APPENDIX.

THE ſuppoſed opinion of Mr. Hatſell, (in his ‘Precedents of Pro⯑ceedings in the Houſe of Commons,’ under the title of ‘King calls the Parliament,’) as compendiouſly ſtated by my worthy and very learn⯑ed friend, Mr. Lofft, in p. 5 of his Obſervations, is a much more fa⯑vourable conſtruction than Mr. Hatſell's own words can really warrant; though all perſons, who are acquainted with that gentleman's very a⯑miable character, (including the writer of this remark,) have reaſon to wiſh, for his ſake, that his opinion (whatever it may be) had been ſo expreſſed as to be really limited by the moderate and very friendly con⯑ſtruction which Mr. Lofft has put upon it. Mr. Lofft ſuppoſes the opi⯑nion of Mr. Hatſell to be, that ‘the intent of the ſtatutes of Edward, and the ancient law and conſtitution of the kingdom, require parliaments to SIT once at leaſt in every year, but NOT that they ſhould be ANNUALLY, OR OFTENER, ELECTED;’ but Mr. Hatſell himſelf, if we may judge by his manner of writing, is far from admitting that the conſtitution requires parliaments even to SIT once a year, or that ‘the king is obli⯑ged to call a parliament once at leaſt in every year;’ for this he has contemptuouſly treated merely as 'a notion' (that) ‘has been ſome⯑times entertained;’ (p. 196, n.) and he, aſſerts, that ‘thoſe perſons, who maintain THIS DOCTRINE,’ (i. e. the doctrine laſt cited in his own words, as a general doctrine, having two different accep⯑tations, ariſing from the 4th and 36th Edward III.) 'do not mean' (ſays he) ‘that, according to theſe ſtatutes, A SESSION of parliament ſhall be hol⯑den every year, but that A NEW ELECTION ſhall be had, &c.’— In an⯑ſwer to which, it may be ſufficient to oppoſe one eminent example for all: viz. that the learned commentator, Judge Blackſtone, notoriouſ⯑ly denied, as well as himſelf, that the latter doctrine 'ever was' the mean⯑ing of thoſe ancient ſtatutes, though he actually was one of ‘thoſe per⯑ſons who maintained’ the former general conſtruction of the ſaid ſta⯑tutes (the only operative conſtruction they are now capable of bearing ſince the traverſe of the modern acts for triennial and ſeptennial elections) as being ſtill in force to bind the king. See 1 Com. c. 2, p. 152 & 153: where the learned writer, having mentioned that ‘the king only can con⯑voke a parliament,’ immediately adds, ‘and THIS, by the ancient ſta⯑tutes of the realm, HE IS BOUND TO DO EVERY YEAR, or oftener if need be;’ for which, in a note, he expreſsly cites theſe ſtatutes of K. Ed. III. and immediately afterwards he mentions the two different acceptations of [4]the ſaid ſtatutes. —'Not' (ſays he) 'that he' (i. e. the king) ‘is, or [...]ver was, obliged by theſe ſtatutes to call a NEW parliament every year; but on⯑ly to permit a parliament to SIT annually,’ &c. The words,—'to permit,'—being a verb in the infinitive mood, do manifeſtly require a repetitio [...] (to be underſtood) of the preceding verb, 'is obliged,'—viz. ‘is oblige [...] to permit;’ which confirms, by neceſſary grammatical conſtruction, th [...] doctrine of the preceding ſentence, that the king 'is bound' by the ſai [...] ancient ſtatutes. This doctrine is ſtrongly confirmed by the nationa [...] declaration in the preamble to the ſtatute of 16 Charles I. c. 1. ‘that by the laws and ſtatutes of this realm, the parliament ought to be hol⯑den AT LEAST ONCE EVERY YEAR for the redreſs of grievances,’ &c [...] which (though the act is repealed) is ſtated, as being ſtill an exiſting principle of parliamentary doctrine, by Judge Hales, in his ‘Original Inſtitution, Power, &c. of Parliaments,’ p. 57. and which is ſtill farther confirmed by the conſtant 'uſage and cuſtom of parliament ever ſince the revolution, as well as by the obvious reaſon and neceſſi⯑ty of it; whereby the 'lex et conſuetudo parliamenti' upon this poin [...] muſt ſurely be ſufficiently clear not to be miſtaken by perſons o [...] much leſs intelligence in thoſe matters than the clerk of the houſe of commons! Yet Mr. Hatſell does not admit even this general conſtruction of the ancient ſtatutes; and, as a proof that he does not, I need only to obſerve, that, though he is writing expreſsly concerning what he call [...] ‘the undoubted prerogative of the crown to judge of the expediency of calling [...] parliament, and to determine at what time the writs ſhall iſſue; yet this pre⯑rogative’ (ſays he) ‘is limited by two acts of parliament, the 16th Ch. II. c. 1, and the 6th of Wm & Mary, c. 2; both of which,’ &c.—‘enact, that from henceforth a parliament ſhall be holden once in three years at the leaſt;’ ‘ſo that, in obedience TO THESE LAWS,’ (ſays he, without citing any other limitation, either of ſtatute or uſage, but theſe two acts for triennial parliaments,) ‘the miniſters of the crown’ (ſays he) ‘are bound to take care, ‘that THE SITTING and holding of parliaments ſhall not be INTERMITTED or DISCONTINUED above three years at the moſt.’’ ‘And it is their duty’ (ſays he) ‘to give directions for iſſuing the writs of ſummons ACCORDINGLY,’—i.e. according to the two acts for triennia [...] parliaments, or rather to a part of one of them, viz. the part he has ſelected for the direction of 'the miniſters of the crown' to ‘take care, that the SITTING, &c. ſhall not be INTERMITTED or DISCONTINUED above three years at the moſt;’ whereby he leaves ‘the miniſters of the crown’ at liberty to ‘intermit and diſcontinue for three years’ even the SITTING of parliament, for he has cited no other limitation of the pre⯑rogative on this head: and, with reſpect to the two ancient ſtatutes of K. Edward III. he did not (it ſeems) think them worthy even to be named in his text, but only in a note, (to ſhew that he had not forgot them,) where he has treated even their general conſtruction merely as "a notion, &c." See p. 196-199.

