DISSERTATION ON FIRST-PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT.

THERE is no ſubject in which mankind are more univerſally intereſted than in the ſubject of govern⯑ment. His ſecurity, be he rich or poor, and, in a great meaſure, his proſperity is connected therewith; it is there⯑fore his intereſt as well as his duty to make himſelf acquainted with its principles, and what the practice ought to be.

Every art and ſcience, however imperfectly known at firſt, has been ſtudied, improved, and brought to what we call perfection by the progreſſive labours of ſucceeding generations; but the ſcience of government has ſtood ſtill. No improvement has been made in the principle and ſcarcely any in the practice till the American revolution began. In all the countries of Europe (except in France) the ſame forms and ſyſtems that were erected in the remote [4]ages of ignorance ſtill continue, and their antiquity is pile in the place of principle; it is forbidden to inveſtigate their origin or by what right they exiſt; if it be aſked how has this happened, the anſwer is eaſy; they are eſta⯑bliſhed on a principle that is falſe, and they employ their power to prevent detection.

Notwithſtanding the myſtery with which the ſcience of government has been enveloped, for the purpoſe of enſlaving, plundering, and impoſing upon mankind, it is of all things the leaſt myſterious and the moſt eaſy to be underſtood. The meaneſt capacity cannot be at a loſs, if it begins its enquiries at the right point. Every art and ſcience has ſome point, or alphabet, at which the ſtudy of that art or ſcience begins, and by the aſſiſtance of which the progreſs is facilitated. The ſame method ought to be obſerved with reſpect to the ſcience of government.

Inſtead then of embarraſſing the ſubject in the outſet with the numerous ſubdiviſions, under which different forms of government have been claſſed, ſuch as ariſto⯑cracy, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, &c. the better method will be to begin with what may be called primary diviſions, or thoſe under which all the ſeveral ſubdiviſions will be comprehended.

The primary diviſions are but two.

• Firſt, government by election and repreſentation.
• Secondly, government by hereditary ſucceſſion.

All the ſeveral forms and ſyſtems of government, however numerous or diverſified, claſs themſelves under one or other of thoſe primary diviſions; for either they are on the ſyſtem of repreſentation, or on that of hereditary ſucceſſion. As to [5]that equivocal thing called mixed government, ſuch as the late government of Holland and the preſent government of England, it does not make an exception to the general rule, becauſe the parts ſeparately conſidered are either re⯑preſentative or hereditary.

Beginning then our enquiries at this point, we have firſt to examine into the nature of thoſe two primary divi⯑ſions. If they are equally right in principle, it is mere matter of opinion which we prefer. If the one be demon⯑ſtratively better than the other, that difference ſhould direct our choice; but if one of them be ſo abſolutely falſe as not to have a right to exiſtence, the matter ſettles itſelf at once; becauſe a negative proved on one thing, where two only are offered, and one muſt be accepted, amounts to an affirmative on the other.

The revolutions that are now ſpreading themſelves in the world have their origin in this ſtate of the caſe, and the preſent war is a conflict between the repreſentative ſyſtem founded on the rights of the people and the here⯑ditary ſyſtem founded in uſurpation. As to what are called Monarchy, Royalty, and Ariſtocracy, they do not, either as things or as terms, ſufficiently deſcribe the hereditary ſyſtem; they are but ſecondary things or ſigns of the he⯑reditary ſyſtem, and which fall of themſelves if that ſyſtem has not a right to exiſt. Were there no ſuch terms as Monarchy, Royalty and Ariſtocracy, or were other terms ſubſtituted in their place, the hereditary ſyſtem, if it con⯑tinued, would not be altered then by. It would be the ſame ſyſtem under any other titulary name as it is now.

The character therefore of the revolutions of the pre⯑ſent [6]day diſtinguiſhes itſelf moſt definitively by grounding itſelf on the ſyſtem of repreſentative government in oppo⯑ſition to the hereditary. No other diſtinction reaches the whole of the principle.

Having thus opened the caſe generally, I proceed, in the firſt place, to examine the hereditary ſyſtem, becauſe it has the priority in point of time. The repreſentative ſyſtem is the invention of the modern world; and that no doubt may ariſe as to my own opinion, I declare it before hand, which is, that there is not a problem in Euclid more mathematically true than that hereditary government has not a right to exiſt. When therefore we take from any man the exerciſe of hereditary power, we take away that which he never had the right to poſſeſs, and which no law or cuſtom could, or ever can, give him a title to

The arguments that have hitherto been employed againſt the hereditary ſyſtem, have been chiefly founded upon the abſurdity of it, and its incompetency to the purpoſe of good government. Nothing can preſent to our judgement, or to our imagination, a figure of greater abſurdity, than that of ſeeing the government of a nation fall, as it fre⯑quently does, into the hands of a lad neceſſarily deſtitute of experience and often little better than a fool. It is an inſult to every man of years, of character, and of talent, in a country. The moment we begin to reaſon upon the hereditary ſyſtem it falls into deriſion; let but a ſingle idea begin and a thouſand will ſoon follow. Inſignificance, imbecility, childhood, dotage, want of moral character; in fine, every defect ſerious or laughable unite to hold up the hereditary ſyſtem as a figure of ridicule. Leaving however [7]the ridiculouſneſs of the thing to the reflections of the reader, I proceed to the more important part of the queſ⯑tion, namely, whether ſuch a ſyſtem has a right to exiſt?

