THE OLD WHIG. With REMARKS upon the PLEBEIAN, N^o II.

THE Author of the Plebeian, to ſhew himſelf a per⯑fect Maſter in the Vocation of Pamphlet Writing, begins like a Son of Grubſtreet, with declaring the great Eſteem he has for himſelf, and the Contempt he entertains for the Scribblers of the Age. One wou'd think, by his way of repreſenting it, that the unexpected Appear⯑ance of his Pamphlet was as great a Surprize upon the World as that of the late Meteor, or indeed ſomething more terrible, if you will believe the Author's magnificent Deſcription of his own Performance. The Plebeian,Page 2. ſays he, ſtarting forth unexpectedly, they were forced like Peo⯑ple in a Surprize, or on an Invaſion, to March immediate⯑ly any Troops they had. If Cardinal Alberoni's Attempt, which furniſhes the Alluſion, ſucceeds no better than that of his Friend the Pamphleteer, he won't have much to boaſt of.

Our Author, in his triumphant Progreſs, firſt animad⯑verts on a Writer, whom he ſays he never read, which being my own Caſe, I ſhall leave that Writer to defend himſelf. The ſecond he mentions, conſidering the Strength of his Arguments, and the Cloſeneſs of his Reaſoning, de⯑ſerved a little more regard from the Plebeian, who, it ſeems, with much ado went thro' the Performance. This [2] wou'd certainly have been true, had he gone through it with a deſign to Anſwer it.

Having routed Baronius, and confounded Bellarmine, paſs we on to the next, ſaid the Country Curate to his admiring Audience. Our Author purſues his Conqueſts with the ſame Satisfaction and Intrepidity. In the firſt place he is angry with a Writer for aſſuming the Name of the Old Whig, who may more juſtly recriminate upon this Author for taking that of the Plebeian, a Title which he is by no means fond of retaining, if we may give Credit to many ſhrewd Gueſſers. But he tells the Old Whig, that he ex⯑pected from that Title no leſs than the utmoſt Wrath and In⯑dignation againſt the Houſe of Lords. [...] 6 and [...] How does this agree with the Cenſure he paſſes upon him afterwards, for treat⯑ing that Species in ſuch a manner as he dares not venture to repeat! I muſt however remind this Author of the Milk with which he nurſes our Nobles, not to omit his ſtagnated Pool; Paſſages of ſuch a Nature, that in Imitation of the Author, I ſhall diſpatch them with an Horreſco refe⯑rens!

The Author, in the next Paragraph, gives us a Definition of the Point in Debate, viz. that it is a Jumble and a Hodge-Podge. A moſt clear, comprehenſive, and elegant Account of the Matter!

The Author then continues his Animoſities againſt the Ephori of Lacedaemon; but this Paſſage I ſhall wave for two Reaſons, Firſt, Becauſe it is nothing to the Purpoſe. Secondly, Becauſe I am informed there are two or three keen Diſputants, who will return a proper Anſwer to it, when they have diſcover'd the Author.

The Plebeian proceeds to detect an imaginary Miſtake in the Old Whig, for having aſſerted that there has been as great an Alteration in one Branch of the Legiſlature, as is [3] now propoſed to be made in another. A Fact immediately puts an end to a Diſpute, and, in the Caſe before us, ſtands thus,

• King Henry VIII. added to the Houſe of Commons 38 Members.
• King Edward VI. 44
• Queen Mary 25
• Queen Elizabeth 62
• King James I. 27

The Queſtion now is, whether the Reſtraining the Num⯑ber of the Houſe of Commons to what it is at preſent, was not as great an Alteration in that Branch of the Legiſlature, as the Reſtriction now propoſed wou'd be to the other Branch of the Legiſlature, ſhou'd it take place in it. To which I ſhall add the following Queſtion, Whether the In⯑conveniencies ariſing from that continual Increaſe in the Houſe of Commons, did not make the Reſtraint upon it prudent and neceſſary; and Whether if the like Inconve⯑niencies ariſe from this perpetually increaſing Houſe of Lords, it is not as neceſſary and as prudent to put a ſtop to it? As for the little Towns of Watchet and Dunſter, our Au⯑thor can draw nothing from them to the Advantage of his Cauſe, if he can beſtow Labour and Time enough, of which he finds it neceſſary to be very ſparing in this Argument, to peruſe the printed Liſt of Counties and Boroughs, to whom the Privilege of ſending Repreſentatives to Parliament was granted or reſtored by the ſeveral Princes above-mention⯑ed; and to Anſwer the ſhort Query propoſed to him at the end of it, with relation to Queen Elizabeth.

