THE TRIAL OF THOMAS PAINE.

The KING againſt THOMAS PAINE.

Before LORD KENYON, by the following Special Jury:

• John Campbell, Merchant, Foreman,
• John Lightfoot,
• Chriſtopher Taddy,
• Robert Oliphant,
• Cornelius Donovan,
• Robert Rolleſton,
• John Lubbock,
• Riehard Tugwell,
• John Porter,
• Thomas Druce,
• Iſaac Railton,
• Henry Evans, Merchants.

MR PERCIVAL opened the pleadings on the part of the Crown. He ſaid, this was an Information againſt Thomas Paine, for that he being a perſon of a wicked, malicious, and ſeditious diſpoſition; and wiſhing to in⯑troduce diſorder and confuſion, and to cauſe it to be be⯑lieved, that the Crown of this kingdom was contrary to the Rights of the Inhabitants of this kingdom; and to cauſe it to be believed alſo, that the Bill of Rights was a Bill of Wrongs and Inſults; all tending to bring the Government of this Country into contempt, and endeavouring to cauſe it to be believed, that the Par⯑liament of this country was openly corrupt in the face of day; and in order to withdraw the affections of the people of this kingdom, againſt the Law and Conſtitution of this country, that the THOMAS PAINE, wiſhing and intending this miſchief, did, on the 16th of Feb⯑ruary, 1791, wickedly, falſely, maliciouſly, ſcanda⯑louſly, and ſeditiouſly publiſh a certain book, called the Second Part of Rights of Man, ſigned THOMAS PAINE, containing many falſe, wicked, ſcandalous, malicious, and ſeditious aſſertions; with which he would not trouble the Jury, as they would have them from the Attorney General. The Defendant had pleaded Not Guilty, upon which iſſue was joined.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL ſaid, the Jury would per⯑mit him to ſtate, in this ſtage of the proceeding, that in his mind a cauſe, which brought its own merit with it, a cauſe more plain, more clear, more certain, and indiſ⯑putable, never came before a Court. Was it not that certain circumſtances had happened, and contributed to make the book in queſtion an object of conſiderable magnitude, and rendered it important, he ſhould at once propoſe reading the pages of the book, as they were in⯑cluded in the information to the Jury, and then have left the caſe to be diſpoſed by their good ſenſe; but the particular miſchief that naturally flowed from this wicked publication, had rendered it neceſſary for him to open the caſe in a fuller way than uſual upon ſuch occaſions. To ſpeak of himſelf was what he had no delight in, and what could not be entertaining to the Jury; but as circumſtances made it neceſſary, he hoped the Jury would forgive it. A rum our had been ſpread [3]that this proſecution did not correſpond with his private judgment. To this he anſwered, that if he did not think this a fit object for proſecution, he ſhould think ſuch an opinion diſqualified him from holding the office he now filled, he would be degraded in the eſtimation of very profeſſional man, and he ought to be deſpiſed if he felt any unwillingneſs to bring this enormous caſe before a Jury of this Country.

This was not the firſt of the kind which this Defen⯑dant had thought fit to publiſh againſt Government. He was not, perhaps, warranted in not bringing the firſt before the Gentlemen of the Jury. He paſſed it by, however, as it was uſhered into the world in that ſhape, that it was likely to fall only into the hands of tolerably informed perſons, who would have the ſenſe to ſee the poiſon, and conſequently would be able to apply the antidote, and refute it as they went along: but when another appeared in a ſmaller ſize, printed on white brown paper, and thruſt in the hands of all per⯑ſons, of all ages, ſexes, and conditions: they were even wrapped up with ſweet meats for children. Such were the ſteps that had been taken to forward this pub⯑lication, and he did what his duty demanded of him, he filed an information againſt the Defendant the firſt day of the ſucceeding term, putting the queſtion upon record, which they, the Jury, had to try.

What it was that was the intention of this man by theſe publications, would not be matter of difficulty for the Jury to diſcover; it was manifeſted by every teſt that could apply to the explanation of a man's intention, and the Jury would have to ſay, whether they were not ſatisfied that the whole of the book in queſtion did not deſerve the blame which had been imputed to it by the information. It was written with a view to vilify, de⯑grade, and to bring into abhorrence and contempt all the eſtabliſhment of this country in all the departments of the ſtate. The whole of the book, the Jury would ſee, was artfully written for the purpoſe for which it was intended, namely, to make the lower orders of ſociety diſaffected to Government, and it was the moſt groſs artifice that ever impoſed upon the credulous part of mankind. It was all written in the dogmatical man⯑ner [4]It conſiſted of ſo many ready-made propoſitions, without regard to truth, and without the leaſt applica⯑tion to circumſtances, and alſo without the leaſt rea⯑ſoning or deduction whatever; addreſſed to men who were very properly anxious about their rights, but who, from too little knowledge of our Conſtitution, and from being too little habituated to reflection, were eaſily impoſed upon by ſhallow artifice; and when theſe honeſt, but deluded men, came to be perſuaded that they were deprived, by the deſpotic temper of Go⯑vernment, of Rights, to which they were clearly in⯑titled, it was a matter of no wonder they ſhould mani⯑feſt an abhorrence of the whole fabric. He defied any man to ſhew a ſyſtem capable of creating more miſ⯑chief than this book. It ſtated that the regular ſyſtem of our legiſlation was inherently corrupt, and that the whole formed a maſs of abominable tyranny. Second⯑ly, that the Legiſlature altogether was, without a ſin⯑gle exception, grounded upon uſurpation; that this uſurped authority framed what was called law, but that in reality there was ſcarcely ſuch a thing as law in the country. Thus ten or twelve millions of people were told they were governed by uſurpation, and that of courſe, as there was no ſuch thing as law, each indi⯑vidual would be left to govern all his actions by his own partial notions of moral duty. Were we, indeed, to follow theſe doctrines?—Were we to fall into a law⯑leſs banditti? Were we to be reduced back again into a ſavage ſtate of nature, where man was the enemy of man, where all his faculties were uſeleſs, except ſtrength and cunning?—Were we to return to this ſtate?—The Jury knew what the anſwer was to theſe queſtions. What was to be ſaid to a man who would thus, with a general ſweep, take away all law, or the force of all law, by aſſerting that all laws which had been hitherto made, are null and void; this ſort of ar⯑tifice was very groſs, it was true, but it did not appear ſo to thoſe who could not detect the artifice. Objec⯑tions too were ſtarted in this book to Monarchy, in ge⯑neral terms, without one word being ſaid of its advan⯑tages. The power of the Ariſtocracy was objected to, but not a word was ſaid about the Democratic part of [5]our Conſtitution. It was well known that England had a powerful Democracy; but not a word of that, becauſe it would not make the lower claſſes of the people diſ⯑contented; this was the common artifice; an artifice ſo very ſhallow, that ſome people might wonder perhaps at the ſucceſs of it; but to whom were theſe things ad⯑dreſſed? to the ignorant, the credulous, and the deſpe⯑rate—the latter were naturally the enemies of all go⯑vernment, order, or regularity; every reſtaint was irk⯑ſome to them, and nothing was ſo plauſible or convinc⯑ing to them, even upon the point of propriety, as to in⯑form them we ſhall have no government at all; the others were eaſily to be impoſed upon, and made the dupes of the crafty and deſigning, who might chuſe to deceive them.

The Jury, in order to judge accurately of the merits of this political performance, would take into their con⯑ſideration, the phraſes and manner in which the author was pleaſed to expreſs his thoughts in this publication: the manner was ſneering and contemptuous; and, as to the matter, he called it an utterdefiance to all law, mora⯑lity, and religion. The indecency with which Monarchy was treated was quite ſhocking, and the concluſions in that work, upon that topic, diſcovered that the author was deſtitute of knowledge, as to the various proviſions, and wiſe ones too, which the law made in that particular.— Here the learned Gentleman entered into an hiſtorical de⯑tail of the various permanent Council for Minor Kings, Regents, hereditary and official adviſers, &c. of the Throne, in various caſes of neceſſity; ſo that the proviſions by law were ſuch, that no material inconvenience could be ſuſtained by the public on account of the monarchical ſyſtem—a ſyſtem which Mr. Paine had been pleaſed to ſay was ſuch, that a caſe might occur where there would be a complete chaſm in that branch of our form of go⯑vernment. The truth was, that our Conſtitution was the beſt upon earth, and that for the plaineſt and cleareſt reaſon—it had had longer time for melioration than that of any other in the world. Seven hundred years ago freedom was its baſis. From the days of Julius Caeſar it had from age to age been improved, until it was com⯑pleted at the Revolution.

He apprehended it to be no difficult operation of the human mind, to diſtinguiſh reaſoning from a deliberate deſign to withdraw men's minds from the Conſtitution; it was done by the operation of good ſenſe, and not dif⯑ficult for a Jury of the city of London. They would obſerve, whether the whole of the book was not calcu⯑lated to convince the ſober part of mankind, or to pro⯑duce diſaffection, to inflame paſſions inſtead of reaſon⯑ing with the mind. He knew of no circumſtance that could leave a doubt in the mind of the Jury as to what was paſſing in the heart of the Defendant, at the time he penned this publication.

He had thought it more becoming, as well as benefi⯑cial to the public, to ſelect out of this wicked work ſix or ſeven paſſages, than to encumber the record with too many recitals. He would now take them in their order:

The firſt paſſage is to be found in page 21, large edi⯑tion, and is in theſe words:

‘All hereditary Government is in its nature ty⯑ranny. An heritable crown, or an heritable throne, or by what other fanciful name ſuch things may be called, have no other ſignificant explanation than that mankind are heritable property. To inherit a Government, is to inherit the people, as if they were flocks and herds.’

Now what was the tendency of this? to deſtroy all ſubordination and ſubmiſſion to the law. It was neither more nor leſs than this; to hold out to the people of this country, that they were ſlaves; this was one of theſe ſhort ready-made propoſitions, which, if a man be⯑lieves, he muſt ſay, I can bear this no longer. As to the King's inheriting the people, that was a piece of ſo⯑phiſtry; he had no inheritance in the people, his inhe⯑ritance was his office, and that was an office under the law.

The next paſſage is in page 47.

‘This Convention met at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, of which General Waſhington was elected Preſident. He was not at that time connected [7]with any of the State Governments, or with Con⯑greſs. He delivered up his Commiſſion when the war ended, and ſince then had lived as a private Citizen.’