To be ſatisfied of the right of a thing to exiſt, we muſt be ſatisfied that it had a right to begin. If it had not a right to begin, it has not a right to continue. By what right then did the hereditary ſyſtem begin? Let a man but aſk himſelf this queſtion, and he will find that he cannot ſatisfy himſelf with an anſwer.

The right which any man, or any family had to ſet itſelf up at firſt to govern a nation, and to eſtabliſh itſelf hereditarily, was no other than the right which Robeſpierre had to do the ſame thing in France. If he had none, they had none. If they had any, he had as much, for it is impoſſible to diſcover ſuperiority of right in any family, by virtue of which hereditary government could begin. The Capets, the Guelphs, the Robeſpierres, the Marats, are all on the ſame ſtanding as to the queſtion of right. It belongs excluſively to none.

It is one ſtep towards liberty, to perceive that hereditary government could not begin as an excluſive right in any family. The next point will be, whether, having once began, it could grow into a right by the influence of time?

This would be ſuppoſing an abſurdity; for either it is putting time in the place of principle, or making it ſupe⯑rior to principle; whereas time has no more connection with, or influence upon principle, than principle has upon time. The wrong which began a thouſand years ago, is as much a wrong, as if it began to day; and the right which originates to day, is as much a right as if it had the [8]ſanction of a thouſand years. Time with reſpect to prin⯑ciples is an eternal NOW: it has no operation upon them: it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. But what have we to do with a thouſand years. Our life time is but a ſhort portion of that period, and if we find the wrong in exiſtence as ſoon as we begin to live, that is the point of time at which it begins to us; and our right to reſiſt it, is the ſame as if it had never exiſted before.

As hereditary government could not begin as a natural right in any family, nor derive after its commencement any right from time, we have only to examine whether there exiſt in a nation a right to ſet it up and eſtabliſh it by what is called law, as has been done in England. I anſwer NO; and that any law or any conſtitution made for that purpoſe is an act of treaſon againſt the rights of every minor in the nation, at the time it is made, and againſt the rights of all ſucceeding generations. I ſhall ſpeak upon each of thoſe caſes. Firſt, of the minor at the time ſuch law is made. Secondly, of the generations that are to follow.

A nation in a collective ſenſe, comprehends all the indi⯑viduals of whatever age, from juſt born to juſt dying. Of theſe, one part will be minors, the other aged. The average of life is not exactly the ſame in every climate and country, but in general the minority in years are the majo⯑rity in numbers, that is, the number of perſons under twenty one years, is greater than the number of perſons above that age. This difference in number is not neceſ⯑ſary to the eſtabliſhment of the principle I mean to lay down, but it ſerves to ſhew the juſtice of it more ſtrongly, [9]The principle would be equally good, if the majority in years were alſo the majority in numbers.

The rights of minors are as ſacred as the rights of the aged. The difference is altogether in the different age of the two parties and nothing in the nature of the rights; the rights are the ſame rights; and are to be preſerved inviolate for the inheritance of the minors when they ſhall come of age. During the minority of minors, their rights are under the ſacred guardianſhip of the aged. The minor, cannot ſurrender them; the guardian cannot diſpoſſeſs him; conſequently, the aged part of a nation who are the lawmakers for the time being, and who, in the march of life, are but a few years a head of thoſe who are yet minors, and to whom they muſt ſhortly give place, have not and cannot have the right to make a law to ſet up and eſta⯑bliſh hereditary government, or, to ſpeak more diſtinctly, an hereditary ſucceſſion of governors; becauſe it is an attempt to deprive every minor in the nation, at the time ſuch a law is made, of his inheritance of rights, when he ſhall come of age, and to ſubjugate him to a ſyſtem of government to which, during his minority, he could neither conſent nor object.

If a perſon, who is a minor at the time ſuch a law is propoſed, had happened to have been born a few years ſooner, ſo as to be of the age of twenty one years at the time of propoſing it, his right to have objected againſt it, to have expoſed the injuſtice and tyrannical principles of it, and to have voted againſt it, will be admitted on all ſides. If, therefore, the law operates to prevent his exerciſing the ſame rights after he comes of age as he would have had a [10]right to exerciſe had he been of age at the time, it is, undeniably, a law to take away and annul the rights of every perſon in the nation who ſhall be a minor at the time of making ſuch a law, and conſequently the right to make it cannot exiſt.

I come now to ſpeak of government by hereditary ſuc⯑ceſſion as it applies to ſucceeding generations; and to ſhew that in this caſe, as in the caſe of minors, there does not exiſt in a nation a right to ſet it up.

