1. To Abandon, Forſake, Leave, To Relinquiſh, Deſert, Quit.

THE words abandon and leave imply involuntary acts; the words for⯑ſake, relinquiſh and deſert, thoſe that are voluntary.

To abandon, is more applicable to things; leave, to perſons. He was under a neceſſity of abandoning his poſſeſſions, and compelled to leave his friends.

To forſake, implies leaving in reſent⯑ment or diſlike; to relinquiſh, quitting [2]any claim to; to deſert, leaving meanly or treacherouſly.

Being treated with diſreſpect, we are apt to forſake even the perſon, whoſe cauſe we were ſtudious to eſpouſe. Every honeſt man, finding his plea not backed by juſtice, would readily relinquiſh his claim, and even make his competitor a recompence adequate to the expence and trouble he had put him to. It is an act of the greateſt baſeneſs to deſert one's friend in time of diſtreſs.

To quit, implies the breaking off from, and may be either voluntary or involuntary.

When he had acquired by trade ſufficient to ſupport himſelf, for the remainder of his life, he, prudently, quitted his buſineſs. Being overpowered, by ſuperior ſtrength, he was obliged to quit his hold.

We ſhould by no means abandon, while we can keep poſſeſſion; nor leave, while we are able to ſtay; we ſhould not forſake, without ſufficient reaſon; nor are we bound to relinquiſh, but when our title is bad; No colour of excuſe can be alledged for deſerti⯑on; nor ſhould we ever quit, with a view of laying hold again.

2. To Abdicate, Renounce, Reſign.

To abdicate is an involuntary act; renounce and reſign are voluntary.

Abdicate more particularly relates to a throne; renounce, to matters of religion; reſign, to employments.

King James the ſecond abdicated the throne of England, when he could keep poſſeſſion of it no longer. Many perſons, through conviction of mind, have formally renounced the errors of the church of Rome. We frequently reſign our employments, through a deſire of retirement.

To abdicate a crown, is ever looked upon as diſgraceful; to renounce a religion, as ho⯑nourable, when done through the preva⯑lence of truth; and to reſign and office, as no⯑ble, when generouſly given up in favour of another, and with the approbation of the perſon we ſerve.

3. To Abale, Diminiſh, To Decreaſe, Leſſen.

Theſe words are nearly ſynonymous, when they are verbs neuter; they, then, mean to grow leſs: as verbs active, they are very different. Even as neuters, they will carry ſome difference in their meaning.

To abate, implies a decreaſe in action; diminiſh, a waſte in ſubſtance; decreaſe, a decay in moral virtue; leſſen, a contraction of parts.

Want of ſpirits, when a man is running, will abate his ardour, and, conſequently, his pace. Febrifuges, if properly applied, will abate a fever. Put ſugar into water, and it will diminiſh viſibly. An object, ſeemingly, diminiſhes, in proportion to the diſtance, from which, we view it.

Through a contempt of religion, men, daily, decreaſe in virtue, a decreaſe in piety, is uſually accompanied with falſe notions of God. Draw the air from a blown-up blad⯑der, and it leſſens, proportionably.

As verbs active; to abate, more particu⯑larly, implies, to lower in the price of; [5] diminiſh, to make leſs by abſciſion or deſ⯑truction, either with reſpect to bulk, value, quality or quantity; leſſen, to a voluntary act of degradation.

Shop-keepers, generally, aſk their cuſ⯑tomers an advanced price for goods, that they may be enabled to abate, if deſired.

By dividing of ſubſtance, we diminiſh its bulk; by breaking a diamond, we diminiſh its value; by mixing water with ſpirits, we diminiſh the quality; and by taking one yard from ten, we diminiſh the quantity.

A mean action always leſſens us, in the ſight of good men; and whatever falſe no⯑tions vanity may inculcate, we ever ſeem leſs, when we ſtrive to appear greater.

4. To Abhor, Hate, To Loath, Deteſt.

All theſe words imply averſion, but re⯑quire to be differently uſed, upon different occaſions.

To abhor, implys an averſion to that, to which, we have a natural antipathy; hate, an averſion actuated by revenge: loath, is [6]more applicable to food: deteſt, implies a⯑verſion actuated by diſapprobation.

We abhor, what we cannot endure. We are apt to hate the perſon, who injures us. We loath the food, by which we have been ſurfeited. We deteſt the man, who is guilty of a mean action.

The ſpendthrift, naturally, abhors nig⯑gardlineſs, and the niggard, profligacy. The hatred of the revengeful man, is rouſed, whenever the object of his revenge approa⯑ches. The ſtomach loaths the very ſight of that meat, by which we have been ſatiated. Every, thinking, man deteſts the leaſt degree of meanneſs, more particularly that, which is fordid or baſe.

5. Abject, Low, Mean, Beggarly.

As the words abject and low are indiſ⯑criminately uſed, when meant to ſignify a perſon's ſtate or condition; ſo are the words mean and beggarly, when we would expreſs the diſpoſition: but the impropriety of ſo doing, is very evident.

By abject, is underſtood that forlorn ſitu⯑ation [7]in life, that a man brings himſelf in⯑to, by ill conduct; by low, that, in which Providence has placed him: the firſt, is voluntary; the latter, involuntary.

Divine Wiſdom hath thought proper, for various reaſons, to make diſtinctions be⯑tween men, placing ſome, in a higher ſphere, others, in a lower; but never was he the cauſe of any one's abjectneſs. Want of merit or fortune, often, renders a man low; but it muſt be a villainous character, to make him abject.

With reſpect to the words mean and beg⯑garly, when meant to expreſs the diſpoſi⯑tion, the abſurdity of uſing them, one for the other, is, equally, viſible.

Mean, ſignifies a man's readineſs to per⯑form a dirty or illicit action; whereas beg⯑garly, is, more particularly, expreſſive of a narrow, groveling ſpirit.

He who can ſtoop, to be guilty of a meanneſs, merits the contempt of all who know him. It has, ever, been accounted beggarly, to live below the rank of life we are in.

When a man is brought into a ſtate of penury and contempt, by a long courſe of infamy, we, juſtly, call him abject; if his [8]narrow circumſtances are, only, owing to the poverty of his parents, we, then, repute him low; when guilty of any thing, beneath the character of an honeſt man, or a gen⯑tleman, we account him mean; and when the treaſures of the rich, are ſullied by the nar⯑row notions of the poor, we call it beggarly.

6. To Aboliſh, Abrogate, Diſannul, To Repeal, Revoke.

Aboliſh, is a term, rather to be uſed with reſpect to cuſtoms; abrogate and repeal, with regard to laws; diſannul and revoke, to private contracts.

When old cuſtoms have been, by long experience, found to be detrimental, they have, very prudently, been aboliſhed. New faſhions, aboliſh old ones.

The word abrogate, is generally uſed with reſpect to ancient laws; repeal, to mo⯑dern: that is, when we talk of rendering old laws null, we call it abrogating; when thoſe lately made, repealing.

Deſpotic power has frequently abrogated what was inſtituted by equity. Upon the [9]enaction of a new law, many inconveniences have ſometimes appeared, before un⯑thought of; this, has occaſioned a repeal.

The abrogation of a fundamental law, frequently cauſes the ruin of the ſovereign, or of the people; and, ſometimes, of both. The legiſlative power has often found itſelf obliged to repeal an act of parliament one ſeſſions, which paſſed the laſt; merely, to appeaſe the clamours of the people.

The difference in meaning, between the words diſannul and revoke, is not very great; yet ſuch, as to admit of a diſtinction.

Diſannul is applied to a written contract; revoke to a verbal.

He, who gives a conditional bond to ano⯑ther, has a right to diſannul it, if the ſpecified conditions are not punctually obſerved. To revoke a promiſe now-a-days, is no other, than faſhionable; whereas, formerly, it was conſidered, as a breach of friendſhip.

7. To Finiſh, Complete, To End, Conclude.

With reſpect to the three firſt words, the proper idea of finiſhing, is, the bringing a [10]thing to its laſt period: the completion of any thing, is, the actual arrival of that laſt period: and the characteriſtic of ending, is ceſſation or diſcontinuation.

Lazy people begin many things, without finiſhing any. We ever feel a ſecret ſatis⯑faction, in the completion of a work, we have been long about. May we not queſ⯑tion the wiſdom of thoſe laws, which, inſtead of ending ſuits, do but ſerve, to prolong them?

By the word conclude, we underſtand, per⯑forming the laſt act of ratiocination; widely differing from complete. We complete a piece of mechaniſm; but conclude an oration.

A piece of clockwork is of little value, till completed. It is allowed by all Rhetori⯑cians, that the greateſt ornament of an ha⯑rangue, is a well finiſhed concluſion.

We finiſh what we have begun, by con⯑tinuing to work at it. We complete a work, by putting the laſt hand to it. We end it, by diſcontinuation. Thus, we may finiſh, without ending; and end, without completing.

8. On, Upon,

Theſe two words are indiſcriminately uſed, one for another, on all occaſions; but, with great impropriety.

On, rather, ſignifies by; as, on my word; on my honour; &c. whereas, upon, means up, on the top of; and is applied to mat⯑ter; as, upon the table; upon the chair; upon the houſe; &c.

The abſurdity of a contrary diction, is evident from the following change of words: it was his honour, upon which, he ſwore.

Indeed, the word upon is uſed with ele⯑gance, even detached from ſubſtance, when the ſenſe is figurative; as for inſ⯑tance, he relied upon the promiſe of his friend; intimating, that, that promiſe, was the ſtaff, upon which, he leaned: but, on other occaſions, the impropriety is groſs.

9. Action, Act, Deed.

As cuſtom has applied the word deed, chiefly to ſignify the written evidence of any legal act, it will be neceſſary, only, to ſhew the difference, between the words acti⯑on and act.

The word action, then, is applicable, indif⯑ferently, to every thing we do, whether common or extraordinary; but the word act, ſhould ſignify, ſomething done, which is remarkable.

An elegant ſpeaker, will not ſay, a virtu⯑ous act, a good or a vitious act; but an act of virtue, or of goodneſs, or of iniquity: where⯑as, to ſay, a virtuous action, or a good or vi⯑tious action, is proper and elegant.

'Tis, generally ſpeaking, a good action to conceal the faults of our neighbours; and it is the rareſt act of charity, among mankind.

The ſentiments of the heart, are not, ſo much, to be judged of, from words, as from actions. It is an act, of great heroiſm, [13]to pardon our enemies, when we have power, to be revenged on them.

Theſe two words are further diſtinguiſh⯑able by our conſidering them, ſomewhat phyſically. The word action, in this light, relates, more, to the power that acts; and the word act, is, more, applicable to the effect itſelf, produced by that power; this makes the one, properly, the attribute of the other: ſo, that it may be, juſtly, ſaid, we ſhould always have a preſence of mind, attendant upon our actions, to ren⯑der, all of them, either acts of bounty, or acts of juſtice.

10. To Enlarge, Increaſe.

The word enlarge, is, properly, uſed to ſignify an addition of extent. Increaſe, is critically, applicable, only, to number, height and quantity.

We enlarge a town; a field; a garden. We increaſe the inhabitants of a town; our expences; our revenues.

The former word, is, more, ſuitable to one entire and vaſt quantity of ſpace; the [14]latter, to any groſs and multiplied quantity in general: thus, it is, commonly, ſaid, that we have enlarged our houſe, when we have made it more extenſive, by adding buildings to the ſides of it: but, we, uſually, ſay, a houſe is increaſed with an additional ſtory, or with ſeveral new rooms.

By enlarging our territory, we, generally, increaſe our riches. Princes, certainly, en⯑large their renown, by widening the bounds of their dominions; and they are apt to think, they, at the ſame time, increaſe their power: but, in this, they are, ſometimes, miſtaken; for ſuch an enlargement, may chance to produce, only, an, increaſe of cares and troubles, which may end, in their utter ruin.

A king, who labours, more, after acquir⯑ing new ſubjects, than, in governing thoſe he already has, may enlarge his fame; but will never increaſe his happineſs.

11. Addreſs, Air, Mien, Behaviour, Manners, Deportment, Carriage.

What is called our air, mien and carriage, ſeem to be born with us, and ſtrike at firſt [15]ſight: our addreſs, manners, behaviour and deportment, are owing to education; and, gradually, diſcloſe themſelves, in our inter⯑courſe with the world.

Mien, rather, relates to our look; carriage to our frame; but, the word air to both. We, uſually, judge of the mien, by the face; the carriage, by the perſon; and the air, by both.

How ſweet is the mien, that has good humour in the countenance! A gentle⯑man, though in rags, is, eaſily, diſcover⯑ed, by his graceful carriage. An open countenance and majeſty of perſon, give a man, the moſt engaging air imagina⯑ble.

Addreſs, is confined to our words; de⯑portment, to our actions; behaviour ariſes from both; and the fruit of behaviour, is manners.

Our addreſs ſhall often pleaſe, when our deportment ſhall diſguſt; and VICE VERSA.

When our addreſs is engaging, and our deportment comformable, 'tis impoſſible our behaviour ſhould be otherwiſe.

In order, to be well with the world, we ſhould ſuit our behaviour, to our company; which, though in the eye of ſome perſons, [16]has been conſidered, as deceitful, muſt, in the end, be looked upon, as the height of good manners.

An engaging air, which is the union of a charming mien and graceful carriage, is neceſſary, to make any thing pleaſe; but unleſs accompanied with good manners, ariſing from a genteel addreſs and deport⯑ment, it becomes, perfectly, diſguſtful.

12. To Accoſt, Approach.

We accoſt thoſe, with whom, we would ſpeak; but, often, approach, without any intention to addreſs.

The bold, can accoſt, without the leaſt heſitation. We cannot approach the great, without ſome kind of ceremony.

When we have any thing to ſay to a perſon, we, naturally, accoſt him: when we would inſinuate ourſelves into his good graces, we endeavour to approach him.

Education teaches us to accoſt the ladies with civility; but, to approach them, re⯑quires ſome kind of aſſurance, ſeafoned with reſpect.

13. Ingenuity, Cleverneſs, Abilities, Parts,

Ingenuity, relates, more, to the invention of things; cleverneſs, to the manner of exe⯑cuting them; ability, to the actual execution of them; and parts, to the diſcernment. The third, then, puts in uſe, what the ſe⯑cond dictates, purſuant to the digeſted plan, of the fourth, invented by the firſt.

A man may be ingenious, and not clever; he may be clever, without abilities to exe⯑cute; and he may have great abilities, and, yet, not be a man of parts.

Admitting we are not very ingenious, ſtill, if we are accuſtomed to the management of things, we may be clever; but it requires abilities, to do with them, as we would; and parts, to conduct them.

He, who diſcovered the powers of refraction and reflection, had he known no⯑thing more, would have been ingenious: he, who conſtructed the teleſcope, was clever; the finiſher, was a man of abilities; and without doubt, the philoſopher, he, who applies the inſtrument to the various pur⯑poſes of aſtronomy, muſt be a man of parts.

14. To Add, Augment.

By adding one thing to another, we aug⯑ment the ſame. By the word adding, we underſtand, the joining of different things together; or, if they are things of the ſame kind, joining them, in ſuch a manner, as not to confound them, but, that after ſuch junction, each, may be diſtinguiſhed from the other: whereas, the word augment, in⯑dicates our making a thing larger or more abundant, by ſuch an addition, as ſhall cauſe it, afterwards, to appear one, and the ſame thing; or, at leaſt, that, when the ad⯑dition is made, the whole, together, ſhall be conceived under one idea; thus, for ex⯑ample, we add one baſket of rubbiſh, to another, one room to another, but we augment the heap, and the houſe.

There are many, who would not ſcruple to augment their own ſtock, by fraudu⯑lently adding to it, that of another.

To add, is a verb active only; augment, both active and neuter.

Our ambition, augments with our for⯑tune; and we are no ſooner in poſſeſſion of [19]one hundred pounds, than we are eager to add to it another.

15. To Study, Learn.

To ſtudy, implies a uniform application, in ſearch of knowledge; to learn, that application, with ſucceſs.

We ſtudy, to learn; and learn, by dint of ſtudy.

People of vivacity, learn eaſily; but are heavy at ſtudy.

We can ſtudy but one thing at a time; but we may learn many.

The more we learn, the more we know; but, oftentimes, the more we ſtudy, the leſs we know.

We have ſtudied well, when we have learned to doubt.

There are many things we learn, without ſtudy; and other things we ſtudy, without learning.

Thoſe are not the wiſeſt, who have ſtudied moſt; but, thoſe who have learnt moſt.

[20]We ſee ſome perſons, ſtudying continually, without learning any thing; and others, learning almoſt every thing, without the leaſt ſtudy.

The time of our youth, is the time of ſtudy; but it is, in a more advanced age, when we, truly, can be ſaid, to learn; it is then, only, we have capacity to digeſt, what we have before, laid up in the memory.

16. Buttreſs, Support, Prop.

The Buttreſs, fortifies; it is fixed cloſe, to reſiſt the impulſion of other bodies: the ſupport, bears, by being placed beneath a thing, to prevent its falling under a weight: the prop, aſſiſts, and its general uſe is, to ſtrengthen.

A wall is frequently made ſtronger, by buttreſſes: An arch is ſupported, by columns: A houſe, when in danger of falling, is kept up, by props.

That, which has received a violent thruſt, or is much bulged, ſtands in need of a buttreſs; that, which is too heavy to [21]carry itſelf, is in want of ſupporters; and that, which ought to ſtand upright, and cannot be made to do ſo of itſelf, muſt be propped.

In a figurative ſenſe, buttreſs relates, more, to defence; ſupport, to credit; and prop, to friendſhip.

The true Chriſtian, ſeeks no buttreſs, a⯑gainſt the malignity of men, but that of innocence and integrity; he makes work, the moſt ſolid ſupport of his life; and looks upon implicit obedience to the decree of heaven, as the moſt ſteady prop of his felicity.

17. Enough, Sufficient.

The object of both theſe words, is quan⯑tity; but with this difference, that enough relates, more, to the quantity, one deſires to have, and ſufficient, to that quantity, one, really, wants to employ.

Thus, the avaritious man never has enough; let him accumulate ever ſo much, he, ſtill, deſires more; and the prodigal, never ſufficient; he, ſtill, wanting to expend more than he has.

[22]We ſay, we have enough, when we wiſh not for more; and we ſay, we have ſufficient, when we have, juſt, what is neceſſary.

When applied to ſuch things, as are con⯑ſumable, the word enough, ſeems to denote, a much greater quantity, than the word ſuffi⯑cient; for in relation to ſuch things, when we ſay we have enough, it ſeems, as though we ſhould have too much, had we more: but, what we call ſufficient, may be added to, without coming near that extreme: for, we may ſay, of a very ſmall income or revenue, that it is ſufficient; though, at the ſame time, we can hardly think it enough.

The word enough, has a more general and comprehenſive meaning; the word ſufficient, a more limited and particular one.

An hour at table, is, certainly, ſufficient, for our nouriſhment; but, not enough, for ſome perſons pleaſure or ſatisfaction.

An oeconomiſt, can find enough, where there is very little; but the prodigal, never has ſufficient, let him have ever ſo much.

18. To Declare, Affirm, Proteſt, Aver, Aſſert, To Maintain, Swear, Avouch, Atteſt.

In the firſt ſeven words, we find different degrees of declaration. To declare, ſigni⯑fies, to tell any thing ſimply, but ſeriouſly; to affirm, means, to ſay confidently; to proteſt, implies a ſolemn affirmation; to aver, ſigni⯑fies, a poſitive declaration; to aſſert, that de⯑claration, defended; to maintain, implies a ſupport of ſuch aſſertion; to ſwear, is, to ratify it, by an oath.

When we give our opinion, on being ſeriouſly aſked, we are ſaid, to declare it: when we would give that declaration, more force, we affirm it: and, to ſtrengthen that affirmation, we proteſt it, ſolemnly; that is we affirm it, by invoking the Deity.

If, ever, we wiſh, to gain credit, in the world, whatever we declare, ſhould be back⯑ed by truth. True politeneſs, forbids our [24] affirming any thing, unleſs required by the obligations of juſtice. To make frequent uſe of proteſtations, betrays a ſuſpicion, that our bare word, is not to be believed. Always to aver, hath an appearance of dogmatiſing; and ſhews us ignorant of that proper degree of diffidence, which ever accompanies wiſ⯑dom. Some perſons are ſo ready to aſſert, that let the matter be right or wrong, 'tis equally the ſame. When our opinions are juſt, and well-grounded, we have an un⯑doubted right, to maintain them. Swearing, was firſt inſtituted in courts of judicature, as a conſcientious teſtimony of truth.

The words avouch, and atteſt, tho' often uſedas ſynonynous, with the foregoing; have a very different ſignification. The word, avouch, implies, an aſſertion, in defence of another; atteſt, a bearing, witneſs to what another has, juſt before, ſaid.

When the reputation of an honeſt man has been, undeſervedly, hurt, 'tis the part of a friend, to avouch his good character.

Too much care to atteſt all that is ad⯑vanced, renders our converſation tireſome.

There is another verb, warrant, which has ſome affinity to the word maintain; but, as cuſtom has made the uſe of it vulgar, [25]it is unneceſſary to take any further notice of it.

19. Arms, Weapons.

By arms, we underſtand thoſe inſtru⯑ments of offence, generally, made uſe of in war; ſuch as, fire-arms, ſwords, &c. By weapons, we, more particularly, mean inſtru⯑ments of other kinds, (excluſive of fire arms,) made uſe of as offenſive, on eſpecial occaſions.

In the ſtate of Switzerland, all men are obliged to learn the uſe of arms, in their youth, that, in caſes of extremity, they may be capable of defending themſelves againſt the attacks of their enemies.

In times of inſurrection, people make uſe of ſuch weapons as they can get.

