SECTION I. INTRODUCTION.

HAVING lately ſeen a Book intitul'd Patriarcha, written by Sir Robert Filmer, concerning the Univerſal and undiſtin⯑guiſh'd Right of all Kings, I thought a time of leiſure might be well employ'd in examining his Doctrin, and the Que⯑ſtions ariſing from it; which ſeem ſo far to concern all Mankind, that, beſides the Influence upon our future Life, they may be ſaid to comprehend all that in this World deſerves to be car'd for. If he ſay true, there is but one Government in the World that can have any thing of Juſtice in it: and thoſe who have hitherto bin eſteem'd the beſt and wiſeſt of Men, for having conſtituted Commonwealths or Kingdoms; and taken much pains ſo to proportion the Powers of ſeveral Magiſtracys, that they might all concur in procuring the Publick Good; or ſo to divide the Powers between the Magiſtrats and People, that a well-regulated Harmony might be preſerv'd in the whole, were the moſt unjuſt and foo⯑liſh of all Men. They were not builders, but overthrowers of Govern⯑ments: their buſineſs was to ſet up Ariſtocratical, Democratical or mix'd Governments, in oppoſition to that Monarchy which by the immutable Laws of God and Nature is impos'd upon Mankind; or preſumptuouſly to put Shackles upon the Monarch, who by the ſame Laws is to be abſo⯑lute and uncontrol'd: They were rebellious and diſobedient Sons, who roſe up againſt their Father; and not only refus'd to hearken to his Voice, but made him bend to their Will. In their Opinion, ſuch only deſerv'd to be call'd Good Men, who endeavour'd to be good to Mankind; or to that Country to which they were more particularly related: and in as much as that Good conſiſts in a Felicity of Eſtate, and Perfection of Perſon, they highly valued ſuch as had endeavour'd to make Men better, wiſer and happier. This they underſtood to be the end for which Men enter'd into Societys: And tho Cicero ſays, that Commonwealths were inſtituted for the obtaining of Juſtice, he contradicts them not, but comprehends all in that [2] word; becauſe 'tis juſt that whoſoever receives a Power, ſhould employ it wholly for the accompliſhment of the Ends for which it was given. This Work could be perform'd only by ſuch as excell'd in Virtue; but leſt they ſhould deflect from it, no Government was thought to be well conſti⯑tuted, Potentiora Legum quam hominum Im⯑peria. Tacit.unleſs the Laws prevail'd above the Commands of Men; and they were accounted as the worſt of Beaſts, who did not prefer ſuch a Condi⯑tion before a Subjection to the fluctuating and irregular Will of a Man.

If we believe Sir Robert, all this is miſtaken. Nothing of this kind was ever left to the Choice of Men. They are not to inquire what conduces to their own good: God and Nature have put us into a way from which we are not to ſwerve: We are not to live to him, nor to our ſelves, but to the Maſter that he hath ſet over us. One Government is eſtabliſh'd over all, and no Limits can be ſet to the Power of the Perſon that manages it. This is the Prerogative, or, as another Author of the ſame Stamp calls it, the Royal Charter granted to Kings by God. They all have an equal right to it; Women and Children are Patriarchs; and the next in Blood, with⯑out any regard to Age, Sex, or other Qualitys of the Mind or Body, are Fathers of as many Nations as fall under their Power. We are not to examin, whether he or ſhe be young or old, virtuous or vicious, ſober minded or ſtark mad; the Right and Power is the ſame in all. Whether Virtue be exalted or ſuppreſt; whether he that bears the Sword be a Praiſe to thoſe that do well, and a Terror to thoſe that do evil; or a Praiſe to thoſe that do evil, and a Terror to ſuch as do well, it concerns us not; for the King muſt not loſe his Right, nor have his Power diminiſh'd on any account. I have bin ſometimes apt to wonder, how things of this nature could enter into the head of any Man: Or, if no Wickedneſs or Folly be ſo great, but ſome may fall into it, I could not well conceive why they ſhould publiſh it to the World. But theſe thoughts ceas'd, when I conſider'd that a People from all Ages in love with Liberty, and deſirous to maintain their own Privileges, could never be brought to reſign 'em, unleſs they were made to believe that in Conſcience they ought to do it; which could not be, unleſs they were alſo perſuaded to believe, that there was a Law ſet to all Mankind which none might tranſ⯑greſs, and which put the Examination of all thoſe Matters out of their power. This is our Author's Work. By this it will appear whoſe Throne he ſeeks to advance, and whoſe Servant he is, whilſt he pretends to ſerve the King. And that it may be evident he has made uſe of Means ſutable to the Ends propos'd for the Service of his great Maſter, I hope to ſhew that he has not us'd one Argument that is not falſe, nor cited one Author whom he has not perverted and abus'd. Whilſt my work is ſo to lay open theſe Snares that the moſt ſimple may not be taken in them, I ſhall not examin how Sir Robert came to think himſelf a Man fit to un⯑dertake ſo great a Work, as to deſtroy the Principles, which from the be⯑ginning ſeem to have bin common to all Mankind; but only weighing the Poſitions and Arguments that he alledges, will, if there be either truth or ſtrength in them, confeſs the Diſcovery comes from him that gave us leaſt reaſon to expect it; and that in [...]p [...]e of the Antients, there is not in the World a Piece of Wood out of which a Mercury may not be made.

SECT. II. The common Notions of Liberty are not from School-Divines, but from Nature.

IN the firſt Lines of his Book he ſeems to denounce War againſt Man⯑kind, endeavouring to overthrow the Principle of Liberty in which God created us, and which includes the chief Advantages of the Life we enjoy, as well as the greateſt helps towards the Felicity, that is the end of our hopes in the other. To this end he abſurdly imputes to the School-Di⯑vines that which was taken up by 'em as a common Notion, written in the Hearts of all Men, denied by none but ſuch as are degenerated into Beaſts, from whence they might prove ſuch Points as of themſelves were leſs evi⯑dent. Thus did Euclid lay down certain Axioms, which none could deny that did not renounce common Senſe, from whence he drew the Proofs of ſuch Propoſitions as were leſs obvious to the Underſtanding; and they may with as much reaſon be accus'd of Paganiſm, who ſay that the Whole is greater than a Part, that two Halfs make the Whole, or that a ſtreight Line is the ſhorteſt way from Point to Point, as to ſay, that they who in Politicks lay ſuch Foundations as have bin taken up by Schoolmen and others as undeniable Truths, do therefore follow them, or have any regard to their Authority. Tho the Schoolmen were corrupt, they were neither ſtupid nor unlearned: They could not but ſee that which all Men ſaw, nor lay more approv'd Foundations, than, That Man is naturally free; That he cannot juſtly be depriv'd of that Liberty without cauſe, and that he dos not reſign it, or any part of it, unleſs it be in conſideration of a greater good, which he propoſes to himſelf. But if he unjuſtly imputes the In⯑vention of this to School-Divines, he in ſome meaſure repairs his Fault in ſaying, This has bin foſter'd by all ſucceeding Papiſts for good Divinity: The Divines of the reformed Churches have entertain'd it, and the Common Peo⯑ple every where tenderly embrace it. That is to ſay, all Chriſtian Divines, whether reform'd or unreform'd, do approve it, and the People every where magnify it, as the height of human Felicity. But Filmer and ſuch as are like to him, being neither reform'd nor unreform'd Chriſtians, nor of the People, can have no Title to Chriſtianity; and, in as much as they ſet themſelves againſt that which is the height of human Felicity, they declare themſelves Enemys to all that are concern'd in it, that is, to all Mankind.

But, ſays he, They do not remember that the deſire of Liberty was the firſt cauſe of the Fall of Man: and I deſire it may not be forgotten, that the Liberty aſſerted is not a Licentiouſneſs of doing what is pleaſing to every one againſt the Command of God; but an Exemption from all human Laws, to which they have not given their aſſent. If he would make us believe there was any thing of this in Adam's Sin, he ought to have prov'd, that the Law which he tranſgreſt was impos'd upon him by Man, and conſequently that there was a Man to impoſe it; for it will eaſily appear that neither the reform'd or unreform'd Divines, nor the People following them, do place the Felicity of Man in an exemption from the Laws of God, but in a moſt perfect conformity to them. Our Saviour taught us not to fear ſuch as could kill the Body, but him that could kill and caſt into [4] Hell: And the Apoſtle tells us that we ſhould obey God rather than Man. It has bin ever hereupon obſerv'd, that they who moſt preciſely adhere to the Laws of God, are leaſt ſollicitous concerning the Commands of Men, unleſs they are well grounded; and thoſe who moſt delight in the glorious Liberty of the Sons of God, do not only ſubject themſelves to him, but are moſt regular Obſervers of the juſt Ordinances of Man, made by the conſent of ſuch as are concern'd according to the Will of God.

The Error of not obſerving this may perhaps deſerve to be pardon'd in a Man that had read no Books, as proceeding from Ignorance; if ſuch as are groſly ignorant can be excus'd, when they take upon them to write of ſuch Matters as require the higheſt knowledg: But in Sir Robert 'tis pre⯑varication and fraud to impute to Schoolmen and Puritans that which in his firſt Page he acknowledg'd to be the Doctrin of all Reform'd and Un⯑reform'd Chriſtian Churches, and that he knows to have bin the Princi⯑ple in which the Grecians, Italians, Spaniards, Gauls, Germans, and Bri⯑tans, and all other generous Nations ever liv'd, before the Name of Chriſt was known in the World; inſomuch that the baſe effeminate Aſiaticks and Africans, for being careleſs of their Liberty, or unable to govern them⯑ſelves, were by Ariſtotle and other wiſe Men call'd Slaves by Nature, and look'd upon as little different from Beaſts.

This which hath its Root in common Senſe, not being to be overthrown by Reaſon, he ſpares his pains of ſeeking any; but thinks it enough to render his Doctrin plauſible to his own Party, by joining the Jeſuits to Geneva, and coupling Buchanan to Doleman, as both maintaining the ſame Doctrin: tho he might as well have join'd the Puritans with the Turks, becauſe they all think that one and one makes two. But whoever marks the Proceedings of Filmer and his Maſters, as well as his Diſciples, will ra⯑ther believe that they have learn'd from Rome and the Jeſuits to hate Gene⯑va, than that Geneva and Rome can agree in any thing farther than as they are oblig'd to ſubmit to the Evidence of Truth; or that Geneva and Rome can concur in any Deſign or Intereſt that is not common to Mankind.

Theſe Men allow'd to the People a liberty of depoſing their Princes. This is a deſperate Opinion. Bellarmin and Calvin look aſquint at it. But why is this a deſperate Opinion? If Diſagreements happen between King and People, why is it a more deſperate Opinion to think the King ſhould be ſubject to the Cenſures of the People, than the People ſubject to the Will of the King? Did the People make the King, or the King make the Peo⯑ple? Is the King for the People, or the People for the King? Did God create the Hebrews that Saul might reign over them? or did they, from an opinion of procuring their own Good, ask a King, that might judg them, and fight their Battels? If God's interpoſition, which ſhall be hereafter explain'd, dos alter the Caſe; did the Romans make Romulus, Numa, Tullus Hoſtilius, and Tarquinius Priſcus Kings? or did they make or beget the Romans? If they were made Kings by the Romans, 'tis certain they that made them ſought their own good in ſo doing; and if they were made by and for the City and People, I deſire to know if it was not better, that when their Succeſſors departed from the End of their Inſtitution, by en⯑deavouring to deſtroy it, or all that was good in it, they ſhould be cen⯑ſur'd and ejected, than be permitted to ruin that People for whoſe good they were created? Was it more juſt that Caligula or Nero ſhould be ſuf⯑fer'd to deſtroy the poor Remains of the Roman Nobility and People, with the Nations ſubject to that Empire, than that the Race of ſuch Monſters [5] ſhould be extinguiſh'd, and a great part of Mankind, eſpecially the beſt, againſt whom they were moſt fierce, preſerv'd by their Death?

I preſume our Author thought theſe Queſtions might be eaſily decided; and that no more was requir'd to ſhew the foremention'd Aſſertions were not at all deſperate, than to examin the Grounds of them; but he ſeeks to divert us from this enquiry, by propoſing the dreadful Conſequences of ſubjecting Kings to the Cenſures of their People: whereas no Conſequence can deſtroy any Truth; and the worſt of this is, That if it were receiv'd, ſome Princes might be reſtrain'd from doing Evil, or puniſh'd if they will not be reſtrain'd. We are therefore only to conſider whether the People, Senat, or any Magiſtracy made by and for the People, have, or can have ſuch a Right; for if they have, whatſoever the Conſequences may be, it muſt ſtand: And as the one tends to the Good of Mankind in reſtraining the Luſts of wicked Kings; the other expoſes'em without Remedy to the Fury of the moſt ſavage of all Beaſts. I am not aſham'd in this to concur with Buchanan, Calvin, or Bellarmin; and without Envy leave to Filmer and his Aſſociats the Glory of maintaining the contrary.

But notwithſtanding our Author's averſion to Truth, he confeſſes, That Hayward, Blackwood, Barclay, and others who have bravely vindicated the Right of Kings in this Point, do with one conſent admit, as an unqueſtiona⯑ble Truth, and aſſent unto the natural Liberty and Equality of Mankind, not ſo much as once queſtioning or oppoſing it. And indeed I believe, that tho ſince the Sin of our firſt Parents the Earth has brought forth Briars and Brambles, and the Nature of Man has bin fruitful only in Vice and Wick⯑edneſs; neither the Authors he mentions, nor any others, have had impu⯑dence enough to deny ſuch evident Truth as ſeems to be planted in the Hearts of all Men; or to publiſh Doctrins ſo contrary to common Senſe, Virtue, and Humanity, till theſe Times. The production of Laud, Man⯑waring, Sibthorp, Hobbs, Filmer and Heylin, ſeems to have bin reſerv'd as an additional Curſe to compleat the Shame and Miſery of our Age and Country. Thoſe who had Wit and Learning, with ſomething of Inge⯑nuity and Modeſty, tho they believ'd that Nations might poſſibly make an ill uſe of their Power, and were very deſirous to maintain the Cauſe of Kings, as far as they could put any good colour upon it; yet never denied that ſome had ſuffer'd juſtly (which could not be, iſ there were no Pow⯑er of judging them) nor ever aſſerted any thing that might arm them with an irreſiſtible Power of doing miſchief, animate them to perſiſt in the moſt flagitious Courſes, with aſſurance of perpetual Impunity, or en⯑gage Nations in an inevitable neceſſity of ſuffering all manner of Outra⯑ges. They knew that the Actions of thoſe Princes who were not altoge⯑ther deteſtable, might be defended by particular Reaſons drawn from them, or the Laws of their Country; and would neither undertake the defence of ſuch as were abominable, nor bring Princes, to whom they wiſh'd well, into the odious extremity of juſtifying themſelves by Argu⯑ments that favour'd Caligula and Nero, as well as themſelves, and that muſt be taken for a Confeſſion, that they were as bad as could be ima⯑gin'd; ſince nothing could be ſaid for them that might not as well be ap⯑plied to the worſt that had bin, or could be. But Filmer, Heylin, and their Aſſociats, ſcorning to be reſtrain'd by ſuch conſiderations, boldly lay the Ax to the Root of the Tree, and rightly enough affirm, That the whole Fabrick of that which they call Popular Sedition would fall to the ground, if the Principle of natural Liberty were remov'd. And on the other hand it muſt be acknowledg'd that the whole Fabrick of Tyranny will [6] be much weaken'd, if we prove, That Nations have a right to make their own Laws, conſtitute their own Magiſtrats; and that ſuch as are ſo conſtituted, owe an account of their Actions to thoſe by whom, and for whom they are appointed.

SECT. III. Implicit Faith belongs to Fools, and Truth is comprehended by examin⯑ing Principles.

WHILST Filmer's buſineſs is to overthrow Liberty and Truth, he, in his Paſſage, modeſtly profeſſes not to meddle with Mysterys of State, or Arcana Imperii. He renounces thoſe Inquirys thro an implicit Faith, which never enter'd into the head of any but Fools, and ſuch as, thro a careleſneſs of the Point in queſtion, acted as if they were ſo. This is the Foundation of the Papal Power, and it can ſtand no longer than thoſe that compoſe the Roman Church can be perſuaded to ſubmit their Conſciences to the Word of the Prieſts, and eſteem themſelves diſcharg'd from the neceſſity of ſearching the Scriptures, in order to know whether the things that are told them are true of falſe. This may ſhew whether our Author or thoſe of Geneva do beſt agree with the Roman Doctrin. But his Inſtance is yet more ſottiſh than his Profeſſion: An Implicit Faith, ſays he, is given to the meaneſt Artificer. I wonder by whom! Who will wear a Shoo that hurts him, becauſe the Shoo-maker tells him 'tis well made? or who will live in a Houſe that yields no defence againſt the ex⯑tremitys of Weather, becauſe the Maſon or Carpenter aſſures him 'tis a very good Houſe? Such as have Reaſon, Underſtanding, or common Senſe, will, and ought to make uſe of it in thoſe things that concern themſelves and their Poſterity, and ſuſpect the Words of ſuch as are in⯑tereſted in deceiving or perſuading them not to ſee with their own Eyes, that they may be more eaſily deceiv'd. This Rule obliges us ſo far to ſearch into Matters of State, as to examin the Original Principles of Government in general, and of our own in particular. We cannot diſtin⯑guiſh Truth from Falſhood, Right from Wrong, or know what Obedi⯑ence we owe to the Magiſtrat, or what we may juſtly expect from him, unleſs we know what he is, why he is, and by whom he is made to be what he is. Theſe perhaps may be call'd Mysterys of State, and ſome would perſuade us they are to be eſteem'd Arcana; but whoſoever confeſſes him⯑ſelf to be ignorant of 'em, muſt acknowledg he is uncapable of giving any judgment upon things relating to the Superſtructure, and in ſo doing evidently ſhews to others, that they ought not at all to hearken to what he ſays.

His Argument to prove this is more admirable. If an Implicit Faith, ſays he, is given to the meaneſt Artificer in his Craft, much more to a Prince in the profound Secrets of Government. But where is the Conſequence? If I truſt to the judgment of an Artificer, or one of a more ingenuous Pro⯑feſſion, 'tis not becauſe he is of it, but becauſe I am perſuaded he dos well underſtand it, and that he will be ſaithful to me in things relating to his Art. I do not ſend for Lower or Micklethwait when I am ſick, nor ask the Advice of Maynard or Jones in a Suit of Law, becauſe the firſt are Phyſicians, and the other Lawyers; but becauſe I think them wiſe, learned, [7] diligent, and faithful, there being a multitude of others who go under the ſame name, whoſe Opinion I would never ask. Therefore if any Concluſion can be drawn from thence in favour of Princes, it muſt be of ſuch as have all the Qualitys of Ability and Integrity, that ſhould create this confidence in me; or it muſt be prov'd that all Princes, in as much as they are Princes, have ſuch Qualitys. No general Concluſion can be drawn from the firſt Caſe, becauſe it muſt depend upon the Circum⯑ſtances, which ought to be particularly prov'd: And if the other be aſ⯑ſerted, I deſire to know whether Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Vitellius, Do⯑mitian, Commodus, Heliogabalus, and others not unlike to them, had thoſe admirable Endowments, upon which an Implicit Faith ought to have bin grounded; how they came by them; and whether we have any Promiſe from God, that all Princes ſhould for ever excel in thoſe Vertues, or whe⯑ther by experience we find that they do ſo. If they are or have bin want⯑ing in any, the whole falls to the ground; for no Man enjoys as a Prince that which is not common to all Princes: And if every Prince has not Wiſdom to underſtand theſe profound Secrets, Integrity to direct him, ac⯑cording to what he knows to be good, and a ſufficient meaſure of Indu⯑ſtry and Valour to protect me, he is not the Artificer to whom the Impli⯑cit Faith is due. His Eyes are as ſubject to dazle as my own. But 'tis a ſhame to inſiſt on ſuch a Point as this. We ſee Princes of all ſorts; they are born as other Men: The vileſt Flatterer dares not deny that they are wiſe or fooliſh, good or bad, valiant or cowardly, like other Men: and the Crown dos neither beſtow extraordinary Qualitys, ripen ſuch as are found in Princes ſooner than in the meaneſt, nor preſerve them from the decays of Age, Sickneſs, or other Accidents, to which all Men are ſubject. And if the greateſt King in the World falls into them, he is as uncapable of that myſterious Knowledg, and his Judgment is as little to be relied on, as that of the pooreſt Peaſant.

This Matter is not mended by ſending us to ſeek thoſe Vertues in the Miniſters, which are wanting in the Prince. The ill effects of Rehobo⯑am's Folly could not be corrected by the Wiſdom of Solomon's Counſel⯑lors: He rejected them; and ſuch as are like to him will always do the ſame thing. Nero advis'd with none but Muſicians, Players, Chariot⯑drivers, or the abominable Miniſters of his Pleaſures and Crueltys. Ar⯑cadius his Senat was chiefly compos'd of Buffoons and Cooks, influenc'd by an old raſcally Eunuch. And 'tis an eternal Truth, that a weak or wicked Prince can never chuſe a wiſe Council, nor receive any benefit by one that is impos'd upon him, unleſs they have a Power of acting with⯑out him, which would render the Government in effect Ariſtocratical, and would probably diſpleaſe our Author as much as if it were ſo in name alſo. Good and wiſe Counſellors do not grow up like Muſhrooms; great Judgment is requir'd in chuſing and preparing them. If a weak or vi⯑cious Prince ſhould be ſo happy to find them choſen to his hand, they would avail him nothing. There will ever be variety of Opinions a⯑mongſt 'em; and he that is of a perverted Judgment will always chuſe the worſe of thoſe that are propos'd, and favour the worſt Men, as moſt like to himſelf. Therefore if this Implicit Faith be grounded upon a ſup⯑poſition of profound Wiſdom in the Prince, the Foundation is over⯑thrown, and cannot ſtand; for to repoſe confidence in the Judgment and Integrity of one that has none, is the moſt brutiſh of all Follys. So that if a Prince may have or want the Qualitys, upon which my Faith in him can be rationally grounded, I cannot yield the Obedience he requires, un⯑leſs [8] I ſearch into the Secrets relating to his Perſon and Commands, which he forbids. I cannot know how to obey, unleſs I know in what, and to whom: Nor in what, unleſs I know what ought to be commanded: Nor what ought to be commanded, unleſs I underſtand the Original Right of the Commander, which is the great Arcanum. Our Author finding himſelf involv'd in many Difficultys, propoſes an Expedient as ridiculous as any thing that had gone before, being nothing more than an abſurd begging the main queſtion, and determining it without any ſhadow of proof. He enjoins an active or paſſive Obedience, before he ſhews what ſhould ob⯑lige or perſuade us to it. This indeed were a compendious way of obvia⯑ting that which he calls Popular Sedition, and of expoſing all Nations, that fall under the Power of Tyrants, to be deſtroy'd utterly by them. Nero or Domitian would have deſir'd no more, than that thoſe who would not execute their wicked Commands, ſhould patiently have ſuffer'd their Throats to be cut by ſuch as were leſs ſcrupulous: And the World that had ſuffer'd thoſe Monſters for ſome years, muſt have continu'd under their Fury, till all that was good and virtuous had bin aboliſh'd. But in thoſe Ages and Parts of the World, where there has bin any thing of Vertue and Goodneſs, we may obſerve a third ſort of Men, who would neither do Villanys, nor ſuffer more than the Laws did permit, or the conſideration of the publick Peace did require. Whilſt Tyrants with their Slaves, and the Inſtruments of their Crueltys, were accounted the Dregs of Mankind, and made the objects of deteſtation and ſcorn, theſe Men who deliver'd their Countrys from ſuch Plagues were thought to have ſomething of Divine in them, and have bin famous above all the reſt of Mankind to this day. Of this ſort were Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Thra⯑ſibulus, Harmodius, Ariſtogiton, Philopemen, Lucius Brutus, Publius Va⯑lerius, Marcus Brutus, C. Caſſius, M. Cato, with a multitude of others a⯑mongſt the antient Heathens. Such as were Inſtruments of the like De⯑liverances amongſt the Hebrews, as Moſes, Othniel, Ehud, Barac, Gideon, Sampſon, Jephtha, Samuel, David, Jehu, the Maccabees and others, have from the Scriptures a certain Teſtimony of the Righteouſneſs of their Proceedings, when they neither would act what was evil, nor ſuffer more than was reaſonable. But leſt we ſhould learn by their Examples, and the Praiſes given to them, our Author confines the Subject's choice to acting or ſuffering, that is, doing what is commanded, or lying down to have his Throat cut, or to ſee his Family and Country made deſolate. This he calls giving to Ceſar that which is Ceſar's; whereas he ought to have con⯑ſider'd that the Queſtion is not, whether that which is Ceſar's ſhould be render'd to him, for that is to be done to all Men; but who is Ceſar, and what doth of right belong to him, which he no way indicates to us: ſo that the Queſtion remains intire, as if he had never mention'd it, unleſs we do in a compendious way take his word for the whole.

SECT. IV. The Rights of particular Nations cannot ſubſiſt, if General Principles contrary to them are receiv'd as true.

NOtwithſtanding this, our Anthor, if we will believe him, dos not que⯑ſtion or quarrel at the Rights or Libertys of this or any other Nation. He only denies they can have any ſuch, in ſubjecting them neceſſarily and [9] univerſally to the will of one Man; and ſays not a word that is not ap⯑plicable to every Nation in the World, as well as to our own. But as the bitterneſs of his malice ſeems to be moſt eſpecially directed againſt Eng⯑land, I am inclin'd to believe he hurts other Countrys only by accident: as the famous The Marchi⯑oneſs of Brin⯑villiers. French Lady intended only to poiſon her Father, Husband, Brother, and ſome more of her neareſt Relations; but rather than they ſhould eſcape, deſtroy'd many other Perſons of Quality, who at ſeveral times din'd with them: and if that ought to excuſe her, I am content he alſo ſhould paſs uncenſur'd, tho his Crimes are incomparably greater than thoſe for which ſhe was condemn'd, or than any can be which are not of a publick extent.

SECT. V. To depend upon the Will of a Man is Slavery.

THis, as he thinks, is farther ſweeten'd, by aſſerting, that he dos not inquire what the Rights of a People are, but from whence; not conſidering, that whilſt he denies they can proceed from the Laws of natural Liberty, or any other Root than the Grace and Bounty of the Prince, he declares they can have none at all. For as Liberty ſolely con⯑ſiſts in an independency upon the Will of another, and by the name of Slave we underſtand a Man, who can neither diſpoſe of his Perſon nor Goods, but enjoys all at the will of his Maſter; there is no ſuch thing in nature as a Slave, if thoſe Men or Nations are not Slaves, who have no other title to what they enjoy, than the grace of the Prince, which he may revoke whenſoever he pleaſes. But there is more than ordinary Ex⯑travagance in his Aſſertion, That the greateſt Liberty in the World is for a People to live under a Monarch, when his whole Book is to prove, That this Monarch has his Right from God and Nature, is endow'd with an unlimited Power of doing what he pleaſes, and can be reſtrain'd by no Law. If it be Liberty to live under ſuch a Government, I deſire to know what is Slavery. It has bin hitherto believ'd in the World, that the Aſſy⯑rians, Medes, Arabs, Egyptians, Turks, and others like them, liv'd in Slavery, becauſe their Princes were Maſters of their Lives and Goods: Whereas the Grecians, Italians, Gauls, Germans, Spaniards, and Cartha⯑ginians, as long as they had any Strength, Vertue or Courage amongſt 'em, were eſteem'd free Nations, becauſe they abhor'd ſuch a Subjection. They were, and would be govern'd only by Laws of their own making: Potentiora erant Legum quam hominum Imperia. Even their Princes had the C. Tacit▪ Ibid. Authority or Credit of Perſuading, rather than the Power of Commanding. But all this was miſtaken: Theſe Men were Slaves, and the Aſiaticks were Freemen. By the ſame rule the Venetians, Switzers, Griſons, and Hol⯑landers, are not free Nations: but Liberty in its perfection is enjoy'd in France, and Turky. The Intention of our Anceſtors was, without doubt, to eſtabliſh this amongſt us by Magna Charta, and other preceding or ſub⯑ſequent Laws; but they ought to have added one clauſe, That the Con⯑tents of 'em ſhould be in ſorce only ſo long as it pleas'd the King. King Alfred, upon whoſe Laws Magna Charta was grounded, when he ſaid the Engliſh Nation was as free as the internal thoughts of a Man, did only mean, that it ſhould be ſo as long as it pleas'd their Maſter. This it ſeems [10] was the end of our Law, and we who are born under it, and are deſcend⯑ed from ſuch as have ſo valiantly defended their Rights againſt the En⯑croachments of Kings, have follow'd after vain ſhadows, and without the expence of Sweat, Treaſure, or Blood, might have ſecur'd our beloved Liberty, by caſting all into the King's hands.

We owe the diſcovery of theſe Secrets to our Author, who after having gravely declar'd 'em, thinks no offence ought to be taken at the freedom he aſſumes of examining things relating to the Liberty of Mankind, be⯑cauſe he has the Right which is common to all. But he ought to have conſider'd, that in aſſerting that Right to himſelf, he allows it to all Mankind. And as the temporal good of all Men conſiſts in the preſerva⯑tion of it, he declares himſelf to be their mortal Enemy, who endeavours to deſtroy it. If he were alive, this would deſerve to be anſwer'd with Stones rather than Words. He that oppugns the publick Liberty, over⯑throws his own, and is guilty of the moſt brutiſh of all Follys, whilſt he arrogates to himſelf that which he denies to all Men.

I cannot but commend his Modeſty and Care not to detract from the Worth of Learned Men; but it ſeems they were all ſubject to error, except himſelf, who is render'd infallible thro Pride, Ignorance, and Impudence. But if Hooker and Ariſtotle were wrong in their Fundamentals concerning natural Liberty, how could they be in the right when they built upon it? Or if they did miſtake, how can they deſerve to be cited? or rather, why is ſuch care taken to pervert their Senſe? It ſeems our Author is by their Errors brought to the knowledg of the Truth. Men have heard of a Dwarf ſtanding on the Shoulders of a Giant, who ſaw farther than the Giant; but now that the Dwarf ſtanding on the Ground ſees that which the Giant did overlook, we muſt learn from him. If there be Senſe in this, the Giant muſt be blind, or have ſuch eyes only as are of no uſe to him. He minded only the things that were far from him: Theſe Great and Learned Men miſtook the very Principle and Foundation of all their Doctrin. If we believe our Author, this misfortune befel them, becauſe they too much truſted to the Schoolmen. He names Ariſtotle, and I preſume intends to comprehend Plato, Plutarch, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and all the antient Grecians, Italians, and others, who aſſerted the natural Free⯑dom of Mankind, only in imitation of the Schoolmen, to advance the Power of the Pope; and would have compaſt their deſign, if Filmer and his Aſſociats had not oppos'd 'em. Theſe Men had taught us to make the unnatural Diſtinction between Royaliſt and Patriot; and kept us from ſeeing, That the relation between King and People is ſo great that their well-being is reciprocal. If this be true, how came Tarquin to think it good for him to continue King at Rome, when the People would turn him out? or the People to think it good for them to turn him out, when he deſir'd to continue in? Why did the Syracuſians deſtroy the Tyranny of Dionyſius, which he was not willing to leave, till he was pull'd out by the heels? How could Nero think of burning Rome? Or why did Caligula wiſh the People had but one Neck, that he might ſtrike it off at one blow, if their Welſare was thus reciprocal? 'Tis not enough to ſay, Theſe were wicked or mad Men; for other Princes may be ſo alſo, and there may be the ſame reaſon of differing from them. For if the Propoſition be not univerſally true, 'tis not to be receiv'd as true in relation to any, till it be particularly prov'd; and then 'tis not to be imputed to the Quality of Prince, but to the perſonal Vertue of the Man.

[11] I do not find any great matters in the paſſages taken out of Bellarmin, which, our Author ſays, comprehend the ſtrength of all that ever he had heard, read, or ſeen produc'd for the natural Liberty of the Subject: but he not mentioning where they are to be found, I do not think my ſelf oblig'd to examin all his Works, to ſee whether they are rightly cited or not; however there is certainly nothing new in them: We ſee the ſame, as to the ſubſtance, in thoſe who wrote many Ages before him, as well as in many that have liv'd ſince his time, who neither minded him, nor what he had written. I dare not take upon me to give an account of his Works, having read few of them; but as he ſeems to have laid the Foundation of his Diſcourſes in ſuch common Notions as were aſſented to by all Mankind, thoſe who follow the ſame method have no more regard to Jeſuitiſm and Popery, tho he was a Jeſuit and a Cardinal, than they who agree with Faber and other Jeſuits in the Principles of Geome⯑try, which no ſober Man did ever deny.

SECT. VI. God leaves to Man the choice of Forms in Government; and thoſe who conſtitute one Form, may abrogate it.

BUT Sir Robert deſires to make Obſervations on Bellarmin's words, before he examins or refutes them; and indeed it were not poſſible to make ſuch ſtuff of his Doctrin as he dos, if he had examin'd or did underſtand it. Firſt, he very wittily concludes, That if by the Law of God, the Power be immediatly in the People, God is the Author of a Democracy: And why not as well as of a Tyranny? Is there any thing in it repugnant to the Being of God? Is there more reaſon to impute to God Caligula's Monarchy, than the Democracy of Athens? Or is it more for the Glory of God, to aſſert his Preſence with the Ottoman or French Monarchs, than with the popular Governments of the Switſers and Griſons? Is Pride, Malice, Luxury and Violence ſo ſutable to his Being, that they who exerciſe them are to be reputed his Miniſters? And is Modeſty, Humility, Equality, and Juſtice ſo contrary to his Nature, that they who live in them ſhould be thought his Enemys? Is there any abſurdity in ſaying, that ſince God in Goodneſs and Mercy to Mankind, has with an equal hand given to all the Benefit of Liberty, with ſome meaſure of underſtanding how to employ it, 'tis lawful for any Nation, as occaſion ſhall require, to give the Exerciſe of that Power to one or more Men, under certain Limitations or Conditions; or to retain it in themſelves, if they think it good for them? If this may be done, we are at the end of all Controverſys concerning one Form of Government eſtabliſh'd by God, to which all Mankind muſt ſubmit; and we may ſafely conclude, that having given to all Men in ſome degree a Capacity of judging what is good for themſelves, he has granted to all likewiſe a Liberty of inventing ſuch Forms as pleaſe them beſt, without favouring one more than another.

His ſecond Obſervation is grounded upon a Falſity in matter of Fact. Bellarmin dos not ſay, that Democracy is an Ordinance of God more than any other Government; nor that the People have no Power to make uſe of their Right; but that they do, that is to ſay ordinarily, tranſmit the Exerciſe of it to one or more. And 'tis certain they do ſometimes, [12] eſpecially in ſmall Citys, retain it in themſelves: But whether that were obſerv'd or not by Bellarmin, makes nothing to our Cauſe, which we defend, and not him.

The next Point is ſubtile, and he thinks thereby to have brought Bel⯑arrmin, and ſuch as agree with his Principle, to a Nonplus. He doubts who ſhall judg of the lawful cauſe of changing the Govern⯑ment, and ſays, It is a peſtilent Concluſion to place that Power in the Multitude. But why ſhould this be eſteem'd peſtilent? or to whom? If the allowance of ſuch a Power to the Senat was peſtilent to Ne⯑ro, it was beneficial to Mankind; and the denial of it, which would have given to Nero an opportunity of continuing in his Villanys, would have bin peſtilent to the beſt of Men, whom he endea⯑vour'd to deſtroy, and to all others that receiv'd benefit from them. But this Queſtion depends upon another; for if Governments are con⯑ſtituted for the Pleaſure, Greatneſs or Profit of one Man, he muſt not be interrupted; for the oppoſing of his Will, is to overthrow the Inſti⯑tution. On the other ſide, if the Good of the Governed be ſought, care muſt be taken that the End be accompliſh'd, tho it be with the prejudice of the Governor: If the Power be originally in the Multitude, and one or more Men, to whom the exerciſe of it, or a part of it was committed, had no more than their Brethren, till it was confer'd on him or them, it cannot be believ'd that rational Creatures would advance one or a few of their Equals above themſelves, unleſs in conſideration of their own Good; and then I find no inconvenience in leaving to them a right of judging, Cujus eſt in⯑ſtituere, ejus eſt abrogate.whether this be duly perform'd or not. We ſay in general, He that inſti⯑tutes, may alſo abrogate, moſt eſpecially when the Inſtitution is not only by, but for himſelf. If the Multitude therefore do inſtitute, the Multitude may abrogate; and they themſelves, or thoſe who ſucceed in the ſame Right, can only be fit Judges of the performance of the Ends of the Inſtitu⯑tion. Our Author may perhaps ſay, The publick Peace may be hereby diſturb'd: but he ought to know, There can be no Peace, where there is no Juſtice; nor any Juſtice, if the Government inſtituted for the good of a Nation be turn'd to its ruin. But in plain Engliſh, the Inconveni⯑ence with which ſuch as he endeavour to afright us, is no more than that He or They, to whom the Power is given, may be reſtrain'd or chaſtis'd, if they betray their Truſt; which I preſume will diſpleaſe none, but ſuch as would rather ſubject Rome with the beſt part of the World depending on it, to the Will of Caligula or Nero, than Caligula or Nero to the Judg⯑ment of the Senat and People; that is, rather to expoſe many great and brave Nations to be deſtroy'd by the rage of a ſavage Beaſt, than ſubject that Beaſt to the Judgment of all, or the choiceſt Men of them, who can have no intereſt to pervert them, or other reaſon to be ſevere to him, than to prevent the Miſchiefs he would commit, and to ſave the People from ruin.

In the next place he recites an Argument of Bellarmin, That 'tis evident in Scripture God has ordain'd Powers; but God has given them to no particu⯑lar Perſon, becauſe by Nature all Men are equal; therefore he has given Power to the People or Multitude. I leave him to untie that Knot if he can; but, as 'tis uſual with Impoſtors, he goes about by Surmiſes to elude the Force of this Argument, pretending that in ſome other place he had contradict⯑ed himſelf, and acknowledg'd that every Man was Prince of his Poſteri⯑ty; becauſe that if many Men had bin created together, they ought all to have bin Princes of their Poſterity. But 'tis not neceſſary to argue upon Paſſages [13] cited from Authors, when he that cites 'em may be juſtly ſuſpected of Fraud, and neither indicates the Place nor Treatiſe, leſt it ſhould be de⯑tected; moſt eſpecially when we are no way concern'd in the Author's Credit. I take Bellarmin's Argument to be ſtrong; and if he in ſome place did contradict it, the hurt is only to himſelf: but in this particular I ſhould not think he did it, tho I were ſure our Author had faithfully repeated his words; for in allowing every Man to be Prince of his Poſterity, he only ſays, every Man ſhould be chief in his own Family, and have a Power over his Children, which no man denies: But he dos not underſtand La⯑tin, who thinks the word Princeps doth in any degree ſignify an abſolute Power, or a right of tranſmitting it to his Heirs and Succeſſors, upon which the Doctrin of our Author wholly depends. On the contrary, The ſame Law that gave to my Father a Power over me, gives me the like over my Children; and if I had a thouſand Brothers, each of them would have the ſame over their Children. Bellarmin's Argument there⯑fore being no way enervated by the alledg'd Paſſage, I may juſtly inſiſt upon it, and add, That God has not only declar'd in Scripture, but written on the Heart of every Man, that as it is better to be cloth'd, than to go naked; to live in a Houſe, than to lie in the Fields; to be defended by the united Force of a Multitude, than to place the hopes of his Security ſolely in his own ſtrength; and to prefer the Benefits of Society, before a ſa⯑vage and barbarous Solitude: he has alſo taught them to frame ſuch So⯑cietys, and to eſtabliſh ſuch Laws as were neceſſary to preſerve them. And we may as reaſonably affirm, that Mankind is for ever oblig'd to uſe no other Clothes than leather Breeches, like Adam; to live in hollow Trees, and eat Acorns, or to ſeek after the Model of his Houſe for a Ha⯑bitation, and to uſe no Arms except ſuch as were known to the Patriarchs; as to think all Nations for ever oblig'd to be govern'd as they govern'd their Familys. This I take to be the genuin ſenſe of the Scripture, and the moſt reſpectful way of interpreting the Places relating to our purpoſe. 'Tis hard to imagin, that God who has left all things to our choice, that are not evil in themſelves, ſhould tie us up in this; and utterly incredible that he ſhould impoſe upon us a neceſſity of following his Will, without declaring it to us. Inſtead of conſtituting a Government over his People, conſiſting of many Parts, which we take to be a Model fit to be imitated by others, he might have declar'd in a word, That the eldeſt Man of the eldeſt Line ſhould be King; and that his Will ought to be their Law. This had bin more ſutable to the Goodneſs and Mercy of God, than to leave us in a dark Labyrinth, full of Precipices; or rather, to make the Government given to his own People, a falſe Light to lead us to deſtructi⯑on. This could not be avoided, if there were ſuch a thing as our Author calls a Lord Paramount over his Childrens Children to all Generations. We ſee nothing in Scripture, of Precept or Example, that is not utterly ab⯑horrent to this Chimera. The only ſort of Kings mention'd there with approbation, is ſuch a one as may not raiſe his Heart above his Brethren. Deut. 17. If God had conſtituted a Lord Paramount with an abſolute Power, and mul⯑titudes of Nations were to labour and fight for his Greatneſs and Pleaſure, this were to raiſe his Heart to a height, that would make him forget he was a Man. Such as are vers'd in Scripture, not only know that it neither agrees with the Letter or Spirit of that Book; but that it is unrea⯑ſonable in it ſelf, unleſs he were of a Species different from the reſt of Mankind. His exaltation would not agree with God's Indulgence to his Creatures, tho he were the better for it; much leſs when probably he [14] would be made more unhappy, and worſe, by the Pride, Luxury and other Vices, that always attend the higheſt Fortunes. 'Tis no leſs incre⯑dible that God, who diſpoſes all things in Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and ap⯑points a due Place for all, ſhould, without diſtinction, ordain ſuch a Power, to every one ſucceeding in ſuch a Line, as cannot be executed; the Wiſe would refuſe, and Fools cannot take upon 'em the burden of it, without ruin to themſelves, and ſuch as are under them: or expoſe Man⯑kind to a multitude of other Abſurditys and Miſchiefs; ſubjecting the Aged to be govern'd by Children; the Wiſe to depend on the Will of Fools; the Strong and Valiant, to expect defence from the Weak or Cowardly; and all in general to receive Juſtice from him, who neither knows nor cares for it.

SECT. VII. Abraham and the Patriarchs were not Kings.

IF any Man ſay, that we are not to ſeek into the depth of God's Coun⯑ſels; I anſwer, That if he had, for Reaſons known only to himſelf, affix'd ſuch a Right to any one Line, he would have ſet a Mark upon thoſe who come of it, that Nations might know to whom they owe Sub⯑jection; or given ſome teſtimony of his Preſence with Filmer and Heylin, if he had ſent them to reveal ſo great a Myſtery. Till that be done, we may ſafely look upon them as the worſt of Men, and teachers only of Lies and Follys. This perſuades me little, to examin what would have bin, if God had it once created many Men, or the Concluſions that can be drawn from Adam's having bin alone. For nothing can be more evident than that if many had bin created, they had bin all equal, unleſs God had given a Preference to one. All their Sons had inherited the ſame Right after their death; and no Dream was ever more empty, than his Whimſy of Adam's Kingdom, or that of the enſuing Patriarchs. To ſay the truth, 'tis hard to ſpeak ſeriouſly of Abraham's Kingdom, or to think any Man to be in earneſt who mentions it. He was a Stranger, and a Pilgrim in the Land where he liv'd, and pretended to no Authority beyond his own Family, which conſiſted only of a Wife and Slaves. He liv'd with Lot as with his Equal, and would have no Conteſt with him, becauſe they were Brethren. His Wife and Servants could neither make up, nor be any part of a Kingdom, in as much as the deſpotical Government, both in Practice and Principle, differs from the Regal. If his Kingdom was to be grounded on the Paternal Right, it vaniſh'd away of it ſelf; he had no Child: Eliezer of Damaſcus, for want of a better, was to be his Heir: Lot, tho his Nephew, was excluded: He durſt not own his own Wife: He had not one foot of Land, till he bought a Field for a burying-place: His three hundred and eighteen Men were Servants, (bought according to the cuſtom of thoſe days) or their Children; and the War he made with them, was like to Gideon's Enterprize; which ſhews only that God can ſave by a few as well as by many, but makes nothing to our Author's purpoſe. For if they had bin as many in number as the Army of Semira⯑mis, they could have no relation to the Regal, much leſs to the Paternal Power; for a Father dos not buy, but beget Children.

[15] Notwithſtanding this, our Author beſtows the proud Title of Lord Pa⯑ramount upon him, and tranſmits it to Iſaac, who was indeed a King like his Father, great, admirable, and glorious in Wiſdom and Holineſs, but utterly void of all worldly ſplendor or power. This ſpiritual Kingdom was inherited by Jacob, whoſe Title to it was not founded on Prerogative of Birth, but Election and peculiar Grace; but he never enjoy'd any other worldly Inheritance, than the Field and Cave which Abraham had bought for a burying-place, and the Goods he had gain'd in Laban's Service.

The Example of Judah his Sentence upon Thamar is yet farther from the purpoſe, if it be poſſible; for he was then a Member of a privat Fa⯑mily, the fourth Son of a Father then living; neither in poſſeſſion, nor under the promiſe of the Privileges of Primogeniture, tho Ruben, Simeon and Levi fell from it by their Sins. Whatſoever therefore the Right was, which belong'd to the Head of the Family, it muſt have bin in Jacob; but as he profeſt himſelf a keeper of Sheep, as his Fathers had bin, the exerciſe of that Employment was ſo far from Regal, that it deſerves no explication. If that Act of Judah is to be imputed to a Royal Power, I have as much as I ask: He, tho living with his Father, and elder Bro⯑thers, when he came to be of Age to have Children, had the ſame Power over ſuch, as were of, or came into his Family, as his Father had over him; for none can go beyond the Power of Life and Death: The ſame in the utmoſt extent, cannot at the ſame time equally belong to many. If it be divided equally, it is no more than that Univerſal Liberty which God has given to Mankind; and every Man is a King till he deveſts him⯑ſelf of his Right, in conſideration of ſomething that he thinks better for him.

SECT. VIII. Nimrod was the firſt King, during the Life of Chuſh, Cham, Shem, and Noah.

THE Creation is exactly deſcrib'd in the Scripture; but we know ſo little of what paſt between the finiſhing of it and the Flood, that our Author may ſay what he pleaſes, and I may leave him to ſeek his Proofs where he can find them. In the mean time I utterly deny, that any Power did remain in the Heads of Familys after the Flood, that dos in the leaſt degree reſemble the Regal in Principle or Practice. If in this I am miſtaken, ſuch Power muſt have bin in Noah, and tranſmitted to one of his Sons. The Scripture ſays only, that he built an Altar, ſacri⯑fic'd to the Lord, was a Husbandman, planted a Vineyard, and per⯑form'd ſuch Offices as bear nothing of the Image of a King, for the ſpace of three hundred and fifty Years. We have reaſon to believe, that his Sons after his Death continu'd in the ſame manner of Life, and the Equality properly belonging to Brethren. 'Tis not eaſy to determin, whether Shem or Japhet were the Elder; but Ham is declar'd to be the younger: Gen. 9.and Noah's Bleſſing to Shem ſeems to be purely Prophetical and Spiritual, of what ſhould be accompliſh'd in his Poſterity; with which Japhet ſhould be perſuaded to join. If it had bin worldly, the whole Earth muſt have bin brought under him, and have for ever continu'd in his Race, which never was accompliſh'd, otherwiſe than in the Spiritual Kingdom of [16] Chriſt, which relates not to our Author's Lord Paramount.

As to earthly Kings, the firſt of 'em was Nimrod, the ſixth Son of Chuſh the Son of Ham, Noah's younger and accurſed Son. This Kingdom was ſet up about a hundred and thirty Years after the Flood, whilſt Chuſh, Ham, Shem and Noah were yet living: whereas if there were any thing of Truth in our Author's Propoſition, all Mankind muſt have continu'd under the Government of Noah whilſt he liv'd; and that Power muſt have bin tranſmitted to Shem, who liv'd about three hundred and ſeventy Years after the erection of Nimrod's Kingdom; and muſt have come to Japhet if he was the Elder, but could never come to Cham, who is de⯑clar'd to have bin certainly the Younger, and condemn'd to be a Ser⯑vant to them both; much leſs to the younger Son of his Son, whilſt he, and thoſe to whom he and his Poſterity were to be Subjects, were ſtill living.

This Rule therefore, which the Partizans of Abſolute Monarchy fancy to be univerſal and perpetual, falling out in its firſt beginning, directly con⯑trary to what they aſſert; and being never known to have bin recover'd, were enough to ſilence them, if they had any thing of modeſty or regard to Truth. But the matter may be carried farther: For the Scripture not only teſtifys, that this Kingdom of Nimrod was an Uſurpation, void of all Right, proceeding from the moſt violent and miſchievous Vices, but exercis'd with the utmoſt fury, that the moſt wicked Man of the accurſed Race, who ſet himſelf up againſt God, and all that is good, could be capable of. The progreſs of this Kingdom was ſutable to its Inſtitution: that which was begun in wickedneſs, was carried on with madneſs, and pro⯑duc'd Confuſion. The mighty Hunter, whom the beſt Interpreters call a cruel Tyrant, receding from the ſimplicity and innocence of the Patriarchs, who were Husbandmen or Shepherds, arrogating to himſelf a Domi⯑nion over Shem, to whom he and his Fathers were to be Servants, did thereby ſo peculiarly become the Heir of God's Curſe, that whatſoever has bin ſaid to this day, of the Power that did moſt directly ſet it ſelf againſt God and his People, has related literally to the Babel that he built, or figuratively to that which reſembles it in Pride, Cruelty, Injuſtice and Madneſs.

But the ſhameleſs rage of ſome of theſe Writers is ſuch, that they ra⯑ther chuſe to aſcribe the beginning of their Idol to this odious Violence, than to own it from the conſent of a willing People; as if they thought, that as all Action muſt be ſutable to its Principle, ſo that which is unjuſt in its practice, ought to ſcorn to be deriv'd from that which is not deteſta⯑ble in its principle. 'Tis hardly worth our pains to examin whether the Nations, that went from Babel after the confuſion of Languages, were more or leſs than ſeventy two, for they ſeem not to have gone according to Familys, but every one to have aſſociated himſelf to thoſe that un⯑derſtood his Speech; and the chief of the Fathers, as Noah and his Sons, were not there, or were ſubject to Nimrod; each of which Points doth deſtroy, even in the Root, all pretence to Paternal Government. Be⯑ſides, 'tis evident in Scripture, that Noah liv'd three hundred and fifty Years after the Flood; Shem five hundred; Abraham was born about two hundred and ninety Years after the Flood, and liv'd one hundred ſeventy five Years: He was therefore born under the Government of Noah, and died under that of Shem: He could not therefore exerciſe a regal Power whilſt he liv'd, for that was in Shem: So that in leaving his Country, and ſetting up a Family for himſelf, that never acknowledg'd any Supe⯑rior, and never pretending to reign over any other, he fully ſhew'd he [17] thought himſelf free, and to owe ſubjection to none: And being as far from arrogating to himſelf any Power upon the Title of Paternity, as from acknowledging it in any other, left every one to the ſame liberty.

The punctual enumeration of the Years that the Fathers of the holy Seed lived, gives us ground of making a more than probable conjecture, that they of the collateral Lines were, in number of days, not unequal to them; and if that be true, Ham and Chuſh were alive when Nimrod ſet himſelf up to be King. He muſt therefore have uſurp'd this Power over his Father, Grandfather, and great Grandfather; or, which is more probable, he turn'd into Violence and Oppreſſion the Power given him by a Multi⯑tude; which, like a Flock without a Shepherd, not knowing whom to obey, ſet him up to be their Chief. I leave to our Author the liberty of chuſing which of theſe two dos beſt ſute with his Paternal Monarchy; but as far as I can underſtand, the firſt is directly againſt it, as well as againſt the Laws of God and Man; the other being from the conſent of the Mul⯑titude, cannot be extended farther than they would have it, nor turn'd to their prejudice, without the moſt abominable ingratitude and treache⯑ry, from whence no Right can be deriv'd, nor any juſtifiable Example taken.

Nevertheleſs, if our Author reſolve that Abraham was alſo a King, he muſt preſume that Shem did emancipate him, before he went to ſeek his Fortune. This was not a Kingly poſture; but I will not contradict him, if I may know over whom he reign'd. Paternal Monarchy is exercis'd by the Father of the Family over his Deſcendents, or ſuch as had bin under the Dominion of him whoſe Heir he is. But Abraham had neither of theſe: Thoſe of his neareſt Kindred continu'd in Meſopotamia, as ap⯑pears by what is ſaid of Bethuel and Laban. He had only Lot with him, over whom he pretended no right: He had no Children till he was a hundred Years old, (that is to ſay, he was a King without a Subject) and then he had but one. I have heard that Omniſque poteſtas im⯑patiens con⯑ſortis erit. Lucan. Sovereigns do impatiently bear Competitors; but now I find Subjection alſo doth admit of none. A⯑braham's Kingdom was too great when he had two Children; and to diſ⯑burden it, Iſhmael muſt be expel'd ſoon aſter the birth of Iſaac. He ob⯑ſerv'd the ſame method after the death of Sarah: He had Children by Keturah; but he gave them Gifts and ſent 'em away, leaving Iſaac like a Stoical King reigning in and over himſelf, without any other Subject till the birth of Jacob and Eſau. But his Kingdom was not to be of a larger extent than that of his Father: The two Twins could not agree: Jacob was ſent away by his Mother; he reign'd over Eſau only, and 'tis not eaſy to determin who was the Heir of his worldly Kingdom; for tho Jacob had the birth-right, we do not find he had any other Goods than what he had gotten in Laban's ſervice. If our Author ſay true, the right of Primogeniture, with the Dominion perpetually annex'd by the Laws of God and Nature, muſt go to the eldeſt: Iſaac therefore, tho he had not bin deceiv'd, could not have conſer'd it upon the younger; for Man cannot overthrow what God and Nature have inſtituted. Jacob, in the Court-Language, had bin a double Rebel, in beguiling his Father, and ſupplanting his Brother: The bleſſing of being Lord over his Brethren, could not have taken place. Or if Iſaac had Power, and his Act was good, the Prerogative of the Elder is not rooted in the Law of God or Nature, but is a matter of conveniency only, which may be chang'd at the Will of the Father, whether he know what he dos or not. But if this Paternal Right to Dominion were of any value, or Dominion over Men [18] were a thing to be deſir'd; why did Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob, content themſelves with ſuch a narrow Territory, when after the death of their Anceſtors, they ought, according to that rule, to have bin Lords of the World? All Authors conclude that Shem was the eldeſt by birth, or pre⯑fer'd by the appointment of God, ſo as the Right muſt have bin in him, and from him tranſmitted to Abraham and Iſaac: but if they were ſo poſ⯑ſeſt with the contemplation of a Heavenly Kingdom, as not to care for the greateſt on Earth; 'tis ſtrange that Eſau, whoſe modeſty is not much commended, ſhould ſo far forget his Intereſt, as neither to lay claim to the Empire of the World, nor diſpute with his Brother the poſſeſſion of the Field and Cave bought by Abraham, but rather to fight for a dwel⯑ling on Mount Seir, that was neither poſſeſt by, nor promis'd to his Fa⯑thers. If he was fallen from his Right, Jacob might have claim'd it; but God was his Inheritance, and being aſſur'd of his Bleſſing, he contented himſelf with what he could gain by his Induſtry, in a way that was not at all ſutable to the Pomp and Majeſty of a King. Which way ſoever therefore the buſineſs be turn'd, whether, according to Iſaac's Bleſſing, Eſau ſhould ſerve Jacob, or to our Author's opinion, Jacob muſt ſerve Eſau, neither of the two was effected in their Perſons: And the King⯑dom of two being divided into two, each of them remain'd Lord of him⯑ſelf.

SECT. IX. The Power of a Father belongs only to a Father.

THIS leads us to an eaſy determination of the Queſtion, which our Author thinks inſoluble; If Adam was Lord of his Children, he dos not ſee how any can be free from the ſubjection of his Parents. For as no good Man will ever deſire to be free from the reſpect that is due to his Father, who did beget and educate him, no wiſe Man will ever think the like to be due to his Brother or Nephew that did neither. If Eſau and Jacob were equally free; if Noah, as our Author affirms, divided Europe, Aſia, and Africa, amongſt his three Sons, tho he can't prove it; and if ſe⯑venty two Nations under ſo many Heads or Kings went from Babylon to people the Earth, about a hundred and thirty years after the Flood, I know not why, according to the ſame rule and proportion, it may not be ſafely concluded, that in four thouſand years Kings are ſo multiplied, as to be in number equal to the Men that are in the World; that is to ſay, they are, according to the Laws of God and Nature, all free, and inde⯑pendent upon each other, as Shem, Ham, and Japhet were. And there⯑fore, tho Adam and Noah had reign'd alone when there were no Men in the World except ſuch as iſſu'd from them, that is no reaſon why any o⯑ther ſhould reign over thoſe that he has not begotten. As the Right of Noah was divided amongſt the Children he leſt, and when he was dead, no one of them depended on the other, becauſe no one of them was Fa⯑ther of the other; and the Right of a Father can only belong to him that is ſo, the like muſt for ever attend every other Father in the World. This paternal Power muſt neceſſarily accrue to every Father: He is a King by the ſame Right as the Sons of Noah; and how numerous ſoever Familys may be upon the increaſe of Mankind, they are all free, till they agree [19] to recede from their own Right, and join together in, or under one Go⯑vernment, according to ſuch Laws as beſt pleaſe themſelves.

SECT. X. Such as enter into Society, muſt in ſome degree diminiſh their Liberty.

REASON leads them to this: No one Man or Family is able to provide that which is requiſite for their convenience or ſecurity, whilſt every one has an equal Right to every thing, and none acknow⯑ledges a Superior to determin the Controverſys, that upon ſuch occaſions muſt continually ariſe, and will probably be ſo many and great, that Man⯑kind cannot bear them. Therefore tho I do not believe that Bellarmin ſaid, a Commonwealth could not exerciſe its Power; for he could not be ignorant, that Rome and Athens did exerciſe theirs, and that all the Regular Kingdoms in the World are Commonwealths: yet there is no⯑thing of abſurdity in ſaying, That Man cannot continue in the perpetual and intire fruition of the Liberty that God has given him. The Liberty of one is thwarted by that of another; and whilſt they are all equal, none will yield to any, otherwiſe than by a general conſent. This is the ground of all juſt Governments; for Violence or Fraud can create no Right; and the ſame conſent gives the Form to them all, how much ſoever they differ from each other. Some ſmall numbers of Men, living within the Pre⯑cincts of one City, have, as it were, caſt into a common Stock, the Right which they had of governing themſelves and Children; and by common Conſent joining in one body, exercis'd ſuch Power over every ſingle Perſon as ſeem'd beneficial to the whole: and this Men call perfect Democracy. Others choſe rather to be govern'd by a ſelect number of ſuch as moſt excell'd in Wiſdom and Vertue; and this, according to the ſig⯑nification of the word, was call'd Ariſtocracy: Or when one Man excell'd all others, the Government was put into his hands under the name of Mo⯑narchy. But the wiſeſt, beſt, and far the greateſt part of Mankind, re⯑jecting theſe ſimple Species, did form Governments mix'd or compos'd of the three, as ſhall be prov'd hereafter, which commonly receiv'd their reſpective Denomination from the Part that prevail'd, and did deſerve praiſe or blame, as they were well or ill proportion'd.

It were a ſolly hereupon to ſay, that the Liberty for which we contend, is of no uſe to us, ſince we cannot endure the Solitude, Barbarity, Weak⯑neſs, Want, Miſery and Dangers that accompany it whilſt we live alone, nor can enter into a Society without reſigning it; for the choice of that So⯑ciety, and the liberty of framing it according to our own Wills, for our own good, is all we ſeek. This remains to us whilſt we ſorm Govern⯑ments, that we our ſelves are Judges how far 'tis good for us to recede ſrom our natural Liberty; which is of ſo great importance, that from thence only we can know whether we are Freemen or Slaves: and the difference between the beſt Government and the worſt, dos wholly de⯑pend upon a right or wrong exerciſe of that Power. If Men are naturally free, ſuch as have Wiſdom and Underſtanding will always frame good Governments: But if they are born under the neceſſity of a perpetual Slavery, no Wiſdom can be of uſe to them; but all muſt for ever depend on the Will of their Lords, how cruel, mad, proud or wicked ſoever they be.

SECT. XI. No Man comes to command many, unleſs by Conſent or by Force.

BUT becauſe I cannot believe God has created Man in ſuch a ſtate of Miſery and Slavery as I juſt now mention'd; by diſcovering the vanity of our Author's whimſical Patriarchical Kingdom, I am led to a certain concluſion, That every Father of a Family is free and exempt from the domination of any other, as the ſeventy two that went from Babel were. 'Tis hard to comprehend how one Man can come to be maſter of many, equal to himſelf in Right, unleſs it be by Conſent or by Force. If by Conſent, we are at an end of our Controverſys: Governments, and the Magiſtrats that execute them, are created by Man. They who give a being to them, cannot but have a right of regulating, limiting and di⯑recting them as beſt pleaſes themſelves; and all our Author's Aſſertions concerning the abſolute Power of one Man, fall to the ground: If by Force, we are to examin how it can be poſſible or juſtifiable. This ſub⯑duing by Force we call Conqueſt; but as he that forces muſt be ſtronger than thoſe that are forc'd, to talk of one Man who in ſtrength exceeds many millions of Men, is to go beyond the extravagance of Fables and Romances. This Wound is not cur'd by ſaying, that he firſt conquers one, and then more, and with their help others: for as to matter of fact, the firſt news we hear of Nimrod is, that he reign'd over a great multi⯑tude, and built vaſt Citys; and we know of no Kingdom in the World, that did not begin with a greater number than any one Man could poſſibly ſubdue. If they who chuſe one to be their Head, did under his conduct ſubdue others, they were Fellow-conquerors with him; and nothing can be more brutiſh, than to think, that by their Vertue and Valour they had purchas'd perpetual Slavery to themſelves and their Poſterity. But if it were poſſible, it could not be juſtifiable; and whilſt our Diſpute is con⯑cerning Right, that which ought not to be is no more to be receiv'd, than if it could not be. No Right can come by conqueſt, unleſs there were a Right of making that Conqueſt, which, by reaſon of the Equality that our Author confeſſes to have bin amongſt the Heads of Familys, and as I have prov'd goes into Infinity, can never be on the Aggreſſor's ſide. No Man can juſtly impoſe any thing upon thoſe who owe him nothing. Our Author therefore, who aſcribes the enlargement of Nimrod's Kingdom to Ʋſurpation and Tyranny, might as well have acknowledg'd the ſame in the beginning, as he ſays all other Authors have done. However, he ought not to have imputed to Sir Walter Raleigh an Approbation of his Right, as Lord or King over his Family; ſor he could never think him to be a Lord by the right of a Father, who by that rule muſt have liv'd and died a Slave to his Fathers that overliv'd him. Whoſoever therefore like Nim⯑rod grounds his pretenſions of Right upon Uſurpation and Tyranny, de⯑clares himſelf to be, like Nimrod, a Uſurper and a Tyrant, that is, an Enemy to God and Man, and to have no Right at all. That which was unjuſt in its beginning, can of it ſelf never change its nature. Tempus in [...]e, ſaith Grotius, nullam habet vim effectricem. He that perſiſts in doing Injuſtice, aggravates it, and takes upon himſelf all the guilt of his Prede⯑ceſſors. But if there be a King in the World, that claims a Right by Con⯑queſt, [21] and would juſtify it, he might do well to tell whom he conquer'd, when, with what aſſiſtance, and upon what reaſon he undertook the War: for he can ground no title upon the obſcurity of an unſearchable antiquity; and if he dos it not, he ought to be look'd upon as a uſurping Nimrod.

SECT. XII. The pretended Paternal Right is diviſible or indiviſible: if diviſible, 'tis extinguiſh'd; if indiviſible, univerſal.

THis paternal right to Regality, if there be any thing in it, is diviſi⯑ble or indiviſible; if indiviſible, as Adam has but one Heir, one Man is rightly Lord of the whole World, and neither Nimrod nor any of his Succeſſors could ever have bin Kings, nor the ſeventy two that went from Babylon: Noah ſurviv'd him near two hundred years: Shem continu'd one hundred and fifty years longer. The Dominion muſt have bin in him, and by him tranſmitted to his Poſterity for ever. Thoſe that call themſelves Kings in all other Nations, ſet themſelves up againſt the Law of God and Nature: This is the Man we are to ſeek out, that we may yield obedience to him. I know not where to find him; but he muſt be of the race of Abraham. Shem was prefer'd before his Brethren: The Inheritance that could not be divided muſt come to him, and from him to Iſaac, who was the firſt of his Deſcendents that outliv'd him. 'Tis pity that Jacob did not know this, and that the Lord of all the Earth, thro ignorance of his Title, ſhould be forc'd to keep one of his Subjects Sheep for wages; and ſtrange, that he who had wit enough to ſupplant his Bro⯑ther, did ſo little underſtand his own bargain, as not to know that he had bought the perpetual Empire of the World. If in conſcience he could not take ſuch a price for a diſh of Pottage, it muſt remain in Eſau: How⯑ever our Lord Paramount muſt come from Iſaac. If the Deed of Sale made by Eſau be good, we muſt ſeek him amongſt the Jews; if he could not ſo eaſily deveſt himſelf of his Right, it muſt remain amongſt his Deſcendents, who are Turks. We need not ſcruple the reception of either, ſince the late Scots Act tells us, That Kings derive their Royal Power from God alone; and no difference of Religion, &c. can divert the right of Succeſſion. But I know not what we ſhall do, if we cannot find this Man; for de non appa⯑rentibus & non exiſtentibus eadem eſt ratio. The Right muſt fall if there be none to inherit: If we do not know who he is that has the Right, we do not know who is near to him: All Mankind muſt inherit the Right, to which every one has an equal title; and that which is Dominion, if in one, when 'tis equally divided among all Men, is that univerſal Liberty which I aſſert. Wherefore I leave it to the choice of ſuch as have inhe⯑rited our Author's opinions, to produce this Jew or Turk that ought to be Lord of the whole Earth, or to prove a better title in ſome other Perſon, and to perſuade all the Princes and Nations of the World to ſubmit: If this be not done, it muſt be confeſt this Paternal Right is a mere whim⯑ſical Fiction, and that no Man by birth has a Right above another, or can have any, unleſs by the conceſſion of thoſe who are concern'd.

If this Right to an univerſal Empire be diviſible, and Noah did actually divide it among his three Sons: if ſeventy and two abſolute Monarchs [22] did at once ariſe out of the Multitude that had aſſembl'd at Babel; Noah, nor his Sons, nor any of the holy Seed, nor probably any elder than Nim⯑rod having bin there; many other Monarchs muſt neceſſarily have ariſen from them alſo. Abraham, as our Author ſays, was a King: Lot muſt have bin ſo alſo; for they were equals: his Sons Ammon and Moab had no dependence upon the Deſcendents of Abraham: Iſmael and Eſau ſet up for themſelves, and great Nations came of them: Abraham's Sons by Ke⯑turah did ſo alſo; that is to ſay, every one as ſoon as he came to be of age to provide for himſelf, did ſo, without retaining any dependence upon the Stock from whence he came: Thoſe of that Stock, or the Head of it, pretended to no Right over thoſe who went from them. Nay, nearneſs in Blood was ſo little regarded, that tho Lot was Abraham's Brother's Son, Eliezer his Servant had bin his Heir, if he had died childleſs. The like continu'd among Jacob's Sons; no Juriſdiction was given to one above the reſt: an equal diviſion of Land was made amongſt 'em: Their Judges and Magiſtrats were of ſeveral Tribes and Familys, without any other preference of one before another, than what did ariſe from the advantages God had given to any particular Perſon. This I take to be a proof of the utmoſt extent and certainty, that the Equality amongſt Mankind was then perfect: He therefore that will deny it to be ſo now, ought to prove that neither the Prophets, Patriarchs, or any other Men did ever under⯑ſtand or regard the Law deliver'd by God and Nature to Mankind; or that having bin common and free at the firſt, and ſo continu'd for many hundreds of years after the Flood, it was afterwards aboliſh'd, and a new one introduc'd. He that aſſerts this muſt prove it; but till it dos appear to us, when, where, how, and by whom this was done, we may ſafely believe there is no ſuch thing; and that no Man is or can be a Lord amongſt us, till we make him ſo; and that by nature we are all Brethren.

Our Author, by endeavouring farther to illuſtrate the Patriarchical Power, deſtroys it, and cannot deny to any Man the Right which he ac⯑knowledges to have bin in Iſmael and Eſau. But if every Man has a Right of ſetting up for himſelf with his Family, or before he has any, he cannot but have a right of joining with others if he pleaſes; as his joining or not joining with others, and the choice of thoſe others depends upon his own will, he cannot but have a right of judging upon what conditions 'tis good for him to enter into ſuch a Society, as muſt neceſſarily hinder him from exerciſing the Right which he has originally in himſelf. But as it cannot be imagin'd that Men ſhould generally put ſuch Fetters upon themſelves, unleſs it were in expectation of a greater good thereby to accrue to them, no more can be requir'd to prove that they do voluntarily enter into theſe Societys, inſtitute them for their own good, and preſcribe ſuch Rules and Forms to them as beſt pleaſe themſelves, without giving account to any. But if every Man be free, till he enter into ſuch a Society as he chuſes for his own good, and thoſe Societys may regulate themſelves as they think ſit; no more can be requir'd to prove the natural Equality in which all Men are born, and continue, till they reſign it as into a common ſtock, in ſuch meaſure as they think fit for the conſtituting of Societys for their own good, which I aſſert, and our Author denies.

SECT. XIII. There was no ſhadow of a Paternal Kingdom amongst the Hebrews, nor precept for it.