After having propoſed theſe Queſtions in plain Terms, I come in the next Place to one of the Plebeian's, which is carried on in Metaphor, till it ends in ſome⯑thing that is paſt my Underſtanding. But theſe Retrench⯑ments being now made. The Queſtion, ſays he,P. 6. at preſent is, whether the Commons ought to go on ſtripping the Crown [4] of every Jewel till it becomes leſs reſplendent than the Doge of Venice's Coronet, or leſs comfortable than the Sword-bearer's Cap of Maintenance? I ſhall only confront this metaphorical Query with one that is adapted to Men of or⯑dinary Capacities. ‘Theſe Retrenchments being made, whether the Commons ought to accept the Offer of the Crown, to part with a Prerogative that is ſtill exorbitant and dangerous to the Community?’

But our Author's chief Concern is for the poor Houſe of Commons, whom he repreſents as naked and defence⯑leſs,P. 6. when the Crown, by loſing this Prerogative, wou'd be leſs able to protect them againſt the Power of a Houſe of Lords. Who forbears laughing, when the Spaniſh Friar repreſents little Dickey, under the Perſon of Gomez, in⯑ſulting the Colonel that was able to fright him out of his Wits with a ſingle Frown? This Gomez, ſays he, flew up⯑on him like a Dragon, got him down, the Devil being ſtrong in him, and gave him Baſtinado on Baſtinado, and Buffet upon Buffet, which the poor meek Colonel being proſtrate, ſuffer'd with a moſt Chriſtian Patience. The Improbability of the Fact never fails to raiſe Mirth in the Audience; and one may venture to anſwer for a Britiſh Houſe of Com⯑mons, if we may gueſs from it's Conduct hitherto, that it will ſcarce be either ſo tame or ſo weak, as our Author ſuppoſes.

The Plebeian, to turn off the Force of the Remark upon a⯑nother Paragraph, has Recourſe to a Shift that is of great Uſe to controverſial Writers, by affirming that his Antagoniſt miſtakes his Meaning. Let the impartial Reader judge whether an Anſwer that proves this Alteration wou'd not be detrimental to the Houſe of Peers, is not ſuited to an Objection which ſays in ſo many Words,P. 7. that it wou'd be detrimental to the Houſe of Peers it ſelf. But ſays the Plebeian in this his Reply to the Old Whig, It will not be detrimental to them in point of Power, but it will be [5] detrimental on Account of thoſe Talents which ought to ac⯑company Power, the Want of which the Commons will feel in their Judicature. Which is, in other Words, ‘I do not mean when I ſay that it will be detrimental to the Houſe of Peers it ſelf, that it will be detrimental to the Peers, but that it will be detrimental to the Commons.’ I appeal to any Man, whether the Old Whig ignorantly miſtook the natural Senſe of thoſe Words; or whether the Plebeian ignorantly expreſt, that which he now ſays was his Meaning in thoſe Words. The Plebeian having in his former Paper repreſented, that this old ſtanding Body of Peers without receiving numerous Additions from Time to Time, wou'd become corrupt and offenſive like a ſtagna⯑ted Pool, tells us here in excuſe for 'em,P. 7 that they will be offenſive to others but not perceive it themſelves ▪ If I cou'd ſuppoſe, with the Author, that they wou'd ever be in this Lamentable Pickle, I ſhou'd be of his Opinion that they ought to be ſweetned by ſuch wholſome, pure and freſh Streams as are continually paſſing into them.

