MOTION, RELATIVE TO THE SPEECH from the THRONE.

A MOTION was made, That a repreſentation be preſented to his Majeſty, moſt humbly to offer to his Royal conſidera⯑tion, that the Addreſs of this Houſe upon his Majeſty's Speech from the Throne, was dictated ſolely by our conviction of his Majeſty's own moſt gracious intentions towards his people, which, as we feel with gratitude, ſo we are ever ready to acknowledge with chearfulneſs and ſatisfaction.

Impreſſed with theſe ſentiments, we were willing to ſeparate from our general expreſſions of duty, reſpect, and veneration to his Majeſty's royal perſon and his princely virtues, all diſcuſſion what⯑ever with relation to ſeveral of the matters ſuggeſted, and ſeveral of the expreſſions employed, in that ſpeech.

That is was not fit or becoming, that any decided opinion ſhould be formed by his faithful Commons, on that ſpeech, without a degree of deliberation adequate to the importance of the object. [2] Having afforded ourſelves due time for that deliberation, we do now moſt humbly beg leave to repreſent to his Majeſty, that, in the ſpeech from the Throne, his Miniſters have thought proper to uſe a language of a very alarming import, unauthorized by the practice of good times, and irreconcileable to the principles of this Go⯑vernment.

Humbly to expreſs to his Majeſty, that it is the privilege and duty of this Houſe to guard the Conſtitution from all infringement on the part of Miniſters; and, whenever the occaſion requires it, to warn them againſt any abuſe of the authorities committed to them: but it is very lately^*, that, in a manner not more unſeemly than irregular and prepoſterous, Miniſters have thought proper, by admonition from the Throne implying diſtruſt and reproach, to convey the expectations of the people to us, their ſole repre⯑ſentatives^†; and have preſumed to caution us, the natural guardians of the Conſtitution, againſt any infringement of it on our parts.

This dangerous innovation we, his faithful Commons, think it our duty to mark; and as theſe admonitions from the Throne, by their frequent repetition, ſeem intended to lead gradually to the eſtabliſhment of an uſage, we hold ourſelves bound thus ſolemnly to proteſt againſt them.

This Houſe will be, as it ever ought to be, anxiouſly attentive to the inclinations and intereſts of its conſtituents: nor do we deſire to ſtraiten any of the avenues to the Throne, or to either Houſe of Par⯑liament. [3] But the ancient order, in which the rights of the people have been exerciſed, is not a reſtriction of theſe rights. It is a method providently framed in favour of thoſe privileges, which it preſerves and enforces by keeping in that courſe which has been found the moſt effectual for anſwering their ends. His Majeſty may receive the opinions and wiſhes of individuals under their ſignatures, and of bodies corporate under their ſeals, as expreſſing their own particular ſenſe: and he may grant ſuch redreſs as the legal powers of the Crown enables the Crown to afford. This, and the other Houſe of Parliament, may alſo receive the wiſhes of ſuch corpora⯑tions and individuals by petition. The collective ſenſe of his people his Majeſty is to receive from his Commons in Parliament aſſembled. It would deſtroy the whole ſpirit of the Conſtitution, if his Com⯑mons were to receive that ſenſe from the Miniſters of the Crown, or to admit them to be a proper or a regular channel for convey⯑ing it.

That the Miniſters in the ſaid Speech declare, ‘"His Majeſty has a juſt and confident reliance, that we (his faithful Commons) are animated with the ſame ſentiments of loyalty, and the ſame attachment to our excellent Conſtitution, which he had the happineſs to ſee ſo fully manifeſted in every part of the king⯑dom."’

To repreſent, that his faithful Commons have never failed in loyalty to his Majeſty. It is new to them to be reminded of it. It is unneceſſary and invidious to preſs it upon them by any example. This recommendation of loyalty, after his Majeſty has ſat for ſo many years, with the full ſupport of all deſcriptions of his ſubjects, on the Throne of this kingdom, at a time of profound peace, and without any pretence of the exiſtence or apprehenſion of war or [4] conſpiracy, becomes in itſelf a ſource of no ſmall jealouſy to his faithful Commons; as many circumſtances lead us to apprehend that therein the Miniſters have reference to ſome other meaſures and principles of loyalty, and to ſome other ideas of the Conſtitution, than the laws require, or the practice of Parliament will admit.

No regular communication of the proofs of loyalty and attach⯑ment to the Conſtitution, alluded to in the ſpeech from the Throne, have been laid before this Houſe, in order to enable us to judge of the nature, tendency, or occaſion of them; or in what particular acts they were diſplayed: but if we are to ſuppoſe the manifeſtations of loyalty (which are held out to us as an example for imitation) conſiſt in certain Addreſſes delivered to his Majeſty, promiſing ſupport to his Majeſty in the exerciſe of his prerogative, and thanking his Majeſty for removing certain of his Miniſters, on account of the votes they have given upon bills depending in Parliament,—if this be the example of loyalty alluded to in the ſpeech from the Throne, then we muſt beg leave to expreſs our ſerious concern for the im⯑preſſion which has been made on any of our fellow-ſubjects by miſ⯑repreſentations, which have ſeduced them into a ſeeming approba⯑tion of proceedings ſubverſive of their own freedom. We conceive, that the opinions delivered in theſe papers were not well conſidered; nor were the parties duly informed of the nature of the matters on which they were called to determine, nor of thoſe proceedings of Parliament which they were led to cenſure.