OUR Author is ſo modeſt to confeſs, that Jacob's Kingdom, conſiſt⯑ing of ſeventy two Perſons, was ſwallow'd up by the power of the greater Monarch Pharaoh: But if this was an Act of Tyranny, 'tis ſtrange that the ſacred and eternal Right, grounded upon the immutable Laws of God and Nature, ſhould not be reſtor'd to God's choſen People, when he deliver'd them from that Tyranny. Why was not Jacob's Mo⯑narchy confer'd upon his right Heir? How came the People to neglect a Point of ſuch importance? Or if they did forget it, why did not Moſes put 'em in mind of it? Why did not Jacob declare to whom it did belong? Or if he is underſtood to have declar'd it, in ſaying the Scepter ſhould not depart ſrom Judah, why was it not deliver'd into his hands, or into his Heirs? If he was hard to be found in a People of one kindred, but four degrees remov'd from Jacob their Head, who were exact in obſerving Ge⯑nealogys; how can we hope to find him after ſo many thouſand years, when we do not ſo much as know from whom we are deriv'd? Or rather how comes that Right, which is eternal and univerſal, to have bin nip'd in the bud, and ſo aboliſh'd before it could take any effect in the World, as never to have bin heard of amongſt the Gentiles, nor the People of God, either before or after the Captivity, from the death of Jacob to this day? This I aſſert, and I give up the Cauſe if I do not prove it. To this end I begin with Moſes and Aaron the firſt Rulers of the People, who were nei⯑ther of the eldeſt Tribe according to birth, nor the diſpoſition of Jacob, if he did, or could give it to any; nor were they of the eldeſt Line of their own Tribe: and even between them the Superiority was given to Moſes, who was the younger; as 'tis ſaid, I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother ſhall be thy Prophet. If Moſes was a King, as our Au⯑thor ſays, but I deny, and ſhall hereafter prove, the matter is worſe: He muſt have bin an Uſurper of a moſt unjuſt Dominion over his Bre⯑thren; and this Patriarchical power, which by the Law of God was to be perpetually fix'd in his Deſcendents, periſh'd with him, and his Sons con⯑tinu'd in an obſcure rank amongſt the Levites. Joſhua of the Tribe of Ephraim ſucceeded him; Othniel was of Judah, Ehud of Benjamin, Barak of Napthalim, and Gideon of Manaſſeh. The other Judges were of ſeve⯑ral Tribes; and they being dead, their Children lay hid among the com⯑mon People, and we hear no more of 'em. The firſt King was taken out of the leaſt Family of the leaſt and youngeſt Tribe. The ſecond, whilſt the Children of the firſt King were yet alive, was the youngeſt of eight Sons of an obſcure Man in the Tribe of Judah: Solomon one of his youngeſt Sons ſucceeded him: Ten Tribes deſerted Rehoboam, and by the command of God ſet up Joroboam to be their King. The Kingdom of Iſrael by the deſtruction of one Family paſs'd into another: That of Ju⯑dah by God's peculiar promiſe continu'd in David's race till the Captivity; but we know not that the eldeſt Son was always prefer'd, and have no reaſon to preſume it. David their moſt reverenced King left no precept ſor it, and gave an example to the contrary: he did not ſet up the Eldeſt, [24] but the Wiſeſt. After the Captivity, they who had moſt wiſdom or va⯑lour to defend the People, were thought moſt fit to command; and the Kingdom at the laſt came to the Aſmonean Race, whilſt the Poſterity of David was buried in the maſs of the common People, and utterly depriv'd of all worldly Rule or Glory. If the Judges had not a Regal Power, or the Regal were only juſt, as inſtituted by God, and eternally annex'd to Paternity, all that they did was evil: There could be nothing of Juſtice in the Powers exercis'd by Moſes, Joſhua, Gideon, Samuel, and the reſt of the Judges. If the Power was regal and juſt, it muſt have continu'd in the Deſcendents of the firſt: Saul, David, and Solomon could never have bin Kings: The Right failing in them, their Deſcendents could in⯑herit none from them; and the others after the Captivity were guilty of the like injuſtice.

Now as the Rule is not general, to which there is any one juſt excep⯑tion, there is not one of theſe Examples that would not overthrow our Author's Doctrin: If one deviation from it were lawful, another might be, and ſo to infinity. But the utmoſt degree of impudent madneſs to which perhaps any Man in the world has ever arriv'd, is to aſſert that to be univerſal and perpetual, which cannot be verify'd by any one Example to have bin in any place of the World, nor juſtify'd by any Precept.

If it be objected, That all theſe things were done by God's immediat diſpoſition: I anſwer, that it were an impious madneſs to believe that God did perpetually ſend his Prophets to overthrow what he had ordain'd from the beginning, and as it were in ſpite to bring the minds of Men into inextricable confuſion and darkneſs; and by particular Commands to over⯑throw his univerſal and eternal Law. But to render this point more clear, I deſire it may be conſider'd, That we have but three ways of di⯑ſtinguiſhing between good and evil.

1. When God by his Word reveals it to us.

2. When by his Deeds he declares it; becauſe that which he dos is good, as that which he ſays is true.

3. By the Light of Reaſon, which is good, in as much as it is from God.

And firſt; It cannot be ſaid we have an explicit word for that conti⯑nuance of the Power in the eldeſt; for it appears not, and having none, we might conclude it to be leſt to our liberty: For it agrees not with the goodneſs of God to leave us in a perpetual ignorance of his Will in a mat⯑ter of ſo great importance, nor to have ſuffer'd his own People, or any other, to perſiſt, without the leaſt reproof or admonition, in a perpetual oppoſition to it, if it had diſpleas'd him.

To the 2d. The Diſpenſations of his Providence, which are the ema⯑nations of his Will, have gone contrary to this pretended Law: There can therefore be no ſuch thing; for God is conſtant to himſelf: his Works do not contradict his Word, and both of them do equally declare to us that which is good.

Thirdly; If there be any Precept that by the light of Nature we can in matters of this kind look upon as certain, 'tis that the Government of a People ſhould be given to him that can beſt perform the Dutys of it: No Man has it ſor himſelf, or from himſelſ; but for and from thoſe who be⯑fore he had it were his Equals, that he may do good to them. If there were a Man, who in Wiſdom, Valour, Juſtice and Purity, ſurpaſs'd all others, he might be call'd a King by Nature, becauſe he is beſt able to bear the weight of ſo great a charge; and like a good Shepherd to lead the People to good. Detur digniori is the voice of Reaſon and that we may [25] be ſure Detur ſeniori is not ſo, Solomon tells us, That a wiſe Child is better than an old and fooliſh King. But if this pretended Right do not belong to him that is truly the eldeſt, nothing can be more abſurd than a fantaſtical pretence to a Right deduc'd from him that is not ſo. Now leſt I ſhould be thought to follow my own Inventions, and call them Reaſon, or the Light of God in us, I deſire it may be obſerv'd that God himſelf has ever taken this method. When he rais'd up Moſes to be the leader of his Peo⯑ple, he endow'd him with the moſt admirable gifts of his Spirit that ever he beſtow'd upon a Man: When he choſe ſeventy Men to aſſiſt him, he endow'd them with the ſame ſpirit. Joſhua had no other title to ſucceed him than the like evidence of God's Preſence with him. When the Peo⯑ple thro ſin fell into miſery, he did not ſeek out their Deſcendents, nor ſuch as boaſted in a prerogative of Birth; but ſhew'd whom he deſign'd for their Deliverer, by beſtowing ſuch gifts upon him as were requir'd for the performance of his work; and never fail'd of doing this, till that miſerable ſinful People rejecting God and his Government, deſir'd that which was in uſe among their accurſed Neighbours, that they might be as like to them in the moſt ſhameful Slavery to Man, as in the Worſhip of Idols ſet up againſt God.

But if this pretended Right be grounded upon no word or work of God, not the reaſon of Man, 'tis to be accounted a mere figment, that has no⯑thing of truth in it.

SECT. XIV. If the paternal Right had included Dominion, and was to be transfer'd to a ſingle Heir, it muſt periſh if he were not known; and could be applied to no other Perſon.

HAving ſhew'd that the firſt Kings were not Fathers, nor the firſt Fathers Kings; that all the Kings of the Jews and Gentiles men⯑tion'd in Scripture came in upon Titles different from, and inconſiſtent with that of Paternity; and that we are not led by the Word nor the Works of God, nor the Reaſon of Man, or Light of Nature, to believe there is any ſuch thing; we may ſafely conclude there never was any ſuch thing, or that it never had any effect, which to us is the ſame. 'Tis as ridiculous to think of retrieving that, which from the beginning of the World was loſt, as to create that which never was. But I may go far⯑ther, and affirm, that tho there had bin ſuch a Right in the firſt Fathers of Mankind exercis'd by them, and for ſome ages individually tranſmitted to their eldeſt Sons, it muſt neceſſarily periſh, ſince the Generations of Men are ſo confus'd, that no Man knows his own original, and conſe⯑quently this Heir is no where to be found; for 'tis a folly for a Man to pretend to an Inheritance, who cannot prove himſelf to be the right Heir. If this be not true, I deſire to know from which of Noah's Sons the Kings of England, France, or Spain do deduce their original; or what reaſon they can give why the title to Dominion, which is fancied to be in Noah, did rather belong to the firſt of their reſpective Races, that attain'd to the Crowns they now enjoy, than to the meaneſt Peaſant of their Kingdoms; or how that can be tranſmitted to them, which was not in the firſt. We know that no Man can give what he has not; that if there be no giver, [26] there is no gift; if there be no root, there can be no branch; and that the firſt point failing, all that ſhould be deriv'd from it muſt neceſſarily fail.

Our Author, who is good at reſolving difficultys, ſhews us an eaſy way out of this ſtrait. 'Tis true, ſays he, all Kings are not natural Parents of their Subjects; yet they either are, or are to be reputed the next Heirs to thoſe firſt Progenitors, who were at firſt the natural Parents of the whole People, and in their right ſucceed to the exerciſe of the ſupreme Juriſdiction: and ſuch Heirs are not only Lords of their own Children, but alſo of their Brethren, and all thoſe that were ſubject to their Father, &c. By this means it comes to paſs, that many a Child ſucceeding a King, hath the right of a Father over many a grey-headed multitude, and hath the title of Pater Patriae.

An Aſſertion comprehending ſo many Points, upon which the moſt important Rights of all Mankind do depend, might deſerve ſome proof: But he being of opinion we ought to take it upon his credit, dos not vouch⯑ſafe to give us ſo much as the ſhadow of any. Nevertheleſs being un⯑willing either crudely to receive, or raſhly to reject it, I ſhall take the li⯑berty of examining the Propoſition, and hope I may be pardon'd, if I dwell a little more than ordinarily upon that which is the foundation of his Work.

We are beholden to him for confeſſing modeſtly that all Kings are not the natural Fathers of their People, and ſparing us the pains of proving, that the Kings of Perſia, who reign'd from the Indies to the Helleſpont, did not beget all the Men that liv'd in thoſe Countrys; or that the Kings of France and Spain, who began to reign before they were five years old, were not the natural Fathers of the Nations under them. But if all Kings are not Fathers, none are, as they are Kings: If any one is, or ever was, the Rights of Paternity belong to him, and to no other who is not ſo alſo. This muſt be made evident; for matters of ſuch importance require proof, and ought not to be taken upon ſuppoſition. If Filmer therefore will pre⯑tend that the right of Father belongs to any one King, he muſt prove that he is the Father of his People; for otherwiſe it dos not appertain to him: he is not the Man we ſeek.

'Tis no leſs abſurd to ſay he is to be reputed Heir to the firſt Progenitor: for it muſt be firſt prov'd, that the Nation did deſcend from one ſingle Progenitor without mixture of other races: That this Progenitor was the Man, to whom Noah (according to Filmer's whimſical diviſion of Aſia, Europe, and Africa among his Sons) did give the Land now inhabited by that People: That this Diviſion ſo made was not capable of Subdiviſions; and that this Man is by a true and uninterrupted Succeſſion deſcended from the firſt and eldeſt Line of that Progenitor: and all fails, if every one of theſe points be not made good. If there never was any ſuch Man who had that Right, it cannot be inherited from him. If by the ſame rule that a parcel of the World was allotted to him, that parcel might be ſubdivided amongſt his Children as they increas'd, the ſubdiviſions may be infinite, and the right of Dominion thereby deſtroy'd. If ſeveral Na⯑tions inhabit the ſame Land, they owe obedience to ſeveral Fathers: that which is due to their true Father, cannot be render'd to him that is not ſo; for he would by that means be depriv'd of the Right which is in⯑ſeparably annex'd to his Perſon: And laſtly, whatſoever the Right of an Heir may be, it can belong only to him that is Heir.

Leſt any ſhould be ſeduc'd from theſe plain Truths by frivolous ſug⯑geſtions, 'tis good to conſider that the title of Pater Patriae, with which our Author would cheat us, has no relation to the matters of Right, upon [27] which we diſpute. 'Tis a figurative ſpeech, that may have bin rightly enough applied to ſome excellent Princes on account of their care and love to their People, reſembling that of a Father to his Children; and can relate to none but thoſe who had it. No man that had common ſenſe, or valu'd truth, did ever call Phalaris, Dionyſius, Nabis, Nero, or Caligula, Fathers of their Countrys; but Monſters, that to the utmoſt of their power endeavour'd their deſtruction: which is enough to prove, that ſacred Name cannot be given to all, and in conſequence to none but ſuch, as by their Virtue, Piety, and good Government do deſerve it.

Theſe matters will yet appear more evident, if it be conſider'd, that tho Noah had reign'd as a King; that Zoroaſter, as ſome ſuppoſe, was Ham, who reign'd over his Children, and that thereby ſome Right might perhaps be deriv'd to ſuch as ſucceeded them; yet this can have no influ⯑ence upon ſuch as have not the like Original: and no man is to be pre⯑ſum'd to have it, till it be prov'd, ſince we have prov'd that many had it not. If Nimrod ſet himſelf up againſt his Grandfather; and if Ninus, who was deſcended from him in the fifth Generation, ſlew him, they ill deſerv'd the name and rights of Fathers; and none, but thoſe who have renounc'd all Humanity, Virtue, and common Senſe, can give it to them, or their Succeſſors. If therefore Noah and Shem had not ſo much as the ſhadow of Regal Power, and the actions of Nimrod, Ninus, and others who were Kings in their times, ſhew they did not reign in the right of Fathers, but were ſet up in a direct oppoſition to it, the titles of the firſt Kings were not from Paternity, nor conſiſtent with it.

Our Author therefore, who ſhould have prov'd every point, dos nei⯑ther prove any one, nor aſſert that which is agreeable to divine or human Story, as to matter of fact; and as little conformable to common ſenſe. It dos not only appear contrary to his general Propoſition, That all Go⯑vernments have not begun with the Paternal Power; but we do not find that any ever did. They who according to his rules ſhould have bin Lords of the whole Earth, liv'd and died private men, whilſt the moſt wicked and boiſterous of their Children commanded the greateſt part of the then inhabited World, not excepting even thoſe Countrys where they ſpent and ended their days; and inſtead of entring upon the Government by the right of Fathers, or managing it as Fathers, they did by the moſt outrageous injuſtice uſurp a violent Domination over their Brethren and Fathers.

It may eaſily be imagin'd what the Right is that could be thus acquir'd, and tranſmitted to their Succeſſors. Nevertheleſs our Author ſays, All Kings either are, or ought to be reputed next Heirs, &c. But why reputed, if they are not? How could any of the accurſed race of Ham be reputed Father of Noah or Shem, to whom he was to be a Servant? How could Nimrod and Ninus be reputed Fathers of Ham, and of thoſe whom they ought to have obey'd? Can Reaſon oblige me to believe that which I know to be falſe? Can a Lie, that is hateful to God and good Men, not only be excus'd, but enjoin'd, when (as he will perhaps ſay) it is for the King's Service? Can I ſerve two Maſters, or, without the moſt unpar⯑donable injuſtice, repute him to be my Father, who is not my Father; and pay the obedience due to him who did beget and educate me, to one from whom I never receiv'd any good? If this be ſo abſurd, that no man dares affirm it in the perſon of any, 'tis as prepoſterous in relation to his Heirs: For Nimrod the firſt King could be Heir to no man as King, and could tranſmit to no man a Right which he had not. If it was ridiculous [28] and abominable to ſay that he was Father of Chuſh, Ham, Shem and Noah; 'tis as ridiculous to ſay, he had the Right of Father, if he was not their Father; or that his Succeſſors inherited it from him, if he never had it. If there be any way thro this, it muſt have accru'd to him by the extirpa⯑tion of all his Elders, and their Races; ſo as he who will aſſert this pre⯑tended Right to have bin in the Babylonian Kings, muſt aſſert, that Noah, Shem, Japhet, Ham, Chuſh, and all Nimrod's elder Brothers, with all their Deſcendents, were utterly extirpated before he began to reign, and all Mankind to be deſcended from him.

This muſt be, if Nimrod, as the Scripture ſays, was the firſt that be⯑came mighty in the Earth; unleſs men might be Kings, without having more Power than others: for Chuſh, Ham and Noah were his Elders and Progenitors in the direct Line, and all the Sons of Shem and Japhet, and their Deſcendents in the Collaterals, were to be prefer'd before him; and he could have no Right at all that was not directly contrary to thoſe Prin⯑ciples which, our Author ſays, are grounded upon the eternal and indiſ⯑penſable Laws of God and Nature. The like may be ſaid of the ſeventy two Heads of Colonys, which (following, as I ſuppoſe, Sir Walter Ra⯑leigh) he ſays went out to people the Earth, and whom he calls Kings: for according to the ſame Rule, Noah, Shem and Japhet, with their Deſcen⯑dents, could not be of the number; ſo that neither Nimrod, nor the o⯑thers that eſtabliſh'd the Kingdoms of the World, and from whence he thinks all the reſt to be deriv'd, could have any thing of Juſtice in them, unleſs it were from a Root altogether inconſiſtent with his Principles. They are therefore falſe, or the Eſtabliſhments beforemention'd could have no Right. If they had none, they cannot be reputed to have any; for no man can think that to be true, which he knows to be falſe: having none, they could tranſmit none to their Heirs and Succeſſors. And if we are to believe, that all the Kingdoms of the Earth are eſtabliſh'd upon this Paternal Right; it muſt be prov'd that all thoſe, who in birth ought to have bin prefer'd before Nimrod, and the ſeventy two, were extirpat⯑ed; or that the firſt and true Heir of Noah did afterwards aboliſh all theſe unjuſt Uſurpations; and making himſelf Maſter of the whole, left it to his Heirs, in whom it continues to this day. When this is done, I will acknowledg the Foundation to be well laid, and admit of all that can be rightly built upon it; but if this fails, all fails: The poiſon of the Root continues in the Branches. If the right Heir be not in poſſeſſion, he is not the right who is in poſſeſſion: If the true Heir be known, he ought to be reſtor'd to his Right: If he be not known, the Right muſt periſh: For nothing can be ſaid to belong to any man, if no man knows to whom it belongs, and can have no more effect than if it were not. This conclu⯑ſion will continue unmovable, tho the diviſion into ſeventy two Kingdoms were allow'd; which cannot be without deſtroying the Paternal Power, or ſubjecting it to be ſubdivided into as many parcels as there are men, which deſtroys Regality; for the ſame thing may be requir'd in every one of the diſtinct Kingdoms, and others deriv'd from them. Or we muſt know who was that true Heir of Noah, that recover'd all: How, when, and to whom he gave the ſeveral Portions; and that every one of them do continue in the poſſeſſion of thoſe, who by this prerogative of Birth are rais'd above the reſt of mankind: and if they are not, 'tis an impious folly to repute them ſo, to the prejudice of thoſe that are; and if they do not appear, to the prejudice of all mankind; who being equal, are thereby made ſubject to them. For as Truth is the Rule of Juſtice; [29] there can be none, when he is reputed ſuperior to all who is certainly in⯑ferior to

[In this place two Pages are wanting in the Original Manuſcript.]

—degenerated from that Reaſon which diſtinguiſhes men from beaſts. Tho it may be fit to uſe ſome Ceremonys before a man be admitted to practiſe Phyſick, or ſet up a Trade, 'tis his own Skill that makes him a Doctor or an Artificer, and others do but declare it. An Aſs will not leave his ſtupidity, tho he be cover'd with Scarlet; and he that is by na⯑ture a Slave, will be ſo ſtill, tho a Crown be put upon his Head: and 'tis hard to imagin a more violent inverſion of the Laws of God and Nature, than to raiſe him to the Throne, whom Nature intended for the Chain; or to make them Slaves to Slaves, whom God has endow'd with the Virtues requir'd in Kings. Nothing can be more prepoſterous, than to impute to God the frantick Domination, which is often exercis'd by wicked, fooliſh and vile Perſons, over the wiſe, valiant, juſt and good; or to ſubject the beſt to the rage of the worſt. If there be any Family therefore in the world, that can by the Law of God and Nature, diſtinct from the Ordinance of Man, pretend to an hereditary Right of Domi⯑nion over any People, it muſt be one that never did, and never can pro⯑duce any Perſon that is not free from all the Infirmitys and Vices that ren⯑der him unable to exerciſe the Sovereign Power; and is endow'd with all the Virtues requir'd to that end; or at leaſt a Promiſe from God, verify'd by Experience, that the next in Blood ſhall ever be able and fit for that work. But ſince we do not know that any ſuch has yet appear'd in the World, we have no reaſon to believe that there is, or ever was any ſuch; and conſequently none upon whom God has confer'd the Rights that can⯑not be exercis'd without them.

If there was no ſhadow of a Paternal Right in the Inſtitution of the Kingdoms of Saul and David, there could be none in thoſe that ſucceeded. Rehoboam could have no other than from Solomon: When he reign'd over two Tribes, and Jeroboam over ten, 'tis not poſſible that both of 'em could be the next Heir of their laſt common Father Jacob; and 'tis abſurd to ſay, that ought to be reputed which is impoſſible: for our thoughts are ever to be guided by Truth, or ſuch an appearance of it, as dos per⯑ſuade or convince us.

The ſame Title of Father is yet more ridiculouſly or odiouſly apply'd to the ſucceeding Kings. Baaſha had no other Title to the Crown, than by killing Nadab the Son of Jeroboam, and deſtroying his Family. Zimri purchas'd the ſame honour by the ſlaughter of Elah when he was drunk, and dealing with the Houſe of Baaſha, as he had done with that of Jero⯑boam. Zimri burning himſelf, transfer'd the ſame to Omri, as a reward for bringing him to that extremity. As Jehu was more fierce than theſe, he ſeems to have gain'd a more excellent recompence than any ſince Jero⯑boam, even a conditional Promiſe of a perpetual Kingdom; but falling from theſe glorious Privileges, purchas'd by his Zeal in killing two wick⯑ed Kings, and above one hundred of their Brethren, Shallum muſt have inherited them, by deſtroying Zachary and all that remain'd of his Race. This in plain Engliſh is no leſs than to ſay, that whoſoever kills a King, and invades a Crown, tho the act and means of accompliſhing it be never ſo deteſtable, dos thereby become Father of his Country, and Heir of all the Divine Privileges annex'd to that glorious Inheritance. And tho [30] I cannot tell whether ſuch a Doctrin be more ſottiſh, monſtrous or im⯑pious, I dare affirm, that if it were receiv'd, no King in the World could think himſelf ſafe in his Throne for one day: They are already encom⯑paſt with many dangers; but leſt Pride, Avarice, Ambition, Luſt, Rage, and all the Vices that uſually reign in the hearts of worldly men, ſhould not be ſufficient to invite 'em perpetually to diſturb Mankind, thro the deſire of gaining the Power, Riches and Splendor that accompa⯑ny a Crown, our Author propoſes to 'em the moſt ſacred Privileges, as a reward of the moſt execrable Crimes. He that was ſtir'd up only by the violence of his own Nature, thought that a Kingdom could never be bought at too dear a rate;

But if the ſacred Character of God's Anointed or Vicegerent, and Father of a Country, were added to the other Advantages that follow the high⯑eſt Fortunes; the moſt modeſt and juſt men would be fill'd with fury, that they might attain to them. Nay, it may be, even the beſt would be the moſt forward in conſpiring againſt ſuch as reign: they who could not be tempted with external Pleaſures, would be moſt in love with divine Privileges; and ſince they ſhould become the ſacred Miniſters of God, if they ſucceeded, and Traitors or Rogues only if they miſcarried, their only care would be ſo to lay their Deſigns, that they might be ſurely executed. This is a Doctrin worthy of Filmer's Invention, and Heylin's Approbation; which being well weigh'd, will ſhew to all good and juſt Kings how far they are oblig'd to thoſe, who under pretence of advancing their Authority, fill the minds of men with ſuch Notions as are ſo deſperatly pernicious to them.

SECT. XVI. The Antients choſe thoſe to be Kings, who excell'd in the Virtues that are moſt beneficial to Civil Societys.

IF the Iſraelites, whoſe Lawgiver was God, had no King in the firſt Inſtitution of their Government, 'tis no wonder that other Nations ſhould not think themſelves oblig'd to ſet up any: if they who came all of one ſtock, and knew their Genealogys, when they did inſtitute Kings, had no regard to our Author's Chimerical right of Inheritance, nor were taught by God or his Prophets to have any; 'tis not ſtrange that Nations, who did not know their own Original, and who probably, if not cer⯑tainly, came of ſeveral Stocks, never put themſelves to the trouble of ſeek⯑ing one, who by his birth deſerv'd to be prefer'd before others: and va⯑rious Changes happening in all Kingdoms (whereby in proceſs of time the Crowns were tranſported into divers Familys, to which the Right of Inheritance could not without the utmoſt impiety and madneſs be im⯑puted) ſuch a fancy certainly could only enter into the heads of Fools; and we know of none ſo fooliſh to have harbour'd it.

The Grecians, amongſt others who follow'd the Light of Reaſon, knew no other original Title to the Government of a Nation, than that Wiſ⯑dom, [31] Valour and Juſtice, which was beneficial to the People. Theſe Qualitys gave beginning to thoſe Governments, which we call Heroum Regna; and the Veneration paid to ſuch as enjoy'd them, proceeded from a grateful ſenſe of the Good receiv'd from them: They were thought to be deſcended from the Gods, who in Vertue and Beneficence ſurpaſs'd other men: The ſame attended their Deſcendents, till they came to abuſe their Power, and by their Vices ſhew'd themſelves like to, or worſe than others. Thoſe Nations did not ſeek the moſt antient, but the moſt worthy; and thought ſuch only worthy to be prefer'd before others, who could beſt perform their Duty. The Spartans knew that Hercules and Achilles were not their Fathers, for they were a Nation before either of them were born; but thinking their Children might be like to them in Valour, they brought them from Thebes and Epirus to be their Kings. If our Author is of another opinion, I deſire to know, whether the Hera⯑clidae, or the Aeacidae were, or ought to be reputed Fathers of the Lacede⯑monians; for if the one was, the other was not.

The ſame method was follow'd in Italy; and they who eſteem'd them⯑ſelves ^* Aborigines, could not ſet up one to govern them under the Title of Parent. They could pay no veneration to any Man under the name of a common Father, who thought they had none; and they who eſteem'd themſelves equal, could have no reaſon to prefer any one, unleſs he were diſtinguiſh'd from others by the Vertues that were beneficial to all. This may be illuſtrated by matters of fact. Romulus and Remus, the Sons of a Nun, conſtuprated, as is probable, by a luſty Soldier, who was ſaid to be Mars, for their Vigour and Valour were made heads of a gather'd People. We know not that ever they had any Children; but we are ſure they could not be Fathers of the People that flock'd to them from ſeveral places, nor in any manner be reputed Heirs of him or them that were ſo: for they never knew who was their own Father; and when their Mother came to be diſcover'd, they ought to have bin Subjects to Amulius or Numitor. They could not be his Heirs whilſt he liv'd, and were not when he died: The Government of the Latins continu'd at Alba, and Romulus reign'd over thoſe who join'd with him in building Rome. The Power not coming to him by Inheritance, muſt have bin gain'd by Force, or confer'd upon him by Conſent: It could not be acquir'd by Force; for one Man could not force a multitude of fierce and valiant men, as they appear to have bin. It muſt therefore have bin by Conſent: And when he aim'd at more Authority than they were willing to allow, they ſlew him. He being dead, they fetch'd Numa from among the Sabines: He was not their Father, nor Heir to their Father, but a Stranger; not a Conqueror, but an unarm'd Philoſopher. Tullus Hoſtilius had no other Title: Ancus Martius was no way related to ſuch as had reign'd. The firſt Tarquin was the Son of a baniſh'd Corinthian. Servius Tullus came to Rome in the belly of his captive Mother, and could inherit nothing but Chains from his vanquiſh'd Father. Tarquin the Proud murder'd him, and firſt took upon himſelf the Title of King, ſine juſſu Populi. If this T. Liv.Murder and Uſurpation be call'd a Conqueſt, and thought to create a Right, the effect will be but ſmall: The Conqueror was ſoon conquer'd, baniſh'd, and his Sons ſlain, after which we hear no more of him or his Deſcendents. Whatſoever he gain'd from Servius, or the People, was [32] ſoon loſt, and did accrue to thoſe that conquer'd and ejected him; and they might retain what was their own, or confer it upon one or more, in ſuch manner and meaſure as beſt pleas'd themſelves. If the Regal Power, which our Author ſays was in the Conſuls, could be divided into two parts, limited to a Year, and ſuffer ſuch reſtrictions as the People pleas'd to lay upon it, they might have divided it into as many parcels, and put it in⯑to ſuch form, as beſt ſuted with their Inclinations; and the ſeveral Ma⯑giſtracys which they did create for the exerciſe of the Kingly, and all other Powers, ſhews they were to give account to none but themſelves.

The Iſraelites, Spartans, Romans and others, who thus fram'd their Governments according to their own Will, did it not by any peculiar Pri⯑viledg, but by a univerſal Right confer'd upon them by God and Nature: They were made of no better Clay than others: They had no Right, that dos not as well belong to other Nations; that is to ſay, The Conſti⯑tion of every Government is refer'd to thoſe who are concern'd in it, and no other has any thing to do with it.

Yet if it be aſſerted, that the Goverment of Rome was Paternal, or they had none at all; I deſire to know, how they came to have ſix Fathers of ſeveral Familys, whilſt they liv'd under Kings; and two or more new ones every Year afterwards: Or how they came to be ſo excellent in Vertue and Fortune, as to conquer the beſt part of the World, if they had no Government. Hobbs indeed dos ſcurrilouſly deride Cicero, Plato and Ari⯑ſtotle, Caeteroſ (que) Romanae & Graecae Anarchiae fautores. But 'tis ſtrange that this Anarchy, which he reſembles to a Chaos, full of darkneſs and confuſion, that can have no Strength or regular Action, ſhould overthrow all the Monarchys that came within their reach, If (as our Authors ſays) the beſt order, greateſt ſtrength, and moſt ſtability be in them. It muſt therefore be confeſt, that theſe Governments are, in their various Forms, rightly inſtituted by ſeveral Nations, without any regard to Inhe⯑ritance; or that theſe Nations have had no Governments, and were more ſtrong, vertuous and happy without Government, than under it, which is moſt abſurd.

But if Governments ariſe from the Conſent of Men, and are inſtituted by Men according to their own Inclinations, they do therein ſeek their own Good; for the Will is ever drawn by ſome real Good, or the appearance of it. This is that which man ſeeks by all the regular or irregular mo⯑tions of his mind: Reaſon and Paſſion, Vertue and Vice do herein con⯑cur, tho they differ vaſtly in the Objects, in which each of 'em thinks this Good to conſiſt. A People therefore that ſets up Kings, Dictators, Conſuls, Pretors or Emperors, dos it not, that they may be great, glo⯑rious, rich or happy, but that it may be well with themſelves and their Poſterity. This is not accompliſh'd ſimply by ſetting one, a few, or more men in the adminiſtration of Powers, but by placing the Authority in thoſe who may rightly perform their Office. This is not every man's Work: Valour, Integrity, Wiſdom, Induſtry, Experience and Skill, are requir'd for the management of thoſe Military and Civil Affairs that neceſſarily fall under the care of the chief Magiſtrats. He or they there⯑fore may reaſonably be advanc'd above their Equals, who are moſt fit to perform the Dutys belonging to their Stations, in order to the publick Good, for which they were inſtituted.

Marius, Sylla, Catiline, Julius or Octavius Caeſar, and all thoſe who by force or fraud uſurp'd a Dominion over their Brethren, could have no Title to this Right; much leſs could they become Fathers of the People, [33] by uſing all the moſt wicked means that could well be imagin'd to deſtroy them; and not being regularly choſen for their Vertues, or the opinion of them, nor prefer'd on account of any Prerogative that had bin from the beginning annex'd to their Familys, they could have no other Right than Occupation could confer upon them. If this can confer a Right, there is an end of all Diſputes concerning the Laws of God or Man. If Julius and Octavius Caeſar did ſucceſſively become Lords and Fathers of their Country, by ſlaughtering almoſt all the Senat, and ſuch Perſons as were eminent for Nobility or Vertue, together with the greater part of the People, it cannot be denied, that a Thief, who breaks into his Neighbour's Houſe, and kills him, is juſtly Maſter of his Eſtate; and may exact the ſame obedience from his Children, that they render'd to their Father. If this Right could be transfer'd to Tiberius, either thro the malice of Octavius, or the fraud of his Wife; a wet Blanket laid over his face, and a few corrupted Soldiers could inveſt Caligula with the ſame. A vile Raſcal pulling Claudius out by the heels from behind the Hangings where he had hid himſelf, could give it to him. A diſh of Muſhrooms well ſeaſon'd by the infamous Strumpet his Wife, and a Potion prepar'd for Britannicus by Locuſta, could transfer it to her Son, who was a ſtran⯑ger to his Blood. Galba became Heir to it, by driving Nero to deſpair and death. Two common Soldiers by exciting his Guards to kill him, could give a juſt Tittle to the Empire of the World to Otho, who was thought to be the worſt man in it. If a Company of Villains in the German Ar⯑my, thinking it as fit for them as others to create a Father of Mankind, could conſer the Dignity upon Vitellius; and if Veſpaſian, cauſing him to be kill'd, and thrown into a Jakes leſs impure than his Life, did inherit all the glorious and ſacred Privileges belonging to that Title, 'tis in vain to inquire after any man's right to any thing.

But if there be ſuch a thing as Right or Wrong to be examin'd by men, and any Rules ſet, whereby the one may be diſtinguiſh'd from the other; theſe Extravagancys can have no effect of Right. Such as commit 'em, are not to be look'd upon as Fathers, but as the moſt mortal Enemys of their reſpective Countrys. No Right is to be acknowledg'd in any, but ſuch as is confer'd upon them by thoſe who have the right of conferring, and are concern'd in the exerciſe of the Power, upon ſuch conditions as beſt pleaſe themſelves. No Obedience can be due to him or them, who have not a right of commanding; which cannot reaſonably be confer'd upon any, that are not eſteem'd willing and able rightly to execute it. This ability to perform the higheſt Works that come within the reach of Men; and integrity of Will not to be diverted from it by any temptati⯑on, or conſideration of privat Advantages, comprehending all that is moſt commendable in Man; we may eaſily ſee, that whenſoever men act according to the Law of their own Nature, which is Reaſon, they can have no other rule to direct them in advancing one above another, than the opinion of a man's Vertue and Ability, beſt to perform the Duty in⯑cumbent upon him; that is, by all means to procure the good of the Peo⯑ple committed to his charge. He is only fit to conduct a Ship, who un⯑derſtands the Art of a Pilot: When we are ſick, we ſeek the aſſiſtance of ſuch as are beſt skill'd in Phyſick: The Command of an Army is prudently confer'd upon him that has moſt Induſtry, Skill, Experi⯑ence and Valour: In like manner, He only can, according to the rules of Nature, be advanc'd to the Dignitys of the World, who excels in the Vertues requir'd for the performance of the Dutys annex'd to them; [34] for he only can anſwer the end of his Inſtitution, The Law of every i [...] ſtituted Power, is to accompliſh the end of its Inſtitution, as Creature are to do the Will of their Creator, and in deflecting from it, overthro [...] their own being. Magiſtrats are diſtinguiſh'd from other men, by th Power with which the Law inveſts them for the publick Good: He tha cannot or will not procure that Good, deſtroys his own being, and be⯑comes like to other men. In matters of the greateſt importance, Detu⯑digniori is the Voice of Nature; all her moſt ſacred Laws are perverted if this be not obſerv'd in the diſpoſition of Governments; and all ar [...] neglected and violated, if they are not put into the hands of ſuch as exce in all manner of Vertues: for they only are worthy of them, and they only can have a right who are worthy, becauſe they only can perform th [...] end for which they are inſtituted. This may ſeem ſtrange to thoſe, wh [...] have their heads infected with Filmer's whimſys; but to others, ſo cer⯑tainly grounded upon Truth, that ^* Bartolomeo de las Caſas Biſhop o [...] Chiapa, in a Treatiſe written by him, and dedicated to the Empero [...] Charles V. concerning the Indies, makes it the foundation of all his Diſ⯑courſe, That notwithſtanding his grant of all thoſe Countrys from the Pope, and his pretenſions to Conqueſt, he could have no right over any of thoſe Nations, unleſs he did in the firſt place, as the principal end, re⯑gard their Good: The reaſon, ſays he, is, that regard is to be had to the principal End and Cauſe, for which a ſupreme or univerſal Lord is ſet over them, which is their good and profit, and not that it ſhould turn to their de⯑ſtruction and ruin; for if that ſhould be, there is no doubt but from thence forward, that Power would be tyrannical and unjuſt, as tending more to the intereſt and profit of that Lord, than to the publick good and profit of the Subjects; which, according to natural Reaſon, and the Laws of God and Man, is abhor'd, and deſerves to be abhor'd. And in another place, ſpeak⯑ing of the Governors, who, abuſing their Power, brought many trou⯑bles and vexations upon the Indians; he ſays, ^† They had rendred his Ma⯑jeſty's Government intolerable, and his Yoke inſupportable, tyrannical, and moſt juſtly abhor'd. I do not alledg this thro an opinion, that a Spaniſh Biſhop is of more Authority than another man; but to ſhew, that theſe are common Notions agreed by all Mankind; and that the greateſt Mo⯑narchs do neither refuſe to hear them, or to regulate themſelves ac⯑cording to them, till they renounce common ſenſe, and degenerate into Beaſts.

But if that Government be unreaſonable, and abhor'd by the Laws of God and Man, which is not inſtituted for the good of thoſe who live un⯑der it; and an Empire grounded upon the Donation of the Pope, which amongſt thoſe of the Roman Religion is of great importance, and an in⯑tire conqueſt of the People, with whom there had bin no former Com⯑pact, do degenerate into a moſt unjuſt and deteſtable Tyranny, ſo ſoon as the Supreme Lord begins to prefer his own intereſt or profit before the good of his Subjects; What ſhall we ſay of thoſe who pretend to a right [35] of Dominion over free Nations, as inſeparably united to their Perſons, without diſtinction of Age or Sex, or the leaſt conſideration of their In⯑firmitys and Vices; as if they were not plac'd in the Throne for the good of their People, but to enjoy the Honours and Pleaſures that attend the higheſt Fortune? What name can be fit for thoſe, who have no other Ti⯑tle to the Places they poſſeſs, than the moſt unjuſt and violent Uſurpati⯑on; or being deſcended from thoſe, who for their Vertues were, by the Peoples conſent, duly advanc'd to the exerciſe of a legitimate Power, and having ſworn to adminiſter it, according to the Conditions upon which it was given, for the good of thoſe who gave it, turn all to their own Pleaſure and Profit, without any care of the Publick? Theſe may be lia⯑ble to hard Cenſures: but thoſe who uſe them moſt gently, muſt confeſs, that ſuch an extreme deviation from the end of their Inſtitution, annuls it; and the Wound thereby given to the natural and original Rights of thoſe Nations cannot be cur'd, unleſs they reſume the Libertys of which they have bin depriv'd, and return to the antient Cuſtom of chuſing thoſe to be Magiſtrats, who for their Vertues beſt deſerve to be prefer'd before their Brethren, and are endow'd with thoſe Qualitys that beſt enable men to perform the great end of providing for the publick Safety.

SECT. XVII. God having given the Government of the World to no one Man, nor de⯑clar'd how it ſhould be divided, left it to the VVill of Man.

OUR Author's next Inquiry is, What becomes of the Right of Father⯑hood, in caſe the Crown ſhould eſcheat for want of an Heir? Whether it doth not eſcheat to the People? His anſwer is, 'Tis but the negligence or ignorance of the People, to loſe the knowledg of the true Heir, &c. And a little below, The Power is not devolv'd to the Multitude: No; the Kingly Power eſcheats on independent Heads of Familys: All ſuch prime Heads have Power to conſent in the uniting, or conferring their Fatherly Right of Sove⯑reign Authority on whom they pleaſe; and he that is ſo elected, claims not his Power as a Donative from the People, but as being ſubſtituted by God, from whom he receives his Royal Charter of Univerſal Father, &c.

In my opinion, before he had ask'd, What ſhould be done in caſe the Crown ſhould eſcheat for want of an Heir? he ought to have prov'd, there had bin a Man in the world, who had the Right in himſelf, and telling who he was, have ſhew'd how it had bin tranſmitted for ſome Generations, that we might know where to ſeek his Heir: and before he accus'd the Multitude of ignorance or negligence, in not knowing this Heir, he ought to have inform'd us, how it may be poſſible to know him, or what it would avail us if we did know him; for 'tis in vain to know to whom a Right belongs, that never was, and never can be executed. But we may go farther, and affirm, that as the Univerſal Right muſt have bin in Noah and Shem (if in any) who never exercis'd it; we have reaſon to believe there never was any ſuch thing: And having prov'd from Scripture and Human Hiſtory, That the firſt Kingdoms were ſet up in a direct oppoſition to this Right, by Nimrod and others, he that ſhould ſeek and find their Heirs, would only find thoſe, who by a moſt accurſed Wickedneſs, had uſurp'd and continu'd a Dominion over their Fathers, [36] contrary to the Laws of God and Nature; and we ſhould neither be more wiſe, nor more happy than we are, tho our Author ſhould furniſh us with certain and authentick Genealogys, by which we might know the true Heirs of Nimrod, and the ſeventy two Kings that went from Babylon, who, as he ſuppoſes, gave beginning to all the Kingdoms of the Earth.

Moreover, if the Right be Univerſal, it muſt be in one; for the World being butone, the whole Right of commanding it cannot at the ſame time be in many, and proceed from the Ordinance of God, or of Man. It cannot proceed from the Ordinance of God; for he dos nothing in vain: He never gave a Right that could not be executed. No man can govern that which he dos not ſo much as know: No man did ever know all the World; no man therefore did or could govern it: and none could be ap⯑pointed by God to do that which is abſolutely impoſſible to be done; for it could not conſiſt with his Wiſdom. We find this in our ſelves. It were a ſhame for one of us poor, weak, ſhort-ſighted Creatures, in the diſpo⯑ſal of our Affairs, to appoint ſuch a method, as were utterly ineffectual for the Preſervation of our Familys, or deſtructive to them; and the blaſphemy of imputing to God ſuch an Ordinance as would be a reproach to one of us, can ſute only with the wicked and impudent Fury of ſuch as our Author, who delights in Monſters. This alſo ſhews us that it can⯑not be from Men: One, or a few, may commit Follys, but Mankind dos not univerſally commit, and perpetually perſiſt in any: They cannot therefore, by a general and permanent Authority, enact that which is ut⯑terly abſurd and impoſſible; or if they do, they deſtroy their own Nature, and can no longer deſerve the Name of reaſonable Creatures. There can be therefore no ſuch man; and the Folly of ſeeking him, or his Heir that never was, may be left to the Diſciples of Filmer.

The Difficultys are as great, if it be ſaid, The World might be divi⯑ded into parcels, and we are to ſeek the Heirs of the firſt Poſſeſſors; for beſides that no man can be oblig'd to ſeek that which cannot be found, (all men knowing that Caliginoſa nocte haec premit Deus) and that the Genealogys of Mankind are ſo confus'd, that, unleſs poſſibly among the Jews, we have reaſon to believe there is not a man in the world who knows his own Original, it could be of no advantage to us tho we knew that of every one; for the Diviſion would be of no value, unleſs it were at the firſt rightly made by him who had all the Authority in himſelf, (which dos no where appear) and rightly deduc'd to him, who, accor⯑ding to that diviſion, claims a right to the Parcel he enjoys. And I fear our Author would terribly ſhake the Crowns, in which the Nations of Europe are concern'd, if they ſhould be perſuaded to ſearch into the Ge⯑nealogys of their Princes, and to judg of their Rights according to the proofs they ſhould give of Titles rightly deduc'd by ſucceſſion of Blood from the ſeventy two firſt Kings, from whom our Author fancys all the Kingdoms of the World to be deriv'd.

Beſides, tho this were done, it would be to no purpoſe; for the ſeventy two were not ſent out by Noah, nor was he or his Sons of that number; but they went, or were ſent, from Babylon where Nimrod reign'd, who, as has bin already prov'd, neither had, nor could have any right at all, but was a mighty Hunter, even a proud and cruel Tyrant, uſurping a Power to which he had no right, and which was perpetually exercis'd by him and his Succeſſors againſt God and his People. From whence I may ſafely conclude, That no right can ever be deriv'd; and may juſtly preſume [37] it will be denied by none who are of better Morals, and of more ſound Principles in matters of Law and Religion than Filmer and Heylin; ſince 'tis no leſs abſurd to deduce a right from him that had none, than to ex⯑pect pure and wholeſom Waters from a filthy, polluted, and poiſonous Fountain.

If it be pretended that ſome other man ſince Noah had this univerſal Right, it muſt either remain in one ſingle perſon as his right Heir, or be divided. If in one, I deſire to know who he is, and where we may find him, that the Empire of the World may be deliver'd to him. But if he cannot be found, the buſineſs is at an end: for every man in the World may pretend himſelf to be the perſon; and the infinite controverſys ari⯑ſing thereupon can never be decided, unleſs either the Genealogys of eve⯑ry one from Noah were extant and prov'd, or we had a Word from Heaven, with a ſufficient teſtimony of his miſſion who announces it. When this is done, 'twill be time to conſider what kind of obedience is due to this wonderfully happy and glorious Perſon. But whilſt the firſt appears to be abſolutely impoſſible, and we have no promiſe or reaſon to expect the other, the Propoſition is to be eſteem'd one of our Author's empty whimſys, which cannot be receiv'd by mankind, unleſs they come all to be poſſeſt with an Epidemical madneſs, which would caſt them into that which Hobbs calls Bellum omnium contra omnes; when eve⯑ry man's Sword would be drawn againſt every man, if God ſhould ſo abandon the World to ſuffer them to fall into ſuch miſery.

If this pretended Right be divided, it concerns us to know by whom, when, how, and to whom: for the diviſion cannot be of any value, unleſs the Right was originally in one; that he did exerciſe this Right in making the diviſion; that the parcels into which the World is divided are ac⯑cording to the allotment made; and that the Perſons claiming them by virtue of it are the true Heirs of thoſe to whom they were firſt granted. Many other difficultys may be alledg'd no leſs inextricable than theſe; but this ſeeming ſufficient for the preſent, I ſhall not trouble my ſelf with more, promiſing that when they ſhall be remov'd, I will propoſe others, or confeſſing my errors, yield up the cauſe.

But if the Dominion of the whole World cannot belong to any one man, and every one has an equal title to that which ſhould give it; or if it did belong to one, none did ever exerciſe it in governing the whole, or dividing it; or if he did divide it, no man knows how, when, and to whom; ſo that they who lay claim to any parcels can give no teſti⯑mony of that diviſion, nor ſhew any better title than other men deriv'd from his firſt Progenitor, to whom 'tis ſaid to have bin granted; and that we have neither a Word, nor the promiſe of a Word from God to decide the controverſys ariſing thereupon, nor any Prophet giving teſtimony of his miſſion that takes upon him to do it, the whole Fabrick of our Au⯑thor's Patriarchical Dominion falls to the ground; and they who propoſe theſe Doctrins, which (if they were receiv'd) would be a root of perpetu⯑al and reconcilable hatred in every man againſt every man, can be accoun⯑ted no leſs than Miniſters of the Devil, tho they want the abilitys he has ſometimes infus'd into thoſe who have bin imploy'd upon the like occaſi⯑ons. And we may juſtly conclude, that God having never given the whole World to be govern'd by one man, nor preſcrib'd any rule for the diviſion of it; nor declar'd where the right of dividing or ſubdividing that which every man has ſhould terminate; we may ſafely affirm that the whole is for ever left to the will and diſcretion of Man: We may enter into, form, [38] and continue in greater or leſſer Societys, as beſt pleaſes our ſelves: The right of Paternity as to Dominion is at an end, and no more remains, but the love, veneration, and obedience, which proceeding from a due ſenſe of the benefits of Birth and Education, have their root in Gratitude, and are eſteem'd ſacred and inviolable by all that are ſober and vertuous. And as 'tis impoſſible to transfer theſe Benefits by inheritance, ſo 'tis impoſſible to transfer the Rights ariſing from them. No man can be my Father but he that did beget me; and 'tis as abſurd to ſay I owe that Duty to one who is not my Father, which I owe to my Father, as to ſay, he did beget me, who did not beget me; for the obligation that ariſes from benefits can only be to him that confer'd them. 'Tis in vain to ſay the ſame is due to his Heir; for that can take place only when he has but one, which in this caſe ſignifies nothing: For if I being the only Son of my Father, inherit his Right, and have the ſame power over my Children as he had over me; if I had one hundred Brothers, they muſt all inherit the ſame; and the Law of England, which acknowledges one only Heir, is not ge⯑neral, but municipal, and is ſo far from being general, as the precept of God and Nature, that I doubt whether it was ever known or us'd in any Nation of the World beyond our Iſland. The words of the Apoſtle, If we are Children, we are therefore Heirs and Co-heirs with Chriſt, are the voice of God and Nature; and as the univerſal Law of God and Nature is al⯑ways the ſame, every one of us who have Children, have the ſame Right over them, as Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob had over theirs; and that Right which was not devolv'd to any one of them, but inherited by them all (I mean the right of Father as Father) not the peculiar promiſes, which were not according to the Law of Nature, but the election of Grace, is alſo inherited by every one of us, and ours, that is, by all Mankind. But if that which could be inherited was inherited by all, and it be impoſſible that a right of Dominion over all can be due to every one, then all that is or can be inherited by every one is that exemption from the Dominion of another, which we call Liberty, and is the gift of God and Nature.

SECT. XVIII. If a right of Dominion were eſteem'd Hereditary according to the Law of Nature, a multitude of deſtructive and inextricable Controverſys would thereupon ariſe.

THere being no ſuch thing therefore, according to the Law of Na⯑ture, as an Hereditary Right to the Dominion of the World, or any part of it; nor any one man that can derive to himſelf a title from the firſt Fathers of Mankind, by which he can rightly pretend to be pre⯑fer'd before others to that command, or a part of it; and none can be de⯑riv'd from Nimrod, or other Uſurpers, who had none in themſelves, we may juſtly ſpare our pains of ſeeking farther into this matter. But as things of the higheſt importance can never be too fully explain'd; it may not be amiſs to obſerve, That if Mankind could be brought to believe that ſuch a right of Dominion were by the Law of God and Nature here⯑ditary, a great number of the moſt deſtructive and inextricable Contro⯑verſys muſt thereupon ariſe, which the wiſdom and goodneſs of God can [39] never enjoin, and Nature, which is Reaſon, can never intend; but at preſent I ſhall only mention two, from whence others muſt perpetually ſpring. Firſt if there be ſuch a Law, no Human Conſtitution can alter it; no length of time can be a defence againſt it: All Governments that are not conformable to it are vicious and void even in their root, and muſt be ſo for ever: That which is originally unjuſt may be juſtly overthrown. We do not know of any (at leaſt in that part of the World in which we are moſt concern'd) that is eſtabliſh'd, or exercis'd with an abſolute Pow⯑er, as by the Authors of thoſe opinions is eſteem'd inſeparable from it: Many, as the Empire, and other States, are directly contrary; and on that account can have no Juſtice in them. It being certain therefore that he or they who exerciſe thoſe Governments have no right: that there is a Man to whom it dos belong, and no man knowing who he is, there is no one man who has not as good a title to it as any other: There is not there⯑fore one who has not a right, as well as any, to overthrow that which has none at all. He that has no part in the Government may deſtroy it, as well as he that has the greateſt; for he neither has that which God or⯑dain'd he ſhould have, nor can ſhew a title to that which he enjoys from that original Prerogative of Birth, from whence it can only be deriv'd.

If it be ſaid, that ſome Governments are arbitrary, as they ought to be; and France, Turkey, and the like be alledg'd as inſtances, the matter is not mended: for we do not only know when thoſe, who deſerve to be re⯑garded by us, were not abſolute, and how they came to be ſo; but alſo, that thoſe very Familys which are now in poſſeſſion are not of very long continuance, had no more title to the original right we ſpeak of than any other men, and conſequently can have none to this day. And tho we cannot perhaps ſay that the Governments of the barbarous Eaſtern Na⯑tions were ever other than they are, yet the known Original of them deprives them of all pretence to the Patriarchical Inheritance; and they may be as juſtly as any other depriv'd of the Power to which they have no title.

In the ſecond place, tho all mens Genealogys were extant, and ful⯑ly verifi'd, and it were allow'd that the Dominion of the World, or eve⯑ry part of it, did belong to the right Heir of the firſt Progenitor, or any other to whom the firſt did rightly aſſign the Parcel, which is under queſtion; yet it were impoſſible for us to know who ſhould be eſteem'd the true Heir, or according to what rule he ſhould be judg'd ſo to be: for God has not by a preciſe word determin'd it, and Men cannot agree a⯑bout it, as appears by the various Laws and Cuſtoms of ſeveral Nations, diſpoſing ſeverally of Hereditary Dominions.

'Tis a folly to ſay, they ought to go to the next in blood; for 'tis not known who is that next. Some give the preference to him who amongſt many Competitors is the feweſt degrees remov'd from their common Pro⯑genitor who firſt obtain'd the Crown: Others look only upon the laſt that poſſeſt it. Some admit of Repreſentation, by which means the Grand⯑child of a King by his eldeſt Son, is prefer'd before his ſecond Son, he being ſaid to repreſent his dead Father, who was the eldeſt: Others ex⯑clude theſe, and advance the younger Son, who is nearer by one degree to the common Progenitor that laſt enjoy'd the Crown than the Grand⯑child. According to the firſt rule, Richard II. was advanc'd to the Crown of England, as Son of the eldeſt Son of Edward III. before his Uncles, who by one degree were nearer to the laſt Poſſeſſor: And in purſuance of the ſecond, Sancho ſirnam'd the Brave, ſecond Son of Alphonſo the Wiſe, [40] King of Caſtile, was prefer'd before Alphonſo Son of Ferdinand his eldeſt Brother, according to the Law of Thaneſtry, which was in force in Spain ever ſince we have had any knowledg of that Country, as appears by the conteſt between Corbis and Orſua, decided by Combat before Scipio Africanus; continu'd in full force as long as the Kingdom of the Goths laſt⯑ed, and was ever highly valu'd, till the Houſe of Auſtria got poſſeſſion of that Country, and introduc'd Laws and Cuſtoms formerly unknown to the Inhabitants.

The Hiſtorys of all Nations furniſh us with innumerable Examples of both ſorts; and whoſoever takes upon him to determin which ſide is in the right, ought to ſhew by what authority he undertakes to be the Judg of Mankind, and how the infinite breaches thereby made upon the rights of the governing Familys ſhall be cur'd, without the overthrow of thoſe that he ſhall condemn, and of the Nations where ſuch Laws have bin in force as he diſlikes: and till that be done, in my opinion, no place will afford a better lodging for him that ſhall impudently aſſume ſuch a Pow⯑er, than the new buildings in Moor-Fields.

'Tis no leſs hard to decide whether this next Heir is to be ſought in the Male Line only, or whether Females alſo may be admitted. If we fol⯑low the firſt as the Law of God and Nature, the title of our Engliſh Kings is wholly aboliſh'd; for not one of them ſince Henry the 1ſt has had the leaſt pretence to an inheritance by the Maſculine Line; and if it were neceſſary, we have enough to ſay of thoſe that were before him.

If it be ſaid, that the ſame Right belongs to Females, it ought to be prov'd that Women are as fit as Men to perform the Office of a King, that is, as the Iſraelites ſaid to Samuel, to go in and out before us, to judg us, and to fight our Battels; for it were an impious folly to ſay that God had ordain'd thoſe for the Offices on which the good of Mankind ſo much de⯑pends, who by nature are unable to perform the dutys of them. If on the other ſide, the ſweetneſs, gentleneſs, delicacy, and tenderneſs of the Sex render them ſo unfit for manly exerciſes, that they are accounted ut⯑terly repugnant to, and inconſiſtent with that modeſty which dos ſo emi⯑nently ſhine in all thoſe that are good amongſt them; that Law of Na⯑ture which ſhould advance them to the Government of Men, would over⯑throw its own Work, and make thoſe to be the Heads of Nations, which cannot be the Heads of privat Familys; for, as the Apoſtle ſays, The Wo⯑man is not the head of the Man, but the Man is the head of the Women. This were no leſs than to oblige Mankind to lay aſide the name of reaſonable Creature: for if Reaſon be his Nature, it cannot enjoin that which is con⯑trary to it ſelf; if it be not, the definition Homo eſt animal rationale, is falſe, and ought no longer to be aſſum'd.

If any man think theſe Arguments to be miſtaken or miſappli'd, I de⯑ſire him to enquire of the French Nation on what account they have al⯑ways excluded Females, and ſuch as deſcended from them? How comes the Houſe of Bourbon to be advanc'd to the Throne before a great Num⯑ber of Familys that come from the Daughters of the Houſe of Valois? Or what title thoſe could have before the Daughters of the other Lines, deſcended from Hugh Capet, Pepin, Meroveus, or Pharamond? I know not how ſuch queſtions would be receiv'd; but I am inclin'd to think that the wickedneſs and folly of thoſe who ſhould thereby endeavour to over⯑throw the moſt antient and moſt venerated Conſtitutions of the greateſt Nations, and by that means to involve them in the moſt inextricable diffi⯑cultys, would be requited only with Stones.

[41] It cannot be denied, that the moſt valiant, wiſe, learned, and beſt po⯑liſh'd Nations have always follow'd the ſame Rule, tho the ^* weak and bar [...] arous acted otherwiſe; and no man ever heard of a Queen, or a man deriving his title from a Female among the antient civiliz'd Nations. But if this be not enough, the Law of God, that wholly omits Females, is ſufficient to ſhew that Nature, which is his Handmaid, cannot advance them. When God deſcribes who ſhould be the King of his People (if they would have one) and how he ſhould govern; no mention is made Deut. 17.of Daughters. The Iſraelites offer'd the Kingdom to Gideon, and to his Sons: God promis'd, and gave it to Saul, David, Jeroboam, Jehu, and their Sons. When all of them, ſave David, by their Crimes fell from the Kingdom, the Males only were extirpated; and the Females who had no part in the Promiſes, did not fall under the Penaltys, or the Ven⯑geance that was executed upon thoſe Familys: and we do not in the Word of God, or in the Hiſtory of the Jews, hear of any Feminin Reign, except that which was uſurp'd by Athaliah; nor that any conſideration was had of their Deſcendents in relation to the Kingdom: which is e⯑nough to ſhew that it is not according to the Law of God, nor to the Law of Nature, which cannot differ from it. So that Females, or ſuch as derive their right by inheritance from Females, muſt have it from ſome other Law, or they can have none at all.

But tho this queſtion were authentically decided, and concluded that Females might or might not ſucceed, we ſhould not be at the end of our conteſts: for if they were excluded, it would not from thence follow, as in France, that their Deſcendents ſhould be ſo alſo; for the Privilege which is denied to them, becauſe they cannot, without receding from the modeſty and gentleneſs of the Sex, take upon them to execute all the Dutys requir'd, may be transfer'd to their Children, as Henry the ſecond and Henry the ſeventh were admitted, tho their Mothers were re⯑jected.

If it be ſaid that every Nation ought in this to follow their own Con⯑ſtitutions, we are at an end of our Controverſys; for they ought not to be follow'd, unleſs they are rightly made: They cannot be rightly made, if they are contrary to the univerſal Law of God and Nature. If there be a general Rule, 'tis impoſſible but ſome of them, being directly contrary to each other, muſt be contrary to it. If therefore all of them are to be follow'd, there can be no general Law given to all; but every People is by God and Nature left to the liberty of regulating theſe matters relat⯑ing to themſelves according to their own prudence or convenience: and this ſeems to be ſo certainly true, that whoſoever dos, as our Author, propoſe Doctrins to the contrary, muſt either be thought raſhly to utter that which he dos not underſtand, or maliciouſly to caſt balls of Diviſion among all Nations, whereby every man's Sword would be drawn againſt every man, to the total ſubverſion of all Order and Government.

SECT. XIX. Kings cannot confer the right of Father upon Princes, nor Princes upon Kings.

LEST what has bin ſaid before by our Author ſhould not be ſuffici⯑ent to accompliſh his deſign of bringing confuſion upon Mankind, and ſome may yet lie ſtill for want of knowing at whoſe command he ſhould cut his Brother's throat, if he has not power or courage to ſet up a title for himſelf, he has a new project that would certainly do his work, if it were receiv'd. Not content with the abſurditys and untruths alrea⯑dy utter'd in giving the incommunicable right of Fathers, not only to thoſe who, as is manifeſtly teſtify'd by ſacred and profane Hiſtorys, did uſurp a power over their Fathers, or ſuch as ow'd no manner of obedi⯑ence to them: and juſtifying thoſe Uſurpations, which are moſt odious to God and all good men, he now fancys a Kingdom ſo gotten may eſ⯑cheat for want of an Heir; whereas there is no need of ſeeking any, if Uſurpation can confer a Right, and that he who gets the Power into his hands, ought to be reputed the right Heir of the firſt Progenitor; for ſuch a one will ſeldom be wanting, if violence and fraud be juſtified by the command of God, and Nations ſtand oblig'd to render obedience, till a ſtronger or more ſucceſsful Villain throws him from the Throne he had invaded. But if it ſhould come to paſs that no man would ſtep into the vacant place, he has a new way of depriving the People of their Right to provide for the Government of themſelves. Becauſe, ſays he, the de⯑pendency of antient Familys is oft obſcure, and worn out of knowledg; there⯑fore the Wiſdom of all or moſt Princes has thought fit many times to adopt thoſe for Heads of Familys, and Princes of Provinces, whoſe merits, abili⯑tys, or fortunes have ennobled them, and made them fit and capable of ſuch Royal Favours: All ſuch prime Heads and Fathers have power to conſent to the uniting and conferring of their fatherly Right and Sovereignty on whom they pleaſe, &c.

I may juſtly ask how any one or more Familys come to be eſteem'd more antient than others, if all are deſcended from one common Father, as the Scriptures teſtify; or to what purpoſe it were to inquire what Fa⯑milys were the moſt antient, if there were any ſuch, when the youngeſt and moſt mean by uſurpation gets an abſolute right of Dominion over the eldeſt, tho his own Progenitors, as Nimrod did: but I may certainly conclude, That whatever the Right be that belongs to thoſe antient Fa⯑milys, it is inherent in them, and cannot be confer'd on any other by any human Power; for it proceeds from Nature only. The Duty I owe to my Father dos not ariſe from an uſurp'd or delegated Power, but from my birth deriv'd from him; and 'tis as impoſſible for any man to uſurp or receive, by the grant of another, the right of a Father over me, as for him to become, or pretend to be made my Father by another who did not beget me. But if he ſay true, this right of Father dos not ariſe from Nature; nor the obedience that I owe to him that begot me, from the benefits which I receiv'd, but is merely an artificial thing depending upon the Will of another: and that we may be ſure there can be no error in this, our Author attributes it to the wiſdom of Princes. But before this [43] comes to be authentick, we muſt at the leaſt be ſure that all Princes have this great and profound Wiſdom, which our Author acknowledges to be in them, and which is certainly neceſſary for the doing of ſuch great things, if they were refer'd to them. They ſeem to us to be born like other men, and to be generally no wiſer than other men. We are not oblig'd to believe that Nebuchadnezzar was wiſe, till God had given him the heart of a man; or that his Grandſon Belſhazzar, who being laid in the balance was found too light, had any ſuch profound Wiſdom. Aha⯑ſuerus ſhew'd it not in appointing all the People of God to be ſlain, upon a Lie told to him by a Raſcal; and the matter was not very much mend⯑ed, when being inform'd of the truth, he gave 'em leave to kill as many of their Enemys as they pleas'd. The hardneſs of Pharaoh's heart, and the overthrow thereby brought upon himſelf and People, dos not argue ſo profound a Judgment as our Author preſumes every Prince muſt have: And 'tis not probable that Samuel would have told Saul, He had done foo⯑liſhly, if Kings had always bin ſo exceeding wiſe: Nay, if Wiſdom had bin annex'd to the Character, Solomon might have ſpar'd the pains of asking it from God, and Rehoboam muſt have had it. Not to multiply ex⯑amples out of Scripture, 'tis believ'd that Xerxes had not inflicted Stripes upon the Sea for breaking his Navy in pieces, if he had bin ſo very wiſe. Caligula for the ſame reaſon might have ſav'd the labour of making love to the Moon, or have choſen a fitter Subject to advance to the Conſulat than his Horſe Incitatus: Nero had not endeavour'd to make a Woman of Sueton.a Man, nor married a Man as a Woman. Many other Examples might be alledg'd to ſhew that Kings are not always wiſe: and not only the Ro⯑man Satyriſt, who ſays Quicquid delirant Reges, &c. ſhews that he did Horat.not believe them to be generally wiſer than other men; but Solomon him⯑ſelf judges them to be as liable to infirmitys, when he prefers a wiſe Child before an old and fooliſh King. If therefore the ſtrength of our Author's Argument lies in the certainty of the Wiſdom of Kings, it can be of no value, till he proves it to be more univerſal in them than Hiſtory or Experience will permit us to believe. Nay, if there be Truth or Wiſdom in the Scripture, which frequently repreſents the wicked Man as a Fool, we cannot think that all Kings are wiſe, unleſs it be prov'd that none of them have bin wicked; and when this is perform'd by Filmer's Diſci⯑ples, I ſhall confeſs my error.

Men give teſtimony of their Wiſdom, when they undertake that which they ought to do, and rightly perform that which they undertake; both which points do utterly fail in the ſubject of our Diſcourſe. We have of⯑ten heard of ſuch as have adopted thoſe to be their Sons who were not ſo, and ſome Civil Laws approve it. This ſignifies no more, than that ſuch a Man, either thro affection to one who is not his Son, or to his Parents▪ or for ſome other reaſon, takes him into his Family, and ſhews kindneſs to him, as to his Son: but the adoption of Fathers is a whimſical piece of nonſenſe. If this be capable of an aggravation, I think none can be greater, than not to leave it to my own diſcretion, who having no Fa⯑ther, may reſolve to pay the Duty I ow'd to my Father to one who may have ſhew'd Kindneſs to me; but for another to impoſe a Father upon a Man, or a People compos'd of Fathers, or ſuch as have Fathers, where⯑by they ſhould be depriv'd of that natural Honour and Right which he makes the foundation of his Diſcourſe, is the utmoſt of all abſurditys. If any Prince therefore has ever undertaken to appoint Fathers of his Peo⯑ple, he cannot be accounted a man of profound Wiſdom, but a Fool or a [44] Madman; and his Acts can be of no value. But if the thing were con⯑ſonant to Nature, and refer'd to the Will of Princes (which I abſo⯑lutely deny) the frequent Extravagancys committed by them in the ele⯑vation of their Favorites, ſhews that they intend not to make them Fa⯑thers of the People, or know not what they do when they do it.

To chuſe or inſtitute a Father is nonſenſe in the very term; but if any were to be choſen to perform the Office of Fathers to ſuch as have none, and are not of age to provide for themſelves (as men do Tutors or Guar⯑dians for Orphans) none could be capable of being elected, but ſuch as in kindneſs to the perſon they were to take under their care, did moſt re⯑ſemble his true Father, and had the virtues and abilitys requir'd rightly to provide for his good. If this fails, all Right ceaſes; and ſuch a corruption is introduc'd as we ſaw in our Court of Wards, which the Nation could not bear, when the Inſtitution was perverted, and the King, who ought to have taken a tender care of the Wards and their Eſtates, deliver'd 'em as a prey to thoſe whom he favour'd.

Our Author ridiculouſly attributes the Title and Authority of Father to the word Prince; for it has none in it, and ſignifies no more than a Man, who in ſome kind is more eminent than the Vulgar. In this ſenſe Trecenti Ro⯑manae juventu⯑tis Principes. T. Liv. Mutius Scaevola told Porſenna, that Three hundred Princes of the Roman Youth had conſpir'd againſt him: By which he could not mean that three hundred Fathers of the Roman Youth, but three hundred Roman young men had conſpir'd; and they could not be Fathers of the City, unleſs they had bin Fathers of their own Fathers. Princeps Senatus was under⯑ſtood in the ſame ſenſe; and T. Sempronius the Cenſor, chuſing Q. Fa⯑bius T. Liv. l. 7. Maximus to that Honour, gave for a reaſon, Se lecturum Q. Fabi⯑um Maximum, quem tum Principem Romanae Civitatis eſſe, vel Anni⯑bale judice, dicturus eſſet; which could not be underſtood that Hannibal thought him to be the Father or Lord of the City (for he knew he was not) but the Man who for Wiſdom and Valour was the moſt eminent in it.

The like are and ought to be the Princes of every Nation; and tho ſomething of Honour may juſtly be attributed to the Deſcendents of ſuch as have done great Services to their Country, yet they who degenerate from them cannot be eſteem'd Princes; much leſs can ſuch Honours or Rights be confer'd upon Court-creatures or Favorites. Tiberius, Cali⯑gula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, and others, could advance Macro, Pallas, Narciſſus, Tigellinus, Vinnius, Laco, and the like, to the higheſt de⯑grees of Riches and Power; but they ſtill continu'd to be Villains, and ſo they died.

No wiſe or good Man ever thought otherwiſe of thoſe, who thro the folly of Princes have bin advanc'd to the higheſt places in ſeveral Coun⯑trys. The madneſs of attributing to them a paternal power, ſeems to have bin peculiarly reſerv'd to compleat the inſamy of our Author; for he only could acknowledg a cooptitious Father, or give to another man the power of chuſing him. I confeſs that a man in his infancy may have bin expos'd, like Moſes, Cyrus, Oedipus, Romulus: He may have bin taken in War; or by the charity of ſome good perſon ſav'd from the teeth of wild Beaſts, or from the Sword by which his Parents fell, and may have bin educated with that care which Fathers uſually have of their Children: 'tis reaſonable that ſuch a one in the whole courſe of his life ſhould pay that veneration and obedience to him, who gave him as it were a ſecond birth, which was due to his natural Father; and this, tho improperly, [45] may be call'd an Adoption. But to think that any man can aſſume it to himſelf, or confer it upon another, and thereby arrogate to himſelf the ſervice and obedience, which, by the moſt tender and ſacred Laws of Nature, we owe to thoſe from whom we receive Birth and Education, is the moſt prepoſterous folly that hitherto has ever enter'd into the heart of man.