The Plebeian next Objects to the Old Whig's Calcula⯑tion of the probable Extinction of two Titles, taking one Year with another. By the Calculation generally received, ſays this Author, I ſuppoſe he means the Liſt publiſhed by way of Prelude to this Project. Whereas the Old Whig cou'd not take that Liſt for his Calculation, but formed his Cal⯑culation from that Liſt, and from the Nature of the Al⯑teration which is propoſed. This Objection will imme⯑diately vaniſh upon diſcovering the Fallacy of the Plebeian's Argument. He ſuppoſes no greater Number of Extinctions wou'd happen among the Engliſh Lords, were their Num⯑bers ſettled at 184, than happen'd in that Body when they were only 59.104.142.153, 162. or 168. At this rate of calculating, the Plebeian will be ſure of gaining his Point, and affirms very truly that the Extinctions by a juſt Medi⯑um amount to no more than a Peer and a half for every [6] Year. But I appeal to honeſt Mr. Wingate, who was ne⯑ver looked upon as a Party-Writer, whether my Calcula⯑tion will not appear very juſt, if examined by his Golden Rule, and other curious Operations of Arithmetick, which are to be met with in his Works. Eſpecially when the Bill, as it evidently tends to multiply Extinctions, by preventing the Peerage from running into Collateral Lines, or deſcending to Females, will more than anſwer my Com⯑putation, if I ſhould have the Misfortune to diſagree with the Plebeian about ſome very minute Fraction of a Lord, that might happen in the Space of 116 Years. As for thoſe contingent Vacancies which may be made by the Edge of the Law, our Author regards the Uncertainty of them as a very uncomfortable Proſpect to the Candidates for Pa⯑trician Honours, ſince they may have time enough to try all their Patience, if they live in Hopes of ſuch a Expe⯑dient for their Promotion. The aſcertaining of this Point is indeed what I am not equal to, and muſt therefore leave it to the Maſters of Political Calculation. But our Author is afraid, that if ſuch lucky Opportunities of Extin⯑ction ſhou'd happen, Lords may ſtill ſit with their Heads on, unleſs a ſeaſonable Increaſe may be made to 'em in ſuch critical Junctures. This, I muſt confeſs, is to me one very great Reaſon for the Alteration propoſed; being fully of Opinion with the Old Whig, as expreſt in the following Words,Whig. 19. ‘Is this Inconvenience better pre⯑vented in a Houſe of Peers on the Bottom it now ſtands? Can any who has been a good Miniſter be ſe⯑cure, if the Crown ſhou'd add a ſufficient Number of his Enemies to thoſe who ſit in Judgment upon him? Or is a bad Miniſter in any Danger, when he may be ſhelter'd by the Addition of a ſufficient Number of his Friends?’ The Plebeian's Anſwer to this Paſſage is high⯑ly ſatisfactory:P. 9. In either of theſe Caſes, ſays he, the ut⯑moſt Iniquity muſt be ſuppos'd in the Crown, which I muſt confeſs I cannot bring my ſelf to do, and therefore my Argu⯑ment remains entire. I very much approve of the Author's [7] dutiful and ſubmiſſive Behaviour to the Crown, which puts one in mind of the worthy Alderman, who, upon hearing a Member of the Common-Council call the Emperor Nero a Monſter of Cruelty, told him, he ought not to ſpeak diſre⯑ſpectfully of a Crowned Head. But if the Author will only go ſuch Lengths with me, as to allow there ever has been a bad Soveraign, or not to ſhock him with ſuch a Suppoſiti⯑on, that there has ever been a wicked Miniſtry, and that it is not utterly impoſſible but there may be ſuch in Times to come, my Argument ſtands entire. God be thanked, we are now bleſt with a good King, and with the Pro⯑ſpect of ſuch for our Days, but cannot anſwer for thoſe who are yet unborn, ſince they will ſtill be Men, and therefore liable to Imperfection.

