AN ESSAY UPON LOANS.
[3]HAVING Treated in brief upon the Difficult Subject of Credit, and that, if (the Town is not a Deceiver), with ſome Succeſs; it ſeems neceſſary to ſpeak a Word or two upon the great Object, upon which that Cre⯑dit Operates, viz. Loans of Money up⯑on the Publick Demands.
The Author, an Enemy to long Pre⯑faces, preſents his Thoughts to the World upon this Head, without any o⯑ther Apology than this, That he thinks it a Service at this time, to remove the [4] Miſtakes which ſome make, and others improve to our Diſadvantage, while they think it is to the Diſadvantage of ſome Body elſe: While they aim at an Object they would hurt, they Wound themſelves; and in Proſecuting private or Party-Prejudices, Injure, Weaken, and Aſſault the Publick Good; which every Man has a Property in, and therefore is in Duty bound to Defend.
A Diſcourſe upon Credit, is naturally an Introduction to a Diſcourſe upon Loan; Credit without Loan is a Beautiful Flower, fair to the Eye, fragrant to the Smell, or⯑namental to the Plot of Ground it grows in; but yielding neither Fruit nor Seed, neither Profit to the Poſſeſſor of it, by making due Advantage of its Produce, or Benefit to Poſterity, by Propagation of its Species. On the other Hand, Loans with⯑out Credit are like the Labouring Plow⯑man upon a Barren Soil, who Works, Cultivates, Sweats, and Toils, but to no purpoſe, all the Fruit of his Labour, ends in Sterility and Abortion.
Loans are the Conſequences of Credit, and the Evidence of that particular Qua⯑lity, which in the preceding Diſcourſe of Credit, I lay'd down as its Foundation; I mean General Probity, Punctual, Juſt, and Honourable Management.
[5] To explain Things as I go; tho' this needs but little: By Loans, I am now to be underſtood to mean, Lending Money to the preſent Government: The Thing will ex⯑tend to private Affairs, and I might take up a great deal of your Time, in ſpeak⯑ing of the Effects of Credit in Trade, ſuch as delivering Goods by Tradeſmen to one another, Paper-Credit in Affairs of Caſh; Pledging, Pawning, and all the Articles of Security for Money, practis'd in General Commerce; but theſe Things are not to the preſent Purpoſe.
The Author of this, confines his Diſ⯑courſe to the Government Borrowing Money of the Subject, whether upon Se⯑curities Eſtabliſh'd by Parliament equi⯑valent in Value deliver'd, publick Faith, general Credit, or otherwiſe.
The Nature of theſe Securities, the Rea⯑ſon, the Uſefulneſs, and the Foundation they ſtand on, are no part of the preſent Subject; they are reſerv'd by the Author to a Head by themſelves, if Leiſure and the publick Service make it proper to pre⯑ſent you a Diſcourſe upon Funds.
The preſent War, which, with a ſmall Interval of an unſetled and Impolitick Peace, is now in its 22d Year, has been remarkable in ſeveral Circumſtances, above all the Wars that ever this Nation [6] has been Engag'd in, ſince the Roman's poſſeſs'd it.
It has been,
- The longeſt in it's Duration
- The Fierceſt and moſt Expenſive in Blood;
- The moſt Famous in Succeſſes, and un⯑heard of Victories;
- It has been carry'd on againſt the moſt Powerful Enemies;
- It has produc'd the moſt firm, and the Greateſt Confederacy;
- And it has in View, the moſt Glorious Concluſion.
Together with theſe Things, it has this alſo peculiar to it; that it has been carry'd on at an Expence, which has ſur⯑mounted not all that ever went before it only, but all that it could be imagin'd, was poſſible for any Nation of our Dimenſi⯑ons in the World, to ſupport.
Not the Fr. King only has been deceiv'd in the Efforts made by this Nation in the Proceſs of the War; which, as penetra⯑ting as he is, he never thought poſſible; but is is moſt certain, had the wiſeſt and beſt Calculator in the Iſland been told what the Undertaking would have call'd for, he would have determined it to be forty Millions Sterling beyond what the [7] Nation was able to do, and that without ſelling the very Nation, it could not be done.