Our Author nevertheleſs is not aſham'd of it, and gives Reaſons no way unſutable to the Propoſition. Men are, ſays he, adopted Fathers of Provinces for their Abilitys, Merits, or Fortunes. But theſe Abilitys can ſimply deſerve nothing; for it they are ill employ'd, they are the worſt of Vices, and the moſt powerful Inſtruments of Miſchief. Merits, in regard of another, are nothing unleſs they be to him; and he alone can merit from me the reſpect due to a Father, who has confer'd Benefits upon me, in ſome meaſure proportionable to thoſe which we uſually re⯑ceive from our Fathers: and the world may judg, whether all the Court-Miniſters and Favorites that we have known, do upon this account de⯑ſerve to be eſteem'd Fathers of Nations. But to allow this on account of their Fortunes, is, if poſſible, more extravagant than any thing that has bin yet utter'd. By this account Mazarin muſt have bin Father of the French Nation: The ſame Right was inherited by his chaſt Niece, and remain'd in her, till ſhe and her ſilly Husband diſſipated the Treaſures which her Uncle had torn from the Bowels of that People. The Parti⯑zans may generally claim the ſame Right over the Provinces they have pillag'd: Old Audley, Dog Smith, Bp Duppa, Brownloe, Child, Daſhwood, Fox, &c. are to be eſteem'd Fathers of the People of England. This Doctrin is perfectly Canonical, if Filmer and Heylin were good Divines; and Legal, if they judg'd more rightly touching matters of Law. But if it be abſurd and deteſtable, they are to be reputed Men, who, by attri⯑buting the higheſt Honours to the vileſt Wretches of the world, for what they had gain'd by the moſt abominable means, endeavour to encreaſe thoſe Vices, which are already come to ſuch a height, that they can by no other way be brought to a greater. Daily experience too plainly ſhews, with what rage Avarice uſually fills the hearts of men. There are not many deſtructive Villanys committed in the World, that do not proceed from it. In this reſpect 'tis call'd Idolatry, and the root of all evil. Solomon warns us to beware of ſuch as make haſt to grow rich, and ſays, they ſhall not be innocent. But 'tis no matter what the Pro⯑phets, the Apoſtles, or the wiſeſt of men ſay of Riches, and the ways of gaining them; for our Author tells us, that men of the greateſt Fortunes, without examining how they came to them, or what uſe they make of them, deſerve to be made Fathers of Provinces.

But this is not his only quarrel with all that is juſt and good: His whole Book goes directly againſt the letter and ſpirit of the Scripture. The work of all thoſe, whom God in ſeveral Ages has rais'd up to announce his Word, was to abate the Luſts and Paſſions that ariſe in the hearts of men; to ſhew the vanity of worldly Enjoyments, with the dangers that accom⯑pany Riches and Honors, and to raiſe our hearts to the love of thoſe Trea⯑ſures that periſh not. Honeſt and wiſe men, following the Light of Na⯑ture, have in ſome meaſure imitated this. Such as liv'd private lives, as Plato, Socrates, Epictetus, and others, made it their buſineſs to abate mens Luſts, by ſhewing the folly of ſeeking vain Honors, uſeleſs Riches, or unſatisſying Pleaſures; and thoſe who were like to them, if they were rais'd to ſupreme Magiſtracys, have endeavour'd by the ſevereſt Puniſh⯑ments [46] to reſtrain men from commiting the Crimes by which Riches are moſt commonly gain'd: but Filmer and Heylin lead us into a new way. If they deſerve credit, whoſoever would become ſupreme Lord and Father of his Country, abſolute, ſacred and inviolable, is only to kill him that is in the head of the Government: Uſurpation confers an equal Right with Election or Inheritance: We are to look upon the Pow⯑er, not the Ways by which it is obtain'd: Poſſeſſion only is to be re⯑garded; and men muſt venerate the preſent Power, as ſet up by God, tho gain'd by Violence, Treachery or Poiſon: Children muſt not impoſe Laws upon, nor examin the Actions of their Father. Thoſe who are a little more modeſt, and would content themſelves with the Honour of being Fathers and Lords only of Provinces, if they get Riches by the ſa⯑vour of the King, or the favour of the King by Riches, may receive that honour from him: The Lord Paramount may make them peculiar Lords of each Province as ſacred as himſelf; and by that means every man ſhall have an immediat and a ſubaltern Father. This would be a Spur to excite even the moſt ſleeping Luſts; and a Poiſon that would fill the gentleſt Spirits with the moſt violent Furys. If men ſhould believe this, there would hardly be found one of whom it might not be ſaid, Hac ſpe, minanti fulmen occurret Jovi. Senec. Theb. No more is requir'd to fill the World with Fire and Blood, than the reception of theſe Precepts: No man can look upon that as a Wickedneſs, which ſhall render him Sacred; nor fear to attempt that which ſhall make him God's Vicegerent. And I doubt, whether the wickedneſs of filling mens heads with ſuch Notions was ever equal'd, unleſs by him who ſaid, Ye ſhall not die, but be as Gods.

But ſince our Author is pleas'd to teach us theſe ſtrange things, I wiſh he would alſo have told us, how many men in every Nation ought to be look'd upon as adopted Fathers: What proportion of Riches, Ability or Merit, is naturally or divinely requir'd to make them capable of this ſublime Character: Whether the Right of this Chimerical Father dos not deſtroy that of the Natural; or whether both continue in force, and men thereby ſtand oblig'd, in deſpite of what Chriſt ſaid, to ſerve two Maſters. For if the Right of my Artificial Father ariſe from any Act of the King, in favour of his Riches, Abilitys or Merit, I ought to know whether he is to excel in all, or any one of theſe Points; How far, and which of 'em gives the preference; ſince 'tis impoſſible for me to deter⯑min whether my Father, who may be wiſe, tho not rich, is thereby deveſted of his Right, and it comes to be transfer'd to another, who may be rich tho not wiſe, nor of any perſonal merit at all, till that Point be decided; or, ſo much as to gueſs when I am emancipated from the Duty I owe to him, by whom I was begotten and educated, unleſs I know whether he be fallen from his Right, thro want of Merit, Wiſdom or Eſtate; and that can never be, till it be determin'd, that he has forfeited his Right, by being defective in all, or any of the three; and what pro⯑portion of Merit, Wiſdom or Eſtate is requir'd in him, ſor the enjoy⯑ment of his Right, or in another that would acquire it: for no man can ſucceed to the Right of another, unleſs the firſt Poſſeſſor be rightly de⯑priv'd of it; and it cannot belong to them both, becauſe common ſenſe univerſally teaches, that two diſtinct Perſons cannot, at the ſame time, and in the ſame degree, have an equal Right to the ſame individual thing.

[47] The Right of Father cannot therefore be confer'd upon Princes by Kings, but muſt for ever follow the Rule of Nature. The Character of a Father is indelible, and incommunicable: The Duty of Children ariſing from Benefits receiv'd is perpetual, becauſe they can never not have receiv'd them, and can be due only to him from whom they are receiv'd. For theſe Reaſons we ſee, that ſuch as our Author calls Prin⯑ces, cannot confer it upon a King; for they cannot give what they have not in themſelves: They who have nothing, can give nothing: They who are only ſuppoſititious, cannot make another to be real; and the Whimſy of Kings making Princes to be Fathers, and Princes conferring that Right on Kings, comes to nothing.

SECT. XX. All juſt Magiſtratical Power is from the People.

HAVING prov'd that the Right of a Father proceeds from the Generation and Education of his Children: That no man can have that Right over thoſe, whom he has not begotten and educated: That every man has it over thoſe who owe their Birth and Education to him: That all the Sons of Noah, Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob, and others, did equally inherit it: That by the ſame Reaſons, it dos for ever belong to every man that begets Children; it plainly appears, that no Father can have a Right over others, unleſs it be by them granted to him, and that he receive his Right from thoſe who granted it. But our Au⯑thor, with an admirable ſagacity peculiar to himſelf, diſcovers, and with equal confidence tells us, that that which is from the People, or the chief Heads of them, is not from the People: He that is ſo elected, ſays he, claims not his Right from the People as a Donative, but from God. That is, if I miſtake not, Romulus was not made King of the Romans by that People, but by God: Thoſe men being newly gather'd together, had two Fathers, tho neither of them had any Children; and no man knew who was their Father, nor which of 'em was the elder: But Romulus by the ſlaughter of his Brother decided all Queſtions, and purchas'd to himſelf a Royal Charter from God; and the Act of the People which confer'd the Power on him, was the Act of God. We had formerly learnt, that whatſoever was done by Monarchs, was to be imputed to God; and that whoſoever murder'd the Father of a People, acquir'd the ſame Right to himſelf: but now it ſeems, that Nations alſo have the ſame privilege, and that God dos what they do. Now I underſtand why it was ſaid of old, Vox Populi eſt Vox Dei: But if it was ſo in regard of Romulus, the ſame muſt be confeſt of Tullus Hoſtilius, Ancus Martius, Tarquinius Priſcus, and Servius Tullus; who being all ſtrangers to each other, and moſt of them Aliens alſo, were ſucceſſively advanc'd by the ſame People, without any reſpect to the Children, Relations or Heirs of their Predeceſſors. And I cannot comprehend, why the Act of the ſame People ſhould not have the ſame Virtue, and be equally attributed to God, when they gave the ſame or more power to Conſuls, Military Tribunes, Decemviri, or Dictators; or why the ſame Divine Character ſhould not be in the ſame manner confer'd upon any Magiſtracys, that by any Peo⯑ple have bin, are, or ſhall be at any time erected for the ſame ends.

[48] Upon the ſame grounds we may conclude, that no Privilege is pecu⯑liarly annex'd to any Form of Government; but that all Magiſtrats are equally the Miniſters of God, who perform the Work for which they were inſtituted; and that the People which inſtitutes them, may propor⯑tion, regulate and terminate their Power, as to time, meaſure, and num⯑ber of Perſons, as ſeems moſt convenient to themſelves, which can be no other than their own good. For it cannot be imagin'd that a multitude of People ſhould ſend for Numa, or any other Perſon to whom they ow'd nothing, to reign over 'em, that he might live in Glory and Pleaſure; or for any other reaſon, than that it might be good for them and their Poſterity. This ſhews the Work of all Magiſtrats to be always and every where the ſame, even the doing of Juſtice, and procuring the Wel⯑fare of thoſe that create them. This we learn from common ſenſe: Plato, Ariſtotle, Cicero, and the beſt human Authors lay it as an un⯑movable Foundation, upon which they build their Arguments relating to matters of that nature: And the Apoſtle from better Authority declares, Rom. 13. That Rulers are not a terror to good Works, but to Evil: Wilt thou then not be afraid of the Power? do that which is good, and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame; for he is the Miniſter of God unto thee for good: But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he bears not the Sword in vain; for he is the Miniſter of God, a revenger to execute Wrath upon him that doth evil. [...] Tim. 2.And the reaſon he gives for praying for Kings, and all that are in Autho⯑rity, is, that we may live a quiet and peaceable life, in all godlineſs and hone⯑ſty. But if this be the Work of the Magiſtrate, and the glorious Name of God's Miniſter be given to him for the performance of it, we may ea⯑ſily ſee to whom that Title belongs. His Children and Servants ye are; whoſe Works ye do. He therefore, and he only, is the Servant of God, who dos the Work of God; who is a terror to thoſe that do evil, and a praiſe to thoſe that do well; who bears the Sword for the puniſhment of Wickedneſs and Vice, and ſo governs, that the People may live quietly in all godlineſs and honeſty. The order of his Inſtitution is inverted, and the Inſtitution vacated, if the Power be turn'd to the praiſe of thoſe that do evil, and becomes a terror to ſuch as do well; and that none who live honeſtly and juſtly can be quiet under it. If God be the Fountain of Juſtice, Mercy and Truth, and thoſe his Servants who walk in them, no exerciſe of Violence, Fraud, Cruelty, Pride, or Avarice, is patroniz'd by him: and they who are the Authors of thoſe Villanys, cannot but be the Miniſters of him, who ſets himſelf up againſt God; becauſe 'tis im⯑poſſible that Truth and Falſhood, Mercy and Cruelty, Juſtice and the moſt violent Oppreſſion can proceed from the ſame Root. It was a folly and a lie in thoſe Jews, to call themſelves the Children of Abraham, who did not the Works of Abraham; and Chriſt declar'd them to be the Chil⯑dren John 8. 39.of the Devil, whoſe Works they did; which words proceeding from the Eternal Truth, do as well indicate to us whoſe Child and Ser⯑vant every man is to be accounted, as to thoſe who firſt heard them.

If our Author's former Aſſertions were void of Judgment and Truth, his next Clauſe ſhews a great defect in his Memory, and contradicts the former: The Judgments of God, ſays he, who has Power to give and take away Kingdoms, are moſt juſt; yet the miniſtry of Men, who execute God's Judgments without Commiſſion, is ſinful and damnable. If it be true, as he ſays, that we are to look at the Power, not the Ways by which it is gain'd; and that he who has it, whether it be by Uſurpation, Conqueſt, or any other means, is to be accounted as Father, or right Heir to the [49] Father of the People, to which Title the moſt ſublime and divine Pri⯑vileges are annex'd; a man who by the moſt wicked and unjuſt Actions advances himſelf to the Power, becomes immediatly the Father of the Peo⯑ple, and the Miniſter of God; which I take to be a piece of Divinity worthy our Author and his Diſciples.

It may be doubted what he means by a Commiſſion from God; for we know of none but what is outwardly by his Word, or inwardly by his Spirit; and I am apt to think, that neither he nor his Abettors allowing of either as to the Point in queſtion, he dos foully prevaricate, in alledg⯑ing that which he thinks cannot be of any effect. If any man ſhould ſay, that the Word of God to Moſes, Joſhua, Ehud, Gideon, Samuel, Jerobo⯑am and Jehu, or any others, are, in the like caſes, Rules to be obſerv'd by all; becauſe that which was from God was good, that which was good, is good; and he that dos good, is juſtified by it: He would proba⯑bly tell us, that what was good in them, is not good in others; and that the Word of God dos juſtify thoſe only to whom it is ſpoken: That is to ſay, No man can execute the juſt Judgments of God, to the benefit of mankind, according to the Example of thoſe Servants of God, without damnable ſin, unleſs he have a preciſe Word particularly directed to him for it, as Moſes had. But if any man ſhould pretend that ſuch a Word was come to him, he would be accounted an Enthuſiaſt, and obtain no credit. So that, which way ſoever the Clauſe be taken, it appears to be full of Fraud, confeſſing only in the Theory, that which he thinks can never be brought into practice; that his beloved Villanys may be thereby ſecur'd, and that the glorious Examples of the moſt heroick Actions, per⯑form'd by the beſt and wiſeſt men that ever were in the World for the benefit of mankind, may never be imitated.

The next Clauſe ſhews, that I did our Author no wrong in ſaying, that he gave a right to Uſurpation; for he plainly ſays, That whether the Prince be the ſupreme Father of his People, or the true Heir of ſuch a Father; or whether he come to the Crown by Ʋſurpation, or Election of the Nobles or People, or by any other way whatſoever, &c. it is the only Right and Authority of the natural Father. In the 3d Chap. Sect. 8. It skills not which way the King comes by his Power, whether by Election, Donation, Succeſſion, or by any other means. And in another place, That we are to regard the Power, not the Means by which it is gain'd. To which I need ſay no more, than that I cannot ſufficiently admire the ingeniouſly invented Title of Father by Uſurpation; and confeſs, that ſince there is ſuch a thing in the World, to which not only privat men, but whole Nations owe obedience, whatſo⯑ever has bin ſaid antiently, (as was thought to expreſs the higheſt exceſs of Fury and Injuſtice) as, Jus datum ſceleri; Jus omne in ferro eſt ſitum; Lucan. &c. Jus licet in jugulos noſtros ſibi fecerit enſe; Sylla potens Mariuſ (que) ferox & Cinna cruentus, Caeſareaeque domus ſeries; were ſolid Truths, good Law and Divinity; which did not only ſignify the actual exerciſe of the Pow⯑er, but induc'd a conſcientious Obligation of obeying it. The Powers ſo gain'd, did carry in themſelves the moſt ſacred and inviolable Rights; and the actors of the moſt deteſtable Villanys thereby became the Mini⯑ſters of God, and the Fathers of their ſubdu'd People. Or if this be not true, it cannot be denied, that Filmer and his followers, in the moſt impudent and outragious Blaſphemy, have ſurpaſt all that have gone be⯑fore 'em.

To confirm his Aſſertion, he gives us a wonderful explanation of the fiſth Commandment; which, he ſays, enjoins Obedience to Princes, un⯑der [50] the terms of, Honour thy Father and thy Mother; drawing this Infe⯑rence, That as all Power is in the Father, the Prince who hath it, cannot be reſtrain'd by any Law; which being grounded upon the perfect likeneſs between Kings and Fathers, no man can deny it to be true. But if Claudius was the Father of the Roman People, I ſuppoſe the chaſt Meſſalina was the Mo⯑ther, and to be honour'd by virtue of the ſame Commandment: But then I fear that ſuch as met her in the moſt obſcene places, were not only guilty of Adultery, but of Inceſt. The ſame Honour muſt needs belong to Nero and his vertuous Poppaea, unleſs it were transfer'd to his new⯑made Woman Sporus; or perhaps he himſelf was the Mother, and the glorious Title of Pater Patriae belong'd to the Raſcal, who married him as a Woman. The like may be ſaid of Agathocles, Dionyſius, Phalaris, Buſiris, Machanidas, Peter the Cruel of Caſtile, Chriſtiern of Denmark, the laſt Princes of the Houſe of Valois in France, and Philip the Second of Spain. Thoſe Actions of theirs which men have ever eſteem'd moſt deteſtable, and the whole courſe of their abominable Government, did not proceed from Pride, Avarice, Cruelty, Madneſs and Luſt, but from the tender care of moſt pious Fathers. Tacitus ſadly deſcribes the ſtate of his Country: Ʋrbs incendiis vaſtata, conſumptis antiquiſſimis delubris, ipſo Capitolio Civium manibus incenſo; pollutae Ceremoniae; magna Adulteria; plenum Exiliis mare; infecti caedibus ſcopuli; atrocius in Ʋrbe ſaevitum; Nobilitas, opes, omiſſi vel geſti honores pro crimine, & ob virtutes certiſſi⯑mum exitium: But he was to blame; all this proceeded from the ardency of a paternal Affection. When Nero, by the death of Helvidius Priſcus and Thraſeas, endeavour'd to cut up Vertue by the roots, ipſam exſcindere virtutem, he did it, becauſe he knew it was good for the World that there ſhould be no vertuous man in it. When he fir'd the City, and when Caligula wiſh'd the People had but one Neck that he might ſtrike it off at one blow, they did it thro a prudent care of their Childrens good, knowing it would be for their advantage to be deſtroy'd; and that the empty deſolated World would be no more troubled with popular Sediti⯑ons. By the ſame rule Pharaoh, Eglon, Nebuchodonoſor, Antiochus, He⯑rod, and the like, were Fathers of the Hebrews. And without looking far backward, or depending upon the Faith of Hiſtory, we may enume⯑rate many Princes, who in a perpetual care of their People, have not yielded to Nero or Caligula. If our Author ſay true, all thoſe Actions of theirs, which we have ever attributed to the utmoſt exceſs of Pride, Cru⯑elty, Avarice and Perfidiouſneſs, proceeded from their princely Wiſdom and fatherly Kindneſs to the Nations under 'em: and we are beholden to him for the diſcovery of ſo great a Myſtery, which has bin hid from man⯑kind from the beginning of the World to this day: if not, we may ſtill look upon them as Children of the Devil; and continue to believe, that Princes as well as other Magiſtrats were ſet up by the People for the pub⯑lick Good; that the Praiſes given to ſuch as are Wiſe, Juſt and Good, are purely perſonal, and can belong only to thoſe, who by a due exerciſe of their Power do deſerve it, and to no others.

SECT. I. That 'tis natural for Nations to govern, or to chuſe Governors; and that Vertue only gives a natural preference of one man above another, or reaſon why one ſhould be choſen rather than another.

IN this Chapter our Author fights valiantly againſt Bellarmin and Sua⯑rez, ſeeming to think himſelf victorious, if he can ſhew that either of them has contradicted the other, or himſelf; but being no way concern'd in them, I ſhall leave their followers to defend their Quar⯑rel: My work is to ſeek after Truth; and, tho they may have ſaid ſome things, in matters not concerning their beloved Cauſe of Popery, that are agreeable to Reaſon, Law, or Scripture, I have little hope of finding it among thoſe who apply themſelves chiefly to School Sophiſtry, as the beſt means to ſupport Idolatry. That which I maintain, is the Cauſe of Mankind; which ought not to ſuffer, tho Champions of corrupt Princi⯑ples have weakly defended, or maliciouſly betray'd it: and therefore not at all relying on their Authority, I intend to reject whatſoever they ſay that agrees not with Reaſon, Scripture, or the approv'd Examples of the beſt poliſh'd Nations. He alſo attacks Plato and Ariſtotle, upon whoſe Opinions I ſet a far greater value, in as much as they ſeem to have pene⯑trated more deeply into the ſecrets of human Nature; and not only to have judg'd more rightly of the Intereſts of Mankind, but alſo to have comprehended in their Writings the Wiſdom of the Grecians, with all that they had learn'd from the Phaenicians, Egyptians, and Hebrews; which may lead us to the diſcovery of the Truth we ſeek. If this be our work, the queſtion is not, whether it be a Paradox, or a receiv'd Opinion, That People naturally govern, or chuſe Governors; but whether it be true or not: for many Paradoxes are true, and the moſt groſs Errors have often bin moſt common. Tho I hope to prove, that what he calls a Paradox, is not only true; but a Truth planted in the hearts of men, and acknowledg'd ſo to be by all that have hearkned to the voice of Nature, and diſapprov'd by none, but ſuch as thro wickedneſs, ſtupidity, or baſeneſs of Spirit, ſeem to have degenerated into the worſt of beaſts, and to have retain'd nothing of men, but the outward ſhape, or the ability of doing thoſe miſ⯑chiefs which they have learn'd from their Maſter the Devil.

We have already ſeen, that the Patriarchical Power reſembles not the Regal in principle or practice: that the beginning and continuance of Regal Power was contrary to, and inconſiſtent with the Patriarchical: that the firſt Fathers of mankind left all their Children independent on each other, and in an equal liberty of providing for themſelves: that every man con⯑tinu'd in this liberty, till the number ſo increas'd, that they became trou⯑bleſom [52] and dangerous to each other; and finding no other remedy to the diſorders growing, or like to grow among them, join'd many Familys into one civil Body, that they might the better provide for the convenien⯑cy, ſafety, and defence of themſelves and their Children. This was a collation of every man's privat Right into a publick Stock; and no one having any other right than what was common to all, except it were that of Fathers over their Children, they were all equally free when their Fa⯑thers were dead; and nothing could induce 'em to join, and leſſen that natural liberty by joining in Societys, but the hopes of a publick Advan⯑tage. Such as were wiſe and valiant procur'd it, by ſetting up regular Governments, and placing the beſt Men in the Adminiſtration; whilſt the weakeſt and baſeſt fell under the power of the moſt boiſterous and violent of their Neighbours. Thoſe of the firſt ſort had their root in Wiſdom and Juſtice, and are call'd lawful Kingdoms or Commonwealths; and the Rules by which they are govern'd, are known by the name of Laws. Theſe Governments have ever bin the Nurſes of Vertue: The Nations living under them have flouriſh'd in Peace and Happineſs, or made Wars with Glory and Advantage: whereas the other ſort ſpring⯑ing from Violence and Wrong, have ever gone under the odious title of Tyrannys; and by fomenting Vices, like to thoſe from whence they grew, have brought ſhame and miſery upon thoſe who were ſubject to them. This appears ſo plainly in Scripture, that the aſſertors of Liberty want no other Patron than God himſelf; and his Word ſo fully juſtifies what we contend for, that it were not neceſſary to make uſe of human Au⯑thority, if our Adverſarys did not oblige us to examin ſuch as are cited by them. This, in our preſent caſe, would be an eaſy work, if our Au⯑thor had rightly mark'd the paſſages he would make uſe of, or had bin faithful in his Interpretation or Explication of ſuch as he truly cites; but failing groſly in both, 'tis hard to trace him.

He cites the 16th Chapter of the third Book of Ariſtotle's Politicks, and I do not find there is more than twelve; or tho that Wound might be cur'd, by ſaying the Words are in the twelfth, his Fraud in pervert⯑ing the Senſe were unpardonable, tho the other miſtake be paſt over. 'Tis true that Ariſtotle dos there ſeem to doubt whether there be any ſuch thing as one man naturally a Lord over many Citizens, ſince a City con⯑ſiſts of Equals: but in the whole ſcope of that Chapter, Book, and his other Writings, he fully ſhews his doubt did not ariſe from an imaginati⯑on that one man could naturally inherit a Right of Dominion over many not deſcended from him; or that they were born under a neceſſity of be⯑ing Slaves to him (for ſuch fancys can proceed only from diſtemper'd Brains) but that Civil Societys aiming at the publick good, thoſe who by nature were endow'd with ſuch Vertues or Talents as were moſt benefi⯑cial to them, ought to be prefer'd. And nothing can be more contrary to the frantick whimſy of our Author, who fancys an hereditary Preroga⯑tive of Dominion inherent to a perſon as Father of a People, or Heir, or to be reputed Heir of the firſt Father, when 'tis certain he is not, but that either he or his Predeceſſor came in by Election or Uſurpation, than to ſhew that 'tis only Wiſdom, Juſtice, Valour, and other commendable Vertues, which are not hereditary, that can give the preſerence; and that the only reaſon why it ſhould be given, is, that Men ſo qualify'd can better than others accompliſh the end for which Societys are conſtituted: Ar [...]ſt. Pol.For tho, ſays he, all are equally free, all are not equally endow'd with thoſe Vertues that render Liberty ſafe, proſperous, and happy. That equality [53] which is juſt among Equals, is juſt only among Equals; but ſuch as are baſe, ignorant, vicious, ſlothful, or cowardly, are not equal in natural or acquir'd Vertues, to the generous, wiſe, valiant, and induſtrious; nor equally uſeful to the Societys in which they live: they cannot there⯑fore have an equal part in the Government of 'em, they cannot equally provide for the common good; and 'tis not a perſonal, but a publick Be⯑nefit that is ſought in their conſtitution and continuance. There may be a hundred thouſand men in an Army, who are all equally free; but they only are naturally moſt fit to be Commanders or Leaders, who moſt ex⯑cel in the Vertues requir'd for the right performance of thoſe Offices; and that, not becauſe 'tis good for them to be rais'd above their Brethren, but becauſe 'tis good for their Brethren to be guided by them, as 'tis ever good to be govern'd by the wiſeſt and the beſt. If the nature of man be Reaſon, Detur digniori, in matters of this kind, is the voice of Nature; and it were not only a deviation from Reaſon, but a moſt deſperate and miſchievous madneſs, for a Company going to the Indies, to give the gui⯑dance of their Ship to the Son of the beſt Pilot in the world, if he want the skill requir'd to that employment, or to one who was maliciouſly ſet to deſtroy them: and he only can have a Right grounded upon the dictates of Nature, to be advanc'd to the Helm, who beſt knows how to govern it, and has given the beſt teſtimonys of his Integrity and Intentions to imploy his skill for the good of thoſe that are imbark'd. But as the work of a Magiſtrat, eſpecially if he be the ſupreme, is the higheſt, nobleſt, and moſt difficult that can be committed to the charge of a man, a more excellent Vertue is requir'd in the Perſon to be advanc'd to it, than for any other; and he that is moſt excellent in that Vertue, is reaſonably and naturally to be prefer'd before any other. Ariſtotle having this in his view, ſeems to think, that thoſe who believ'd it not to be natural for one man to be Lord of all the Citizens, ſince a City conſiſts of Equals, had not obſerv'd that inequality of Endowments, Vertues and Abilitys in men, which render ſome more fit than others for the performance of their Du⯑tys, and the Work intended; but it will not be found, as I ſuppoſe, that he did ever dream of a natural Superiority, that any man could ever have in a civil Society, unleſs it be ſuch a ſuperiority in Vertue as moſt conduces to the publick good.

He confirms this in proceeding to examin the different ſorts of Govern⯑ments, according to the different diſpoſitions of Nations; and is ſo bold to ſay, That a popular Government is the beſt for a People, who are natural⯑ly generous and warlike: that the Government of a few ſutes beſt with thoſe, among whom a few men are found to excel others in thoſe Vertues that are profitable to Societys; and that the Government of one is good, when that one dos ſo far ſurpaſs all others in thoſe Vertues, that he has more of them than all the reſt of the people together. And for the ſame reaſon that induc'd him to believe that equality is juſt amongſt Equals, he concludes inequali⯑ty of Power to be moſt unjuſt, unleſs there be inequality of Merit; and equality of Power to be ſo alſo, when there is inequality of Vertue, that being the only rule by which every man's part ought to be regulated.

But if it be neither reaſonable nor juſt that thoſe who are not equal in Vertue ſhould be made equal in Power, or that ſuch as are equal in Ver⯑tue ſhould be unequal in Power; the moſt brutal and abominable of all extravagancys is to make one or a few, who in Vertue and Abilitys to perform Civil Functions are inferior to others, ſuperior to all in power: and the Miſerys ſuffer'd by thoſe Nations, who, inverting the Laws of Na⯑ture [54] and Reaſon, have plac'd Children or Men of no Vertue in the Go⯑vernment, when men that excel'd in all Vertues were not wanting, do ſo far manifeſt this Truth, that the pains of proving it may be ſpar'd.

'Tis not neceſſary for me to inquire, whether it be poſſible to find ſuch a Man as Ariſtotle calls Naturâ Regem; or whether he intended to recom⯑mend Alexander to the world for the Man deſign'd by God and Nature to be King over all, becauſe no man was equal to him in the Vertues that were beneficial to all. For purſuing my Poſition, that Vertue only can give a juſt and natural preference, I ingenuouſly confeſs, that when ſuch a Man, or race of Men as he deſcribes, ſhall appear in the world, they carry the true marks of Sovereignty upon them: We ought to believe, that God has rais'd 'em above all, whom he has made to excel all: It were an impious folly to think of reducing him to the ordinary level of Man⯑kind, whom God has placed above it. 'Twere better for us to be guid⯑ed by him, than to follow our own judgment; nay, I could almoſt ſay, 'twere better to ſerve ſuch a Maſter, than to be free. But this will be nothing to the purpoſe, till ſuch a Man, or ſucceſſion of men do appear; and if our Author would perſuade us, that all Mankind, or every parti⯑cular, is oblig'd to a perpetual ſubjection to one Man or Family, upon any other condition, he muſt do it by the credit of thoſe who favour his De⯑ſign more than Ariſtotle.

I know not who that will be, but am confident he will find no help from Plato: for if his Principles be examin'd, by which a grave Author's ſenſe is beſt comprehended, it will appear, that all his Books of Laws, Plato de Leg. c [...] de Republ.and of a Commonwealth, are chiefly grounded upon this, ‘"That Magi⯑ſtrats are choſen by Societys, ſeeking their own good; and that the beſt men ought to be choſen for the attaining of it:"’ whereas his whole deſign of ſeeking which is the beſt form of Government, or what Laws do moſt conduce to its perfection and permanency, (if one Rule were by nature appointed for all, and none could juſtly tranſgreſs it; if God had deſign'd an univerſal Lord over the whole World, or a particular one over every Nation, who could be bound by no Law) were utterly ab⯑ſurd; and they who write Books concerning Political matters, and take upon 'em to inſtruct Nations how to govern themſelves, would be found either fooliſhly to miſpend their time, or impiouſly to incite People to re⯑bel againſt the Ordinance of God. If this can juſtly be imputed to Plato; he is not the wiſe Man he is ſuppos'd to have bin; and can leſs deſerve the title of Divine, which our Author gives him: but if he remain juſt⯑ly free from ſuch Cenſures, it muſt be confeſt, that whilſt he ſeeks what is good for a people, and to convince 'em by reaſon that it is ſo, he takes it for granted, that they have a liberty of chuſing that which appears to Plato de Leg.be the beſt to them. He firſt ſays, ‘"That this Good conſiſts in the ob⯑taining of Juſtice; but farther explaining himſelf, he ſhews that un⯑der the name of Juſtice, he comprehends all that tends to their perfecti⯑on and felicity: in as much as every People, by joining in a civil Socie⯑ty, and creating Magiſtrats, doth ſeek its own good; and 'tis juſt, that he or they who are created, ſhould, to the utmoſt of their power, accompliſh the end of their Creation, and lead the People to Juſtice, without which there is neither perfection nor happineſs: That the pro⯑per act of Juſtice is to give to every one his due; to Man that which belongs to Man, and to God that which is God's. But as no man can be juſt, or deſire to be ſo, unleſs he know that Juſtice is good; nor know that it is good, unleſs he know that original Juſtice and Good⯑neſs, [55] thro which all that is juſt is juſt, and all that is good is good, 'tis impoſſible for any man to perform the part of a good Magiſtrat, unleſs he have the knowledg of God; or to bring a People to Juſtice, unleſs he bring them to the knowledg of God, who is the Root of all Juſtice and Goodneſs."’ If Plato therefore deſerve credit, he only can duly perform the part of a good Magiſtrate, whoſe moral Vertues are ri⯑pen'd and heightned by a ſuperinduction of Divine Knowledg. ‘"The miſery of Man proceeds from his being ſeparated from God: This Se⯑paration is wrought by corruption; his reſtitution therefore to Felici⯑ty and Integrity, can only be brought about by his reunion to the Good from which he is fallen."’ Plato looks upon this as the only worthy Ob⯑ject of Man's deſire: and in his Laws and Politicks he intends not to teach us how to erect Manufactures, and to increaſe Trade or Riches; but how Magiſtrats may be helpful to Nations in the manner before menti⯑on'd, and conſequently what men are fit to be Magiſtrats. If our Au⯑thor therefore would make uſe of Plato's Doctrin to his end, he ought to have prov'd that there is a Family in every Nation, to the chief of which, and ſucceſſively to the next in Blood, God dos ever reveal and infuſe ſuch a knowledg of himſelf, as may render him a Light to others; and failing in this, all that he ſays is to no purpoſe.

The weakneſs in which we are born, renders us unable to attain this Good of our ſelves: we want help in all things, eſpecially in the greateſt. The fierce Barbarity of a looſe Multitude, bound by no Law, and regu⯑lated by no Diſciplin, is wholly repugnant to it: Whilſt every man fears his Neighbour, and has no other defence than his own ſtrength, he muſt live in that perpetual anxiety which is equally contrary to that happineſs, and that ſedate temper of mind which is requir'd for the ſearch of it. The firſt ſtep towards the cure of this peſtilent Evil, is for many to join in one body, that every one may be protected by the united force of all, and the various Talents that men poſſeſs, may by good diſciplin be ren⯑der'd uſeful to the whole; as the meaneſt piece of wood or ſtone being plac'd by a wiſe Architect, conduces to the beauty of the moſt glorious Building. But every man bearing in his own breaſt Affections, Paſſions, and Vices repugnant to this end, and no man owing any ſubmiſſion to his Neighbour; none will ſubject the correction or reſtriction of them⯑ſelves to another, unleſs he alſo ſubmit to the ſame Rule. They are rough pieces of timber or ſtone, which 'tis neceſſary to cleave, ſaw, or cut: This is the work of a skilful Builder, and he only is capable of e⯑recting a great Fabrick, who is ſo: Magiſtrats are Political Architects; and they only can perform the Work incumbent on them, who excel in Political Vertues. Nature, in variouſly framing the minds of men, ac⯑cording to the variety of Uſes in which they may be employ'd, in order to the inſtitution and preſervation of Civil Societys, muſt be our Guide, in allotting to every one his proper work. And Plato obſerving this Va⯑riety, affirms, ‘"That the Laws of Nature cannot be more abſurdly vio⯑lated, than by giving the Government of a People to ſuch, as do not excel others in thoſe Arts and Vertues that tend to the ultimate Ends for which Governments are inſtituted."’ By this means thoſe who are Slaves by Nature, or render'd ſo by their Vices, are often ſet above thoſe that God and Nature had fitted for the higheſt Commands; and Societys which ſubſiſt only by order, fall into corruption, when all Order is ſo prepoſterouſly inverted, and the moſt extreme Confuſion introduc'd. This is an Evil that Solomon deteſted: Folly is ſet in great dignity, and the Eccl. 10. 7▪ [56] Rich ſit in low places: I have ſeen Servants upon Horſes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the Earth. They who underſtand Solomon's Language, will eaſily ſee, that the Rich, and the Princes he means, are ſuch only who are rich in Vertue and Wiſdom, and who ought to be pre⯑fer'd for thoſe Qualitys: And when he ſays, a Servant that reigneth is one of the three things the Earth cannot bear, he can only mean ſuch as de⯑ſerve to be Servants; for when they reign, they do not ſerve, but are ſerv'd by others: Which perfectly agrees with what we learn from Pla⯑to, and plainly ſhews, that true Philoſophy is perfectly conformable with what is taught us by thoſe who were divinely inſpir'd. Therefore tho I ſhould allow to our Author, that Ariſtotle, in thoſe words, It ſeems to ſome, not to be natural for one Man to be Lord of all the Citizens, ſince the Ci⯑ty conſists of Equals, did ſpeak the opinion of others rather than his own; and ſhould confeſs that he and his Maſter Plato did acknowledg a natu⯑ral inequality among men, it would be nothing to his purpoſe: for the Inequality, and the rational Superiority due to ſome, or to one, by rea⯑ſon of that Inequality, did not proceed from Blood or Extraction, and had nothing Patriarchical in it; but conſiſted ſolely in the Vertues of the Perſons, by which they were render'd more able than others to perform their Duty, for the good of the Society. Therefore if theſe Authors are to be truſted, whatſoever place a Man is advanc'd to in a City, 'tis not for his own ſake, but for that of the City; and we are not to ask who was his Father, but what are his Vertues in relation to it. This induces a neceſſity of diſtinguiſhing between a ſimple and a relative Inequality; for if it were poſſible for a man to have great Vertues, and yet no way bene⯑ficial to the Society of which he is, or to have ſome one Vice that renders 'em uſeleſs, he could have no pretence to a Magiſtratical Power more than any other. They who are equally free, may equally enjoy their freedom; but the Powers that can only be executed by ſuch as are endow'd with great Wiſdom, Juſtice and Valor, can belong to none, nor be rightly confer'd upon any, except ſuch as excel in thoſe Vertues. And if no ſuch can be found, all are equally by turns to participate of the Ho⯑nors annex'd to Magiſtracy; and Law, which is ſaid to be written Rea⯑ſon, cannot juſtly exalt thoſe, whom Nature, which is Reaſon, has de⯑preſt, nor depreſs thoſe whom Nature has exalted. It cannot make Kings Slaves, nor Slaves Kings, without introducing that Evil, which, if we believe Solomon, and the Spirit by which he ſpoke, the Earth cannot bear. This may diſcover what Lawgivers deſerve to be reputed wiſe or juſt; and what Decrees or Sanctions ought to be reputed Laws. Ariſtotle proceeding by this Rule, rather tells us who is naturally a King, than where we ſhould find him; and after having given the higheſt Praiſes to this true natural King and his Government, he ſticks not to declare that of one Man, in Vertue equal or inferior to others, to be a mere Tyran⯑ny, even the worſt of all, as it is the corruption of the beſt, (or, as our Author calls it, the moſt Divine) and ſuch as can be fit only for thoſe barbarous and ſtupid Nations, which, tho bearing the ſhape of Men, are little different from Beaſts. Whoever therefore will from Ariſtotle's words inſer, that Nature has deſign'd one Man, or ſucceſſion of Men, to be Lords of every Country, muſt ſhew that Man to be endow'd with all the Vertues that render him fit for ſo great an Office, which he dos not bear for his own Pleaſure, Glory or Profit, but for the good of thoſe that are under him; and if that be not done, he muſt look after other Pa⯑trons than Ariſtotle for his opinion.

[57] Plato dos more explicitly ſay, that the Civil or Politick Man, the Shep⯑herd, Father, or King of the People, is the ſame, deſign'd for the ſame Work, enabled to perform it by the excellency of the ſame Vertues, and made perfect by the infuſion of the divine Wiſdom. This is Plato's Monarch, and I confeſs, that whereſoever he dos appear in the World, he ought to be accounted as ſent from God for the good of that People. His Government is the beſt that can be ſet up among Men; and if aſſu⯑rance can be given, that his Children, Heirs or Succeſſors, ſhall for ever be equal to him in the abovemention'd Vertues, it were a folly and a ſin to bring him under the government of any other, or to an equality with them, ſince God had made him to excel them all; and 'tis better for them to be rul'd by him, than to follow their own judgment. This is that which gives him the preference: He is wiſe thro the knowledg of the Truth, Plato in Al⯑ [...]ib. l. 1, [...]. and thereby becomes good, happy, pure, beautiful and perfect. The divine Light ſhining forth in him, is a guide to others; and he is a fit Leader of a People to the good that he enjoys. If this can be expreſt by words in faſhi⯑on, this is his Prerogative; this is the Royal Charter given to him by God, and to him only, who is ſo adapted for the performance of his Office. He that ſhould pretend to the ſame Privileges, without the ſame Abilitys to perform the Works for which they are granted, would exceed the fol⯑ly of a Child, that takes upon him a burden which can only be born by a Giant; or the madneſs of one who preſumes to give Phyſick, and un⯑derſtands not the Art of a Phyſician, thereby drawing guilt upon him⯑ſelf, and death upon his Patient. It were as vain to expect that a Child ſhould carry the Giant's burden, and that an ignorant man ſhould give wholſom Phyſick, as that one who lives void of all knowledg of Good, ſhould conduct men to it. Whenſoever therefore ſuch a Man, as is a⯑bove-deſcrib'd, dos not appear, Nature and Reaſon inſtruct us to ſeek him or them who are moſt like to him; and to lay ſuch burdens upon 'em as are proportionable to their ſtrength; which is as much as to ſay, to prefer every man according to his merit, and aſſign to every one ſuch Works as he ſeems able to accompliſh.

But that Plato and Ariſtotle may neither be thought unreaſonably ad⯑dicted to Monarchy; nor, wholly rejecting it, to have talk'd in vain of a Monarch, that is not to be found; 'tis good to conſider that this is not a ſiction. Moſes, Joſhua, Samuel, and others, were ſuch as they define; and were made to be ſuch, by that communion with God which Plato requires: And he in all his Writings, intending the inſtitution of ſuch a Diſciplin as ſhould render men happy, wiſe and good, could take no bet⯑ter way to bring his Countrymen to it, than by ſhewing 'em that Wiſdom, Vertue, and Purity only could make a natural difference a⯑mong men.

'Tis not my work to juſtify theſe Opinions of Plato and his Scholar A⯑riſtotle: They were men, and, tho wiſe and learned, ſubject to error. If they err'd in theſe Points, it hurts not me, nor the Cauſe I maintain; ſince I make no other uſe of their Books, than to ſhew the impudence and prevarication of thoſe, who gather ſmall ſcraps out of good Books, to ju⯑ſtify their Aſſertions concerning ſuch Kings as are known amongſt us; which being examin'd, are found to be wholly againſt 'em; and if they were follow'd, would deſtroy their Perſons and Power.

But our Author's intention being only to cavil, or to cheat ſuch as are not vers'd in the Writings of the Antients, or at leaſt to cauſe thoſe who do not make Truth their Guide, to waver and fluctuate in their Diſcourſes, [58] he dos in one page ſay, That without doubt Moſes his Hiſtory of the Crea⯑tion guided theſe Philoſophers in finding out this lineal Subjection. And in the next affirms, That the Ignorance of the Creation occaſion'd ſeveral a⯑mong the Heathen Philoſophers to think that men met together as herds of Cat⯑tel. Whereas they could not have bin ignorant of the Creation, if they had read the Books that Moſes writ; and having that knowledg, they could not think that men met together as herds of Cattel. However, I deny that any of 'em did ever dream of that lineal Subjection, deriv'd from the firſt Parents of mankind, or that any ſuch thing was to be learn'd from Moſes. Tho they did not perhaps juſtly know the beginning of Mankind, they did know the beginnings and progreſs of the Govern⯑ments under which they liv'd: and being aſſur'd that the firſt Kingdoms had bin thoſe, which they call'd Heroum Regna, that is, of thoſe who had bin moſt beneficial to Mankind; that their Deſcendents in many pla⯑ces degenerating from their Vertues, had given Nations occaſion to ſet up Ariſtocracys; and they alſo falling into corruption, to inſtitute Democracys, or mix'd Governments; did rightly conclude, That every Nation might juſtly order their own Affairs according to their own pleaſure, and could have neither obligation nor reaſon to ſet up one man or a few above others, unleſs it did appear to them that they had more of thoſe Vertues which conduce to the good of Civil Societys, than the reſt of their Brethren.

Our Author's cavil upon Ariſtotle's Opinion, That thoſe who are wiſe in mind are by nature fitted to be Lords, and thoſe who are ſtrong of body ordain'd to obey, deſerves no anſwer; for he plainly falſifies the Text. Ariſtotle ſpeaks only of thoſe Qualitys which are requir'd for every purpoſe; and means no more, than that ſuch as are eminent in the Virtues of the mind deſerve to govern, tho they do not excel in bodily ſtrength; and that they who are ſtrong of body, tho of little underſtanding, and uncapa⯑ble of commanding, may be uſeful in executing the commands of others: But is ſo far from denying that one man may excel in all the perfections of mind and body, that he acknowledges him only to be a King by nature who dos ſo, both being requir'd for the full performance of his Duty. And if this be not true, I ſuppoſe that one who is like Agrippa Poſthumus, Corporis viribus ſtolide ferox, may be fit to govern many Nations; and Moſes or Samuel, if they naturally wanted bodily ſtrength, or that it de⯑cay'd by age, might juſtly be made Slaves, which it a diſcovery worthy our Author's invention.

SECT. II. Every Man that has Children, has the right of a Father, and is capa⯑ble of preferment in a Society compos'd of many.

I Am not concern'd in making good what Suarez ſays: A Jeſuit may ſpeak that which is true; but it ought to be receiv'd, as from the Devil, cautiouſly, leſt miſchief be hid under it: and Sir Robert's fre⯑quent prevarications upon the Scripture, and many good Authors, give reaſon to ſuſpect he may have falſify'd one, that few Proteſtants read, if it ſerv'd to his purpoſe; and not mentioning the place, his fraud cannot eaſily be diſcover'd, unleſs it be by one who has leiſure to examin all his vaſtly voluminous Writings. But as to the point in queſtion, that pains [59] may be ſav'd; there is nothing that can be imputed to the invention of Suarez; for, that Adam had only an Oeconomical, not a Political Power, is not the voice of a Jeſuit, but of Nature and common Senſe: for Po⯑litick ſignifying no more in Greek, than Civil in Latin; 'tis evident there could be no Civil Power, where there was no Civil Society; and there could be none between him and his Children, becauſe a Civil Society is compos'd of Equals, and fortify'd by mutual compacts, which could not be between him and his Children, at leaſt if there be any thing of truth in our Author's Doctrin, That all Children do perpetually and abſolutely de⯑pend upon the Will of their Father. Suarez ſeems to have bin of another opinion; and obſerving the benefits we receive from Parents, and the Ve⯑neration we owe to 'em to be reciprocal, he could not think any Duty could extend farther than the knowledg of the Relation upon which it was grounded; and makes a difference between the Power of a Father, before and after his Children are made free; that is in truth, before and after they are able to provide for themſelves, and to deliver their Parents from the burden of taking care of them. Which will appear rational to any who are able to diſtinguiſh between what a Man of 50 years old, ſubſiſting by himſelf, and having a Family of his own, or a Child of eight, dos owe to his Father: The ſame reaſon that obliges a Child to ſubmit intirely to the Will of his Parents, when he is utterly ignorant of all things, dos per⯑mit, and often enjoin men of ripe age to examin the Commands they receive before they obey them; and 'tis not more plain that I owe all manner of duty, affection, and reſpect to him that did beget and educate me, than that I can owe nothing on any ſuch account to one that did neither.

This may have bin the opinion of Suarez: but I can hardly believe ſuch a notion, as, that Adam in proceſs of time might have Servants, could proceed from any other brain than our Author's: for if he had liv'd to this day, he could have had none under him but his own Children; and if a Family be not compleat without Servants, his muſt always have bin defective; and his Kingdom muſt have bin ſo too, if that has ſuch a re⯑ſemblance to a Family as our Author fancies. This is evident, that a hard Father may uſe his Children as Servants, or a rebellious, ſtubborn Son may deſerve to be ſo us'd; and a gentle and good Maſter may ſhew that kindneſs to faithful and well-deſerving Servants, which reſembles the ſweetneſs of a fatherly rule: but neither of 'em can change their nature; a Son can never grow to be a Servant, nor a Servant to be a Son. If a Family therefore be not compleat, unleſs it conſiſt of Chil⯑dren and Servants, it cannot be like to a Kingdom or City, which is compos'd of Freemen and Equals: Servants may be in it, but are not Members of it. As Truth can never be repugnant to Juſtice, 'tis impoſ⯑ſible this ſhould be a prejudice to the paternal Rule, which is moſt juſt; eſpecially when a grateful remembrance of the benefits receiv'd, dos ſtill remain, with a neceſſary and perpetual obligation of repaying them in all affection and duty: whereas the care of ever providing for their Familys, as they did probably increaſe in the time of our firſt long-living Fathers, would have bin an inſupportable burden to Parents, if it had bin incum⯑bent on 'em. We do not find that Adam exercis'd any ſuch power over Cain, when he had ſlain Abel, as our Author fancies to be Regal: The Murderer went out, and built a City for himſelf, and call'd it by the name of his firſt-born. And we have not the leaſt reſon to believe, that after Adam's death Cain had any Dominion over his Brethren, or their Poſterity; or any one of them over him and his. He fear'd that whoſo⯑ever [60] ſaw him would kill him, which language dos not agree with the Rights belonging to the haughty Title of Heir apparent to the Dominion of the whole Earth. The like was practis'd by Noah and his Sons, who ſet up Colonys for themſelves; but liv'd as privat men in obſcure places, whilſt their Children of the fourth or fifth Generation, eſpecially of the youngeſt and accurſed Son, were great and powerful Kings, as is fully prov'd in the firſt Chapter.

Tho this had bin otherwiſe, it would have no effect upon us; for no argument drawn from the examples of Shem, Ham, and Japhet, if they and their Children had continu'd under the Dominion of Noah as long as he liv'd, can oblige me to reſign my ſelf and all my concernments abſo⯑lutely into the hands of one who is not my Father. But when the con⯑trary is evidently true in them, and their next enſuing Generations, 'tis an admirable boldneſs in our Author to think of impoſing upon us for an eternal and univerſal Law (when the knowledg of our firſt Progenitors is utterly extinguiſh'd) that which was not at all regarded by thoſe, who could not be ignorant of their own Original, or the Duty thereby incumbent upon them, or their immediate Fathers then living, to whom the Rights muſt have belong'd, if there had bin any ſuch thing in nature, or that they had bin of any advantage to them: whereas in truth, if there had bin ſuch a Law in the beginning, it muſt have vaniſh'd of it ſelf, for want of being exercis'd in the beginning, and could not poſſibly be reviv'd after four thouſand years, when no man in the world can poſſibly know to whom the univerſal right of Dominion over the whole World or particular Nations dos belong; for 'tis in vain to ſpeak of a Right, when no one man can have a better Title to it than any other. But there being no precept in the Scripture for it, and the examples directed or ap⯑prov'd by God himſelf and his moſt faithful Servants, being inconſiſtent with, and contrary to it, we may be ſure there never was any ſuch thing; and that men being left to the free uſe of their own underſtanding, may order and diſpoſe of their own Affairs as they think fit: No man can have a better title than another, unleſs for his perſonal Vertues; every man that in the judgment of thoſe concern'd excels in them, may be ad⯑vanc'd: and thoſe Nations that thro miſtake ſet up ſuch as are unworthy, or do not take right meaſures in providing for a ſucceſſion of men worthy, and other things neceſſary to their welfare, may be guilty of great folly, to their own ſhame and miſery; but can do no injuſtice to any in rela⯑tion to an hereditary Right, which can be naturally in none.

SECT. III. Government is not inſtituted for the good of the Governor, but of the Governed; and Power is not an Advantage, but a Burden.

THE Follys with which our Author endeavours to corrupt and trou⯑ble the World, ſeem to proceed from his fundamental miſtakes of the Ends for which Governments are conſtituted; and from an Opinion, that an exceſſive Power is good for the Governor, or the diminution of it a prejudice: whereas common ſenſe teaches, and all good men acknow⯑ledg, that Governments are not ſet up for the Advantage, Profit, Plea⯑ſure or Glory of one or a few men, but for tho good of the Society. For [61] this reaſon Plato and Ariſtotle find no more certain way of diſtinguiſhing ‘"between a lawful King and a Tyrant, than that the firſt ſeeks to pro⯑cure the common Good, and the other his own Pleaſure or Profit; and doubt not to declare, That he who according to his Inſtitution was the firſt, deſtroys his own being, and degenerates into the latter, if he deflect from that rule: He that was the beſt of Men, becomes the worſt; and the Father or Shepherd of the People makes himſelf their Enemy."’ And we may from hence collect, that in all Controverſys concerning the Power of Magiſtrats, we are not to examin what con⯑duces to their Profit or Glory, but what is good for the Publick.

His ſecond Error is no leſs groſs and miſchievous than the firſt; and that abſolute Power to which he would exalt the chief Magiſtrate, would be burdenſom, and deſperately dangerous if he had it. The higheſt Places are always ſlippery: Mens eyes dazle when they are carried up to them; and all falls from them are mortal. Few Kings or Tyrants, ſays ^* Juve⯑nal, go down to the Grave in peace; and he did not imprudently couple them together, becauſe in his time few or no Kings were known who were not Tyrants. Dionyſius thought no man left a Tyranny, till he was drawn out by the heels. But Tacitus ſays, Neſcit quam grave & intole⯑randum ſit cuncta regendi onus. Moſes could not bear it: Gideon would not accept of any Reſemblance of it. The moral ſenſe of Jotham's wiſe Parable is eternal: The Bramble coveted the Power, which the Vine, O⯑live and Figtree refus'd. The worſt and baſeſt of men are ambitious of the higheſt places, which the beſt and wiſeſt reject; or if ſome, who may be otherwiſe well qualify'd—

[In this place two pages are wanting in the Original Manuſcript.]

—as the fitteſt to be follow'd by Mankind. If theſe Philoſophers and Divines deſerve credit, Nimrod, Ninus, Pharaoh, and the reſt of that ac⯑curſed Crew, did not commit ſuch exceſſes as were condemn'd by God, and abhor'd by good Men; but gaining to themſelves the glorious Cha⯑racter of his Vicegerents, left their practices as a perpetual Law to all ſucceeding Generations; whereby the world, and every part of it, would be for ever expos'd to the violence, cruelty and madneſs of the moſt wick⯑ed men that it ſhould produce. But if theſe Opinions comprehend an ex⯑travagancy of wickedneſs and madneſs, that was not known among men, till ſome of theſe Wretches preſum'd to attempt the increaſe of that corruption under which Mankind groans, by adding fuel to the worſt of all Vices; we may ſafely return to our Propoſitions, That God having eſtabliſh'd no ſuch Authority as our Author fancies, Nations are left to the uſe of their own Judgment, in making proviſion for their own Wel⯑fare: That there is no lawful Magiſtrate over any of them, but ſuch as they have ſet up; that in creating them, they do not ſeek the advantage of their Magiſtrate, but their own: And having found that an abſolute Power over a People, is a burden which no man can bear; and that no wiſe or good Man ever deſir'd it; from thence conclude, that it is not good for any to have it, nor juſt for any to affect it, tho it were perſonal⯑ly good for himſelf; becauſe he is not exalted to ſeek his own good, but that of the Publick.

SECT. IV. The Paternal Right devolves to, and is inherited by all the Children.

THO the perverſity of our Author's Judgment and Nature may have driven him into the moſt groſs Errors, 'tis not amiſs to ob⯑ſerve, that many of thoſe deliver'd by him, proceed from his ignorance of the moſt important Differences between Father and Lord, King and Tyrant; which are ſo evident and irreconcilable, that one would have thought no man could be ſo ſtupid, as not to ſee it impoſſible for one and the ſame man, at the ſame time, to be Father and Maſter, King and Ty⯑rant, over the ſame Perſons. But leſt he ſhould think me too ſcrupu⯑lous, or too ſtrict in inquiring after Truth, I intend for the preſent to wave that inquiry, and to ſeek what was good for Adam or Noah: What we have reaſon to believe they deſir'd to tranſmit to their Poſterity, and to take it for a perpetual Law in its utmoſt extent; which I think will be of no advantage to our Author: for this Authority, which was univer⯑ſal during their lives, muſt neceſſarily after their deceaſe be divided, as an Inheritance, into as many parcels as they had Children. The Apoſtle Rom. 8. 19.ſays, If Children, then Heirs, Heirs of God, and joint Heirs with Chriſt; which alluding to the Laws and Cuſtoms of Nations, could have bin of no force, unleſs it had bin true and known to be ſo. But if Children are Heirs, or joint Heirs, whatſoever Authority Adam or Noah had, is inherited by every man in the world; and that title of Heir which our Author ſo much magnifys, as if annex'd to one ſingle perſon, vaniſhes into nothing; or elſe the words of the Apoſtle could have neither ſtrength nor truth in them, but would be built upon a falſe Foundation, which may perhaps agree with our Author's Divinity.

Yet if the Apoſtle had not declar'd himſelf ſo fully in this Point, we might eaſily have ſeen that Adam and Noah did leave their Children in that equality; for Fathers are ever underſtood to embrace all their Chil⯑dren with equal Affection, till the diſcovery of perſonal Vertues or Vi⯑ces makes a difference. But the perſonal Vertues, that give a reaſonable preference of one before another, or make him more fit to govern than the others, cannot appear before he is, nor can be annex'd to any one Line: Therefore the Father cannot be thought to have given to one Man, or his Deſcendents, the Government of his Brethren and their Deſcen⯑dents.

Beſides, tho the Law of England may make one man to be ſole Heir of his Father, yet the Laws of God and Nature do not ſo. All the Children of Noah were his Heirs: The Land promis'd to Abraham, I⯑ſaac, and Jacob, was equally divided among their Children. If the Chil⯑dren of Joſeph made two Tribes, it was not as the firſt-born, but by the Will of Jacob, who adopted Ephraim and Manaſſeh; and they thereby became his Sons, and obtain'd an Inheritance equal to that of the other Tribes. The Law allow'd a double Portion to the firſt begotten; but this made a difference between Brothers only in proportion, whereas that between Lord and Servant is in ſpecie, not in degree. And if our Au⯑thor's Opinion might take place, inſtead of ſuch a diviſion of the common [63] Inheritance between Brothers, as was made between the Children of Ja⯑cob, all muſt continue for ever Slaves to one Lord; which would eſtabliſh a difference in ſpecie between Brethren, which Nature abhors.

If Nature dos not make one man Lord over his Brethren, he can never come to be their Lord, unleſs they make him ſo, or he ſubdue them. If he ſubdue them, it is an act of Violence, contrary to Right, which may conſequently be recover'd: If they make him Lord, 'tis for their own ſakes, not for his; and he muſt ſeek their good, not his own, leſt, as Ariſtotle ſays, he degenerat from a King into a Tyrant. He therefore who would perſuade us, that the Dominion over every Nation dos natu⯑rally belong to one Man, Woman or Child, at a venture; or to the Heir, whatſoever he or ſhe be, as to Age, Sex, or other Qualifications, muſt prove it good for all Nations to be under them. But as Reaſon is our Nature, that can never be natural to us that is not rational. Reaſon gives Paria paribus, equal Power to thoſe who have equal Abilitys and Merit: It allots to every one the part he is moſt fit to perform; and this fitneſs muſt be equally laſting with the Law that allots it. But as it can never be good for great Nations, having men amongſt 'em of Vertue, Expe⯑rience, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, to be govern'd by Children, Fools, or vicious and wicked Perſons; and we neither find that the Ver⯑tues requir'd in ſuch as deſerve to govern them, did ever continue in any race of men, nor have reaſon to believe they ever will, it can never be reaſonable to annex the Dominion of a Nation to any one Line. We may take this upon Solomon's word, Wo to thee, O Land, when thy King Eccl. 10. 16. is a Child, and thy Princes eat in the morning! And I wiſh the experience of all Ages did not make this Truth too evident to us. This therefore can never be the Work, much leſs the Law of Nature; and if there be any ſuch thing in the world, as the Dominion over a Nation inſeparably united to a Man and his Family, it can have no other Root than a civil or muni⯑cipal Law, which is not the ſubject of our Diſcourſe.

Moreover, every Father's Right muſt ceaſe, when he ceaſes to be; or be tranſmitted to thoſe, who, being alſo Fathers, have the ſame Title to it. And tho the contrary method of annexing the whole Inheritance to one Perſon, or expoſing all his Brethren to be deſtroy'd by his rage if they will not ſubmit, may conduce to the enlargement of a proud and violent Empire, as in Turky; where he that gains the Power, uſually begins his Reign with the ſlaughter of his Brothers and Nephews: yet it can never agree with the piety, gentleneſs and wiſdom of the Patriarchs, or the Laws of God and Nature.

Theſe thing being agreed, we need not trouble our ſelves with the Li⯑mits or Definition of a Family, and as little with the Titles given to the Head of it: 'Tis all one to us, whether it be confin'd to one Roof and Fire, or extended farther; and none but ſuch as are ſtrangers to the pra⯑ctice of mankind, can think that titles of Civility have a power to create a right of Dominion. Every man in Latin is call'd Dominus, unleſs ſuch as are of the vileſt condition, or in a great ſubjection to thoſe who ſpeak to them; and yet the word ſtrictly taken, relates only to Servus, for a Man is Lord only of his Servant or Slave. The Italians are not leſs li⯑beral of the Titles of Signore and Padrone, and the Spaniards of Sennor; but he would be ridiculous in thoſe Countrys, who thereupon ſhould ar⯑rogate to himſelf a right of Dominion over thoſe who are ſo civil. The vanity of our Age ſeems to carry this Point a little higher, eſpecially a⯑mong the French, who put a great weight upon the word Prince; but [64] they cannot change the true ſignification of it; and even in their ſenſe, Prince du Sang ſignifys no more than a chief Man of the Royal Blood, to whom they pay much reſpect, becauſe he may come to the Crown; as they at Rome do to Cardinals, who have the Power of chu⯑ſing Popes, and out of whoſe number, for ſome Ages, they have bin cho⯑ſen. In this ſenſe did Scevola, when he was apprehended by Porſenna, T. Liv. l. 2.ſay, Trecenti conjuravimus Romanae juventutis Principes; which was ne⯑ver otherwiſe underſtood, than of ſuch young Citizens as were remarka⯑ble amongſt their Companions. And nothing can be more abſurd than to think, if the name of Prince had carried an abſolute and deſpotical Power with it, that it could belong to three hundred in a City, that poſſeſt no more than a ten miles territory; or that it could have bin given to them, whilſt they were young, and the moſt part of their Fathers, as is moſt probable, ſtill living.

I ſhould, like our Author, run round in a Circle, if I ſhould refute what he ſays of a Regal Power in our firſt Parents; or ſhew, that the Regal, where it is, is not abſolute as often as he dos aſſert it. But having already prov'd, that Adam, Noah, Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob, &c. enjoy'd no ſuch Power; tranſmitted to every one of their Sons that which they had, and they became Fathers of many great Nations, who always con⯑tinu'd independent on each other; I leave to our Author to prove, when and by what Law the Right of ſubdividing the Paternal Power was ſtop'd, and how any one or more of their Deſcendents came to have that Power over their Brethren, which none of their immediate Children had over theirs.

His queſtion to Suarez, how and when Sons become free, favours more of Jeſuitical Sophiſtry, than any thing ſaid by the Jeſuit; but the Solu⯑tion is eaſy: for if he mean the reſpect, veneration and kindneſs proceed⯑ing from gratitude, it ceaſes only with the Life of the Father to whom it is due, and the memory of it muſt laſt as long as that of the Son; and if they had bin poſſeſt of ſuch an abſolute Power as he fancys, it muſt have ceas'd with the reaſons upon which it was grounded.

Firſt, Becauſe the Power, of which a Father would probably have made a wiſe and gentle uſe, could not be rightly truſted in the hands of one who is not a Father; and that which tended only to the preſervation of all the Children, could not be turn'd to the increaſe of the Pride, Luxury and Violence of one, to the oppreſſion of others who are equally Heirs.

In the ſecond place, Societys cannot be inſtituted, unleſs the Heads of the Familys that are to compoſe them, reſign ſo much of their Right as ſeems convenient into the publick Stock, to which every one becomes ſub⯑ject: But that the ſame Power ſhould, at the ſame time, continue in the true Father, and the figurative Father, the Magiſtrate; and that the Children ſhould owe intire Obedience to the Commands of both, which may often croſs each other, is abſurd.

Thirdly, It ceaſes when it cannot be executed; as when men live to ſee four or five Generations, as many do at this day; becauſe the Son cannot tell whether he ſhould obey his Father, Grandfather, or Great-Grandfather, and cannot be equally ſubject to them all; moſt eſpecially, when they live in divers places, and ſet up Familys of their own, as the Sons of the Patriarchs did: which being obſerv'd, I know no place where this Paternal Power could have any effect, unleſs in the fabulous Iſland of Pines; and even there it muſt have ceas'd, when he died, who, [65] by the Inventor of the ſtory, is ſaid to have ſeen above ten thouſand Per⯑ſons iſſued of his body.

And if it be ſaid, that Noah, Shem, Abraham, &c. conſented that their Children ſhould go where they thought fit, and provide for themſelves; I anſwer, that the like has bin done in all Ages, and muſt be done for ever. 'Tis the Voice of Nature, obey'd not only by Mankind, but by all living Creatures; and there is none ſo ſtupid as not to underſtand it. A Hen leaves her Chickens, when they can ſeek their own nouriſhment: A Cow looks after her Calf no longer, than till it is able to feed: A Lion gives over hunting for his Whelps, when they are able to ſeek their own Prey, and have ſtrength enough to provide what is ſufficient for them⯑ſelves. And the contrary would be an inſupportable burden to all living Creatures, but eſpecially to Men; for the good order that the rational Nature delights in, would be overthrown, and Civil Societys, by which it is beſt preſerv'd, would never be eſtabliſh'd.

We are not concern'd to examin, Whether the Political and Oecono⯑mical Powers be intirely the ſame, or in what they differ: for that abſo⯑lute Power which he contends for, is purely deſpotical, different from both, or rather inconſiſtent with either as to the ſame Subject; and that which the Patriarchs exercis'd, having bin equally inherited by their Chil⯑dren, and conſequently by every one of their Poſterity, 'tis as much as is requir'd for my purpoſe of proving the natural, univerſal Liberty of Man⯑kind; and I am no way concern'd in the Queſtion, Whether the firſt Pa⯑rents of Mankind had a Power of Life and Death over their Children, or not.

SECT. V. Freemen join together and frame greater or leſſer Societys, and give ſuch Forms to them as beſt pleaſe themſelves.

THis being eſtabliſh'd, I ſhall leave Filmer to fight againſt Suarez and Bellarmin; or to turn one of them againſt the other, without any concernment in the Combat, or the ſucceſs of it. But ſince he there⯑upon raiſes a Queſtion, Whether the ſupreme Power be ſo in the People, that there is but one and the ſame Power in all the People of the World; ſo that no Power can be granted, unleſs all Men upon the Earth meet, and agree to chuſe a Governor: I think it deſerves to be anſwer'd, and might do it by pro⯑poſing a Queſtion to him; Whether in his opinion, the Empire of the whole World dos, by the Laws of God and Nature, belong to one Man, and who that Man is? Or, how it came ſo to be divided, as we have ever known it to have bin, without ſuch an injury to the Univerſal Mo⯑narch, as can never be repair'd? But intending to proceed more candidly, and not to trouble my ſelf with Bellarmin or Suarez, I ſay, that they who place the Power in a Multitude, underſtand a Multitude compos'd of Free⯑men, who think it for their convenience to join together, and to eſtabliſh ſuch Laws and Rules as they oblige themſelves to obſerve: which Mul⯑titude, whether it be great or ſmall, has the ſame Right, becauſe ten Men are as free as ten Millions of Men; and tho it may be more prudent in ſome caſes to join with the greater than the ſmaller number, becauſe there is more ſtrength, it is not ſo always: But however, every Man muſt there⯑in [66] be his own judg, ſince if he miſtake, the hurt is only to himſelf; and the ten may as juſtly reſolve to live together, frame a Civil Society, and oblige themſelves to Laws, as the greateſt number of Men that ever met together in the World.

Thus we find that a few Men aſſembling together upon the Banks of the Tiber, reſolv'd to build a City, and ſet up a Government among them⯑ſelves: And the Multitude that met at Babylon, when their deſign of building a Tower that ſhould reach up to Heaven fail'd, and their Lan⯑guage was confounded, divided themſelves, as our Author ſays, into ſe⯑venty two parcels, and by the ſame Right might have divided into more, as their Deſcendents did into almoſt an infinite number before the death of their common Father Noah. But we cannot find a more perfect Picture of Freemen, living according to their own Will, than in Abraham and Lot; they went together into Canaan, continu'd together as long as was convenient for them, and parted when their Subſtance did ſo increaſe, that they became troubleſom to each other. In the like manner Iſmael, Iſaac, and Abraham's ſix Sons by Keturah, might have continu'd together and made one Nation; Iſaac and Eſau, Moab and Ammon, might have done ſo too; or all of them that came of the ſame Stock might have united toge⯑ther; but they did not: And their Deſcendents by the ſame rule might have ſubdivided perpetually, if they had thought it expedient for them⯑ſelves: and if the Sons of Jacob did not do the like, 'tis probable they were kept together by the hope of an Inheritance promis'd to 'em by God, in which we find no ſhadow of a deſpotical Dominion, affected by one as Father or Heir to the firſt Father, or reputed to be the Heir; but all con⯑tinu'd Gen. 13.in that fraternal equality, which according to Abraham's words to Lot they ought to do. There was no Lord, Slave or Vaſſal; no ſtrife was to be among them: They were Brethren; they might live together, or ſeparate, as they found it convenient for themſelves. By the ſame Law that Abraham and Lot, Moab and Ammon, Iſmael, Iſaac, and the Sons of Keturah, Jacob, Eſau, and their Deſcendents, did divide and ſet up ſeve⯑ral Governments, every one of their Children might have done the like: and the ſame Right remain'd to their Iſſue, till they had by agreement engag'd themſelves to each other. But if they had no dependence upon each other, and might live together in that fraternal equality which was between Abraham and Lot; or ſeparate, and continue in that ſeparation, or reunite; they could not but have a right of framing ſuch conditions of their union as beſt pleas'd themſelves. By this means every number of Men, agreeing together and framing a Society, became a compleat Body, having all Power in themſelves over themſelves, ſubject to no other hu⯑man Law than their own. All thoſe that compoſe the Society, being equally free to enter into it or not, no Man could have any Prerogative above others, unleſs it were granted by the conſent of the whole: and nothing obliging them to enter into this Society, but the conſideration of their own Good; that Good, or the opinion of it, muſt have bin the Rule, Motive and End of all that they did ordain. 'Tis lawful therefore for any ſuch Bodys to ſet up one, or a few Men to govern them, or to re⯑tain the Power in themſelves; and he or they who are ſet up, having no other Power but what is ſo confer'd upon them by that Multitude, whe⯑ther great or ſmall, are truly by them made what they are; and by the Law of their own Creation, are to exerciſe thoſe Powers according to the proportion, and to the ends for which they were given.

