriſh'd with eaſe and idleneſs. Baniſh thoſe arts from ſociety, you deprive men both of action and of pleaſure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even deſtroy the reliſh of indo⯑lence, which never is agreeable, but when it ſuc⯑ceeds to labour, and recruits the ſpirits, exhauſted by too much application and fatigue.

ANOTHER advantage of induſtry and of refine⯑ments in the mechanical arts is, that they com⯑monly produce ſome refinements in the liberal arts; nor can the one be carried to perfection, without being accompany'd, in ſome degree, with the other. The ſame age, which produces great philoſophers and politicians, renown'd generals and poets, uſu⯑ally abounds with ſkilful weavers and ſhip-carpen⯑ters. We cannot reaſonably expect, that a piece of woolen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation, that is ignorant of aſtronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The ſpirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once rous'd from their lethargy, and put into a fermen⯑tation, [27] turn themſelves on all fides, and carry im⯑provements into every art and ſcience. Profound ignorance is totally baniſh'd, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleaſures of the mind as well as thoſe of the body.

THE more theſe refin'd arts advance, the more ſociable do men become; nor is it poſſible, that, when enrich'd with ſcience, and poſſeſt of a fund of converſation, they ſhould be contented to re⯑main in ſolitude, or live with their fellow citizens in that diſtant manner, which is peculiar to igno⯑rant and barbarous nations. They flock into ci⯑ties; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to ſhow their wit or their breeding; their taſte in converſation or living, in cloaths or furniture. Cu⯑rioſity allures the wiſe: Vanity the fooliſh: And pleaſure both. Particular clubs and ſocieties are every where form'd: Both ſexes meet in an eaſy and ſociable manner, and mens tempers, as well as behaviour, refine a-pace. So that beſide the im⯑provements they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, 'tis impoſſible but they muſt feel an increaſe of humanity, from the very habit of con⯑verſing together, and contributing to each other's pleaſure and entertainment. Thus induſtry, know⯑ledge, and humanity are linkt together by an indiſ⯑ſoluble chain, and are found, from experience as [28] well as reaſon, to be peculiar to the more poliſh'd and luxurious ages.

NOR are theſe advantages attended with diſad⯑vantages, that bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleaſure, the leſs will they indulge in exceſſes of any kind; becauſe nothing is more deſtructive to true pleaſure than ſuch exceſ⯑ſes. One may ſafely affirm, that the Tartars are oftner guilty of beaſtly gluttony, when they feaſt on their dead horſes, than European courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more fre⯑quent in polite ages, when it is often regarded on⯑ly as a piece of gallantry, drunkenneſs, on the other hand, is much leſs common: A vice more odious and more pernicious both to mind and body. And in this matter I would appeal not only to an Ovid or a Petronius, but to a Seneca or a Cato. We know, that Caeſar, during Cataline's conſpiracy, being neceſſitated to put into Cato's hands a billet⯑doux, which diſcover'd an intrigue with Servilia, Cato's own ſiſter, that ſtern philoſopher threw it back to him with indignation, and in the bitterneſs of his wrath gave him the appellation of drunkard, as a term more opprobrious than that with which he cou'd more juſtly have reproach'd him.

BUT induſtry, knowledge, and humanity are not advantageous in private life alone: They diffuſe their beneficial influence on the Public, and render [29] the government as great and flouriſhing as they make individuals happy and proſperous. The en⯑creaſe and conſumption of all the commodities, which ſerve to the ornament and pleaſure of life, are advantageous to ſociety; becauſe at the ſame time that they multiply thoſe innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of ſtore-houſe of labour, which, in the exigencies of ſtate, may be turn'd to the public ſervice. In a nation, where there is no demand for ſuch ſuperfluities, men ſink into indo⯑lence, loſe all the enjoyment of life, and are uſeleſs to the public, which cannot maintain nor ſupport its fleets and armies, from the induſtry of ſuch ſloth⯑ful members.

THE bounds of all the European kingdoms are, at preſent, pretty near the ſame they were two hundred years ago: But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of thoſe king⯑doms? Which can be aſcrib'd to nothing but the encreaſe of art and induſtry. When Charles the VIII. of France invaded Italy, he carry'd with him about 20,000 men: And yet this arma⯑ment ſo exhauſted the nation, as we learn from Guicciardin, that for ſome years it was not able to make ſo great an effort. The late king of France, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men;^* tho' from Mazarine's death to his own he was en⯑gag'd in a courſe of wars, that laſted near thirty years.

[30] THIS induſtry is much promoted by the know⯑ledge, inſeparable from the ages of arts and luxury; as on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the beſt advantage of the induſtry of its ſubjects. Laws, order, police, diſcipline; theſe can never be carry'd to any degree of perfec⯑tion, before human reaſon has refin'd itſelf by ex⯑erciſe, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at leaſt, of commerce and manufactures. Can we expect, that a government will be well model'd by a people, who know not how to make a ſpin⯑ning wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infeſt⯑ed with ſuperſtition, which throws the government off its bias, and diſturbs men in the purſuit of their intereſt and happineſs.

KNOWLEDGE in the arts of government natur⯑ally begets mildneſs and moderation, by inſtruct⯑ing men in the advantages of humane maxims a⯑bove rigour and ſeverity, which drive ſubjects in⯑to rebellion, and render the return to ſubmiſſion impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When mens temper is ſoften'd as well as their knowledge improv'd, this humanity appears ſtill more conſpicuous, and is the chief characteriſtic, that diſtinguiſhes a civiliz'd age from times of bar⯑barity and ignorance. Factions are then leſs invete⯑rate; revolutions leſs tragical; authority leſs ſevere; [31] and ſeditions leſs frequent. Even foreign wars a⯑bate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and intereſt ſteel men againſt com⯑paſſion as well as fear, the combatants diveſt them⯑ſelves of the brute, and reſume the man.

NOR need we fear, that men, by loſing their ferocity, will loſe their martial ſpirit, or become leſs undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. The arts have no ſuch effect in enervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, induſtry, their inſeparable attendant, adds new force to both. And if anger, which is ſaid to be the whetſtone of courage, loſes ſomewhat of its aſperity, by politeneſs and refinement; a ſenſe of honour, which is a ſtronger, more conſtant, and more governable principle, acquires freſh vigour by that elevation of genius, which ariſes from knowledge and a good education. Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any uſe, when not accompany'd with diſcip⯑line and martial ſkill, which are ſeldom found a⯑mong a barbarous people. The antients remark'd that Datames was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war. And Pyrrhus ſeeing the Romans marſhal their army with ſome art and ſkill, ſaid with ſurprize Theſe barbarians have no⯑thing barbarous in their diſcipline! 'Tis obſervable, that as the old Romans, by applying themſelves ſolely to war, were the only unciviliz'd people that [32] ever poſſeſt military diſcipline; ſo the modern I⯑talians are the only civiliz'd people, among Euro⯑peans, that ever wanted courage and a martial ſpirit. Thoſe who wou'd aſcribe this effeminacy of the I⯑talians to their luxury or politeneſs, or application to the arts, need but conſider the French and Eng⯑liſh, whoſe bravery is as unconteſtable as their love of luxury, and their aſſiduity in commerce. The Italian hiſtorians give us a more ſatisfactory reaſon for this degeneracy of their countrymen. They ſhew us how the ſword was dropt at once by all the Italian ſovereigns; while the Venetian ariſto⯑cracy was jealous of its ſubjects, the Florentine de⯑mocracy apply'd itſelf entirely to commerce; Rome was govern'd by prieſts, and Naples by women. War then became the buſineſs of ſoldiers of for⯑tune, who ſpar'd one another, and to the aſtoniſh⯑ment of the world, cou'd engage a whole day in what they call'd a battle, and return at night to their camps without the leaſt bloodſhed.

WHAT has chiefly induc'd ſevere moraliſts to declaim againſt luxury and refinement in pleaſure is the example of antient Rome, which, joining, to its poverty and ruſticity, virtue and public ſpirit, roſe to ſuch a ſurpriſing height of grandeur and liberty; but having learn'd from its conquer'd pro⯑vinces the Grecian and Aſiatic luxury, fell into e⯑very kind of corruption; whence aroſe ſedition and civil wars, attended at laſt with the total loſs of li⯑berty. [33] All the Latin claſſics, whom we peruſe in our infancy, are full of theſe ſentiments, and uni⯑verſally aſcribe the ruin of their ſtate to the arts and riches imported from the Eaſt: inſomuch that Sal⯑luſt repreſents a taſte for painting as a vice no leſs than lewdneſs and drinking. And ſo popular were theſe ſentiments during the latter ages of the re⯑public, that this author abounds in praiſes of the old rigid Roman virtue, tho' himſelf the moſt egregi⯑ous inſtance of modern luxury and corruption; ſpeaks contemptuouſly of Grecian eloquence, tho' the moſt elegant writer in the world; nay, employs prepoſterous digreſſions and declamations to this purpoſe, tho' a model of taſte and correctneſs.

BUT it would be eaſy to prove, that theſe writ⯑ers miſtook the cauſe of the diſorders in the Ro⯑man ſtate, and aſcrib'd to luxury and the arts what really proceeded from an ill model'd government, and the unlimited extent of conqueſts. Luxury or refinement on pleaſure has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The value, which all men put upon any particular pleaſure, depends on compariſon and experience; nor is a porter leſs greedy of money, which he ſpends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchaſes champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times and to all men, becauſe they always purchaſe pleaſures, ſuch as men are accuſtom'd to and deſire; nor can any thing reſtrain or regulate the love of money but [34] a ſenſe of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound moſt in ages of luxury and knowledge.

OF all European kingdoms, Poland ſeems the moſt defective in the arts of war as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal; and yet 'tis there that venality and corruption do moſt prevail. The nobles ſeem to have preſerv'd their crown elective for no other purpoſe, but regularly to ſell it to the higheſt bidder. This is almoſt the only ſpecies of commerce, with which that people are acquainted.

THE liberties of England, ſo far from decaying ſince the origin of luxury and the arts, have ne⯑ver flouriſh'd ſo much as during that period. And tho' corruption may ſeem to encreaſe of late years; this is chiefly to be aſcrib'd to our eſtabliſh'd liberty, when our princes have found the impoſſibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying par⯑liaments by the fantom of prerogative. Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails infinitely more among the electors than the elect⯑ed; and therefore cannot juſtly be aſcrib'd to any refinements in luxury.

IF we conſider the matter in a proper light, we ſhall find, that luxury and the arts are rather fa⯑vourable to liberty, and have a natural tendency to preſerve, if not produce a free government. In [35] rude unpoliſh'd nations, where the arts are neglect⯑ed, all the labour is beſtow'd on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole ſociety divides into two claſſes, proprietors of land, and their vaſſals or tenants. The latter are neceſſarily dependent and fitted for ſlavery and ſubjection; eſpecially where they poſſeſs no riches, and are not valu'd for their knowledge in agriculture; as muſt always be the caſe where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themſelves into petty tyrants; and muſt either ſubmit to an abſolute maſter for the ſake of peace and order; or if they will preſerve their independency, like the Gothic barons, they muſt fall into feuds and conteſts amongſt them⯑ſelves, and throw the whole ſociety into ſuch con⯑fuſion as is perhaps worſe than the moſt deſpotic government. But where luxury nouriſhes com⯑merce and induſtry, the peaſants, by a proper culti⯑vation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradeſmen and merchants acquire a ſhare of the property, and draw authority and conſider⯑ation to that middling rank of men; who are the beſt and firmeſt baſis of public liberty. Theſe ſub⯑mit not to ſlavery, like the poor peaſants, from po⯑verty and meanneſs of ſpirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the ſake of that gratification, to ſubmit to the tyranny of their ſovereign. They covet equal laws, which may ſecure their proper⯑ty, [36] and preſerve them from monarchical, as well as ariſtocratical tyranny.

THE houſe of commons is the ſupport of our popular government; and all the world acknow⯑ledge, that it ow'd its chief influence and conſider⯑ation to the encreaſe of commerce, which threw ſuch a balance of property into the hands of the commons. How inconſiſtent, then, is it to blame ſo violently luxury, or a refinement in the arts, and to repreſent it as the bane of liberty and public ſpirit!

TO declaim againſt preſent times, and magnify the virtue of remote anceſtors, is a propenſity al⯑moſt inherent in human nature; and as the ſenti⯑ments and opinions of civiliz'd ages alone are tranſmitted to poſterity, hence it is that we meet with ſo many ſevere judgments pronounc'd a⯑gainſt luxury and even ſcience, and hence it is that at preſent we give ſo ready an aſſent to them. But the fallacy is eaſily perceiv'd from comparing dif⯑ferent nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better ſet in oppoſition thoſe manners with which we are ſufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the moſt pernicious and moſt odious of all vi⯑ces, ſeem peculiar to unciviliz'd ages; and by the refin'd Greeks and Romans were aſcrib'd to all the barbarous nations, which ſurrounded them. They [37] might juſtly, therefore, have preſum'd, that their own anceſtors, ſo highly celebrated, poſſeſt no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their poſterity in honour and humanity as in taſte and ſcience. An antient Frank or Saxon may be high⯑ly extoll'd: But I believe every man would think his life or fortune much leſs ſecure in the hands of a Moor or Tartar, than in thoſe of a French or Engliſh gentleman, the rank of men the moſt civiliz'd, in the moſt civiliz'd nations.

WE come now to the ſecond poſition, which we propos'd to illuſtrate, viz. that as innocent luxury or a refinement in pleaſure is advantageous to the public; ſo wherever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial, and when carry'd a degree farther, begins to be a quality pernicious, tho', perhaps, not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

LET us conſider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification, however ſenſual, can, of itſelf, be eſteem'd vicious. A gratification is only vici⯑ous, when it engroſſes all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for ſuch acts of duty and genero⯑ſity as are requir'd by his ſituation and fortune. Suppoſe, that he correct the vice, and employ part of his expence in the education of his children, in the ſupport of his friends, and in relieving the poor; would any prejudice reſult to ſociety? On the con⯑trary, [38] the ſame conſumption would ariſe; and that labour, which, at preſent, is employ'd only in pro⯑ducing a ſlender gratification to one man, would relieve the neceſſitous, and beſtow ſatisfaction on hundreds. The ſame care and toil, which raiſe a diſh of peas at Chriſtmas, would give bread to a whole family during ſix months. To ſay, that, without a vicious luxury, the labour would not have been employ'd at all, is only to ſay, that there is ſome other defect in human nature, ſuch as indo⯑lence, ſelfiſhneſs, inattention to others, for which luxury, in ſome meaſure, provides a remedy; as one poiſon may be an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholeſome food, is better than poiſons, however corrected.

SUPPOSE the ſame number of men, that are, at preſent, in Britain, with the ſame ſoil and climate; I ask, is it not poſſible for them to be happier, by the moſt perfect way of life, that can be imagin'd, and by the greateſt reformation, which omnipo⯑tence itſelf could work in their temper and dispo⯑ſition? To aſſert, that they cannot, appears evi⯑dently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its inhabitants, they cou'd never, in ſuch an Utopian ſtate, feel any other ills, than thoſe which ariſe from bodily ſickneſs; and theſe are not the half of human miſeries. All other ills ſpring from ſome vice, either in ourſelves or others; and even many of our diſeaſes proceed from the ſame [39] origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You muſt only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the matter worſe. By baniſhing vicious luxury, without cur⯑ing ſloth and an indifference to others, you only diminiſh induſtry in the ſtate, and add nothing to mens charity or their generoſity. Let us, there⯑fore, reſt contented with aſſerting, that two oppo⯑ſite vices in a ſtate may be more advantageous than either of them alone; but let us never pronounce vice, in it ſelf, advantageous. Is it not very in⯑conſiſtent for an author to aſſert in one page, that moral diſtinctions are inventions of politicians for public intereſt; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public?^* And in⯑deed, it ſeems, upon any ſyſtem of morality, little leſs than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice, that is in general beneficial to ſociety.

I THOUGHT this reaſoning neceſſary, in order to give ſome light to a philoſophical queſtion, which has been much diſputed in Britain. I call it a phi⯑loſophical queſtion, not a political one. For what⯑ever may be the conſequence of ſuch a miracu⯑lous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every ſpecies of virtue, and free them from every vice, this concerns not the magiſtrate, who aims only at poſſibilities. He cannot cure e⯑very vice, by ſubſtituting a virtue in its place. Ve⯑ry [40] often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that caſe, he ought to prefer what is leaſt per⯑nicious to ſociety. Luxury, when exceſſive, is the ſource of many ills; but is in general prefer⯑able to ſloth and idleneſs, which wou'd commonly ſucceed in its place, and are more pernicious both to private perſons and to the public. When ſloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life prevails a⯑mongſt individuals, without ſociety, without enjoy⯑ment. And if the ſovereign, in ſuch a ſituation, demands the ſervice of his ſubjects, the labour of the ſtate ſuffices only to furniſh the neceſſaries of life to the labourers, and can afford nothing to thoſe, who are employ'd in the public ſervice.

DISCOURSE III. Of Money.

MONEY is not, properly ſpeaking, one of the ſubjects of commerce; but only the in⯑ſtrument, which men have agreed upon to facili⯑tate the exchange of one commodity for another. 'Tis none of the wheels of trade: 'Tis the oil, which renders the motion of the wheels more ſmooth and eaſy. If we conſider any one king⯑dom by itſelf, 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs plenty of money is of no conſequence; ſince the prices of commodities are always proportion'd to the plenty of money, and a crown in Harry the VII's. time ſerv'd the ſame purpoſe as a pound does at preſent. 'Tis only the public, that draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money; and that only in its wars and negociations with fo⯑reign ſtates. And this is the reaſon, why all rich and trading countries, from Carthage to Britain and Holland, have employ'd mercenary troops, which they hir'd from their poorer neighbours. Were they to make uſe of their native ſubjects, they would find leſs advantage from their ſuperior riches, and from their great plenty of gold and ſilver; ſince the pay of all their ſervants muſt riſe in proportion to the public opulence. Our ſmall army in Britain [42] of 20,000 men are maintain'd at as great expence as a French army thrice as numerous. The Eng⯑liſh fleet, during the late war, requir'd as much money to ſupport it as all the Roman legions, which kept the whole world in ſubjection, during the time of the emperors ^*

THE greater number of people and their great⯑er induſtry are ſerviceable in all caſes; at home and abroad, in private and in public. But the greater plenty of money is very limited in its uſe, and may even ſometimes be a loſs to a nation in its com⯑merce with foreigners.

[43] THERE ſeems to be a happy concurrence of cauſes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confin'd entirely to one people; as might natural⯑ly at firſt be dreaded from the advantages of an e⯑ſtabliſh'd commerce. Where one nation has got the ſtart of another in trade, 'tis very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has loſt; becauſe of the ſuperior induſtry and skill of the former, and the greater ſtocks, which its merchants are poſſeſt' of, and which enable them to trade for ſo much ſmaller profits. But theſe advantages are compen⯑ſated, in ſome meaſure, by the low prices of labour in every nation, that has not an extenſive com⯑merce, and does not very much abound in gold and ſilver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually ſhift their places, leaving thoſe countries and provinces, which they have already enrich'd, and flying to o⯑thers, whither they are allur'd by the cheapneſs of proviſions and labour; till they have enrich'd theſe alſo, and are again baniſh'd by the ſame cauſes. And in general, we may obſerve, that the dearneſs of every thing, from plenty of money, is a diſad⯑vantage, that attends an eſtabliſh'd commerce, and ſets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer ſtates to underſell the richer in all foreign markets.

THIS has made me entertain a great doubt con⯑cerning the benefit of banks and paper credit, which [44] are ſo generally eſteem'd advantageous to every nation. That proviſions and labour ſhou'd become dear by the encreaſe of trade and money, is, in many reſpects, an inconvenience; but an inconve⯑nience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that public wealth and proſperity, which are the end of all our wiſhes. 'Tis compenſated by the advan⯑tages we reap from the poſſeſſion of theſe precious metals, and the weight which they give the nati⯑on in all foreign wars and negotiations. But there appears no reaſon for encreaſing that inconveni⯑ence by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will never accept of, and which any great diſorder in the ſtate will reduce to nothing. There are, 'tis true, many people in every rich ſtate, who, hav⯑ing large ſums of money, wou'd prefer paper with good ſecurity; as being of more eaſy tranſport and more ſafe cuſtody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take advantage of this circumſtance; as the goldſmiths formerly did in London, or as the bankers do at preſent in Dublin: And therefore 'tis better, it may be thought, that a public company ſhould enjoy the benefit of that paper credit, which always will have place in every opulent kingdom. But to endeavour artificially to encreaſe ſuch a credit, can never be the intereſt of any trading nation; but muſt lay them under diſadvantages, by encreaſing money beyond its na⯑tural proportion to labour and commodities, and thereby heightening their price to the merchant [45] and manufacturer. And in this view, it muſt be allow'd, that no bank cou'd be more advantageous than ſuch a one as lockt up all the money it re⯑ceiv'd, and never augmented the circulating coin, as is uſual, by returning part of its treaſure into com⯑merce. A public bank, by this expedient, might cut off much of the dealings of private bankers and mo⯑ney jobbers; and tho' the ſtate bore the charge of ſalaries to the directors and tellers of this bank, (for according to the preceeding ſuppoſition, it would have no profit from its dealings) the nation⯑al advantage, reſulting from the low price of la⯑bour and the deſtruction of paper credit, would be a ſufficient compenſation. Not to mention, that ſo large a ſum, lying ready at command, would be a great convenience in times of public danger and diſtreſs; and might be replac'd at leiſure, when peace and tranquillity were reſtor'd to the nation.

BUT of this ſubject of paper credit, we ſhall treat more largely hereafter. And I ſhall finiſh this eſſay of money, by propoſing and explaining two obſervations, which may, perhaps, ſerve to employ the thought of our ſpeculative politicians. For to theſe only I all along addreſs myſelf. 'Tis enough that I ſubmit to the ridicule ſometimes, in this age, attach'd to the character of a philoſo⯑pher, without adding to it that which belongs to a projector.

[46] I. 'T WAS a ſhrewd obſervation of Anachar⯑ſis ^* the Scythian, who had never ſeen money in his own country, that gold and ſilver ſeem'd to him of no uſe to the Greeks, but to aſſiſt them in nu⯑meration and arithmetic. 'Tis indeed evident, that money is nothing but the repreſentation of labour and commodities, and ſerves only as a method of rating or eſtimating them. Where coin is in great⯑er plenty; as a greater quantity of it is then re⯑quir'd to repreſent the ſame quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itſelf: no more than it wou'd make any alteration on a merchant's books, if inſtead of the Arabian method of notation, which requires few characters, he ſhou'd make uſe of the Roman, which requires a great many. Nay the greater plenty of money, like the Roman characters, is ra⯑ther inconvenient and troubleſome; and requires greater care to keep and tranſport it. But not⯑withſtanding this concluſion, which muſt be allow⯑ed juſt, 'tis certain, that ſince the diſcover of the mines in America, induſtry has encreas'd in all the nations of Europe, except in the poſſeſſors of thoſe mines; and this may juſtly be aſcrib'd, amongſt o⯑ther reaſons, to the encreaſe of gold and ſilver. Ac⯑cordingly we find, that in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than for⯑merly, every thing takes a new face; labour and [47] induſtry gain life; the merchant becomes more en⯑terprizing; the manufacturer more diligent and ſkillful; and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. This is not eaſily to be accounted for, if we conſider only the influence, which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itſelf, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a great⯑er number of theſe little yellow or white pieces for every thing he purchaſes. And as to foreign trade, it appears, that great plenty of money is rather diſadvantageous, by raiſing the price of every kind of labour.

To account, then, for this phaenomenon, we muſt conſider, that tho' the high price of commo⯑dities be a neceſſary conſequence of the encreaſe of gold and ſilver, yet it follows not immediately upon that encreaſe; but ſome time is requir'd before the money circulate thro' the whole ſtate, and make its effects be felt on all ranks of people. At firſt, no alteration is perceiv'd; by degrees, it raiſes the price firſt of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at laſt riſes to a juſt proportion, with the new quantity of ſpecie, which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, 'tis only in this interval or interme⯑diate ſituation, betwixt the acquiſition of money and riſe of prices, that the encreaſing quantity of gold and ſilver is favourable to induſtry. When any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is [48] not at firſt diſperſt into many hands; but is confin'd to the coffers of a few perſons, who immediately ſeek to employ it to the beſt advantage. Here are a ſet of manufacturers or merchants, we ſhall ſup⯑poſe, who have receiv'd returns of gold and ſilver for goods, which they ſent to Cadiz. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly, who never dream of demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment from ſuch good paymaſters. If workmen become ſcarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages; but at firſt re⯑quires an encreaſe of labour, and this is willingly ſubmitted to by the artizan, who can now eat and drink better to compenſate his additional toil and fatigue. He carries his money to market, where he finds every thing at the ſame price as formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds, for the uſe of his family. The farmer and gardener, finding that all their commodities are taken off, apply themſelves with alacrity to the raiſing of more; and at the ſame time, can afford to take better and more cloaths from their tradeſ⯑men, whoſe price is the ſame as formerly, and their induſtry only whetted by ſo much new gain. 'Tis eaſy to trace the money in its progreſs thro' the whole commonwealth; where we ſhall find, that it muſt firſt quicken the diligence of every indivi⯑dual, before it encreaſe the price of labour.

[49] AND that the ſpecie may encreaſe to a conſider⯑able pitch, before it have this latter effect, appears, amongſt other reaſons, from the frequent operations of the French king on the money; where it was al⯑ways found, that the augmenting the numerary va⯑lue did not produce a proportional riſe of the prices, at leaſt for ſome time. In the laſt year of Louis the XIV. money was rais'd three ſevenths, but prices augmented only one. Corn in France is now ſold at the ſame price, or for the ſame number of livres, it was in 1683, tho' ſilver was then at 30 livres the mark, and is now at 50.^* Not to mention, the [50] great addition of gold and ſilver, which may have come into that kingdom, ſince the former period.

FROM the whole of this reaſoning we may con⯑clude, that 'tis of no manner of conſequence, with regard to the domeſtic happineſs of a ſtate, whe⯑ther money be in a greater or leſs quantity. The good policy of the magiſtrate conſiſts only in keep⯑ing it, if poſſible, ſtill encreaſing; becauſe, by that means, he keeps a ſpirit of induſtry alive in the na⯑tion, and encreaſes the ſtock of labour, wherein conſiſts all real power and riches. A nation, whoſe money decreaſes, is actually, at that time, much weaker and more miſerable, than another nation, who poſſeſſes no more money, but is on the en⯑creaſing hand. This will be eaſily accounted for, if we conſider, that the alterations in the quantity of money, either on the one ſide or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alte⯑rations in the prices of commodities. There is al⯑ways an interval before matters be adjuſted to their new ſituation; and this interval is as pernicious to induſtry, when gold and ſilver are diminiſhing, as it is advantageous, when theſe metals are encreaſing. The workman has not the ſame employment from the manufacturer and merchant; tho' he pays the ſame price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot diſpoſe of his corn and cattle; tho' he muſt pay the ſame rent to his landlord. The [51] poverty and beggary and ſloth, which muſt enſue, are eaſily foreſeen.

II. The ſecond obſervation I propos'd to make with regard to money, may be explain'd after the following manner. There are ſome kingdoms, and many provinces in Europe, (and all of them were once in the ſame condition) where money is ſo ſcarce, that the landlord can get none at all from his tenants; but is oblig'd to take his rent in kind, and either to conſume it himſelf, or tranſport it to pla⯑ces, where he may find a market. In thoſe coun⯑tries, the prince can levy few or no taxes, but in the ſame manner: And as he will receive very ſmall benefit from impoſitions ſo pay'd, 'tis evi⯑dent, that ſuch a kingdom has very little force e⯑ven at home; and cannot maintain fleets and ar⯑mies to the ſame extent, as if every part of it a⯑bounded in gold and ſilver. There is ſurely a greater diſproportion betwixt the force of Germany at preſent and what it was three centuries ago,^* than there is in its induſtry, people and manfac⯑tures. The Auſtrian dominions in the empire are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are of great extent, but have not a proportionable weight in the balance of Europe; proceeding, as is commonly ſuppos'd, from their ſcarcity of money. How do all theſe facts agree with that principle of [52] reaſon, that the quantity of gold and ſilver is in it⯑ſelf altogether indifferent? According to that prin⯑ciple, wherever a ſovereign has numbers of ſub⯑jects, and theſe have plenty of commodities, he ſhou'd, of courſe, be great and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater or leſ⯑ſer abundance of the precious metals. Theſe ad⯑mit of diviſions and ſub-diviſions to a great extent; and where they wou'd become ſo ſmall as to be in danger of being loſt, 'tis eaſy to mix them with a baſer metal, as is practis'd in ſome countries of Europe; and by that means raiſe them to a bulk more ſenſible and convenient. They ſtill ſerve the ſame purpoſes of exchange, whatever their num⯑ber may be, or whatever colour they may be ſup⯑pos'd to have.

To theſe difficulties I anſwer, that the effect, here ſuppos'd to flow from ſcarcity of money, re⯑ally ariſes from the manners and cuſtoms of the in⯑habitants, and that we miſtake, as is uſual, a col⯑lateral effect for a cauſe. The contradiction is only apparent; but it requires ſome thought and reflection to diſcover the principles, by which we can reconcile reaſon to experience.

It ſeems a maxim almoſt ſelf-evident, that the prices of every thing depend on the proportion be⯑twixt commodities and money, and that any con⯑ſiderable alteration on either of theſe has the ſame [53] effect either of heightening or diminiſhing the price. Encreaſe the commodities, they become cheaper: Encreaſe the money, they riſe in their value. As on the other hand, a diminution of the former, and that of the latter have contrary tendencies.

'TIS alſo evident, that the prices do not ſo much depend on the abſolute quantity of commodities and of money, which are in a nation; as on that of the commodities, which come or may come to market, and of the money, which circulates. If the coin be lockt up in cheſts, 'tis the ſame thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated: If the commodities be hoarded in granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities, in theſe caſes, never meet, they cannot affect each other. Were we, at any time, to form con⯑jectures concerning the prices of proviſions, the corn, which the farmer muſt reſerve for the main⯑tenance of himſelf and family, ought never to en⯑ter into the eſtimation. 'Tis only the overplus, compar'd to the demand, that determines the value.

To apply theſe principles, we muſt conſider, that in the firſt and more uncultivated ages of a⯑ny ſtate, e're fancy has confounded her wants with thoſe of nature, men, contented with the produc⯑tions of their own fields, or with thoſe rude prepa⯑rations, which they themſelves can work upon [54] them, have little occaſion for exchange, or at leaſt for money, which, by agreement, is the common meaſure of exchange. The wool of the farmer's own flock, ſpun in his own family, and wrought by a neighbouring weaver, who receives his pay⯑ment in corn or wool, ſuffices for furniture and cloathing. The carpenter, the ſmith, the maſon, the taylor are retain'd by wages of a like nature; and the landlord himſelf, dwelling in the neigh⯑bourhood, is contented to receive his rent in the commodities rais'd by the farmer. The greateſt part of theſe he conſumes at home, in ruſtic ho⯑ſpitality: The reſt, perhaps, he diſpoſes of for mo⯑ney to the neighbouring town, whence he draws the materials of his expence and luxury.

BUT after men begin to refine on all theſe en⯑joyments, and live not always at home, nor are contented with what can be rais'd in their neigh⯑bourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that ex⯑change. The tradeſmen will not be paid in corn; becauſe they want ſomething more than barely to eat. The farmer goes beyond his own pariſh for the commodities he purchaſes, and cannot always carry his commodities to the merchant, who ſup⯑plies him. The landlord lives in the capital or in a foreign country; and demands his rent in gold and ſilver, which can eaſily be tranſported to him. Great undertakers and manufacturers and mer⯑chants [55] ariſe in every commodity; and theſe can conveniently deal in nothing but in ſpecie. And conſequently, in this ſituation of ſociety, the coin enters into many more contracts, and by that means is much more employ'd than in the former.

THE neceſſary effect is, that provided the mo⯑ney does not encreaſe in the nation, every thing muſt become much cheaper in times of induſtry and refinement, than in rude, uncultivated ages. 'Tis the proportion betwixt the money, that cir⯑culates, and the commodities in the market, that determines the prices. Goods, that are conſum'd at home, or exchang'd with other goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they af⯑fect not, in the leaſt, the current ſpecie; with re⯑gard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and conſequently this method of uſing them ſinks the proportion on the ſide of the commodities, and en⯑creaſes the prices. But after money enters into all contracts and ſales, and is every where the meaſure of exchange, the ſame national caſh has a much greater task to perform; all commodities are then in the market; the ſphere of circulation is enlarg'd; 'tis the ſame caſe as if that individual ſum were to ſerve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here diminiſh'd on the ſide of the money, every thing muſt become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.

[56] BY the moſt exact computations, that have been form'd all over Europe, after making allowance for the change in the numerary value or the deno⯑mination, 'tis found, that the prices of all things have only riſen three, or at moſt four times ſince the diſcovery of the Weſt Indies. But will any one aſſert, that there is no more than four times the coin in Europe, that was in the fifteenth cen⯑tury and the centuries preceding it? The Spani⯑ards and Portugueſe from their mines, the En⯑gliſh, French and Dutch, by their African trade, and by their interlopers in the Weſt Indies, bring home about ſeven millions a year, of which not a⯑bove a tenth part goes to the Eaſt Indies. This ſum alone in five years would probably double the antient ſtock of money in Europe. And no other ſatisfactory reaſon can be given, why all prices have not riſen to a much more exorbitant height, except that deriv'd from a change of cuſtoms and manners. Beſides, that more commodities are produc'd by additional induſtry, the ſame commo⯑dities come more to market, after men depart from their antient ſimplicity of manners. And tho' this encreaſe has not been equal to that of mo⯑ney, it has, however, been conſiderable, and has preſerv'd the proportion betwixt coin and commo⯑dities nearer the antient ſtandard.

WERE the queſtion propos'd, which of theſe methods of living in the people, the ſimple or the [57] refin'd, is the moſt advantageous to the ſtate or pub⯑lic, I ſhou'd, without much ſcruple, prefer the latter, in a view to politics at leaſt; and ſhould produce this as an additional reaſon for the encou⯑ragement of trade and manufactures.

WHEN men live in the antient ſimple manner, and ſupply all their neceſſities from their domeſtic induſtry or from the neighbourhood, the ſovereign can levy no taxes in money from a conſiderable part of his ſubjects; and if he will impoſe on them any burthens, he muſt take his payment in commodities, with which alone they abound; a method attended with ſuch great and obvious in⯑conveniencies, that they need not here be inſiſted on. All the money he can pretend to raiſe muſt be from his principal cities, where alone it circu⯑lates; and theſe, 'tis evident, cannot afford him ſo much as the whole ſtate cou'd, did gold and ſil⯑ver circulate thro' the whole. But beſides this obvious diminution of the revenue, there is alſo another cauſe of the poverty of the public in ſuch a ſituation. Not only the ſovereign receives leſs money, but the ſame money goes not ſo far as in times of induſtry and general commerce. Every thing is dearer, where the gold and ſilver are ſup⯑pos'd equal; and that becauſe fewer commodities come to market, and the whole coin bears a high⯑er proportion to what is to be purchas'd by it; [58] whence alone the prices of every thing are fix'd and determin'd.