As the view of the Expence would have made us wiſely have avoided the War, and either not have begun it, or long ſince ended it, upon the beſt Terms we could obtain from the Enemy; ſo had the Enemy believed England capable of ſupporting the War, at ſuch a prodigy of Expence, he would never have begun it; which the King of France himſelf has been heard, in Terms very plain, to acknow⯑ledge.
When upon the Revolution the Parli⯑ment fell moſt willingly into the War, as a thing the Enemy, by eſpouſing King James's Intereſt, made abſolutely Neceſ⯑ſary: The firſt Brach of our Expence was carried on in the common Road of levying Taxes, and the Money required for every Years Expence was raiſed and paid within the Year.
The Nation was rich, Trade prodigi⯑ouſly great, Paper-Credit run high, and the Goldſmiths in Lombard-ſtreet, &c. commanded immenſe Summs; Antici⯑pations were indeed in Practice, they had been ſo of Old, and borrowing Clauſes were added to the Bills of Aid; but theſe laſted but a few Months, the Money [8] came in of courſe, and they were paid off in their turn: Land-Tax, Polls, ad⯑ditional Duties of Cuſtoms, Exciſes, and the like, were the Ways and Means by which theſe things were done; the Year generally ſupported its own Demands, all the Loans were ſuppoſed to be Tem⯑porary, and to end with the Collection.
As the War every Year grew heavier upon us, and the Expence increaſed, new Ways and Means were neceſſary to ſup⯑ply the growing Demand, till all the Taxes that could be raiſed, by the ordi⯑nary Way, were found little enough to bring the Annual Expence about.
This put the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury upon liſtening to new Taxes, and entertaining all the Projects for raiſ⯑ing Money, that the working Heads of the Age could ſupply them with.
Theſe, back'd with Parliamentary Au⯑thority, were too unadviſedly ſuppoſed to raiſe ſuch certain Summs as the Pub⯑lick Occaſions then call'd for, and borrow⯑ing Clauſes were added to them, limit⯑ting the ſaid Summs; which paſs'd as a giving the Treaſury Credit upon the Acts of Parliament for ſuch Summs as they were granted for; but the Collections falling infinitely ſhort of the Summs pro⯑poſed, left the Publick in Arrear to the [9] Lenders, and from hence came the great Load of Deficiencies, which the Nation feels the Weight of to this Hour.
As the Summs given fell ſhort, ſo the War called every Year for ſtill greater Summs; which added to the Deficiencies of the old Taxes, grew ſo heavy, that our Mannagers found it was in vain to ſtruggle with the Difficulty any Longer, upon the foot of Annual Taxes; and that it was next to impoſſible to raiſe every Year what the publick Occaſions call'd for.
This lead them of courſe to a new Me⯑thod to ſupply the great Demands of the War, (viz.) by Eſtabliſhing Annual Re⯑ceipts of limited or perpetual Intereſts for ſuch Summs, as might be borrowed upon the Credit of the Nation, the Principal to ſink in the Hands of the Publick. Theſe were call'd FUNDS.
To encourage the People to lend upon theſe Funds, Premioes for advancing the Money, large Intereſts, and other Ad⯑vantages were annex'd; ſuch as 14 per Cent. per Annum upon Annuities, with Survivourſhip, Chance of Prizes by way of Lottery, 7 per Cent. upon Exchequer Bills, and the like.
Here, together with the innumerable Tal⯑lies, which upon the Deficiency of former [10] Taxes as aforeſaid, went about the Town upon Diſcount, and the great Obſtructi⯑on of running Caſh, by calling in the old Coin, was the firſt riſe given to the Art and Myſtery of Stock-Jobbing; a Pra⯑ctice, whether good or evil in its Conſe⯑quences to the publick Affairs, is not to the preſent Purpoſe to enquire.
By this Method has the greateſt part of our Yearly Taxes, ſince that time, been raiſed; the Parliament Eſtabliſhing Funds for payment of Intereſt, and the People advanving Money, by way of Loan, on thoſe Intereſts.
