LETTER THE FIRST.

WHEN we ſaw a member of the Whig club made the-firſt magiſtrate of the capital, it was eaſy to predict by what ſpirit the nominal acts of the city for the year would be directed: notwithſtand⯑ing it appears by the tables of the prices of wheat, [...] by Dr. Adam Smith, that when the price [...] to advance, war ſtrongly retards that [...]; and in every other caſe greatly [...] its rate; and that the increaſe of prices in y [...]rs of ſcarcity is always greateſt in peace^*: yet many perſons, having never examined this irreſiſtible body of evidence, hold the contrary, [2] and among the advantages of peace number the cheapneſs of bread. The opportunity of an un⯑precedented dearth was too precious for the engi⯑neers of the cabal to fling away: they conjoined the continuance of war and the price of bread together; affirming the firſt, as they had done on a former occaſion, to be the cauſe of the ſecond. We may admit a part of thoſe who diſclaim the inten⯑tion of exciting commotion hereby, to have done it bonâ fide: but it cannot be doubted to be the object of others; and that there are men among them of extenſive and curious information, whom the real fact has not eſcaped, although it may not have been noted by all.

Nothing could be more opportune to theſe re⯑publican diſciples of the Florentine, than the French propoſition for a general peace; [...] apparent eagerneſs, with which the [...] rhetoric of Buonaparte, ſpecifying [...] ſeemed to court it. A common hall was [...] and peace petitioned for by exciting the [...] expectation ſtated above. The error was very general; it was calculated that it would operate generally; and that the example of the capital would be followed, and diſtract the whole country with riot and petitioning. The dexterity of the Corſican in this meaſure has been undoubtedly great: all thoſe who before him have poſſeſſed themſelves of the ſeat of power for ſixteen or [3] eighteen months, have obtained acquieſcence, long enough to give ſuch conſolidation to it's heteroge⯑neous foundation as it was capable of, barely by profeſſing their readineſs to hear propoſitions of peace.—The crafty conſul colours the maſk higher: he puts on the appearance of zealouſly ſoliciting it: to which he adds, in the eyes of thoſe of his new ſub⯑jects whom he can deceive, and the laſt hope of preſervation will deceive even wiſdom itſelf, the ſemblance of reſigning the high expectation he may from his talents be reputed to form, of the additions to his great military reputation which the continuance of war may procure to him; and which may carry him that one ſtep higher, which it ſtill remains for him to aſcend.—In ſo well ſtudied a mode has he played over again the cuſtomary arti⯑f [...]e, [...] obtain the neceſſary leaſe of a few months [...] over his old maſters^*. And as to the [...] with whom he is at war, the chance muſt [...] for ſomething, that his overtures may [...] their preparations for the field; whereby with a rapidity which he certainly poſſeſſes, he may ſteal a victory to give brilliancy to his conſular inauguration: and then with ſome better para⯑doxical epigram in proſe, than we can make on this ſide of the water; Syeyes ſhall urge it as a [4] proof of the ſincerity of his deſire to give peace to France and a bleeding world, that he has ſought for it in the way which is both the ſhorteſt and moſt certain; the path of glory.

But the Syeyes' of this country, into whoſe hands this fuſilader of municipalities^*, playing his own game at home, plays alſo the cards ſo well; do not think him blind enough to imagine, that a general peace can take place with ſecurity to his power, and conſequently to his life. They know the example of the Romans has been aped and prated about many years, by every republican of France: and that this alien conſul and his political Mentor, have extracted the whole ſpirit of the hiſtory of that republic for his uſe.

They know he argues thus: In the Roman republic the reign of purity of private manners was univerſal, even in the turbulent times [...] Gracchi. For Cicero ſpeaking of the [...] morals ſays, no one diſſolute man was to [...] in thoſe moſt exemplary times ^†. At that period it appears, that the only moral quality from which theſe republicans derived perſonal honour, as ex⯑celling [5] each other, was frugality^*. And when this virtue, primarily uſeful to the individual, was a ſource of honourable and popular diſtinction, how prevalent muſt it have been, together with its conſequences, moderate paſſions, the general caſe of individuals, and contentment in their ſitua⯑tions? yet with all theſe preſervatives of the wholeſome ſtate of the public mind, it was cor⯑rupted by too ſtrong a portion of the leaven of political equality; whereby the conſtitution of the republic was kept in ſuch a conſtant inteſtine motion and fermentation, that war abroad was the ſole means of ſecuring any peace at home.

Yet if ever the ſpirit of univerſal political equa⯑lity could ſubſiſt, without external war, or the annihilation of government; Rome muſt have held out an example of this poſſibility. Its effects ſeem there to have been ſo mitigated as to diveſt it of danger, to the utmoſt degree of which we can form a [...]ption, by the exact ſpirit and habits of ſub⯑ordination. The plebeians who had ſhaken the [6] baſis of the ſtate, to obtain the capacity of being elected to certain high offices, for their whole body; as ſoon as it was acquired, refuſed to raiſe the moſt eminent individuals of it to thoſe digni⯑ties. ‘When the elections came on, the moſt active declaimers and agitators of the tribunicial party ſolicited the votes of the people in vain. They were animated with one ſentiment while liberty and dignity were at ſtake; but with another, when the ceſſation of the ſtruggle made way for the operation of uncorrupted judgment—all the military tribunes were created from the patricians—they were content that a plebeian could be legitimately nominated: where ſhall we find now, (ſays the hiſtorian) that mo⯑deſty, that equity, that elevation of mind in a ſingle individual; which was then the character of the whole people^*?’ And the populace and their leaders ſeemed willing enough, for different reaſons, to let their acquiſition drop into ob [...]vion, ſo early as the year after it was obtained: for the fathers deſired the conſulſhip, to which they only were eligible, to be reſtored; ‘and they carried their point—the people had loſt the inclination of contending to which of the two honours they ſhould elect patricians: while the leading ple⯑beians rather choſe thoſe elections to take place, [7] in which they could not become candidates, than thoſe in which they were rejected as un⯑worthy of choice^*.’ It was at the interval of thirty-nine years after, and on the occaſion of the groſs miſconduct of two of the patrician military tribunes, that the plebeians choſe one of their own claſs, in the whole number of thoſe officers, which was ſeven, "as an exerciſe of their right^†."

While this ſpirit of practical ſubordination ſubſiſted; which was probably generated, as its duration was protracted, by the legal relation of patron and client; which in Rome ſtrongly cemented the plebeian to the patrician order; ſuch an exem⯑plary and general power of morals, induſtry and frugality, was an inſufficient counterpoiſe to the pernicious effects of one diſorganizing principle. What therefore is to be expected of a nation, whoſe morals having been long much relaxed, has now been ſyſtematically taught to hold morality itſelf in contempt, as hoſtile in many reſpects to the laws of nature, clearly announcing themſelves in the voice of morbid paſſion and appetite? The maſs of the people there are not rendered eaſy and con⯑tented in their private ſituations, by their frugality and induſtry: on the contrary, diſſoluteneſs daily leads an unexampled proportion of them to ruin; [8] and has left them nothing but the keen wants of habitual and extreme exceſs, and the inward irri⯑tation and ſhame of guilty poverty, goading them to whatever unprincipled reſolution, ſubtlety, and deſpair can ſuggeſt. If foreign war was neceſſary to provide an outlet for the internal diſtempered ſpirit of the one ſtate, to preſerve any authority to thoſe at the head of it; muſt not that neceſſity be indefinitely increaſed in the other? and muſt not a ſhort interval of peace deſtroy the preſent form of rule in France, together with its rulers?

Of the perpetual neceſſity of external war to the Roman republic, no one can entertain a doubt: and the greater neceſſity of it to France is equally clear. But its government has always laboured under a compulſion to avoid a general peace, of a more imperative nature, cauſed by the impoſſibility of maintaining the armies on their return home.

How fully the Directory were ſenſible of this in the year 1797, will appear by what paſſed [...]t a conference of its members with the committee of finance. They had repreſented to the latter, that if they would ſuffer 100 millions of livres to be put into their diſpoſition, they could obtain a peace: the requiſition was granted. Gibert, a leading mem⯑ber of the committee and author of its reports ſays, the pretext was falſe: and gives the following account of what paſſed at a ſecond conference of the ſame parties. When the directory was obliged [9] to go into the reaſons, which had obſtructed a peace taking place; "They appeared," he affirm⯑ed, ‘to dread it, and to fear the return of the army into the interior.’ The committee then ſaid, ‘Do you dread our defenders? What then do you hope? Have you determined that they ſhall periſh in the enemies country?’ The reply was; ‘We have no ſuch thought: we wiſh to ſee them again and to embrace them: but who will maintain them ^*.’

The beſt informed undertakers for the ſincerity of Buonaparte's pacific propoſitions in this coun⯑try; perfectly know that his ſituation in this re⯑ſpect, is not at all ſuperior to that of the directory; whom ſelf-preſervation compelled, never to be without a foreign war. And it is as manifeſt to them as to himſelf, that he has fettered himſelf down to this, by a much more rigid neceſſity, ariſing out of a ſpecial act of his own.

When the firſt uſurpers bribed their armies, fluc⯑tuating and almoſt hoſtile to them, to ſupport them in the war, by the promiſe of that immenſe donative of a milliard of livres, 41,666,666£. ſterling, to be paid on its termination: in the ſtate to which France was then reduced, they made the con⯑cluſion of a peace impoſſible to themſelves. The [10] promiſe could not be accompliſhed; and they would have paid with their lives for the violation of it. However the ſcythe which has cut down almoſt annually, every thing that is rooted and flouriſhes in the ſoil of that violent revolution, had ſwept them all away: and their ſucceſſors ſeemed in much leſs danger, of having the performance of a promiſe, to which they were not parties, exacted on pain of death.

But the conſul has placed himſelf in the ſitua⯑tion of the firſt ſet of rulers. In the commotions preceding the revolution of Fructidor, he was the firſt commander, who engaged his army to declare againſt the party of the two directors, and the majority of the councils. The generals of the others followed his example: and in the mani⯑feſtoes of one of them, his particular creature, tranſmitted to the government then exiſting in the name of his ſoldiers; we find the following inter⯑rogation put to it: ‘Where now is the milliard, promiſed to us with ſo much emphaſis, when our ſervices were wanted^*?’

Thus Buonaparte rendered himſelf inſtrumental to the revival of this expectation, when he wanted to trample underfoot a party, which had ſhown a diſpoſition to call him to account^†: and to obtain effect to that expectation, the armies by force pro⯑tected [11] him from an inquiry into his conduct; the ground of which, I ſhall hereafter find neceſſary to ſtate; and drove his opponents into exile. Hence he is conſcious that he dares not act contrary to the promiſe thus chargeable upon him, and that it will be impoſſible for him to fulfil it. For the original decree was a ſentence, by which France was condemned to pay a penalty of forty-two mil⯑lions ſterling, on the return of peace; to an inex⯑orable claimant who will hear nothing of abatement or delay. A ſum not now to be found unburied in that country; from which emigration and non-productive neceſſity, has carried out money every year, faſter than requiſition and plunder has brought it in. And for this payment the conſul has thus given bond, under his hand and ſeal.

If a tumultuous, debauched, irreſiſtible ſoldiery could be brought to hear reaſon, he cannot alledge to them, as the expelled powers might have done, that the expectation was not given by us, or our friends on our behalf, but by our enemies; who have moſt of them periſhed, by your aid, in our proſcriptions: therefore we cannot carry into effect one of their engagements, the moſt deſtructive to the country in preſent oppreſſion, and future ex⯑ample. And the plenitude of power with which the laſt revolution has inveſted the grand conſul, robs him of the excuſe that was apparently well founded, in the impotence of the ill-conſtructed [12] ſyſtem laſt ſuperſeded: the armies will demand that with the power they have conferred oh him, that he will work this impoſſibility in their behalf.