HERE then we may learn the fallacy of the re⯑mark, often to be met with in hiſtorians, and even in common converſation, that any particular ſtate is weak, tho' fertile, populous, and well cultivat⯑ed, merely becauſe it wants money. It appears, that the want of money can never injure any ſtate within itſelf: For men and commodities are the real ſtrength of any community. 'Tis the ſimple manner of living which here hurts the public, by confining the gold and ſilver to few hands, and preventing its univerſal diffuſion and circulation. On the contrary, induſtry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole ſtate, however ſmall its quantity may be: They digeſt it into e⯑very vein, ſo to ſpeak; and make it enter into e⯑very tranſaction and contract. No hand is entire⯑ly empty of it; and as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the ſovereign has a double advan⯑tage: He may draw money by his taxes from every part of the ſtate, and what he receives goes farther in every purchaſe and payment.

WE may infer, from a compariſon of prices, that money is not more plentiful in China, than it was in Europe three centuries ago: But what im⯑menſe power is that empire poſſeſt of, if we may judge by the civil and military liſt, maintain'd by [59] it? Polybius ^* tells us, that proviſions were ſo cheap in Italy during his time, that in ſome places the ſtated club in the inns was a ſemis a head, little more than a farthing: Yet the Roman power had even then ſubdu'd the whole known world. A⯑bout a century before that period, the Carthagini⯑an ambaſſadors ſaid, by way of raillery, that no people liv'd more ſociably amongſt themſelves than the Romans; for that in every entertainment, which, as foreign miniſters, they receiv'd, they ſtill obſerv'd the ſame plate at every table.^† The abſolute quantity of the precious metals is a mat⯑ter of great indifference. There are only two cir⯑cumſtances of any importance, viz. their gradual encreaſe, and their thorough concoction and cir⯑culation thro' the ſtate; and the influence of both theſe circumſtances has been here explained.

IN the following diſcourſe we ſhall ſee an in⯑ſtance of a like fallacy, as that above mention'd; where a collateral effect is taken for a cauſe, and where a conſequence is aſcrib'd to the plenty of money; tho' it be really owing to a change in the manners and cuſtoms of the people.

DISCOURSE IV. Of Intereſt.

NOTHING is eſteem'd a more certain ſign of the flouriſhing condition of any nation than the lowneſs of intereſt: And with reaſon; tho' I believe the cauſe is ſomewhat different from what is commonly apprehended. The lowneſs of intereſt is generally aſcrib'd to the plenty of money. But money, however plentiful, has no other ef⯑fect, if fixt, than to raiſe the price of labour. Sil⯑ver is more common than gold; and therefore you receive a greater quantity of it for the ſame com⯑modities: But do you pay leſs intereſt for it? In⯑tereſt in Batavia and Jamaica is at 10 per cent. in Portugal at 6; tho' theſe places, as we may learn from the prices of every thing, abound much more in gold and ſilver than either London or Amſter⯑dam.

WERE all the gold in England annihilated at once, and one and twenty ſhillings ſubſtituted in the place of every guinea, wou'd money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? No ſurely: We ſhou'd only uſe ſilver inſtead of gold. Were gold ren⯑der'd as common as ſilver, and ſilver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or in⯑tereſt [62] lower? We may aſſuredly give the ſame an⯑ſwer. Our ſhillings would then be yellow, and our half-pence white; and we ſhou'd have no guineas. No other difference wou'd ever be obſerv'd. No alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or intereſt; unleſs we imagine, that the colour of the metal is of any conſequence.

NOW what is ſo viſible in theſe greater variations of ſcarcity or abundance of the precious metals, muſt hold in all inferior changes. If the multiply⯑ing gold and ſilver fifteen times makes no diffe⯑rence, much leſs can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no other effect than to heigh⯑ten the price of labour and commodities; and e⯑ven this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progreſs towards theſe changes, the aug⯑mentation may have ſome influence, by exciting induſtry; but after the prices are ſettled, ſuitable to the new abundance of gold and ſilver, it has no manner of influence.

AN effect always holds proportion with its cauſe. Prices have riſen about four times, ſince the diſ⯑covery of the Indies; and 'tis probable gold and ſilver have multiply'd much more: But intereſt has not fallen much above half. The rate of intereſt, therefore, is not deriv'd from the quantity of the precious metals.

[63] MONEY having merely a fictitious value, ariſ⯑ing from the agreement and convention of men, the greater or leſs plenty of it is of no conſequence, if we conſider a nation within itſelf; and when once fixt, tho' in never ſo great abundance, it has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of thoſe ſhining bits of me⯑tal, for cloaths, furniture, or equipage, without en⯑creaſing any one convenience of life. If a man borrows money to build a houſe, he then carries home a greater load; becauſe the ſtone, timber, lead, glaſs, &c. with the labour of the maſons and carpenters, are repreſented by a greater quantity of gold and ſilver. But as theſe metals are con⯑ſider'd merely as repreſentations, there can no al⯑teration ariſe, from their bulk or quantity, their weight or colour, either upon their real value or their intereſt. The ſame intereſt, in all caſes, bears the ſame proportion to the ſum. And if you lent me ſo much labour and ſo many commodities; by receiving five per cent. you receive always pro⯑portional labour and commodities, however repre⯑ſented, whether by yellow or white coin, whe⯑ther by a pound or an ounce. 'Tis in vain, there⯑fore, to look for the cauſe of the fall or riſe of in⯑tereſt in the greater or leſs quantity of gold and ſil⯑ver, which is fixt in any nation.

[64] HIGH intereſt ariſes from three circumſtances: A great demand for borrowing; little riches to ſupply that demand; and great profits ariſing from commerce: And theſe circumſtances are a clear proof of the ſmall advance of commerce and in⯑duſtry, not of the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver. Low intereſt, on the other hand, proceeds from the three oppoſite circumſtances: A ſmall demand for borrowing; great riches to ſupply that demand; and ſmall profits ariſing from commerce: And theſe circumſtances are all connected together, and proceed from the encreaſe of induſtry and com⯑merce, not of gold and ſilver. We ſhall endea⯑vour to prove theſe points as fully and diſtinctly as poſſible, and ſhall begin with the cauſes and the effects of a great or ſmall demand for borrowing.

WHEN a people have emerg'd ever ſo little from a ſtate of barbarity, and their numbers have en⯑creas'd beyond the original multitude, there muſt immediately ariſe an inequality of property; and while ſome poſſeſs large tracts of land, others are confin'd within narrow limits, and ſome are en⯑tirely without any landed property. Thoſe, who poſſeſs more land than they can labour, employ thoſe who poſſeſs none, and agree to receive a de⯑terminate part of the product. Thus the landed intereſt is immediately eſtabliſh'd; nor is there any ſettled government, however rude, wherein [65] affairs are not on this footing. Of theſe proprie⯑tors of land, ſome muſt preſently diſcover them⯑ſelves to be of different tempers from others; and while one wou'd willingly ſtore up the product of his land for futurity, another deſires to conſume at preſent what ſhou'd ſuffice for many years. But as the ſpending a ſettled revenue is a way of life en⯑tirely without occupation; men have ſo much need of ſomewhat to fix and engage them, that pleaſures, ſuch as they are, will be the purſuit of the greateſt part of the landholders, and the prodigals amongſt them will always be more numerous than the mi⯑ſers. In a ſtate, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed intereſt, as there is little frugality, the borrowers muſt be very numerous, and the rate of intereſt muſt hold proportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money, but on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone the demand for borrowing is encreas'd or diminiſh'd. Were money ſo plentiful as to make an egg be ſold for ſix-pence; as long as there are only land⯑ed gentry and peaſants in the ſtate, the borrowers muſt be numerous, and intereſt high. The rent for the ſame farm wou'd be heavier and more bul⯑ky: But the ſame idleneſs of the landlord, with the higher prices of commodities, wou'd diſſipate it in the ſame time, and produce the ſame neceſſi⯑ty and demand for borrowing.^*

[66] NOR is the caſe different with regard to the ſe⯑cond circumſtance we propos'd to conſider, viz. the great or little riches to ſupply this demand. This effect alſo depends on the habits and ways of living of the people, not on the quantity of gold and ſilver. In order to have, in any ſtate, a great number of lenders, 'tis not ſufficient nor requiſite, that there be great abundance of the precious me⯑tals. 'Tis only requiſite, that the property or com⯑mand of that quantity, which is in the ſtate, whe⯑ther great or ſmall, ſhould be collected in particu⯑lar hands, ſo as to form conſiderable ſums, or com⯑poſe a great money'd intereſt. This begets a num⯑ber of lenders, and ſinks the rate of uſury; and this, I ſhall venture to affirm, depends not on the quan⯑tity of ſpecie, but on particular manners and cuſ⯑toms, which make the ſpecie gather into ſeparate ſums or maſſes of conſiderable value.

FOR ſuppoſe, that, by miracle, every man in Britain ſhou'd have five pounds ſlipt into his poc⯑ket in one night; this wou'd much more than [67] double the whole money that is at preſent in the kingdom, and yet there would not next day, nor for ſome time, be any more lenders, nor any vari⯑ation on the intereſt. And were there nothing but landlords and peaſants in the ſtate, this money, however abundant, cou'd never gather into ſums, and wou'd only ſerve to encreaſe the prices of e⯑very thing, without any farther conſequence. The prodigal landlord diſſipates it, as faſt as he receives it; and the beggarly peaſant has no means nor view nor ambition of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus of borrowers above that of lenders continuing ſtill the ſame, there will follow no re⯑duction of intereſt. That depends upon another principle, and muſt proceed from an encreaſe of in⯑duſtry and frugality, of arts and commerce.

EVERY thing, uſeful to the life of man, ariſes from the ground; but few things ariſe in that con⯑dition, which is requiſite to render them uſeful. There muſt, therefore, beſide the peaſants and the proprietors of land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own uſe and ſubſiſtence. In the infancy of ſociety, theſe contracts betwixt the artizans and the peaſants, and betwixt one ſpecies of artizan and another, are commonly enter'd into immediately, by the perſons themſelves, who, being neighbours, are readily acquainted with each other's neceſſities, [68] and can lend their mutual aſſiſtance to ſupply them. But when mens induſtry encreaſes, and their views enlarge; 'tis found, that the moſt remote parts of the ſtate can aſſiſt each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourſe of good offi⯑ces may be carry'd on to the greateſt extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of merchants, the moſt uſeful race of men in the whole ſociety, who ſerve as agents betwixt thoſe parts of the ſtate, that are wholly unacquainted, and are ignorant of each o⯑ther's neceſſities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in ſilk and linen and a thouſand cuſtomers; and theſe two ranks of men, ſo neceſſary to each other, can never rightly meet, 'till one man erects a ſhop, to which all the workmen, and all the cuſtomers repair. In this province, graſs riſes in abundance: The inhabitants abound in cheeſe and butter and cattle; but want bread and corn, which, in a neighbour⯑ing province, are in too great abundance for the uſes of the inhabitants. One man diſcovers this. He brings corn from the one province, and returns with cattle; and ſupplying the wants of both, he is, ſo far, a common benefactor. As the people en⯑creaſe in numbers and induſtry, the difficulty of their mutual intercourſe encreaſes: The buſineſs of the agency or merchandize becomes more intri⯑cate; and divides, ſub-divides, compounds, and mixes to a greater variety. In all theſe tranſacti⯑ons, 'tis neceſſary and reaſonable, that a conſider⯑able part of the commodities and labour ſhou'd be⯑long [69] to the merchant, to whom, in a great mea⯑ſure, they are owing. And theſe commodities he will ſometimes preſerve in kind, or more common⯑ly convert into money, which is their common re⯑preſentation. If gold and ſilver have encreas'd in the ſtate along with induſtry, it will require a great quantity of theſe metals to repreſent a great quan⯑tity of commodities and labour. If induſtry alone has encreas'd, the prices of every thing muſt ſink, and a very ſmall quantity of ſpecie will ſerve as a repreſentation.

THERE is no craving or demand of the human mind more conſtant and inſatiable than that for ex⯑erciſe and employment; and this deſire ſeems the foundation of moſt of our paſſions and purſuits. Deprive a man of all buſineſs and ſerious occupa⯑tion, he runs reſtleſs from one amuſement to ano⯑ther; and the weight and oppreſſion, which he feels from idleneſs, is ſo great, that he forgets the ruin, which muſt follow from his immoderate ex⯑pences. Give him a more harmleſs way of em⯑ploying his mind or body, he is ſatisfied, and feels no longer that inſatiable thirſt after pleaſure. But if the employment you give him be profitable, e⯑ſpecially if the profit be attach'd to every particular exertion of induſtry, he has gain ſo often in his eye, that he acquires, by degrees, a paſſion for it, and knows no ſuch pleaſure as that of ſeeing the daily encreaſe of his fortune. And this is the reaſon why [70] trade encreaſes frugality, and why, among mer⯑chants, there is the ſame overplus of miſers above prodigals, as, among the poſſeſſors of land, there is the contrary.

COMMERCE encreaſes induſtry, by conveying it readily from one member of the ſtate to another, and allowing none of it to periſh or become uſeleſs. It encreaſes frugality, by giving occupation to men, and employing them in the arts of gain, which ſoon engage their affection, and remove them from all reliſh of pleaſure and expence. 'Tis an infallible conſequence of all induſtrious profeſſions to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love of pleaſure. Among lawyers and phyſi⯑cians, who have any practice, there are many more, who live within their income, than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers and phyſici⯑ans beget no induſtry; and 'tis even at the expence of others they acquire their riches; ſo that they are ſure to diminiſh the poſſeſſions of ſome of their fel⯑low citizens as faſt as they encreaſe their own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget induſtry, by ſerving as canals to convey it thro' every corner of the ſtate; and, at the ſame time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that in⯑duſtry, and collect a large property in the labour and commodities, which they are the chief inſtru⯑ments in producing. There is no other profeſſion, therefore, except merchandize, which can make [71] the money'd intereſt conſiderable, or in other words, can encreaſe induſtry, and by alſo encreaſing fru⯑gality, give a great command of that induſtry to particular members of the ſociety. Without com⯑merce, the ſtate muſt conſiſt chiefly of landed gen⯑try, whoſe prodigality and expence make a con⯑tinual demand for borrowing; and of peaſants, who have no ſums to ſupply that demand. The mo⯑ney never gathers into large ſtocks or ſums, that can be lent at intereſt. It is diſperſt into number⯑leſs hands, who either ſquander it in idle ſhow and magnificence, or employ it in the purchaſe of the common neceſſaries of life. Commerce alone aſſembles it into conſiderable ſums; and this effect it has merely from the induſtry, which it begets, and the frugality, which it inſpires, independent of the quantity of precious metal, which may cir⯑culate in the ſtate.

THUS an encreaſe of commerce, by a neceſſary and infallible conſequence, raiſes a great number of lenders, and by that means produces a lowneſs of intereſt. We muſt now conſider how far this encreaſe of commerce diminiſhes the profits ariſ⯑ing from that profeſſion, and gives riſe to the third circumſtance requiſite to produce a lowneſs of in⯑tereſt.

IT may be proper to obſerve on this head, that low intereſt and low profits of merchandize are [72] two events, that mutually forward each other, and are both originally deriv'd from that extenſive com⯑merce, which produces opulent merchants, and renders the money'd intereſt conſiderable. Where merchants poſſeſs great ſtocks, whether repreſent⯑ed by few or many pieces of metal, it muſt fre⯑quently happen, that, when they either become tir'd of buſineſs, or have heirs unwilling or unfit to engage in commerce, a great deal of theſe riches naturally ſeeks an annual and ſecure revenue. The plenty diminiſhes their price, and makes the lend⯑ers accept of a low intereſt. This conſideration obliges many to keep their ſtocks in trade, and ra⯑ther be content with low profit than diſpoſe of their money at an under-value. On the other hand, when commerce has become very extenſive, and employs very large ſtocks, there muſt ariſe rival⯑ſhips among the merchants, which diminiſh the profits of trade; at the ſame time, that they en⯑creaſe the trade itſelf. The low profits of mer⯑chandize induce the merchants to accept more willingly of a low intereſt, when they leave off buſineſs, and begin to indulge themſelves in eaſe and indolence. It is needleſs, therefore, to enquire, which of theſe circumſtances, viz. low intereſt or low profits, is the cauſe, and which the effect. They both ariſe from an extenſive commerce, and mu⯑tually forward each other. No man will accept of low profits, where he can have high intereſt; and no man will accept of low intereſt, where he can [73] have high profits. An extenſive commerce, by pro⯑ducing large ſtocks, diminiſhes both intereſt and profit, and is always aſſiſted, in its diminution of the one, by the proportional ſinking of the other. I may add, that as low profits ariſe from the en⯑creaſe of commerce and induſtry; they ſerve in their turn to the farther encreaſe of commerce, by ren⯑dering the commodities cheaper, encreaſing the conſumption, and heightening the induſtry. And thus, if we conſider the whole connexion of cauſes and effects, intereſt is the true barometer of the ſtate, and its lowneſs is a ſign almoſt infallible of the flouriſhing of a people. It proves the encreaſe of induſtry, and its prompt circulation thro' the whole ſtate, little inferior to a demonſtration. And tho', perhaps, it may not be impoſſible but a ſudden and a great check to commerce may have a momenta⯑ry effect of the ſame kind, by throwing ſo many ſtocks out of trade; it muſt be attended with ſuch miſery and want of employment in the poor, that, beſides its ſhort duration, it will not be poſſible to miſtake the one caſe for the other.

THOSE, who have aſſerted, that the plenty of money was the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeem to have taken a collateral effect for a cauſe; ſince the ſame induſtry, which ſinks the intereſt, does common⯑ly acquire great abundance of the precious metals. A variety of fine manufactures, along with vigilant, enterpriſing merchants, will ſoon draw money to [74] a ſtate, if it be any where to be found in the world. The ſame cauſe, by multiplying the conveniences of life, and encreaſing induſtry, collects great riches into the hands of perſons, who are not proprietors of land, and produces by that means a lowneſs of intereſt. But tho' theſe effects, plenty of money and low intereſt, do both naturally ariſe from com⯑merce and induſtry, they are altogether indepen⯑dent of each other. For, ſuppoſe a nation remov'd into the Pacific ocean, without any foreign com⯑merce or any knowledge of navigation: Suppoſe, that this nation poſſeſſes always the ſame ſtock of coin, but is continually encreaſing in its numbers and induſtry: 'Tis evident, that the price of eve⯑ry commodity muſt gradually diminiſh in that king⯑dom; ſince 'tis the proportion betwixt money and any ſpecies of goods, which fixes their mutual va⯑lue; and upon the preſent ſuppoſition, the conve⯑niences of life become every day more abundant, without any alteration on the current ſpecie. A leſs quantity of money, therefore, amongſt this people, will make a rich man, during the times of induſtry, than wou'd ſerve to that purpoſe, in ig⯑norant and ſlothful ages. Leſs money will build a houſe, portion a daughter, buy an eſtate, ſupport a manufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. Theſe are the uſes, for which men borrow money; and therefore, the greater or leſs quantity of it in a ſtate has no influence on the intereſt. But 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs ſtock of labour [75] and commodities muſt have a great influence; ſince we really and in effect borrow theſe, when we take money upon intereſt. 'Tis true, when commerce is extended all over the globe, the moſt induſtrious nations always abound moſt with the precious me⯑tals: So that low intereſt and plenty of money are in fact almoſt inſeparable. But ſtill 'tis of conſe⯑quence to know the principle, whence any pheno⯑menon ariſes, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt a cauſe and a concomitant effect. Beſides, that the ſpecu⯑lation is curious, it may frequently be of uſe in the conduct of public affairs. At leaſt, it muſt be own'd, that nothing can be of more uſe than to improve, by practice, the method of reaſoning on theſe ſub⯑jects, which, of all others, are the moſt important; tho' they are commonly treated in the looſeſt and moſt careleſs manner.

ANOTHER reaſon of this popular miſtake with regard to the cauſe of low intereſt ſeems to be the inſtance of ſome nations; where, after a ſudden ac⯑quiſition of riches or of the precious metals, by means of foreign conqueſt, the intereſt has fal⯑len, not only amongſt them, but in all the neigh⯑bouring ſtates, as ſoon as that money was diſperſt, and had inſinuated itſelf into every corner. Thus, intereſt in Spain fell near a half immediately after the diſcovery of the Weſt Indies, as we are inform'd by Garcilaſſo de la Vega: And it has been ever ſince gradually ſinking in every kingdom of Europe. [76] Intereſt in Rome, after the conqueſt of Egypt, fell from 6 to 4 per cent. as we learn from Dion. ^*

THE cauſes of the ſinking of intereſt upon ſuch an event ſeem different in the conquering country and in the neighbouring ſtates; but in neither of them can we juſtly aſcribe that effect merely to the encreaſe of gold and ſilver.

IN the conquering country, 'tis natural to ima⯑gine, that this new acquiſition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gather'd into large ſums, which ſeek a ſecure revenue, either by the pur⯑chaſe of land or by intereſt; and conſequently the ſame effect follows, for a little time, as if there had been a great occaſion of induſtry and com⯑merce. The encreaſe of lenders above the bor⯑rowers ſinks the intereſt; and ſo much the faſt⯑er, if thoſe, who have acquir'd thoſe large ſums, find no induſtry or commerce in the ſtate, and no method of employing their money but by lending it at intereſt. But after this new maſs of gold and ſilver has been digeſted and has circulated, thro' the whole ſtate, affairs will ſoon return to their former ſituation: While the landlords and new money-holders, living idly, ſquander above their in⯑come; and the former daily contract debt, and the latter encroach on their ſtock 'till its final extinc⯑tion. The whole money may ſtill be in the ſtate, [77] and make itſelf felt by the encreaſe of prices: But not being now collected into any large maſſes or ſtocks, the diſproportion betwixt the borrowers and lenders is the ſame as formerly, and conſe⯑quently the high intereſt returns.

ACCORDINGLY we find, in Rome, that ſo ear⯑ly as Tiberius's time, intereſt had again mounted to 6 per cent. ^* tho' no accident had happen'd to drain the empire of money. In Trajan's time, money, lent on mortgages in Italy, bore 6 per cent. ^† on common ſecurities in Bithynia, 12.^‡ And if intereſt in Spain has not riſen to its old pitch; this can be aſcrib'd to nothing but the continuance of the ſame cauſe, that ſunk it, viz. the large fortunes continually made in the Indies, which come over to Spain, from time to time, and ſupply the de⯑mand of the borrowers. But this accidental and extraneous cauſe, more money is to be lent in Spain; that is, more money is collected into large ſums, than would otherways be found in a ſtate, where there are ſo little commerce and induſtry.

As to the reduction of intereſt, which has fol⯑low'd in England, France, and other kingdoms of Europe, that have no mines, it has been gra⯑dual, and has not proceeded from the encreaſe of money, conſider'd merely in itſelf, but from the [78] encreaſe of induſtry, which is the natural effect of the former encreaſe, in that interval, before it raiſ⯑es the price of labour and proviſions. For to re⯑turn to the foregoing ſuppoſition; if the induſtry of England had riſen as much from other cauſes (and that riſe might eaſily have happen'd, tho' the ſtock of money had remain'd the ſame) muſt not all the ſame conſequences have follow'd, which we obſerve at preſent? The ſame people wou'd, in that caſe, be found in the kingdom, the ſame commo⯑dities, the ſame induſtry, manufactures and com⯑merce, and conſequently the ſame merchants, with the ſame ſtocks, that is, with the ſame command over labour and commodities, only repreſented by a ſmaller number of white or yellow pieces: Which being a circumſtance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and trunk-maker. Lu⯑xury, therefore, manufactures, arts, induſtry, fru⯑gality, flouriſhing equally as at preſent, 'tis evident that intereſt muſt alſo have been as low; ſince that is the neceſſary reſult of all theſe circumſtances; ſo far as they determine the profits of commerce, and the proportion betwixt the borrowers and lend⯑ers in any ſtate.

DISCOURSE V. Of the Balance of Trade.

'TIS very uſual, amongſt nations ignorant of the nature of commerce, to prohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preſerve a⯑mongſt themſelves, whatever they think valuable and uſeful. They conſider not, that, in this pro⯑hibition, they act directly contrary to their inten⯑tions, and that the more is exported of any com⯑modity, the more will be rais'd at home, of which they themſelves will always have the firſt offer.

'TIS well known to the learned, that the antient laws of Athens render'd the exportation of figs cri⯑minal; that being ſuppos'd a ſpecies of fruit ſo ex⯑cellent in Attica, that the Athenians eſteem'd it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner. And in this ridiculous prohibition they were ſo much in earneſt, that informers were thence called ſy⯑cophants among them, from two Greek words, which ſignify figs and diſcoverer. ^* I have been told, that many old acts of parliament ſhow the ſame ignorance in the nature of commerce. And to this day, in a neighbouring kingdom, the exporta⯑tion of corn is almoſt always prohibited; in order, [80] as they ſay, to prevent famines; tho' 'tis evident, that nothing contributes more to the frequent fa⯑mines, which ſo much diſtreſs that fertile country.

THE ſame jealous fear with regard to money has alſo prevail'd amongſt ſeveral nations; and it requir'd both reaſon and experience to convince any people, that theſe prohibitions ſerve to no other purpoſe than to raiſe the exchange againſt them, and produce a ſtill greater exportation.

THESE errors, one may ſay, are groſs and palp⯑able: But there ſtill prevails, even amongſt nati⯑ons well acquainted with commerce, a ſtrong jea⯑louſy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and ſilver may be leaving them. This ſeems to me, almoſt in every caſe, a very groundleſs apprehenſion; and I ſhou'd as ſoon dread, that all our ſprings and rivers wou'd be exhauſted, as that money ſhou'd abandon a king⯑dom, where there are people and induſtry. Let us carefully preſerve theſe latter advantages; and we need never be apprehenſive of loſing the former.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that all calculations con⯑cerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and ſuppoſitions. The cuſtom⯑houſe books are own'd to be an inſufficient ground of reaſoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better, unleſs we conſider it with all nations, and [81] know alſo the proportions of the ſeveral ſums re⯑mitted; which one may ſafely pronounce impoſ⯑ſible. Every man, who has ever reaſon'd on this ſubject, has always prov'd his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enume⯑ration of all the commodities ſent to all foreign kingdoms.

THE writings of Mr. Gee ſtruck the nation with an univerſal pannic, when they ſaw it plainly de⯑monſtrated, by a detail of particulars, that the ba⯑lance was againſt them for ſo conſiderable a ſum as muſt leave them without a ſingle ſhilling in five or ſix years. But, luckily, twenty years have ſince elaps'd, along with an expenſive foreign war; and yet 'tis commonly ſuppos'd, that money is ſtill more plentiful amongſt us than in any former period.

NOTHING can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. Swift; an author, who has more humour than knowledge, more taſte than judg⯑ment, and more ſpleen, prejudice, and paſſion than any of theſe qualities. He ſays, in his ſhort view of the ſtate of Ireland, that the whole caſh of that kingdom amounted but to 500,000 l. that out of this they remitted every year a neat million to Eng⯑land, and had ſcarce any other ſource to compen⯑ſate themſelves from, and little other foreign trade but the importation of French wines, for which they pay'd ready money. The conſequence of [82] this ſituation, which muſt be own'd diſadvantage⯑ous, was, that in a courſe of three years, the cur⯑rent money of Ireland, from 500,000 l. was re⯑duc'd to leſs than two. And at preſent, I ſuppoſe, in a courſe of near 30 years, it is abſolutely nothing. Yet I know not how, that opinion of the advance of riches in Ireland, which gave the doctor ſo much indignation, ſeems ſtill to continue, and gain ground amongſt every body.

IN ſhort, this apprehenſion of the wrong balance of trade, appears of ſuch a nature, that it diſcovers itſelf, wherever one is out of humour with the miniſtry, or is in low ſpirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, which may prove the impoſſibility of that event, as long as we preſerve our people and our induſtry.

SUPPOSE four parts of all the money in Britain to be annihilated in one night, and the nation re⯑duc'd to the ſame condition, in this particular, as in the reigns of the Harrys and Edwards; what would be the conſequence? Muſt not the price of all labour and commodities ſink in proportion, and every thing be ſold as cheap as they were in thoſe ages? What nation could then diſpute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to ſell manufactures at the ſame price, which to us [83] wou'd afford ſufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, muſt this bring back the money, which we had loſt, and raiſe us to the level of all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we have ar⯑riv'd, we immediately loſe the advantage of the cheapneſs of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is ſtopt by our fulneſs and repletion.

AGAIN; ſuppoſe, that all the money in Britain were multiply'd four-fold in a night, muſt not the contrary effect follow? Muſt not all labour and commodities riſe to ſuch an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became ſo cheap in compariſon, that, in ſpite of all the laws, which cou'd be form'd, they wou'd be run in upon us, and our money wou'd flow out; 'till we fall to a level with foreigners, and loſe that great ſuperiority of riches, which had laid us under ſuch diſadvantages?

Now 'tis evident, that the ſame cauſes, which wou'd correct theſe exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculouſly, muſt prevent their happening in the common courſe of nature, and muſt for ever, in all neighbouring nations, preſerve money nearly proportion'd to the art and induſtry of each nation. All water, wherever it commu⯑nicates, remains always at a level: Ask naturaliſts [84] the reaſon; they tell you, that were it to be rais'd in any one place, the ſuperior gravity of that part, not being balanc'd, muſt depreſs it, 'till it meets a counterpoize; and that the ſame cauſe, which re⯑dreſſes the inequality, when it happens, muſt for ever prevent it, without ſome violent, external o⯑peration.^*

CAN one imagine, that it had ever been poſ⯑ſible, by any laws, or even by any art, or induſtry, to have preſerv'd all the money in Spain, which the galleons have brought from the Indies? Or that all commodities cou'd be ſold in France for a tenth of the price they wou'd yield on the other ſide of the Pyrenees, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immenſe treaſure? What other reaſon, indeed, is there, why all nations, at preſent, gain in their trade with Spain and Portu⯑gal; but becauſe it is impoſſible to heap up mo⯑ney, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level? The ſovereigns of theſe countries have ſhown, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and ſilver to themſelves, had it been in any degree prac⯑ticable.

[85] BUT as any body of water may be rais'd above the level of the ſurrounding element, if the form⯑er has no communication with the latter; ſo in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or phyſical impediment (for all laws alone are ineffectual) there may, in ſuch a caſe, be a ve⯑ry great inequality of money. Thus the immenſe diſtance of China, along with the monopolies of our India companies, obſtructing the communication, preſerve in Europe the gold and ſilver, eſpecially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But notwithſtanding this great obſtruction, the force of the cauſes above mention'd is ſtill evident. The ſkill and ingenu⯑ity of Europe in general much ſurpaſſes that of Chi⯑na, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; yet are we never able to trade thither without great diſadvantage: And were it not for the continual re⯑cruits we receive from America, money wou'd ve⯑ry ſoon ſink in Europe, and riſe in China, 'till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reaſonable man doubt, but that induſtrious na⯑tion, were they as near us as Poland or Barba⯑ry, would drain us of the overplus of our ſpecie, and draw to themſelves a larger ſhare of the Weſt Indian treaſures. We need have no recourſe to a phyſical attraction, to explain the neceſſity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, ariſing from the intereſts and paſſions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

[86] HOW is the balance kept in the provinces of e⯑very kingdom among themſelves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impoſſible for mo⯑ney to loſe its level, and either to riſe or ſink, be⯑yond the proportion of the labour and commodi⯑ties, that is in each province? Did not long expe⯑rience make people eaſy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford a melancholy Yorkſhire man; while he computed and magnify'd the ſums drawn to London by taxes, abſentees, commodities; and found on compariſon the oppoſite articles ſo much inferior? And no doubt, had the Heptarchy ſubſiſted in England, the legiſlature of each ſtate had been continually a⯑larm'd by the fear of a wrong balance; and as 'tis probable, that the mutual hatred of theſe ſtates wou'd have been extremely violent, on account of their cloſe neighbourhood, they wou'd have loaded and oppreſt all commerce, by a jealous and ſuperflu⯑ous caution. Since the union has remov'd the bar⯑riers betwixt Scotland and England; which of theſe nations gains from the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom has receiv'd any encreaſe of riches, can it be reaſonable accounted for by a⯑ny thing, but the encreaſe of its art and induſtry? 'Twas a common apprehenſion in England, before the union, as we learn from L'Abbe du Bos, ^* that Scotland wou'd ſoon drain them of their treaſure, [87] were an open trade allow'd; and on t'other ſide the Tweed a contrary apprehenſion prevail'd: With what juſtice in both, time has ſhown.

WHAT happens in ſmall portions of mankind muſt take place in greater. The provinces of the Roman empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with Italy, independent of the le⯑giſlature; as much as the ſeveral counties of Bri⯑tain, or the ſeveral pariſhes of each county. And any man, who travels over Europe, at this day, may ſee, by the prices of commodities, that mo⯑ney, in ſpite of the abſurd jealouſy of princes and ſtates, has brought itſelf nearly to a level, and that the difference betwixt one kingdom and another is not greater in this reſpect, than it is often betwixt different provinces of the ſame kingdom. Men naturally flock to capital cities, ſea-ports, and na⯑vigable rivers. There we find more men, more induſtry, more labour, and conſequently more mo⯑ney; but ſtill the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preſerv'd.^*

[88] OUR jealouſy and our hatred of France are with⯑out bounds; and the former ſentiment, at leaſt, muſt be acknowledg'd very reaſonable and well ground⯑ed. Theſe paſſions have occaſion'd innumerable barriers and obſtructions upon commerce, where we are accus'd of being commonly the aggreſſors. But what have we gain'd by the bargain? We loſt the French market for our woolen manufactures, and transferr'd the commerce of wine to Spain and Portugal, where we buy much worſe liquor at a higher price. There are few Engliſhmen, that wou'd not think their country abſolutely ruin'd, were French wines ſold in England ſo cheap and in ſuch abundance as to ſupplant, in ſome meaſure, all ale and home-brewn liquors: But wou'd we lay a⯑ſide prejudice, it wou'd not be difficult to prove, that nothing cou'd be more innocent, perhaps ad⯑vantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in France, in order to ſupply England with wine, wou'd make it requiſite for the French to take the product of an Engliſh acre, ſown in wheat or bar⯑ley, in order to ſubſiſt themſelves; and 'tis evi⯑dent, we have thereby got command of the better commodity.

[89] THERE are many edicts of the French king, pro⯑hibiting the planting of new vineyards, and order⯑ing all thoſe lately planted to be grubb'd up: So ſenſible are they, in that country, of the ſuperior value of corn, above every other product.

MARESCHAL Vauban complains often, and with reaſon, of the abſurd duties, which load the entry of wines of Languedoc, Guienne and thoſe other ſouthern provinces, that are imported into Britany and Normandy. He entertain'd no doubt, but theſe latter provinces cou'd preſerve their ba⯑lance, notwithſtanding the open commerce, which he recommends. And 'tis evident, that a few leagues more navigation to England wou'd make no difference: Or if it did, that it muſt operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

THERE is indeed one expedient, by which it is poſſible to ſink, and another by which we may raiſe, money beyond its natural level in any king⯑dom; but theſe caſes, when examin'd, will be found to reſolve into our general theory, and to bring ad⯑ditional authority to it.