The Plebeian was hard ſet by the Anſwer of the Old Whig to his Arguments, That the Limitation of the Num⯑ber of the Lords wou'd run the Conſtitution into an Ariſto⯑cracy, and has therefore very prudently ſhuffled the Conſi⯑deration of that Point under another Head, where he forgets the Old Whig's Reply to what was urged againſt his Opinion in that Caſe, ſo that he has viſibly given up the Point which was moſt material in his firſt Plebeian. The Old Whig's Re⯑mark therefore ſtill ſtands out againſt him unanſwer'd; and plainly turns his own ill Conſequence upon him, by ſhewing there is a viſible Tendency to an Ariſtocracy as the Con⯑ſtitution now ſtands, which would be taken away by the Alteration propoſed. But it is ungenerous to inſult a baffled Adverſary; I ſhall therefore proceed to the next Particular in diſpute.

The Old Whig affirms that the Power of giving Mo⯑ney and raiſing Taxes is confined to the Body of the Com⯑mons, and that all the Privileges together of the Lords are not equal to that One of commanding the Purſe of the Community. The Plebeian allows the Conſequence, but cavils at the Poſition, which is a received Maxim among the Commons of England, the Doctrine of the Houſe [8] of Commons in particular, and eſtabliſhed by the Practice of every Parliament in the Memory of Man. Let us now ſee what the Plebeian affirms in Contradiction to it, and by the way obſerve whether he perſonates his Part well, and ſpeaks the Language of one who writes himſelf a Member of the Houſe of Commons. The Author aſſerts, That whether a Money-Bill may not originally take its Riſe in the Houſe of Lords, is a Point never yet clearly given up by their Lordſhips, if he is not very much miſin⯑formed. This Point, if I am not very much miſinformed, was never claimed by the Houſe of Lords, and has not a ſingle Precedent in the Practice of that Body in the Legiſ⯑lature.P. 13. He afterwards aſſerts that the Commons have no more Power over their Fellow-Subjects Eſtates than the Lords. Is not the Power of granting a Supply, fixing the Quantum of that Supply, appropriating every Part of it to particular Uſes, and ſettling the Ways and Means for raiſing it; is not this Power over their Fellow-Subjects E⯑ſtates much greater than that of the Lords, who can neither add to, diminiſh, nor after any one of theſe Particulars? And if the Power of the Commons extends it ſelf to all theſe Points, how can the Author further affirm, that all which is peculiar to the Commons in this Matter is, that they have hitherto been allow'd to chuſe what Tax they judged eaſieſt for the People! But what Shadow of Reaſon is there for him to proceed in aſſerting, that every Day's Experience ſhews us, that if the Lords differ in Opinion from the Com⯑mons, their Power is at an end; ſince, on the contrary, Ex⯑perience ſhews us, that whenever the Lords have pretend⯑ed to ſuch a Power, they have always been over-ruled by the Commons!P. 9. Our Author tells us the Concurrence of the Lords is as neceſſary to a Money-Bill as to any other Bill. That is not deny'd; but he muſt allow that the Lords Concurrence to a Money-Bill is not of the ſame Nature with their Concurrence to any other Bill, which they may undoubtedly change, amend, and return upon the Hands of the Houſe of Commons for their Concur⯑rence in ſuch Amendments as the Lords ſhall think proper. [9] Beſides, to ſhew the Plebeian ▪ how much the Purſe of the Community is at the Command of the Commons, let him conſider the Caſe of a Vote of Credit, which is tranſact⯑ed wholly between the Soveraign and the Lower Houſe. To this we may add, that the Soveraign himſelf, in his Speeches to Parliament, applies that Part which relates to Money to the Houſe of Commons, diſtinct from that of the Lords; by which Method it is plain the Crown ſup⯑poſes thoſe Privileges are veſted in the Houſe of Commons, to which every Member of that Houſe has always pretend⯑ed, excepting the preſent Author.