We ſhall act more adviſedly.—The loyalty we ſhall manifeſt will not be the ſame with theirs; but, we truſt, it will be equally ſincere, and more enlightened. It is no ſlight authority which ſhall perſuade us (by receiving as proofs of loyalty the miſtaken principles lightly taken up in theſe addreſſes) obliquely to criminate, with the heavy and [5] ungrounded charge of diſloyalty and diſaffection, an uncorrupt, in⯑dependent, and reforming Parliament^*. Above all, we ſhall take care that none of the rights and privileges, always claimed, and ſince the acceſſion of his Majeſty's illuſtrious Family conſtantly exerciſed by this Houſe (and which we hold and exerciſe in truſt for the Commons of Great Britain, and for their benefit) ſhall be conſtructively ſurrendered, or even weakened and impaired under [6] ambiguous phraſes, and implications of cenſure on the late Parlia⯑mentary proceedings. If theſe claims are not well-founded, they ought to be honeſtly abandoned; if they are juſt, they ought to be ſteadily and reſolutely maintained.

Of his Majeſty's own gracious diſpoſition towards the true prin⯑ciples of our free conſtitution, his faithful Commons never did, or could, entertain a doubt: but we humbly beg leave to expreſs to his Majeſty our uneaſineſs concerning other new and unuſual expreſ⯑ſions of his Miniſters, declaratory of a reſolution ‘"to ſupport, in their juſt balance, the rights and privileges of every branch of the Legiſlature."’

It were deſirable that all hazardous theories concerning a balance of rights and privileges (a mode of expreſſion wholly foreign to Parliamentary uſage) might have been forborne. His Majeſty's faithful Commons are well inſtructed in their own rights and pri⯑vileges, which they are determined to maintain on the footing upon which they were handed down from their anceſtors: They are not unacquainted with the rights and privileges of the Houſe of Peers; and they know and reſpect the lawful prerogatives of the Crown: But they do not think it ſafe to admit any thing concerning the exiſtence of a balance of thoſe rights, privileges, and prerogatives; nor are they able to diſcern to what objects Miniſters would apply their fiction of a balance; nor what they would conſider as a juſt one. Theſe unauthorized doctrines have a tendency to ſtir impro⯑per diſcuſſions; and to lead to miſchievous innovations in the Conſtitution^*.

[7] That his faithful Commons moſt humbly recommend, inſtead of the inconſiderate ſpeculations of unexperienced men, that on all occaſions, reſort ſhould be had to the happy practice of Parliament, and to thoſe ſolid maxims of Government which have prevailed ſince the acceſſion of his Majeſty's illuſtrious family, as furniſhing the only ſafe principles on which the Crown and Parliament can proceed.

[8] We think it the more neceſſary to be cautious on this head, as, in the laſt Parliament, the preſent Miniſters had thought proper to countenance, if not to ſuggeſt, an attack upon the the moſt clear and undoubted rights and privileges of this Houſe^*.

Fearing, from theſe extraordinary admonitions, and from the new Doctrines, which ſeem to have dictated ſeveral unuſual expreſſions, that his Majeſty has been abuſed by falſe repreſentations of the late proceedings in Parliament, we think it our duty reſpectfully to inform his Majeſty, that no attempt whatever has been made againſt his lawful prerogatives, or againſt the rights and privileges of the Peers, by the late Houſe of Commons, in any of their addreſſes, votes, or reſolutions: Neither do we know of any proceeding by bill, in which it was propoſed to abridge the extent of his Royal Preroga⯑tive: But, if ſuch proviſion had exiſted in any bill, we proteſt, and we declare, againſt all Speeches, Acts or Addreſſes, from any perſons whatſoever, which have a tendency to conſider ſuch bills, or [9] the perſons concerned in them, as juſt objects of any kind of cenſure and puniſhment from the Throne. Neceſſary reformations may hereafter require, as they have frequently done in former times, limitations, and abridgments, and in ſome caſes an entire extinction of ſome branch of prerogative. If bills ſhould be improper in the form in which they appear in the Houſe where they originate, they are liable, by the wiſdom of this Conſtitution, to be corrected, and even to be totally ſet aſide, elſewhere. This is the known, the legal, and the ſafe remedy: But whatever, by the manifeſtation of the Royal diſpleaſure, tends to intimidate individual Members from propoſing, or this Houſe from receiving, debating, and paſſing bills, tends to prevent even the beginning of every reformation in the State; and utterly deſtroys the deliberative capacity of Parliament.—We therefore claim, demand, and inſiſt upon it, as our undoubted right, that no perſons ſhall be deemed proper objects of animadver⯑ſion by the Crown, in any mode whatever, for the votes which they give, or the propoſitions which they make, in Parliament.