I SCARCE know any method of ſinking money below its level; but thoſe inſtitutions of banks, funds, and paper credit, with which we are in this kingdom ſo much infatuated. Theſe render [90] paper equivalent to money, circulate it thro' the whole ſtate, make it ſupply the place of gold and ſilver, raiſe proportionably the price of labour and commodities, and by that means either baniſh a great part of thoſe precious metals, or prevent their farther encreaſe. What can be more ſhort-ſight⯑ed than our reaſonings on this head? We fancy, becauſe an individual wou'd be much richer, were his ſtock of money doubled, that the ſame good ef⯑fect wou'd follow were the money of every one encreas'd; not conſidering, that this wou'd raiſe as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man, in time, to the ſame condition as be⯑fore. 'Tis only in our public negotiations and tranſactions with foreigners, that a greater ſtock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there abſolutely inſignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects, ariſing from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages.

SUPPOSE there are 12 millions of paper, that circulate in the kingdom as money (for we are not to imagine, that all our enormous funds are em⯑ploy'd in that ſhape) and ſuppoſe, that the real caſh of the kingdom is 18 millions: Here is a ſtate, which is found by experience able to hold a ſtock of 30 millions. I ſay, if it be able to hold it, it muſt of neceſſity have acquir'd it in gold and ſilver, had we not obſtructed the entrance of theſe metals by this new invention of paper. Whence would it [91] have acquir'd that ſum? From all the kingdoms of the world. But why? Becauſe, if you remove theſe 12 millions, money in this ſtate is below its level, compar'd with our neighbours; and we muſt immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and ſaturate, ſo to ſpeak, and can hold no more. By our wiſe politics, we are as careful to ſtuff the nation with this fine commodity of bank⯑bills and chequer-notes, as if we were afraid of be⯑ing overburthen'd with the precious metals.

'TIS not to be doubted, but the great plenty of bullion in France, is, in a great meaſure, owing to the want of paper credit. The French have no banks: Merchants bills do not there circulate as with us: Uſury or lending on intereſt is not di⯑rectly permitted; ſo that many have large ſums in their coffers: Great quantities of plate are us'd in private houſes; and all the churches are full of it. By this means, proviſions and labour ſtill remain much cheaper amongſt them than in nations that are not half ſo rich in gold and ſilver. The ad⯑vantage of this ſituation in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies, is too evident to be diſputed.

THE ſame faſhion, a few years ago, prevail'd in Genoa, which ſtill has place in England and Hol⯑land, of uſing ſervices of China ware inſtead of plate; but the ſenate, wiſely foreſeeing the conſe⯑quences, [92] prohibited the uſe of that brittle commo⯑dity beyond a certain extent; while the uſe of ſil⯑ver plate was left unlimited. And I ſuppoſe, in their late diſtreſſes, they felt the good effect of this ordonnance.^*

BEFORE the introduction of paper money into our colonies, they had gold and ſilver ſufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of that commodity, the leaſt of the inconveniencies that has follow'd, is the total baniſhment of the preci⯑ous metals. And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while theſe colonies poſſeſs manufactures and commodities, the only things valuable in commerce, and for whoſe ſake alone all men deſire money.

WHAT pity Lycurgus did not think of paper cre⯑dit, when he wanted to baniſh gold and ſilver from Sparta! It wou'd have ſerv'd his purpoſe better than the lumps of iron he made uſe of as money; and wou'd alſo have prevented more effectually all commerce with ſtrangers, as being of ſo much leſs real and intrinſic value.

BUT as our darling projects of paper credit are pernicious, being almoſt the only expedient, by which we can ſink money below its level; ſo in my opinion the only expedient, by which we can raiſe money above its level, is a practice we wou'd all [93] exclaim againſt as deſtructive, viz. the gathering large ſums into a public treaſure, locking them up, and abſolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid, not communicating with the neigh⯑bouring element, may, by ſuch an artifice, be rais'd to what height we pleaſe. To prove this, we need only return to our firſt ſuppoſition, of the anni⯑hilating the half or any part of our caſh; where we found, that the immediate conſequence of ſuch an event wou'd be, the attraction of an equal ſum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there ſeem to be any neceſſary bounds ſet, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding. A ſmall city, like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages, might engroſs nine tenths of the money of Europe. There ſeems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obſtacle to that immenſe growth of riches. A weak ſtate, with an enormous treaſure, wou'd ſoon become a prey to ſome of its poorer but more powerful neighbours. A great ſtate wou'd diſſipate its wealth on dangerous and ill⯑concerted projects; and probably deſtroy, along with it, what is much more valuable, the induſtry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid, in this caſe, rais'd to too great a height, burſts and deſtroys the veſſel, that contains it; and mixing it⯑ſelf with the ſurrounding element, ſoon falls to its proper level.

[94] So little are we commonly acquainted with this principle, that, tho' all hiſtorians agree in relating uniformly ſo recent an event, as the immenſe treaſure amaſs'd by Harry the VII. (which they make amount to 1,700,000 pounds) we rather re⯑ject their concurring teſtimony, than admit of a fact, which agrees ſo ill with our inveterate prejudices. 'Tis indeed probable, that that ſum might be three fourths of all the money in England. But where is the difficulty that ſuch a ſum might be amaſs'd in twenty years, by a cunning, rapacious, frugal, and almoſt arbitrary monarch? Nor is it probable, that the diminution of circulating money was ever ſen⯑ſibly felt by the people, or ever did them any pre⯑judice. The ſinking of the prices of all commo⯑dities wou'd immediately replace it, by giving Eng⯑land the advantage in its commerce with all the neighbouring kingdoms.

HAVE we not an inſtance in the ſmall republic of Athens with its allies, who in about fifty years, betwixt the Median and Peloponeſian wars, amaſs'd a ſum greater than that of Harry the VII?^* For all the Greek hiſtorians ^† and orators ^‡ agree, that the Athenians collected in the citadel more than 10,000 [95] talents, which they afterwards diſſipated to their own ruin, in raſh and imprudent enterpriſes. But when this money was ſet a running, and began to communicate with the ſurrounding fluid; what was the conſequence? Did it remain in the ſtate? No. For we find by the memorable cenſus, men⯑tion'd by Demoſthenes ^* and Polybius, ^† that in about fifty years afterwards, the whole value of the repu⯑blic, comprehending lands, houſes, commodities, ſlaves, and money, was leſs than 6000 talents.

WHAT an ambitious high ſpirited people was this, to collect and keep in their treaſury, with a view to conqueſts, a ſum, which it was every day in the power of the citizens, by a ſingle vote, to diſtribute among themſelves, and which wou'd go near to triple the riches of every individual! For we muſt obſerve, that the numbers and private rich⯑es of the Athenians are ſaid by antient writers to have been no greater at the beginning of the Pelopon⯑neſian war, than at the beginning of the Macedonian.

MONEY was little more plentiful in Greece dur⯑ing the age of Philip and Perſeus than in England during that of Harry the VII: Yet theſe two mo⯑narchs in 30 years,^‡ collected, from the ſmall kingdom of Macedon, a much larger treaſure than that of the Engliſh monarch. Paulus Aemilius [96] brought to Rome about 1,700,000 pounds Ster⯑ling. ^* Pliny ſays 2,400,000.^† And that was but a part of the Macedonian treaſure. The reſt was diſſipated by the reſiſtance and flight of Perſeus. ^‡

WE may learn from Stanyan, that the canton of Berne had 300,000 pounds lent at intereſt, and had above ſix times as much in their treaſury. Here then is a ſum hoarded of 1,800,000 pounds Sterling, which is at leaſt quadruple of what ſhou'd naturally circulate in ſuch a petty ſtate; and yet no one, who travels into the Païs de Vaux or any part of that canton, obſerves any want of money more than cou'd be ſuppos'd in a country of that extent, ſoil, and ſituation. On the contrary, there are ſcarce any inland provinces in the continent of France or Germany, where the inhabitants are at this time ſo opulent; tho' that canton has vaſtly en⯑creas'd its treaſure ſince 1714, the time when Sta⯑nyan wrote his judicious account of Switzerland. ^*

THE account given by Appian ^† of the treaſure of the Ptolemies, is ſo prodigious, that one cannot ad⯑mit [97] of it; and ſo much the more, that the hi⯑ſtorian ſays the other ſucceſſors of Alexander were alſo frugal, and had many of them treaſures not much inferior. For this ſaving humour of the neigh⯑bouring princes muſt neceſſarily have check'd the frugality of the Aegyptian monarchs, according to the foregoing theory. The ſum he mentions is 740,000 talents or 191,166,666 pounds 13 ſhil⯑lings and 4 pence, according to Dr. Arbuthnot's com⯑putation. And yet Appian ſays, that he extracted his account from the public records; and he was himſelf a native of Alexandria.

FROM theſe principles we may learn what judg⯑ment we ought to form of thoſe numberleſs bars, obſtructions, and impoſts, which all nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant deſire of amaſſing money, which never will heap up beyond its le⯑vel, while it circulates; or from an ill grounded ap⯑prehenſion of loſing their ſpecie, which never will ſink below it. Cou'd any thing ſcatter our riches, 'twou'd be ſuch impolitic contrivances. But this general ill effect, however, reſults from them, that they deprive neighbouring nations of that free com⯑munication and exchange, which the author of the world has intended, by giving them ſoils, climates, and geniuſes, ſo different from each other.

[98] OUR modern politics embrace the only method of baniſhing money, the uſing paper credit; they reject the only method of amaſſing it, the practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivan⯑ces, which ſerve to no purpoſe but to check induſ⯑try, and rob ourſelves and our neighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.

ALL taxes, however, upon foreign commodi⯑ties, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or uſeleſs, but thoſe only which are founded on the jealou⯑ſy above mention'd. A tax on German linen en⯑courages home manufactures, and thereby multi⯑plies our people and induſtry. A tax on brandy encreaſes the ſale of rum, and ſupports our ſouthern colonies. And as 'tis neceſſary impoſts ſhou'd be levy'd for the ſupport of government, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities, which can eaſily be intercepted at the port, and ſubjected to the impoſt. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. Swift, that, in the arithmetic of the cuſtoms, two and two make not four, but often make only one. It can ſcarcely be doubted, but if the duties on wine were lower'd to a third, they wou'd yield much more to the government than at preſent: Our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a better and more wholſome liquor: And no preju⯑dice wou'd enſue to the balance of trade, of which [99] we are ſo jealous. The manufacture of ale, beyond the agriculture, is but inconſiderable, and gives employment to few hands. The tranſport of wine and corn wou'd not be much inferior.

BUT are there not frequent inſtances, you will ſay, of ſtates and kingdoms, that were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly? Has not the money left them, with which they formerly abounded? I anſwer, If they loſe their trade, induſtry, and people, they cannot expect to keep their gold and ſilver: For theſe precious me⯑tals hold proportion to the former advantages. When Lisbon and Amſterdam got the Eaſt India trade from Venice and Genoa, they alſo got the pro⯑fits and money, that aroſe from it. Where the ſeat of government is transferr'd, where expenſive armies are maintain'd at a diſtance, where great funds are poſſeſt by foreigners; there naturally fol⯑lows from theſe cauſes a diminution of the ſpecie. But theſe, we may obſerve, are violent and forcible methods of carrying away money, and are in time commonly attended with the tranſport of people and induſtry. But where theſe remain, and the drain is not continu'd, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred canals, of which we have no notion nor ſuſpicion. What immenſe trea⯑ſures have been ſpent, by ſo many nations, in Flan⯑ders, ſince the revolution, in the courſe of three long wars? More money perhaps, than the half of what [100] is at preſent in all Europe. But what has now be⯑come of it? Is it in the narrow compaſs of the Auſ⯑trian provinces? No ſurely: It has moſt of it re⯑turn'd to the ſeveral countries, whence it came, and has follow'd that art and induſtry, by which, at firſt, it was acquir'd.

IN ſhort, a government has great reaſon to pre⯑ſerve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may ſafely truſt to the courſe of human affairs, without fear or jealouſy. Or if it ever give attention to that latter circumſtance, it ought on⯑ly to be ſo far as it affects the former.

DISCOURSE VI. Of the Balance of Power.

IT is a queſtion, whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phraſe only has been invented in theſe latter ages. 'Tis certain, that^* Xenophon, in his inſtitution of Cyrus, repreſents the combination of the Aſiatic powers to have ariſen from a jealouſy of the encreaſing force of the Medes and Perſians; and tho' that elegant compoſition ſhou'd be ſup⯑pos'd altogether a romance, this ſentiment, aſcrib'd by the author to the Eaſtern princes, is at leaſt a proof of the prevailing notions of antient times.

IN the whole politics of Greece, the anxiety, with regard to the balance, is moſt apparent, and is expreſsly pointed out to us, even by the antient hiſtorians. Thucydides ^† repreſents the league, which was form'd againſt Athens, and which produc'd the Peloponneſian war, as entirely owing to this prin⯑ciple. And after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedemonians diſputed for ſovereigni⯑ty, we find, that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) threw themſelves always into the [102] lighter ſcale, and endeavour'd to preſerve the ba⯑lance. They ſupported Thebes againſt Sparta, till the great victory, gain'd by Epaminondas at Leuc⯑tra; after which they immediately went over to the conquer'd, from generoſity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealouſy of the conquer⯑ors.^*

WHOEVER will read Demoſthenes's oration for the Megalopolitans, may ſee the utmoſt refinements on this principle, that ever enter'd into the head of a Venetian or Engliſh ſpeculatiſt. And upon the firſt riſe of the Macedonian power, this orator im⯑mediately diſcover'd the danger, ſounded the alarm thro' all Greece, and at laſt aſſembled that confede⯑racy under the banners of Athens, which fought the great and deciſive battle of Chaeronea.

'TIS true, the Grecian wars are regarded by hiſtorians as wars of emulation rather than of poli⯑tics; and each ſtate ſeems to have had more in view the honour of leading the reſt than any well⯑grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we conſider, indeed, the ſmall number of inhabitants in any one republic, compar'd to the whole, the great difficulty of forming ſieges in thoſe times, and the extraordinary bravery and diſcipline of every free⯑man amongſt that noble people; we ſhall con⯑clude, [103] that the balance of power was of itſelf ſuf⯑ficiently ſecur'd in Greece, and needed not to be guarded with that caution, which may be requi⯑ſite in other ages. But whether we aſcribe the ſhifting ſides in all the Grecian republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were a⯑like, and every prevailing power was ſure to meet with a confederacy againſt it, and that often com⯑pos'd of its former friends and allies.

THE ſame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produc'd the Oſtraciſm of Athens and Petaliſm of Syracuſe, and expell'd every citizen, whoſe fame or power overtop'd the reſt; the ſame principle, I ſay, naturally diſcover'd itſelf in foreign politics, and ſoon rais'd enemies to the leading ſtate, how⯑ever moderate in the exerciſe of its authority.

THE Perſian monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compar'd to the Grecian republics; and therefore it behov'd him, from views of ſafety more than from emulation, to intereſt himſelf in their quarrels, and to ſupport the weaker ſide in every conteſt. This was the advice given by Alcibiades to Tiſſaphernes, ^* and it prolong'd near a century the date of the Perſian empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the firſt appearance of the aſpiring genius of Philip, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, [104] with a rapidity, of which there are few inſtances in the hiſtory of mankind.

THE ſucceſſors of Alexander ſhow'd an infinite jealouſy of the balance of power; a jealouſy, found⯑ed on true politics and prudence, and which pre⯑ſerv'd diſtinct for ſeveral ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of Antigonus ^* threaten'd them anew with an univerſal monarchy; but their com⯑bination and their victory at Ipſus ſav'd them. And in after times, we find, that, as the Eaſtern princes conſider'd the Greeks and Macedonians as the only real military force, with whom they had any in⯑tercourſe, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The Ptolemies, in particu⯑lar, ſupported firſt Aratus and the Achaeans, and then Cleomenes King of Sparta, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the Macedonian mo⯑narchs. For this is the account, which Polybius gives of the Egyptian politics.^†

THE reaſon, why 'tis ſuppos'd, that the antients were intirely ignorant of the balance of power, ſeems to be drawn from the Roman hiſtory more than the Greek; and as the tranſactions of the former are generally the moſt familiar to us, we have thence form'd all our concluſions. It muſt be [105] own'd, that the Romans never met with any ſuch general combination or confederacy againſt them, as might naturally be expected from their rapid conqueſts and declar'd ambition; but were al⯑low'd peaceably to ſubdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion o⯑ver the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous hiſtory of their Italic wars^*; there was, [104] [...] [105] [...] [106] upon Hannibal's invaſion of the Roman ſtate, a ve⯑ry remarkable criſis, which ought to have call'd up the attention of all civiliz'd nations. It appear'd afterwards (nor was it difficult to be obſerv'd at the time ^*) that this was a conteſt for univerſal empire; and yet no prince or ſtate ſeems to have been in the leaſt alarm'd about the event or iſſue of the quarrel. Philip of Macedon remain'd neuter, 'till he ſaw the victories of Hannibal; and then moſt imprudently form'd an alliance with the conque⯑ror, upon terms ſtill more imprudent. He ſtipu⯑lated, that he was to aſſiſt the Carthaginian ſtate in their conqueſt of Italy; after which they en⯑gag'd to ſend over forces into Greece, to aſſiſt him in ſubduing the Grecian commonwealths ^†.

THE Rhodian and Achaean republics are much celebrated by antient hiſtorians for their wiſdom and ſound policy; yet both of them aſſiſted the Romans in their wars againſt Philip and Antiochus. And what may be eſteem'd ſtill a ſtronger proof, that this maxim was not familiarly known in thoſe ages; no antient author has ever remark'd the impru⯑dence [107] of thoſe meaſures, nor has even blam'd that abſurd treaty above mention'd, made by Philip with the Carthaginians. Princes and ſtateſmen may, in all ages, be blinded in their reaſonings with re⯑gard to events, before hand: But 'tis ſomewhat extraordinary, that hiſtorians, afterwards, ſhou'd not form a ſounder judgment of them.

Maſſiniſſa, Attalus, Pruſias, in ſatisfying their private paſſions, were, all of them, the inſtru⯑ments of the Roman greatneſs, and never ſeem to have ſuſpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanc'd the conqueſts of their ally. A ſimple treaty and agreement betwixt Maſ⯑ſiniſſa and the Carthaginians, ſo much requir'd by mutual intereſt, barr'd the Romans from all en⯑trance into Africa, and preſerv'd liberty to man⯑kind.

THE only prince we meet with in the Roman hiſtory, who ſeems to have underſtood the balance of power, is Hiero king of Syracuſe. Tho' ally of Rome, he ſent aſſiſtance to the Carthaginians, dur⯑ing the war of the auxiliaries. ‘Eſteeming it re⯑quiſite, (ſays Polybius ^*) both in order to re⯑tain his dominions in Sicily, and to preſerve the Roman friendſhip, that Carthage ſhou'd be ſafe: Leſt by its fall the remaining power ſhou'd be able, without contraſte or oppoſition, to execute [108] every purpoſe and undertaking. And here he acted with great wiſdom and prudence. For that is never, on any account, to be overlookt; nor ought ſuch a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring ſtates from defending their rights againſt it.’ Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in expreſs terms.

IN ſhort, the maxim of preſerving the balance of power is founded ſo much on common ſenſe and obvious reaſoning, that 'tis impoſſible it cou'd alto⯑gether have eſcap'd antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, ſo many marks of deep penetra⯑tion and diſcernment. If it was not ſo generally known, and acknowledg'd as at preſent, it had, at leaſt, an influence on all the wiſer and more ex⯑perienc'd princes and politicians. And indeed, e⯑ven at preſent, however generally known and ac⯑knowledged, amongſt ſpeculative reaſoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extenſive, amongſt thoſe who govern the world.

AFTER the fall of the Roman empire, the form of government eſtabliſh'd by the northern con⯑querors, incapacitated them, in a great meaſure, from farther conqueſts, and long maintain'd each ſtate in its proper boundaries. But when vaſſalage and the feudal militia were aboliſh'd, mankind were anew alarm'd by the danger of univerſal mo⯑narchy, [109] from the union of ſo many kingdoms and principalities in the perſon of the emperor, Charles. But the power of the houſe of Auſtria, founded on extenſive but divided dominions, and their rich⯑es, deriv'd chiefly from mines of gold and ſilver, were more likely to decay, of themſelves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks rais'd againſt them. In leſs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was ſhat⯑ter'd, their opulence diſſipated, their ſplendor e⯑clips'd. A new power ſucceeded, more formida⯑ble to the liberties of Europe, poſſeſſing all the ad⯑vantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a ſhare of that ſpirit of bi⯑gotry and perſecution, with which the houſe of Auſtria were ſo long and ſtill are ſo much infa⯑tuated.

Europe has now, for above a century, remain'd on the defenſive againſt the greateſt force, that e⯑ver, perhaps, was form'd by the civil or political combination of mankind. And ſuch is the influ⯑ence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five laſt general wars, have been victorious in four ^*, and unſucceſsful only in one ^†, they have not much enlarg'd their domini⯑ons, nor acquir'd a total aſcendant over Europe. [110] On the contrary, there remain ſtill ſome hopes of maintaining the reſiſtance ſo long, that the natu⯑ral revolutions of human affairs, together with un⯑foreſeen events and accidents, may guard us a⯑gainſt univerſal monarchy, and preſerve the world from ſo great an evil.

IN the three laſt of theſe general wars, Britain has ſtood foremoſt in the glorious ſtruggle; and ſhe ſtill maintains her ſtation, as guardian of the gene⯑ral liberties of Europe, and patron of mankind. Be⯑ſide her advantages of riches and ſituation; her people are animated with ſuch a national ſpirit, and are ſo fully ſenſible of the ineſtimable bleſſings of their government, that we may hope their vigor ne⯑ver will languiſh in ſo neceſſary and ſo juſt a cauſe. On the contrary, if we may judge by the paſt, their paſſionate ardour ſeems rather to require ſome mo⯑deration; and they have oftener err'd from a laud⯑able exceſs than from a blamable deficiency.

IN the firſt place, we ſeem to have been more poſſeſt with the antient Greek ſpirit of jealous emu⯑lation, than actuated with the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with France have been begun with juſtice, and even, perhaps, from neceſ⯑ſity; but have always been too far puſh'd, from obſtinacy and paſſion. The ſame peace, which was afterwards made at Ryſwick in 1697, was of⯑fer'd ſo early as the ninety two; that concluded at [111] Utrecht in 1712 might have been finiſh'd on as good conditions at Gertruytenberg in the eight; and we might have given at Frankfort, in 1743, the ſame terms, which we were glad to accept of at Aix-la-Chapelle in the forty eight. Here then we ſee, that above half of our wars with France, and all our public debts are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

IN the ſecond place, we are ſo declar'd in our oppoſition to French power, and ſo alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuſe all reaſonable terms of accommodation. Habent ſubjectos, tanquam ſu⯑os; viles, ut alienos. All the world knows, that the factious vote of the houſe of commons, in the beginning of the laſt parliament, along with the profeſt humour of the nation, made the queen of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with Pruſſia, which wou'd immediate⯑ly have reſtor'd the general tranquillity of Europe.

IN the third place, we are ſuch true combatants, that, when once engag'd, we loſe all concern for ourſelves and our poſterity, and conſider only how we may beſt annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at ſo deep a rate, in wars, where we were only acceſſaries, was ſurely the moſt fatal deluſion, [112] that a nation, who had any pretenſion to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That re⯑medy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poiſon, ought, in all reaſon, to be reſerv'd to the laſt extremity; and no evil, but the greateſt and moſt urgent, ſhou'd ever induce us to embrace ſo dangerous an expedient.

THESE exceſſes, to which we have been carry'd, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, be⯑come ſtill more prejudicial another way, by beget⯑ing, as is uſual, the oppoſite extreme, and render⯑ing us totally careleſs and ſupine with regard to the fate of Europe. The Athenians, from the moſt buſtling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, find⯑ing their error in thruſting themſelves into every quarrel, abandon'd all attention to foreign affairs; and in no conteſt ever took party on either ſide, except by their flatteries and complaiſance to the victor.

ENORMOUS monarchies, ſuch as Europe, at pre⯑ſent, is in danger of falling into, are, probably, de⯑ſtructive to human nature; in their progreſs, in their continuance,^* and even in their downfall, which never can be very diſtant from their eſta⯑bliſhment. The military genius, which aggran⯑diz'd [113] the monarchy, ſoon leaves the court, the ca⯑pital, and the center of ſuch a government; while the wars are carry'd on at a great diſtance, and in⯑tereſt ſo ſmall a part of the ſtate. The antient no⯑bility, whoſe affections attach them to their ſove⯑reign, live all at court, and never will accept of mi⯑litary employments, which wou'd carry them to re⯑mote and barbarous frontiers, where they are diſ⯑tant both from their pleaſure and their fortune. The arms of the ſtate muſt, therefore, be truſted to mercenary ſtrangers, without zeal, without at⯑tachment, without honour; ready on every occa⯑ſion to turn them againſt the prince, and join each deſperate malecontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the neceſſary progreſs of human affairs: Thus human nature checks itſelf in its airy eleva⯑tions: Thus ambition blindly labours for the de⯑ſtruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of e⯑very thing near and dear to him. The Bourbons, truſting to the ſupport of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would puſh their advantage, without reſerve or limitation. Theſe, while fir'd with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war: But never would ſubmit to languiſh in the garriſons of Hungary or Lithuania, forgot at court, and ſacriſic'd to the intrigues of e⯑very minion or miſtreſs, that approaches the prince. The troops are filled with Cravates and Tartars, Huſſars and Coſſacs; intermingled, perhaps, with [114] a few ſoldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the Roman emperors, from the ſame cauſes, is renew'd, over and over a⯑gain, 'till the final diſſolution of the monarchy.

DISCOURSE VII. Of Taxes.

THERE is a maxim, that prevails amongſt thoſe, whom, in this country, we call ways and means men, and who are denominated Finan⯑ciers and Maltotiers in France; that every new tax creates a new ability in the ſubjects to bear it, and that each encreaſe of publick burthens encreaſes proportion⯑ably the induſtry of the people. This maxim is of ſuch a nature as is moſt likely to be extremely a⯑bus'd, and is ſo much the more dangerous, that its truth cannot be altogether deny'd; but it muſt be own'd; when kept within certain bounds, to have ſome foundation in reaſon and experience.

WHEN a tax is laid upon commodities, that are conſum'd by the common people, the neceſſary conſequence may ſeem to be, that either the poor muſt retrench ſomething from their way of living, or raiſe their wages, ſo as to make the burthen of the tax fall entirely upon the rich. But there is a third conſequence, which very often follows upon taxes, viz. that the poor encreaſe their induſtry, perform more work, and live as well as before, without de⯑manding more for their labour. Where taxes are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the [116] neceſſaries of life, this conſequence naturally follows; and 'tis certain, that ſuch difficulties often ſerve to excite the induſtry of a people, and render them more opulent and laborious than others, who enjoy the greateſt advantages. For we may obſerve, as a parallel inſtance, that the moſt trading nations have not always poſſeſt the greateſt extent of fertile land; but on the contrary, that they have labour'd under many natural diſadvantages. Tyre, Athens, Car⯑thage, Rhodes, Genoa, Venice, Holland are ſtrong examples to this purpoſe. And in all hiſtory, we find only three inſtances of large and fertile coun⯑tries, that have poſſeſt much trade, the Netherlands, England, and France. The two former ſeem to have been allur'd by the advantages of their mari⯑time ſituation, and the neceſſity they lay under of frequenting foreign ports, in order to procure what their own climate refus'd them. And as to France, trade has come very late into that kingdom, and ſeems to have been the effect of reflection and ob⯑ſervation in an ingenious and enterpriſing people, who remark'd the immenſe riches acquir'd by ſuch of the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigati⯑on and commerce.

THE places mention'd by Cicero, ^* as poſſeſt of the greateſt commerce in his time are Alexandria, Colchos, Tyre, Sidon, Andros, Cyprus, Pamphilia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, [117] Miletum, Coos. All theſe, except Alexandria, were either ſmall iſlands or narrow territories. And that city ow'd its trade entirely to the happineſs of its ſituation.

SINCE therefore ſome natural neceſſities or diſ⯑advantages may be thought favourable to induſtry, why may not artificial burthens have the ſame ef⯑fect? Sir William Temple, ^† I am ſure, aſcribes the induſtry of the Dutch entirely to neceſſity, proceed⯑ing from their natural diſadvantages; and illuſtrates his doctrine by a very ſtriking compariſon with Ire⯑land; ‘where, (ſays he,) by the largeneſs and plenty of the ſoil, and ſcarcity of people, all things neceſſary to life are ſo cheap, that an in⯑duſtrious man, by two days labour, may gain enough to feed him the reſt of the week: Which I take to be a very plain ground of the lazineſs, attributed to the people. For men naturally prefer eaſe before labour, and will not take pains, if they can live idle; though when, by neceſſity, they have been enur'd to it, they cannot leave it, being grown a cuſtom neceſſary to their health and to their very entertainment: Nor perhaps is the change harder, from con⯑ſtant eaſe to labour, than from conſtant labour to eaſe.’ After which the author proceeds to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above, the places, where trade has moſt flouriſh'd, in [118] antient and modern times; and which are com⯑monly obſerv'd to be ſuch narrow confin'd terri⯑tories, as beget a neceſſity for induſtry.

'TIS always obſerv'd, in years of ſcarcity, if it be not extreme, that the poor labour more, and really live better, than in years of great plenty, when they indulge themſelves in idleneſs and riot. I have been told, by a conſiderable manufacturer, that in the year 1740, when bread and proviſions of all kinds were very dear, his workmen not on⯑ly made a ſhift to live, but paid debts, which they had contracted in former years, that were much more favourable and abundant.^*

THIS doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes, may be admitted in ſome degree: But beware of the abuſe. Taxes, like neceſſity, when carry'd too far, deſtroy induſtry, by engendring deſpair; and even before they reach this pitch, they raiſe the wages of the labourer and manufacturer, and heighten the price of all commodities. An atten⯑tive, diſintereſted legiſlature will obſerve the point, when the emolument ceaſes, and the prejudice be⯑gins: But as the contrary character is much more common, 'tis to be fear'd, that taxes, all over Europe, are multiplying to ſuch a degree, as will entirely cruſh all art and induſtry; tho', perhaps, their firſt increaſe, along with other circumſtan⯑ces, [119] might contribute to the growth of theſe ad⯑vantages.

THE beſt taxes are thoſe which are levy'd upon conſumptions, eſpecially thoſe of luxury; becauſe ſuch taxes are leſs felt by the people. They ſeem to be, in ſome meaſure, voluntary, ſince a man may chuſe how far he will uſe the commodity, which is taxed: They are paid gradually and in⯑ſenſibly: And being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are ſcarcely perceiv'd by the conſumers. Their only diſadvantage is, that they are expenſive in the levying.

TAXES upon poſſeſſions are levy'd without ex⯑pence; but have every other diſadvantage. Moſt ſtates, however, are oblig'd to have recourſe to them, in order to ſupply the deficiencies of the o⯑ther.

BUT the moſt pernicious of all taxes are thoſe which are arbitrary. They are commonly con⯑verted, by their management, into puniſhments on induſtry; and alſo, by their unavoidable inequali⯑ty, are more grievous than by the real burthen, which they impoſe. 'Tis ſurpriſing, therefore, to ſee them have place amongſt any civiliz'd people.

IN general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbi⯑trary, which they commonly are, may be eſteem'd [120] dangerous: Becauſe it is ſo eaſy for the ſovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the ſum demanded, that theſe taxes are apt to become alto⯑gether oppreſſive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itſelf; and a prince will ſoon find, that an encreaſe of the im⯑poſt is no encreaſe of his revenue. It is not eaſy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruin'd by ſuch taxes.

HISTORIANS inform us, that one of the chief cauſes of the deſtruction of the Roman ſtate was the alteration, which Conſtantine introduc'd into the finances, by ſubſtituting an univerſal poll-tax, in lieu of almoſt all the tythes, cuſtoms, and exciſ⯑es, which formerly compos'd the revenue of the empire. The people, in all the provinces, were ſo grinded and oppreſt by the publicans, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whoſe dominion, as they had fewer neceſſities and leſs art, was found preferable to the refin'd tyranny of the Romans.

THERE is a prevailing opinion, that all taxes, however levy'd, fall upon the land at laſt. Such an opinion may be uſeful in Britain, by checking the landed gentlemen, in whoſe hands our legiſlature is lodg'd, and making them preſerve great regard for trade and induſtry. But I muſt confeſs, that this principle, tho' firſt advanc'd by a celebrated writer, [121] has ſo little appearance of reaſon, that, were it not for his authority, it had never been receiv'd by any body. Every man, to be ſure, is deſirous of puſh⯑ing off from himſelf the burthen of any tax, that is impos'd, and laying it upon others: But as eve⯑ry man has the ſame inclination, and is upon the defenſive; no ſet of men can be ſuppos'd to prevail altogether in this conteſt. And why the landed gentleman ſhou'd be the victim of the whole, and ſhou'd not be able to defend himſelf, as well as o⯑thers are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradeſmen, indeed, wou'd willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they cou'd: But this inclina⯑tion they always have, tho' no taxes were levy'd; and the ſame methods, by which he guards againſt the impoſition of tradeſmen before taxes, will ſerve him afterwards, and make them ſhare the burthen with him.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we have, with regard to taxes, an inſtance of what frequently happens in political inſtitutions, that the conſequences of things are diametrically oppoſite to what we ſhou'd expect on the firſt appearance. 'Tis regarded as a fundamental max⯑im of the Turkiſh government, that the Grand ſig⯑nior, tho' abſolute maſter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impoſe a new tax; and every Ottoman prince, who has made ſuch an attempt, either has been oblig'd to retract, [122] or has found the fatal effects of his perſeverance. One wou'd imagine, that this prejudice or eſta⯑bliſh'd opinion were the firmeſt barrier in the world againſt oppreſſion; yet'tis certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of encreaſing his revenue, muſt allow all the baſhas and governors to oppreſs and abuſe the ſubjects: And theſe he ſqueezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he cou'd impoſe a new tax, like our European princes, his intereſt wou'd ſo far be united with that of his peo⯑ple, that he wou'd immediately feel the bad effects of theſe diſorderly levies of money, and wou'd find, that a pound, rais'd by a general impoſition, wou'd have leſs pernicious effects, than a ſhilling taken in ſo unequal and arbitrary a manner.

DISCOURSE VIII. Of Public Credit.

IT appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make proviſion, in time of peace, for the neceſſities of war, and to hoard up treaſures, before hand, as the inſtruments either of conqueſt or defence; without truſting to extraordinary im⯑poſts, much leſs to borrowing, in times of diſorder and confuſion. Beſides the immenſe ſums above⯑mention'd,^* which were amaſs'd by Athens, and by the Ptolemies, and other ſucceſſors of Alexander; we learn from Plato, ^† that the frugal Lacedemoni⯑ans had alſo collected a great treaſure; and Arri⯑an ^‡ and Plutarch ^* ſpecify the riches, which A⯑lexander got poſſeſſion of on the conqueſt of Suſa and Ecbatana, and which were reſerv'd, ſome of them, from the time of Cyrus. If I remember right, the ſcripture alſo mentions the treaſure of Hezekiah and the Jewiſh princes; as profane hi⯑ſtory does that of Philip and Perſeus kings of Mace⯑don. The antient republics in Gaul had commonly [124] large ſums in reſerve.^* Every one knows the treaſure ſeiz'd in Rome by Julius Caeſar, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiſer emperors, Auguſtus, Tiberius, Veſpaſian, Severus, &c. always diſcover'd the prudent foreſight, of ſav⯑ing great ſums againſt any public exigency.