20. Attractions, Allurements, Charms.

Beſides the general idea, which makes theſe three words appear ſynonymous, it is, likewiſe, their common fate, ſcarce ever to be uſed in the ſingular number; at leaſt, in thoſe ſenſes, in which, they are here con⯑ſidered; that is, whenever they are uſed to ſignify the power of beauty, of agreeable⯑neſs, or, of any thing which pleaſes.

With reſpect to their different mean⯑ings, it appears to me, that attractions mean, ſomething natural; allurements, ſome⯑what, rather, artificial; and charms, ſome⯑what ſtronger and more uncommon than either.

Attractions, may be ſaid, to engage us; allurements, to entice us; charms, to ſeduce us.

The heart of man can ſcarce ſtand againſt the attractions of a pretty woman: It is with difficulty he can defend, himſelf againſt the allurements of a coquette; but, [27]to reſiſt the charms of a ſweet-tempered beauty, is impoſſible.

Ladies, always, owe their attractions and their charms, to a happy formation of their features and perſons; but they, ſometimes, procure their allurements, at their toilettes.

I know not whether I may fall in with the taſte of mankind; but in my opinion, attractions riſe from thoſe ordinary graces, which nature has beſtowed upon the wo⯑men with more or leſs liberality, and which are the common appendages of the ſex; allurements, from thoſe cultivated graces, which form a faithful mirrour of the natu⯑ral, and are ſtudied, merely, with a deſire to pleaſe; charms, from thoſe ſingular graces, which nature, ſometimes, beſtows as a moſt valuable gift, and which are more particu⯑lar and perſonal.

Defects not ſeen at firſt, but afterwards obſerved, leſſen attractions greatly. Allure⯑ments vaniſh, as ſoon as the artifice appears. Charms loſe their force, when time and cuſtom hath rendered them familiar.

Theſe words are not in uſe only, with regard to beauty, and the graces of the ſex; but, with reſpect to every thing that pleaſes. In this caſe, attractions and charms, [28]are applied, only, to ſuch things, as are amiable in themſelves; whereas, the word allurements, is, ſometimes, applied to ſuch things, as are even in themſelves odious; but, which we love nevertheleſs.

Virtue has attractions, which the moſt vicious of men cannot avoid being ſenſible of. The riches of the world are allure⯑ments, which never fail to captivate, in ſpite of their ill tendency. Pleaſure has ſuch charms, that it is hunted after by every one, as well by the philoſopher, as the li⯑bertine.

We ſay, great attractions; powerful al⯑lurements; and, invincible charms.

Honour attracts; fortune allures; but, the charms of glory, are invincible.

21. Miſerly, Niggardly, Covetous, Avaritious.

The word miſerly, ſignifies, rather, a par⯑cimonious diſpoſition, or a depriving our⯑ſelves of the neceſſaries of life, merely to hoard the riches we poſſeſs. By niggardly, [29]we underſtand, that ſordid temper, that does things by halves. Covetous, implies, an eager craving for the poſſeſſions of another. By avaritious, we mean, that inordinate thirſt of gain, that makes a man graſp at-every thing he ſees. Taking the words in theſe fenſes, which are undoubtedly the proper ones, we may be covetous and not avariti⯑ous, niggardly and not miſerly.

He, who never gives any thing away, is juſtly, called miſerly; he, who fails to beſtow when neceſſary, or, when he beſtows, gives too little, draws on himſelf the epithet of niggardly; he, who longs for the goods of another, is covetous; and he, who graſps at wealth by all means whatever, avaritious.

Of all extraordinary beings, there is no greater one than the miſer, who puniſhes himſelf, and ſtarves in the midſt of plenty.

The miſer is laughed at, but the niggard is deſpiſed.

The contented man is at quiet within himſelf; but the covetous is ever on the rack: he eagerly wiſhes for what another poſſeſſes, and his inability of obtaining it, is his continual torment.

[30]It is neceſſary to be ever watchful of an avaritious man, for his diſpoſition leads him to take every opportunity of defrauding you.

22. Acknowledgment, Confeſſion.

Acknowledgment, ſuppoſes a queſtion aſk⯑ed; whereas, confeſſion, favours a little of accuſation.

We acknowledge what we had an inclina⯑tion to conceal: We confeſs that which we were blameable in doing.

It is interrogation, which cauſes acknow⯑ledgment; repentance, confeſſion.

It is better to make a ſincere acknow⯑ledgment, than a bad excuſe.

We ſhould not confeſs to all ſorts of people.

An acknowledgment unaſked, is either noble or fooliſh, according to the circum⯑ſtances, and effect it produces.

Confeſſion, unaccompanied with repent⯑ance, is an inſult to the Deity.

[31]It would be want of ſpirit, to acknowledge a fault, without a certainty that ſuch ac⯑knowledgment would be ſatisfactory; and it would be fooliſh, to make confeſſion, without hopes of pardon; for why ſhould we de⯑clare ourſelves culpable to thoſe, who breathe nothing but vengeance.

23. Admonition, Advice, Counſel.

The end of admonition, is gentle reproof. Advice and counſel, are to convey inſtruction; but with this difference, that advice, implies no ſuperiority with reſpect either to rank or parts, in the perſon who gives it; where⯑as, counſel, generally, carries with it one, if not both.

Admonition, in a maſter, frequently has a greater effect than correction.

People are readier to give advice, than to take it.

[32]Parents ſhould take care to counſel their children, before they turn them out into the world.

Admonition ſhould be given with temper. Advice, with ſincerity, and counſel, with art and modeſty.

Admoniſh a friend in private, but reward him openly.

Nothing is more ſalutary than good ad⯑vice, and yet, nothing is more nauſeous to take.

When counſel is given with an air of im⯑pertinence, it is ſure to make the counſel deſpiſed, and the counſellor odious.

24. To Have, Poſſeſs.

In order to have a thing, it is not neceſ⯑ſary to have the power of diſpoſal of it, or to have it actually in our hands; it is ſuf⯑ficient that it belongs to us: but to poſſeſs it, it muſt be in our hands, and, we have the liberty of diſpoſing of it, whenever we think proper.

[33]Thus, we have, an eſtate, notwithſtand⯑ing it is mortgaged for the benefit of our creditors; but, as to riches, we poſſeſs, them.

We are not always maſters, of what we have; we are, of what we poſſeſs.

A married man has continual torment, when the Demon of Jealouſy poſſeſſes him.

We have often but the half of things, partaking them with others; we poſſeſs them, when they are entirely our own.

Thoſe, who have only the knowledge of arts, follow their rules; but thoſe, who poſſeſs them, lay down their rules to fol⯑low.

25. Battle, Combat, Fight.

Battle, is an action, more general, and commonly, preceded by ſome preparation. Combat, ſeems to be an action, more parti⯑cular, and often unexpected. Fight may be either, one or the other, and is ſeldom uſed in the plural.

[34]Thus, the fight, between the Carthaginians and the Romans, and that, at Pharſalia, be⯑tween Caeſar and Pompey, were battles: but thoſe, in which the Horatii and the Curatii, decided the fate of Rome, were combats.

26. Handſome, Pretty, Beautiful.

It is the fate of theſe words, when ap⯑plied to the female ſex, to be uſed indiſ⯑criminately one for the other, and yet, at the ſame time, no three words can be more different.

By a handſome woman, we underſtand one, that is graceful and well ſhaped, with a regu⯑lar diſpoſition of features: by a pretty, we mean one, that is delicately made, and whoſe features are ſo formed, as to pleaſe: by a beautiful, a union of both.

A lady may be handſome and not pretty, pretty and not handſome; but, to be beautiful, ſhe muſt be both pretty and handſome.

Many a handſome woman has a forbidding countenance.

[35]It has been the misfortune of many a pretty woman, to be crooked.

A beautiful woman, is, now-a-days, very rare to be met with.

Prettineſs, carries an idea of ſimplicity; handſomeneſs, of nobility; beauty, of ma⯑jeſty.

The ladies, in romances, are deſcribed, as, either beautiful or handſome; the ſhep⯑herdeſſes, by the poets, are repreſented as pretty; ſo, in other things, we ſay, a beau⯑tiful palace; a handſome houſe; a pretty cot⯑tage.

A beautiful woman, is an object of curio⯑ſity; a handſome woman, of admiration; and a pretty one, of love.

When applied to other things, beautiful, relates to ſomething more ſerious and en⯑gaging; pretty, to ſomewhat more gay and diverting: this is the reaſon why we ſay a beautiful tragedy; but, a pretty comedy.

27. Benignity, Benevolence, Kindneſs, Tenderneſs, Humanity.

Benignity, is a ſort of kind condeſcen⯑tion, and an attribute of princes only. Be⯑nevolence, a wiſhing well to mankind, and ſeems relative to thoſe, who have, more parti⯑cularly, the power of doing good. Kindneſs, is the ſame diſpoſition among equals. Ten⯑derneſs, is a ſuſceptibility of impreſſion, and more applicable, to perſons nearly connect⯑ed. Humanity, denotes a fellow feeling, for the diſtreſſes, even, of a ſtranger.

Benegnity, benevolence, and kindneſs, ſpring from the will; tenderneſs, and humanity, from the heart.

The benignity of a prince, makes him univerſally beloved by his ſubjects.

Benevolence, is a ſhining character, and is more conſpicuous, for the charitable actions it produces.

Kindneſs, is what one man naturally ex⯑pects from another, and what we are reci⯑procally bound to impart.

[37]The tenderneſs of a parent, has, often, been the ruin of a child.

The diſtreſſes of individuals, will, often, draw tears from a perſon, truly humane.

From the very inſtant of our birth, we experience the benignity of heaven, and malignity of corrupt nature.

The realized benevolence, of ſome good men, have, almoſt, made them worſhiped by their fellow creatures.

Kindneſſes, are in the power of every one to ſhew; therefore, he, that withholds them, fa⯑vours more of the brute, than of the man.

The great tenderneſs of animals, to their young, is a ſtanding reproof to the many unfeeling mothers.

True humanity conſiſts, in not treating with rigour, but excuſing the weakneſſes, ſupplying the defects, aſſuaging the pains, and comforting the afflictions, of our neighbour.

28. Poverty, Indigence, Want, Need, Neceſſity.

Poverty, is that ſituation of fortune, op⯑poſed to riches, in which, we are deprived of the conveniences of life.

Indigence, is a degree lower; we there want the neceſſaries; and is oppoſed to ſu⯑perfluity.

Want, ſeems rather to arrive by accident, implies, a ſcarcity of proviſions, rather than a lack of money, and is oppoſed to abundance.

Need and neceſſity relate leſs to the ſitua⯑tion of life, than the other three words, but more to the relief we expect, or the remedy we ſeek; with this difference be⯑tween the two, that need, ſeems leſs preſſing than neceſſity.

Merit, or a fortunate circumſtance, in life, frequently extricates us from a ſtate of poverty, in which we were born; and in which, prodigality often plunges the rich.

[39]Diligence is the beſt remedy againſt in⯑digence, which is, generally, the juſt pu⯑niſhment of idleneſs.

Wiſe precautions prevent want, which is often brought on, by extravagance.

When we are in need, we ſhould ſeek aſſiſtance from our friends, but be careful not to importune too much.

The means of obtaining relief, in ex⯑treme neceſſity, is to implore the ſuccour of the truly charitable.

A ſtate of poverty, is moſt conducive to the health of the ſoul; we being there, out of the way of temptations.

The man, who opens his hand to the cravings of the indigent, feels within his breaſt a ſecret ſatisfaction, which the un⯑charitable man, is an entire ſtranger to.

He that will waſte, will want.

A friend in need, is a friend indeed.

Neceſſity, is the mother of invention.

29. Good-fortune, Proſperity.

What we call good-fortune, is the effect of chance; it comes unexpected. Proſperity, is the ſucceſs of conduct; and comes by degrees.

Fools have, ſometimes, good fortune: wiſe men do not, always, proſper.

The Capital, that was ſaved by the cack⯑ling of geeſe, and not by the vigilance of the centinels, is a piece of hiſtory, more proper, to ſhew the good-fortune, of the Ro⯑mans, than their military government on that occaſion; though, on all others, their wiſe conduct, has contributed as much to their proſperity, as the valour of their ſoldiers.

30. Good-nature, Good-humour.

Theſe terms, though very expreſſive of their reſpective meanings, are too often [41]for want of proper diſcernment, con⯑founded.

We may be good-humoured, and not good⯑natured; good-natured, and yet not, always, good-humoured.

To make this properly appear, it is ne⯑ceſſary to give a full definition of each.

By good-nature, is meant, that diſpoſition, which partakes the felicity of all mankind; that promotes the ſatisfaction of every in⯑dividual, within the reach of its ability; that relieves the diſtreſſed, comforts the afflicted, diffuſes bleſſings, and communi⯑cates happineſs, as far as its ſphere of ac⯑tion can extend; whereas, good-humour is nothing more, than a chearful, pleaſing de⯑portment, ariſing, either from a natural gaiety of mind, or, an affectation of popu⯑larity, joined to an affability of behaviour, which is the reſult of good-breeding, and a compliance with the taſte of every com⯑pany.—This kind of good-humour, is by far, the moſt ſtriking quality; 'tis frequently miſtaken for, and complimented with, the ſuperior name of real good-nature. A man, by this ſpecious appearance, has often ac⯑quired that appellation, who, in all the ac⯑tions of his private life, has been a moroſe, [42]cruel, revengeful, ſullen, haughty tyrant. On the contrary, a man of a true benevo⯑lent diſpoſition, and formed, to promote the happineſs of all around him, may ſometimes, perhaps, from an ill habit of body, an accidental vexation, or a com⯑mendable openneſs of heart, above the meanneſs of diſguiſe, be guilty of little ſal⯑lies of peeviſhneſs or ill-humour, that may carry the appearance of, and be, unjuſtly, thought to proceed from, ill-nature, by per⯑ſons who are not acquainted with his true character; and, who take them for ſynony⯑mous terms, tho', in reality, they have not the leaſt analogy to each other.

31. Happineſs, Felicity, Bliſs.

Theſe three words denote, equally, an ad⯑vantageous ſtate, and agreeable ſituation; but that of happineſs, marks, properly, the ſtate of fortune, capable of diſpenſing plea⯑ſures, and placing them within our reach; that of felicity, expreſſes, particularly, the ſtate of [43]the heart; diſpoſed to ta [...]e pleaſure, which it finds, in whatſoever it poſſeſſes; that of bliſs, which conveys a myſ [...] idea, paints a ſtate of imagination, which we anticipate, as it were, from a thorough conviction that we ſhall inherit it hereafter.

Our happineſs glares in the eyes of the world, and expoſes us, often, to envy. Our felicity is known only to ourſelves, and gives us continual ſatisfaction. The idea of bliſs, extends itſelf beyond a life temporal.

We are ſometimes in a ſtate of happineſs, without being in a ſtate of felicity. Happi⯑neſs conſiſts in the poſſeſſion of wealth, ho⯑nours, friends and health; but 'tis the ſatisfaction of the mind, and the enjoyment of thoſe things, that conſtitutes felicity. As to bliſs, it is the portion of the godly, and depends in each religion, on the per⯑ſuaſion of the mind.

Satisfaction without, forms the happineſs of man; ſatisfaction within, his felicity: bliſs muſt be aſked of God. The firſt, is within the reach of riches, the ſecond, of wiſdom, but, the third, is reſerved for thoſe, whom the ſcripture calls, the poor in ſpirit.

32. Confines, Limits, Bounds.

Confines, are where we are at liberty to go. Limits, are what we ought, not to paſs. Bounds, are what we can, not paſs.

We approach, or, get farther from the confines; we contract, or, extend the limits; we advance, or, remove the bounds.

By confines, we rather underſtand, the edge or border: the confines of a country, not ſurrounded by the ſea, are generally diſtin⯑guiſhed by rivers or hills.

He, who continually exceeds the limits, which temperance hath ſet, will ſoon find himſelf, on the confines of the grave.

They ſay, with more eloquence than truth, that the limits of the Roman empire, were thoſe of the world.

The Sea, the Alps, and the Pirenean mountains, are the natural bounds of France.

Ambition knows no bounds; and we are never happy, but when the bounds of our fortune, are thoſe of our deſire.

33. Extremity, End.

Each, of theſe words, ſignifies, the leaſt of thoſe parts which conſtitutes a thing; but with this difference, that extremity, ſuppoſes a ſituation and an arrangement, intimating the greateſt diſtance; whereas, end, ſuppoſes a length only, and denotes, that place where the length ceaſes.

Extremity, anſwers to the centre; end, to the beginning; thus, we ſay, the extremity of a kingdom; the end of life.

34. Aim, View, Deſign.

The aim, is more fixed, we take every method to purſue it; the view, more vague, we make uſe of means to accompliſh it; the deſign, more cloſe, we leave nothing undone to complete it.

A good prince has no other deſign in his government, than to render his ſtate flou⯑riſhing, [46]becauſe, he has the happineſs of his people, in view, and true glory, is his aim.

The true Chriſtian has no other aim, than heaven; no other view, than to pleaſe God; nor any other deſign to complete, than his own ſalvation.

We are ſaid, to lay an aim; to have views; to form a deſign.

Reaſon forbids our laying any aim, that is impoſſible to attain; to have any chimerical views, or to form any deſign we are unable to execute.

If my views are juſt, I have a deſign in my head, that will bring me to my aim.

35. Burden, Load.

By the word, burden, we underſtand, a weight, poſſible to be born; by load, a weight, more than we are able to bear.

A light burthen, is no inelegant expreſſi⯑on; but, a light load, certainly is.

In the heat of ſummer, our very cloaths, are a burthen.

[47]Many a poor animal is ſo inhumanly laden, as to ſink under the load.

Taken now in a figurative ſenſe, they are, equally, different.

How unhappy is the man, who feels the burthen of an evil conſcience!

We have, ſometimes, thro' a bad habit of body, ſuch a load upon our ſpirits, as not to be able to ſupport ourſelves.

36. Charm, Enchantment, Spell.

The word charm, carries an idea of force, which puts a ſtop to ordinary effects and natural cauſes. The word enchantment, is uſed, properly, for that which regards the illuſion of the ſenſes. The word ſpell, bears particularly an idea of ſomething, which diſturbs the reaſon. All the three, in the literal ſenſe, mark the effect of a magical operation, condemned by religion, and laughed at by philoſophy.

Antiquated tales, ſay there is a charm to deſtroy the effect of arms, and make them [48]invulnerable. We read, in old romances, of the ſurpriſing power of enchantments, that have, ſuddenly, changed the manners, and reverſed the fortune. Weak people have thought, and do ſtill believe, that by means of a ſpell, the health has been deſtroyed, and the perſon ſo bewitched, made raving mad; but, perſons, of good ſenſe, ſee no charm in the world, but the caprice of paſ⯑ſions, with reſpect to reaſon, which often ſuſpends reflexion, and ſtops the effects, which that would naturally and neceſſarily produce: they are acquainted with no other enchantment, than, that ſeduction ariſing from a depraved taſte, and diſordered ima⯑gination: they know alſo, that, which is fooliſhly attributed to the power of a ſpell, maliciouſly laid, is no other, than the effect of a bad conſtitution, which is frequently remedied, by an application of proper medicines.

37. To Chaſtiſe, Puniſh, To Correct, Diſcipline,

We chaſtiſe, him, who has committed a fault, to prevent his doing the ſame again: we puniſh, the perſon guilty of a crime, by way of expiation, and, as an example to others. To correct, ſignifies, to amend, by means of chastiſement; to diſcipline, means, to regulate and inſtruct.

We chastiſe a child, in order to correct his manners: officers are, frequently, oblig⯑ed to puniſh a ſoldier with death, to keep up good diſcipline in the regiment.

It is neceſſary, for good correction, that the chaſtiſement, be not the effect of anger: juſtice demands, that the puniſhment, be ri⯑gorous, when the crime, is enormous; other⯑wiſe, there can be no good diſcipline in the ſtate.

God, like a tender father, chaſtiſes us in this life, that we may not be puniſhed in the life to come.

As the words chastiſe, and, puniſh, are thought to have the neareſt affinity to each [50]other; it may not be unneceſſary, to ſhew a, yet further, difference between them.

Chaſtiſe, then, carries, always, with it an idea of ſubordination; denoting, an autho⯑rity or ſuperiority in him, who chastiſes, over the perſon, chastiſed; but the word, puniſhment, carries no ſuch idea, in its ſigni⯑fication; for we are ſometimes puniſhed, by our equals, by ourſelves, by our inferiors, by the mere event of things, or, by the effects of the fault, we have committed.

Parents, who, thro' tenderneſs to their children, forbear to chastiſe them, are often puniſhed for their folly, by their future in⯑gratitude and ill conduct.

38. Prudence, Diſcretion, Care, Caution,

Prudence, is here the mother virtue, and ſignifies, wiſdom applied to practiſe: diſcre⯑tion, is the effect of prudence, and means, a knowledge to govern or direct one's ſelf: By care, we underſtand, heed, in order to [51]preſervation. Caution, implies, a greater de⯑gree of warineſs.

A proper attention to prudence, would make us ſo diſcreet, as to be careful, in every thing we do; and cauſe us to act, with the greateſt caution.

A haſty conduct, can never be called prudent: want of attention, in affairs of moment, is the greateſt height of indiſcre⯑tion; for without that neceſſary qualifica⯑tion, 'tis impoſſible any thing we do, can be attended with ſucceſs: He who expects to do any thing well, muſt act with care; and he, who is deſirous of avoiding diffi⯑culties, with caution.

To weigh matters well, before we put them into execution, is a mark of prudence.

A diſcreet man, in the company of dan⯑gerous perſons, ſuch as would take advan⯑tage of his words, would be careful, how he opened his mouth, and, would utter no⯑thing, but with the greateſt caution.