We humbly conceive, that beſides its ſhare of the Legiſlative power, and its right of impeachment, that, by the law and uſage of Parliament, this Houſe has other powers and capacities, which it is bound to maintain. This Houſe is aſſured, that our humble advice on the exerciſe of prerogative will be heard with the ſame attention with which it has ever been regarded; and that it will be followed by the ſame effects which it has ever produced, during the happy and glorious Reigns of his Majeſty's Royal Progenitors; not doubt⯑ing but that, in all thoſe points, we ſhall be conſidered as a Council of wiſdom and weight to adviſe, and not merely as an accuſer of competence to criminate^*. This Houſe claims both capacities; [10] and we truſt that we ſhall be left to our free diſcretion which of them we ſhall employ as beſt calculated for his Majeſty's, and the Na⯑tional ſervice—Whenever we ſhall ſee it expedient to offer our advice concerning his Majeſty's ſervants, who are thoſe of the public, we confidently hope, that the perſonal favour of any Miniſter, or any ſet of Miniſters, will not be more dear to his Majeſty, than the credit and character of an Houſe of Commons. It is an experiment full of peril to put the repreſentative wiſdom and juſtice of his Majeſty's people in the wrong; it is a crooked and deſperate deſign, leading to miſchief, the extent of which no human wiſdom can foreſee, to attempt to form a prerogative party in the nation, to be reſorted to as occaſion ſhall require, in derogation from the authority of the Com⯑mons of Great-Britain in Parliament aſſembled: It is a contrivance full of danger, for Miniſters to ſet up the repreſentative and conſtituent bodies of the Commons of this kingdom as two ſeparate and diſtinct powers, formed to counterpoiſe each other, leaving the preference in the hands of ſecret adviſers of the Crown. In ſuch a ſituation of things, theſe adviſers, taking advantage of the dif⯑ferences which may accidentally ariſe, or may purpoſely be foment⯑ed between them, will have it in their choice to reſort to the one or the other, as may beſt ſuit the purpoſes of their finiſter ambition. By exciting an emulation and conteſt between the repreſentative and conſtituent bodies, as parties contending for credit and influence at the Throne, Sacrifices will be made by both; and the whole can end in nothing elſe than the deſtruction of the deareſt rights and liberties of the nation. If there muſt be another mode of conveying the collective ſenſe of the people to the Throne than that by the Houſe of Commons, it ought to be fixed and defined, and its autho⯑rity ought to be ſettled: It ought not to exiſt in ſo precarious and dependent a ſtate as that Miniſters ſhould have it in their power, at their own mere pleaſure, to acknowledge it with reſpect, or to reject it with ſcorn.

[11] It is the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to diſſolve Parlia⯑ment; but we beg leave to lay before his Majeſty, that it is, of all the truſts veſted in his Majeſty, the moſt critical and delicate, and that in which this Houſe has the moſt reaſon to require, not only the good faith, but the favour of the Crown. His Commons are not always upon a par with his Miniſters in an application to popu⯑lar judgment: It is not in the power of the members of this Houſe to go to their election at the moment the moſt favourable for them. It is in the power of the Crown to chooſe a time for their diſſolu⯑lution whilſt great and arduous matters of ſtate and legiſlation are depending, which may be eaſily miſunderſtood, and which cannot be fully explained before that miſunderſtanding may prove fatal to the honour that belongs, and to the conſideration that is due, to Members of Parliament.

With his Majeſty is the gift of all the rewards, the honours, diſ⯑tinctions, favour, and graces of the ſtate; with his Majeſty is the mitigation of all the rigours of the law; and we rejoice to ſee the Crown poſſeſſed of truſts calculated to obtain good-will, and charged with duties which are popular and pleaſing. Our truſts are of a different kind. Our duties are harſh and invidious in their nature; and juſtice and ſafety is all we can expect in the exerciſe of them. We are to offer ſalutary, which is not always pleaſing, council: We are to enquire and to accuſe: And the objects of our enquiry and charge will be for the moſt part perſons of wealth, power, and ex⯑tenſive connections: We are to make rigid laws for the preſervation of revenue, which of neceſſity more or leſs confine ſome action, or reſtrain ſome function, which before was free: What is the moſt critical and invidious of all, the whole body of the public impoſi⯑tions originate from us, and the hand of the Houſe of Commons is ſeen and felt in every burthen that preſſes on the people. Whilſt, [12] ultimately, we are ſerving them, and in the firſt inſtance whilſt we are ſerving his Majeſty, it will be hard, indeed, if we ſhould ſee a Houſe of Commons the victim of its zeal and fidelity, ſacrificed by his Miniſters to thoſe very popular diſcontents which ſhall be ex⯑cited by our dutiful endeavours for the ſecurity and greatneſs of his Throne. No other conſequence can reſult from ſuch an example, but that, in future, the Houſe of Commons, conſulting its ſafety at the expence of its duties, and ſuffering the whole energy of the State to be relaxed, will ſhrink from every ſervice, which, how⯑ever neceſſary, is of a great and arduous nature, or that, willing to provide for the public neceſſities, and, at the ſame time, to ſecure the means of performing that taſk, they will exchange independence for protection, and will court a ſubſervient exiſtence through the favour of thoſe Miniſters of State, or thoſe Secret Adviſers, who ought themſelves to ſtand in awe of the Commons of this realm.