A nation, though continually exiſting, is continually in a ſtate of renewal and ſucceſſion. It is never ſtationary. Every day produces new births, carries minors forward to maturity, and old perſons from the ſtage. In this ever running flood of generations there is no part ſuperior in authority to another. Could we conceive an idea of ſupe⯑riority in any, at what point of time, or in what century of the world, are we to fix it? To what cauſe are we to aſcribe it? By what evidence are we to prove it? By what criterion are we to know it? A ſingle reflection will teach us that our anceſtors, like ourſelves, were but tenants for life in the great freehold of rights. The fee-abſolute was not in them, it is not in us, it belongs to the whole family of man, thro' all ages. If we think otherwiſe than this, we think either as ſlaves or as tyrants. As ſlaves, if we think that any former generation had a right to bind us; as tyrants, if we think that we have authority to bind the ge⯑nerations that are to follow.

It may not be inapplicable to the ſubject, to endeavour to define what is to be underſtood by a generation in the ſenſe the word is here uſed.

[11]As a natural term its meaning is ſufficiently clear. The father, the ſon, the grandſon are ſo many diſtinct genera⯑tions. But when we ſpeak of a generation as deſcribing the perſons in whom legal authority reſides, as diſtinct from another generation of the ſame deſcription who are to ſucceed them, it comprehends all thoſe who are above the age of twenty one years, at the time we count from; and a generation of this kind will continue in authority between fourteen and twenty one years, that is, until the number of minors, who ſhall have arrived at age, ſhall be greater than the number of perſons remaining of the former ſtock.

For example, if France at this or any other moment, contain twenty four millions of ſouls, twelve millions will be males, and twelve females. Of the twelve mil⯑lions of males, ſix millions will be of the age of twenty one years, and ſix will be under, and the authority to govern will reſide in the firſt ſix. But every day will make ſome alteration, and in twenty one years every one of thoſe minors who ſurvive will have arrived at age, and the greater part of the former ſtock will be gone: the majority of perſons then living, in whom the legal authority reſides, will be compoſed of thoſe who, twenty one years before, had no legal exiſtence. Thoſe will be fathers and grand fathers in their turn, and in the next twenty one years, (or leſs) another race of minors, arrived at age, will ſucceed them, and ſo on.

As this is ever the caſe, and as every generation is equal in rights to another, it conſequently follows, that there cannot be a right in any to eſtabliſh government by here⯑ditary ſucceſſion, becauſe it would be ſuppoſing itſelf [12]poſſeſſed of a right ſuperior to the reſt, namely, that of commanding by its own authority how the world ſhall be hereafter governed, and who ſhall govern it. Every age and generation is and muſt be (as a matter of right) as free to act for itſelf in all caſes, as the age and generation that preceded it. The vanity and preſumption of govern⯑ing beyond the grave is the moſt ridiculous and inſolent of all tyrannics. Man has no property in man, neither has one generation a property in the generations that are to follow.

In the firſt part of Rights of Man I have ſpoken of govern⯑ment by hereditary ſucceſſion; and I will here cloſe the ſubject with an extract from that work, which ſtates it under the two following heads.

"Firſt, of the right of any family to eſtabliſh itſelf with hereditary power.

"Secondly, of the right of a nation to eſtabliſh a parti⯑cular family.

"With reſpect to the firſt of thoſe heads, that of a family eſtabliſhing itſelf with hereditary powers on its own autho⯑rity independant of the nation, all men will concur in calling it deſpotiſm, and it would be treſpaſſing on their underſtanding to attempt to prove it.

"But the ſecond head, that of a nation, that is, of a gene⯑ration for the time being, eſtabliſhing a particular family with hereditary powers, it does not preſent itſelf as deſpotiſm on the firſt reflection; but if men will permit a ſecond reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward, even but one remove out of their own perſons to that of heir offpring, they will then ſee, that hereditary ſucceſſion [13]becomes the ſame deſpotiſm to others, which the firſt perſons reprobated for themſelves. It operates to preclude the conſent of the ſucceeding generation, and the precluſion of conſent is deſpotiſm.

"In order to ſee this matter more clearly, let us conſider the generation which undertakes to eſtabliſh a family with hereditary powers, ſeparately from the generations which are to follow.

"The generation which firſt ſelects a perſon and puts him at the head of its government, either with the title of king, or any other nominal diſtinction, acts its own choice, as a free agent for itſelf, be that choice wiſe or fooliſh. The perſon ſo ſet up is not hereditary, but ſelected and ap⯑pointed; and the generation which ſets him up, does not live under an hereditary government, but under a govern⯑ment of its own choice. Were the perſon ſo ſet up, and the generation who ſets him up, to live for ever, it never could become hereditary ſucceſſion, and of conſequence, hereditary ſucceſſion can only follow on the death of the firſt parties.

"As therefore hereditary ſucceſſion is out of the queſ⯑tion, with reſpect to the firſt generation, we have next to conſider the character in which that generation acts towards the commencing generation and to all ſucceeding ones.

"It aſſumes a character to which it has neither right nor title; for it changes itſelf from a legiſlator to a teſtator, and affects to make a will and teſtament, which is to have operation, after the demiſe of the makers, to bequeath the government; and it not only attempts to [14]bequeath, but to eſtabliſh on the ſucceeding generation a new and different form of government under which itſelf lived. Itſelf, as al ready obſerved, lived not under an hereditary government, but under a government of its own choice; and it now attempts, by virtue of a will and teſta⯑ment, which it has not authority to make, to take from the commencing generation, and from all future ones, the right and free agency by which itſelf acted.