ON the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the pub⯑lic revenues, and to truſt, that poſterity, during peace, will pay off the incumbrances, contracted during the preceding war: And they, having be⯑fore their eyes, ſo good an example of their wiſe fathers, have the ſame prudent reliance on their po⯑ſterity; who, at laſt, from neceſſity, more than choice, are oblig'd to place the ſame confidence in a new poſterity. But not to waſte time in declaim⯑ing againſt a practice, which appears ruinous, be⯑yond the evidence of a hundred demonſtrations; it ſeems pretty apparent, that the antient maxims are, in this reſpect, much more prudent than the modern; even tho' the latter had been confin'd within ſome reaſonable bounds, and had ever, in any inſtance, been attended with ſuch frugality, in time of peace, as to diſcharge the debts incurr'd by an expenſive war. For why ſhou'd the caſe be ſo very different betwixt the public and an indivi⯑dual, as to make us eſtabliſh ſuch different maxims of conduct for each? If the funds of the former be [125] greater, its neceſſary expences are proportionably larger; if its reſources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its frame ſhould be calculated for a much longer duration, than the date of a ſingle life, or even of a family, it ſhou'd embrace max⯑ims, large, durable, and generous, ſuitable to the ſuppos'd extent of its exiſtence. To truſt to chan⯑ces and temporary expedients is, indeed, what the neceſſity of human affairs frequently reduces us to; but whoever voluntarily depend on ſuch reſources have not neceſſity, but their own folly, to accuſe for their misfortunes, when any ſuch befal them.

IF the abuſes of treaſures be dangerous, either by engaging the ſtate in raſh enterpriſes, or mak⯑ing them neglect military diſcipline, in confidence of their riches; the abuſes of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and ſubjection to foreign powers.

ACCORDING to modern policy, war is attend⯑ed with every deſtructive circumſtance; loſs of men, encreaſe of taxes, decay of commerce, diſſi⯑pation of money, plunder by ſea and land. Ac⯑cording to antient maxims, the opening of the public treaſure, as it produc'd an uncommon afflu⯑ence of gold and ſilver, ſerv'd as a temporary en⯑couragement to induſtry, and aton'd, in ſome de⯑gree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

[126] WHAT then ſhall we ſay to the new paradox, that public encumbrances are, of themſelves, ad⯑vantageous, independent of the neceſſity of con⯑tracting them; and that any ſtate, even tho' it were not preſt by a foreign enemy, cou'd not poſſibly have embrac'd a wiſer expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds and debts and taxes, without limitation? Diſcourſes, ſuch as theſe, might naturally have paſt for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on Buſiris and Nero; had we not ſeen ſuch abſurd maxims patroniz'd, by great miniſters, and by a whole party among us. And theſe puz⯑zling arguments, (for they deſerve not the name of ſpecious) tho' they cou'd not be the foundation of lord Oxford's conduct; for he had more ſenſe; ſerv'd at leaſt to keep his partizans in countenance, and perplex the underſtanding of the nation.

LET us examine the conſequences of public debts, both in our domeſtic management, by their influence on commerce and induſtry, and in our foreign tranſactions, by their effects on wars and negotiations.

THERE is a word, which is here in the mouth of every body, and which, I find, has alſo got a⯑broad, and is much employ'd by foreign writers,^* [127] in imitation of the Engliſh; and that is CIRCULA⯑TION. This word ſerves as an account of every thing; and tho' I confeſs, that I have ſought for its meaning in the preſent ſubject, ever ſince I was a ſchool-boy, I have never yet been able to diſco⯑ver it. What poſſible advantage is there which the nation can reap by the eaſy transference of ſtock from hand to hand? Or is there any para⯑lel to be drawn from the circulation of other com⯑modities, to that of chequer notes and India bonds? Where a manufacturer has a quick ſale of his goods to the merchant, the merchant to the ſhop-keeper, the ſhop-keeper to his cuſtomers; this enlivens in⯑duſtry, and gives new encouragement to the firſt dealer or the manufacturer and all his tradeſmen, and makes them produce more and better commo⯑dities of the ſame ſpecies. A ſtagnation is here pernicious, wherever it happens; becauſe it oper⯑ates backwards, and ſtops or benumbs the induſ⯑trious hand in its production of what is uſeful to human life. But what production we owe to Change-alley, or even what conſumption, except that of coffee, and pen, ink and paper, I have not yet learn'd; nor can one foreſee the loſs or decay of any one beneficial commerce or commodity, tho' that place and all its inhabitants were for ever bury'd in the ocean.

BUT tho' this term, circulation, has never been explain'd by thoſe, who inſiſt ſo much on the ad⯑vantages [128] that reſult from it, there ſeems, however, to be ſome benefit of a ſimilar kind, ariſing from our incumbrances: As indeed, what human evil is there, which is not attended with ſome advantage? This we ſhall endeavour to explain, that we may eſtimate the weight we ought to allow it.

PUBLIC ſecurities are with us become a kind of money, and paſs as readily at the current price as gold or ſilver. Wherever any profitable undertak⯑ing offers itſelf, however expenſive, there are ne⯑ver wanting hands enow to embrace it; nor need a trader, who has ſums in the public ſtocks, fear to launch out into the moſt extenſive trade; ſince he is poſſeſt of funds, which will anſwer the moſt ſud⯑den demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it neceſſary to keep by him any conſiderable caſh. Bank ſtock, or India bonds, eſpecially the latter, ſerve to all the ſame purpo⯑ſes; becauſe he can diſpoſe of them, or pledge them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the ſame time, they are not idle, even when in his ſcritoire, but bring him in a conſtant revenue. In ſhort, our national debts furniſh merchants with a ſpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces ſure gain, beſide the profits of their commerce. This muſt enable them to trade upon leſs profit. The ſmall profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper; cauſes a greater conſumption; quickens the labour of the [129] common people; and helps to ſpread arts and in⯑duſtry thro' the whole ſociety.

THERE are alſo, we may obſerve, in England, and in all ſtates, that have both commerce and pub⯑lic debts, a ſet of men, who are half merchants, half ſtock-holders, and may be ſuppos'd willing to trade for ſmall profits; becauſe commerce is not their principal or ſole ſupport, and their revenues in the funds are a ſure reſource for themſelves and their families. Were there no funds, great mer⯑chants wou'd have no expedient for realizing or ſecuring any part of their profit, but by making purchaſes of land; and land has many diſadvanta⯑ges in compariſon of funds. Requiring more care and inſpection, it divides the time and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extra⯑ordinary accident in trade, it is not ſo eaſily con⯑verted into money; and as it attracts too much, both by the many natural pleaſures it affords, and the authority it gives, it ſoon converts the citizen into the country gentleman. More men, there⯑fore, with large ſtocks and incomes may naturally be ſuppos'd to continue in trade, where there are public debts: And this, it muſt be own'd, is of ſome advantage to commerce, by diminiſhing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging induſtry.^*

[130] BUT in oppoſition to theſe two favourable cir⯑cumſtances, perhaps of no very great importance, weigh the many diſadvantages, that attend our public debts, in the whole interior oeconomy of the ſtate: You will find no compariſon betwixt the ill and the good, that reſult from them.

Firſt, 'TIS certain, that national debts cauſe a mighty confluence of people and riches to the ca⯑pital, by the great ſums, which are levy'd in the provinces to pay the intereſt of thoſe debts; and perhaps too, by the advantages in trade above men⯑tion'd, which they give the merchants in the ca⯑pital above the reſt of the kingdom. The queſtion is, whether, in our caſe, it be for the public intereſt, that ſo many privileges ſhou'd be conferr'd on Lon⯑don, which has already arriv'd at ſuch an enormous ſize, and ſeems ſtill encreaſing. Some men are apprehenſive of the conſequences. For my part, I cannot forbear thinking, that tho' the head is un⯑doubtedly too big for the body, yet that great city is ſo happily ſituated, that its exceſſive bulk cauſes leſs inconvenience, than even a ſmaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference be⯑twixt [131] the prices of all proviſions in Paris and Lan⯑guedoc than betwixt thoſe in London and Yorkſhire.

Secondly, PUBLIC ſtocks, being a kind of paper⯑credit, have all the diſadvantages attending that ſpecies of money. They baniſh gold and ſilver from the moſt conſiderable commerce of the ſtate, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all proviſions and labour dearer than otherwiſe they wou'd be.

Thirdly, THE taxes, which are levy'd to pay the intereſt of theſe debts, are a check upon induſtry, heighten the price of labour, and are an oppreſſion on the poorer ſort.

Fourthly, As foreigners poſſeſs a ſhare of our na⯑tional funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occaſion the tranſport of our people and our induſtry.

Fifthly, THE greateſt part of public ſtock being always in the hands of idle people, who live on their revenue, our funds give great encouragement to an uſeleſs and inactive life.

BUT tho' the injury, that ariſes to commerce and induſtry from our public funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, very conſiderable, it is trivial in compariſon of the prejudice, that reſults [132] to the ſtate, conſider'd as a body politic, which muſt ſupport itſelf in the ſociety of nations, and have various tranſactions with other ſtates, in wars and negotiations. The ill, there, is pure and unmixt, without any favourable circumſtance to atone for it: And 'tis an ill too, of a nature the higheſt and moſt important.

WE have indeed been told, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts; ſince they are moſtly due amongſt ourſelves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another. 'Tis like transferring money from the right hand to the left; which leaves the perſon neither richer nor poorer than before. Such looſe reaſonings and ſpecious compariſons will always paſs, where we judge not upon principles. I ask, Is it poſſible, in the nature of things, to overburthen a nation with taxes, even where the ſovereign reſides a⯑mongſt them? The very doubt ſeems extravagant; ſince 'tis requiſite, in every commonwealth, that there be a certain proportion obſerv'd betwixt the laborious and the idle part of it. But if all our pre⯑ſent taxes be mortgag'd, muſt we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carry'd to a length, that is ruinous and deſtructive?

IN every nation, there are always ſome methods of levying money more eaſy than others, ſuitable to the way of living of the people, and the commodi⯑ties [133] they make uſe of. In Britain, the exciſes up⯑on malt and beer afford a very large revenue; be⯑cauſe the operations of malting and brewing are very tedious and are impoſſible to be conceal'd; and at the ſame time, theſe commodities are not ſo ab⯑ſolutely neceſſary to life, as that the raiſing their price wou'd very much affect the poorer ſort. Theſe taxes being all mortgag'd, what difficulty to find new ones! What vexation and ruin of the poor!

DUTIES upon conſumptions are more equal and eaſy than thoſe upon poſſeſſions. What a loſs to the public, that the former are all exhauſted, and that we muſt have recourſe to the more grievous method of levying taxes!

WERE all the proprietors of land only ſtewards to the public; muſt not neceſſity force them to practiſe all the arts of oppreſſion, us'd by ſtewards, where the abſence and negligence of the proprietor render them ſecure againſt enquiry?

'TWILL ſcarce be aſſerted, that no bounds ought ever to be ſet to national debts, and that the pub⯑lic wou'd be no weaker, were 12 or 15 ſhillings in the pound, land tax, mortgag'd, along with all the preſent cuſtoms and exciſes. There is ſomething, therefore, in the caſe, beſide the mere transferring of property from one hand to another. In 500 years, [134] the poſterity of thoſe, now in the coaches, and of thoſe upon the boxes, will probably have chang'd places, without affecting the public by theſe revo⯑lutions.

I MUST confeſs, that there is a ſtrange ſupine⯑neſs, from long cuſtom, crept into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts; not unlike what di⯑vines ſo vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the moſt ſanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future miniſtry will be poſſeſt of ſuch rigid and ſteady frugality, as to make any conſider⯑able progreſs in the payment of our debts, or that the ſituation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leiſure and tranquillity, ſufficient for ſuch an undertaking.^* What then is to become of us? Were we ever ſo good Chriſtians, and ever ſo reſign'd to providence; this, methinks, were a curious queſtion, even conſider'd as a ſpeculative one, and what it might not be altogether impoſſible [135] to form ſome conjectural ſolution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues, and factions. There ſeems to be a natural progreſs of things, which may guide our reaſoning. As it wou'd have requir'd but a moderate ſhare of prudence, when we firſt began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of miniſters, that things wou'd neceſſarily be carry'd to the length we ſee; ſo now that they have at laſt happily reach'd it, it may not be difficult to gueſs at the conſequence. It muſt, indeed, be one of theſe two events; ei⯑ther the nation muſt deſtroy public credit, or pub⯑lic credit will deſtroy the nation. 'Tis impoſ⯑ſible they can both ſubſiſt, after the manner they have been hitherto manag'd, in this, as well as in ſome other nations.

THERE was, indeed, a ſcheme for the payment of our debts, which was propos'd by an excellent citizen, Mr. Hutchinſon, above 30 years ago, and which was much approv'd of by ſome men of ſenſe, but never was likely to take effect. He aſſerted, that there was a fallacy in imagining, that the public ow'd this debt; for that really every individual ow'd a proportional ſhare of it, and paid, in his taxes, a proportional ſhare of the intereſt, beſide the ex⯑pences of levying theſe taxes. Had we not better, then, ſays he, make a proportional diſtribution of the debt amongſt us, and each of us contribute a [136] ſum ſuitable to his property, and by that means, diſcharge at once all our funds and public mort⯑gages? He ſeems not to have conſider'd, that the laborious poor pay a conſiderable part of the taxes by their annual conſumptions, tho' they cou'd not advance, at once, a proportional part of the ſum re⯑quir'd. Not to mention, that property in money and ſtock in trade might eaſily be conceal'd or diſ⯑guis'd; and that viſible property in lands and hou⯑ſes wou'd really at laſt anſwer for the whole: An inequality and oppreſſion, which never wou'd be ſubmitted to. But tho' this project is never likely to take place; 'tis not altogether improbable, that, when the nation become heartily ſick of their debts, and are cruelly oppreſt by them, ſome daring pro⯑jector may ariſe, with viſionary ſchemes for their diſcharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the leaſt touch will deſtroy it, as happen'd in France; and in this manner, it will dye of the doctor. ^*

BUT 'tis more probable, that the breach of na⯑tional faith will be the neceſſary effect of wars, de⯑feats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conqueſts. I muſt confeſs, when I ſee princes and ſtates fighting and quarrel⯑ing, amidſt their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel⯑playing fought in a China ſhop. How can it be expected, that ſovereigns will ſpare a ſpecies of property, which is pernicious to themſelves and to the public, when they have ſo little compaſſion on lives and properties, which are uſeful to both? Let the time come (and ſurely it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not ſubſcrib'd to, and raiſe not the mo⯑ney projected. Suppoſe, either that the caſh of the nation is exhauſted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto ſo ample, begins to fail us. Sup⯑poſe, that, in this diſtreſs, the nation is threaten'd with an invaſion, a rebellion is ſuſpected or broke out at home, a ſquadron cannot be equipt for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign ſubſi⯑dy cannot be advanc'd. What muſt a prince or miniſter do in ſuch an emergence? The right of [138] ſelf-preſervation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our ſtateſmen muſt then be greater than the folly of thoſe who firſt contracted debt, or what is more, than that of thoſe who truſted, or continue to truſt this ſecurity, if theſe ſtateſmen have the means of ſafety in their hands, and do not employ it. The funds, created and mortgag'd, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of the nation: Money is per⯑haps lying in the exchequer, ready for the diſcharge of the quarterly intereſt: Neceſſity calls, fear urges, reaſon exhorts, compaſſion alone exclaims: The money will immediately be ſeiz'd for the current ſervice, under the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, per⯑haps, of being immediately replac'd. But no more is requiſite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thouſands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the natural death of public credit: For to this period it tends as na⯑turally as an animal body to its diſſolution and de⯑ſtruction.^*

[139] THESE two events, ſuppos'd above, are calami⯑tous, but not the moſt calamitous. Thouſands are thereby ſacrific'd to the ſafety of millions. But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be ſacrific'd, for ever, to the temporary ſafety of thouſands. ^* Our [140] popular government, perhaps, will render it diffi⯑cult or dangerous for a miniſter to venture on ſo deſperate an expedient, as that of a voluntary bank⯑ruptcy. And tho' the houſe of lords be altogether compos'd of the proprietors of lands, and the houſe of commons chiefly; and conſequently neither of them can be ſuppos'd to have great property in the funds; yet the connexions of the members may be ſo great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even juſtice, ſtrictly ſpeaking, requires. And per⯑haps too, our foreign enemies, or rather enemy (for we have but one to dread) may be ſo politic as to diſcover, that our ſafety lyes in deſpair, and may not, therefore, ſhow the danger, open and bare⯑fac'd, 'till it be inevitable. The balance of power in Europe, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all juſtly eſteem'd too unequal to be preſerv'd without our attention and aſſiſtance. But our [141] children, weary with the ſtruggle, and fetter'd with incumbrances, may ſit down ſecure, and ſee their neighbours oppreſt and conquer'd; till at laſt, they themſelves and their creditors lye both at the mer⯑cy of the conqueror. And this may properly e⯑nough be denominated the violent death of our public credit.

THESE ſeem to be the events, which are not ve⯑ry remote, and which reaſon foreſees as clearly al⯑moſt as ſhe can do any thing, that lyes in the womb of time. And tho' the antients maintain'd, that, in order to reach the gift of propheſy, a certain di⯑vine fury or madneſs was requiſite; one may ſafe⯑ly affirm, that, in order to deliver ſuch propheſies as theſe, no more is neceſſary, than merely to be in one's ſenſes, free from the influence of popular madneſs and deluſion.

DISCOURSE IX. Of ſome remarkable cuſtoms.

I SHALL obſerve three remarkable cuſtoms in three celebrated governments; and ſhall con⯑clude from the whole, that all general maxims in politics ought to be eſtabliſh'd with great reſerve, and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently diſcover'd, in the moral, as well as in the phyſical world. The former, perhaps, we can better account for, after they happen, from ſprings and principles, of which every one has, within himſelf, or from obvious obſervation, the ſtrongeſt aſſurance and conviction: But 'tis often fully as impoſſible for human prudence, before hand, to foreſee and foretell them.

I. ONE wou'd think it eſſential to every ſupreme council or aſſembly, which debates, that entire li⯑berty of ſpeech ſhou'd be granted to every member, and that all motions or reaſonings ſhou'd be re⯑ceiv'd, which can any way tend to illuſtrate the point under deliberation. One wou'd conclude, with ſtill greater aſſurance, that, after a motion was made, which was voted and approv'd by that aſſembly, in which the legiſlature is lodg'd, the member, who made the motion, muſt, for ever, be [144] exempted from farther trial and enquiry. But no political maxim can, at firſt ſight, appear more undiſputable, than that he muſt, at leaſt, be ſe⯑cur'd from all inferior juriſdiction; and that no⯑thing leſs, than the ſame ſupreme legiſlative aſ⯑ſembly, in their ſubſequent meetings, cou'd render him accountable for thoſe motions and harangues, which they had before approv'd of. But theſe ax⯑ioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all fail'd in the Athenian government, from cauſes and principles too, which appear almoſt inevitable.

BY the [...] or indictment of illegali⯑ty, (tho' it has not been remark'd by antiquaries or commentators) any man was try'd and puniſh'd, in a common court of judicature, for any law, which had paſs'd upon his motion, in the aſſem⯑bly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjuſt or prejudicial to the public. Thus Demo⯑ſthenes, finding that ſhip money was levy'd irregu⯑larly, and that the poor bore the ſame burthen as the rich, in equipping the gallies, corrected this in⯑equality by a very uſeful law, which proportion'd the expence to the revenue and income of each in⯑dividual. He mov'd for this law in the aſſembly; he prov'd its advantages; ^* he convinc'd the people, the only legiſlature in Athens; the law paſs'd; and was carried into execution: And yet he was try'd in a criminal court for that law, upon the com⯑plaint [145] of the rich, who reſented the alteration he had introduc'd into the finances. ^* He was, in⯑deed, acquitted, upon proving anew the uſefulneſs of his law.

Cteſiphon mov'd in the aſſembly of the people, that particular honours ſhou'd be conferr'd on De⯑moſthenes, as on a citizen affectionate and uſeful to the commonwealth: The people, convinc'd of this truth, voted thoſe honours: Yet was Cteſiphon try'd by the [...]. It was aſſerted, amongſt other topics, that Demoſthenes was not a good citi⯑zen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth: And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and conſequently himſelf; which he executed by that ſublime piece of eloquence, that has ever ſince been the admiration of mankind.

AFTER the fatal battle of Chaeronea, a law was paſt, upon the motion of Hyperides, giving liberty to ſlaves, and enrolling them in the troops. ^† On account of this law, the orator was afterwards try'd by the indictment above mention'd; and defended himſelf, amongſt other topics, by that ſtroke cele⯑brated by Plutarch and Longinus. It was not I, [146] ſaid he, that mov'd for this law: It was the neceſ⯑ſities of war; it was the battle of Chaeronea. The orations of Demoſthenes abound with many inſtan⯑ces of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practis'd.

THE Athenian democracy was ſuch a mobbiſh government, as we can ſcarce form a notion of in the preſent age of the world. The whole collec⯑tive body of the people voted in every law, with⯑out any limitation of property, without any diſtinc⯑tion of rank, without controul from any magiſtra⯑cy or ſenate; ^* and conſequently with little regard to order, juſtice, or prudence. The Athenians ſoon became ſenſible of the miſchiefs attending this con⯑ſtitution: But being averſe to the checking them⯑ſelves by any rule or reſtriction, they reſolv'd, at leaſt, to check their demagogues or counſellors, by the fear of future puniſhment and enquiry. They accordingly inſtituted this remarkable law; a law eſteem'd ſo eſſential to their government, that Ae⯑ſchines inſiſts on it, as a known truth, that were it aboliſh'd or neglected, it were impoſſible for the democracy to ſubſiſt. ^†

[147] THE people fear'd not any ill conſequences to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts; becauſe theſe were nothing but very numerous ju⯑ries, choſen by lot from amongſt the people. And they conſider'd themſelves juſtly as in a ſtate of pu⯑pillage, where they had an authority, after they came to the uſe of reaſon, not only to retract and controul whatever had been determin'd, but to pu⯑niſh any guardian for meaſures, which they had em⯑brac'd by his perſuaſion. The ſame law had place in Thebes; ^* and for the ſame reaſon.

IT appears to have been an uſual practice in A⯑thens, on the eſtabliſhment of any law, eſteem'd very uſeful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the ſupport of ſhows and ſpectacles, made it criminal ſo much as to move for a reverſement of this law. ^† Thus Leptines mov'd for a law, not only to recal all the immu⯑nities formerly granted, but to deprive the people for the future of the power of granting any more. ^‡ Thus all bills of attainder ^* were forbid, or laws that affect one Athenian, without extending to the whole [148] commonwealth. Theſe abſurd clauſes, by which the legiſlature vainly attempted to bind itſelf for e⯑ver, proceeded from an univerſal ſenſe of the levity and inconſtancy of the people.

II. A WHEEL within a wheel, ſuch as we ob⯑ſerve in the German empire, is conſider'd by lord Shaftsbury, ^† as an abſurdity in politics: But what muſt we ſay to two equal wheels, which govern the ſame political machine, without any mutual check, controul, or ſubordination; and yet preſerve the greateſt harmony and concord? To eſtabliſh two diſtinct legiſlatures, each of which poſſeſſes full and abſolute authority within itſelf, and ſtands in no need of the other's aſſiſtance, in order to give vali⯑dity to its acts; this may appear, before hand, al⯑together impracticable, as long as men are actuat⯑ed by the paſſions of ambition, emulation, and ava⯑rice, which have been hitherto their chief govern⯑ing principles. And ſhou'd I aſſert, that the ſtate I have in my eye was divided by two diſtinct fac⯑tions, each of which predominated in a diſtinct le⯑giſlature, and yet produc'd no claſhing of theſe in⯑dependent powers; the ſuppoſition may appear al⯑moſt incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I ſhou'd affirm, that this disjointed, irregular go⯑vernment was the moſt active, triumphant, and il⯑luſtrious commonwealth, that ever yet appear'd on [149] the ſtage of the world; I ſhou'd certainly be told, that ſuch a political chimera was as abſurd as any viſion of the poets. But there is no need for ſearch⯑ing long, in order to prove the reality of the fore⯑going ſuppoſitions: For this was actually the caſe with the Roman republic.

THE legiſlative power was there lodged both in the comitia centuriata and comitia tributa. In the former, 'tis well known, the people voted accord⯑ingly to their cenſus; ſo that when the firſt claſs was unanimous, (as commonly happen'd) tho' it con⯑tain'd not, perhaps, the hundredth part of the com⯑monwealth, it determin'd the whole; and with the authority of the ſenate, eſtabliſh'd a law. In the latter, every vote was alike; and as the authority of the ſenate was not there requiſite, the lower people entirely prevail'd, and gave law to the whole ſtate. In all party diviſions, at firſt betwixt the Pa⯑tricians and Plebeians, afterwards betwixt the nobles and the people, the intereſt of the Ariſtocracy was predominant in the firſt legiſlature; that of the De⯑mocracy in the ſecond: The one cou'd always de⯑ſtroy what the other had eſtabliſh'd: Nay, the one, by a ſudden and unforeſeen motion, might take the ſtart of the other; and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the conſtitu⯑tion, had the full authority of a law. But no ſuch conteſt or ſtruggle is obſerv'd in the hiſtory of Rome: No inſtance of a quarrel betwixt theſe two legiſla⯑tures; [150] tho' many betwixt the parties, that govern'd in each. Whence aroſe this concord, which may ſeem ſo extraordinary?

THE legiſlature eſtabliſh'd at Rome, by the au⯑thority of Servius Tullius, was the comitia centuri⯑ata, which, after the expulſion of the kings, ren⯑der'd the government, for ſome time, altogether a⯑riſtocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their ſide, and being elated with frequent conqueſts and victories in their foreign wars, always prevail'd when puſh'd to extremities, and firſt ex⯑torted from the ſenate the magiſtracy of the tri⯑bunes, and then the legiſlative power of the comitia tributa. It then behov'd the nobles to be more careful than ever not to provoke the people. For beſide the force, which the latter were always poſ⯑ſeſt of, they had now got poſſeſſion of legal autho⯑rity, and cou'd inſtantly break in pieces any order or inſtitution, which directly oppos'd them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combinati⯑on, and by the reſpect paid their character; the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly ſet their comitia centuriata in opoſition to the tributa, they had ſoon loſt the advantage of that inſtitution, along with their conſuls, praetors, ediles, and all the magiſtrates elected by it. But the comitia tri⯑buta, not having the ſame reaſon for reſpecting the centuriata, frequently repeal'd laws favourable to [151] the ariſtocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles; protected the people from oppreſſion; and controul'd the actions of the ſenate and magiſ⯑tracy. The centuriata found it convenient always to ſubmit; and tho' equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durſt never directly give any ſhock to the other legiſlature, either by repealing its laws, or eſtabliſhing laws, which, it foreſaw, wou'd ſoon be repeal'd by it.

NO inſtance is found of any oppoſition or ſtruggle betwixt theſe comitia; except one ſlight attempt of this kind, mention'd by Appian in the 3d book of his civil wars. Mark Anthony reſolving to deprive Decimus Brutus of the government of Ciſalpine Gaul, rail'd in the Forum, and call'd one of the comitia, in order to prevent the meeting of the o⯑ther, which had been order'd by the ſenate. But affairs were then fallen into ſuch confuſion, and the Roman conſtitution was ſo near its laſt extremity, that no inſerence can be drawn from ſuch an ex⯑pedient. This conteſt, beſides, was founded more on form than party. 'Twas the ſenate, who order'd the comitia tributa, that they might obſtruct the meeting of the centuriata, which, by the conſtitu⯑tion, or at leaſt forms of the government, cou'd a⯑lone diſpoſe of provinces.

Cicero was recall'd by the comitia centuriata; tho' baniſh'd by the tributa, that is, by a plebiſcitum: [152] But his baniſhment, we may obſerve, never was conſider'd as a legal deed, ariſing from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was al⯑ways aſcrib'd to the violence alone of Clodius, and the diſorders introduc'd by him into the govern⯑ment.

III. THE third cuſtom we propos'd to obſerve regards England; and tho' it be not ſo important as thoſe, which we have pointed out in Athens and Rome, it is no leſs ſingular and remarkable. 'Tis a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undiſputed and univerſal, that a power, how⯑ever great, when granted by law to an eminent magiſtrate, is not ſo dangerous to liberty, as an authority, however inconſiderable, which he ac⯑quires from violence and uſurpation. For beſides that the law always limits every power, which it beſtows; the very receiving it as a conceſſion e⯑ſtabliſhes the authority whence it is deriv'd, and preſerves the harmony of the conſtitution. By the ſame right that one prerogative is aſſum'd without law, another may alſo be claim'd, and another, with ſtill greater facility: While the firſt uſurpa⯑tions both ſerve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroiſm of Hampden, who ſuſtain'd the whole violence of royal proſecution rather than pay a tax of 20 ſhil⯑lings, not impos'd by parliament: Hence the care of all Engliſh patriots to guard againſt the firſt en⯑croachments [153] of the crown: And hence alone the exiſtence, at this day, of Engliſh liberty.

THERE is, however, one occaſion, wherein the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the preſſing of ſeamen. The exerciſe of an illegal power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and tho' it has frequently been deliberat⯑ed on, how that power might be render'd legal, and under what reſtrictions it might be granted to the ſovereign, no ſafe expedient cou'd ever be pro⯑pos'd for that purpoſe, and the danger to liberty always appear'd greater from law than from uſur⯑pation. While this power is exercis'd to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly ſubmit to it, from a ſenſe of its uſe and neceſſity; and the ſailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to ſupport them, in claiming the rights and privi⯑leges, which the law grants, without diſtinction, to all Engliſh ſubjects. But were this power, on any occaſion, made an inſtrument of faction or mi⯑niſterial tyranny, the oppoſite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, wou'd immediately take the alarm, and ſupport the injur'd party: The liberty of Engliſhmen wou'd be aſſerted: Juries wou'd be implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both againſt law and equity, wou'd meet with the ſevereſt vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant ſuch an authority, they wou'd probably fall into one of theſe two incon⯑veniencies: They wou'd either beſtow it under ſo [154] many reſtrictions as wou'd make it loſe its effects, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they wou'd render it ſo large and comprehenſive, as might give occaſion to great abuſes, for which we cou'd, in that caſe, have no remedy. The very illegality of the power, at preſent, prevents its a⯑buſes, by affording ſo eaſy a remedy againſt them.

I PRETEND not, by this reaſoning, to exclude all poſſibility of contriving a regiſter for ſeamen, which might mann the navy, without being dange⯑rous to liberty. I only obſerve, that no ſatisfac⯑tory ſcheme of that nature has yet been propos'd. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice ſeemingly the moſt abſurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full in⯑ternal peace and concord, is arm'd againſt law: A continu'd and open uſurpation in the crown is permitted, amidſt the greateſt jealouſy and watch⯑fulneſs in the people; nay proceeding from thoſe very principles: Liberty, in a country of the high⯑eſt liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, with⯑out any countenance or protection: The wild ſtate of nature is renew'd, in one of the moſt civiliz'd ſocieties of mankind: And great violences and diſ⯑orders, amongſt the people, the moſt humane and the beſt natur'd, are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the ſu⯑preme magiſtrate, the other the permiſſion of fun⯑damental laws.

DISCOURSE X. Of the Populouſneſs of antient Nations. ^*

THERE is very little ground, either from reaſon or experience, to conclude the uni⯑verſe eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remark'd in the heavens, the plain traces, as well as traditi⯑on, of an univerſal deluge or general convulſion of the elements; all theſe prove ſtrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its paſſage, by cor⯑ruption or diſſolution, from one ſtate or order to an⯑other. It muſt, therefore, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, as well as each individual form, which it contains, and 'tis probable, that, in all theſe variations, man, equally with every animal [156] and vegetable, will partake. In the flouriſhing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human ſpecies ſhou'd poſſeſs greater vigour both of mind and body, more proſperous health, higher ſpirits, longer life, and a ſtronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general ſyſtem of things, and human ſociety of courſe, have any ſuch gradu⯑al revolutions, they are too ſlow to be diſcernible in that ſhort period, which is comprehended by hiſ⯑tory and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, ſeem hi⯑therto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much the ſame. The arts and ſciences, indeed, have flouriſh'd in one period, and have decay'd in another: But we may obſerve, that at the time when they roſe to greateſt perfection amongſt one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the neighbouring nations; and tho' they univerſally decay'd in one age, yet in a ſucceeding generation they again reviv'd, and diffus'd themſelves over the world. As far, therefore, as obſervation reaches, there is no univerſal difference diſcernible in the hu⯑man ſpecies; and tho' it were allow'd, that the uni⯑verſe, like an animal body, had a natural progreſs from infancy to old age, yet as it muſt ſtill be uncertain, whether, at preſent, it be advancing to its point of perfection, or declining from it, we cannot thence preſuppoſe any decay in human nature. ^* To [157] prove, therefore, or account for the greater popu⯑louſneſs of antiquity, by the imaginary youth or vigour of the world, will ſcarce be admitted by any juſt reaſoner. Theſe general phyſical cauſes ought entirely to be excluded from that queſtion.

THERE are indeed ſome more particular phyſi⯑cal cauſes of great importance. Diſeaſes are men⯑tion'd in antiquity, which are almoſt unknown to modern medicine; and new diſeaſes have ariſen and propagated themſelves, of which there are no traces in ancient hiſtory. And in this particular, we may obſerve, upon compariſon, that the diſad⯑vantage is very much on the ſide of the moderns. Not to mention ſome others of leſs importance, the ſmall pox commits ſuch ravages, as would almoſt alone account for the great ſuperiority ſuppos'd in antient times. The tenth or the twelfth part of mankind, deſtroy'd every generation, ſhou'd make a vaſt difference, it may be thought, in the num⯑bers of the people; and when join'd to venereal diſ⯑tempers, a new plague diffus'd every where, this diſeaſe is perhaps equivalent, by its conſtant oper⯑ation, to the three great ſcourges of mankind, war, [158] peſtilence, and famine. Were it certain, therefore, that antient times were more populous than the pre⯑ſent, and cou'd no moral cauſes be aſſign'd for ſo great a change; theſe phyſical cauſes alone, in the opinion of many, wou'd be ſufficient to give us ſa⯑tisfaction on that head.

BUT is it certain, that antiquity was ſo much more populous, as is pretended? The extrava⯑gancies of Voſſius, with regard to this ſubject, are well known: But an author of much greater ge⯑nius and diſcernment has ventur'd to affirm, that, according to the beſt computations, which theſe ſubjects will admit of, there are not now the fifti⯑eth part of mankind on the face of the earth, which exiſted in the time of Julius Caeſar. ^* It may eaſi⯑ly be obſerv'd, that the compariſons, in this caſe, muſt be very imperfect; even tho' we confine our⯑ſelves to the ſcene of antient hiſtory, Europe and the nations about the Mediterranean. We know not exactly the numbers of any European kingdom, or even city, at preſent: How can we pretend to calculate thoſe of antient cities and ſtates, where hiſtorians have left us ſuch imperfect traces? For my part, the matter appears to me ſo uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together ſome reflexi⯑ons on that head, I ſhall intermingle the enquiry concerning cauſes with that concerning facts; [159] which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be aſcertain'd with any tolerable aſſurance. We ſhall firſt conſider, whether it be probable, from what we know of the ſituation of ſociety in both periods, that antiquity muſt have been more populous. Secondly, Whether in reality it was ſo. If I can make appear, that the concluſion is not ſo certain, as is pretended, in favour of antiquity, 'tis all I aſpire to.