The royalty of France when the country abounded in wealth, was ſwallowed up in the gulph of a de⯑ficit: this greater gulph muſt ſwallow up and deſtroy any ſemblance of government, and ſet of governors, which ſucceeds it, Proviſional, Directorial or Con⯑ſular, which ſhall make peace with all its enemies. But if it could be filled up, will not the ſoldiery, grown inſolent in ſharing ſo rich a prey, ſet up other pretenſions to ſpoil their native country? eſpecially any that can be pleaded with the colour of equity? The donative, they will ſay, is an ad⯑dition to our juſt wages as ſoldiers; not a diſcharge of arrears due both for pay, and for proviſion which we have been compelled to purchaſe, or to procure at the hazard of our lives, by modes forming no part of the duty of a ſoldier. A de⯑mand for theſe arrears they certainly will not paſs over: for in the manifeſto before me, they urge the juſtice of the claim ‘of ten thouſand officers, to an adequate proviſion, who have received no other price of their ſervices than their wounds; who are now languiſhing in the inner country, with⯑out ſupport or help^*.’ Yet, this proviſion is an object with them far ſecond to their own ar⯑rears, [13] and certainly occurring to them much later.

When acting under the influence of Buonaparte, they have been taught to preſs ſuch pretenſions, on what they held to be the ſovereign power of their country; will they not aſſail him with the ſame, whom they look upon to be their creature, as holding his power in effect entirely from them? He cannot expect any thing elſe, than when the occaſion occurs, to be attacked by the ſame com⯑bination of armies, and to hear the ſame menaces denounced againſt him, which he thus taught them to employ againſt others, who wiſhed to ſet their claim to the donative aſide; and that they will be carried into full execution. He dares not to conclude a general peace, without money in the treaſury to pay the immenſe arrears of the army; and this donative of nearly forty-two mil⯑lions. The ſeal to the decrees of the milliard is iron and infrangible: and the inſcription ingraved round it, is the unalterable deſtiny of the republic, meurs, ou tue ^*.

Hence the conſul knows, that the concluſion of a general peace muſt be followed by his fall from his elevation; and that his tenure of life and of power muſt terminate together. He offers, therefore, what it is impoſſible for him to be deter⯑mined [14] to carry into effect, in caſe that offer were accepted.

It is thus this vice of rulers, this cut-purſe of an empire reaſons: and thus it is well known, by many at leaſt of thoſe, who maintain the ſincerity of his deſire for peace with the greateſt perverted ability, that he of neceſſity muſt reaſon. He has not hitherto ſucceeded any where in his overtures: and thoſe who ſecond him here, have prevailed no farther, than to obtain a declaration from the capital. In their expectation that it would be a general example to the country, they have notori⯑ouſly failed.

But the remoteneſs of harveſt; and the alarm⯑ing proſpect even of a ſtill higher price of food, before we can be relieved by it, is ſuch; that many months of danger remain for us, and of expectation for them; in which they flatter them⯑ſelves petitions will be heaped on petitions. The promoters of them are divided into two parties: one which knows it can have at no future time any acceſs to power but by ſtrange means; in the preſent ſingular calamity hopes to obtain it, from an effective although not nominal coercion of an excellent parliament: while the other to which the firſt always affords a ſolicitous protection, flatters itſelf with a general inſurrection, in conſequence of the expected firm⯑neſs of that aſſembly, and by the cry of peace [15] bread, to involve us in ſanguinary civil wars, and deſolation.

The friends of their country then are to look forward, that every poſſible attempt will be made by the two parties in conjunction, by propagating fallacies more or leſs artful, to convert the conſti⯑tutional franchiſe of petitioning, to the one or the other of thoſe purpoſes. I here give an abſtract of the other leading topics which will be employed by them on this occaſion, previous to the demon⯑ſtration of their fallacy.

‘The ſole purpoſe of the continuation of the war on our parts, (theſe demagogues will con⯑tend) is the reſtoration of the monarchy of France. For this the blood and treaſure of this kingdom is to be ſtill further exhauſted; a ſacri⯑fice which we are called to make by no obliga⯑tion: for which no Britiſh intereſt can be pre⯑tended. For what intereſt of ours can be ſerved, by reſtoring to power a family, whoſe inveterate, and we may call it perfidious hoſtility to theſe kingdoms, has involved us in all the wars of the laſt century, and the burthens they have brought upon us.’

‘This calamitous ſtruggle has already been too long protracted by the moſt futile of all preten⯑ſions; that the rulers of France have been always incapable of maintaining the relations of amity with other nations: a poſition refuted by [16] the real friends of their country, the friends of her peace and proſperity, as often as it has been advanced. There may have indeed been a period when the indignation of over-weening proſperity might have made that people, daily inſulted with this language, repulſe overtures which they had done better to have attended to: but if any ſuſpicion of extraordinary infidelity to their engagement might then have been enter⯑tained, nothing of that kind can attach to the repeated propoſitions of Buonaparte: nothing hoſtile or faithleſs can be ſuppoſed to be covered under them. He knows the mode of ſucceed⯑ing againſt the moſt formidable enemies with what is called glory; and is even ſuppoſed too much attached to it. He cannot therefore prefer attaining the ſame end, by means which muſt cover him with infamy.’

The leading propoſitions I ſhall take in the order I have placed them. The firſt is, that this kingdom is neither intereſted in the reſtoration of the houſe of Bourbon; or under any obligation to aſſiſt therein by war.

Thoſe who are reduced to give up the ſecond part of the propoſition, will not all of them after⯑wards offer ſuch an inſult to the national morality, as to make any ſtand upon the firſt. This will induce me to be moſt particular in my obſerva⯑tions upon it.

[17]The moraliſts tell us that there is the ſame moral relation between one people and another, as between man and man: that it is a national crime to plead intereſt againſt an expreſs ſpecific national compact, when the caſus foederis takes place: and that the crime is much aggravated, when the article of the compact is matter of ſpecial moral obligation, antecedent to the formal agreement. As for inſtance, when one nation having received a high benefit from another, binds itſelf by a written compact, in caſe of neceſſity, to return that benefit. And it is by ſuch an obligation that we were bound, at the commencement of the war, to aſſiſt by arms in the reſtoration of the houſe of Bourbon; no extreme neceſſity, moral or phyſical, reſtraining us.

Nothing can be more clear than that we are under an expreſs obligation of this kind: this I will firſt ſhow; and afterward, that it is of the higher or moral nature deſcribed.

By the ſecond article of the laſt definitive treaty with France, dated September 3, 1783; ‘the triple alliance of the Hague of 1717; and the quadruple alliance of London 1718,’ (with other treaties therein ſpecified) ‘are declared to ſerve as the baſis of that treaty: and for this purpoſe, they were both renewed and confirmed in the beſt form ^*.’

[18]Theſe treaties therefore, were in full force when the unfortunate Louis XVI was formally depoſed. The Proteſtant ſucceſſion to the throne of Great Britain, and that of France in the deſcendants of the French branch of the houſe of Bourbon, had been recogniſed by the ſovereigns of the two king⯑doms mutually, at the treaty of Utrecht: but by the ſeventh article of the triple alliance of 1717, it is ſtipulated, that ‘if the kingdoms (of France or England) be diſturbed by inteſtine quarrels, or by rebellions on account of the ſaid ſucceſſions, or under any other pretence whatever, the ally thus in trouble ſhall have full right to demand the ſuccours therein abovementioned,’ that is to ſay, France or England was to furniſh 8000 foot and 2000 horſe, each to the other, on ſuch de⯑mand. And by the fourth article of the quadruple alliance, ſigned in 1718, to which England, France, Holland, and THE EMPEROR were parties; England and the two other powers ‘promiſe to guarantee and defend the right of ſucceſſion to the kingdom of France^* againſt all perſons whatſoever, who may preſume to diſturb the order of the ſaid ſuc⯑ceſſion.’

[19]Thus at the laſt treaty of peace with a king of France, and ſubſiſting at the time of his depoſi⯑tion; we ‘renewed and confirmed in the beſt form,’ a ſpecific engagement to ſuccour him on demand, with a force of 10,000 men againſt all "rebellions;" excited ‘under any pretence whatſoever.’ A right to which aid, by our act, remained in him as long as the treaty ſubſiſted. And his helpleſs ſituation, cut off from the poſſibi⯑bility of appealing to the faith then given him, was the moſt ſolemn of demands. But I now proceed to the ſecond point; and ſhall ſhow that without ſpecial compact, this aid was a debt from this coun⯑try to that unfortunate monarch: and therefore not having been diſcharged, remains exigible by his heir, whenever it can be effectively paid to him.

In order to this, I muſt ſtate ſome important tranſactions which took place, in an early part of the long reign of the immediate predeceſſor of Louis XVI; on which this moral obligation was founded. At the acceſſion of the houſe of Ha⯑nover, the eyes of a great party of the kingdom were not opened to the brilliant fortune, it was deſ⯑tined to under the new dynaſty. They did not foreſee the future progreſs of our power, opulence and commerce; the uninterrupted and excluſive reign of law, and the ſtability it would give to our con⯑ſtitution of government; which during the whole of the preceding age, had been repeatedly and alter⯑nately, in the hazard of being loſt in arbitrary mo⯑narchy, [20] or an anarchial democracy. The partizans of an illegal claimant were ſo numerous as to en⯑danger the Hanoverian ſucceſſion: and the vigorous interpoſition of a foreign power might have turned the balance in their favour, eſtabliſhed a foreign intereſt in our councils, and annexed a foreign de⯑pendence to the crown.

Louis XIV, from political and other motives, was deeply engaged in the intereſts of the Pre⯑tender. By his death, which ſoon followed that of Queen Anne, the regency, during the mino⯑rity of his ſucceſſor, devolved on his brother the Duke of Orleans: ‘who adopted a new ſyſtem of politics, and had already entered into engage⯑ments with the king of Great Britain.’ Before the breaking out of the rebellion in 1715, he ap⯑pears indeed for a time, to have concealed the ſhort turn he had cauſed the ſyſtem of the French cabinet to take; and ‘inſtead of aſſiſting the pretender, he amuſed his agents with vague de⯑clarations, calculated to fruſtrate the expedi⯑tion^*’ preparing at the king's death.

After its failure there were many, who other⯑wiſe wiſhed well to the Stuart line, yet were averſe to its being placed on the throne by a power of the Romiſh religion, but who would with great alacrity have acted in its favour, if they had ſeen it's cauſe ſupported in the kingdom by [21] an army of foreign Proteſtants conducted by a good leader. George the firſt had incurred the implacable reſentments of Charles the 12th, the greateſt and moſt enterpriſing general of his age; he had alſo incenſed Peter the Great: they ſacri⯑ficed their rivality to dethrone him. And by the aſſiſtance of Peter, Charles was to have attempted this, at the head of a formidable Proteſtant force.

