A LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND.

IT hath for a conſiderable time been the reproach of Scotland, that her in⯑habitants have been deſtitute of public ſpirit, and have felt themſelves merely as a number of individuals, to whom no meaſure of ſtate was of any conſequence, unleſs ſo far as it affected their private intereſts. The reign of his preſent Ma⯑jeſty has been troubled with a ſeries of faction, hurtful to government at home, and ruinous to the Britiſh power abroad: But all the while Scotland has remained in cold indifference; and each adminiſtration, of whatever principles, has been ſure of our acquieſcence at [4] leaſt, if not of our ſupport, as a matter of courſe.

The flagrant injuſtice of the Houſe of Commons, in the caſe of the Middle⯑ſex election, by which a precedent was eſtabliſhed for violating the valuable pri⯑vilege of all the electors of Great Britain, was no more regarded in Scotland than any ordinary vote in that Houſe. It has ſince been reſcinded, not indeed by the ſame Parliament, but by almoſt the ſame members: So that it may be ſaid with⯑out offence, that the Houſe of Commons is at no time infallible.

The claim of the Britiſh Parliament to tax the American colonies, or, in other words, that his Majeſty's ſubjects in Great Britain ſhould command the pro⯑perty of his Majeſty's ſubjects in Ame⯑rica, was almoſt univerſally approved of in Scotland, where due conſideration was had of the advantage of raiſing regi⯑ments. I was one of the few who, as far as my voice could go, ventured to oppoſe it, both as unjuſt and inexpedient:—Un⯑juſt, [5] becauſe I thought the people of A⯑merica, as participant of the Britiſh con⯑ſtitution, ſhould no more be taxed with⯑out the conſent of their repreſentatives, than the people of Ireland, or the people of Great Britain:—Inexpedient, becauſe I did not think it poſſible for this coun⯑try to prevail, unleſs one of two propo⯑ſitions, utterly improbable, but induſtri⯑ouſly circulated, were true: The firſt, that a whole people were cowards; the ſecond, that a whole people were willing that their all ſhould be at the unconditional mercy of another people. My intimacy with the excellent and much honoured General Oglethorpe, who himſelf ſettled one of the American colonies, and ſtill lives with all his faculties and all his be⯑nevolence in full vigour^*, confirmed me [6] in my opinion; and when pleading at the bar of the Houſe of Commons, in a queſtion concerning taxation, I a⯑vowed that opinion, declaring that the man in the world for whom I have the higheſt reſpect^†, had not been able to convince me that Taxation was no Tyran⯑ny. My principles being of a Tory caſt, that is to ſay, thoſe of a ſteady Royaliſt, it grieved me to the heart, that our moſt gracious Sovereign ſhould be adviſed by evil counſellors to aſſent to ſevere mea⯑ſures againſt an immenſe body of his ſubjects, who were willing faithfully to ſubmit themſelves to the King as ſu⯑preme,—to the father of all his people;—but not to his ſubjects, their brethren, with whom they were entitled to equal privileges.

It appeared to me, that Miniſtry car⯑ried on the war againſt our colonies, chiefly in the hope that if they ſhould be ſubdued, a multitude of offices might [7] be created, the diſpoſal of which would abſolutely ſecure a majority in Parlia⯑ment upon every occaſion; and for that reaſon, had there been no other, every friend to rational freedom muſt have abhorred the deſign. The ſlavery ſpread over the continent of America, would have reverberated upon Britain. The right of the people to ſupply or to with⯑hold money, is the great check upon the executive power; and in that conſiſts the chief excellence of our free government.

A ſtrong party in the Houſe of Com⯑mons, oppoſed that baleful adminiſtra⯑tion which perſevered in the Ameri⯑can war, and oppoſed it with ſuch vio⯑lence, as at length to obtain a vote in the Houſe of Commons, ‘"That the in⯑fluence of the Crown has increaſed, is increaſing, and ought to be diminiſh⯑ed;"’ the truth of which vote, in this democratical reign, I leave to the conſi⯑deration of every candid man.

[8] I would wiſh, in all queſtions of na⯑tional concern, not to regard men, but meaſures; and therefore, I ſhall make no remarks upon that extraordinary fluc⯑tuation of Miniſters whom we have ſince ſeen, like the viſions of Macbeth:

But I earneſtly entreat the attention of my countrymen, to the alarming attempt which has been recently made, to de⯑ſtroy the ſecurity of private property, and annihilate the conſtitutional mo⯑narchy of theſe kingdoms, under the pretext of ‘"better regulating the affairs of the Eaſt-India Company."’