39. Circumſpection, Conſideration, Regard.

A proper attention, to the manner of act⯑ing, and, conducting ourſelves, in our com⯑merce with the world, with reſpect to others; contributing rather to their ſatis⯑faction, than our own, is the common and general idea, which theſe three words pre⯑ſent, at firſt ſight: notwithſtanding which, it appears to me, that their application ſhould be different.

Circumſpection, principally, takes place in diſcourſe; it prevents our letting any thing eſcape us, that may do hurt, or give offence; and, is the effect of prudence, which riſks nothing. Conſideration, is more per⯑ſonal, and relates, particularly, to our man⯑ner of treating other people, making a proper diſtinction, as different opportuni⯑ties may offer; and, is the conſequence of eſteem and duty. Regard, relates more to the ſtate, or, ſituation of perſons; being, particularly, careful to omit nothing, which [53]good ſenſe and politeneſs requires; and, is the fruit of a good education.

To be well with the world, requires cir⯑cumſpection, when we are ſpeaking before thoſe, with whom, we are not acquainted; conſideration, for people of rank and qua⯑lity; and, regard, towards thoſe, with whom, we are intereſted.

We ought to have a great deal of cir⯑cumſpection, in converſations of religion and government; becauſe, they are public mat⯑ters, and, ſubjects, on which particulars are not, at liberty, to ſay, what they think, eſpecially, if their thoughts are in oppoſi⯑tion to thoſe eſtabliſhed in the country, where they are. It is not adviſeable, for our intereſts, to omit ſhewing marks of con⯑ſideration, to ſuch perſons, whoſe aſſiſtance we may ſtand in need of, and, from whom, we hope to receive any ſervice. We can⯑not have too great a regard for the ladies; it is what they expect, and, are diſpleaſed if we neglect.

40. Cunning, Fineſſe, Device, Artifice, Trick, Stratagem.

Cunning, is the art of conducting de⯑ſigns, in a manner proper to ſucceed. Fi⯑neſſe, is a French word, lately adopted by the Engliſh, and means, an acting ſecretly and under cover. Device, is rather a pretty thought or contrivance. Artifice, is unna⯑tural, and a far-fetched mean, of execut⯑ing deſigns. Trick, which eludes the ſenſes, implies, a juggle: and ſtratagem, denotes, a diſguiſed way of obtaining our ends.

The firſt three of theſe words, are oftner underſtood in a good ſenſe, than the other.

Cunning, is employed in uſing means; fineſſe, inſinuates inſenſibly, and, muſt be accompanied by penetration; device, ſur⯑priſes, and, gives ſatisfaction; artifice, gene⯑rally, makes uſe of ſtudied diſſimulation; a trick, is, commonly, looked on as a fraud, and a ſtratagem, is oftener illicit, than otherwiſe.

[55]Without ſome degree of cunning, it will be impoſſible to deal with, or, guard againſt, the generality of mankind.

Fineſſe, is ſo eſſential to the courtier, that, without it, he is ſeen through preſently.

Pretty devices, declare the authors of them, perſons of ingenuity.

We ought particularly to guard againſt a man, who makes uſe of a great deal of artifice.

Jugglers perform tricks, to divert, and conſequently, if clever, deſerve applauſe; but he, who tricks his neighbour, in order to ſerve himſelf, is a rogue.

All ſtratagems, in war, are lawful; but, in other caſes, they are ever conſidered, as de⯑rogatory to the character of an honeſt man.

41. Moment, Inſtant,

A moment, is not long; but, an inſtant, is ſtill ſhorter. The word moment, has a ſig⯑nification, more extended; it is taken ſome⯑times, for time, in general; and, is uſed in [56]a figurative ſenſe: that, of instant, is more contracted; it marks the ſhorteſt duration or time, and, is never uſed, but in the lite⯑ral ſenſe.

All depends upon knowing the favour⯑able moment; ſometimes, an inſtant, too ſoon, or, too late, is all, that makes the dif⯑ference between ſucceſs and misfortune.

Let us baniſh thought, as much as in our power, ſtill, now and then, a reflective moment will intrude. The face of things, which we have thought eſtabliſhed, have been, frequently, changed in an instant.

Every moment is dear to one, who knows the value of time. Every instant of our life, is a ſtep nearer the grave.

42. Cuſtoms, Manners, Faſhions.

Cuſtoms, relate to the general practice of the people; manners, to their way of life; and, faſhions, to their dreſs.

There cannot be a more ridiculous cuſtom, than that, of perſons compliment⯑ing [57]each other, in time of divine ſervice; it being ſuppoſed, they have there, more material things to engroſs their attention.

An increaſe, or, decreaſe of luxury, has been found to have, more or leſs, influence on the manners of the people.

It has been obſerved, that there is a con⯑tinual round of faſhions; when the new are worn out, they, then, have recourſe to the old, and thoſe old ones, become new.

43. To Be, Exiſt, Subſiſt.

Be, agrees with all ſorts of ſubjects, ſub⯑ſtances or modes; with all manner of be⯑ings, real or ideal: Exiſt, is uſed, only, with reſpect to ſubſtances, and thoſe, real: Subſiſt, is applied, equally, to ſubſtances or modes, but with reference to the duration of their being, which is not expreſſed by the other two words.

We ſay, of qualities, forms, actions, mo⯑tions, and, of all their different relations, that, they are; we ſay, of matter, ſpirit, [58]bodies, and, all real beings, that, they exiſt: We ſay, of ſtates, works, affairs, laws, and, all eſtabliſhments, which are neither deſtroyed or changed, that, they ſubſiſt.

The verb, be, is commonly, uſed to mark the event of any modification or quality, in the ſubject: that, of exiſt, is in uſe, only, to expreſs the end of ſimple exiſtence: and we employ ſubſiſt, to point out the dura⯑tion of that exiſtence or modification. Thus, we ſay, that man is inconſtant; that the phoenix exiſts not; that all human eſtabliſhments ſubſiſt, but for a time.

44. Famous, Illuſtrious, Celebrated, Renowned.

Each of theſe qualities, diſtinguiſhes the reputation; but that, which the word fa⯑mous, expreſſes, means, no more than a ſimple diſtinction of one country or age, above another, let that diſtinction be taken either in good part or bad. That, which the word, illuſtrious expreſſes, is found⯑ed upon a merit, ſupported by dignity and glory; which makes the object, not only [59]known, but admired, and ranked among the great. That, which we underſtand, by the word, celebrated, expreſſes, a ſuperior degree of talents, with reſpect either to abilities or knowledge; tho' it raiſes not the object, to an equal degree of grandeur, with the illuſtrious, it is, nevertheleſs, ho⯑nourable. That, which the word, renown⯑ed, denotes, is founded, only, upon faſhion or public taſte; which, without caſting much honour on the ſubject, draws it ſim⯑ply from oblivion, and makes its name known to the world.

The maid of Orleans, cried down by the Engliſh, but, eſteemed by the French, was, equally, famous, in both nations. Princes ſhine, during their life; but, they are only illuſtrious, in future ages, by the monu⯑ments of grandeur, wiſdom and greatneſs, which they leave behind them. There are celebrated authors, whoſe works, we cannot find fault with; and, thoſe, which we can⯑not even commend; without riſking our own reputation. A man's fortune is half made, when once he becomes renowned in his profeſſion.

Famous, celebrated, and, renowned, are equally, applicable to perſons or things; [60]but illuſtrious, to perſons only; at leaſt, when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Eroſtratus, among the Greeks, ſet ſire to the temple of Diana, to make himſelf famous: he was rendered more ſo, by an order of the ſtate, that his name ſhould never after be mentioned, on pain of pu⯑niſhment. The greateſt part of our libels, are of the ſame kind; they raiſe a duſt and become famous, by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough be⯑came illuſtrious, by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are cele⯑brated in hiſtory; ſo, are the many court⯑intrigues of the Dutcheſs. The Gobelins were ſo renowned, that their names live in the place, were they worked, and, in thoſe works, in which, others imitate them. It is a queſtion, whether the Phalernian wine was more renowned, than thoſe are, of Champaigne and Burgundy.

45. Excuſe, Pardon, Forgiveneſs.

We make excuſe, for an apparent fault, or, ſlight offence: we aſk pardon, for a real fault, or, when the offence is greater. We implore forgiveneſs of our ſins. The firſt, is an apology, in order to juſtify ourſelves, and, is founded on politeneſs; the ſecond, is the mark of a good diſpoſition, and, is done, in hopes of extenuation; the laſt, to avert the vengeance, and, declares repentance.

The good mind, excuſes, eaſily. The good heart, pardons, readily. God delights more in forgiveneſs, than in revenge.

Excuſe, is more uſed, when we addreſs ourſelves to equals; pardon, to ſuperiors; and, forgiveneſs, to heaven.

Good manners demand an excuſe for that, which turns out wrong, let the intention be never ſo good. It can never be a degra⯑dation, to aſk pardon of that perſon, whom we have offended; beſides, the ſuperior rank of ſome perſons, makes it an abſolute duty in the offender. How great is the [62]preſumption of that wretch, who fancies himſelf not in need of the forgiveneſs of the Almighty!

46. Duty, Obligation.

Duty, means, ſomething conſcientious, and, ſprings from a law; obligation, ſome⯑thing abſolute in practice, and, ſprings from cuſtom.

We are ſaid, to fail, in our duty; and, to diſpenſe, with an obligation.

It is the duty of a clergyman, to carry himſelf modeſtly; and he is obliged, to wear dark coloured cloaths.

Policy finds leſs diſadvantage, in neg⯑lecting her duty, than in forgetting the leaſt of her obligations.

47. To Live, Dwell.

Theſe two words are ſynonymous, in that ſenſe, in which they ſignify reſidence; [63]but live, relates to the particular place where, we inhabit; dwell, to the building, in which, we reſide.

We live, in London; in Middleſex; in the country; we dwell, in a large houſe; a cottage; or, a furniſhed lodging.

When perſons of diſtinction, live in Lon⯑don; they dwell in hovels, comparatively ſpeaking, with their houſes in the country.

We ſay, with great propriety, I live, all the ſummer, in the country; and, have one of the prettieſt dwellings imaginable.

48. To Stay, Remain.

The common idea of theſe two words, is a ceſſation of progreſſion; and their difference conſiſts in this; that, to ſtay, ſeems to have leſs duration, than to remain.

A good ſervant, when ſent on a meſſage, ſtays, as ſhort a time as poſſible.

When we have given offence, we ſhould endeavour to make ſuch an attonement, that the offended party may not remain diſſatisfied.

[64]The duration of time, expreſſed by the word, ſtay, ſeems leſs determinate, than that, by the word, remain.

Thus, we ſay, he remained at his country houſe a month; he ſtay'd longer, than we expected.

49. Event, Incident.

Event, is a word, moſt agreeable to ſtates and governments; incident, to caſualties in private life.

The revolutions of the ſtate, are events, that determine the happineſs of the people.

Our life is full of incidents, which, the eye of prudence cannot foreſee.

50. To Awake, Awaken.

The firſt, of theſe words, is, more fre⯑quently, uſed in a literal ſenſe; the laſt, in a figurative.

[65]The leaſt noiſe awakes thoſe, who ſleep indifferently. It requires but little, to awaken a paſſion, which is not, entirely, rooted out from the heart.

50. Heavy, Weighty.

The word heavy, is more applicable to that, which loads the body; weighty, to that, which burdens the mind. It requires ſtrength, to carry the one; parts, to ſup⯑port the other.

A weak man finds that, heavy, which, the ſtrong find, light. The adminiſtration of ſtate affairs, is too weighty a concern, for one perſon to undertake.

51. To Conquer, Subdue, Overcome.

Each of theſe words, implies, reſiſtance; but, that of conquer, refers to victory over ene⯑mies; [66]and is, generally, uſed in the literal ſenſe: that of ſubdue, is more applicable to our paſſions; being, oftener, uſed in a fi⯑gurative; and means, a bringing under ſubjection: that of overcome, ſuppoſes ef⯑forts, againſt any obſtacle that oppoſes; meaning, rather, to ſurmount.

We have conquered our enemies, when we have beat them, in ſuch a manner, as to put it out of their power, to do us any further hurt. We may be ſaid, to have ſubdued our luſts, when we are able to withſtand every temptation. We over⯑come our adverſaries, when we obtain our end, in ſpite of every oppoſition.

It requires courage and valour, to con⯑quer; endeavour and reſolution, to ſubdue; patience and perſeverance, to overcome.

Alexander gloried more in his conqueſts, than in any other thing upon earth. Of all paſſions, avarice is the moſt difficult to ſub⯑due; as neither age, or, weakneſs of conſti⯑tution, is able to rebate its edge. We ſhould ſtrive to overcome evil, with good.

53. To no purpoſe, Ineffectually, In vain.

We work, to no purpoſe, when we meet not with the reward, we expected to re⯑ceive; Ineffectually, when that, which we have done, anſwers not the end propoſed; In vain, when our work, is of no kind of uſe whatever.

I ſhall have worked to no purpoſe, if theſe ſheets meet not with the approbation of the public; Ineffectually, if, after all my trouble, I have not been able to ſhew the true difference between words, reputed ſy⯑nonymous; and, in vain, if the book is found to be, neither amuſing or inſtructive.

54. Wave, Surge, Billow.

Waves, are the natural effect of the flui⯑dity of a running water; they are as ap⯑plicable to rivers, as the ſea; and, leave [68]the idea of a calm. Surges, are appli⯑ed, properly, to the ſea, only; imply ſwol'n waves, and, mark a ſmall degree of agitation. Billows, proceed from a more violent motion, conſequently, denote a greater agitation; they break into white foam, and, are attended with no little roar.

We cut through the waves; are lift⯑ed, by the ſurges; toſſed and daſhed, by the billows.

The life of ſome men, may be, aptly, compared to the ſharp-keeled veſſel, cutting through the waves, leaving no noiſe or track behind it: while that of others, may be repreſented, as toſſed up and down, on the wind-ſwoln ſurges of a boiſterous fortune; or, daſhed in pieces, by the foaming billows of ad⯑verſity.

55. Uproar, Tumult, Riot.

Uproar, conveys an idea of ſome great noiſe; tumult, and, riot, of ſome great diſ⯑order.

The diference between the words tu⯑mult, and, riot, is, that tumult, implies, the riſing of many people; riot, the diſturbance of a few; whereas, an up⯑roar, may be occaſioned, by one ſingle perſon.

Tumults, and, riots are, always, attend⯑ed with ſuch uproars, as give umbrage to a peaceable neighbourhood.

Houſes of debauchery, are ſubject to riots: a tumult often happens, in ill-policed cities.

56. Inclination, Propenſion, Bias.

Theſe three words riſe gradually; inclination, implying ſome thing leſs ſtrong, [70]than propenſion; propenſion, than bias: the firſt, leads us to an object; the ſe⯑cond, draws us, the third, drags us.

Inclination, is, greatly, owing to education; propenſion, to cuſtom; bias, to conſtitu⯑tion.

Choice of company, is eſſential to the education of youth, becauſe, at that age, they imbibe eaſily the inclinations of thoſe, whoſe company they keep. It is a dan⯑gerous thing, to give a looſe to any one vice, as frequent commiſſion, is apt to create ſtrong propenſion. Perſons of warm conſtitutions, have a natural bias to venery.

Inclination, is, generally, applied to good objects; propenſion, to bad. Thus, we ſay, the charitable man is ever inclined to aſſiſt his neighbour. So deprayed is hu⯑man nature, that we have, always, a pro⯑penſion to vice.

Of two perſons to be ſerved, a fo⯑reigner, and, a countryman; we are, ge⯑nerally, biaſſed in favour of the laſt.

57. Should, Ought, Is neceſſary.

The firſt of theſe expreſſions, implys, more preciſely, an obligation of complai⯑ſance, cuſtom, or, perſonal intereſt: thus, we ſhould not offend the company, we are in; we ſhould follow the faſhion; we ſhould know a man, before we truſt him. The ſecond, denotes, more particularly, an obli⯑gation of reaſon and good ſenſe; thus, we ought in every thing, to give up to thoſe, who know better than ourſelves; we ought to ſerve them, who have ſerved us. The third, is more uſed to ex⯑preſs an eſſential and indiſpenſable obliga⯑tion; thus, it is neceſſary, to love God, in order to be ſaved: It is neceſſary, to be com⯑plaiſant, to pleaſe.

58. Furthermore, Moreover, Beſides.

Furthermore, is, properly, uſed, when there is need only to add one more reaſon, to thoſe, before-mentioned; its intent, is to multiply, and, it has no relation, but to number. Moreover, is in its right place, when uſed, to add a reaſon of a different kind, to thoſe, that went before; its chief office is, to add, with a particular reſpect, to diverſity. Beſides, is uſed with pro⯑priety, when we would ſtrengthen by a new reaſon, the force of thoſe, that were ſufficient of themſelves, its principal office is, to enhance by abundance.

For a ſtate to ſupport itſelf, thoſe, who govern, ſhould be moderate; thoſe who ought to obey, governable; furthermore, the laws ſhould be judicious. There will always be war among men, becauſe, they are naturally ambitious, and are governed by intereſt; moreover, zeal for religion, makes them rigid. Holy Scripture teaches us the unity of the Godhead, and, reaſon [73]points it out to us: beſides, all nature makes us perceive it.

59. To Manifeſt, Publiſh, Proclaim.

Theſe three words, imply, open decla⯑ration; but that of manifeſt, ſeems to con⯑vey, a proof of what is made known; meaning, to ſhew inconteſtably: Publiſh, de⯑notes, only, a ſimple declaration, but ge⯑neral: to proclaim, is, to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has loſt his name, let him manifeſt his good character, as much as poſſible, he will find it difficult, to recover the good opinion of mankind, for prejudice is blind, even, to the moſt viſible truths. He who publiſhes to the world, the failings of another, betrays in himſelf, a want of humanity, and, is ſure to meet with the contempt of every think⯑ing man. A famous Sultan of Egypt left to poſterity, a moſt remarkable teſtimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur; for, on his [74]death-bed, he commanded, that his wind⯑ing ſheet ſhould be carried at the end of a lance, by a herald; who was to proclaim, here is all, that this great prince will carry out of the world with him, of his wealth, dignity, and dominion, that he enjoyed upon earth.

Manifeſtos of a ſtate, are, uſually, publiſh⯑ed, by formal proclamation.

60. To Tell, Diſcloſe, Reveal, To Divulge, Diſcover.

To make known that which is un⯑known, is the common ſignification of thoſe words: but, to tell, is to declare things purpoſely, with a deſign to inform thoſe, we would not have remain ignorant. To diſcloſe, is to ſhew, either by deſign or inadvertency, that which was before con⯑cealed. To reveal, is to lay open a ſecret: to divulge, is to do the ſame abroad. To diſ⯑cover, is the declaring a perſon to have done a thing, which he would not have been thought the author of.

[75]So great an itch, have ſome perſons for prattling, that they tell every individual thing they hear. Confidents too often diſ⯑cloſe the intrigues, they are entruſted with. Confeſſors reveal, ſometimes, by their im⯑prudence, the confeſſion of penitents. The divulging of a ſecret, has, often, done more harm, than any other one thing whatever; as it is impoſſible to ſmother, what once has been blazed abroad. If we would not be diſcovered, we ſhould be careful to have no witneſs of our actions.

61. Equivocation, Ambiguity, Double-entendre.

Equivocation, has two ſenſes; the one, natural, in which, we would have what we ſay underſtood, and, in which, the hearer does, abſolutely, underſtand us; the other, perverted, underſtood only, by the perſon ſpeaking. Ambiguity, has one general ſenſe, ſuſceptible of different interpretations; it, always, creates a difficulty in getting at the true ſenſe of the author, and, ſome⯑times, [76]an impoſſibility. The double-enten⯑dre, a french word lately naturalized, has two natural and apt ſignifications, one of which preſents itſelf to the common under⯑ſtanding of all the world; and, by the other is made, a fine alluſion, underſtood, but by certain perſons.

Theſe three ways of ſpeaking, are, upon occaſion, ingenious methods of concealing one's true meaning: but we make uſe of an equivocation, to deceive; of an ambi⯑guity, to keep in the dark, from all; and of a double-entendre, to conceal, from ſome.

It is beneath the character of an honeſt man, to make frequent uſe of equivocati⯑ons; he that does, being ſure to meet with the contempt of mankind. Ambiguities, are perhaps, oftener the effect of a confuſion of ideas, than a ſtudied deſign of keeping people in the dark: we ought never to uſe them, but when an elucidation would be dangerous. Malice and politeneſs have introduced the double-entendre, but it ſhould never, be uſed, at the expence of our neighbours reputation.

62. Great, Big, Large.

The word great, is a general term, ſig⯑nifying any thing conſiderable either in bulk, extent, quality, number, &c. thus we ſay, a great houſe; a great road; a great weight; a great many; a great fa⯑mine; a great happineſs. The words big, and, large, are more circumſcribed; big, implies, greatneſs of bulk; large, greatneſs of extent. Thus, we ſay, a big man; a big ſtone; but, a large room; a large field.

A large man, is as great an impropriety, as a big field; and we need, only, mention a big or large pleaſure, to ſhew the ab⯑ſurdity.

63. Grave, Serious, Staid.

We are ſtaid, through diſcretion and cuſtom; grave, thro' humour and conſti⯑tution; ſerious, thro' taſte and affectation.

Levity is the reverſe, of being ſtaid; vi⯑vacity, of gravity; wantonneſs, of ſeriouſneſs.

Aconſtant round of buſineſs and continual tranſaction of affairs, make us ſtaid; reflecti⯑ons on our latter end, give gravity; the deſire of being thought grave, ſeriouſneſs.

64. Genius, Talent.

Theſe are both born with us, and are a happy diſpoſition of nature, by which, we are qualified for ſome peculiar employ⯑ment: but genius, ſeems to be more inter⯑nal, and poſſeſſed of the powers of inven⯑tion; talent, more external, and capable of execution.