"In whatever light hereditary ſucceſſion, as growing out of the will and teſtament of ſome former generation, preſents itſelf, it is both criminal and abſurd. A cannot make a will to take from B the property of B and give it to C; yet this is the manner in which, what is called hereditary ſucceſſion by law, operates. A certain genera⯑tion makes a will, under the form of a law to take away the rights of the commencing generation, and of all future generations, and convey thoſe rights to a third perſon who afterwards comes forward and aſſumes the government in conſequence of that illicit conveyance."

The hiſtory of the Engliſh parliament furniſhes an example of this kind; and which merits to be recorded as being the greateſt inſtance of legiſlative ignorance and want of principle that is to be found in the hiſtory of any country. The caſe is as follows.

The Engliſh parliament of 1688, imported a man and his wife from Holland, William and Mary, and made them king and queen of England. Having done this, the ſaid parliament made a law to convey the government of the country to the heirs of William and Mary in the following words, ‘We the lords-ſpiritual and temporal, [15]and commons, do in the name of the people of England, moſt humbly and faithfully ſubmit ourſelves, our heirs, and poſterities, to William and Mary, their heirs and poſterities for ever.’ And in a ſubſequent law, as quoted by Edmund Burke, the ſaid parliament, in the name of the people of England then living, binds the ſaid people, their heirs and poſterities, to William and Mary, their heirs and poſterities, to the end of time.

It is not ſufficient that we laugh at the ignorance of ſuch law makers; it is neceſſary that we reprobate their want of principle. The conſtituent aſſembly of France 1789 fell into the ſame vice as the parliament of England had done, and aſſumed to eſtabliſh an hereditary ſucceſſion in the family of the Capets, as an act of the conſtitution of that year. That every nation, for the time being, has a right to govern itſelf as it pleaſes, muſt always be admit⯑ted; but government by hereditary ſucceſſion, is govern⯑ment for another race of people and not for itſelf; and as thoſe on whom it is to operate, are not yet in exiſtence or are minors, ſo neither is the right in exiſtence to ſet it up for them, and to aſſume ſuch a right is treaſon againſt the right of poſterity.

I here cloſe the arguments on the firſt head, that of government by hereditary ſucceſſion; and proceed to the ſecond, that of government by election and repreſentation; or as it may be conciſely expreſſed, repreſentative government in contra-diſtinction to hereditary government.

Reaſoning by excluſion, if hereditary government has not a right to exiſt, and that it has not is proveable, repre⯑ſentative government is admitted of courſe.

[16]In contemplating government by election and repre⯑ſentation, we amuſe not ourſelves in enquiring when or how, or by what right it began. Its origin is ever in view. Man is himſelf the origin and the evidence of the right. It appertains to him in right of his exiſtence, and his perſon is the title deed.

The true and only true baſis of repreſentative govern⯑ment is equality of Rights. Every man has a right to one vote and no more in the choice of repreſentatives. The rich have no more right to exclude the poor from the right of voting, or of electing and being elected, than the poor have to exclude the rich; and wherever it is attempted, or propoſed, on either ſide, it is a queſtion of force and not of right. Who is he that would exclude another? That other has the ſame right to exclude him.

That which is now called ariſtocracy implies an ine⯑quality of rights, but who are the perſons that have a right to eſtabliſh this inequality? Will the rich exclude them⯑ſelves? No. Will the poor exclude themſelves! No. By what right then can any be excluded? It would be a queſtion, if any man or claſs of men have a right to exclude themſelves; but, be this as it may, they cannot have the right to exclude another. The poor will not delegate ſuch a right to the rich, nor the rich to the poor, and to aſſume it, is not only to aſſume arbitrary power, but to aſſume a right to commit robbery. Perſonal rights, of which the right of voting for repreſentatives is one, are a ſpecies of property of the moſt ſacred kind: and he that would employ his pecuniary property, or preſume upon the influence it gives him, to diſpoſſeſs or rob another of his property of rights, [17]uſes that pecuniary property, as he would uſe fire-arms, and merits to have it taken from him.

Inequality of rights is created by a combination in one part of the community to exclude another part from its rights. Whenever it be made an article of a conſtitution, or a law, that the right of voting, or of electing and being elected, ſhall appertain excluſively to perſons poſſeſſing a certain quantity of property, be it little or much, it is a combination of the perſons poſſeſſing that quantity, to ex⯑clude thoſe who do not poſſeſs the ſame quantity. It is inveſting themſelves with powers as a ſelf-created part of ſociety, to the excluſion of the reſt.

It is always to be taken for granted, that thoſe who oppoſe an equality of rights, never mean the excluſion ſhould take place on themſelves; and in this view of the caſe, pardoning the vanity of the thing, ariſtocracy is a ſubject of laughter. This ſelf-ſoothing vanity is encou⯑raged by another idea not leſs ſelſiſh, which is, that the oppoſers conceive they are playing a ſa [...] [...]me, in which there is a chance to gain and none to loſe; that at any ſate the doctrine of equality includes them, and that if they cannot get more rights than thoſe whom they oppoſe and would exclude, they ſhall not have leſs. This opinion has already been fatal to thouſands who, not contented with equal rights, have ſought more till they loſt all, and experienced in themſelves the degrading inequality they endeavoured to fix upon others.