It may not be improper here for ſome People to reflect, That in the Advantages granted by the Government upon theſe Loans, and the great Diſcounts upon Tal⯑lies on the deficient Aids, mentioned a⯑bove, were founded the great ſtocks of Money, Banks and powerful Credit; with which ſome People are grown to ſuch a height, eſpecially in their own O⯑pinion, as to talk of influencing the pub⯑lick Affairs, and as it were menacing the Government with Apprehenſions of their Lending or not Lending, as they are, or are not pleaſed with the Management of, or Managers in the publick Oeconomy; and this is the Subject I am a little to ſpeak to.
[11] LOANS to the Government, by the Gradations aforeſaid, having been found eſſentially Neceſſary, the firſt Steps to that new Method were found fatally In⯑cumbering; the high Premio's given, the great Advantages propoſed, and the large Intereſts paid to the Lender. The Go⯑vernment appear'd like a diſtreſſed Deb⯑tor, who was every Day ſqueez'd to Death by the exorbitant greedineſs of the Len⯑der; the Citizens began to decline Trade and turn Uſerers; Foreign Commerce attended with the hazards of War, had infinite Diſcouragements, and the People in general drew home their Effects, to embrace the Advantage of lending their Money to the Government. Then grew up the BANK, whoſe ſecond Subſcripti⯑on being founded upon a Parliamentary Security, for making good the deficient Tallies; was formed by receiving in thoſe Tallies at Par, which coſt the Subſcribers but 55 to 65 per Cent; by which the greateſt Eſtates were raiſed in the leaſt time, and the moſt of them, that has been known in any Age, or in any part of the World.
This, I ſay, turn'd the whole City in⯑to a Corporation of Uſury, and they ap⯑pear'd not as a Bank, but rather one ge⯑neral Society of Bankers; all Men that [12] could draw any Money out of their Trades, run with it to Exchange-Alley, to buy Stocks and Tallies, Subſcribe to Banks or Companies; or to the Exchequer with it to put into Loans, and lend it upon the advantageous FUNDS ſettled by Parliament.
It is meet to mention theſe things, for the ſake of the People who have gotten ſuch great Eſtates by the Government, to let them know from whence the Advan⯑tages they have made, did proceed; and alſo for ſome other Reaſons which will appear in the ſequel of this Diſcourſe.
The Government, to preſerve to them⯑ſelves the Advantage of theſe Loans, and yet to avoid being Impoſed upon and Oppreſt by thoſe exorbitant Intereſts and Encouragements, about the Year 1698. entered into Meaſures to ſecure the Loan of Money, and yet lower the Ad⯑vantages given to the Lenders.
The firſt was done by the Parliament, apylying themſelves to reſtore Credit, by a Vote to make good all Deficiencies, and Erecting a punctual, juſt, and fair Ma⯑nagement of the Payments; by which every ſeveral Engagement being Honou⯑rably complyed with, the Credit of the publick Affairs reviv'd, and the Exorbi⯑tances the former Years were expoſed to, wore off of courſe.
[13] This tedious Recapitulation of Things will appear leſs trouble to the Reader, when he ſees the uſe I ſhall make of it.
Here may be ſeen ſeveral Things, which, if well conſidered, tend to the lowring the high and extravagant Ima⯑ginations of ſome People, with reſpect to Loans, Credit, Borrowing and Lending of Money to the Government; ſuch as theſe.
- I. Large Intereſt, Advantages, Premio's for advance of Money, and the like, will bring in Loans in ſpight of Parties, in ſpight of Deficiencies, in ſpight of all the Conſpiracies in the World to the contrary; while a juſt, honourable, and punctual Per⯑formance on the part of the Govern⯑ment, does but maintain the Credit of the Nation.
- II. As the Affairs of the Govern⯑ment have made Loans neceſſary, and they can not go on without Bor⯑rowing; ſo the ſtream of Trade and Caſh is ſo Univerſally turn'd into publick Funds, the whole Ntia⯑on feels ſo much of gains, ſo much by, and depends ſo much upon the pub⯑lick Credit, that they can no more [14] do without the Funds, than the Funds can do without the Loan.
