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DISSERTATION ON FIRST-PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT; By THOMAS PAINE, AUTHOR OF COMMON SENSE; RIGHTS OF MAN; AGE OF REASON, &c.

PARIS, PRINTED AT THE ENGLISH PRESS, RUE DE VAUGIRARD, No. 970. THIRD YEAR OF THE FRENCH REPUPLIC.

DISSERTATION ON FIRST-PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT.

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THERE is no ſubject in which mankind are more univerſally intereſted than in the ſubject of government. His ſecurity, be he rich or poor, and, in a great meaſure, his proſperity is connected therewith; it is therefore his intereſt as well as his duty to make himſelf acquainted with its principles, and what the practice ought to be.

Every art and ſcience, however imperfectly known at firſt, has been ſtudied, improved, and brought to what we call perfection by the progreſſive labours of ſucceeding generations; but the ſcience of government has ſtood ſtill. No improvement has been made in the principle and ſcarcely any in the practice till the American revolution began. In all the countries of Europe (except in France) the ſame forms and ſyſtems that were erected in the remote [4]ages of ignorance ſtill continue, and their antiquity is pile in the place of principle; it is forbidden to inveſtigate their origin or by what right they exiſt; if it be aſked how has this happened, the anſwer is eaſy; they are eſtabliſhed on a principle that is falſe, and they employ their power to prevent detection.

Notwithſtanding the myſtery with which the ſcience of government has been enveloped, for the purpoſe of enſlaving, plundering, and impoſing upon mankind, it is of all things the leaſt myſterious and the moſt eaſy to be underſtood. The meaneſt capacity cannot be at a loſs, if it begins its enquiries at the right point. Every art and ſcience has ſome point, or alphabet, at which the ſtudy of that art or ſcience begins, and by the aſſiſtance of which the progreſs is facilitated. The ſame method ought to be obſerved with reſpect to the ſcience of government.

Inſtead then of embarraſſing the ſubject in the outſet with the numerous ſubdiviſions, under which different forms of government have been claſſed, ſuch as ariſtocracy, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, &c. the better method will be to begin with what may be called primary diviſions, or thoſe under which all the ſeveral ſubdiviſions will be comprehended.

The primary diviſions are but two.

  • Firſt, government by election and repreſentation.
  • Secondly, government by hereditary ſucceſſion.

All the ſeveral forms and ſyſtems of government, however numerous or diverſified, claſs themſelves under one or other of thoſe primary diviſions; for either they are on the ſyſtem of repreſentation, or on that of hereditary ſucceſſion. As to [5]that equivocal thing called mixed government, ſuch as the late government of Holland and the preſent government of England, it does not make an exception to the general rule, becauſe the parts ſeparately conſidered are either repreſentative or hereditary.

Beginning then our enquiries at this point, we have firſt to examine into the nature of thoſe two primary diviſions. If they are equally right in principle, it is mere matter of opinion which we prefer. If the one be demonſtratively better than the other, that difference ſhould direct our choice; but if one of them be ſo abſolutely falſe as not to have a right to exiſtence, the matter ſettles itſelf at once; becauſe a negative proved on one thing, where two only are offered, and one muſt be accepted, amounts to an affirmative on the other.

The revolutions that are now ſpreading themſelves in the world have their origin in this ſtate of the caſe, and the preſent war is a conflict between the repreſentative ſyſtem founded on the rights of the people and the hereditary ſyſtem founded in uſurpation. As to what are called Monarchy, Royalty, and Ariſtocracy, they do not, either as things or as terms, ſufficiently deſcribe the hereditary ſyſtem; they are but ſecondary things or ſigns of the hereditary ſyſtem, and which fall of themſelves if that ſyſtem has not a right to exiſt. Were there no ſuch terms as Monarchy, Royalty and Ariſtocracy, or were other terms ſubſtituted in their place, the hereditary ſyſtem, if it continued, would not be altered then by. It would be the ſame ſyſtem under any other titulary name as it is now.

The character therefore of the revolutions of the preſent [6]day diſtinguiſhes itſelf moſt definitively by grounding itſelf on the ſyſtem of repreſentative government in oppoſition to the hereditary. No other diſtinction reaches the whole of the principle.

Having thus opened the caſe generally, I proceed, in the firſt place, to examine the hereditary ſyſtem, becauſe it has the priority in point of time. The repreſentative ſyſtem is the invention of the modern world; and that no doubt may ariſe as to my own opinion, I declare it before hand, which is, that there is not a problem in Euclid more mathematically true than that hereditary government has not a right to exiſt. When therefore we take from any man the exerciſe of hereditary power, we take away that which he never had the right to poſſeſs, and which no law or cuſtom could, or ever can, give him a title to

The arguments that have hitherto been employed againſt the hereditary ſyſtem, have been chiefly founded upon the abſurdity of it, and its incompetency to the purpoſe of good government. Nothing can preſent to our judgement, or to our imagination, a figure of greater abſurdity, than that of ſeeing the government of a nation fall, as it frequently does, into the hands of a lad neceſſarily deſtitute of experience and often little better than a fool. It is an inſult to every man of years, of character, and of talent, in a country. The moment we begin to reaſon upon the hereditary ſyſtem it falls into deriſion; let but a ſingle idea begin and a thouſand will ſoon follow. Inſignificance, imbecility, childhood, dotage, want of moral character; in fine, every defect ſerious or laughable unite to hold up the hereditary ſyſtem as a figure of ridicule. Leaving however [7]the ridiculouſneſs of the thing to the reflections of the reader, I proceed to the more important part of the queſtion, namely, whether ſuch a ſyſtem has a right to exiſt?

To be ſatisfied of the right of a thing to exiſt, we muſt be ſatisfied that it had a right to begin. If it had not a right to begin, it has not a right to continue. By what right then did the hereditary ſyſtem begin? Let a man but aſk himſelf this queſtion, and he will find that he cannot ſatisfy himſelf with an anſwer.

The right which any man, or any family had to ſet itſelf up at firſt to govern a nation, and to eſtabliſh itſelf hereditarily, was no other than the right which Robeſpierre had to do the ſame thing in France. If he had none, they had none. If they had any, he had as much, for it is impoſſible to diſcover ſuperiority of right in any family, by virtue of which hereditary government could begin. The Capets, the Guelphs, the Robeſpierres, the Marats, are all on the ſame ſtanding as to the queſtion of right. It belongs excluſively to none.

It is one ſtep towards liberty, to perceive that hereditary government could not begin as an excluſive right in any family. The next point will be, whether, having once began, it could grow into a right by the influence of time?