IN general, we may obſerve, that the queſtion with regard to the comparative populouſneſs of ages or kingdoms implies very important conſequences, and commonly determines concerning the prefe⯑rence of their whole police, manners, and conſtituti⯑on of government. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a deſire and power of generation more active than is ever univerſally exerted, the re⯑ſtraints, which it lyes under, muſt proceed from ſome difficulties in mens ſituation, which it be⯑longs to a wiſe legiſlature carefully to obſerve and remove. Almoſt every man, who thinks he can maintain a family, will have one; and the human ſpecies, at this rate of propagation, wou'd more than double every generation, were every one coupled as ſoon as he comes to the age of puberty. How faſt do mankind multiply in every colony or new ſettle⯑ment; where it is an eaſy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no way ſtraitned or confin'd, as in long eſtabliſh'd governments? Hi⯑ſtory [160] tells us frequently of plagues, that have ſwept away the third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the deſtruction was not per⯑ceiv'd; and the ſociety had again acquir'd their former number. The lands, that were cultivated, the houſes built, the commodities rais'd, the riches acquir'd, enabled the people, who eſcap'd, imme⯑diately to marry, and to rear families, which ſup⯑ply'd the place of thoſe who had periſh'd. ^* And for a like reaſon, every wiſe, juſt, and mild govern⯑ment, by rendering the condition of its ſubjects ea⯑ſy and ſecure, will always abound moſt in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whoſe climate and ſoil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one, which produces only corn, and that more populous than one, which is only fitted for paſturage. But if every thing elſe be equal, it ſeems natural to expect, that whereever there are moſt happineſs and virtue and the wiſeſt inſtitutions, there will alſo be moſt people.

THE queſtion, therefore, concerning the popu⯑louſneſs of antient and modern times being allow'd of great importance, 'twill be requiſite, if we wou'd [161] bring it to ſome determination, to compare both the domeſtic and political ſituation of theſe two pe⯑riods, in order to judge of the facts by their moral cauſes; which is the firſt view, in which we pro⯑pos'd to conſider them.

THE chief difference betwixt the domeſtic oeco⯑nomy of the antients and that of the moderns con⯑ſiſts in the practice of ſlavery, which prevail'd a⯑mongſt the former, and which has been aboliſh'd for ſome centuries throughout the greateſt part of Europe. Some paſſionate admirers of the antients and zealous partizans of civil liberty (for theſe ſen⯑timents, as they are both of them, in the main, extremely juſt, are alſo found to be almoſt inſe⯑parable) cannot forbear regreting the loſs of this inſtitution; and whilſt they brand all ſubmiſſion to the government of a ſingle perſon, with the harſh denomination of ſlavery, they wou'd gladly ſubject the greateſt part of mankind to real ſlavery and ſubjection. But to one, who conſiders cooly of the ſubject, it will appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at preſent, in the moſt arbitrary government of Europe, than it ever did during the moſt flouriſhing period of antient times. As much as ſubmiſſion to a petty prince, whoſe dominions extend not beyond a ſingle city, is more grievous than obedience to a great mon⯑arch; ſo much is domeſtic ſlavery more cruel and oppreſſive than any civil ſubjection whatſoever. [162] The more the maſter is remov'd from us in place and rank, the greater liberty do we enjoy; the leſs are our actions inſpected and controul'd; and the fainter that cruel compariſon becomes betwixt our own ſubjection, and the freedom and even domi⯑nion of another. The remains, that are left of do⯑meſtic ſlavery, in our colonies, and amongſt ſome European nations, wou'd never ſurely create a de⯑ſire oſ rendering it more univerſal. The little hu⯑manity commonly obſerv'd in perſons, accuſtom'd, from their infancy, to exerciſe ſo great authority over their fellow creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were ſufficient alone to diſguſt us with that authority. Nor can a more probable rea⯑ſon be given for the ſevere, I might ſay, barbarous, manners of antient times, than the practice of do⯑meſtic ſlavery; by which every man of rank was render'd a petty tyrant, and educated amidſt the flattery, ſubmiſſion, and low debaſement of his ſlaves.

ACCORDING to the antient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to reſtrain him to the duty of ſubmiſſion; none on the ſuperior, to engage him to the reciprocal duties of gentleneſs and humanity. In modern times, a bad ſervant finds not eaſily a good maſter, nor a bad maſter a good ſervant; and the checks are mutual, ſuitable to the inviolate and eternal laws of reaſon and equity.

[163] THE cuſtom of expoſing old, uſeleſs, or ſick ſlaves in an iſland of the Tyber, there to ſtarve, ſeems to have been pretty common in Rome; and who⯑ever recover'd, after having been ſo expos'd, had his liberty given him, by an edict of the emperor Claudius; where it was likeways forbid to kill any ſlave, merely for old age or ſickneſs. ^* But ſup⯑poſing, that this edict was ſtrictly obey'd, wou'd it better the domeſtic treatment of ſlaves, or ren⯑der their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others wou'd practiſe, when it was the profeſt maxim of the elder Cato to ſell his ſu⯑perannuated ſlaves for any price, rather than main⯑tain what he eſteem'd an uſeleſs burthen. ^†

THE ergaſtula or dungeons, where ſlaves in chains were beat to work, were very common all over Italy. Columella ^‡ adviſes, that they be al⯑ways built under ground; and recommends ^† it as the duty of a careful overſeer to call over every day the names of theſe ſlaves, like the muſtering of a regiment or ſhip's company, in order to know preſently when any of them had deſerted. A proof of the frequency of theſe ergaſtula, and of the great number of ſlaves confin'd in them. Partem Italiae ergaſtula a ſolitudine vindicant, ſays Livy.

[164] ACHAIN'D ſlave for a porter was uſual in Rome, as appears from Ovid, ^* and other authors. ^† Had not theſe people ſhaken off all ſenſe of compaſſion towards that unhappy part of their ſpecies, wou'd they have preſented all their friends, at the firſt en⯑trance, with ſuch an image of the ſeverity of the maſter, and miſery of the ſlave?

NOTHING ſo common in all trials, even of civil cauſes, as to call for the evidence of ſlaves; which was always extorted by the moſt exquiſite tor⯑ments. Demoſthenes ſays, ^‡ that where it was poſ⯑ſible to produce, for the ſame fact, either freemen or ſlaves as witneſſes, the judges always preferr'd the torturing of ſlaves, as a more certain and infall⯑ible evidence. ^†

Seneca draws a picture of that diſorderly luxury, which changes day into night and night into day, and inverts every ſtated hour of every office in life. Amongſt other circumſtances, ſuch as diſplacing the meals and time of bathing, he mentions, that, regularly, about the third hour of the night, the [165] neighbours of one, who indulges this falſe refine⯑ment, hear the noiſe of whips and laſhes; and up⯑on enquiry, find he is then taking an account of the conduct of his ſervants, and giving them due correction and diſcipline. This is not remark'd as an inſtance of cruelty, but only of diſorder, which, even in actions the moſt uſual and methodical, changes the fixt hours, that an eſtabliſh'd cuſtom had aſſign'd them. ^*

BUT our preſent buſineſs is only to conſider the influence of ſlavery on the populouſneſs of a ſtate. 'Tis pretended, that, in this particular, the antient practice has infinitely the advantage, and was the the chief cauſe of that extreme populouſneſs, which [166] is ſuppos'd in thoſe times. At preſent, all maſters diſcourage the marrying of their male ſervants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then ſuppos'd altogether incapacitated for their ſervice. But where the property of the ſer⯑vants is lodg'd in the maſter, their marriage and ſertility form his riches, and bring him a ſucceſſion of ſlaves that ſupply the place of thoſe, whom age and infirmity have diſabled. He encourages, there⯑fore, their propagation, as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the ſame care; and educates them to ſome art or calling, which may render them more uſeful or valuable to him. The opu⯑lent are, by this policy, intereſted in the being at leaſt, tho' not the well-being of the poor; and enrich themſelves by encreaſing the number and induſtry of thoſe, who are ſubjected to them. Each man, being a ſovereign in his own family, has the ſame intereſt with regard to it, as the prince with regard to the ſtate; and has not, like the prince, any oppoſite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his little ſove⯑reignty. All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has leiſure to inſpect the moſt minute de⯑tail of the marriage and education of his ſubjects. ^*

[167] SUCH are the conſequences of domeſtic ſlavery, according to the firſt aſpect and appearance of things: But if we enter deeper into the ſubject, we ſhall perhaps find reaſon to retract our haſty deter⯑minations. The compariſon is ſhocking betwixt the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely juſt, when apply'd to the preſent ſubject, it may be proper to trace the conſequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, rich, induſtrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Proviſions, lodging, atten⯑dance, labour are there dear; and men find better their account in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper countries. Theſe are conſequently the only breed⯑ing countries for cattle; and by a parity of reaſon, for men too, when the latter are put on the ſame footing with the former. To rear a child in Lon⯑don, till he cou'd be ſerviceable, wou'd coſt much dearer, than to buy one of the ſame age from Scot⯑land or Ireland; where he had been rais'd in a cot⯑tage, cover'd with rags, and fed on oatmeal or po⯑tatoes. Thoſe who had ſlaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous countries, wou'd diſ⯑courage the pregnancy of the females, and either [168] prevent or deſtroy the birth. The human ſpecies wou'd periſh in thoſe places, where it ought to en⯑creaſe the faſteſt; and a perpetual recruit be need⯑ed from all the poorer and more deſart provinces. Such a continu'd drain wou'd tend mightily to de⯑populate the ſtate, and render great cities ten times more deſtructive than with us; where every man is maſter of himſelf, and provides for his children from the powerful inſtinct of nature, not the calculations of ſordid intereſt. If London, at preſent, without much encreaſing, needs a yearly recruit from the country of 5000 people, as is commonly comput⯑ed: What muſt it require, if the greateſt part of the tradeſmen and common people were ſlaves, and were hinder'd from breeding, by their avarici⯑ous maſters?

ALL antient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of ſlaves to Italy from the remoter provinces, particularly Syria, Cilicia, ^* Cappadocia, the leſſer Aſia, Thrace and Egypt: Yet the number of people encreas'd not in Italy; and writers com⯑plain of the continual decay of induſtry and agri⯑culture. ^† Where then is that extreme fertility of the Roman ſlaves, which is commonly ſuppos'd? [169] So far from multiplying, they cou'd not, it ſeems, ſo much as keep up the ſtock, without immenſe recruits. And tho' great numbers were continual⯑ly manumitted, and converted into Roman citizens, the numbers even of theſe did not encreaſe; ^* till the freedom of the city was communicated to fo⯑reign provinces.

THE term for a ſlave, born and bred in the fa⯑mily, was verna; ^† and theſe ſlaves ſeem to have [170] been intitled by cuſtom to privileges and indul⯑gences beyond others; a ſufficient reaſon, why the maſters wou'd not be fond of rearing many of that kind. ^* Whoever is acquainted with the maxims of our planters will acknowledge the juſtneſs of this obſervation. ^†

Atticus is much prais'd by his hiſtorian for the care which he took in recruiting his family from the ſlaves born in it: ^‡ May we not thence infer, that that practice was not then very common?

THE names of ſlaves in the Greek comedies, Sy⯑rus, Myſus, Geta, Thrax, Davus, Lydus, Phryx, &c. afford a preſumption, that at Athens, at leaſt, moſt of the ſlaves were imported from foreign nations. [171] The Athenians, ſays Strabo, ^* gave to their ſlaves, either the names of the nations, whence they were bought, as Lydus, Syrus, or the names that were moſt common amongſt thoſe nations, as Manes or Midas to a Phrygian, Tibias to a Paphlagonian.

Demoſthenes, after having mention'd a law, which forbid any man to ſtrike the ſlave of another, praiſes the humanity of this law; and adds, that if the barbarians, from whom ſlaves were bought, had information that their countrymen met with ſuch gentle treatment, they wou'd entertain a great eſteem for the Athenians. ^† Iſocrates ^‡ alſo ſays, that all the Greek ſlaves were barbarians.

'TIS well known, that Demoſthenes, in his non⯑age, had been defrauded of a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recover'd, by a pro⯑ſecution at law, the value of his patrimony. His orations, on that occaſion, ſtill remain, and contain a very exact detail of the whole ſubſtance left by his father,^⸫ in money, merchandiſe, houſes, and ſlaves, along with the value of each particular. A⯑mongſt the reſt were 52 ſlaves, handicraftſmen, viz. 32 ſword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers;⁽⁾ all males, not a word of any wives, children, or [172] family, which they certainly wou'd have had, had it been a common cuſtom at Athens to breed from the ſlaves: And the value of the whole muſt have depended very much on that circumſtance. No female ſlaves are even ſo much as mention'd, ex⯑cept ſome chamber-maids, that belong'd to his mo⯑ther. This argument has great force, if it be not altogether deciſive.

CONSIDER this paſſage of Plutarch, ^* ſpeaking of the elder Cato. ‘He had a great number of ſlaves, which he took care to buy at the ſales of priſoners of war; and he choſe them young, that they might eaſily be accuſtom'd to any diet or manner of life, and be inſtructed in any buſi⯑neſs or labour, as men teach any thing to young dogs or horſes.—And eſteeming love the chief ſource of all diſorders, he allow'd the male ſlaves to have a commerce with the female in his fa⯑mily, upon paying a certain ſum for this privi⯑lege: But he ſtrictly forbid all intrigues out of his family.’ Are there any ſymptoms in this narration of that care, which is ſuppos'd in the an⯑tients, of the marriage and propagation of their ſlaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general intereſt, it wou'd ſurely have been em⯑brac'd by Cato, who was a great occonomiſt, and [173] liv'd in times, when the antient frugality and ſimpli⯑city of manners were ſtill in credit and reputation.

IT is expreſsly remark'd by the writers of the Roman law, that ſcarce any ever purchaſe ſlaves with a view of breeding from them.^*

OUR lackeys and chamber-maids, I own, do not ſerve much to multiply the ſpecies: But the anti⯑ents, beſide thoſe who attended on their perſon, had all their labour perform'd by ſlaves, who liv'd, many of them, in their family; and ſome great men poſſeſt to the number of 10,000. If there be any [174] ſuſpicion, therefore, that this inſtitution was unfa⯑vourable to propagation, (and the ſame reaſon, at leaſt in part, holds with regard to antient ſlaves as well as modern ſervants) how deſtructive muſt ſla⯑very have prov'd?

HISTORY mentions a Roman nobleman, who had 400 ſlaves under the ſame roof with him; and having been aſſaſſinated at home by the furious re⯑venge of one of them, the law was executed with ri⯑gour, and all without exception were put to death.^* Many other Roman noblemen had families equal⯑ly, or more numerous; and I believe every one will allow, that this wou'd ſcarce be practicable were we to ſuppoſe all the ſlaves marry'd, and the fe⯑males to be breeders.^†

So early as the poet Heſiod, ^‡ marry'd ſlaves, whe⯑ther male or female, were eſteem'd very inconve⯑nient. How much more, where families had en⯑creas'd to ſuch an enormous ſize, as in Rome, and the antient ſimplicity of manners was baniſh'd from all ranks of people?

[175] Xenophon in his oeconomics, where he gives di⯑rections for the management of a farm, recommends a ſtrict care and attention of laying the male and female ſlaves at a diſtance from each other. He ſeems not to ſuppoſe they are ever marry'd. The only ſlaves amongſt the Greeks, that appear to have continu'd their own breed, were the Helotes, who had houſes apart, and were more the ſlaves of the public than of individuals.^*

THE antients talk ſo frequently of a fixt, ſtated portion of proviſions aſſign'd to each ſlave,^† that we are naturally led to conclude, that ſlaves liv'd almoſt all ſingle, and receiv'd that portion as a kind of board wages.

THE practice, indeed, of marrying the ſlaves ſeems not to have been very common, even a⯑mongſt the country labourers, where it is more naturally to be expected. Cato, ^‡ enumerating the ſlaves, requiſite to labour a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them amount to 15; the overſeer and his wife, villicus and villica, and 13 male ſlaves. For an olive plantation of 240 acres, the overſeer and his wife and II male ſlaves: And ſo in pro⯑portion to a greater or leſs plantation or vineyard.

[176] Varro, ^* citing this paſſage of Cato, allows his computation to be juſt in every other reſpect, ex⯑cept the laſt. For as it is requiſite, ſays he, to have an overſeer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or ſmall, this muſt alter the ex⯑actneſs of the proportion. Had Cato's computati⯑on been erroneous in any other reſpect, it had cer⯑tainly been corrected by Varro, who ſeems fond of diſcovering ſo trivial an error.

THE ſame author,^† as well as Columella, ^‡ re⯑commends it as requiſite to give a wife to the over⯑ſeer, in order to attach him the more ſtrongly to his maſter's ſervice. This was, therefore, a pecu⯑liar indulgence granted to a ſlave, in whom ſo great a confidence was repos'd.

IN the ſame place, Varro mentions it as an uſeful precaution not to buy too many ſlaves from the ſame nation; leſt they beget factions and ſeditions in the family: A preſumption, that in Italy the greateſt part, even of the country labouring ſlaves (for he ſpeaks of no other) were bought from the remoter provinces. All the world knows, that the family ſlaves in Rome, who were inſtruments of ſhow and luxury, were commonly imported from the Eaſt. Hoc profecere, ſays Pliny, ſpeaking of the jealous care of maſters, mancipiorum legiones, et in [177] domo turba externa, ac ſervorum quoque cauſa no⯑menclator adhibendus. ^*

IT is indeed recommended by Varro, ^† to propa⯑gate young ſhepherds in the family from the old ones. For as graſing farms were commonly in remote and cheap places, and each ſhepherd liv'd in a cottage apart, his marriage and encreaſe were not liable to the ſame inconveniencies as in dearer places, and where many ſervants liv'd in a family; which was univerſally the caſe in ſuch of the Roman farms as produc'd wine or corn. If we conſider this exception with regard to ſhepherds, and weigh the reaſon of it, it will ſerve for a ſtrong confirma⯑tion of all our foregoing ſuſpicions.^‡

Columella, ^⸫ I own, adviſes the maſter to give a reward, and even liberty to a female ſlave, that had rear'd him above three children: A proof, that ſometimes the antients propagated from their ſlaves, which, indeed, cannot be deny'd. Were it other⯑wiſe, the practice of ſlavery, being ſo common in antiquity, muſt have been deſtructive to a degree, which no expedient cou'd repair. All I pretend by theſe reaſonings is, that ſlavery is in general diſ⯑advantageous both to the happineſs and populouſ⯑neſs of mankind, and that its place is much better ſupply'd by the practice of hir'd ſervants.

[178] THE laws, or, as ſome writers call them, the ſe⯑ditions of the Gracchi, were occaſion'd by their obſerving the encreaſe of ſlaves all over Italy, and the diminution of free-citizens. Appian ^* aſcribes this encreaſe to the propagation of the ſlaves: Plu⯑tarch ^† to the purchaſe of barbarians, who were chain'd and impriſon'd, [...] ^‡. 'Tis to be preſum'd, that both cauſes concurr'd.

Sicily, ſays Florus, ^⸫ was full of ergaſtula, and was cultivated by labourers in chains. Eunus and Athenio excited the ſervile war, by breaking up theſe monſtrous priſons, and giving liberty to 60,000 ſlaves. The younger Pompey augmented his army in Spain by the ſame expedient ⁽⁾. If the country labourers throughout the Roman empire were ſo generally in this ſituation, and if it was difficult or impoſſible to find ſeparate lodgings for the families of the city ſervants; how unfavourable to propa⯑gation, [179] as well as humanity, muſt the inſtitution of domeſtic ſlavery be eſteem'd?

Conſtantinople, at preſent, requires the ſame re⯑cruits of ſlaves from all the provinces, which Rome did of old; and theſe provinces are of conſequence far from being populous.

Aegypt, according to Monſ. Maillet, ſends con⯑tinual colonies of black ſlaves to the other parts of the Turkiſh empire, and receives annually an e⯑qual return of white: The one brought from the inland parts of Africa, the other from Mingrelia, Circaſſia, and Tartary.

OUR modern convents are, no doubt, very bad inſtitutions: But there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that an⯑tiently every great family in Italy, and probably in other parts of the world, was a ſpecies of convent. And tho' we have reaſon to deteſt all theſe popiſh inſtitutions, as nurſeries of the moſt abject ſuper⯑ſtition, burthenſome to the public, and oppreſſive to the poor priſoners, male, as well as female; yet may it be queſtion'd, whether they be ſo deſtruc⯑tive to the populouſneſs of a ſtate as is commonly imagin'd. Were the land, which belongs to a con⯑vent, beſtow'd on a nobleman, he wou'd ſpend its revenue on dogs, horſes, grooms, footmen, cooks, and chamber-maids; and his family wou'd not furniſh many more citizens than the convent.

[180] THE common reaſon why parents thruſt their daughters into nunneries, is, that they may not be overburthen'd with too numerous a family; but the antients had a method almoſt as innocent and more effectual to that purpoſe, viz. the expoſing their children in the earlieſt infancy. This prac⯑tice was very common; and is not mention'd by any author of thoſe times with the horror it de⯑ſerves, or ſcarce ^* even with diſapprobation. Plu⯑tarch, the humane, good natur'd Plutarch, ^† re⯑commends it as a virtue in Attalus, king of Per⯑gamus, that he murder'd, or, if you will, expos'd all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the ſon of his brother, Eumenes: Signalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to Eume⯑nes, who had left him his heir preferably to that ſon. 'Twas Solon, the moſt celebrated of the ſa⯑ges of Greece, who gave parents permiſſion by law to kill their children.^‡

SHALL we then allow theſe two circumſtances to compenſate each other, viz. monaſtic vows and the expoſing of children, and to be unfavourable, in equal degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the ſide of anti⯑quity. [181] Perhaps, by an odd conexion of cauſes, the barbarous practice of the antients might ra⯑ther render thoſe times more populous. By re⯑moving the terrors of too numerous a family, it wou'd engage many people in marriage; and ſuch is the force of natural affection, that very few, in compariſon, wou'd have reſolution enough, when it came to the puſh, to carry into execution their former intentions.

China the only country, where this barbarous practice of expoſing children prevails at preſent, is the moſt populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages cou'd ſcarce be general, had not men the proſpect of ſo eaſy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that Plutarch ^* ſpeaks of it as a very univerſal maxim of the poor to expoſe their children; and as the rich were then averſe to marriage, on account of the courtſhip they met with from thoſe who expected legacies from them, the public muſt have been in a bad ſituation be⯑twixt them.^†

[182] OF all ſciences there is none, where firſt ap⯑pearances are more deceitful than politics. Hoſ⯑pitals for foundlings ſeem favourable to the encreaſe of numbers; and perhaps, may be ſo, when kept under proper reſtrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without diſtinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious to the ſtate. 'Tis computed, that every ninth child, born at Paris, is ſent to the hoſpital; tho' it ſeems certain, according to the common courſe of human affairs, that 'tis not a hundredth part, whoſe pa⯑rents are altogether incapacitated to rear and edu⯑cate them. The infinite difference, for health, induſtry, and morals, betwixt an education in an hoſpital and that in a private family, ſhou'd induce us not to make the entrance into an hoſpital too ea⯑ſy and engaging. To kill one's own child is ſhock⯑ing to nature, and muſt therefore be pretty unuſual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.

HAVING conſider'd the domeſtic life and man⯑ners of the antients, compar'd to thoſe of the mo⯑derns;¹²³ [183] where, in the main, we ſeem rather ſuperior, ſo far as the preſent queſtion is concern'd; we ſhall now examine the political cuſtoms and inſtitutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.

BEFORE the encreaſe of the Roman power, or rather, till its full eſtabliſhment, almoſt all the na⯑tions, which are the ſcene of antient hiſtory, were divided into ſmall territories or petty common⯑wealths, where of courſe a great equality of for⯑tune prevail'd, and the center of government was always very near its frontiers. This was the ſitu⯑ation of affairs, not only in Greece and Italy, but al⯑ſo in Spain, Gaul, Germany, Afric, and a great part of the leſſer Aſia: And it muſt be own'd, that no inſtitution cou'd be more favourable to the pro⯑pagation of mankind. For tho' a man of an over⯑grown fortune, not being able to conſume more than another, muſt ſhare it with thoſe who ſerve and attend him: Yet their poſſeſſion being preca⯑rious, they have not the ſame encouragement to marriage, as if each had a ſmall fortune, ſecure and independent. Enormous cities are beſides de⯑ſtructive to ſociety, beget vice and diſorder of all kinds, ſtarve the remoter provinces, and even ſtarve themſelves, by the high prices, to which they raiſe all proviſions. Where each man had his little houſe and field to himſelf, and each county had its capital, free and independent: What a happy ſi⯑tuation [184] of mankind! How favourable to induſtry and agriculture; to marriage and propagation! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that reſtraint, which poverty and neceſſity impoſes on it, wou'd double the numbers every generation: And nothing ſurely can give it more liberty, than ſuch ſmall commonwealths, and ſuch an equality of fortune amongſt the citizens. All ſmall ſtates naturally produce equality of for⯑tune, becauſe they afford no opportunities of great encreaſe; but ſmall commonwealths much more, by that diviſion of power and authority, which is eſſential to them.

WHEN Xenophon ^* return'd after the famous ex⯑pedition with Cyrus, he hir'd himſelf and 6000 of the Greeks into the ſervice of Seuthes, a prince of Thrace; and the articles of his agreement were, that each ſoldier ſhou'd receive a daric a month, each captain two darics, and he himſelf as general four: A regulation of pay, which wou'd not a little ſur⯑prize our modern officers.

WHEN Demoſthenes and Aeſchines, with eight more, were ſent ambaſſadors to Philip of Macedon, their appointments for above four months were a thouſand drachmas, which is leſs than a drachma a day for each ambaſſador.^† But a drachma a day, [185] nay ſometimes two,^* was the pay of a common foot ſoldier.

A CENTURION amongſt the Romans had only double pay to a common ſoldier, in Polybius's ^† time; and we accordingly find their gratuities after a triumph regulated by that proportion.^‡ But Mark Anthony and the triumvirate gave the centurions five times the reward of the other.^‖ So much had the encreaſe of the commonwealth encreas'd the inequality amongſt the citizens.^§

IT muſt be own'd, that the ſituation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near ſo favourable, ei⯑ther to the propagation or happineſs of mankind. Europe is ſhar'd out moſtly into great monarchies; and ſuch parts of it as are divided into ſmall terri⯑tories, are commonly govern'd by abſolute princes, who ruin their people by a ridiculous mimickry of the greater monarchs, in the ſplendor of their court and number of their forces. Swiſſerland alone and Holland reſemble the antient republics; and tho' the former is far from poſſeſſing any advantage ei⯑ther [186] of ſoil, climate, or commerce, yet the num⯑bers of people, with which it abounds, notwith⯑ſtanding their enliſting themſelves into every ſer⯑vice in Europe, prove ſufficiently the advantages of their political inſtitutions.

THE antient republics deriv'd their chief or on⯑ly ſecurity from the numbers of their citizens. The Trachinians having loſt great numbers of their people, the remainder, inſtead of enriching them⯑ſelves by the inheritance of their fellow citizens, ap⯑ply'd to Sparta, their metropolis, for a new ſtock of inhabitants. The Spartans immediately col⯑lected ten thouſand men, amongſt whom the old citizens divided the lands, of which the former pro⯑prietors had periſh'd.^*

AFTER Timoleon had baniſh'd Dionyſius from Syracuſe, and had ſettled the affairs of Sicily, find⯑ing the cities of Syracuſe and Sellinuntium extreme⯑ly depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction, he in⯑vited over from Greece ſome new inhabitants to repeople them.^† Immediately forty thouſand men (Plutarch ^‡ ſays ſixty thouſand) offer'd themſelves; and he diſtributed ſo many lots of land amongſt them, to the great ſatisfaction of the antient inha⯑bitants: A proof at once of the maxims of antient policy, which affected populouſneſs more than rich⯑es; [187] and of the good effects of theſe maxims, in the extreme populouſneſs of that ſmall country, Greece, which cou'd at once ſupply ſo large a co⯑lony. The caſe was not much different with the Romans in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, ſaid M. Curius, who cannot be contented with ſe⯑ven acres.^* Such ideas of equality cou'd not fail to produce populouſneſs.

WE muſt now conſider what diſadvantages the antients lay under with regard to populouſneſs, and what checks they receiv'd from their political max⯑ims and inſtitutions. There are commonly com⯑penſations in every human condition; and tho' theſe compenſations be not always perfectly equi⯑valent, yet they ſerve, at leaſt, to reſtrain the pre⯑vailing principle. To compare them and eſtimate their influence is indeed very difficult, even where they take place in the ſame age and in neighbour⯑ing countries: But where ſeveral ages have inter⯑ven'd, and only ſcatter'd lights are afforded us by antient authors; what can we do but amuſe our⯑ſelves [188] by talking, pro and con, on an intereſting ſubject, and thereby correcting all haſty and vio⯑lent determinations?

Firſt, WE may obſerve, that the antient repu⯑blics were almoſt in perpetual war; a natural ef⯑fect of their martial ſpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred, which gene⯑rally prevails amongſt nations, that live in a cloſe neighbourhood. Now war in a ſmall ſtate is much more deſtructive than in a great one; both becauſe all the inhabitants, in the former caſe, muſt fill the armies, and becauſe the ſtate is all frontier, and all expos'd to the inroads of the enemy.

THE maxims of antient war were much more deſtructive than thoſe of modern; chiefly by the diſtribution of plunder, in which the ſoldiers were indulg'd. Our common ſoldiers are ſuch a low raſcally ſet of people, that we find any abundance, beyond their ſimple pay, breeds confuſion and diſ⯑order, and a total diſſolution of diſcipline. The very wretchedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe, who fill the modern armies, render them leſs deſtructive to the countries, which they invade: One inſtance, amongſt many, of the deceitfulneſs of firſt appear⯑ances in all political reaſonings.^*

[189] ANTIENT battles were much more bloody by the very nature of the weapons employ'd in them. The antients drew up their men 16 or 20, ſome⯑times 50 men deep, which made a narrow front; and 'twas not difficult to find a field, in which both armies might be marſhall'd, and might engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not ſo ſoon decided be⯑twixt the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the difficulties, that oppos'd them, and take part in the engagement. And as the whole armies were thus engag'd, and each man cloſely buckl'd to his antagoniſt, the battles were com⯑monly very bloody, and great ſlaughter made on both ſides, but eſpecially on the vanquiſh'd. The long, thin lines, requir'd by fire arms, and the quick deciſion of the fray, render our modern engage⯑ments but partial rencounters, and enable the ge⯑neral, who is foil'd in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greateſt part of his army, ſound and entire. Cou'd Folard's project of the column take place (which ſeems impracticable^*) it wou'd ren⯑der modern battles as deſtructive as the antient.

THE battles of antiquity, both by their durati⯑on and their reſemblance of ſingle combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury, quite unknown to latter ages. Nothing cou'd then engage the com⯑batants to give quarter but the hopes of profit, by making ſlaves of their priſoners. In civil wars, as we learn from Tacitus, ^† the battles were the moſt bloody, becauſe the priſoners were not ſlaves.

WHAT a ſtout reſiſtance muſt be made, where the vanquiſh'd expected ſo hard a fate! How in⯑veterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every reſpect, ſo bloody and ſevere!

INSTANCES are very frequent, in antient hiſto⯑ry, of cities beſieg'd, whoſe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murder'd their wives and chil⯑dren, and ruſh'd themſelves on a voluntary death, ſweeten'd perhaps with a little proſpect of revenge upon the enemy. Greeks, ^* as well as Barbarians, have been often wrought up to this degree of fury. And the ſame determinate ſpirit and cruelty muſt, in many other inſtances, leſs remarkable, have been [191] extremely deſtructive to human ſociety, in thoſe petty commonwealths, that liv'd in a cloſe neigh⯑bourhood, and were engag'd in perpetual wars and contentions.

SOMETIMES the wars in Greece, ſays Plutarch, ^* were carried on entirely by inroads, and robberies, and pyracies. Such a method of war muſt be more deſtructive, in ſmall ſtates, than the bloodieſt battles and ſieges.

BY the laws of the 12 tables, poſſeſſion for two years form'd a preſcription for land; one year for movables:^† An indication, that there was not in Italy, during that period, much more order, tran⯑quillity, and ſettled police than there is at preſent a⯑mongſt the Tartars.

THE only cartel, I remember in antient hiſtory, is that betwixt Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Rho⯑dians; when it was agreed, that a free citizen ſhou'd be reſtor'd for 1000 drachamas, a ſlave bearing arms for 500.^‡

BUT ſecondly, it appears, that antient manners were more unfavourable than the modern, not on⯑ly in time of war but alſo in time of peace, and that too, in every reſpect, except the love of civil li⯑berty [192] and equality, which is, I own, of conſiderable importance. To exclude faction from a free go⯑vernment is very difficult, if not altogether imprac⯑ticable; but ſuch inveterate rage betwixt the fac⯑tions, and ſuch bloody maxims, are found, in mo⯑dern times, amongſt religious parties alone, where bigotted prieſts are the accuſers, judges, and execu⯑tioners. In antient hiſtory, we may always ob⯑ſerve, where one party prevail'd, whether the no⯑bles or people, (for I can obſerve no difference in this reſpect ^†) that they immediately butcher'd all of the oppoſite party they laid their hands on, and baniſh'd ſuch as had been ſo fortunate as to eſcape their fury. No form of proceſs, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the city were ſlaughter'd, or expell'd, every revo⯑lution; and the exiles always join'd foreign ene⯑mies, and did all the miſchief poſſible to their fel⯑low citizens; till fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as theſe were very frequent in ſuch violent govern⯑ments, the diſorder, diffidence, jealouſy, enmity, which muſt prevail, are not eaſy for us to imagine in this age of the world.

THERE are only two revolutions I can recollect in all antient hiſtory, which paſt without great ſe⯑verity and great effuſion of blood in maſſacres and [193] aſſaſſinations, viz. the reſtoration of the Athenian democracy by Thraſybulus, and the ſubduing the Roman republic by Caeſar. We learn from antient hiſtory, that Thraſybulus paſt a general amneſty for all paſt offences; and firſt introduc'd that word, as well as practice into Greece. ^* It appears, howe⯑ver, from many orations of Lyſias, ^† that the chief, and even ſome of the ſubaltern offenders, in the pre⯑ceeding tyranny, were try'd, and capitally puniſh'd. This is a difficulty not clear'd up, and even not ob⯑ſerv'd, by antiquarians and hiſtorians. And as to Caeſar's clemency, tho' much celebrated, it wou'd not gain great applauſe in the preſent age. He butcher'd, for inſtance, all Cato's ſenate, when he became maſter of Utica; ^‡ and theſe, we may rea⯑dily believe, were not the moſt worthleſs of the party. All thoſe, who had born arms againſt that uſurper, were forfeited; and, by Hirtius's law, de⯑clar'd incapable of all public offices.