Harſh and abuſive expreſſions can do no good, and are very foreign from the intention of this Letter, which is not to kindle a wild rage, but to rouſe a ſteady ſpirit. I ſhall therefore abſtain from uſing thoſe epithets which have, with juſtice, been applied to the bill for veſt⯑ing the affairs of the Eaſt-India Com⯑pany in certain Commiſſioners. But I [9] will ſay, that I look upon this bill as the moſt dangerous meaſure to the country that ever yet was hazarded in Parlia⯑ment.

I ſhall conſider it in both the views which I have mentioned, 1ſt, As affect⯑ing property; and, 2dly, As affecting the conſtitution.

And, 1ſt, As to Property, the bill pro⯑vides, ‘"That the ſaid Commiſſioners ſhall immediately enter into, and poſ⯑ſeſs themſelves of all lands, tenements, houſes, ware-houſes, and other build⯑ings whatever, belonging to the ſaid Company, and all books, records, char⯑ters, &c. and all ſhips and veſſels, goods, wares, merchandiſes, money, ſecurities for money, and all other ef⯑fects whatſoever; and the Directors of the ſaid Company, and all officers and ſervants thereof, are hereby injoined, immediately upon the requiſition of the ſaid Commiſſioners, to deliver to them, or to ſuch perſons as they ſhall [10] appoint, the ſeveral matters aforemen⯑tioned."’

Can a more tremenduous exerciſe of arbitrary power be figured than this?—That a great Company which has ſubſiſt⯑ed for above two centuries, under the ſanction of charters from the Crown, ſhould all at once not only be deprived of the territorial power, which it has ac⯑quired, and which has no doubt been flagitiouſly abuſed by ſome of its ſer⯑vants; but have all its effects, in all parts of the world, abſtracted from its own care and management, and delivered up to a ſet of men not of its own appoint⯑ment. There is ſomething in this ſo ſhocking to the firſt notions of property and juſtice, as muſt make us ſhudder with conſternation. Were ſuch a bill to paſs into a law, the expreſſion ‘"What is a charter but a ſheet of parchment with a bit of wax dangling to it,"’ might be uttered without being ſtigma⯑tized as groſsly indecent; for there [11] would then be no force in a charter, the eſſence of which is not matter but ſpirit. If an Attorney General were hanged, it might be ſaid with vulgar triumph, ‘"What is an Attorney General, but a carcaſe dangling the end of a rope?"’ But can ſuch expreſſions be uſed with propriety, while a charter contains the faith of Majeſty, and the perſon of an Attorney General, is dignified with an important truſt from the King?

It is well known, that many indivi⯑duals of different nations have their whole property veſted in the funds of the Eaſt-India Company, becauſe it hath hi⯑therto been believed, that in this great and free country, there is no danger of ſuch confiſcations or ſeizures by an un⯑expected ſtretch of power, as have ſome⯑times happened in other countries in Eu⯑rope; but had this rapacious graſp been ſucceſsful, Where would have been our boaſted pre-eminence of ſecurity? And how wofully muſt our national credit [12] have ſunk? What muſt the moneyed men of Holland have thought of ſuch better regulating of commercial concerns? They muſt have thought of their own verbeetering buys, where criminals are ſore⯑ly puniſhed to make them better. The Houſe of Commons muſt have appeared a Houſe of Correction with a vengeance.

The injuſtice of the meaſure would have been the ſame to the proprietors of whatever nation, but muſt have been pe⯑culiarly diſtreſſing to thoſe of our own country, who for a long period of time have been habituated to the perſuaſion, that a Royal Charter is ſo ſacred, that no⯑thing but the ſtrongeſt reaſons, amount⯑ing almoſt to the plea of neceſſity, can be permitted to annual or alter it.