In any view of the caſe it is dangerous and impolitic, ſome⯑times ridiculous, and always unjuſt, to make property the criterion of the right of voting. If the ſum, or value [18]of the property upon which the right is to take place be conſiderable, it will exclude a majority of the people, and unite them in a common intereſt againſt the government and againſt thoſe who ſupport it, and as the power is always with the majority, they can overturn ſuch a government and its ſupporters whenever they pleaſe.

If, in order to avoid this danger, a ſmall quantity of property be fixed, as the criterion of the right, it exhibits liberty in diſgrace, by putting it in competion with acci⯑dent and inſignificance. When a brood-mare ſhall fortu⯑nately produce a ſoal or a mule, that by being worth the ſum in queſtion, ſhall convey to its owner the right of voting, or by its death take it from him, in whom does the origin of ſuch a right exiſt? Is it in the man, or in the mule? When we conſider how many ways property may be acquired without merit, and loſt without a crime, we ought to ſpurn the idea of making it a criterion of rights.

But the offenſive part of the caſe is, that this excluſion from the right of voting implies a ſtigma on the moral character of the perſons excluded; and this is what no part of the community has a right to pronounce upon another part. No external circumſtance can juſtify it; wealth is no proof of moral character; nor poverty of the want of it. On the contrary, wealth is often the preſumptive evi⯑dence of diſhoneſty; and poverty the negative evidence of inuocence. If therefore property, whether little or much, be made a criterion, the means by which that pro⯑perty has been acquired, ought to be made a criterion alſo.

The only ground upon which excluſion from the right of voting is conſiſtent with juſtice, would be to inflict it as [19]a puniſhment for a certain time upon thoſe who ſhould propoſe to take away that right from others. The right of voting for repreſentatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected. To take away this right is to reduce a man to a ſtate of ſlavery, for ſlavery conſiſts in being ſubject to the will of another, and he that has not a vote in the election of repreſentatives, is in this caſe. The propoſal therefore to disfranchiſe any claſs of men is as criminal as the propoſal to take away property. When we ſpeak of right, we ought always to unite with it the idea of duties: right becomes duties by reciprocity. The right which I enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee it to another, and he to me; and thoſe who violate the duty juſtly incur a forſeicure of the right.

In a political view of the caſe the ſtrength and perma⯑nent ſecurity of government is in proportion to the num⯑ber of people intereſted in ſupporting it. The true policy therefore is to intereſt the whole by an equality or rights, for the danger ariſes from excluſions. It is poſſible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impoſſible to exclude them from the right of rebelling againſt that excluſion; and when all other rights are taken away, the right of rebellion is made perfect.

While men could be perſuaded they had no rights, or that rights appertained only to a certain claſs of men, or that government was a thing exiſting in right of itſelf, it was not difficult to govern them authoritatively. The ignorance in which they were held, and the ſuperſtition in which they were inſtructed, furniſhed the means of doing [20]it; but when the ignorance is gone, and the ſuperſtition with it; when they perceive the impoſition that has been acted upon them; when they reflect that the cultivator and the manufacturer are the primary means of all the wealth that exiſt in the world, beyond what nature ſpon⯑taneouſly produces; when they begin to feel their conſe⯑quence by their uſefulneſs, and their right as members of ſociety, it is then no longer poſſible to govern them as before. The fraud once detected cannot be re-acted. To attempt it is to provoke deriſion, or invite deſtruction.

That property well ever be unequal is certain. Induſtry, ſuperiority of talents, dexterity of management, extreme frugality, fortunate opportunities, or the oppoſite, or the mean of thoſe things, will ever produce that effect without having recourſe to the harſh ill ſounding names of avarice, and oppreſſion; and beſide this, there are ſome men who, though they do not deſpiſe wealth, will not ſtoop to the drudgery or the means of acquiring it, nor will be troubled with the care of it, beyond their wants or their indepen⯑dence; whilſt in others, there is an avidity to obtain it by every means not puniſhable; it makes the ſole buſineſs of their lives, and they follow it as a religion. All that is required with reſpect to property is to obtain it honeſtly, and not employ it criminally; but it is always criminally employed, when it is made a criterion for excluſive rights.

In inſtitutions that are purely pecuniary, ſuch as that of a bank or a commercial company, the rights of the members compoſing that company are wholly created by the property they inveſt therein; and no other rights are repreſented in the government of that company, than what [21]ariſe out of that property; neither has that government cognizance of any thing but prope [...]ty.

But the caſe is totally different with reſpect to the inſti⯑tution of civil government, organized on the ſyſtem of repreſentation. Such a government has cognizance of every thing and of every man as a member of the national ſociety, whether he has property or not; and therefore the principle requires that every man, and every kind of right be repreſented, of which the right to acquire and to hold pro⯑perty is but one, and that not of the moſt eſſential kind. The protection of a man's perſon is more ſacred than the protection of property; and beſides this, the faculty of performing any kind of work or ſervice by which he acquires a livelihood, or maintains his family, is of the nature of property. It is property to him; he has acquired; it and it is as much the object of his protection, as exterior property, poſſeſſed without that faculty, can be the object of protection to another perſon.