The Plebeian in the next Paragraph makes uſe of a very ſure and wiſe Method of confounding his Antagoniſt, by putting his own Senſe upon a Paſſage in that Author's Pam⯑phlet. The Old Whig repreſents how dangerous it would be to our Conſtitution, if the Crown, which is already poſ⯑ſeſt of a certain Means to over-rule one Branch of the Le⯑giſlature, ſhould ever be able to influence the Elections of a Houſe of Commons, ſo as to gain one to its Meaſures; in which Caſe, if Liberty was endanger'd in the Lower Houſe, it could not make a Stand in the other. The Ple⯑beian perverts this Meaning after the following Manner; This Author, ſays he, aſſures us, P. 10. that the Crown has Power enough to gain a Houſe of Commons of what Complexion it pleaſes; and after puzzling himſelf in his own voluntary Blunder, is diſpleaſed with the Old Whig for not propoſing to cure an Inconvenience which he never affirmed to be in the Houſe of Commons, as well as that which he proves to be in the Houſe of Lords; ſo that he would have had him quit the Subject which he had undertaken, to ſpeak of one which he had nothing to do with. But ſup⯑poſing the Plebeian had rightly ſtated the Senſe of the Au⯑thor, the Inconvenience in the Houſe of Lords is that which is woven into its very Conſtitution, and therefore at all times expoſes us to its ill Conſequences; whereas what the Plebeian ſuggeſts with regard to the Houſe of [10] Commons, is only extrinſick, and accidental to that Body, if it ever happens in it.

It is not probable that this Diſpute between the Ple⯑beian and the Old Whig will laſt many Weeks: But if there was time to diſcuſs the whole Point, I think it may be ſhown to a Demonſtration, that the Check of the Crown upon the Houſe of Commons, which is the Power of Diſſolution, is, by infinite Degrees, a weaker Check than that it has in the preſent Conſtitution upon the Houſe of Lords, which is the Power of Adding to it what Num⯑ber, at what Time, and for what Purpoſe it pleaſes: Nay, that the Power of Diſſolution is alſo in its Nature a Check upon the Houſe of Lords as it diſſolves them in a Legiſlative Capacity, and may break the moſt dangerous Cabals againſt the Crown, which are ſuch as may be formed between the Leaders of the Two Houſes. Theſe two Points, if drawn out into ſuch Conſiderations as naturally riſe from them, wou'd fully eſtabliſh the Neceſſity of three Branches in a perfect Legiſlature, and demonſtrate that they ſhou'd be ſo far ſeparate and diſtinct from each other, as is eſſential to Legiſlative Bodies: Or, as the Old Whig has before ex⯑plained it, ‘If one Part of the Legiſlature may any ways be inveſted with a Power to force either of the other Two to concur with it, the Legiſlative Power is in Re⯑ality, whatever it may pretend to, divided into no more than two Branches.’

I have hitherto followed the Plebeian in his own Me⯑thod, by examining, Firſt, his Replies to the Objections made by the Old Whig; and come now to his Second ge⯑neral Head, wherein he formally propoſes to conſider the Argument as the Old Whig ſtates it himſelf. And here I was not a little ſurprized to find, that inſtead of anſwering the ſeveral diſtinct Arguments urged by that Author, in Defence of the Bill: as drawn from the Nature of Govern⯑ment in general; from the Britiſh Conſtitution; from its [11] Effects on the Crown; on the Houſe of Commons; on the whole Body of the Engliſh Commonalty; and from the ill Conſequences it wou'd remedy in the preſent Conſti⯑tution; the Plebeian contents himſelf with attacking but one ſingle Argument of his Antagoniſt. Till the Plebeian ſhall have anſwer'd thoſe other Points, I ſhall take it for granted, that he gives them up. Not to multiply Words, I believe every Reader will allow me that an Author is not to be much regarded, who writes profeſſedly in Anſwer to a Diſcourſe which proceeds on many Arguments, when he ſingles out the Argument only which he thinks is the weakeſt; eſpecially when he fails in his Anſwer even to that ſingle Argument. A famous French Author compares the imaginary Triumphs of ſuch a kind of Diſputant, whom he was then dealing with, to thoſe of Claudius, which, in⯑ſtead of being repreſented by the ſtrong Towns he had taken, and the Armies he had defeated, were teſtified to the People of Rome, by a Preſent of Cockle-Shells that he had gather'd up on the Sea-Shore.