We, in this part of the united king⯑dom, experienced in the late reign an ex⯑tinction of a number of chartered rights, by the act aboliſhing heritable juriſdic⯑tions. A clamour was raiſed at the time, and there are ſtill ſome who perſiſt in [13] maintaining that this was an infringe⯑ment of the Articles of the Union, by which it was ſtipulated that the juriſdic⯑tion and courts of Scotland ſhould re⯑main as before. But upon looking at⯑tentively at the Articles, it will be found that the heritable juriſdictions were to be reſerved only as rights of property: Conſequently, they, like other rights of property, might at any time be taken from the owners by the Legiſlature for the greater good of the publick. The hereditary juriſdictions were grants from the Sovereign, delegating parcels of his power; and when they were aboliſhed in the perſons of private territorial pro⯑prietors, they were abſorbed in his Ma⯑jeſty, the great fountain from which they originally flowed, and from whence they now iſſue in a different manner. Whe⯑ther the act aboliſhing heritable juriſ⯑dictions was a beneficial meaſure or not, may be fairly queſtioned; for my own part, I ſhould be better pleaſed to live [14] under the immediate juriſdiction of an hereditary Lord, of ancient and generous blood, than under that of a lower man, who by occaſional intereſt has been ap⯑pointed a Sheriff. The former was as much under the controul of higher au⯑thority as the latter. But I am not go⯑ing to diſcuſs the queſtion. I mention the meaſure as an act of State coming nearer ‘"the buſineſs and boſoms"’ of my countrymen; and that I might recal to their remembrance the deliberation and delicacy with which it was conducted, and the compenſation which was made to thoſe who were deprived of their rights. Yet what is the gratification of pride by additional power, when compared with the eſſential value of property?

How different was the conduct of the Eaſt-India bill? Was any kind of compen⯑ſation to the Proprietors of that Company ever propoſed? Was there any tender⯑neſs ſhewn to thoſe who had their whole property at ſtake? No. The tyranny of [15] that audacious bill, (I muſt be allowed this expreſſion) was unfeeling and inflex⯑ible; thouſands were to behold all that they had upon earth wreſted from them, and committed to ſtrangers, while no⯑thing was left to them but amazement and grief. Was this bill ſedately and deliberately conſidered by the Houſe of Commons? Was full time given not on⯑ly to the Proprietors, but to the nation at large, with humble confidence to ſtate their objections to it? No. It was hur⯑ried on in a manner which will not ſoon be forgotten. The rapidity of its courſe, and its ill-looking appearance, indicated its character; and when it came into the Houſe of Lords, the alarm was,—Stop thief.

The ſolemn attention paid to a ſubject of ſuch magnitude, by that moſt Ho⯑nourable Houſe where the ſtate of the Eaſt-India Company was proved to re⯑quire no deſperate remedy; and the vote by which the bill was rejected, will ever [16] be remembered with admiration and gra⯑titude, not only by the great Company which was immediately concerned, but by every Corporation in the kingdom; and indeed by every man who holds any thing valuable by charter. While that portentous bill was ſuſpended over our heads, every man was aſking his neigh⯑bour, ‘"What will be done next?"’ Cities, towns, banks, hoſpitals, were in danger, and inſignificance was the only ſecurity. The comfort and joy at being relieved from ſuch apprehenſions, could not but be great and univerſal.

In the ſecond place, as to the Conſtitu⯑tion, the bill provides, ‘"That a certain number of perſons to be named by this bill, ſhall be Commiſſioners for governing and managing the ſaid ter⯑ritorial poſſeſſions and commerce."’

And, ‘"That the ſaid Commiſſioners, or the majority thereof, ſhall have full power to remove, ſuſpend, appoint or reſtore [17] all perſons whatſoever, from or to any office, civil or military, whether ſuch perſons ſhall have been appointed by acts of Parliament, or howſoever o⯑therwiſe appointed, except as herein provided."’

Here, then, we were to have had the eſtabliſhment of a dominion civil and military, of vaſt and various extent, veſted in perſons independent of his moſt ſacred Majeſty, the lawful Sove⯑reign of the realm. The patronage an⯑nexed to this dominion would have been immenſe, and infinitely beyond what is annexed to the crown of Great Britain. The very ſame Right Honourable Gen⯑tleman who inſiſted that the influence of the Crown ought to be diminiſhed, and actually prevailed in having it rigid⯑ly curtailed, drove on this bill, by which ſeven men propoſed by himſelf were to have an influence far beyond what the Crown ever had. If both theſe meaſures were parts of one preconceived plan; if, [18] while he was diminiſhing the power of the Crown, he entertained the project of aggrandizing his own power, his abili⯑ties, great as we muſt acknowledge them to be, are yet of mightier extent than we have ever imagined. Had the appoint⯑ment taken place, ‘"the Crown would have been a bawble which no man of ſpirit would have choſen to wear,"’ as was nobly ſaid by a great and intrepid Ma⯑ſter of our conſtitution, and moſt power⯑ful Orator. There would have been in Britain one conſtitutional King,—and an unconſtitutional heptarchy, not of Kings, but of Emperors, and that heptar⯑chy nominated by the Right Honourable Gentleman. He might then have bid defiance to any other power in the king⯑dom. He might have had his commiſ⯑ſion prolonged during all the days of his life, and ſat ſupreme in his circle of the Houſe of Commons poſſeſſed of ſuch a ſevenfold ſhield