An Houſe of Commons, reſpected by his Miniſters, is eſſential to his Majeſty's ſervice: It is fit that they ſhould yield to Parliament, and not that Parliament ſhould be broken and new modelled until it is fitted to their purpoſes. If our authority is only to be held up when we coincide in opinion with his Majeſty's Adviſers, but is to be ſet at nought the moment it differs from them, the Houſe of Commons will ſink into a mere appendage of Adminiſtration; and will loſe that independent character which, inſeparably connecting the honour and reputation with the acts of this Houſe, enables us to afford a real, effective, and ſubſtantial ſupport to his government, It is the deference ſhewn to our opinion, when we diſſent from the ſervants of the Crown, which alone can give authority to the pro⯑ceedings of this Houſe, when it concurs with their meaſures.

[13] That authority once loſt, the credit of his Majeſty's Crown will be impaired in the eyes of all nations. Foreign powers, who may yet wiſh to revive a friendly intercourſe with this nation, will look in vain for that hold which gave a connection with Great-Britain the preference to an alliance with any other State. An Houſe of Commons, of which Miniſters were known to ſtand in awe, where every thing was neceſſarily diſcuſſed, on principles fit to be openly and publicly avowed, and which could not be retracted or varied without danger, furniſhed a ground of confidence in the public faith, which the engagement of no State dependent on the fluctuation of perſonal favour, and private advice, can ever pretend to. If faith with the Houſe of Commons, the grand ſecurity for the national faith itſelf, can be broken with impunity, a wound is given to the political importance of Great Britain, which will not eaſily be healed.

That there was a great variance between the late Houſe of Com⯑mons and certain perſons, whom his Majeſty has been adviſed to make and continue as Miniſters, in defiance of the advice of that Houſe, is notorious to the world. That Houſe did not confide in thoſe Miniſters; and they with-held their confidence from them for reaſons for which poſterity will honour and reſpect the names of thoſe who compoſed that Houſe of Commons, diſtinguiſhed for its independence. They could not confide in perſons who have ſhewn a diſpoſition to dark and dangerous intrigues. By theſe intrigues they have weakened, if not deſtroyed, the clear aſſurance which his Majeſty's people, and which all nations ought to have, of what are, and what are not, the real acts of his government.

If it ſhould be ſeen that his Miniſters may continue in their offices, without any ſignification to them of his Majeſty's diſpleaſure [14] at any of their meaſures, whilſt perſons conſiderable for their rank, and known to have had acceſs to his Majeſty's ſacred perſon, can, with impunity, abuſe that advantage, and employ his Majeſty's name to diſavow and counteract the proceedings of his official ſer⯑vants, nothing but diſtruſt, diſcord, debility, contempt of all autho⯑rity, and general confuſion, can prevail in his government.

This we lay before his Majeſty, with humility and concern, as the inevitable effect of a ſpirit of intrigue in his executive govern⯑ment; an evil which we have but too much reaſon to be perſuaded exiſts and increaſes. During the courſe of the laſt ſeſſion it broke out in a manner the moſt alarming. This evil was infinitely aggra⯑vated by the unauthorized, but not diſavowed uſe which has been made of his Majeſty's name, for the purpoſe of the moſt unconſti⯑tutional, corrupt, and diſhonourable influence on the minds of the Members of Parliament, that ever was practiſed in this kingdom. No attention, even to the exterior decorum, in the practice of cor⯑ruption, and intimidation employed on Peers, was obſerved: Several Peers were obliged under menaces to retract their declarations, and to recall their proxies.

The Commons have the deepeſt intereſt in the purity and inte⯑grity of the Peerage. The Peers diſpoſe of all the property in the kingdom, in the laſt reſort; and they diſpoſe of it on their honour and not on their oaths, as all the members of every other tribunal in the kingdom muſt do; though in them the proceeding is not concluſive. We have, therefore, a right to demand that no appli⯑cation ſhall be made to Peers of ſuch a nature as may give room to call in queſtion, much leſs to attaint, our ſole ſecurity for all that we poſſeſs. This corrupt proceeding appeared to the Houſe of Com⯑mons, who are the natural guardians of the purity of Parliament, [15] and of the purity of every branch of judicature, a moſt reprehenſible and dangerous practice, tending to ſhake the very foundation of the authority of the Houſe of Peers;—and they branded it as ſuch by their reſolution.

The Houſe had not ſufficient evidence to enable them legally to puniſh this practice, but they had enough to caution them againſt all confidence in the authors and abettors of it. They performed their duty in humbly adviſing his Majeſty againſt the employment of ſuch Miniſters; but his Majeſty was adviſed to keep thoſe Miniſters, and to diſſolve that Parliament. The Houſe, aware of the importance and urgency of its duty with regard to the Britiſh intereſts in India, which were and are in the utmoſt diſorder, and in the utmoſt peril, moſt humbly requeſted his Majeſty not to diſ⯑ſolve the Parliament during the courſe of their very critical pro⯑ceedings on that ſubject. His Majeſty's gracious condeſcenſion to that requeſt was conveyed in the Royal faith, pledged to an Houſe of Parliament, and ſolemnly delivered from the throne. It was but a very few days after a committee had been, with the conſent and concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed for an enquiry into certain accounts delivered to the Houſe by the Court of Directors, and then actually engaged in that enquiry, that the Miniſters, regardleſs of the aſſurance given from the Crown to an Houſe of Commons, did diſſolve that Parliament. We moſt humbly ſubmit to his Majeſty's conſideration the conſequences of this their breach of public faith.