[67] Theſe Rights, in ſeveral Nations and Ages, have bin variouſly execu⯑ted, in the eſtabliſhment of Monarchys, Ariſtocracys, Democracys, or mix'd Governments, according to the variety of Circumſtances; and the Go⯑vernments have bin good or evil, according to the rectitude or pravity of their Inſtitution, and the vertue and wiſdom, or the folly and vices of thoſe to whom the Power was committed: but the end which was ever propos'd, being the good of the Publick, they only perform'd their duty, who procur'd it according to the Laws of the Society, which were equally valid as to their own Magiſtrats, whether they were few or many.

This might ſuffice to anſwer our Author's Queſtion; but he endeavours further to perplex it, by a fiction of his own brain, That God gave this Power to the whole Multitude met, and not to every particular Aſſembly of Men: And expects a proof, That the whole Multitude met, and divided this Power which God gave them in groſs, by breaking it into parcels, and by ap⯑pointing a diſtinct Power to each Commonwealth. He alſo fathers it upon the Aſſertors of Liberty; and dos not ſee, as he ſays, how there can be an Election of a Magiſtrate by any Commonwealth, that is not an Ʋſurpation upon the Privilege of the whole World, unleſs all Mankind had met together, and divided the Power into parcels which God had given them in groſs. But be⯑fore I put my ſelf to the trouble of anſwering that which is but an Ap⯑pendix to a whimſy of his own, I may juſtly ask, What hurt he finds in Uſurpation, who aſſerts, that the ſame Obedience is due to all Monarchs, whether they come in by Inheritance, Election or Uſurpation? If Uſur⯑pation can give a Right to a Monarch, why dos it not confer the ſame up⯑on a People? Or rather, if God did in groſs confer ſuch a Right upon all Mankind, and they neither did, nor can meet together by conſent to diſ⯑poſe of it for the good of the whole; why ſhould not thoſe who can, and do conſent to meet together, agree upon that which ſeems moſt expedient to them for the Government of themſelves? Did God create Man under the neceſſity of wanting Government, and all the good that proceeds from it; becauſe at the firſt all did not, and afterwards all could not meet to agree upon Rules? Or did he ever declare, that unleſs they ſhould uſe the firſt opportunity of dividing themſelves into ſuch parcels as were to re⯑main unalterable, the right of reigning over every one ſhall fall to the firſt Villain that ſhould dare to attempt it? Is it not more conſonant to the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, to leave to every Nation a liberty of re⯑pairing the Miſchiefs fallen upon them thro the omiſſion of their firſt Pa⯑rents, by ſetting up Governments among themſelves, than to lay 'em un⯑der a neceſſity of ſubmitting to any that ſhould inſolently aſpire to a Do⯑mination over them? Is it not more juſt and reaſonable to believe, that the univerſal Right not being executed, devolves upon particular Nations, as Members of the great Body, than that it ſhould become the reward of Violence or Fraud? Or is it poſſible that any one Man can make himſelf Lord of a People, or parcel of that Body, to whom God had given the liberty of governing themſelves, by any other means than Violence or Fraud, unleſs they did willingly ſubmit to him? If this Right be not de⯑volv'd upon any one Man, is not the invaſion of it the moſt outrageous Injury that can be done to all Mankind, and moſt particularly to the Na⯑tion that is enſlav'd by it? Or if the Juſtice of every Government depends neceſſarily upon an original Grant, and a Succeſſion certainly deduc'd from our firſt Fathers, dos not he by his own Principles condemn all the Mo⯑narchys of the World, as the moſt deteſtable Uſurpations, ſince not one of 'em that we know do any way pretend to it? Or, tho I, who deny [68] any Power to be juſt that is not founded upon Conſent, may boldly blame Uſurpation; is it not an abſurd and unpardonable impudence in Filmer, to condemn Uſurpation in a People, when he has declar'd that the Right and Power of a Father may be gain'd by Uſurpation; and that Nations in their Obedience are to regard the Power, not the Means by which it was gain'd? But not to loſe more time upon a moſt frivolous fiction, I affirm, that the Liberty which we contend for is granted by God to every Man in his own Perſon, in ſuch a manner as may be uſeful to him and his Poſte⯑rity, and as it was exercis'd by Noah, Shem, Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob, &c. and their Children, as has bin prov'd, and not to the vaſt Body of all Mankind, which never did meet together ſince the firſt Age after the Flood, and never could meet to receive any benefit by it.

His next Queſtion deſerves ſcorn and hatred, with all the effects of ei⯑ther, if it proceed from malice; tho perhaps he may deſerve compaſſion, if his Crime proceed from ignorance: Was a general Meeting of a whole Kingdom, ſays he, ever known for the Election of a Prince? But if there never were any general Meetings of whole Nations, or of ſuch as they did delegate and entruſt with the Power of the whole, how did any Man that was elected come to have a Power over the whole? Why may not a People meet to chuſe a Prince, as well as any other Magiſtrate? Why might not the Athenians, Romans, or Carthaginians, have choſen Princes as well as Archons, Conſuls, Dictators or Suffetes, if it had pleas'd them? Who choſe all the Roman Kings, except Tarquin the proud, if the People did not; ſince their Hiſtorys teſtify, that he was the firſt who took upon T. Liv. l. 1.him to reign ſine juſſu populi? Who ever heard of a King of the Goths in Spain, that was not choſen by the Nobility and People? Or, how could they chuſe him, if they did not meet in their Perſons, or by their De⯑putys, which is the ſame thing, when a People has agreed it ſhould be ſo? How did the Kings of Sweden come by their Power, unleſs by the like Election, till the Crown was made hereditary, in the time of Guſtavus the Firſt, as a Reward of his Vertue and Service, in delivering that Country from the Tyranny of the Danes? How did Charles Guſtavus come to be King, unleſs it was by the Election of the Nobility? He acknowledg'd by the Act of his Election, and upon all occaſions, that he had no other right to the Crown than what they had confer'd on him. Did not the like Cuſtom prevail in Hungary and Bohemia, till thoſe Countrys fell un⯑der the Power of the Houſe of Auſtria? and in Denmark till the Year 1660? Do not the Kings of Poland derive their Authority from this popular Election, which he derides? Dos not the ſtile of the Oath of Allegiance us'd in the Kingdom of Arragon, as it is related by Antonio Perez Secre⯑tary of State to Philip 2d, ſhew, that their Kings were of their own ma⯑king? Could they ſay, ^* We who are as good as you, make you our King, on condition that you keep and obſerve our Privileges and Libertys; and if not, not; if he did not come in by their Election? Were not the Roman Em⯑perors, in diſorderly times, choſen by the Soldiers; and in ſuch as were more regular, by the Senate, with the conſent of the People?

Our Author may ſay, the whole Body of theſe Nations did not meet at their Elections; tho that is not always true, for in the Infancy of Rome, when the whole People dwelt within the Walls of a ſmall City, they did meet for the choice of their Kings, as afterwards for the choice of other [69] Magiſtrats. Whilſt the Goths, Franks, Vandals and Saxons, liv'd with⯑in the Precincts of a Camp, they frequently met for the Election of a King, and rais'd upon a Target the Perſon they had choſen: but finding that to be inconvenient, or rather impoſſible, when they were vaſtly increas'd in number, and diſpers'd over all the Countrys they had conquer'd, no better way was found, than to inſtitute Gemotes, Parlia⯑ments, Diets, Cortez, Aſſemblys of Eſtates, or the like, to do that which formerly had bin perform'd by themſelves; and when a People is, by mutual compact, join'd together in a civil Society, there is no difference as to Right, between that which is done by them all in their own Perſons, or by ſome deputed by all, and acting according to the Powers receiv'd from all.

If our Author was ignorant of theſe things, which are the moſt com⯑mon in all Hiſtorys, he might have ſpar'd the pains of writing upon more abſtruſe Points; but 'tis a ſtupendous folly in him, to preſume to raiſe Doctrins depending upon the univerſal Law of God and Nature, with⯑out examining the only Law that ever God did in a publick manner give to Man. If he had look'd into it, he might have learnt, That all Iſrael 1 Sam. 10.was, by the command of God, aſſembl'd at Miſpeth to chuſe a King, and did chuſe Saul: He being ſlain, all Judah came to Hebron, and made 2 Sam. 2. David their King: After the death of Iſhboſheth, all the Tribes went to 2 Sam. 5. Hebron, and anointed him King over them, and he made a Covenant with them before the Lord. When Solomon was dead, all Iſrael met to⯑gether in Shechem, and ten Tribes diſliking the proceedings of Rehoboam, 1 King. 12.rejected him, and made Jeroboam their King. The ſame People in the time of the Judges, had general Aſſemblys, as often as occaſion did re⯑quire, to ſet up a Judg, make War, or the like: And the ſeveral Tribes had their Aſſemblys to treat of Buſineſſes relating to themſelves. The Hi⯑ſtorys of all Nations, eſpecially of thoſe that have peopled the beſt parts of Europe, are ſo full of Examples in this kind, that no man can queſtion them, unleſs he be brutally ignorant, or maliciouſly contentious. The great matters among the Germans were tranſacted omnium conſenſu. De C. Tacit. de mor. Germ. minoribus conſultant Principes; de majoribus omnes. The Michelgemote a⯑mong the Saxons was an Aſſembly of the whole People: The Baronagi⯑um is truly ſaid to be the ſame, in as much as it comprehended all the Freemen, that is, all the People; for the difference between Civis and Servus is irreconcilable; and no man, whilſt he is a Servant, can be a Member of a Commonwealth; for he that is not in his own power, can⯑not have a part in the Government of others. All the foremention'd Nor⯑thern Nations had the like cuſtoms among 'em: The Governments they had were ſo inſtituted. The utmoſt that any now remaining pretends to, is, to derive their right from them: If, according to Filmer, theſe firſt Aſſemblys could not confer it upon the firſt, they had none: Such as claim under 'em, can inherit none from thoſe that had none; and there can be no right in all the Governments we ſo much venerate; and nothing can tend more to their overthrow than the reception of our Author's Doctrin.

Tho any one Inſtance would be ſufficient to overthrow his general ne⯑gative Propoſition (for a Rule is not generally true, if there be any juſt Exception againſt it) I have alledg'd many, and find it ſo eaſy to in⯑creaſe the number, that there is no Nation, whoſe Original we know, out of whoſe Hiſtorys I will not undertake to produce the like: But I have not bin ſolicitous preciſely to diſtinguiſh, which Nations have acted [70] in their own Perſons, and which have made uſe of Delegats; nor in what times they have chang'd from one way to the other: for if any have act⯑ed by themſelves, the thing is poſſible; and whatſoever is done by dele⯑gated Powers, muſt be refer'd to their Principals; for none can give to any a Power which they have not in themſelves.

He is graciouſly pleas'd to confeſs, That when Men are aſſembled by a human Power, that Power that dos aſſemble them, may alſo limit the manner of the execution of that Power, &c. But in Aſſemblys that take their Au⯑thority from the Law of Nature, it is not ſo; for what liberty or freedom is due to any man by the Law of Nature, no inferior Power can alter, limit or diminiſh: No one man, or multitude of men, can give away the natural Right of another, &c. Theſe are ſtrong Lines, and ſuch as, if there be any ſenſe in them, utterly overthrow all our Author's Doctrin; for if any Aſſembly of men did ever take their Authority from the Law of Nature, it muſt be of ſuch as, remaining in the intire fruition of their natural Liberty, and reſtrain'd by no Contract, meet together to deliberate of ſuch matters as concern themſelves; and if they can be reſtrnin'd by no one man, or number of men, they may diſpoſe of their own Affairs as they think fit. But becauſe no one of them is oblig'd to enter into the So⯑ciety that the reſt may conſtitute, he cannot enjoy the benefit of that So⯑ciety unleſs he enter into it: He may be gone and ſet up for himſelf, or ſet up another with ſuch as will agree with him. But if he enter into the Society, he is oblig'd by the Laws of it; and if one of thoſe Laws be, that all things ſhould be determin'd by the plurality of Voices, his Aſſent is afterwards comprehended in all the Reſolutions of that Plurali⯑ty. Reuben or Simeon might, according to the Laws of Nature, have divided themſelves from their Brethren, as well as Lot from Abraham, or Iſmael and the Sons of Keturah from Iſaac; but when they, in hopes of having a part in the Inheritance promis'd to their Fathers, had join'd with their Brethren, a few of their Deſcendents could not have a right, by their diſſent, to hinder the Reſolutions of the whole Body, or ſuch a part of it as by the firſt Agreement was to paſs for an Act of the whole. And the 1 Sam. 10.Scripture teaches us, that when the Lot was fallen upon Saul, they who deſpis'd him were ſtil'd Men of Belial; and the reſt, after his Victory over the Ammonites, would have ſlain 'em if he had permitted. In the like manner, when a number of Men met together to build Rome, any man who had diſlik'd the deſign, might juſtly have refus'd to join in it; but when he had enter'd into the Society, he could not by his Vote invalidate the Acts of the whole, nor deſtroy the Rights of Romulus, Numa, and the others, who by the Senat and People were made Kings; nor thoſe of the other Magiſtrats, who after their expulſion were legally created.

This is as much as is requir'd to eſtabliſh the natural Liberty of Man⯑kind in its utmoſt extent, and cannot be ſhaken by our Author's ſurmiſe, That a Gap is thereby open'd for every ſeditious multitude to raiſe a new Com⯑monwealth: For till the Commonwealth be eſtabliſh'd, no multitude can be ſeditious, becauſe they are not ſubject to any human Law; and Sedi⯑tion implies an unjuſt and diſorderly oppoſition of that Power which is legally eſtabliſh'd; which cannot be when there is none, nor by him who is not a Member of the Society that makes it; and when it is made, ſuch as enter'd into it, are oblig'd to the Laws of it.

This ſhewing the root and foundation of Civil Powers, we may judg of the uſe and extent of them, according to the letter of the Law, or the true intentional meaning of it; both which declare them to be purely [71] Human Ordinances, proceeding from the will of thoſe who ſeek their own good; and may certainly infer, that ſince all Multitudes are compos'd of ſuch as are under ſome Contract, or free from all, no Man is oblig'd to enter into thoſe contracts againſt his own will, nor oblig'd by any to which he dos not aſſent: Thoſe multitudes that enter into ſuch Contracts, and thereupon form Civil Societys, act according to their own will: Thoſe that are engag'd in none, take their Authority from the Law of Nature; their Rights cannot be limited or diminiſh'd by any one Man, or number of Men; and conſequently whoever dos it, or attempts the doing of it, violates the moſt ſacred Laws of God and Nature.

His cavils concerning Proxys, and the way of uſing them, deſerve no anſwer, as relating only to one ſort of Men amongſt us, and can have no influence upon the Laws of Nature, or the proceedings of Aſſemblys, acting according to ſuch Rules as they ſet to themſelves. In ſome places they have voted all together in their own perſons, as in Athens: In others by Tribes, as in Rome: Sometimes by Delegats, when the number of the whole People is ſo great, that no one place can contain them, as in the Parliaments, Diets, General Aſſemblys of Eſtates, long us'd in the great Kingdoms of Europe. In other Parts many Citys are join'd together in Leagues, as antiently the Achaians, Etolians, Samnites, Tuſcans; and in theſe times the States of Holland, and Cantons of Switzerland: but our Author not regarding ſuch matters, in purſuance of his folly, with an ignorance as admirable as his ſtupidity, repeats his Challenge; I ask, ſays he, but one Example out of the Hiſtory of the whole World; let the Common⯑wealth be nam'd, wherever the Multitude, or ſo much as the major part of it, conſented either by Voice or Procuration to the Election of a Prince: not obſerving, that if an Anſwer could not be given, he did overthrow the Rights of all the Princes that are, or ever have bin in the World: for if the Liberty of one Man cannot be limited or diminiſh'd by one, or any number of Men, and none can give away the Right of another; 'tis plain that the Ambition of one Man, or of many, a faction of Citizens, or the mutiny of an Army, cannot give a Right to any over the Libertys of a whole Nation. Thoſe who are ſo ſet up, have their root in Violence or Fraud, and are rather to be accounted Robbers and Pirats, than Magi⯑ſtrats. Leo Africanus obſerving in his Hiſtory, that ſince the extinction Leonis Afr. Hiſt. Africae.of Mahomet's Race (to whom his Countrymen thought God had given the Empire of the World) their Princes did not come in by the conſent of thoſe Nations which they govern'd, ſays, that they are eſteem'd Thieves; and that on this account, the moſt honourable Men among the Arabians and Moors ſcorn to eat, drink, or make Alliances with them: and if the caſe were as general as that Author makes it, no better Rule could be any where follow'd by honourable and worthy Men. But a good Cauſe muſt not be loſt by the fault of an ill Advocate; the Rights of Kings muſt not periſh, becauſe Filmer knows not how to defend, or dos maliciouſly betray them. I have already prov'd that David, and di⯑vers of the Judges, were choſen by all Iſrael; Jeroboam by ten Tribes; all the Kings of Rome, except Tarquin the Proud, by the whole City. I may add many Examples of the Saxons in our own Country: Ina and Offa were made Kings, omnium conſenſu: Theſe All are expreſt plainly Mat. Paris.by the words, Archiepiſcopis, Epiſcopis, Abbatibus, Senatoribus, Ducibus & Populo terrae. Egbert and Ethelward came to the Crown by the ſame Authority, Omnium conſenſu Rex creatur. Ethelwolf the Monk, Neceſſi⯑tate Guil. Ma [...]ſ. Polyd. cogente ſac [...]us eſt Rex, & conſenſus publicus in regem dari petiit. Ethel⯑ſtan, [72] tho a Baſtard, electus eſt magno conſenſu Optimatum, & a Populo con⯑ſalutatus. Polyd. Huntingd. Mat. Weſt. Hoveden.In the like manner Edwin's Government being diſlik'd, they choſe Edgar: Ʋnanimi omnium conſpiratione, Edwino dejecto, eligerunt Deo dictante Edgarum in Regem, & annuente Populo: And in another place, Edgarus ab omni Anglorum Populo electus eſt. Ironſide being dead, Canu⯑tus Florent.was receiv'd by the general conſent of all: Juraverunt illi, quod eum regem ſibi eligere vellent; foedus etiam cum principibus & omni populo ipſe, & Abbas Croyl. Huntingd. illi cum ipſo percuſſerunt. Whereupon, Omnium conſenſu ſuper totam An⯑gliam Canutus coronatur. Hardicanutus gaudenter ab omnibus ſuſcipitur & electus eſt. The ſame Author ſays that Edward the Confeſſor, electus eſt Ingulf. in regem ab omni populo: And another, Omnium Electione in Edwardum con⯑cordatur. Tho the name of Conqueror be odiouſly given to William the Norman, he had the ſame Title to the Crown with his Predeceſſors; In magna exultatione a Clero & Populo ſuſceptus, & ab omnibus Rex acclama⯑tus. I cannot recite all the Examples of this kind, that the Hiſtory of al⯑moſt all Nations furniſhes, unleſs I ſhould make a Volume in bulk not in⯑ferior to the Book of Martyrs: But thoſe which I have mention'd out of the Sacred, Roman, and Engliſh Hiſtory, being more than ſufficient to anſwer our Author's Challenge, I take liberty to add, that tho there could not be one Example produc'd of a Prince, or any other Magiſtrate, choſen by the general conſent of the People, or by the major part of them, it could be of no advantage to the Cauſe he has undertaken to maintain: For when a People has either indefinitely, or under certain Conditions and Limitations, reſign'd their Power into the hands of a certain number of Men; or agreed upon Rules, according to which Perſons ſhould, from time to time, be deputed for the management of their Affairs, the Acts of thoſe Perſons, if their Power be without reſtrictions, are of the ſame va⯑lue as the Acts of the whole Nation, and the aſſent of every individual Man is comprehended in them. If the Power be limited, whatſoever is done according to that limitation, has the ſame Authority. If it dos there⯑fore appear (as is teſtify'd by the Laws and Hiſtorys of all our Northern Nations) that the power of every People is either wholly, or to ſuch a degree as is neceſſary for creating Kings, granted to their ſeveral Gemotes, Diets, Cortez, Aſſemblys of Eſtates, Parliaments, and the like; all the Kings that they have any where, or at any time choſen, do reign by the ſame authority, and have the ſame right, as if every individual Man of thoſe Nations had aſſented to their Election. But that theſe Gemotes, Diets, and other Aſſemblys of State, have every where had ſuch Powers, and executed them by rejecting or ſetting up Kings; and that the Kings now in being among us have receiv'd their beginning from ſuch Acts, has bin fully prov'd, and is ſo plain in it ſelf, that none but thoſe who are groſly ſtupid or impudent can deny it: which is enough to ſhew that all Kings are not ſet up by violence, deceit, faction of a few powerful Men, or the mutinys of Armys; but from the conſent of ſuch multitudes, as joining together, frame Civil Societys; and either in their own Perſons at general Aſſemblys, or by their Delegats, confer a juſt and legal Power upon them; which our Author rejecting, he dos, as far as in him lies, prove them all to be Uſurpers and Tyrants.

SECT. VI. They who have a right of chuſing a King, have the right of making a King.

THO the Right of Magiſtrats dos eſſentially depend upon the con⯑ſent of thoſe they govern, it is hardly worth our pains to examin, Whether the ſilent acceptation of a Governor by part of the People be an argu⯑ment of their concurring in the election of him; or by the ſame reaſon the tacit conſent of the whole Commonwealth may be maintain'd: for when the queſtion is concerning Right, fraudulent ſurmiſes are of no value; much leſs will it from thence follow, that a Prince commanding by Succeſſion, Conqueſt, or Ʋſurpation, may be ſaid to be elected by the People; for evident marks of diſſent are often given: Some declare their hatred; others murmur more privatly; many oppoſe the Governour or Government, and ſucceed ac⯑cording to the meaſure of their Strength, Virtue, or Fortune. Many would reſiſt, but cannot; and it were ridiculous to ſay, that the Inhabi⯑tants of Greece, the Kingdom of Naples, or Dutchy of Tuſcany, do tacitly aſſent to the Government of the Great Turk, King of Spain, or Duke of Florence; when nothing is more certain than that thoſe miſerable Nations abhor the Tyrannys they are under; and if they were not maſter'd by a Power much too great for them, they would ſoon free themſelves. And they who are under ſuch Governments do no more aſſent to them, tho they may be ſilent, than a Man approves of being robb'd, when, with⯑out ſaying a word, he delivers his Purſe to a Thief that he knows to be too ſtrong for him.

'Tis not therefore the bare ſufferance of a Government when a diſguſt is declar'd, nor a ſilent ſubmiſſion when the power of oppoſing is wan⯑ting, that can imply an Aſſent, or Election, and create a Right; but an explicit act of Approbation, when Men have ability and courage to reſiſt or deny. Which being agreed, 'tis evident that our Author's diſtinction between eligere and inſtituere ſignifys nothing: tho, if the power of inſti⯑tuting were only left to Nations, it would be ſufficient; for he is in vain elected who is not inſtituted; and he that is inſtituted is certainly elected, for his Inſtitution is an Election. As the Romans who choſe Romulus, Numa, and Hoſtilius to be Kings; and Brutus, Valerius, or Lucretius to be Conſuls; did make them ſo, and their Right was ſolely grounded up⯑on their Election. The Text brought by our Author againſt this dos fully prove it, Him ſhalt thou ſet King over thee whom the Lord ſhall chuſe; Deut. 17.for God did not only make the inſtitution of a King to be purely an act of the People, but left it to them to inſtitute one or not, as ſhould beſt pleaſe themſelves: and the words, whom the Lord ſhall chuſe, can have no other ſignification, than that the People reſolving to have a King, and follow⯑ing the Rules preſcrib'd by his Servant Moſes, he would direct 'em in their choice; which relates only to that particular People in covenant with God, and immediately under his Government, which no other was. But this pains might have bin ſav'd, if God by a univerſal Law had given a rule to all. The Iſraelites could not have bin three hundred years with⯑out a King, and then left to the liberty of making one, or not, if he by a perpetual Law had ordain'd that every Nation ſhould have one; and it [74] had bin as well impertinent as unjuſt to deliberate who ſhould be King, if the Dominion had by right of Inheritance belong'd to one: They muſt have ſubmitted to him whether they would or not: No care was to be taken in the election or inſtitution of him, who by his birth had a Right annex'd to his Perſon that could not be alter'd: He could not have bin forbidden to multiply Silver or Gold, who by the Law of his Creation might do what he pleas'd: It had bin ridiculous to ſay, he ſhould not raiſe his Heart above his Brethren, who had no Brethren, that is, no Equals; but was rais'd above all by God, who had impos'd upon all others a ne⯑ceſſity of obeying him. But God, who dos nothing in vain, did neither conſtitute or elect any till they deſir'd it, nor command 'em to do it them⯑ſelves, unleſs it ſo pleas'd themſelves; nor appoint 'em to take him out of any one Line: Every Iſraelite might be choſen: None but Strangers were excluded; and the People were left to the liberty of chuſing and in⯑ſtituting any one of their Brethren.

Our Author endeavouring by Hooker's authority to eſtabliſh his diſtin⯑ction between eligere and inſtituere, deſtroys it, and the paternal Right, which he makes the foundation of his Doctrine. Heaps of Scripture are alledg'd, ſays he, concerning the ſolemn Coronation and Inauguration of Saul, David, Solomon and others, by Nobles, Antients, and People of the Com⯑monwealth of Iſrael: which is enough to prove that the whole work was theirs; that no other had any title more than what they beſtow'd upon him; that the Kings were ſet up by the Nobles, Antients and People: Even God did no otherwiſe intervene than by ſuch a ſecret diſpoſition of the Lots by his Providence, as is exercis'd in the Government of all the things in the World; and we cannot have a more certain evidence, that a paternal right to Dominion is a mere Whimſy, than that God did not cauſe the Lot to fall upon the eldeſt, of the eldeſt Line, of the eldeſt Tribe; but upon Saul, a young Man, of the youngeſt Tribe: and after⯑wards, tho he had deſign'd David, Solomon, Jerobvam, and others, who had no pretence to the paternal Right, to be Kings, he left both the election and inſtitution of them to the Elders and People.

But Hooker being well examin'd, it will appear that his opinions are as contrary to the Doctrin of our Author, as thoſe we have mention'd out Hooker Eccl. Pol. l. 1. c. 10. of Plato and Ariſtotle. He plainly ſays, It is impoſſible that any ſhould have a compleat lawful power over a multitude conſiſting of ſo many Familys, as eve⯑ry politick Society dos, but by conſent of Men, or immediate appointment from God: Becauſe not having the natural Superiority of Fathers, their Power muſt needs be uſurp'd, and then unlawful; or if lawful, then either granted or con⯑ſented to by them over whom they exerciſe the ſame, or elſe given extraordina⯑rily by God. And tho he thinks Kings to have bin the firſt Governors ſo conſtituted, he adds, That this is not the only Regiment that has bin receiv'd in the World. The inconveniences of one kind have caus'd ſundry others to be devis'd. So that in a word, all publick Regiment, of what kind ſoever, ſeems evidently to have riſen from deliberate advice, conſultation and compoſi⯑tion between Men, judging it convenient and behoofeful. And a little below, Man's Nature ſtanding therefore as it doth, ſome kind of regiment the Law of Nature dos require; yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature ties not to any one, but leaves the choice as a thing arbitrary. And again, To live by one Man's will, became all Mens miſery: This conſtrain'd them to come unto Laws, &c. But as thoſe Laws do not only teach that which is good, but enjoin it, they have in them a conſtraining force. To conſtrain Men to any thing inconve⯑nient ſeems unreaſonable: Moſt requiſite therefore it is that to deviſe Laws, [75] which all Men ſhould be forc'd to obey, none but wiſe Men ſhould be admitted. Moreover that which we ſay concerning the power of Government, muſt here be apply'd to the power of making Laws, whereby to govern; which Power God has over all; and by the natural Law, whereunto he has made all ſubject, the lawful power of making Laws to command whole politick Societys of men, belongs ſo properly to the ſame intire Societys, that for any Prince or Poten⯑tate, of what kind ſoever upon Earth, to exerciſe the ſame of himſelf, and not either by expreſs commiſſion immediately from God, or elſe by authority de⯑riv'd at the firſt from their conſent, upon whoſe perſons they impoſe Laws, it is no better than mere Tyranny. Laws therefore they are not, which publick conſent has not made ſo. The humour of our Age conſider'd, I ſhould not have ventur'd to ſay ſo much: But if Hooker be a Man of ſuch great Au⯑thority, I cannot offend in tranſcribing his words, and ſhewing how vilely he is abus'd by Filmer; concluding, that if he be in the right, the choice and conſtitution of Government, the making of Laws, Coro⯑nation, Inauguration, and all that belongs to the chuſing and making of Kings, or other Magiſtrats, is merely from the People; and that all Power exercis'd over them, which is not ſo, is Uſurpation and Tyranny, unleſs it be by an immediate Commiſſion from God; which if any man has, let him give teſtimony of it, and I will confeſs he comes not within the reach of our reaſonings, but ought to be obey'd by thoſe to whom he is ſent, or over whom he is plac'd.

Nevertheleſs our Author is of another opinion; but ſcorning to give us a reaſon, he adds to Hooker's words, As if theſe Solemnitys were a kind of deed, whereby the right of Dominion is given; which ſtrange, untrue, and unnatural Conceits are ſet abroad by Seedſmen of Rebellion: And a little farther, Ʋnleſs we will openly proclaim defiance to all Law, Equity, and Reaſon, we muſt ſay (for there is no remedy) that in Kingdoms hereditary, Birthright giveth a Right to Sovereign Dominion, &c. Thoſe Solemnitys do either ſerve for an open teſtification of the Inheritor's Right, or belong to the form of inducing him into the poſſeſſion. Theſe are bold Cenſures, and do not only reach Mr. Hooker, whoſe modeſty and peaceableneſs of ſpirit is no leſs eſteem'd than his Learning; but the Scriptures alſo, and the beſt of human Authors, upon which he founded his Opinions. But why ſhould it be thought a ſtrange, untrue, or unnatural Conceit, to believe that when the Scriptures ſay Nimrod was the firſt that grew powerful in the Earth, long before the death of his Fathers, and could conſequently nei⯑ther have a right of Dominion over the Multitude met together at Baby⯑lon, nor ſubdue them by his own ſtrength, he was ſet up by their Con⯑ſent; or that they who made him their Governor, might preſcribe Rules by which he ſhould govern? Nothing ſeems to me leſs ſtrange, than that a multitude of reaſonable Creatures, in the performance of Acts of the greateſt importance, ſhould conſider why they do them. And the infinite variety which is obſerv'd in the conſtitution, mixture, and regu⯑lation of Governments, dos not only ſhew that the ſeveral Nations of the World have conſider'd them; but clearly prove that all Nations have perpetually continu'd in the exerciſe of that Right. Nothing is more natural than to follow the voice of Mankind: The wiſeſt and beſt have ever employ'd their ſtudys in forming Kingdoms and Commonwealths, or in adding to the perfections of ſuch as were already conſtituted; which had bin contrary to the Laws of God and Nature, if a general Rule had bin ſet, that had oblig'd all to be for ever ſubject to the Will of one; and they had not bin the beſt, but the worſt of men who had departed [76] from it. Nay, I may ſay, that the Law given by God to his peculiar People, and the Commands deliver'd by his Servants in order to it, or the proſecution of it, had bin contrary to his own eternal and univerſal Law; which is impoſſible. A Law therefore having bin given by God, which had no relation to, or conſiſtency with the abſolute paternal pow⯑er; Judges and Kings created, who had no pretence to any preference before their Brethren, till they were created, and commanded not to raiſe their Hearts above them when they ſhould be created; the Wiſdom and Vertue of the beſt men in all ages ſhewn in the conſtitution or reforma⯑tion of Governments; and Nations in variouſly framing them, preſerv⯑ing the poſſeſſion of their natural Right, to be govern'd by none, and in no other way than they ſhould appoint: The opinions of Hooker, That all publick Regiment, of what kind ſoever, ariſes from the deliberate advice of men ſeeking their own good, and that all other is mere Tyranny; are not untrue and unnatural conceits ſet abroad by the Seedſmen of Rebellion, but real Truths grounded upon the Laws of God and Nature, acknowledg'd and practis'd by Mankind. And no Nation being juſtly ſubject to any but ſuch as they ſet up, nor in any other manner than according to ſuch Laws as they ordain, the right of chuſing and making thoſe that are to govern them, muſt wholly depend upon their Will.

SECT. VII. The Laws of every Nation are the meaſure of Magiſtratical Power.

OUR Author lays much weight upon the word Hereditary: but the queſtion is, What is inherited in an Hereditary Kingdom, and how it comes to be hereditary? 'Tis in vain to ſay the Kingdom; for we do not know what he means by the Kingdom: 'tis one thing in one place, and very different in others; and I think it not eaſy to find two in the World that in power are exactly the ſame. If he underſtands all that is comprehended within the precincts over which it reaches, I deny that any ſuch is to be found in the World: If he refers to what preceding Kings enjoy'd, no determination can be made, till the firſt original of that Kingdom be examin'd, that it may be known what that firſt King had, and from whence he had it.

If this variety be denied, I deſire to know whether the Kings of Spar⯑ta and Perſia had the ſame power over their Subjects; if the ſame, whe⯑ther both were abſolute, or both limited; if limited, how came the De⯑crees of the Perſian Kings to paſs for Laws? If abſolute, how could the Spartan Kings be ſubject to Fines, Impriſonment, or the ſentence of Death; and not to have power to ſend for their own Supper out of the Common Hall? Why did Xenophon call Ageſilaus a good and faithful King, obedient to the Laws of his Country, when, upon the command of the Ephori, he left the War that he had with ſo much glory begun in Aſia, if he was ſubject to none? How came the Ephori to be eſtabliſh'd to reſtrain the Power of Kings, if it could no way be reſtrain'd, if all ow'd obedience to them, and they to none? Why did Theopompus his Wife reprove him for ſuffering his power to be diminiſh'd by their crea⯑tion, if it could not be diminiſh'd? Or why did he ſay he had made the [77] Power more permanent in making it lefs odious, if it was perpetual and unalterable? We may go farther, and taking Xenophon and Plutarch for our guides, aſſert that the Kings of Sparta never had the powers of War or Peace, Life and Death, which our Author eſteems inſeparable from Regality, and conclude either that no King has them, or that all Kings are not alike in power. If they are not in all places the ſame, Kings do not reign by an univerſal Law, but by the particular Laws of each Coun⯑try; which give to every one ſo much power, as in the opinion of the givers conduces to the end of their Inſtitution, which is the publick good.

It may be alſo worth our inquiry how this inherited Power came to be hereditary. We know that the Sons of Veſpaſian and Conſtantine inheri⯑ted the Roman Empire, tho their Fathers had no ſuch title: But having gain'd the Empire by violence, which Hooker ſays is mere Tyranny that can create no right, they could devolve none to their Children. The Kings of France of the three Races have inherited the Crown; but Me⯑roveus, Pepin, and Hugh Capet could neither pretend title nor conqueſt, or any other Right than what was confer'd upon them by the Clergy, Nobili⯑ty, and People; and conſequently whatſoever is inherited from them can have no other Original; for that is the gift of the People which is be⯑ſtow'd upon the firſt, under whom the Succeſſors claim, as if it had bin by a peculiar Act given to every one of them. It will be more hard to ſhew how the Crown of England is become hereditary, unleſs it be by the Will of the People; for tho it were granted that ſome of the Saxon Kings came in by inheritance (which I do not, having, as I think, prov'd them to have bin abſolutely elective) yet William the Norman did not, for he was a Baſtard, and could inherit nothing. William Rufus and Henry did not; for their Elder Brother Robert by right of Inheritance ought to have bin prefer'd before 'em: Stephen and Henry the ſecond did not; for Maud the only Heireſs of Henry the firſt was living when both were crown'd: Richard and John did not, for they were Baſtards born in a⯑dultery. They muſt therefore have receiv'd their Right from the Peo⯑ple, or they could have none at all; and their Succeſſors fall under the ſame condition.

Moreover, I find great variety in the deduction of this hereditary Right. In Sparta there were two Kings of different Familys, endow'd with an equal power. If the Heraclidae did reign as Fathers of the Peo⯑ple, the Aeacidae did not: if the right was in the Aeacidae, the Heraclidae could have none; for 'tis equally impoſſible to have two Fathers as two thouſand. 'Tis in vain to ſay that two Familys join'd, and agreed to reign jointly: for 'tis evident the Spartans had Kings before the time of Hercules or Achilles, who were the Fathers of the two Races. If it be ſaid that the Regal power with which they were inveſted did entitle 'em to the right of Fathers, it muſt in like manner have belong'd to the Ro⯑man Conſuls, Military Tribunes, Dictators and Pretors; for they had more Power than the Spartan Kings; and that glorious Nation might change their Fathers every year, and multiply or diminiſh the number of 'em as they pleas'd. If this be moſt ridiculous and abſurd, 'tis certain that the Name and Office of King, Conſul, Dictator, or the like, dos not confer any determin'd Right upon the Perſon that has it: Every one has a right to that which is allotted to him by the Laws of the Country by which be is created.

[78] As the Perſians, Spartans, Romans or Germans, might make ſuch Ma⯑giſtrats, and under ſuch names as beſt pleas'd themſelves, and accord⯑ingly enlarge or diminiſh their Power; the ſame Right belongs to all Na⯑tions, and the Rights due unto, as well as the Dutys incumbent upon eve⯑ry one, are to be known only by the Laws of that place. This may ſeem ſtrange to thoſe who know neither Books nor Things, Hiſtorys nor Laws; but is well explain'd by Grotius, who denying the Sovereign Power to be annex'd to any Name, ſpeaks of divers Magiſtrats under ſeveral names that had, and others that under the ſame names had it not; and diſtin⯑guiſhes Grot. de Jur. bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 1.thoſe who have the Summum Imperium ſummo modo, from thoſe who have it modo non ſummo: and tho probably he look'd on the firſt ſort as a thing merely ſpeculative, if by that ſummo modo, a right of do⯑ing what one pleaſes be underſtood; yet he gives many Examples of the other. Among thoſe who had liberrimum imperium, if any had it, he names the Kings of the Sabeans; who nevertheleſs were under ſuch a condition, that tho they were, as Agatharchidas reports, obey'd in all things, whilſt they continu'd within the Walls of their Palace, might be ſton'd by any that met 'em without it. He finds alſo another Obſtacle to the Abſolute power, Cum Rex partem habeat ſummi Imperii, partem Senatus, ſive Populus; which parts are proportion'd according to the Laws of each Kingdom, whether Hereditary or Elective, both being equally regulated by them.

The Law that gives and meaſures the Power, preſcribes Rules how it ſhould be tranſmitted. In ſome places the ſupreme Magiſtrats are annu⯑ally elected, in others their Power is for life; in ſome they are merely elective, in others hereditary under certain Rules or Limitations. The antient Kingdoms and Lordſhips of Spain were hereditary; but the Suc⯑ceſſion went ordinarily to the eldeſt of the reigning Family, not to the neareſt in Blood. This was the ground of the Quarrel between Corbis T. Liv. l. 28.the Brother, and Orſua the Son of the laſt Prince, decided by combat be⯑fore Scipio. I know not whether the Goths brought that cuſtom with 'em when they conquer'd Spain, or whether they learnt it from the In⯑habitants; but certain it is, that keeping themſelves to the Familys of Saavedra coro⯑na Gothica.the Balthei, and Amalthei, they had more regard to Age than Proximity; and almoſt ever prefer'd the Brother, or eldeſt Kinſman of the laſt King Marian. Hiſt. Hiſpan.before his Son. The like cuſtom was in uſe among the Moors in Spain and Africa, who according to the ſeveral Changes that happen'd among the Familys of Almohades, Almoranides, and Benemerini, did always take one of the reigning Blood; but in the choice of him had moſt reſpect to Age and Capacity. This is uſually call'd the Law of Thaneſtry; and, as in many other places, prevail'd alſo in Ireland, till that Country fell under the Engliſh Government.

In France and Turky the Male that is neareſt in Blood, ſucceeds; and I do not know of any deviation from that Rule in France, ſince Henry the Firſt was prefer'd before Robert his elder Brother, Grandchild to Hugh Capet: But notwithſtanding the great veneration they have for the Royal Blood, they utterly exclude Females, leſt the Crown ſhould fall to a Stranger; or a Woman that is ſeldom able to govern her ſelf, ſhould come to govern ſo great a People. Some Nations admit Females, either ſimply, as well as Males; or under a condition of not marrying out of their Country, or without the conſent of the Eſtates, with an abſolute excluſion of them and their Children if they do; according to which Law, now in force among the Swedes, Charles Guſtavus was choſen King [79] upon the reſignation of Queen Chriſtina, as having no Title; and the Crown ſetled upon the Heirs of his Body, to the utter excluſion of his Brother Adolphus, their Mother having married a German. Tho divers Nations have differently diſpos'd their Affairs; all thoſe that are not na⯑turally Slaves, and like to Beaſts, have prefer'd their own Good before the perſonal Intereſts of him that expects the Crown, ſo as upon no pre⯑tence whatever to admit of one who is evidently guilty of ſuch Vices as are prejudicial to the State. For this reaſon the French, tho much ad⯑dicted to their Kings, rejected the vile remainders of Meroveus his Race, and made Pepin the Son of Charles Martel King: And when his Deſcen⯑dents fell into the like Vices, they were often depos'd, till at laſt they were wholly rejected, and the Crown given to Capet and to his Heirs Male as formerly. Yet for all this Henry his Grandchild, being eſteem'd more fit to govern than his elder Brother Robert, was, as is ſaid before, made King, and that Crown ſtill remains in his Deſcendents; no conſi⯑deration being had of the Children of Robert, who continu'd Dukes of Burgundy during the reigns of ten Kings. And in the memory of our Fa⯑thers, Henry of Navarr was rejected by two Aſſemblys of the Eſtates, becauſe he differ'd in Religion from the Body of the Nation, and could never be receiv'd as King, till he had renounc'd his own, tho he was cer⯑tainly the next in Blood; and that in all other reſpects he excel'd in thoſe Vertues which they moſt eſteem.

We have already prov'd, that our own Hiſtory is full of the like Ex⯑amples, and might enumerate a multitude of others, if it were not too tedious: and as the various Rules, according to which all the hereditary Crowns of the World are inherited, ſhew, that none is ſet by Nature, but that every People proceeds according to their own Will; the fre⯑quent deviations from thoſe Rules do evidently teſtify, that Salus Populi eſt Lex ſuprema; and that no Crown is granted otherwiſe, than in ſub⯑miſſion to it.

But tho there were a Rule, which in no caſe ought to be tranſgreſt, there muſt be a Power of judging to whom it ought to be applied. 'Tis perhaps hard to conceive one more preciſe than that of France, where the eldeſt Legitimate Male in the direct Line is prefer'd; and yet that alone is not ſufficient. There may be Baſtardy in the caſe: Baſtards may be thought legitimate, and legitimate Sons Baſtards. The Children born of Iſabel of Portugal during her Marriage with John the Third of Caſtile were declar'd Baſtards; and the Title of the Houſe of Auſtria to that Crown, depends upon that Declaration. We often ſee that Marriages which have bin contracted, and for a long time taken to be good, have bin declar'd null; and the legitimation of the preſent King of France is founded ſolely upon the abolition of the Marriage of Henry the Fourth with Marguerite of Valois, which for the ſpace of twenty ſeven Years was thought to have bin good. Whilſt Spain was divided into five or ſix Kingdoms, and the ſeveral Kings link'd to each other by mutual Allian⯑ces, inceſtuous Marriages were often contracted, and upon better conſi⯑deration annul'd; many have bin utterly void, thro the preingagement of one of the Partys. Theſe are not feign'd Caſes, but ſuch as happen frequently; and the diverſity of Accidents, as well as the humours of Men, may produce many others, which would involve Nations in the moſt fatal Diſorders, if every one ſhould think himſelf oblig'd to follow ſuch a one who pretended a Title, that to him might ſeem plauſible, when another ſhould ſet up one as pleaſing to others, and there were no Power [80] to terminate thoſe Diſputes to which both muſt ſubmit, but the deciſion muſt be left to the Sword.

This is that which I call the Application of the Rule, when it is as plain and certain as human Wiſdom can make it; but if it be left more at large, as where Females inherit, the difficultys are inextricable: and he that ſays, the next Heir is really King when one is dead, before he be ſo declar'd by a Power that may judg of his Title, dos, as far as in him lies, expoſe Nations to be ſplit into the moſt deſperate Factions, and every man to fight for the Title which he fancies to be good, till he deſtroy thoſe of the contrary Party, or be deſtroy'd by them. This is the bleſſed way propos'd by our Author to prevent Sedition: But, God be thank'd, our Anceſtors found a better. They did not look upon Robert the Norman as King of England after the death of his Father; and when he did proudly endeavour, on pretence of Inheritance, to impoſe himſelf upon the Nation, that thought fit to prefer his younger Brothers before him, he paid the penalty of his folly, by the loſs of his Eyes and Liberty. The French did not think the Grandchild of Pharamond to be King after the death of his Father, nor ſeek who was the next Heir of the Merovin⯑gian Line, when Chilperic the Third was dead; nor regard the Title of Charles of Lorrain after the death of his Brother Lothair, or of Robert of Burgundy eldeſt Son of King Robert; but advanc'd Meroveus, Pepin, Ca⯑pet and Henry the Firſt, who had no other Right than what the Nobility and People beſtow'd upon them. And if ſuch Acts do not deſtroy the Pretences of all who lay claim to Crowns by Inheritance, and do not create a Right, I think it will be hard to find a lawful King in the world, or that there ever has bin any; ſince the firſt did plainly come in like Nimrod, and thoſe who have bin every where ſince Hiſtorys are known to us, ow'd their exaltation to the Conſent of Nations, arm'd or unarm'd, by the depoſition or excluſion of the Heirs of ſuch as had reign'd before them.

Our Author not troubling himſelf with theſe things, or any other re⯑lating to the matter in queſtion, is pleas'd to ſlight Hooker's Opinions concerning Coronation and Inauguration, with the heaps of Scripture up⯑on which he grounds them; whereas thoſe Solemnitys would not only have bin fooliſh and impertinent, but profane and impious, if they were not Deeds by which the Right of Dominion is really confer'd. What could be more wickedly ſuperſtitious, than to call all Iſrael together be⯑fore the Lord, and to caſt Lots upon every Tribe, Family and Perſon, for the election of a King, if it had bin known to whom the Crown did belong by a natural and unalterable Right? Or if there had bin ſuch a thing in Nature, how could God have caus'd that Lot to fall upon one of the youngeſt Tribe, for ever to diſcountenance his own Law, and divert Nations from taking any notice of it? It had bin abſurd for the Tribe of Judah to chuſe and anoint David, and for the other Tribes to follow their example after the death of Iſhboſheth, if he had bin King by a Right not depending on their Will. David did worſe in ſlaying the Sons of Rim⯑mon, ſaying, they had kill'd a righteous Man lying upon his bed, if Iſh⯑boſheth, whoſe Head they preſented, had moſt unrighteouſly detain'd from him, as long as he liv'd, the Dominion of the ten Tribes: The King, Elders and People, had moſt ſcornfully abus'd the moſt ſacred things, by uſing ſuch Ceremonys in making him King, and com⯑pleating their Work in a Covenant made between him and them before the Lord, if he had bin already King, and if thoſe Acts [81] had bin empty Ceremonys conferring no Right at all.

I dare not ſay that a League dos imply an abſolute equality between both Partys; for there is a Foedus inequale, wherein the weaker, as Groti⯑us ſays, dos uſually obtain protection, and the ſtronger honour; but there can be none at all, unleſs both Partys are equally free to make it, or not to make it. David therefore was not King, till he was elected, and thoſe Covenants made; and he was made King by that Election and Covenants.

This is not ſhaken by our Author's Suppoſition, That the People would not have taken Joas, Manaſſeh or Joſiah, if they had had a right of chuſing a King; ſince Solomon ſays, Wo unto the Kingdom whoſe King is a Child! For, firſt, they who at the firſt had a right of chuſing whom they pleas'd to be King, by the Covenant made with him whom they did chuſe, may have depriv'd themſelves of the farther execution of it, and render'd the Crown hereditary even to Children, unleſs the Conditions come to be violated upon which it was granted. In the ſecond place, if the Infancy of a King brings Wo upon a People, the Government of ſuch a one can⯑not be according to the Laws of God and Nature; for Governments are not inſtituted by either for the pleaſure of a Man, but for the good of Nations; and their Weal, not their Wo, is ſought by both: And if Children are any where admitted to rule, 'tis by the particular Law of the place, grounded perhaps upon an opinion, that it is the beſt way to prevent dangerous Conteſts; or that other ways may be found to prevent the Inconveniences that may proceed from their weakneſs. Thirdly, It cannot be concluded that they might not reject Children, becauſe they did not: Such matters require poſitive Proofs, Suppoſitions are of no value in relation to them, and the whole matter may be alter'd by par⯑ticular Circumſtances. The Jews might reaſonably have a great venera⯑tion for the Houſe of David: they knew what was promis'd to that Family; and whatever reſpect was paid, or privilege granted on that ac⯑count, can be of no advantage to any other in the world. They might be farther induc'd to ſet up Joas, in hope the defects of his Age might be ſupplied by the Vertue, Experience and Wiſdom of Jehoiada. We do not know what good opinion may have bin conceiv'd of Manaſſeh when he was twelve years old; but much might be hop'd from one that had bin virtuouſly educated, and was probably under the care of ſuch as had bin choſen by Hezekiah: and tho the contrary did fall out, the miſchiefs brought upon the People by his wicked Reign, proceeded not from the weakneſs of his Childhood, but from the malice of his riper Years. And both the Examples of Joas and Joſiah prove, that neither of 'em came in by their own right, but by the choice of the People. Jehoiada gather'd the Levites out of all the Citys of Judah, and the chief of the Fa⯑thers 2 Chron. 23. of Iſrael, and they came to Jeruſalem: And all the Congregation made a Covenant with the King in the Houſe of God, and brought out the King's Son, and put upon him the Crown, and gave him the Teſtimony, and made him King; whereupon they ſlew Athaliah. And when Ammon was ſlain, 2 Chron. 33. the people of the Land ſlew them that had conſpir'd againſt King Ammon; and the people of the Land made Joſiah his Son King in his ſtead: which had bin moſt impertinent, if he was of himſelf King before they made him ſo. Beſides, tho Infancy may be a juſt cauſe of excepting againſt, and rejecting the next Heir to a Crown, 'tis not the greateſt or ſtrongeſt. 'Tis far more eaſy to find a Remedy againſt the folly of a Child (if the State be well regulated) than the more rooted Vices of grown men. [82] The Engliſh, who willingly receiv'd Henry the Sixth, Edward the Fifth and Sixth, tho Children, reſolutely oppos'd Robert the Norman: And the French, who willingly ſubmitted to Charles the Ninth, Lewis the Thir⯑teenth and Fourteenth in their Infancy, rejected the rude remainders of Meroveus his Race, Charles of Lorrain with his Kindred deſcended from Pepin, Robert Duke of Burgundy with his Deſcendents, and Henry of Navarr, till he had ſatisfy'd the Nobility and People in the point of Reli⯑gion. And tho I do not know that the Letter upon the words, Vae regno Lamb. Leg. Saxon. cujus Rex p [...]er eſt, recited by Lambard, was written by Eleutherius Bi⯑ſhop of Rome; yet the Authority given to it by the Saxons, who made it a Law, is much more to be valu'd than what it could receive from the Writer: And whoever he was, he ſeems rightly to have underſtood So⯑lomon's meaning, who did not look upon him as a Child that wanted years, or was ſuperannuated, but him only who was guilty of Inſolence, Luxury, Folly and Madneſs; and he that ſaid, A wiſe Child was better than an old and fooliſh King, could have no other meaning, unleſs he ſhould ſay, it was worſe to be govern'd by a wiſe Perſon than a Fool; which may agree with the judgment of our Author, but could never enter into the heart of Solomon.

Laſtly, Tho the practice of one or more Nations may indicate what Laws, Covenants or Cuſtoms were in force among them, yet they can⯑not bind others: The diverſity of them proceeds from the variety of mens Judgments, and declares, that the direction of all ſuch Affairs depends up⯑on their own Will; according to which every People for themſelves do form and meaſure the Magiſtracy, and magiſtratical Power; which, as it is directed ſolely for the good, has its exerciſes and extent proportiona⯑ble to the Command of thoſe that inſtitute it; and ſuch Ordinances being good for men, God makes them his own.

SECT. VIII. There is no natural propenſity in Man or Beaſt to Monarchy.

I SEE no reaſon to believe that God did approve the Government of one over many, becauſe he created but one: but to the contrary, in as much he did endow him, and thoſe that came from him, as well the youngeſt as the eldeſt Line, with underſtanding to provide for themſelves, and by the invention of Arts and Sciences to be beneficial to each other; he ſhew'd, that they ought to make uſe of that underſtanding in forming Governments according to their own convenience, and ſuch occaſions as ſhould ariſe, as well as in other matters. And it might as well be infer'd, that it is unlawful for us to build, clothe, arm, defend, or nouriſh our ſelves, otherwiſe than our firſt Parents did, before or ſoon after the Flood, as to take from us the liberty of inſtituting Governments that were not known to them. If they did not find out all that conduces to the uſe of man, but a Faculty as well as a Liberty was left to every one, and will be to the end of the World, to make uſe of his Wit, Induſtry, and Ex⯑perience, according to preſent Exigences, to invent and practiſe ſuch things as ſeem convenient to himſelf and others in matters of the leaſt impor⯑tance; it were abſurd to imagin, that the political Science, which of all [83] others is the moſt abſtruſe and variable according to Accidents and Cir⯑cumſtances, ſhould have bin perfectly known to them who had no uſe of it; and that their Deſcendents are oblig'd to add nothing to what they practis'd. But the reaſon given by our Author to prove this extravagant fancy, is yet more ridiculous than the thing it ſelf; God, ſays he, ſhew'd his opinion, viz. that all ſhould be govern'd by one, when he endow'd not only Men, but Beaſts with a natural propenſity to Monarchy: Neither can it be doubted, but a natural propenſity is refer'd to God who is the Author of Nature: Which I ſuppoſe may appear if it be conſider'd.

Nevertheleſs I cannot but commend him in the firſt place for intro⯑ducing God ſpeaking ſo modeſtly, not declaring his Will, but his Opi⯑nion. He puts haughty and majeſtick Language into the mouth of Kings. They command and decide, as if they were ſubject to no Error, and their Will ought to be taken for perpetual Laws; but to God he aſcribes an humble delivery of his Opinion only, as if he fear'd to be miſtaken. In the ſecond place, I deny that there is any ſuch general propenſity in Man or Beaſt, or that Monarchy would thereby be juſtify'd tho it were found in them. It cannot be in Beaſts, for they know not what Govern⯑ment is; and being uncapable of it, cannot diſtinguiſh the ſeveral ſorts, nor conſequently incline to one more than another. Salmaſius his ſtory of Bees is only fit for old Women to prate of in Chimny-corners; and they who repreſent Lions and Eagles as Kings of Birds and Beaſts, do it only to ſhow, that their Power is nothing but brutiſh Violence, exercis'd in the deſtruction of all that are not able to oppoſe it, and that has nothing of goodneſs or juſtice in it: which Similitude (tho it ſhould prove to be in all reſpects adequate to the matter in queſtion) could only ſhew, that thoſe who have no ſenſe of Right, Reaſon or Religion, have a natural propen⯑ſity to make uſe of their ſtrength to the deſtruction of ſuch as are weake [...] than they; and not that any are willing to ſubmit, or not to reſiſt it if they can; which I think will be of no great advantage to Monarchy. But whatever propenſity may be in Beaſts, it cannot be attributed gene⯑rally to Men; for if it were, they never could have deviated from it, un⯑leſs they were violently put out of their natural courſe; which in this caſe cannot be, for there is no Power to force them. But that they have moſt frequently deviated, appears by the various Forms of Government eſtabliſh'd by them. There is therefore no natural propenſity to any one, but they chuſe that which in their judgment ſeems beſt for them. Or, if he would have that inconſiderate impulſe, by which brutiſh and ignorant men may be ſway'd when they know no better, to paſs for a Propenſity; others are no more oblig'd to follow it, than to live upon Acorns, or inhabit hollow Trees, becauſe their Fathers did it when they had no better dwel⯑lings, and found no better nouriſhment in the uncultivated World. And he that exhibits ſuch Examples, as far as in him lies, endeavours to take from us the uſe of Reaſon, and, extinguiſhing the light of it, to make us live like the worſt of Beaſts, that we may be fit Subjects to abſolute Monarchy. This may perhaps be our Author's intention, having learn'd from Ariſtotle, that ſuch a Government is only ſutable to the nature of the moſt beſtial men, who being uncapable of governing themſelves, fall un⯑der the Power of ſuch as will take the conduct of 'em: But he ought with⯑al to have remember'd, that, according to Ariſtotle's opinion, this Con⯑ductor muſt be in nature different from thoſe he takes the charge of; and if he be not, there can be no Government, nor Order, by which it ſub⯑ſiſts: Beaſts follow Beaſts, and the blind lead the blind to deſtruction.

[84] But tho I ſhould grant this Propenſity to be general, it could not be imputed to God, ſince man by Sin is fallen from the Law of his Creation. The wickedneſs of man (even in the firſt Ages) was great in the World: All the imaginations of his heart are evil, and that continually. All men are liars: There is none that doth good, no not one. Out of the heart proceed evil Thoughts, Murders, Adulterys, Fornications, Thefts, falſe Teſtimonys, &c. Theſe are the Fruits of our corrupted nature, which the Apoſtle obſerving, dos not only make a difference between the natural and the ſpiritual Man, whoſe proceeding only can be refer'd to God, and that on⯑ly ſo far as he is guided by his Spirit; but ſhews, that the natural man is in a perpetual enmity againſt God, without any poſſibility of being re⯑concil'd to him, unleſs by the deſtruction of the old Man, and the rege⯑nerating or renewing him thro the Spirit of Grace. There being no foot⯑ſteps of this in our Author's Book, he and his Maſter Heylin may have differ'd from the Apoſtle, referring that Propenſity of Nature to God, which he declares to be utter enmity againſt him; and we may conclude, that this Propenſity, however general it may be, cannot be attributed to God as the Author of Nature, ſince it cannot be more general than the Corruptions into which we are fallen.

SECT. IX. The Government inſtituted by God over the Iſraelites was Ariſtocratical.

NOtwithſtanding all this, our Author is reſolv'd that Monarchy muſt be from God: What form of Government, ſays he, God ordain'd by his Authority, may be gather'd by that Commonwealth which he inſtituted a⯑mongst the Hebrews; which was not Ariſtocratical, as Calvin ſays, but plainly Monarchical. I may in as few words deny the Government ſet up by God to have bin Monarchical, as he aſſerts it; but finding ſuch Lan⯑guage ordinarily to proceed from a mixture of folly, impudence and pride, I chuſe rather to ſhew upon what I ground my Opinions, than nakedly to deliver them; moſt eſpecially, when by inſiſting upon the Government inſtituted by God over his People, he refers us to the Scripture. And I do this the more boldly, ſince I follow Calvin's Expoſition, and believe that he having bin highly eſteem'd for his Wit, Judgment, and Learning, by ſuch as were endow'd with the like, and reverenc'd as a glorious Ser⯑vant of God, might, if he were now alive, comfort himſelf, tho he had the misfortune to fall under the cenſures of Filmer and his followers. 'Tis probable he gave ſome Reaſons for his Opinions; but our Author having maliciouſly conceal'd 'em, and I not having leaſure at preſent to examin all his Writings to find 'em, muſt content my ſelf with ſuch as my ſmall underſtanding may ſuggeſt, and ſuch as I have found in ap⯑proved Authors.

In the firſt place I may ſafely ſay, he was not alone of that opinion: Joſephus, Philo, and Moſes Maimonides, with all the beſt of the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Authors, had long before deliver'd the ſame. Joſephus [...]o [...]. Ant. Jud.ſays, that Saul's firſt Sin by which he fell, was, that he took away the A⯑riſtocracy; which he could not do if it had never bin eſtabliſh'd. Philo imputes the inſtitution of Kingly Government, as it was in Iſrael, neither [85] to God nor his Word, but to the fury of the ſinful People. Abarbe⯑nel ſays, it proceeded from their delight in the Idolatry to which their Abar. in 1 Sam. 8.Neighbours were addicted, and which could be upheld only by a Go⯑vernment, in practice and principle contrary to that which God had in⯑ſtituted. Maimonides frequently ſays the ſame thing, grounded upon the Maim. More-Nevochim.words of Hoſea, I gave them Kings in my Wrath; and whoſoever will call that a divine Inſtitution, may give the ſame name to Plagues or Fa⯑mines, and induce a neceſſity incumbent upon all men to go and ſearch the one where they may find it, and to leave their Lands for ever unculti⯑vated that they may be ſure of the other: which being too beſtial to be aſſerted by a man, I may ſafely ſay the Hebrew Kings were not inſtituted by God, but given as a puniſhment of their Sin, who deſpis'd the Go⯑vernment he had inſtituted: and the above-mention'd Authors agree in the ſame thing, calling the Peoples deſire to have a King, furious, mad, wicked, and proceeding from their love to the Idolatry of their Neigh⯑bours, which was ſuted to their Government; both which were inconſi⯑ſtent with what God had eſtabliſh'd over his own People.

But waving the opinions of men, 'tis good to ſee what we can learn from the Scripture, and inquire if there be any Precept there expreſly commanding them to make a King; or any Example that they did ſo whilſt they continu'd obedient to the Word of God; or any thing from whence we may reaſonably infer they ought to have done it: all which, if I miſtake not, will be found directly contrary.

The only Precept that we find in the Law concerning Kings, is that of Deut. 17. already mention'd; and that is not a Command to the People to make, but Inſtructions what manner of King they ſhould make if they deſir'd to have one: There was therefore none at all.

Examples do as little favour our Author's Aſſertions. Moſes, Joſhua, and the other Judges, had not the name or power of Kings: They were not of the Tribe to which the Scepter was promis'd: They did not tranſ⯑mit the Power they had to their Children, which in our Adverſary's opi⯑nion is a Right inſeparable from Kings; and their Power was not conti⯑nu'd by any kind of Succeſſion, but created occaſionally, as need requir'd, according to the Vertues diſcover'd in thoſe who were rais'd by God to deliver the Nation in the time of their diſtreſs; which being done, their Children lay hid among the reſt of the People. Thus were Ehud, Gide⯑on, Jephtha, and others ſet up: Whoſoever will give battel (ſay the Prin⯑ces Judg. 1 [...].and People of Gilead) to the Children of Ammon, ſhall be head over the Inheritance of Gilead: and finding Jephtha to be ſuch a man as they ſought, they made him their Chief, and all Iſrael follow'd them. When Othniel had ſhew'd his Valour in taking Kiriath Sepher, and delivering his Bre⯑thren from Cuſhan-Riſhathaim, he was made Judg: When Ehud had kill'd Eglon; when Shamgar and Samſon had deſtroy'd great numbers of the Philiſtins; and when Gideon had defeated the Midianites, they were ſit to be advanc'd above their Brethren. Theſe Dignitys were not inhe⯑rent in their Perſons or Familys, but confer'd upon them; nor confer'd, that they might be exalted in Riches and Glory, but that they might be Miniſters of Good to the People. This may juſtify Plato's opini⯑on, that if one man be found incomparably to excel all others in the Vertues that are beneficial to Civil Societys, he ought to be advanc'd a⯑bove all: but I think it will be hard from thence to deduce an Argument in favour of ſuch a Monarchy as is neceſſarily to deſcend to the next in Blood, whether Man, Woman, or Child, without any conſideration of [86] Vertue, Age, Sex, or Ability; and that failing, it can be of no uſe to our Author. But whatever the dignity of a Hebrew Judg was, and how⯑ſoever he was rais'd to that Office, it certainly differ'd from that of a King. Gideon could not have refus'd to be a King when the People would have made him ſo, if he had bin a King already; or that God from the beginning had appointed they ſhould have one: The Elders and People 1 Sam. 8.could not have ask'd a King of Samuel, if he had bin King; and he could not without impiety have bin diſpleas'd with them for asking ſuch a one as God had appointed; neither would God have ſaid to him, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I ſhould not reign over them, if he had ordain'd what they deſir'd.

They did not indeed reject God with their Mouths: They pretended to uſe the liberty he had given them to make a King; but would have ſuch a one as he had forbidden: They drew near to him with their Lips, but their Hearts were far from him; and he ſeeing their Hypocriſy, ſe⯑verely chaſtis'd 'em in granting their ill conceiv'd requeſt; and foretold the Miſerys that ſhould thereupon befal 'em, from which he would not deliver 'em, tho they ſhould cry to him by reaſon of what they ſuf⯑fer'd from their King▪ He was their Creature, and the miſchiefs thereby brought upon them were the fruits of their own labour.

This is that which our Author calls God's inſtitution of Kings; but the Hoſ. 13.Prophet explains the matter much better, I gave them Kings in my anger, and took them away in my wrath: in deſtroying them God brought deſolati⯑on upon the people that had ſinn'd in asking for them, and following their example in all kind of Wickedneſs. This is all that our Author has to boaſt of: but God who acknowledges thoſe works only to be his own, which proceed from his goodneſs and mercy to his People, diſowns this; Hoſ. 8. Iſrael hath caſt off the thing that is good (even the Government that he had eſtabliſh'd) the Enemy ſhall purſue him: They have ſet up Kings, but not by me; and Princes, but I know them not. As if he ſought to juſtify the ſeverity of his Judgments brought upon them by the wickedneſs of their Kings, that they, not he, had ordain'd.

Having ſeen what Government God did not ordain, it may be ſeaſona⯑ble to examin the Nature of the Government which he did ordain; and we ſhall eaſily find that it conſiſted of three parts, beſides the Magiſtrats of the ſeveral Tribes and Citys. They had a chief Magiſtrat, who was Numb. 11.call'd Judg or Captain, as Joſhua, Gideon, and others; a Council of ſe⯑venty choſen men; and the General Aſſemblys of the People.

The firſt was merely occaſional, like to the Dictators of Rome: and as the Romans in times of danger frequently choſe ſuch a Man as was much eſteem'd for Valour and Wiſdom, God's peculiar People had a peculiar re⯑gard to that Wiſdom and Valour which was accompanied with his Pre⯑ſence, hoping for deliverance only from him.

The ſecond is known by the name of the Great Sanhedrin, which be⯑ing inſtituted by Moſes according to the command of God, continu'd, till they were all ſave one ſlain by Herod. And the third part, which is the Aſſembly of the People, was ſo common, that none can be ignorant of it, but ſuch as never look'd into the Scripture. When the Tribes of Reu⯑ben, Gad, and half that of Manaſſeh had built an Altar on the ſide of Jor⯑dan, Joſh. 22. The whole Congregation of the Children of Iſrael gather'd together at Shiloh to go up to war againſt them, and ſent Phineas the Son of Eleazer, and with him ten Princes, &c. This was the higheſt and moſt important action that could concern a People, even War or Peace, and that not [87] with Strangers, but their own Brethren. Joſhua was then alive: The Elders never fail'd: yet this was not tranſacted by him or them, but by the collected body of the People; for They ſent Phineas. This Demo⯑cratical Embaſſy was Democratically receiv'd: It was not directed to one Man, but to all the Children of Reuben, Gad, and Manaſſeh, and the Anſwer was ſent by them all; which being pleaſing to Phineas, and the ten that were with him, they made their report to the Congregation, and all was quiet.

The laſt eminent Act perform'd by Joſhua was the calling of a like Aſ⯑ſembly to Shechem, compos'd of Elders, Heads of Familys, Judges, Of⯑ficers, Joſ. 24.and all the People, to whom he propos'd, and they agreeing made a Covenant before the Lord.

Joſhua being dead, the Proceedings of every Tribe were grounded up⯑on Counſels taken at ſuch Aſſemblys among themſelves for their own concerns, as appears by the Actions of Judah, Simeon, &c. againſt the Canaanites; and when the Levite complain'd that his Wife had bin forc'd Judg. 1.by thoſe of Gibeah, the whole Congregation of Iſrael met together at Miſpeth from all parts, even from Dan to Beerſheba, as one man, and there reſolv'd upon that terrible War which they made againſt the Tribe of Benjamin. The like Aſſembly was gather'd together for the election of Saul, every man was there: and tho the Elders only are ſaid to have ask'd a King of Samuel, they ſeem to have bin deputed from the whole Congregation; for God ſaid, Hearken to the Voice of the People. In the 1 Sam. 8. 7.ſame manner the Tribe of Judah, and after that the reſt, choſe and a⯑nointed David to be their King. After the death of Solomon all Iſrael met together to treat with Rehoboam; and not receiving ſatisfaction from him, ten of the Tribes abrogated his Kingdom.