This would be ſuppoſing an abſurdity; for either it is putting time in the place of principle, or making it ſuperior to principle; whereas time has no more connection with, or influence upon principle, than principle has upon time. The wrong which began a thouſand years ago, is as much a wrong, as if it began to day; and the right which originates to day, is as much a right as if it had the [8]ſanction of a thouſand years. Time with reſpect to principles is an eternal NOW: it has no operation upon them: it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. But what have we to do with a thouſand years. Our life time is but a ſhort portion of that period, and if we find the wrong in exiſtence as ſoon as we begin to live, that is the point of time at which it begins to us; and our right to reſiſt it, is the ſame as if it had never exiſted before.

As hereditary government could not begin as a natural right in any family, nor derive after its commencement any right from time, we have only to examine whether there exiſt in a nation a right to ſet it up and eſtabliſh it by what is called law, as has been done in England. I anſwer NO; and that any law or any conſtitution made for that purpoſe is an act of treaſon againſt the rights of every minor in the nation, at the time it is made, and againſt the rights of all ſucceeding generations. I ſhall ſpeak upon each of thoſe caſes. Firſt, of the minor at the time ſuch law is made. Secondly, of the generations that are to follow.

A nation in a collective ſenſe, comprehends all the individuals of whatever age, from juſt born to juſt dying. Of theſe, one part will be minors, the other aged. The average of life is not exactly the ſame in every climate and country, but in general the minority in years are the majority in numbers, that is, the number of perſons under twenty one years, is greater than the number of perſons above that age. This difference in number is not neceſſary to the eſtabliſhment of the principle I mean to lay down, but it ſerves to ſhew the juſtice of it more ſtrongly, [9]The principle would be equally good, if the majority in years were alſo the majority in numbers.

The rights of minors are as ſacred as the rights of the aged. The difference is altogether in the different age of the two parties and nothing in the nature of the rights; the rights are the ſame rights; and are to be preſerved inviolate for the inheritance of the minors when they ſhall come of age. During the minority of minors, their rights are under the ſacred guardianſhip of the aged. The minor, cannot ſurrender them; the guardian cannot diſpoſſeſs him; conſequently, the aged part of a nation who are the lawmakers for the time being, and who, in the march of life, are but a few years a head of thoſe who are yet minors, and to whom they muſt ſhortly give place, have not and cannot have the right to make a law to ſet up and eſtabliſh hereditary government, or, to ſpeak more diſtinctly, an hereditary ſucceſſion of governors; becauſe it is an attempt to deprive every minor in the nation, at the time ſuch a law is made, of his inheritance of rights, when he ſhall come of age, and to ſubjugate him to a ſyſtem of government to which, during his minority, he could neither conſent nor object.

If a perſon, who is a minor at the time ſuch a law is propoſed, had happened to have been born a few years ſooner, ſo as to be of the age of twenty one years at the time of propoſing it, his right to have objected againſt it, to have expoſed the injuſtice and tyrannical principles of it, and to have voted againſt it, will be admitted on all ſides. If, therefore, the law operates to prevent his exerciſing the ſame rights after he comes of age as he would have had a [10]right to exerciſe had he been of age at the time, it is, undeniably, a law to take away and annul the rights of every perſon in the nation who ſhall be a minor at the time of making ſuch a law, and conſequently the right to make it cannot exiſt.

I come now to ſpeak of government by hereditary ſucceſſion as it applies to ſucceeding generations; and to ſhew that in this caſe, as in the caſe of minors, there does not exiſt in a nation a right to ſet it up.

A nation, though continually exiſting, is continually in a ſtate of renewal and ſucceſſion. It is never ſtationary. Every day produces new births, carries minors forward to maturity, and old perſons from the ſtage. In this ever running flood of generations there is no part ſuperior in authority to another. Could we conceive an idea of ſuperiority in any, at what point of time, or in what century of the world, are we to fix it? To what cauſe are we to aſcribe it? By what evidence are we to prove it? By what criterion are we to know it? A ſingle reflection will teach us that our anceſtors, like ourſelves, were but tenants for life in the great freehold of rights. The fee-abſolute was not in them, it is not in us, it belongs to the whole family of man, thro' all ages. If we think otherwiſe than this, we think either as ſlaves or as tyrants. As ſlaves, if we think that any former generation had a right to bind us; as tyrants, if we think that we have authority to bind the generations that are to follow.

It may not be inapplicable to the ſubject, to endeavour to define what is to be underſtood by a generation in the ſenſe the word is here uſed.

[11]As a natural term its meaning is ſufficiently clear. The father, the ſon, the grandſon are ſo many diſtinct generations. But when we ſpeak of a generation as deſcribing the perſons in whom legal authority reſides, as diſtinct from another generation of the ſame deſcription who are to ſucceed them, it comprehends all thoſe who are above the age of twenty one years, at the time we count from; and a generation of this kind will continue in authority between fourteen and twenty one years, that is, until the number of minors, who ſhall have arrived at age, ſhall be greater than the number of perſons remaining of the former ſtock.

For example, if France at this or any other moment, contain twenty four millions of ſouls, twelve millions will be males, and twelve females. Of the twelve millions of males, ſix millions will be of the age of twenty one years, and ſix will be under, and the authority to govern will reſide in the firſt ſix. But every day will make ſome alteration, and in twenty one years every one of thoſe minors who ſurvive will have arrived at age, and the greater part of the former ſtock will be gone: the majority of perſons then living, in whom the legal authority reſides, will be compoſed of thoſe who, twenty one years before, had no legal exiſtence. Thoſe will be fathers and grand fathers in their turn, and in the next twenty one years, (or leſs) another race of minors, arrived at age, will ſucceed them, and ſo on.

As this is ever the caſe, and as every generation is equal in rights to another, it conſequently follows, that there cannot be a right in any to eſtabliſh government by hereditary ſucceſſion, becauſe it would be ſuppoſing itſelf [12]poſſeſſed of a right ſuperior to the reſt, namely, that of commanding by its own authority how the world ſhall be hereafter governed, and who ſhall govern it. Every age and generation is and muſt be (as a matter of right) as free to act for itſelf in all caſes, as the age and generation that preceded it. The vanity and preſumption of governing beyond the grave is the moſt ridiculous and inſolent of all tyrannics. Man has no property in man, neither has one generation a property in the generations that are to follow.

In the firſt part of Rights of Man I have ſpoken of government by hereditary ſucceſſion; and I will here cloſe the ſubject with an extract from that work, which ſtates it under the two following heads.

"Firſt, of the right of any family to eſtabliſh itſelf with hereditary power.

"Secondly, of the right of a nation to eſtabliſh a particular family.