But, though the original meaning and force of theſe ancient ſtatutes are materially affected and injured by the modern acts for triennial and ſeptennial parliaments, yet they are certainly ſtill in force (as Judge [5]Blackſtone has allowed) to oblige the king 'to permit a parliament to ſit annually for the redreſs of grievances and diſpatch of buſineſs;' and this, without impediment from the words 'if need be' in the 'looſe and vague' manner that the Judge has applied them, contrary to the neceſſary gram⯑matical conſtruction of the whole ſentence: (ſee 'Declaration of the 'People's Rights, p. 166 to 169, n.)—For our right to an annual ſeſ⯑ſion of parliament is founded on the ancient conſtitution of the kingdom, — on laws that are almoſt coeval with our national exiſtence in this iſland. See the 'uſage perpetual' ordained by K. Alfred, and cited by Lord Coke, 1 Inſt. p. 110. viz. 'Le Roy Alfred' (fiſt) ‘aſſem⯑bler les Counties, &c. et ordeina, pur USAGE PERPETUEL, que deux foitz par an, ou pluis ſovent, pour miſter’ (meſtier) ‘in temps de peace, ſe aſſemblerent a Londres, a parliamenter ſur le guidament del people de Dieu, &c.’— The teſtimony of Knighton, (‘one of our beſt hiſ⯑torians,’ as Mr. Petyt calls him in his preface to the Ancient Right of the Commons, p. 41.) ‘that, by an ancient STATUTE and CUSTOM, laudable and approved, which nobody could deny, the king was ONCE IN A YEAR to convene his LORDS and COMMONS to his Court of Parlia⯑ment,’ &c. Mr. Nevill's teſtimony concerning an ancient ſtatute of Edward I. ordering that ‘a parliament ſhall be held every year, and oftener if need be;’ for which ſee his Plato Redivivus, p. 110-112. — The ſame doctrine declared in the very next reign, as proved by Mr. Petyt (p. 77) from Rot. Clauſ 10 Edw. II. m. 28, intus; that "upon a petition to the king," (K. Edw. II.) 'he granted that "SEMEL IN ANNO TENEATUR parliamentum," &c. whence it is evident, that the act of 4 Edw. III. c. 14, was not a new law, but a declaration of the old conſtitution, viz. ‘That a parliament ſhall be holden every year once, and more often if need be;’ which was again confirmed by ſtatute in the 36 Ed. III. c. 10. And the USAGE of thoſe times (proved by the writs iſſued for general elections frequently ‘MORE OFTEN’ than 'ONCE' in a year) excludes all 'doubtful'-neſs from theſe ancient ſtatutes; ſo that new parliaments muſt neceſſarily have been underſtood, until (by the traverſe of modern acts) they became applicable only to the annual ſitting of parliament.