[79]Thus, we have a genius, for poetry and painting; but, a talent, for ſpeaking and writing.

Such as have a genius for mechanics, may have no talent for watch-making.

65. People, Perſons.

The word people, is ſo very general, that it cannot be connected with a determinate number; as, for inſtance, four, five, or, ſix people; but that of perſons, may.

To be pleaſant at table, none ſhould be admitted but people of good humour; neither, ſhould there be more, than ſeven or eight perſons.

In order to deſcribe a company, we ſhould know the quality of the people, and the number of perſons, preſent.

In all governments, we find ill-affected people: and there are, always, among a number, ſome diſcontented perſons.

66. To Regard, Concern, Touch.

We ſay, very indifferently, without much choice, that a thing regards us, con⯑cerns us, or, touches us, to mark the part we bear in it. There, nevertheleſs, appears to me, to be a delicate diſtinction between theſe three expreſſions, each riſing, gra⯑dually, above the other, according to the rank, in which, I have placed them. Tho' we have the leaſt part, imaginable, in a thing, it may be ſaid, to regard us; to concern us, we muſt have a greater; but, when we are ſenſibly affected by it, it may be ſaid, to touch us. It ſeems alſo, that the word regard, is more applicable, when our intereſt is in queſtion; that of concern, when ſpeaking of things, committed to our care and conduct; that of touch, when it reſpects our honour of fortune.

The ill-behaviour of a ſervant, to a cuſtomer, regards the maſter; as it affects his intereſt. The leaſt diſturbance in Eu⯑rope, in ſome meaſure, regards every ſtate; [81]it being difficult, for any of them, to keep a perfect neutrality, for any length of time, while the others are at war. All the operations of government, concern the firſt miniſter. It concerns a man, to be punctual, in the diſcharge of his duty: The conduct of a wife, touches the huſ⯑band, ſo cloſe, that he ought to have an eye over all ſhe does. The behaviour of an ambaſſador, touches, always, more or leſs, the honour of the prince the repreſents.

Many people make themſelves uneaſy at that, which does not, in the leaſt, regard them; meddle with what no ways con⯑cerns them; and, at the ſame time, are indifferent to thoſe things, which touch them nearly.

67. Tranquillity, Peace, Quiet.

Theſe words, let them be applied either to the ſoul, to a republic, or any particu⯑lar ſociety; expreſs, equally, a ſituation exempt from trouble and moleſtation; [82]but tranquillity, relates to that, within one⯑ſelf, and in the time preſent, independent of any other relation: peace, to the ſitua⯑tion, with regard to enemies, in whoſe power it is, to make an alteration: quiet, with reſpect to time paſt or future, as ſucceeding or preceding a ſituation trou⯑bled.

Uneaſy people have no tranquillity in their families. Litigious perſons are hardly ever at peace with their neighbours. After a troubleſome time, we enjoy a quiet ſtate, with greater ſatisfaction.

What a ſtate of tranquillity, does the re⯑ligious man enjoy; no outward things having the power to rufflle or diſcompoſe him! To preſerve peace, we ſhould keep ourſelves, always, in a ſtate of defence. It is indulgence, only, that will eſtabliſh quiet in a mutinous people.

68. Temple, Church.

Both theſe words ſignify, an edifice, ſet apart for the public ſervice of religion; [83]but that of temple, is a more pompous ex⯑preſſion, and leſs in uſe, than church: with reſpect to the Pagan religion, we, fre⯑quently uſe the word temple: as the temple of Apollo; the temple of Janus; but with relation to our own, ſeldom: St. Paul's church; St. Saviour's church.

Temple, ſeems to expreſs ſomething, more auguſt, and ſignifies, properly, and edifice, dedicated to the deity. Church ſomething, more common, ſignifying, par⯑ticularly, an edifice, erected for the con⯑gregation of the faithful.

The grandeur of Solomon's temple, was beyond deſcription. Nothing profane ought to enter the temple of the Lord. The pre⯑ſent thinneſs of our churches, is a manifeſt ſign of a decreaſe in religion. Nothing ought to be permitted in church, that does not contributed to the edification of chriſti⯑ans.

69. Huge, Vaſt, Enormous, Immenſe.

The common idea of theſe words, is ſomething, greatly, beyond the uſual mea⯑ſure; but thoſe, of huge, and, vaſt, relate, more, to ſuch things, as are material; thoſe, of enormous, and, immenſe, to ſuch, as are ideal; with this difference, between them; that huge, implies, greatneſs in bulk; vaſt, greatneſs in extent; enormous, greatneſs in ſize, even to deformity and dreadful⯑neſs; immenſe, unlimited extent, even be⯑yond expreſſion. Thus, we ſay, a huge giant; a vaſt tract of land; an enormous crime; the immenſe expanſe.

There are ſome promontories, ſo huge, as to ſhock the eye that views them. The deſarts of Arabia, are ſo vaſt, that unleſs travellers carried their lodging and provi⯑ſion with them, they would periſh, before they reached their journey's end. The ſins of the preſumptuous wretch, are ſo enormous, that he can have little hopes of ſalvation, but, in the infinite mercies of an all-gracious God. So great is the immen⯑ſity [85]of the Godhead, as to exceed the ut⯑moſt ſtretch of human thought.

70. Way, Road.

Way, is much more extenſive and gene⯑ral, than road; and implies the paſſage from place to place, whether through the high road, or not: road, is much more li⯑mited, and particular, and means the beaten way of travellers, from one town or city to another. Which, ſays the travel⯑ler, is our beſt way to Hampton; the Hounſlow road, or Kingſton? either road, ſays his guide, is good; but when we come to Twittenham, the ſhorteſt way, is acroſs the fields; tho' the pleaſanteſt way, would be, to go by water.

As the word, way, is, often, uſed to ſig⯑nify, means; which, when conſidered as the intermediate ſtep to attainment, is not, widely, different from that, of road; when we would adopt the figure of travelling, not to confuſe our ideas, we, generally, make uſe of the word road: thus, dili⯑gence [86]with perſeverance, is the high road to preferment; yet, notwithſtanding, way is a much more elegant expreſſion: a ſtrict adherence to the principles of chriſtianity, is the direct way to heaven.

71. Ways, Means.

We go, the ways; we uſe, the means.

Ways, are the methods, we take, means, what, we put in execution, to ſucceed. The firſt word, enfolds in its idea, honour and probity; the laſt, pays little or no regard, but, to the end aimed at. Thus, good ways, are thoſe, which are juſt; good means, thoſe, which are ſure.

Simoniacal practices, are very bad ways; but, very good means, of obtaining bene⯑fices.

I cannot avoid here, taking notice of the ingrammatical impropriety, of annexing the ſingular number, to the word means; the fault, almoſt, of every ſpeaker and writer; liberality, ſay they, is, a ſure means, of becoming popular: there is, no better [87] means, of keeping in with the world, than that, of paſſing by affronts, with compo⯑ſure:—Glaring abſurdity! ſince, the word, means, is evidently, plural, and it would be, much more, elegant, was the falſe concord avoided.

72. Often, Frequently.

One, relates to the repetition of the ſame acts; the other, to a plurality of objects. We, often, diſguiſe our thoughts: by doing the ſame thing, often, it becomes habitual. We, frequently, meet with traitors; we, frequently, do thoſe things, which we re⯑pent of, afterwards.

There are two other words, bearing an equal ſignification with often, viz. oft, and, oftentimes, but they being, no more, than the ſame word, abbreviated and lengthened; it is needleſs, to take any further notice of them.

73. Cannot, Impoſſible.

One of theſe words, more properly, re⯑lates to inability; the other, to impoſſibi⯑lity.

We cannot ſerve two maſters. It is im⯑poſſible to execute two oppoſite orders, at the ſame time.

We cannot love one, by whom we have been injured. It is impoſſible, to love one, to whom, we have a natural averſion.

74. Glory, Honour.

Glory, expreſſes ſomething, more ſingu⯑lar, than honour. The one, makes us un⯑dertake, voluntarily, the moſt difficult things; the other, leads us, willingly, to the execution of the moſt rigorous exac⯑tions.

Queſt of glory, ſometimes, ſtimulates the ſoldier's courage, even to raſhneſs; and no⯑tions [89]of honour, in ſpite of fear, keep him, often, to his duty.

An indifference to glory, may paſs unno⯑ticed; but not ſo, with reſpect to honour.

It is cuſtomary, in converſation, to place intereſt, in oppoſition to glory; and incli⯑nation, to honour: thus, we ſay, an author, who labours after glory, takes more pains in the completion of his piece; than he, who works, merely for intereſt: and, when an avaritious man lays out his money, it is more through honour, than inclination.

75. World, Univerſe.

World, conveys only an idea, of one ſin⯑gle being, though general; that which ex⯑iſts: Univerſe, an idea, of many beings, or, rather that, of all parts of the world; all that exiſts: the firſt, of theſe words, is, ſometimes, uſed in the literal ſenſe, as when, we ſay, the old and new world; and ſometimes in a figurative, as, when we ſay, in this world, and in the o⯑ther; the wicked world; the polite world: the ſecond, is, always, uſed according to [90]the letter; and in a ſenſe that excepts no one thing: it is, for this reaſon, when we would expreſs the univerſe, by the term, world, that, we are obliged to put the word, all, before it, which, we have no occaſion to do, by univerſe; for example, we ſhould ſay, the ſun warms all the world, and, is the heat of the univerſe.

76. Anſwer, Reply.

The anſwer, is made to a demand or a queſtion, aſked; the reply, to an anſwer or a remonſtrance.

Academics are taught firſt, to ſtart diffi⯑culties, and then, to anſwer them. It is nobler, to hear a wiſe remonſtrance, and, profit by it; than make any reply.

The word, anſwer, is more extenſive in its ſignification, than reply; we anſwer the queſtions of thoſe, who aſk us; the de⯑mands, of ſuch, as expect our ſervices; the examination of counſel; the arguments of diſputants; the letters we receive; and, [91]for all our conduct. The word, reply, is far more limited; it ſuppoſes a diſpute, com⯑menced from difference of ſentiment; we reply, to the anſwer, of an author whoſe works we have criticiſed; to the reprimands of thoſe, whoſe correction, we are unwilling to ſubmit to; to pleaders; to an anſwer in chancery.

An anſwer, ſhould be clear, true, and dictated by reaſon, and good ſenſe; a reply, ſtrong and convincing, armed by truth, and ſtrengthened by experience.

We ſhould teach children, as much as poſſible, to give nice and judicious anſ⯑wers; and convince them, that there is more honour, in liſtning, than in making replies to thoſe, who have the goodneſs to inſtruct them.

77. Danger, Hazard, Riſk, Venture,

All theſe words, imply, chance of harm; but that, of danger, relates to the evil, that may happen; thoſe, of hazard, risk, and, venture, to the good, we may loſe; with [92]this difference, that, hazard, expreſſes ſome⯑thing, near; riſk, ſomething, at a diſtance; venture, ſomething, farther off, relating only to the poſſibility of events. Hence thoſe expreſſions, in danger, of death; in hazard, of our life; by giving a looſe to debau⯑chery, we risk our health; nothing venture, nothing have.

Danger, creates fear; hazard, alarm; risk, caution; but we, often venture, with the greateſt ſatisfaction.

The avaritious man, ſpurred on by in⯑tereſt, fears no danger; hazards his health and happineſs; runs every risk that attends his profeſſion; and, gladly, ventures his all, in ſearch of that, which, if obtained, he would not have the ſpirit, to enjoy.

78. Againſt, In ſpite of.

Both theſe, denote oppoſition; but, the expreſſion, in ſpite of, implies, more reſolu⯑tion and greater force, than the word, againſt; againſt, ſuppoſing little, or no re⯑ſiſtance, [93]in the object oppoſed; but, in ſpite of, a conſiderable ſtruggle.

We act againſt the will, or, againſt rule, and, in ſpite of oppoſitions.

The good man, does nothing, againſt the dictates of his conſcience. The wicked man, commits ſin, in ſpite of the puniſh⯑ment, annexed to it.

Raſhneſs, will attempt things, againſt all appearance of ſucceſs; and reſolution, will purſue the attempt, in ſpite of all the obſtacles it meets with.

79. Boldneſs, Audaciouſneſs, Impudence, Effrontery,

There is a commendable holdneſs, that proceeds from a ſelf-conſciouſneſs of worth; but the holdneſs, which is here meant, ſprings from ignorance; is brazen and preſuming. Audaciouſneſs, is a greater degree of boldneſs; ſuch, as is ſteeled a⯑gainſt reproof; is rude and noiſy. Impu⯑dence conſiſts, in being an utter ſtranger, to all kind of modeſty; is ſcurrilous and abu⯑ſive. Effrontery, proceeds from pride, and [94]ſelf-ſufficiency; is overbearing and inſo⯑lent.

The bold, are unawed by diffidence; they ſpeak, with great aſſurance; neither the quality or rank of thoſe, they addreſs, being able to diſconcert them. The more you reprove the audacious man, the more it hardens him; he, wilfully, forgets the reſpect, due to his ſuperiors, and, idly, imagines his boiſterous behaviour, a diſ⯑tinguiſhing mark of manhood. The wea⯑pons of the impudent, are ſaucineſs and abuſe; which, they take up at every turn; and, with which, they lay about them, in a moſt unmerciful manner. As great a cauſe of effrontery, as any, is the want of education; he, whom it poſſeſſes, is ar⯑rogant and inſolent, a ſtranger to good⯑ſenſe, and unacquainted with the rules of good-breeding.

80. Profitable, Advantageous, Beneficial.

Profitable, is more applicable to gain; Advantageous, to honour, or any kind of convenience; beneficial, to health.

Some kinds of merchandiſe, are far more profitable, than others. A good name is very advantageous, as, it ſerves to puſh us forward in the world. Loſs of blood, to a feveriſh perſon, is very beneficial.

Light profits, make a heavy purſe. A ſeaſonable word, ſpoke in favour, is, fre⯑uently, of more advantage, than the great⯑eſt ſervices. The greateſt benefit to the ſoul, is, a ſincere repentance.

81. To See, Look at, To Behold, View.

We ſee, whatever ſtrikes the ſight: we look at an object, when we deſignedly caſt our eye upon it: we behold it, when we look with attention: we view it, when we ſurvey it.

We ſee, all objects before our eyes: we look at, thoſe, which excite our curioſity: we behold, ſuch, as cauſe our admiration: we view, thoſe, we are deſirous to ex⯑amine.

We ſee, diſtinctly or confuſedly. We look at, near, or at a diſtance. We be⯑hold, with wonder and attention. We view, with care and exactneſs.

The eyes, open, to ſee; turn, to look at; fix themſelves, to behold; and move all ways, to view.

The connoiſſeur, in painting, looks at the firſt picture, he ſees; if it be the work of a celebrated artiſt, he beholds it, with pleaſure, and views every part of it, with the greateſt minuteneſs.

82. To Stare, Gaze.

Though the common meaning of theſe words is, to fix both the eyes upon an ob⯑ject, and look at it with wonder, intently and earneſtly; yet, there is a great diffe⯑rence between them: ſtaring, implies, looking, with wonder and impudence; gazing, with wonder and reſpect.

The impudence of ſome fellows, is ſo great, that, they will ſtare, a modeſt woman, out of countenance.

A man in love, will, ſometimes, gaze upon the object of his affections, till he, almoſt, loſes his ſight.

When our Saviour firſt appeared to his diſciples, after his reſurrection; they gazed on him, with aſtoniſhment and rapture.

To ſtare another, in the face, has, al⯑ways, been conſidered, as a breach of good manners.

83. Uſeful, Serviceable.

As nearly ſynonymous, as theſe words may appear to be, there is, yet, a mani⯑feſt difference between them, but the diſ⯑tinction is ſo delicate, as to require ſome attention to diſcover it. Uſeful, in my opi⯑nion, is more applicable to things, in uſe; to thoſe we have often recourſe to; and what, cannot be well done without: Ser⯑viceable, to things, of ſervice, ſuch, as we, oftener, do without, than with: and ſuch, as we little expect to have. Thus, furni⯑ture is uſeful; memorandum books, to per⯑ſons engaged in a multiplicity of Buſineſs, are uſeful. Friends and good connections, are ſerviceable.

The plummet, is ſo uſeful to the carpen⯑ter; that, to fix a perpendicular, without it, would give him a great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horſe, is the moſt ſervice⯑able.

To thoſe, who take ſnuff, a box, is ex⯑tremely uſeful; but its contents, very far, from ſerviceable.

84. Gulph, Abyſs.

What theſe words ſhould expreſs, is ra⯑ther imaginary, than real: they are, ge⯑nerally, uſed therefore in a figurative ſenſe: we are ſuppoſed to be ſwallowed up, by a gulph; and loſt, in an abyſs. The firſt, car⯑ries with it, an idea of inſatiable voracity, which drags in and conſumes all, that ap⯑proaches; the ſecond, of an unmeaſurable depth, to whoſe bottom, we can never get; and in which, we loſe, at the ſame time, the ſight of the place, from whence, we came, and of that, where, we are going.

A gulph, is ſuppoſed to have, many turns and windings; of which, when we have once ſet a ſtep in, we cannot poſſibly get out, but are carried on, in ſpite of all our endeavours to the contrary. An abyſs, is ſuppoſed to have, many uncertain and obſcure roads, without end; in which, tho' we may, ſometimes, ſtoop, in hopes of find⯑ing a way out; yet, being deceived, we become diſheartened, bewildered with doubts, and overwhelmed with deſpair.

[100]A looſe woman, is a gulph of woe, all periſhes there; virtue, riches, and health. Philoſophy, teaches us, that man is, con⯑tinually, wandering, in an abyſs of dark⯑neſs.

85. Determination, Reſolution.

Determination, is an act of judgment, and ſuppoſes examination; reſolution, an act of the will, and ſuppoſes deliberation: the firſt ſhuts out ſuſpence; the laſt, wa⯑vering.

Our determinations, ſhould be juſt, to avoid repentance; our reſolutions, fixed, to exclude variation.

Nothing is more diſagreeable, both to ourſelves and others; than to be, always, undetermined, in our affairs, and irreſolute, in our proceedings.

It is more difficult, to determine on points of precedence; than, on ſolid and real in⯑tereſts. [101]There are, no weaker reſolutions than thoſe, made at confeſſion, or, on a ſick-bed; the firſt return of health, carry⯑ing us again, into the ſame courſe of life.

We may be determined, and yet not re⯑ſolved; that is, we may come to ſome de⯑ciſion, and ſtill, not be ſo far reſolved, as to put that deciſion, into execution; fear, timidity, or, ſome other motive, may pre⯑vent us.

The determinations of women, are ſeldom better grounded, than on whimſey or ca⯑price: Men, are, ſo often, led by taſte and cuſtom: that, their reſolutions are, gene⯑rally, vain.

In ſcience, we ſay, the determination of a point; the reſolution of a difficulty.

The more, we determine, the leſs, we prove. Though, in the ſchools, we anſwer every difficulty, we reſolve but few.

86. Old, Ancient, Antique.

Theſe words riſe one upon the other; antique, upon ancient, and that, of ancient, upon old.

A faſhion is old, when it ceaſes to be in uſe; ancient, when its uſe, has been, ſome⯑time, paſt; antique, when it has been, a long time, ancient.

That, which is recent, is not old; that, which is new, is not ancient; that, which is modern, is not antique.

Oldneſs agrees beſt with age; ancientneſs, with the origin of families; antiquity, with what exiſted in former times.

As we grow old, we decreaſe in ſtrength; but gain more experience.

Ancientneſs, makes faſhions diſagreeable; but adds ſplendour to nobility.

Antiquity, deſtroys the proofs of hiſtory, and weakens credit; but renders monu⯑ments of greater value.

87. General, Univerſal.

General, implies, a great number of par⯑ticulars; univerſal, every particular.

The government of princes, has no ob⯑ject in view, but, the general good. The providence of God, is univerſal.

An orator ſpeaks, in general, when he makes no particular application. Know⯑ledge is univerſal, when it knows every thing.

Chriſtianity is, generally, known and be⯑lieved; but, not univerſally.

88. Word, Term, Expreſſion,

Nothing is more common, than an in⯑diſcriminate uſe of theſe words; and yet none differ more among themſelves. A word, is a ſingle part of ſpeech; is gene⯑ral, and determined by uſe: Term, is a [104]particular caſt of language; owes its for⯑mation to the ſubject, and its excellence, to its ſuitableneſs. Expreſſion, is a certain mode of ſpeech; riſes from thought, and is, more or leſs, beautiful, according to its particular turn.

The purity of language, depends upon its words; the preciſion, upon its terms; and brilliancy, upon its expreſſions.

Elaborate diſcourſes, require the words, to be, truly, Engliſh; the terms, proper; and the expreſſions noble.

A word, which has eſcaped us, unde⯑ſignedly, ſometimes, has been attended with fatal conſequences. Terms of art, are now, pretty generally, known; however, they appear with little grace, except, in the mouths of the profeſſors of thoſe arts. Starched or far-fetched expreſſions, carry with them, an air of pedantry.

89. Pile, Heap,

Theſe words, equally, ſignify a quantity of things together, one upon another; [105]with this difference, that pile, rather means, things put up, regularly; whereas, heap, implies no other order in the arrangement, than what riſes from chance. As, a pile of wood; a heap of rubbiſh.

We ſay, a pile of bricks; when they are, the materials, prepared for building; and a heap of bricks, when they are, the remains of a fallen edifice.

90. Departure, Death, Deceaſe.

Departure, is a ſtile, more refined, and carries with it, an idea of the paſſage, from one life, to another; death, more com⯑mon, and ſignifies, preciſely, extinction of life; deceaſe, more ſtudied, is a term ſomewhat bordering upon the law, and im⯑plies, the refuge of mortality. The ſe⯑cond, of theſe words, is made uſe of, with reſpect to all ſorts of animals; the other two, to man only.