I have always believed that the beſt ſecurity for property, be it much or little, is to remove from every part of the community, as far as can poſſibly be done, every cauſe of complaint, and every motive to violence: and this can only be done by an equality of rights. When rights are ſecure, property is ſecure in conſequence. But when property is made a pretence for unequal or excluſive rights, it weakens the right to hold the property, and provokes indignation and tumult; for it is unnatural to believe that property can be ſecure under the guarantee of a ſociety injured in its rights by the influence of that property.

Next to the injuſtice and ill-policy of making property [22]a pretence for excluſive rights, is the unaccountable abſur⯑dity of giving to mere ſound the idea of property, and annexing to it certain rights; for what elſe is a [...] but ſound. Nature is often giving to the world ſome extraor⯑dinary men who arrive at fame by merit and univerſal conſent, ſuch as Ariſtotle, Socrates, Plato, &c. Theſe were truly great or noble. But when government ſ [...]ts up a manufactory of nobles, it is as abſurd, as if ſhe undertook to manufacture wiſe men. Her nobles are all counter⯑feits.

This wax-work order has aſſumed the name of ariſto⯑cracy; and the diſgrace of it would be leſſend if it could be conſidered only as childiſh imbecility. We pardon foppery becauſe of its inſignificance, and on the ſame ground we might pardon the foppery of Titles. But the origin of ariſtocracy was worſe than foppery. It was robbery. The firſt ariſtocrats in all countries were bri⯑gands. Thoſe of latter times, ſycophants.

It is very well known that in England, (and the ſame will be found in other countries) the great landed eſtates now held in deſcent were plundered from the quiet inha⯑bitants at the conqueſt. The poſſibility did not exiſt of acquiring ſuch eſtates honeſtly. If it be aſked how they could have been acquired no anſwer but that of robbery can be given. That they were not acquired by trade, by commerce, by manufactures, by agriculture, or by any re⯑putable employment is certain. How then were they acquir⯑ed? Bluſn ariſtocracy to hear your origin, for your progeni⯑tors were Thieves. They were the Robeſpierres and the Jacobins of that day. When they had committed the robbery, [23]they endeavoured to loſe the diſgrace of it, by ſinking their real names under fictitious ones, which they called Titles. It is ever the practice of Felons to act in this manner. They never paſs by their real names.

As property honeſtly obtained, is beſt ſecured by an equality of Rights, ſo ill-gotten property depends for pro⯑tection on a monopoly of rights. He who has robbed another of his property will next endeavour to diſarm him of his rights, to ſecure that property; for when the robber becomes the legiſlator, he believes himſelf ſecure. That part of the government of England that is called the houſe of lords, was originally compoſed of perſons who had com⯑mitted the robberies of which I have been ſpeaking. It was an aſſociation for the protection of the property they had ſtolen.

But beſides the criminality of the origin of ariſtocracy, it has an injurious effect on the moral and phyſical cha⯑racter of man. Like ſlavery it debilitates the human faculties; for as the mind bowed down by ſlavery loſes in ſilence its elaſtic powers, ſo, in the contrary extreme, when it is bouyed up by folly it becomes incapable of exerting them, and dwindles into imbecility. It is im⯑poſſible that a mind employed upon ribbands and titles can ever be great. The childiſhneſs of the objects con⯑ſumes the man.

It is at all times neceſſary, and more particularly ſo, during the progreſs of a revolution, and until right ideas confirm themſelves by habit, that we frequently refreſh our patrio⯑tiſm by reference to firſt principles. It is by tracing things to their origin that we learn to underſtand them; [24]and it is by keeping that line and that origin always in view, that we never forget them.

An enquiry into the origin of Rights will demonſtrate to us that rights are not gifts from one man to another, nor from one claſs of men to another; for who is he who could be the firſt giver, or by what principles, or on what authority, could he poſſeſs the right of giving? A decla⯑ration of rights is not a creation of them, nor a donation of them. It is a manifeſt of the principle by which they exiſt, followed by a detail of what the rights are; for every civil right has a natural right for its foundation, and it includes the principle of a reciprocal guarantee of thoſe rights from man to man. As therefore it is impoſſible to diſcover any origin of rights otherwiſe than in the origin of man, it conſequently follows, that rights appertain to man in right of his exiſtence only, and muſt therefore be equal to every man. The principle of an equality of rights is clear and ſimple. Every man can underſtand it, and it is by underſtanding his rights that he learns his duties; for where the rights of men are equal, every man muſt finally ſee the neceſſity of protecting the rights of others as the moſt effectual ſecurity for his own. But if in the forma⯑tion of a conſtitution, we depart from the principle of equal rights, or attempt any modification of it, we plunge into a labyrinth of difficulties from which there is no way out, but by retreating. Where are we to ſtop? Or by what principle are we to find out the point to ſtop at, that ſhall diſcriminate between men of the ſame country, part of whom ſhall be free, and the reſt not? If property is to be made the criterion, it is a total departure from every [25]moral principle of liberty, becauſe it is attaching rights to mere matter, and making man the agent of that matter. It is moreover holding up property as an apple of diſcord, and not only exciting but juſtifying war againſt it; for I maintain the principle, that when property is uſed as an inſtrument to take away the rights of thoſe who may happen not to poſſeſs property, it is uſed to an unlawful purpoſe, as fire-arms would be in a ſimilar caſe.