- III. Theſe Borrowings and Lend⯑ings are become ſo much a Trade, ſo many Families have their Em⯑ployment from, and get ſo great Eſtates by the Negotiating theſe Things, that it is impoſſible for any particular Sett of Men to put a ſtop to it; or to get any ſuch Power in⯑to their Hands, as to give the Go⯑vernment juſt Grounds of Ap⯑prehenſion, that this or that Party of Men can put a Cheque to the publick Affairs, be they Whigs, To⯑ries, City, Court, Banks, Company, or what they pleaſe to call them⯑ſelves.
I ſhall not tye my ſelf to ſpeak to theſe apart, the liberty of this Tract will not ad⯑mit of it, but in a Summary way you will find the Fact Demonſtrated, and the Conſequence Evident.
Men in Trade, more eſpecially than the reſt of Mankind, are bound by their Inte⯑reſt; Gain is the end of Commerce, where that Gain viſibly attends the Adventurer, as no Hazard can diſcourage, ſo no other Obligation can prevent the Application‘Impiger extremos currit Mercator ad Indos.’
[15] To pretend after this, that Parties ſhall Govern Mankind againſt their Gain, is to Philoſophize wiſely upon what may be, and what would be Politick to bring to paſs; but what no Man can ſay was ever put in Practiſe to any Perfection; or can be ſo by the common Principles that Go⯑vern Mankind in the World.
There have been Combinations in Trade, and People have ſeem'd to act counter to their preſent Intereſts; nay, have gone on in apparent Loſs, in pur⯑ſuance of ſuch Combinations; but they have always been made in order to ſecure a Return of greater Gain; and therefore the Laws made againſt ſuch Combinati⯑ons, are not made to prevent Peoples go⯑ing on to their Loſs, but to prevent the end of that appearing Loſs; viz. the In⯑groſſment or Monopolizing of Trade, to come at ſome Advantage over others, and thereby make an exorbitant Gain.
But it was never yet heard, that the Zeal of any Party got the better ſo much of their Intereſt, as to put a general Stop to the current and natural Stream of their Intereſt; that a People ſhould reject the fair and juſt Advantages which have rai⯑ſed ſo many Eſtates, and are the due Supplies to the Breaches made by the War upon general Commerce. To talk, [16] that we will not lend Money to the Go⯑vernment, while the Parliament ſettles Funds, allows Intereſts, gives Premio's and Advantages, is to ſay, Nature will ceaſe, Men of Money will abſtain from being Men loving to get Money. That Tradeſmen ſhould ceaſe to ſeek Gain, and Uſerers to love large Intereſts; that Men that have gain'd Money ſhould leave off deſiring to get more; and that Zeal to a Party ſhould prevail over Zeal to their Families; that Men ſhould forfeit their Intereſt for their Humour, and ſerve their Politicks at the price of their In⯑tereſt.
Let thoſe that promiſe themſelves theſe things, enquire among the Merchants, and ſee if Parties govern any thing in Trade; if there is either Whig or Tory in a good Bargain; Churchman or Diſ⯑ſenter in a good Freight; High Church or Low Church in a Good Adventure; if a Shop-keeper ſees a good Penny⯑worth, a Scrivener a good Mortgage, a Money'd Man a good Purchaſe; Do they ever ask what Party he is of that parts with it? Nay, rather in ſpight of Party Averſions, do we not Buy, Sell, Lend, Borrow, enter into Companies, Partner⯑ſhips, and the cloſeſt Engagements with oen another, nay Marry with one ano⯑ther [17] without any Queſtions of the Mat⯑ter?