‘The Convention went deeply into all ſubjects: and having, after a variety of debate and inveſ⯑tigation, agreed among themſelves upon the ſe⯑veral parts of a federal Conſtitution; the next queſtion was the manner of giving it authority and practice.’

‘For this purpoſe they did not, like a cabal of Courtiers, ſend for a Dutch Stadtholder, or a Ger⯑man Elector, but they referred the whole matter to the ſenſe and intereſt of the country.’

What was this? Why the whole was written for the ſake of introducing a ſneer againſt a Dutch Stadtholder and German Elector, this diſcovered the temper of the man; but it was another dogma or rea⯑dy-made propoſition, without the leaſt deduction.

Another paſſage was to be found in page 52.

‘The hiſtory of the Edwards and the Hen⯑ries, and up to the commencement of the Stuarts, exhibits as many inſtances of tyranny as could be acted within the limits to which the nation had reſtricted it. The Stuarts endeavoured to paſs thoſe limits, and their fate is well known. In all thoſe inſtances we hear nothing of a conſtitu⯑tion, but only of reſtrictions on aſſumed power.’

‘After this, another William, deſcended from the ſame ſtock, and claiming from the ſame origin, gained poſſeſſion; and of the two evils, James and William, the nation preferred what it thought the leaſt; ſince, from circumſtances, it muſt take one. The act, called the Bill of Rights, comes here into view. What is it but a bargain, which the parts of the government made with each other to divide powers, profits, and privileges? You ſhall have ſo much, and I will have the reſt; and with reſpect to the nation, it ſaid, for your ſhare YOU ſhall have the right of petitioning. This being the [8]caſe, the bill of rights is more properly a bill of wrongs, and of inſult. As to what is called the Convention Parliament, it was a thing that made itſelf, and then made the authority by which it acted. A few perſons got together, and called themſelves by that name. Several of them had never been elected, and none of them for the pur⯑poſe.’

‘From the time of William, a ſpecies of Go⯑vernment aroſe, iſſuing out of this coalition bill of rights; and more ſo, ſince the corruption intro⯑duced at the Hanover ſucceſſion, by the agency of Walpole; that can be deſcribed by no other name than a deſpotic legiſlation. Though the parts may embarraſs each other, the whole has no bounds; and the only right it acknowledges out of itſelf, is the right of petitioning. Where then is the Con⯑ſtitution, either that gives, or that reſtrained power?’

‘It is not becauſe a part of the government is elective, that makes it leſs a deſpotiſm, if the per⯑ſons ſo elected poſſeſs afterwards, as a Parliament, unlimited powers. Election, in this caſe, becomes ſeparated from repreſentation, and the candidates are candidates for deſpotiſm.’

Thus this author would have us believe, that, from the days of the Edwards and the Henries, up to the Stuarts, we had nothing but tyranny; and the Bill of Rights, it ſeemed, was a bill of wrongs and inſults. Who was ſo infatuated as to believe all this? Who among us was ignorant of the character of that great founder of our juriſprudence, Edward the Third. And as to the Bill of Rights, ſtrangely muſt that heart be conſtituted, which had not a grate⯑ful reverence for the memory of thoſe who procured it. But as eulogium would be loſt on that bill, let it ſpeak for itſelf.—Here he recited almoſt the whole of the Bill of Rights.—Such was the bill of wrongs and inſults—he would not profane it by a comment.

The next paſſage was in page 56.

‘The attention of the government of England (for I rather chuſe to call it by this name than the Engliſh government) appears, ſince its poli⯑tical connection with Germany, to have been ſo completely engroſſed and abſorbed by foreign affairs, and the means of raiſing taxes, that it ſeems to exiſt for no other purpoſes. Domeſtic concerns are neglected; and, with reſpect to re⯑gular law, there is ſcarcely ſuch a thing.’

Here was a reflection of the moſt wicked ſort on the government of this country, and an invitation to the people to rebel, by telling them there was ſcarcely ſuch a thing as law in England.

The next paſſage was a note in page 63.

‘With reſpect to the two houſes, of which the Engliſh Parliament is compoſed, they appear to be effectually influenced into one, and, as a legiſlature to have no temper of its own. The Miniſter, whoever he at any time may be, touches it as with an opium wand, and it ſleeps obe⯑dience.’

‘But if we look at the diſtinct abilities of the two houſes, the difference will appear ſo great, as to ſhew the inconſiſtency of placing power where there can be no certainty of the judgment to uſe it. Wretched as the ſtate of repreſentation is in England, it is manhood compared with what is called the Houſe of Lords; and ſo little is this nick-named houſe regarded, that the peo⯑ple ſcarcely inquire at any time what it is doing. It appears alſo to be moſt under influence, and the fartheſt removed from the general intereſt of the nation.’

There was no occaſion to defend the Houſe, it al⯑ways had and has at this moment ſome of the moſt illuſtrious men in Europe.

The next paſſage was in pages 107 and 108.

‘Having thus glanced at ſome of the defects of the two Houſes of Parliament, I proceed to what is called the Crown, upon which I ſhall be very conciſe.’

‘It ſignifies a nominal office of a million ſter⯑ling a year, the buſineſs of which conſiſts in re⯑ceiving the money. Whether the perſon be wiſe or fooliſh, ſane or inſane, a native or a foreigner, matters not. Every miniſtry acts upon the ſame idea that Mr. Burke writes, namely, that the peo⯑ple muſt be hood-winked, and held in ſuperſtitious ignorance by ſome bug-bear or other; and what is called the Crown anſwers this purpoſe, and there⯑fore it anſwers all the purpoſes to be expected from it. This is more than can be ſaid of the other two branches.’

‘The hazard to which this office is expoſed in all countries, is not from any thing that can happen to the man, but from what may happen to the nation—the danger of its coming to its ſenſes.’

So that if the people of this country come into their ſenſes, we ſhall have no Crown.—We had been out of for ſenſes for centuries, if this was the caſe; and all he could wiſh was that we might remain lunatics for ever.

The next paſſage was a note in page 116 and 117.

‘I happened to be in England as the celebra⯑tion of the centenary of the Revolution of 1688. The character of William and Mary have always appeared to me deteſtable; the one ſeeking to deſtroy his uncle, and the other her father, to get poſſeſſion of power themſelves; but the nation was diſpoſed to think ſomething of that event. I felt hurt at ſeeing it aſcribe the whole repu⯑tation of it to a man who had undertaken it as a job, and who, beſides what he otherwiſe got, charged ſix hundred thouſand pounds for the expence of the little fleet that brought him from Holland. George the Firſt acted the fame cloſe-fiſted part as William had done, and bought the Duchy of Bremen with the money he got from England, two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds over and above his pay as King; and having thus purchaſed it at the expence of England, added it to his Hanoverian dominions for his own private [11]profit. In fact, every nation that does not govern itſelf, is governed as a job. England has been the prey of jobs ever ſince the Revolution.’

The Attorney General made a few obſervations upon theſe ſlanders on William and Mary, and the whole of the Houſe of Hanover.

The laſt paſſage was in page 161.

‘The fraud, hypocriſy, and impoſition of govern⯑ments, are now beginning to be too well under⯑ſtood to promiſe them any long career. The farce of monarchy and ariſtocracy, in all countries, is following that of chivalry, and Mr. Burke is dreſſ⯑ing for the funeral. Let it then paſs quietly to the tomb of all other follies, and the mourners be comforted.’

‘The time is not very diſtant when England will laugh at itſelf for ſending to Holland, Hanover, Zell, or Brunſwick for men, at the expence of a million a year, who underſtood neither her laws, her language, nor her intereſt, and whoſe capacities would ſcarcely have fitted them for the office of a pariſh conſtable. If government could be truſted to ſuch hands, it muſt be ſome eaſy and ſimple thing indeed, and materials fit for all the purpoſes may be found in every town and village in England.’

Mr. Attorney General, after commenting able on the various paſſages adverted to, made ſeveral obſer⯑vations on the great advantages derived from an here⯑ditary when compared to an elective Monarchy. This was manifeſted in the Conſtitution of Poland, which obliged a great, a humane, and a worthy Prince to ab⯑dicate his throne. He then called the attention of the Jury, to arguments that had been urged againſt Mr. Paine's Rights of Man, by an American Gentleman of the name of Adams; he read ſeveral extracts out of this book, and ſaid, theſe arguments ſeemed to him to be complete anſwers to the Rights of Man—Having finiſh⯑ed his obſervations, he thought it unneceſſary to trou⯑ble the Gentlemen of the Jury further in this ſtage of the buſineſs. According as they ſhould or ſhould not [12]be of opinion that this book had a dangerous tendency, would be their verdict. He had done his duty by bringing an offender of this ſort before the Gentlemen of the Jury, and thereby putting the Public under the ſhield of their protection.

Thomas Haynes was the firſt witneſs called on the part of the proſecution; who ſaid he had bought the Second Part of the Rights of Man on the 20th of February laſt, at the ſhop of Mr. Jordan, No. 166, Fleet-ſtreet.

Thomas Chapman ſaid he was a printer, and knew the defendant Thomas Paine. He was introduced to Mr. Paine by Mr. Thomas Chariſtie. He was introduced as a printer to print ſome books. In the year 1791 he printed the Firſt part of the Rights of Man; he alſo printed part of the Second Part of the Rights of Man, to wit, to page 112, to ſignature H. He had the manu⯑ſcript in his poſſeſſion to p. 146, and had compoſed as far as 140. But when ſheet I came into his hands, up⯑on examining it, part of it appeared to have a danger⯑ous tendency. He then determined in his own mind not to proceed with the work. He wrote a ſhort note to Mr. Paine for that purpoſe, and it was with a degree of reluctance that he did it, owing to the civilities he had received from Mr. Paine. An accident, however, occurred, which made this buſineſs eaſy. About the 16th of January Mr. Paine called on him, and was ra⯑ther intoxicated with liquor. He had been dining at Mr. Johnſon's, in St. Paul's Church-yard. Mr. Paine introduced a ſubject upon which they had often differed —that of religion, which was a favourite topic when he was intoxicated. The ſubject of debate running very high, Mr. Paine at laſt came to perſonal abuſe. An obſervation was made by Mrs. Chapman, at which Mr. Pain was greatly offended, and ſaid he had not been ſo much affronted in the whole courſe of his life. He roſe in a great paſſion, declaring that as the witneſs was a diſſenter, he had a bad opinion of him, as they were a ſet of hypocrites. Mr. Paine told the witneſs he wiſh⯑ed to ſettle with him. He called on the witneſs the next morning, and made many apologies for what he had ſaid; that it was the effect of liquor, and wiſhed him to go on with the work. But the witneſs would not, as he thought a part of it had an evil tendency. [13]He made three ſeparate propoſals to Mr. Paine during the publication of this work; firſt, he offered him 100 guineas for the copy; ſecondly; he offered him 500 l. and, thirdly, he offered him 1000 guineas. He anſwer⯑ed, as he intended to publiſh a ſmall edition of the work, that he wiſhed to reſerve it in his own hands.