Whilſt the Members of the Houſe of Commons, under that ſecurity, were engaged in his Majeſty's and the national buſineſs, endeavours were induſtriouſly uſed to calumniate thoſe whom it was found impracticable to corrupt. The reputation of the Members, [16] and the reputation of the Houſe itſelf, was undermined in every part of the kingdom.

In the Speech from the Throne relative to India, we are cautioned by the Miniſters, ‘"not to loſe ſight of the effect any meaſure may have on the conſtitution of our country."’ We are apprehenſive that a calumnious report ſpread abroad of an attack upon his Majeſty's prerogative by the late Houſe of Commons, may have made an impreſſion on his Royal mind, and have given occaſion to this unuſual admonition to the preſent. This attack is charged to have been made in the late Parliament, by a bill which paſſed the Houſe of Commons in the laſt ſeſſion of that Parliament, for the regu⯑lation of the affairs, for the preſervation of the commerce, and for the amendment of the government of this nation, in the Eaſt-Indies.

That his Majeſty and his people may have an opportunity of entering into the ground of this injurious charge, we beg leave humbly to acquaint his Majeſty, that, far from having made any infringement whatſoever on any part of his Royal prerogative, that bill did, for a limited time, give to his Majeſty certain powers never before poſſeſſed by the Crown; and for this his preſent Miniſters (who, rather than fall ſhort in the number of their calumnies, employ ſome that are contradictory) have ſlandered this Houſe, as aiming at the extenſion of an unconſtitutional influence in his Majeſty's Crown. This pretended attempt to increaſe the influence of the Crown, they were weak enough to endeavour to perſuade his Majeſty's people was amongſt the cauſes which excited his Majeſty's reſentment againſt his late Miniſters.

[17] Further, to remove the impreſſions of this calumny concerning an attempt in the Houſe of Commons againſt his prerogative, it is proper to inform his Majeſty, that the territorial poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies never have been declared, by any public judgment, act, or inſtrument, or any reſolution of Parliament whatſoever, to be the ſubject matter of his Majeſty's prerogative; nor have they ever been underſtood as belonging to his ordinary adminiſtration, or to be annexed or united to his Crown; but that they are acquiſition of a new and peculiar deſcription^*, unknown to the ancient executive conſtitution of this country.

From time to time, therefore, Parliament provided for their government according to its diſcretion, and to its opinion of what was required by the public neceſſities. We do not know that his [18] Majeſty was entitled, by prerogative, to exerciſe any act of autho⯑rity whatſoever in the Company's affairs, or that, in effect, ſuch authority ever has been exerciſed. His Majeſty's patronage was not taken away by that bill; becauſe it is notorious that his Majeſty never originally had the appointment of a ſingle officer, civil or military, in the Company's eſtabliſhment in India; nor has the leaſt degree of patronage ever been acquired to the Crown in any other manner or meaſure, than as the power was thought expedient to be granted by act of Parliament; that is, by the very ſame authority by which the offices were diſpoſed of and regulated in the bill, which his Majeſty's ſervants have falſely and injuriouſly repreſented as infringing upon the prerogative of the Crown.

Before the year 1773 the whole Adminiſtration of India, and the whole patronage to office there, was in the hands of the Eaſt India Company. The Eaſt-India Company is not a branch of his Ma⯑jeſty's Prerogative Adminiſtration, nor does that body exerciſe any ſpecies of authority under it, nor indeed from any Britiſh title, that does not derive all its legal validity from Acts of Parliament.

When a claim was aſſerted to the India territorial poſſeſſions in the occupation of the Company, theſe poſſeſſions were not claimed as parcel of his Majeſty's patrimonial eſtate, or as a fruit of the ancient inheritance of his Crown. They were claimed for the public. And when agreements were made with the Eaſt-India Company concern⯑ing any compoſition for the holding, or any participation of the profits of thoſe territories, the agreement was made with the public, and the preambles of the ſeveral acts have uniformly ſo ſtated it. Theſe agreements were not made (even nominally) with his Majeſty but with Parliament; and the bills making and eſtabliſhing ſuch agreements always originated in this Houſe, which appropriated the [19] money to await the diſpoſition of Parliament, without the ceremony of previous conſent from the Crown even ſo much as ſuggeſted by any of his Miniſters; which previous conſent is an obſervance of decorum, not indeed of ſtrict right, but generally paid when a new appropria⯑tion takes place in any part of his Majeſty's prerogative revenues.