Let us come to the general Body of People as Fate has unhappily divided us; where are the Men? ſuppoſing a Party Conſpiracy againſt the Government in this matter of Loan; Where are the Men who would hold together, and refuſe making ſeven per Cent. of their Money to preſerve the Engagement? Where the Men who would ſtay their Hands, and loſe the probability of gaining a Thou⯑ſand Pounds a Year by a Lottery? No, no, it is not to be done; the ſtream of Deſire after Gain runs too ſtrong in Man⯑kind, to bring any thing of that kind to Perfection in this Age. The thing is ſo impracticable in its Nature, that it ſeems a Token of great Ignorance in the Hu⯑mour of the Age to ſuggeſt it; and a Man would be tempted to think thoſe People that do ſuggeſt it, do not them⯑ſelves believe what they ſay about it.
In the matter of Loan it next comes in our way to enquire, how does the Caſh of the Nation, which is the thing we are upon, ſtand divided, and how is the Go⯑vernment in hazard of any Combinati⯑on of this kind? If it be poſſible to make this Enquiry without any Party By aſs, and ſo as to give Offence to neither ſide, [18] it ſhall be done. I do not ſay who is in, or who out; who has the Management, who had it, or who would have it; let that ſtand as it does, or may; but how do the Parties ſtand, with reſpect to one another; ſuppoſing any one Party would endeavour to ſtagnate the general Circu⯑lation of Credit, in Prejudice of the other: As for the purpoſe;
Suppoſe a Whig Adminiſtration, and all the High Church Men and their Appen⯑dices in hopes to reduce them to Exigen⯑ces in the Management, ſhould Con⯑ſpire together to run down the Publick Credit, and lend no Money on any of the Funds. Vice Verſa; ſuppoſe a Reverſe, and the Whigs in general ſhould do the ſame thing: Let us enquire; Are either of theſe Parties ſso rich in Caſh, ſo power⯑ful in Lending, that all the Loans muſt depend upon their Money; or are either of theſe Parties ſo inconſiderable in this Caſe, that their Support ſhall ſignify no⯑thing without the concurrence of the o⯑ther? If the laſt were true, that weak Party could make no manner of Figure in this Government, or be ſignificant e⯑nough for the Sovereign without viſible Diſtraction to engage with. To deſcend to Particulars.
[19] The Notion is general, at leaſt among themſelves, that the Groſs of the Caſh is with the Whigs; and the Review ſpeaks of it as a thing capable of ſome Demonſtrations; tho' with his good li⯑king, it may be ſaid, he may be miſtaken. Some have gone a length beyond the Author of the Review, and will have it, that the Money lies in the Hands of the Diſſenters; and will allow the Church⯑men, eſpecially the High-Church-Men to have little enough for themſelves, and by conſequence leſs to ſpare to the Publick Loans.
Others will tell you, the High-Church-Party have a large ſhare of the Nation's Caſh in their Hands; that they have ge⯑nerally a Proportion of Money, and beyond Compariſon more Land than the other. They add, That as they have more Land, they can when they pleaſe have more Money; and that therefore tho' they ſhould grant that the Low-Church and Diſſenters put together, have the moſt ready Money, yet allowing them the Superiority in the Lands, they can fetch the Money into their own Hands when they pleaſe.
It is not for me to determine who has moſt Land, or who moſt Money; it is my Opinion, neither have ſo much [20] or ſo little, as to render them Formidable or Contemptible to one another in the Matter of Loan. Both Sides have enough to be uſeful to, and both Sides have little enough to ſtand in need of one another; and in this Diviſion the Ballance of Parties (which at this time is the onely Felicity that we can find in having any Parties at all,) does conſiſt.
I make no Difficulty to Acknowledge, That where the Land is, there is the Foundation of all the real Wealth in the Nation: I do not ſay, it is in this or that Party excluſive; That the Gentlemen, who call themſelves of the High-Party, have a great ſhare of the Land, is moſt certain, but that they have ſo much more than the Whigs and Diſſenters join'd, as ſome will alledge, I cannot de⯑termine. No doubt where the Land is, there can be no want of Money, becauſe Land will at any time raiſe Money; whereas Money, without the Aſſiſtance of Trade, Landed-men, or Governments, can operate no way, but like the Viper, preying upon it ſelf.