The witneſs ſaid he had ſeen Paine write, and thought he ſhould know his hand writing. He looked at ſeveral letters ſigned Thomas Paine, and be⯑lieved they were the hand-writing of the defendant. One of theſe letters empowered Mr. Jordan of Fleet-ſtreet, who was the publiſher of this work, to declare that if any perſon enquired who was the author of the work, to ſay, that he, Paine, was the author. Others of theſe letters were orders to Mr. Chapman to deliver copies of the Rights of Man to Mr. Jordan.

John Perdue ſaid, he was formerly acquainted with Mr. Paine when he was in the Exciſe, and before he went to America. A letter, was ſhewn him, which Paine wrote to Archibald M'Donald, Eſq. his Majeſty's Attorney General. The witneſs ſaid, he believed it was the hand-writing of Mr. Paine. This letter was dated Paris, Nov. 11th, firſt year of the Republic.—There were paſſages in this letter, re⯑flecting on the Royal Family of England.

Mr. Erſkine objected to this letter being read in evidence, as it was not relevant to the ſubject of the preſent trial. My Lord, ſaid he, the Attorney General ſtates, that it contains a Libel of the moſt atrocious kind againſt his Majeſty, and his illuſ⯑trious progeny; if ſo, let him be proſecuted by another information.

It cannot prove any thing contained in the Se⯑cond Part of the Rights of Man, nor will be evi⯑dence whether any thing therein contained be libel⯑lous or not. The preſent Information charges nothing reſpecting this Letter, and Mr. Attorney General may aswell read any other work of Mr. Paine as this pretended Letter.

Lord Kenyon ſaid, he felt the force of Mr. Erſkine's objection in the light which he put it, and he ſhould certainly reject the Letter, if the Attorney General [14]had attempted to introduce it, either as matter of aggravation or inducement to the Jury to find the Defendant guilty on the preſent charge. But the Letter contained an avowal that Mr Paine was the Author of the Book which is the ſubject of this Trial; and as the Attorney General offered it only to prove this fact, he could not reſiſt its being read.

The Attorney General then ſtated the ſubſtance of the letter; which was, that he wrote to the Attorney General as a Friend; that he had nothing to do with the trial himſelf. Whatever was the event, it could affect him in no other way than the increaſe of his reputa⯑tion; that it was not his trial, but a trial of the Engliſh Government with the people of England; that getting a verdict againſt him (which however would be diffi⯑cult except by a packed jury), was the ſame as a verdict againſt the man in the moon; that had he time when he was in England, he would have publiſhed the in⯑formation, with remarks upon it, but that now he would wait until the trial was over, and then he ſhould have ſome obſervations. It ſtated, that it was poſſible for him to believe that Mr. Guelph, or any of his pro⯑fligate ſons, had not capacity to govern a nation.—In ſtating this part, the Attorney General felt great emo⯑tion; he made ſeveral ſuitable comments on it.—The letter then went on, ſtating ſeveral other particulars, together with a requeſt that it might be read by the Attorney General to the Jury at the trial.

Several other letters were produced, all of which were proved to be the hand-writing of Mr. Paine— In ſhort, there was no occaſion for all theſe proofs, as nothing was denied upon the facts on the part of Mr. Paine by his council, except the letter to the Attorney General.

The Proſecution being thus cloſed, Mr. Erſkine addreſſed the Court as follows:

Gentlemen of the Jury,

In that part of the Attorney General's addreſs in which he commented on the ſubject of a letter ſtated to have been received from France, he did not appear [15]to me to play the actor, when he exhibited ſigns of of emotion proceeding from feelings that did honour to his nature—from feelings which, animated by his duty, muſt make him eager to expreſs his abhorrence of the direct and ſcandalous attack upon the honour of his Royal Maſter, and upon the character of his family. If his embarraſſment was ſo great, and if his feeling were ſo deeply wounded, he will do me the juſtice, that mine muſt be equally, if not more deeply affected. In the high office which he holds, he muſt feel the ſtrongeſt ſenſe of duty in correcting every imputation that may be thrown on the auguſt Perſonage whom he ſerves; but that high Perſon⯑age is too far removed, too elevated above ſociety, for the learned Gentleman to enter into thoſe habits which beget the nicer ſenſibilities of the heart. I ſtand in the ſame ſituation with the Attorney-Ge⯑neral, in reſpect of another auguſt and illuſtrious Perſon, implicated in the moſt improper manner in the forged letter which he has read; and in addition to my official ſituation, he has had the condeſcenſion to admit me to the honour of his friendſhip, and there⯑fore I owe him, I feel for him, all the duty of a grateful ſervant, to an indulgent maſter; and all the affection which man can owe to man. What then muſt be my embarraſſment this day, I muſt be without feelings and without affections, if I did not experience at this moment, the moſt afflicting emotions. But great, though they are, they have not been able to detach me from the duty which I owe to my profeſſion, to juſtice, to honour, and to my country. Gentlemen, it is the firſt and deareſt benefit of an Engliſhman, that he is intitled to an impartial trial. The author of the Rights of Man would have had ample ground of detraction, if there appeared the ſmalleſt tincture of partiality in the proceedings of this Court. If the man whom he had choſen to defend him, had been inti⯑midated by threats—had been reduced by prejudice— had been prevailed upon in any way to abandon the cauſe, he might have had occaſion to complain. It would, indeed, be a blur and a blot on our Conſti⯑tution, if a man could ſay that the ſlighteſt impedi⯑ment [16]was thrown in the way of juſtice. I lament, therefore, that the Attorney-General thought it ne⯑ceſſary to read that forged letter. If he knew it to be genuine and authentic, it was his duty to make it the ſubject of a diſtinct proſecution. It has nothing to do with the preſent trial. I feel the impreſſion it has made on my own. But I ſtand here as the advocate of Tho⯑mas Paine for the book that is the ſubject of the in⯑formation, and knowing how eſſential it is to the character of Britiſh juſtice that the Bar ſhould be free, I will ſtill maintain what I conceive to be my pro⯑feſſional duty as far as nature can ſtruggle. That forged letter was admitted only under the pretext of its ſerving to decypher the quo animo of the Author in writing the book. Granting even that it be a genuine letter, which I expreſsly deny, it has not the ſmalleſt tendency to eſtabliſh that fact. It was written months after the publication: nay, after the Author had withdrawn from his country; after a time when, from the treatment he received at Do⯑ver, he might conſider himſelf as one expelled from his country. Granting, therefore, that the letter were genuine, it is immaterial; it is foreign to the preſent trial; and the Attorney-General has utterly failed in that which I contend to be eſſential to a pro⯑ſecution, in pruducing evidence of the evil mind with which the Author wrote his book. No one fact, previous to the publication, has he ſtated. No⯑thing to delineate the malignity, the wicked deſign, the ſeditous ſpirit with which the Author propagated his doctrines; nothing has he brought forward but this forged letter written ſo many months after, and in ſuch circumſtances.

The Attorney-General has ſaid, that a rumour has gone abroad that the preſent proſecution has been car⯑ried on without his approbation, and he has thought it neceſſary to do away this impreſion by ſlating his direct concurrence. No one can be more ready than myſelf to do liberal juſtice to the candour, impartiality, and fairneſs of the learned Gentleman. I have no doubt of the integrity with which he has brought even the pre⯑ſent [17]action; but if he felt himſelf a little embarraſſed by theſe rumours, which at beſt muſt have been heard only in a narrow circle, what muſt be my ſituation this day? ſtanding up as I do againſt prejudices that have been openly, widely, generally circulated—Againſt im⯑putations of the groſſeſt and the moſt affecting kind— Gentlemen, you cannot be ignorant of the diſgraceful means that have been taken, not merely to inflame the public mind againſt the Defendant, but to ſtamp and brand every man with the mark and reproach of diſaf⯑fection to the Government and Conſtitution, who ſhall venture to hazard the ſlighteſt approbation of his doc⯑trines. Can you go into any places of public reſort, either for pleaſure or buſineſs, without hearing the cry againſt this man—without hearing every deſcription of perſons who may be inclined to wiſh for the réform of certain abuſes in the adminiſtration of Government, confounded into one band of deſperate deſtroyers of the Conſtitution? Can you go into any of theſe places without ſeeing the newſpapers filled with the moſt di⯑rect attacks upon my character, for having undertaken his defence, as if it were not the bounden duty of a profeſſional man to exerciſe his faculties in the cauſe of juſtice, impartially? Without making myſelf a party to the cauſe of my client, I hold myſelf bound to ſtand up in his defence, and to take care that what⯑ever be the offence alledged againſt him, he ſhall have all the benefits to be derived from the law, and from the pure adminiſtration of it. I ſay, Gentlemen, that the Conſtitution would be gone indeed, if the feelings, the foibles, the virtues, the caprices of Barriſters were to be indulged, in the cauſes in which they take a a part.—What would be the conſequence of giving them an election? What would be the conſequence if it were to be permitted to a man high in his pro⯑feſſion to exerciſe his diſcretion in ſtating what cauſes he would appear in, and in what not? Would it not be giving a previous judgment in the caſe? Would it not be arrogating to himſelf the province of the Judge, and giving a colour and prejudice to the caſe? I am ſure the Noble Lord will tell you, that it is inconſiſtent with the pure adminiſtration of juſtice, [18]that perſonal feelings ſhould be permitted to weigh againſt public duty. I do not affect to hold myſelf out as a perſon ſo high in the profeſſion as that weight ſhould be given to the authority of my example; but yet from my ſtation at this Bar, I may ſay, without the im⯑putation of vanity, that it would be a flagrant breach of the integrity of the practice, detrimental and injurious to the character of the Bar, if I could be induced by any conſiderations to forego the defence of a client. I have, therefore, Gentlement, treated with the contempt that they merited, all the ſarcaſms, all the calumnies, with which the converſation of companies, and the co⯑lumns of newſpapers, have been loaded. Regardleſs of all that folly, and of all that malice, can utter, I ſhall maintain until I die, the equal right of every man of this kingdom to a fair trial; and on this ground I ſtand up to defend this book, and this author, as by the law of England he, and it, can be defended. It is my duty, Gentlemen, to ſtate the Queſtion of this day. The Queſtion is not whether the Engliſh Conſtitution be preferable to that of America, or that of France, for the common ſenſe of the moſt uninformed perſon muſt revolt at ſuch an idea; for how can a Court, conſtituted by Engliſh Government and Engliſh law, give a deci⯑ſion againſt that which creates its authority and con⯑ſtitutes its juriſdiction. It is not, therefore, the queſtion this day, to try whether the doctrines of this author are congenial with the Conſtitution of England; nor whether they are doctrines oppoſite to, and in hoſtility with, the Conſtitution of England; but whether the book has been written and publiſhed agreeable to, and in conformity with, the law of the land.