[19] But this aſtoniſhing project has been happily defeated by the Houſe of Lords, the hereditary Counſellors of the King. The ſpeech of the Earl of Abingdon, u⯑pon that memorable occaſion, will re⯑main as a diſtinguiſhed example of con⯑ſtitutional knowledge and legiſlative ſpi⯑rit. Had there been nothing againſt the bill, but its violation of chartered pro⯑perty, I ſhould have thought it deſerved its fate, and many of the Lords put their negative upon that ground. But when it was equally hoſtile to the King, and to the people; and while on one hand, it directly daſhed in pieces the ſecurity of chartered property; it, on the other hand, indirectly, overwhelmed the Royal prerogative, there were two forcible reaſons for throwing it out. The laſt was the ground taken by the Biſhop of Saliſbury, who with the dignified candour which is to be found in every one of the noble family of Bar⯑rington, offered to give his aſſent to the [20] bill, if the Miniſtry would aſſure him that the King ſhould have the appoint⯑ment of the Commiſſioners. But that would have been fruſtrating the enor⯑mous ſcheme of miniſterial influence, the principal object of the bill.

The ferment which hath ſince agita⯑ted the Houſe of Commons, need nei⯑ther ſurpriſe nor alarm us; becauſe there is no wonder that the great majority, who voted for the bill, ſhould be angry at their diſappointment. That there ſhould have been ſuch a majority, for ſuch a meaſure, is ſeriouſly diſtreſſing. I for⯑bear to conjecture the cauſe; ſorry I am that to ſome of the number may be ſaid et tu Brute! But it is ſurely not a ſtrange thing, that the Nobles of the land ſhould ſet themſelves againſt a bill which would have been ſo fatal to the power of the Crown. For as Blackſtone well obſerves, ‘"the Nobility are the pillars which are reared from among the people, more immediately to ſupport the Throne, [21] and if that falls, they muſt alſo be buried under its ruins^*."’ The nobility therefore, in this caſe, had a common cauſe with the King, Why then ſhould it be ſuppoſed? why ſhould it be ru⯑moured, that the influence of his Majeſty determined them againſt a bill which the ſecurity of their own Order called upon them to reject?

But were it true, that the Sovereign's diſapprobation of the bill was conveyed by a reſpectable Peer to others of his or⯑der; that Noble Lord who repreſented his Majeſty in Ireland with ſo generous a ſplendour, and ſo much to the ſatisfac⯑tion of that kingdom, might juſtly ſay, (I love his phraſe,) ‘"I will meet the charge with a high head."’

He has ſince proved to us, that he did not mean the artificial high head of miniſterial influence, but the lofty port of conſcious rectitude. What Mr Har⯑ley ſaid of Sir John Lowther, in the parliament 1693, may be applied to [22] him, ‘"I think Lowther has told you the true ſtate of the caſe; the greatneſs of his eſtate and mind, makes him too great to be ſuſpected in this matter^*."’

Can it be ſeriouſly maintained as con⯑ſtitutional doctrine, that when the King hath recommended to Parliament, in a ſpeech from the Throne, any particular buſineſs, and a bill is brought in concern⯑ing that buſineſs, containing clauſes to which the King cannot poſſibly conſent, his Majeſty ſhall be reſtrained from con⯑ſulting with any of his hereditary Coun⯑ſellors, or any perſon whatever, and from ſignifying his mind either pri⯑vately or publicly.

It hath been ſaid, that Miniſters a⯑lone are reſponſible for public meaſures, and therefore, none but actual Miniſters can be allowed to adviſe the Sovereign: But there is here a falacy which it is not difficult to detect. Public meaſures in the executive part of adminiſtration, are thoſe for which Miniſters are reſpon⯑ſible; [23] and therefore, they dare not car⯑ry into execution what they know to he wrong, or rather what they fear may ſubject them to puniſhment; but pu⯑blic meaſures in the deliberative part of adminiſtration, are not within the pro⯑vince of Miniſters, but belong to Par⯑liament, until they have paſt both houſes, and come to receive the aſſent or negative of the King; and then, and not till then, does the Miniſters reſpon⯑ſibility in that branch commence.