His miniſter, the Baron Goertz, who had brought about this ſingular reconciliation, and aſſociated Cardinal Alberoni in the conſpiracy; went to the Hague to further its progreſs. And Gyllenburgh, the Swediſh embaſſador at London, carried on the plot with the diſaffected here. Every thing ſeemed to promiſe a ſucceſsful iſſue to it, when it was diſcovered by the regent of France^*: who ſent ſuch intelligence of it to our court, as occaſioned the arreſt of Gyllenburgh here, and of Goertz in Holland^†. The latter on his libe⯑ration in 1717, ſtrengthened the reſentments and connection of Charles and the Czar againſt this country. By the aid of the regent the firſt deſign had been baffled, but the danger ſtill remaining was formidable. Againſt this France further concurred in guarding us, by entering into the treaty called the triple alliance; wherein was ſtipulated, with [22] what force the kings of England and France ſhould aid each other, in caſe of a rebellion in the dominion of either. By the terms of the treaty, the advantage to each ſeems mutual: but the circumſtances of the period conſidered, when no danger menaced the throne of France, and that of the Hanoverian family in England was aſſailed by a ſtrong domeſtic faction, and the coalition of the two moſt able ſovereigns who have reigned in Europe in the preſent century; the benefit of this mutual guarantee was intirely on our ſide.

The quadruple alliance, binding us to the ſup⯑port of the king of France in caſe of rebellion, was ſigned in the following year 1718; in which the connection between Charles and Peter had been further ſtrengthened, by the conferences at Ahland.

It is proper to add here, that the ſolemn adop⯑tion of the whole of both the treaties in that ſub⯑ſiſting with the unfortunate Louis, ſtrictly obliged us at the time of his depoſition and impriſonment, to have concurred with the ſtipulated force in any attempt for his preſervation and reſtoration; or placing his ſucceſſor upon the throne, after he was murdered. And as far forth as the object convention of Pilnitz, was to maintain the gua⯑rantee of the houſe of Auſtria, entered into in 1718, and to protect the perſon and family of the ſove⯑reign in France from danger then adequately ma⯑nifeſt, [23] ſo far forth we, by the ſpirit of thoſe arti⯑cles, were obliged to have concurred openly in its object, if unreſtricted by a neceſſity which ſhall be afterwards ſpoken of.

And on that treaty itſelf it is to be remarked; that the faction which finally depoſed the king, had attained conſiderable ſtrength at the time it was made; and its objects were not indiſtinctly foreſeen. Hence the emperor, being by the quad⯑ruple alliance obliged to take arms to ſuccour the king on an actual attack; the ſpirit of his obliga⯑tion, called upon him to keep his preparations in the ſame ſtate of forwardneſs, as thoſe of the conſpi⯑rators. He was alſo in full right to form alliances for that purpoſe: as was the king of Pruſſia to enter into a league with him, to enable him to fulfil any moral obligation: and the execution of every initially juſt treaty is ſuch.

Theſe treaties were in terms equal; as preſerv⯑ing to each ſovereign the honourable appearance of being ſeated with an equal ſtability on his throne. In effect they bound France to the ſup⯑port of the Hanoverian family; at firſt certainly not firmly eſtabliſhed here, and at that particular juncture in much additional hazard: and Britain to the ſupport of the crown of France; ſeem⯑ingly in the firmeſt ſecurity. This obligation, as undertaken ſpontaneouſly, was almoſt a nudum pactum and conventional only upon the latter: [24] whereas on the ſide of Britain, it is conventional and moral. And this nation thereby came under a moral obligation, to give to the prince reigning in France, the ſame ſupport the king of Great Bri⯑tain had received, the circumſtances being the ſame: that is to aid him againſt all rebels, during the time of peace. For it is dormant from its na⯑ture in every war, and revives on its termination^*. It was therefore in force in the year 1792, when Louis was depoſed: and not having been diſ⯑charged to him, is yet due to his heirs.

But the affirmation of a moral obligation exiſt⯑ing in this caſe, will be met by an objection, de⯑rived from the ſupport that unfortunate prince was induced to give, in the time of full peace, to the revolted colonies; and his commencing a war for that purpoſe. Here it will be urged, that by giving aid to a rebellion againſt the family on the throne, he, by his own act, cancelled that obliga⯑tion as to himſelf. The objection might at firſt fight be thought to have it's convenience, to thoſe who have contended for a declaration from this country, againſt all future aid to the reſtoration of the French monarchy: but unfortunately for them, [25] their moſt avowed principles preclude them from the uſe of it. They maintain the reſiſtance of America to have been juſtifiable; and therefore no rebellion; which is always, as the term imports, an unjuſtifi⯑able reſiſtance: and where no rebellion took place, none was ſupported. Hence they muſt ad⯑mit, that if ſuch obligation exiſted before the French interpoſition, it is not in the leaſt invalidated ſince. To the Whig club therefore, and its factious ſup⯑porters, I preſent the following alternative for their choice. Was the reſiſtance in America a rebel⯑lion, or juſtifiable? If you ſay a rebellion, then your principles, by your own confeſſion, lead to re⯑bellion and civil war. If you ſay it was juſtifiable, or no rebellion, then it remained matter of moral obligation to have given aid to the late king of France, after he had given his aſſent to a con⯑ſtitution which you have declared to be ‘the moſt ſtupendous and glorious edifice of liberty which had been erected on the foundation of human integrity, in any time or country^*.’ For you muſt admit that it was a rebellion which drove him from the throne this conſtitution had erected and placed him upon, into a priſon, and then bu⯑ried the throne itſelf beneath the ruins of this "moſt ſtupendous and glorious edifice of liberty;" [26] or you muſt deny the poſſibility of committing the crime of rebellion.

The great body of thoſe who affirm the reſiſt⯑ance of the Colonies to Britain to have been a rebellion, are in fact adverſe to a declaration on our parts, againſt all future aid to the reſtoration. However it may be proper to inquire, how far the point here maintained is affected, by admitting their affirmation. And here the quality of the in⯑terpoſition of France in favour of the inſurgents is to be examined; as it muſt be granted to have modified, although not annihilated, the moral ob⯑ligation, ariſing from the aſſiſtance of France to the Houſe of Hanover, in the moſt difficult times. The object of this rebellion, was not to take a throne from an auguſt family on which the Houſe of Bourbon had been very ſerviceable in eſtabliſh⯑ing it; but to cut off from its dominions a remote and ill-connected province: of great magnitude indeed, but the Goitre of the empire; from which, with a true Alpine abſurdity, we boaſted that it derived both ornament and ſtrength—an error common to our rivals alſo. Our prior obli⯑gation, as it was excluſively founded on thoſe friendly acts ſtated above, was to defend the king of France againſt a rebellion in the time of peace, the object of which was either to deprive him of his crown; or ſuch a one as ſhould be ſet on foot to wreſt a ſingle province from him: the latter he [27] cancelled by his act, whether he was influenced or uninfluenced in it, the caſe is the ſame: that part of the obligation he did away: but the former, to de⯑fend him againſt all rebellions to depoſe him, re⯑mained.

But the treaties with France, furniſh us with further matter of comment, not to be paſſed over. The principle that we are not bound to aſſiſt the Houſe of Bourbon, has been here examined and refuted, becauſe it is a topic to which recourſe is had to obtain petitions of a dangerous tendency. It alſo ſtrictly applies to the ultimate object of this letter, to ſhow from thoſe treaties, that the com⯑mon end of one party who will actively puſh for petitions, the bringing of Mr. Fox and his attached phalanx into power, is in a high degree dangerous and diſhonourable to this kingdom, as he maintains that this country ought to have made no efforts to reſtore the king and the monarchy of France; and concurs with thoſe who move us to declare, that we ought to diſavow all intention of continuing the war a day for that purpoſe.

The articles of no treaty ever underwent a more thorough parliamentary examination than that of 1783; and this poſition is ſubſtantiated by the part he took therein. The queſtion on the preli⯑minaries was a trial of ſtrength between two great parties, for the poſſeſſion of the whole govern⯑ment, which it was expected would prove deciſive. [28] I am not diſpoſed to defend them as either ade⯑quate or honourable. Their defects were examined with the greateſt attention.

The declarations of the Rockingham party, when the vote of cenſure was paſſed by the commons on the articles, are to be regarded as thoſe of Mr. Fox; leaving what their new allies ſpoke on the ſubject out of the queſtion: becauſe, by the interpoſition of Mr. Burke, he was become the leader of that party there: and every greater ground of objec⯑tion brought forward againſt them, was of courſe ſelected by him, or by others who conſulted with him. Yet no exception was then taken, as appears by the account of the debate I have before me, againſt the article renewing the former obli⯑gation of Great Britain to aſſiſt the king of France againſt all rebellion, now effectively propoſed to be renounced: it was not even mentioned in the debate on the preliminaries. The cenſure of them was brought forward by Lord John Cavendiſh in five reſolutions; which before they were offered to the houſe, had been certainly approved by that party, of which Mr. F. was the head. By the firſt of theſe, which was adopted without conteſt, it was declared, ‘that in conſideration of public faith, which ought to be preſerved inviolable, his faithful commons will ſupport his majeſty, in rendering firm and permanent the peace to be concluded definitively, in conſequence of the [29] preliminary articles^*.’ A reſolution which paſſed without a diſſenting voice; and Mr. Fox ſpoke in favour of all of them collectively. When the previous addreſs of thanks to his majeſty was debated, on the preliminaries being firſt laid be⯑fore the commons; Lord John C. had alſo moved them to declare, that ‘whatever the ſenti⯑ments of the commons might be on the terms of pacification, they beg leave to aſſure his majeſty, of their firm and unalterable reſolu⯑tion, to adhere inviolably to the ſeveral articles for which the public faith is pledged^†.’ And Mr. Fox, and moſt of thoſe who now with him contend, that we never ought to have endeavoured to fulfil the obligations of the ſecond article, gave an unqualified ſupport to theſe declarations.

We read in Grotius that ‘treaties being made by the ſupreme power,’ (in that behalf law⯑fully acknowledged by the people) ‘the infraction of their articles expoſes a nation to the divine wrath^‡.’ Our conſtitution places that power in an hereditary king; and his engagement alone would, in any ſuppoſable caſe, bind us to every article of a treaty, even if parliament be ſilent. I may aſk Mr. Fox and the elder members of the phalanx, whether the added promiſe of the people, [30] which their recommendations contributed ſo far to procure to be given, by thoſe who alone can law⯑fully and bindingly ſpeak for them, their repre⯑ſentatives, annihilates the obligation which would ariſe out of their very ſilence? Does the com⯑pleteſt declaration of a great nation's taking upon itſelf an obligation, that it is in its nature able to make, cancel its articles?

Theſe declarations of the party, of which Mr. Fox was the head, might be very well regarded as his own, had we not a ſpecific avowal of aſſent to the ſubſtance of them, from himſelf, when he laid the definitive treaty before the commons; con⯑ceived even in ſtronger terms. He contended in his ſpeech on that occaſion, that there were conſi⯑derable improvements made in the preliminaries; and in proof of this entered into his own exceptions againſt them. Here we find no reprobation of the article, renewing the obligation of each country to aid with a certain force the king of the other, in caſe of a rebellion "on any pretence whatever." He came likewiſe into the examination of the deme⯑rits of the treaty apparently better prepared than any of the leaders even of his own party, except Mr. Sheridan. For Mr. F. himſelf had drawn up an ori⯑ginal project, and tranſmitted it to Mr. Grenville, the firſt time he was in the cabinet; as appears by the joint declarations of both^*: and it is to be [31] ſuppoſed that his project itſelf, according to every precedent of a treaty in the laſt ſeventy years, con⯑tained this compact: for as there was nothing appa⯑rently unequal in it, ſo there was nothing diſho⯑nourable to this country; and perhaps according to appearances, the balance of its probable expedience muſt have ſeemed to Mr. Fox to be on his and our ſide. For when he was in power, he was hardly without his apprehenſions of a principle he had brought forward in parliament in 1781; that it is ‘not only legal but laudable, for the people of this country to appoint delegates, to reſide in the metropolis to watch the conduct of their repreſentatives ^*:’ that is, to appoint a permanent convention: this right alſo, was de⯑clared to include neceſſarily the right of eſtabliſh⯑ing ‘aſſociations, and committees of correſpond⯑ence ^†, throughout the kingdom at large.’ And the ſtability of the throne of France, was not then menaced by the ſociety naming themſelves ‘the friends of the conſtitution^‡;’ which ſince, from their place of meeting at Paris, the convent of the Jacobins, have had a different name given them. Who alſo at firſt incorporated themſelves^‖ ‘to watch over the general intereſts of liberty’ [32] only; not over the whole conduct of their repre⯑ſentatives, the more extenſive object of Mr. F.'s delegates: theſe copyiſts ‘alſo eſtabliſhed ſimilar aſſociations, and a regular correſpondence with them, all over France^*.’