In purſuance of a right thus uniformly recognized, and uniformly acted on, when Parliament undertook the reformation of the Eaſt-India Company in 1773, a commiſſion was appointed as the com⯑miſſion in the late bill was appointed; and it was made to continue for a term of years, as the commiſſion in the late bill was to con⯑tinue; all the Commiſſioners were named in Parliament, as in the late bill they were named. As they received, ſo they held their offices, wholly independent of the Crown; they held them for a fixed term; they were not removeable by an Addreſs of either Houſe, or even of both Houſes of Parliament, a precaution ob⯑ſerved in the late bill, relative to the Commiſſioners propoſed therein; nor were they bound by the ſtrict rules of pro⯑ceeding which regulated and reſtrained the late Commiſſioners againſt all poſſible abuſe of a power, which could not fail of being diligently and zealouſly watched by the Miniſters of the Crown, and the Proprietors of the Stock, as well as by Parliament. Their pro⯑ceedings were, in that bill, directed to be of ſuch a nature as eaſily to ſubject them to the ſtricteſt reviſion of both, in caſe of any mal⯑verſation.

In the year 1780, an Act of Parliament again made proviſion for the Government of thoſe territories for another four years, without any ſort of reference to prerogative; nor was the leaſt objection taken at the ſecond, more than at the firſt of thoſe periods, as if an [20] infringement had been made upon the rights of the Crown; yet his Majeſty's Miniſters have thought fit to repreſent the late com⯑miſſion as an entire innovation on the Conſtitution, and the ſetting⯑up a new order and eſtate in the nation, tending to the ſubverſion of the monarchy itſelf.

If the Government of the Eaſt-Indies, other than by his Ma⯑jeſty's prerogative, be, in effect, a fourth Order in the Common⯑wealth, this Order has long exiſted; becauſe the Eaſt-India Com⯑pany has for many years enjoyed it in the fulleſt extent, and does at this day enjoy the whole adminiſtration of thoſe provinces, and the patronage to offices throughout that great empire, except as it is controuled by Act of Parliament.

It was the ill condition, and ill Adminiſtration of the Company's affairs, which induced this Houſe (merely as a temporary eſtabliſh⯑ment) to veſt the ſame powers which the Company did before poſſeſs, (and no other) for a limited time, and under very ſtrict directions, in proper hands, until they could be reſtored, or further proviſion made concerning them. It was therefore no creation whatever of a new power, but the removal of an old power, long ſince created, and then exiſting, from the management of thoſe perſons who had manifeſtly and dangerouſly abuſed their truſt. This Houſe, which well knows the Parliamentary Origin of all the Company's powers and privileges, and is not ignorant or negligent of the authority which may veſt thoſe powers and privileges in others, if juſtice and the public ſafety ſo require, is conſcious to itſelf, that it no more creates a new Order in the ſtate, by making occaſional Truſtees for the direction of the Company, than it originally did in giving a much more permanent truſt to the Directors, or to the General Court of that Body. The monopoly of the Eaſt-India Company was a dero⯑gation [21] from the general freedom of trade belonging to his Majeſty's people. The powers of Government, and of peace and war, are parts of Prerogative of the higheſt order. Of our competence to reſtrain the rights of all his ſubjects by Act of Parliament, and to veſt thoſe high and eminent Prerogatives even in a particular Company of Merchants, there has been no queſtion. We beg leave moſt humbly to claim as our right, and as a right which this Houſe has always uſed, to frame ſuch bills, for the regulation of that commerce, and of the territories held by the Eaſt-India Company, and every thing relating to them, as to our diſcretion ſhall ſeem fit: and we aſſert and maintain, that therein we follow, and do not innovate on the Conſtitution.

That his Majeſty's Miniſters, miſled by their ambition, have en⯑deavoured, if poſſible, to form a faction in the country againſt the popular part of the conſtitution; and have therefore thought proper to add to their ſlanderous accuſation againſt a Houſe of Parliament, relative to his Majeſty's prerogative, another of a different nature, calculated for the purpoſe of raiſing fears and jealouſies among the corporate bodies of the kingdom, and of perſuading uninformed perſons belonging to thoſe corporations to look to, and to make Addreſſes to them as protectors of their rights, under their ſeveral Charters, from the deſigns which they, without any ground, charged the then Houſe of Commons to have formed againſt Charters in general. For this purpoſe they have not ſcrupled to aſſert, that the exertion of his Majeſty's prerogative in the late precipitate change in his Adminiſtration, and the diſſolution of the late Parliament, were meaſures adopted in order to reſcue the people and their rights out of the hands of the Houſe of Commons, their Repreſentatives.

[22] We truſt that his Majeſty's ſubjects are not yet ſo far deluded as to believe that the Charters, or that any other of their local or general privileges can have a ſolid ſecurity in any place but where that ſecurity has always been looked for, and always found, in the Houſe of Commons. Miſerable and precarious indeed would be the ſtate of their franchiſes, if they were to find no defence but from that quarter from whence they have always been attacked^*. But the [23] late Houſe of Commons in paſſing that bill, made no attack upon any powers or privileges, except ſuch as an Houſe of Commons has [24] frequently attacked, and will attack (and they truſt, in the end, with their wonted ſucceſs) that is, upon thoſe which are corruptly and oppreſſively adminiſtered; and this Houſe do faithfully aſſure his Majeſty, that we will correct, and, if neceſſary for the purpoſe, as far as in us lies, will wholly deſtroy every ſpecies of power and authority exerciſed by Britiſh ſubjects to the oppreſſion, wrong, and detriment of the people, and to the impoveriſhment and deſolation of the countries ſubject to it.