THESE people were extremely fond of liberty; but ſeem not to have underſtood it very well. When the thirty tyrants firſt eſtabliſh'd their do⯑minion at Athens, they began with ſeizing all the ſycophants and informers, that had been ſo trouble⯑ſome during the democracy, and putting them to death, by an arbitrary ſentence and execution. E⯑very [194] man, ſays Salluſt ^* and Lyſias, ^† was rejoiced at theſe puniſhments; not conſidering, that liberty was from that moment annihilated.

THE utmoſt energy of Thucydides's nervous ſtile, and the great copiouſneſs and expreſſion of the Greek language ſeem to ſink under that hiſtorian, when he attempts to deſcribe the diſorders, that a⯑roſe from faction, throughout all the Greek com⯑monwealths. You wou'd imagine, that he ſtill labours with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pa⯑thetic deſcription with an obſervation, which is at once very refin'd and very ſolid. ‘In theſe con⯑teſts, (ſays he,) thoſe who were dulleſt and moſt ſtupid and had the leaſt foreſight, com⯑monly prevail'd. For being conſcious of this weakneſs, and dreading to be over-reach'd by thoſe of greater penetration, they went to work haſtily, without premeditation, by the ſword and poniard, and thereby prevented their antago⯑niſts, who were forming fine ſchemes and pro⯑jects for their deſtruction.’ ^‡

[195] NOT to mention Dionyſius ^* the elder, who is computed to have butcher'd in cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow citizens; nor Agathocles, ^† Nabis, ^‡ and others, ſtill more bloody than he; the tranſactions, even in free governments, were ex⯑tremely violent and deſtructive. At Athens, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murder'd, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and baniſh'd above the half of the citizens that re⯑main'd.^§ In Argos, near the ſame time, the people kill'd 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own demagogues, becauſe they had refus'd to carry their proſecutions farther.^‖ The people alſo in Cor⯑cyra kill'd 1500 of the nobles and baniſh'd a thou⯑ſand.^¶ Theſe numbers will appear the more ſurprizing, if we conſider the extreme ſmallneſs of [196] theſe ſtates: But all antient hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances.^*

WHEN Alexander order'd all the exiles to be reſtor'd, thro' all the cities; it was found that the [197] whole amounted to 20,000 men;^* the remains probably of ſtill greater ſlaughters and maſſacres. What an aſtoniſhing multitude in ſo narrow a country as antient Greece! And what domeſtic confuſion, jealouſy, partiality, revenge, heart-burn⯑ings, muſt tear thoſe cities, where factions were wrought up to ſuch a degree of fury and deſpair?

'TWOU'D be eaſier, ſays Iſocrates to Philip, to raiſe an army in Greece at preſent from the vaga⯑bonds than from the cities.

EVEN where affairs came not to ſuch extremi⯑ties (which they fail'd not to do almoſt in every city twice or thrice every century) property was render'd very precarious by the maxims of antient government. Xenophon, in the banquet of Socrates, gives us a very natural, unaffected deſcription of the tyranny of the Athenian people. ‘In my po⯑verty, (ſays Charmides,) I am much more hap⯑py than ever I was during my riches; as much as it is happier to be in ſecurity than in ter⯑rors, free than a ſlave, to receive than to pay court, to be truſted than ſuſpected. Formerly I was oblig'd to careſs every informer: Some impoſition was continually laid upon me; and it was never allow'd me to travel or be abſent [198] from the city. At preſent, when I am poor, I look big and threaten others. The rich are a⯑fraid of me, and ſhow me every kind of civility and reſpect; and I am become a kind of tyrant in the city.’ ^*

IN one of the pleadings of Lyſias, ^† the orator very coolly ſpeaks of it, by the bye, as a maxim of the Athenian people, that, whenever they wanted money, they put to death ſome of the rich citizens as well as ſtrangers, for the ſake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he ſeems to have no intention of blaming them; ſtill leſs, of provoking them, who were his audience and judges.

WHETHER a man was a citizen or a ſtranger amongſt that people, it ſeems indeed requiſite, ei⯑ther that he ſhou'd impoveriſh himſelf, or the peo⯑ple wou'd impoveriſh him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator laſt mention'd gives a pleaſant account of an eſtate laid out in the pub⯑lic ſervice;^‡ that is, above the third of it, in raree⯑ſhows and figur'd dances.

[199] INEED not inſiſt on the Greek tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even the mixt monar⯑chies, by which moſt of the antient ſtates of Greece were govern'd, before the introduction of repub⯑lics, were very unſettled. Scarce any city, but A⯑thens, ſays Iſocrates, could ſhow a ſucceſſion of kings, for four or five generations ^*.

BESIDES many other obvious reaſons for the inſtability of antient monarchies, the equal diviſi⯑on of property amongſt the brothers in private fa⯑milies, [200] by a neceſſary conſequence, muſt contribute to unſettle and diſturb the ſtate. The univerſal preference given to the elder in modern govern⯑ments, tho' it increaſes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accuſtoms men to the ſame idea of public ſucceſſion, and cuts off all claim and pretenſion of the younger.

THE new ſettled colony of Heraclea, falling immediately into factions, apply'd to Sparta, who ſent Heripidas with full authority to quiet their diſſenſions. This man, not provok'd by any op⯑poſition, not inflam'd by party rage, knew no bet⯑ter expedient than immediately putting to death about 500 of the citizens ^†. A ſtrong proof how deeply rooted theſe violent maxims of govern⯑ment were throughout all Greece.

IF ſuch was the diſpoſition of mens minds a⯑mongſt that refin'd people, what may be expected in the commonwealths of Italy, Afric, Spain, and Gaul, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherways did the Greeks ſo much value them⯑ſelves on their humanity, gentleneſs and modera⯑tion above all other nations? This reaſoning ſeems very natural: But unluckily the hiſtory of the Roman commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the receiv'd accounts, ſtands againſt us. No blood was ever ſhed in any ſedition at [201] Rome, 'till the murder of the Gracchi. Dionyſius Halicarnaſſoeus ^‡, obſerving the ſingular humanity of the Roman people in this reſpect, makes uſe of it as an argument that they were originally of Gre⯑cian extraction: Whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous re⯑publics were more violent than even thoſe of Greece above mention'd.

IF the Romans were ſo late in coming to blows, they made ample compenſation after they had once enter'd upon the bloody ſcene; and Appian's hiſto⯑ry of their civil wars contains the moſt frightful picture of maſſacres, proſcriptions and forfeitures, that ever was preſented to the world. What pleaſes moſt in that hiſtorian is, that he ſeems to feel a proper reſentment of theſe barbarous pro⯑ceedings; and talks not with that provoking cool⯑neſs and indifference, which cuſtom had produc'd in many of the Greek hiſtorians.^¶

[202] THE maxims of antient politics contain, in general, ſo little humanity and moderation, that it ſeems ſuperfluous to give any particular reaſon for the violences committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear obſerving, that the laws, in the latter ages of the Roman commonwealth, were ſo abſurdly contriv'd, that they oblig'd the heads of parties to have recourſe to theſe extre⯑mities. All capital puniſhments were aboliſh'd: However criminal, or what is more, however dan⯑gerous any citizen might be, he cou'd not regu⯑larly be puniſh'd otherways than by baniſhment: And it became neceſſary, in the revolutions of par⯑ty, to draw the ſword of private vengeance; nor was it eaſy, when laws were once violated, to ſet bounds to theſe ſanguinary proceedings. Had Bru⯑tus himſelf prevail'd over the triumvirate, cou'd he, in common prudence, have allow'd Octavius [203] and Anthony to live, and have contented himſelf with baniſhing them to Rhodes or Marſeilles, where they might ſtill have plotted new commotions and rebellions? His executing C. Antonius, bro⯑ther to the triumvir, ſhows evidently his ſenſe of the matter. Did not Cicero, with the approbati⯑on of all the wiſe and virtuous of Rome, arbitrari⯑ly put to death Catiline's aſſociates, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of proceſs? And if he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his temper or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched ſecurity in a government, which pretends to laws and li⯑berty.

THUS, one extreme produces another. In the ſame manner as exceſſive ſeverity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; ſo their exceſſive lenity naturally engenders cruelty and barbarity. 'Tis dangerous to force us, in a⯑ny caſe, to uſe freedom with their ſacred regulati⯑ons and preſcriptions.

ONE general cauſe of the diſorders, ſo frequent in all antient governments, ſeems to have conſiſted in the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing any ariſtocra⯑cy in thoſe ages, and the perpetual diſcontents and ſeditions of the people, whenever even the meaneſt and moſt beggarly were excluded from the legiſ⯑lature and from public offices. The very quality [204] of freeman gave ſuch a rank, being oppos'd to that of ſlave, that it ſeem'd to intitle the poſſeſſor to every power and privilege of the common⯑wealth. Salon's ^† laws excluded no freeman from votes or elections, but confin'd ſome magiſtracies to a particular cenſus; yet were the people never ſatisfy'd 'till thoſe laws were repeal'd. By the treaty with Antipater ^‡, no Athenian had a vote, whoſe cenſus was leſs than 2000 drachmas (about 60 l. Sterl.) And tho' ſuch a government wou'd to us appear ſufficiently democratical, it was ſo diſagreeable to that people, that above two thirds immediately deſerted their country ^¶ Caſſander reduc'd that cenſus to the half ^⸫; yet ſtill the go⯑vernment was conſider'd as an oligarchical tyran⯑ny, and the effect of foreign violence.

Servius Tullius's ⁽⁾ laws ſeem very equal and reaſonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property: Yet the Roman people cou'd never be brought quietly to ſubmit to them.

IN thoſe days, there was no medium betwixt a ſevere, jealous ariſtocracy, over diſcontented ſub⯑jects; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical demo⯑cracy.

[205] BUT thirdly, there are many other circumſtan⯑ces, in which antient nations ſeem inferior to the modern, both for the happineſs and encreaſe of mankind. Trade, manufactures, induſtry were no where, in former ages, ſo flouriſhing as they are at preſent, in Europe. The only garb of the antients, both for males and females, ſeems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore common⯑ly white or grey, and which they ſcour'd, as of⯑ten as it grew dirty. Tyre, which carry'd on, after Carthage, the greateſt commerce of any city in the Mediterranean, before it was deſtroyed by Alexander, was no mighty city, if we credit Arri⯑an's account of its inhabitants ^†. Athens is com⯑monly ſuppos'd to have been a trading city; but it was as populous before the Median war, as at any time after it, according to Herodotus ^‡; and yet its commerce, at that time, was ſo inconſiderable, that, as the ſame hiſtorian obſerves ^¶, even the neighbouring coaſts of Aſia were as little frequent⯑ed by the Greeks as the pillars of Hercules: For beyond theſe, he conceiv'd nothing.

GREAT intereſt of money and great profits of trade are an infallible indication, that induſtry and [206] commerce are but in their infancy. We read in Lyſias ^⸫ of 100 per cent. profit made on a cargo of two talents, ſent to no greater diſtance than from Athens to the Adriatic: Nor is this mention'd as an inſtance of exorbitant profit. Antidorus, ſays De⯑moſthenes ⁽⁾, pay'd three talents and a half for a houſe, which he let at a talent a year: And the orator blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, ſays he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 of the ſlaves, left by his father, he computes at 40 minas; and the yearly profit of their labour at twelve ^[]. The moſt moderate intereſt at Athens (for there was higher^:-: often pay'd) was 12 per cent. ^*; and that pay'd month⯑ly. Not to inſiſt upon the exorbitant intereſt of 34 per cent. to which the vaſt ſums diſtributed in elections had rais'd money ^† at Rome, we find, that Verres, before that factious period, ſtated 24 per cent. for money, which he left in the publi⯑cans hands. And tho' Cicero exclaims againſt this article, it is not on account of the extravagant u⯑ſury; but becauſe it had never been cuſtomary to ſtate any intereſt on ſuch occaſions ^‡. Intereſt, indeed, ſunk at Rome, after the ſettlement of the [207] empire: But it never remain'd any conſiderable time, ſo low as in the commercial ſtates of mo⯑dern ages ^*.

AMONGST the other inconveniencies, which the Athenians felt from the fortifying Decelia by the Lacedemonians, it is repreſented by Thucydides ^† as one of the moſt conſiderable, that they cou'd not bring over their corn from Euboea by land, paſ⯑ſing by Oropus, but were oblig'd to embark it, and to ſail about the promontory of Sunium. A ſurpriſ⯑ing inſtance of the imperfection of antient naviga⯑tion: For the water carriage is not here above double the land.

I DO not remember any paſſage in any antient author, wherein the growth of any city is aſcrib'd to the eſtabliſhment of a manufacture. The com⯑merce, which is ſaid to flouriſh, is chiefly the ex⯑change of thoſe commodities, for which different ſoils and climates were ſuited. The ſale of wine and oil into Africa, according to Diodorus Siculus ^‡, was the foundation of the riches of Agrigentum. The ſituation of the city of Sybaris, according to the ſame author⁽⁾, was the cauſe of its immenſe populouſneſs; being built near the two rivers, Cra⯑thys and Sybaris. But theſe two rivers, we may obſerve, are not navigable; and cou'd only pro⯑duce ſome fertile vallies for agriculture and hus⯑bandry; [208] an advantage ſo inconſiderable, that a modern writer wou'd ſcarcely have taken notice of it.

THE barbarity of the antient tyrants, along with the extreme love of liberty, which animated thoſe ages, muſt have baniſh'd every merchant and manufacturer, and have quite depopulated the ſtate, had it ſubſiſted upon induſtry and commerce. While the cruel and ſuſpicious Dionyſius was car⯑rying on his butcheries, who, that was not de⯑tain'd by his landed property, and cou'd have car⯑ry'd along with him any art or skill to procure a ſubſiſtence in other countries, wou'd have remain'd expos'd to ſuch implacable barbarity? The perſe⯑cutions of Philip the II. and Lewis the XIV. fill'd all Europe with the manufacturers of Flanders and of France.

I GRANT, that agriculture is the ſpecies of in⯑duſtry, which is chiefly requiſite to the ſubſiſtence of multitudes of people; and it is poſſible, that this induſtry may flouriſh, even where manufactures and other arts are unknown or neglected. Swiſ⯑ſerland is at preſent a very remarkable inſtance; where we find, at once, the moſt skilful husband⯑men and the moſt bungling tradeſmen, that are to be met with in all Europe. That agriculture flou⯑riſh'd mightily in Greece and Italy, at leaſt in ſome parts of them, and at ſome periods, we have rea⯑ſon [209] to preſume: And whether the mechanical arts had reach'd the ſame degree of perfection may not be eſteem'd ſo material; eſpecially, if we conſi⯑der the great equality in the antient republics, where each family was oblig'd to cultivate, with the greateſt care and induſtry, its own little field, in order to its ſubſiſtence.

BUT is it juſt reaſoning, becauſe agriculture may, in ſome inſtances, flouriſh without trade or manu⯑factures, to conclude that, in any great extent of country, and for any great tract of time, it wou'd ſubſiſt alone? The moſt natural way, ſurely, of en⯑couraging husbandry, is firſt to excite other kinds of induſtry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of ſuch goods as may contribute to his pleaſure and enjoy⯑ment. This method is infallible and univerſal; and as it prevails more in modern governments than in the antient, it affords a preſumption of the ſuperior populouſneſs of the former.

EVERY man, ſays Xenophon, ^* may be a farmer: No art or ſkill is requiſite: All conſiſts in the in⯑duſtry and attention to the execution. A ſtrong proof, as Columella hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of Xenophon.

ALL our latter improvements and refinements; have they operated nothing towards the eaſy ſub⯑ſiſtence [210] of men, and conſequently towards their propagation and encreaſe? Our ſuperior ſkill in mechanics, the diſcovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been ſo much enlarg'd, the eſta⯑bliſhment of poſts, and the uſe of bills of exchange; theſe ſeem all extremely uſeful to the encourage⯑ment of art, induſtry, and populouſneſs. Were we to ſtrike off theſe, what a check wou'd we give to every kind of buſineſs and labour, and what mul⯑titudes of families wou'd immediately periſh from want and hunger? And it ſeems not probable, that we cou'd ſupply the place of theſe new inventions by any other regulation or inſtitution.

HAVE we reaſon to think, that the police of an⯑tient ſtates was any way comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal ſecurity, either at home, or in their journeys by land or water? I queſtion not, but every impartial exami⯑ner wou'd give us the preference in this particular.^*

THUS upon comparing the whole, it ſeems im⯑poſſible to aſſign any juſt reaſon, why the world ſhou'd have been more populous in antient than in modern times. The equality of property, a⯑mongſt the antients, liberty, and the ſmall diviſi⯑ons of their ſtates, were indeed favourable to the propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and deſtructive; their governments [211] more factious and unſettl'd; commerce and ma⯑nufactures more feeble and languiſhing; and the general police more looſe and irregular. Theſe latter diſadvantages ſeem to form a ſufficient coun⯑ter-balance to the former advantages; and rather favour the oppoſite opinion to that which common⯑ly prevails with regard to this ſubject.

BUT there is no reaſoning, it may be ſaid, a⯑gainſt matter of fact. If it appear, that the world was then more populous than at preſent, we may be aſſur'd, that our conjectures are falſe, and that we have overlook'd ſome material circumſtance in the compariſon. This I readily own: All our preceding reaſonings, I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at leaſt, ſmall ſkirmiſhes and frivolous rencounters, that decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, can⯑not be render'd much more deciſive. The facts deliver'd by antient authors are either ſo uncertain or ſo imperfect as to afford us nothing deciſive in this matter. How indeed cou'd it be otherwiſe? The very facts, which we muſt oppoſe to them, in computing the greatneſs of modern ſtates, are far from being either certain or compleat. Many grounds of calculation, proceeded on by celebrat⯑ed writers, are little better than thoſe of the em⯑peror Heliogabalus, who form'd an eſtimate of the immenſe greatneſs of Rome, from ten thouſand [212] pound weight of cobwebs, which had been found in that city.^*

'TIS to be remark'd, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in antient manuſcripts, and have been ſubject to much greater corruptions than any other part of the text; and that for a very obvious rea⯑ſon. Any alteration in other places, commonly affects the ſenſe or grammar, and is more readily perceiv'd by the reader and tranſcriber.

FEW enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any antient author of good authority; ſo as to afford us a large enough view for compariſon.

'TIS probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the numbers of citizens aſſigned to any free city; becauſe they enter'd for a ſhare of the government, and there were exact regiſters kept of them. But as the number of ſlaves is ſeldom mention'd, this leaves us in as great uncertain⯑ty as ever, with regard to the populouſneſs even of ſingle cities.

The firſt page of Thucydides is, in my opinion, the commencement of real hiſtory. All preced⯑ing narrations are ſo intermixt with fable, that phi⯑loſophers [213] ought to abandon them, in a great mea⯑ſure, to the embelliſhment of poets and orators.^*

WITH regard to remote times, the numbers of people aſſign'd are often ridiculous, and loſe all cre⯑dit and authority. The free citizens of Sybaris, able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They encountred at Siagra with 100,000 citizens of Crotona, another Greek city contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is Diodorus Siculus's ^‖ account; and is very ſeriouſly inſiſted on by that hiſtorian. Strabo ^† alſo men⯑tions the ſame number of Sybarites.

Diodorus Siculus ^‡, enumerating the inhabitants of Agrigentum, when it was deſtroy'd by the Car⯑thaginians, ſays, that they amounted to 20,000 citi⯑zens, 200,000 ſtrangers, beſides ſlaves, who, in ſo o⯑pulent [214] a city, as he repreſents it, wou'd probably be, at leaſt, as numerous. We muſt remark, that the women and the children are not included; and that therefore, upon the whole, the city muſt contain near two millions of inhabitants^§ And what was the reaſon of ſo immenſe an encreaſe? They were very induſtrious in cultivating the neighbouring fields, not exceeding a ſmall Engliſh county; and they traded with their wine and oil to Africa, which, at that time, had none of theſe commodi⯑ties.

Ptolemy, ſays Theocritus ^‡, commands 33,339 cities. I ſuppoſe the ſingularity of the number was the reaſon of aſſigning it. Diodorus Siculus ^* gives three millions of inhabitants to Aegypt, a very ſmall number: But then he makes the number of their cities amount to 18,000: An evident contra⯑diction.

He ſays ^†, the people were formerly ſeven mil⯑lions. Thus remote times are always moſt envy'd and admir'd.

THAT Xerxes's army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the great extent of his [215] empire, and from the fooliſh practice of the Eaſtern nations, of encumbering their camp with a ſuper⯑fluous multitude: But will any reaſonable man cite Herodotus's wonderful narrations as an authority? There is ſomething very rational, I own, in Lyſi⯑as's ^‡ argument upon this ſubject. Had not Xerx⯑es's army been incredibly numerous, ſays he, he had never made a bridge over the Helleſpont: It had been much eaſier to have tranſported his men over ſo ſhort a paſſage, with the numerous ſhipping he was maſter of.

Polybius ^§ ſays, that the Romans, betwixt the firſt and ſecond Punic wars, being threaten'd with an invaſion from the Gauls, muſter'd all their own forces, and thoſe of their allies, and found them a⯑mount to ſeven hundred thouſand men able to bear arms. A great number ſurely, and which, when join'd to the ſlaves, is probably more than that ex⯑tent of country affords at preſent ^† The enume⯑ration too ſeems to have been made with ſome ex⯑actneſs; and Polybius gives us the detail of the par⯑ticulars. But might not the number be magnify'd, in order to encourage the people?

[216] Diodorus Siculus ^† makes the ſame enumeration amount to near a million: Theſe variations are ſuſpicious. He plainly too ſuppoſes, that Italy in his time was not ſo populous: Another very ſuſpi⯑cious circumſtance. For who can believe, that the inhabitants of that country diminiſh'd from the time of the firſt Punic war to that of the triumvi⯑rates?

Julius Caeſar, according to Appian ^§, encoun⯑ter'd four millions of Gauls, kill'd one million, and took another priſoner ^*. Suppoſing the numbers of the enemy's army and of the kill'd cou'd be ex⯑actly aſſign'd, which never is poſſible; how cou'd it be known how often the ſame man return'd in⯑to the armies, or how diſtinguiſh the new from the old levy'd ſoldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to ſuch looſe, exaggerated calculati⯑ons; eſpecially where the author tells us not the mediums, upon which the calculations were form'd.

Paterculus ^‡ makes the number kill'd by Caeſar amount only to 400,000: A much more probable account, and more eaſily reconcil'd to the hiſtory [217] of theſe wars, given by that conqueror himſelf in his commentaries.

ONE wou'd imagine, that every circumſtance of the life and actions of Dionyſius the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous ex⯑aggerations; both becauſe he liv'd at a time when letters flouriſh'd moſt in Greece, and becauſe his chief hiſtorian was Philiſtus, a man allow'd to be of great genius, and who was a courtier and mi⯑niſter of that prince. But can we admit, that he had a ſtanding army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horſe, and a fleet of 400 gallies?^† Theſe, we may obſerve, were mercenary forces, and ſubſiſted up⯑on their pay, like our armies in Europe. For the citizens were all diſarm'd; and when Dion after⯑wards invaded Sicily, and call'd on his country⯑men to vindicate their liberty, he was oblig'd to bring arms along with him, which he diſtributed among thoſe who join'd him.^* In a ſtate, where agriculture alone flouriſhes, there may be many inhabitants; and if theſe be all arm'd and diſci⯑plin'd, a great force may be call'd out upon occa⯑ſion: But great numbers of mercenary troops can never be maintain'd, without either trade and ma⯑nufactures, or very extenſive dominions. The United Provinces never were maſters of ſuch a force by ſea and land, as that which is ſaid to belong to Dionyſius; yet they poſſeſs as large a territory, per⯑fectly [218] well cultivated, and have infinitely more re⯑ſources from their commerce and induſtry. Dio⯑dorus Siculus allows, that, even in his time, the army of Dionyſius appear'd incredible; that is, as I interpret it, it was entirely a fiction, and the o⯑pinion aroſe from the exaggerated flattery of the courtiers, and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himſelf.

THE critical art may very juſtly be ſuſpected of temerity, when it pretends to correct or diſpute the plain teſtimony of antient hiſtorians by any pro⯑bable or analogical reaſonings: Yet the licence of authors upon all ſubjects, particularly with regard to numbers, is ſo great, that we ought ſtill to re⯑tain a kind of doubt or reſerve, whenever the facts advanc'd depart, in the leaſt, from the com⯑mon bounds of nature and experience. I ſhall give an inſtance with regard to modern hiſtory. Sir William Temple tells us, in his memoirs, that, having a free converſation with Charles the II, he took the opportunity of repreſenting to that mo⯑narch the impoſſibility of introducing into this iſland the religion and government of France, chiefly on account of the great force, requiſite to ſubdue the ſpirit and liberty of ſo brave a people. ‘The Romans, ſays he, were forc'd to keep up 12 legi⯑ons for that purpoſe'' (a great abſurdity^*) and [219] Cromwell left an army of near eighty thouſand men.’ Muſt not this laſt fact be regarded as unqueſtion'd by future critics, when they find it aſſerted by a wiſe and learned miniſter of ſtate, contemporary to the fact, and who addreſt his diſcourſe, upon an ungrateful ſubject, to a great monarch, who was alſo contemporary, and who himſelf broke thoſe very forces about fourteen years before. Yet by the moſt undoubted autho⯑rity, we may inſiſt, that Cromwell's army, when he died, did not amount to half the number here mention'd.

'TIS a very uſual fallacy to conſider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and to compute the numbers contain'd in the great cities mention'd by antient authors, as if theſe cities had been all con⯑temporary. The Greek colonies flouriſh'd ex⯑tremely in Sicily, during the age of Alexander: But in Auguſtus's time they were ſo decay'd, that almoſt all the product of that fertile iſland was con⯑ſum'd in Italy. ^*

LET us now examine the numbers of inhabi⯑tants aſſign'd to particular cities in antiquity; and omitting the numbers of Nineveh, Babylon, and the Egyptian Thebes, let us confine ourſelves to the [220] ſphere of real hiſtory, to the Grecian and Roman empires. I muſt own, the more I conſider this ſubject, the more am I inclin'd to ſcepticiſm, with regard to the great populouſneſs aſcrib'd to antient times.

Athens is ſaid by ^‖ Plato to be a very great ci⯑ty; and it was ſurely the greateſt of all the Greek ^* cities, excepting Syracuſe, which was nearly about the ſame ſize in Thucydides's ^† time, and afterwards encreas'd beyond it. For Cicero ^‡ mentions it as the greateſt of all the Greek cities in his time; not comprehending, I ſuppoſe, either Antioch or Alex⯑andria under that denomination. Athenaeus ^§ ſays, that by the enumeration of Demetrius Phalereus there were in Athens 21,000 citizens, 10,000 ſtrangers, and 400,000 ſlaves. This number is very much inſiſted on, by thoſe whoſe opinion I call in queſtion, and is eſteem'd a fundamental fact to their purpoſe: But in my opinion there is no point of criticiſm more certain, than that Athe⯑naeus, and Cteſicles, whom he cites, are here miſ⯑taken, [221] and that the number of ſlaves is augmented by a whole cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.

Firſt. WHEN the number of citizens is ſaid to be 21,000 by Athenaeus, ^‖ men of full age are only underſtood. For (1) Herodotus ^* ſays, that Ariſtagoras, embaſſador from the Ionians, found it harder to deceive one Spartan than 30,000 A⯑thenians; meaning, in a looſe way, the whole ſtate, ſuppos'd in one popular aſſembly, excluding the women and children. (2) Thucydides ^† ſays, that making allowances for all the abſentees in the fleet, army, garriſons, and for people employ'd in their private affairs, the Athenian aſſembly never roſe to five thouſand. (3) The forces enumerated by the ſame hiſtorian ^‡, being all citizens, and amount⯑ing to 13,000 heavy arm'd infantry, prove the ſame method of calculation; as alſo the whole te⯑nor of the Greek hiſtorians, who always under⯑ſtand men of full age, when they aſſign the num⯑ber of citizens in any republic. Now theſe being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free Atheni⯑ans were by this account 84,000; the ſtrangers 40,000; and the ſlaves, calculating by the ſmall⯑er number, and allowing that they marry'd and [222] propagated at the ſame rate with freemen, were 160,000: And the whole inhabitants 284,000: A large enough number ſurely. The other num⯑ber 1,720,000 makes Athens larger than London and Paris united.

Secondly. THERE were but 10,000 houſes in Athens. ^*

Thirdly. THO' the extent of the walls, as given us by Thucydides be great,^† (viz. 18 miles, beſide the ſea-coaſt) yet Xenophon ^‡ ſays, there was much waſte ground within the walls. They ſeem indeed to have join'd four diſtinct and ſeparate cities^§.

Fourthly. NO inſurrection of the ſlaves, or ſu⯑ſpicion of inſurrection ever mention'd by hiſtori⯑ans; except one commotion of the miners.^‖

[223] Fifthly. THE Athenians treatment of their ſlaves is ſaid by Xenophon ^* and Demoſthenes ^† and Plau⯑tus ^‡ to have been extremely gentle and indul⯑gent: Which cou'd never have been the caſe, had the diſproportion been twenty to one. The diſ⯑proportion is not ſo great in any of our colonies; and yet we are oblig'd to exerciſe a very rigorous, military government over the Negroes.

Sixthly. NO man is ever eſteem'd rich for poſ⯑ſeſſing what may be reckon'd an equal diſtribution of property in any country, or even triple or qua⯑druple that wealth. Thus every perſon in Eng⯑land is computed by ſome to ſpend ſix pence a day: Yet is he eſteem'd but poor that has five times that ſum. Now Timarchus is ſaid by Aeſchines ^‖ to have been left in eaſy circumſtances; but he was maſter only of 10 ſlaves employ'd in manufactures. Lyſias and his brother, two ſtrangers, were pro⯑ſcrib'd by the thirty for their great riches; tho' they had but 60 a piece.^§ Demoſthenes was left very rich by his father; yet he had no more than 52 ſlaves.^‖ His work-houſe, of 20 cabinet mak⯑ers, is ſaid to be a very conſiderable manufactory.^†

Seventhly. DURING the Decelian war, as the Greek hiſtorians call it, 20,000 ſlaves deſerted, and brought [224] brought the Athenians to great diſtreſs, as we learn from Thucydides. ^* This could not have happen'd, had they been only the twentieth part. The beſt ſlaves wou'd not deſert.

Eighthly. Xenophon ^† propoſes a ſcheme for en⯑tertaining by the public 10,000 ſlaves: And that ſo great a number may poſſibly be ſupported, a⯑ny one will be convinc'd, ſays he, who conſiders the numbers we had before the Decelian war. A way of ſpeaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of Athenaeus.

Ninthly. THE whole cenſus of the ſtate of A⯑thens was leſs than 6000 talents. And tho' num⯑bers in antient manuſcripts be often ſuſpected by critics, yet this is unexceptionable; both becauſe Demoſthenes, ^‡ who gives it, gives alſo the detail, which checks him, and becauſe Polybius ^§ aſſigns the ſame number, and reaſons upon it. Now the moſt vulgar ſlave cou'd yield by his labour an obo⯑lus a day, over and above his maintenance; as we learn from Xenophon, ^‖ who ſays that Nicias's over⯑feer paid his maſter ſo much for ſlaves, whom he employ'd in digging of mines; and alſo kept up the number of ſlaves. If you will take the pains to e⯑ſtimate an obolus a day, and the ſlaves at 400,000, computing only at 4 years purchaſe, you will find the ſum above 12,000 talents; even tho' allowance [225] be made for the great number of holy-days in A⯑thens. Beſides, many of the ſlaves wou'd have a much greater value from their art. The loweſt that Demoſthenes ^* eſtimates any of his father's ſlaves is two minas a-head. And upon this ſuppoſition, it is a little difficult, I confeſs, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 ſlaves with the cenſus of 6000 talents.

Tenthly. Chios is ſaid by Thucydides ^† to contain more ſlaves, than any Greek city except Sparta. Sparta, then, had more than Athens, in proportion to the number of citizens. The Spartans were 9000 in the town; 30,000 in the country.^‡ The male ſlaves, then, of full age, muſt have been more than 780,000: The whole more than 3,120,000. A number impoſſible to be maintain'd in a narrow, barren country, ſuch as Laconia, which had no trade. Had the Helotes been ſo very numerous, the murder of 2000 mention'd by Thucydides, ^§ wou'd have irritated them, without weakening them.

BESIDES, we are to conſider, that the number, aſſign'd by Athenaeus, ^‖ whatever it is, compre⯑hends all the inhabitants of Attica, as well as thoſe of Athens. The Athenians affected much a coun⯑er [226] try life, as we learn from Thucydides; ^* and when they were all chas'd into town, by the invaſion of their territory during the Peloponneſian war, the city was not able to contain them, and they were ob⯑lig'd to lye in the porticos, temples, and even ſtreets, for want of lodging.^†

THE ſame remark is to be extended to all the other Greek cities; and when the number of the citizens is aſſign'd, we muſt always underſtand it of the inhabitants of the neighbouring country, as well as of the city. Yet even with this allow⯑ance, it muſt be confeſt, that Greece was a popu⯑lous country, and much exceeded what we cou'd imagine of ſo narrow a territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no ſupplies of corn from other places. For excepting Athens, which trad⯑ed to Pontus for that commodity, the other cities ſeem to have ſubſiſted chiefly from their neighbour⯑ing territory.^‡

[227] Rhodes is well known to have been a city of ex⯑tenſive commerce, and of great fame and ſplendor; yet it contain'd only 6000 citizens able to bear arms, when it was beſieg'd by Demetrius. ^*

Thebes was always one of the capital cities of Greece: ^† But the number of its citizens exceeded not thoſe of Rhodes. ^‡ Phliaſia is ſaid to be a ſmall city by Xenophon; ^§ yet we find, that it contain'd 6000 citizens.^¶ I pretend not to reconcile theſe two facts.

Mantinaea was equal to any city in Arcadia: ^‖ Conſequently it was equal to Megalopolis, which was 50 ſtadia, or 6 miles and a quarter in circumfe⯑rence.^* But Mantinaea had only 3000 citizens.^† The Greek cities, therefore, contain'd often fields and gardens, along with the houſes; and we can⯑not judge of them by the extent of their walls. A⯑thens contain'd no more than 10,000 houſes; yet [228] its walls, with the ſea coaſt, were above 20 miles in extent. Syracuſe was 22 miles in circumference; yet was ſcarce ever ſpoke of by the antients as more populous than Athens. Babylon was a ſquare of 15 miles or 60 miles in circuit; but it contain'd large cultivated fields and incloſures, as we learn from Pliny. Tho' Aurelian's wall was 50 miles in circumference;^* the circuit of all the 13 diviſions of Rome, taken a-part, according to Publius Victor, was only about 43 miles. When an enemy in⯑vaded the country, the whole inhabitants retir'd within the walls of the antient cities, along with their cattle, and furniture, and inſtruments of hus⯑bandry. And the great height, to which the walls were rais'd, enabled a ſmall number to defend them with facility.

Sparta, ſays Xenophon, ^† is one of the cities of Greece, that has the feweſt inhabitants. Yet Po⯑lybius ^‡ ſays it was 48 ſtadia in circumference, and was round.