Thus we ſee no hoſtility on the part of Mr. Fox, or of thoſe who then acted and ſtill continue to act with him, to the reciprocal guarantee of the ſucceſſion of the two crowns. On the con⯑trary there ariſes a ſtrong preſumption, that it was entered into with his total approbation; from his apprehenſion of the effect this fourth power (which he had been deſirous of wedging into the very ſummit of the arch of the conſtitution,) might have on thoſe of the crown; the perpetual admi⯑niſtration of which he is ſuppoſed ſoon after to have graſped at, by ſtrange means well coloured over. In power he wiſhed to guard himſelf againſt the diſcharge and battery of his own engine: and was willing to provide himſelf beforehand with aid, from any quarter whence it might be obtained.

I place not here in too ſtrong a light, the danger of thoſe diſtempered times, before Mr. Fox's com⯑ing into the cabinet; when the worſt ſchemes re⯑ceived his moſt decided patronage. And in proof of this, I will give you ſome traits of the deſcrip⯑tion of them, tranſmitted to us by one who lived [33] and acted a great part in that period; and was in much confidence even with the principal agita⯑tors: a great ſtateſman, always temperately wiſe in his meaſures; and who, in a life of active ſer⯑vice to his country, which bloated blundering arrogance joined with impotent malignity drove him to write the apology of, boaſted of his being able to prevent this cloud burſting out into a hur⯑ricane, as one of his beſt ſervices to the ſtate. I mean the late Mr. Burke.

He deſcribes this time as ‘one of the moſt critical periods in our annals: there was a dread⯑ful fermentation. Wild and ſavage inſurrection quitted the woods, and prowled about our ſtreets in the name of Reform. Other projects ex⯑actly coincident with this, ſtruck at the very exiſtence of the kingdom under any conſtitution. There are who remember the blind fury of ſome, and the lamentable helpleſſneſs of others. At the ſame time a ſort of national convention ſat with a kind of ſuperintendance over parliament, and little leſs than dictated to it. And had the por⯑tentous comet of the rights of man, then croſſed upon us in that internal ſtate of England, no⯑thing could have prevented our being irreſiſtibly hurried (like a planet) out of the highway of heaven, into all the vices, crimes, horrors, and miſeries of the French revolution^*.’

[34]Mr. Fox, when he was in power, probably enter⯑tained ſerious apprehenſions, from the exploſion of theſe prepared inflammable materials, to the accu⯑mulation of which he had contributed ſo much; and thence came to wiſh for the reciprocal gua⯑rantee. Thinking that after the court of France had effected one democratic revolution, on the other ſide of the Atlantic; which had made a conſiderable impreſſion on the minds of its ſub⯑jects at home; that power would willingly concur with her real aid, to prevent the greater danger which might aſſail her, from the example of a ſecond breaking out at her own door.

Let us now grant that he condemned the mu⯑tual guarantee: that he even went ſo far, as to uſe en⯑deavours to have it omitted in the definitive treaty, and that he failed therein; although he was able, in many other articles, to improve on the preli⯑minaries: yet neither he, nor any of his preſent maniple of a phalanx then acting with him, can pretend that it was not of intire obligation (and by his act in which they cordially joined) after the rebellion of the tenth of Auguſt. For he declared, and with much juſtice, when the defi⯑nitive treaty came under debate; on a compariſon of the articles we had been engaged to, with our reſources and thoſe of our late enemies: that ‘the faith of the nation was now taken againſt the ſtate of the country. And this in his appre⯑henſion [35] was a conſideration of ſo much weight, that now the buſineſs was concluded he would not heſitate to ſay, that, committed as the pub⯑lic faith had been by the preliminary articles, he would have concluded the definitive treaty upon the baſis of them; if the miniſters of the other belligerent powers, had thought proper to adhere to their letter^*.’

What will be ſaid of the character of that na⯑tion, where poſitions contrary to the faith of trea⯑ties and moral obligation, are not only ſupported in ſenates, but ſenates come to decree upon them? Are the articles of thoſe compacts which ſheath the ſword of war, and end the calamities of three quarters of the habitable globe, of no obligation? Or is that of the obnoxious article, the reciprocal guarantee, cancelled, becauſe if it could have been acted upon with effect in time paſt, it would have prevented the moſt atrocious ſcene of crimes, and the moſt dreadful calamities that in latter ages have viſited the world? Or if in future we may be able ſo to act upon it, becauſe it preſents the beſt hope of that recovery from theſe afflictions a future ge⯑neration may rejoice in, but we ſhall never ſee?

Grant that the violation of treaties is common: that is, has been ſo frequent as to have been one of the moſt terrible ſcourges to human kind: does Mr. Fox contend that there ſhould be one more added to the number? In the mouth of any man, the [36] ſcorn of that important part of the code of mo⯑rals, which binds nation to nation, would have co⯑vered him with diſgrace; but ſuch a man's offence will not nearly approach the rankneſs of his; it exhibits a contempt of honeſt political reputation, of which there are few parallels indeed in the hiſ⯑tory of this kingdom.

For the reciprocal guarantee being now conſi⯑dered as one of the articles which he regarded as diſadvantageous at the ſignature of the treaty; it muſt be further aſked did he not come for⯑ward and tell the body of the nation, through their repreſentatives, that there were bad arti⯑cles in the treaty, but that the public faith was pledged upon them; and if worſe had been inſiſted on, that faith was ſo committed, it muſt have been definitively given even to thoſe? But Mr. Fox was in office when the definitive treaty was concluded: he is therefore pledged perſonally, to endeavour to the utmoſt, that its letter and ſpirit ſhould be car⯑ried into effect: and he was not only in office, but he tells us it was concluded by himſelf ^*. It was then BY HIS COUNCIL that the faith and ſignature of his ſovereign were given to it: and now he ſeeks, and has all along ſought, to make uſe of the force of parliament as an engine to offer violence to the conſcience of his king, rightly or wrongly impli⯑cated by his own advice. Repreſenting alſo the preliminaries as diſadvantageous, he cauſed the whole nation by a ſingular reſolution to engage its [37] faith to the performance of them even as ſuch, by their repreſentatives: and now he calls upon us in the ſame mode, gratuitouſly ^* to declare, we will break that very faith he recommended us to engage, and which the hiſtory of the day informs us was unanimouſly given. Did he know or did he not know the guarantee he brought the nation into, by renewing the triple and quadruple alli⯑ances? If he was informed of it, was there ever a more frontleſs dereliction of principle, and of a principle he himſelf has talked ſo highly of, than is contained in his recent declarations, and thoſe he has been making ever ſince the war? If he really was ignorant of it, was there ever a more criminal neglect of public care and duty in a miniſter? In neither caſe can ſuch a man be ele⯑vated to power again, without extreme danger and diſhonour to the kingdom. And this elevation is the declared object of his party, for exciting the movements which at this diſtempered time agitate the nation.

That he ſhould maintain our moſt ſolemn na⯑tional engagements to foreign powers, to bind us no longer than it is our intereſt to adhere to them; is perfectly conſonant as to its ſpirit, to what he [38] has laid down in parliament; that individuals may enter into engagements reſpecting the public, in⯑jurious to its intereſt, to avoid pecuniary loſſes: and conſequently for pecuniary gain.

He has before been charged with this by ſome writers, but as it is wanted in proof here, the heads of the evidence ſhall be repeated. In the debate on the aſſociations entered into in 1792, for the proſecu⯑tion of ſeditious libels, ‘he expreſſed his doubts of their legality:’ but the purpoſes to which they were employed, he repreſented as execrable; he affirmed that they ‘were then made the inſtru⯑ments of tyranny over men's minds, almoſt as bad as the clubs in France^*;’ and ‘compared them to the riotous aſſemblies of Lord George Gordon in 1780^†.’ With reſpect to theſe aſſo⯑ciations, in his belief, equivocal in principle, and which he aſſerted to be execrable in object, what council did he give? how did he act? he ‘de⯑clared in the houſe, that he adviſed his friends in Weſtminſter to ſign them, whether they agreed to them or not; in order to avoid’ two evils, the latter of which was, "a deſertion of their ſhops^‡. This exhortation to a general avowed and [39] proſtitute falſehood in public engagements, was de⯑ſervedly and indignantly reprobated by Mr. Dundas. ‘Men (he ſaid on that occaſion) who ſigned pa⯑pers of which they diſapproved, might ſoon learn to ſwear what they did not believe; and the ſignature of traitors might appear among thoſe of good citizens.’ But Mr. Fox, to ſhow that he was not aſhamed to act as he had adviſed, ‘on the morning after this debate with ſeveral of his particular and moſt intimate friends, inhabitants of St. George's pariſh, attended and ſigned an aſſociation^*,’ of particular paſſages of which, the following is an extract. ‘We hold ourſelves bound by duty, and we now think ourſelves par⯑ticularly called upon by the times to declare; that we will each of us, in our reſpective ſta⯑tions, individually contribute every aſſiſtance in our power, to diſcountenance all illegal meet⯑ings, and all ſeditious and inflammatory writ⯑ings,’ &c.^† A full parallel of the coincidence of his prior and ſubſequent declarations and acts, with theſe parts of his engagement; would form a tract of no little prolixity.

[40]One of the motives alledged by Mr. Fox, to induce his friends to ſubſcribe theſe declarations; which, following him, they muſt have reputed to be inſtruments to promote the worſt ends, is omitted above; ‘to avoid the deſtruction of their per⯑ſons and their houſes^*.’ It was certainly expe⯑dient for Mr. Fox, to feign the exiſtence of ſome more cogent neceſſity to give colour to his criminal advice, than conſiderations of profit in trade could furniſh him with. If the danger alledged had been true, the principle his advice reſts upon is im⯑moral: but the allegation was as defective in truth, as the principle in morality. I ſhall proceed to ſhow it was a calumnious imputation on the friends of regular government, which he preſſed into the ſervice of the minute: and that they were the perſons whoſe apprehenſions were great; and who ſought in thoſe aſſociations, ſecurity only.

I reſt this on the authority of what Mr. Chalmers has ſaid, in the dedication of the laſt edition of that capital work, his Eſtimate, to Jaſper Wilſon, the Aſtur of political arithmetic and oeconomy, and the perfect repreſentative of the Ligurian faith, and foppery of that hero of Virgil. "Hiſtory," ſays this well-informed obſerver, ‘will record the month of November 1792 as a memorable epoch in our annals. It was peculiarly unfortu⯑nate [41] to our traders. Yet it was a month pro⯑pitious to the conſtitution. I was not inatten⯑tive as you may ſuppoſe to the paſſages of that month. I knew that the violence of the repub⯑licans, and levellers, had by its action and re⯑action, ſpread terror far and wide. I was acquainted with perſons who feared the loſs of their lands from the tumults of the Jacobins at Shef⯑field. I was acquainted with perſons, who ſold their ſtock in the Britiſh funds, in order to inveſt it where they ſuppoſed it would be more ſafe. I was acquainted with thoſe, who diſpoſed at an under value of moveable property, which they ima⯑gined was moſt likely to be deſtroyed by innovation and tumult ^*.’