The oppoſers of the original meaning (viz for annual elections, and more often) have rendered that conſtruction ſtill more obvious by their own miſerable ſhifts to evade it! One ſays, — the words are ‘looſe and vague,’ though ſuch a charge is applicable only to his own un⯑grammatical conſtruction; and another would render the acts doubt⯑ful, by boldly excluding the only juſt criterion for ‘clearing up doubts’ in ſuch a caſe, viz. the USAGE of the times in which the acts were made; and, inſtead of it, would have us refer ONLY to ‘the practice’ and to 'the opinion' of perſons who lived from 200 to 400 years after thoſe times! But the propoſer ſeems not to be aware, that this mode of 'explaining ancient ſtatutes' is exactly ſimilar to one of the moſt groſs and deluſive practices of popery! The apoſtate church of Rome, for obvious reaſons, cannot ſubmit the determination of what ought to be eſteemed apoſtolic doctrine to the evidence of apoſtolic [6]times; and, of courſe, ſhe is driven to this wretched ſubterfuge of re⯑ferring for evidence (in favour of her innovations and unſcriptural prac⯑tices) to the traditions of more modern times, and to the practices and opinions of perſons who lived from 200 to 400 years afterwards; in or⯑der to invalidate all cotemporary evidence of facts and primitive uſages. — And ſurely this diſhoneſt and arbitrary mode of 'ſettling doubts' is e⯑qually unjuſtifiable in legal and political, as in religious, queſtions. Yet Mr. Hatſell boldly ventures to tell us that, ‘where the expreſſions of acts of parliament,’ (ſpeaking of the acts of Edward,) ‘paſſed above FOUR HUNDRED YEARS AGO, are DOUBTFUL,’ (ſays he, though the contrary is evident,) ‘nothing can clear up and ſettle theſe DOUBTS but the OPINION of all the wiſeſt and beſt-informed perſons,’ &c. ‘from the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth to the preſent time.’ (P. 198, n.) Thus, even the commencement of the time, here propoſed as the beſt for afford⯑ing information, is actually more than two hundred years AFTER the times in which the acts were made; and he cuts off all cotemporary, as well as intermediate, evidence, by a ſingle bold aſſertion, that ‘nothing can clear up —but,’ &c. taking care to ſecure to himſelf the ample ſpace of ano⯑ther two hundred years, (ſtill more diſtant from the times in queſtion,) that he may range more ſecurely in his ſearch for precedents of innova⯑tions both in practice and opinion. And indeed he has moſt induſtriouſly diſplayed the practices of the Stuarts, reminding us, in the courſe of argument, even of 'intermiſſions of parliaments' for ſeveral years toge⯑ther: — 'an intermiſſion of Parliament of ſix years,' by K. James I. — 'an intermiſſion of parliaments for twelve years' together, by K. Charles I. Theſe were ſurely moſt unpropitious times for parliamentary knowledge; and Mr. Hatſell does not ſeem to be aware, that the fear of ſimilar intermiſſions was probably the principal cauſe which withheld the patriots of thoſe days from urging their election-rights at a time when the ſum total of all their rights was at ſtake, even the right to have any parliament at all! ſo that their ſilence reſpecting annua [...] elections does not at all aſſiſt Mr. Hatſell's argument againſt them. — The people of England, in thoſe times, were rendered ſo deplorably abject, by the unlimited, and therefore illegal, rule of Tudors and Stuarts that it was conſidered as a crime, in the preceding reign of James I even to urge the expediency of calling a parliament at all: — ‘I would fain know the man that durſt perſuade the king unto it,’ — ſays THE MI⯑NISTER OF STATE in Sir Walter Rawleigh's Dialogue on the Prero⯑gative of Parliaments, (p. 2.) ſo that this was undoubtedly the language of thoſe times to which Mr. Hatſell has referred us for acts, opinions and ſpeeches, whereby (with the addition of ſome ſtill more modern in formation) he thinks ‘the true intent and meaning of the words uſed in th [...] ſtatutes of Edward III,’ (though made almoſt 300 years before) ‘migh [...] be beſt explained:’ but, to look for explanatory 'opinions' and 'ſpeeche [...] ▪ in ſuch arbitrary times, when men dared not to ſpeak their opinions upo [...] the ſubject, is too great an abſurdity! ſo that Mr. Hatſell is peculiarl [...] unfortunate in fixing his aera for parliamentary information. And ye [...] if 'the wiſeſt and beſt-informed men' of thoſe times had ſhewn a littl [...] [7]more regard to the nation's rights than to the ſecurity of their own per⯑ſons and property, (for rich men are commonly the worſt citizens, for various reaſons,) and had ventured, like honeſt men rather than like wiſe and prudent ^* men, to ſpeak their opinions in favour of that SACRED TRUTH, our indiſpenſible right to the actual ſitting of a new parliament 'every year once' at leaſt, 'and more often if need be' — (a truth never to be concealed, a claim never to be relaxed!) — they might probably, with God's bleſſing in the cauſe of truth and right, have ſo checked the progreſs of unconſtitutional doctrines, as to deter their kings and ſtateſ⯑men from changing a limited monarchy to an abſolute tyranny; and might thereby have prevented the horrible effects of miſrule which ſpeedily broke out and overwhelmed the ſtate! and indeed the infringe⯑ment of our parliamentary rights was the true ſource of all the miſchiefs that ſhortly followed: for, when the able patriots (named by Mr. Hatſell) were ſtruggling, almoſt in deſpair, to retain the mere exiſtence of a parliament, under K. Charles I. they did not ſeem to apprehend that their full conſtitutional claim to an annual election was a ſubject proper to be diſcuſſed at ſuch a time; but their only aim, when they met, ('after an intermiſſion of parliaments for twelve years,') ſeems to be how they might prolong their SITTING at any rate for the redreſs of grie⯑vances; whereby it is manifeſt, that the obſtinate monarch's unwil⯑lingneſs to permit a parliament to SIT, together with the previous crimi⯑nal intermiſſions, (as one illegality is apt to beget another,) became, eventually, the parents of a ſtill greater evil—a long parliament without any election at all, which ſeverely repaid the royal perfidy in kind, by 'an [...] intermiſſion,' in return, of regal government,—an excluſion of that per⯑ [...]ured monarch's family from the throne for exactly the ſame number of years that he had preſumed to intermit the ſitting of parliaments, viz.—for 'TWELVE YEARS at one time,' and even the SIX YEARS intermiſſion, [...]n his father's reign, was ſeverely repaid in a bloody SIX YEARS war, until the ſon's impriſonment and death!