"With reſpect to the firſt of thoſe heads, that of a family eſtabliſhing itſelf with hereditary powers on its own authority independant of the nation, all men will concur in calling it deſpotiſm, and it would be treſpaſſing on their underſtanding to attempt to prove it.

"But the ſecond head, that of a nation, that is, of a generation for the time being, eſtabliſhing a particular family with hereditary powers, it does not preſent itſelf as deſpotiſm on the firſt reflection; but if men will permit a ſecond reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward, even but one remove out of their own perſons to that of heir offpring, they will then ſee, that hereditary ſucceſſion [13]becomes the ſame deſpotiſm to others, which the firſt perſons reprobated for themſelves. It operates to preclude the conſent of the ſucceeding generation, and the precluſion of conſent is deſpotiſm.

"In order to ſee this matter more clearly, let us conſider the generation which undertakes to eſtabliſh a family with hereditary powers, ſeparately from the generations which are to follow.

"The generation which firſt ſelects a perſon and puts him at the head of its government, either with the title of king, or any other nominal diſtinction, acts its own choice, as a free agent for itſelf, be that choice wiſe or fooliſh. The perſon ſo ſet up is not hereditary, but ſelected and appointed; and the generation which ſets him up, does not live under an hereditary government, but under a government of its own choice. Were the perſon ſo ſet up, and the generation who ſets him up, to live for ever, it never could become hereditary ſucceſſion, and of conſequence, hereditary ſucceſſion can only follow on the death of the firſt parties.

"As therefore hereditary ſucceſſion is out of the queſtion, with reſpect to the firſt generation, we have next to conſider the character in which that generation acts towards the commencing generation and to all ſucceeding ones.

"It aſſumes a character to which it has neither right nor title; for it changes itſelf from a legiſlator to a teſtator, and affects to make a will and teſtament, which is to have operation, after the demiſe of the makers, to bequeath the government; and it not only attempts to [14]bequeath, but to eſtabliſh on the ſucceeding generation a new and different form of government under which itſelf lived. Itſelf, as al ready obſerved, lived not under an hereditary government, but under a government of its own choice; and it now attempts, by virtue of a will and teſtament, which it has not authority to make, to take from the commencing generation, and from all future ones, the right and free agency by which itſelf acted.

"In whatever light hereditary ſucceſſion, as growing out of the will and teſtament of ſome former generation, preſents itſelf, it is both criminal and abſurd. A cannot make a will to take from B the property of B and give it to C; yet this is the manner in which, what is called hereditary ſucceſſion by law, operates. A certain generation makes a will, under the form of a law to take away the rights of the commencing generation, and of all future generations, and convey thoſe rights to a third perſon who afterwards comes forward and aſſumes the government in conſequence of that illicit conveyance."

The hiſtory of the Engliſh parliament furniſhes an example of this kind; and which merits to be recorded as being the greateſt inſtance of legiſlative ignorance and want of principle that is to be found in the hiſtory of any country. The caſe is as follows.

The Engliſh parliament of 1688, imported a man and his wife from Holland, William and Mary, and made them king and queen of England. Having done this, the ſaid parliament made a law to convey the government of the country to the heirs of William and Mary in the following words, ‘We the lords-ſpiritual and temporal, [15]and commons, do in the name of the people of England, moſt humbly and faithfully ſubmit ourſelves, our heirs, and poſterities, to William and Mary, their heirs and poſterities for ever.’ And in a ſubſequent law, as quoted by Edmund Burke, the ſaid parliament, in the name of the people of England then living, binds the ſaid people, their heirs and poſterities, to William and Mary, their heirs and poſterities, to the end of time.

It is not ſufficient that we laugh at the ignorance of ſuch law makers; it is neceſſary that we reprobate their want of principle. The conſtituent aſſembly of France 1789 fell into the ſame vice as the parliament of England had done, and aſſumed to eſtabliſh an hereditary ſucceſſion in the family of the Capets, as an act of the conſtitution of that year. That every nation, for the time being, has a right to govern itſelf as it pleaſes, muſt always be admitted; but government by hereditary ſucceſſion, is government for another race of people and not for itſelf; and as thoſe on whom it is to operate, are not yet in exiſtence or are minors, ſo neither is the right in exiſtence to ſet it up for them, and to aſſume ſuch a right is treaſon againſt the right of poſterity.

I here cloſe the arguments on the firſt head, that of government by hereditary ſucceſſion; and proceed to the ſecond, that of government by election and repreſentation; or as it may be conciſely expreſſed, repreſentative government in contra-diſtinction to hereditary government.

Reaſoning by excluſion, if hereditary government has not a right to exiſt, and that it has not is proveable, repreſentative government is admitted of courſe.

[16]In contemplating government by election and repreſentation, we amuſe not ourſelves in enquiring when or how, or by what right it began. Its origin is ever in view. Man is himſelf the origin and the evidence of the right. It appertains to him in right of his exiſtence, and his perſon is the title deed.

The true and only true baſis of repreſentative government is equality of Rights. Every man has a right to one vote and no more in the choice of repreſentatives. The rich have no more right to exclude the poor from the right of voting, or of electing and being elected, than the poor have to exclude the rich; and wherever it is attempted, or propoſed, on either ſide, it is a queſtion of force and not of right. Who is he that would exclude another? That other has the ſame right to exclude him.

That which is now called ariſtocracy implies an inequality of rights, but who are the perſons that have a right to eſtabliſh this inequality? Will the rich exclude themſelves? No. Will the poor exclude themſelves! No. By what right then can any be excluded? It would be a queſtion, if any man or claſs of men have a right to exclude themſelves; but, be this as it may, they cannot have the right to exclude another. The poor will not delegate ſuch a right to the rich, nor the rich to the poor, and to aſſume it, is not only to aſſume arbitrary power, but to aſſume a right to commit robbery. Perſonal rights, of which the right of voting for repreſentatives is one, are a ſpecies of property of the moſt ſacred kind: and he that would employ his pecuniary property, or preſume upon the influence it gives him, to diſpoſſeſs or rob another of his property of rights, [17]uſes that pecuniary property, as he would uſe fire-arms, and merits to have it taken from him.

Inequality of rights is created by a combination in one part of the community to exclude another part from its rights. Whenever it be made an article of a conſtitution, or a law, that the right of voting, or of electing and being elected, ſhall appertain excluſively to perſons poſſeſſing a certain quantity of property, be it little or much, it is a combination of the perſons poſſeſſing that quantity, to exclude thoſe who do not poſſeſs the ſame quantity. It is inveſting themſelves with powers as a ſelf-created part of ſociety, to the excluſion of the reſt.