A glorious departure, is preferable to a ſhameful life. Death, is the common lot [106]of all things living. Succeſſion, does not take place, 'till the moment of deceaſe.

Departure preſents nothing horrid to the imagination, it indicates ſomething agree⯑able, in eternity: deceaſe, conveys, only, an idea of trouble, in being ſeparated from things, we are much attached to: but death, preſents ſomething dreadful and affrighting.

91. Value, Worth.

Value, riſes from the intrinſic good⯑neſs of things; worth from the eſtimation, of them.

Of two things, the beſt, is the moſt valuable; and that worth moſt, that bears the greateſt price.

92. Valley, Bottom, Vale, Dale.

Of theſe four words, valley, implies, a narrow ſpace, ſituated between two hills; bottom, a like ſpace, but, quaggy and diſa⯑greeable. [107] Vale, ſignifies, a ſpace, more extended: whereas, dale, means, rather, low lands.

The words, dale and vale, are, oftener, found in poetry; valley and bottom, in proſe.

Valleys are, for the moſt part, winding, and, as they receive water from the hills on each ſide, are, generally, converted into meads. He, whoſe houſe ſtands in a bot⯑tom, cannot live on a more unhealthy ſpot. A fine vale, with beautiful encloſures, bounded by riſing woods, is a delightful proſpect. Dales, are much eaſier to be ploughed, than hilly lands.

93. Head, Chief.

The word head, is reckoned ſynonymous only, to chief, when uſed in a figurative ſenſe; but, even then, it requires a diffe⯑rent application. Head, agrees beſt, with reſpect to arrangement: chief, with regard to ſubordination. Thus, we ſay, the head [108]of a batallion, or, a ſhip; the chief of a party, or, an undertaking.

A commander in chief, is generally, at the head of his troops.

94. Impediment, Obſtacle, Obſtruction.

There ſeems to be a gradation in theſe words. The impediment, ſtays; the obſta⯑cle reſiſts; the obſtruction, puts an entire ſtop to.

We ſay, remove the impediment; ſur⯑mount the obſtacle; take away or vanquiſh the obſtruction.

Even ſmall impediments, ſometimes, prove ſuch obstacles, as obſtruct our beſt endeavours.

The word, impediment, ſeems to expreſs ſomething, riſing from the nature and proper circumſtances of what we are about; that, of obſtacle, ſomething, from a foreign cauſe; that of obſtruction, ſome⯑thing, proceeding from a ſuperior force.

Every temptation, may be ſaid, to im⯑pede [109]our reſolutions to virtue. The elo⯑quence of Demoſthenes, was the greateſt obſtacle, that Philip of Macedon found, in all his political undertakings, and which he could never ſurmount, but by force of arms. Nearneſs of kin, is an obſtruction to marriage, which the laws have made, and which, thoſe laws, only, can take away.

95. Learning, Literature, Erudition.

Of all order of words, there does not appear a more regular climax than in the above three; which ſeems to be compleat⯑ed, by the word, KNOWLEDGE; but as that, has never been accounted ſynonymous with theſe, I ſhall take no notice of it, here.

Learning, implies, ſimply, that know⯑ledge, which we acquire, by our common ſtudy at ſchool. Literature, denotes, po⯑lite learning, or, an acquaintance with the BELLES LETTRES, and is rather, practical: [110]but erudition, ſignifies, great depth of knowledge, with a particular relation to that, which is ſpeculative.

Without ſome degree of learning, 'tis impoſſible to paſs well, through the world. There was a time, when the nobility piqued themſelves, on being men of literature. A taſte for erudition, will furniſh infinite amuſement, for a tranquil and retired life.

96. To Inquire, Interrogate, Aſk.

We inquire, we interrogate, we aſk, in or⯑der to know; but the verb, inquire, im⯑plies, curioſity; that, of interrogate, au⯑thority; that of aſk, ſomething, more, civil and reſpectful.

The words inquire, and interrogate, make ſenſe, by themſelves; but, to uſe the word aſk, with propriety, we muſt add the mat⯑ter to it; that is, to make the ſenſe per⯑fect, we muſt mention the thing we aſk.

[111]'Tis the buſineſs of a ſpy, to make en⯑quiries. Criminals are interrogated by the judge. The ſoldier aſks orders from the commanding officer.

97. To Shun, Avoid, Fly.

We ſhun, thoſe perſons, whom we would not ſee, or by whom, we would not be ſeen. We avoid, doing things, that are diſagree⯑able to us. We fly, both perſons and things, which we fear and dread.

In the words, ſhun and avoid, which ſeem to have the neareſt affinity to each other; there is this ſtanding difference, that, the word, ſhun, is generally, ap⯑plied to perſons; that, of avoid, to things.

In order to fly, we turn to the oppoſite ſide, and get quick away, to prevent be⯑ing taken; in order to ſhun, we take ano⯑ther road, getting ſlily away, to avoid be⯑ing ſeen, or to eſcape a trap; in order to avoid, we uſe ſome extraordinary means.

[112]We ſhun troubleſome company. We avoid running into exceſs. We fly thoſe, who purſue us.

Knowlege of the world, makes us ſhun. Prudence makes us avoid. Fear, makes us fly.

The beſt remedy againſt the plague, is to fly far from the place where it is. The ſureſt method of preſerving our innocence, is to ſhun bad company. It is an act of the greateſt weakneſs, not to avoid doing thoſe things, which are detrimental to our in⯑tereſt.

98. Severity, Rigour.

Severity, ſhews itſelf, chiefly, in the manner of thinking and judging; it con⯑demns readily and admits of no excuſe. Ri⯑gour, is ſeen, particularly, in the manner of puniſhing; it pardons nothing, nor lightens the ſtroke.

Falſe-devotees are ſevere, only, to others, whom, they are ever eager to condemn; and are always, applauding their own ac⯑tions. Rigour, can never be juſtifiable, [113]but, at thoſe times, when example is of the utmoſt conſequence; yet, even then, ſome ſort of allowance ſhould be made for human frailty.

99. To Succour, Help, To Aſſist, Relieve.

We make uſe of the word, ſuccour, in danger; help, in labour; aſſist, in want; relieve, in diſtreſs. The firſt, ſprings from a motive of generoſity; the ſecond, from good nature; the third, from humanity; the fourth, from compaſſion.

We give ſuccour, in battle; we help, when we carry part of another's burden; we aſſiſt, the poor; and relieve, the af⯑flicted.

The policy of ſtates has found it neceſ⯑ſary to ſuccour each other, when the pow⯑er of any one of them, is gaining too great a head. Very extraordinary things have been done, by the joint help of num⯑bers. Many a parent, has beggar'd him⯑ſelf, in advancing the fortune of his child, tis therefore, the indiſpenſable duty of that child, to aſſiſt his father, to the utmoſt [114]of his power. The truly compaſſionate man, receives, as much inward ſatisfaction in relieving the diſtreſſed, as he commu⯑nicates.

100. Always, Continually, Perpetually.

That which we do, always, we do, at all times, and on all occaſions; that, which is done, continually, is done, without inter⯑ruption, or intermiſſion, but, for a time limited; whereas, what is done, perpetu⯑ally, is done, alſo, without intermiſſion, and, without any regard to time.

We ſhould, always, prefer our duty to our pleaſure. It is impoſſible to be, conti⯑nually, at work. The heavenly bodies are, perpetually, in motion.

To pleaſe in company, we ſhould, always, talk well, but not, continually. The longi⯑tude may be diſcovered by perpetual motion.

101. Diverſity, Variety.

Diverſity, ſuppoſes a change, which taſte is always in ſearch of; in order to diſ⯑cover ſome novelty that may enliven and delight it: variety, ſuppoſes a plurality of things, differing from each other in like⯑neſs, which cheers the imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a uniformity.

Without ſome diverſity, life would be, altogether, inſipid. Nature has thrown infi⯑nite variety among the ſmalleſt objects; which, if we cannot perceive, is owing to a defect of light.

An agreeable diverſity of colours, will give as much pleaſure to the eye, as har⯑monious ſounds to the ear. Variety of amuſements, inſenſibly, lead us into a diſ⯑ſipation.

102. Difference, Diſpute, Quarrel,

Oppoſition of intereſts, cauſes differences. Contrariety of opinions, produces diſputes. [116]Harſhneſs of diſpoſitions, is the ſource of quarrels.

We make up, the difference. We end, the diſpute. We appeaſe, the quarrel.

Envy and covetouſneſs, make, ſome⯑times, great differences for trifles. Prejudice and want of attention to what is ſaid, commonly, prolong diſputes. Quarrels, for the moſt part, proceed more from diſ⯑poſition, than animoſity.

103. Ill, Sick.

Theſe two words, are conſidered, only, as ſynonymous, when they imply, afflicted with diſeaſe; but, as indiſcriminately, as they may be uſed, even in that ſenſe, ſtill, they convey different ideas, marking diffe⯑rent degrees of illneſs. The word ill, in my opinion, is uſed, with moſt propriety, when health is the leaſt impaired; that of ſick, when the body is greatly diſeaſed. Thus we ſay, when we find a heavineſs upon the ſpirits, or, a want of appetite: [117]that we are ill; but when the whole frame of any one is diſordered, we, naturally, ſay, he is ſick.

When we apply either of theſe words to ourſelves, they carry very different mean⯑ings; thus, I am ill, is general, and implies, diſordered, in any part of the body; whereas, I am ſick, is particular, and means, diſordered, in the ſtomach.

There is, yet, a further diſtinction be⯑tween them; Ill, is moſt applicable, when in pain only; ſick, when diſeaſed; thus, we ſay, he is ill of the gout; but, ſick, of a fever.

104. Diſeaſe, Diſtemper, Sickneſs.

Diſeaſe and diſtemper, imply, particular diſorders, with this difference, that, diſeaſe is more applicable to man; diſtemper, to brutes; whereas, ſickneſs, is more general, and may be applied to either.

Diſeaſes, ſuch as the plague, fevers, &c. are, ſometimes, ſo epidemical, as to [118]lay waſte more, than the ſword. Diſtempers, among cattle, are, generally, infectious. Divine diſpleaſure hath, often, ſhewn it⯑ſelf, by a general ſickneſs, among men and beaſts.

Both diſeaſes and diſtempers, when, be⯑come univerſal, are ſickneſſes, ſo ſevere, as draw the joint prayers of a people, in hopes, to avert them.

105. Weary, Tired, Fatigued.

It is the continuation of the ſame thing, that either, wearies, or tires, with this dif⯑ference, that, weary, implies, a leſs de⯑gree; tired, a greater; but it is labour that fatigues. We grow weary, or tired with ſtanding. We are fatigued with work.

When we are weary of a thing, to com⯑plete it, we lack ſpirits; when, tired, we are, totally, unable; when fatigued, we want ſtrength to go through it, as we would.

[119] Wearineſs, proceeds, ſometimes, from an unwillingneſs, in what we undertake; we are, frequently, tired, through diſpoſition of body, and ſlow circulation of blood; but, fatigue, is, always, the conſequence of much action; it ſuppoſes exceſs of work, with reſpect, either to difficulty or length of time.

In a figurative ſenſe, a petitioner grows weary, through his impatience; tired, thro' his perſeverance; and fatigued, through his importunities.

We are weary, with waiting; tired, with ill-ſucceſs; and fatigued with purſuing.

Thus, may we be weary, and not tired; tired, yet, not fatigued.

106. Light, Brightneſs, Splendor.

Light, is, the origin or commencement of brightneſs; ſplendor, is, brightneſs in per⯑fection.

[120]The intention of light, is, only, to make objects viſible, that, of brightneſs, to make them, clearly, diſtinguiſhable and known: ſplendor, ſhews them, to the greateſt de⯑gree of perfection.

It is light at day-break; bright, in the morning; ſplendid, at noon.

We attribute light, to the ſtars; bright⯑neſs, to the moon; and ſplendor, to the ſun.

107. Luſtre, Brilliancy, Radiancy.

Theſe three words, as the laſt, riſe, gra⯑dually, one upon another, and mark the different degrees of the effect of light.

Luſtre, ſeems to be poſſeſſed of poliſh, only; brilliancy, of light; but, radiancy, of fire.

Luſtre, ſhines, only; brilliancy, dazzles; but, radiancy, glares.

We, ſeldom, make uſe of the word luſtre, but, in the literal ſenſe; whereas, we, frequently, uſe that, of radiancy, and, [121]much more often, that, of brilliancy, in the figurative. Conſidered then, in this ſenſe, it appears to me, that, it is the force of truth, the energy of language, and the newneſs of the thoughts, that give radiancy, to a diſcourſe; whereas, brilliancy, riſes from the beautiful turns and lively touches of expreſſion: and that, it is the choice of words, the agreement of terms, and the ar⯑rangement of phraſes, that give a luſtre, to what is ſaid.

108. Wiſdom, Prudence.

Wiſdom, makes us act and ſpeak, pro⯑perly; prudence, prevents our ſpeaking, or acting, improperly. The firſt, in order to attain its ends, ſearches out the beſt paths to follow: the ſecond, that it may not miſs its aim, tries, to diſcover the bad ways, in order to avoid them.

Wiſdom, is more knowing; prudence, more wary.

[122]The wiſe man, makes uſe of thoſe means, that are moſt proper for his purpoſe; he conducts himſelf, by the light of reaſon. The prudent, man, takes thoſe ways, he thinks moſt ſure; he does not venture, in⯑to places unknown.

An ancient writer, has ſaid, that, it is a mark of wiſdom, not to talk on any ſub⯑ject, but what, we are thorough maſters of, eſpecially, if we would be eſteemed: we, may add to this maxim, that, it is a piece of prudence, not to bring a diſagreeable ſub⯑ject on the tapis, particularly, if we are de⯑ſirous of being beloved.

109. To Find, Meet with.

We find, things, unknown, or, which we ſought after. We meet with, things, that are in our way, or, which preſent them⯑ſelves to us, unſought for.

The unfortunate, find, always, ſome re⯑ſource, in their misfortunes. People, who [123]readily unite themſelves with all the world, are liable to meet with bad company.

110. Union, Joining.

Union, relates, particularly, to two dif⯑ferent things, which agree together. Join⯑ing, reſpects properly two diſtant things, which draw near together, one after the other.

The word, union, carrys with it an idea of agreement, and fitneſs: that, of joining, ſeems to ſuppoſe, ſome kind of motion.

We ſay, the union, of colours; and the joining, of armies: the union, of two neigh⯑bours; and the joining, of two rivers.

That, which is not united, is divided: that which is not joined, is ſeparated.

We unite, in order to form a ſociety. We join, for the ſake of company.

Union, is, often, uſed, in a figurative ſenſe; but joining, only, in the literal.

[124] Union, is the ſupport of families, and the power of ſtates. The joining of many ſtreams, forms great rivers.

111. Situation, Condition, State.

The words, ſituation and condition, imply, ſomething accidental, and tranſitory; with this difference, that ſituation, reſpects out⯑ward circumſtances; condition, thoſe, within the matter referred to; whereas, that of ſtate, implies, ſomething, more habitual, and laſting.

We, generally, uſe the word, ſituation, as relative, to affairs, rank or fortune; condition, with reſpect, to the nature, qua⯑lity or property of a thing; and that, of ſtate, applying it to health, or, our well or ill-being.

We ſay, our ſituation is bad; when we are ſurrounded with difficulties: that a building is in bad condition; when out [125]of repair; and, that ſome perſons en⯑joy but an indifferent ſtate of health.

An ill-ſtate of health, added to a bad ſituation of affairs, is a condition, into which, every man muſt, naturally, dread the fal⯑ling.

Such is the condition, and viciſſitude of human life, that, the moſt prudent men, have, often, found themſelves in perplex⯑ing ſituations; and from a ſtate of happineſs, have, as it were, through the perverſeneſs of fortune, fallen into one moſt wretched and deplorable.

112. Of Faſhion, Of Quality.

As ſynonymous, as theſe expreſſions may be, in the mouths of thoſe, who uſe them; they, ſtill, imply particular characters, in their right ſignification, when we are ob⯑liged, on certain occaſions, to expreſs our⯑ſelves properly. The laſt of theſe expreſ⯑ſions, riſes upon the firſt, and ſignifies the nobility; whereas, by the other, is, only, underſtood the gentry.

[126]The pride and folly of the world is grown to ſo great a pitch, that perſons in trade, are, continually, apeing people of of-faſhion; and thoſe, of-faſhion, people of⯑quality.

113. Notes, Remarks, Obſervations.

Notes, imply, a ſhortneſs and preciſion: remarks, a choice and diſtinction: obſer⯑vations, ſomething critical and far-fetched.

Notes, are, often, neceſſary: remarks, are, ſometimes, uſeful: obſervations, ſhould be, always, learned.

Change of manners and cuſtoms, for the moſt part, render authors in want of notes. There are as good remarks, perhaps, to be made upon the moderns, as upon the ancients. Hiſtorical obſervations, make antiquity more known.

114. To Take, Receive, Accept.

We take, what, is given us. We receive, what, is ſent us. We accept, what, is offered us.

We take, money; we receive, favours; we accept, ſervices.

To accept, implys, always, conſent and approbation; to receive, does not; to take, excludes, only, refuſal.

No man ſhould ever take more, than his due. We ſhould, always, acknowledge thoſe civilities we have received. What, we have once accepted, ſhould, never afterwards be rejected.

115. Sentiment, Opinion, Thought.

Theſe words are all in uſe, when the bare expreſſion, only, of ideas, is in queſ⯑tion. In this fenſe, ſentiment, is more certain; it is a belief, raiſed by ſolid or apparent reaſons; opinion, is more doubt⯑ful; it is a judgement, built on ſome foun⯑dation: Thought, is ſtill leſs certain; ſpring⯑ing, only, from conjecture.

The word ſentiment, is uſed, with more propriety, when the ſubject, is on taſte. That, Homer is an excellent poet, is the ſentiment, of every man of learning. The word opinion, agrees beſt, when talking of ſcience. It is the general opinion, that the ſun, is the centre of the world. The word thought, is, more particularly, in uſe, when we are judging of the event of things or, the actions of men. Politicians have long thought, that, the Moſcovians would find a greater advantage from Aſia, than from Europe.

[129] Sentiments, are, in ſome meaſure, guided, by the influence of the heart; we, often, find them in favour of thoſe perſons we love. Opinions, are frequently, owing to prejudice; it is common for ſcholars, to have good ones for their maſters. Thoughts, riſe, greatly, from imagination; they are, often, chimerical.

116. Reſolution, Courage, Valour, Bravery, Intrepidity.

Reſolution, either baniſhes fear or ſur⯑mounts it; it will not admit a falling back, but is ſtaunch on all occaſions. Courage, is impatient to attack; it undertakes boldly, and is not leſſened by difficulty. Valour, acts with vigour; it gives no way to reſiſt⯑ance, but, purſues its enterprize, in ſpite of oppoſition. Bravery, knows no fear; it runs nobly into danger, and prefers ho⯑nour to life itſelf. Intrepidity, encounters the greateſt perils with the utmoſt cool⯑neſs; and dares, even preſent, death.

[130]The three firſt of theſe words, ſeem more relative to action, than the two laſt; and the two laſt, ſeem to imply, a greater fearfulneſs of danger, than the three firſt.

Reſolution, ſupports us in action. Courage, makes us advance. Valour, makes us exe⯑cute. Through bravery, we expoſe our⯑ſelves to danger. We would ſacrifice our⯑ſelves through intrepidity.

Reſolution, ſhould never deſert us: cou⯑rage, ſhould, always, determine us to do right: valour, would never make us deſ⯑piſe the enemy: bravery, ſhould not pride itſelf in oppoſition: nor, ſhould intrepidity, ſhew itſelf, but, in caſes of duty or neceſ⯑ſity.

117. Angry, In a Paſſion, Paſſionate.

An impatient agitation, or, riſing of the blood, againſt any one, who has offended us, is the common import of the two firſt, of theſe terms: The word, angry, implies, a paſſion more internal and laſting; where⯑as the expreſſion, in a paſſion, carries in its idea, a ſudden, external guſt of anger; ſhort, but violent.

Anger, ſhall, ſometimes, brood in the breaſt, for years; till at laſt it becomes, as it were, fixed and ſettled; ſometimes, it will diſſemble, for a long while together; but, often, finds it extremely difficult to pardon: On the contrary, it is the gene⯑ral characteriſtic of thoſe, who are in a paſſion, to forgive, as ſoon as it ſubſides; which may, perhaps, be the next quarter of an hour; beſides, the man, in a paſſion, cannot diſſemble; his violence of anger, muſt have vent; when that's obtained, he is as cool as before: indeed, his paſſion, will now and then, ſettle into confirmed [132] anger, but when that is the caſe, it is, ge⯑nerally, owing to repeated offences.

With reſpect to the word, paſſionate, there is a wide difference, between the man in a paſſion, and the paſſionate man; the one, being extraordinary, the other, ordinary.

Few men, for example, can avoid being in a paſſion, when, they are, greatly, of⯑fended; but paſſionate people, are heated, on the moſt trifling occaſions.

118. Haſty, Paſſionate.

According to my conception, it appears, that haſty, relates, more, to action or blows; and that, paſſionate, goes ſeldom farther, than words.

A hasty man, is apt to lift his hand; it is, generally, with him, a word and a blow. A paſſionate man, will vent his anger in words, only.

We ſhould be upon our guard, when, with haſty people; and have patience, with the paſſionate.