The propagators of the calumnies againſt that Houſe of Parlia⯑ment have been indefatigable in exaggerating the ſuppoſed injury [25] done to the Eaſt-India Company by the ſuſpenſion of the authorities which they have, in every inſtance, abuſed; as if power had been wreſted, by wrong and violence, from juſt and prudent hands; but they have, with equal care, concealed the weighty grounds and reaſons on which that Houſe had adopted the moſt moderate of all poſſible expedients for reſcuing the natives of India from oppreſſion, and for ſaving the intereſts of the real and honeſt Proprietors of their Stock, as well as that great national, commercial concern, from imminent ruin.

The Miniſters aforeſaid have alſo cauſed it to be reported, that the Houſe of Commons have confiſcated the property of the Eaſt-India Company. It is the reverſe of truth. The whole management was a truſt for the Proprietors, under their own inſpection (and it was ſo provided for in the bill) and under the inſpection of Parliament. That bill, ſo far from confiſcating the Company's property, was the only one which, for ſeveral years paſt, did not, in ſome ſhape or other, affect their property, or reſtrain them in the diſpoſition of it.

It is proper that his Majeſty and all his people ſhould be in⯑formed, that the Houſe of Commons have proceeded, with regard to the Eaſt-India Company, with a degree of care, circumſpection, and deliberation, which has not been equalled in the hiſtory of Par⯑liamentary proceedings. For ſixteen years the ſtate and condition of that body has never been wholly out of their view: In the year 1767 the Houſe took thoſe objects into conſideration, in a Commit⯑tee of the whole Houſe: The buſineſs was purſued in the following year: In the year 1772, two Committees were appointed for the ſame purpoſe, which examined into their affairs with much diligence, and made very ample Reports: In the year 1773, the proceedings [26] were carried to an Act of Parliament, which proved ineffectual to its purpoſe; the oppreſſions and abuſes in India having ſince rather increaſed than diminiſhed, on account of the greatneſs of the temp⯑tations and convenience of the opportunities, which got the better of the Legiſlative proviſions calculated againſt ill practices, then in their beginnings: Inſomuch that, in 1781, two Committees were again inſtituted, who have made ſeventeen reports. It was upon the moſt minute, exact, and laborious collection and diſcuſſion of facts, that the late Houſe of Commons proceeded in the reform which they attempted in the Adminiſtration of India, but which has been fruſtrated by ways and means the moſt diſhonourable to his Majeſty's Government, and the moſt pernicious to the Conſtitution of this kingdom. His Majeſty was ſo ſenſible of the diſorders in the Company's adminiſtration, that the conſideration of that ſubject was no leſs than ſix times recommended to this Houſe in Speeches from the Throne.

The reſult of the Parliamentary enquiries has been, that the Eaſt-India Company was found totally corrupted, and totally perverted from the purpoſes of its inſtitution, whether political or commer⯑cial; that the powers of war and peace given by the Charter had been abuſed, by kindling hoſtilities in every quarter for the purpoſes of rapine; that almoſt all the treaties of peace they have made, have only given cauſe to ſo many breaches of public faith; that countries once the moſt flouriſhing are reduced to a ſtate of indigence, decay, and depopulation, to the dimunition of our ſtrength, and to the in⯑finite diſhonour of our national character; that the laws of this kingdom are notoriouſly, and almoſt in every inſtance, deſpiſed; that the ſervants of the Company, by the purchaſe of qualifications to vote in the General Court, and, and at length, by getting the Company itſelf deeply in their debt, have obtained the entire and [27] abſolute maſtery in the body, by which they ought to have been ruled and coerced. Thus their malverſations in office are ſupported inſtead of being checked by the Company. The whole of the affairs of that body are reduced to a moſt perilous ſituation; and many millions of innocent and deſerving men who are under the protec⯑tion of this nation, and who ought to be protected by it, are oppreſſed by a moſt deſpotic and rapacious tyranny. The Company and their Servants having ſtrengthened themſelves by this confederacy, have ſet at defiance the authority and admonitions of this Houſe em⯑ployed to reform them; and when this Houſe had ſelected certain principal delinquents, whom they declared it the duty of the Com⯑pany to recall, the Company held out its legal privileges againſt all reformation; poſitively refuſed to recall them; and ſupported thoſe who had fallen under the the juſt cenſure of this Houſe, with new and ſtronger marks of countenance and approbation.

The late Houſe diſcovering the reverſed ſituation of the Company, by which the nominal ſervants are really the maſters, and the offen⯑ders are become their own judges, thought fit to examine into the ſtate of their commerce; and they have alſo diſcovered that their commercial affairs are in the greateſt diſorder; that their debts have accumulated beyond any preſent or obvious future means of payment, at leaſt under the actual adminiſtration of their affairs; that this condition of the Eaſt India Company has begun to affect the ſink⯑ing fund itſelf, on which the public credit of the kingdom reſts, a million and upwards being due to the Cuſtoms, which that Houſe of Commons, whoſe intentions towards the Company have been ſo groſsly miſrepreſented, were indulgent enough to reſpite. And thus, inſtead of confiſcating their property, the Company received without intereſt (which in ſuch a caſe had been before charged) the uſe of a very large ſum of the public money. The revenues are under the [28] peculiar care of this Houſe, not only as the revenues originate from us, but as, on every failure of the funds ſet apart for ſupport of the national credit, or to provide for the national ſtrength and ſafety, the taſk of ſupplying every deficiency falls upon his Majeſty's faithful Commons, this Houſe muſt, in effect, tax the people. The Houſe therefore, at every moment, incurs the hazard of becoming ob⯑noxious to its Conſtituents.