ALL the Aetolians able to bear arms in Antipa⯑ter's time were but ten thouſand men.^§

Polybius ^‖ tells us, that the Achaean league might, without any inconvenience, march 30 or 40,000 [229] men; and this account ſeems very probable. For that league comprehended the greateſt part of Pe⯑loponneſus. Yet Pauſanias, ^* ſpeaking of the ſame period, ſays, that all the Achaeans able to bear arms, even when ſeveral manumitted ſlaves were join'd to them, did not amount to fifteen thouſand.

THE Theſſalians, till their final conqueſt by the Romans, were, in all ages, turbulent, factious, ſe⯑ditious, diſorderly.^† 'Tis not therefore natural to ſuppoſe, that that part of Greece abounded much in people.

THE whole inhabitants of Epirus, of all ages, ſexes and conditions, who were ſold by Paulus Ae⯑milius, amounted only to 150,000.^‡ Yet Epirus might be double the extent of Yorkſhire. ^‖

WE may now conſider the numbers of people in Rome, and Italy, and collect all the lights afford⯑ed us by ſcatter'd paſſages in antient authors. We ſhall find, upon the whole, a great difficulty in fix⯑ing any opinion on that head; and no reaſon to ſupport thoſe exaggerated calculations, ſo much in⯑ſiſted on by modern writers.

Dionyſius Halycarnaſſeus ^* ſays, that the antient walls of Rome were nearly of the ſame compaſs with thoſe of Athens, but that the ſuburbs ran out to a great extent; and it was difficult to tell, where the town ended or the country begun. In ſome places of Rome, it appears from the ſame author,^† from Juvenal, ^‡ and from other antient writers,^‖ that the houſes were high, and families liv'd in ſe⯑parate [231] ſtories, one above another: But 'tis prob⯑able, theſe were only the poorer citizens, and only in ſome few ſtreets. If we may judge from the younger Pliny's ^* account of his houſe, and from Bartoli's plans of antient buildings, the men of quality had very ſpacious palaces; and their build⯑ings were like the Chineſe houſes at this day, where each apartment is ſeparate from the reſt, and riſ⯑es no higher than a ſingle ſtory. To which, if we add, that the Roman nobility much affected very ex⯑tenſive porticos and even woods ^† in town; we may perhaps allow Voſſius (tho' there is no man⯑ner of reaſon for it) to read the famous paſſage of the elder Pliny ^‡ his own way, without admitting [232] [233] [234] own way, without admitting the extravagant con⯑ſequences he draws from it.

THE number of citizens, who receiv'd corn by the public diſtribution in Auguſtus's time,^* were 200,000. This one wou'd eſteem a pretty certain ground of calculation: Yet is it attended with ſuch circumſtances as throw us back into doubt and un⯑certainty.

Did the poorer citizens only receive the diſtri⯑bution? It was calculated, to be ſure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a paſſage of Cicero, ^† that the rich might alſo take their porti⯑on, and that it was eſteem'd no reproach in them to apply for it.

TO whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, woman and child? The portion every month was five mo⯑dii to each ^‡ (about ⅚ of a buſhel.) This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual. [235] A very accurate antiquarian,^† therefore, infers, that it was given to every man of full years: But he allows the matter to be uncertain.

WAS it ſtrictly enquir'd, whether the claimant liv'd within the precincts of Rome, or was it ſuffi⯑cient, that he preſented himſelf at the monthly diſ⯑tribution? This laſt ſeems more probable.^‡

WERE there no falſe claimants? We are told,^* that Caeſar ſtruck off at once 170,000, who had crept in without a juſt title; and it is very little probable, that he remedy'd all abuſes.

BUT laſtly, what proportion of ſlaves muſt we aſſign to theſe citizens? This is the moſt material queſtion; and the moſt uncertain. 'Tis very doubt⯑ful, whether Athens can be eſtabliſh'd as a rule for Rome. Perhaps the Athenians had more ſlaves, becauſe they employ'd them in manufactures, for which a capital city, like Rome, ſeems not ſo proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Romans had more ſlaves, on account of their ſuperior lux⯑ury and riches.

THERE were exact bills of mortality kept in Rome; but no antient author has given us the [236] number of burials, except Suetonius, ^* who tells us, that in one ſeaſon, there were 30,000 names car⯑ry'd to the temple of Libitina: But this was dur⯑ing a plague; which can afford no certain founda⯑tion for any inference.

THE public corn, tho' diſtributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very conſiderably the whole a⯑griculture of Italy: ^‡ A fact no way reconcileable to ſome modern exaggerations with regard to the in⯑habitants of that country.

THE beſt ground of conjecture I can find, con⯑cerning the greatneſs of antient Rome is this: We are told by Herodian, ^† that Antioch and Alexan⯑dria were very little inferior to Rome. It appears from Diodorus Siculus, ^§ that one ſtraight ſtreet of Alexandria, reaching from port to port, was five miles long; and as Alexandria was much more ex⯑tended in length than breadth, it ſeems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of Paris; ^‖ and Rome might be about the ſize of London.

[237] THERE liv'd in Alexandria in Diodorus Sicu⯑lus's time,^* 300,000 free people, comprehending, I ſuppoſe, women and children.^† But what num⯑ber of ſlaves? Had we any juſt ground to fix theſe at an equal number with the free inhabitants, it wou'd favour the foregoing calculation.

THERE is a paſſage in Herodian, which is a little ſurpriſing. He ſays, poſitively and plainly, that the palace of the emperor was as large as all [238] the reſt of the city.^‡ This was Nero's golden houſe, which is indeed repreſented by Suetonius ^‖ and Pliny ^* as of an enormous extent; but no pow⯑er of imagination can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to ſuch a city as London.

WE may obſerve, had the hiſtorian been relating Nero's extravagance, and had he made uſe of ſuch an expreſſion, it would have had much leſs weight; theſe rhetorical exaggerations being ſo apt to creep into an author's ſtile, even when the moſt chaſte and correct. But 'tis mention'd by Herodian on⯑ly by the bye, in relating the quarrels betwixt Ge⯑ta and Caracalla.

IT appears from the ſame hiſtorian,^† that there was, then, much land uncultivated, and put to no [239] manner of uſe; and he aſcribes it as a great praiſe to Pertinax, that he allow'd every one to take ſuch land, either in Italy or elſewhere, and cultivate it as he pleas'd, without paying any taxes. Lands uncul⯑tivated and put to no manner of uſe! This is not heard of in any part of Chriſtendom; except per⯑haps, in ſome remote parts of Hungary, as I have been inform'd. And it ſurely correſponds very ill with that idea of the extreme populouſneſs of an⯑tiquity, ſo much inſiſted on.

We learn from Vopiſcus, ^* that there was in E⯑truria much fertile land uncultivated; which the emperor, Aurelian, intended to convert into vine⯑yards, in order to furniſh the Roman people with a gratuitous diſtribution of wine: A very proper ex⯑pedient to diſpeople ſtill farther that capital and all the neighbouring territories.

IT may not be amiſs to take notice of the ac⯑count, which Polybius ^† gives of the great herds of ſwine to be met with in Tuſcany and Lombardy, as well as in Greece, and of the method of feeding them which was then practis'd. ‘There are great herds of ſwine, (ſays he) throughout all Italy, particularly, in former times, thro' Etru⯑ria and Ciſalpine Gaul. And a herd frequently contains a thouſand or more ſwine. When one of [240] theſe herds in feeding meets with another, they mix together; and the ſwine-herds have no o⯑ther expedients to ſeparate them than to go to different quarters, where they ſound their horn; and theſe animals, being accuſtom'd to that ſig⯑nal, run immediately each to the horn of his own keeper. Whereas in Greece, if the herds of ſwine happen to mix in the foreſts, he, who has the greateſt flock, takes cunningly the op⯑portunity of driving all away. And thieves are very apt to purloin the ſtraggling hogs, which have wander'd to a great diſtance from their keeper, in ſearch of food.’

MAY we not infer from this account, that the North of Italy was then much leſs peopled, and worſe cultivated than at preſent? How cou'd theſe vaſt herds be fed in a country, ſo thick of enclo⯑ſures, ſo improv'd by agriculture, ſo divided by farms, ſo planted with vines and corn intermingled together? I muſt confeſs, that Polybius's relation has more the air of that oeconomy, which is to be met with in our American colonies, than the management of an European country.

WE meet with a reflection in Ariſtotle's ^† e⯑thics, which ſeems to me unaccountable on any ſuppoſition, and by proving too much in favour of [241] our preſent reaſoning may be thought really to prove nothing. That philoſopher, treating of friend⯑ſhip, and obſerving, that that relation ought nei⯑ther to be contracted to a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illuſtrates his opinion by the following argument. ‘In like manner, (ſays he,) as a city cannot ſubſiſt, if it either have ſo few inhabitants as ten, or ſo many as a hundred thouſand; ſo is there a mediocrity requir'd in the number of friends; and you deſtroy the eſ⯑ſence of friendſhip by running into either ex⯑treme.’ What! Impoſſible, that a city can contain a hundred thouſand inhabitants! Had A⯑riſtotle never ſeen, nor heard of a city that was near ſo populous? This, I muſt own, paſſes my comprehenſion.

Pliny ^* tells us, that Seleucia, the ſeat of the Greek empire in the Eaſt, was reported to contain 600,000 people. Carthage is ſaid by Strabo ^† to have contain'd 700,000. The inhabitants of Pe⯑kin are not much more numerous. London, Pa⯑ris, and Conſtantinople may admit of nearly the ſame computation; at leaſt, the two latter cities do not exceed it. Rome, Alexandria, Antioch we have already ſpoke of. From the experience of paſt and preſent ages, one might conjecture, that there is a kind of impoſſibility in the nature of [242] things, that any city cou'd ever riſe much beyond this proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce or on empire, there ſeem to be invincible obſtacles, which prevent its farther progreſs. The ſeats of vaſt monarchies, by intro⯑ducing extravagant luxury, irregular expence, idle⯑neſs, dependence, and falſe ideas of rank and ſuperiority, are improper for commerce. Exten⯑ſive commerce checks itſelf, by raiſing the price of all labour and commodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous nobility, poſſeſt of over-grown fortunes, the middling gen⯑try remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate income. And if the dominions of a ſtate arrive at an enormous ſize, there neceſſarily ariſe many capitals, in the remot⯑er provinces; whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair, for education, fortune, and amuſement.^* London, by uniting extenſive com⯑merce and middling empire, has, perhaps, arriv'd at a greatneſs, which no city will ever be able to exceed.

CHUSE Dover or Calais for a center: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: You compre⯑hend London, Paris, the Netherlands, the United [243] Provinces, and ſome of the beſt cultivated coun⯑ties of France and England. It may ſafely, I think, be affirm'd, that no ſpot of ground can be found, in antiquity, of equal extent, which contain'd near ſo many great and populous cities, and was ſo ſtockt with riches and inhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the ſtates, which poſſeſt moſt art, know⯑ledge, civility and the beſt police, ſeems the trueſt method of compariſon.

'TIS an obſervation of L'Abbe du Bos, ^† that I⯑taly is warmer at preſent than it was in antient times. ‘The annals of Rome tell us, (ſays he) that in the year 480. ab U. C. the winter was ſo ſevere that it deſtroy'd the trees. The Tyber froze in Rome, and the ground was cover'd with ſnow for forty days. When Juvenal ^* deſcribes a ſuperſtitious woman, he repreſents her as breaking the ice of the Tyber, that ſhe may per⯑form her ablutions.’

‘He ſpeaks of that river's freezing as a common event. Many paſſages of Horace ſuppoſe the ſtreets of Rome full of ſnow and ice. We ſhou'd have more certainty with regard to this point, had the antients known the uſe of thermome⯑ters: But their writers, without intending it, [244] give us information, ſufficient to convince us, that the winters are now much more temperate at Rome than formerly. At preſent, the Tyber no more freezes at Rome than the Nile at Cairo. The Romans eſteem the winter very rigorous, if the ſnow lyes two days, and if one ſees for eight and forty hours a few ſmall icicles hang from a fountain that has a North expoſition.’

THE obſervation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other European climates. Who cou'd diſcover the mild climate of France in Diodorus Siculus's ^* deſcription of Gaul? ‘As it is a Nort⯑hern climate, (ſays he) it is infeſted with cold to an extreme degree. In cloudy weather, in⯑ſtead of rain, there fall great ſnows; and in clear weather it there freezes ſo exceſſive hard, that the rivers acquire bridges of their own ſub⯑ſtance, over which, not only ſingle travellers may paſs, but large armies, accompany'd with all their baggage and loaded waggons. And there being many rivers in Gaul, the Rhone, the Rhine, &c. almoſt all of them are froze over; and 'tis uſual, in order to prevent falling, to cover the ice with chaff and ſtraw, at the places where the road paſſes.’

NORTH of the Cevennes, ſays Strabo, ^† Gaul pro⯑duces not figs and olives: And the vines, that have been planted, bear not grapes, that will ripen.

[245] Ovid poſitively maintains, with all the ſerious affirmation of proſe, that the Euxine ſea froze every winter in his time; and he appeals to Roman go⯑vernors, whom he names, for the truth of his aſ⯑ſertion.^‡ This never happens at preſent in the la⯑titude of Tomi, whither Ovid was baniſh'd. All the complaints of the ſame poet ſeem to mark a rigour of the ſeaſons, which is ſcarce experienc'd at preſent in Petersburg or Stockholm.

Tournefort, a Provencal, who had travel'd into the ſame countries, obſerves that there is not a finer climate in the world: And he aſſerts that nothing but Ovid's melancholy cou'd have given him ſuch diſmal ideas of it. But the facts, menti⯑on'd by that poet, are too circumſtantiate to bear any ſuch interpretation.

Polybius ^* ſays, that the climate in Arcadia was very cold, and the air moiſt.

‘Italy, ^† (ſays Varro,) is the moſt temperate climate in Europe. The inland parts’ (Gaul, Germany, and Pannonio, no doubt) ‘have almoſt perpetual winter.’

THE Northern parts of Spain, according to Strabo, ^¶ are but ill inhabited, becauſe of the great cold.

[246] ALLOWING, therefore, this remark to be juſt, that Europe is become warmer than formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly, by no other me⯑thod, but by ſuppoſing, that the land is at preſent much better cultivated, and that the woods are clear'd, which formerly threw a ſhade upon the earth, and kept the rays of the ſun from penetrat⯑ing to it. Our Northern colonies in America be⯑come more temperate, in proportion as the woods are fell'd;^* but in general, every one may remark, that cold ſtill makes itſelf much more ſeverely felt, both in North and South America, than in places un⯑der the ſame latitude in Europe.

Saſerna, cited by Columella, ^† affirm'd, that the diſ⯑poſition of the heavens was alter'd before his time, 2nd that the air had become much milder and warmer; as appears hence, ſays he, that many pla⯑ces now abound with vineyards and olive plantati⯑ons, which formerly, by reaſon of the rigour of the climate, cou'd raiſe none of theſe productions. Such a change, if real, will be allow'd an evident ſign of the better cultivation and peopling of coun⯑tries [247] before the age of Saſerna; ^‖ and if it be continu'd to the preſent times, is a proof, that theſe advantages have been continually encreaſing throughout this part of the world.

LET us now caſt our eye over all the countries, that were the ſcene of antient and modern hiſtory, and compare their paſt and preſent ſituation. We ſhall not, perhaps, find ſuch foundation for the complaint of the preſent emptineſs and deſolation of the world. Aegypt is repreſented by Maillet, to whom we owe the beſt account of it, as extreme⯑ly populous; tho' he eſteems the number of its in⯑habitants to be diminiſh'd. Syria and the leſſer Aſia, as well as the coaſt of Barbary, I can readi⯑ly own, to be very deſart in compariſon of their antient condition. The depopulation of Greece is alſo very obvious; but whether the country now call'd Turky in Europe may not, in gene⯑ral, contain as many inhabitants as during the flou⯑riſhing period of Greece may be a little doubtful. The Thracians ſeem, then, to have liv'd like the Tar⯑tars at preſent, by paſturage and plunder:^* The Getes were ſtill more unciviliz'd:^† And the Illyri⯑ans were no better.^‡ Theſe occupy nine tenths of that country: And tho' the police and government [248] of the Turks be not very favourable to induſtry and propagation; yet it preſerves, at leaſt, peace and order amongſt the inhabitants; and is preferable to that barbarous, unſettled condition, in which they antiently liv'd.

Poland and Muſcovy in Europe are not very po⯑pulous; but are certainly much more ſo than the antient Sarmatia and Scythia; where no husban⯑dry or agriculture was ever heard of, and paſturage was the ſole art, by which the people were main⯑tain'd. The like obſervation may be extended to Denmark and Sweden. No one ought to eſteem the immenſe ſwarms of people, that formerly came from the North, and over-ran all Europe, to be a⯑ny objection to this opinion. Where a whole na⯑tion, or even half of it, remove their ſeat; 'tis ea⯑ſy to imagine what a prodigious multitude they muſt form; with what deſperate courage they muſt make their attacks; and how the terror they ſtrike into the invaded nations, will make theſe magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multi⯑tude of the invaders. Scotland is neither extenſive nor populous; but were the half of its inhabitants to ſeek a new habitation, they wou'd form a co⯑lony as large as the Teutons and Cimbri, and wou'd ſhake all Europe; ſuppoſing it in no better a con⯑dition for defence than formerly.

Germany has ſurely at preſent twenty times more inhabitants than in antient times, when they cul⯑tivated [249] no ground, and each tribe valu'd itſelf on the extenſive deſolation which it ſpread around, as we learn from Caeſar ^* and Tacitus ^† and Strabo. ^‡ A proof that the diviſion into ſmall republics will not alone render a nation populous, unleſs attended with the ſpirit of peace, order, and induſtry.

THE barbarous condition of Britain in former times is well known, and the thinneſs of its inha⯑bitants may eaſily be conjectur'd, both from their barbarity, and from a circumſtance mention'd by Herodian, ^‖ that all Britain was marſhy, even in Severus's time, after the Romans had been fully ſettled in it above a whole century.

'TIS not eaſily imagin'd, that the Gauls were antiently much more advanc'd in the arts of life than their Northern neighbours; ſince they travel'd to this iſland for their education in the myſteries of the religion and philoſophy of the Druids. ^§ I cannot, therefore, think, that Gaul was then near ſo populous as France is at preſent.

WERE we to believe, indeed, and join together the teſtimony of Appian and that of Diodorus Si⯑culus, we muſt admit an incredible populouſneſs in Gaul. The former hiſtorian ^¶ ſays, that there [250] were 400 nations in that country; the latter af⯑firms ^* that the largeſt of the Gallic nations conſiſt⯑ed of 200,000 men, beſides women and children, and the leaſt of 50,000. Calculating, therefore, at a medium, we muſt admit of near 200 millions of people, in a country, which we eſteem popu⯑lous at preſent, tho' ſuppos'd to contain little more than 20.^† Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance loſe all manner of authority. We may obſerve, that that equality of property, to which the populouſneſs of antiquity may be a⯑ſcrib'd, had no place amongſt the Gauls. ^‡ Their inteſtine wars alſo, before Caeſar's time, were al⯑moſt perpetual.^‖ And Strabo ^§ obſerves, that tho' all Gaul was cultivated, yet it was not cultivated with any ſkill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them leſs to arts than arms, till their ſlave⯑ry to Rome produc'd peace among themſelves.

Caeſar ^‖ enumerates very particularly the great forces, which were levy'd in Belgium, to oppoſe his conqueſts; and makes them amount to 208,000. Theſe were not the whole people able to bear arms in Belgium: For the ſame hiſtorian tells us, that the Bellovaci cou'd have brought a hundred thou⯑ſand men into the field, tho' they engag'd only for ſixty. Taking the whole, therefore, in this pro⯑portion [251] of ten to ſix, the ſum of fighting men in all the ſtates of Belgium was above half a million; the whole inhabitants two millions. And Belgium being about the fourth of Gaul, that country might contain eight millions, which is not above the third of its preſent inhabitants.^*

THE antient Helvetia was 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to Caeſar; ^† yet con⯑tain'd only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of Berne alone, has, at preſent, as many people.

AFTER this computation of Appian and Diodo⯑rus Siculus, I know not if I dare ſay, that the mo⯑dern Dutch are more numerous than the antient Batavi.

Spain is decay'd from what it was three centu⯑ries ago; but if we ſtep backward two thouſand [252] years, and conſider the reſtleſs, turbulent, unſettl'd condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclin'd to think, that it is now much more popu⯑lous. Many Spaniards kill'd themſelves when de⯑priv'd of their arms by the Romans. ^* It appears from Plutarch ^† that robbery and plunder were e⯑ſteem'd honourable amongſt the Spaniards. Hir⯑tius ^‡ repreſents in the ſame light the ſituation of that country in Caeſar's time; and he ſays, that e⯑very man was oblig'd to live in caſtles and wall'd towns for his ſecurity. 'Twas not till their final conqueſt under Auguſtus, that theſe diſorders were repreſt.^‖ The account, which Strabo ^§ and Juſ⯑tin ^¶ give of Spain, correſponds exactly with thoſe above mention'd. How much, therefore, muſt it diminiſh from our idea of the populouſneſs of anti⯑quity, when we find, that Cicero, comparing I⯑taly, Afric, Gaul, Greece, and Spain, mentions the great number of inhabitants, as the peculiar cir⯑cumſtance which render'd that latter country for⯑midable.^{{inverted †}}

[253] Italy, 'tis probable, however, has decay'd: But how many great cities does it ſtill contain; Venice, Genoa, Pavia, Turin, Milan, Naples, Florence, Leghorn, which either ſubſiſted not in antient times, or were then very inconſiderable? If we re⯑flect on this, we ſhall not be apt to carry matters to ſo great an extreme as uſual, with regard to this ſubject.

WHEN the Roman authors complain, that Italy, which formerly exported corn, became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they never aſcribe this alteration to the encreaſe of its inhabi⯑tants, but to the neglect of tillage and agriculture.^* A natural effect of that pernicious practice of im⯑porting corn, in order to diſtribute it gratis among the Roman citizens, and a very bad means of mul⯑tiplying the inhabitants of any country.^† The ſportula, ſo much talk'd of by Martial and Juve⯑nal, being preſents regularly made by the great lords to their ſmaller clients, muſt have had a like tendency to produce idleneſs, debauchery, and a continual decay amongſt the people.

[254] WERE I to aſſign a period, when I imagine this part of the world might poſſibly contain more in⯑habitants than at preſent, I ſhou'd pitch upon the age of Trajan and the Antonines; the great ex⯑tent of the Roman empire being then civiliz'd and cultivated, ſettled almoſt in a profound peace both foreign and domeſtic, and living under the ſame re⯑gular police and government.^* But we are not told, [255] that all extenſive governments, eſpecially abſolute monarchies, are deſtructive to population, and con⯑tain [256] a ſecret vice and poiſon, which deſtroy the ef⯑fect of all theſe promiſing appearances.^* To con⯑firm this, there is a paſſage, cited from Plutarch, ^† which being ſomewhat ſingular, we ſhall here ex⯑amine it.

THAT author, endeavouring to account for the ſilence of many of the oracles, ſays, that it may be aſcribed to the preſent deſolation of the world, proceeding from former wars and factions; which common calamity, he adds, has fallen heavier upon Greece than on any other country; inſomuch, that the whole cou'd ſcarce at preſent furniſh out three thouſand warriors, which, in the time of the Me⯑dian war, were ſupply'd by the ſingle city of Me⯑gara. The gods, therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have ſuppreſt many of their oracles, and deign not to uſe ſo many inter⯑preters of their will to ſo diminutive a people.

I MUST confeſs, that this paſſage contains ſo ma⯑ny difficulties, that I know not what to make of it. You may obſerve, that Plutarch aſſigns for a cauſe [257] of the decay of mankind, not the extenſive domi⯑nion of the Romans, but the former wars and fac⯑tions of the ſeveral nations; all which were quiet⯑ed by the Roman arms. Plutarch's reaſoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference, which is drawn from the fact he advances.

Polybius ſuppoſes, that Greece had become more proſperous and flouriſhing after the eſtabliſhment of the Roman yoke;^* and tho' that hiſtorian wrote before theſe conquerors had degenerated, from be⯑ing the patrons, to be the plunderers of mankind; yet as we find from Tacitus ^† that the ſeverity of the emperors afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reaſon to think that exten⯑ſive monarchy ſo deſtructive, as it is often repre⯑ſented.

WE learn from Strabo, ^‡ that the Romans, from their regard to the Greeks, maintain'd, to his time, moſt of the privileges and liberties of that celebrat⯑ed [258] nation; and Nero afterwards rather encreas'd them.^* How therefore can we imagine, that the Roman yoke was ſo burthenſome over that part of the world? The oppreſſion of the proconſuls was check'd; and the magiſtracies in Greece being all be⯑ſtow'd in the ſeveral cities, by the free votes of the people, there was no great neceſſity for the com⯑petitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers went to ſeek their fortunes in Rome, and advance themſelves by learning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them wou'd return with the fortunes they had made, and thereby enrich the Grecian commonwealths.

BUT Plutarch ſays, that the general depopula⯑tion had been more ſenſibly felt in Greece than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its ſuperior privileges and advantages?

BESIDES, this paſſage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. Only three thouſand men able to bear arms in all Greece! Who can admit ſo ſtrange a propoſition; eſpecially, if we conſider the great numbers of Greek cities, whoſe names ſtill remain in hiſtory, and which are mention'd by writers long after the age of Plutarch? There are there ſurely ten times more people at preſent, when there ſcarce remains a city in all the bounds [259] of antient Greece. That country is ſtill tolerably cultivated, and furniſhes a ſure ſupply of corn, in caſe of any ſcarcity in Spain, Italy or the South of France.

WE muſt obſerve, that the antient frugality of the Greeks, and their equality of property, ſtill ſub⯑ſiſted during the age of Plutarch; as appears from Lucian. ^* Nor is there any ground to imagine, that that country was poſſeſt by a few maſters, and a great number of ſlaves.

'TIS probable, indeed, that military diſcipline, being entirely uſeleſs, was extremely neglected in Greece after the eſtabliſhment of the Roman empire; and if theſe commonwealths, formerly ſo warlike and ambitious, maintain'd each of them a ſmall city guard, to prevent mobbiſh diſorders, 'tis all they had occaſion for: And theſe, perhaps, did not amount to three thouſand men, throughout all Greece. I own, that if Plutarch had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a very groſs paralo⯑giſm, and aſſigns cauſes no way proportion'd to the effects. But is it ſo great a prodigy, that an au⯑thor ſhou'd fall into a miſtake of this nature?^†

[260] BUT whatever force may remain in this paſſage of Plutarch, we ſhall endeavour to counter-ba⯑lance it by as remarkable a paſſage in Diodorus Si⯑culus, where the hiſtorian, after mentioning Ni⯑nus's army of 1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horſe, endeavours to ſupport the credibility of this ac⯑count, by ſome poſterior facts; and adds, that we muſt not form a notion of the antient populouſneſs [261] of mankind from the preſent emptineſs and depo⯑pulation, which is ſpread over the world.^† Thus an author, who liv'd at that very period of antiquity, which is repreſented as moſt populous,^‡ complains of the deſolation, which then prevail'd, gives the preference to former times, and has recourſe to an⯑tient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humour of blaming the preſent, and admiring the paſt, is ſtrongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence, even on perſons, endu'd with the pro⯑foundeſt judgment and moſt extenſive learning.

DISCOURSE XI. Of the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

I SUPPOSE, that a member of parliament, in the reign of king William or queen Anne, while the eſtabliſhment of the proteſtant ſucceſſion was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he wou'd chuſe in that important queſtion, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide. I believe the follow⯑ing particulars wou'd have enter'd into his conſide⯑ration.

HE wou'd eaſily perceive the great advantages, reſulting from the reſtoration of the Stuart family; by which we ſhou'd preſerve the ſucceſſion clear and undiſputed, free from a pretender, with ſuch a ſpecious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the ſtrongeſt, and moſt eaſily comprehended. 'Tis in vain to ſay, as many have done, that the queſtion with regard to governors, independent of government, is frivolous, and little worth diſputing, much leſs fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into theſe ſentiments; and 'tis much happier, I believe, for ſociety, that they do not, but continue in their natural prejudices and prepoſſeſſions. How cou'd [264] ſtability be preſerv'd in any monarchical govern⯑ment (which, tho', perhaps, not the beſt, is, and always has been the moſt common of any) unleſs men had ſo paſſionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even tho' weak in under⯑ſtanding, or infirm in years, gave him ſo great a preference above perſons, the moſt accompliſh'd in ſhining talents, or celebrated for great atchieve⯑ments? Wou'd not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, or even without any va⯑cancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual wars and convulſions? The condition of the Roman empire, ſurely, was not, in this re⯑ſpect, much to be envy'd; nor is that of the Eaſtern nations, who pay little regard to the title of their ſovereigns, but ſacrifice them, every day, to the caprice or momentary humour of the populace or ſoldiery. 'Tis but a fooliſh wiſdom, which is ſo carefully diſplay'd, in undervaluing princes, and placing them on a level with the meaneſt of man⯑kind. To be ſure, an anatomiſt finds no more in the greateſt monarch than in the loweſt peaſant or day-labourer; and a moraliſt may, perhaps, fre⯑quently find leſs. But what do all theſe reflections tend to? We, all of us, ſtill retain theſe prejudi⯑ces in favour of birth and family; and neither in our ſerious occupations, nor moſt careleſs amuſe⯑ments, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that wou'd repreſent the adventures of common ſailors, or porters, or even of private [265] gentlemen, wou'd preſently diſguſt us; but one, that introduces kings and princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or ſhou'd a man be able, by his ſuperior wiſdom, to get en⯑tirely above ſuch prepoſſeſſions, he wou'd ſoon, by means of the ſame wiſdom, again bring himſelf down to them; for the ſake of ſociety, whoſe wel⯑fare he wou'd perceive to be intimately connected with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he wou'd cheriſh and foſter ſuch ſentiments of reverence to their prin⯑ces; as requiſite to preſerve a due ſubordination in ſociety. And tho' the lives of twenty thouſand men be often ſacrific'd to maintain a king in poſſeſſi⯑on of his throne, or preſerve the right of ſucceſ⯑ſion undiſturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loſs; on pretence that every individual of theſe was, perhaps, in himſelf, as valuable as the prince he ſerv'd. He conſiders the conſequences of vio⯑lating the hereditary right of kings: Conſequen⯑ces, which may be felt for many centuries; while the loſs of ſeveral thouſand men brings ſo little pre⯑judice to a large kingdom, that it may not be per⯑ceiv'd a few years afterwards.

THE advantages of the Hanover ſucceſſion are of an oppoſite nature, and ariſe from this very cir⯑cumſtance, that it violates hereditary right, and places on the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. 'Tis evident to any one, [266] who conſiders the hiſtory of this iſland, that the privileges of the people have, during the two laſt centuries, been continually upon the encreaſe, by the diviſion of the church lands, by the alienations of the barons eſtates, by the progreſs of trade, and above all, by the happineſs of our ſituation, which, for a long time, gave us ſufficient ſecurity, with⯑out any ſtanding army or military eſtabliſhment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almoſt in e⯑very other nation of Europe, been, during the ſame period, extremely upon the decline; while the people were diſguſted at the hardſhips of the old Go⯑thic militia, and choſe rather to entruſt their prince with mercenary armies, which he eaſily turn'd a⯑gainſt themſelves. 'Twas nothing extraordinary, therefore, that ſome of our Britiſh ſovereigns miſ⯑took the nature of the conſtitution, and genius of the people; and as they embrac'd all the favour⯑able precedents left them by their anceſtors, they over-look'd all thoſe, which were contrary, and which ſuppos'd a limitation in our government. They were encourag'd in this miſtake, by the ex⯑ample of all the neighbouring princes, who, bear⯑ing the ſame title or appellation, and being adorn'd with the ſame enſigns of authority, naturally led them to claim the ſame powers and prerogatives.^* [267] The flattery of courtiers farther blinded them; and above all, that of the clergy, who from ſeve⯑ral paſſages of their ſcripture, and theſe wreſted too, had erected a regular and avow'd ſyſtem of [268] tyranny and deſpotic power. The only method of deſtroying, at once, all theſe exorbitant claims and pretenſions was to depart from the true here⯑ditary line, and chuſe a prince, who, being plain⯑ly a creature of the public, and receiving the crown on conditions, expreſt and avow'd, found his au⯑thority eſtabliſh'd on the ſame bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious ſubjects, who might, in future emergencies, diſturb the go⯑vernment by their cabals and pretenſions: By ren⯑dering the crown hereditary in his family, we a⯑voided all the inconveniencies of elective monar⯑chy: And by excluding the lineal heir, we ſecur'd all our conſtitutional limitations, and render'd our government uniform and of a piece. The people cheriſh monarchy, becauſe protected by it: The monarch favours liberty, becauſe created by it. And thus every advantage is obtain'd by the new eſtabliſhment, as far as human ſkill and wiſdom can extend itſelf.

[269] THESE are the ſeparate advantages of fixing the ſucceſſion, either in the houſe of Stuart, or in that of Hanover. There are alſo diſadvantages in each eſtabliſhment, which an impartial patriot wou'd ponder and examine, in order to form a juſt judg⯑ment upon the whole.

THE diſadvantages of the proteſtant ſucceſſion conſiſt in the foreign dominions, which are poſſeſt by the princes of the Hanover line, and which, it might be ſuppos'd, wou'd engage us in the in⯑trigues and wars of the continent, and loſe us, in ſome meaſure, the ineſtimable advantage we poſ⯑ſeſs, of being ſurrounded and guarded by the ſea, which we command. The diſadvantages of re⯑calling the abdicated family conſiſt chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to ſociety than that eſtabliſh'd amongſt us, is contrary to it, and affords no toleration or peace or ſecurity to any o⯑ther religion.

IT appears to me, that all theſe advantages and diſadvantages are allow'd on both ſides; at leaſt, by every one, who is at all ſuſceptible of argument or reaſoning. No ſubject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the diſputed title and foreign domi⯑nions of the preſent royal family are a loſs; nor is there any partizan of the Stuart family, but will confeſs, that the claim of hereditary, indefeaſible right, and the Roman catholick religion are alſo diſ⯑advantages [270] in that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philoſopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all theſe circumſtances in the ſcale, and aſſign to each of them its proper poize and influence. Such an one will readily, at firſt, acknowledge, that all political queſtions are infinitely complicat⯑ed; and that there ſcarce ever occurs, in any de⯑liberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. Conſequences, mix'd and vary'd, may be foreſeen to flow from every meaſure: And many conſequences, unforeſeen, do always, in fact, reſult from it. Heſitation, and reſerve, and ſuſ⯑pence are, therefore, the only ſentiments he brings to this eſſay or trial. Or if he indulges any paſſi⯑on, 'tis that of deriſion and ridicule againſt the ig⯑norant multitude, who are always clamorous and dogmatical, even in the niceſt queſtions, of which, from want of temper, perhaps ſtill more than of underſtanding, they are altogether unfit judges.

BUT to ſay ſomething more determinate on this head; the following reflections will, I hope, ſhow the temper, if not the underſtanding of a philoſo⯑pher.