If theſe Actions were conſider'd ſingly by themſelves, Calvin might have given the name of a Democracy to the Hebrew Government, as well as to that of Athens; for without doubt they evidently manifeſt the ſu⯑preme Power to have bin in the ſupreme manner in theſe General Aſſem⯑blys: but the Government (as to its outward order) conſiſting of thoſe three parts, which comprehend the three ſimple ſpecies; and no times having bin appointed, nor occaſions ſpecify'd, upon which Judges ſhould be choſen, or theſe Aſſemblys call'd, whereas the Sanhedrim, which was the Ariſtocratical part, was permanent; the whole might rightly be call'd an Ariſtocracy, that part prevailing above the others: and tho Jo⯑ſephus calls it a Theocracy, by reaſon of God's preſence with his People; yet in relation to man he calls it an Ariſtocracy, and ſays that Saul's firſt Sin by which he fell from the Kingdom was, that Gubernationem optimatum ſuſtulit; which could not be, if they were govern'd by a Monarch before he was choſen.

Our Author taking no notice of theſe matters, firſt endeavours to prove the excellency of Monarchy from natural inſtinct; and then begging the queſtion, ſays, that God did always govern his People by Monarchy: whereas he ought in the firſt place to have obſerv'd that this inſtinct (if there be any ſuch thing) is only an irrational appetite, attributed to Beaſts, that know not why they do any thing; and is to be follow'd only by thoſe men who being equally irrational, live in the ſame igno⯑rance: and the ſecond being prov'd to be abſolutely falſe by the ex⯑preſs words of the Scripture, There was then no King in Iſrael, ſeve⯑ral Judg. 18.times repeated, and the whole ſeries of the Hiſtory, he has no other evaſion than to ſay, That even then the Iſraelites were under the [88] Kingly Government of the Fathers of particular Familys.

It appears by the foremention'd Text cited alſo by our Author, that in the Aſſembly of the People, gather'd together to take counſel concerning the War againſt Benjamin, were four hundred thouſand Footmen that drew Sword: They all aroſe together, ſaying, Not a man of us ſhall go to his Tent. So all the men of Iſrael were gather'd together againſt the City. This is repeated ſeveral times in the relation. The Benjamites proceeded in the like manner in preparing for their defence; and if all theſe who did ſo meet to conſult and determin were Monarchs, there were then in Iſrael and Benjamin four hundred twenty ſix thouſand ſeven hundred Monarchs or Kings, tho the Scripture ſays there was not one.

If yet our Author inſiſts upon his notion of Kingly Government, I de⯑ſire to know who were the Subjects, if all theſe were Kings; for the Text ſays, that the whole Congregation was gather'd together as one man from Dan to Beerſheba. If there can be ſo many Kings without one Subject, what becomes of the Right of Abraham, Iſaac and Jacob, that was to have bin devolv'd upon one Man as Heir to them, and thereby Lord of all? If e⯑very man had an equal part in that inheritance, and by virtue of it be⯑came a King, why is not the ſame eternally ſubdivided to as many men as are in the World, who are alſo Kings? If this be their natural condi⯑tion, how comes it to be alter'd, till they dethrone themſelves by conſent, to ſet up one or more to have a power over them all? Why ſhould they deveſt themſelves of their natural Right to ſet up one above them⯑ſelves, unleſs in conſideration of their own good? If the 426700 Kings might retain the power in themſelves, or give it to one, why might they not give it to any ſuch number of men as ſhould beſt pleaſe themſelves, or retain it in their own hands, as they did till the days of Saul; or frame, limit, and direct it according to their own pleaſure? If this be true, God is the Author of Democracy; and no aſſertor of human Li⯑berty did ever claim more than the People of God did enjoy and exerciſe at the time when our Author ſays they were under the Kingly Govern⯑ment; which Liberty being not granted by any peculiar conceſſion or in⯑ſtitution, the ſame muſt belong to all Mankind.

'Tis in vain to ſay the 426700 men were heads of Familys; for the Scripture only ſays, They were Footmen that drew the Sword, or rather all the men of Iſrael from Dan to Beerſheba, who were able to make War. When ſix hundred Benjamites did only remain of the 26700, 'tis plain that no more were left of that Tribe, their Women and Children having bin deſtroy'd in the Citys after their defeat. The next Chapter makes the matter yet more plain; for when all that were at the Congregation in Miſpeth were found to have ſworn, they would not give their Daughters to any of the Tribe of Benjamin, no Iſraelite was free from the Oath, but J [...]dg. [...]1.the men of Jabeſh Gilead, who had not bin at the Aſſembly: All the reſt of Iſrael was therefore comprehended; and they continuing to govern in a popular way with abſolute power, ſent twelve thouſand of their moſt valiant men to deſtroy all the Males of Jabeſh Gilead, and the Women that had lain by Man, reſerving the Virgins for the Benjamites. This is enough for my purpoſe: for the queſtion is not concerning the power that every Houſholder in London has over his Wife, Children and Servants; but whether they are all perpetually ſubject to one man and Family; and I intend not to ſet up their Wives, Prentices, and Children againſt them, or to diminiſh their Rights, but to aſſert them, as the gift of God and Nature, no otherwiſe to be reſtrain'd than by Laws made with their own conſent.

[89] Reaſon failing, our Author pleaſes himſelf with terms of his own In⯑vention: When the People beg'd a King of Samuel, they were govern'd by a Kingly power: God out of a ſpecial love and care to the Houſe of Iſrael, did chuſe to be their King himſelf, and did govern them at that time by his Vice⯑roy Samuel and his Sons. The behaviour of the Iſraelites towards Samuel has bin thought proud, perverſe, and obſtinate; but the fine Court-word begging was never before apply'd to them; and their inſolent fury was not only ſeen againſt Samuel, but again&;st God; They have not rejected thee, 1 Sam. 8. but they have rejected me. And I think Filmer is the firſt who ever found that Beggars in begging did reject him of whom they beg'd: Or if they were Beggars, they were ſuch as would not be denied; for after all that Samuel had ſaid to diſſuade them from their wicked deſign, they ſaid, Nay, but we will have a King. Ver. 19.

But leſt I ſhould be thought too much inclin'd to contradict our Au⯑thor, I confeſs that once he has happen'd to be in the right. God out of a ſpecial love to the Houſe of Iſrael choſe to be their King: He gave them Laws, preſcrib'd a Form of Government, rais'd up Men in a wonderful man⯑ner to execute it, fill'd them with his Spirit, was ever preſent when they call'd up⯑on him: He gave them counſel in their doubts, and aſſistance in all their ex⯑tremitys: He made a Covenant with them, and would be exalted by them. But what is this to an earthly Monarch? Who can from hence derive a Right to any one man to play the Lord over his Brethren, or a reaſon why any Nation ſhould ſet him up? God is our Lord by right of creation, and our only Lord, becauſe he only has created us. If any other were equal to him in Wiſdom, Power, Goodneſs, and Beneficence to us, he might challenge the ſame duty from us. If growing out of our ſelves, re⯑ceiving being from none, depending on no providence, we were offer'd the protection of a Wiſdom ſubject to no error, a Goodneſs that could never fail, and a Power that nothing could reſiſt; it were reaſonable for us to enter into a Covenant, ſubmit our ſelves to him, and with all the facultys of our minds to addict our ſelves to his Service. But what Right can from hence accrue to a mortal Creature like to one of us, from whom we have receiv'd nothing, and who ſtands in need of help as much as we? Who can from hence deduce an argument to perſuade us to depend upon his Wiſdom, who has as little as other men? To ſubmit to his Will who is ſubject to the ſame Frailtys, Paſſions, and Vices with the reſt of Mankind? Or to expect protection and defence from him whoſe life depends upon as ſlender threds as our own; and who can have no power but that which we confer upon him? If this cannot be done, but is of all things the moſt contrary to common ſenſe, no man can in himſelf have any right over us; we are all as free as the four hundred twenty ſix thouſand ſeven hundred Hebrew Kings: We can naturally owe allegiance to none; and I doubt whether all the luſts that have reign'd amongſt Men ſince the beginning of the World, have brought more guilt and miſery upon them than that prepoſterous and impudent pretence of imitating what God had inſtituted. When Saul ſet himſelf moſt violently to oppoſe the command of God, he pretended to fulfil it: When the Jews grew weary of God's Government, and reſolv'd to re⯑ject him, that he ſhould not reign over them, they us'd ſome of Moſes his words, and ask'd that King of God, whom they intended to ſet up againſt him: But this King had not bin ſet up againſt God, the People had not rejected God, and ſin'd in asking for him, if every Nation by a general Law ought to have one, or by a particular Law one had bin [90] appointed by him over them. There was therefore no King amongſt them, nor any Law of God or Nature, particular or general, according to which they ought to have one.

SECT. X. Ariſtotle was not ſimply for Monarchy or againſt Popular Govern⯑ment; but approv'd or diſapprov'd of either according to circum⯑ſtances.

OUR Author well obſerves that Ariſtotle is hardly brought to give a general opinion in favour of Monarchy, as if it were the beſt form of Government, or to ſay true, never dos it. He uſes much caution, propoſes conditions and limitations, and makes no deciſion but accord⯑ing to circumſtances. Men of Wiſdom and Learning are ſubject to ſuch doubts; but none ought to wonder if ſtupidity and ignorance defend Fil⯑mer and his Followers from them; or that their hatred to the antient Vertue ſhould give 'em an averſion to the Learning that was the Nurſe of it. Thoſe who neither underſtand the ſeveral Species of Government, nor the various Tempers of Nations, may without fear or ſhame give their opinions in favour of that which beſt pleaſes them; but wiſe men will always proportion their praiſes to the merit of the Subject, and never commend that ſimply which is good only according to circumſtances. Ariſtotle highly applauds Monarchy, when the Monarch has more of thoſe Vertues that tend to the good of a Commonwealth, than all they who compoſe it. This is the King mention'd in his Ethicks, and extol'd in his Politicks: He is above all by Nature, and ought not by a muni⯑cipal Law to be made equal to others in Power: He ought to go⯑vern, becauſe 'tis better for a People to be govern'd by him, than to enjoy their Liberty; or rather, they do enjoy their Liberty, which is never more ſafe, than when defended by one who is a liv⯑ing Law to himſelf and others. Whereſoever ſuch a man appears, he ought to reign: He bears in his Perſon the Divine Character of a Sove⯑reign: God has rais'd him above all; and ſuch as will not ſubmit to him, ought to be accounted Sons of Belial, brought forth and ſlain. But he dos withal confeſs, that if no ſuch man be found, there is no natural King: All the Prerogatives belonging to him vaniſh, for want of one who is capable of enjoying them. He lays ſevere Cenſures upon thoſe who not being thus qualified take upon them to govern men, equal to or better than themſelves; and judges the aſſumption of ſuch Powers by perſons not naturally adapted to the adminiſtration of them, as barbarous Uſurpations, which no Law or Reaſon can juſtify; and is not ſo much tranſported with the excellency of this true King, as not to A [...]t. [...]o [...]t. [...]confeſs he ought to be limited by Law: Qui legem praeeſſe jubet, videtur jubere praeeſſe Deum & Leges: qui autem hominem praeeſſe jubet, adjungit & beſtiam; libido quippe talis eſt, atque obliquos agit, etiam viros optimos qui ſunt in pot [...]ſtate, ex quo mens atque appetitus Lex eſt. This agrees with the words of the beſt King that is known to have bin in the world, pro⯑ceeding, as is moſt probable, from a ſenſe of the Paſſions that reign'd in his own breaſt; Man being in honour, has no underſtanding, but is like to the beaſt that periſhes. This ſhews that ſuch as deny that Kings do reign [91] by Law, or that Laws may be put upon Kings, do equally ſet themſelves againſt the opinions of wiſe Men, and the Word of God: and our Au⯑thor having found that Learning made the Grecians ſeditious, may reaſo⯑nably doubt that Religion may make others worſe; ſo as none will be fit Subjects of his applauded Government, but thoſe who have neither Religion nor Learning; and that it cannot be introduc'd till both be ex⯑tinguiſh'd.

Ariſtotle having declar'd his mind concerning Government, in the Books expreſly written on that Subject, whatſoever is ſaid by the by in his Moral Diſcourſes, muſt be refer'd to and interpreted by the other: And if he ſaid (which I do not find) that Monarchy is the beſt Form of Government, and a Popular State the worſt, he cannot be thought to have meant otherwiſe, than that thoſe Nations were the moſt happy, who had ſuch a Man as he thinks fit to be made a Monarch; and thoſe the moſt unhappy, who neither had ſuch a one, nor a few, that any way excel'd the reſt; but all being equally brutiſh, muſt take upon 'em the Government they were unable to manage: for he dos no where admit any other end of Juſt and Civil Government, than the good of the Governed; nor any advantage due to one or a few perſons, unleſs for ſuch Vertues as conduce to the common good of the Society. And as our Author thinks Learning makes men ſeditious, Ariſtotle alſo acknow⯑ledges, that thoſe who have Underſtanding and Courage, which may be taken for Learning, or the effect of it, will never endure the Govern⯑ment of one or a few that do not excel them in Vertue: but no where diſpraiſes a Popular Government, unleſs the Multitude be compos'd of ſuch as are barbarous, ſtupid, leud, vicious, and uncapable of the Hap⯑pineſs for which Governments are inſtituted; who cannot live to them⯑ſelves, but like a herd of Beaſts muſt be brought under the dominion of another; or who, having among themſelves ſuch an excellent Perſon as is above deſcrib'd, will not ſubmit to him, but either kill, baniſh, or bring him to be equal with others, whom God had made to excel all. I do not trouble my ſelf, or the Reader, with citing here and there a Line out of his Books, but refer my ſelf to thoſe who have perus'd his Moral and Political Writings, ſubmitting to the ſevereſt Cenſures, if this be not the true Senſe of 'em; and that Vertue alone, in his opinion, ought to give the preheminence. And as Ariſtotle following the wiſe Men of thoſe times, ſhews us how far Reaſon, improv'd by Meditation, can advance in the knowledge and love of that which is truly good; ſo we may in Filmer guided by Heylin, ſee an Example of corrupted Chriſtians, who extingui⯑ſhing the Light of Religion by their Vices, and degenerating into Beaſts (whilſt they endeavour to ſupport the perſonal Intereſt of ſome men, who are rais'd to Dignitys by the conſent of Nations, or by unwarran⯑table ways and means) would caſt all the Power into the hands of ſuch as happen to be born in certain Familys; as if Governments had not bin inſtituted for the common good of Nations, but only to increaſe their Pride, and foment their Vices; or that the care and direction of a great People were ſo eaſy a work, that every Man, Woman, or Child, how young, weak, fooliſh or wicked ſoever, may be worthy of it, and able to manage it.

SECT. XI. Liberty produces Vertue, Order and Stability: Slavery is accompanied with Vice, Weakneſs and Miſery.

OUR Author's judgment, as well as inclinations to Vertue, are ma⯑nifeſted in the preference he gives to the manners of the Aſſyrians and other Eaſtern Nations, before the Grecians and Romans: Whereas the firſt were never remarkable for any thing, but Pride, Leudneſs, Treachery, Cruelty, Cowardice, Madneſs, and hatred to all that is good; whilſt the others excel'd in Wiſdom, Valour, and all the Vertues that deſerve imitation. This was ſo well obſerv'd by St. Auguſtin, that De Civ. Dei.he brings no ſtronger Argument to prove, that God leaves nothing that is good in man unrewarded, than that he gave the dominion of the beſt part of the World to the Romans, who in moral Vertues excel'd all other Na⯑tions. And I think no Example can be alledg'd of a Free People that has ever bin conquer'd by an Abſolute Monarch, unleſs he did incomparably ſurpaſs them in Riches and Strength; whereas many great Kings have bin overthrown by ſmall Republicks: and the ſucceſs being conſtantly the ſame, it cannot be attributed to Fortune, but muſt neceſſarily be the pro⯑duction of Vertue and good Order. Machiavel diſcourſing of theſe mat⯑ters, finds Vertue to be ſo eſſentially neceſſary to the eſtabliſhment and preſervation of Liberty, that he thinks it impoſſible for a corrupted Peo⯑ple to ſet up a good Government, or for a Tyranny to be introduc'd if they be vertuous; and makes this ^*Concluſion, That where the Matter (that is, the body of the People) is not corrupted, Tumults and Diſorders do no hurt; and where it is corrupted, good Laws do no good: Which being confirm'd by Reaſon and Experience, I think no wiſe man has ever con⯑tradicted him.

But I do not more wonder that Filmer ſhould look upon Abſolute Mo⯑narchy to be the Nurſe of Vertue, tho we ſee they did never ſubſiſt toge⯑ther, than that he ſhould attribute Order and Stability to it; whereas Order principally conſiſts in appointing to every one his right Place, Of⯑fice or Work; and he lays the whole weight of the Government upon one Perſon, who very often dos neither deſerve, nor is able to bear the leaſt part of it. Plato, Ariſtotle, Hooker, and (I may ſay in ſhort) all wiſe men have held, that Order requir'd that the wiſeſt, beſt, and moſt valiant ſhould be plac'd in the Offices where Wiſdom, Vertue and Va⯑lour are requiſit. If common ſenſe did not teach us this, we might learn it from the Scripture. When God gave the conduct of his People to Moſes, Joſhua, Samuel, and others, he endow'd them with all the Ver⯑tues and Graces requir'd for the right performance of their Duty. When the Iſraelites were oppreſt by the Midianites, Philiſtins and Ammonites, they expected help from the moſt viſe and valiant. When Hannibal was at the Gates of Rome, and had fill'd Italy with Fire and Blood; or when the Gauls overwhelm'd that Country with their multitudes and fury, the Senat and People of Rome put themſelves under the conduct of Ca⯑millus, [93] Manlius, Fabius, Scipio, and the like; and when they fail'd to chuſe ſuch as were fit for the work to be done, they receiv'd ſuch defeats as convinc'd 'em of their Error. But if our Author ſay true, Order re⯑quir'd that the Power of defending the Country ſhould have bin annex'd as an Inheritance to one Family, or left to him that could get it, and the exerciſe of all Authority committed to the next in Blood, tho the weakeſt of Women, or the baſeſt of Men.

The like may be ſaid of judging, or doing of Juſtice; and 'tis abſurd to pretend that either is expected from the Power, not the Perſon of the Monarch; for experience dos too well ſhew how much all things halt in relation to Juſtice or Defence, when there is a defect in him that ought to judg us, and to fight our Battels. But of all things this ought leaſt to be alledg'd by the Advocats for abſolute Monarchy, who deny that the Authority can be ſeparated from the Perſon, and lay it as a fundamental Principle, that whoſoever has it may do what he pleaſes, and be accoun⯑table to no man.

Our Author's next work is to ſhew, that Stability is the effect of this good Order; but he ought to have known, that Stability is then only worthy of praiſe, when it is in that which is good. No man delights in ſickneſs or pain, becauſe it is long, or incurable; nor in ſlavery and miſery, becauſe it is perpetual: much leſs will any man in his ſenſes com⯑mend a permanency in vice and wickedneſs. He muſt therefore prove, that the Stability he boaſts of is in things that are good, or all that he ſays of it ſignifies nothing.

I might leave him here with as little fear, that any man who ſhall e⯑ſpouſe his Quarrel, will ever be able to remove this Obſtacle, as that he himſelf ſhould riſe out of his Grave and do it. But I hope to prove, that of all things under the Sun, there is none more mutable or unſtable than abſolute Monarchy; which is all that I diſpute againſt, profeſſing much veneration for that which is mix'd, regulated by Law, and directed to the Publick Good.

This might be prov'd by many Arguments, but I ſhall confine my ſelf to two; the one drawn from Reaſon, the other from matters of Fact.

Nothing can be call'd ſtable, that is not ſo in Principle and Practice, in which reſpect human Nature is not well capable of Stability; but the ut⯑moſt deviation from it that can be imagin'd, is, when ſuch an Error is laid for a Foundation as can never be corrected. All will confeſs, that if there be any ſtability in man, it muſt be in Wiſdom and Vertue, and in thoſe Actions that are thereby directed; for in weakneſs, folly and mad⯑neſs, there can be none. The Stability therefore that we ſeek, in rela⯑tion to the exerciſe of Civil and Military Powers, can never be found, unleſs care be taken that ſuch as exerciſe thoſe Powers, be endow'd with the Qualitys that ſhould make them ſtable. This is utterly repugnant to our Author's Doctrin: He lays for a Foundation, That the Succeſſion goes to the next in Blood, without diſtinction of Age, Sex, or perſonal Qualitys; whereas even he himſelf could not have the impudence to ſay, that Children, and Women (where they are admitted) or Fools, Mad⯑men, and ſuch as are full of all wickedneſs, do not come to be the Heirs of reigning Familys, as well as of the meaneſt. The Stability therefore that can be expected from ſuch a Government, either depends upon thoſe who have none in themſelves, or is refer'd wholly to Chance, which is directly oppoſite to Stability.

[94] This would be the caſe, tho it were (as we ſay) an even Wager, whether the Perſon would be fit or unfit, and that there were as many men in the world able, as unable to perform the Duty of a King; but Experience ſhewing that among many millions of men, there is hardly one that poſſeſſes the Qualitys requir'd in a King, 'tis ſo many to one, that he upon whom the Lot ſhall fall, will not be the man we ſeek, in whoſe Perſon and Government there can be ſuch a ſtability as is aſſerted. And that failing, all muſt neceſſarily fail; for there can be no ſtability in his Will, Laws or Actions, who has none in his Perſon.

That we may ſee whether this be verify'd by Experience, we need not ſearch into the dark relations of the Babylonian and Aſſyrian Monarchys: Thoſe rude Ages afford us little inſtruction; and tho the fragments of Hiſtory remaining do ſufficiently ſhow, that all things there were in per⯑petual fluctuation, by reaſon of the madneſs of their Kings, and the vio⯑lence of thoſe who tranſported the Empire from one Place or Family to another, I will not much rely upon them, but ſlightly touching ſome of their Storys, paſs to thoſe that are better known to us.

The Kings of thoſe Ages ſeem to have liv'd rather like Beaſts in a Fo⯑reſt, than Men join'd in Civil Society: they follow'd the Example of Nimrod the mighty Hunter; Force was the only Law that prevail'd, the ſtronger devour'd the weaker, and continu'd in Power till ejected by one of more ſtrength or better fortune. By this means the race of Ninus was deſtroy'd by Belochus: Arbaces rent the Kingdom aſunder, and took Media to himſelf: Morodach extinguiſh'd the Race of Belochus, and was made King: Nabuchodonoſor like a Flood overwhelm'd all for a time, deſtroy'd the Kingdoms of Jeruſalem and Egypt, with many others, and found no obſtacle, till his rage and pride turn'd to a moſt beſtial madneſs: And the Aſſyrian Empire was wholly aboliſh'd at the death of his Grand⯑child Belſhazzar; and no Stability can be found in the reigns of thoſe great Kings, unleſs that name be given to the Pride, Idolatry, Cruelty, and Wickedneſs in which they remain'd conſtant. If we examin matters more diſtinctly, we ſhall find that all things vari'd according to the hu⯑mour of the Prince. Whilſt Pharaoh liv'd, who had receiv'd many ſig⯑nal Services from Joſeph, the Iſraelites were well us'd: but when another roſe up who knew him not, they were perſecuted with all the extremitys of Injuſtice and Cruelty, till the furious King perſiſting in his deſign of exterminating them, brought deſtruction upon himſelf and the Nation. Where the like Power has prevail'd, it has ever produc'd the like effects. When ſome great men of Perſia had perſuaded Darius, that it was a fine thing to command that no man for the ſpace of thirty days ſhould make any Petition to God or Man, but to the King only, Daniel the moſt wiſe and holy Man then in the world muſt be thrown to the Lions. When God [...] [...].had miraculouſly ſav'd him, the ſame Sentence was paſs'd againſt the Princes of the Nation. When Haman had fill'd Ahaſuerus his ears with Lies, all the Jews were appointed to be ſlain; and when the fraud of that Villain was detected, leave was given them, with the like precipitancy, to kill whom they pleas'd. When the Iſraelites came to have Kings, they were ſubject to the ſame Storms, and always with their Blood ſuffer'd the Penalty of their Princes madneſs. When one kind of Fury poſſeſt Saul, he ſlew the Prieſts, perſecuted David, and would have kill'd his brave Son Jonathan: When he fell under another, he took upon him to do the Prieſt's Office, pretended to underſtand the Word of God better than Samuel, and ſpar'd thoſe that God had commanded him to deſtroy: [95] Upon another whimſy he kill'd the Gibeonites, and never reſted from finding new Inventions to vex the People, till he had brought many thou⯑ſands of them to periſh with himſelf and his Sons on Mount Gilboa. We do not find any King, in Wiſdom, Valour and Holineſs, equal to Da⯑vid; and yet he falling under the temptations that attend the greateſt Fortunes, brought Civil Wars and a Plague upon the Nation. When Solomon's heart was drawn away by ſtrange Women, he fill'd the Land with Idols, and oppreſt the People with intolerable Tributes. Rehobo⯑am's Folly made that Rent in the Kingdom which could never be made up. Under his Succeſſors the people ſerv'd God, Baal or Aſhtaroth, as beſt pleas'd him who had the Power; and no other marks of Stability can be alledg'd to have bin in that Kingdom, than the conſtancy of their Kings in the practice of Idolatry, their cruelty to the Prophets, hatred to the Jews, and civil Wars producing ſuch Slaughters as are reported in few other Storys: The Kingdom was in the ſpace of about two hundred years poſſeſt by nine ſeveral Familys, not one of 'em getting poſſeſſion otherwiſe than by the ſlaughter of his Predeceſſor, and the extinction of his Race; and ended in the Bondage of the ten Tribes, which continues to this day.

He that deſires farther proofs of this Point, may ſeek 'em in the Hiſto⯑rys of Alexander of Macedon, and his Succeſſors: He ſeems to have bin endow'd with all the Vertues that Nature improv'd by Diſciplin did ever attain, ſo that he is believ'd to be the man meant by Ariſtotle, who on account of the excellency of his Vertues was by Nature fram'd for a King; and Plutarch aſcribes his Conqueſts rather to thoſe, than to his Fortune. Plut. in Vic. Alex.But even that Vertue was overthrown by the Succeſſes that accompanied it: He burnt the moſt magnificent Palace of the world in a frolick, to pleaſe a mad drunken Whore: Upon the moſt frivolous ſuggeſtions of Eunuchs and Raſcals, he kill'd the beſt and braveſt of his Friends; and his Valour, which had no equal, not ſubſiſting without his other Ver⯑tues, periſh'd when he became leud, proud, cruel and ſuperſtitious; ſo as it may be truly ſaid, he died a Coward. His Succeſſors did not differ from him: When they had kill'd his Mother, Wife and Children, they exercis'd their fury againſt one another; and tearing the Kingdom to pieces, the Survivors left the Sword as an Inheritance to their Familys, who periſh'd by it, or under the weight of the Roman Chains.

When the Romans had loſt that Liberty which had bin the Nurſe of their Vertue, and gain'd the Empire in lieu of it, they attain'd to our Author's applauded Stability. Julius being ſlain in the Senat, the firſt Queſtion was, whether it could be reſtor'd, or not? And that being de⯑cided by the Battel of Philippi, the Conquerors ſet themſelves to deſtroy all the eminent men in the City, as the beſt means to eſtabliſh the Mo⯑narchy. Auguſtus gain'd it by the death of Antonius, and the corruption of the Soldiers; and he dying naturally, or by the fraud of his Wife, the Empire was transfer'd to her Son Tiberius; under whom the mi⯑ſerable People ſuffer'd the worſt effects of the moſt impure Luſt and inhuman Cruelty: He being ſtifled the Government went on with much uniformity and ſtability; Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius regularly and conſtantly did all the miſchief they could, and were not more like to each other in the Villanys they committed, than in the Deaths they ſuffer'd. Veſpaſian's more gentle Reign did no way com⯑penſate the Blood he ſpilt to attain the Empire: And the Benefits receiv'd from Titus his ſhort liv'd Vertue, were infinitly overbalanc'd by the de⯑teſtable [96] Vices of his Brother Domitian, who turn'd all things into the old Channel of Cruelty, Luſt, Rapine and Perfidiouſneſs. His ſlaugh⯑ter gave a little breath to the gaſping periſhing World; and men might be vertuous under the Government of Nerva, Trajan, Antoninus, Aure⯑lius, and a few more; tho even in their time Religion was always dange⯑rous. But when the Power fell into the hands of Commodus, Heliogaba⯑lus, Caracalla, and others of that ſort, nothing was ſafe but obſcurity, or the utmoſt exceſſes of leudneſs and baſeneſs. However, whilſt the Will of the Governor paſs'd for a Law, and the Power did uſually fall into the hands of ſuch as were moſt bold and violent, the utmoſt ſecurity that any man could have for his Perſon or Eſtate, depended upon his temper; and Princes themſelves, whether good or bad, had no longer Leaſes of their lives, than the furious and corrupted Soldiers would give them; and the Empire of the World was changeable, according to the Succeſs of a Battel.

Matters were not much mended when the Emperors became Chriſti⯑ans: Some favour'd thoſe who were call'd Orthodox, and gave great Re⯑venues to corrupt the Clergy. Others ſupported Arianiſm, and perſecu⯑ted the Orthodox with as much aſperity as the Pagans had done. Some revolted, and ſhew'd themſelves more fierce againſt the profeſſors of Chriſtianity, than they that had never had any knowledg of it. The World was torn in pieces amongſt them, and often ſuffer'd as great miſe⯑rys by their ſloth, ignorance and co wardice, as by their fury and mad⯑neſs, till the Empire was totally diſſolv'd and loſt. That which under the weakneſs and irregularity of a popular Government, had conquer'd all from the Euphrates to Britain, and deſtroy'd the Kingdoms of Aſia, E⯑gypt, Macedon, Numidia, and a multitude of others, was made a Prey to unknown barbarous Nations, and rent into as many pieces as it had bin compos'd of, when it enjoy'd the Stability that accompanys Divine and Abſolute Monarchy.

The like may be ſaid of all the Kingdoms in the World: they may have their ebbings and flowings according to the Vertues or Vices of Prin⯑ces or their Favorites; but can never have any Stability, becauſe there is, and can be none in them. Or if any Exception may be brought againſt this Rule, it muſt be of thoſe Monarchys only which are mix'd and regu⯑lated by Laws, where Diets, Parliaments, Aſſemblys of Eſtates, or Se⯑nats, may ſupply the defects of a Prince, reſtrain him if he prove extra⯑vagant, and reject ſuch as are found to be unworthy of their Office, which are as odious to our Author and his Followers, as the moſt popular Go⯑vernments, and can be of no advantage to his Cauſe.

There is another ground of perpetual Fluctuation in Abſolute Monar⯑chys; or ſuch as are grown ſo ſtrong, that they cannot be reſtrain'd by Law, tho according to their Inſtitution they ought to be, diſtinct from, but in ſome meaſure relating to the Inclinations of the Monarch, that is, the impulſe of Miniſters, Favorites, Wives or Whores, who frequently govern all things according to their own Paſſions or Intereſts. And tho we cannot ſay who were the Favorites of every one of the Aſſyrian or Egyptian Kings, yet the Examples before-mention'd of the different me⯑thod follow'd in Egypt before and after the death of Joſeph, and in Perſis whilſt the idolatrous Princes, and Haman, or Daniel, Eſther and Mor⯑decai were in credit; the violent Changes happening thereupon, give us reaſon to believe the like were in the times of other Kings: and if we ex⯑amin the Hiſtorys of latter Ages, and the Lives of Princes that are more [97] exactly known, we ſhall find that Kingdoms are more frequently ſway'd by thoſe who have Power with the Prince, than by his own Judgment: So that whoſoever has to deal with Princes concerning Foreign or Dome⯑ſtick Affairs, is oblig'd more to regard the humour of thoſe Perſons, than the moſt important Intereſts of a Prince or People.

I might draw too much envy upon my ſelf, if I ſhould take upon me to cite all the Examples of this kind that are found in modern Hiſtorys, or the Memoirs that do more preciſely ſhew the Temper of Princes, and the ſecret Springs by which they were mov'd. But as thoſe who have well obſerv'd the management of Affairs in France during the Reigns of Francis the Firſt, Henry the Second, Francis the Second, Charles the Ninth, Henry the Third, Henry the Fourth, and Lewis the Thirteenth, will confeſs, that the Intereſts of the Dukes of Montmorency and Guiſe, Queen Katherine de Medicis, the Duke of Epernon, La [...]oſſeuſe, Madame de Guiche, de Gabriele, d' Entragues, the Marechal d' Ancre, the Conſtable de Luines, and the Cardinal de Richelieu, were more to be conſider'd by thoſe who had any publick or private Buſineſs to treat at Court, than the Opinions of thoſe Princes, or the moſt weighty Concernments of the State; ſo it cannot be denied, that other Kingdoms where Princes legally have, or wrongfully uſurp the like Power, are govern'd in the like manner; or if it be, there is hardly any Prince's Reign that will not furniſh abun⯑dant proof of what I have aſſerted.

I agree with our Author, that good Order and Stability produce Strength. If Monarchy therefore excel in them, Abſolute Monarchys ſhould be of more ſtrength than thoſe that are limited, according to the proportion of their Riches, extent of Territory, and number of People that they go⯑vern; and thoſe limited Monarchys in the like proportion more ſtrong than popular Governments or Commonwealths. If this be ſo, I wonder how a few of thoſe giddy Greeks who, according to our Author, had learn⯑ing enough only to make them ſeditious, came to overthrow the vaſt Armys of the Perſians as often as they met with 'em; and ſeldom found any other difficulty than what aroſe from their own Countrymen, who ſometimes ſided with the Barbarians. Seditions are often rais'd by a little prating; but when one Man was to fight againſt fifty, or a hundred, as at the Bat⯑tels of Salamis, Platea, Marathon, and others, then Induſtry, Wiſdom, Skill and Valour were requir'd; and if their Learning had not made 'em to excel in thoſe Vertues, they muſt have bin overwhelm'd by the prodi⯑gious multitudes of their Enemys. This was ſo well known to the Perſi⯑ans, that when Cyrus the younger prepar'd to invade his Brother Artax⯑erxes, Plut. vit. Artax.he brought together indeed a vaſt Army of Aſiaticks; but chiefly re⯑lied upon the Counſel and Valour of ten thouſand Grecians, whom he had engag'd to ſerve him. Theſe giddy heads, accompanied with good hands, in the great Battel near Babylon, found no reſiſtance from Artaxerxes his Army; and when Cyrus was kill'd by accident in the purſuit of the Vic⯑tory they had gain'd, and their own Officers treacherouſly murder'd, they made good their retreat into Greece under the conduct of Xenophon, in de⯑ſpite of above four hundred thouſand Horſe and Foot, who endeavour'd to oppoſe them. They were deſtitute of Horſe, Mony, Proviſions, Friends and all other help, except what their Wiſdom and Valour fur⯑niſh'd them; and thereupon relying, they paſs'd over the Bellys of all the Enemys that ventur'd to appear againſt them in a march of a thouſand miles. Theſe things were perform'd in the weakneſs of popular confuſion; but Ageſilaus not being ſenſible of ſo great defects, accompanied only [98] with ſix and thirty Spartans, and ſuch other Forces as he could raiſe upon his perſonal credit, adventur'd without Authority or Mony to undertake a War againſt that great King Artaxerxes; and having often beaten Phar⯑nabazus and Tiſſaphernes his Lieutenants, was preparing to aſſault him in the heart of his Kingdom, when he was commanded by the Ephori to re⯑turn for the defence of his own Country.

It may in like manner appear ſtrange, that Alexander with the Forces of Greece, much diminiſh'd by the Phocean, Peloponneſian, Theban, and other inteſtin Wars, could overthrow all the Powers of the Eaſt, and conquer more Provinces than any other Army ever ſaw; if ſo much order and ſtability were to be found in abſolute Monarchys, and if the Liberty in which the Grecians were educated did only fit them for Sedi⯑tions: And it would ſeem no leſs aſtoniſhing, that Rome and Greece, whilſt they were free, ſhould furniſh ſuch numbers of men excelling in all moral Vertues, to the admiration of all ſucceeding Ages; and thereby become ſo powerful that no Monarchs were able to reſiſt them; and that the ſame Countrys ſince the loſs of their Liberty, have always bin weak, baſe, cowardly and vicious, if the ſame Liberty had not bin the Mother and Nurſe of their Vertue, as well as the root of their Power.

It cannot be ſaid that Alexander was a Monarch in our Author's ſenſe; for the power of the Macedonian Kings was ſmall. Philip confeſt the People were Freemen, and his Son found them to be ſo, when his For⯑tune had overthrown his Vertue, and he fell to hate and fear that genero⯑ſity of Spirit which it creates. He made his Conqueſts by it, and lov'd it as long as he deſerv'd to be lov'd. His Succeſſors had the ſame fortune: When their Hearts came to be fill'd with Barbarick Pride, and to delight only in rendring men Slaves, they became weak and baſe, and were eaſily overthrown by the Romans, whoſe Vertue and Fortune did alſo periſh with their Liberty. All the Nations they had to deal with, had the ſame fate. They never conquer'd a Free People without extreme difficulty: They receiv'd many great defeats, and were often neceſſitated to fight for their Lives againſt the Latins, Sabins, Tuſcans, Samnites, Carthaginians, Spaniards; and in the height of their Power found it a hard work to ſubdue a few poor Etolians: But the greateſt Kings were eaſily overcome. When Antiochus had inſolently boaſted that he would Plut. in vit. Q. Flamin.cover Greece and Italy with the multitude of his Troops, Quintius Flami⯑nius ingeniouſly compar'd his Army of Perſians, Chaldeans, Syrians, Meſopotamians, Cappadocians, Arabians, and other baſe Aſtatic Slaves, to a Supper ſet before him by a Grecian Freind, which ſeeming to be of ſeve⯑ral ſorts of Veniſon, was all cut out of one Hog, variouſly dreſs'd; and not long after, that vaſt multitude was as eaſily ſlaughter'd as the Hog had bin. The greateſt danger of the War with Mithridates was to avoid his Poi⯑ſons and Treacherys; and to follow him thro the Deſerts where he fled. When Lucullus with leſs than twenty thouſand men had put Tigranes Plut. in vit. Lucul.with two hundred thouſand to flight, the Roman Soldiers who for a while had purſu'd the chace, ſtood ſtill on a ſudden, and fell into a loud laughter at themſelves for uſing their Arms againſt ſuch wretched cow⯑ardly Slaves. If this be not enough to prove the Falſhood of our Au⯑thor's Propoſition, I deſire it may be conſider'd whether good Order or Stability be wanting in Venice: Whether Tuſcany, be in a better condition to defend it ſelf ſince it fell under the power of the Medices, or when it was full of free Citys: Whether it were an eaſy work to conquer Swit⯑zerland: Whether the Hollanders are of greater ſtrength ſince the recovery [99] of their Liberty, or when they groan'd under the Yoke of Spain: And laſtly, whether the intire conqueſt of Scotland and Ireland, the Victorys obtain'd againſt the Hollanders when in the height of their Power, and the reputation to which England did riſe in leſs than five years after 1648. be good marks of the inſtability, diſorder, and weakneſs of free Nati⯑ons: And if the contrary be true, nothing can be more abſurdly falſe than our Author's aſſertion.

SECT. XII. The Glory, Vertue, and Power of the Romans began and ended with their Liberty.

AMong many fine things propos'd by our Author, I ſee none more to be admir'd, or that better declares the ſoundneſs of his Judgment, than that he is only pleas'd with the beginning and end of the Roman Empire; and ſays, that their time of Liberty (between thoſe two ex⯑tremes) had nothing of good in it, but that it was of ſhort continuance. Whereas I dare affirm that all that was ever deſirable, or worthy of praiſe and imitation in Rome, proceeded from its Liberty, and grew up and pe⯑riſh'd with it: which I think will not be contradicted by any, but thoſe who prefer the moſt ſordid Vices before the moſt eminent Vertues; who believe the People to have bin more worthily employ'd by the Tarquins in cleanſing Jakes and common Shores, than in acquiring the Dominion of the beſt part of Mankind; and account it better for a People to be op⯑preſt with hard labour under a proud Maſter, in a ſteril, unhealthy ten⯑mile Territory, than to command all the Countrys that lie between the Fuphrates and Britain. Such Opinions will hardly find any better Patrons than Filmer and his Diſciples, nor the matters of fact, as they are repre⯑ſented, be denied by any that know the Hiſtorys of thoſe times. Many Romans may have had ſeeds of vertue in them, whilſt in the inſancy of that City they liv'd under Kings; but they brought forth little fruit. Tarquin, ſirnam'd the Proud, being a Grecian by extraction, had perhaps obſerv'd that the Vertue of that Nation had render'd them averſe to the Divine Government he deſir'd to ſet up; and having by his well⯑natur'd Tullia poiſon'd his own Brother her Husband, and his own Wife her Siſter, married her, kill'd her Father, and ſpar'd none that he thought able to oppoſe his deſigns, to finiſh the work, he butcher'd the Senat, with ſuch as ſeem'd moſt eminent among the People, and like a moſt pious Father endeavour'd to render the City deſolate: during that time they who would not be made inſtruments of thoſe Villanys, were oblig'd for their own ſafety to conceal their Vertues; but he being re⯑mov'd, they ſhin'd in their Glory. Whilſt he reign'd, Brutus, Vale⯑rius, Horatius, Herminius, Larcius, and Coriolanus, lay hid and unre⯑garded; but when they came to fight for themſelves, and to imploy their Valour for the good of their Country, they gave ſuch teſtimonys of Bra⯑very as have bin admir'd by all ſucceeding ages, and ſettled ſuch a Diſci⯑plin, as produc'd others like to them, or more excellent than they, as long as their Liberty laſted. In two hundred and ſixty years that they re⯑main'd under the Government of Kings, tho all of 'em, the laſt only ex⯑cepted, were choſen by the Senat and People, and did as much to advance [100] the publick Service as could reaſonably be expected from them, their Do⯑minion hardly extended ſo far as from London to Hownſlow: But in little more than three hundred years after they recover'd their Liberty, they had ſubdu'd all the warlike Nations of Italy, deſtroy'd vaſt Armys of the Gauls, Cimbri, and Germans, overthrown the formidable power of Car⯑thage, conquer'd the Ciſalpine and Tranſalpine Gauls, with all the Nati⯑ons of Spain, notwithſtanding the ferocity of the one, and the more con⯑ſtant valour of the other, with the prodigious multitudes of both: They had brought all Greece into ſubjection, and by the conqueſt of Macedon the Spoils of the World to adorn their City; and found ſo little difficulty in all the Wars that happen'd between them and the greateſt Kings after the Death of Alexander of Epirus and Pirrhus, that the defeats of Siphax, Perſes, Antiochus, Pruſias, Tigranes, Ptolomy, and many others, did hardly deſerve to be number'd amongſt their Victorys.

It were ridiculous to impute this to chance, or to think that Fortune, which of all things is the moſt variable, could for ſo many Ages continue the ſame courſe, unleſs ſupported by Vertue; or to ſuppoſe that all theſe Monarchys which are ſo much extol'd, could have bin deſtroy'd by that Commonwealth, if it had wanted Strength, Stability, Vertue, or good Order. The ſecret Counſels of God are impenetrable; but the ways by which he accompliſhes his deſigns are often evident: When he intends to exalt a People, he fills both them and their Leaders with the Vertues ſuta⯑ble to the accompliſhment of his end; and takes away all Wiſdom and Vertue from thoſe he reſolves to deſtroy. The Pride of the Babylonians and Aſſyrians fell thro the baſeneſs of Sardanapalus; and the great City was taken while Belſhazzar lay drunk amongſt his Whores: The Em⯑pire was tranſported to the Perſians and Grecians by the valour of Cyrus, Alexander, and the brave Armys that follow'd them. Hiſtorys furniſh us with innumerable examples of this kind: But I think none can be found of a cowardly, weak, effeminate, fooliſh, ill-diſciplin'd People, that have ever ſubdu'd ſuch as were eminent in Strength, Wiſdom, Valor, and good Diſciplin; or that theſe qualitys have bin found or ſubſiſted any where, unleſs cultivated and nouriſh'd by a well-order'd Govern⯑ment. If this therefore was found among the Romans, and not in the Kingdoms they overthrew, they had the order and ſtability which the Monarchys had not; and the Strength and Vertue by which they ob⯑tain'd ſuch ſucceſs, was the product of them. But if this Vertue and the glorious effects of it did begin with Liberty, it alſo expir'd with the ſame. The beſt men that had not fallen in Battel were glean'd up by the Proſcriptions, or circumvented for the moſt part by falſe and frivo⯑lous Accuſations. Mankind is inclin'd to Vice, and the way to Vertue is ſo hard, that it wants encouragement; but when all Honours, Advanta⯑ges and Preferments are given to Vice, and deſpis'd Vertue finds no other reward than Hatred, Perſecution, and Death, there are few who will follow it. Tacitus well deſcribes the State of the Empire, when the [...] Tacit. [...]Power was abſolutely fallen into the hands of one: Italia novis cladibus, vel poſt longam ſeculorum ſeriem repetitis, afflicta; Vrbs incendiis vaſtata, conſumptis antiquiſſimis delubris, ipſo Capitolio Civium manibus incenſo; pol⯑lutae ceremoniae; magna adulteria; plenum exiliis mare; infecti caedibus ſco⯑puli; atrocius in urbe ſaevitum; Nobilitas, opes, omiſſi vel geſti honores pro crimine, & ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium. His following words ſhew, that the rewards of theſe abominations were not leſs odious than the things themſelves: The higheſt Dignitys were beſtow'd upon the Dela⯑tores, [101] who were a kind of Rogues like to our Iriſh Witneſſes, or thoſe that by a new coin'd word we call Trepanners. This is not a Picture drawn by a vulgar hand, but by one of the beſt Painters in the world; and being a Model that ſo much pleaſes our Author, 'tis good to ſee what it produc'd. The firſt fruit was ſuch an intire degeneracy from all good, that Rome may be juſtly ſaid never to have produc'd a brave Man ſince the firſt age of her Slavery. Germanicus and Corbulo were born expirante Libertate; and the recompence they receiv'd did ſo little encourage others to follow their example, that none have bin found in any degree like to them; and thoſe of the moſt noble Familys applied themſelves to ſleep, lazineſs, and luxury, that they might not be ſuſpected to be better than their Maſters. Thraſeas, Soranus, and Helvidius were worthy men, who reſolv'd to perſiſt in their Integrity, tho they ſhould die for it; but that was the only thing that made them eminent; for they were of unknown Familys, not Romans by birth, nor ever employ'd in War: And thoſe Emperors who did arrive to any degree of Vertue, were Spaniards, Gauls, Africans, Thracians, and of all Nations, except Romans. The Patrician and Plebeian Familys, which for many ages had fill'd the World with great Commanders, and ſuch as excel'd in all Vertues, being thus extin⯑guiſh'd or corrupted, the common People fell into the loweſt degree of baſeneſs: Plebs ſordida Circo & Theatris ſueta. That People which in C. Tacitmagnanimity ſurpaſt all that have bin known in the World; who ne⯑ver found any Enterprize above their Spirit to undertake, and Power to accompliſh, with their Liberty loſt all their Vigor and Vertue. They who by their Votes had diſpos'd of Kingdoms and Provinces, fell to de⯑ſire nothing but to live and ſee ^* Plays. Whether their Emperors were good or bad, they uſually rejoic'd at their Death, in hopes of getting a little Mony or Victuals from the Succeſſor. Tho the Empire was by this means grown weak and bloodleſs, yet it could not fall on a ſudden: So vaſt a Body could not die in a moment: All the neighbouring Nations had bin ſo much broken by their Power, that none was able to take ad⯑vantage of their Weakneſs; and life was preſerv'd by the ſtrength of hungry Barbarians, allur'd by the greatneſs of the Pay they receiv'd to defend thoſe, who had no power left to defend themſelves. This preca⯑rious and accidental help could not be durable. They who for a while had bin contented with their Wages, ſoon began to think it fit for them rather to fight for themſelves, than for their weak Maſters; and there⯑upon fell to ſet up Emperors depending on themſelves, or to ſeize upon the naked Provinces, where they found no other difficulty than to con⯑tend with other Strangers, who might have the like deſign upon the ſame. Thus did the Armys of the Eaſt and Weſt ſet up Emperors at their pleaſure; and tho the Goths, Vandals, Huns, Sueves, Alans, and others, had cruel Wars among themſelves, yet they fear'd and ſuffer'd little or nothing from the Romans. This ſtate of things was ſo ſoon ob⯑ſerv'd, that in the beginning of Tiberius his reign, they who endeavour'd to excite the Gauls to take Arms, us'd no other arguments than ſuch as were drawn from the extreme weakneſs of the ^† Romans. It was evi⯑dent that after the Battels of Philippi and Actium, the ſtrength of the Ro⯑man [102] Armys conſiſted of Strangers; and even the Victorys that went un⯑der their name were gain'd by thoſe Nations which in the time of their Liberty they had ſubdu'd. They had nothing left but Riches gather'd out of their vaſt Dominions; and they learn'd by their ruin, that an Em⯑pire acquir'd by Vertue could not long be ſupported by Mony. They who by their Valour had arriv'd at ſuch a height of Glory, Power, Greatneſs, and Happineſs, that was never equal'd, and who in all ap⯑pearance had nothing to fear from any foreign Power, could never have fallen, unleſs their Vertue and Diſciplin had decay'd, and the corruption of their Manners excited 'em to turn their victorious Swords into their own bowels. Whilſt they were in that flouriſhing condition, they thought they had nothing more to deſire than continuance; but if our Author's judgment is to be follow'd, there was nothing of good in it, ex⯑cept the ſhortneſs of its continuance; they were beholden to thoſe who wrought the Change; they were the better for the Battels of Pharſalia, Philippi, Munda, and Actium; the deſtruction of two thirds of the Peo⯑ple, with the ſlaughter of all the moſt eminent men among them, was for their advantage: The Proſcriptions were wholſom Remedys: Tacitus did not underſtand the ſtate of his own Country, when he ſeems to be Ann [...]l. l. 4.aſham'd to write the Hiſtory of it, Nobis in arcto & inglorius labor; when inſtead of ſuch glorious things as had bin atchiev'd by the Romans, whilſt either the Senat, or the Common Poople prevail'd, he had nothing left to relate, but ſaeva juſſa, continuas accuſationes, fallaces amicitias, perni⯑ciem innocentium: They enjoy'd nothing that was good from the expul⯑ſion of the Tarquins to the reeſtabliſhment of Divine abſolute Monarchy in the Perſons of thoſe pious Fathers of the People, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, &c. There was no Vertue in the Junii, Horatii, Cornelii, Quintii, Decii, Manlii; but the generous and tender-hearted Princes before-mention'd were perfect examples of it: Whilſt annual Magiſtrats govern'd, there was no ſtability; Sejanus, Ma⯑cro and Tigellinus introduc'd good order: Vertue was not eſteem'd by the antient Senat and People; Meſſalina, Agrippina, Poppaea, Narciſſus, Pallas, Vinnius, and Laco knew how to put a juſt value upon it: The irregularitys of popular Aſſemblys, and want of Prudence in the Senat, was repair'd by the temperate proceedings of the German, Pannonian and Eaſtern Armys▪ or the modeſt diſcretion of the Pretorian Bands: The City was deliver'd by them from the burden of governing the World, and for its own good frequently plunder'd, fir'd; and at laſt, with the reſt of deſolated Italy, and the nobleſt Provinces of Europe, Aſia, and Africa, brought under the yoke of the moſt barbarous and cruel Na⯑tions. By the ſame light we may ſee that thoſe who endeavour'd to per⯑petuate the miſery of Liberty to Rome, or loſt their lives in the defence of it, were the worſt or the moſt fooliſh of men, and that they were the beſt who did overthrow it. This rectifys all our Errors; and if the higheſt Praiſes are due to him that did the work, the next are well deſerv'd by thoſe who periſh'd in attempting it: and if the Sons of Brutus, with their Companions the Vitellii and Aquillii; Claudius Appius the Decemvir; thoſe that would have betray'd the City to Porſenna; Spurius Melius, Spur. Caſſius, Manlius Capitolinus, Saturninus, Catiline, Cethegus, Lentu⯑lus, had bin as fortunate as Julius Caeſar, they might as well have de⯑ſerv'd an Apotheoſis. But if all this be falſe, abſurd, beſtial, and abomi⯑nable, the principles that neceſſarily lead us to ſuch concluſions are ſo al⯑ſo; which is enough to ſhew, that the Strength, Vertue, Glory, Wealth, [103] Power, and Happineſs of Rome proceeding from Liberty, did riſe, grow, and periſh with it.

SECT. XIII. There is diſorder or prejudice in changing the name or number of Magiſtrats, whilſt the root and principle of their Power continues intire.

IN the next place our Author would perſuade us that the Romans were inconſtant, becauſe of their changes from annual Conſuls to Military Tribunes, Decemviri, and Dictators; and gives the name of Sedition to the complaints made againſt Uſury, or the conteſts concerning Marriages or Magiſtracy: But I affirm,

1. That no change of Magiſtracy, as to the name, number, or form, dos teſtify irregularity, or bring any manner of prejudice, as long as it is done by thoſe who have a right of doing it, and he or they who are created continue within the power of the Law to accompliſh the end of their inſtitution; many forms being in themſelves equally good, and may be us'd as well one as another, according to times and other circum⯑ſtances.

2. In the ſecond place, 'tis a rare thing for a City at the firſt to be rightly conſtituted: Men can hardly at once foreſee all that may happen in many Ages, and the changes that accompany them ought to be pro⯑vided for. Rome in its foundation was ſubject to theſe defects, and the inconveniences ariſing from them were by degrees diſcover'd and reme⯑di'd. They did not think of regulating Uſury, till they ſaw the miſ⯑chiefs proceeding from the cruelty of Uſurers; or of ſetting limits to the proportion of Land that one man might enjoy, till the avarice of a few had ſo far ſucceeded, that their Riches were grown formidable, and ma⯑ny by the poverty to which they were reduc'd became uſeleſs to the City. It was not time to make a Law that the Plebeians might marry with the Patricians, till the diſtinction had rais'd the Patricians to ſuch Pride, as to look upon themſelves to have ſomething of divine, and the others to be Inauſpicati, or profane, and brought the City into danger by that divi⯑ſion; nor to make the Plebeians capable of being elected to the chief Magiſtracys, till they had men able to perform the dutys of them. But theſe things being obſerv'd, remedys were ſeaſonably apply'd without any bloodſhed or miſchief, tho not without noiſe and wrangling.

3. All human Conſtitutions are ſubject to corruption, and muſt periſh, unleſs timely renew'd and reduc'd to their firſt principles: This was chief⯑ly done by means of thoſe Tumults which our Author ignorantly blames: The whole People by whom the Magiſtracy had bin at firſt created, exe⯑cuted their power in thoſe things which comprehend Sovereignty in the higheſt degree, and brought every one to acknowledg it: There was no⯑thing that they could not do, who firſt confer'd the ſupreme Honours up⯑on the Patricians, and then made the Plebeians equal to them. Yet their Modeſty was not leſs than their Power or Courage: and therefore when by the Law they might have made a Plebeian Conſul, they did not chuſe one in forty years; and when they did make uſe of their Right in ad⯑vancing men of their own Order, they were ſo prudent, that they can⯑not [104] be ſaid to have bin miſtaken in their Elections three times, whilſt their Votes were free: whereas, of all the Emperors that came in by Uſurpation, pretence of Blood from thoſe who had uſurp'd, or that were ſet up by the Soldiers, or a few Electors, hardly three can be nam'd who deſerv'd that Honour, and moſt of them were ſuch as ſeem'd to be born for Plagues to Mankind.

4. He manifeſts his fraud or ignorance in attributing the Legiſlative power ſometimes to the Senat, and ſometimes to the People; for the Se⯑nat never had it. The ſtile of Senatus cenſuit, Populus juſſit, was never alter'd; but the right of Adviſing continuing in the Senat, that of En⯑acting ever continu'd in the People.

5. An occaſion of commending abſolute Power, in order to the eſta⯑bliſhment of Hereditary Monarchy, is abſurdly drawn from their Cu⯑ſtom of creating a Dictator in time of danger; for no man was ever crea⯑ted, but ſuch as ſeem'd able to bear ſo great a burden, which in hereditary Governments is wholly left to chance. Tho his Power was great, it did ariſe from the Law; and being confin'd to ſix months, 'twas almoſt im⯑poſſible for any man to abuſe it, or to corrupt ſo many of thoſe who had enjoy'd the ſame honour, or might aſpire to it, as to bring them for his pleaſure to betray their Country: and as no man was ever choſen who had not given great teſtimonys of his Vertues, ſo no one did ever forſeit the good opinion conceiv'd of him. Vertue was then honour'd, and thought ſo neceſſarily to comprehend a ſincere love and fidelity to the Commonwealth, that without it the moſt eminent qualitys were reputed vile and odious; and the memory of former Services could no way ex⯑piate the guilt of conſpiring againſt it. This ſeeming Severity was in truth the greateſt Clemency: for tho our Author has the impudence to ſay, that during the Roman Liberty the beſt men thriv'd worſt, and the worſt beſt, he cannot alledg one example of any eminent Roman put to death (except Manlius Capitolinus) from the expulſion of the Tarquins to the time of the Gracchi, and the Civil Wars not long after enſuing; and of very few who were baniſh'd. By theſe means Crimes were prevented; and the temptations to evil being remov'd, Treachery was deſtroy'd in the root; and ſuch as might be naturally ambitious, were made to ſee there was no other way to Honour and Power, than by acting ver⯑tuouſly.

But leſt this ſhould not be ſufficient to reſtrain aſpiring men, what Power ſoever was granted to any Magiſtrate, the Sovereignty ſtill re⯑main'd in the People, and all without exception were ſubject to them. This may ſeem ſtrange to thoſe who think the Dictators were abſolute, becauſe they are ſaid to have bin ſine provocatione; but that is to be only underſtood in relation to other Magiſtrats, and not to the People, as is clearly prov'd in the caſe of Q. Fabius, whom Papirius the Dictator [...]. [...]av. [...]. 8.would have put to death: Tribunos Plebis appello, ſays Fabius Maximus his Father, & provoco ad Populum, eum (que) tibi fugienti exercitus tui, fu⯑gienti Senatus Judicium, judicem ſero; qui certe unus pluſquam tua dicta⯑ [...]ura poteſt polletque: videro, ceſſuruſne ſis provocationi, cui Tullus Hoſti⯑lius ceſſit. And tho the People did rather intercede for Fabius than com⯑mand his deliverance, that modeſty did evidently proceed from an opi⯑nion that Papirius was in the right; and tho they deſir'd to ſave Fabius, who ſeems to have bin one of the greateſt and beſt men that ever the Ci⯑ty produc'd, they would not enervate that military Diſciplin, to which they ow'd, not only their greatneſs, but their ſubſiſtence; moſt eſpe⯑cially [105] when their Sovereign Authority was acknowledg'd by all, and the Dictator himſelf had ſubmitted. This right of Appeals to the People was the foundation of the Roman Commonwealth, laid in the days of Ro⯑mulus, T. Liv. l. 1.ſubmitted to by Hoſtilius in the caſe of Horatius, and never vio⯑lated, till the Laws and the Liberty which they ſupported were over⯑thrown by the power of the Sword. This is confirm'd by the ſpeech of Metellus the Tribune, who in the time of the ſecond Carthaginian War, cauſeleſly diſliking the Proceedings of Q. Fabius Maximus then Dictator, in a publick Aſſembly of the People ſaid, Quod ſi antiquus animus Plebi T. Liv. l. 22. Romanae eſſet, ſe audacter laturum de abrogando Q. Fabii Imperio; nunc mo⯑dicam rogationem promulgaturum, de aequando Magiſtri Equitum & Dicta⯑toris jure: which was done, and that Action, which had no precedent, ſhews that the People needed none, and that their Power being eminent⯑ly above that of all Magiſtrats, was oblig'd to no other rule than that of their own Will. Tho I do therefore grant that a Power like to the Dic⯑tatorian, limited in time, circumſcrib'd by Law, and kept perpetually under the ſupreme Authority of the People, may, by vertuous and well⯑diſciplin'd Nations, upon ſome occaſions, be prudently granted to a ver⯑tuous man, it can have no relation to our Author's Monarch, whoſe Power is in himſelf, ſubject to no Law, perpetually exercis'd by himſelf, and for his own ſake, whether he has any of the abilitys requir'd for the due performance of ſo great a work, or be intirely deſtitute of them; no⯑thing being more unreaſonable than to deduce conſequences from caſes, which in ſubſtance and circumſtances are altogether unlike: but to the contrary, theſe examples ſhewing that the Romans, even in the time of ſuch Magiſtrats as ſeem'd to be moſt abſolute, did retain and exerciſe the Sovereign Power, do moſt evidently prove that the Government was ever the ſame remaining in the People, who without prejudice might give the Adminiſtration to one or more men as beſt pleas'd themſelves, and the ſucceſs ſhews that they did it prudently.

SECT. XIV. No Sedition was hurtful to Rome, till thro their Proſperity ſome men gain'd a Power above the Laws.

LIttle pains is requir'd to confute our Author, who imputes much bloodſhed to the popular Government of Rome; for he cannot prove that one man was unjuſtly put to death, or ſlain in any Sedition before Publius Gracchus: The Foundations of the Commonwealth were then ſo ſhaken, that the Laws could not be executed; and whatſoever did then fall out, ought to be attributed to the Monarchy for which the great Men began to contend. Whilſt they had no other Wars than with neighboring Nations, they had a ſtrict eye upon their Commanders, and could preſerve Diſciplin among the Soldiers: but when by the excellence of their Valour and Conduct the greateſt Powers of the World were ſubdu'd, and for the better carrying on of foreign Wars, Armys were ſuffer'd to continue in the ſame hands longer than the Law did direct, Soldiery came to be ac⯑counted a Trade, and thoſe who had the worſt deſigns againſt the Com⯑monwealth, began to ſavour all manner of Licentiouſneſs and Rapine, that they might gain the ſavour of the Legions, who by that means be⯑came [106] unruly and ſeditious; 'twas hard, if not impoſſible, to preſerve a Civil equality, when the Spoils of the greateſt Kingdoms were brought to adorn the Houſes of private men; and they who had the greateſt Ci⯑tys and Nations to be their Dependents and Clients, were apt to ſcorn the power of the Law. This was a moſt dangerous Diſeaſe, like thoſe to which human Bodys are ſubject, when arriv'd to that which Phyſicians call the Athletick habit, proceeding from the higheſt perfection of Health, Activity and Strength, that the beſt Conſtitution by Diet and Exerciſe can attain. Whoſoever falls into them ſhews that he had attain'd that perfection; and he who blames that which brings a State into the like condition, condemns that which is moſt perfect among men. Whilſt the Romans were in the way to this, no Sedition did them any hurt: they were compos'd without Blood; and thoſe that ſeem'd to be the moſt dan⯑gerous, produc'd the beſt Laws. But when they were arriv'd to that condition, no Order could do them good; the fatal period ſet to human things was come, they could go no higher,

and all that our Author blames, is not to be imputed to their Conſtitution, but their departing from it. All men were ever ſubject to error, and it may be ſaid that the miſtaken People in the ſpace of about three hundred years did unjuſtly fine or baniſh five or ſix men; but thoſe miſtakes were ſo frankly acknowledg'd, and carefully repair'd by Honours beſtow'd upon the injur'd Perſons, as appears by the Examples of Camillus, Livius Sali⯑nator, Paulus Emylius, and others, that they deſerve more praiſe than if they had not fail'd.

If for the above-mention'd time Seditions were harmleſs or profitable, they were alſo abſolutely exempted from Civil Wars. Thoſe of Apulia and Greece were Revolts of conquer'd Nations, and can no way fall un⯑der that name: But 'tis moſt abſurdly apply'd to the ſervile and gladiato⯑rian Wars; for the Gladiators were Slaves alſo, and Civil Wars can be made only by thoſe who are Members of the Civil Society, which Slaves are not. Thoſe that made the bellum Sociale, were Freemen, but not Ci⯑tizens; and the War they made could not be call'd Civil. The Romans had three ways of dealing with conquer'd Nations.

1. Some were receiv'd into the body of the City, Civitate donati, as the Latins by Romulus; the Albans by Hoſtilius; the Privernates when their Ambaſſador declar'd, that no Peace could be durable unleſs it were juſt and eaſy; and the Senat ſaid, Se viri & liberi vocem audiviſſe, ta⯑leſ (que) dignos eſſe ut Romani ſiant; and the like Favour was ſhown to many others.

2. By making Leagues with them, as Livy ſays, Populum Romanum devictos bello populos, malle ſocietate & amicitia habere conjunctos, quam tri⯑ſti ſubjectos ſervitio: Of which ſort were the Samnites, who not liking their condition, join'd with Hannibal; and afterwards, under the conduct of the brave Teleſinus, with other Nations that liv'd under the condition of Socii, made an unproſperous attempt to deliver themſelves.

3. Thoſe who after many Rebellions were in Provinciam redacti, as the Capuans, when their City was taken by Appius Claudius, and Q. F [...]l⯑vius Flaccus.

We oſten hear of Wars made by thoſe of the two latter ſorts; but of none that can be call'd Civil, till the times of Marius, Sylla, and Catiline: and as they are to be eſteem'd the laſt Struglings of expiring Liberty, [107] when the Laws, by which it had ſubſiſted, were enervated; ſo thoſe that happen'd between Ceſar and Pompey, Octavius and Antonius, with the Proſcriptions, Triumvirate, and all the Miſchiefs that accompany'd them, are to be imputed wholly to the Monarchy for which they con⯑tended, as well as thoſe between Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Veſ⯑paſian, that hardly ever ceas'd till the Empire was aboliſh'd; for the name of a Commonwealth continu'd to the end; and I know not why Tiberius or Nero might not uſe it as well as Sylla or Marius.

Yet if our Author be reſolv'd to impute to Popular Government all that paſs'd before Ceſar made himſelf perpetual Dictator, he will find no more than is ſeen in all places. We have known few ſmall States, and no great one free from Revolts of Subjects or Allies; and the greateſt Empire of the Eaſt was overthrown by the rebellion of the Mammalukes their Slaves. If there is any difference to be obſerv'd between what happen'd at Rome, 'tis chiefly, that whilſt there was any ſhadow of Liberty, the Slaves, Gladiators, Subjects or Allies, were always beaten and ſuppreſs'd; whereas in the time of the Emperors, the Revolt of a Province was ſufficient to give a new Maſter to the beſt part of Mankind; and he having no more power than was requir'd for a preſent Miſchief, was for the moſt part, in a ſhort time, deſtroy'd by another. But to pleaſe our Author, I will acknowledg a ſecond defect, even that Wantonneſs to which he aſcribes all their Diſorders; tho I muſt withal deſire him to conſider from whence Wantonneſs dos proceed. If the People of Turky or France did rebel, I ſhould think they were driven to it by Miſery, Beggery, or Deſpair; and could lay Wantonneſs only to the charge of thoſe who enjoy much Proſperity. Nations that are oppreſt and made miſerable, may fall into Rage, but can never grow wanton. In the time of the Roman Emperors, the Pretorian Cohorts, or the Armys that had the liberty of ravaging the richeſt Provinces, might be proud of their Strength, or grow wanton thro the abundance of their Enjoyments: The Janizarys in later Ages may, for the ſame reaſons, have fallen into the like exceſſes; but ſuch as have loſt their Liberty are in no danger of them. When all the Nobility of Rome was deſtroy'd, and thoſe who excel'd in Reputation or Vertue, were fallen in the Wars, or by the Pro⯑ſcriptions; when two thirds of the People were ſlain, the beſt Citys and Colonys burnt, the Provinces exhauſted, and the ſmall remains left in them oppreſt with a moſt miſerable ſlavery, they may have revolted, and ſometimes did, as the Britans, Batavians, and others mention'd in the Roman Hiſtory: But they were driven to thoſe Revolts by Fury and Neceſſity, ariſing from the Miſerys and Indignitys they ſuffer'd under an inſupportable Tyranny; and Wantonneſs had no part in them. The People of Rome, when they were a little freed from the Terror of the Soldiers, did ſometimes for the ſame reaſons conſpire againſt the Empe⯑rors; and when they could do no more, expreſt their hatred by breaking their Statues: But after the Battels of Pharſalia, Philippi, and the Pro⯑ſcriptions, they never committed any folly thro Wantonneſs. In the like manner Naples and Sicily have revolted within theſe few years; and ſome who are well acquainted with the State of thoſe Kingdoms, think them ready again to do the like: but if it ſhould ſo happen, no man of un⯑derſtanding would impute it to Wantonneſs. The Preſſures under which they groan, have cur'd 'em of all ſuch Diſeaſes; and the Romans after the loſs of their Liberty could never fall into them. They may have grown wanton when their Authority was reverenc'd, their Vertue ad⯑mir'd, [108] their Power irreſiſtible, and the Riches of the World were flow⯑ing in upon them, as it were, to corrupt their Manners, by inticing them to pleaſure. But when all that was loſt, and they found their Perſons expos'd to all manner of Violence from the baſeſt of men; their Riches exhauſted by Tributes and Rapine, whilſt the Treaſures of the Empire were not ſufficient to ſupply the Luxury of their Maſters: the miſery they ſuffer'd, and the ſhame of ſuffering it, with the contemptible weakneſs to which they were reduc'd, did too ſtrongly admoniſh them that the Vices of Wantonneſs belong'd only to thoſe who enjoy'd a Condition far different from theirs; and the memory of what they had loſt, ſharpned the ſenſe of what they felt. This is the ſtate of things which pleaſes our Author; and, by praiſing that Government, which depriv'd thoſe who were under it of all that is moſt deſirable in the world, and introduc'd all that ought to be deteſted, he ſufficiently ſhews that he delights only in that which is moſt abominable, and would introduce his admir'd Abſo⯑lute Monarchy, only as an Inſtrument of bringing Vice, Miſery, De⯑vaſtation and Infamy upon Mankind.

SECT. XV. The Empire of Rome perpetually decay'd when it fell into the hands of one Man.

IN purſuance of his Deſign our Author, with as much Judgment as Truth, denies that Rome became Miſtreſs of the World under the Popular Government: It is not ſo, ſays he, for Rome began her Empire under Kings, and did perfect it under Emperors: It did only increaſe under that Popularity: Her greateſt exaltation was under Trajan, and longeſt Peace under Auguſtus. For the illuſtration of which, I deſire theſe few things may be conſider'd.