Theſe are awful examples, worthy the ſerious attention of all parties; [...]hough we are bound, at the ſame time, to diſcriminate between exam⯑ples (or facts) and precedents, that ſuch baneful examples may not (by the critical obſervations of ingenious men) be drawn into precedents for pro⯑ceedings, but that the legal acceptation of the word precedent may always [...]e duly maintained.

Mr. Hatſell's argument, upon the whole, is certainly a very extraor⯑ [...]inary one: not only becauſe the arbitrary times, to which he has limited the commencement of our parliamentary reſearches, ſeem to be utterly incapable of affording the leaſt information upon the par⯑ticular point in queſtion, and are alſo near three hundred years AFTER the only proper time for aſcertaining the uſage of the times when the ſtatutes to be explained were made, — but alſo becauſe he perempto⯑rily [8]excludes all other evidence whatever— ‘Nothing can clear up, &c. but the opinion, &c. from the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth! &c.’

I am far more willing to attribute ſuch an unaccountable argument to inattention, and a ſuperficial manner of writing, than to ſuſpect any rea [...] deſign of the ingenious author to promote a mode of explaining ancient ſtatutes ſo dangerouſly preſumptuous and arbitrary! And, to juſtify the more moderate concluſion of the two, he has luckily furniſhed me with an eaſy and obvious proof of it in the very next chapter but one, to which he has given the running title of— ‘King adjourns the Parlia⯑ment,’ — 'King adjourns the Parliament,' — for ſeveral pages together, (i. e. from 204 to 211.) ſo that that one would naturally ſuppoſe that he really meant what he had ſo often written: but, at length, (though not till the very laſt page of that head,) he kindly guards us againſt that baneful error by an explicit ſtating of what HE HIMSELF believes to be ‘the true parliamentary doctrine,’ viz. ‘That the king has no authority to adjourn the parliament;’ and, of courſe, his 'ſuperficial manner' of expreſſing himſelf (I mean on this particular head) muſt be corrected, in his next edition, to 'the true parliamentary doctrine,' — ‘King does NOT adjourn the Parliament: —’ ſo that he muſt put a negative upon his preſent title throughout all theſe pages!

But, to return to my ſubject, I truſt that the neceſſity of at leaſt ONE SITTING of the parliament every year, and of our national right to ſuch SITTING, is ſo ſufficiently underſtood and acknowledged, by the majo⯑rity even of all parties, that THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE, which ariſes too apparently from Mr. Hatſell's manner of treating the king's prerogative on that ſubject, will need no particular refutation: and yet ſo reſpectable is the authority of the writer, (not only by his office of clerk of the houſe of commons, but alſo by the perſonal eſteem which is certainly due to him from a very numerous and reſpectable body of friends and acquaintance,) that I thought myſelf obliged to take ſome notice of his manner of treating the ſubject before us, in order to warn the public againſt a poſſible conſtruction of it which might hereaf⯑ter (if not ſeaſonably cenſured) have dangerous conſequences. At the ſame time I ſincerely profeſs, that my cenſure is aimed more at this gentleman's manner of writing than his intention, and that I am much more willing to believe that the opinion he intended to expreſs was truly what Mr. Lofft has ſuppoſed; or that I myſelf may perhaps be miſta⯑ken in conceiving that his words are liable to a different conſtruction; rather than to ſuſpect that the worthy clerk of the houſe of com⯑mons could really intend to favour a doctrine which is repugnant to the eſtabliſhed uſage of parliament for near a century, and is equally inimical to the juſt privileges of the Lords as to thoſe of the Commons, and, of courſe, to the welfare of the whole nation.