While a bill, then, is pending in Par⯑liament, the Miniſter is perfectly ſecure in whatever way the influence of the Crown may be alledged to be uſed; for, Parliament is, or may be, altogether in⯑dependent of that influence; and if being independent, they are ſwayed by it, it muſt be the influence of reaſon, and therefore an influence of which it would be un⯑reaſonable to complain.

And what is the precedent which has been mentioned for all this jealouſy of [24] regal influence? It is a precedent taken from that gloomy period of our hiſtory, the reign of Charles I. when faction grew more and more virulent, till it became rank rebellion; and by murdering the King, changed our government into anarchy and uſurpation. The caſe which has been quoted was in 1641, when the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion in Ireland required ſpeedy and effectual meaſures to be taken, as the affairs of India do at preſent; and when attention to the former had been recommended from the Throne, as attention to the lat⯑ter has now been.

The paſſage of Charles I.'s ſpeech, at which exceptions were taken, was as fol⯑lows^*:

The Houſe of Commons haſtily decla⯑red, that the privileges of Parliament had been broken, and deſired a conference about them with the Lords^*.

[26] That conference being held, a decla⯑ratory proteſtation was entered in both Houſes of Parliament, and a humble re⯑monſtrance and petition by the Lords and Commons was preſented to the ‘"King^*, declaring it their ancient and undoubted right, that his Majeſty ought not to take notice of any matter in agitation of either Houſes of Parlia⯑ment, but by their informations or agreement; and that his Majeſty ought not to propound any condition to any bill in either Houſe of Parliament, or declare his approbation or diſlike of the ſame before it be preſented to his Majeſty in due courſe of Parliament; and that his Majeſty ought not to con⯑ceive diſpleaſure againſt any man for ſuch opinions and propoſitions as he ſhall deliver and debate in Parliament, and declaring, that all theſe privileges had been lately broken, to the great ſor⯑row and grievance of his moſt humble and [27] faithful ſubjects, in the ſpeech which his Majeſty made in Parliament, beſeeching his Majeſty to protect them in theſe, and all other their privileges; and that his Majeſty would be pleaſed to make known the name or names of the perſon or perſons by whoſe miſin⯑formation and evil counſel his Maje⯑ſty was induced to the ſame, that ſo he or they may receive ſuch condign puniſhment as ſhall appertain to ju⯑ſtice in that behalf."’

Such is the ſubſtance of that produc⯑tion of factious turbulence and effronte⯑ry, to which a much injured Prince re⯑turned the following anſwer:

He to whom this does not appear a ſufficient anſwer in every reſpect, and who can ſtill wiſh to copy the petition and remonſtrance, muſt have a caſt of thinking ſo different from mine, that it would be in vain for me to argue with him.

Charles I. inſtead of talking to his Parliament in the high and imperious tone of Queen Elizabeth, had, with the beſt intentions, mildly endeavoured to [31] co-operate with them, in bringing for⯑ward a matter of great importance, in a manner conſiſtent with the royal preroga⯑tive, which it was his Majeſty's bounden duty to maintain. And as diſpatch was required, his Majeſty fairly notified to his Parliament, that they ſhould not waſte time in carrying through all the forms, a bill to which he could not aſſent, and told them with what limitation he could paſs it. Was not this a wiſe and a can⯑did conduct? And what are we to think of thoſe who made an attack upon it? Pudet hoec opprobria.

And perhaps the caſe of the Eaſt-India bill may be juſtly reckoned to fall under the exceptions which Mr Hatſell, bred under the patronage of Onſlow, the Ga⯑maliel of the Houſe of Commons, and therefore fully inſtructed in its privi⯑leges, and abundantly zealous for them, admits in his Precedents, under the head, ‘"KING is not to take notice of buſineſs de⯑pending."’ His words are: ‘"There are [32] however, in the proceedings of the Houſe of Commons, exceptions to this rule, neceſſarily ariſing out of their own forms and orders, as in thoſe caſes where the King is intereſted as a party in any bill depending before the Houſe, either as Patron of a living, Lord of the manor or ſoil, or in any o⯑ther manner. Here, as it is the duty of his ſervants to acquaint him with the purport of ſuch bills, and to take care that his property or intereſt may be ſe⯑cured, or that he may have an adequate compenſation for them, it is uſual for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lan⯑caſter, to acquaint the Houſe, either on preſenting the petition, or in the courſe of the bill, that his Majeſty ha⯑ving been informed of the purport of the ſaid bill, gives his conſent, as far as his Majeſty's intereſt is concerned, that the Houſe may do therein as they ſhall think fit. And this is no breach [33] of the privileges of the Houſe of Com⯑mons, as it is a proceeding founded on the fundamental rules of natural juſtice ^*."’