1. That the firſt Monarchy of Rome was not abſolute: The Kings were made by the People without regard to any Man's Title, or other rea⯑ſon than the common Good, chuſing him that ſeem'd moſt likely to procure it; ſetting up at the ſame time a Senat conſiſting of a hundred of the moſt eminent Men among them; and, after the reception of the Sabins into the City, adding as many more to them, and committing the principal part of the Government to their care, retaining the power of making thoſe Laws to which the Kings who reign'd by their Command were ſub⯑ject, and reſerving to themſelves the Judgment of all great Matters upon Appeal. If any of their Kings deſerv'd to be call'd a Monarch, according to Filmer's Definition, it was the laſt Tarquin; for he alone of all their [...]. L [...]v. l. 2.Kings reign'd not juſſu Populi, but came in by Treachery and Murder. If he had continu'd, he had cur'd the People of all Vices proceeding from Wantonneſs; but his fartheſt Conqueſt was of the ſmall Town of Gabii ten miles diſtant from Rome, which he effected by the fraud of his deteſta⯑ble Son; and that being then the utmoſt limit of the Roman Empire, muſt deſerve to be call'd the World, or the Empire of it was not gain'd by their Kings.

2. The Extent of Conqueſts is not the only, nor the chief thing that ought to be conſider'd in them; regard is to be had to the Means whereby they are made, and the Valour or Force that was employ'd by the Ene⯑my. [109] In theſe reſpects not only the overthrow of Carthage, and the Con⯑queſts of Spain, but the Victorys gain'd againſt the Sabins, Latins, Tuſ⯑cans, Samnites, and other valiant Nations of Italy, who moſt obſtinately defended their Liberty, when the Romans had no Forces but their own, ſhew more Vertue, and deſerve incomparably more Praiſe, than the De⯑feats of any Nations whatſoever, when they were increas'd in Number, Riches, Reputation and Power, and had many other warlike People iuſtruc⯑ted in their Diſciplin, and fighting under their Enſigns. But I deny that the Romans did ever make any conſiderable acquiſition after the loſs of their Liberty. They had already ſubdu'd all Italy, Greece, Macedon, the Iſlands of the Mediterranean Sea, Thracia, Illyrium, Aſia the Leſs, Pontus, Armenia, Syria, Egypt, Africa, Gaul and Spain. The Forces of Germany were broken; a Bridg laid over the Rhine, and all the Countrys on this ſide ſubdu'd. This was all that was ever gain'd by the Valour of their own Forces, and that could bring either Honour or Profit. But I know of no Conqueſt made after that time, unleſs the name of Conqueſt be gi⯑ven to Caligula's Expedition, when he ſaid he had ſubdu'd the Sea, in making an uſeleſs Bridg from Puteoli to Baiae; or that of the other Fool, who enter'd Rome in triumph, for having gather'd ſhells on the Sea⯑ſhore. Trajan's Expedition into the Eaſt, was rather a Journy than a War: He rambled over the Provinces that Auguſtus had abandon'd as not worth keeping, and others that had nothing to defend them, but ill⯑arm'd and unwarlike Barbarians: Upon the whole matter, he ſeems to have bin led only by Curioſity; and the vanity of looking upon them as Conqueſts, appears in their being relinquiſh'd as ſoon as gain'd. Britain was eaſily taken from a naked and unskilful, tho a brave People; hardly kept, and ſhamefully loſt. But tho the Emperors had made greater Wars than the Commonwealth, vanquiſh'd Nations of more valour and skill than their Italian Neighbours, the Grecians or Carthaginians; ſub⯑du'd and ſlaughter'd thoſe that in Numbers and Ferocity had exceeded the Cimbri, Gauls and Teutons, encounter'd Captains more formidable than Pirrhus and Hannibal, it might indeed increaſe the Glory of him that ſhould have done it, but could add nothing of Honour or Advantage to the Roman Name: The Nobility was extirpated long before, the People corrupted and enſlav'd, Italy lay deſolate, ſo as a Roman was hardly to be found in a Roman Army, which was generally compos'd of ſuch, as fight⯑ing for themſelves or their Commander, never thought of any thing leſs than the Intereſt of Rome. And as it is impoſſible that what is ſo neglected and betray'd, ſhould be durable, that Empire which was acquir'd by the Valour and Conduct of the braveſt and beſt diſciplin'd People of the World, decay'd and periſh'd in the hands of thoſe Abſolute Monarchs who ought to have preſerv'd it.

3. Peace is deſirable by a State that is conſtituted for it, who contenting themſelves with their own Territorys, have no deſires of enlarging them: Or perhaps it might ſimply deſerve praiſe, if Mankind were ſo fram'd, that a People intending hurt to none, could preſerve themſelves; but the World being ſo far of another temper, that no Nation can be ſafe without Valour and Strength, thoſe Governments only deſerve to be commended, which by Diſciplin and Exerciſe increaſe both, and the Roman above all, that excel'd in both. Peace therefore may be good in its ſeaſon, and was ſo in Numa's Reign; yet two or three ſuch Kings would have encou⯑rag'd ſome active Neighbours to put an end to that aſpiring City, be⯑fore its Territory had extended beyond Fidenae. But the Diſciplin that [110] beſt agreed with the Temper and Deſigns of a Warlike People, being renew'd by his brave Succeſſors, the Dangers were put on their Enemys; and all of them, the laſt only excepted, perſiſting in the ſame way, did reaſonably well perform their Duty. When they were remov'd, and the Affairs of the City depended no longer upon the Temper or Capacity of one Man, the ends for which the City was conſtituted were vigorouſly purſu'd, and ſuch Magiſtrats annually choſen, as would not long continue in a univerſal Peace, till they had gotten the Empire to which they aſpir'd, or were by ill Fortune brought to ſuch weakneſs, as to be no longer able to make War. Both of theſe happen'd in the ſo much magnify'd Reign of Augustus. He found the Empire ſo great, that all Additions might rationally be rejected as uſeleſs or prejudicial; and Italy ſo exhauſted, that Wars could only be carry'd on by the ſtrength of Strangers: It was time to lie ſtill when they had no power to act; and they might do it ſafely, whilſt the Reputation gain'd by former Victorys preſerv'd them from Foreign Invaſions. When Craſſus, Pompey, and Ceſar, who had torn the Commonwealth into three Monarchys, were kill'd, and the Flower of the Roman Nobility and People deſtroy'd with them, or by them: When Cato's Vertue had prov'd too weak to ſupport a falling State, and Brutus with Caſſius had periſh'd in their noble Attempt to reſtore their Liberty: When the beſt part of the Senat had bin expos'd for a Prey to the Vulturs and Wolves of Theſſaly, and one hundred and thirty of thoſe who de⯑ſerv'd the hatred of Tyrants, and had eſcap'd the fury of War, had bin deſtroy'd by the Proſcriptions: When neither Captains nor Soldiers remain'd in the deſolate City; when the Tyrant abhor'd and fear'd all thoſe who had either Reputation or Vertue, and by the moſt ſubtil Arts endeavour'd ſo to corrupt or break the Spirits of the remaining People, that they might not think of their former Greatneſs, or the ways of re⯑covering it, we ought not to wonder that they ceas'd from War. But ſuch a Peace is no more to be commended, than that which Men have in the Grave; as in the Epitaph of the Marqueſs Trivultio ſeen at Milan, Qui nunquam quievit, quieſcit, tace. This Peace is in every Wilderneſs: The Turks have eſtabliſh'd it in the empty Provinces of Aſia and Greece. Where there are no men, or if thoſe men have no Courage, there can be no War. Our Anceſtors the Britans obſerv'd, that the Peace which in that Age the Romans eſtabliſh'd in the Provinces, conſiſted in the moſt C. Tacit.wretched ſlavery and ſolitude: Miſerrimam ſervitutem pacem appellant. And in another place, Solitudinem faciunt, pacem vocant. This is the Peace the Spaniards ſettled in their Dominions of the Weſt-Indies, by the deſtruction of above Barth. de las Caſas, de⯑ſtruy [...]. de las Indias.forty millions of Souls. The Countrys were ve⯑ry quiet, when wild Beaſts only were left to fight in them, or a few mi⯑ſerable Wretches, who had neither ſtrength nor courage to reſiſt their violence. This was the Peace the Romans enjoy'd under Auguſtus: A few of thoſe who made themſelves ſubſervient to his Pleaſure, and Mini⯑ſters of the publick Calamitys, were put into a flouriſhing condition; but the reſt pin'd, wither'd, and never recover'd. If yet our Author will have us to think the Liberty and People of Rome oblig'd to Auguſtus, who procur'd ſuch a Peace for them, he ought to remember that beſides what they ſuffer'd in ſettling it, they paid dear for it even in the future; for Italy was thereby ſo weaken'd, as never to recover any ſtrength or ver⯑tue to deſend it ſelf; but depending abſolutely upon barbarous Nations, or Armys compos'd of them, was ravag'd and torn in pieces by every In⯑vader.

[111] 4. That Peace is only to be valu'd which is accompany'd with Juſtice; and thoſe Governments only deſerve praiſe, who put the Power into the hands of the beſt Men. This was wholly wanting during the Reigns of Auguſtus and his Succeſſors. The worſt of men gain'd the Sovereignty by Alliance, Fraud, or Violence, and advanc'd ſuch as moſt reſembled themſelves. Auguſtus was worſe in the beginning than in the latter end of his Reign; but his bloody and impure Succeſſor grew every day more wicked as long as he liv'd: Whilſt he ſat upon the Rocks at Capreae with his Chaldeans, he meditated nothing but Luſt or Miſchief, and had Sejanus and Macro always ready to execute his deteſtable Deſigns. Cali⯑gula could find none equal to himſelf in all manner of Villanys; but ſa⯑vour'd thoſe moſt who were likeſt to him. Claudius his ſtupidity, drun⯑kenneſs, and ſubjection to the fury of two impudent Strumpets, and manumis'd Slaves, prov'd as hurtful to the Empire, as the ſavage fury of his Predeceſſor. Tho Nero was a Monſter that the World could not bear, yet the raging Soldiers kill'd Galba, and gave the Empire to Otho for no other reaſon, than that he had bin the Companion of his De⯑bauches, and of all men was thought moſt to reſemble him. With them all Evils came in like a Flood; and their Succeſſors finding none ſo bad as themſelves, but the Favorites, Whores and Slaves that govern'd them, would ſuffer no Vertue to grow up; and fill'd the City with a baſe, leud, and miſerable Rabble, that car'd for nothing beyond Stage-plays and Bread. Such a People could not be ſeditious; but Rome had bin deſo⯑late, if they had not thus fill'd it. And tho this temper and condition of a People may pleaſe our Author; yet it was an incurable Wound to the State, and in conſequence to the beſt part of the World.

When the City had bin burnt by the Gauls, it was ſoon reſtor'd: The Defeats of Ticinum, Trebia, Thraſimene, and Cannae, were repair'd with equal or greater Victorys: The War of the Allies ended in their over⯑throw: The Fury of the Gladiators was extinguiſh'd with their Blood: The Commonwealth loſt Battels, but was never conquer'd in any War: and in the end triumph'd over all that had contended with them. Whilſt Liberty continu'd, it was the Nurſe of Vertue; and all the Loſſes ſuf⯑fer'd in Foreign or Civil Wars, were eaſily recover'd: but when Liber⯑ty was loſt, Valour and Vertue was torn up by the roots, and the Roman Power proceeding from it, periſh'd.

I have not dwelt ſo long upon this point to expoſe the folly of our Au⯑thor, but to ſhow that the abovemention'd Evils did proceed from a per⯑manent cauſe, which will always produce the like effects; and Hiſtorys teſtify, that it has done the ſame in all places. Carthage was rebuilt, af⯑ter i [...] had bin deſtroy'd by Scipio, and continu'd to be a rich City for al⯑moſt a thouſand years, but produc'd no ſuch Men as Amilcar, Aſdrubal and Hannibal: Cleomenes and Euclidas were the laſt that deſerv'd to be call'd Spartans: Athens never had an eminent Man, after it felt the weight of the Macedonian Yoke, and Philopemen was the laſt of the Achaians. Tho the Commonwealths of Italy in later Ages, having too much apply'd themſelves to the acquiſition of Mony, wanted that greatneſs of Spirit which had reign'd in their Anceſtors, yet they have not bin without Valour and Vertue. That of Piſa was famous for Power at Sea, till the Genoeſes overthrew them. Florence had a brave Nobility, and a ſtout People. Arezzo, Piſtoia, Cortona, Sienna, and other ſmall Towns of Tuſcany, were not without ſtrength, tho for the moſt part unhappily ex⯑ercis'd in the Factions of Ghibelins and Guelphs, Neri and Bianchi, that [112] divided all Italy; but ſince the introduction of Filmer's divine Abſolute Monarchy, all Power, Vertue, Reputation and Strength, are utterly periſh'd from among them, and no man dares to oppoſe the publick Miſ⯑chiefs. They uſually decide private Quarrels by Aſſaſſination or Poiſon; and in other reſpects they enjoy the happineſs of that Peace which is al⯑ways found within empty Walls and deſolated Countrys: And if this be according to the Laws of God and Nature, it cannot be deny'd, that Weakneſs, Baſeneſs, Cowardice, Deſtruction and Deſolation are ſo likewiſe. Theſe are the Bleſſings our well-natur'd Author would confer upon us; but if they were to be eſteem'd ſo, I cannot tell why thoſe that felt them, com⯑plain'd ſo much of 'em. Tacitus reciting what paſt in his time, and ſomewhat before (for want of a Chriſtian Spirit) in the bitterneſs of [...]. Tacit. l. 1.his Soul ſays, Nec unquam atrocioribus Populi Romani cladibus, magiſque juſtis indiciis probatum eſt, non eſſe curae Deis ſecuritatem noſtram eſſe ultio⯑nem. Some thought that no Puniſhments could be juſtly deſerv'd by a People that had ſo much favour'd Vertue; others, that even the Gods they ador'd, envied their Felicity and Glory; but all confeſs'd they were fallen from the higheſt pitch of human Happineſs into the loweſt degree of Infamy and Miſery: And our Author being the firſt that ever found they had gain'd by the change, we are to attribute the diſcovery of ſo great a Spirit to the excellency of his Wiſdom. If, ſuſpending my Judgment in this point, till it be prov'd by better Authority than his word, I in the mean time follow the opinion of thoſe who think Slavery dos naturally produce meanneſs of Spirit, with its worſt effect, flattery, which Tacitus calls foedum ſervitutis crimen; I muſt believe, that the Im⯑pudence of carrying it to ſuch a height, as to commend nothing in the moſt glorious Liberty, that made the moſt vertuous People in the world, but the ſhortneſs of its continuance, and to prefer the Tyran⯑ny of the baſeſt of Men, or worſt of Monſters, is peculiar to Filmer; and that their wickedneſs, which had never bin equal'd, is ſurpaſt by him, who recommends as the Ordinance of God, the Principles that cer⯑tainly produce them.

But, ſays our Author, tho Rome was for a while miraculouſly upheld in Glory by a greater Prudence than its own, yet in a ſhort time, after manifold Alterations, ſhe was ruin'd by her own hand. But 'tis abſurd to ſay, that the overthrow of a Government, which had nothing of good in it, can be a ruin; or that the Glory in which it continu'd, had nothing of good in it; and moſt of all, that it could be ruin'd by no hands but its own, if that Glory had not bin gain'd, and immediately or inſtrumentally ſupported by ſuch vertue and ſtrength as is worthily to be prefer'd before all other temporal Happineſs, and dos ever produce it. This ſhews that Liars ought to have good memorys. But paſſing over ſuch fooliſh Contradicti⯑ons, I deſire to know, how that Prudence, greater than its own (which till I am better inform'd, I muſt think to be inſeparably united to Juſtice and Goodneſs) came miraculouſly to ſupport a Government, which was not only evil in it ſelf, as contrary to the Laws of God and Nature; but ſo perpetually bent againſt that Monarchy, which he ſays is according to them, as to hate all Monarchs, deſpiſe all that would live under them, deſtroy as many of them as came within their reach; and make a Law by which any man was authoris'd to kill him, who ſhould endeavour to ſet up this Divine Power among them. Moreover, no human Prudence pre⯑ſerv'd the Roman Glory but their own: the others directly ſet themſelves to oppoſe it, and the moſt eminent fell under it. We know of no Pru⯑dence [113] ſurpaſſing the human, unleſs it be the Divine: But the Divine Prudence did never miraculouſly exert it ſelf, except to bear witneſs to the Truth, and to give authority to thoſe that announc'd it. If therefore the Glory of this Popular Government was miraculouſly ſupported by a more than human Prudence, it was good in it ſelf; the Miracles done in favour of it did teſtify it, and all that our Author ſays againſt it is falſe and abominable.

If I lay aſide the word Miraculous, as put in by chance, 'twill be hard to know how God (who in the uſual courſe of his Providence guides all things by ſuch a gentle and undiſcern'd Power, that they ſeem to go on of themſelves) ſhould give ſuch vertue to this popular Government, and the Magiſtrats bred up under it, that the greateſt Monarchs of the Earth were as duſt before them, unleſs there had bin an excellency in their Diſciplin, far ſurpaſſing that of their Enemys; or how that can be call'd ill in its Principle, and ſaid to comprehend no good, which God did ſo gloriouſly ſupport, and no man was ever able to reſiſt. This can⯑not be better anſwer'd than by our Author's Citation, Suis & ipſa Roma viribus ruit; That City which had overthrown the greateſt Powers of the World muſt, in all appearance, have laſted for ever, if their Vertue and Diſciplin had not decay'd, or their Forces bin turn'd againſt them⯑ſelves. If our Author therefore ſay true, the greateſt good that ever be⯑fel the Romans, was the decay of their Vertue and Diſciplin; and the turning of their own Arms againſt themſelves, was not their Ruin but their Preſervation.

When they had brought the warlike Nations of Italy into ſubjection, or aſſociation; often repreſt the fury of the Gauls, Cimbri and Teutons; overthrown the Wealth, Power and Wit of Carthage, ſupported by the Skill, Induſtry and Valour of Hannibal and his brave Relations; almoſt extirpated the valiant Spaniards, who would no other way be ſubdu'd; defeated Philip, Perſes, Antiochus, Gentius, Syphax and Jugurtha; ſtruck an aw into Ptolomy; avoided the ſnares and poiſons of Mithridates; fol⯑low'd him in his Flights, reveng'd his Treacherys, and carry'd their vic⯑torious Arms beyond his conquer'd Kingdoms to the Banks of Tygris: When neither the Revolt of their Italian Aſſociats, nor the Rebellion of their Slaves led by Spartacus (who in skill ſeems to have bin equal to Hannibal, and above him in Courage) could put a ſtop to their Victorys: When Greece had bin reduc'd to yield to a Vertue rather than a Power greater than their own, we may well ſay that Government was ſuppor⯑ted by a more than human prudence, which led them thro Vertue to a height of Glory, Power and Happineſs, that till that day had bin un⯑known to the World, and could never have bin ruin'd, if by the decay of that Vertue they had not turn'd their victorious Arms againſt them⯑ſelves. That City was a Giant that could die by no other hand than his own; like Hercules poiſon'd and driven into madneſs, after he had de⯑ſtroy'd Thieves, Monſters and Tyrants, and found nothing on the Earth able to reſiſt him. The wiſeſt of men in antient times, looking upon this as a point of more than human Perfection, thought or feign'd to think, that he was deſcended from the Gods, and at his death receiv'd into their number, tho perhaps Filmer would prefer a weak, baſe and effeminate Slave before him. The matter will not be much different, if we adhere to the foremention'd ſimilitude of the Athletick Habit; for the danger proceeds only from the perfection of it, and he who diſlikes it, muſt commend that Weakneſs and Vice which may periſh, but can ne⯑ver [114] be chang'd into any thing worſe than it ſelf, as thoſe that lie upon the ground can never fall. However this Fall of the Romans, which our Author, ſpeaking truth againſt his will, calls their Ruin, was into that which he recommends as the Ordinance of God: Which is as much as to ſay, that they were ruin'd when they fell from their own unnatural In⯑ventions to follow the Law of God and of Nature; that Luxury alſo thro which they fell, was the product of their Felicity; and that the Na⯑tions that had bin ſubdu'd by them, had no other way of avenging their Defeats, than by alluring their Maſters to their own Vices: This was the Root of their Civil Wars. When that proud City found no more reſi⯑ſtance, it grew ^* wanton. Honeſt Poverty became uneaſy, when Ho⯑nours were given to ill-gotten Riches. This was ſo Monarchical, that a People infected with ſuch a Cuſtom muſt needs fall by it. They who by Vice had exhauſted their Fortunes, could repair them only by bringing their Country under a Government that would give impunity to Rapine; and ſuch as had not Vertues to deſerve Advancement from the Senat and Peo⯑ple, would always endeavour to ſet up a Man that would beſtow the Honours due to Vertue, upon thoſe who would be moſt abjectly ſubſer⯑vient to his Will and Intereſts. When mens minds are fill'd with this Fury, they ſacrifice the common Good to the advancement of their pri⯑vate Concernments. This was the temper of Catiline expreſt by Salluſt, Salluſt. Bell. Catilin. Luxuria principi gravis, paupertas vix à privato toleranda; and this put him upon that deſperate extremity to ſay, Incendium meum ruinâ extin⯑guam. Others in the ſame manner being fill'd with the ſame rage, he could not want Companions in his moſt villanous Deſigns. 'Tis not long ſince a Perſon of the higheſt Quality, and no leſs famous for Learning and Wit, having obſerv'd the State of England, as it ſtood not many years ago, and that to which it has bin reduc'd ſince the year ſixty, as is thought very much by the Advice and Example of France, ſaid, That they were now taking a moſt cruel Vengeance upon us for all the Over⯑throws receiv'd from our Anceſtors, by introducing their moſt damna⯑ble Maxims, and teaching us the worſt of their Vices. 'Tis not for me to determin whether this Judgment was rightly made or not; for I intend not to ſpeak of our Affairs: but all Hiſtorians agreeing, that the change of the Roman Government was wrought by ſuch means as I have mention'd; and our Author acknowledging that change to have bin their ruin, as in truth it was, I may juſtly conclude, that the overthrow of that Government could not have bin a ruin to them, but good for them, unleſs it had bin good; and that the Power which did ruin it, and was ſet up in the room of it, cannot have bin according to the Laws of God or Nature, for they confer only that which is good, and deſtroy nothing that is ſo; but muſt have bin moſt contrary to that good which was over⯑thrown by it.

SECT. XVI. The beſt Governments of the World have bin compos'd of Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy.

OUR Author's cavils concerning I know not what vulgar Opinions that Democracys were introduc'd to curb Tyranny, deſerve no an⯑ſwer; for our queſtion is, Whether one form of Government be pre⯑ſcrib'd to us by God and Nature, or we are left according to our own un⯑derſtanding, to conſtitute ſuch as ſeem beſt to our ſelves. As for Demo⯑cracy, he may ſay what pleaſes him of it; and I believe it can ſute only with the convenience of a ſmall Town, accompany'd with ſuch Circum⯑ſtances as are ſeldom ſound. But this no way obliges men to run into the other extreme, in as much as the variety of Forms between mere Demo⯑cracy and Abſolute Monarchy is almoſt infinite: And if I ſhould under⯑take to ſay, there never was a good Government in the world, that did not conſiſt of the three ſimple Species of Monarchy, Ariſtocracy and Democracy, I think I might make it good. This at the leaſt is certain, that the Government of the Hebrews inſtituted by God, had a Judg, the great Sanhedrin, and General Aſſemblys of the People: Sparta had two Kings, a Senat of twenty eight choſen Men, and the like Aſſemblys: All the Dorian Citys had a chief Magiſtrat, a Senat, and occaſional Aſſem⯑blys: The Ionian, Athens, and others, had an Archon, the Areopagi; and all Judgments concerning matters of the greateſt importance, as well as the Election of Magiſtrats, were refer'd to the People. Rome in the be⯑ginning had a King and a Senat, whilſt the Election of Kings, and Judg⯑ments upon Appeals remain'd in the People; afterwards Conſuls repre⯑ſenting Kings, and veſted with equal Power, a more numerous Senat, and more frequent meetings of the People. Venice has at this day a Duke, the Senat of the Pregadi, and the Great Aſſembly of the Nobility, which is the whole City, the reſt of the Inhabitants being only Incolae, not Cives; and thoſe of the other Citys or Countrys are their Subjects, and do not participate of the Government. Genoa is govern'd in like man⯑ner: Luca not unlike to them. Germany is at this day govern'd by an Emperor, the Princes or great Lords in their ſeveral Precincts, the Citys by their own Magiſtrats, and by general Diets, in which the whole Pow⯑er of the Nation reſides, and where the Emperor, Princes, Nobility, and Citys have their places in perſon, or by their Deputys. All the Nor⯑thern Nations, which upon the diſſolution of the Roman Empire poſſeſt the beſt Provinces that had compos'd it, were under that form which is uſually call'd the Gothick Polity: They had King, Lords, Commons, Diets, Aſſemblys of Eſtates, Cortez, and Parliaments, in which the So⯑vereign Powers of thoſe Nations did reſide, and by which they were exer⯑cis'd. The like was practis'd in Hungary, Bohemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland; and if things are chang'd in ſome of theſe places within a few years, they muſt give better proofs of having gain'd by the change than are yet ſeen in the World, before I think my ſelf oblig'd to change my opinion.

Some Nations not liking the name of King, have given ſuch a power as Kings enjoy'd in other places to one or more Magiſtrats, either limited [116] to a certain time, or left to be perpetual, as beſt pleas'd themſelves: Others approving the Name, made the Dignity purely elective. Some have in their Elections principally regarded one Family as long as it laſt⯑ed: Others conſider'd nothing but the fitneſs of the Perſon, and re⯑ſerv'd to themſelves a Liberty of taking where they pleas'd. Some have permitted the Crown to be hereditary as to its ordinary courſe; but reſtrain'd the Power, and inſtituted Officers to inſpect the Proceedings of Kings, and to take care that the Laws were not violated: Of this ſort were the Ephori of Sparta, the Maires du Palais, and afterwards the Con⯑ſtable of France; the Juſticia in Arragon; the Rijcſhofmeiſter in Denmark; the High Steward in England; and in all places ſuch Aſſemblys as are be⯑fore mention'd under ſeveral names, who had the Power of the whole Na⯑tion. Some have continu'd long, and it may be always in the ſame form; others have chang'd it: Some being incens'd againſt their Kings, as the Romans exaſperated by the Villanys of Tarquin, and the Tuſcans by the Crueltys of Mezentius, aboliſh'd the name of King: Others, as Athens, Sici⯑on, Argos, Corinth, Thebes, and the Latins, did not ſtay for ſuch extremitys; but ſet up other Governments when they thought it beſt for themſelves, and by this conduct prevented the evils that uſually fall upon Nations, when their Kings degenerate into Tyrants, and a Nation is brought to en⯑ter into a War by which all may be loſt, and nothing can be gain'd which was not their own before. The Romans took not this ſalutary Courſe; the miſchief was grown up before they perceiv'd, or ſet themſelves againſt it; and when the effects of Pride, Avarice, Cruelty and Luſt were grown to ſuch a height, that they could no longer be endur'd, they could not free themſelves without a War: and whereas upon other occa⯑ſions their Victorys had brought them increaſe of Strength, Territory, and Glory; the only reward of their Vertue in this was, to be deliver'd from a Plague they had unadviſedly ſuffer'd to grow up among them. I confeſs this was moſt of all to be eſteem'd; for if they had bin over⯑thrown, their condition under Tarquin would have bin more intolerable than if they had fallen under the power of Pirrhus or Hannibal; and all their following Proſperity was the fruit of their recover'd Liberty: But it had bin much better to have reform'd the State after the death of one of their good Kings, than to be brought to fight for their Lives againſt that abo⯑minable Tyrant. Our Author in purſuance of his averſion to all that is good, diſapproves this; and wanting reaſons to juſtify his diſlike, accor⯑ding to the cuſtom of Impoſtors and Cheats, has recourſe to the ugly terms of a Back-door, Sedition, and Faction: as if it were not as juſt for a People to lay aſide their Kings when they receive nothing but evil, and can rationally hope for no benefit by them, as for others to ſet them up in expectation of good from them. But if the truth be examin'd, nothing will be found more orderly than the changes of Government, or of the Perſons and Races of thoſe that govern'd, which have bin made by many Nations. When Pharamond's Grandſon ſeem'd not to deſerve the Crown he had worn, the French gave it to Meroveus, who more reſembled him in Vertue: In proceſs of time when this Race alſo degenerated, they were rejected, and Pepin advanc'd to the Throne; and the moſt remote in blood of his Deſcendents having often bin prefer'd before the neareſt, and Baſtards before the legitimate Iſſue, they were at laſt all laid aſide; and the Crown remains to this day in the Family of Hugh Capet, upon whom it was beſtow'd on the rejection of Charles of Lorrain. In like manner the Caſtilians took Don Sancho ſirnam'd the Brave, ſecond Son to Alphonſo the [117] Wiſe, before Alphonſo el Deſheredado, Son of the elder Brother Ferdinand. The States of Arragon prefer'd Martin, Brother to John the firſt, before Mary his Daughter marry'd to the Count de Foix, tho Females were not excluded from the Succeſſion; and the Houſe of Auſtria now enjoys that Crown from Joan Daughter to Ferdinand. In that and many other King⯑doms, Baſtards have bin advanc'd before their legitimate Brothers. Hen⯑ry Count of Traſtamara, Baſtard to Alphonſo XI. King of Caſtile, receiv'd the Crown as a reward of the good Service he had done to his Country againſt his Brother Peter the Cruel, without any regard had to the Houſe of La Cerda deſcended from Alphonſo el Deſheredado, which to this day never enjoy'd any greater honour than that of Duke de Medina Celi. Not long after the Portugueſe conceiving a diſlike of their King Ferdinand, and his Daughter marry'd to John King of Caſtile, rejected her and her Uncle by the Father's ſide, and gave the Crown to John a Knight of Cala⯑trava, and Baſtard to an Uncle of Ferdinand their King. About the begin⯑ning of this age the Swedes depos'd their King Sigiſmund for being a Papiſt, and made Charles his Uncle King. Divers Examples of the like nature in England have bin already mention'd. All theſe tranſportations of Crowns were Acts perform'd by Aſſemblys of the three Eſtates in the ſeveral King⯑doms, and theſe Crowns are to this day enjoy'd under Titles deriv'd from ſuch as were thus brought in by the depoſition or rejection of thoſe, who according to deſcent of blood had better Titles than the preſent Poſ⯑ſeſſors. The Acts therefore were lawful and good, or they can have no Title at all; and they who made 'em, had a juſt power ſo to do.

If our Author can draw any advantage from the reſemblance of Re⯑gality that he finds in the Roman Conſuls and Athenian Archons, I ſhall without envy leave him the enjoyment of it; but I am much miſtaken if that dos not prove my aſſertion, that thoſe Governments were compos'd of the three ſimple ſpecies: for if the Monarchical part was in them, it cannot be deny'd that the Ariſtocratical was in the Senat or Areopagi, and the Democratical in the People. But he ought to have remember'd, that if there was ſomething of Monarchical in thoſe Governments when they are ſaid to have bin Popular, there was ſomething of Ariſtocratical and De⯑mocratical in thoſe that were call'd Regal; which juſtifys my propoſition on both ſides, and ſhews that the denomination was taken from the part that prevail'd: and if this were not ſo, the Governments of France, Spain, and Germany might be call'd Democracys, and thoſe of Rome and Athens Monarchys, becauſe the People have a part in the one, and an image of Monarchy was preſerv'd in the other.

If our Author will not allow the caſes to be altogether equal, I think he will find no other difference, than that the Conſuls and Archons were regularly made by the Votes of the conſenting People, and orderly re⯑ſign'd their Power, when the time was expir'd for which it was given; whereas Tarquin, Dionyſius, Agathocles, Nabis, Phalaris, Ceſar, and al⯑moſt all his Succeſſors, whom he takes for compleat Monarchs, came in by violence, fraud, and corruption, by the help of the worſt men, by the ſlaughter of the beſt, and moſt commonly (when the method was once eſtabliſh'd) by that of his Predeceſſor, who, if our Author ſays true, was the Father of his Country, and his alſo. This was the root and foundation of the only Government that deſerves praiſe: this is that which ſtampt the divine character upon Agathocles, Dionyſius and Ceſar, and that had beſtow'd the ſame upon Manlius, Marius, or Catiline, if they had gain'd the Monarchys they affected. But I ſuppoſe that ſuch as [118] God has bleſt with better judgment, and a due regard to Juſtice and Truth, will ſay, that all thoſe who have attain'd to ſuch greatneſs as de⯑ſtroys all manner of good in the places where they have ſet up themſelves by the moſt deteſtable Villanys, came in by a backdoor; and that ſuch Magiſtrats as were orderly choſen by a willing People, were the true Shep⯑herds who came in by the gate of the Sheepfold, and might juſtly be call'd the Miniſters of God, ſo long as they perform'd their duty in pro⯑viding for the good of the Nations committed to their charge.

SECT. XVII. Good Governments admit of Changes in the Superſtructures, whilſt the Foundations remain unchangeable.

IF I go a ſtep farther, and confeſs the Romans made ſome changes in the outward Form of their Government, I may ſafely ſay they did well in it, and proſper'd by it. After the Expulſion of the Kings, the Power was chiefly in the Nobility, who had bin Leaders of the People; but it was neceſſary to humble them, when they began to preſume too much upon the advantages of their Birth; and the City could never have bin great, unleſs the Plebeians who were the Body of it, and the main ſtrength of their Armys, had bin admitted to a participation of Ho⯑nours. This could not be done at the firſt: They who had bin ſo vilely oppreſt by Tarquin, and haraſs'd with making or cleanſing Sinks, were not then fit for Magiſtracys, or the Command of Armys: but they could not juſtly be excluded from them, when they had men who in courage and conduct were equal to the beſt of the Patricians; and it had bin ab⯑ſurd for any man to think it a diſparagement to him to marry the Daugh⯑ter of one whom he had obey'd as Dictator or Conſul, and perhaps fol⯑low'd in his Triumph. Rome that was conſtituted for War, and ſought its Grandeur by that means, could never have arriv'd to any conſiderable height, if the People had not bin exercis'd in Arms, and their Spirits rais'd to delight in Conqueſts, and willing to expoſe themſelves to the greateſt fatigues and dangers to accompliſh them. Such men as theſe were not to be us'd like Slaves, or oppreſt by the unmerciful hand of Uſu⯑rers. They who by their ſweat and blood were to defend and enlarge the Territorys of the State, were to be convinc'd they fought for them⯑ſelves; and they had reaſon to demand a Magiſtracy of their own, veſted with a Power that none might offend, to maintain their Rights, and to protect their Familys whilſt they were abroad in the Armys. Theſe were the Tribuns of the People, made, as they call'd it, Sacroſancti or inviolable; and the creation of them was the moſt conſiderable Change that happen'd till the time of Marius, who brought all into diſorder. The creation or abolition of Military Tribuns with Conſular Power, ought to be accounted as nothing; for it imported little whether that Au⯑thority were exercis'd by two, or by five: That of the Decemviri was as little to be regarded: they were intended only for a Year; and tho new ones were created for another, on pretence the Laws they were to frame could not be brought to perfection in ſo ſhort a time, yet they were ſoon thrown down from the Power they uſurp'd, and endeavour'd to retain contrary to Law: The creation of Dictators was no novelty, they [119] were made occaſionally from the beginning, and never otherwiſe than occaſionally, till Julius Ceſar ſubverted all order, and invading that ſu⯑preme Magiſtracy by force ^*, uſurp'd the Right which belong'd to all. This indeed was a mortal Change even in root and principle. All other Magiſtrats had bin created by the People for the publick good, and al⯑ways were within the power of thoſe that had created them. But Ceſar coming in by force, ſought only the ſatisfaction of his own raging Ambi⯑tion, or that of the Soldiers, whom he had corrupted to deſtroy their Country; and his Succeſſors governing for themſelves by the help of the like Villains, perpetually expos'd the Empire to be ravag'd by them. But whatever opinion any man may have of the other Changes, I dare affirm, there are few or no Monarchys (whoſe Hiſtorys are ſo well known to us as that of Rome) which have not ſuffer'd Changes incompa⯑rably greater and more miſchievous than thoſe of Rome whilſt it was free. The Macedonian Monarchy fell into pieces immediately after the death of Alexander: 'Tis thought he periſh'd by Poiſon: His Wives, Children and Mother, were deſtroy'd by his own Captains: The beſt of thoſe who had eſcap'd his fury, fell by the Sword of each other. When the famous Argyraſpides might have expected ſome Reward of their labours, and a little reſt in old age, they were maliciouſly ſent into the Eaſt by An⯑tigonus, to periſh by hunger and miſery, after he had corrupted them to betray Eumenes. No better fate attended the reſt; all was in confuſion, every one follow'd whom he pleas'd, and all of them ſeem'd to be fill'd with ſuch a rage, that they never ceas'd from mutual ſlaughters till they were conſum'd; and their Kingdoms continu'd in perpetual Wars againſt each other, till they all fell under the Roman Power. The fortune of Rome was the ſame after it became a Monarchy: Treachery, Murder and Fury, reign'd in every part; there was no Law but Force; he that could corrupt an Army, thought he had a ſufficient Title to the Empire: by this means there were frequently three or four, and at one time thirty ſe⯑veral Pretenders, who call'd themſelves Emperors; of which number he only reign'd that had the happineſs to deſtroy all his Competitors; and he himſelf continu'd no longer than till another durſt attempt the deſtruction of him and his Poſterity. In this ſtate they remain'd, till the waſted and bloodleſs Provinces were poſſeſt by a multitude of barbarous Nations. The Kingdoms eſtabliſh'd by them enjoy'd as little Peace or Juſtice; that of France was frequently divided into as many parts as the Kings of Mero⯑veus or Pepin's Race had Children, under the names of the Kingdoms of Paris, Orleans, Soiſſons, Arles, Burgundy, Auſtraſia, and others: Theſe were perpetually vex'd by the unnatural fury of Brothers or neareſt Rela⯑tions, whilſt the miſerable Nobility and People were oblig'd to fight up⯑on their fooliſh Quarrels, till all fell under the power of the ſtrongeſt. This miſchief was in ſome meaſure cur'd by a Law made in the time of Hugh Capet, that the Kingdom ſhould no more be divided: But the Ap⯑panages, as they call them, granted to the King's Brothers, with the ſe⯑veral Dukedoms and Earldoms erected to pleaſe them and other great Lords, produc'd frequently almoſt as bad effects. This is teſtify'd by the deſperate and mortal Factions, that went under the names of Burgundy and Orleans, Armagnac and Orleans, Montmorency and Guiſe: Theſe were fol⯑low'd by thoſe of the League, and the Wars of the Hugonots: They [120] were no ſooner finiſh'd by the taking of Rochel, but new ones began by the Intrigues of the Duke of Orleans, Brother to Lewis the 13th, and his Mother; and purſu'd with that animoſity by them, that they put them⯑ſelves under the protection of Spain: To which may be added, that the Houſes of Conde, Soiſſons, Montmorency, Guiſe, Vendoſme, Angouleme, Bouillon, Rohan, Longueville, Rochefocault, Epernon, and I think I may ſay every one that is of great eminency in that Kingdom, with the Citys of Paris, Bourdeaux, and many others, in the ſpace of theſe laſt fifty years, have ſided with the perpetual Enemys of their own Country.

Again, other great Alterations have happen'd within the ſame King⯑dom: The Races of Kings four times wholly chang'd: Five Kings de⯑pos'd in leſs than 150 Years after the death of Charles the Great: The Offices of Maire du Palais, and Conſtable, erected and laid aſide: The great Dukedoms and Earldoms, little inferior to Sovereign Principalitys, eſtabliſh'd and ſuppreſt: The deciſion of all Cauſes, and the execution of the Laws, plac'd abſolutely in the hands of the Nobility, their Deputys, Seneſchals, or Vice-Seneſchals, and taken from them again: Parliaments ſet up to receive Appeals from the other Courts, and to judg ſovereignly in all caſes, expreſly to curb them: The Power of theſe Parliaments, af⯑ter they had cruſh'd the Nobility, brought ſo low, that within the laſt twenty years they are made to regiſter, and give the Power of Laws, to Edicts, of which the Titles only are read to them; and the General Aſ⯑ſemblys of Eſtates, that from the time of Pepin had the Power of the Nation in their hands, are now brought to nothing, and almoſt forgotten.

Tho I mention theſe things, 'tis not with a deſign of blaming them, for ſome of them deſerve it not; and it ought to be conſider'd, that the Wiſdom of man is imperfect, and unable to foreſee the Effects that may proceed from an infinite variety of Accidents, which according to Emer⯑gences, neceſſarily require new Conſtitutions, to prevent or cure the miſ⯑chiefs ariſing from them, or to advance a good that at the firſt was not thought on: And as the nobleſt work in which the Wit of man can be exercis'd, were (if it could be done) to conſtitute a Government that ſhould laſt for ever, the next to that is to ſute Laws to preſent Exigences, and ſo much as is in the power of man to foreſee: And he that ſhould reſolve to perſiſt obſtinately in the way he firſt enter'd upon, or to blame thoſe who go out of that in which their Fathers had walk'd, when they find it neceſſary, dos as far as in him lies, render the worſt of Errors perpetual. Changes therefore are unavoidable, and the Wit of man can go no farther than to inſtitute ſuch, as in relation to the Forces, Manners, Nature, Religion or Intereſts of a People and their Neighbours, are ſutable and adequate to what is ſeen, or apprehended to be ſeen: And he who would oblige all Nations at all times to take the ſame courſe, would prove as fooliſh as a Phyſician who ſhould apply the ſame Medicin to all Diſtempers, or an Architect that would build the ſame kind of Houſe for all Perſons, without conſidering their Eſtates, Dignitys, the number of their Children or Servants, the Time or Climate in which they live, and many other Circumſtances; or, which is, if poſſible, more ſottiſh, a General who ſhould obſtinately reſolve always to make War in the ſame way, and to draw up his Army in the ſame form, without examining the nature, number and ſtrength of his own and his Enemys Forces, or the advantages and diſadvantages of the Ground. But as there may be ſome univerſal Rules in Phyſick, Architecture and Military Diſciplin, from which men ought never to depart; ſo there are ſome in Politicks alſo, [121] which ought always to be obſerv'd: and wiſe Legiſlators adhering to them only, will be ready to change all others as occaſion may require, in order to the publick Good. This we may learn from Moſes, who laying the Foundation of the Law given to the Iſraelites in that Juſtice, Charity and Truth, which having its root in God, is ſubject to no change, left them the liberty of having Judges or no Judges, Kings or no Kings, or to give the Sovereign Power to High Prieſts or Captains, as beſt pleas'd themſelves; and the Miſchiefs they afterwards ſuffer'd, proceeded not ſimply from chang⯑ing, but changing for the worſe. The like judgment may be made of the Alterations that have happen'd in other places. They who aim at the publick Good, and wiſely inſtitute means proportionable and adequate to the attainment of it, deſerve praiſe; and thoſe only are to be diſlik'd, who either fooliſhly or maliciouſly ſet up a corrupt private Intereſt in one or a few men. Whoſoever therefore would judg of the Roman Changes, may ſee, that expelling the Tarquins, creating Conſuls, abating the vio⯑lence of Uſurers, admitting Plebeians to marry with the Patricians, ren⯑dring them capable of Magiſtracys, deducing Colonys, dividing Lands gain'd from their Enemys, erecting Tribuns to defend the Rights of the Commons, appointing the Decemviri to regulate the Law, and abrogating their Power when they abus'd it, creating Dictators and Military Tri⯑buns with a Conſular Power, as occaſions requir'd; they acted in the face of the Sun for the good of the Publick; and ſuch Acts having always produc'd Effects ſutable to the rectitude of their Intentions, they conſe⯑quently deſerve praiſe. But when another Principle began to govern, all things were chang'd in a very different manner: Evil Deſigns, tending only to the advancement of private Intereſts, were carry'd on in the dark by means as wicked as the end. If Tarquin when he had a mind to be King, poiſon'd his firſt Wife and his Brother, contracted an inceſtuous Mar⯑riage with his ſecond by the death of her firſt Husband, murder'd her Fa⯑ther and the beſt men in Rome, yet Ceſar did worſe: He favour'd Catiline and his villanous Aſſociats, brib'd and corrupted Magiſtrats; conſpir'd with Craſſus and Pompey; continu'd in the Command of an Army beyond the time preſcrib'd by Law, and turn'd the Arms with which he had bin intruſted for the ſervice of the Commonwealth, to the deſtruction of it; which was rightly repreſented by his Dream, that he had conſtuprated his Mother: In the like manner when Octavius, Antonius and Lepidus, divided the Empire, and then quarrel'd among themſelves; and when Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Veſpaſian ſet up Partys in ſeveral Provinces, all was manag'd with Treachery, Fraud and Cruelty; nothing was intended but the advancement of one Man, and the Recompence of the Villains that ſerv'd him: And when the Empire had ſuffer'd infinite Calamitys by pulling down or rejecting one, and ſetting up another, it was for the moſt part difficult to determin who was the worſt of the two; or whe⯑ther the prevailing ſide had gain'd or loſt by their Victory. The queſtion therefore upon which a Judgment may be made to the praiſe or diſpraiſe of the Roman Government, before or after the loſs of their Liberty, ought not to be, Whether either were ſubject to changes, for neither they nor any thing under the Sun was ever exempted from them; but whether the Changes that happen'd after the eſtabliſhment of Abſolute Power in the Emperors, did not ſolely proceed from Ambition, and tend to the publick Ruin: whereas thoſe Alterations related by our Author concern⯑ing Conſuls, Dictators, Decemviri, Tribunes and Laws, were far more rare, leſs violent, tending to, and procuring the publick Good, and there⯑fore [122] deſerving praiſe. The like having bin prov'd by the Examples of other Kingdoms, and might be farther confirm'd by many more, which on account of brevity I omit, is in my opinion ſufficient to manifeſt, that whilſt the Foundation and Principle of a Government remains good, the Superſtructures may be chang'd according to occaſions, without any pre⯑judice to it.

SECT. XVIII. Xenophon in blaming the Diſorders of Democracys, favours Ariſtocracys, not Monarchys.

IN the next place our Author introduces Xenophon diſallowing Popular Governments: Cites Rome and Athens as Places where the beſt Men thriv'd worſt, and the worſt beſt; and condemns the Romans for making it capital to paſs Sentence of Death, Baniſhment, loſs of Liberty, or Stripes upon any Citizen of Rome. But leſt his Fraud in this ſhould be detected, he cites no preciſe Paſſage of any Author, alledges few Examples, and thoſe miſtaken; never tells us what that Law was, when made, or where to be found: whereas I hope to prove, that he has upon the whole mat⯑ter abominably prevaricated, and advanc'd things that he knows to be either impertinent or falſe.

1. To this end we are in the firſt place to conſider, whether Xenophon ſpeaks of Popular Governments ſimply, or comparatively: if ſimply, 'tis confeſt that a pure Democracy can never be good, unleſs for a ſmall Town; if comparatively, we muſt examin to what he compares it: We are ſure it was not to Abſolute Monarchy; there was no ſuch thing a⯑mongſt the Greeks eſtabliſh'd by Law: The little Tyrants who had en⯑ſlav'd their own Countrys, as Jaſon, Phaereus, Phalaris, and the like, had no pretence to it, and were accounted as the worſt of Beaſts: None but ſuch as in all beſtiality were like to 'em, did ever ſpeak or think well of them. Xenophon's Opinion in this point, may be eaſily found out by what paſs'd between his Maſter Plato and the Sicilian Tyrant; and the matter will not be mended by referring to his own experience: He had ſeen the vaſt Monarchy of Perſia torn in pieces by the fury of two Bro⯑thers, and more than a million of men brought to fight upon their private quarrel: Inſtead of that Order, Stability and Strength which our Author aſcribes to Abſolute Monarchy as the effect of Wiſdom and Juſtice, he knew, that by filling one man with pride and cruelty, it brought unſpeak⯑able miſerys upon all others, and infected 'em with all the Vices that ac⯑company Slavery: Men liv'd like Fiſhes, the great ones devour'd the ſmall; and as appear'd by Tiſſaphernes, Pharnabazus, and others with whom he had to deal, the worſt and baſeſt were made to be the greateſt: The Satrapes inſulted over thoſe of meaner rank, with an inſolence and cruelty that equal'd the depth of their ſervil ſubmiſſion to their proud Maſter. Luxury and Avarice reign'd in all: many great Nations were made to live for the ſervice of one man, and to foment his Vices. This produc'd weakneſs and cowardice; no number of thoſe Slaves were able to ſtand againſt a few free Grecians. No man knew this better than Xe⯑nophon, who after the death of Cyrus the younger, and the treacherous murder of Clearchus, and other Officers that commanded the Greeks who [123] had ſerv'd him, made his retreat from Babylon to the Helleſpont with ten thouſand foot, and paſſed over the bellys of all that dar'd to oppoſe him. He would never have ſpent his life in exciting his Countrymen to at⯑tempt the Conqueſt of Aſia, nor perſuaded Ageſilaus to put himſelf at the head of the Enterprize, if he had thought there was ſuch admirable Order, Stability and Strength in that Monarchy, and in the Greeks no⯑thing but giddineſs of Spirit, and ſo much Learning as made them ſeditious: Nor could he, being a wiſe man and an excellent Captain, have conceiv'd ſuch a deſign, if he had not by experience found that Liberty inſpir'd his Countrymen with ſuch ſolid Vertue, and produc'd ſuch Stability, good Order and Strength, that with ſmall numbers of them he might hope to overthrow the vain Pomp of the Barbarians, and to poſſeſs himſelf of their Riches, tho they could bring more than a hundred men to fight againſt one; which Deſign being interrupted in his time by domeſtick Wars, was ſoon after his death accompliſh'd by Alexander.

But that Xenophon's meaning may be better underſtood, 'tis good to conſider, that he ſpoke of ſuch Governments as were then in uſe among the Greeks; which tho mix'd, yet took their denomination from the pre⯑vailing part: ſo that the Dorians, who plac'd the Power chiefly in the hands of a few choſen men, were ſaid to be govern'd Ariſtocratically; and the Ionians giving more Power to the common People, Democrati⯑cally: And he, tho an Ionian, either thro friendſhip to Ageſilaus, con⯑verſation with the Spartans, or for other reaſons beſt known to himſelf, prefer'd the Government of Sparta, or ſome other which he thought he could frame, and deſir'd to introduce, before that of Athens; as Cimon, Thucydides, and many other excellent men of that City are ſaid to have done: And if I acknowledg they were in the right, and that Athens was more ſubject to diſorder, and had leſs Stability than Sparta, I think it will be of little advantage to Abſolute Monarchy.

2. The Athenians did baniſh ſome worthy men, and put others to death; but our Author, like the Devil, never ſpeaking truth, unleſs to turn it into a lie, prevaricates in his report of them. The temporary ba⯑niſhment, which they call'd Oſtraciſm, was without hurt or diſhonour, never accounted as a Puniſhment, nor intended for any other end, than to put a ſtop to the too eminent greatneſs of a man, that might prove dange⯑rous to the City; and ſome excellent Perſons who fell under it, were ſoon recall'd, and brought home with glory. But I am not ſolicitous whether that reaſon be ſufficient to juſtify it or not: We are upon a general Theſis relating to the Laws of God and Nature; and if the Athenians, by a fancy of their own, did make an imprudent uſe of their Liberty, it can⯑not prejudice the publick Cauſe. They who make the worſt of it can only ſay, that by ſuch means they, for a time, depriv'd themſelves of the benefits they might have receiv'd from the Vertues of ſome excellent men, to the hurt of none but themſelves; and the application of it as an in⯑juſtice done to Themiſtocles, is abſolutely falſe: He was a man of great Wit, Induſtry and Valour, but of uncertain Faith, too much addicted to his Plut. in vit. Themiſt.own Intereſt, and held a moſt dangerous Correſpondence with the Per⯑ſians, who then threaten'd the deſtruction of Greece. Thro envy and ſpite to Ariſtides, and to increaſe his own Power, he rais'd dangerous Factions in the City, and being ſummon'd to render an account of his Pro⯑ceedings, he declin'd the Judgment of his Country, fled to their Enemys, and juſtly deſerv'd the Sentence pronounc'd againſt him. Some among them were unjuſtly put to death, and above all Socrates; but the People, [124] who, deceiv'd by falſe Witneſſes, (againſt whom neither the Laws of God or Man have ever preſcrib'd a ſufficient defence) had condemn'd him, did ſo much lament their Crime, when the truth was diſcover'd to them, that I doubt whether a more righteous Judgment had given bet⯑ter teſtimony of their righteous Intentions. But our Author's impudence appears in the higheſt exceſs, in imputing the death of Phocion to the po⯑pular State of Athens: Their Forces had bin broken in the Sicilian War; the City taken, and the principal Men ſlain by Lyſander; the remains of the moſt Worthy deſtroy'd by the thirty Tyrants ſet up by him; their ill-recover'd Liberty overthrown by the Macedonians, and the death of Phocion compaſt by Polyperchon, who with Foreign Soldiers, Slaves, Va⯑gabonds, and Outlaws, overpower'd the People.

The proceedings of Rome may be more compleatly juſtify'd: Coriola⯑nus was duly condemn'd, he ſet too great a price upon his own Valour, and arrogated to himſelf a Power in Rome, which would hardly have bin indur'd in Corioli: His violence and pride overbalanc'd his Services; and he that would ſubmit to no Law, was juſtly driven out from the So⯑ciety which could ſubſiſt only by Law. Quintius was not unlike him, and Manlius Capitolinus far worſe than either. Their Vertues were not to be conſider'd when they departed from them. Conſideration ought to be had of human frailty, and ſome indulgence may be extended to thoſe who commit Errors, after having done important Services; but a State cannot ſubſiſt, which compenſating evil Actions with good, gives impu⯑nity to the moſt dangerous Crimes, in remembrance of any Services whatever. He that dos well, performs his Duty, and ought always to do ſo: Juſtice and Prudence concur in this; and 'tis no leſs juſt than pro⯑fitable, that every Action be conſider'd by it ſelf, and ſuch a reward or puniſhment allotted to it, as in nature and proportion it beſt de⯑ſerves.

This, as I ſuppoſe, is enough for their Caſes; but relates not to thoſe of Mamercus, Camillus, Livius Salinator, and Emylius Paulus; their Ver⯑tue was compleat, they were wrongfully ſentenc'd. But the beſt Princes, Senat or People that ever was in the world, by the deceit of evil men, may and have bin drawn out of the way of Juſtice: Yet of all the States that are known to us, none was ever ſo free from Crimes of malice and wilful injuſtice; none was ever guilty of ſo few Errors as that of Rome; and none did ever give better teſtimonys of Repentance, when they were diſcover'd, than the Romans did by the Veneration they ſhew'd to thoſe worthy Perſons, and the Honors they confer'd upon them afterwards. [...] Liv. Mamercus was made Dictator, to repair the unjuſt mark of Infamy laid upon him by the Cenſors. Camillus being recall'd from his baniſhment, often enjoy'd the ſame honour, and died the moſt reverenc'd Man that had ever bin in that City. Livius Salinator was not only made Conſul after he had bin fin'd, but the People (as it were to expiate the guilt of having condemn'd him) ſuffer'd that aſperity of ſpeech and manners, which might have perſuaded ſuch as had bin leſs confident of his Vertue and their own, that he deſir'd to be reveng'd, tho it were with the ruin of the City. They dealt in the like manner with Paulus Emylius, repairing the injury of a Fine unduly impos'd. Their generoſity in leaving the Tri⯑buns in the Forum, with their Accuſation againſt Scipio Africanus, and following him to celebrate an annual Sacrifice in the Capitol, in comme⯑moration of his victory againſt Hannibal, was no leſs admirable than the greatneſs of his mind, who thought his Vertue ſhould be ſo well known, [125] that no account ought to be expected from him; which was an Error proceeding from a noble Root, but not to be born in a well-govern'd Commonwealth. The Laws that aim at the publick Good, make no di⯑ſtinction of Perſons; and none can be exempted from the Penaltys of them, otherwiſe than by approv'd Innocence, which cannot appear with⯑out a Trial: He that will not bend his mind to them, ſhakes off the e⯑quality of a Citizen, and uſurps a Power above the Law, to which no man ſubmits upon any other condition, than that none ſhould be exemp⯑ted from the power of it. And Scipio being the firſt Roman that thus diſdain'd the Power of the Law, I do not know whether the prejudice brought upon the City by ſo dangerous an Example, did not outweigh all the Services he had done: Nevertheleſs the people contented with his re⯑tirement to his own houſe, and afterwards convinc'd of his Innocence, would probably (if he had not dy'd in a few months) have brought him back with the Honours that Fate reſerv'd for his aſhes.

I do not at preſent remember any other eminent men, who can be ſaid in any reſpect to have thriv'd ill, whilſt the People and Senat of Rome acted freely; and if this be not ſufficient to clear the point, I deſire to know the names of thoſe worſt men that thriv'd beſt. If they may have bin judg'd to thrive, who were frequently advanc'd to the ſupreme Ma⯑giſtracys, and enjoy'd the chief Honors; I find no men ſo eminent as Brutus, Publicola, Quintius Cincinnatus, and Capitolinus, the two Fabii ſirnam'd Maximi, Corvinus, Torquatus, Camillus, and the like: and if theſe were the worſt Men that Rome produc'd in thoſe Ages, Valor, Wiſdom, Induſtry in the Service of their Country, and a moſt intire Love to it, muſt have bin the worſt of qualitys; and I preſume our Author may have thought them ſo, ſince they were invincible obſtacles to the in⯑troduction of that Divine Monarchy which Appius Claudius the Decem⯑vir, Manlius Capitolinus, Spurius Caſſius, Sp. Melius, and ſome others may be thought to have affected.

However, theſe inſtances are not to be underſtood as they are ſimply in themſelves, but comparatively with what has happen'd in other places under abſolute Monarchys: for our inquiry is not after that which is per⯑fect, well knowing that no ſuch thing is found among men; but we ſeek that human Conſtitution which is attended with the leaſt, or the moſt pardonable inconveniences. And if we find that in the ſpace of three hundred years, while the Senat, People, and legally created Magiſtrats govern'd Rome, not one worthy Man was put to death, not above five or ſix condemn'd to Fines by the beguil'd People, and thoſe injurys re⯑pair'd by the moſt honourable ſatisfaction that could be given; ſo that Vertue continu'd ever flouriſhing; the beſt men that could be found were put into the chief Commands, and the City was fill'd with more excel⯑lent men than were ever known to be in any other place: And on the other ſide, if the Emperors ſo ſoon as the Government was chang'd, made it their buſineſs to deſtroy the beſt, and ſo far ſucceeded in their deſign, that they left none; and never fail'd to advance the worſt, unleſs it fell out as to Queen Katherine de Medicis, who is ſaid never to have done any good but by miſtake, and ſome few may have prov'd better than was in⯑tended; it will appear, that our Author's Aſſertions are in the utmoſt de⯑gree falſe. Of this we need no better witneſs than Tacitus. The Civil Wars, and the Proſcriptions upon which he touches, are juſtly to be at⯑tributed to that Monarchy which was then ſetting up, the only queſtion being who ſhould be the Monarch, when the Liberty was already over⯑thrown. [126] And if any eminent Men eſcap'd, it was much againſt the will of thoſe who had uſurp'd the Power: He acknowledges his Hiſtorys to be a continu'd relation of the ſlaughter of the moſt illuſtrious Perſons, and that in the times of which he writes, Vertue was attended with certain deſtruction. After the death of Germanicus and his eldeſt Children, Vale⯑rius Aſiaticus, Seneca, Corbulo, and an infinite number more who were thought moſt to reſemble them, found this to be true at the expence of their lives: Nero, in purſuance of the ſame tyrannical deſign, murder'd Helvidius and Thraſeas, that he might ^* tear up Vertue by the roots: Domi⯑tian ſpar'd none willingly that had either Vertue or Reputation; and tho Trajan, with perhaps ſome other, might grow up under him in the re⯑mote Provinces, yet no good Man could eſcape who came under his eye, and was ſo eminent as to be obſerv'd by him. Whilſt theſe, who were thought to be the beſt Men that appear'd in the Roman Empire, did thrive in this manner, Sejanus, Macro, Narciſſus, Pallas, Tigellinus, Icetus, Vin⯑nius, Laco, and others like to 'em, had the power of the Empire in their hands. Therefore, unleſs Mankind has bin miſtaken to this day, and that theſe, who have hitherto bin accounted the worſt of Villains, were indeed the beſt Men in the world; and that thoſe deſtroy'd by them, who are thought to have bin the beſt, were truly the worſt, it cannot be deny'd that the beſt Men, during the Liberty of Rome, thriv'd beſt; that good Men ſuffer'd no indignity, unleſs by ſome fraud impos'd upon the well-meaning People; and that ſo ſoon as the Liberty was ſubverted, the worſt men thriv'd beſt. The beſt Men were expos'd to ſo many Calami⯑tys and Snares, that it was thought a matter of great wonder to ſee a vertuous man die in his bed: and if the account were well made, I think it might appear, that every one of the Emperors before Titus ſhed more noble and innocent Blood, than Rome and all the Commonwealths in the world have done, whilſt they had the free enjoyment of their own Liber⯑ty. But if any man in favour of our Author ſeeks to diminiſh the vaſt diſproportion between the two differing ſorts of Government, and imputes the diſorders that happen'd in the time of the Gracchi, and others, whilſt Rome was ſtrugling for her Liberty, to the Government of a Common⯑wealth, he will find them no more to be compar'd with thoſe that fell out afterwards, than the railings of a turbulent Tribune againſt the Senat, to the Villanys and Crueltys that corrupted and diſpeopl'd the Provinces from Babylon to Scotland. And whereas the State never fail'd to recover from any diſorders, as long as the Root of Liberty remain'd untouch'd, and became more powerful and glorious than ever, even after the Wars of Marius and Sylla; when that was deſtroy'd, the City fell into a lan⯑guiſhing condition, and grew weaker and weaker, till that and the whole Empire was ruin'd by the Barbarians.

3. Our Author, to ſhew that his memory is as good as his judgment, having repreſented Rome in the times of Liberty as a publick Slaughter⯑houſe, ſoon after blames the clemency of their Laws: whereas 'tis impoſſible that the ſame City could at the ſame time be guilty of thoſe contrary ex⯑tremitys; and no leſs certain, that it was perfectly free from them both. Salluſt. Bell. Catilin.His aſſertion ſeems to be grounded upon Ceſar's Speech (related by Salluſt) in favour of Lentulus and Cethegus Companions of Catiline: but tho he there endeavour'd to put the beſt colour he could upon their cauſe, it ſig⯑nify'd only thus much, that a Roman Citizen could not be put to death, [127] without being heard in publick; which Law will diſpleaſe none that in underſtanding and integrity may not be compar'd to Filmer and his Fol⯑lowers. 'Tis a folly to extend it farther; for 'tis eaſily prov'd that there was always a power of putting Citizens to death, and that it was exer⯑cis'd when occaſion requir'd. The Laws were the ſame in the time of the Kings, when that Office was executed by Conſuls, excepting ſuch changes as are already mention'd. The Lex perduellionis cited by Livy in the caſe of Horatius who had kill'd his Siſter, continu'd in force from the foundation to the end of that Government: the condemnation was to death, the words of the Sentence theſe, Caput obnubito, infelici arbore reſte ſuſpendito; verberato intra Pomaerium vel extra Pomaerium. He was try'd by this Law upon an appeal made to the People by his Father, and abſolv'd admiratione magis virtutis quam jure cauſae; which could not have bin, if by the Law no Citizen might be put to death. The Sons of Brutus were condemn'd to death in publick, and executed with the Aquilii and Vitellii their Companions in the ſame Conſpiracy: Manlius Capitolinus was put to death by the vote of the People: Titus Manlius by the command of his Father Torquatus, for fighting without order: Two Legions were decimated by Appius Claudius: Spurius Melius refu⯑ſing to appear before the Dictator, was kill'd by Servilius Ahala General of the Horſe, and pronounc'd jure caeſum: Quintus Fabius was by Papi⯑rius the Dictator condemn'd to die, and could not have bin ſav'd but by the interceſſion and authority of the People. If this be not ſo, I de⯑ſire to be inform'd what the Senat meant by condemning Nero to be put to death more majorum, if more majorum no Citizen might be put to death: Why the Conſuls, Dictators, Military Tribuns, Decemviri, caus'd Rods and Axes to be carry'd before them, as well within as with⯑out the City, if no uſe was to be made of 'em. Were they only vain Badges of a Power never to be executed; or upon whom was the Supreme Power ſignify'd by them, to be exercis'd within and without the City, if the Citizens were not ſubject to it? 'Tis ſtrange that a man who had ever read a Book of matters relating to the Affairs of Rome, ſhould fancy theſe things; or hope to impoſe them upon the World, if he knew them to be fooliſh, falſe, and abſurd. But of all the marks of a moſt ſupine ſtupi⯑dity that can be given by a man, I know none equal to this of our Au⯑thor, who in the ſame Clauſe wherein he ſays no Citizen could be put to death or baniſh'd, adds, that the Magiſtrats were upon pain of death forbidden to do it; for if a Magiſtrate might be put to death for baniſhing a Citizen, or cauſing him to be executed, a Citizen might be put to death; for the Magiſtrats were not Strangers, but Citizens. If this was not ſo, he muſt think that no Crime was capital, but the puniſhment of capital Crimes; or that no man was ſubject to the Supreme Power, but he that was created for the execution of it. Yet even this will not ſtop the gap; for the Law that condemn'd the Magiſtrate to die, could be of no effect, if there were no man to execute it; and there could be none if the Law prohibited it, or that he who did it was to die for it: And this goes on to infinity. For if a Magiſtrate could not put a Citizen to death, I ſuppoſe a Citizen could not put to death a Magiſtrate; for he alſo is a Citizen. So that upon the whole matter we may conclude, that Malice is blind, and that Wickedneſs is Madneſs. 'Tis hard to ſay more in praiſe of Popular Governments than will reſult from what he ſays againſt them: his reproaches are Praiſes, and his Praiſes reproaches. As Government is inſtituted for the preſervation of the Governed, the Romans were ſparing [128] of Blood, and are wiſely commended by Livy for it: Nulli unquam Popu⯑lo mitiores placuere poenae; which gentleneſs will never be blam'd, unleſs by thoſe who are pleas'd with nothing ſo much as the fury of thoſe Mon⯑ſters, who with the ruin of the beſt part of Mankind, uſurp'd the domi⯑nion of that glorious City. But if the Romans were gentle in puniſhing Offences, they were alſo diligent in preventing them: the excellence of their Diſciplin led the Youth to Vertue, and the Honors they receiv'd for recompence confirm'd them in it. By this means many of 'em became Laws to themſelves; and they who were not the moſt excellent, were yet taught ſo much of good, that they had a veneration for thoſe they could not equal, which not only ferv'd to incite them to do well accord⯑ing to their Talents, but kept them in ſuch a w as to fear incurring their ill opinion by any bad action, as much as by the penalty of the Law. This integrity of manners made the Laws as it were uſeleſs; and whilſt they ſeem'd to ſleep, ignorant perſons thought there were none: But their Diſciplin being corrupted by Proſperity, thoſe Vices came in which made way for the Monarchy; and Wickedneſs being plac'd in the Throne, there was no ſafety for any but ſuch as would be of the ſame ſpirit, and the Empire was ruin'd by it.

SECT. XIX. That Corruption and Venality which is natural to Courts, is ſeldom found in Popular Governments.

OUR Author's next work is, with that modeſty and truth which is natural to him, to impute Corruption and Venality to Common⯑wealths. He knows that Monarchys are exempted from thoſe evils, and has diſcover'd this truth from the integrity obſerv'd in the modern Courts of England, France, and Spain, or the more antient of Rome and Perſia: But after many falſhoods in matter of fact, and miſrepreſentations of that which is true, he ſhews that the Corruption, Venality, and Violence he blames, were neither the effects of Liberty, nor conſiſtent with it. Cneius Manlius, who with his Aſiatic Army brought in the Luxury that gave birth to thoſe miſchiefs, did probably follow the looſeneſs of his own diſpoſition; yet the beſt and wiſeſt men of that time knew from the be⯑ginning that it would ruin the City, unleſs a ſtop might be put to the courſe of that evil: But they who had ſeen Kings under their feet, and could no longer content themſelves with that equality which is neceſſary among Citizens, fomented it as the chief means to advance their am⯑bitious deſigns. Tho Marius was rigid in his nature, and car'd nei⯑ther for Mony nor ſenſual Pleaſures, yet he favour'd thoſe Vices in others, and is ſaid to be the firſt that made uſe of 'em to his advantage. Catiline was one of the leudeſt men in the world, and had no other way of com⯑paſſing his deſigns than by rendring others as bad as himſelf: and Ceſar ſet up his Tyranny by ſpreading that corruption farther than the others had bin able to do; and tho he, Caligula, and ſome others were ſlain, yet the beſt men found it as impoſſible to reſtore Liberty to the City when it was corrupted, as the worſt had done to ſet up a Tyranny whilſt the inte⯑grity of their manners did continue. Men have a ſtrange propenſity to run into all manner of exceſſes, when plenty of means invite, and there [129] is no power to deter; of which the ſucceeding Emperors took advantage, and knowing that even their ſubſiſtence depended upon it, they thought themſelves oblig'd by intereſt as well as inclination to make Honors and Preferments the rewards of Vice: and tho it be not always true in the utmoſt extent that all men follow the example of the King; yet it is of great effica⯑cy: Tho ſome are ſo good that they will not be perverted, and others ſo bad that they will not be corrected; yet a great number dos always follow the courſe that is favour'd and rewarded by thoſe that govern. There were Idolaters doubtleſs among the Jews in the days of David and Heze⯑kiah; but they proſper'd better under Jeroboam and Ahab: England was not without Papiſts in the time of Queen Elizabeth; but they thriv'd much better during the Reign of her furious Siſter. Falſe Witneſſes and Accu⯑ſers had a better trade under Tiberias, who call'd them Cuſtodes Legum, than under Trajan who abhor'd them; and Whores, Players, and Fid⯑lers, with other ſuch Vermin, abounded certainly more when encourag'd by Nero, than when deſpis'd by Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius. But as every one of theſe manifeſted what he was by thoſe he favor'd or pu⯑niſh'd, and that a man can only be judg'd by his principles or practices, he that would know whether abſolute Monarchys or mix'd Govern⯑ments do moſt foment or puniſh Venality and Corruption, ought to ex⯑amin the principle and practice of both, and compare them one with the other.