I will make myſelf clearly underſtood—Suppoſe then that the doctrines of Thomas Paine were doctrines, Gentlemen, of which every one of you approved, and that I were now addreſſing myſelf to a Jury of Repu⯑blicans, I ſay that you would not be authorized to give a verdict for the Defendant, if it ſhould be made mani⯑feſt to you, by the evidence, that he wrote theſe doc⯑trines, and publiſhed them for the malignant purpoſe of promoting an inſurrection in the country, thereby of⯑fending againſt the laws of the land; you have no juriſ⯑diction [19]and authority but from law; you have no right to give a verdict in favour of a man offending againſt the law, becauſe you may happen to entertain opinions of the ſame kind which produced this breach of the law. This the Noble Lord will tell you from the Bench, and it is material for you to reflect upon this clear deſcription of your duty; for it matters not how perfectly conſiſtent with your opinions the doctrines might be; if they are contrary to the ſpirit and letter of the law, you muſt condemn. Were I therefore, as I ſay, addreſſing a body of men who lived upon this book, of whom it was the ſoul, who doated on it, as on an angel from heaven, I would ſay, Gentlemen, you cannot ac⯑quit this man if he has committed an offence againſt the law. It is not whether his opinion be your's; you are not to try his opinions, for the law has nothing to do with opinions; the law binds only conduct, it leaves opinion open. You muſt ſee, therefore, what his con⯑duct has been, and ſuffer not the congeniality of your opinions to blind and influence your judgment. This may be conſidered as a large conceſſion, by ſome, as an artful manoeuvre by others; but I aſſert, that it is a clear diſtinct deſcription of the office of the Jury; for, on the other hand, if you ſhall diſapprove of the doc⯑trines of Thomas Paine, if you ſhall think that the Government of England has not the infirmities he im⯑putes to it, nay, that the paſſages of the book related by the Attorney General tend to injure that Conſtitution, and to alienate the minds of the people of this country from the love of it; I ſay, that you cannot convict this man, unleſs you ſhall be convinced that he has over⯑ſtepped the Freedom of the Preſs; for, Gentlemen, you muſt look at the mind, you muſt enquire whether he has written this book with an honeſt intention, from the genuine ſentiments of his heart, and from a pure conviction that he was thereby promoting diſcuſſions for the benefit of his fellow citizens; and this is to be collected from the matter on the record. If a man is to be judged on extrinſic matter, that matter muſt be brought into connection, and put upon the record, that the Jury may be able to judge of it, and that the De⯑fendant may have all the benefits of the law. What [20]crime then is charged upon this man?—That he has written and publiſhed this book, and that this book is hoſtile to the Conſtitution of England?—No. The law of England knows no ſuch crime. It muſt be proved, in order to conſtitute his guilt, not whether the Attorney General approves the book—not whether you approve the book—but whether Paine did not ſit down and write a book againſt a Conſtitution which he ad⯑mired and loved, with the diabolical intention of pro⯑voking diſcord and ſedition in the country. If this were proved, Thomas Paine could not be defended; but if he thinks, what I and you do not think, that the Conſtitu⯑tion of England is not the beſt calculated to promote the happineſs of the people of this country, he is not guilty of any offence againſt the law, though his opi⯑nions may be inconſiſtent with the principles of the Conſtitution. Every man is protected in his opinions, it is only his conduct that makes guilt.

I hold it, Gentlemen, to be the duty of an advocate, if he ſhould happen to have ſentiments different from his client, that he is bound to conceal them. I hold him equally bound to diſcloſe his opinions, if they ſhould happen to be favourable to him; for he is bound to exert his whole ſaculties in ſupport of his client. I am ſure that it will be of little weight, what may be my opinions upon thoſe doctrines; but I am ready to give my client all the benefit that he can derive from the declaration of my ſentiments. I profeſs myſelf then to love the genuine principles of the Britiſh Conſtitution; and I ſolemnly believe, that the Conſtitution, as admi⯑niſtered by King, Lords, and Commons, is the beſt cal⯑culated to ſecure the happineſs of the people of this country, of any frame of Government, ever conceived by man. I think it neceſſary thus to preface my parti⯑cular opinions, that you, Gentlement, may ſee that they come from no ſuſpected quarter; that we are in uniſon with each other; and that in ſtriving to aſcertain the truth, and to ſecure the happineſs of this country, we are animated by a common principle. I proceed, there⯑fore, to ſay, and this propoſition I pledge myſelf to maintain, from the very nature of civil ſociety and Go⯑vernment, as well as from the theory and practice of the [21]Engliſh law, that unleſs it can be proved, which I con⯑tend it has not been, that he has endeavoured to excite individuals to rebellion againſt the national will, from an evil mind, you cannot convict him of a libel on the record. Though you and I may think differently, that is no object; there would be an end of the liberty of Engliſh men if they could not write and ſpeculate freely upon the principles of Government. The Freedom of the Preſs of England, Gentlemen, conſiſts in this, that a man muſt not addreſs to individuals, upon the ſpur of ſome occaſion, opinions that ſhall provoke them to ſedi⯑tion, to inſurrection, and tumult; but he may freely addreſs to the univerſal reaſon of a whole nation, prin⯑ciples of Government, congenial with, or hoſtile to, the form of Government under which he lives. He may canvas the forms of Government in general, or he may diſcuſs thoſe of his own in particular; he may take them to pieces, he may ſcrutinize them with the greateſt rigour—he may ſtate what he thinks to be wrong in the original conception; he may trace the gradual pro⯑greſs of decay, or of corruption; he may point out the conſequences; he may dwell on their enormity; he may warn the people of their fate; and, in all this, he is not the ſubject of a criminal pro⯑ſecution. He is not criminal, unleſs he did it, not contemplating the hope of meliorating the con⯑dition of the people, but ſeaſting on the miſery, with the proſpect of which he indulged a diabolical na⯑ture. The Liberty of the Preſs conſiſts in this, that any individual may teach his fellow-citizens doctrines in oppoſition to thoſe under which they live; he may exerciſe his own faculties: he may provoke them to the exerciſe of theirs; he may perſuade the whole peo⯑ple to agree with him in theſe doctrines, and he is not guilty; but if he ſhall teach it as a doctrine, that any individual may oppoſe the law of the land, may reſiſt the legal authority, and may, by himſelf, or in con⯑junction with others, not merely diſobey, but thwart and impede the ſettled order of ſociety, he would be guilty of a libel upon the record. Shew me an expreſ⯑ſion like theſe in the books of Thomas Paine; ſhew me, from any part of the evidence which the Attorney [22]General has brought forward, any thing to prove the evil mind of the author. The Attorney General has brought forward a ſet of paſſages, but he knows that paſſages are not to be taken without the context. You muſt diſcover the mind of Thomas Paine in his book, and as you muſt take his book out of Court with you it will be your duty to read it carefully. What will you ſay, Gentlemen, when you find, in the very Pre⯑face to his book, the following ſentiments? Every one knows, that the very end of a preface is to announce to the reader the intention and ſubſtance of the following tract; and here you will find, Gentlemen, in the very outſet of this dangerous and diabolical performance, an antidote to the very poiſon which it is ſtated to diſſeminate.

"If a law be bad, it is one thing to oppoſe the prac⯑tice of it, but it is quite a different thing to expoſe its errors, to reaſon on its defects, and to ſhew cauſe why it ſhould be repealed, or why another ought to be ſub⯑ſtituted in its place. I have always held it an opinion (making it alſo my practice), that it is better to obey a bad law, making uſe, at the ſame time, of every argu⯑ment to ſhew its errors, and procure its repeal, than forcibly to violate it: becauſe the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the force, and lead to diſcre⯑tionary violations of thoſe which are good^*.

"It is for the good of Nations, and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular individuals, that Government ought to be eſtabliſhed, and that man⯑kind are at the expence of ſupporting it. The defects of every Government and Conſtitution, both as to prin⯑ciple and form, muſt, on a parity of reaſoning, be as open to diſcuſſion as the defects of a law; and it is a duty which every man owes to ſociety to point them out. When theſe defects, and the means of remedying them are generally ſeen by a Nation, that Nation will reform its Government or its Conſtitution in the one caſe, as the Government repealed or reformed the law [23]in the other. The operations of Government are re⯑ſtricted to the making and the adminiſtering of laws; but it is to a Nation that the right of forming or re⯑forming, generating or re-generating Conſtitutions and Governments belong; and conſequently thoſe ſubjects, as ſubjects of inveſtigation, are always before a country as a matter of right, and cannot, without invading the general right of that country, be made ſubjects for pro⯑ſecution."

Theſe, Gentlemen, are the Rights of Man: for no man can, without rebellion, withdraw his obedience; nothing ſhort of the will of the whole can alter the Conſtitution of a country, but every individual of that country may publiſh his opinions, may give his advice, and may endeavour to bring over other people to his ſentiments. If a man taught that his fellow-citizens might act at their diſcretion, if he were to ſay that their natural rights freed them from all reſtraint, and that they were to form to themſelves the rule of their own conduct, in direct oppoſition to the exiſting law, he could not be acquitted by a tribunal of Engliſh juſtice; but if a man teaches the wiſdom of Reviſion and Reform, the duty of meliorating our condition to the uttermoſt, or even the advantages that would flow, in his opinion, from a complete alteration of the form of our Govern⯑ment, he acts upon the known, acknowledged, valuable privileges of an Engliſhman. Thanks be to God, and to the wiſdom of our anceſtors, ſuch has ever been our advantageous Liberty, with ſome ſlight and melancholy interruption, which I ſhall bye and bye ſtate to you. If no man could have gone before the day in which he lived, and pointed out, from the force of ſuperior in⯑tellect, improvements in our ſocial ſyſtem, how could Government have paſſed on from ſtage to ſtage, from ſtate to ſtate, until at laſt it has acquired the beautiful ſhape and proſperous eſtabliſhment, which the Attorney General thinks it would be profanation to touch, and to ſuch a ſtate of perfection as to make it a vain hope to look for any further melioration?