I deſire to know, if the King was not deeply intereſted in the Eaſt-India bill, both as it is transferred to certain Com⯑miſſioners, great and important chartered rights, which, if forfeited, ſhould have re⯑verted to the Crown, and been at his Ma⯑jeſty's diſpoſal; and as it created a new and formidable power, civil and military, independent of his Majeſty? And ſup⯑poſing his Majeſty to have, at the time, ſuch ſervants as were more attached to miniſterial influence, than to royal pre⯑rogative, and did not acquaint his Ma⯑jeſty with the purport and tendency of the bill,—were none of the real friends of the conſtitution, none of the King's faithful counſellors, to warn him of the danger; and if warned and convinced, [34] was a dead ſilence to be kept, and no diſapprobation to be diſcovered?

If it be urged, that it would have been more conſtitutional to have left the mat⯑ter to the royal negative, I, in the firſt place, deny the propoſition; and, in the next place, I maintain, that acting in that manner might have occaſioned a more violent roar of faction, if we can ſuppoſe the bill to have paſſed both Houſes.

A notion has been pretty generally en⯑tertained, that the royal aſſent has been refuſed to no bill ſince the Revolution. But this is ſo far from being true, that part of the very Addreſs to his Majeſty, which was carried in the Houſe of Commons the other day, is copied from a repreſen⯑tation of that Houſe to William III. in 1693, bearing, ‘"That the uſage of Par⯑liament in all times hath been, that what bills have been agreed to by both Houſes, for the redreſs of grievances, or other public good, have, when tender⯑ed [35] to the Throne, obtained the royal aſ⯑ſent; and that there are very few in⯑ſtances in former reigns, where ſuch aſſent in ſuch caſes has not been given, and thoſe attended with great inconve⯑niencies to the Crown of England."’

And then reflecting, ‘"that, ſince your Majeſty's acceſſion to the Crown, ſeve⯑ral public bills, made by advice of both Houſes of Parliament, have not obtained the royal aſſent; and in parti⯑cular a bill entitled An Act touching free and impartial Proceedings in Parliament."’

And in concluſion, ‘"humbly praying, that, for the future, you will be graciouſ⯑ly pleaſed to hearken to the advice of your Parliament, and not to the ſecret advice of particular perſons, who may have private intereſts of their own, ſeparate from the true intereſt of your Majeſty and your people ^*."’

Here then we have an inſtance of what an outcry may be raiſed, when a [36] bill has been permitted to make its way through both Houſes of Parliament, and then is cruſhed by the ultimate ſtroke of the royal negative. Then we ſee this part of the prerogative, the exerciſe of which has been of late ſo warmly invi⯑ted, receives an indirect challenge, in ex⯑preſſions which might have ſtartled a ti⯑mid Prince, or a Prince who had expe⯑rienced the dreadful effects of a ſtorm of faction.

What was the anſwer made to this re⯑preſentation, by a Prince who had been but a few years before elected to the throne? Did King William yield to the Houſe of Commons in any degree? Did he ſtoop to promiſe a different conduct in compliance with their wiſhes? No.—He gave them a general conſtitutional decla⯑ration, which any King might make at any time; and did not ſay one word to the particular ſubject of the repreſenta⯑tion.

[37]

That our Monarchy received a ſhock at the Revolution, cannot be denied. But it was a ſhock of political neceſſity, the rea⯑ſons [38] of which Blackſtone, that our minds may be quiet, wiſely puts upon ‘"the ſo⯑lid footing of authority."’—‘"For our anceſtors having moſt indiſputably a competent juriſdiction to decide this great and important queſtion, and ha⯑ving in fact decided it, it is now be⯑come our duty, at this diſtance of time, to acquieſce in their determina⯑tion^*.’ But we ſee that, after the Re⯑volution, though the line of ſucceſſion was changed, the Crown retained its pre⯑rogative as to Acts of Parliament, and exer⯑ciſed it with a bold reſolution.