But to come to the Matter before us. The Old Whig, after having conſidered it in ſeveral Views, examines it with Regard to the whole Bulk of the Britiſh Commons. Un⯑der this Head he has the following Words. ‘But the great Point, and which ought to carry the chief Weight with us in this Caſe, is, that the Alteration now propos'd, will give ſuch a mighty Power to the Bulk of the Engliſh Commons, as can be never counterbalanc'd by the Body of the Nobility.’ Now what the Old Whig here calls the Great Point with Regard to the Commonalty of England, the Plebeian inſinuates he calls the Great Point with Regard to the whole Controverſy, and deſcants upon it accordingly. Whereas it is evident the Author inſiſts upon many Points as Great as This in other Views of the Queſtion. The Old Whig affirms, that the Commonalty has infinitely more Wealth than the Nobility, which was the proper Conſide⯑ration of this Place. The Plebeian returns for Anſwer, [12] that the Commonalty is indeed much richer than the Nobi⯑lity, but that the Houſe of Commons is not ſo rich; which was not the proper Conſideration of this Place. It is im⯑poſſible for a Diſputant to loſe the Cauſe, who is a Maſter of ſuch Diſtinctions. I remember I was once preſent at an Univerſity Diſputation, which was managed on the one Side by a notable Peripatetick. The Queſtion which he defended in the Negative was, Whether Comets are a⯑bove the Moon? The Sophiſter being preſs'd very hard by the Force of Demonſtration, very gravely extricated him⯑ſelf out of it by the following Diſtinction. Comets, ſaid he, are Two-fold, Supra-lunar, and Sub-lunar. That Supra-lu⯑nar Comets are above the Moon I do allow; but that Sub-lunar Comets are above the Moon I utterly deny. And it is of this latter kind of Comets that the Queſtion is to be un⯑derſtood.

The Fallacy of the Plebeian's Anſwer being thus far diſ⯑cover'd, all that he further adds in his own way of arguing will be eaſily confuted by unravelling the Matter which he has very artificially perplex'd. The Old Whig ſuppoſes that every Lord in the Legiſlature, taken one with another, may be worth 5000 l. a Year, in which, for Argument's ſake, every one knows his Conceſſion has been vaſtly too liberal. The Plebeian values every Member of the Houſe of Com⯑mons at 800 l. per Annum one with another, in which 'tis plain he has been exceeding Scanty. Nay many are of Opinion that upon caſting up the whole Sum of Property that now reſides in the Houſe of Lords, it wou'd not exceed that which is in the Houſe of Commons. If this Particular ap⯑proaches to the Truth, all the Arguments of a Superior Power ariſing from its greater Property fall to the Ground of themſelves, as being raiſed on a falſe Foundation. To which I muſt further add, that if this increaſing Power ſtill continues in the Crown, the Property of the Houſe of Peers will indiſputably ſurmount that of the Houſe of Com⯑mons; and that on the contrary, if the Bill paſſes, it viſi⯑bly [13] tends to prevent the Impoveriſhment of the Houſe of Commons in point of Property, and to fill it with Men of ſuch Eſtates, as in a few Years will be more than a Counter⯑balance to the Houſe of Lords, even under this View.

But further to ſhew the Weakneſs of the Plebeian's Rea⯑ſonings upon this Head, I will allow that the Houſe of Lords enjoy at preſent, and may ſtill continue to enjoy, a greater Share of Property than the Houſe of Commons. But not⯑withſtanding this Conceſſion, to which the Nature of the Thing does not oblige me, it is ſtill evident that the immenſe Property which ſubſiſts in the Bulk of the Engliſh Com⯑mons, will render their Repreſentatives more powerful than the Body of the Lords. This will plainly appear from conſidering the very Nature of Repreſentatives; from thoſe Junctures which can poſſibly give them an Occaſion of ex⯑erting their Power; and from Matter of Fact.