In a ſtate of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal in power; the weak cannot protect himſelf againſt the ſtrong. This being the caſe, the inſtitution of civil ſociety is for the purpoſe of making an equaliza⯑tion of powers that ſhall be parallel to, and a guarantee of the equality of rights. The laws of a country when pro⯑perly conſtructed apply to this purpoſe. Every man takes the arm of the law for his protection as more effectual than his own; and therefore every man has an equal right in the formation of the government and of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged. In extenſive countries and ſocieties, ſuch as America and France, this right, in the individual, can only be exerciſed by delega⯑tion, that is, by election and repreſentation; and hence it is that the inſtitution of repreſentative government ariſes.

Hitherto I have confined myſelf to matters of principle only. Firſt, that hereditary government has not a right to exiſt; that it cannot be eſtabliſhed on any principle of right; and that it is a violation of all principle. Secondly, that government by election and repreſentation has its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man; for whether a man be his own la [...]-giver, as he would be in a ſtate of [26]nature; or whether he exerciſes his portion of legiſlative ſovereignty in his own perſon, as might be the caſe in ſmall democraties where all could aſſemble for the forma⯑tion of the laws by which they were to be governed; or whe⯑ther he exerciſes it in the choice of perſons to repreſent him in a national aſſembly of repreſentatives, the origin of the right is the ſame in all caſes. The firſt, as is before obſer⯑ved, is defective in power; the ſecond, is practicable only in democracies of ſmall extent; the third is the greateſt ſcale upon which human government can be inſtituted.

Next to matters of principle, are matters of opinion, and it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh between the two. Whether the rights of men ſhall be equal is not a matter of opinion but of right, and conſequently of principle; for men do not hold their rights as grants from each other, but each one in right of himſelf. Society is the guardian but not the giver. And as in extenſive ſocieties, ſuch as America and France, the right of the individual, in matters of govern⯑ment, cannot be exerciſed but by election and repreſenta⯑tion; it conſequently follows, that the only ſyſtem of govern⯑ment, conſiſtent with principle, where ſimple democracy is impracticable, is the repreſentative ſyſtem. But as to the organical part, or the manner in which the ſeveral parts of government ſha [...]l be arranged and compoſed, it is alto⯑gether matter of opinion. It is neceſſary that all the parts be conformable with the principle of equal rights; and ſo long as this principle be religiouſly adhered to, no very material error can take place▪ neither can any error continue long, in that part that falls within the province of opinion.

In all matters of opinion, the ſocial compact, or the [27]principle by which ſociety is held together, requires that the majority of opinions becomes the rule for the whole, and that the minority yields practical obedience thereto. This is perfectly conformable to the principle of equal rights: for, in the firſt place, every man has a right to g [...]ve an opinion, but no man has a right that his opinion ſhould govern the reſt. In the ſecond place, it is not ſuppoſed to be known before hand on which ſide of any queſtion, whe⯑ther for or againſt, any man's opinion will fall. He may happen to be in a majority upon ſome queſtions, and in a minority upon others; and by the ſame rule that he expects obedience in the one caſe, he muſt yield it in the other. —All the diſorders that have ariſen in France during the progreſs of the revolution have had their origin, not in the principle of equal rights, but in the violation of that principle. The principle of equal rights has been repeat⯑edly violated, and that not by the majority but by the minority, and that minority has been compoſed of men poſſiſſing property as well as of men without property; property therefore, even upon the experience already had, is no more a criterion of character than it is of rights. It will ſometimes happen that the minority are right, and the majority are wrong, but as ſoon as experience proves this to be the caſe, the minority will increaſe to a majority, and the error will reform itſelf by the tranquil operation of freedom of opinion and equality of rights. Nothing therefore can juſtify an inſurrection, neither can it ever be neceſſary, where rights are equal and opinions free.

Taking then the principle of equal rights as the ſoun⯑dation of the revolution, and conſequently of the conſtitu⯑tion, [28]the organical part, or the manner in which the ſeveral parts of the government ſhall be arranged in the conſtitu⯑tion, will, as is already ſaid, fall within the province of opinion.

Various methods will preſent themſelves upon a queſtion of this kind, and tho' experience is yet wanting to deter⯑mine which is the beſt, it has, I think, ſufficiently decided which is the worſt. That is the worſt, which in its deli⯑berations and deciſions is ſubject to the precipitancy and paſſion of an individual; and when the whole legiſlature is crouded into one body, it is an individual in maſs. In all caſes of deliberation it is neceſſary to have a crops of reſerve, and it would be better to divide the repreſentation by lot into two parts, and let them reviſe and correct each other, than that the whole ſhould ſit together and debate at once.