WERE we to judge merely by firſt appearance, and by paſt experience, we muſt allow, that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the houſe of Hanover are much greater than thoſe of an undiſ⯑puted hereditary title in the houſe of Stuart; and [271] that our fathers acted wiſely in preferring the for⯑mer to the latter. So long as the houſe of Stuart reign'd in Britain, which, with ſome interrupti⯑ons, was above 80 years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the contentions betwixt the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If arms were dropt, the noiſe of diſ⯑putes continu'd: Or if theſe were ſilenc'd, jea⯑louſy ſtill corroded the heart, and threw the nati⯑on into an unnatural ferment and diſorder. And while we were thus occupy'd in domeſtic conten⯑tions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to public liberty, erected itſelf in Europe, without a⯑ny oppoſition from us, and even ſometimes with our aſſiſtance.

BUT within theſe laſt ſixty years, when a par⯑liamentary eſtabliſhment has taken place; whate⯑ver factions may have prevail'd either amongſt the people or in public aſſemblies; the whole force of our conſtitution has always fallen to one ſide, and an uninterrupted harmony has been preſerv'd be⯑twixt our princes and our parliaments. Public li⯑berty, with internal peace and order, has flouriſh'd, almoſt without interruption: Trade and manufac⯑tures and agriculture have encreas'd: The arts and ſciences and philoſophy have been cultivated: E⯑ven religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancour: And the glory of the nation has ſpread itſelf all over Europe; while we [272] ſtand the bulwark againſt oppreſſion, and the great antagoniſt of that power, which threatens every people with conqueſt and ſubjection. So long and ſo glorious a period no nation almoſt can boaſt of; nor is there another inſtance, in the whole hiſtory of mankind, that ſo many millions of people have, during ſuch a ſpace of time, been held together, in a manner ſo free, ſo rational, and ſo ſuitable to the dignity of human nature.

BUT tho' this recent inſtance ſeems clearly to decide in favour of the preſent eſtabliſhment, there are ſome circumſtances to be thrown into the o⯑ther ſcale; and 'tis dangerous to regulate our judg⯑ment by one event or example.

WE have had two rebellions during the flouriſh⯑ing period above mention'd; beſides plots and con⯑ſpiracies without number. And if none of theſe have produc'd any very fatal event, we may aſcribe our eſcape chiefly to the narrow genius of thoſe princes, who diſputed our eſtabliſhment; and may eſteem ourſelves ſo far fortunate. But the claims of the baniſh'd family, I fear, are not yet antiquat⯑ed; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce no greater diſorder?

THE diſputes betwixt privilege and prerogative may eaſily be compos'd by laws, and votes, and conferences, and conceſſions; where there is toler⯑able [273] temper or prudence on both ſides, or on ei⯑ther ſide. Amongſt contending titles, the queſti⯑on can only be determin'd by the ſword, and by devaſtation, and by civil war.

A PRINCE, who fills the throne with a diſputed title dares not arm his ſubjects; the only method of ſecuring a people fully, both againſt domeſtic oppreſſion and foreign conqueſt.

NOTWITHSTANDING all our riches and re⯑nown, what a critical eſcape did we lately make, from dangers, which were owing not ſo much to bad conduct and ill ſucceſs in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, and the ſtill more pernicious maxim of never paying off our in⯑cumbrances. Such fatal meaſures cou'd never have been embrac'd, had it not been to ſecure a preca⯑rious eſtabliſhment.^*

BUT to convince us, that an hereditary title is to be embrac'd rather than a parliamentary one, which is not ſupported by any other views or mo⯑tives; a man needs only tranſport himſelf back to the aera of the reſtoration, and ſuppoſe, that he had had a ſeat in that parliament, which recall'd the royal family, and put a period to the greateſt diſ⯑orders [274] that ever aroſe from the oppoſite pretenſi⯑ons of prince and people. What wou'd have been thought of one, that had propos'd, at that time, to ſet aſide Charles the ſecond, and ſettle the crown on the duke of York or Glouceſter; merely, in or⯑der to exclude the high claims of their father and grandfather? Wou'd not ſuch an one have been re⯑garded as a very extravagant projector, who lov'd dangerous remedies, and cou'd tamper and play with a government and national conſtitution, like a quack with a ſickly patient?

THE advantages, which reſult from a parlia⯑mentary title, preferably to an hereditary one, tho' they are great, are too refin'd ever to enter into the conception of the vulgar. The bulk of man⯑kind wou'd never allow them to be ſufficient for committing what wou'd be regarded as an injuſtice to the prince. They muſt be ſupported by ſome groſs, popular, and familiar topics; and wiſe men, tho' convinc'd of their force, wou'd reject them, in compliance with the weakneſs and prejudices of the people. An encroaching tyrant or deluded bi⯑got alone, by his miſconduct, is able to enrage the nation, and render practicable what was always, perhaps, deſirable.

IN reality, the reaſon aſiign'd by the nation for excluding the race of Stuart, and ſo many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of [275] their hereditary title (which however juſt in itſelf, wou'd, to vulgar apprehenſions, have appear'd al⯑together abſurd) but on account of their religion: Which leads us to compare the diſadvantages above mention'd of each eſtabliſhment.

I CONFESS, that, conſidering the matter in ge⯑neral, it were rather to be wiſh'd, that our prince had no foreign dominions, and cou'd confine all his attention to the government of this iſland. For not to mention ſome real inconveniencies, that may reſult from territories on the continent; they afford ſuch a handle for calumny and defamation, as is greedily ſeiz'd by the people, who are always diſpos'd to think ill of their ſuperiors. It muſt, however, be acknowledg'd, that Hanover is, per⯑haps, the ſpot of ground in Europe the leaſt incon⯑venient for a king of Britain. It lyes in the heart of Germany, at a diſtance from the great powers, which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well as by the arms of its own ſovereign: And it ſerves only to connect us more cloſely with the houſe of Auſtria, which is our natural ally.

IN the laſt war, it has been of ſervice to us, by furniſhing us with a conſiderable body of auxiliary troops, the braveſt and moſt faithful in the world. The elector of Hanover is the only conſiderable prince in the empire, who has drove no ſeparate [276] end, and has rais'd up no ſtale pretenſions, during the late commotions of Europe; but has acted, all along, with the dignity of a king of Britain. And ever ſince the acceſſion of that family, 'twou'd be difficult to ſhow any harm we have ever receiv'd from the electoral dominions, except that ſhort diſguſt in 1718, with Charles the twelfth, who, regulating himſelf by maxims very different from thoſe of other princes, made a perſonal quarrel of every public injury.

THE religious perſuaſion of the houſe of Stuart is an inconvenience of a much deeper dye, and wou'd threaten us with much more diſmal conſe⯑quences. The Roman catholic religion, with its huge train of prieſts and friers, is vaſtly more ex⯑penſive than ours: Even tho' unaccompany'd with its natural attendants of inquiſitors and ſtakes and gibbets, it is leſs tolerating: And not contented with dividing the ſacerdotal from the regal office, (which muſt be prejudicial to any ſtate) it beſtows the former on a foreigner, who has always a ſepa⯑rate, and may often have an oppoſite intereſt to that of the public.

BUT were this religion ever ſo advantageous to ſociety, it is contrary to that which is eſtabliſh'd among us, and which is likely to keep poſſeſſion, for a long time, of the minds of the people. And tho' it is much to be hop'd, that the progreſs of rea⯑ſon [277] and philoſophy will, by degrees, abate the vi⯑rulent acrimony of oppoſite religious all over Eu⯑rope; yet the ſpirit of moderation has, as yet, made too ſlow advances to be entirely truſted. The conduct of the Saxon family, where the ſame per⯑ſon can be a catholic king and a proteſtant elector, is, perhaps, the firſt inſtance, in modern times, of ſo reaſonable and prudent a behaviour. And the gradual progreſs of the catholic ſuperſtition does, even there, prognoſticate a ſpeedy alteration: Af⯑ter which, 'tis juſtly to be apprehended, that per⯑ſecutions will put a ſpeedy period to the proteſtant religion in the place of its nativity.

THUS, upon the whole, the advantages of the ſettlement in the family of Stuart, which frees us from a diſputed title, ſeem to bear ſome proporti⯑on with thoſe of the ſettlement in the family of Hanover, which frees us from the claims of prero⯑gative: But at the ſame time, its diſadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman catholic, are much greater than thoſe of the other eſtabliſhment, in ſettling the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of king William or queen Anne, wou'd have choſen a⯑midſt theſe oppoſite views, may, perhaps, to ſome appear hard to determine. For my part, I eſteem liberty ſo invaluable a bleſſing in ſociety, that what⯑ever favours its progreſs and ſecurity, can ſcarce [278] be too fondly cheriſh'd by every one, who is a lo⯑ver of human kind.

BUT, the ſettlement in the houſe of Hanover has actually taken place. The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without ſollicita⯑tion on their part, have been call'd to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole legiſlative body. They have, ſince their acceſſion, diſplay'd, in all their actions, the utmoſt mildneſs, equity, and regard to the laws and conſtitution. Our own miniſters, our own parliaments, ourſelves have go⯑vern'd us; and if aught ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourſelves. What a reproach muſt we become amongſt nations, if, diſguſted with a ſettlement ſo deliberately made, and whoſe conditions have been ſo religiouſly obſerv'd, we ſhou'd throw every thing again into confuſion; and by our levity and rebellious diſpoſition, prove our⯑ſelves totally unfit for any ſtate but that of abſo⯑lute ſlavery and ſubjection?

THE greateſt inconvenience attending a diſput⯑ed title is, that it brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wiſe man, to avoid this in⯑convenience, wou'd run directly upon a civil war and rebellion? Not to mention, that ſo long poſ⯑ſeſſion, ſecur'd by ſo many laws, muſt, e're this time, in the apprehenſion of a great part of the nation, have begot a title in the houſe of Hano⯑ver, [279] independent of their preſent poſſeſſion: So that now we ſhou'd not even, by a revolution, obtain the end, of avoiding a diſputed title.

No revolution, made by national forces, will e⯑ver be able, without ſome other great neceſſity, to aboliſh our debts and incumbrances, in which the intereſt of ſo many perſons is concern'd. And a revolution, made by foreign forces, is a conqueſt: A calamity, with which the precarious balance of power very nearly threatens us, and which our ci⯑vil diſſenſions are likely, above all other circum⯑ces, to bring ſuddenly upon us.

DISCOURSE XII. Idea of a perfect Commonwealth.

OF all mankind, there are none ſo pernicious as political projectors, if they have power; nor ſo ridiculous, if they want it: As on the other hand, a wiſe politician is the moſt beneficial cha⯑racter in nature, if accompany'd with authority, and the moſt innocent, and not altogether uſeleſs, even if depriv'd of it. 'Tis not with forms of go⯑vernment, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may be rejected, if we can diſ⯑cover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may ſafely be made, even tho' the ſuc⯑ceſs be doubtful. An eſtabliſh'd government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumſtance of its being eſtabliſh'd; the bulk of mankind being govern'd by authority, not reaſon, and never attri⯑buting authority to any thing, that has not the re⯑commendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try projects, merely upon the cre⯑dit of ſuppos'd argument and philoſophy, can ne⯑ver be the part of a wiſe magiſtrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and tho' he may attempt ſome improvement for the public good, yet will he adjuſt his innovations, as much as poſſible, to the antient fabric, and pre⯑ſerve [282] entire the chief pillars and ſupports of the conſtitution.

THE mathematicians in Europe have been much divided concerning that figure of a ſhip, which is the moſt commodious for ſailing; and Huygens, who at laſt fixt this controverſy, is juſtly thought to have oblig'd the learned, as well as commerci⯑al world; tho' Columbus had ſail'd to America, and Sir Francis Drake made the tour of the world, without any ſuch diſcovery. As one form of go⯑vernment muſt be allow'd more perfect than ano⯑ther, independent of the manners and humours of particular men; Why may we not enquire what is the moſt perfect of all, tho' the common botcht and inaccurate governments ſeem to ſerve the pur⯑poſes of ſociety, and tho' it be not ſo eaſy to eſta⯑bliſh a new government as to build a veſſel upon a new plan? The ſubject is ſurely the moſt worthy curioſity, of any the wit of man can poſſibly de⯑viſe. And who knows, if this controverſy were fixt by the univerſal conſent of the learned, but in ſome future age an opportunity might be afford⯑ed of reducing the theory to practice, either by a diſſolution of the old governments, or the combi⯑nation of men to form a new one, in ſome diſtant part of the world? In all caſes, it muſt be advan⯑tageous to know what is moſt perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real conſtitution or form of government as near it as poſſible, by [283] ſuch gentle alterations and innovations, as may not give too great diſturbance to ſociety.

ALL I'pretend to in the preſent eſſay is to re⯑vive this ſubject of ſpeculation; and therefore I ſhall deliver my ſentiments in as few words as poſ⯑ſible. A long diſſertation on that head wou'd not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the pub⯑lic, who will be apt to regard ſuch diſquiſitions, both as uſeleſs and chimerical.

ALL plans of government, which ſuppoſe great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plain⯑ly imaginary. Of this nature, are the republic of Plato, and the Utopia of Sir Thomas More. The Oceana is the only valuable model of a common⯑wealth, that has yet been offer'd to the public.

THE chief defects of the Oceana ſeem to be theſe. Firſt, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throw⯑ing men, of whatever ability, by intervals, out of public employments. Secondly, Its Agrarian is im⯑practicable. Men will ſoon learn the art, which was practis'd in antient Rome, of concealing their poſſeſſions under other peoples names; till at laſt, the abuſe will become ſo common, that they will throw off, even the appearance of reſtraint. Third⯑ly, The Oceana provides not a ſufficient ſecurity for liberty or the redreſs of grievances. The ſenate muſt propoſe, and the people conſent; by which [284] means, the ſenate have not only a negative upon the people, but what is of infinitely greater conſe⯑quence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the king's negative of the ſame na⯑ture in the Engliſh conſtitution, and cou'd he pre⯑vent any bill from coming into parliament, he wou'd be an abſolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houſes, it is of little con⯑ſequence: Such a difference is there in the man⯑ner of placing the ſame thing. When a popular bill has been debated in the two houſes, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconvenien⯑cies weigh'd and balanc'd; if afterwards it be pre⯑ſented for the royal aſſent, few princes will ven⯑ture to reject the unanimous deſire of the people. But cou'd the king cruſh a diſagreeable bill in em⯑bryo (as was the caſe, for ſome time in the Scotch parliament, by means of the lords of the articles) the Britiſh government wou'd have no balance, nor wou'd grievances ever be redreſt: And 'tis certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any govern⯑ment, from new laws, ſo much as from neglecting to remedy the abuſes, which frequently riſe upon the old ones. A government, ſays Machiavel, muſt often be brought back to its original prin⯑ciples. It appears, then, that in the Oceana the whole legiſlature may be ſaid to reſt in the ſenate; which Harrington wou'd own to be an inconve⯑nient form of government; eſpecially after the Agrarian is aboliſh'd.

[285] HERE is a form of government, to which I can⯑not, in theory, diſcover any conſiderable objection. Let Great Britain and Ireland, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 pariſhes, making in all 10,000. If the country, purpos'd to be erected into a com⯑monwealth, be of more narrow extent, we may diminiſh the number of counties, but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, 'twere better to enlarge the pariſhes, or throw more pariſhes into a county, than encreaſe the number of counties.

LET all the freeholders in the country pariſhes, and thoſe who pay ſcot and lot in the town pa⯑riſhes, meet annually in the pariſh church, and chuſe by ballot ſome freeholder of the county for their member, whom we ſhall call the county re⯑preſentative.

LET the 100 county repreſentatives, two days after their election, meet in the county town, and chuſe by ballot, from their own body, ten coun⯑ty magiſtrates, and one ſenator. There are, there⯑fore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 ſenators, 1100 county magiſtrates, and 10,000 county re⯑preſentatives. For we ſhall beſtow on all ſena⯑tors the authority of county magiſtrates, and on all county magiſtrates the authority of county repre⯑ſentatives.

[286] LET the ſenators meet in the capital, and be en⯑dow'd with the whole executive power of the com⯑monwealth, the power of peace and war, of giv⯑ing orders to generals, admirals, and ambaſſadors; and in ſhort, all the prerogatives of a Britiſh king, except his negative.

LET the county repreſentatives meet in their particular counties, and poſſeſs the whole legiſla⯑tive power of the commonwealth; the greateſt number of counties deciding the queſtion, and where theſe are equal, let the ſenate have the caſt⯑ing vote.

EVERY new law muſt firſt be debated in the ſenate; and tho' rejected by it, if ten ſenators in⯑ſiſt and proteſt, it muſt be ſent down to the coun⯑ties. The ſenate may join to the copy of the law, their reaſons for receiving or rejecting it.

BECAUSE it would be troubleſome to aſſemble the whole county repreſentatives for every trivial law, that may be requiſite, the ſenate have their choice of ſending down the law either to the coun⯑ty magiſtrates or county repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates, tho' the law be referr'd to them, may, if they pleaſe, call the repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination.

WHETHER the law be referr'd by the ſenate to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, a co⯑py of it, and of the ſenate's reaſons muſt be ſent to [287] every repreſentative eight days before the day ap⯑pointed for the aſſembling in order to deliberate concerning it. And tho' the determination be, by the ſenate, referr'd to the magiſtrates, if five re⯑preſentatives of the county order the magiſtrates to aſſemble the whole court of repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination, they muſt obey.

EITHER the county magiſtrates or repreſenta⯑tives may give, to the ſenator of the county, the copy of a law to be propos'd to the ſenate; and if five counties concur in the ſame order, the law, tho' refus'd by the ſenate, muſt come either to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, as is con⯑tain'd in the order of the five counties.

ANY twenty counties, by a vote either of their magiſtrates or repreſentatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a year. Thirty coun⯑ties for three years.

THE ſenate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The ſenate cannot throw out twice in a year the ſenator of the ſame county.

THE power of the old ſenate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county repre⯑ſentatives. Then all the new ſenators are ſhut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intri⯑cate [288] ballot, ſuch as that of Venice or Malta, they chuſe the following magiſtrates; a protector, who repreſents the dignity of the commonwealth, and preſides in the ſenate; two ſecretaries of ſtate; theſe ſix councils, a council of ſtate, a coun⯑cil of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty; each council conſiſting of five perſons: Along with ſix commiſſioners of the treaſury and a chief commiſſioner. All theſe muſt be ſenators. The ſenate alſo names all the ambaſſadors to fo⯑reign courts, who may either be ſenators or not.

THE ſenate may continue any or all of theſe, but muſt re-elect them every year.

THE protector and two ſecretaries have ſeſſion and ſuffrage in the council of ſtate. The buſineſs of that council is all foreign politics. The coun⯑cil of ſtate has ſeſſion and ſuffrage in all the other councils.

THE council of religion and learning inſpects the univerſities and clergy. That of trade inſpects e⯑very thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inſpects all the abuſes of laws by the inferior magiſtrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war in⯑ſpects the militia and its diſcipline, magazines, ſtores, &c. and when the republic is in war, ex⯑amines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the ſame power with re⯑gard [289] to the navy, along with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

NONE of theſe councils can give orders them⯑ſelves, except where they receive ſuch powers from the ſenate. In other caſes, they muſt communicate every thing to the ſenate.

WHEN the ſenate is under adjournment, any of the councils may aſſemble it before the day ap⯑pointed for its meeting.

BESIDES theſe councils or courts, there is ano⯑ther call'd the court of competitors, which is thus conſtituted. If any candidates for the office of ſe⯑nator have more votes than a third of the repreſen⯑tatives, that candidate, which has moſt votes, next to the ſenator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magiſtrate or repreſentative: But he takes his ſeat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court, which may ſometimes conſiſt of a hundred members; ſometimes have no members at all; and by that means, be for a year aboliſh'd.

THE court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inſpection of public accounts, and the accuſing any man before the ſenate. If the ſenate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they pleaſe, appeal to the people, either magiſtrates or repreſentatives. Up⯑on that appeal, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives meet on the day appointed by the court of compe⯑titors, [290] and chuſe in each county three perſons; from which number every ſenator is excluded. Theſe to the number of 300 meet in the capital, and bring the perſon accus'd to a new trial.

The court of competitors may propoſe any law to the ſenate; and if refus'd may appeal to the people, that is to the magiſtrates or repreſentatives, who examine it in their counties. Every ſenator, who is thrown out of the ſenate by a vote of the court, takes his ſeat in the court of competitors.

THE ſenate poſſeſſes all the judicative authority of the houſe of lords, that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewiſe nominates the lord chancellor, and all the officers of the law.

EVERY county is a kind of republic within itſelf, and the repreſentatives may make county laws; which have no authority 'till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is ſent to the ſenate, and to every other county. The ſenate or any ſingle county may, at any time, annul any law of another county.

THE repreſentatives have all the authority of the Britiſh juſtices of the peace in trials, commit⯑ments, &c.

THE magiſtrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All cauſes with regard to the revenue are appeal'd ultimately [291] to the magiſtrates. They paſs the accompts of all the officers; but muſt have all their own accompts examin'd and paſt at the end of the year by the repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates name rectors or miniſters to all the pariſhes.

THE presbyterian government is eſtabliſh'd; and the higheſt eccleſiaſtical court is an aſſembly or ſynod of all the presbyters of the county. The magiſtrates may take any cauſe from this court, and determine it themſelves.

THE magiſtrates may try, and depoſe or ſuſ⯑pend any presbyter.

THE militia is eſtabliſh'd in imitation of that in Swiſſerland, which being well known, we ſhall not inſiſt upon it. 'Twill only be proper to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamp'd during ſix weeks in ſummer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.

THE magiſtrates nominate all the colonels and downwards. The ſenate all upwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and down⯑wards, and his commiſſion is good for a twelve⯑month. But after that it muſt be confirm'd by the magiſtrates of the county, to which the regiment belongs. The magiſtrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the ſenate may do the ſame to any officer in the ſervice. If the ma⯑giſtrates [292] do not think proper to confirm the gene⯑ral's choice, they may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.

ALL crimes are try'd within the county by the magiſtrates and a jury. But the ſenate can ſtop a⯑ny trial, and bring it before themſelves.

ANY county may indict any man before the ſe⯑nate, for any crime.

THE protector, the two ſecretaries, the coun⯑cil of ſtate, with any five more that the ſenate ap⯑points, on extraordinary emergencies, are poſſeſt of dictatorial power for ſix months.

THE protector may pardon any perſon con⯑demn'd by the inferior courts.

IN time of war, no officer of the army, that is in the field, can have any civil office in the com⯑monwealth.

THE capital, which we ſhall call London, may be allow'd four members in the ſenate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The re⯑preſentatives of each of theſe chuſe one ſenator, and ten magiſtrates. There are therefore in the city four ſenators, forty four magiſtrates, and four hun⯑dred repreſentatives. The magiſtrates have the ſame authority as in the counties. The repreſen⯑tatives alſo have the ſame authority; but they ne⯑ver meet in one general court: They give their [293] votes in their particular county or diviſion of hun⯑dreds.

WHEN they enact any city law, the greateſt number of counties or diviſions determines the mat⯑ter. And where theſe are equal, the magiſtrates have the caſting vote.

THE magiſtrates chuſe the mayor, ſheriff, re⯑corder and other officers of the city.

IN the commonwealth, no repreſentative, ma⯑giſtrate, or ſenator, as ſuch, has any ſalary. The protector, ſecretaries, councils, and ambaſſadors have ſalaries.

THE firſt year in every century is ſet apart to correct all inequalities, which time may have pro⯑duc'd in the repreſentation. This muſt be done by the legiſlature.

THE following political aphoriſms may explain the reaſon of theſe orders.

THE lower ſort of people and ſmall proprietors are good enough judges of one not very diſtant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuſe the beſt or nearly the beſt repreſentative: But they are wholly unfit for county meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportuni⯑ty of deceiving them.

[294] TEN thouſand, even tho' they were not annu⯑ally elected, are a large enough baſis for any free government. 'Tis true, the nobles in Poland are more than 10,000, and yet theſe oppreſs the people. But as power continues there always in the ſame perſons and families, this makes them, in a man⯑ner, a different nation from the people. Beſides, the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

ALL free governments muſt conſiſt of two coun⯑cils, a leſs and a greater, or in other words, of a ſenate and people. The people, as Harrington ob⯑ſerves, wou'd want wiſdom, without the ſenate: The ſenate, without the people, wou'd want ho⯑neſty.

A LARGE aſſembly of 1000, for inſtance, to re⯑preſent the people, if allow'd to debate, wou'd fall into diſorder. If not allow'd to debate, the ſenate has a negative upon them, and the worſt kind of negative, that before reſolution.

HERE therefore is an inconvenience which no government has yet fully remedy'd, but which is the eaſieſt to be remedy'd in the world. If the people debate, all is confuſion: If they do not de⯑bate, they can only reſolve; and then the ſenate carves for them. Divide the people into many ſe⯑parate bodies; and then they may debate with [295] ſafety, and every inconvenience ſeems to be pre⯑vented.

CARDINAL de Retz ſays, that all numerous aſ⯑ſemblies, however compos'd, are mere mob, and ſway'd in their debates by the leaſt motive. This we find confirm'd by daily experience. When an abſurdity ſtrikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and ſo on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and tho every member be only of middling ſenſe, 'tis not probable, that a⯑ny thing but reaſon can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being remov'd, good ſenſe will always get the better of bad among a num⯑ber of people, Good ſenſe is one thing: But fol⯑lies are numberleſs; and every man has a diffe⯑rent one. The only way of making a people wiſe is to keep them from uniting into large aſſemblies.

THERE are two things to be guarded againſt in every ſenate: Its combination and its diviſion. Its combination is moſt dangerous; and againſt this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies. 1, The great dependence of the ſena⯑tors on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undiſtinguiſhing rabble, like the Engliſh electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2, The ſmall power they are allow'd. They have few offices to diſpoſe of. Almoſt all are given by the magiſtrates in the counties. 3, The court of [296] competitors, which being compos'd of men that are their rivals, next to them in intereſt, and un⯑eaſy in their preſent ſituation, will be ſure to take all advantages againſt them.

THE diviſion of the ſenate is prevented, 1, By the ſmallneſs of their number. 2, As faction ſup⯑poſes a combination to a ſeparate intereſt, it is pre⯑vented by their dependence on the people. 3, They have a power of expelling any factious member. 'Tis true, when another member of the ſame ſpirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they ſhou'd; for that ſhows the humour to be in the people, and probably ariſes from ſome ill conduct in public affairs. 4, Almoſt any man, in a ſenate ſo regularly choſen by the people, may be ſuppos'd fit for any civil office. 'Twou'd be proper, there⯑fore, for the ſenate to form ſome general reſoluti⯑ons with regard to the diſpoſing of offices among the members: Which reſolutions wou'd not con⯑fine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary ſtupidity on the other, appears in any ſenator; but yet they wou'd be ſufficient to prevent brigue and faction, by making the diſpoſal of the offices a thing of courſe. For inſtance; let it be a reſolution, that no man ſhall enjoy any office, till he has ſat four years in the ſenate: That, except ambaſſadors, no man ſhall be in office two years following: That [297] no man ſhall attain the higher offices but thro' the lower; That no man ſhall be protector twice, &c. The ſenate of Venice govern themſelves by ſuch reſolutions.

IN foreign politics the intereſt of the ſenate can ſcarc eever be divided from that of the people; and therefore 'tis fit to make the ſenate abſolute with regard to them; otherwiſe there cou'd be no ſe crecy nor refin'd policy. Beſides, without mo⯑ney, no alliance can be executed; and the ſenate is ſtill ſufficiently dependent. Not to mention, that the legiſlative power being always ſuperior to the executive, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives may interpoſe, whenever they think proper.

THE chief ſupport of the Britiſh government is the oppoſition of intereſts; but that, tho' in the main ſerviceable, breeds endleſs factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The competitors have no power of controlling the ſenate: They have only the power of accuſing, and appealing to the people.

'TIS neceſſary, likewiſe, to prevent both com⯑bination and diviſion in the thouſand magiſtrates. This is done ſufficiently by the ſeparation of places and intereſts.

BUT leſt that ſhou'd not be enough, their de⯑pendence on the 10,000 for their elections, ſerves to the ſame purpoſe.

[298] NOR is that all: For the 10,000 may reſume the power, whenever they pleaſe; and not only when they all pleaſe, but when any five of a hun⯑dred pleaſe, which will happen upon the very firſt ſuſpicion of a ſeparate intereſt.

THE 10,000 are too large a body either to u⯑nite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by almoſt the whole body of the people.

A SMALL commonwealth is the happieſt go⯑vernment in the world, within itſelf; becauſe eve⯑ry thing lyes under the eye of the rulers: But it may be ſubdu'd by great force from without. This ſcheme ſeems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

EVERY county law may be anull'd either by the ſenate or another county; becauſe that ſhows an oppoſition of intereſts: In which caſe, no part ought to decide for itſelf. The matter muſt be referr'd to the whole, which will beſt determine what agrees with general intereſt.

AS to the clergy and militia, the reaſons of theſe orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magiſtrate, and without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free government will ever have ſecurity or ſtability.

[299] IN many governments, the inferior magiſtrates have no rewards but what ariſe from their ambiti⯑on, vanity, or public ſpirit. The ſalaries of the French judges amount not to the intereſt of the ſums they pay for their offices. The Dutch bur⯑go-maſters have little more immediate profit than the Engliſh juſtices of peace, or the members of the houſe of commons formerly. But leſt any ſhou'd ſuſpect that this wou'd beget negligence in the adminiſtration, (which is little to be fear'd con⯑ſidering the natural ambition of mankind) let the magiſtrates have competent ſalaries. The ſena⯑tors have acceſs to ſo many honourable and lucra⯑tive offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance requir'd of the repreſentatives.

THAT the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who conſiders the reſemblance it bears to the commonwealth of the United provinces, formerly one of the wiſeſt and moſt renown'd governments, that ever was in the world. The alterations in the preſent ſcheme are all evidently to the better. 1, The repreſen⯑tation is more equal. 2, The unlimited power of the burgo-maſters in the towns, which forms a perfect ariſtocracy in the Dutch commonwealth, is corrected by a well temper'd democracy, in giv⯑ing to the people the annual election of the coun⯑ty [300] repreſentatives. 3, The negative, which eve⯑ry province and town has upon the whole body of the Dutch republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the impoſition of taxes, is here re⯑mov'd. 4, The counties, in the preſent plan, are not ſo independent of each other, nor do they form ſeparate bodies ſo much as the ſeven provinces; where the jealouſy and envy of the ſmaller pro⯑vinces and towns againſt the greater, particular⯑ly Holland and Amſterdam, have frequently diſ⯑turb'd the government. 5, Larger powers, tho' of the ſafeſt kind, are entruſted to the ſenate than the States General poſſeſs; by which means, the former may become more expeditious, and ſecret in their reſolutions, than 'tis poſſible for the latter.

THE chief alterations, that cou'd be made on the Britiſh government, in order to bring it to the mo [...]t perfect model of limited monarchy, ſeem to be the following. Firſt, The plan of the republican par⯑liament ought to be reſtor'd, by making the repre⯑ſentation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county elections who poſſeſs not a hundred a year. Secondly, As ſuch a houſe of commons wou'd be too weighty for a frail houſe of lords, like the preſent, the biſhops and Scotch peers ought to be remov'd, whoſe behaviour, in former parli⯑aments, deſtroy'd entirely the authority of that houſe: The number of the upper houſe ought to be rais'd to three or four hundred: Their ſeats not [301] hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no com⯑moner ſhou'd be allow'd to refuſe a ſeat, that was offer'd him. By this means, the houſe of lords wou'd conſiſt entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and intereſt of the nation; and every tur⯑bulent leader in the houſe of commons might be taken off, and connected in intereſt with the houſe of peers. Such an ariſtocracy wou'd be an excel⯑lent barrier both to the monarchy and againſt it. At preſent, the balance of our government de⯑pends, in ſome meaſure, on the ability and behavi⯑our of the ſovereign; which are variable and un⯑certain circumſtances.

I ALLOW, that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is ſtill liable to three great in⯑conveniencies. Firſt, It removes not entirely, tho it may ſoften, the parties of court and country. Se⯑condly, The king's perſonal character muſt ſtill have a great influence on the government. Third⯑ly, The ſword is in the hands of a ſingle perſon, who will always neglect to diſcipline the militia, in order to have a pretext for keeping up a ſtand⯑ing army. 'Tis evident, that this is a mortal diſ⯑temper in the Britiſh government, of which it muſt at laſt inevitably periſh. I muſt, however, con⯑feſs, that Sweden ſeems, in ſome meaſure, to have remedy'd this inconvenience, and to have a mili⯑tia, along with its limited monarchy, as well as a [302] ſtanding army, which is leſs dangerous than the Britiſh.

WE ſhall conclude this ſubject with obſerving the falſhood of the common opinion, that no large ſtate, ſuch as France or Britain, cou'd ever be mo⯑dell'd into a commonwealth, but that ſuch a form of government can only take place in a city or ſmall territory. The contrary ſeems evident. Tho' 'tis more difficult to form a republican government in an extenſive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is form'd, of preſerving it ſteady and uniform, without tumult and faction, in the former than in the latter. 'Tis not eaſy, for the diſtant parts of a large ſtate to combine in any plan of free government; but they eaſily con⯑ſpire in the eſteem and reverence for a ſingle per⯑ſon, who, by means of this popular favour, may ſeize the power, and forcing the more obſtinate to ſubmit, may eſtabliſh a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the ſame notions of government, the natural equality of property favours liberty, and the nearneſs of ha⯑bitation enables the citizens mutually to aſſiſt each other. Even under abſolute princes, the ſubordi⯑nate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is monarchical. But theſe ſame circumſtances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their conſtitution more frail and uncertain. Democra⯑cies [303] are turbulent. For however the people may be ſeparated or divided into ſmall parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very ſenſible. Ariſtocracies are bet⯑ter adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were moſt admired by antient writers; but they are jealous and oppreſſive. In a large government, which is modell'd with maſterly ſkill, there is com⯑paſs and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the firſt elections or firſt concoction of the com⯑monwealth, to the higher magiſtrates, who direct all the motions. At the ſame time, the parts are ſo diſtant and remote, that 'tis very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or paſſion, to hurry them into any meaſures againſt the public intereſt.

'TIS needleſs to enquire whether ſuch a govern⯑ment wou'd be immortal. I allow the juſtneſs of the poet's exclamation on the endleſs projects of human race, Man and for ever! The world itſelf probably is not immortal. Such conſuming plagues may ariſe as wou'd leave even a perfect govern⯑ment a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not, how far enthuſiaſm, or other extraordinary motions of the human mind, may tranſport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of intereſt is remov'd, whimſical and unaccountable factions often ariſe, from perſonal [304] favour or enmity. Perhaps, ruſt may grow to the ſprings of the moſt accurate political machine, and diſorder its motions. Laſtly, extenſive conqueſts when purſu'd, muſt be the ruin of every free go⯑vernment, and of the more perfect governments ſooner than of the imperfect; becauſe of the very advantages, which the former poſſeſs above the lat⯑ter. And tho' ſuch a ſtate ought to eſtabliſh a fun⯑damental law againſt conqueſts: Yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and preſent in⯑tereſt makes men forgetful of their poſterity. 'Tis a ſufficient incitement to human endeavours, that ſuch a government wou'd flouriſh for many ages; without pretending to beſtow on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty ſeems to have refus'd to his own productions.