A keen debate on King William's an⯑ſwer took place in the Houſe of Com⯑mons, which had, in effect, queſtioned his Majeſty's undoubted prerogative in refuſing his aſſent. It was moved, ‘"That an humble addreſs be made to the King for a farther anſwer."’ But there was prin⯑ciple and decency enough amongſt them [39] to reject it. In truth, to diſpute the King's free right of a negative upon any bill, is tantamount to inſiſting that he is a cy⯑pher in the conſtitution. And I admire the ſtrong blunt ſpeech of Mr Brewer, ‘"All agree, that the King hath a nega⯑tive voice to bills: No body hath a greater reverence to Parliaments than myſelf; but the bill rejected was liable to exceptions. I gave my vote to make the Prince of Orange King; but will never give my vote to unking him^†."’ Let Mr Brewer of 1693 be oppoſed to Mr Baker of 1783, and the conſtitutional palm detur digniori.

The purpoſe of this Letter is to recom⯑mend to the people of Scotland, in their ſeveral counties, boroughs, corporations, and public bodies of every kind, to AD⯑DRESS his Majeſty upon this momentous criſis, to expreſs their ſincere ſatisfaction, that a bill for veſting the affairs of the [40] Eaſt-India Company in certain Commiſ⯑ſioners,—a bill dangerous at once to the rights of the King and people, has been rejected by his Majeſty's hereditary coun⯑ſellors, the Houſe of Lords; aſſuring his Majeſty of their firm attachment to his Royal Perſon and Government, and of their ſupport of ſuch Miniſters as his Majeſty may be graciouſly pleaſed to chuſe for the ſtable adminiſtration of public affairs, at a time when ſtability is of moſt eſſential conſequence; hum⯑bly truſting, that his Majeſty's paternal care for the intereſts of his ſubjects, and due regard to the conſtitutional preroga⯑tive of his Crown, will prevent any in⯑fringement upon either.

Addreſſes, I know, have but too often been proſtituted. That is no reaſon why they ſhould never be preſented. I do not mean that either influence or ſolici⯑tation ſhould be uſed: But if my coun⯑trymen in general are perſuaded of the [41] dangerous tendency of the late Eaſt-India bill, an honeſt expreſſion of their ſenti⯑ments upon its defeat, is a tribute due to thoſe who withſtood it; and may have weight in preventing a renewal of the attempt. It was urged by its principal abettor, that there had been no petitions againſt it, except from the city of Lon⯑don, and the borough of Chipping Wy⯑combe. Let numerous Addreſſes prove, that time, and not will, was wanting. And as, in conſequence of the ſcheme for eſtabliſhing a new and formidable power having proved abortive, there is a conflict of parties with reſpect to an ad⯑miniſtration, let our moſt gracious Sove⯑reign, whoſe exalted worth and benig⯑nity are far above my panegyric, have the comfort of knowing from his people themſelves, how they think and feel: And let Scotland, at the moſt intereſt⯑ing period ſince the Reſtoration, aſſume the importance to which ſhe is entitled.

Let us, as much as we poſſibly can, diveſt ourſelves of private conſiderations, [42] more eſpecially how particular perſons of eminence may be affected one way or other. Whatever may be the abilities, whatever the good intentions of any of them, whatever our expectations from their influence, let us, upon this awful occaſion, think only of property and the conſtitution.

For my own part, I ſhould claim no credit, did I not flatter myſelf, that I practiſe what I now preſume to recom⯑mend. I have mentioned former cir⯑cumſtances, perhaps, of too much ego⯑tiſm, to ſhow, that I am no time-ſerver; and, at this moment, friends to whom I am attached by affection, gratitude and intereſt, are zealous for the meaſure which I deem ſo alarming. Let me add, that a diſmiſſion of the Portland Ad⯑miniſtration, will probably diſappoint an object which I have moſt ardent⯑ly at heart. But, holding an eſtate, tranſmitted to me through my anceſtors, [43] by charters from a ſeries of Kings, the importance of a Charter, and the prero⯑gative of a King, impreſs my mind with ſeriouſneſs and with duty; and while a⯑nimated, I hope, as much as any man, with genuine feelings of liberty, I ſhall ever adhere to our excellent monarchy, that venerable inſtitution under which liberty is beſt enjoyed.