It might very well be expected, that this agi⯑tated ſtate of the public mind, ſhould be attended with dangerous effects to commercial credit: that ſuch effects followed it, is indicated ſufficiently in the bankruptcies of that very month. In the pre⯑ceding ten months their number had been 476, or 48 monthly: in that, November, it ſuddenly roſe to 105. The greateſt number ſtated in Mr. Chalmers's table for any month, in any preceding year, is 83: that of no other exceeded 70. In the month of December, in which Mr. Fox affirmed the ſolideſt property to have been endangered, and conſequently mutual credit at its loweſt depreſſion, the bankruptcies were reduced again to 47, the ave⯑rage [42] of the firſt ten months of the year, and leſs than that of the preceding. Mr. Chalmers's ob⯑ſervation immediately annexed to the paſſage be⯑fore cited is, ‘Whether theſe apprehenſions pro⯑duced any of the numerous bankruptcies of November 1792, I pretend not to know:’ that is from poſitive and particular information, as he knew the other effects of the national fears: on this fact he tacitly refers to the evidence of his table. He goes on to ſay, ‘I believe that all terrors diſappeared, when the parliament was called, the militia were embodied, and, ABOVE all, when the nation with an overpowering voice, avowed her attachment to the conſtitution, and promiſed her ſupport of the laws^*.’ That ſupport was engaged for, by the national acceſſion to that aſſociation, which was ſet on foot on the 20th of this month of November by Mr. REEVES. It was, as Mr. Fox alledges, the commencement of theſe very aſſociations, which cauſed the terror of aſſaſſination and plunder mentioned by him: as if ſuch a terror could have exiſted, when in the very month in the middle of which he made his declara⯑tion, the bankruptcies were reduced ſuddenly, and nearly enough in the proportion of five to two.

We cannot much wonder to ſee that the ſtateſ⯑man who can teach individuals, that they may for [43] the continuance of their private profit enter into ſolemn engagements, in face of their country, contrary to their principles; ſhould not heſitate to propoſe the breach pf thoſe which one country enters into with another, even although they be his own acts; when its intereſt, well or ill under⯑ſtood, may ſeem to require it; or, what with ſuch a ſtateſman is the ſame thing, when his own inte⯑reſt, well or ill underſtood, ſeems to require it. And that there are caſes, in which a ſtateſman may ut⯑terly miſtake his own intereſt, is very evident: for if Mr. Fox had not contended for the infrac⯑tion of the guarantee, primarily his own miniſterial act; it is undeniably certain that he would at this inſtant have been high in power; or at leaſt that he would before this time, have been recalled to an eminent ſtation; which he would have enjoyed for the whole term his infatuated impetuoſity ordinarily gives him leave.

The infuſing of theſe principles, relating to the engagements they give to the public, into the minds of the people at large; is great crime in a ſtateſ⯑man, and affects the total of his character as ſuch. It is long ſince that the fact has been charged upon Mr. Fox with full evidence, by Mr. Burke, and no defence ſet up in his behalf. Thoſe there⯑fore of his partizans who ſince continue to main⯑tain, that his public character is excellent and immaculate, are morally become acceſſaries after [44] the fact: but if they ſhall ſay that they never deigned to examine the charges of Mr. Burke againſt him; then the probability of that declara⯑tion muſt be enquired into; and if the inquiry turn out in their favour, it follows from the de⯑fence eſtabliſhed, and the great name, the moral character, and the honour of the accuſer; that their bigotted belief of the impeccability of Mr. Fox, robs what they ſay in his praiſe of every pretence to more belief, than bigotry voluntarily blinding itſelf, can claim to its declarations to its fooliſh creed, from the authority due to the clearneſs of its views. And from this unfortunate poſition, they can extricate themſelves only by proving the falſehood of their own plea ſo ſet up.

It is not the queſtion of peace or war which is examined in this part of my letter; it is not the prayer of the petitions paſt and future; and the oſtenſible pretence by which commotion is ſoli⯑cited: it is the danger of the real object of one of the parties which promotes the petitions, that of the ſuperior claſs of agitators; namely, to have Mr. Fox called into power: the firſt end with all, and with many the laſt; although they openly call for it only as the neceſſary means to obtain the prayer of ſuch petitions. This is the object here contended againſt, and it is this which makes his character as a ſtateſman, clearly ſhown in his public acts and declarations, an eſſential inquiry at this juncture. The right to go into which, re⯑ſtraining [45] my condemnation of Mr. Fox to what ariſes from his public acts, he has fully admitted himſelf; in the debate on poſtponing the recom⯑mitment of the Quebec bill in 1791: when he declared, that ‘the public has a right to the opinions of public men on public meaſures^*;’ meaning to include his own. A right which would be totally nugatory, if individuals had not beſide a co-exiſting and ſubſidiary right, to lay their com⯑ments on ſuch opinions before that public: and he will not ſay, he meant to admit hereby a nugatory or non-effective right only to be veſted in it.

I have long anticipated a queſtion you may have formed in your own mind on the ſubject of the guarantee. You will aſk how has it happened, that in all the debates in which the reſtoration of the houſe of Bourbon has been conſidered, this article has never been brought forward, by thoſe whoſe principles and arguments it would ſo de⯑cidedly have ſupported? The exiſtence of the guarantee having been proved, I am in full right to ſay, that whether an anſwer to this be or be not given, it can neither reinforce nor diminiſh the obligation ariſing out of it; and ſuch an an⯑ſwer I am not of neceſſity obliged to attempt to give: I ſhall however revert to the queſtion after⯑ward; here it would be a mere ſcholium. The bringing home the guarantee to Mr. Fox, and the deduction of its conſequences, although neceſſarily [46] connected with the meaſures purſued to compel a preſent negociation with France, in the manner ſhown above, yet has retarded the progreſs of the conſidera⯑tion of the former for no ſhort time; and I decline entering into another branch of the ſubject, which will lead to a ſecond diſcuſſion lengthening that in⯑convenience. I therefore poſtpone the anſwer to this inquiry, noting only, that it terminates in a new proof of the danger and diſhonour of ever, at any future period, intruſting Mr. Fox with power.

It is only a few obſervations that I have to add, on the guarantee and its formal renunciation. It will be ſaid, that the effective execution of it is evidently now impoſſible, and that our obligation terminates with the poſſibility. But political poſ⯑ſibilities are ſubject to die and revive, alternately, at leaſt to all appearance. A few months continu⯑ance has not yet, in any caſe, given ſtability to thoſe who have uſurped power in France: and if there be ſome circumſtances which ſeem to promiſe it to the preſent uſurpation, which were wanted to the former, they are more than overbalanced by the conſul being an effective alien. The ſpirit of revolution often ſeems dormant, when it is ſecretly exerting itſelf with great efficacy; and may be really dormant, but not dead. Revolution in France, reſembles a certain inſect, which the reſearches of modern naturaliſts have diſcovered, and which from its inceſſant gyration or rotatory motion, has obtained with us the name of the Wheel animalculum. [47] It follows from what Dr. Pulteney, in his view of the writings of Linnaeus, tells us, that this great legiſ⯑lator of natural hiſtory includes this ſpecies among the Chaotic animalcula; which immediately follow the Furiae ^*. When dried it will remain as duſt for long periods of time, but revives in full vigour by barely putting a ſingle drop of water upon it, and inſtantly reſumes its revolutionary movements. Now according to the average duration of a French conſtitution, the preſent conſular government ſeems already to have ſurvived almoſt a third of its term: the time may be a little more or a little leſs, for without a diligent inquiry, which I have not time to enter upon, an error may be eaſily fallen into, in reckoning the periods of power enjoyed by their ſeveral ſets of rulers, before they have been ſent to Cayenne or the guillotine. But I have a deſcriptive catalogue lying before me, drawn up by one of ‘the curious’ in revolutions^†, which makes the num⯑ber of thoſe taking place in our civil wars to have amounted to ſeventeen in nineteen years. However it evidently includes ſome proviſional and conſtituent councils, which cannot be called governments: and we are not to reckon more than ſeven diſ⯑tinct forms, conſtituted in that term; although [48] two or three of them were violently or otherwiſe ſet aſide, and afterward reſtored again. Whence the mean duration of an experimental conſtitution in England comes out to be 2 5/7 years, or two years, eight months, ſeventeen days, and a ſmall fraction: and if we admit the mutability of the French character to be to that of the Engliſh, in the exact ratio of two to one; then will the pro⯑bable length of the conſular revolution be ſixteen months, and a few odd days; but conſiderably leſs than a fortnight.

Indeed the example of Harrington ſhould ſerve as a warning to thoſe, who at this time maintain the impoſſibility of a regal counter-revolution in France. Hume ſomewhere in his eſſays tells us, that he had predicted, that the conſtitution of this kingdom would permanently remain republican; a conſequence which he had deduced from ſome abſtract political principle: I think it was, that no change could take place in the form of a ſtate, after the center of power and the center of pro⯑perty were brought into coincidence. The laſt ſheets of his work were not dry from the preſs, when Monk was on his march from St. Alban's to London. France therefore is not arrived to the period which the lawyers would name, that after the poſſibility of counter-revolution, extinct. But in a word, nothing can procure univerſal peace, but removing from thoſe who wield the force of repub⯑licanized [49] France, the neceſſity of continuing war to preſerve themſelves from the vengeance of their armies; whoſe hopes of the immenſe donative muſt be fruſtrated on its concluſion. A ſeparate peace, leaving a war on the continent, whereby the other powers, eſpecially SPAIN, Portugal, and the ſmaller German and Italian ſtates, may one by one be ſwallowed all in the vortex of the republic, or rendered dependent on it, ought not to be made; and a univerſal peace cannot. Therefore a declared dereliction of the guarantee contained in the laſt treaty, can effect nothing; or is neither neceſſary or honourable, if renouncing engagements to which the body of the nation has in a ſingular manner pledged itſelf, and for no motive or foreſeen effect at all, be both nugatory and diſhonourable.

‘But the ambition of the princes of the houſe of Bourbon, and their inſidious policy, which ex⯑perience has ſhown, to have formerly been almoſt perpetually employed againſt this iſland; is an argument, it will be urged, furniſhing the cleareſt demonſtration, that the intereſt of Great Bri⯑tain can never be promoted by their reſtoration to the monarchy of France.’ This charge againſt them I ſhall leave, without attempting to detract any thing from that ſtrength with which it may be ſupported; and courteouſly ſuffer even ſome preſent overcharged exaggerations of it to paſs. It will be here ſufficient to ſay, that as frail as the ſe⯑curity of the faith of thoſe princes may have been, it [50] muſt be acknowledged, that ſtronger reliance might at all times have juſtly been placed upon it, than on that of the republic under the firſt conſtitution; on which there was more dependence than on the faith of the ſecond: and that the engagements of the latter, were intitled to a greater confidence, than that which can be given to any treaty to be concluded with Buonaparte.

The proof of this will be evident enough, from the conſideration I am now going to enter upon, of the further arguments of the preſent Gallomaniſtes; and of ſome ci-devant Gallomaniſtes, whoſe mea⯑ſures and declarations ſtill continue, in different modes, to give the moſt effective ſupport here to the views of the great conſul. ‘They urge that our calamitous ſtruggle with France has been too long protracted, and by the moſt futile of all pretenſions; that the rulers of the republic have been conſtantly incapable of maintaining the relations of amity with other ſtates: a poſition refuted by the real friends of their country, as often as it has been advanced.’