It is always to be taken for granted, that thoſe who oppoſe an equality of rights, never mean the excluſion ſhould take place on themſelves; and in this view of the caſe, pardoning the vanity of the thing, ariſtocracy is a ſubject of laughter. This ſelf-ſoothing vanity is encouraged by another idea not leſs ſelſiſh, which is, that the oppoſers conceive they are playing a ſa [...] [...]me, in which there is a chance to gain and none to loſe; that at any ſate the doctrine of equality includes them, and that if they cannot get more rights than thoſe whom they oppoſe and would exclude, they ſhall not have leſs. This opinion has already been fatal to thouſands who, not contented with equal rights, have ſought more till they loſt all, and experienced in themſelves the degrading inequality they endeavoured to fix upon others.

In any view of the caſe it is dangerous and impolitic, ſometimes ridiculous, and always unjuſt, to make property the criterion of the right of voting. If the ſum, or value [18]of the property upon which the right is to take place be conſiderable, it will exclude a majority of the people, and unite them in a common intereſt againſt the government and againſt thoſe who ſupport it, and as the power is always with the majority, they can overturn ſuch a government and its ſupporters whenever they pleaſe.

If, in order to avoid this danger, a ſmall quantity of property be fixed, as the criterion of the right, it exhibits liberty in diſgrace, by putting it in competion with accident and inſignificance. When a brood-mare ſhall fortunately produce a ſoal or a mule, that by being worth the ſum in queſtion, ſhall convey to its owner the right of voting, or by its death take it from him, in whom does the origin of ſuch a right exiſt? Is it in the man, or in the mule? When we conſider how many ways property may be acquired without merit, and loſt without a crime, we ought to ſpurn the idea of making it a criterion of rights.

But the offenſive part of the caſe is, that this excluſion from the right of voting implies a ſtigma on the moral character of the perſons excluded; and this is what no part of the community has a right to pronounce upon another part. No external circumſtance can juſtify it; wealth is no proof of moral character; nor poverty of the want of it. On the contrary, wealth is often the preſumptive evidence of diſhoneſty; and poverty the negative evidence of inuocence. If therefore property, whether little or much, be made a criterion, the means by which that property has been acquired, ought to be made a criterion alſo.

The only ground upon which excluſion from the right of voting is conſiſtent with juſtice, would be to inflict it as [19]a puniſhment for a certain time upon thoſe who ſhould propoſe to take away that right from others. The right of voting for repreſentatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected. To take away this right is to reduce a man to a ſtate of ſlavery, for ſlavery conſiſts in being ſubject to the will of another, and he that has not a vote in the election of repreſentatives, is in this caſe. The propoſal therefore to disfranchiſe any claſs of men is as criminal as the propoſal to take away property. When we ſpeak of right, we ought always to unite with it the idea of duties: right becomes duties by reciprocity. The right which I enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee it to another, and he to me; and thoſe who violate the duty juſtly incur a forſeicure of the right.

In a political view of the caſe the ſtrength and permanent ſecurity of government is in proportion to the number of people intereſted in ſupporting it. The true policy therefore is to intereſt the whole by an equality or rights, for the danger ariſes from excluſions. It is poſſible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impoſſible to exclude them from the right of rebelling againſt that excluſion; and when all other rights are taken away, the right of rebellion is made perfect.

While men could be perſuaded they had no rights, or that rights appertained only to a certain claſs of men, or that government was a thing exiſting in right of itſelf, it was not difficult to govern them authoritatively. The ignorance in which they were held, and the ſuperſtition in which they were inſtructed, furniſhed the means of doing [20]it; but when the ignorance is gone, and the ſuperſtition with it; when they perceive the impoſition that has been acted upon them; when they reflect that the cultivator and the manufacturer are the primary means of all the wealth that exiſt in the world, beyond what nature ſpontaneouſly produces; when they begin to feel their conſequence by their uſefulneſs, and their right as members of ſociety, it is then no longer poſſible to govern them as before. The fraud once detected cannot be re-acted. To attempt it is to provoke deriſion, or invite deſtruction.

That property well ever be unequal is certain. Induſtry, ſuperiority of talents, dexterity of management, extreme frugality, fortunate opportunities, or the oppoſite, or the mean of thoſe things, will ever produce that effect without having recourſe to the harſh ill ſounding names of avarice, and oppreſſion; and beſide this, there are ſome men who, though they do not deſpiſe wealth, will not ſtoop to the drudgery or the means of acquiring it, nor will be troubled with the care of it, beyond their wants or their independence; whilſt in others, there is an avidity to obtain it by every means not puniſhable; it makes the ſole buſineſs of their lives, and they follow it as a religion. All that is required with reſpect to property is to obtain it honeſtly, and not employ it criminally; but it is always criminally employed, when it is made a criterion for excluſive rights.

In inſtitutions that are purely pecuniary, ſuch as that of a bank or a commercial company, the rights of the members compoſing that company are wholly created by the property they inveſt therein; and no other rights are repreſented in the government of that company, than what [21]ariſe out of that property; neither has that government cognizance of any thing but prope [...]ty.

But the caſe is totally different with reſpect to the inſtitution of civil government, organized on the ſyſtem of repreſentation. Such a government has cognizance of every thing and of every man as a member of the national ſociety, whether he has property or not; and therefore the principle requires that every man, and every kind of right be repreſented, of which the right to acquire and to hold property is but one, and that not of the moſt eſſential kind. The protection of a man's perſon is more ſacred than the protection of property; and beſides this, the faculty of performing any kind of work or ſervice by which he acquires a livelihood, or maintains his family, is of the nature of property. It is property to him; he has acquired; it and it is as much the object of his protection, as exterior property, poſſeſſed without that faculty, can be the object of protection to another perſon.

I have always believed that the beſt ſecurity for property, be it much or little, is to remove from every part of the community, as far as can poſſibly be done, every cauſe of complaint, and every motive to violence: and this can only be done by an equality of rights. When rights are ſecure, property is ſecure in conſequence. But when property is made a pretence for unequal or excluſive rights, it weakens the right to hold the property, and provokes indignation and tumult; for it is unnatural to believe that property can be ſecure under the guarantee of a ſociety injured in its rights by the influence of that property.

Next to the injuſtice and ill-policy of making property [22]a pretence for excluſive rights, is the unaccountable abſurdity of giving to mere ſound the idea of property, and annexing to it certain rights; for what elſe is a [...] but ſound. Nature is often giving to the world ſome extraordinary men who arrive at fame by merit and univerſal conſent, ſuch as Ariſtotle, Socrates, Plato, &c. Theſe were truly great or noble. But when government ſ [...]ts up a manufactory of nobles, it is as abſurd, as if ſhe undertook to manufacture wiſe men. Her nobles are all counterfeits.