What is the faireſt fruits of the Engliſh Tree of Li⯑berty?— The ſecurity of our rights and of the law, and that no man ſhall be brought to trial where there is [24]prejudice exiſting againſt him. If any thing appears that can infect the minds of the Jury, the Court upon motion will poſtpone the trial. The Noble Lord will recollect, that upon this principle the trial of the Dean of St. Aſaph was poſtponed; for it was ſtated in the Court, that a number of extracts from ancient books, aſ⯑ſerting the rights of Jurors, had been circulated; and the Noble Lord put off the trial. If ſuch was the caſe upon the more circulation of a ſet of extracts from a ſet of writers of high authority, what muſt be the ſituation of my client?—This book, and this deſendant, have been the ſubjects of every ſort of imputation. Pending the trial, even a ſet of Aſſociators, who know ſo little of the Conſtitution of England, as to interfere with the courſe of juſtice, circulate an anſwer to this very pamphlet. It is given away at turnpikes, thrown down our areas, thruſt into every man's hand. The coffee-houſes, the newſpapers, are full of it—nay, that high tribunal, which is the guardian, and the repreſentative of the popular branch of England, has been inſulted with anathemas againſt this man, and againſt this book. What is the reſult of all this?—That the cauſe is pre⯑judged —that the mind of no man within the ſweep of this torrent can be free; and that if I had made a mo⯑tion in the Court, I am confident that the juſtice of the Noble Lord would have poſtponed the trial. What is the conſequence of all this? You, Gentlemen, muſt guard your minds againſt the approach of this frenzy; that you muſt collect firmneſs with conſcience, and ele⯑vate yourſelves above the feebleneſs of human weakneſs. —You muſt diſcover his mind in his book, not in the rage, nor in the cant of the times. You muſt throw away every thing but the book—the forged letter that has been read to you, you muſt equally reject. I heard of this ſame forged letter, and I have reaſon to believe it to be a foul forgery, brought forward at this moment, not merely to embarraſs me, but to embarraſs you; but you muſt prove that you are not men whoſe under⯑ſtandings are to be tortured by ſuch appeals. You will prove by your verdict, that you will deal by this man as you would wiſh to be dealt with in a ſimilar ſitua⯑tion.—Remember this doctrine of Engliſhmen, that [25] opinion is free.—If I were to move an amendment in any part of the exiſting laws of the land, would it be right, would it be reaſonable, that you ſhould convict me of a libel, becauſe you differed from me in opinion? It is the opinion of this author, that it is the duty of citizens to obey a law while it exiſts. "When a nation," ſays he, "changes its opinions and habits of thinking, it is no longer to be governed as before; but it would not only be wrong, but bad policy to attempt by force, what ought to be accompliſhed by reaſon. Rebellion conſiſts in forcibly oppoſing the general will of a na⯑tion, whether by a party or by individuals." Such is the doctrine of Thomas Paine; and I aſſert this to be the true law of England; and I ſay, that I give the beſt proof of my attachment to the illuſtrious family upon the throne, when I maintain theſe doctrines: and when I aſſert, that they are the ſafeſt for their deſirable intereſts, and for their honour. The Attorney Gene⯑ral, in his obſervation upon the infamous aſperſion on the Royal Family, ſpeaks of the heir-apparent of the Crown from hope—I ſpeak from knowledge. Without detaining you for one moment to animadvert on what I think, the indecency of the tameneſs with which impu⯑tations on the Royal progeny have been ſuffered of late, of the apparent diſinclinations to proſecute what tends to break the beſt hopes of Engliſhmen, and wound the fondeſt feelings of the Royal boſom, while there is an eagerneſs to proſecute the diſcuſſion of popular opi⯑nions. I believe, and I know, that if ever there was a man more firmly attached than another to the pure principles of the Britiſh Conſtitution, to thoſe rights of the people, the exerciſe of which ſeated the preſent Family upon the throne, it is the heir-apparent of the Crown of theſe realms. If there ſhall come a time that, by the courſe of nature, and God forbid that it ſhould ever happen otherwiſe than by the courſe of nature, he ſhould ſucceed to the throne of his anceſtors, I have the firmeſt confidence that he will make the Conſtitu⯑tion the rule of his conduct. I know that theſe ſenti⯑ments are congenial to his breaſt. I had the honour, in my place in the Houſe of Commons, when I believe that auguſt perſon was preſent, to pronounce my opi⯑nion [26]on political doctrines, and to put the title of the King's Majeſty upon the right which the people have to chuſe their chief Magiſtrate—the only right upon which, in my opinion, the title can be truly ſafe.

In endeavouring to find the true ſpirit with which this book was written, you muſt go back to the train of circumſtances which have formed the habits and opi⯑nions of the author. You cannot have forgotten that calamitous aera in our hiſtory, to which no man can look back without horror,—the aera of the American war. This man performed a conſiderable part on that memorable theatre; and of his conduct there, Mr. Burke, that celebrated character, of whom I cannot ſpeak otherwiſe than with great reſpect, however he may affect to treat me with contempt, has ſpoken of the conduct of Thomas Paine with high reſpect. Here Mr. Erſkine read ſome quotations from his Thoughts on he Cauſes of the preſent diſcontent, and other works in commendation of Thomas Paine, and he ſaid that theſe two perſons uſed to be of the ſame mind, though they now differ. Paine might be right, but Mr. Burke could not be right, for Mr. Paine had been conſiſtent with himſelf, but Mr. Burke had contradicted every former opinion. Paine ſeeing the conſequences of the conduct of Britain with regard to America, had at⯑tacked the Engliſh Conſtitution, for Mr. Erſkine ſaid, he does attack the Engliſh Conſtitution—I do not affect to deny it. He ſpeaks againſt the original frame of our Conſtitution, what I think is only applicable to its de⯑cay, and what, for I will not mince the matter, proceeds from corruptions which would bring on the ruin of us all, if I did not know and believe that the Conſtitution contains the ſeeds of its own reform. Is it libellous in him, however, to ſay what he has ſaid againſt the con⯑ſtitutent branches of our Conſtitution?—the grandeſt authorities of England have done the ſame. Mr. Erſkine quoted a paſſage of a letter from Sir George Savile to his conſtituents—[Vide Annual Regiſter for 1780, p. 400.]—"I return to you," ſays Sir George, "baffled and diſpirited, and, I am ſorry that truth obliges me to add, with hardly a ray of hope, of ſeeing any change in the miſerable courſe of public calamities." And of Sir [27]George Savile, Mr. Erſkine gave the admirable cha⯑racter as drawn by Mr. Burke. At this time Mr. Paine and Mr. Burke fought in the ſame field—Mr. Burke ſpoke to Parliament, Mr. Paine to the People. Mr. Paine has only been a plagiary from himſelf; he has been drawn on in the ſame train of thinking; and, therefore, I aſſert that his book is the product of his real ſentiments, the genuine efforts of a mind ſtruggling for what he conceives to be the intereſts of Humanity. The cauſe is potent, it produced the revolution in America, it produced the revolution in France; where a Government, incurable from its corruption, and profli⯑gacy, was totally overthrown; but can the ſame doc⯑trines affect the Conſtitution of England? No. His doctrines had no effect, nor could there have occurred a period when the public mind could have been excited by any ſuch doctrines, if it had not been previouſly provoked by the inflammatory, the ill-judged, and the exaſperating doctrines of Mr. Burke. He it was who led the van in all this war of ſedition.—Let us go back for a moment to this origin. When the people of this country ſaw this deſpicable government of France demoliſhed—that government which had been the ſcourge of England—they rejoiced in the happineſs of ſo many millions. A reverend divine, now no more, made it the ſubject of exhortation from the pulpit. A ſociety of gentlemen met to celebrate it, and Mr. Burke was rouſed by this into the fever of oppoſition. Though he repreſented them as an inſignificant body of obſcure individuals, he attacked the whole ſyſtem of England with ſuch bitterneſs of invective, and attacked the moſt eſtabliſhed doctrines, with ſuch vehemence of diſſent, that from that day till this the flame of contention has not ceaſed to rage.—What was the principle of this work?—That the People of England had no right, no power, to change a tittle of their Conſtitution; that it was an indiſſoluble compact, which at no time, on no ground, for no reaſon, could be broken: ſo that neither reaſon nor revelation, however they might point out to the people of England a better form of government, wiſer inſtitutes of peace, ſtronger baſes of liberty, they durſt not ſtrive to attain them. If it be ſo, for God's [28]ſake, let policy and diſcretion ſtrive to conceal the af⯑flicting truth, for it will ſurely lead to the convulſion which he affects to deprecate. Rather put Paine into the hands of every man, make the loweſt ignorance ac⯑quainted with his doctrines, and chaſe away, if it be poſſible, the impreſſions which Mr. Burke has made. How different is the doctrine of truth and of peace!— How different is the doctrine of the Revolution! Look at the Conſtitution, ſay the friends of liberty, it is your own treaſure. Will you keep it as it is, or will you change it at the ſuggeſtion of every theoriſt? Your own happineſs is at ſtake; but remember the happineſs that it has produced you. Will they not be likely to touch with awe a Conſtitution which comes thus re⯑commended to them by parental tenderneſs? and will they not protect it with parental authority?—Look now at the addreſs of Mr. Burke. Here is your Con⯑ſtitution, which we have made for you, and for your poſterity for ever. We buckle it on your backs, for you are beaſts of burden. You muſt not dare to touch it—you have entered into a compact which is indiſſolu⯑ble. Are ſuch doctrines the legitimate way of endear⯑ing the Conſtitution to the people? And I mention all this in order to ſhew you what the book of Mr. Paine is; for Paine's book is an anſwer to thoſe doctrines of Mr. Burke—doctrines more injurious than any that could be aſſerted by Republicans and Levellers!