To ſhow the fallacy of this ſturdy aſſertion little remains for me to do, but to make extracts from ſome curious documents, brought together to my hand, in an excellent pamphlet publiſhed in the beginning of the preſent year^*: and to inquire as [51] a conſequence deducible from them, how far the credit of thoſe who advanced it, and continue to repeat it, is at this juncture affected thereby, on queſtions relating to the propoſed negociation.

The friends of their country had not failed to ſtudy with accuracy, the general ſpirit and detail of the ſemi-organiſed anarchy called the conſtitu⯑tion, during the tyranny of Roberſpierre: and one reſult of their ſcrutiny was, that thereby the party in power was unable to maintain the relation of amity with foreign ſtates: or, in the language of Vatel, that by the fundamental laws no power was conſtituted, able to contract with validity. This charge againſt the new ſyſtem was refuted here in⯑deed, as far as a poſitive declaration againſt it could go: but the party maintaining ſuch power to have been any where veſted by it, omitted one mode to confirm their affirmation, which the laws of reaſoning, as they ſtood before the revolution, obliged them to follow; namely to produce the title and ſection of the conſtitution, in which this power was to be found.

After the fall of Roberſpierre, a committee was appointed to draw up the plan of a new conſtitu⯑tion. They turned their views to the old one, and among other objects, to ſee what it eſtabliſhed on the head of compacts with foreign ſtates. The reſult of their ſearch we are made acquainted with, by the ſpeech of Boiſſy d'Anglas to the national [52] aſſembly, in the name of that committee. After enumerating many defects of the ſyſtem to be re⯑pealed, "what muſt we think," ſays he, ‘of a conſtitution, in which no principle of relation to foreign powers is to be found^*?’ It is highly worthy of remark here, that while he adopts the charge advanced againſt the conſtitution before exiſting in France, and ſo reſolutely denied by our oppoſition, he at the ſame time adopts the very language in which it had been here expreſſed.

The ſyſtem which originated from the labours of this committee was called the Conſtitutional; as that which it ſuperſeded, had been named the Revolutionary government. So lately as the month of November laſt, Boulay de la Meurthe con⯑firmed the declaration of Boiſſy d'Anglas, quoted above, relating to the former: ‘It is well known’ (he affirmed) ‘that peace could not be con⯑cluded, before the eſtabliſhment of the conſti⯑tutional government; for there then exiſted a government which called itſelf revolutionary, and which afforded no certain guarantee either to things or perſons^†.’

Boiſſy d'Anglas, having been at the head of the committee to draw up the plan of the conſtitu⯑tional government, it was to be expected that [53] a power would have been ſomewhere veſted in it, "to contract with validity" with foreign ſtates. The mode in which De la Meurthe has lately ex⯑preſſed himſelf on that head, ſeems however to caſt a doubt even on this; yet it does not amount to an ab⯑ſolute negation of it, and it is known to have been true on other authorities. But there may exiſt in a ſtate other incapacities to treat or be treated with, equal to the former in effect: for certain perſons, by a conſtitution of government, may have legal powers to conclude a formal treaty, to which that government itſelf is unable to give either force or continuance.

It is from Boulay de la Meurthe we are officially informed, that this was the caſe of the republic, under the ſyſtem which was called the Conſtitu⯑tional government. ‘It ſhould ſeem (ſays that great ſtateſman of the new ſchool) that this per⯑manence and guarantee ought to have exiſted, from the eſtabliſhment, and by the operations of the conſtitutional ſyſtem; and yet there were not more, but perhaps leſs of them than before.’ And by way of concluſion, he adds: ‘Thus if we form an opinion according to well known facts, the French government cannot be conſidered as poſſeſſing any permanence, either with reſpect to men or things’—‘it is found difficult to ſtipulate con⯑ditions of peace, and ſtill more difficult to pre⯑ſerve them.’

[54]Thus the firſt conſtitution afforded no certain guarantee either to perſons or things, and the ſe⯑cond was found more defective than the firſt. ‘Treaties of peace were quickly broken;’ ‘and became the ſource of a new war, ſtill more deſpe⯑rate and bloody than the former.’ ‘And the directory terrified all Europe; and deſtroyed, according to its caprice, ſeveral governments.’

But this iniquity and caprice very inadequately accounts for the conduct of the directory: the motive to which, as it muſt continue to act and produce the ſame effects in every form the republic may aſſume, the ſpeaker, who was the "mouth piece" of its new rulers, was obliged to keep out of ſight. For none can doubt the iniquity of the old directors to have been intereſted and ſyſtema⯑tical; and nothing could have been of leſs power than caprice to determine in what acts it ſhould manifeſt itſelf: in this its members were guided by policy: and if general peace had been conſiſtent with their perſonal ſafety, the beſt policy would have dictated that meaſure to them. The impoſ⯑ſibility of diſcharging the donative to the army forced them to continue war; but a war that would maintain itſelf, and perhaps afford ſome ſlight temporary aids to their exhauſted treaſury. They were driven to ſupport their armies as a Tartar feeds his herds: where there is but little plunder to be acquired in the one caſe, and the [55] herbage is almoſt eaten off in the other; the herd and the army are led, perhaps to very remote diſtances, to devour and fatten upon a freſh coun⯑try. Hence we have ſeen their wars ceaſing in one quarter, and breaking out ſuddenly and unex⯑pectedly in another: Germany began to threaten the republicans to be equally barren of triumphs and of plunder: a kind of treaty was ſuddenly patched up with the Emperor; and the French armies were immediately ſent to invade the friendly territories of Egypt and Switzerland. It is the fear of the return of their armies home, that is the motive of their wars abroad: they ariſe from the inability of the ſtate to pay the debt to them at the return of peace. It depends neither on the nominal powers of the executive govern⯑ment, nor the perſonal character of its members; it is not in the nature of a pentarchy, or a conſular or a dictatorial government, to create the funds to diſcharge this immenſe debt: although in the in⯑augural oration of the conſular government, it was incumbent on Boulay de la Meurthe roundly to affirm the firſt, and ſuppreſs every idea of the ſecond.

I have before endeavoured to prove to you, that the conſul is compelled to maintain a perpetual war by a ſtronger degree of neceſſity, than that by which the directors were fettered. Boulay de la Meurthe indeed tacitly denies this neceſſity, by [56] aſcribing all their infractions of the laws of nations to their violences and the caprice of iniquity; and many argue ſo here. Let us therefore now ſuppoſe with him and them, that the continuation of the war and all theſe violations of the rights of foreign ſtates; aroſe ſolely from a bad ſyſtem of govern⯑ment, and the bad character of thoſe who poſſeſſed the executive power, and not from that neceſſity hitherto inſiſted on; and proceed to examine what the conſequence of this admiſſion will be, on the queſtion whether we ought to have entered into a negociation, on the late invitation of Buonaparte.

As the infidelity of France to her compacts which took place under the ſecond conſtitution, was effectively greater than that under the firſt; the ſole motives to our treating with her rulers now, muſt be either the greateſt neceſſity; or the expectation that the laſt revolution has introduced ſome amelioration to this evil. The fallacy of this ſhall therefore be ſhown, and moreover that there is a probability of great magnitude, that its effect muſt be of a directly contrary nature.

The conſular conſtitution has given to Buona⯑parte, an authority much greater than that of the depoſed directory. The plenitude of dominion or the intire ſovereignty, is nominally divided be⯑tween the chief conſul and his three ſenates; as before between the directory and the two councils. But fetters have been forged for the latter, of ſo complicated a contrivance, that the check upon his [57] acts is a name only. The meaſures therefore which will be purſued by the republic with reſpect to other nations, will be more fully impreſſed with his character, than thoſe carried into execution un⯑der the conſtitutional ſyſtem, at any particular time, with the character of the directors then in authority. Hence the fidelity of the conſul to his own public declarations and acts, becomes not only a proper but a neceſſary object of diligent inquiry: the character of the ſtate having now become iden⯑tified with his, there being no adequate balance to his power to direct its meaſures.

But while that conſtitution ſubſiſted, the violation of the laws of nations by treachery and force ſolely imputable to him, exceeded, in degree, the crimes of the ſame kind, great and many as they were, with which thoſe ephemeral tyrants were deſervedly charged. And the atrocity of thoſe committed by him, were likewiſe further heightened by this cir⯑cumſtance; that if the enterpriſes to be conſidered had been politically juſt, if undertaken by legitimate authority; yet in him they were high civil crimes; having been uſurpations of the right of the ſove⯑reign power he acknowledged, in its high capacity of making peace and war. Therefore, admitting as we muſt do here, the authority from which he received his military appointment; theſe vio⯑lations of the law of nations were aggravated by a crime, his principals could not in the nature of [58] things poſſibly commit: they could not uſurp on their own ſovereignty in matters of peace and war.

Theſe acts were the ſubverſion of the republics of Venice and Genoa. "It was on their ruins," ſays Mr. Mallet du Pan, ‘that Buonaparte drew up the ſentence of the neutral ſtates^*.’ And the criminality of theſe acts of "duplicity, rapine," and frontleſs infraction of the law of nations, was heightened by ‘his ingratitude to theſe two re⯑publics; which from the day of his paſſing the Po, had loaded him and his army with gratifi⯑cations^†.’ This intelligent writer apparently brings forward theſe two uſurpations, as the worſt in principle to be found even in the annals of the French revolution. And in effect, if the peculiar circumſtances attending them be examined in the proper point of view, they will ſo be found to have been. For let it here for a moment be granted, that the law of nations is to give way, according to the new principles, to the repub⯑licanizing of Europe, in every caſe where they come in competition; the deſtruction of a republic, neutral in name, but in effect a dependent and obedient ally; is in one act, a ſubverſion of the new and the old principles together. This re⯑mark on the character of theſe uſurpations it is [59] not unneceſſary to give, although, it is not to be imagined that any one, be his political ſyſtem ever ſo hoſtile to that Mr. Mallet du Pan was known to hold, will imagine him not minutely acquainted with the crimes of the French againſt other na⯑tions; or, that when his ſubject required him to bring forward the moſt atrocious, that he would err in the examples he ſelected.

But in the ſubverſion of theſe friendly republics, Buonaparte clearly appears to have acted without orders or inſtructions from France. For when the conteſts between the councils and the majority of the directory, which terminated in what is called the revolution of Fructidor, were approaching to a criſis, Dumolard made a motion, that the directory ſhould give an account of the revolutions of Venice and Genoa; effected ‘apparently without previous or⯑der^*.’ Although the terms in which this de⯑mand was couched were general, it was levelled at Buonaparte. And Mr. Mallet du Pan, ſpeak⯑ing of the ſubverſion of the two republics ſays, that ‘theſe exceſſes of Buonaparte, excited rather a deſire than a determination to bring him to juſtice. But the firſt plaint of the council againſt him coſt that aſſembly its exiſtence^†.’

[60]The directory ſeized with eagerneſs this oppor⯑tunity afforded to them by their adverſaries, of attaching Buonaparte to their intereſts. ‘They made no other anſwer to the demand, than diſ⯑patching to him an oſtenſible letter; in which they declared to him that they gave their full ap⯑probation to his conduct, both POLITICAL and mili⯑tary, namely, with reſpect to Venice and Genoa ^*.’