This wax-work order has aſſumed the name of ariſtocracy; and the diſgrace of it would be leſſend if it could be conſidered only as childiſh imbecility. We pardon foppery becauſe of its inſignificance, and on the ſame ground we might pardon the foppery of Titles. But the origin of ariſtocracy was worſe than foppery. It was robbery. The firſt ariſtocrats in all countries were brigands. Thoſe of latter times, ſycophants.

It is very well known that in England, (and the ſame will be found in other countries) the great landed eſtates now held in deſcent were plundered from the quiet inhabitants at the conqueſt. The poſſibility did not exiſt of acquiring ſuch eſtates honeſtly. If it be aſked how they could have been acquired no anſwer but that of robbery can be given. That they were not acquired by trade, by commerce, by manufactures, by agriculture, or by any reputable employment is certain. How then were they acquired? Bluſn ariſtocracy to hear your origin, for your progenitors were Thieves. They were the Robeſpierres and the Jacobins of that day. When they had committed the robbery, [23]they endeavoured to loſe the diſgrace of it, by ſinking their real names under fictitious ones, which they called Titles. It is ever the practice of Felons to act in this manner. They never paſs by their real names.

As property honeſtly obtained, is beſt ſecured by an equality of Rights, ſo ill-gotten property depends for protection on a monopoly of rights. He who has robbed another of his property will next endeavour to diſarm him of his rights, to ſecure that property; for when the robber becomes the legiſlator, he believes himſelf ſecure. That part of the government of England that is called the houſe of lords, was originally compoſed of perſons who had committed the robberies of which I have been ſpeaking. It was an aſſociation for the protection of the property they had ſtolen.

But beſides the criminality of the origin of ariſtocracy, it has an injurious effect on the moral and phyſical character of man. Like ſlavery it debilitates the human faculties; for as the mind bowed down by ſlavery loſes in ſilence its elaſtic powers, ſo, in the contrary extreme, when it is bouyed up by folly it becomes incapable of exerting them, and dwindles into imbecility. It is impoſſible that a mind employed upon ribbands and titles can ever be great. The childiſhneſs of the objects conſumes the man.

It is at all times neceſſary, and more particularly ſo, during the progreſs of a revolution, and until right ideas confirm themſelves by habit, that we frequently refreſh our patriotiſm by reference to firſt principles. It is by tracing things to their origin that we learn to underſtand them; [24]and it is by keeping that line and that origin always in view, that we never forget them.

An enquiry into the origin of Rights will demonſtrate to us that rights are not gifts from one man to another, nor from one claſs of men to another; for who is he who could be the firſt giver, or by what principles, or on what authority, could he poſſeſs the right of giving? A declaration of rights is not a creation of them, nor a donation of them. It is a manifeſt of the principle by which they exiſt, followed by a detail of what the rights are; for every civil right has a natural right for its foundation, and it includes the principle of a reciprocal guarantee of thoſe rights from man to man. As therefore it is impoſſible to diſcover any origin of rights otherwiſe than in the origin of man, it conſequently follows, that rights appertain to man in right of his exiſtence only, and muſt therefore be equal to every man. The principle of an equality of rights is clear and ſimple. Every man can underſtand it, and it is by underſtanding his rights that he learns his duties; for where the rights of men are equal, every man muſt finally ſee the neceſſity of protecting the rights of others as the moſt effectual ſecurity for his own. But if in the formation of a conſtitution, we depart from the principle of equal rights, or attempt any modification of it, we plunge into a labyrinth of difficulties from which there is no way out, but by retreating. Where are we to ſtop? Or by what principle are we to find out the point to ſtop at, that ſhall diſcriminate between men of the ſame country, part of whom ſhall be free, and the reſt not? If property is to be made the criterion, it is a total departure from every [25]moral principle of liberty, becauſe it is attaching rights to mere matter, and making man the agent of that matter. It is moreover holding up property as an apple of diſcord, and not only exciting but juſtifying war againſt it; for I maintain the principle, that when property is uſed as an inſtrument to take away the rights of thoſe who may happen not to poſſeſs property, it is uſed to an unlawful purpoſe, as fire-arms would be in a ſimilar caſe.

In a ſtate of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal in power; the weak cannot protect himſelf againſt the ſtrong. This being the caſe, the inſtitution of civil ſociety is for the purpoſe of making an equalization of powers that ſhall be parallel to, and a guarantee of the equality of rights. The laws of a country when properly conſtructed apply to this purpoſe. Every man takes the arm of the law for his protection as more effectual than his own; and therefore every man has an equal right in the formation of the government and of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged. In extenſive countries and ſocieties, ſuch as America and France, this right, in the individual, can only be exerciſed by delegation, that is, by election and repreſentation; and hence it is that the inſtitution of repreſentative government ariſes.

Hitherto I have confined myſelf to matters of principle only. Firſt, that hereditary government has not a right to exiſt; that it cannot be eſtabliſhed on any principle of right; and that it is a violation of all principle. Secondly, that government by election and repreſentation has its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man; for whether a man be his own la [...]-giver, as he would be in a ſtate of [26]nature; or whether he exerciſes his portion of legiſlative ſovereignty in his own perſon, as might be the caſe in ſmall democraties where all could aſſemble for the formation of the laws by which they were to be governed; or whether he exerciſes it in the choice of perſons to repreſent him in a national aſſembly of repreſentatives, the origin of the right is the ſame in all caſes. The firſt, as is before obſerved, is defective in power; the ſecond, is practicable only in democracies of ſmall extent; the third is the greateſt ſcale upon which human government can be inſtituted.

Next to matters of principle, are matters of opinion, and it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh between the two. Whether the rights of men ſhall be equal is not a matter of opinion but of right, and conſequently of principle; for men do not hold their rights as grants from each other, but each one in right of himſelf. Society is the guardian but not the giver. And as in extenſive ſocieties, ſuch as America and France, the right of the individual, in matters of government, cannot be exerciſed but by election and repreſentation; it conſequently follows, that the only ſyſtem of government, conſiſtent with principle, where ſimple democracy is impracticable, is the repreſentative ſyſtem. But as to the organical part, or the manner in which the ſeveral parts of government ſha [...]l be arranged and compoſed, it is altogether matter of opinion. It is neceſſary that all the parts be conformable with the principle of equal rights; and ſo long as this principle be religiouſly adhered to, no very material error can take place neither can any error continue long, in that part that falls within the province of opinion.