119. Strong, Robust, Stout, Sturdy.

Strength, is, chiefly, owing to the con⯑ſtruction of the muſcles. A little man is, often, ſtronger, than a greater. Robustneſs, carries with it, an idea of luſtineſs, is leſs ſubject to infirmities, and, much owing to conſtitution. A ſhort man, may be robuſt. By ſtout, we underſtand tall and ſtrong⯑made. A little man, tho' never ſo ſtrong, cannot be called, ſtout. By ſturdy, we mean stout, with a degree of hardineſs.

Strength, gives a man an advantage over his enemies; robuſtneſs, lends him, an air of dignity and authority; ſtoutneſs, makes him, admired; ſturdineſs, is accompanied, with an air of meanneſs.

120. Complaiſant, Polite, Well-bred.

Complaiſance, riſes from the reſpect we ſhew thoſe, whom we meet; is, ſometimes, ſincere, ſometimes, not; politeneſs, from the flattering methods, we make uſe of in our behaviour and converſation; and is, gene⯑rally, inſincere; but, to be well-bred, is to ſhew the ſame honours, always, with ſin⯑cerity.

Complaiſance, is the characteriſtic of the lover; politeneſs, of the courtier; but, to be well-bred, denotes, the gentleman.

We ſhould be complaiſant, without im⯑portunity; and polite, without inſipidity. The diſtinguiſhing mark of a well-bred man, is, the conſtant care he takes, never to diſguſt or offend.

121. Hump-backed, Crocked, Deformed.

The true meaning of the word, hump⯑backed, is, having a riſing, upon the back, owing either to crookedneſs, or ſome other cauſe, and may be either natural or acci⯑dental: tho' the words, crooked and deform⯑ed, convey other ideas, ſtill nothing is more common, than to find them, fre⯑quently, in uſe to expreſs the ſame as hump-backed. By crookedneſs, is underſtood, any deviation from natural ſtraitneſs. De⯑formity, implies, any part of the body being imperfect or unnatural. Thus, a man is crooked, if any ways, twiſted or bent from the natural ſhape; and deformed, if he has an eye, a finger, or, a toe, too little, or, too much. We may be hump-backed, or, crook⯑ed, by a fall, or, ſome other accident; but deformed, we cannot be, otherwiſe, than by a defect or exuberance in nature.

A man may be deformed, and not crook⯑ed; crooked, yet, not hump backed.

122. Perfect, Finiſhed, Complete.

Perfection, regards, properly, the beauty, which riſes from the deſign and conſtruction of the work; finiſhing, from the workman⯑ſhip and hand, of the workman. Completion, depends upon the want of nothing; but, on the work's having every thing, it ſhould have. The firſt, excludes all ſorts of de⯑fect. The ſecond, ſhews a particular care and attention, to the minuteſt article. The third, reſpects more, the totality of parts.

We may, eaſily, make a thing com⯑plete; and with much pains, finiſh it; but, after all, it may not be perfect.

123. Misfortune, Diſaſter, Calamity.

Each, of theſe words, denotes, a ſad event; but, that, of misfortune, is applied to [137]caſualties, and, outward circumſtances, things detached from us. Diſaſter, reſpects, properly, perſonal accidents. Calamity, im⯑plies, ſomething, more general.

It is a misfortune, to loſe our money or our friend. It is a diſaster, to fall or be wounded. It is a calamity, to find our⯑ſelves, ſuddenly, diſgraced and ruined in the world.

We ſay, a great misfortune; a ſhocking diſaſter; and a dreadful calamity.

Misfortunes, will happen to the beſt of men. We bring diſaſters, frequently, upon ourſelves, thro' want of proper care. Ca⯑lamities, are, often, ſent by heaven, upon the wicked, to rouſe them, from their ſin⯑ful lethargy.

124. To Conſent, Acquieſce, Agree.

We conſent, to the will of others, by permitting. We acquieſce, in what is pro⯑poſed, by conforming. We agree, to what is ſaid, by approving.

[138]We, naturally, oppoſe, what, we do not conſent to; diſcourage, what, we will not acquieſce in; and, diſpute, what, we cannot agree to.

It appears to me, that, the word, con⯑ſent, ſuppoſes ſome authority, in the per⯑ſon conſenting; that, of acquieſce, ſome ſub⯑miſſion, in the perſon acquieſcing; and that, the word agree, denotes, ſome averſion to diſpute.

Parents, conſent, to the marriage of their children. Parties, acquieſce, in the decree of a judge. Well-bred perſons, agree, al⯑moſt, to every thing.

125. Management, Direction, Adminiſtration, Conduct, Government.

Management, reſpects, only, private things, truſted to the care of ſome one, to employ for the profit of another, and, to whom, he is to render an account; as that of a clerk, to his maſter. Direction, relates to certain affairs, where, there is a diſtribu⯑tion, either of money, office or whatever [139]elſe, is committed to the care of another, to preſerve neceſſary order. Adminiſtration, refers to objects of greater conſequence, ſuch, as thoſe of juſtice, or, the finances of a ſtate; it ſuppoſes a pre-eminence of employ, which gives power, credit, and, a kind of liberty, in the department, the perſon is engaged in. Conduct, points out ſome knowledge and ability, with reſpect to things; and, a ſubordination, with re⯑gard to perſons. Government, reſults from authority and dependance; it indicates a ſuperiority of office, with a particular rela⯑tion, to policy.

Whoſoever has the management of any one's concerns in truſt; ſhould be as at⯑tentive and as careful, as if they were his own. He, who undertakes the direction of public charities; ſhould diveſt himſelf of all prejudice and partiality. A judge ought to be wiſely circumſpect in the ad⯑miniſtration of juſtice; and, a prime mi⯑niſter intently wary, in the adminiſtration of public affairs. No one thing ſhould be committed to the conduct of another, un⯑leſs, we are well perſwaded, he has abili⯑ties, adequate to the taſk; and will act in conformity, to the intentions of him, whoſe [140]buſineſs he undertakes. The man, who, thro' favour of his prince, is offered the helm of government; ſhould, ſeriouſly, re⯑flect on the arduous office; and not ſuffer his ambition, to get the better of his diſ⯑cretion.

126. Affront, Inſult, Abuſe,

Affront, is an arrow of reproach and con⯑tempt, ſhot in public; it piques and mor⯑tifies thoſe, who have any ſenſe of honour. Inſult, is an attack, made with inſolence; it is, uſually, repelled with ſpirit. Both affronts and inſults, may be given without words; but, abuſe reſults, chiefly, from ſcurrilous language.

Affronts, are, often, given through the childiſh itch of revenge. Inſults, are, too frequently the offspring of pride. We ſeldom, if ever, hear abuſe, in the mouth of a well-bred man.

[141]Happy is that perſon, that can put up affronts, with compoſure; bear inſults, with calmneſs; and, turn a deaf ear, to a⯑buſe.

127. To, In order, to.

Theſe terms are ſynonymous in that ſenſe, where, they ſignify, doing one thing, in view of another; but the word, to, de⯑notes, a nearer view; the expreſſion, In order, to, one, farther off.

We get introduced to a prince, to make our court: we make our court to him, in order, to obtain his favours.

The word, to, ſeems to agree beſt, when what we do, in view of ſome other thing, is, almoſt, certain to take effect. The expreſſion, in order, to, appears to be uſed, with moſt propriety, when the thing we have in view, may not be the immedi⯑ate conſequence.

We fire cannon, againſt a beſieged place, to make a breach, and in order, to [142]take it, by aſſault, or, oblige the enemy to ſurrender.

To, reſpects, more particularly, an effect, which ought to be produced. In order, to, regards, properly, an aim, which we would obtain.

Young women, at a certain age, do all they can to pleaſe, in order, to procure them⯑ſelves, huſbands.

128. Outſide, Appearance.

In the literal ſenſe; it is, the walls, the ditches, the courts, the gardens, the ave⯑nues that forms the outſide of a caſtle; but it is, the figures, the grandeur, the ſituation, and, the architecture, that determines the ap⯑pearance: the outſide, being the external part of a thing; the appearance, the effect, which a view of that thing produces, or the idea, we form of it, by that view.

In the figurative ſenſe; outſide, is, oft⯑ner, applied to our manners, and, our way of living: appearance, ſeems to be more in [143]uſe, with reſpect to our actions and our conduct.

A brilliant outſide, is no certain proof, of a good fortune. Going, frequently, to church, is an appearance, that can deter⯑mine little, with regard to virtue.

129. Viſion, Apparition.

A viſion, paſſes, inwardly, in the mind; and, is ſuppoſed to be, only, an action of the imagination. An apparition, ſtrikes the ſenſes, outwardly, and, is ſuppoſed to be, an object from without.

Joſeph was warned by a viſion, to fly into Egypt, with his family. Mary Mag⯑delen was informed of the reſurrection of our Saviour, by an apparition.

Feveriſh perſons, often, think they ſee viſions. Timid and credulous people, ſometimes, take trees or poſts, for appa⯑ritions; and, frequently, objects of their own imagination.

130. To See, Perceive.

Objects, that have ſome duration, or, that ſhew themſelves, are ſeen; thoſe, that paſs by quickly, or, are hid, in ſome meaſure, from the eye, are, only, perceived.

We ſee the face, and, by that, perceive the diſpoſition of the heart.

In a crowded court, thoſe, who ſtand forward, are ſeen, by the prince; while others, behind, are ſcarcely perceived.

131. To Fear, be Apprehenſive, To Dread, be Afraid.

We fear, an ill; through a natural a⯑verſion to it, and, from a ſenſe, that it may happen to us: we are apprehenſive, of loſing a benefit; through an eager deſire to obtain it, and, from a conviction that we never may: we dread, our adverſary; through ſentiments of eſteem, when we [145]know him our ſuperior: we are afraid of danger; through a timid diſpoſition.

Want of courage, makes us fear: Doubt of ſucceſs, makes us apprehenſive. Diſtruſt of ſtrength, makes us dread. Imagination itſelf, will, often, make us afraid.

Common people fear death, more than any thing: the Epicureans were, much more, in fear of pain; but gentlemen, are of opinion, they ought to fear nothing, ſo much as infamy. The more, ardently, we wiſh for a thing, the more we apprehend the loſing of it. Whatever merit, an au⯑thor may flatter himſelf that he has, he ſhould always dread the judgment of the public. Women, who are afraid of nothing, but loſing their reputation; do honour to their ſex.

132. To Teach, Learn, Inſtruct.

To teach, is, only, to give leſſons: to learn, is, to give leſſons, with ſucceſs: both which words, relate more to thoſe [146]things, that are proper to cultivate the mind, and, form a good education; for, which reaſon, we uſe them with propriety, when the arts and ſciences, are in queſtion. To inſtruct, has a greater relation, to that, which is uſeful, in the conduct of life and ſucceſs of affairs; it is, therefore, in its proper place, when ſpeaking of any thing, that concerns either our duty, or, our in⯑tereſt.

Profeſſors teach, in public ſchools, thoſe, who come to hear them. The hiſtorian learns, poſterity, the events of his times. A father inſtructs, his children, how they ought to live in the world.

It requires great knowledge, to teach method and plainneſs, to learn others; ex⯑perience and abilities, to inſtruct.

Many perſons attempt to teach, what, they have occaſion to ſtudy themſelves. Some will undertake to learn others, what, they, themſelves, are, almoſt ignorant of. Very few, are capable of inſtructing.

133. Gentle, Tame.

Gentle animals, are, naturally ſo; tame ones, are ſo, partly by the art and induſ⯑try of man.

The dog, the ox, and, the horſe, are gentle animals; the bear, and, the lion, are ſome⯑times, tame.

134. To Bind, Tie.

We bind, to prevent the limbs moving, or, the parts of a thing ſeparating; we tie, to ſtop a thing, or, prevent its going any farther.

We bind the feet and hands of a crimi⯑nal; and, we tie him to a ſtake.

In the figurative ſenſe, a man is bound, when he is not at liberty to act; and, he is tied, when he cannot change his party, or, quit it.

[148]Authority and power bind: intereſt and love tie.

We do not think ourſelves bound, when we ſee not our bonds; and, we do not ima⯑gine ourſelves tied, when we have no occa⯑ſion to uſe our liberty.

135. To Hope. Expect.

The firſt of theſe words has, for its ob⯑ject, ſucceſs in itſelf, and denotes, a truſt, born up by ſome encouragement. The ſe⯑cond, regards, particularly, the happy mo⯑ment of event, and intimates, a certainty of its arriving; we hope, to obtain things: we expect, their coming.

We ſhould always hope, for the indul⯑gence of heaven; and, expect, without mur⯑muring, the hour of Providence.

What we hope for, ſeems to be more a favour or a kindneſs; what we expect, more a duty or obligation. Thus, we hope, for favourable anſwers to our demands; and, we expect, ſuch as are agreeable to our propo⯑ſitions.

[149]I hope, my work will meet with the taſte of the public; and, I expect, an equitable ſentence.

136. Weight, Influence, Sway.

Taking theſe words in the ſenſe, of hav⯑ing power over the minds of others; weight, implies, prevalence, tho' ſmall; influence, ſeems to have more force; ſway, is more abſolute.

Superiority of rank and reaſon, gives weight; it is commonly by perſuaſion, that it acts. Attachment to perſons contri⯑butes much to the influence, they have over us; it is by ſollicitation, it prevails. The art of finding out and taking advan⯑tage of the weakneſs of men, forms the ſway, we bear over them; 'tis by watch⯑ing their motion, that we ſucceed.

The weight we have with others, pro⯑ceeds, always, from ſome worth, in our⯑ſelves, either of mind, birth or fortune. Influence is owing to ſome tye, either of [150]heart or intereſt. Sway, riſes from an aſ⯑cendency, arrogated by art, or, ceded to us, thro' weakneſs.

A perſon of weight, has ſucceeded, ſome⯑times, when arguments would have no force. Influence, on ſome occaſions, hath wrought, almoſt, miracles, effecting that, which money could not bring to bear. Sway, is a wonderful operator on weak minds: procuring that, through art, which no other thing can, poſſibly, ob⯑tain.

What perverſeneſs then, can poſſibly withſtand a man of ſome weight in himſelf; whoſe influence is great, and, who knows how to bear a proper ſway.

137. Authority, Power, Dominion,

We find in the word, authority, ſuffici⯑ent energy to make us perceive a right, either of civil or politic adminiſtration. There is in the word, power, a particular relation to the ſubordinate execution of [151]ſuperior orders. The word, dominion, carries with it, an idea of empire.

It is the law, which gives authority; it deriving all its might, from thence. Power, is inveſted in delegates, thoſe, to whom the execution of the laws is entruſted, and is, conſequently, in ſubordination to au⯑thority. Dominion, ſprings from the joint conſent of the people, or, from the force of arms, and, is either lawful or tyran⯑nical.

We are happy, in living under the autho⯑rity of a Prince, who prides himſelf in juſtice; whoſe miniſters aſſume no power, beyond what is legal; and, who makes the welfare of his ſubjects, the baſis of his dominion.

Authority, if weak, is expoſed to con⯑tempt; it is, equally, as dangerous, not to make uſe of it on proper occaſions, as, even, to abuſe it. A blind power, which acts in oppoſition to juſtice, becomes odious, and paves the way to its own ruin. A jealous dominion, that admits of no ſharer, makes itſelf formidable; awakens, on that ao⯑count, the ardor of its enemies, and, thus, uſhers in its own fall.

[152]There appears to me, particularly, in the idea of authority, ſomething juſt and re⯑ſpectable; in the idea of power, ſomething ſtrong and active; and, in the idea of domi⯑uion, ſomething great and elevated.

As there is none but God, that has an unlimited authority; ſo, there is none elſe, who has infinite power; neither is there any abſolute, ſovereign, and independent domini⯑on, than his.

Nature has eſtabliſhed no authority among men, but that of fathers, over their children; all other, proceeds from poſitive right. The power of the paſſions, is the true ſpring of action, and, determines us, with reſpect, either to good or evil. It is not only by the diſpoſition of human laws, that marriage places the woman under the dominion of the man; but, it is, alſo, ſo ſet⯑tled by the divine.

138. Volume, Book.

A volume, may contain many books: A book, may make many volumes. The [153]binding, properly, diſtinguiſhes the vo⯑lumes; and, the diviſion of the work, the books.

We muſt not, always, judge of the knowledge of an author, by the largeneſs of the volume. Works are, ſometimes, ſpread out into many books, which would be more valuable, were they reduced to one.

139. To have a Mind, for, Long for, Wiſh for, To Hanker after, Luſt after.

The laſt, of theſe expreſſions, is more uſed in theology, and ſuppoſes, always, an illicit object, forbid by the laws of God; thus, we luſt after a woman; or, the goods of another. The others, are all, in common uſe, and, expreſs our inclination to a thing, be it what it will; with the following diffe⯑rence between them. We, have a mind, for, or, long for, a preſent object; but, have a mind, ſeems attended with more knowledge and reflection; long for, more opinion and more taſte: we wiſh for things, farther [154]diſtant: we hanker after things, that more affect us.

Princes, ſometimes, have a mind, to gra⯑tify their ambition, at the expence of their future welfare. Women with child, fre⯑quently, long for moſt things they ſee: Lazy people, often, ſit down and content themſelves, with wiſhing for thoſe things, they would, preſently, obtain, if diligent and aſſiduous. Some children will hanker, a long time, after their nurſes, and, it is with the greateſt difficulty, they can be brought to forget them.

140. Gain, Profit, Lucre, Emolument.

Gain, ſeems to ariſe from ſomething ve⯑ry caſual; and implies, riſk and hazard; it is for this reaſon, the word, is in great uſe among gameſters and tradeſmen. Pro⯑fit, appears to be more ſure; proceeding either from lands or induſtry. Thus, we ſay, the profits of the earth; or, the profits of our labour. The characteriſtic of lu⯑cre, conſiſts in a ſimple relation, to the paſſion of intereſt; 'tis on this account, [155]we ſay, with the greateſt propriety, that man is fond of lucre. Emolument relates to commiſſions and employments; intimating, not only the ſalaries, but, all other per⯑quiſites.

Some perſons are ſo particularly rigid, as to condemn all gain, ariſing from play. Many will, idly, call that profit, which has accrued by illicit means. It is low and ſordid, to be ever led by lucre. We do not, always, find the greateſt honour, in of⯑fices, where there is the greateſt emolu⯑ment.

141. Very, Extremely.

We are apt to uſe theſe words indiffe⯑rently, one as well as the other, to expreſs a great degree of any thing. Thus, for example, we ſay, in the ſame ſenſe, very wiſe; extremely wiſe; notwithſtanding this, there appears to me ſome difference be⯑tween them: The word, very, marks an extraordinary degree; but extremely, a de⯑gree to admiration. Thus, we ſay, men [156]are, very, wicked: Providence is, extremely, kind.

Beſides this diſtinction, there is one more delicate, which is, that very, does not ſuit well, but in the literal and natural ſenſe; for when we ſay, a man is very wiſe; we would be underſtod, as ſaying; truly wiſe, whereas extremely, may be uſed with ele⯑gance, in an ironical ſenſe. We ſay, then, in raillery, he is, extremely, wiſe, in ceaſing to purſue that, he knows not how to get at; and, extremely, patient, in taking a blow calmly, he has not the ſpirit to return.

242. Fantaſtical, Whimſical, Maggotty, Fanciful,

Of theſe words, that of fantiſtical, implies, a rambling from true taſte, thro exceſs of delicacy, or, an unſeaſonable ſearch after ſomething better. That of whimſical, means, an affectation of ſingula⯑rity. By maggotty, is underſtood, a great inconſtancy, or, ſudden change of taſte. Fanciful, implies, a certain revolu⯑tion of humour, or, a particular way of thinking.

[157]There cannot be a more deſpicable crea⯑ture, than the fantaſtical fop; he tricks out his charming ſelf, in hopes of attract⯑ing the reſpect of mankind; but, on the contrary, meets, only, with ſcorn and con⯑tempt. The whimſical man, if his invention be fertile, is, ſometimes, an object of preſent admiration; but, on ſerious reflection, is, too frequently, the ſubject of ridicule. A maggotty perſon, is, equally, tireforne to himſelf and to others; as what pleaſes him, one minute, ſhall, often, diſpleaſe him, the next. He, who is fanciful, is far more troubleſome to himſelf, than to others; for being led away by his wild imagination, he, fondly, believes many things to be real, which, in fact are, only, ideal.

141. Capacity, Ability.

Capacity, has more relation to the know⯑ledge of things; ability, to their applicati⯑on. The one, is acquired, by ſtudy; the other, by practice.

He, who has capacity for a thing, is pro⯑per [158]to undertake; he, who has ability, to execute.

144. Little, Small.

The word, little, ſometimes, ſignifies, on⯑ly, want of bigneſs; and, at other times, want of greatneſs, in every ſenſe; whereas that of ſmall, is the oppoſite, only, to bigneſs, and, ſuppoſes ſome kind of length. Thus, we ſay, a little houſe; a little man; a little cup; a little globe: but, a ſmall thread; a ſmall line; a ſmall twig.

145. To Remark, Obſerve.

To remark, implies, taking notice, with attention, in order, to remember: to obſerve, means, rather, to watch, with examination, by way of paſſing our judgement.

The traveller remarks, that, which ſtrikes him moſt; the ſpy, obſerves thoſe proceed⯑ings, which he thinks of conſequence.

[159]It is the part of a general to remark thoſe, of his men, who diſtinguiſh them⯑ſelves in battle; and, obſerve the motions, of the enemy.

We may obſerve, in order, to remark; but cuſtom will not admit of an inverſion of the phraſe.

Thoſe, who obſerve the conduct of others, in order, to remark their faults; do it, rather, through a delight in cenſuring, than, a deſire of correcting their own errors.

146. To go Back, Return.

We go back, from a place, where we have, ſome conſiderable time, been. We return, to a place, we had, juſt before left. Thus, we ſay, he is gone back into his own coun⯑try. He is returned home. We ſay, alſo, he is gone back from virtue; he has returned to his fault.