It will not fail to ſtrike you, that if he had acted in conſequence of their inſtructions, ſuch an ap⯑probation and ratification of his acts would have been not only totally nugatory, but even prejudicial to him: as it would have left him expoſed to the charge of having acted without orders, in a mat⯑ter which the more reſpectable and popular party in France and in the councils, actually then treated as highly criminal. It is to be noted alſo, that a con⯑ſiderable period was ſuffered to elapſe, between theſe tranſactions of Buonaparte and the date of the approbation of the directory. There is there⯑fore a ſtrong probability, that they wiſhed to pre⯑ſerve theſe charges of his acting without authority in matters of the very higheſt conſequence, outſtanding againſt him; in order to be produced at a proper time to annihilate the power he was acquiring, which began to overſhadow all others in the ſtate: or at leaſt by the apprehenſion of them, to reduce [61] him from an almoſt independent agent to a ſub⯑ordinate inſtrument of their purpoſes^*. But the councils on this occaſion commenced the proceſs of Buonaparte: the ſtronger party in the direc⯑tory [62] was weak in thoſe aſſemblies; and the po⯑pular cry was againſt them: their whole depend⯑ance was on the military force. The uſe alſo of this accuſation as an inſtrument to reſtrain the power of the general, was taken out of their hands. There remained to them therefore only to pro⯑mote the intended proceedings againſt him, rather with diſgrace than advantage to themſelves; as having for purpoſes not oſtenſible, long tolerated groſs crimes; while by concurring in the charge, they likewiſe were reduced to multiply their ene⯑mies, and take from themſelves the laſt hope of ſupport: or they were conſtrained to meet his ac⯑cuſers in his defence, with a ratification of his acts; and by voluntarily making a common cauſe with him, to attempt to enſure his ſtrong ſupport.

I am ſenſible that the invaſion of Switzerland, which happened after the deſtruction of the ſiſter republics of Venice and Genoa, was followed by more ſanguinary ſcenes: the plan of the firſt is aſcribed to the directory; the latter were the acts of Buonaparte: and the determination upon [63] them will be found the moſt flagitious and faith⯑leſs. It is the degrees of infidelity ſhown in the acts of the directory and the Corſican that are to be compared; not the miſery which in different countries, as a natural conſequence, has followed that of each. The two Italian ſtates had granted if not anticipated every wiſh that Buonaparte could form from them: each had been ſubſervient to his requiſitions, and furniſhed him with great loans for the ſupport of his army. But Switzerland, although deſirous to preſerve peace with this tyran⯑nical power, had furniſhed to it no ſuch aſſiſtance: on the contrary, the republic had ſent 25,000 men to the defence of Geneva when it was firſt attacked by France; and forced her, for that time, to relinquiſh her prey. When the French were plundering Suabia, they armed to protect their own borders from their rapines: and if during their calamitous retreat, they ſuffered a diviſion of the army to re⯑turn to their native country through a part of their territories, they compelled them to paſs through them diſarmed. The invaſion of Switzerland, as a violation of national faith, was no more ſo than the conqueſt of Venice and Genoa, and was not at the ſame time a violation of national gratitude; at leaſt in a ſenſe any thing ſo high as in the latter caſe: and it is to be conſidered, that the moral criminality of doing an evil to a benefactor, is double to that of the ſame injury to an indifferent perſon. [64] Hence theſe infractions of the laws binding nation to nation, by Buonaparte; ſhow a more frontleſs defiance of the principles of their moral rights, than any act of the late directory^*.

[65]If the grand conſul, when acting by commiſſion from a ſuperior power; thus trampled under foot the law of nations; brought utter ruin without the very ſhadow of a pretext upon two feeble unof⯑fending ſtates his benefactors; trampling under foot, by the ſame crime, the authority he acted under; being now freed even from the appear⯑ance of reſtraint, and armed with powers truſted to none of his predeceſſors, will he ſhrink at a repetition of theſe crimes? or the commiſſion of others, poſſible to the utmoſt abuſe of unprinci⯑pled, unreſtricted force?— ‘Quid domini faciant, audent cum talia fures?’ What will grand conſuls of France do, when French generals dare ſo much? Or what human principle is there to induce him to obſerve his compacts better with his moſt determined enemies, [66] than with the beneficent, ſubmiſſive friends of his neceſſities, as well as his proſperity?

France tells us, and by the partiſans of that re⯑volution which placed this power in his hands, that the former ſets of men who held the reins of her executive government were perfidious—power under leſs controul is now fallen into the hands of one more perfidious: ſhall we now give that faith to him which France aſſures us we juſtly and wiſely refuſed to them?

Yet if this concluſion be erroneous, every one muſt foreſee the calamities in which, if it ſhould be generally embraced, it muſt involve all Eu⯑rope. It is neceſſary therefore to conſider every thing bearing the form of an argument, which may be advanced againſt it. None has occurred to me deſerving conſideration, except the follow⯑ing: which although in ſome inſtances it might have weight, in this caſe, ſuch are the particular circumſtances with which it is attended, it may be clearly ſhowed to be intitled to none.

Some, it will be ſaid, who have waded through crimes to empire, have diſplayed in the poſſeſſion of it, qualities which with a juſter original title, would have enſured to their names a pre-eminent place among the beſt of ſovereigns. And is not Buonaparte daily making fair advances in that ex⯑piatory career? His acceſſion to power has not been clouded over by the exile or death of his pre⯑deceſſors: [67] his attention to decorum of manners has made him diſcountenance, as far as he is yet able, ſome of that depraved licentiouſneſs which has ſpread over the country like a moral peſtilence; or at leaſt he has checked the outward marks of it: he has lightened the reſtraints, and removed the ſevere oppreſſions of the profeſſors of a reli⯑gion, the great body of whom he may regard as his moſt powerful and irreconcileable enemies: all practicable indulgence he has extended to the emi⯑grants; of many he has permitted and even in⯑vited the return; and his juſtice and liberality has ſoftened the miſeries of others. And are ſuch returns to what is liberal and virtuous, to be taxed as void of all reality?

I anſwer that theſe appearances are ſtill to con⯑tinue to be ſo reputed, granting all that is here ſaid; formed of conſequences drawn, ſome from ac⯑counts of dubious or little authority; and others from ſuch as more probably lead to different con⯑cluſions, or which are evidently carried too far. For I ſay, of no bad quality of the character of the conſul, are the lines more full and dark, than of hypocriſy.

For he can counterfeit a faith in what (if he believe in a God) he knows to be a ſuperſtition injurious to a due reverence to him; and therefore to the obedience due to him; for an end as cruel as the means are impious; to lead ignorant and credulous nations into the deepeſt human calami⯑ties, [68] thoſe which have afflicted his own. This he has done, in his proclamation addreſſed to the in⯑habitants of Egypt. Speaking of his countrymen, and certainly meaning to be underſtood firſt of himſelf, ſolemnly invoking ‘the name of God gracious and merciful,’ he declares, ‘the French honour the prophet and his holy koran:—the French are true Muſſulmen^*.’ As a divine, it may be thought by ſome, that I have cenſured this crime with an intereſted rigour: to ſhow I have not deſcribed it too ſtrongly, I ſhall cite a text confirming what I have ſaid, from the canonical writings of one of the princes of the apoſtles of infidelity: he is conſidering indeed an act of apoſ⯑tacy, differing in ſome circumſtances from this: that of a man making a profeſſed change of reli⯑gion to ſave his own life and that of another: where although the mean is impious the end is lawful. Theſe are his words:

If we compare the ends for which ſuch an unhappy criminal puts on this maſk of hypo⯑criſy, [69] with thoſe of the French general; we muſt judge the latter to be the more atrocious and unprin⯑cipled hypocrite of the two: the crime of the one is committed on extreme compulſion, of the other in the plenitude of power.

And if in Egypt Buonaparte had found that the hypocritical aſſumption of ſome virtues, the fine playing off of ſomething like redreſs of griev⯑ances; would have probably attached to him a confidence, which would have enabled him to carry his ſanguinary ſchemes of rapacity into effect; would he with more reluctance have aſſumed this other maſk? Or is it contended, that to obtain the means of carrying his execrable deſigns into exe⯑cution, he would have rather choſen to have com⯑mitted one of the moſt impious crimes, than to have embraced a few meaſures, which would have been of temporary benefit to ſome not undeſerving objects? Now if it be certain, that he would have put on this ſpecious appearance of moderation in Egypt; ſhall we believe he will not do the ſame in Europe? Among blind and ignorant barbarians, it may be ſaid, whoſe praiſe or reprobation could be of little honour or diſcredit to him, he cared as little about the character of his meaſures: but there is no effrontery, which does not ſtand in more awe of the juſt and indignant condemnation of wiſe and enlightened nations. The admiſſion this contains that his acts are under the influence of [70] no moral principle may be paſſed by.—But aſk at Venice and at Genoa, with what awe he regards the judgment and execration of this part of the world?

After the proclamation of Buonaparte in Egypt, it would ſeem to be the extreme of folly, from the evident farce of the confeſſor at Dijon, to think him in real perſuaſion a member of the Romiſh church: but certainly no man with any pretenſion to wiſdom, or any ſtate governed by wiſe councils, can conceive that the wound he gave in that coun⯑try to the faith of his public inſtruments, is in the ſmalleſt degree cloſed thereby; or take any im⯑portant meaſure in conſequence of that belief. Is he who can falſely, and with ſolemn appeals to God, ſet up a religious pretence for the purpoſe of ſlaugh⯑tering and pillaging a people at peace with him, worthy of credit a ſecond time, be his ſecond re⯑ligious profeſſions ever ſo ſolemn? or may a true or a falſe religion be ſo ſported with? Even po⯑litical infidelity, which has not loſt ſight of mo⯑ral ſentiment and political wiſdom, would at all times have execrated ſuch a conduct; and at this juncture will view it with a ſtronger execration than ever. And to thoſe who continue to con⯑tend, that the hypocriſy of Buonaparte has not been ſuch, as to deprive his declarations of all faith, it may be fairly urged; that he either be⯑lieves or diſbelieves the creed of the Romiſh Church: then they may be deſired to make their [71] election of either of the alternatives, the poſition holds out to them: If they ſay he diſbelieves it— what is his act, in taking a confeſſor, and appointing him apartments at Dijon? It will not be affirmed it was a piece of the old etiquette of the revolu⯑tionary chiefs of the republic, which it was impo⯑litic to lay aſide, for fear of affronting the princi⯑ples of his partiſans: and which we have the guarantee of their influence over him, to expect ſomething from. And in this caſe, the language of the poet^*, who when he choſe it wrote morally, is perfectly applicable to him; ſuch hypocriſy is a lie to God and to man. Now let his retainers take the oppoſite ſide of the alternative, and ſay that he holds the creed of that church: judging him then by his own private conſcience and belief, as ſtated by them⯑ſelves; could there be in him a more profane and public act of apoſtacy, than the firſt words of his manifeſto in Egypt? ‘In the name of God gracious and merciful—there is no god but God;—he has no ſon—no aſſociate in his kingdom^†.’ Will he who ſolemnly denies the Redeemer whom in his heart he adores, be incapable of writing a few inflated phraſes to deceive you? or ſetting his hand to a treaty which he is predetermined on certain events to break, in expectation that he can [72] uſe it as the moſt probable means to bring them to maturity?

I proceed in the next place to ſhow, that the favourable ſentiments now attempted to be propa⯑gated, of the moderation of his principles, on the foundation of ſome of his late acts, are refuted by proofs of his hypocriſy, even ſuperior in validity, to thoſe brought above. Againſt the Romiſh church, of which he pretends to be a member, he has declared in words; againſt the ſyſtem of mo⯑deration which he pretends to embrace, he has de⯑clared in words, and in the ſtrongeſt acts.