In all matters of opinion, the ſocial compact, or the [27]principle by which ſociety is held together, requires that the majority of opinions becomes the rule for the whole, and that the minority yields practical obedience thereto. This is perfectly conformable to the principle of equal rights: for, in the firſt place, every man has a right to g [...]ve an opinion, but no man has a right that his opinion ſhould govern the reſt. In the ſecond place, it is not ſuppoſed to be known before hand on which ſide of any queſtion, whether for or againſt, any man's opinion will fall. He may happen to be in a majority upon ſome queſtions, and in a minority upon others; and by the ſame rule that he expects obedience in the one caſe, he muſt yield it in the other. —All the diſorders that have ariſen in France during the progreſs of the revolution have had their origin, not in the principle of equal rights, but in the violation of that principle. The principle of equal rights has been repeatedly violated, and that not by the majority but by the minority, and that minority has been compoſed of men poſſiſſing property as well as of men without property; property therefore, even upon the experience already had, is no more a criterion of character than it is of rights. It will ſometimes happen that the minority are right, and the majority are wrong, but as ſoon as experience proves this to be the caſe, the minority will increaſe to a majority, and the error will reform itſelf by the tranquil operation of freedom of opinion and equality of rights. Nothing therefore can juſtify an inſurrection, neither can it ever be neceſſary, where rights are equal and opinions free.

Taking then the principle of equal rights as the ſoundation of the revolution, and conſequently of the conſtitution, [28]the organical part, or the manner in which the ſeveral parts of the government ſhall be arranged in the conſtitution, will, as is already ſaid, fall within the province of opinion.

Various methods will preſent themſelves upon a queſtion of this kind, and tho' experience is yet wanting to determine which is the beſt, it has, I think, ſufficiently decided which is the worſt. That is the worſt, which in its deliberations and deciſions is ſubject to the precipitancy and paſſion of an individual; and when the whole legiſlature is crouded into one body, it is an individual in maſs. In all caſes of deliberation it is neceſſary to have a crops of reſerve, and it would be better to divide the repreſentation by lot into two parts, and let them reviſe and correct each other, than that the whole ſhould ſit together and debate at once.

Repreſentative government is not neceſſarily confined to any one particular form. The principle is the ſame in all the forms under which it can be arranged. The equal rights of the people is the root from which the whole ſprings, and the branches may be arranged as preſent opinion or future experience ſhall beſt direct. As to that hoſpital of incurables (as Cheſterfield calls it) the Britiſh houſe of peers, it is an excreſſence growing out of corruption; and there is no more affinity or reſemblance between any of the branches of a legiſlative body originating from the rights of the people, and the aforeſaid houſe of peers, than between a regular member of the human body and an ulcerated wen.

As to that part of government that is called the [29] executive, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to fix a preciſe meaning to the word.

There are but two diviſions into which power can be arranged. Firſt, that of willing or decreeing the laws; ſecondly, that of executing or putting them in practice. The former, correſponds to the intellectual faculties of the human mind, which reaſons and determines what ſhall be done; the ſecond, to the mechanical powers of the human body that puts that determination into practice. If the former decides, and the latter does not perform, it is a ſtate of imbecility; and if the latter acts without the predetermination of the former, it is a ſtate of lunacy. The executive department therefore is official, and is ſubordinate to the legiſlative, as the body is to the mind in a ſtate of health; for, it is impoſſible to conceive the idea of two ſovereignties, a ſovereignty to will, and a ſovereignty to act. The executive is not inveſted with the power of deliberating whether it ſhall act or not; it has no diſcretionary authority in the caſe; for i [...] can act no other thing that what the laws decree, and it is obliged to act conformably thereto; and in this view of the caſe, the executive is made up of all the official departments that execute the laws, of which, that which is called the judiciary is the chief.

But mankind have conceived an idea that ſome kind of authority is neceſſary to ſuperintend the execution of the l [...]ws, and to ſee that they are faithfully performed; and it is by confounding this ſuperintending authority with the official execution that we get embarraſſed about the term executive power. — All the parts in the governments of the [30]united ſtates of America that are called THE EXECUTIVE, are no other than authorities to ſuperintend the execution of the laws; and they are ſo far independent of the legiſlative, that they know the legiſlative only thro' the laws, and cannot be controuled or directed by it, through any other medium.

In what manner this ſuperintending authority ſhall be appointed or compoſed, is a matter that falls within the province of opinion. Some may prefer one method and ſome another; and in all caſes, where opinion only and not principle is concerned, the majority of opinions forms the rule for all. There are however ſome things deducible from reaſon, and evidenced by experience, that ſerve to guide our deciſion upon the caſe. The one is, never to inveſt any individual with extraordinary power; for beſides his being tempted to miſuſe it, it will excite contention and commotion in the nation for the office. Secondly, never to inveſt power long in the hands of any number of individuals. The inconveniences that may be ſuppoſed to accompany frequent changes, are leſs to be feared than the danger that a riſes from long continuance.

I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe with offering ſome obſervations on the means of preſerving liberty; for it is not only neceſſary that we eſtabliſh it, but that we preſerve it.

It is, in the firſt place, neceſſary that we diſtinguiſh between the means made uſe of to overthrow deſpotiſm, in order to prepare the way for the eſtabliſhment of liberty, and the means to be uſed after the deſpotiſm is over thrown.

The means made uſe of in the firſt caſe are juſtified by [31]neceſſity. Thoſe means are in general inſurrections; for whilſt the eſtabliſhed government of deſpotiſm continues in any country it is ſcarcely poſſible that any other means can be uſed. It is alſo certain that in the commencement of a revolution, the revolutionary party permit to themſelves a diſcretionary exerciſe of power regulated more by circumſtances than by principle, which were the practice to continue, liberty would never be eſtabliſhed, or if eſtabliſhed would ſoon be overthrown. It is never to be expected in a revolution that every man is to change his opinion at the ſame mom [...]nt. There never yet was any truth or any principle ſo irr [...]ſiſtibly obvious, that all men believed it at once. Time and reaſon muſt co-operate with each other to the final eſtabliſhment of any principle; and therefore thoſe who may happen to be firſt convinced have not a right to perſecute others, on whom conviction operates more ſlowly. The moral principle of revolutions is to inſtruct; not to deſtroy.