As to the Principle, the above-mention'd Vices may be profitable to ptivate men, but they can never be ſo to the Government, if it be popu⯑lar or mix'd: No People was ever the better for that which renders them weak or baſe; and a duly created Magiſtracy, governing a Nation with their conſent, can have no intereſt diſtinct from that of the Publick, or deſire to diminiſh the ſtrength of the People, which is their own, and by which they ſubſiſt. On the other ſide, the abſolute Monarch who go⯑verns for himſelf, and chiefly ſeeks his own preſervation, looks upon the ſtrength and bravery of his Subjects as the root of his greateſt danger, and frequently deſires to render them weak, baſe, corrupt, and unfaithful to each other, that they may neither dare to attempt the breaking of the Yoke he lays upon them, nor truſt one another in any generous deſign for the recovery of their Liberty. So that the ſame corruption which pre⯑ſerves ſuch a Prince, if it were introduc'd by a People, would weaken, if not utterly deſtroy them.

Again, all things have their continuance from a principle in Nature ſu⯑table to their Original: all Tyrannys have had their beginnings from cor⯑ruption. The Hiſtorys of Greece, Sicily, and Italy, ſhew that all thoſe who made themſelves Tyrants in ſeveral places, did it by the help of the worſt, and the ſlaughter of the beſt: Men could not be made ſubſervient to their Luſts whilſt they continu'd in their integrity; ſo as their buſineſs was to deſtroy thoſe who would not be corrupted. They muſt therefore endeavour to maintain or increaſe the corruption by which they attain their greatneſs: If they fail in this point, they muſt fall as Tarquin, Piſiſtratus, and others have done; but if they ſucceed ſo far that the vi⯑cious part do much prevail, the Government is ſecure, tho the Prince may be in danger. And the ſame thing dos in a great meaſure accidentally conduce to the ſafety of his Perſon: For they who for the moſt part are the Authors of great Revolutions, not being ſo much led by a particular hatred to the Man, as by a deſire to do good to the Publick, ſeldom ſet themſelves to conſpire againſt the Tyrant, unleſs he be altogether deteſta⯑ble [130] and intolerable, if they do not hope to overthrow the Tyranny.

The contrary is ſeen in all popular and well-mix'd Governments: they are ever eſtabliſh'd by wiſe and good men, and can never be upheld other⯑wiſe than by Vertue: The worſt men always conſpiring againſt them, they muſt fall, if the beſt have not power to preſerve them. Whereſo⯑ever therefore a People is ſo govern'd, the Magiſtrats will obviate afar off the introduction of Vices, which tend as much to the ruin of their Perſons and Government, as to the preſervation of the Prince and his. This is evidenc'd by experience. 'Tis not eaſy to name a Monarch that had ſo many good qualitys as Julius Ceſar, till they were extinguiſh'd by his Ambition, which was inconſiſtent with them: He knew that his ſtrength lay in the corruption of the People, and that he could not accom⯑pliſh his deſigns without increaſing it. He did not ſeek good men, but ſuch as would be for him; and thought none ſufficiently addicted to his Intereſts, but ſuch as ſtuck at the performance of no wickedneſs that he commanded: he was a Soldier according to Ceſar's heart who ſaid,

And leſt ſuch as were devoted to him ſhould grow faint in Villany, he induſtriouſly inflam'd their fury:

Having ſpread this Poiſon amongſt the Soldiers, his next work was by cor⯑rupting the Tribuns to turn that Power to the deſtruction of the People, which had bin erected for their preſervation; and pouring the Treaſures he had gain'd by rapine in Gaul into the Boſom of Curio, made him an inſtrument of miſchief, who had bin a moſt eminent Supporter of the Laws. Tho he was thought to have affected the glory of ſparing Cato, and with trouble to have found that he deſpis'd life when it was to be ac⯑counted his gift; yet in ſuſpecting Brutus and Caſſius, he ſhew'd he could not believe that vertuous men who lov'd their Country could be his Friends. Such as carry on the like deſigns with leſs Valor, Wit, and Generoſity of Spirit, will always be more bitterly bent to deſtroy all that are good, knowing that the deformity of their own Vices is render'd moſt manifeſt, when they are compar'd with the good qualitys of thoſe who are moſt unlike them; and that they can never defend themſelves againſt the ſcorn and hatred they incur by their Vices, unleſs ſuch a num⯑ber can be infected with the ſame, and made to delight in the recompences of iniquity that foment them, as may be able to keep the reſt of the Peo⯑ple in ſubjection.

The ſame thing happens even when the Uſurpation is not ſo violent as that of Agathocles, Dionyſius, or the laſt King of Denmark, who in one day by the ſtrength of a mercenary Soldiery overthrew all the Laws of his Country: and a lawfully created Magiſtrate is forc'd to follow the ſame ways as ſoon as he begins to affect a Power which the Laws do not confer upon him. I wiſh I could ſay there were few of theſe; but experience ſhews that ſuch a proportion of Wiſdom, moderation of Spirit, and Juſtice is requir'd in a ſupreme Magiſtrate, to render him content with a [131] limited Power, as is ſeldom found. Man is of an aſpiring nature, and apt to put too high a value upon himſelf; they who are rais'd above their Brethren, tho but a little, deſire to go farther; and if they gain the name of King, they think themſelves wrong'd and degraded, when they are not ſuffer'd to do what they ^* pleaſe. In theſe things they never want Maſters; and the nearer they come to a Power that is not eaſily reſtrain'd by Law, the more paſſionately they deſire to aboliſh all that oppoſes it: and when their Hearts are fill'd with this fury, they never fail to chuſe ſuch Miniſters as will be ſubſervient to their Will: and this is ſo well known, that thoſe only approach them who reſolve to be ſo. Their in⯑tereſts as well as their inclinations incite them to diffuſe their own manners as far as they can, which is no leſs than to bring thoſe who are under their power to all that wickedneſs of which the nature of man is capable; and no greater teſtimony can be given of the efficacy of theſe means towards the utter corruption of Nations, than the accurſed effects we ſee of 'em in our own and the neighboring Countrys.

It may be ſaid that ſome Princes are ſo full of Vertue and Goodneſs, as not to deſire more power than the Laws allow, and are not oblig'd to chuſe ill men, becauſe they deſire nothing but what the beſt are willing to do. This may be, and ſometimes is: the Nation is happy that has ſuch a King; but he is hard to find, and more than a human Power is requir'd to keep him in ſo good a way. The ſtrength of his own affections will ever be againſt him: Wives, Children, and Servants will always join with thoſe Enemys that ariſe in his own breaſt to pervert him: if he has any weak ſide, any Luſt unſubdu'd, they will gain the victory. He has not ſearch'd into the nature of Man, who thinks that any one can reſiſt when he is thus on all ſides aſſaulted: Nothing but the wonderful and im⯑mediate power of God's Spirit can preſerve him; and to alledg it will be nothing to the purpoſe, unleſs it can be prov'd that all Princes are bleſt with ſuch an aſſiſtance, or that God has promis'd it to them and their Succeſſors for ever, by what means ſoever they came to the Crowns they enjoy.

Nothing is farther from my intention than to ſpeak irreverently of Kings; and I preſume no wiſe man will think I do ſo, if I profeſs, that having obſerv'd as well as I can what Hiſtory and daily Experience teach us concerning the Vertues and Religions that are or have bin from the be⯑ginning of the World encourag'd and ſupported by Monarchs, the me⯑thods they have follow'd ſince they have gone under the name of Chriſtians, their moral as well as theological Graces, together with what the Scriptures tell us of thoſe who in the laſt days will principally ſupport the Throne of Antichriſt; I cannot be confident that they are generally in an extraordina⯑ry manner preſerv'd by the hand of God from the Vices and Frailtys to which the reſt of mankind is ſubject. If no man can ſhew that I am in this miſtaken, I may conclude, that as they are more than any other men in the world expos'd to temptations and ſnares, they are more than any in danger of being corrupted, and made Inſtruments of corrupting others, if they are no otherwiſe defended than the reſt of men.

This being the ſtate of the matter on both ſides, we may eaſily collect, that all Governments are ſubject to corruption and decay; but with this difference, that Abſolute Monarchy is by principle led unto, or rooted [132] in it; whereas mix'd or popular Governments are only in a poſſibility of falling into it: As the firſt cannot ſubſiſt, unleſs the prevailing part of the people be corrupted; the other muſt certainly periſh, unleſs preſerv'd in a great meaſure free from Vices. And I doubt whether any better reaſon can be given, why there have bin and are more Monarchys than popular Governments in the world, than that Nations are more eaſily drawn into corruption than defended from it; and I think that Monarchy can be ſaid to be natural in no other ſenſe, than that our deprav'd Nature is moſt in⯑clin'd to that which is worſt.

To avoid unneceſſary Diſputes, I give the name of Popular Govern⯑ments to thoſe of Rome, Athens, Sparta, and the like, tho improperly, unleſs the ſame may alſo be given to many that are uſually called Monar⯑chys, ſince there is nothing of violence in either; the Power is confer'd upon the chief Magiſtrats of both by the free conſent of a willing People, and ſuch a part as they think fit is ſtill retain'd and executed in their own Aſſemblys; and in this ſenſe it is that our Author ſeems to ſpeak againſt them. As to Popular Government in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, (that is pure De⯑mocracy, where the People in themſelves, and by themſelves, perform all that belong to Government) I know of no ſuch thing; and if it be in the World, have nothing to ſay for it. In aſſerting the Liberty, generally, as I ſuppoſe, granted by God to all mankind, I neither deny, that ſo ma⯑ny as think fit to enter into a Society, may give ſo much of their Power as they pleaſe to one or more men, for a time or perpetually, to them and their Heirs, according to ſuch Rules as they preſcribe; nor approve the Diſorders that muſt ariſe if they keep it intirely in their own hands. And looking upon the ſeveral Governments, which under different forms and names have bin regularly conſtituted by Nations, as ſo many undeniable Te⯑ſtimonys, that they thought it good for themſelves and their Poſterity ſo to do, I infer, that as there is no man who would not rather chuſe to be go⯑vern'd by ſuch as are juſt, induſtrious, valiant and wiſe, than by thoſe that are wicked, ſlothful, cowardly and fooliſh; and to live in ſociety with ſuch as are qualify'd like thoſe of the firſt ſort, rather than with thoſe who will be ever ready to commit all manner of Villanys, or want experience, ſtrength or courage, to join in repelling the Injurys offer'd by others: So there are none who do not according to the meaſure of their underſtand⯑ing, endeavour to ſet up thoſe who ſeem to be beſt qualify'd, and to pre⯑vent the introduction of thoſe Vices which render the Faith of the Ma⯑giſtrate ſuſpected, or make him unable to perform his duty, in providing for the execution of Juſtice, and the publick defence of the State againſt Foreign or Domeſtick Enemys. For as no man who is not abſolutely mad, will commit the care of a Flock to a Villain, that has neither skill, diligence, nor courage to defend them, or perhaps is maliciouſly ſet to de⯑ſtroy them, rather than to a ſtout, faithful, and wiſe Shepherd; 'tis leſs to be imagin'd that any would commit the ſame error in relation to that Soci⯑ety which comprehends himſelf with his Children, Friends, and all that is dear to him.

The ſame Conſiderations are of equal force in relation to the Body of every Nation: For ſince the Magiſtrate, tho the moſt perfect in his kind, cannot perform his duty, if the people be ſo baſe, vicious, effeminate and cowardly, as not to ſecond his good Intentions; thoſe who expect good from him, cannot deſire ſo to corrupt their Companions that are to help him, as to render it impoſſible for him to accompliſh it. Tho I believe there have bin in all Ages bad men in every Nation, yet I doubt whether there was [133] one in Rome, except a Catiline or a Ceſar who deſign'd to make themſelves Tyrants, that would not rather have wiſh'd the whole People as brave and vertuous as in the time of the Carthaginian Wars, than vile and baſe as in the days of Nero and Domitian. But 'tis madneſs to think, that the whole Body would not rather wiſh to be as it was when Vertue flou⯑riſh'd and nothing upon Earth was able to reſiſt their power, than weak, miſerable, baſe, ſlaviſh, and trampled under foot by any that would in⯑vade them; and forc'd as a Chattel to become a prey to thoſe that were ſtrongeſt. Which is ſufficient to ſhew, that a People acting according to the liberty of their own Will, never advance unworthy men, unleſs it be by miſtake, nor willingly ſuffer the introduction of Vices: Whereas the Abſolute Monarch always prefers the worſt of thoſe who are addicted to him, and cannot ſubſiſt unleſs the prevailing part of the People be baſe and vicious.

If it be ſaid, that thoſe Governments in which the Democratical part governs moſt, do more frequently err in the choice of men, or the means of preſerving that purity of Manners which is requir'd for the well-being of a People, than thoſe wherein Ariſtocracy prevails; I confeſs it, and that in Rome and Athens the beſt and wiſeſt men did for the moſt part incline to Ariſtocracy. Xenophon, Plato, Ariſtotle, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, and others, were of this ſort: But if our Author there ſeek Pa⯑trons for his Abſolute Monarchy, he will find none but Phalaris, Agatho⯑cles, Dionyſius, Catiline, Cethegus, Lentulus, with the corrupted Crew of mercenary Raſcals, who did, or endeavor'd to ſet 'em up. Theſe are they quibus ex honeſto nulla eſt ſpes; they abhor the Dominion of the Law, becauſe it curbs their Vices, and make themſelves ſubſervient to the Luſts of a man who may nouriſh them. Similitude of Intereſts, Manners, and Deſigns, is a link of Union between them: Both are Enemys to po⯑pular and mix'd Government; and thoſe Governments are Enemys to them, and by preſerving Vertue and Integrity, oppoſe both; know⯑ing, that if they do not, they and their Governments muſt certainly pe⯑riſh.

SECT. XX. Man's natural love to Liberty is temper'd by Reaſon, which originally is his Nature.

THAT our Author's Book may appear to be a heap of Incongrui⯑tys and Contradictions, 'tis not amiſs to add to what has already bin obſerv'd, that having aſſerted Abſolute Monarchy to be the only natu⯑ral Government, he now ſays, that the nature of all People is to deſire Li⯑berty without reſtraint. But if Monarchy be that Power which above all reſtrains Liberty, and ſubjects all to the Will of one; this is as much as to ſay, that all People naturally deſire that which is againſt Nature; and by a wonderful exceſs of extravagance and folly to aſſert contrary Propo⯑ſitions, that on both ſides are equally abſurd and falſe. For as we have already prov'd that no Government is impos'd upon men by God or Na⯑ture, 'tis no leſs evident, that Man being a rational Creature, nothing can be univerſally natural to him, that is not rational. But this Liberty without reſtraint being inconſiſtent with any Government, and the [134] Good which man naturally deſires for himſelf, Children and Friends, we find no place in the world where the Inhabitants do not enter into ſome kind of Society or Government to reſtrain it: and to ſay that all men deſire Liberty without reſtraint, and yet that all do reſtrain it, is ridi⯑culous. The truth is, man is hereunto led by Reaſon which is his Na⯑ture. Every one ſees they cannot well live aſunder, nor many together, without ſome Rule to which all muſt ſubmit. This ſubmiſſion is a re⯑ſtraint of Liberty, but could be of no effect as to the Good intended, un⯑leſs it were general; nor general, unleſs it were natural. When all are born to the ſame freedom, ſome will not reſign that which is their own, unleſs others do the like: This general conſent of all to reſign ſuch a part of their Liberty as ſeems to be for the good of all, is the voice of Na⯑ture, and the act of Men (according to natural Reaſon) ſeeking their own Good: And if all go not in the ſame way, according to the ſame form, 'tis an evident teſtimony that no one is directed by Nature; but as a few or many may join together, and frame ſmaller or greater Societys, ſo thoſe Societys may inſtitute ſuch an order or form of Government as beſt pleaſes themſelves; and if the ends of Government are obtain'd, they all equally follow the voice of Nature in conſtituting them.

Again, if man were by nature ſo tenacious of his Liberty without re⯑ſtraint, he muſt be rationally ſo. The creation of Abſolute Monarchys, which intirely extinguiſhes it, muſt neceſſarily be moſt contrary to it, tho the people were willing; for they thereby abjure their own Nature. The uſurpation of them can be no leſs than the moſt abominable and out⯑rageous violation of the Laws of Nature that can be imagin'd: The Laws of God muſt be in the like meaſure broken; and of all Govern⯑ments, Democracy, in which every man's Liberty is leaſt reſtrain'd, be⯑cauſe every man has an equal part, would certainly prove to be the moſt juſt, rational and natural; whereas our Author repreſents it as a perpe⯑tual ſpring of diſorder, confuſion and vice. This conſequence would be unavoidable, if he ſaid true; but it being my fate often to differ from him, I hope to be excus'd if I do ſo in this alſo, and affirm, that nothing but the plain and certain dictates of Reaſon can be generally applicable to all men as the Law of their Nature; and they who, according to the beſt of their underſtanding provide for the good of themſelves and their Poſterity, do all equally obſerve it. He that inquires more exactly into the matter may find, that Reaſon enjoins every man not to arrogate to himſelf more than he allows to others, nor to retain that Liberty which will prove hurtful to him; or to expect that others will ſuffer themſelves to be reſtrain'd, whilſt he, to their prejudice, remains in the exerciſe of that freedom which Nature allows. He who would be exempted from this common Rule, muſt ſhew for what reaſon he ſhould be rais'd above his Brethren; and if he dos it not, he is an enemy to them. This is not Popularity, but Tyranny; and Tyrants are ſaid exuiſſe hominem, to throw off the Nature of men, becauſe they do unjuſtly and unreaſonably aſ⯑ſume to themſelves that which agrees not with the frailty of human Na⯑ture, and ſet up an Intereſt in themſelves contrary to that of their Equals, which they ought to defend as their own. Such as favour them are like to them; and we know of no Tyranny that was not ſet up by the worſt, nor of any that have bin deſtroy'd, unleſs by the beſt of men. The ſe⯑veral Tyrannys of Syracuſe were introduc'd by Agathocles, Dionyſius, Hieronymus, Hippocrates, Epicides, and others, by the help of lend, diſ⯑ſolute, mercenary Villains; and overthrown by Timoleon, Dion, Theo⯑dorus, [135] and others, whoſe Vertues will be remember'd in all ages. Theſe, and others like to them, never ſought liberty without reſtraint, but ſuch as was reſtrain'd by Laws tending to the publick Good; that all might concur in promoting it, and the unruly deſires of thoſe who affected Power and Honours which they did not deſerve might be repreſt.

The like was ſeen in Rome: When Brutus, Valerius, and other ver⯑tuous Citizens had thrown out the leud Tarquins, they truſted to their own innocence and reputation; and thinking them ſafe under the pro⯑tection of the Law, contented themſelves with ſuch Honors as their Countrymen thought they deſerv'd. This would not ſatisfy the diſſo⯑lute crew that us'd to be ^*companions to the Tarquins. I cannot ſay that either of theſe ſought a Liberty without reſtraint; for the vertuous were willing to be reſtrain'd by the Law, and the vicious to ſubmit to the Will of a man, to gain impunity in offending. But if our Author ſays true, the licentious fury of theſe leud young men, who endeavour'd to ſubvert the Conſtitution of their Country to procure the impunity of their own Crimes, would have bin more natural, that is more reaſonable than the ordinary proceedings of the moſt vertuous, who deſir'd that the Law might be the rule of their Actions, which is moſt abſurd.

The like vicious Wretches have in all times endeavour'd to put the Power into the hands of one man, who might protect 'em in their Villanys, and advance 'em to exorbitant Riches or undeſerv'd Honors; whilſt the beſt men truſting in their Innocence, and deſiring no other Riches or Pre⯑ferments than what by their Equals they were thought to deſerve, were contented with a due Liberty, under the protection of a juſt Law: and I muſt tranſcribe the Hiſtorys of the World, or at leaſt ſo much of them as concerns the Tyrannys that have bin ſet up or caſt down, if I ſhould here inſert all the proofs that might be given of it. But I ſhall come nearer to the point, which is not to compare Democracy with Monarchy, but a regular mix'd Government with ſuch an Abſolute Monarchy, as leaves all to the will of that Man, Woman, or Child, who happens to be born in the reigning Family, how ill ſoever they may be qualify'd. I deſire thoſe who are lovers of Truth to conſider, whether the wiſeſt, beſt, and braveſt of Men, are not naturally led to be pleas'd with a Go⯑verment that protects them from receiving wrong, when they have not the leaſt inclination to do any? Whether they who deſire no unjuſt ad⯑vantage above their Brethren, will not always deſire that a People or Se⯑nat conſtituted as that of Rome, from the expulſion of Tarquin to the ſetting up of Ceſar, ſhould rather judg of their Merit, than Tarquin, Ceſar, or his Succeſſors? Or whether the leud or corrupted Pretorian, Bands, with Macro, Sejanus, Tigellinus, and the like, commanding them will not ever, like Brutus his Sons, abhor the inexorable Power of the Laws, with the neceſſity of living only by their innocence, and favour the Intereſt of Princes like to thoſe that advanc'd them? If this be not ſufficient, they may be pleas'd a little to reflect upon the Affairs of our own Country, and ſeriouſly conſider whether H—de, Cl—f—d, F-lm th, Arl-ng-n and D—nby, could have pretended to the chief places, if the [136] diſpoſal of them had bin in a free and well-regulated Parliament? Whe⯑ther they did moſt reſemble Brutus, Publicola, and the reſt of the Va⯑lerii, the Fabii, Quintii, Cornelii, &c. or Narciſſus, Pallas, Icetus, Laco, Vinnius, and the like? Whether all men, good and bad, do not favour that ſtate of things, which favours them and ſuch as they are? Whether Cl-v-l-d, P-rtſm-th, and others of the ſame trade, have attain'd to the Riches and Honors they enjoy by Services done to the Commonwealth? And what places Chiffinch, F—x and Jenkins, could probably have at⯑tain'd, if our Affairs had bin regulated as good men deſire? Whether the old Arts of begging, ſtealing and bawding, or the new ones of informing and trepanning, thrive beſt under one man who may be weak or vicious, and is always ſubject to be circumvented by Flatterers, or under the ſe⯑vere ſcrutinys of a Senat or People? In a word, whether they who live by ſuch Arts, and know no other, do not always endeavour to advance the Government under which they enjoy, or may hope to obtain the high⯑eſt Honors, and abhor that, in which they are expos'd to all manner of ſcorn and puniſhment? Which being determin'd, it will eaſily appear why the worſt men have ever bin for Abſolute Monarchy, and the beſt againſt it; and which of the two in ſo doing can be ſaid to deſire an un⯑reſtrain'd Liberty of doing that which is evil.

SECT. XXI. Mix'd and Popular Governments preſerve Peace, and manage Wars, better than Abſolute Monarchys.

BEing no way concern'd in the defence of Democracy; and having prov'd that Xenophon, Thucydides, and others of the Antients, in ſpeaking againſt the over-great Power of the common People, intended to add Reputation to the Ariſtocratical Party to which they were addicted, and not to ſet up Abſolute Monarchy, which never fell under diſcourſe among them, but as an object of ſcorn and hatred, evil in it ſelf, and only to be endur'd by baſe and barbarous People; I may leave our Knight, like Don Quixote, fighting againſt the Phantaſms of his own brain, and ſaying what he pleaſes againſt ſuch Governments as never were, unleſs in ſuch a place as San Marino near Sinigaglia in Italy, where a hundred Clowns go⯑vern a barbarous Rock that no man invades, and relates nothing to our queſtion. If his Doctrin be true, the Monarchy he extols is not only to be prefer'd before unruly Democracy, and mix'd Governments, but is the only one that, without a groſs violation of the Laws of God and Na⯑ture, can be eſtabliſh'd over any Nation. But having, as I hope, ſuf⯑ficiently prov'd, that God did neither inſtitute, nor appoint any ſuch to be inſtituted, nor approve thoſe that were; that Nature dos not incline us to it, and that the beſt as well as the wiſeſt men have always abhor'd it; that it has bin agreeable only to the moſt ſtupid and baſe Nations; and if others have ſubmitted to it; they have done ſo only as to the great⯑eſt of Evils brought upon them by Violence, Corruption or Fraud; I may now proceed to ſhew that the Progreſs of it has bin in all reſpects ſutable to its beginning.

To this end 'twill not be amiſs to examin our Author's words. Thus, ſays he, do they paint to the life this Beaſt with many heads: Let me give [137] the Cypher of their Form of Government; as it is begot by Sedition, ſo it is nouriſh'd by Crimes: It can never ſtand without Wars, either with an Enemy abroad, or with Friends at home. And in order to this I will not criticize upon the terms, tho the Cypher of a Form, and War with Friends, may be juſtly call'd Nonſenſe; but coming to his Aſſertions, that popular or mix'd Governments have their birth in Sedition, and are ever after⯑terwards vex'd with Civil or Foreign Wars, I take liberty to ſay, That whereas there is no Form appointed by God or Nature, thoſe Govern⯑ments only can be call'd Juſt, which are eſtabliſh'd by the conſent of Na⯑tions. Theſe Nations may at the firſt ſet up popular or mix'd Govern⯑ments, and without the guilt of Sedition introduce them afterwards, if that which was firſt eſtabliſh'd prove unprofitable or hurtful to them; and thoſe that have done ſo, have enjoy'd more Juſtice in times of Peace, and managed Wars, when occaſion requir'd, with more vertue and bet⯑ter ſucceſs, than any Abſolute Monarchys have done. And whereas he ſays, that in popular Governments each man has a care of his particular, and thinks baſely of the common Good; They look upon approaching Miſchiefs as they do upon Thunder, only every man wiſhes it may not touch his own Perſon: I ſay, that men can no otherwiſe be engag'd to take care of the Publick, than by having ſuch a part in it, as Abſolute Monarchy dos not allow; for under it they can neither obtain the Good for themſelves, Poſterity and Friends, that they deſire, nor prevent the Miſchiefs they fear, which are the principal Arguments that perſuade men to expoſe themſelves to la⯑bours or dangers. 'Tis a folly to ſay, that the vigilance and wiſdom of the Monarch ſupplies the defect of care in others; for we know that no men under the Sun were ever more void of both, and all manner of ver⯑tue requir'd to ſuch a work, than very many Monarchs have bin: And, which is yet worſe, the ſtrength and happineſs of the People being fre⯑quently dangerous to them, they have not ſo much as the will to pro⯑mote it: nay, ſometimes ſet themſelves to deſtroy it. Antient Monar⯑chys afford us frequent examples of this kind; and if we conſider thoſe of France and Turky, which ſeem moſt to flouriſh in our Age, the People will appear to be ſo miſerable under both, that they cannot fear any change of Governor or Government; and all, except a few Miniſters, are kept ſo far from the knowledg of, or power in the management of Affairs, that if any of them ſhould fancy a poſſibility of ſomething that might befal them worſe than what they ſuffer, or hope for that which might allevi⯑ate their miſery, they could do nothing towards the advancement of the one, or prevention of the other. Tacitus obſerves, that in his time no man was able to write what paſt, Inſcitia Reipublicae ut alienae. They Tacit. An. l. 1.neglected the publick Affairs in which they had no part. In the ſame Age it was ſaid, that the People, who whilſt they fought for their own Intereſts had bin invincible, being enſlav'd, were grown ſordid, idle, baſe, running after Stage-plays and Shows; ſo as the whole ſtrength of the Roman Armys conſiſted of Strangers. When their Spirits were de⯑preſt by ſervitude, they had neither courage to defend themſelves, nor will to fight for their wicked Maſters; and leaſt of all to increaſe their Power, which was deſtructive to themſelves. The ſame thing is found in all places. Tho the Turk commands many vaſt Provinces, that natu⯑rally produce as good Soldiers as any, yet his greateſt ſtrength is in Chil⯑dren that do not know their Fathers; who not being very many in num⯑ber, may periſh in one Battel, and the Empire by that means be loſt, the miſerable Nations that groan under that Tyranny having neither courage, [138] power, nor will to defend it. This was the fate of the Mamalukes. They had for the ſpace of almoſt two hundred years domineer'd in Egypt, and a great part of Aſia; but the people under them being weak and diſaf⯑fected, they could never recover the Defeat they received from Selim near Tripoli, who purſuing his Victory, in a few months utterly aboliſh'd their Kingdom.

Notwithſtanding the preſent Pride of France, the numbers and war⯑like Inclinations of that People, the bravery of the Nobility, extent of Dominion, convenience of Situation, and the vaſt Revenues of their King, his greateſt Advantages have bin gain'd by the miſtaken Counſels of England, the valor of our Soldiers unhappily ſent to ſerve him, and the Strangers of whom the ſtrength of his Armys conſiſts; which is ſo unſteddy a ſupport, that many who are well vers'd in Affairs of this na⯑ture, incline to think he ſubſiſts rather by little Arts, and corrupting Mi⯑niſters in Foreign Courts, than by the Power of his own Armys; and that ſome reformation in the Counſels of his Neighbours might prove ſufficient to overthrow that Greatneſs which is grown formidable to Eu⯑rope; the ſame miſery to which he has reduc'd his People, rendring them as unable to defend him, upon any change of Fortune, as to defend their own Rights againſt him.

This proceeds not from any particular defect in the French Government, but that which is common to all Abſolute Monarchys. And no State can be ſaid to ſtand upon a ſteddy Foundation, except thoſe whoſe ſtrength is in their own Soldiery, and the body of their own People. Such as ſerve for Wages, often betray their Maſters in diſtreſs, and always want the courage and induſtry which is found in thoſe who fight for their own Intereſts, and are to have a part in the Victory. The buſineſs of Mer⯑cenarys is ſo to perform their duty as to keep their Employments, and to draw profit from them; but that is not enough to ſupport the Spirits of men in extreme dangers. The Shepherd who is a hireling, flies when the Thief comes; and this adventitious help failing, all that a Prince can reaſonably expect from a diſaffected and oppreſt People is, that they ſhould bear the Yoke patiently in the time of his Proſperity; but upon the change of his Fortune they leave him to ſhift for himſelf, or join with his Enemys to avenge the Injurys they had receiv'd. Thus did Al⯑phonſo and Ferdinand Kings of Naples, and Lodovico Sforza Duke of Mi⯑lan fall in the times of Charles the Eighth and Louis the Twelfth, Kings of France. The two firſt had bin falſe, violent, and cruel; nothing within their Kingdom could oppoſe their fury: but when they were in⯑vaded by a foreign Power, they loſt all, as Guicciardin ſays, without breaking one Lance; and Sforza was by his own mercenary Soldiers de⯑liver'd into the hands of his Enemys.

I think it may be hard to find Examples of ſuch as proceeding in the ſame way have had better Succeſs: But if it ſhould ſo fall out, that a Peo⯑ple living under an Abſolute Monarchy, ſhould thro cuſtom, or fear of ſomething worſe (if that can be) not only ſuffer patiently, but deſire to uphold the Government; neither the Nobility, nor Commonalty can do any thing towards it. They are ſtrangers to all publick Concern⯑ments: All things are govern'd by one, or a ſew men, and others know nothing either of Action or Counſel. Filmer will tell us 'tis no matter; the profound Wiſdom of the Prince provides for all. But what if this Prince be a Child, a Fool, a ſuperannuated Dotard, or a Madman? Or if he dos not fall under any of theſe extremitys, and poſſeſſes ſuch a [139] proportion of Wit, Induſtry, and Courage as is ordinarily ſeen in men, how ſhall he ſupply the Office that indeed requires profound Wiſdom, and an equal meaſure of Experience and Valor? 'Tis to no purpoſe to ſay a good Council may ſupply his defects; for it dos not appear how he ſhould come by this Council, nor who ſhould oblige him to follow their advice: If he be left to his own will to do what he pleaſes, tho good advice be given to him; yet his judgment being perverted, he will always incline to the worſt: If a neceſſity be impos'd upon him of act⯑ing according to the advice of his Council, he is not that abſolute Mo⯑narch of whom we ſpeak, nor the Government Monarchical, but Ari⯑ſtocratical. Theſe are imperfect Figleave coverings of Nakedneſs. It was in vain to give good Counſel to Sardanapalus; and none could defend the Aſſyrian Empire, when he lay wallowing amongſt his Whores, with⯑out any other thought than of his Luſts. None could preſerve Rome, when Domitian's chief buſineſs was to kill Flies, and that of Honorius to take care of his Hens. The Monarchy of France muſt have periſh'd under the baſe Kings they call Les Roys faineants, if the Scepter had not bin wreſted out of their unworthy hands. The World is full of Exam⯑ples in this kind: and when it pleaſes God to beſtow a juſt, wiſe, and valiant King as a bleſſing upon a Nation, 'tis only a momentary help, his Vertues end with him; and there being neither any divine Promiſe nor human Reaſon, moving us to believe that they ſhall always be renew'd and continu'd in his Succeſſors, men cannot rely upon it; and to alledg a poſſibility of ſuch a thing is nothing to the purpoſe.

On the other ſide, in a popular or mix'd Government every man is concern'd: Every one has a part according to his quality or merit; all changes are prejudicial to all: Whatſoever any man conceives to be for the publick good, he may propoſe it in the Magiſtracy, or to the Ma⯑giſtrate: The body of the People is the publick defence, and every man is arm'd and diſciplin'd: the advantages of good ſucceſs are communi⯑cated to all, and every one bears a part in the loſſes. This makes men generous and induſtrious, and fills their hearts with Love to their Coun⯑try: ^*This, and the deſire of that praiſe which is the Reward of Vertue, rais'd the Romans above the reſt of Mankind; and whereſoever the ſame ways are taken, they will in a great meaſure have the ſame effects. By this means they had as many Soldiers to fight for their Country as there were Freemen in it. Whilſt they had to deal with the free Nations of Italy, Greece, Africa or Spain, they never conquer'd a Country, till the Inhabitants were exhauſted: But when they came to fight againſt Kings, the ſucceſs of a Battel was enough to bring a Kingdom under their power. Antiochus upon a ruffle receiv'd from Acilius at Thermopylae, left all that he poſſeſt in Greece; and being defeated by Scipio Naſica, he quitted all the Kingdoms and Territorys of Aſia on this ſide Taurus. Paulus Emilius became Maſter of Macedon by one proſperous fight againſt Perſes. Sy⯑phax, Gentius, Tigranes, Ptolomy, and others, were more eaſily ſubdu'd. The mercenary Armys on which they rely'd being broken, the Citys and Countrys not caring for their Maſters, ſubmitted to thoſe who had more vertue, and better fortune. If the Roman Power had not bin built upon a more ſure foundation, they could not have ſubſiſted. Notwith⯑ſtanding their Valor, they were often beaten; but their loſſes were imme⯑diately [140] repair'd by the excellence of their Diſciplin. When Hannibal had gain'd the Battels of Trebia, Ticinum, Thraſimene, and Cannae; defeated the Romans in many other Encounters, and ſlain above two hundred thouſand of their Men, with Paulus Emilius, C. Servilius, Sempronius Gracchus, Quintius, Marcellus, and many other excellent Commanders: When about the ſame time the two brave Scipio's had bin cut off with their Armys in Spain, and many great Loſſes had bin ſuſtain'd in Sicily and by Sea, one would have thought it impoſſible for the City to have reſiſted: But their Vertue, love to their Country, and good Government was a ſtrength that increas'd under all their Calamitys, and in the end overcame all. The nearer Hannibal came to the Walls, the more obſti⯑nate was their reſiſtance. Tho he had kill'd more great Captains than any Kingdom ever had, others daily ſtep'd up in their place, who excel'd them in all manner of Vertue. I know not, if at any time that con⯑quering City could glory in a greater number of men fit for the higheſt En⯑terpriſes, than at the end of that cruel War, which had conſum'd ſo ma⯑ny of them; but I think that the finiſhing Victorys by them obtain'd, are but ill proofs of our Author's aſſertion, that they thought baſely of the common Good, and ſought only to ſave themſelves. We know of none ex⯑cept Cecilius Metellus, who after the Battel of Cannae had ſo baſe a thought as to deſign the withdrawing himſelf from the publick ruin; but Scipio (afterwards ſirnam'd Africanus) threatning death to thoſe who would not ſwear never to abandon their Country, forc'd him to leave it. This may in general be imputed to good Government and Diſciplin, with which all were ſo ſeaſon'd from their infancy, that no affection was ſo rooted in them, as an ardent love to their Country, and a reſolution to die for it, or with it; but the means by which they accompliſh'd their great Ends, ſo as after their defeats to have ſuch men as carry'd on their nobleſt Deſigns with more glory than ever, was their annual Elections of Magiſtrats, many being thereby advanc'd to the ſupreme Commands, and every one by the Honors he enjoy'd, fill'd with a deſire of rendring him⯑ſelf worthy of them.

I ſhould not much inſiſt upon theſe things, if they had bin ſeen only in Rome: but tho their Diſciplin ſeems to have bin more perfect, better obſerv'd, and to have produc'd a Vertue that ſurpaſt all others; the like has bin found, tho perhaps not in the ſame degree, in all Nations that have enjoy'd their Liberty, and were admitted to ſuch a part of the Go⯑vernment, as might give them a love to it. This was evident in all the Nations of Italy. The Sabins, Volſci, Aequi, Tuſcans, Samnites and o⯑thers, were never conquer'd, till they had no men left. The Samnites alone inhabiting a ſmall and barren Province, ſuffer'd more defeats before they were ſubdu'd, than all the Kingdoms of Numidia, Aegypt, Mace⯑don, and Aſia; and, as 'tis expreſt in their Embaſſy to Hannibal, never yielded, till they who had brought vaſt numbers of men into the Field, and by them defeated ſome of the Roman Armys, were reduc'd to ſuch weakneſs, that they could not reſiſt one Legion. We hear of ſew Spar⯑tans who did not willingly expoſe their Lives for the ſervice of their Country; and the Women themſelves were ſo far inflam'd with the ſame affection, that they refus'd to mourn for their Children and Husbands who dy'd in the defence of it. When the brave Braſidas was ſlain, ſome eminent men went to comfort his Mother upon the news of his death; and telling her he was the moſt valiant man in the City, ſhe Thucyd. de Bell. Pelopon.anſwer'd, that he was indeed a valiant man, and dy'd as he ought to do, [141] but that thro the goodneſs of the Gods, many others were left as valiant as he.

When Xerxes invaded Greece, there was not a Citizen of Athens able to bear Arms, who did not leave his Wife and Children to ſhift for them⯑ſelves in the neighbouring Citys, and their Houſes to be burnt when they imbark'd with Themiſtocles; and never thought of either till they had de⯑feated the Barbarians at Salamis by Sea, and at Platea by Land. When men are thus ſpirited, ſome will ever prove excellent: and as none did ever ſur⯑paſs thoſe who are bred under this diſciplin in all moral, military and civil Vertues; thoſe very Countrys where they flouriſh'd moſt, have not pro⯑duc'd any eminent men ſince they loſt that Liberty which was the Mo⯑ther and Nurſe of them.

Tho I ſhould fill a Volume with examples of this kind (as I might ea⯑ſily do) ſuch as our Author will ſay, that in Popular Governments men look upon Miſchiefs as Thunder, and only wiſh it may not touch them⯑ſelves: But leaving them to the ſcorn and hatred they deſerve by their impudence and folly, I conclude this point with the anſwer, that Trajano Ragion. 99. Boccalini puts into the mouth of Apollo, to the Princes who complain'd that their Subjects had not that love to their Countrys, as had bin, and was daily ſeen in thoſe who liv'd under Commonwealths; which amounted to no more than to tell them, that their ill Government was the cauſe of that defect, and that the prejudices incur'd by Rapine, Violence, and Fraud, were to be repair'd only by Liberality, Juſtice, and ſuch a care of their Subjects, that they might live happily under them.

SECT. XXII. Commonwealths ſeek Peace or War according to the Variety of their Conſtitutions.

IF I have hitherto ſpoken in general of popular or mix'd Govern⯑ments, as if they were all founded on the ſame principle, it was only becauſe our Author without diſtinction has generally blam'd them all, and generally imputed to every one thoſe Faults, which perhaps never were many; but moſt certainly are directly oppoſite to the temper and conſtitu⯑tion of many among them. Malice and Ignorance reign ſo equally in him, that 'tis not eaſy to determin from which of the two this falſe repre⯑ſentation proceeds. But leſt any man ſhould thereby be impos'd upon, 'tis time to obſerve, That the Conſtitutions of Commonwealths have bin ſo various, according to the different temper of Nations and Times, that if ſome of them ſeem to have bin principally conſtituted for War, others have as much delighted in Peace; and many having taken the middle, and (as ſome think) the beſt way, have ſo moderated their love to Peace, as not to ſuffer the Spirits of the People to fall, but kept them in a perpe⯑tual readineſs to make War when there was occaſion: and every one of thoſe having follow'd ſeveral ways and ends, deſerve our particular conſi⯑deration.

The Citys of Rome, Sparta, Thebes, and all the Aſſociations of the Eto⯑lians, Achaians, Sabins, Latins, Samnites, and many others that antient⯑ly flouriſh'd in Greece and Italy, ſeem to have intended nothing but the juſt preſervation of Liberty at home, and making War abroad. All the Na⯑tions [142] of Spain, Germany, and Gaul ſought the ſame things. Their prin⯑cipal work was to render their People valiant, obedient to their Com⯑manders, lovers of their Country, and always ready to fight for it: And for this reaſon when the Senators of Rome had kill'd Romulus, they per⯑ſuaded Julius Proculus to affirm, that he had ſeen him in a moſt glorious form aſcending to Heaven, and promiſing great things to the City, Proinde rem militarem colant. The Athenians were not leſs inclin'd to War, but apply'd themſelves to Trade, as ſubſervient to that end, by increaſing the number of the People, and furniſhing them with the means of carrying it on with more vigor and power. The Phenician Citys, of which Car⯑thage was the moſt eminent, follow'd the ſame method; but knowing that Riches do not defend themſelves, or ſcorning ſlothfully to enjoy what was gain'd by Commerce, they ſo far apply'd themſelves to War, that they grew to a Power, which Rome only was able to overthrow. Ve⯑nice, Florence, Genoa, Lucca, and ſome other Citys of Italy ſeem chiefly to have aim'd at Trade; and placing the hopes of their ſafety in the pro⯑tection of more powerful States, have unwillingly enter'd into Wars, eſpecially by Land; and when they did, they made them by mercenary Soldiers.

Again, ſome of thoſe that intended War deſir'd to enlarge their Terri⯑torys by conqueſt; others only to preſerve their own, and to live with freedom and ſafety upon them. Rome was of the firſt ſort; and know⯑ing that ſuch ends cannot be accompliſh'd without great numbers of men, they freely admitted Strangers into the City, Senat, and Magiſtracy. Nu⯑ma was a Sabin: Tarquinius Priſcus was the Son of a Grecian: One hundred of thoſe Sabins who came with Tatius were admitted into the Senat: Appi⯑us Claudius of the ſame People came to Rome, was made a Member of the Senat, and created Conſul. They demoliſh'd ſeveral Citys, and brought the Inhabitants to their own; gave the right of Citizens to many others (ſome⯑times to whole Citys and Provinces) and car'd not how many they re⯑ceiv'd, ſo they could engraft them upon the ſame intereſt with the old ſtock, and ſeaſon them with the ſame Principles, Diſciplin, and Man⯑ners. On the other ſide, the Spartans deſiring only to continue free, ver⯑tuous, and ſafe in the enjoyment of their own Territory; and thinking themſelves ſtrong enough to defend it, fram'd a moſt ſevere Diſciplin, to which few Strangers would ſubmit. They baniſh'd all thoſe curious Arts, that are uſeful to Trade; prohibited the importation of Gold and Silver; appointed the Helotes to cultivate their Lands, and to exerciſe ſuch Trades as are neceſſary to life; admitted few Strangers to live amongſt them; made none of them free of their City, and educated their Youth in ſuch exer⯑ciſes only as prepar'd them for War. I will not take upon me to judg whether this proceeded from ſuch a moderation of Spirit, as plac'd Felicity rather in the fulneſs and ſtability of Liberty, Integrity, Vertue, and the enjoyment of their own, than in Riches, Power, and Dominion over others; nor which of theſe two different methods deſerves moſt to be commended: But certain it is that both ſucceeded according to the inten⯑tion of the Founders.

Rome conquer'd the beſt part of the World, and never wanted men to defend what was gain'd: Sparta liv'd in ſuch happineſs and reputation, that till it was invaded by Epimanondas, an Enemys Trumpet had not bin heard by thoſe within the Town for the ſpace of eight hundred years, and never ſuffer'd any great diſaſter, till receding from their own Inſtitu⯑tions, they were brought by proſperity to affect the principality of Greece, [143] and to undertake ſuch Wars as could not be carry'd on without Mony, and greater numbers of men than a ſmall City was able to furniſh; by which means they were oblig'd to beg aſſiſtance from the Barba⯑rians, whom they ſcorn'd and hated, as appears by the Storys of Callicra⯑tidas, Lyſander, and Ageſilaus, and fell into ſuch ſtraits as were never re⯑cover'd.

The like variety has bin obſerv'd in the Conſtitutions of thoſe Nor⯑thern Nations that invaded the Roman Empire: for tho all of them in⯑tended War, and look'd upon thoſe only to be Members of their Com⯑monwealths who us'd arms to defend them, yet ſome did immediately incorporate themſelves with thoſe of the conquer'd Countrys. Of this number were the Franks, who preſently became one Nation with the Gauls; others kept themſelves in a diſtinct Body, as the Saxons did from the Britains: And the Goths for more than three hundred years that they reign'd in Spain, never contracted Marriages, or otherwiſe mix'd with the Spaniards, till their Kingdom was overthrown by the Moors.

Theſe things, and others of the like nature, being weigh'd, many have doubted whether it were better to conſtitute a Commonwealth for War or for Trade; and of ſuch as intend War, whether thoſe are moſt to be prais'd who prepare for defence only, or thoſe who deſign by con⯑queſt to enlarge their Dominions. Or, if they admit of Trade, whe⯑ther they ſhould propoſe the acquiſition of Riches for their ultimate end, and depend upon foreign or mercenary Forces to defend them; or to be as helps to enable their own People to carry on thoſe Wars in which they may be frequently engag'd. Theſe Queſtions might perhaps be eaſily decid⯑ed, if Mankind were of a temper to ſuffer thoſe to live in peace, who of⯑fer no injury to any; or that men who have Mony to hire Soldiers when they ſtand in need of them, could find ſuch as would valiantly and faith⯑fully defend them, whilſt they apply themſelves to their Trades. But experience teaching us that thoſe only can be ſafe who are ſtrong; and that no People was ever well defended but thoſe who fought for themſelves; the beſt Judges of theſe matters have always given the preference to thoſe Conſtitutions that principally intend War, and make uſe of Trade as aſſiſt⯑ing to that end: and think it better to aim at conqueſt, rather than ſim⯑ply to ſtand upon their own defence; ſince he that loſes all if he be over⯑come, ſights upon very unequal terms; and if he obtain the Victory, gains no other advantage, than for the preſent to repel the danger that threaten'd him.

Theſe Opinions are confirm'd by the examples of the Romans, who proſper'd much more than the Spartans: And the Carthaginians, who made uſe of Trade as a help to War, rais'd their City to be one of the moſt potent that ever was in the World: Whereas the Venetians having rely'd on Trade and mercenary Soldiers, are always forc'd too much to depend upon foreign Potentats; very often to buy Peace with ignomi⯑nious and prejudicial conditions; and ſometimes to fear the infidelity of their own Commanders, no leſs than the violence of their Enemys. But that which ought to be valu'd above all in point of Wiſdom as well as Juſtice, is the Government given by God to the Hebrews, which chiefly fitted them for War, and to make Conqueſts. Moſes divided them un⯑der ſeveral Captains, into thouſands, hundreds, fiftys, and tens: This was a perpetual Ordinance amongſt them: In numbring them, thoſe only were counted, who were able to bear arms: Every man was oblig'd to go out to War, except ſuch as had marry'd a Wife, or upon other [144] ſpecial occaſions were for a time excus'd; and the whole ſeries of the ſa⯑cred Hiſtory ſhews that there were always as many Soldiers to fight for their Country as there were men able to fight. And if this be taken for a Picture of a many-headed Beaſt delighting in Blood, begotten by Sedi⯑tion, and nouriſh'd by Crimes, God himſelf was the drawer of it.

In this variety of Conſtitutions, and Effects proceeding from them, I can ſee nothing more juſtly and generally to be attributed to them all, than that Love to their Country, which our Author impudently affirms to be wanting in all. In other matters their proceedings are not only diffe⯑rent, but contrary to each other: yet it cannot be ſaid that any Nations have injoy'd ſo much Peace as ſome Republicks. The Venetians too great inclination to Peace is accounted to be a mortal error in their Conſtitu⯑tion; and they have not bin leſs free from domeſtick Seditions than fo⯑reign Wars: the Conſpiracys of the Falerii and Tiepoli were extinguiſh'd by their puniſhment, and that of La Cueva cruſh'd before it was ripe. Genoa has not bin altogether ſo happy: the factions of the Guelphs and Ghibelins that ſpread themſelves over all Italy, infected that City; and the malice of the Spaniards and French rais'd others under the Fregoſi and Adorni; but they being compos'd, they have for more than a hundred and fifty years reſted in quiet.

There is another ſort of Commonwealth compos'd of many Citys aſ⯑ſociated together, and living aequo jure; every one retaining and exerci⯑ſing a Sovereign Power within it ſelf, except in ſome caſes expreſt in the Act of Union, or League made between them. Theſe I confeſs are more hardly preſerv'd in Peace. Diſputes may ariſe among them concerning Limits, Juriſdiction, and the like. They cannot always be equally con⯑cern'd in the ſame things. The injurys offer'd to one do not equally af⯑fect all. Their Neighbors will ſow Diviſions among them; and not having a Mother-City to decide their Controverſys by her authority, they may be apt to fall into quarrels, eſpecially if they profeſs Chriſtianity; which having bin ſplit into variety of opinions ever ſince it was preach'd, and the Papiſts by their cruelty to ſuch as diſſent from them, ſhewing to all, that there is no other way of defending themſelves againſt them, than by uſing the ſame, almoſt every man is come to think he ought (as far as in him lies) to impoſe his belief on others, and that he can give no better teſtimony of his Zeal, than the exceſs of his violence on that account. Nevertheleſs the Cantons of the Switzers, tho accompany'd with all the moſt dangerous circumſtances that can be imagin'd, being thirteen in number, independent on each other, govern'd in a high degree popular⯑ly, profeſſing Chriſtianity differing in moſt important points; eight of them much influenc'd by the Jeſuits, and perpetually excited to War a⯑gainſt their Brethren by the powerful Crowns of Spain and France, have ever ſince they caſt off the inſupportable Yoke of the Earls of Hapſ⯑burg, enjoy'd more peace than any other State of Europe, and from the moſt inconſiderable people, are grown to ſuch a Power, that the greateſt Monarchs do moſt ſollicitouſly ſeek their Friendſhip; and none have dar'd to invade them, ſince Charles Duke of Burgundy did it to his ruin: and he who for a long time had bin a terror to the great, dangerous, and ſub⯑til King of France, gave by the loſs of three Armys and his own life, a laſting teſtimony of his temerity in aſſaulting a free and valiant, tho a poor people, fighting in their own quarrel. Commines well relates that War; but a vaſt heap of Bones remaining to this day at Muret with this inſcription, Caroli fortiſſimi Burgundiorum Ducis exercitus Muretum ob⯑ſidens [145] ab Helvetiis caeſus, hoc ſui Monumentum reliquit, beſt ſhews the ſuc⯑ceſs of it. Since that time their greateſt Wars have bin for the defence of Milan; or ſuch as they have undertaken for pay under the Enſigns of France or Spain, that by the uſe of Arms they may keep up that Courage, Reputation, and Experience which is requir'd for the defence of their own Country. No Government was ever more free from popular Sedi⯑tions; the revolts of their Subjects have bin few, weak, and eaſily ſup⯑preſt; the diſſenſion rais'd by the Jeſuits between the Cantons of Zurich and Lucern was as ſoon compos'd as the rebellion of the County of Vaux againſt the Canton of Bern; and thoſe few of the like nature that have happen'd among them have had the like ſucceſs: So that Thuanus in the Hiſtory of his time, comprehending about fifty years, and relating the horrid domeſtick and foreign Wars, that diſtracted Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Flanders, England, Scotland, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, Tranſilvania, Muſcovy, Turky, Africk, and other places, has no more to ſay of them than to ſhew what Arts had bin in vain us'd to diſturb their ſo much envy'd quiet. But if the modeſt temper of the People, together with the Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Strength of their Go⯑vernment, could not be diſcompos'd by the meaſures of Spain and France, by the induſtry of their Embaſſadors, or the malicious craft of the Jeſu⯑its, we may ſafely conclude that their State is as well ſettled as any thing among men can be, and can hardly comprehend what is like to interrupt it. As much might be ſaid of the Citys of the Hanſeatick Society, if they had an intire Sovereignty in themſelves: But the Citys of the United Provinces in the Low Countrys being every one of them Sovereign with⯑in themſelves, and many in number, ſtill continuing in their Union in ſpite of all the endeavours that have bin us'd to divide them, give us an example of ſuch ſteddineſs in practice and principle, as is hardly to be pa⯑rallel'd in the world, and that undeniably prove a temper in their Con⯑ſtitutions directly oppoſite to that which our Author imputes to all popu⯑lar Governments: and if the Death of Barnevelt and De Wit, or the pre⯑ſerment of ſome moſt unlike to them, be taken for a teſtimony that the beſt men thrive worſt, and the worſt beſt, I hope it may be conſider'd that thoſe Violences proceeded from that which is moſt contrary to Popu⯑larity, tho I am not very willing to explain it.

If theſe matters are not clear in themſelves, I deſire they may be com⯑par'd with what has happen'd between any Princes that from the begin⯑ning of the world have bin join'd in League to each other, whether they were of the ſame or of different Nations. Let an example be brought of ſix, thirteen, or more Princes or Kings who enter'd into a League; and for the ſpace of one or more Ages, did neither break it, nor quarrel upon the explication of it. Let the States of the Switzers, Griſons, or Hollanders, be compar'd with that of France, when it was ſometimes divided between two, three, or four Brothers of Meroveus or Pepin's Races; with the Heptarchy of England; the Kingdoms of Leon, Arra⯑gon, Navarr, Caſtile and Portugal, under which the Chriſtians in Spain were divided; or thoſe of Cordoua, Sevil, Malaga, Granada, and others under the Power of the Moors: and if it be not evident, that the popu⯑lar States have bin remarkable for Peace among themſelves, conſtancy to their Union, and Fidelity to the Leagues made with their Aſſociats; whereas all the abovemention'd Kingdoms, and ſuch others as are known among men to have bin join'd in the like Leagues, were ever infeſted with domeſtick Rebellions and Quarrels ariſing from the Ambition of Princes, [146] ſo as no Confederacy could be ſo cautiouſly made, but they would find ways to elude it, or ſo ſolemn and ſacred, but they would in far leſs time break thro it: I will confeſs, that Kingdoms have ſometimes bin as free from civil diſturbances; and that Leagues made between ſeveral Princes, have bin as conſtantly and religiouſly obſerv'd, as by Commonwealths. But if no ſuch thing dos appear in the World, and no man who is not impudent or ignorant dare pretend it, I may juſtly conclude, that tho every Commonwealth has its Action ſutable to its Conſtitution, and that many aſſociated together are not ſo free from diſturbances, as thoſe that wholly depend upon the Authority of a Mother City; yet we know of none that have not bin, and are more regular and quiet than any Princi⯑palitys; and as to Foreign Wars, they ſeek or avoid them according to their various Conſtitutions.

SECT. XXIII. That is the beſt Government, which beſt provides for War.

OUR Author having huddled up all popular and mix'd Governments into one, has in ſome meaſure forc'd me to explain the various Con⯑ſtitutions and Principles upon which they are grounded: But as the wiſ⯑dom of a Father is ſeen, not only in providing Bread for his Family, or increaſing his Patrimonial Eſtate, but in making all poſſible proviſion for the ſecurity of it; ſo that Government is evidently the beſt, which, not relying upon what it dos at firſt enjoy, ſeeks to increaſe the number, ſtrength, and riches of the People; and by the beſt Diſciplin to bring the Power ſo improv'd into ſuch order as may be of moſt uſe to the Pub⯑lick. This comprehends all things conducing to the adminiſtration of Ju⯑ſtice, the preſervation of domeſtick Peace, and the increaſe of Com⯑merce, that the People being pleas'd with their preſent condition, may be fill'd with love to their Country, encourag'd to fight boldly for the publick Cauſe, which is their own; and as men do willingly join with that which proſpers, that Strangers may be invited to fix their Habita⯑tions in ſuch a City, and to eſpouſe the principles that reign in it. This is neceſſary for ſeveral reaſons; but I ſhall principally inſiſt upon one, which is, that all things in their beginning are weak: The Whelp of a Lion newly born has neither ſtrength nor fierceneſs. He that builds a Ci⯑ty, and dos not intend it ſhould increaſe, commits as great an abſurdity, as if he ſhould deſire his Child might ever continue under the ſame weak⯑neſs in which he is born. If it dos not grow, it muſt pine and periſh; for in this World nothing is permanent: that which dos not grow better will grow worſe. This increaſe alſo is uſeleſs, or perhaps hurtful, if it be not in Strength, as well as in Riches or Number; for every one is apt to ſeize upon ill-guarded Treaſures: and the terror that the City of Lon⯑don was poſſeſt with, when a few Dutch Ships came to Chatham, ſhews that no numbers of men, tho naturally valiant, are able to defend them⯑ſelves, unleſs they be well arm'd, diſciplin'd and conducted. Their Mul⯑titude brings confuſion: their Wealth, when 'tis like to be made a prey, increaſes the fears of the owners; and they, who if they were brought into good order, might conquer a great part of the World, being deſti⯑tute of it, durſt not think of defending themſelves.

[147] If it be ſaid that the wiſe Father mention'd by me endeavours to ſecure his Patrimony by Law, not by Force; I anſwer, that all defence termi⯑nates in force; and if a private man dos not prepare to defend his Eſtate with his own Force, 'tis becauſe he lives under the protection of the Law, and expects the force of the Magiſtrate ſhould be a ſecurity to him: but Kingdoms and Commonwealths acknowledging no Superior, except God alone, can reaſonably hope to be protected by him only; and by him, if with induſtry and courage they make uſe of the means he has given them for their own defence. God helps thoſe who help themſelves; and men are by ſeveral reaſons (ſuppoſe to prevent the increaſe of a ſuſpected Power) induc'd to ſuccour an induſtrious and brave People: But ſuch as neglect the means of their own preſervation, are ever left to periſh with ſhame. Men cannot rely upon any League: The State that is defended by one Potentat againſt another, becomes a Slave to their Pro⯑tector: Mercenary Soldiers always want Fidelity or Courage, and moſt commonly both. If they are not corrupted or beaten by the Invader, they make a prey of their Maſters. Theſe are the followers of Camps who have neither Faith nor Piety ^*but prefer Gain before Right. They who expoſe their Blood to ſale, look where they can make the beſt bargain, and never fail of pretences for following their intereſts.

Moreover, private Familys may by ſeveral arts increaſe their Wealth, as they increaſe in number; but when a People multiplies (as they will always do in a good Climat under a good Government) ſuch an enlarge⯑ment of Territory as is neceſſary for their ſubſiſtence can be acquir'd only by War. This was known to the Northern Nations that invaded the Roman Empire; but for want of ſuch Conſtitutions as might beſt im⯑prove their Strength and Valor, the numbers they ſent out when they were overburden'd, provided well for themſelves, but were of no uſe to the Countrys they left; and whilſt thoſe Goths, Vandals, Franks, and Normans enjoy'd the moſt opulent and delicious Provinces of the World, their Fathers languiſh'd obſcurely in their frozen Climats. For the like reaſons, or thro the ſame defect, the Switzers are oblig'd to ſerve other Princes, and often to imploy that valor in advancing the power of their Neighbors, which might be us'd to increaſe their own. Genoua, Lucca, Geneva, and other ſmall Commonwealths, having no Wars, are not able to nouriſh the men they breed; but ſending many of their Children to ſeek their Fortunes abroad, ſcarce a third part of thoſe that are born a⯑mong them, die in thoſe Citys; and if they did not take this courſe, they would have no better than the Nations inhabiting near the River Niger, who ſell their Children as the increaſe of their Flocks.

This dos not leſs concern Monarchys than Commonwealths; nor the abſolute leſs than the mix'd: All of them have bin proſperous or miſera⯑ble, glorious or contemptible, as they were better or worſe arm'd, diſci⯑plin'd, or conducted. The Aſſyrian Valor was irreſiſtible under Nabu⯑chodonozor; but was brought to nothing under his baſe and luxurious Grandſon Belſhazzar: The Perſians who under Cyrus conquer'd Aſia, were like Swine expos'd to ſlaughter when their Diſciplin fail'd, and they were commanded by his proud, cruel, and cowardly Succeſſors. The Mace⯑donian Army overthrown by Paulus Emilius was not leſs in number than that with which Alexander gain'd the Empire of the Eaſt; and perhaps had not bin inferior in Valor, if it had bin as well commanded. Many poor and almoſt unknown Nations have bin carry'd to ſuch a height of [148] Glory by the Bravery of their Princes, that I might incline to think their Government as fit as any other for diſciplining a People to War, if their Vertues continu'd in their Familys, or could be tranſmitted to their Suc⯑ceſſors. The impoſſibility of this is a breach never to be repair'd; and no account is to be made of the good that is always uncertain, and ſeldom enjoy'd. This diſeaſe is not only in abſolute Monarchys, but in thoſe alſo where any regard is had to Succeſſion of Blood, tho under the ſtricteſt limitations. The Fruit of all the Victorys gain'd by Edward the Firſt and Third, or Henry the Fifth of England, periſh'd by the baſeneſs of their Succeſſors: the glory of our Arms was turn'd into ſhame; and we, by the loſs of Treaſure, Blood, and Territory, ſuffer'd the puniſh⯑ment of their Vices. The effects of theſe changes are not always equally violent; but they are frequent, and muſt fall out as often as occaſion is preſented. It was not poſſible for Lewis the Thirteenth of France to pur⯑ſue the great deſigns of Henry the Fourth: Chriſtina of Sweden could not ſupply the place of her brave Father; nor the preſent King in his In⯑fancy accompliſh what the great Charles Guſtavus had nobly undertaken: and no remedy can be found for this mortal infirmity, unleſs the power be put into the hands of thoſe who are able to execute it, and not left to the blindneſs of fortune. When the Regal Power is committed to an an⯑nual or otherwiſe choſen Magiſtracy, the Vertues of excellent men are of uſe, but all dos not depend upon their perſons: One man finiſhes what a⯑nother had begun; and when many are by practice render'd able to per⯑form the ſame things, the loſs of one is eaſily ſupply'd by the election of another. When good Principles are planted, they do not die with the perſon that introduc'd 'em; and good Conſtitutions remain, tho the Au⯑thors of 'em periſh. Rome did not fall back into ſlavery when Brutus was kill'd, who had led them to recover their Liberty: Others like to him purſu'd the ſame ends; and notwithſtanding the loſs of ſo many great Commanders conſum'd in their almoſt continual Wars, they never wanted ſuch as were fit to execute whatever they could deſign. A well⯑govern'd State is as fruitful to all good purpoſes, as the ſeven-headed Ser⯑pent is ſaid to have bin in evil; when one head is cut off, many riſe up in the place of it. Good Order being once eſtabliſh'd, makes good men; and as long as it laſts, ſuch as are fit for the greateſt imployments will never be wanting. By this means the Romans could not be ſurpris'd: No King or Captain ever invaded them, who did not find many excellent Com⯑manders to oppoſe him; whereas they themſelves found it eaſy to over⯑throw Kingdoms, tho they had bin eſtabliſh'd by the braveſt Princes, thro the baſeneſs of their Succeſſors.

But if our Author ſays true, 'tis of no advantage to a popular State to have excellent men; and therefore he impoſes a neceſſity upon every People to chuſe the worſt men for being the worſt, and moſt like to themſelves; leſt that if vertuous and good men ſhould come into power, they ſhould be ex⯑cluded for being vicious and wicked, &c. Wiſe men would ſeize upon the State, and take it from the People. For the underſtanding of theſe words, 'tis good to conſider whether they are to be taken ſimply, as uſually ap⯑ply'd to the Devil and ſome of his inſtruments, or relatively, as to the thing in queſtion: If ſimply, it muſt be concluded that Valerius, Brutus, Cincinnatus, Capitolinus, Mamercus, Paulus Emilius, Naſica, and others like to 'em, were not only the worſt men of the City; but that they were ſo often advanc'd to the ſupreme Magiſtracy becauſe they were ſo: if in the other ſenſe relating to Magiſtracy, and the command of [149] Armys, the worſt are the moſt ignorant, unfaithful, ſlothful, or coward⯑ly; and our Author, to make good his propoſition, muſt prove, that when the People of Rome, Carthage, Athens, and other States had the power of chuſing whom they pleas'd, they choſe Camillus, Corvinus. Tor⯑quatus, Fabius, Rullus, Scipio, Amilcar, Hannibal, Aſdrubal, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Pericles, Ariſtides, Themiſtocles, Phocion, Alcibiades, and others like to them, for their Ignorance, Infidelity, Sloth, and Cowar⯑dice; and on account of thoſe Vices, moſt like to thoſe who choſe them. But if theſe were the worſt, I deſire to know what wit or eloquence can deſcribe or comprehend the excellency of the beſt; or of the Diſciplin that brings whole Nations to ſuch perfection, that worſe than theſe could not be found among them? And if they were not ſo, but ſuch as all ſuc⯑ceeding Ages have juſtly admir'd for their Wiſdom, Vertue, Induſtry, and Valor, the impudence of ſo wicked and falſe an Aſſertion ought to be rejected with ſcorn and hatred.

But if all Governments, whether Monarchial or Popular, abſolute or limited, deſerve praiſe or blame as they are well or ill conſtituted for ma⯑king War; and that the attainment of this end dos intirely depend upon the qualifications of the Commanders, and the Strength, Courage, Number, Affection, and temper of the People out of which the Ar⯑mys are drawn; thoſe Governments muſt neceſſarily be the beſt which take the beſt care that thoſe Armys may be well commanded; and ſo provide for the good of the People, that they may daily increaſe in Num⯑ber, Courage, and Strength, and be ſo ſatisfy'd with the preſent ſtate of things, as to fear a change, and fight for the preſervation or advancement of the publick Intereſt as of their own. We have already found that in Hereditary Monarchys no care at all is taken of the Commander: He is not choſen, but comes by chance; and dos not only frequently prove defective, but for the moſt part utterly uncapable of performing any part of his duty; whereas in Popular Governments excellent men are general⯑ly choſen; and there are ſo many of them, that if one or more periſh, others are ready to ſupply their places. And this Diſcourſe having (if I miſtake not) in the whole ſeries ſhewn, that the advantages of popu⯑lar Governments, in relation to the increaſe of Courage, Number, and Strength in a People, out of which Armys are to be form'd, and bringing them to ſuch a temper as prepares 'em bravely to perform their duty, are as much above thoſe of Monarchys, as the prudence of Choice ſurpaſſes the accidents of Birth; it cannot be deny'd that in both reſpects the part which relates to War is much better perform'd in Popular Governments than in Monarchys.

That which we are by reaſon led to believe, is confirm'd to us by experi⯑ence. We every where ſee the difference between the Courage of men fighting for themſelves and their poſterity, and thoſe that ſerve a Maſter who by good ſucceſs is often render'd inſupportable. This is of ſuch effi⯑cacy, that no King could ever boaſt to have overthrown any conſiderable Commonwealth, unleſs it were divided within it ſelf, or weaken'd by Wars made with ſuch as were alſo free; which was the caſe of the Greci⯑an Commonwealths when the Macedonians fell in upon them. Whereas the greateſt Kingdoms have bin eaſily deſtroy'd by Commonwealths; and theſe alſo have loſt all Strength, Valor and Spirit, after the change of their Government. The Power and Vertue of the Italians grew up, de⯑cay'd and periſh'd with their Liberty. When they were divided into many Commonwealths, every one of them was able to ſend out great [150] Armys, and to ſuffer many Defeats before they were ſubdu'd; ſo that their Citys were deliver'd up by the old Men, Women, and Children, when all thoſe who were able to bear arms had bin ſlain: And when they were all brought under the Romans, either as Aſſociats or Subjects, they made the greateſt Strength that ever was in the World.

Alexander of Epirus was in Valor thought equal, and in Power little inferior to Alexander of Macedon: but having the fortune to attack thoſe who had bin brought up in Liberty, taught to hazard or ſuffer all things for it, and to think that God has given to men Hands and Swords only to defend it, he periſh'd in his attempt; whilſt the other encountring ſlaviſh Nations, under the conduct of proud, cruel and for the moſt part unwarlike Tyrants, became Maſter of Aſia.

Pyrrhus ſeems to have bin equal to either of them; but the Victo⯑rys he obtain'd by an admirable Valor and Conduct, coſt him ſo dear, that he deſir'd Peace with thoſe Enemys who might be defeated, not ſub⯑du'd.

Hannibal wanting the prudence of Pyrrhus, loſt the fruits of all his Victorys; and being torn out of Italy, where he had neſted himſelf, fell under the Sword of thoſe whoſe Fathers he had defeated or ſlain; and dy'd a baniſh'd man from his ruin'd Country.

The Gauls did once bring Rome, when it was ſmall, to the brink of Deſtruction; but they left their Carcaſes to pay for the miſchiefs they had done; and in ſucceeding times their Invaſions were mention'd as Tumults rather than Wars.

The Germans did perhaps ſurpaſs them in numbers and ſtrength, and were equal to them in fortune as long as Rome was free. They often enter'd Italy, but they continu'd not long there, unleſs under the weight of their Chains. Whereas the ſame Nations, and others like to them, aſſaulting that Country, or other Provinces under the Emperors, found no other difficulty than what aroſe upon conteſts among themſelves who ſhould be Maſter of them. No manly Vertue or Diſciplin remain'd among the Italians: Thoſe who govern'd them, rely'd upon tricks and ſhifts; they who could not defend themſelves, hir'd ſome of thoſe Nations to under⯑take their Quarrels againſt others. Theſe trinklings could not laſt. The Goths ſcorning to depend upon thoſe who in Valor and Strength were much inferior to themſelves, ſeiz'd upon the City that had commanded the World, whilſt Honorius was ſo buſy in providing for his Hens, that he could not think of defending it. Arcadius had the luck not to loſe his prin⯑cipal City; but paſſing his time among Fidlers, Players, Eunuchs, Cooks, Dancers, and Buffoons, the Provinces were ſecurely plunder'd and ranſack'd by Nations, that are known only from their Victorys a⯑gainſt him.