147. Idea, Thought. Imagination, Notion.

The idea, repreſents the object; thought, conſiders it; imagination, forms it; thus worked up, it becomes a notion. The firſt, only, points; the ſecond, examines; the third, ſeduces; but, the laſt, draws.

When in converſation, our ideas are juſt; our thoughts, fine; and, our imaginati⯑ons, brilliant; we ſhall be ſure to pleaſe: and, our notions, tho' ſingular, will, al⯑ways, be reſpectable.

148. Buſineſs, Affairs.

Buſineſs, implies, an object of induſtry; affairs, an object of concern. The firſt, employs the hands; the ſecond, the mind. The word, buſineſs, by its having no plu⯑ral number, intimates a particular employ; by the ſingular of affairs, being ſeldom in uſe, in the ſenſe before us, that word is [161]underſtood to mean, a variety of tranſac⯑tions.

The man of much buſineſs, ought to have a ſtrong conſtitution. He, who has many affairs to ſettle, tho' he may have a clear head, will find it difficult, to adjuſt them all, to his ſatisfaction.

He, who, continually, interferes with the buſineſs of others, neglecting his own af⯑fairs, makes himſelf an object of ridi⯑cule; and, merits the contempt of man⯑kind.

149. To Take, Chooſe.

When we would take a thing, we de⯑termine upon one, becauſe, we cannot have all. We chooſe, by comparing things, be⯑cauſe, we would have the beſt. The one, ſuppoſes a ſimple determination of the will; the other, a diſcernment of the mind.

Between two things, exactly alike, we may determine, which to take, when at the ſame time, there is no choice.

[162]We are ſometimes conſtrained to take one thing, out of many, when we are not obliged to chooſe.

We cannot uſe the word take, but, with reſpect to ourſelves; but we chooſe, ſome⯑times, for others.

It is a point of good-manners, when of⯑fered fruit or any other thing, where there is choice; to take, that, which comes firſt to hand: but, when we would preſent any thing of the like ſort, to a ſtranger, it is a mark of politeneſs, to chooſe for him the beſt.

When things are at our option, that is, when we may take, which we pleaſe; we ſhould try to make a good choice.

Between a good courſe of life and a bad, there is no medium; we muſt either take the one or the other. Nothing appears more difficult to me, than the choice of a friend.

If, in a journey, there were, only, two roads, to take; the one, ſhort, but, bad; the other, long, but, good; I ſhould, cer⯑tainly, chooſe the laſt.

150. To Chooſe, Make choice of

The word, chooſe, is moſt, in its place, with reſpect to things, we would make uſe of. The expreſſion, make choice of, is, more proper, when it relates to perſons, we would appoint to any dignity or em⯑ploy.

George, the third, choſe, the Queen's palace, as his place of reſidence in town; and, made choice of Caeſar Hawkins, to in⯑oculate his children.

To chooſe, indicates, more particularly, a compariſon made between things, in or⯑der, to know, which is beſt to take; to make choice of, marks with greater preciſi⯑on, the ſimple determination of one per⯑ſon preferable to another.

Princes do not, always, chooſe their miniſ⯑ters; neither, do they, always, make choice of a Talbot, for a chancellor; nor, a Marlbo⯑rough, for a general.

151. To Chooſe, Prefer.

We do not, always, chooſe, what, we pre⯑fer: but, we ever prefer, that, which we chooſe.

To chooſe, is, to determine in favour of a thing, either on account of its merit, or, its value. To prefer, is, to determine in its favour, by any motive whatſoever; whether it be merit, affection, good-man⯑ners, policy, or, what not.

'Tis the judgment, that makes the choice; the heart, that gives the preference. 'Tis for this reaſon, that we, commonly, chooſe, what, we are acquainted with; and, prefer, what, we love.

Prudence, ſometimes, forbids our chooſing that, which ſtrikes the eye moſt. Juſ⯑tice will not, often, permit us to prefer our friends, to other people.

In chooſing a ſtate of life, I think there can be no harm in preferring that, which is moſt agreeable to our inclinations; as, in [165]ſo doing, we ſhould, naturally, find more ſatisfaction in our duty.

Choice, is either good or bad, according to our taſte, or, the knowledge we have in things. Preference, is, either juſt or unjuſt, as reaſon dictates, or, paſſion in⯑ſpires.

Partial preference, is, ſometimes, allow⯑ed to princes in the diſtribution of their honours; but, they ſhould, always, make choice of the ableſt men, in their appoint⯑ments to public offices.

152. Meat, Fleſh.

By the word, Meat, is underſtood, any kind of food; but fleſh, ſignifies, only, the natural compoſition of an animal. Thus, we ſay, that fiſh and vegetables are proper meats for Lent; and, that the fleſh of a partridge, is very white and tender.

Grain is the meat of birds; fleſh, the food of beaſts.

153. Reformation, Reform.

Reformation, ſignifies, often, the action of reforming; reform, ſeldom any other than, the effect.

A general reformation of manners, among the people, will ever be found a very diffi⯑cult and laborious taſk. When we have not been able to complete a thing to our ſatisfaction, by any ſort of amendment, we have, often, brought it to bear, by a thorough reform.

154. Smooth, Level.

That, which is not rough, is ſmooth. That, which is free from either hollows or riſings, is level.

The ſmootheſt marble is the beſt. A country, where there is neither hills nor valleys, is level.

155. To Fade, Wither.

Of theſe two words, wither, riſes up⯑that of fade. A flower, which is faded, may recover; but that, whichis withered, can not.

Beauty, like a flower, fades through length of time; and may wither, ſudden⯑ly, by an accident.

156. Prerogative, Privilege.

Prerogative, relates to honour, and per⯑ſonal preference; it riſes principally, from ſubordination, or, from the relation, perſons bear among themſelves: whereas, privilege, implies, ſome advantage from intereſt or office, proceeding from the grant of a prince, or, the laws of a ſociety.

Birth, gives prerogatives. Offices, give privileges.

157. Knowing, Diſcerning.

The knowing man, acts ſurely, he ſel⯑dom deceives himſelf; yet, knowledge of life, only, is his fort. The diſcerning man, is clear-ſighted and judicious, ſees thro' the artifices of mankind, with half an eye, and, will not ſuffer himſelf to be deceived; his great abilities conſiſt, in diſ⯑tinguiſhing.

The ſtudy of man, will make a perſon knowing; but, it requires great experience, and, a long attention, both to men and books, to render him diſcerning.

An artful, ingenious rogue, will, ſome⯑times, take in the knowing, by a novel de⯑ceit; through the fallacy of which, the diſcerning man, ſhall, readily, penetrate.

158. Order, Regularity.

Each, of theſe words, implies, a prudent diſpoſition of things; but, that, of order, relates, more, to the effect, which reſults from ſuch a diſpoſition; that, of regularity, more, to the power, and, to the model, that conducts that diſpoſition.

We obſerve order, in conformance to regularity. The firſt, is the effect, of the ſecond.

159. Traffic, Trade, Commerce,

Traffic, relates, more, to the exchange of merchandiſe; trade, and, commerce, to that, of buying and ſelling; with this difference, that trade, ſeems to imply the manufactur⯑ing and vending of merchandiſe within ourſelves; commerce, negociating with other countries.

[170]We traffic, with nations, that have not the uſe of money; by bartering one kind of merchandiſe, for another. Trade, is looked upon by the wiſeſt of men, to be the ſupport of every ſtate; as the proſperity of a kingdom depends, in a great mea⯑ſure, upon its riches; and, riches, is the immediate effect of trade. The great and extenſive commerce, that England holds with other nations, makes us, the glory and admiration of the world.

160. Exchange, Truck, Barter.

The word, exchange, means, ſimply, in a general ſenſe, the act of exchanging one thing for another, be it, what it may: the other two, are in uſe to denominate the particular kinds or methods of exchange; of which, this is the difference, that, the word, truck, is uſed, with moſt propriety, when ſpeaking of ſerviceable things, ſuch as are moveable; as the trucking of horſes, trinkets, utenſils, &c. Whereas, [171] barter, is a more mercantile expreſſion, and intimates the exchange of different commo⯑dities, by way of traffic. Thus, ſo little are the natives of Guinea acquainted, with the value of gold, that, they hold commerce with other nations, by bartering it away for glaſs, and, other trifling ornaments.

161. Regard, Eſteem, Veneration, Reſpect.

When we entertain a good opinion of a man, we are ſaid, to regard him; when that regard increaſes, we call it eſteem; we teſtify that eſteem, by veneration; and prove it, by ſubmiſſion, through reſpect.

We have a natural regard for a quiet neighbour; we eſteem him if he ſtudies the good of the neighbourhood; if we per⯑ceive in him any eminent qualities, we hold him in veneration; and, in proportion, to the rank he is in above us, either by birth or fortune, we treat him, with leſs or greater reſpect.

Being born in the ſame country, claims regard. Civility creates eſteem. Age and [172]merit, render venerable; rank and dignity, reſpectable.

162. Retinue, Train.

Retinue, implies, a number of followers; train, the ſame, with order. Thus, his coach was attended, with ſo great a retinue, that, there was no ſeeing the carriage, for duſt. It was cuſtomary, in a Roman tri⯑umph, to have, always, a number of cap⯑tive ſlaves, in the train.

163. Occaſion, Occurrence, Conjuncture, Caſe, Circumſtance.

Occaſion, is uſed, for the arrival of ſome⯑thing new, whether it be that, which pre⯑ſents itſelf, or what, we ſeek; and, in a ſenſe, as indeterminate with reſpect to time, as the object. Occurrence, is, only, in uſe, to expreſs that, which happens un⯑expectedly, [173]and with relation to the time preſent. We make uſe of the word, con⯑juncture, to mark a ſituation proceeding from a concurrence of events, whether of buſineſs or intereſt. Caſe, is employed to ſignify, the main point, with a ſpecial re⯑ference to the ſort and ſingularity of the thing in queſtion. Circumſtance, carries with it no other idea, than that of ſome⯑thing additional, accompanying another, which is principal.

We know people on particular occaſions. We ſhould demean ourſelves, according to the occurrence of the times. It is, com⯑monly, the conjunctures, that determines us, which ſide to take. It has been pretended, that there are caſes, in which, reaſon would condemn, even an attention to virtue. Di⯑verſity of circumſtances, will make the ſame man, think differently, upon the ſame ſubject.

164. Uncertainty, Doubt, Suſpence.

In that ſenſe, in which, theſe words are accounted ſynonymous, they, all three, im⯑ply indetermination; but, uncertainty riſes, when the event of things is unknown. Doubt, when the mind knows not how to chooſe. By ſuſpence, is underſtood, an inde⯑termined ſtate, when the mind is held in expectation.

We are in uncertainty, with reſpect to the ſucceſs of our proceedings; in doubt, what ſtep to take; in ſuſpence, when we are held from acting, by a delay of certainty.

Uncertainty, requires caution; doubt, con⯑ſideration; ſuſpence, patience.

A wiſe man is ſeldom uncertain, as to what ſhall happen; he foreſees future events, and prepares himſelf for them. When we are in doubt, and at a loſs to de⯑termine; we ſhould leave the matter to the deciſion of others. Of all ſtates of indetermination, that of ſuſpence, is the moſt [175]vexatious, and the only remedy, is a quiet reſignation.

165. Right, Juſtice.

Right, is the object of juſtice; and that, which is due to every one. Juſtice, is the conformity of our actions, with right; it is to render and ſecure to every one that which is his due. The firſt, is dictated by nature, or, eſtabliſhed by authority, either divine or human; and is, according to cir⯑cumſtances, ſometimes, liable to change. The ſecond, is the rule, we ſhould, always, follow, and, is, ever, invariable.

It is conſiſtent with the laws of juſtice, to uſe the ſame means, in ſupport and de⯑fence of our rights, as are, often, employed to attack them.

166. Dejected, Melancholy, Low-ſpirited, Dull.

Dejection, is, commonly, cauſed by great affliction, and is, too often, a mark of de⯑ſpair. Melancholy, is, generally, the effect of conſtitution; its cloudy ideas overpower and baniſh all that are chearful. Low⯑ſpiritedneſs, is involuntary, and, often, pro⯑ceeds from a weakneſs of nerves: exceſs of joy, fatigue, bad digeſtion, will occa⯑ſion it. Dullneſs, on the contrary, is vo⯑luntary; it ariſes, frequently, from diſcon⯑tent, diſappointment, and from any other circumſtance that may diſpleaſe the mind.

The mind, in dejection, is unhappy, not having ſufficient ſtrength and reaſon to get the better of it. Melancholy, will, ſometimes, wear away, by frequent diverſion and diſſi⯑pation. A perſon, ſubject to low-ſpirits, ſhould purſue a regular courſe of life, and a uniform method of living. Dullneſs is encreaſed by giving way to it; it is in our power to baniſh it, whenever we pleaſe, and the damp it throws on every company, [177]one would imagine, ſhould be our greateſt inducement, to do it.

The reverſe of dejection, is joy; the re⯑verſe of melancholy, chearfulneſs; gaiety is the oppoſite, to low-ſpiritedneſs; and ſpright⯑lineſs, to dullneſs.

167. Piercing, Penetrating.

The word, piercing, implies, great ſtrength of light, and, a ſtroke of the eye; that, of penetrating, great force of atten⯑tion, and, reflexion.

A piercing mind, ſees things, even, through the veils, that cover them; it is difficult, to conceal truth from it; it will not ſuffer itſelf, to be deceived. A mind that penetrates, reaches to the bot⯑tom of things, without ſtopping at the ſurface; it is not eaſy to deceive it, neither will it ſuffer itſelf, to be amuſed.

Beſides the above diſtinction, piercing, ſeems to be executed, by a ſudden glance; penetrating, by making way gradually.

168. To Put, Place.

Put, ſeems to have a general ſenſe; place, one more limited, meaning to put, orderly, and, in a proper place.

We put columns, to ſupport an edifice: we place them, with ſymmetry.

169. Diſcernment, Judgment.

Diſcernment, relates, not only, to a thing itſelf, but, alſo, to its appearances; and, is a diſtinguiſhing knowledge, that prevents the confounding of one thing, with ano⯑ther. Judgment, relates to a thing conſi⯑dered in itſelf, only in order, to inveſtigate the truth; and, is a knowledge that deter⯑mines. The firſt, is limited to things pre⯑ſent; its office is to diſcern truth from falſehood, perfections from defects, mo⯑tives from pretexts: the ſecond, prys, even, into futurity; diſcovers the relation, and,[179]conſequence of things, foreſeeing their ef⯑fects. In ſhort, we may ſay, of diſcern⯑meut, that, it is knowing; that, it renders our ideas, juſt; and, of judgment, that, it is wiſe; that, it makes our conduct, diſ⯑creet.

When choice, or, determination, with reſpect to the goodneſs, or, beauty of ob⯑jects, is in queſtion, we ſhould have re⯑courſe to thoſe, who have diſcernment. When we would take any ſtep of conſe⯑quence, we ſhould take the advice of ſuch perſons, as have judgment.

Arts and ſciences require diſcernment; which is, more or leſs nice, according to the delicacy of the underſtanding, or, the extent of knowledge. Government, and, the policy of ſtates demand judgment; which is, more or leſs, ſure, according to the force of reaſon, and, the length of expe⯑rience.

170. Satisfied, Contented.

We are ſatisfied, when, we have obtained, what we wiſhed for: We are contented, when, we wiſh not for any more.

It happens, often, that, when, well ſatis⯑fied, we are not the more content.

Poſſeſſion will, always, prove ſatisfactory; but it is the true enjoyment, only, of what we poſſeſs, that can make us content.

171. Tale, Novel, Romance, Story.

Each, of theſe words, implies, a ſmall hiſtory, or, an entertaining relation of ad⯑ventures: the three firſt, are ſuppoſed to be fabulous, and, made public; whereas, the laſt, may be either true, or, feigned, and told either in print, or, by word of mouth; but, as they carry ideas peculiar to them⯑ſelves, it is my buſineſs, to point them out: by the word, tale, then, is meant, a [181]ſhort, but dreſſed-up narrative of ſome ſin⯑gle adventure; that, of novel, ſignifies, an amuſing hiſtory, made up of many adven⯑tures, and, carried on through one, or, more volumes. By romance, is underſtood, a collection of wild adventures, in love and war.

Tales, ought to be well related; novels, well invented; romances, well carried on; stories, well told.

Tales, if attended with good morals, are not, only, amuſing, but, inſtructive. No⯑vels, are of no other uſe, than to entertain; they waſte the time, without making the leaſt improvement. Romances ſpoil the taſte of young people, who, by an attention to them, are apt to prefer the marvellous, to the natural and ſimple truth. A droll story, told with humour, is a great enli⯑vener of company.

172. Continuance, Continuation,

Continuance, relates to duration; continu⯑ation, to extent.

We ſhould ſtudy a conſcientious diſ⯑charge of our duty, during our continuance in any office. The ſeveral books, contained in the volume of Paradiſe Loſt, are conti⯑nuations, of the ſame ſubject.

173. Continual, Continued.

There may be an interruption in that, which is continual; but that, which is con⯑tinued, will not admit of it. So that the firſt of theſe words, denotes properly, the length of duration, although, there may be intervals, and, different renewals; and, the ſecond, marks ſimply, the unity of that duration, independent either of length, or, [183]ſhortneſs of the time; it is, for this reaſon, we ſay, a continual noiſe; continual rains; but, a continued ſtream; and, in muſic, a continued baſe.

Continual interruptions will make us weary of the beſt undertakings. In coun⯑tries, ſituated near the poles, there is, for the ſpace of five or ſix months together, one continued darkneſs, inſomuch, that the inhabitants, during that time, are obliged to leave the place.

174. To Bid, Order.

The firſt, of theſe, is extremely general, the other more limited. To bid, intimates, direction to perform, whether the perſon directing, has any authority for ſo doing, or, not. To order, implies, the exerciſe of authority.

Some people are ſo very officious, that they are, always, ready to do, what they are bid, whether the thing be right or wrong, [184]or, the perſon bidding, be impowered, to order them, or, not.

175. Yet, In the mean while, However, Nevertheleſs.

Yet, ſeems, to have more force and energy; it aſſures, with firmneſs, in ſpite of every oppoſition. In the mean while, is leſs abſolute, it affirms, only, againſt con⯑trary appearances. However, diſtinguiſhes two things, which ſeem oppoſite; ſupport⯑ing one without hurting the other. Never⯑theleſs, affirms a thing, by exception; giv⯑ing us to underſtand, that it does not oc⯑cur, but, at the time, we are ſpeak⯑ing.

Though the whole earth is in arms againſt truth, yet, it does not prevent its triumphing. Some parents are very ſtrict, with reſpect to the morals of their chil⯑dren; in the mean while, will indulge them⯑ſelves, in every thing, their own heart can wiſh. Addiſon was a wretched ſpeaker, however, he was an excellent author. [185]Churchill, every one knows, was a bad liver; nevertheleſs, he was of ſome ſervice to his country, by ridiculing vice, and laſhing venality.

176. Excellency, Excellence.

Notwithſtanding theſe words are, evi⯑dently, the ſame, excellence, being no other than excellencie, contracted, or, the re⯑dundant ſyllable, general in old writing, taken away; yet, cuſtom ſeems to have ap⯑plied excellency, to expreſs the title of a go⯑venour, or, that of an ambaſſador, from one prince, to another, whereas, by excel⯑lence, is underſtood, the ſtate of abounding in any good quality.

177. Pride, Arrogance, Vanity, Preſumption, Haughtineſs.

Pride, is, unreaſonable or inordinate ſelf-eſteem. Arrogance, implies, taking much upon ourſelves, and, is pride attend⯑ed with inſolence and contempt. Vanity, is accompanied with affectation, and, means, pride, exerted, on ſlight grounds. By pre⯑ſumption, is underſtood, a blind, and, ad⯑venturous confidence; with reſpect to haugh⯑tineſs, it is a mixture of ſoftneſs and inſo⯑lence, the immediate effect of pride.

The haughtineſs of the proud man, is in⯑ſufferable. Pride makes us value ourſelves; arrogance, deſpiſe others; Through vanity, we covet the attention of our acquaintance. Preſumption flatters us, with having a vain power.

The proud, conſider themſelves, in their own mind; full, and, ſelf-ſwoln, they are taken up, with their own perſon. The arrogant, claim to themſelves, what they have not the leaſt pretentions to, are ready [187]to inſult thoſe, who will not allow them, what they claim; and look down, on the reſt of the world, with contempt. The vain, value themſelves, upon the opinion of others; greedy of eſteem, they are ea⯑ger, to engroſs the attention of all man⯑kind. The preſumptious, carry their audaci⯑ous hopes, even to chimeras; bold, to un⯑dertake, they, fondly, imagine they have power to do every thing.

The greateſt pain, we can, poſſibly, give the proud man, is, by laying his defects, before his eyes. We cannot hurt the arro⯑gant, ſo much, as by ſilent contempt. We cannot mortify a vain man more, than by paying no attention, to thoſe qualifica⯑tions or qualities, he prides himſelf in. In order to confound the preſumptuous, we need, only, deſire him, to put his vain deſigns in execution.

178. Cure, Remedy.

We perform a cure. We procure a re⯑medy. The firſt, relates more to the mala⯑dy, and, to the action of him, who heals it; the ſecond, has more relation to health, and, the ſtate of the malady, we heal. We ſay, of a cure, that, it is fine; when its ſucceſs, does honour to the perſon, who formed it; and, we ſay, of a remedy, that, it is certain, or, ſure; when its operations are efficacious; that is, when it produces thoſe conſequences, we intended; and, we ſay of both, that, they are, either, eaſy, or, difficult.

Cure, ſeems to have no other object, than ſtubborn diſorders, and thoſe, which proceed from conſtitution; whereas, re⯑medy, has a view to ſlight complaints, and, ſuch, as are of ſhort duration.