Had a conſtitution been eſtabliſhed two years ago (as ought to have been done) the violences that have ſince deſolated France, and injured the character of the revolution, would, in my opinion, have been prevented. The nation would then have had a bond of union, and every individual would have known the line of conduct he was to follow. But inſtead of this, a revolutionary government, a thing without either principle or authority, was ſubſtituted in its place; virtue and crime depended upon accident; and that which was patriotiſm one day became treaſon the next. All theſe things have followed from the want of a conſtitution; for it is the nature and intention [32]of a conſtitution to prevent governing by party, by eſtabliſhing a common principle that ſhall limit and controul the power and impulſe of party, and that ſays to all parties, THUS FAR SHALT THOU GO AND NO FURTHER. But in the abſence of a conſtitution men look entirely to party; and inſtead of principle governing party, party governs principle.

An avidity to puniſh is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to ſtretch, to miſinterpret, and to miſapply even the beſt of laws. He that would make his own liberty ſecure, muſt guard even his enemy from oppreſſion; for if he violates this duty, he eſtabliſhes a precedent that will reach to himſelf.

THOMAS PAINE.

SPEECH OF THOMAS PAINE, As delivered in the Convention, July 7, 1795. Wherein he alludes to the preceding Work.

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ON the motion of Lanthenas. "That permiſſion be granted to Thomas Paine, to deliver his ſentiments on the Declaration of Rights and the Conſtitution, Thomas Paine aſcended the Tribune; and no oppoſition being made to the motion, one of the Secretaries, who ſtood by Mr. Paine, read his ſpeech, of which the following is a literal tranſlation:

CITIZENS,

The effects of a malignant fever, with which I was afflicted during a rigorous confinement in the Luxembourg, have thus long prevented me from attending at my poſt in the boſom of the Convention, and the magnitude of the ſubject under diſcuſſion, and no other conſideration on earth, could induce me now to repair to my ſtation.

A recurrence to the viciſſitudes I have experienced, and the critical ſituations in which I have been placed in conſequence of the French Revolution, will throw upon what I now propoſe to ſubmit to the Convention, the moſt unequivocal proofs of my integrity, and the rectitude of thoſe principles which have uniformly influenced my conduct.

In England I was proſcribed for having vindicated the French Revolution, and I have ſuffered a rigorous impriſonment in France for having purſued a ſimilar [34]mode of conduct. During the reign of terroriſm, I was a cloſe priſoner for eight long months, and remained ſo above three months after the aera of the 10th Thermidor. I ought, however, to ſcate, that I was not perſecuted by the people either of England or France. The proceedings in both countries were the effects of the deſpotiſm exiſting in their reſpective governments. But, even if my perſecution had originated in the people at large, my principles and conduct would ſtill have remained the ſame. Principles which are influenced and ſubject to the controul of tyranny have not their foundation in the heart.

A few days ago I tranſmitted to you, by the ordinary mode of diſtribution, a ſhort Treatiſe, entitled "Diſſertation on the Firſt Principles of Government." This little work I did intend to have dedicated to the people of Holland, who, about the time I began to write it, were determined to accompliſh a Revolution in their Government,—rather than to the people of France, who had long before effected that glorious object. But there are, in the Conſtitution which is about to be ratified by the Convention, certain articles, and in the report which preceded it, certain points, ſo repugnant to reaſon, and incompatible with the true principles of liberty, as to render this Treatiſe, drawn up for another purpoſe, applicable to the preſent occaſion, and under this impreſſion I preſumed to ſubmit it to your conſideration.

If there be faults in the Conſtitution, it were better to expunge them now, than to abide the event of their miſchievous tendency; for certain it is, that the plan of the Conſtitution which has been preſented to you is not conſiſtent with the grand object of the Revolution, nor congenial to the ſentiments of the individuals who accompliſhed it.

To deprive half the people in a nation of their rights as citizens, is an eaſy matter in theory or on paper: but it is a moſt dangerous experiment, and rarely practicable in the execution.

[35]I ſhall now proceed to the obſervations I have to offer on this important ſubject; and I pledge myſelf that they ſhall be neither numerous nor diffuſive.

In my apprehenſion, a conſtitution embraces two diſtinct parts or objects, the Principle and the Practice; and it is not only an eſſential, but an indiſpenſable proviſion, that the practice ſhould emanate from, and accord with the principle. Now I maintain, that the converſe of this propoſition is the caſe in the plan of the Conſtitution under diſcuſtion. The firſt article, for inſtance, of the POLITICAL STATE of Citizens, (v. TITLE II. OF THE CONSTITUTION) ſays,

"Every man born and reſident in France, who, being twenty-one years of age, has inſcribed his name on the Civic Regiſter of his Canton, and who has lived afterwards one year on the territory of the Republic, and who pays any direct contribution whatſoever, real or perſonal, is a French citizen."

I might here aſk, if thoſe only who come under the above deſcription are to be conſidered as citizens, what deſignation do you mean to give the reſt of the people? I allude to that portion of the people on whom the principal part of the labour falls, and on whom the weight of indirect taxation will in the event chiefly preſs. In the ſtructure of the ſocial fabric, this claſs of people are inſinitely ſuperior to that privileged order, whoſe only qualification is their wealth or territorial poſſeſſions. For what is trade without merchants? What is land without cultivation? And what is the produce of the land without manufacturers? But to return to the ſubject.

In the firſt place, this article is incompatible with the three firſt articles of the Declaration of Rights, which precede the Conſtitutional Act.

The firſt article of the Declaration of Rights ſays:—

"The end of ſociety is the public good; and the inſtitution of government is to ſecure to every individual the enjoyment of his rights."

[36]But the article of the Conſtitution to which I have juſt adverted propoſes as the object of ſociety, not the public good, or in other words, the good of all, but a partial good, or the good only of a few; and the Conſtitution provides ſolely for the rights of this few, to the excluſion of the many.

The ſecond article of the Declaration of Rights ſays:—

"The Rights of Man in ſociety are Liberty, Equality, Security of his perſon and property."

But the article alluded to in the Conſtitution has a direct tendency to eſtabliſh the converſe of this poſition, inaſmuch as the perſons excluded by this inequality can neither be ſaid to poſſeſs liberty, nor ſecurity againſt oppreſſion. They are conſigned totally to the caprice and tyranny of the reſt.

The third article of the Declaration of Rights ſays:—

"Liberty conſiſts in ſuch acts of volition, as are not injurious to others."

But the article of the Conſtitution, on which I have obſerved, breaks down this barrier. It enables the liberty of one part of ſociety to deſtroy the freedom of the other.

Having thus pointed out the inconſiſtency of this article to the Declaration of Rights, I ſhall proceed to comment on that part of the ſame article which makes a direct contribution a neceſſary qualification to the right of citizenſhip.

A modern refinement on the object of public revenue has divided the taxes or contributions into two claſſes, the direct and the indirect, without being able to define preciſely the diſtinction, or difference between them, becauſe the effect of both is the ſame.