The enemies of the late Houſe of Commons reſolved, if poſſible, to bring on that event. They therefore endeavoured to miſrepreſent the provident means adopted by the Houſe of Commons for keeping off this invidious neceſſity, as an attack on the rights of the Eaſt-India Company; for they well knew, that on the one hand, if, for want of proper regulation and relief, the Company ſhould become inſolvent, or even ſtop payment, the national credit and commerce would ſuſtain an heavy blow; and that calamity would be juſtly im⯑puted to Parliament, which after ſuch long enquiries, and ſuch fre⯑quent admonitions from his Majeſty, had neglected ſo eſſential and ſo urgent an article of their duty: On the other hand they knew, that, wholly corrupted as the Company is, nothing effectual could be done to preſerve that intereſt from ruin, without taking for a time the national objects of their truſt out of their hands; and then a cry would be induſtriouſly raiſed againſt the Houſe of Commons, as depriving Britiſh Subjects of their legal privileges. The reſtraint, being plain and ſimple, muſt be eaſily underſtood by thoſe who would be brought with great difficulty, to comprehend the intricate detail of matters of fact, which rendered this ſuſpenſion of the adminiſtra⯑tion of India abſolutely neceſſary on motives of juſtice, of policy, of public honour, and public ſafety.

[29] The Houſe of Commons had not been able to deviſe a method, by which the redreſs of grievances could be effected through the Au⯑thors of thoſe grievances; nor could they imagine how corruptions could be purified by the corruptors and the corrupted; nor do we now conceive, how any reformation can proceed from the known abettors and ſupporters of the perſons who have been guilty of the miſdemeanors which Parliament has reprobated, and who for their own ill purpoſes have given countenance to a falſe and deluſive ſtate of the Company's affairs, fabricated to miſlead Parliament, and to impoſe upon the nation^*.

Your Commons feel, with a juſt reſentment, the inadequate eſti⯑mate which your Miniſters have formed of the importance of this great concern. They call on us to act upon the principles of thoſe who have not enquired into the ſubject; and to condemn thoſe who, with the moſt laudable diligence, have examined and ſcrutinized every part of it. The deliberations of Parliament have been broken; the ſeaſon of the year is unfavourable; many of us are new Mem⯑bers, who muſt be wholly unacquainted with the ſubject, which lies remote from the ordinary courſe of general information.

We are cautioned againſt an infringement of the Conſtitution; and it is impoſſible to know, what the ſecret adviſers of the Crown, who have driven out the late Miniſters for their conduct in [30] Parliament, and have diſſolved the late Parliament for a pretended attack upon prerogative, will conſider as ſuch an in⯑fringement. We are not furniſhed with a rule, the obſervance of which can make us ſafe from the reſentment of the Crown, even by an implicit obedience to the dictates of the Miniſters who have adviſed that Speech: We know not how ſoon thoſe Miniſters may be diſavowed; and how ſoon the Members of this Houſe, for our very agreement with them, may be conſidered as objects of his Majeſty's diſpleaſure. Until by his Majeſty's goodneſs and wiſdom the late example is completely done away, we are not free.

We are well aware, in providing for the affairs of the Eaſt, what an adult ſtrength of abuſe, and of wealth and influence growing out of that abuſe, his Majeſty's Commons had, in the laſt Parliament, and we ſtill have, to ſtruggle. We are ſenſible that the influence of that wealth, in a much larger degree and meaſure than at any former period, may have penetrated into the very quarter from whence alone any real reformation can be expected^*.

[31] If, therefore, in the arduous affairs recommended to us, our Pro⯑ceedings ſhould be ill adapted, feeble and ineffectual; if no delin⯑quency ſhould be prevented, and no delinquent ſhould be called to account; if every perſon ſhould be careſſed, promoted, and raiſed in power, in proportion to the enormity of his offences; if no relief ſhould be given to any of the natives unjuſtly diſpoſſeſſed of their rights, juriſdictions, and properties; if no cruel and unjuſt exac⯑tions ſhall be forborne; if the ſource of no peculation, or oppreſſive gain ſhould be cut off; if, by the omiſſion of the opportunities that were in our hands, our Indian empire ſhould fall into ruin irre⯑trievable; and in its fall cruſh the credit, and overwhelm the Re⯑venues of this country, we ſtand acquitted to our honour, and to our conſcience, who have reluctantly ſeen the weightieſt intereſts of our country, at times the moſt critical to its dignity and ſafety, ren⯑dered the ſport of the inconſiderate and unmeaſured ambition of individuals, and by that means the wiſdom of his Majeſty's Go⯑vernment degraded in the public eſtimation, and the policy and character of this renowned nation rendered contemptible in the eyes of all Europe.

It paſſed in the Negative.