This leads me to Examine the Difference between Loan and Fund in this Caſe. Examining which, ſomething may perhaps come to light for our Inſtru⯑ction, [21] which has not been much thought of before,
Solomon tells us, The Borrower is Ser⯑vant to the Lender; but with the Wiſe⯑man's leave, in this Caſe it is not ſo. Solomon is there to be underſtood ſpeaking of the poor borrowing Wretch, who Bor⯑row'd upon the Foot of Charity and Compaſſion, and therefore he juſt before ſays, The Poor uſes many Entreaties, but the Rich anſwer roughly. The poor Man that Borrows on his ſingle Promiſe to ſup⯑ply his urgent Neceſſity, uſes Entreaties, as we may ſay, He Begs to Borrow; but the rich Lender is ſurly, hardly conſents, anſwers Roughly, and is with Difficulty brought to Lend.
But we are to Diſtinguiſh here between Solomon's Borrower deſcrib'd as above, and he that Borrows on a ſufficient current Security: He is no more Servant to the Lender than the Lender is Servant to him; having an unqueſtion'd Security to give, he ſcorns to ask you twice; but if you do not think fit to lend your Money, he goes to another.
This is apparent in the Public Secu⯑rities, as well as in private; and will make it out, if ever put to the Teſt, That the People of England ſtand in as much need of the Funds to lend their [22] Money upon, as the Government ſtands in need of their Money upon thoſe Funds. I prove this by a matter of Fact, freſh in your Memories, and undeniable in all its Circumſtances. In the Beginning of the War, when the Money lay abroad in TRADE, the Knowledge of Affairs young, and the People not apprized of the thing; the Anticipations upon Taxes and Loans came heavy, and were ſmall, What drew them on? Large Premio's, high Intereſts, Chances of Prizes, Survivorſhip, and the like.
Thus when the Neceſſities of the Go⯑vernment were great and their Credit young to Borrow, the Lenders made their Market: But when the Government found themſelves rich in Funds, their Demands, tho' great, yet not preſſing; Credit Eſtabliſh'd, the Parliament, the great Fund of Funds, and Center of Credit, ready to make good Deficiencies, and leaving no room for Jealouſies in the Minds of the People, What was the Caſe? You took off your Premio's, you drew no more Lotteries for 16 Years, you lower'd your Intereſt, you brought your Annuities from 14 to 7 per Cent. and your Intereſt on Tallies from 7 to 6 per Cent. per Ann. From 7 per Cent. upon Exchequer-Bills, you came down to 4 [23] per Cent. And what was the Conſequence? The Neceſſity of the Lenders being more to lodge their Money for Improve⯑ment, than the Neceſſity of the Borrow⯑ers was to ask, they came always down to your Price; and had you brought the general Intereſt of Loans to 4 per Cent. they muſt have come down, for Money is no longer Money than it can be im⯑prov'd. Nay, it is to be obſerv'd, the Eagerneſs of the People to bring in their Money encreaſed, as the Advantages of Lending decreaſed: Having no way to improve it better, they were under an abſolute Neceſſity of bringing it in, for the ſake of the Improvement.
Are theſe any of the People, who can be ſuppoſed to ſay to the Parliament, They will not lend their Money? It would almoſt provoke a Man to laugh at them. You won't lend your Money! Why, what will you do with it?
Perhaps you wont lend it to the Go⯑vernment, well you will then lend it upon private Security, upon Land, and the like; why then thoſe you lend it to, will lend it to the Government, and ſo the Malice of the Affair will be loſt, and the Advantage too. Will you run it into Trade? Do ſo by all means. Some of thoſe Hands it will Circulate through, [24] will lend it to the Government. Your very Export and Import is a Loan to the Government. In ſhort, the Govern⯑ment ſhall have your Money firſt or laſt, do what you will with it.
Suppoſe it were poſſible to divide this Nation into two Parts, the Landed-men and the Money'd-men, and the Govern⯑ment were to be put into the Hands of the Firſt againſt the Conſent of the Last; and the Money'd-men knowing the Land⯑ed-men could not carry on the War with⯑out Money, reſolv'd to lend them none, I mean as a Government, What Courſe ſhould the Landed-men take?