It is implied in the very Nature of Repreſentatives, that they are back'd with the Power of thoſe whom they repreſent: As the Demands of a Plenipotentiary, let his Perſonal Wealth or Power be as little as you pleaſe, have the ſame Weight with them as if they were made by the Perſon of his Principal. I will beg leave to borrow from the Plebeian an Example of the Bank of England, which, as he makes uſe of it, has no manner of Analogy with the Subject of the Diſpute. Is not the whole Stock of that nu⯑merous Community under the Guidance of a few Directors? And will any one ſay, that theſe Directors have no other Influence on the Publick, than what ariſes to them from the Share which they perſonally enjoy in that Stock? The Author urges that the Peers are Principals, which in Reality is the reaſon why their Power is not to be apprehended in Oppo⯑ſition to that of the Commons; whereas were they only Repreſentatives of a Body immenſely rich and numerous, they wou'd beſide their own Perſonal Property have ſuch a Support, as wou'd make them truly formidable. The [14] whole Commons of England are the Principals on one ſide, as the Lords are the Principals on the other; and which of theſe Principals are arm'd with moſt Power and Pro⯑perty?

To conſider in the next place thoſe Junctures that can poſſibly give them an Occaſion of exerting their Power it is on both ſides ſuppos'd to be in ſuch Caſes as will affect the Rights of the Engliſh Commonalty, in which Caſe every Commoner of England is as much concern'd as any of their Repreſentatives. Thus if four London Citizens, to make the Caſe exactly parallel, were deputed to maintain the Rights of their Principals, as Citizens, who can imagine that they wou'd not be ſupported by the whole Power and Property of the City, and not be too hard for any two or three great Men, who had ten times their Perſonal Eſtates? Now as the Plebeian's Suppoſition reduces things to the laſt Extremity, it can only take place in a Rupture, which is never likely to happen. And in that Caſe, as theſe two great Bo⯑dies muſt act ſeparately, there is no room for conſidering how far the Concurrence of the Houſe of Lords is neceſ⯑ſary in a Money Bill, which entirely takes away the Author's Reaſoning in his 13th Page.

But Matters of Fact are the beſt Arguments. We both agree that Power ariſes out of Property, and the Author himſelf has given an Inſtance of the Power of the Houſe of Commons in having been able to effect the Ruin of the Monarchy and Peerage. Whence had the Commons this Power, but from being ſupported by their Principals?

The Plebeian thinks he ſtrengthens his Point, by adding that the Lords are a fixt Body. To this I might reply, that the Principals of the Houſe of Commons are as fixt a Body as the Lords; and therefore, however their Repreſenta⯑tives may vary, they will continue intent, from Age to Age, to aſſert and vindicate their peculiar Rights and Privileges, [15] unleſs we can believe that any Body of Men will act againſt thoſe two ſtrong Motives of Self-Intereſt and Self-Preſer⯑vation. I might further venture to ſay, that Men of the greateſt Wealth and Weight in the Houſe of Commons, are almoſt as ſure of a Seat there, as if it came to 'em by Inhe⯑ritance. But ſuppoſing the Houſe of Lords never ſo much fix'd, and ſo manageable by two or three great Men (for which very reaſon Additions are very often made to 'em, which the Alteration wou'd prevent); we have ſeen that their United Power, if their Number is limited, can never be a Match for that of the Houſe of Commons, ſuppoſing ſtill ſuch a Rupture, as the Plebeian all along imagines, in which each Body is to act ſeparately for it ſelf.

The Author, in the remaining part of his Pamphlet, ap⯑pears like every Writer that is driven out of all his Holds. He endeavours to ſet the Crown, and the whole Body of Peers, upon his Adverſary; accuſes him in effect of Scan⯑dalum Magnatum; nay, and gives very broad Intimations that he ought to be indicted for High-Treaſon.

I ſhou'd not have given my ſelf, or the Publick, all this Trouble, had I not been ſo peremptorily call'd to it by the laſt Plebeian. I do aſſure him, my Silence hitherto was not the effect of Old Age, as it has made me Slow, but to tell him the Truth, as it has made me a little Teſty, and conſequently impatient of Contradiction, when I find my ſelf in the right. I muſt own however, that the Writer of the Plebeian has made the moſt of a Weak Cauſe, and do be⯑lieve that a good one wou'd ſhine in his Hands; for which reaſon I ſhall adviſe him, as a Friend, if he goes on in his new Vocation, to take care that he be as happy in the Choice of his Subject, as he is in the Talents of a Pamphleteer.