Mr. Erſkine then cited ſeveral of our moſt eminent Engliſh writers, whoſe ſentiments are congenial with thoſe of Mr. Paine on the ſubject of Government.—He firſt quoted Mr. Paley on the Principles of Moral and Political Philoſophy, p. 426.

V. ‘No uſage, law, or authority whatever is ſo binding, that it need or ought to be continued, when it may be changed with advantage to the Community. The family of the Prince, the order of ſucceſſion, the prerogative of the Crown, the form and parts of the Legiſlature, together with the reſ⯑pective powers, office, duration, and mutual de⯑pendency of the ſeveral parts, are all only ſo many laws, mutable like other laws, whenever expe⯑diency [29]requires, either by the ordinary act of the Legiſlature, or, if the occaſion deſerve it, by the interpoſition of the People. Theſe points are wont to be approached with a kind of awe; they are repre⯑ſented to the mind as principles of the Conſtitution ſettled by our anceſtors, and, being ſettled, to be no more committed to innovation or debate; as foundations never to be ſtirred; as the terms and conditions of the ſocial compact, to which every citizen of the ſtate has engaged his fidelity, by vir⯑tue of a promiſe, which he cannot now recall. Such reaſons have no place in our ſyſtem? to us, if there be any good reaſon for treating theſe with more deference and reſpect than other laws; it is either the advantage of the preſent Conſtitution of Government (which reaſon muſt be of different force in different countries), or becauſe in all coun⯑tries, it is of importance, that the form and uſage of governing be acknowledged and underſtood, as well by the governors as the governed, and becauſe the ſeldomer it is changed, the more it will be reſ⯑pected by both ſides.’

Mr. Erſkine then introduced Hume's Hiſtory of England, vol. ii. p. 88.

‘It muſt be confeſſed that the former articles of the Great Charter contain ſuch mitigations and ex⯑planations of the Feodal Law as are reaſonable and equitable; and that the latter involve all the chief outlines of a Loyal Government, and provide for the equal diſtribution of Juſtice, and free enjoy⯑ment of property; the great object for which po⯑litical ſociety was at firſt founded by men, which the people have a perpetual and unalienable right to recall, and which no time, nor precedent, nor ſtatute, nor poſitive inſtitution, ought to deter them from keeping ever uppermoſt in their thoughts and attention.’

The next Writer was the immortal Locke, and he cit⯑ed the following paſſages from his Treatiſe on Civil Government, p. 268, 270, 309, 3 [...]3.

‘All men, ſay they, are born under Government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a ſubject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of ſubjection and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor conſidered any ſuch natural ſubjection that they were born in, to one or to the other, that tied them, without their own conſents, to a ſubjection to them and their heirs.’

‘Thoſe who would perſuade us, that by being born under any government we are naturally ſubjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the free⯑dom of the ſtate of Nature, have no other reaſon (bating that of paternal power, which we have al⯑ready anſwered) to produce for it, but only becauſe our fathers or progenitors paſſed away their natur⯑al liberty, and thereby bound up themſelves and their poſterity to a perpetual ſubjection to the go⯑vernment, which they themſelves ſubmitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or promi⯑ſes any one has made for himſelf, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatſoever, bind his children or poſterity; for his ſon, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the ſon, that it can of any body elſe.’

‘And therefore they have a very wrong notion of Government who ſay, that the people have incroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by poſitive laws; for in ſo doing, they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared that that power which they in⯑definitely left in his or his anceſtor's hands to be exerciſed for their good; was not a thing which they intended him when he uſed it otherwiſe; for the end of Government being the good of the Community, whatſoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, ſince nobody in Government can have a right tending to any other end: and thoſe only are [31]encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good. Thoſe who ſay otherwiſe, ſpeak as if the prince had a diſtinct and ſeparate intereſt from the good of the Community, and was not made for it; the root and ſource from which ſpring almoſt all thoſe evils and diſ⯑orders which happen in Kingly Governments. And indeed, if that be ſo, the people under his government are not a ſociety of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good; they are not ſuch as have ſet rulers over themſelves, to guard and pro⯑mote that good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures, under the dominion of a maſter, who keeps them and works them for his own pleaſure or profit. If men were ſo void of reaſon, and brutiſh, as to enter into ſociety upon ſuch terms, Prerogative might indeed be, what ſome men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people.’

‘And, therefore, though the People cannot be judge, ſo as to have, by the conſtitution of that ſociety, any ſuperior power, to determine and give effective ſen⯑tence in the caſe; yet, they have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all poſitive laws of men, reſerved that ultimate determination to themſelves which be⯑longs to all mankind; God and Nature never allowing a man ſo to abandon himſelf, as to neglect his own preſervation; and ſince he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for diſorder; for this operates not till the inconveniency is ſo great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a neceſſity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wiſe princes, never need come in the danger of; and it is the thing, of all others, they have moſt need to avoid, as of all others the moſt perilous.’

‘Whenſoever, therefore, the legiſlative ſhall tranſ⯑greſs this fundamental will of ſociety, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to graſp themſelves, or put into the hands of any other, an abſolute power over the lives, liberties, and eſtates of the people; by this breach of truth they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for [32]quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to reſume their original liberty, and, by the eſtabliſhment of a new legiſlative, (ſuch as they ſhall think fit) provide for their own ſafety and ſecurity, which is the end for which they are in ſociety. What I have ſaid here, concerning the legiſlative, (ſuch as they ſhall think fit) provide for their own ſafety and ſecurity, which is the end for which they are in ſociety. What I have ſaid here, concerning the legiſlative in general, holds true con⯑cerning the ſupreme executor, who having a double truſt put in him, both to have a part in the legiſla⯑tive, and the ſupreme execution of the law, acts againſt both, when he goes about to ſet up his own arbitary will as the law of the ſociety. He acts alſo contrary to his truſt, when he either employs the force, treaſure, and offices, of the Society, to corrupt the repreſentatives, and gain them to his purpoſes: or openly pre-engages the electors, and preſcribes to their choice ſuch, whom he has by ſolicitations, threats, promiſes, or otherwiſe, won to his deſigns; and employs them to bring in ſuch, who have pro⯑miſed before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new⯑model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the Government by the roots, and poiſon the very fountain of public ſecurity? For the people having reſerved to themſelves the choice of their repreſenta⯑tives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they may always be freely choſen, and ſo choſen, freely act and adviſe, as the neceſſity of the commonwealth, and the public good, ſhould, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This thoſe who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reaſons on all ſides, are not capable of doing. To prepare ſuch an aſſembly as this, and endeavour to ſet up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true repreſentatives of the people, and the law-makers of the ſociety, is certainly as great a breach of truſt, and as perfect a declaration of a deſign to ſubvert the Government, as is poſſible to be met with. To [33]which, if one ſhall add rewards and puniſhments viſibly employed to the ſame end, and all the arts of perverted law made uſe of to take off and deſtroy all that ſtand in the way of ſuch a deſign, and will not comply and conſent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be paſt doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the ſociety, who thus employ it contrary to the truſt which went along with it in its firſt inſtitution, is eaſy to determine; and one cannot but ſee, that he who has once attempted any ſuch thing as this, cannot any longer be truſted.’

‘But it will be ſaid, this hypotheſis lays a fer⯑ment for frequent rebellion. To which I anſwer.’

‘Firſt, No more than any other hypotheſis: for when the People are made miſerable and find them⯑ſelves expoſed to the ill uſuage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for ſons of Jupiter; let them be ſacred and divine, deſ⯑cended or authorized from Heaven; give them out for whom or what you pleaſe, the ſame will happen. The People generally ill-treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occaſion to eaſe them⯑ſelves of a burden that ſits heavy upon them. They will wiſh, and ſeek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakneſs and accidents of human affairs, ſeldom delays long to offer itſelf. He muſt have lived but a little while in the world, who has not ſeen examples of this in his time; and he muſt have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all ſorts of government in the world.’

‘Secondly, I anſwer ſuch revolutions happen not upon every little miſmanagement in public affairs. Great miſtakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the ſlips of human frailty, will be borne by the People, without mutiny or mur⯑mur. If a long train of abuſes, prevarications and artifices, all tending the ſame way, make the de⯑ſign viſible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and ſee whither they are going; it is not to be wondered at, that they ſhould then rouſe themſelves, and endeavour to put the rule into ſuch hands as may ſecure to them the ends for which Government was at firſt erected; and with⯑out [34]which, ancient names, and ſpecious forms, are ſo far from being better, that they are much worſe, than the ſtate of nature, or pure Anarchy; the inconve⯑niencies being all as great and as near, but the reme⯑dy farther off and more difficult.’

‘Thirdly, I anſwer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their ſafety a-new, by a new legiſlative, when their legſlators have acted con⯑trary to their truſt, by invading their property, is the beſt fence againſt rebellion, and the probableſt means to hinder it: for rebellion being an oppoſition, not to perſons, but authority, which is founded only in the Conſtitutions and Laws of the Government; thoſe, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force juſtify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into ſo⯑ciety and civil government, have excluded force, and introdueed laws for the preſervation of property, peace and unity amongſt themſelves, thoſe who ſet up force again in oppoſition to the laws, do rebel⯑lure, that is, bring back again the ſtate of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence they have to authority, the temp⯑tation of force they have in they their hands, and the flattery of thoſe about them) being likelieſt to do; the propereſt way to prevent the evil, is to ſhew them the danger and injuſtice of it, who are under the greateſt temptation to run into it.’

‘Nor let any one ſay, that miſchief can ariſe from hence, as often as it ſhall pleaſe a buſy head, or turbulent ſpirit, to deſire the alteration of the Goyernment. It is true, ſuch men may ſtir whenever they pleaſe; but it will be only to their own juſt ruin and perdition: for till the miſchief be grown general, and the ill deſigns of the rulers become viſible, or their attempts ſenſible to the greater part, the people, who are more diſpoſed to ſuffer than right themſelves by reſiſtance, are not apt to ſtir. The examples of particular injuſtice, or oppeſſion of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But if they univerſally have a perſuaſion grounded upon manifeſt evidence, that [35]deſigns are carrying on againſt their liberties, and the general courſe and tendency of things cannot but give them ſtrong ſuſpicions of the evil intention of their Governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who can help it, if they who might avoid it, bring themſelves into this ſuſpicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the ſenſe of ra⯑tional creatures, and can think of things no other⯑wiſe than as they find and feel them?—And is it not rather their fault who put things into ſuch a poſture, that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I grant that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men, have ſometimes cauſed great diſorders in commonwealths, and fac⯑tions have been fatal to ſtates and kingdoms. But whether the miſchief hath oftner begun in the peo⯑ple's wantonneſs, and a deſire to caſt off the lawful authority of their rulers, or in the rulers' inſolence, and endeavours to get and exerciſe an arbitrary power over their people; whether oppreſſion or diſobedience gave the firſt rife to the diſorder, I leave it to impartial hiſtory to determine.’