Every one knows, that during that part of the tempeſtuous night of the revolutionary tyranny, when Barthelemi was in the direction, and be⯑fore the violence of Thermidor; ſomething like a dawn of moderation, like the beginning of the reign of a milder oppreſſion began to appear. The ſyſtem brought into action was the ſame, from which at this time the partiſans of the conſul draw their inferences, in favour of the principles of his future internal adminiſtration of the country. Immediately before that criſis, the councils and the directory were di⯑vided into two hoſtile parties: either of them at firſt would gladly have availed itſelf, of the protection the general's aſcendency over the armies would have given it; and in return, he might have com⯑manded any terms from either, of which he could avow his deſire: it was for a long time perfectly [73] open to him to chuſe his party, to eſtabliſh its power, and reap great rewards from his act.

From the meaſures then embraced by the general againſt moderate party we may judge, from what ſincerity of principle his late aſſumed moderation flows; a quality to which at that time, he gave the fatal name of royaliſm. It was to cruſh its partiſans, that he ‘demanded of his legions, whe⯑ther they were not ready, if it were neceſſary, to paſs with the rapidity of the eagle, the moun⯑tains which ſeparated them from France^*:’ and their reply was an eager declaration of hoſti⯑lity againſt the majority of the councils; ‘that it was only a ſtep from the Adige, to the Rhine and the Seine.’ And the army of Augereau^†, to whom Buonaparte cauſed the execution of his intended violence to be committed, told the ſame party in their manifeſto, ſomething leſs metaphori⯑cally, that ‘the price of their iniquities was at the point of their bayonets^‡.’ They paſſed the [74] magic circle, which the conſtitution had traced round the ſeat of legiſlation and government: and the majority of the directory, aided by Buona⯑parte's agent Augereau, who was appointed by him for that purpoſe, ſent the defenders of that moderation he now is ſaid to aſſume, to a death almoſt certain, in the peſtilential moraſſes of Cayenne. The diſpoſition the moſt open to con⯑fidence, muſt ſee in his aſſumption of the appear⯑ances of moderation, nothing at preſent, but a new act of political hypocriſy; and that inſtead of adding faith to the moſt ſpecious propoſitions, it diminiſhes the minute probability of ſincerity, which they might otherwiſe have carried.

His ſudden diſplay of reverence for a religion he has ſolemnly abjured, and of an attachment to political virtues he has perſecuted with proſcription and death, carry ſuch evident marks of being the meer ſacrifices of hypocriſy to a temporary expe⯑dience, that no abſurdity can ſurpaſs that of the endeavour to extract an argument from them, to prove that he, who, when his authority was limited, regardleſs of thoſe limits, trampled with greater per⯑fidy on the law of nations, than the directory them⯑ſelves, who left all other criminals recorded in the hiſtory of Europe far behind them; will now, armed with great and independent powers, fulfil the contracts he may enter into with foreign ſtates, with the cuſtomary degree of fidelity with which [75] they are in fact obſerved between nation and na⯑tion; however ſhort that may fall, of the ſanctity with which they ought to be adhered to.

In a word, from the very commencement of his political and military career, Buonaparte ſeems to have been attached to no religious or moral prin⯑ciples but thoſe of Dicaearchus, of which Polybius has tranſmitted to us the following account.

‘When the laſt Philip of Macedon, contrary to the faith of treaties, determined to attack the Cyclades; he had the command of the enter⯑priſe. Placed at the head of an expedition ap⯑parently ſo impious, he ſtopped not at the ſimple commiſſion of a great crime; but carried his inſolence ſo far, as to determine to aſtoniſh gods and men. Therefore on his arrival in port, he erected two altars; conſecrating one to Impiety, and the other to Injuſtice; and offered ſacrifices upon each^*.’ Curious as the monuments of ancient Greece are, this marble muſt be one of the moſt ſingular, even among them: the Buccaneer nation in its univerſal robberies, has profeſſedly ſeized with particular avidity, on all the fine or ſin⯑gular remains of Grecian art: if it ſhould have fallen into their hands, and now decorates their oſtentatious and crammed repoſitory of ſtolen goods; that altar might well ſuit the Corſican to [76] ſwear to the future treaty, and offer the federative ſacrifice upon, with the orthodox rites eſtabliſhed at its conſecration by its pious founder. But we ought to put little confidence in ſuch rites, or the per⯑manency of the compacts we enter into with the votary of ſuch divinities. No party I ſuppoſe among us will controvert this concluſion, hardly an individual; except there ſhould be found one, who having officially adviſed, that we ſhould become bound to the aid of the exiled family of the Bour⯑bons, may in his parliamentary capacity, perſiſt to urge for a declaration of the nation by its repreſenta⯑tives, that it will in no wiſe, in any future inſtant of the preſent war, endeavour to perform the obli⯑gation we have laid ourſelves under. But when the great conſul ſhall ſo ratify that peace, which is to join together the conflicting nations in bands of perpetual amity, happily of a firmer texture than the former weak ligaments the ſame in name only, but liable four or five times in every century, to be untwiſted by perfidy, or cut through by the ſword of ambition; we muſt intirely agree with his par⯑tizans— ſuch a ſtateſman, and ſuch a one only, will be worthy to receive on our parts, that high and ſolemn ratification.

There are other points of view of high import⯑ance, on which the fallacy of the pretenſion of thoſe, who contend that we ought to have entered into negociations on the late propoſition from France, and renounced immediately the guarantee [77] of that monarchy, might be ſhown; and which even reduce thoſe who maintain them to the moſt indefenſible ſituations. But I ſhall not now or pro⯑bably in future, enter upon them: inclined here to quit the argument, and not ſtopping to add any farther matter, even to anticipate one or two fri⯑volous objections to what I have written above; which may or may not occur, to the open or hy⯑pocritical enemies of the real peace and happineſs of the nations of Europe.

But although I refrain from conſidering any fur⯑ther objections to the matter I have written; I ſhall ſtate and conſider one which will be made to its manner.

Againſt that it will be zealouſly urged, that na⯑tions with whom we are in a ſtate of hoſtility, or the rulers of ſuch nations, ſhould never be attacked with the ſtrong and indignant language of crimina⯑tion: for even where its juſtice cannot be diſputed, it operates on their minds as inſult, provoking added injuries on their parts; and no good purpoſe can be anſwered by exaſperating repreſentations. That the lines of ſuch pictures, when drawn by the pencil of a profeſſed enemy, are ſeldom truly drawn: and if they obtain not general credit, will be eſtimated as the imbecillity of virulence; but if unfortunately they become the popular belief, they may put off the return of a peace, until long after the term a nation, ſo deluded, may have [78] felt that it becomes neceſſary: and the poſſibility that term may arrive, no one can deny.

To what is ſaid of neceſſity, it is readily an⯑ſwered, that in this caſe, the neceſſity admitted has certain qualities by which it may be deſcribed: it muſt be ſuch a one as can be acted upon; but this it cannot be, when the public enemy is under a neceſſity of continuing the war. We muſt look alſo to its origin; the difficulty and danger of con⯑tinuing the war: but againſt this is to be ſtated, the danger emergent upon the peace: that after we ſhall have diſarmed, a perfidious enemy will certainly watch his opportunity to renew the war, at a criſis moſt convenient to himſelf, and threat⯑ening to be moſt fatal to us: and here the balance of danger and difficulty ſeems on the other ſide. And this neceſſity is moreover required to be of that urgency, which gives to a nation a real diſpen⯑ſation from a moral obligation, ſuch as the guarantee is; for public treaties conſtitute ſuch an obligation.

Nor can ſuch charges, in any poſſible though improbable caſe, be attended with the irritating effect ſuppoſed, on thoſe againſt whom they are brought. The facts on which they are grounded, are all tranſcribed literally, from authorities of the moſt extenſive circulation: and the cenſure would be very ſingular on any one, that he recalls from oblivion, what is of a nature never to be forgotten. There remains only therefore one circumſtance in [79] which this letter can have the tendency cenſured: that theſe facts are conſidered here ſomewhat in a new point of view, and applied to in a new way to the queſtion. But here I am ſenſible that thoſe who take up all the reſt of the objection againſt me, will be among the firſt to deny the charge on my behalf. And however deſirous I may be, to enter on a defence againſt it myſelf, I rely with much more confidence on the zeal and ability with which they will do it for me: I leave it to them therefore intirely, without ſuggeſting a ſingle hint, which they might apply on the ſubject.

But until the virtuous ſentiments of moral in⯑dignation^*, ‘the ſtrong antipathy of good to bad,’ ſhall be eradicated by the reformers of our nature (for even the moral conſtitution of our nature ordained by Providence has its ſet of re⯑formers). Men will continue to think, that on the higheſt crimes the ſtrongeſt reprobation ought to be inflicted; and include thoſe mentioned above among them.

And if they be not duly preſent to general re⯑collection at certain ſeaſons, it will become even of the higheſt neceſſity to ſtate them afreſh with all their conſequences; and particularly it becomes a duty, when forbearance tends ſtrongly to expoſe [80] new victims to the repetition of former crimes. Where they have been fatal to individuals only, the truth of this has never been conteſted: but a po⯑litical party now contends, that this does not hold equally true of ſuch as may involve ſtates and na⯑tions in utter deſolation; and their native country as well as any other; the miſery ariſing from which, muſt be perpetuated to many generations. But thoſe who ſhall venture to cenſure the indig⯑nant ſtatement of crimes that are the ſcourges of the world in awful periods like the preſent, muſt rank under one of the three following deſcriptions: either of partiſans of the criminals and promoters of the ſucceſs of their meditated enormities; or of factionaries, who for a chance of obtaining gain or power, determinately involve their country in the hazard of deſtruction; or men of that duped and devoted blindneſs, whom the calamities of others, will never teach wiſdom for themſelves.

It is therefore not only defenſible but neceſſary and right, to call the friends of their country to look with ſolicitous apprehenſion, to the events which muſt follow a peace, ſigned by the ſame hand which guaranteed the ſtates of Venice and Genoa, and almoſt before the ink of the ſubſcrip⯑tion was dry, ſubſcribed the inſtruments of their annihilation. They may juſtly ſuppoſe the motives of the grand conſul the ſame in any future treaty with us, as in his two latter compacts with them; to lay aſleep the vigilance of the ſtate, the deſtruc⯑tion [81] of which he is plotting: expecting that if after the peace we continue powerfully armed, the ex⯑penſe will foſter the ſpirit of diſcontent until it be matured into inſurrection among us, without his appearing at firſt to caſt any fuel upon the fire. And in caſe we diſarm, the correſpondence of the two countries being re-opened, his plan will be to employ every machination, to inflame and propa⯑gate the ſpirit of anarchy and rebellion in every claſs, by the aid of which he will renew his hoſtile attack upon us with better hope of ſucceſs. If we be thus forced into a ſecond conteſt, in victory we ſhall have much to fear, in conſequence of the burthen of another war almoſt immediately ſuc⯑ceeding the preſent; from the inflammable ſtate and perverted diſpoſition of the populace, and the criminal ambition of their greater and leſs leaders; educated and diſciplined in the arts of attacking and ſubverting civil government, by the experience of more than ten years here, and the example of the more ſucceſsful diviſions of their fraternity abroad, embarked in the ſame warfare, and acting with the utmoſt dexterity, and frequently with ſucceſs in the ſame and almoſt every other variety of circum⯑ſtances.

But it is time to put an end to this very long letter, with aſſurances that I am, &c.