Repreſentative government is not neceſſarily confined to any one particular form. The principle is the ſame in all the forms under which it can be arranged. The equal rights of the people is the root from which the whole ſprings, and the branches may be arranged as preſent opi⯑nion or future experience ſhall beſt direct. As to that hoſpital of incurables (as Cheſterfield calls it) the Britiſh houſe of peers, it is an excreſſence growing out of corrup⯑tion; and there is no more affinity or reſemblance between any of the branches of a legiſlative body originating from the rights of the people, and the aforeſaid houſe of peers, than between a regular member of the human body and an ulcerated wen.

As to that part of government that is called the [29] executive, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to fix a preciſe meaning to the word.

There are but two diviſions into which power can be arranged. Firſt, that of willing or decreeing the laws; ſecondly, that of executing or putting them in practice. The former, correſponds to the intellectual faculties of the human mind, which reaſons and determines what ſhall be done; the ſecond, to the mechanical powers of the human body that puts that determination into practice. If the former decides, and the latter does not perform, it is a ſtate of imbecility; and if the latter acts without the predetermination of the former, it is a ſtate of lunacy. The executive department therefore is official, and is ſubordinate to the legiſlative, as the body is to the mind in a ſtate of health; for, it is impoſſible to conceive the idea of two ſovereignties, a ſovereignty to will, and a ſovereignty to act. The executive is not inveſted with the power of deliberating whether it ſhall act or not; it has no diſcretionary authority in the caſe; for i [...] can act no other thing that what the laws decree, and it is obliged to act conformably thereto; and in this view of the caſe, the executive is made up of all the official departments that execute the laws, of which, that which is called the judi⯑ciary is the chief.

But mankind have conceived an idea that ſome kind of authority is neceſſary to ſuperintend the execution of the l [...]ws, and to ſee that they are faithfully performed; and it is by confounding this ſuperintending authority with the official execution that we get embarraſſed about the term executive power. — All the parts in the governments of the [30]united ſtates of America that are called THE EXECUTIVE, are no other than authorities to ſuperintend the execution of the laws; and they are ſo far independent of the legiſla⯑tive, that they know the legiſlative only thro' the laws, and cannot be controuled or directed by it, through any other medium.

In what manner this ſuperintending authority ſhall be appointed or compoſed, is a matter that falls within the province of opinion. Some may prefer one method and ſome another; and in all caſes, where opinion only and not principle is concerned, the majority of opinions forms the rule for all. There are however ſome things deducible from reaſon, and evidenced by experience, that ſerve to guide our deciſion upon the caſe. The one is, never to inveſt any individual with extraordinary power; for beſides his being tempted to miſuſe it, it will excite contention and commotion in the nation for the office. Secondly, never to inveſt power long in the hands of any number of indi⯑viduals. The inconveniences that may be ſuppoſed to ac⯑company frequent changes, are leſs to be feared than the danger that a riſes from long continuance.

I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe with offering ſome obſer⯑vations on the means of preſerving liberty; for it is not only neceſſary that we eſtabliſh it, but that we preſerve it.

It is, in the firſt place, neceſſary that we diſtinguiſh between the means made uſe of to overthrow deſpotiſm, in order to prepare the way for the eſtabliſhment of liberty, and the means to be uſed after the deſpotiſm is over thrown.

The means made uſe of in the firſt caſe are juſtified by [31]neceſſity. Thoſe means are in general inſurrections; for whilſt the eſtabliſhed government of deſpotiſm continues in any country it is ſcarcely poſſible that any other means can be uſed. It is alſo certain that in the commencement of a revolution, the revolutionary party permit to them⯑ſelves a diſcretionary exerciſe of power regulated more by circumſtances than by principle, which were the practice to continue, liberty would never be eſtabliſhed, or if eſta⯑bliſhed would ſoon be overthrown. It is never to be expected in a revolution that every man is to change his opinion at the ſame mom [...]nt. There never yet was any truth or any principle ſo irr [...]ſiſtibly obvious, that all men believed it at once. Time and reaſon muſt co-operate with each other to the final eſtabliſhment of any principle; and therefore thoſe who may happen to be firſt convinced have not a right to perſecute others, on whom conviction operates more ſlowly. The moral principle of revolutions is to inſtruct; not to deſtroy.

Had a conſtitution been eſtabliſhed two years ago (as ought to have been done) the violences that have ſince deſolated France, and injured the character of the revolu⯑tion, would, in my opinion, have been prevented. The na⯑tion would then have had a bond of union, and every indi⯑vidual would have known the line of conduct he was to follow. But inſtead of this, a revolutionary government, a thing without either principle or authority, was ſubſti⯑tuted in its place; virtue and crime depended upon acci⯑dent; and that which was patriotiſm one day became treaſon the next. All theſe things have followed from the want of a conſtitution; for it is the nature and intention [32]of a conſtitution to prevent governing by party, by eſta⯑bliſhing a common principle that ſhall limit and controul the power and impulſe of party, and that ſays to all parties, THUS FAR SHALT THOU GO AND NO FURTHER. But in the abſence of a conſtitution men look entirely to party; and inſtead of principle governing party, party governs principle.

An avidity to puniſh is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to ſtretch, to miſinterpret, and to miſapply even the beſt of laws. He that would make his own liberty ſecure, muſt guard even his enemy from oppreſſion; for if he violates this duty, he eſtabliſhes a precedent that will reach to himſelf.