Mr. Burkes's Letter to the Sheriffs of Briſtol, was then introduced; and Mr. Erſkine read the following paſſages from p. 55. 57, 58.

‘If there be one fact in the world perfectly clear, it is this, 'That the diſpoſition of the people of America is wholly averſe to any other than a free government;' and this is indication enough to any honeſt Stateſman, how he ought to adapt whatever power he finds in his hands to their caſe. If any aſk me what a free government is, I anſwer, that, for any practical purpoſe it is what the people think ſo; and that they and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of this matter. If they practically allow me a greater degree of au⯑thority over them, than is conſiſtent with any cor⯑rect ideas of perfect freedom, I ought to thank them for ſo great a truſt, and not to endeavour to prove from thence, that they have reaſoned amiſs, and that having gone ſo far, by analogy, they muſt hereafter have no enjoyment but my pleaſure.’

‘Civil Freedom, gentlemen, is not, as many have endeavoured to perſuade you, a thing that lies hid in the depth of abſtruſe ſcience. But is a bleſſing and a benefit, not an abſtract ſpecula⯑tion; and all the juſt reaſoning that can be upon it, is of ſo coarſe a texture, as perfectly to ſuit the ordinary capacities of thoſe who are to enjoy and to defend it.’

‘For Liberty is a good to be improved, and not an evil to be leſſened. It is not only a pri⯑vate bleſſing of the firſt order, but the vital ſpring and energy of the ſtate itſelf, which has juſt ſo much life and vigour as there is liberty in it. But whether liberty be advantageous or not, (for I know it is a faſhion to decry the very prin⯑ciple) none will diſpute that peace is a bleſſing; and peace muſt, in the courſe of human affairs, be frequently bought by ſome indulgence and toleration at leaſt of liberty. For as the Sabbath (though of divine inſtitution) was made for man, not man for the Sabbath, Government, which can claim no higher origin or authority, in its exerciſe at leaſt, ought to conform to the exi⯑gencies of the times, and the temper and cha⯑racter of the people with whom it is concerned, and not always to attempt, violently, to bend the people to their theories of Subjection. The bulk of Mankind, on their part, are not exceſſively curious concerning any theories, while they are really happy; and one ſure ſymptom of an ill-conducted State, is the propenſity of the people to reſort to them.’

Do not let us be raſh, Gentlemen, in deciding upon this great queſtion. Before we condemn this author by bell, book, and candle, let us reflect a little on the progreſs of the principles of freedom. It is but one year ago, that I could have an opportunity of addreſ⯑ſing to you ſuch an argument. Gentlemen, your au⯑thority to judge of a Libel is but a year old. It is but ſeven or eight years ago when I ſtood upon a queſ⯑tion like the preſent, upon very different grounds, when I had leſs to ſupport me againſt the embarraſs⯑ment [37]with which I was ſorrounded in the preſence of an enlightened profeſſion, and holding a doctrine that was ſcouted. The Earl of Mansfield, who, though he could not treat me with unkindneſs, for it was not in his nature, laughed at me as you laugh at the prattle of a child; and I was deſired to go to ſchool with my new-fangled doctrines, to learn the law of the land. Here is an argument againſt raſhneſs. I have lived to ſee the Parliament of England unanimouſly declare that I was in the right. Knowing then that it has been by ſlow and gradual degrees, that the con⯑ſtitution of England has grown to what it is, for God's ſake let us be careful not to ſtifle the voice of reaſon by a raſh and haſty deciſion. If Mr. Burke's doctrine be right, no opinions upon government can be publiſhed, for the people have no juriſdiction. If the people have not the power to alter and amend, advice is not mere⯑ly impertinent, it is dangerous. A juriſdiction to be competent muſt have power; and when, therefore, he aſſerts that the people of this country are utterly and for ever deprived of the power of changing their Conſtitution, he pronouces a prohibition upon all rea⯑ſoning, upon all opinion, upon all diſcuſſion. What has been the courſe of man? That he has been led by awful authorities, ſtep by ſtep, from his ſavage ſtate in the woods, to our preſent bleſſed condition of light, of knowledge, and of enjoyments. We ſhould ſtill be ſavages, we ſhould yet be in the woods, if this pro⯑hibition had exiſted; and to what muſt we return, if every man is to be condemned, who ſhall now pro⯑mulgate the opinions that he entertains upon the nature of government?

Of all the attainments of a people, the Liberty of the Preſs has been uniformly the laſt—Uniformly deſ⯑potiſm has reſiſted the propagation of truth. All other conceſſions power has been willing to make, but againſt the truths of reaſon—againſt the light of knowledge, it has maintained an eternal war. Let us recollect the courſe of the world, the univerſal God of Nature, the Saviour of Mankind, the Fountain of all Light, who came to ſave man from eternal darkneſs, expired on a croſs—the object of Infidel ſcorn—of impious incredu⯑lity, becauſe they raſhly oppoſed the meek and mild [38]propagation of the truths that were to point to peace and happineſs in the world. His bleſſed followers felt victims to the ſame horrid ſpirit. The Saviour might have come, inveſted with eternal power, and compelled the inſtantaneous acceptance of his doctrines. But he came to confound the pride of worldly power. He came cloathed in meekneſs, in benevolence, in humi⯑lity, and he preached his conſolations to the poor; in this way did political power continue to exerciſe its tyranny, until religion had ariſen to ſuch a ſtandard as to make it formidable; and then political power took eccleſiaſtical power into partnerſhip, when they exerted their combined efforts at once againſt the reaſon, and the conſcience of man. Thus, upon the revival of letters, was ſuperſtition made the inſtrument of politi⯑cal tyranny; but at length the inquiſitive ſpirit of Engliſhmen burſt the chains, and the Liberty of the Preſs had its beginning. It was free until, (in 1637), the Star Chamber was erected; mark the conſe⯑quence, the people ſuffered under reſtraint indeed; but in eleven years Charles I. periſhed on a ſcaffold. Gentlemen, the human mind cannot live under reſtraint. Let men communicate their thoughts with freedom, and their indignation fly off like a fire ſpread on the ſurface; like gunpowder ſcattered they kindle, they communicate; but the exploſion is neither loud nor dangerous:—keep them under reſtraint, it is a ſubterraneous fire, whoſe agitation is unſeen untill it burſts into earthquake or volcano. Such was the whole effect of the reſtraints in England. Crom⯑well ſuffered almoſt all his misfortunes from this cauſe, and the vigour of his government could not ſave it againſt the conſequences of his attack on the liberty of the preſs. The reſtraint continued under Charles II. and the emotions that it produced, happily for England and for man, ended in the revolution. All the licenſes were done away, the preſs was made free, and the Conſtitution has already endured a century. Thus, gentlemen, our government has been ſafe in proportion to the freedom of writing. Here Mr. Erſkine produced ſome of the fineſt authorities of England—the glorious Milton led the van: his memorable paſſage, that in former times the iſſue of the brain was no more ſtifled than the iſſue of the womb, and his fine illuſtration of the conſequences of ſuppreſſing truth, in the fate of Galileo, [39]were dexterouſly uſed by Mr. Erſkine—He periſhed in a priſon, becauſe he ventured to think, from obſerving the phaſes of Venus, that the ſun was that centre of our ſyſtem, and yet, ſaid he, we know that the ſun is in that centre, and by our knowledge, we are enabled to puſh our navigation to the extreme limits of the world, and, by line and rule, to make our way through regions the moſt unknown.

He then cited the following paſſage from Milton's Areo⯑pagatica, p. 58.

‘If it be deſired to know the immediate cauſe of all this free writing, and free ſpeaking, there cannot be aſ⯑ſigned a truer than your own mild, and free, and humane government; it is the liberty, Lords and Commons, which your own valourous and happy counſels have pur⯑chaſed us; liberty which is the nurſe of all great wits this is that which hath rarified and enlightened our ſpirits like the influence of heaven; this is that which hath enfranchiſed, enlarged, and lifted up our apprehenſions degrees above themſelves. Ye cannot make us now leſs capable, leſs knowing, leſs eagerly purſuing of the truth, unleſs ye firſt make yourſelves, that made us ſo, leſs the lovers, leſs the founders of our true liberty. We can grow ignorant again, brutiſh, formal, and ſlav⯑iſh, as ye found us; but you then muſt firſt become that which ye cannot be, oppreſſive, arbitrary, and tyrannous, as they were from whom ye have freed us. That our hearts are now more capacious, our thoughts now more erected to the ſearch and expectation of the greateſt and exacteſt things, is the iſſue of your own virtue propagated in us; ye cannot ſuppreſs that, unleſs ye reinforce an abrogated and mercileſs law, that fathers may diſpatch at will their own children. And who ſhall then ſtick cloſeſt to ye, and excite others? Not he who takes up arms for coat and conduct, and his four nobles of Danegelt. Al⯑though I diſpraiſe not the defence of juſt immunities, yet love my peace better, if that were all. Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conſcience, above all liberties.’

‘What would be beſt adviſed then, if it be found ſo hurt⯑ful and ſo unequal to ſuppreſs opinions for the newneſs or unſuitableneſs to a cuſtomary acceptance, will not be my taſk to ſay; I ſhall only repeat what I have learnt from the Lord Brook—he exhorts us to hear with patience and [40]humility, thoſe, however they may be miſcalled, that deſire to live purely in ſuch a uſe of God's Ordinances as the beſt guidance to their conſciences gives them, and to tolerate them, though in ſome diſconformity to ourſelves.—And now the time in ſpecial is by privilege to write and ſpeak what may help to further the diſcuſſing of matters in agi⯑tation.—The Temple of Janus, with his two controver⯑ſial faces, might now not inſignificantly be ſet open; and although all the Winds of Doctrine were let looſe to play upon the earth, ſo Truth be in the field, we do injurious by licenſing and prohibiting to miſdoubt her ſtrength—let her and falſhood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worſe in a free and open encounter? her confuting is the beſt and ſureſt ſuppreſſing—when a man hath been labouring the hardeſt labour in the deep mines of know⯑ledge; hath furniſhed out his findings in all their equipage; drawn forth his reaſon as it were a battle ranged; ſcatter⯑ed and defeated all objections in his way; calls out his ad⯑verſary into the plain; offers him all the advantage of wind and ſea, if he pleaſe that he may try the matter by dint of argument—for his opponents then to ſculk, to lay am⯑buſhments, to keep a narrow bridge of licenſing where the challenger ſhould paſs, though it be valour enough in ſoldierſhip, is but weakneſs and cowardice in the wars of truth, for who knows not that Truth, like the Almighty, is ſtrong, ſhe needs no policies nor ſtratagems’ (he might have added proſecutions) "to make her victorious."