In my Opinion, they ſhould paſs an Act, That none of thoſe People ſhould be admitted to lend any Money to the Government at all; What then would be the Conſequence? They would be immediately diſtreſs'd with the Weight of Money without Improvement; they would eagerly lend it to the Landed-men at 4 per Cent. upon their Land; and they again lending it to the Government at 6 and 7 per Cent. the Government would be ſupply'd, and the Landed-men would get 3 per Cent. by the other Mens Money.
I am not making Application; but let any of the preſent Parties, who Boaſt of [25] their having the Groſs of the Money, reflect what they would ſay, if an Act were to paſs, That no Whig's Money, or no Diſſenter's Money, or no High-Church⯑man's Money ſhould be accepted upon Loan; That they ſhould not be allow'd a Transfer upon any Stock, or to Buy any Annuity; the Complaint would be very loud of their being excluded the common Advantages of their Fellow-Subjects; and that paying their Share of Taxes, they ought to have room for equal Improvements, and ought not to be ex⯑cluded; and this is true too, it would be hard. Then they would run about to their Friends among the contrary Party, ſhelter their Money under their Names, and perhaps give ½ per Cent. or 1 per Cent. Commiſſion to others to Lend, Buy and Transfer for them: And what would the Government feel in all this?
The Caſe is this, No Party can be ſo fooliſh to think they can be able ſtop the Loan of Money to the Government; nor need the Government think of putting the Laws in Execution againſt ſuch Combi⯑nation (tho' if any ſuch appear'd, no doubt they might be proſecuted.) Keep up but the Credit of Parliament, and let that Parliament find Funds, it is not in the Power of any Party of Men to Stop [26] the Current of Loans, any more than they can Stop the Tide at London-Bridge, in its conſtant Courſe of Flux and Re⯑flux from and to the Sea.
There is no doubt but the French have Agents amons us, who would be glad to weaken our Hands in the War, and pre⯑vent our Supplies for that Purpoſe: From them it muſt be that theſe Notions creep into Peoples Heads; Engliſh Men cannot in their common Senſes be ſo weak; tel⯑ling us that we ſhall have no Loans, is much at one to telling us we ſhall have no Recruits to our Army; as, while you can Pay Armies, you ſhall never want Men; ſo while you can pay Intereſt, you ſhall never want Loans.
The Eſtates that ſome Men boaſt of, by which they are enabled to Lend, and made bold enough to threaten a ſtop of it, were gain'd by Lending. Thoſe that have them are too eager to Encreaſe them, thoſe that want them too eager to Gain them, by the ſame method, and all too Covetous and too Selfiſh not to come into any good Propoſal.
The Worſt theſe Men can do, is, by ma⯑king things appear backward, to raiſe the Rate of Intereſts, and move the Parliament to add ſomething to the uſual Encourage⯑ments for lending; and if the Nation pays [27] this, who have they to blame for it? Yet neither will they be able to do this, the preſent Credit of the Britiſh Parliament putting it out of their Power; for as the neceſſity of Lending will prompt on one Hand, the undoubted Security of Parlia⯑mentary Credit removes all the Jealouſies our Party-men would raiſe on the other.
The Zeal ſome Men ſhew for their Country, as well as Juſtice to the Govern⯑ment, is nevertheleſs very Conſpicuous in this; who (firſt) to glorifie their Party-Pre⯑judices would have the War miſcarry, ra⯑ther than Money ſhould be lent, while ſuch Men Manage as they pretend not to like; (ſecondly) reproach ſome People with De⯑ſigns to make Peace with France, and yet endeavour by diſcouraging Loans to render it impoſſible for them to carry on the War.
But both theſe will be diſappointed: While the Parliament Supports Credit, and good Funds Support the Parliament, Money will come in as naturally, as Fire will aſcend, or Water flow; nor will it be in the Power of our worſt Enemies to prevent it.
If the Author of this appears again in Publick, it may be upon the Subject of FƲNDS.