Thoſe are deſignated indirect taxes which fall upon the conſumers of certain articles, on which the tax is impoſed, becauſe the tax being included in the price, the conſumer pays it without taking notice of it.

The ſame obſervation is applicable to the territorial tax. The land proprietors, in order to reimburſe themſelves, [37]will rack-rent their tenants: the farmer, of courſe, will transfer the obligation to the miller, by enhancing the price of grain; the miller to the baker, by increaſing the price of flour; and the baker to the conſumer, by raiſing the price of bread. The territorial tax, therefore, though called direct, is in its conſequences indirect.

To this tax the land proprietor contributes only in proportion to the quantity of bread and other proviſions that are conſumed in his own family. The deficit is furniſhed by the great maſs of the community, which comprehends every individual of the nation.

From the logical diſtinction between the direct and indirect taxation, ſome emolument may reſult, I allow, to auditors of public accounts, &c. but to the people at large I deny that ſuch a diſtinction (which by the by is without a difference) can be productive of any practical benefit. It ought not, therefore, to be admitted as a principle in the conſtitution.

Beſides this objection, the proviſion in queſtion does not affect to define, ſecure, or eſtabliſh the right of citizenſhip. It conſigns to the caprice or diſcretion of the legiſlature the power of pronouncing who ſhall, or ſhall not, exerciſe the functions of a citizen; and this may be done effectually, either by the impoſition of a direct or indirect tax, according to the ſelfiſh views of the legiſlators, or by the mode of collecting the taxes ſo impoſed.

Neither a tenant who occupies an extenſive farm, nor a merchant or manufacturer, who may have embarked a large capital in their reſpective purſuits, can ever, according to this ſyſtem, attain the pre-emption of a citizen. On the other hand, any upſtart, who has by ſucceſſion or management, got poſſeſſion of a few acres of land, or a miſerable tenement, may exultingly exerciſe the functions of a citizen, although perhaps he neither poſſeſſes a hundredth part of the worth or property of a ſimple mechanic, nor contributes in any proportion to the exigencies of the ſtate.

[38]The contempt in which the old government held mercantile purſuits, and the obliquy that attached on merchants and manufacturers, contributed not a little to its embarraſſments, and its eventual ſubverſion; and, ſtrange to tell, though the miſchiefs ariſing from this mode of conduct are ſo obvious, yet an article is propoſed for your adoption, which has a manifeſt tendency to reſtore a defect inherent in the monarchy.

I ſhall now proceed to the ſecond article of the ſame title, with which I ſhall conclude my remarks.

The ſecond article ſays, "Every French ſoldier, who ſhall have ſerved one or more campaigns in the cauſe of liberty, is deemed a citizen of the Republic, without any reſpect or reference to other qualifications."

It ſhould ſeem, that in this Article, the Committee were deſirous of extricating themſelves from a dilemma into which they had been plunged by the preceding article. When men depart from an eſtabliſhed principle, they are compelled to reſort to trick and ſubterfuge, always ſhifting their means to preſerve the unity of their objects; and as it rarely happens that the firſt expedient makes amends for the proſtitution of principle, they muſt call in aid a ſecond of a more flagrant nature to ſupply the deficiency of the former. In this manner legiſlators go on accumulating error upon error, and artifice upon artifice, until the maſs becomes ſo bulky and incongruous, and their embarraſſment ſo deſperate, that they are compelled, as their laſt expedient, to reſort to the very principle they had violated.—The Committee were preciſely in this predicament, when they framed this article; and to me, I confeſs, their conduct appears ſpecious rather than efficacious.

It was not for himſelf alone, but for his family, that the French citizen, at the dawn of the revolution (for then indeed every man was conſidered a citizen) marched ſoldier-like to the frontiers, and repelled a foreign invaſion. He had it not in his contemplation, that he ſhould enjoy liberty for the reſidue of his earthly career [39]and by his own act preclude his off [...]ri [...] from that ineſtimable bleſſing. No! I [...] wiſhed to leave it as an inheritance to his children, and that they might hand it down to their lateſt poſterity. If a Frenchman, who united in his perſon the character of a Soldier and a Citizen, was now to return from the army to his peaceful habitation, he muſt addreſs his ſmall family in this manner:

"Sorry I am, that I cannot leave to you a ſmall portion of what I have acquired by expoſing my perſon to the ferocity of our enemies, and defeating their machinations. I have eſtabliſhed the republic, and, painful the reflection, all the laurels I have won in the field are blaſted, and all the privileges to which my exertions have entitled me, extend not beyond the period of my own exiſtence!" Thus the meaſure that has been adopted by way of ſubterfuge, falls ſhort of what the framers of it ſpeculated upon; for in conciliating the affections of the Soldier, they have ſubjected the Father to the moſt pungent ſenſations, by obliging him to adopt a generation of Slaves.

Citizens, a great deal has been urged reſpecting inſurrections. I am confident no man has a greater abhorrence of them than myſelf, and I am ſorry that any inſinuations ſhould have been thrown out upon me as a promoter of violence of any kind. The whole tenor of my life and converſation gives the lie to thoſe calumnies, and proves me to be a friend to order, truth and juſtice.

I hope you will attribute this effuſion of my ſentiments to my anxiety for the honor and ſucceſs of the revolution. I have no intereſt diſtinct from that which has a tendency to meliorate the ſituation of mankind. The revolution, as far as it reſpects myſelf, has been productive of more loſs and perſecution than it is poſſible for me to deſcribe, or for you to indemnify. But with reſpect to the ſubject under conſideration, I could not refrain from declaring my ſentiments.

In my opinion, if you ſubvert the baſis of the revolution, [40]if you diſpenſe with principles, and ſubſtitute expedients, you will extinguiſh that enthuſiaſin and energy which have hitherto been the life and ſoul of the revolution; and you will ſubſtitute in its place nothing but a cold indifference and ſelf-intereſt, which will again degenerate into intrigue, cunning, and effeminacy.

But to diſcard all conſiderations of a perſonal and ſubordinate nature, it is eſſential to the well-being of the republic, that the practical or organic part of the conſtitution ſhould correſpond with its principles; and as this does not appear to be the caſe in the plan that has been preſented to you, it is abſolutely neceſſary that it ſhould be ſubmitted to the reviſion of a committee, who ſhould be inſtructed to compare it with the Declaration of Rights, in order to aſcertain the difference between the two, and to make ſuch alterations as ſhall render them perfectly conſiſtent and compatible with each other.

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Zitationsvorschlag für dieses Objekt
TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 3712 Dissertation on first principles of government by Thomas Paine. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5EF4-8