There is ſuch a connection between licentiouſneſs and liberty, that it is not eaſy to correct the one, with⯑out dangerouſly wounding the other; it is extremely hard to diſtinguiſh the true limit between them: Like a changeable ſilk, we can eaſily ſee there are two diffe⯑rent colours, but we cannot eaſily diſcover where the one ends, or where the other begins.

The Attorney General had given no principles to draw the line by which we were to know where the Liberty of the Preſs ended, and the licentiouſneſs be⯑gan. He applied Lord Loughborough's memorable ob⯑ſervation of the application. "To your tents, O Iſ⯑rael," as a pregnant inſtance of what would be ſeditious. Earl Stanhope had, with great ſhrewdneſs, ridiculed this ſort of Liberty of the Preſs, which was to be all on one ſide—a liberty to praiſe Miniſters. This is a [41]ſort of liberty that even the Empreſs of Ruſſia would give you, and it may be called the Ruſſian Liberty of the Preſs. To make the work of the author appear ſe⯑ditious, the doctrine of Lord Loughborough muſt be proved. It muſt be ſhewn that his doctrine was cou⯑pled with circumſtances, or with expreſſions, tending clearly to provoke tumult; ſuch as, "We ſhall ſee how this will work—this will bring on a new revolu⯑tion—we ſhall have French inſurrections." But, ſaid Mr. Erſkine, no ſuch thing: if one ſuch expreſſion had been proved, I would have thrown up my brief—as they are not, I ſtand up to give him the benefits of a fair trial, and I am not to be ſlandered with the charge of diſaffection for exerciſing my faculties in his defence. When my Lord and I were engaged together as counſel for Lord George Gordon, as well might we have been ſuſpected of ſavouring tumult and diſorder, as that I now ſhould be of ſedition and diſaffection.

Mr. Erſkine then cited a paſſage from Lord Stan⯑hope's Rights of Juries Defended, as follows, page 142, 143, 144.

‘The thing that is illegal, is the exciting any one to ſedition, or to a breach [...]f the Peace. The queſtion, therefore, upon a Libel is, whether the Paper pu⯑bliſhed did thus excite and was ſo intended. Conſe⯑quently mere ſpeculative writings on the Conſtitution are not Libels, however abſurd they may be. Suppoſe, for inſtance, that a man were to write a ſpeculative work, to prove that a trial by a ſingle Judge would be far preferable to the Trial by Jury; or that a Parliament, compoſed only of a King and Houſe of Peers, would be beyond compariſon better than a Legiſlature of King, Lords, and Commons. No man could poſſibly reprobrate ſuch a work more than I ſhould: but if the work did not excite the people to ſedition, ſuch a ſpeculative Publication could cer⯑tainly never be deemed a Libel: for abſurdity is no part of the definition of a Libel.’

‘If our boaſted Liberty of the Preſs were to conſiſt only in the Liberty to write in praiſe of the Conſti⯑tution; that is a Liberty enjoyed under many an ar⯑bitrary [42]Government. I ſuppoſe it would not be deemed quite an unpardonable Offence even by the Empreſs of Ruſſia, if any man were to take it into his head to write a panegyric upon the Ruſſian form of Government. Such a Liberty as that might there⯑fore properly be termed the Ruſſian Liberty of the Preſs. But, the Engliſh Liberty of the Preſs, is of a very different deſcription: for, by he Law of Eng⯑land, it is not prohibited to publiſh ſpeeulative Works upon the Conſtitution, whether they contain Praiſe or Cenſure.’

‘The Liberty of the Preſs is of ineſtimable value, for, without it, this Nation might ſoon be as thoroughly enſlaved as France was, or as Turkey is. Every man who deteſts the old Government of France, and the preſent Government of Turkey, muſt be, there⯑fore, earneſt to ſecure that Palladium of Liberty; and muſt alſo be anxious to preſerve to the People, inviolate, the Trial by Jury, that tranſcendant, that incomparable and guardian Right.’

Mr. Erſkine came now to examine the paſſages ſet forth in the Information. We have already gone at ſo much length into his general argument, as to be unable to follow him in the ingenuity of his obſervations on his Extract. As to the firſt, that all hereditary govern⯑ment was a tyranny, he deſired the Jury to look at the context. I deny, ſays Paine, that hereditary Monarchy is the Conſtitution. He does not inherit us like floks, for the People may confer it; they have conferred it. This is his argument. The ſecond was an extraor⯑dinary ſelection—it would be no attack upon the Revo⯑tion, if it had been accompliſhed by demons. Do we love the Reformation leſs for being accompliſhed by one of the moſt profligate of our Kings? No matter that the Revolution was brought about by intrigue; that it was the work of a Coalition. It is not by whom, but what it is, that the People will enquire. He con⯑tended, that the People had, by the freedom of opinion, obtained every thing from Magna Charta downwards? The third quotation, that we had hardly any law in England; was no libel; for he did not arraign the admi⯑niſtration [43]of law, and many of our beſt writers had aſ⯑ſerted, that there was much confuſion, much difficulty, much to be mended in our juriſprudence. With regard to the paſſages on the two Houſes of Parliament, it was ſtrange that Mr. Burke ſhould accuſe him; he who had ſo ſeverely, ſo outrageouſly impeached both Houſes in their turn; and here he quoted ſome of the memorable paſſages of Mr. Burke, of the Lords voting themſelves uſeleſs, and of an addreſſing Houſe of Com⯑mons, when there was a petitioning People. He quoted alſo the memorable Proclamation of Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Richmond, from the Thatched Houſe Ta⯑vern. On the celebrated paſſage of Mr. Burke, that Kings were naturally fond of low company, and that Lords were only low buffoons, he made a ſevere com⯑ment. It was a ſcandalous aſperſion on the King, and on the Nobility; but theſe aſſociators might write, though they would ſuffer no one to write but them⯑ſelves lawyers, though ſo ignorant of the character and delicacy of the ſaw, as to propagate every ſpecies of prejudice againſt this man, and to create ſuch a hue and cry againſt him, that if he had been ſlained with blood inſtead of ink—if he had been degraded by the crimes that make humanity abhorrent, ought not to have been raiſed againſt him in the moment of his trial—ſuch a clamour, that even he was almoſt beat down and abaſhed by the roar. Even in the Houſe of Parliament he was ſtigmatized by name, but he had delivered his opinion with the ſpirit and independence that becaume a profeſſional man, determined not to ſhrink from his duty, whatever might be the hazard. Theſe aſſociators, had, with equal ignorance, ſaid, that the great Harrington was as great a thief, and as obſcure a ruffian, even as Paine.—Who was Harrington?—It might have ſatisfied them to have read his pedigree;—he was deſcended from eight Dukes, three Mar⯑quiſſes, ſeventy Earls, twenty-ſeven Viſcounts, and thirty-ſix Barons, of which number ſixteen were Knights of the Garter. Will not this do, ſaid Mr. Erſkine, even for this time?—In a Court of Germany it would be deciſive; but what was better than his deſcent was his conduct. He was the faithful ſervant of his Maſter Charles; he was a man of [44]ſuch undoubted honour, that he avowed his Republican prin⯑ciples, yet retained the confidence and affection of his maſter. "I know not," ſays Toland, ‘which moſt to commend—the King for truſting an honeſt man, though of Republican principles, or Harrington for owning his principles while he ſerved a King.’ How did he ſerve him? he ſtaid in the Iſle of Wight, to watch the fortune of his Royal Maſter; he came up by ſtealth, concealed in the boot of a coach, to take his laſt farewell of him; he fell into his arms, and fainted at his feet on the ſcaffold. After Charles's death, he wrote the famous Oceana, and in the work pays a tribute of truth to the virtues of his unfortu⯑nate Sovereign, and aſcribes his misfortunes to the feeble nature of a Monarchy. Mr. Erſkine ſtated the intereſting anecdote, by which he recovered his Oceana from the gripe of Cromwell. He applied to his favourite daughter, and ſeeing her infant at her ſide, he ſnatched it up in his arms, and ran away; alarmed for its fate, the mother followed him—"I have ſeized your child," ſaid Harrington, ‘your father has ſeized mine—I reſtore to you your child—ſup⯑plicate your father to reſtore my child.’ The daughter ſupplicated, and Cromwell yielded. "If my Government," ſaid Cromwell, ‘be made to ſtand, it will not be battered down by paper ſhot.’ After various other quotations from Monteſquieu, Milton, and other claſſics, he made a warm and affecting concluſion. ‘Do not think that En⯑gliſhmen are to be bent to your purpoſe by this froward courſe.’

Engage them by their affections, convince their reaſon and they will be loyal from the only principle that can make loyalty ſincere, vigorous, or rational, a conviction that it is their trueſt intereſt, and that their form of Government is for their common good. Conſtraint is the natural parent of reſiſtance, and this is no new doctrine. In all times where one ſide has been tyrannical, the other has been re⯑fractory. You muſt all remember, Gentlemen, Lucian's pleaſant ſtory—Jupiter and a countryman were walking together, converſing with great freedom and familiarity up⯑on the ſubjects of heaven and earth. The countryman liſ⯑tened [45]with attention and acquieſcence, while Jupiter ſtrove only to convince him, but happening to hint a doubt, Jupiter turned haſtily round, and threatened him with his thunder.—"Ah! ah!" ſaid the countryman, ‘now, Jupi⯑ter, I know that your are wrong; you're always wrong, when you appeal to your thunder.’

The Attorney General roſe to reply; but Mr. Camp⯑bell, the foreman of the Jury, ſaid he was inſtructed by his brother jurors to ſay that he might ſave himſelf the trouble of any obſervations, unleſs he thought otherwiſe himſelf, for that they were ſatisfied. The Attorney General ſat down, and the Jury immediately gave a verdict of Guilty.