The more inveterate the diſorder, the more difficult the cure; in many caſes, re⯑gular living, is the beſt remedy.

[189]The word cure, is, often, conſidered, as the effect of remedy. Some remedies, will complete a cure, much ſooner than others.

Incurable diſorders, are not, only, thoſe, where the cure is abſolutely impoſſible; bu, ſuch, as, for which, no remedy can be found.

179. Haughtineſs, Diſdain.

Both theſe words, denote, a diſpoſition, that prevents affability, and keeps us at a diſtance from thoſe, whom we think be⯑neath us, either in birth, fortune, or, abi⯑lities, with this difference, that, haughti⯑neſs is founded upon the eſteem, a man has for himſelf; and, diſdain, upon the diſ⯑eſteem, he has for others.

Haughtineſs, is ſeldom met with, but in perſons of weak underſtanding, and thoſe, who have had a bad education. There are, a ſort of vain people, who look upon diſ⯑dain, as a perſonal accompliſhment; and, who uſe it on all occaſions, as, a teſt of the merit, they pretend to.

180. Sloth, Lazineſs, Sluggiſhneſs.

Sloth and lazineſs, are voluntary, with this difference, that ſloth, implies, utter in⯑activity, an abſolute averſion to work; lazineſs, an inclination, but, a fear of trou⯑ble and fatigue: whereas, ſluggiſhneſs, is, often, involuntary; proceeding, ſometimes, from conſtitution, and, is diſcovered, by its dull, heavy method of acting.

The ſlothful man, will not work, at all. The lazy man, is drawn to it, with diffi⯑culty. The ſluggiſh man is ſlow, through the whole operation.

Induſtry, is the reverſe of ſloth; acti⯑vity, of lazineſs; expedition, of ſluggiſh⯑neſs.

He, who is ſlothful, is a murderer of time. Lazineſs, is its own puniſhment. A ſluggiſh perſon, is fit for no kind of em⯑ployment, ſeldom doing any thing well, he undertakes.

181. Harm, Hurt, Injury, Detriment, Miſchief.

Theſe words, imply, ſome kind of ill, happening to a man's perſon, character, or, property. Thoſe of harm, and, hurt, relate more to the perſon, or, character; with this difference, that harm, ſeems to denote, a ſmall degree of hurt; hurt, a great degree of harm. Miſchief, implies, ill, to the per⯑ſon, or, property, and appears, ever, to be done, with an evil intent. Injury, intimates, a degree of hurt, without juſtice; and re⯑lates to the character, or, property. De⯑triment, carries an idea of loſs, and, is ſel⯑dom uſed, but, with, regard to property.

By wounding a man, more or leſs, we harm, or, hurt, his perſon. By ſpeaking ill of him, deſervedly or not, we harm, or, hurt, his character: by breaking his head, or, ſetting fire to his houſe, we are ſaid to do him a miſchief. By taking away his good name, we injure his character: by defrauding him of his goods, we injure him [192]in his property. By breaking a hedge, or, treading down of corn, we do a great deal of detriment.

182. Quickly, Soon, Speedily.

The word quickly, ſeems, more proper, to expreſs the motion, with which, we act; its reverſe, is, ſlowly. The word, ſoon, reſpects the time, when the action is per⯑formed; its reverſe, is, late. The word, ſpeedily, has a greater relation to the time, we employ about a thing; its reverſe, is, long-time.

We advance the more by going quick; but, we go ſurely, by going ſlowly. Wick⯑edneſs is always, puniſhed, either, ſooner, or later. It is neceſſary, to be a long-time deliberating; but, we ſhould execute ſpee⯑dily.

He, who begins ſoon, and, works quick; will ſpeedily, have done.

183. Aſſiduous, Expeditious, Quick.

When we are aſſiduous, at work, we loſe no time; when expeditious, we defer not, but finiſh immediately: when quick, we work with activity. Idleneſs, delay, and ſlowneſs, are the three defects, oppoſite to theſe three good qualities.

An aſſiduous man, thinks nothing of the trouble of what he takes in hand. An expeditious man, will not quit his work. One that is quick, will preſently, have done.

We ſhould be aſſiduous, in what we un⯑dertake; expeditious, in affairs, that re⯑quire to be ſoon ended; and quick, in the ex⯑ecution of orders.

184. Now, Inſtantly, Immediately, Preſently.

The doing a thing now, expreſſes the taking it in hand, at that very inſtant; the other three words, as they are here placed, expreſs a time farther and farther off. In⯑ſtantly, implies, without any perceptible intervention of time. Immediately, means, without delay. By preſently, is underſtood, ſoon after.

185. Faſhion, Custom.

Theſe two words, like many others, I have taken notice of, tho' they may not ſtrike the reader, at firſt ſight, as words, reputed ſynonymous; have, nevertheleſs, been uſed as ſuch, by ſome of our beſt writers, and, are, at preſent: it is therefore neceſſary, to point out the diffe⯑rence between them. Faſhion, then, ſeems, [195]more univerſal; cuſtom, more antient: that, which the greater part of the people practice, is, a faſhion; that, which has been practiſed a long time, is, a cuſ⯑tom.

Faſion, introduces itſelf, and, extends daily; cuſtom, eſtabliſhes itſelf, and, gains authority; the firſt, forms the mode; the ſecond, a uſage: each, is a kind of law, independent on reaſon, with reſpect to that, which relates to our outward actions.

There is, ſometimes, more policy in conforming to a bad faſhion; than being ſingular in ſome good things. Many per⯑ſons follow cuſtom, even in their way of thinking; imbibing the notions of their mothers and nurſes.

186. Variation, Change.

Variation, conſiſts in being, as much of one ſort, as another: Change, conſiſts, on⯑ly, in ceaſing to be the ſame.

[196]We vary in our ſentiments, when, we give them up, and, embrace them again. We change our opinions, when, we re⯑ject one, in order, to embrace another.

He, who has no certain principles, is li⯑able to vary. He, who is more attached to fortune, than truth, will find no diffi⯑culty in changing his doctrine.

187. Variation, Variety.

Succeſſive changes, in the ſame ſubject, make variation: A multitude of different objects, forms variety. Thus, we ſay, the the variation of time; variety of colours.

There is no government, but, is ſubject to variation. There is no ſpecies in nature, in which, we may not obſerve great variety.

188. Track, Footſtep.

Track, is more general; meaning, any mark left on the way, of whatever paſſed. [197] Footſtep, is more limited; implying, the print of the feet. Thus, we ſay, the track of a horſe, or, a carriage; but, the footſteps, of a man.

189. Fickle, Inconſtancy, Unſteady, Changeable.

The attachments, of the fickle man, are ſlight; thoſe, of the inconſtant, of ſhort durati⯑on. As to the words, unſteady, and, changea⯑ble, they imply, an averſion in adhering to the ſame thing; with this difference, that the unſteady man, is, eager to enjoy many things; the changeable man, is, in conſtant ſearch of different ones.

Men, are, commonly, more ſickle and inconſtant, than women; but women, more unſteady and changeable, than men. The firſt, err thro' indifference; the ſe⯑cond, thro' a love of novelty. Conſe⯑quently, it is a merit, in men, to perſevere; and in women, to reſiſt.

190. Rogue, Sharper, Thief.

Theſe are all perſons, who ſteal what does not belong to them; with this diffe⯑rence, that the rogue, ſteals in ſecret; he pilfers. The ſharper, ſteals, by fineſſe; he over-reaches. The thief, ſteals, by all manner of means, robbing by force and violence.

The rogue, fears to be diſcovered; the ſharper, to be known again; and the thief, to be taken.

191. Intention, Deſign.

Intention, is, a diſpoſition or inclination of the mind, to ſomething at a diſtance; its characteriſtic, is to aim. Deſign, ſeems to ſuppoſe, ſomething ſtudied and methodi⯑cal; [199]it is employed, in ſearching out the means of execution.

Intentions, are more ſecret and vague; deſigns, more extenſive, and, more rational.

Intention, is the ſoul of action, and, the ſpring of true worth. Deſign, is, the ef⯑fect of reflection.

As, no one cares to be balked in his intentions, or, croſſed in his deſigns; we ſhould have no other intention, than, to do our duty; nor, any other deſign, than, to conform to the will of Providence.

Nothing is leſs followed, than, the ori⯑ginal intention of charitable foundations. Nothing has been found more difficult to accompliſh, than, the deſign of bringing about a thorough reformation of man⯑ners.

That man is, truly, great, who is right in his intentions, and, reaſonable, in his de⯑ſigns.

192. Unpolite, Clowniſh.

It is a much greater defect, to be clown⯑niſh, than, to be, barely, unpolite.

Unpoliteneſs, is, a want of good-man⯑ners: it does not pleaſe. Clowniſhneſs, is, a mixture of ill-manners: it diſpleaſes.

Clowniſhneſs, proceeds, from an entire want of education: unpoliteneſs, is owing to a bad one.

193. To Tolerate, Suffer, Permit.

We tolerate a thing, when, knowing it, and, having ſufficient power, we do not hinder it. We ſuffer it, by making no oppoſition, but, ſeeming, either, not to know it, or, not to have the power of pre⯑venting [201]it. We permit it, when we autho⯑riſe it, by formal conſent.

The words, tolerate and ſuffer, are never uſed, but, with reſpect to bad things, or, ſuch, as we believe ſo; whereas, the word permit, relates, either, to good or bad.

The legiſlative power is, ſometimes, obliged to tolerate certain evils, in order, to prevent worſe. It is, ſometimes, pru⯑dence, to ſuffer, even, abuſe in the diſcipline of the church, rather, than de⯑ſtroy its unity. Human laws never will permit, what the divine law forbids; but, ſometimes, forbids, what the other will permit.

194. Gay, Merry, Diverting.

We are gay, by diſpoſition; merry, through turn of mind; diverting, by our way of acting. Sad, ſerious, and, tireſome, are, exactly, their oppoſites.

[202]Our gaiety turns almoſt, entirely, to our own advantage: our merriment, at the ſame time, that it is agreeable to others, it is no leſs ſo, to ourſelves; but, our being diverting, is enjoyed, only, by the com⯑pany.

A gay man, will laugh himſelf; a merry man, is good company; a diverting man, will make us laugh.

We ſhould, if poſſible, ſuppreſs our gai⯑ety, when, in the houſe of affliction. We ſhould ceaſe to be merry, when, others are ſad. We ſhould take care not to be divert⯑ing, at the expence of our character, or, good-ſenſe.

195. Enmity, Rancour.

Enmity, is more declared; it ſeems, al⯑ways, open. Rancour, is more concealed; it, generally, diſſembles.

Bad ſervices, and, rude language, create enmity; which never ceaſes, 'till tired out [203]with puniſhing; or, a reconciliation is brought about, by the interceſſion of friends. Remembrance of injuries, or, af⯑fronts received, keeps rancour alive in the breaſt; which never ſubſides, while there is the leaſt thirſt of vengeance; or, 'till we pardon, ſincerely.

Enmity, does not, always, deſtroy our eſteem for an enemy, nor, prevent our do⯑ing him the juſtice, he is entitled to; but, it will not admit of our careſſing him, or, doing him any good, otherwiſe, than through a ſenſe of honour, or, greatneſs of ſoul; to which, we, ſometimes, ſacrifice our vengeance. Rancour, makes us embrace, with pleaſure, every opportunity of re⯑venging ourſelves; but, can hide itſelf, with the cloak of friendſhip, 'till the very moment it begins to act.

Enmity is, ſometimes, noble, and it would be mean not to conceive it, againſt certain perſons; but, rancour is, always, low.

A ſettled enmity in families, ſometimes, runs through many generations; and will not ceaſe, 'till time ſhall obliterate it. Per⯑fect reconciliations are very rare; there re⯑maining, [204]often, a great deal of rancour, in the breaſts of thoſe, who ſeem moſt ſin⯑cere.

A philoſopher ſhould have no object of enmity, but, the diſturbers of public tranquillity. If rancour can, in any caſe, be excuſable, it muſt be, with reſpect to traitors; their crime, being too black, to be thought of, without indignation.

196. To Inſinuate, Suggeſt.

We inſinuate, by cunning, and, addreſs; we ſuggeſt, by credit, and, artifice.

In order, to inſinuate, we muſt conſult both time and opportunity; in order, to ſuggeſt, it is neceſſary, to have aſcendancy over the minds of perſons.

Inſinuate, implies, ſomething delicate: ſuggeſt, frequently, ſomething fraudu⯑lent.

We cover, artfully, what we would inſi⯑nuate: and, what we would ſuggeſt, we make of ſome conſequence.

[205]We, often, imagine that, what, others inſinuate, was firſt thought of, by ourſelves. He, who ſuggeſts evil to another, is much more culpable, than he, who commits it.

197. Ordinary, Common.

Theſe words, have been reputed ſyno⯑nymous, in two ſenſes; as implying, fre⯑quent uſe; and, meaning, of little or no value: but, they are different in both. In the firſt ſenſe, the word, ordinary, ſeems to me, to be beſt applied, when the repe⯑tition of actions, is in queſtion; common, when a multitude of objects. Thus, no⯑thing is more ordinary at court, than diſ⯑ſimulation. Monſters are common in Africa.

In the ſecond, that, which is ordinary, has nothing, to diſtinguiſh it; that, which is common, has nothing, to make it ſought after.

198. To Hear, Hearken.

To hear, implies, having the ear ſtruck with any ſound. To hearken, means, to lend an ear, in order, to hear. Sometimes, we hear, without hearkening; and, we, of⯑ten, hearken, without hearing.

199. To Underſtand, Comprehend, Conceive.

To have juſt and proper ideas of every thing, that occurs, is the common ſignifi⯑cation of theſe words: but, to under⯑ſtand, implies, a conformity of ideas, which has a peculiar relation to the value of the terms, we uſe; to comprehend, de⯑notes, ſuch a conformity, as anſwers direct⯑ly, to the nature of the things, we explain; and that, which is expreſſed by the word, [207] conceive, relates, more eſpecially, to the order and deſign, of what, we propoſe. The firſt, is uſed, with propriety, when, applied to the particulars, of what, we ſay; the tone, with which, we ſpeak; the turn of our phraſes; and, the delicacy of our expreſſions. The ſecond, ſeems to agree beſt, with a relation to principles, leſſons, precepts, and, ſpeculative knowledge. The third, appears with greater elegance, when, it relates to forms, arrangement, projects, and, plans; in ſhort, all that depends on the imagination.

We underſtand languages. We compre⯑hend ſciences. We conceive, whatever has relation to arts.

It is difficult to underſtand that, which is enigmatical; to comprehend that, which is abſtruſe; and, to conceive that, which is confuſed.

Readineſs of understanding, is a mark of acuteneſs; that, of comprehenſion, is, a proof of penetration; that, of conception, denotes, a clear head.

A lover, underſtands the language of the paſſions. A learned man, comprehends the metaphyſical queſtions of the ſchools. An [208]architect, conceives the plan and oeconomy of buildings.

200. Faſhion, Figure, Form.

Faſhion, riſes from labour, and, reſults from the workmanſhip; the workman, enriching it, more or leſs, according to his taſte. Figure, ſprings from deſign, and, reſults from the out-lines of the thing; the author of the plan, making it, either more or leſs, regular, according to his abilities. Form, riſes from conſtruction, and, reſults, from the arrangement of parts; the conductor of the work, making it, more or leſs, natural, as his imagination di⯑rects him.

The faſhion of a work, frequently, ex⯑ceeds in value, the price of the materials. We ſeldom give in architecture a round figure to any thing, except, to ſingle pieces, and, ſuch as ſtand by themſelves. Paganiſm pictures the Deity, under all kinds [209]of forms; whereas, Chriſtianity confines it to thoſe, of a man, and, of a dove.

We ſay of faſhion, that it is, either pret⯑ty, or, ugly; of figure, that it is, either, agreeable, or, diſagreeable; of form, that, it is, either, common, or, uncommon.

201. Fault, Defect, Imperfection.

Fault, includes in its idea, a relation to the maker; ſo that, while it implies, ſome real want, in the finiſhing of the work, it denotes, alſo, that, it was owing to the workman. Defect, expreſſes ſomething imperfect, in the thing, without any relation to the maker of it. Imperfection, intimates, ſomething of leſs conſequence, than is un⯑derſtood by the preceding words, and, is uſed, with more propriety, in morality, than, either, in phyſics, or, mechanics.

The ſmoaking of chimneys, is a great fault in houſes; as, a little attention in the builder, may eaſily prevent it. When the beauty of a building is ſpoiled, for want of [210]room, or, proper materials, it is a defect, which the builder could not prevent. Im⯑perfections, are conſidered by the bigotted religioniſt, as real ſins; but, reaſonable chriſtians, look upon them, only, as the natural conſequents of frail humanity.

202. Fault, Crime.

Faults, reſult from human weakneſs; be⯑ing tranſgreſſions of the rules of duty. Crimes, proceed from the wickedneſs of the heart; being actions, againſt the rules of nature.

The effects of anger, and, the intrigues of gallantry, are faults. Calumnies, and, aſſaſſinations, are crimes.

It is our indiſpenſable duty, to pardon faults; but, puniſh crimes.

203. To Oblige, Conſtrain, To Compel, Force.

The laſt of theſe words, riſes upon the third, as the third does, upon the ſecond, [211]and, the ſecond, upon the firſt; each of them, implying, an oppoſition to liberty. The word, oblige, relates more to duty, or, neceſſity; intimating, a power acting on us, in conformity to our inclinations: conſtrain, refers to thoſe troubleſome oppoſitions, that make us determine, againſt our incli⯑nations; compel, alludes to power and au⯑thority, which makes us act, in expreſs contrariety to our will, which, we lament the not being maſter of: the word, force, implies, contrary efforts of a vigorous ac⯑tion, which, we try to reſiſt, but, in vain.

The duty of a child, to its parents, ob⯑liges it, to aſſiſt him, in his old-age. The weaker and ſofter ſex, is that, which can leaſt brook conſtraint. There are, ſome, occa⯑ſions, on which we ſhould not be ſorry, to be compelled, even to that, we are moſt un⯑willing to do. Ancient politeneſs of the table, went ſo far, as, to force gueſts to eat and drink.

204. Heavineſs, Weight.

In the figurative ſenſe, the difference of theſe words, is ſo extremely great, as to need no pointing out; in the literal, in⯑deed, they are, often, confounded; con⯑ſidered then, in this laſt ſenſe, heavineſs, is that quality in a body, which we feel, and, diſtinguiſh by itſelf: weight, is the mea⯑ſure and degree of that quality, which we cannot aſcertain, but, by compariſon.

We ſay, abſolutely, and, in an undeter⯑mined ſenſe, that a thing is heavy; but re⯑latively, and, in a manner determined, that, it is of ſuch a weight, for example, of two, three, or, four pounds.

A thouſand circumſtances, prove the heavineſs of the air; and, the mercury, de⯑termines its exact weight.

205. To Return, Surrender, Reſtore.

We are ſaid, to return, what has been lent or given us: to ſurrender, what we have in pledge or charge: to reſtore, what we have taken or ſtolen.

We ought to return, punctually; to ſurrender, faithfully; and, to reſtore, wholly.

We borrow, with an intent to return; we take a thing in charge, with a view of ſurrendering it again; but, we ſeldom take, with a deſign to reſtore.

Cuſtom makes uſe of theſe words, on the following occaſions; the firſt, with reſ⯑pect to civility, favours, preſents, or, teſti⯑monies of kindneſs: the ſecond, with reſpect to what, we are entruſted with; honours, employs, or, offices, with which we are in⯑veſted: the third, with relation to things taken away, that have been our due. Thus, we return money, that has been lent us; preſents, we have received; and, let⯑ters, to a deſerted ſweet-heart: we ſurrender [214]a child, to its parents; the ribbon of an order, the ſtaff of command, ſeals, and, dig⯑nities to a prince; we reſtore, an accuſed perſon, when found innocent, to his eſtates and honours; and, a minor, to the poſſeſ⯑ſion of his effects, which have been held from him.

206. Sincerity, Frankneſs, Plainneſs, Ingenuouſneſs.

Sincerity, prevents our ſpeaking, other⯑wiſe, than we think; and, is a virtue. Frank⯑neſs, makes us ſpeak, as we think; and, is a natural effect. Plainneſs, is, ſpeaking, freely, what we think; and, ſprings, ſome⯑times, from want of reflection. Ingenuouſ⯑neſs, makes us declare what we know; and, is, often, a folly.

A ſincere man, will not deceive; a frank man, will not diſſemble; a plain man, is not apt to flatter; an ingenuous man, knows not how to conceal any thing.

Sincerity, is of great value, in the inter⯑courſe of the heart. Frankneſs, facilitates [215]the commerce of the world. Plainneſs, is, often, conſidered, as a want of politeneſs. Ingenuouſneſs, is, frequently, found to err, againſt prudence.

The ſincere, are, always, eſteemed. The frank, pleaſe all the world. The plain, ſometimes, offend. The ingenuous, often, betray themſelves.

207. Experiment, Trial, Proof.

Experiment, relates, properly, to the truth of things; it determines, whether a thing is, or, is not; clearing up of doubt, and, diſſipating ignorance. Trial, concerns, particularly, the uſe of things; judging, whether they are proper, or, not; it ſettles the matter, and, determines the will. Proof, has a greater relation to the quality of things; teaching us, whether they are good, or, bad, diſtinguiſhing the beſt, and, taking away any fear of being deceived.

[216]We make experiments, in order, to know; trials, to chooſe; and, proofs, to be, tho⯑roughly, acquainted with.

Experiments, confirm our opinions; be⯑ing the root of knowledge. Trial, con⯑ducts our taſte; being the road to ſatisfac⯑tion. Proof, removes our fears; and, is a remedy againſt error and impoſture.