'Tis in vain to ſay that this proceeded from the fatal corruption of that Age; for that corruption proceeded from the Government, and the en⯑ſuing deſolation was the effect of it. And as the like diſorder in Govern⯑ment has bin ever ſince in Greece and the greateſt part of Italy, thoſe Coun⯑trys which for Extent, Riches, convenience of Situation, and numbers of men, are equal to the beſt in the world, and for the Wit, Courage, and Induſtry of the Natives, perhaps juſtly preferable to any, have ſince that time bin always expos'd as a prey to the firſt Invader. Charles the Eighth of France is by Guicciardin, and other Writers, repreſented as a Prince equal⯑ly weak in Body, Mind, Mony, and Forces; but as an ill Hare is ſaid to make a good Dog, he conquer'd the beſt part of Italy without breaking [151] a Lance. Ferdinand and Alphonſo of Arragon, Kings of Naples, had go⯑vern'd by Trepanners, falſe Witneſſes, corrupt Judges, mercenary Sol⯑diers, and other Miniſters of Iniquity: but theſe could afford no help a⯑gainſt an Invader; and neither the oppreſt Nobility, nor People, concern⯑ing themſelves in the quarrel, they who had bin proud, fierce, and cruel againſt their poor Subjects, never durſt look an Enemy in the face; and the Father dying with anguiſh and fear, the Son ſhamefully fled from his ill-govern'd Kingdom.

The ſame things are no leſs evident in Spain. No People ever defended themſelves with more Obſtinacy and Valor than the Spaniards did againſt the Carthaginians and Romans, who ſurpaſt them in Wealth and Skill. Livy calls them Gentem ad bella gerenda & reparanda natam, and who ge⯑nerally kill'd themſelves when they were maſter'd and diſarm'd, Nullam ſine armis vitam eſſe rati. But tho the mixture of Roman Blood could not impair their Race, and the conjunction of the Goths had improv'd their Force; yet no more was requir'd for the overthrow of them all, than the weakneſs and baſeneſs of the two leud Tyrants, Witza and Rodrigo, who diſdain'd all Laws, and reſolv'd to govern according to their Luſt. They who for more than two hundred years had reſiſted the Romans, were intirely ſubdu'd by the vile, half-naked Moors, in one ſlight Skirmiſh; and do not to this day know what became of the King who brought the De⯑ſtruction upon them. That Kingdom after many Revolutions, is with many others come to the Houſe of Auſtria, and enjoys all the Wealth of the Indys; whereupon they are thought to have affected an univerſal Mo⯑narchy. Sed ut ſunt levia Aulicorum ingenia, this was grounded upon nothing except their own Vanity: They had Mony and Craft; but wanting that ſolid Vertue and Strength which makes and preſerves Con⯑queſts, their Kings have nothing but Milan that did not come to them by Marriage: And tho they have not receiv'd any extraordinary diſaſters in War, yet they languiſh and conſume thro the defects of their own Go⯑vernment, and are forc'd to beg aſſiſtance from their mortal and formerly deſpis'd Enemys. Theſe are the beſt hopes of defence that they have from abroad; and the only Enemy an Invader ought to fear in their de⯑ſolate Territorys, is that Want and Famin which teſtifys the good Order, Strength and Stability of our Author's divine Monarchy; the profound Wiſdom of their Kings in ſubtilly finding out ſo ſure a way of defending the Country; their paternal care in providing for the good of their Sub⯑jects; and that whatſoever is defective in the Prince, is aſſuredly ſupply'd by the Sedulity of a good Council.

We have already ſaid enough to obviate the objections that may be drawn from the proſperity of the French Monarchy. The beauty of it is falſe and painted. There is a rich and haughty King, who is bleſt with ſuch Neighbours as are not likely to diſturb him, and has nothing to fear from his miſerable Subjects; but the whole body of that State is full of boils, and wounds, and putrid ſores: There is no real ſtrength in it. The People are ſo unwilling to ſerve him, that he is ſaid to have put to death above four ſcore thouſand of his own Soldiers within the ſpace of fifteen years, for flying from their Colours; and if he were vigorouſly attack'd, little help could be expected from a diſcontented Nobility, or a ſtarving and deſpairing People. If to diminiſh the force of theſe arguments and examples, it be ſaid, that in two or three thouſand years all things are chang'd; the antient Vertue of Mankind is extinguiſh'd; and the love that every one had to his Country is turn'd into a care of his private In⯑tereſts: [152] I anſwer, that Time changes nothing, and the Changes produc'd in this time proceed only from the change of Governments. The Na⯑tions which have bin govern'd arbitrarily, have always ſuffer'd the ſame Plagues, and bin infected with the ſame Vices; which is as natural, as for Animals ever to generate according to their kinds, and Fruits to be of the ſame nature with the Roots and Seeds from which they come. The ſame Order that made men valiant and induſtrious in the ſervice of their Country during the firſt Ages, would have the ſame effect, if it were now in being. Men would have the ſame love to the Publick as the Spar⯑tans and Romans had, if there was the ſame reaſon for it. We need no other proof of this than what we have ſeen in our own Country, where in a few years, good Diſciplin and a juſt Encouragement given to thoſe who did well, produc'd more examples of pure, compleat, incorruptible, and invincible Vertue than Rome or Greece could ever boaſt; or if more be wanting, they may eaſily be found among the Switzers, Hollanders, and others: but 'tis not neceſſary to light a Candle to the Sun.

SECT. XXIV. Popular Governments are leſs ſubject to Civil Diſorders than Monar⯑chys; manage them more ably, and more eaſily recover out of them.

'TIS in vain to ſeek a Government in all points free from a poſſibility of Civil Wars, Tumults, and Seditions: that is a Bleſſing de⯑ny'd to this life, and reſerv'd to compleat the Felicity of the next. But if theſe are to be accounted the greateſt evils that can fall upon a People, the rectitude or defects of Governments will beſt appear if we examin which Species is more or leſs expos'd to, or exempted from them.

This may be done two ways.

1. By ſearching into the cauſes from whence they may, or uſually do ariſe.

2. Which kind has actually bin moſt frequently and dangerouſly di⯑ſturb'd by them.

To the firſt: Seditions, Tumults, and Wars do ariſe from miſtake, or from malice; from juſt occaſions, or unjuſt. From miſtake, when a Peo⯑ple think an evil to be done or intended, which is not done nor intended; or take that to be evil which is done, tho in truth it be not ſo. Well re⯑gulated Citys may fall into theſe errors. The Romans being jealous of their newly recover'd Liberty, thought that Valerius Publicola deſign'd to make himſelf King, when he built a Houſe in a place that ſeem'd too ſtrong and eminent for a private man. The Spartans were not leſs ſuſ⯑picious of Lycurgus; and a leud young Fellow in a Sedition put out one of his eyes: but no People ever continu'd in a more conſtant af⯑fection to their beſt deſerving Citizens, than both the Romans and Spartans afterwards manifeſted to thoſe vertuous and wrongfully ſuſpect⯑ed men.

Sometimes the fact is true, but otherwiſe underſtood than was intend⯑ed. When the Tarquins were expel'd from Rome, the Patricians retain'd to themſelves the principal Magiſtracys; but never thought of bringing back Kings, or of ſetting up a corrupt Oligarchy among themſelves, as the Plebeians imagin'd: And this miſtake being diſcover'd, the fury they [153] had conceiv'd, vaniſh'd; and they who ſeem'd to intend nothing leſs than the extirpation of all the Patrician Familys, grew quiet. Menenius Agrippa appeas'd one of the moſt violent Seditions that ever happen'd a⯑mongſt them (till civil Intereſts were purſu'd by arm'd Troops) with a Fable of the ſeveral parts of the Body that murmur'd againſt the Belly: and the moſt dangerous of all was compos'd by creating Tribuns to protect them. Some of the Patrician young men had favour'd the De⯑cemviri, and others being unwilling to appear againſt them, the People believ'd they had all conſpir'd with thoſe new Tyrants: but Valerius and Horatius putting themſelves at the head of thoſe who ſought their de⯑ſtruction, they perceiv'd their Error, and look'd upon the Patricians as the beſt defenders of their Libertys: Et inde, ſays Livy, auram Libertatis captare, unde ſervitutem timuiſſent. Democratical Governments are moſt liable to theſe miſtakes: In Ariſtocracys they are ſeldom ſeen, and we hear of none in Sparta after the eſtabliſhment of the Laws by Lycurgus. But Abſolute Monarchys ſeem to be totally exempted from them. The miſchiefs deſign'd are often diſſembled or deny'd, till they are paſt all poſ⯑ſibility of being cur'd by any other way than force: and ſuch as are by neceſſity driven to uſe that remedy, know they muſt perfect their work or periſh. He that draws his Sword againſt the Prince, ſay the French, ought to throw away the Scabbard; for tho the deſign be never ſo juſt, yet the Authors are ſure to be ruin'd if it miſcarry. Peace is ſeldom made, and never kept, unleſs the Subject retain ſuch a Power in his hands, as may oblige the Prince to ſtand to what is agreed; and in time ſome trick is found to deprive them of that benefit.

Seditions proceeding from malice, are ſeldom or never ſeen in popular Governments; for they are hurtful to the People, and none have ever willingly and knowingly hurt themſelves. There may be, and often is malice in thoſe who excite them; but the People are ever deceiv'd, and whatſoever is thereupon done, ought to be imputed to error, as I ſaid be⯑fore. If this be diſcover'd in time, it uſually turns to the deſtruction of the Contriver; as in the caſes of Manlius Capitolinus, Spurius Melius, and Sp. Caſſius: if not, for the moſt part it produces a Tyranny, as in thoſe of Agathocles, Dionyſius, Piſistrates, and Ceſar. But in Abſolute Monarchys, almoſt all the Troubles that ariſe, proceed from malice; they cannot be reform'd, the extinction of them is exceeding difficult, if they have continu'd long enough to corrupt the People; and thoſe who appear againſt 'em, ſeek only to ſet up themſelves, or their Friends. Thus we ſee that in the Civil Wars of the Eaſt, the queſtion was, Whe⯑ther Artaxerxes or Cyrus, Phraartes or Bardanes, ſhould reign over the Perſians and Parthians: The People ſuffer'd equally from both whilſt the Conteſts laſted; and the deciſion left 'em under the power of a proud and cruel Maſter. The like is ſeen in all places. After the death of Brutus and Caſſius, no War was ever undertaken in the Roman Empire upon a better account than one man's private concernments: The Provinces ſuffer'd un⯑der all; and he, whom they had aſſiſted to overthrow one wicked Tyrant, very often prov'd worſe than his Predeceſſor. And the only ground of all the Diſſenſions with which France was vex'd under the Princes of Me⯑roveus and Pepin's Races, were, which of them ſhould reign, the People remaining miſerable under them all.

The caſe is not much different in mix'd Monarchys: Some Wars may be undertaken upon a juſt and publick account, but the pretences are com⯑monly falſe: a laſting Reformation is hardly introduc'd, an intire Change [154] often diſlik'd. And tho ſuch Kingdoms are frequently and terribly di⯑ſtracted, as appears by the beforemention'd Examples of England, Spain, &c. the Quarrels are for the moſt part begun upon perſonal Titles, as be⯑tween Henry the Firſt and Robert; Stephen and Maud; or the Houſes of Lancaſter and York: and the People who get nothing by the Victory which way ſoever it fall, and might therefore prudently leave the Com⯑petitors to decide their own Quarrels, like Theoreſtes and Polinices, with their own Swords, become cruelly engag'd in them.

It may ſeem ſtrange to ſome that I mention Seditions, Tumults, and Wars, upon juſt occaſions; but I can find no reaſon to retract the term. God intending that men ſhould live juſtly with one another, dos certainly intend that he or they who do no wrong, ſhould ſuffer none; and the Law that forbids Injurys, were of no uſe, if no Penalty might be in⯑flicted on thoſe who will not obey it. If Injuſtice therefore be evil, and Injurys forbidden, they are alſo to be puniſh'd; and the Law inſtituted for their prevention, muſt neceſſarily intend the avenging of ſuch as can⯑not be prevented. The work of the Magiſtracy is to execute this Law; the Sword of Juſtice is put into their hands to reſtrain the fury of thoſe within the Society who will not be a Law to themſelves; and the Sword of War to protect the people againſt the violence of Foreigners. This is without exception, and would be in vain if it were not. But the Magi⯑ſtrate who is to protect the People from Injury, may, and is often known not to have done it: he ſometimes renders his Office uſeleſs by neglecting to do Juſtice; ſometimes miſchievous by overthrowing it. This ſtrikes at the root of God's general Ordinance, That there ſhould be Laws; and the particular Ordinances of all Societys, that appoint ſuch as ſeem beſt to them. The Magiſtrate therefore is comprehended under both, and ſub⯑ject to both, as well as private men.

The ways of preventing or puniſhing Injurys, are Judicial or Extraju⯑dicial. Judicial proceedings are of force againſt thoſe who ſubmit or may be brought to trial, but are of no effect againſt thoſe who reſiſt, and are of ſuch power that they cannot be conſtrain'd. It were abſurd to cite a man to appear before a Tribunal who can aw the Judges, or has Armys to de⯑fend him; and impious to think that he who has added Treachery to his other Crimes, and uſurp'd a Power above the Law, ſhould be protected by the enormity of his wickedneſs. Legal proceedings therefore are to be us'd when the Delinquent ſubmits to the Law; and all are juſt, when he will not be kept in order by the legal.

The word Sedition is generally apply'd to all numerous Aſſemblys, without or againſt the Authority of the Magiſtrate, or of thoſe who aſ⯑ſume that Power. Athaliah and Jezabel were more ready to cry out Trea⯑ſon than David; and examples of that ſort are ſo frequent, that I need not alledg them.

Tumult is from the diſorderly manner of thoſe Aſſemblys, where things can ſeldom be done regularly; and War is that Decertatio per vim, or trial by force, to which men come when other ways are inef⯑fectual.

If the Laws of God and Men are therefore of no effect, when the Magiſtracy is left at liberty to break them; and if the Luſts of thoſe who are too ſtrong for the Tribunals of Juſtice, cannot be otherwiſe reſtrain'd than by Sedition, Tumults and War, thoſe Seditions, Tumults, and Wars, are juſtify'd by the Laws of God and Man.

[155] I will not take upon me to enumerate all the caſes in which this may be done, but content my ſelf with three, which have moſt frequently given occaſion for proceedings of this kind.

The firſt is, When one or more men take upon them the Power and Name of a Magiſtracy, to which they are not juſtly call'd.

The ſecond, When one or more being juſtly call'd, continue in their Magiſtracy longer than the Laws by which they are call'd do preſcribe.

And the third, When he or they who are rightly call'd, do aſſume a Power, tho within the time preſcrib'd, that the Law dos not give; or turn that which the Law dos give, to an end different and contrary to that which is intended by it.

For the firſt; Filmer forbids us to examin Titles: he tells us, we muſt ſubmit to the Power, whether acquir'd by Uſurpation or otherwiſe, not obſerving the miſchievous Abſurdity of rewarding the moſt deteſtable Villanys with the higheſt Honors, and rendering the veneration due to the ſupreme Magiſtrate as Father of the People, to one who has no other ad⯑vantage above his Brethren, than what he has gain'd by injuriouſly diſ⯑poſſeſſing or murdering him that was ſo. Hobbs fearing the advantages that may be taken from ſuch deſperate nonſenſe, or not thinking it neceſ⯑ſary to his end to carry the matter ſo far, has no regard at all to him who comes in without Title or Conſent; and denying him to be either King or Tyrant, gives him no other name than Hoſtis & Latro, and allows all things to be lawful againſt him, that may be done to a publick Enemy or Pyrat: which is as much as to ſay, any man may deſtroy him how he can. Whatever he may be guilty of in other reſpects, he dos in this fol⯑low the voice of Mankind, and the dictates of common ſenſe: for no man can make himſelf a Magiſtrate for himſelf, and no man can have the De Civ. l. 2.right of a Magiſtrate, who is not a Magiſtrate. If he be juſtly account⯑ed an Enemy to all, who injures all; he above all muſt be the publick Enemy of a Nation, who by uſurping a power over them, dos the greateſt and moſt publick injury that a People can ſuffer: For which rea⯑ſon, by an eſtabliſh'd Law among the moſt vertuous Nations, every man might kill a Tyrant; and no Names are recorded in Hiſtory with more honor, than of thoſe who did it.

Theſe are by other Authors call'd Tyranni ſine titulo, and that name is given to all thoſe who obtain the ſupreme Power by illegal and unjuſt means. The Laws which they overthrow can give them no protection; and every man is a Soldier againſt him who is a publick E⯑nemy.

The ſame rule holds, tho they are more in number; as the Magi, who uſurp'd the Dominion of Perſia after the death of Cambyſes; the thirty Tyrants at Athens overthrown by Thraſibulus; thoſe of Thebes ſlain by Pelopidas; the Decemviri of Rome, and others: For tho the multitude of Offenders may ſometimes procure impunity, yet that act which is wicked in one, muſt be ſo in ten or twenty; and whatſoever is lawful againſt one Uſurper, is ſo againſt them all.

2. If thoſe who were rightly created, continue beyond the time li⯑mited by the Law, 'tis the ſame thing. That which is expir'd, is as if it had never bin. He that was created Conſul for a year, or Dictator for ſix months, was after that a private man; and if he had continu'd in the exerciſe of his Magiſtracy, had bin ſubject to the ſame puniſhment as if he had uſurp'd it at the firſt. This was known to Epaminondas, who finding that his Enterprize againſt Sparta could not be accompliſh'd [156] within the time for which he was made Boeotarches, rather choſe to truſt his Countrymen with his life than to deſiſt, and was ſav'd merely thro an admiration of his Vertue, aſſurance of his good Intentions, and the glory of the Action.

The Roman Decemviri, tho duly elected, were proceeded againſt as private men uſurping the Magiſtracy, when they continu'd beyond their time. Other Magiſtrats had ceas'd; there was none that could regularly call the Senat or People to an Aſſembly: but when their ambition was manifeſt, and the People exaſperated by the death of Virginia, they laid aſide all ceremonys. The Senat and People met, and exerciſing their Authority in the ſame manner as if they had bin regularly call'd by the Magiſtrate appointed to that end, they abrogated the Power of the De⯑cemviri, proceeded againſt them as Enemys and Tyrants, and by that means preſerv'd themſelves from utter ruin.

3. The ſame courſe is juſtly us'd againſt a legal Magiſtrate, who takes upon him (tho within the time preſcrib'd by the Law) to exerciſe a Power which the Law dos not give; for in that reſpect he is a private man, Quia, as Grotius ſays, eatenus non habet imperium; and may be re⯑ſtrain'd as well as any other, becauſe he is not ſet up to do what he liſts, but what the Law appoints for the good of the People: and as he has no other Power than what the Law allows, ſo the ſame Law limits and di⯑rects the exerciſe of that which he has. This Right naturally belonging to Nations, is no way impair'd by the name of Supreme given to their Magiſtrats; for it ſignifys no more, than that they do act ſovereignly in the matters committed to their charge. Thus are the Parliaments of France call'd Cours Souveraines; for they judg of Life and Death, deter⯑min Controverſys concerning Eſtates; and there is no appeal from their Decrees: but no man ever thought, that it was therefore lawful for them to do what they pleas'd; or that they might not be oppos'd, if they ſhould attempt to do that which they ought not. And tho the Roman Dicta⯑tors and Conſuls were ſupreme Magiſtrats, they were ſubject to the Peo⯑ple, and might be puniſh'd as well as others if they tranſgreſt the Law. Thuanus carrys the word ſo far, that when Barlotta, Giuſtiniano, and others who were but Colonels, were ſent as Commanders in chief of three or four thouſand men upon an Enterprize, he always ſays, Sum⯑mum Imperium ei delatum. Grotius explains this point, by diſtinguiſhing thoſe who have the ſummum Imperium ſummo modo, from thoſe who have it modo non ſummo. I know not where to find an Example of this Sove⯑reign Power, enjoy'd without reſtriction, under a better title than Occu⯑pation; which relates not to our purpoſe, who ſeek only that which is legal and juſt. Therefore laying aſide that point for the preſent, we may De Jur. Bell. & Pac. l. 2.follow Grotius in examining the right of thoſe who are certainly limited: Ʋbi partem Imperii habet Rex, partem Senatus ſive Populus; in which caſe he ſays, Regi in partem non ſuam involanti, vis juſta opponi poteſt, in as much as they who have a part, cannot but have a right of defend⯑ing that part. Quia data facultate, datur jus facultatem tuendi, without which it could be of no effect.

The particular limits of the Rights belonging to each, can only be judg'd by the preciſe Letter, or general Intention of the Law. The Dukes of Venice have certainly a part in the Government, and could not be call'd Magiſtrats if they had not. They are ſaid to be ſupreme; all Laws and publick Acts bear their Names. The Embaſſador of that State ſpeaking [...]h [...]an. l. 137.to Pope Paul the Fifth, deny'd that he acknowledg'd any other Superior [157] than God. But they are ſo well known to be under the Power of the Law, that divers of 'em have bin put to death for tranſgreſſing it; and a marble Gallows is ſeen at the foot of the ſtairs in St. Mark's Palace, upon which ſome of them, and no others, have bin executed. But if they may be duly oppos'd, when they commit undue Acts, no man of judg⯑ment will deny, that if one of them by an outrageous Violence ſhould endeavour to overthrow the Law, he might by violence be ſuppreſt and chaſtis'd.

Again, ſome Magiſtrats are intruſted with a power of providing Ships, Arms, Ammunition, and Victuals for War; raiſing and diſciplining Soldiers, appointing Officers to command in Forts and Gariſons, and making Leagues with Foreign Princes and States. But if one of theſe ſhould imbezel, ſell, or give to an Enemy thoſe Ships, Arms, Ammuni⯑tion or Proviſions; betray the Forts; employ only or principally, ſuch men as will ſerve him in thoſe wicked Actions; and, contrary to the truſt repos'd in him, make ſuch Leagues with Foreigners, as tend to the advancement of his perſonal Intereſts, and to the detriment of the Pub⯑lick, he abrogates his own Magiſtracy; and the Right he had, periſhes (as the Lawyers ſay) fruſtratione finis. He cannot be protected by the Law which he has overthrown, nor obtain impunity for his Crimes from the Authority that was confer'd upon him, only that he might do good with it. He was ſingulis major on account of the excellency of his Office; but univerſis minor, from the nature and end of his Inſtitution. The ſureſt way of extinguiſhing his Prerogative, was by turning it to the hurt of thoſe who gave it. When matters are brought to this po⯑ſture, the Author of the miſchief, or the Nation muſt periſh. A Flock cannot ſubſiſt under a Shepherd that ſeeks its ruin, nor a People under an unfaithful Magiſtrate. Honor and Riches are juſtly heap'd upon the heads of thoſe who rightly perform their duty, becauſe the difficulty as well as the excellency of the work is great. It requires Courage, Expe⯑rience, Induſtry, Fidelity and Wiſdom. The good Shepherd, ſays our Saviour, lays down his life for his Sheep: The Hireling who flies in time of danger, is repreſented under an ill character; but he that ſets himſelf to deſtroy his Flock, is a Wolf. His Authority is incompatible with their ſubſiſtence; and whoever diſapproves Tumults, Seditions or War, by which he may be remov'd from it, if gentler means are ineffectual, ſub⯑verts the Foundation of all Law, exalts the fury of one man to the de⯑ſtruction of a Nation; and giving an irreſiſtible Power to the moſt abo⯑minable Iniquity, expoſes all that are good to be deſtroy'd, and Vertue to be utterly extinguiſh'd.

Few will allow ſuch a Preeminence to the Dukes of Venice or Genoa, the Advoyers of Switzerland, or the Burgomaſters of Amſterdam. Ma⯑ny will ſay theſe are Raſcals if they prove falſe, and ought rather to be hang'd, than ſuffer'd to accompliſh the Villanys they deſign. But if this be confeſt in relation to the higheſt Magiſtrats that are among thoſe Na⯑tions, why ſhould not the ſame be in all others, by what name ſoever they are call'd? When did God confer upon thoſe Nations the extraor⯑dinary privilege of providing better for their own ſafety than others? Or was the Gift univerſal, tho the Benefit accrue only to thoſe who have baniſh'd great Titles from among them? If this be ſo, 'tis not their Feli⯑city, but their Wiſdom that we ought to admire and imitate. But why ſhould any think their Anceſtors had not the ſame care? Have not they, who retain'd in themſelves a Power over a Magiſtrate of one name, the [158] like over another? Is there a charm in words, or any name of ſuch effi⯑cacy, that he who receives it ſhould immediately become Maſter of thoſe that created him, whereas all others do remain for ever ſubject to them? Would the Venetian Government change its nature, if they ſhould give the name of King to their Prince? Are the Polanders leſs ſree ſince the title of King is confer'd upon their Dukes; or are the Moſcovites leſs Slaves, be⯑cauſe their chief Magiſtrate has no other than that of Duke? If we exa⯑min things but a little, 'twill appear that Magiſtrats have enjoy'd large Powers, who never had the name of Kings; and none were ever more reſtrain'd by Laws than thoſe of Sparta, Arragon, the Goths in Spain, Hungary, Bohemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and others, who had that Title. There is therefore no ſuch thing as a Right univerſally belonging to a Name; but every one enjoys that which the Laws, by which he is, con [...]er upon him. The Law that gives the Power, regulates it; and they who give no more than what they pleaſe, cannot be oblig'd to ſuffer him to whom they give it, to take more than they thought fit to give, or to go unpuniſh'd if he do. The Agreements made are always con⯑firm'd by Oath, and the treachery of violating them is conſequently ag⯑gravated by Perjury. They are good Philoſophers and able Divines, who think this can create a Right to thoſe who had none; or that the Laws can be a protection to ſuch as overthrow them, and give op⯑portunity of doing the miſchiefs they deſign. If it do not, then he that was a Magiſtrate, by ſuch actions returns into the condition of a private man; and whatever is lawful againſt a Thief who ſubmits to no Law, is lawful againſt him.

Men who delight in cavils may ask, Who ſhall be the Judg of theſe oc⯑caſions? And whether I intend to give to the People the deciſion of their own Cauſe? To which I anſwer, that when the conteſt is between the Ma⯑giſtrate and the People, the party to which the determination is refer'd, muſt be the Judg of his own caſe; and the queſtion is only, Whether the Magiſtrate ſhould depend on the Judgment of the People, or the Peo⯑ple on that of the Magiſtrate; and which is moſt to be ſuſpected of inju⯑ſtice: That is, whether the People of Rome ſhould judg Tarquin, or Tarquin judg the People. He that knew all good men abhor'd him for the murder of his Wife, Brother, Father-in-law, and the beſt of the Senat, would cer⯑tainly ſtrike off the heads of the moſt eminent remaining Poppys; and having incur'd the general hatred of the people by the wickedneſs of his Government, he fear'd revenge; and endeavouring to deſtroy thoſe he fear'd (that is the City) he might eaſily have accompliſh'd his work, if the judgment had bin refer'd to him. If the People judg Tarquin, 'tis hard to imagin how they ſhould be brought to give an unjuſt Sentence: They lov'd their former Kings, and hated him only for his Villanys: They did not fancy, but know his cruelty. When the beſt were ſlain, no man that any way reſembled them could think himſelf ſecure. Brutus did not pretend to be a Fool, till by the murder of his Brother he found how dangerous a thing it was to be thought wiſe. If the people, as our Author ſays, be always leud, fooliſh, mad, wicked, and deſirous to put the Power into the hands of ſuch as are moſt like to themſelves, he and his Sons were ſuch men as they ſought, and he was ſure to find favoura⯑ble Judges: If vertuous and good, no injuſtice was to be fear'd from them, and he could have no other reaſon to decline their judgment, than what was ſuggeſted by his own wickedneſs. Caligula, Nero, Domitian, and the like, had probably the ſame conſiderations: But no man of com⯑mon [159] ſenſe ever thought that the Senat and People of Rome did not better deſerve to judg, whether ſuch Monſters ſhould reign over the beſt part of mankind to their deſtruction, than they to determin whether their Crimes ſhould be puniſh'd or not.

If I mention ſome of theſe known Caſes, every man's experience will ſuggeſt others of the like nature; and whoſoever condemns all Seditions, Tumults and Wars rais'd againſt ſuch Princes, muſt ſay, that none are wicked, or ſeek the ruin of their People, which is abſurd: for Caligula wiſh'd the People had but one Neck, that he might cut it off at a blow; Nero ſet the City on fire; and we have known ſuch as have bin worſe than either of them: They muſt either be ſuffer'd to continue in the free exerciſe of their rage, that is, to do all the miſchief they deſign; or muſt be reſtrain'd by a legal, judicial, or extrajudicial way; and they who diſallow the extrajudicial, do as little like the judicial. They will not hear of bringing a ſupreme Magiſtrate before a Tribunal, when it may be done. They will, ſays our Author, depoſe their Kings. Why ſhould they not be depos'd, if they become Enemys to their People, and ſet up an intereſt in their own perſons inconſiſtent with the publick good, for the promoting of which they were erected? If they were created by the publick conſent, for the publick good, ſhall they not be remov'd when they prove to be of publick damage? If they ſet up themſelves, may they not be thrown down? Shall it be lawful for them to uſurp a Power over the liberty of others, and ſhall it not be lawful for an injur'd People to re⯑ſume their own? If injuſtice exalt it ſelf, muſt it be for ever eſtabliſh'd? Shall great Perſons be render'd ſacred by rapine, perjury and murder? Shall the crimes for which private men do juſtly ſuffer the moſt grievous puniſhments, exempt them from all, who commit them in the higheſt ex⯑ceſs, with moſt power, and moſt to the prejudice of mankind? Shall the Laws that ſolely aim at the prevention of Crimes, be made to patronize them, and become ſnares to the innocent whom they ought to protect? Has every man given up into the common ſtore his right of avenging the Injurys he may receive, that the publick Power which ought to protect or avenge him, ſhould be turn'd to the deſtruction of himſelf, his Poſte⯑rity, and the Society into which they enter, without any poſſibility of redreſs? Shall the Ordinance of God be render'd of no effect; or the Powers he has appointed to be ſet up for the diſtribution of Juſtice, be made ſubſervient to the luſts of one or a ſew men, and by impunity in⯑courage them to commit all manner of crimes? Is the corruption of man's Nature ſo little known, that ſuch as have common ſenſe ſhould expect Juſtice from thoſe, who ſear no puniſhment if they do Injuſtice; or that the modeſty, integrity, and innocence, which is ſeldom found in one man, tho never ſo cautiouſly choſen, ſhould be conſtantly found in all thoſe who by any means attain to Greatneſs, and continue for ever in their Succeſſors; or that there can be any ſecurity under their Government, if they have them not? Surely if this were the condition of men living under Government, Foreſts would be more ſafe than Citys; and 'twere better for every man to ſtand in his own defence, than to enter into Societys. He that lives alone might encounter ſuch as ſhould aſſault him upon equal terms, and ſtand or fall according to the meaſure of his courage and ſtrength; but no Valor can defend him, if the malice of his Enemy be upheld by a publick Power. There muſt therefore be a right of pro⯑ceeding judicially or extrajudicially againſt all perſons who tranſgreſs the Laws, or elſe thoſe Laws, and the Societys that ſhould ſubſiſt by them, [160] cannot ſtand; and the ends for which Governments are conſtituted, to⯑gether with the Governments themſelves, muſt be overthrown. Extraju⯑dicial proceedings by Sedition, Tumult, or War, muſt take place, when the perſons concern'd are of ſuch power, that they cannot be brought un⯑der the Judicial. They who deny this, deny all help againſt an uſurp⯑ing Tyrant, or the perfidiouſneſs of a lawfully created Magiſtrate, who adds the crimes of Ingratitude and Treachery to Uſurpation. Theſe of all men are the moſt dangerous Enemys to ſupreme Magiſtrats: for as no man deſires indemnity for ſuch Crimes as are never committed, he that would exempt all from puniſhment, ſuppoſes they will be guilty of the worſt; and by concluding that the People will depoſe them if they have the power, acknowledg that they purſue an Intereſt annex'd to their Per⯑ſons, contrary to that of their People, which they would not bear if they could deliver themſelves from it. This ſhewing all thoſe Governments to be tyrannical, lays ſuch a burden upon thoſe who adminiſter them, as muſt neceſſarily weigh them down to deſtruction.

If it be ſaid that the word Sedition implys that which is evil; I anſwer, that it ought not then to be apply'd to thoſe who ſeek nothing but that which is juſt; and tho the ways of delivering an oppreſt People from the violence of a wicked Magiſtrate, who having arm'd a Crew of leud Villains, and fatted them with the Blood and Confiſcations of ſuch as were moſt ready to oppoſe him, be extraordinary, the inward righteouſ⯑neſs of the Act dos fully juſtify the Authors. He that has vertue and power to ſave a People, can never want a right of doing it. Valerius Aſiaticus had no hand in the death of Caligula; but when the furious Guards began tumultuouſly to inquire who had kill'd him, he appeaſed them with wiſhing he had bin the man. No wiſe man ever ask'd by what authority Thraſibulus, Harmodius, Ariſtogiton, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Dion, Timoleon, Lucius Brutus, Publicola, Horatius, Valerius, Marcus Brutus, C. Caſſius, and the like, deliver'd their Countrys from Tyrants. Their Actions carry'd in them their own juſtification, and their Vertues will never be forgotten whilſt the names of Greece and Rome are remem⯑ber'd in the World.

If this be not enough to declare the Juſtice inherent in, and the Glory that ought to accompany theſe Works, the examples of Moſes, Aaron, Othniel, Ehud, Barac, Gideon, Samuel, Jephtha, David, Jehu, Jehoiada, the Maccabees, and other holy men rais'd up by God for the deliverance of his People from their Oppreſſors, decide the Queſtion. They are perpetually renown'd for having led the People by extraordinary ways (which ſuch as our Author expreſs under the names of Sedition, Tumult, and War) to recover their Libertys, and avenge the injurys receiv'd from foreign or domeſtick Tyrants. The work of the Apoſtles was not in their time to ſet up or pull down any civil State; but they ſo behav'd themſelves in relation to all the Powers of the Earth, that they gain'd the name of peſtilent ſeditious Fellows, Diſturbers of the People; and left it as an inheritance to thoſe, who in ſucceeding Ages by following their ſteps ſhould deſerve to be call'd their Succeſſors; whereby they were expos'd to the hatred of corrupt Magiſtrats, and brought under the neceſſity of pe⯑riſhing by them, or deſending themſelves againſt them: and he that de⯑nys them that right, dos at once condemn the moſt glorious Actions of the wiſeſt, beſt, and holieſt men that have bin in the world, together with the Laws of God and Man, upon which they were founded.

[161] Nevertheleſs, there is a ſort of Sedition, Tumult, and War proceeding from Malice, which is always deteſtable, aiming only at the ſatisfaction of private Luſt, without regard to the publick Good. This cannot hap⯑pen in a Popular Government, unleſs it be amongſt the Rabble; or when the Body of the People is ſo corrupted, that it cannot ſtand; but is moſt frequent in, and natural to abſolute Monarchys. When Abimelech deſir'd Judg. 9.to make himſelf King, he rais'd a Tumult among the baſeſt of the Peo⯑ple: He hir'd light and vain Perſons, ſome Tranſlations call them leud Vagabonds, kill'd his Brethren, but periſh'd in his deſign; the corrupt party that favor'd him not having Strength enough to ſubdue the other, who were more ſincere. Sp. Melius, Sp. Caſſius, and Manlius attempted the like in Rome: they acted maliciouſly, their pretences to procure the publick Good were falſe. 'Tis probable that ſome in the City were as bad as they, and knew that miſchief was intended; but the Body of the People not being corrupted, they were ſuppreſt. It appear'd, ſays Livy, Nihil eſſe minus populare quam regnum: they who had favor'd Manlius, condemn'd him to death when it was prov'd, that egregias alioqui virtutes foeda regni cupidine maculaſſet. But when the People is generally corrup⯑ted, ſuch deſigns ſeldom miſcarry, and the ſucceſs is always the erection of a Tyranny. Nothing elſe can pleaſe vain and profligate perſons, and no Tyranny was ever ſet up by ſuch as were better qualify'd. The ways of attaining it have always bin by corrupting the manners of the People, bribing Soldiers, entertaining mercenary Strangers, opening Priſons, giving Liberty to Slaves, alluring indigent perſons with hopes of aboliſhing Debts, coming to a new diviſion of Lands, and the like. Seditions rais'd by ſuch men always tend to the ruin of popular Govern⯑ments; but when they happen under abſolute Monarchys, the hurt intended is only to the Perſon, who being remov'd, the Promoters of 'em ſet up another; and he that is ſet up, ſubſiſting only by the ſtrength of thoſe who made him, is oblig'd to foment the Vices that drew them to ſerve him; tho another may perhaps make uſe of the ſame againſt him.

The conſequence of this is, That thoſe who uphold popular Govern⯑ments, look upon Vice and Indigence as miſchiefs that naturally increaſe each other, and equally tend to the ruin of the State. When men are by Vice brought into want, they are ready for miſchief: there is no Villany that men of profligate Lives, loſt Reputation, and deſperate Fortunes will not undertake. Popular Equality is an enemy to theſe; and they who would preſerve it, muſt preſerve integrity of Manners, Sobriety, and an honeſt contentedneſs with what the Law allows. On the other ſide, the abſolute Monarch, who will have no other Law than his own Will, deſires to increaſe the number of thoſe who thro leudneſs and beg⯑gery may incline to depend upon him; tho the ſame temper of Mind, and condition of Fortune prepare them alſo for ſuch Seditions as may bring him into danger; and the ſame corruption which led them to ſet him up, may invite them to ſell him to another that will give them better wages.

I do not by this conclude that all Monarchs are vicious men; but that whoever will ſet up an abſolute Power, muſt do it by theſe means; and that if ſuch a Power be already eſtabliſh'd, and ſhould fall into the hands of a perſon, who by his Vertue and the gentleneſs of his Nature ſhould endeavor to render the Yoke ſo eaſy, that a better diſciplin'd People might be contented to bear it; yet this method could laſt no longer than [162] his life, and probably would be a means to ſhorten it; that which was at firſt eſtabliſh'd by evil Arts always returning to the ſame: That which was vicious in the principle, can never be long upheld by Vertue; and we ſee that the worſt of the Roman Emperors were not in greater dan⯑ger from ſuch good men as remain'd undeſtroy'd, than the beſt from the corrupt Party that would not be corrected, and ſought ſuch a Maſter as would lay no reſtriction upon their Vices. Thoſe few who eſcap'd the rage of theſe Villains, only gave a little breathing time to the afflicted World, which by their Children or Succeſſors was again plung'd into that extremity of miſery, from which they intended to deliver it. An ex⯑traordinary Vertue was requir'd to keep a Prince in a way contrary to the principles of his own Government; which being rarely found, and ne⯑ver continuing long in a Family or Succeſſion of men, the endeavors of the beſt became ineffectual, and either they themſelves periſh'd in them, or after their death all things return'd into the old polluted Chan⯑nel.

Tho the Power of the Hebrew Kings was not unlimited, yet it ex⯑ceeded the Rules ſet by God, and was ſufficient to increaſe the number of the worſt of men, and to give them opportunitys of raiſing perpetual diſturbances. On the King's ſide there were Flatterers and Inſtruments of miſchief: On the other ſide there were indebted and diſcontented Perſons. Notwithſtanding the Juſtice of David's cauſe, the Wiſdom, Valor, and Piety of his Perſon, none would follow him, except a few of his own Kindred (who knew what God had promis'd to him) and ſuch as were uneaſy in their worldly circumſtances. After the death of Saul there was a long and bloody War between Iſhboſheth and David. The former being kill'd, the ſlighteſt matters were ſufficient to put the whole Nation into blood. Abſalom with a few fair words was able to raiſe all Iſrael againſt his Father: Sheba the Son of Bichri with as much eaſe rais'd a more dangerous Tumult: David, by Wiſdom, Valor, and the Bleſſing of God, ſurmounted theſe Difficultys, and prepar'd a peace⯑able Reign for Solomon: but after his death they broke out into a Flame that was never quench'd, till the Nation was ſo diſpers'd that no man knew where to find his Enemys. Solomon by his Magnificence had reduc'd Iſrael to ſuch poverty, as inclin'd them to revolt upon the firſt offer of an opportunity by Jeroboam. From that time forward Iſrael was perpetually vex'd with Civil Seditions and Conſpiracys, or Wars with their Brethren of Judah. Nine Kings with their Familys were deſtroy'd by the firſt, and the latter brought ſuch Slaughters upon the miſerable People, as were never ſuffer'd by any who were not agitated by the like Fury; and the courſe of theſe miſchiefs was never interrupted, till they had brought the Nation into Captivity, and the Country to Deſolation. Tho God ac⯑cording to his promiſe did preſerve a light in the Houſe of David, yet the Tribe of Judah was not the more happy. Joaſh was ſlain by a pri⯑vate Conſpiracy, and Amaziah (as is moſt probable) by publick Autho⯑rity, for having fooliſhly brought a terrible Slaughter upon Judah. A⯑thaliah deſtroy'd the King's Race, and was kill'd her ſelf by Jehoiada, who not having learn'd from our Author to regard the Power only, and not the ways by which it was obtain'd, caus'd her to be drag'd out of the Temple, and put to a well-deſerv'd Death. The whole Story is a Tragedy: and if it be pretended that this proceeded rather from the wrath of God againſt his People for their Idolatry, than from ſuch cauſes as are applicable to other Nations; I anſwer, that this Idolatry was the [163] production of the Government they had ſet up, and moſt ſutable to it; and chuſing rather to ſubject themſelves to the Will of a man than to the Law of God, they deſervedly ſuffer'd the evils that naturally follow the worſt Counſels. We know of none who, taking the like courſe, have not ſuffer'd the like miſerys. Notwithſtanding the admirable Ver⯑tue and Succeſs of Alexander, his Reign was full of Conſpiracys, and his knowledg of them prompted him to deſtroy Parmenio, Philotas, Clitus, Caliſthenes, Hermolaus, and many more of his beſt Friends. If he e⯑ſcap'd the Sword, he fell by Poiſon. The Murder of his Wives, Mo⯑ther, and Children, by the rage of his own Soldiers; the Fury of his Captains imploy'd in mutual Slaughters, till they were conſum'd; his pa⯑ternal Kingdom after many Revolutions transfer'd to Caſſander his moſt mortal Enemy; the utter extinction of his conquering Army, and parti⯑cularly the famous Argyraſpides, who being grown faithleſs and ſeditious, after the death of Eumenes were ſent to periſh in unknown parts of the Eaſt, abundantly teſtify the admirable ſtability, good order, peace, and quiet that is enjoy'd under abſolute Monarchy. The next Government of the like nature that appear'd upon the Stage of the World was that of Rome, introduc'd by Wars that conſum'd two thirds of the People; con⯑firm'd by Proſcriptions, in which all that were eminent for Nobility, Riches, or Vertue, periſh'd. The peace they had under Auguſtus was like that which the Devil allow'd to the Child in the Goſpel, whom he rent Mark 9. 26.ſorely, and left as dead. The miſerable City was only caſt into a Swound: after long and violent vexations by Seditions, Tumults, and Wars, it lay as dead; and finding no helper like to him who cur'd the Child, it was deliver'd to new Devils to be tormented, till it was utterly deſtroy'd. Tiberius was appointed as a fit inſtrument for ſuch a purpoſe. It was thought that thoſe who ſhould feel the effects of his Pride, Cruelty, and Luſt, would look upon the Death of Auguſtus as a loſs. He perform'd the work for which he was choſen; his Reign was an uninterrupted Se⯑ries of Murders, Subornations, Perjurys, and Poiſonings, intermix'd with the moſt deteſtable Impuritys, the revolts of Provinces, and Muti⯑nys of Armys. The matter was not mended by his Succeſſors: Caligula was kill'd by his own Guards; Claudius poiſon'd by his Wife: Spain, Gaul, Germany, Pannonia, Maeſia, Syria, and Aegypt, revolted at once from Nero; the People and Senat follow'd the example of the Provinces. This I think was, in our Author's ſenſe, Sedition with a witneſs. Nero being dead by the hand of a Slave, or his own, to prevent that of the Hangman, Galba enter'd the City with Blood and Slaughter; but when his own Soldiers found he would not give the Mony for which they intended to ſell the Empire, they kill'd him: and to ſhew the ſtability of Abſolute Monarchy, it may be obſerv'd, that this was not done by the advice of the Senat, or by a conſpiracy of great men; Suſcepere duo ma⯑nipulares C. Tacit. Hiſt▪ l. 1. Populi Romani Imperium transferendum, & tranſtulerunt. Two Raſcals gave the Empire to Otho, and the whole Senat was like to be butcher'd for not being ſo ready to follow their venerable Authority as they ought to have bin, and hardly eſcap'd the fury of their mad and drunken Companions. As a farther teſtimony that theſe Monarchys are not ſubject to Seditions and Tumults, he had at once only two Competi⯑tors againſt whom he was to defend the well-acquir'd Empire: His Ar⯑my was deſeated at Breſcia, he kill'd himſelf; and his Succeſſor Vitellius was ſoon after thrown into the Common-ſhore. The ſame method ſtill continu'd: Rome was fill'd with Blood and Aſhes; and to recite all the [164] publick Miſchiefs would be to tranſcribe the Hiſtory: For as Pyrrhus be⯑ing ask'd who ſhould ſucceed him, anſwer'd, He who has the ſharpeſt Sword; that was the only Law that govern'd in the following ages. Whoever could corrupt two or three Legions, thought he had a good ti⯑tle to the Empire; and unleſs he happen'd to be kill'd by Treachery, or another Tumult of his own Soldiers, he ſeldom receded from it without a Battel, wherein he that was moſt ſucceſsful, had no other ſecurity than what the preſent temper of the Soldiers afforded him: and the miſerable Provinces having neither Vertue nor Force, were oblig'd ſlaviſhly to follow the fury or fortune of thoſe Villains. In this ſtate did Rome de⯑dicate to Conſtantine the Triumphal Arch that had bin prepar'd for Maxentius; and thoſe Provinces which had ſet up Albinus and Niger ſubmitted to Septimius Severus. In the vaſt variety of Accidents that in thoſe Ages diſturb'd the World, no Emperor had a better title than what he purchas'd by Mony or Violence; and enjoy'd it no longer than thoſe helps continu'd, which of all things were the moſt uncertain. By this means moſt of the Princes periſh'd by the Sword, Italy was made deſo⯑late, and Rome was ſeveral times ſack'd and burnt. The Miſtreſs of the World being made a Slave, the Provinces which had bin acquir'd by the Blood of her antient vertuous Citizens, became part of an Uſurper's Patrimony, who without any regard to the publick good, diſtributed 'em to his Children according to their number, or his paſſion. Theſe ei⯑ther deſtroy'd one another, or fell under the Sword of a third who had the fortune of their Father, the greateſt part moſt commonly falling to the ſhare of the worſt. If at any time the contrary happen'd, the Go⯑vernment of the beſt was but a lucid interval, and well-wiſhing men grew more extremely to abhor the darkneſs that follow'd when they were gone. The beſt of 'em could do no more than ſuſpend miſchief for a while, but could not correct the corrupt principle of their Government; and ſome of 'em were deſtroy'd as ſoon as they were thought to intend it: Others who finiſh'd their days in peace, left the Empire to ſuch per⯑ſons of their relations as were moſt unlike to them. Domitian came in as Brother to Titus. Commodus and Heliogabalus were recommended by the memory of thoſe Vertues that had bin found in Antoninus and Aure⯑lius. Honorius and Arcadius, who by their baſeneſs brought utter ruin upon the Weſtern and Eaſtern Empires, were the Sons of the brave Theo⯑doſius. They who could keep their hands free from Blood, and their Hearts from Malice, Covetouſneſs, and Pride, could not tranſmit their Vertues to their Succeſſors, nor correct the perverſeneſs that lay at the root and foundation of their Government. The whole maſs of Blood was vitia⯑ted: the Body was but one vaſt Sore, which no hand but that of the Al⯑mighty could heal; and he who from an abhorrence of iniquity had de⯑clar'd he would not hear the crys of his own people, when they had cho⯑ſen the thing that was not good, would not ſhew mercy to Strangers who had done the ſame thing.

I have inſiſted upon the Hebrew, Macedonian and Roman Hiſtorys, be⯑cauſe they are the moſt eminent and beſt known to us: We are in the dark concerning the Babylonian, Aſſyrian, Chaldean, Bactrian, and Egyp⯑tian Monarchys: We know little more of them than the Scripture occa⯑ſionally relates concerning their barbarous cruelty, beſtial pride, and ex⯑travagant folly. Others have bin like to them, and I know not where to find a peaceable Monarchy unleſs it be in Peru, where the Ynca Gar [...]ilaſſo de la Vega ſays, that a Man and a Woman, Children of the Sun and the [165] Moon, appearing amongſt a barbarous people living without any Reli⯑gion or Law, eſtabliſh'd a Government amongſt them, which continu'd in much Peace and Juſtice for twelve Generations: But this ſeeming to be as fabulous as their Birth, we may paſs it over, and fix upon thoſe that are better known; of which there is not one that has not ſuffer'd more dan⯑gerous and miſchievous Seditions, than all the popular Governments that have bin in the World: And the condition of thoſe Kingdoms which are not abſolute, and yet give a preference to Birth, without conſideration of Merit or Vertue, is not much better.

This is prov'd by the Reaſons of thoſe Seditions and Tumults, as well as from the Fact it ſelf.

The Reaſons ariſe from the violence of the Paſſions that incite men to them, and the intricacy of the Queſtions concerning Succeſſion.

Every man has Paſſions; few know how to moderate, and no one can wholly extinguiſh them. As they are various in their nature, ſo they are govern'd by various Objects; and men uſually follow that which is pre⯑dominant in them, whether it proceed from Anger or Deſire, and whe⯑ther it terminate in Ambition, Covetouſneſs, Luſt, or any other more or leſs blamable Appetite. Every manner of life furniſhes ſomething, that in ſome meaſure may foment theſe; but a Crown comprehends all that can be grateful to the moſt violent and vicious. He who is covetous, has vaſt Revenues, beſides what he may get by fraud and rapine, to ſatisfy his Appetite. If he be given to Senſuality, the variety of pleaſures, and the facility of accompliſhing whatever he deſires, tends farther to inflame that Paſſion. Such as are ambitious, are incited by the greatneſs of their Power to attempt great matters; and the moſt ſottiſh or lazy may diſ⯑charge themſelves of Cares, and hope that others will be eaſily hir'd to take the burden of Buſineſs upon them whilſt they lie at eaſe. They who naturally incline to pride and cruelty, are more violently tempted to uſurp Dominion; and the wicked Advices of Flatterers, always con⯑curring with their Paſſions, incite them to exerciſe the Power they have gotten with the utmoſt rigor, to ſatiate their own rage, and to ſecure themſelves againſt the effects of the publick hatred, which they know they have deſerv'd. If there be, as our Author ſays, no other Rule than Force and Succeſs, and that he muſt be taken for the Father of a People who is in poſſeſſion of a Power over them; whoever has the one, may put the other to a trial. Nay, even thoſe who have regard to Juſtice, will ſeldom want Reaſons to perſuade them that it is on their ſide. Something may be amiſs in the State; Injurys may be done to themſelves and their Friends. Such Honors may be deny'd as they think they de⯑ſerve; or others of leſs Merit, as they ſuppoſe, may be prefer'd before them. Men do ſo rarely make a right eſtimate of their own Merits, that thoſe who mean well may be often deceiv'd: and if nothing but Succeſs be requir'd to make a Monarch, they may think it juſt to attempt whatever they can hope to accompliſh. This was the caſe of Julius Cae⯑ſar; he thought all things ^* lawful, when the Conſulat, which he ſup⯑pos'd he had deſerv'd, was deny'd. Theſe Enterprizes ſeem to belong to men of great Spirits; but there are none ſo baſe not to be capable of un⯑dertaking, and (as things may ſtand) of bringing 'em to perfection. Hi⯑ſtory [166] repreſents no man under a more contemptible character of ſottiſ [...] Lazineſs, Cowardice, and Drunkenneſs, than Vitellius; no one more impure and ſordid than Galba: Otho was advanc'd for being in his man⯑ners like to Nero: Veſpaſian was ſcorn'd for his Avarice, till the Power fell into ſuch hands as made the world believe none could be unworthy of the Empire; and in the following Ages the worſt men by the worſt means moſt frequently obtain'd it.

Theſe Wounds are not cur'd by ſaying, that the Law of God and Na⯑ture prevents this miſchief, by annexing the Succeſſion of Crowns to proximity of Blood; for mankind had not bin continually afflicted with them if there had bin ſuch a Law, or that they could have bin prevent⯑ed by it: and tho there were ſuch a Law, yet more Queſtions would a⯑riſe about that Proximity, than any wiſe man would dare to determin. The Law can be of no effect, unleſs there be a Power to decide the Con⯑teſts ariſing upon it: But the fundamental Maxim of the great Monar⯑chys is, that there can be no Interregnum: The Heir of the Crown is in poſſeſſion, as ſoon as he who did injoy it is dead. Le Mort, as the French ſay, Saiſit le vif: There can be therefore no ſuch Law, or it ſerves for nothing. If there be Judges to interpret the Law, no man is a King till judgment be given in his favor; and he is not King by his own Title, but by the Sentence given by them. If there be none, the Law is merely imaginary, and every man may in his own caſe make it what he pleaſes. He who has a Crown in his view, and Arms in his hand, wants nothing but ſucceſs to make him a King; and if he proſpers, all men are oblig'd to obey him.

'Tis a folly to ſay the matter is clear, and needs no deciſion; for every man knows that no Law concerning privat Inheritances can be ſo exactly drawn, but many Controverſys will ariſe upon it, that muſt be decided by a Power to which both Partys are ſubject: and the diſputes concerning Kingdoms are ſo much the more difficult, becauſe this Law is no where to be found; and the more dangerous, becauſe the Competitors are for the moſt part more powerful.

Again, this Law muſt either be general to all Mankind, or particular to each Nation. If particular, a matter of ſuch importance requires good proof, when, where, how, and by whom it was given to every one. But the Scriptures teſtifying to the contrary, that God gave Laws to the Jews only, and that no ſuch thing as hereditary Monarchy, ac⯑cording to proximity of Blood, was preſcrib'd by them, we may ſafely ſay, that God never gave any ſuch Law to every particular, nor to any Nation. If he did not give it to any one, he did not give it to all, for eve⯑ry one is comprehended in all; and if no one has it, 'tis impoſſible that all can have it; or that it ſhould be obligatory to all, when no man knows or can tell, when, where, and by what hand it was given, nor what is the ſenſe of it: all which is evident by the various Laws and Cuſtoms of Nations in the diſpoſal of hereditary Succeſſions: And no one of them, that we know, has to this day bin able to ſhew that the method follow'd by them, is more according to nature than that of others.

If our Author pretends to be God's Interpreter, and to give the ſolu⯑tion of theſe doubts, I may ask which of the five following ways are appointed by God, and then we may examin Caſes reſulting from them.

[167] 1. In France, Turky, and other places, the Succeſſion comes to the next Male, in the ſtreight eldeſt Line, according to which the Son is pre⯑fer'd before the Brother of him who laſt enjoy'd the Crown, (as the preſent King of France before his Uncle the Duke of Orleans) and the Son of the eldeſt before the Brothers of the eldeſt; as in the caſe of Richard the Second of England, who was advanc'd preferably to all the Brothers of the black Prince his Father.

2. Others keep to the Males of the reigning Family, yet have more regard to the eldeſt Man than to the eldeſt Line: and Repreſentation tak⯑ing no place among them, the eldeſt Man is thought to be neareſt to the firſt King; and a ſecond Son of the Perſon that laſt reign'd, to be nearer to him than his Grandchild by the eldeſt Son: according to which Rule, any one of the Sons of Edward the Third remaining after his death, ſhould have bin prefer'd before Richard the Second who was his Grand⯑child.

3. In the two caſes beforemention'd, no manner of regard is had to Fe⯑males, who being thought naturally uncapable of commanding Men, or performing the Functions of a Magiſtrate, are, together with their De⯑ſcendents, utterly excluded from the ſupreme as well as from the inferior Magiſtracys; and in Turky, France, and other great Kingdoms, have no pretence to any Title: But in ſome places, and particularly in Eng⯑land, the advantages of Proximity belong to them as well as to Males; by which means our Crown has bin tranſported to ſeveral Familys and Nations.

4. As in ſome places they are utterly rejected, and in others receiv'd ſimply without any condition; ſo thoſe are not wanting, where that of not marrying out of the Country, or without the conſent of the Eſtates, is impos'd, of which Sweden is an Example.

5. In ſome places Proximity of Blood is only regarded, whether the Iſſue be legitimate, or illegitimate; in others Baſtards are wholly ex⯑cluded.

By this variety of Judgments made by ſeveral Nations upon this Point, it may appear, that tho it were agreed by all that the next in Blood ought to ſucceed, yet ſuch Conteſts would ariſe upon the interpretation and ap⯑plication of the general Rule, as muſt neceſſarily be a perpetual Spring of irreconcilable and mortal Quarrels.

If any man ſay, The Rule obſerv'd in England is that which God gave to Mankind; I leave him firſt to diſpute that point with the Kings of France, and many others, who can have no right to the Crowns they wear, if it be admitted; and in the next place to prove that our Ance⯑ſtors had a more immediate communication with God, and a more certain knowledg of his Will than others, who for any thing we know, may be of Authority equal to them: But in the mean time we may rationally conclude, that if there be ſuch a Rule, we have had no King in England for the ſpace of almoſt a thouſand years, having not had one who did not come to the Crown by a moſt manifeſt violation of it; as appears by the forecited Examples of William the Firſt and Second; Henry the Firſt; Henry the Second and his Children; John, Edward the Third, Henry the Fourth, Edward the Fourth and his Children; Henry the Seventh, and all that claim under any of them. And if Poſſeſſion or Succeſs can give a right, it will I think follow, that Jack Straw, Wat Tyler, Perkin War⯑beck, or any other Raſcal, might have had it if he had bin as happy as bold in his Enterprize. This is no leſs than to expoſe Crowns to the firſt [168] that can ſeize them, to deſtroy all Law and Rule, and to render Right a ſlave to Fortune. If this be ſo, a late Earl of Pembroke, whoſe under⯑ſtanding was not thought great, judg'd rightly when he ſaid his Grandfa⯑ther was a wiſe man tho he could neither write nor read, in as much as he reſolv'd to follow the Crown, tho it were upon a Coalſtaff. But if this be ſufficient to make a wiſe man, 'tis pity the ſecret was no ſooner diſco⯑ver'd, ſince many, who for want of it liv'd and dy'd in all the infamy that juſtly accompanys Knavery, Cowardice and Folly, might have gain'd the reputation of the moſt excellent Men in their ſeveral ages. The bloody Factions with which all Nations ſubject to this ſort of Mo⯑narchy have bin perpetually vex'd, might have bin prevented by throw⯑ing up croſs or pile, or by battel between the Competitors body to body, as was done by Corbis and Orſua, Cleoreſtes and Polinices, Ironſide and Canutus; it being moſt unreaſonable, or rather impiouſly abſurd, for any to venture their Lives and Fortunes, when their Conſciences are not concern'd in the Conteſt, and that they are to gain nothing by the Victory.

If Reaſon teaches, that till this expeditious way of ending Controver⯑ſys be receiv'd, the Ambition of men will be apt to imbroil Nations in their Quarrels; and others judging variouſly of thoſe matters, which can be reduc'd to no certain Rule, will think themſelves in Conſcience oblig'd to follow the party that ſeems to them to be moſt juſt: Experience mani⯑feſts the ſame, and that Ambition has produc'd more violent miſchiefs than all the other deſires and paſſions that have ever poſſeſt the hearts of men. That this may appear, it will not be amiſs to divide theſe miſchiefs, into ſuch as proceed from him who is in poſſeſſion of the Power, thro jea⯑louſy of State, as they call it, to prevent the enterprizes of thoſe who would diſpoſſeſs him, and ſuch as ariſe between Competitors contending for it.

Tarquin's Counſel concerning the Poppys, and Periander's heads of Corn, are of the firſt ſort. The moſt eminent are always moſt fear'd, as the readieſt to undertake, and moſt able to accompliſh great Deſigns. This eminence proceeds from Birth, Riches, Vertue, or Reputation, and is ſometimes wrought up to the greateſt height by a conjunction of all theſe. But I know not where to find an example of ſuch a man, who could long ſubſiſt under Abſolute Monarchy. If he be of high Birth, he muſt, like Brutus, conceal his Vertue, and gain no reputation, or re⯑ſolve to periſh, if he do not prevent his own death by that of the Ty⯑rant: All other ways are ineffectual; the ſuſpicions, fears and hatred thereupon ariſing, are not to be remov'd: Perſonal reſpects are forgotten, and ſuch ſervices as cannot be ſufficiently valu'd, muſt be blotted out by the death of thoſe who did them. Various ways may be taken, and pre⯑tences us'd according to the temper of Times and Nations; but the thing muſt be done; and whether it be colour'd by a trick of Law, or per⯑form'd by a Mute with a Bowſtring, imports little. Henry the fourth was made King by the Earl of Northumberland, and his brave Son Hot⯑ſpur; Edward the fourth by the valiant Earl of Warwick; Henry the ſe⯑venth by Stanley: but neither of 'em could think himſelf ſafe, till his Benefactor was dead. No continu'd fidelity, no teſtimonys of modeſty and humility can prevent this. The modeſty of Germanicus in rejecting the Honors that were offer'd to him, and his induſtry in quieting the mu⯑tiny'd Legions, accelerated his ruin: When 'twas evident he might be Emperor if he pleas'd, he muſt be ſo, or die: There was no middle ſtati⯑on [169] between the Throne and the Grave. 'Tis probable that Caligula, Nero, and other Beaſts like to them, might hate Vertue for the good which is in it; but I cannot think that either they, their Predeceſſors or Succeſſors, would have put themſelves upon the deſperate deſign of extir⯑pating it, if they had not found it to be inconſiſtent with their Govern⯑ment; and that being once concluded, they ſpar'd none of their neareſt Relations. Artaxerxes kill'd his Son Darius: Herod murder'd the beſt of his Wives, and all his Sons except the worſt. Tiberius deſtroy'd Agrippa Poſtuhmus, and Germanicus with his Wife and two Sons. How highly ſo⯑ever Conſtantine the Great be commended, he was polluted with the Blood of his Father-in-law, Wife, and Son. Philip the ſecond of Spain did in like manner deliver himſelf from his fears of Don Carlos; and 'tis not doubted that Philip the fourth, for the ſame reaſons, diſpatch'd his Bro⯑ther Don Carlos, and his Son Balthaſar. The like caſes were ſo common in England, that all the Plantagenets, and the noble Familys ally'd to them, being extinguiſh'd, our Anceſtors were ſent to ſeek a King in one of the meaneſt in Wales.

This method being known, thoſe who are unwilling to die ſo tamely, endeavour to find out ways of defending themſelves; and there being no other than the death of the Perſon who is in the Throne, they uſually ſeek to compaſs it by ſecret Conſpiracy, or open Violence; and the number of Princes that have bin deſtroy'd, and Countrys diſturb'd by thoſe who thro fear have bin driven to extremitys, is not much leſs than of thoſe who have ſuffer'd the like from men following the impulſe of their own Ambition.

The diſorders ariſing from Conteſts between ſeveral Competitors, be⯑fore any one could be ſettled in the poſſeſſion of Kingdoms, have bin no leſs frequent and bloody than thoſe above-mention'd; and the miſerys ſuffer'd by them, together with the ruin brought upon the Empires of Macedon and Rome, may be ſufficient to prove it: however to make the matter more clear, I ſhall alledg others. But becauſe it may be preſump⯑tion in me to think I know all the Hiſtorys of the World, or tedious to relate all thoſe I know, I ſhall content my ſelf with ſome of the moſt eminent and remarkable: And if it appears they have all ſuffer'd the ſame miſchiefs, we may believe they proceed not from Accidents, but from the power of a permanent Cauſe, that always produces the ſame or the like Effects.

To begin with France. The Succeſſion not being well ſettled in the time of Meroveus, who had diſpoſſeſt the Grandchildren of Pharamond, he was no ſooner dead than Gillon ſet up himſelf, and with much ſlaughter drove his Son Chilperic out of the Kingdom; who after a little time re⯑turning with like fury, is ſaid to have ſeen a Viſion, firſt of Lions and Leo⯑pards, then of Bears and Wolves, and laſtly of Dogs and Cats, all tear⯑ing one another to pieces. This has bin always accounted by the French Hiſt. de France en la Vie de Chil⯑peric 1.to be a repreſentation of the nature and fortune of the three Races that were to command them, and has bin too much verify'd by experi⯑ence. Clovis their firſt Chriſtian and moſt renowned King, having by good means or evil exceedingly enlarg'd his Territorys, but chiefly by the murders of Alaric, and Ragnacaire with his Children, and ſuborning Mezeray & de Serres. Sigiſmond of Metz to kill his Father Sigebert, left his Kingdom to be torn in pieces by the rage of his four Sons, each of 'em endeavouring to make himſelf Maſter of the whole; and when, according to the uſual fate of ſuch Conteſts, ſucceſs had crown'd Clothair, who was the worſt of 'em [170] all, by the [...]laughter of his Brothers and Nephews, with all the flower of the French and Gauliſh Nobility, the advantages of his Fortune only re⯑ſulted to his own perſon. For after his death the miſerable Nations ſuf⯑fer'd as much ſrom the madneſs of his Sons, as they had done by himſelf and his Brothers. They had learn'd from their Predeceſſors not to be ſlow in doing miſchief, but were farther incited by the rage of two infa⯑mous Strumpets, Fredegonde and Brunehaud, which is a ſort of Vermin that, I am inclin'd to think, has not uſually govern'd Senats or Popular Aſſemblys. Chilperic the ſecond, who by the ſlaughter of many Perſons of the Royal Blood, with infinite numbers of the Nobility and People, came to be Maſter of ſo much of the Country as procur'd him the name of King of France, kill'd his eldeſt Son on ſuſpicion he was excited a⯑gainſt him by Brunehaud, and his ſecond, leſt he ſhould revenge the death of his Brother: he marry'd Fredegonde, and was ſoon after kill'd by her Adulterer Landry. The Kingdom continu'd in the ſame miſery thro the rage of the ſurviving Princes, and found no relief, tho moſt of 'em fell by the Sword; and that Brunehaud who had bin a principal Cauſe of thoſe Tragedys, was ty'd to the tails of four wild Horſes, and ſuffer'd a death as foul as her life. Theſe were Lions and Leopards. They in⯑volv'd the Kingdom in deſperate troubles; but being Men of valor and induſtry, they kept up in ſome meaſure the Reputation and Power of the Nation, and he who attain'd to the Crown defended it. But they being fallen by the hands of each other, the poiſonous Root put forth another Plague more mortal than their Fury. The vigor was ſpent, and the Suc⯑ceſſion becoming more ſettled, ten baſe and ſlothful Kings, by the French called Les Roys faineans, ſucceeded. Some may ſay, They who do no⯑thing, do no hurt; but the Rule is falſe in relation to Kings. He that takes upon him the Government of a People, can do no greater evil than by doing nothing, nor be guilty of a more unpardonable Crime, than by Negligence, Cowardice, Voluptuouſneſs, and Sloth, to deſert his charge. Vertue and Manhood periſh under him; good Diſciplin is for⯑gotten; Juſtice ſlighted; the Laws perverted or render'd uſeleſs; the People corrupted; the publick Treaſures exhauſted; and the Power of the Government always falling into the hands of Flatterers, Whores, Favorites, Bauds, and ſuch baſe Wretches as render it contemptible, a way is laid open for all manner of diſorders. The greateſt cruelty that has bin known in the world, if accompany'd with wit and courage, never did ſo much hurt as this ſlothful beſtiality; or rather theſe ſlothful Beaſts have ever bin moſt cruel. The Reigns of Septimius Severus, Ma⯑homet the ſecond, or Selim the ſecond, were cruel and bloody; but their fury was turn'd againſt Foreigners, and ſome of their near Rela⯑tions, or againſt ſuch as fell under the ſuſpicion of making attempts againſt them: The condition of the People was tolerable; thoſe who would be quiet might be ſafe; the Laws kept their right courſe; the Re⯑putation of the Empire was maintain'd, the Limits defended, and the publick Peace preſerv'd. But when the Sword paſt into the hands of leud, ſlothful, fooliſh, and cowardly Princes, it was of no power againſt foreign Enemys, or the diſturbers of domeſtic Peace, tho always ſharp againſt the beſt of their own Subjects. No man knew how to ſecure himſelf againſt them, unleſs by raiſing civil Wars; which will always be ſrequent, when a Crown defended by a weak hand is propos'd as a Prize to any that dare invade it. This is a perpetual Spring of diſorders; and no Nation was ever quiet, when the moſt eminent men found leſs danger in the moſt violent Attempts, than in ſubmitting patiently to the [171] Will of a Prince, that ſuffers his Power to be manag'd by vile Perſons, who get credit by flattering him in his Vices. But this is not all; ſuch Princes naturally hate and fear thoſe who excel them in Vertue and Re⯑putation, as much as they are inferior to them in Fortune; and think their Perſons cannot be ſecur'd, nor their Authority enlarg'd, except by their deſtruction. 'Tis ordinary for them, inter ſcorta & ganeas prin⯑cipibus C. Tacit. viris perniciem machinare, and to make Cruelty a cover to Igno⯑rance and Cowardice. Beſides the Miſchiefs brought upon the Publick by the loſs of eminent Men, who are the Pillars of every State, ſuch Reigns are always accompany'd with Tumults and Civil Wars, the great Men ſtriving with no leſs violence who ſhall get the weak Prince into his power, when ſuch regard is had to ſucceſſion that they think it not fit to deveſt him of the Title, than when with leſs reſpect they contend for the Sovereignty it ſelf. And whilſt this ſort of Princes reign'd, France was not leſs afflicted with the Conteſts between Grimbauld, Ebroin, Grimoald, and others, for the Mayoralty of the Palace, than they had bin before by the rage of thoſe Princes who had conteſted for the Crown. The Iſſue alſo was the ſame: After many Re⯑volutions, Charles Martel gain'd the Power of the Kingdom, which he had ſo bravely defended againſt the Saracens; and having tranſmitted it to his Son Pepin, the General Aſſembly of Eſtates, with the approbation of Mankind, confer'd the Title alſo upon him. This gave the Nation eaſe for the preſent; but the deep-rooted Evil could not be ſo cur'd; and the Kingdom, that by the Wiſdom, Valor, and Reputation of Pepin, had bin preſerv'd from civil Troubles during his life, fell as deeply as ever into them ſo ſoon as he was dead. His Sons, Carloman and Charles, di⯑vided the Dominions, but in a little time each of them would have all. Carloman fill'd the Kingdom with Tumult; rais'd the Lombards, and march'd with a great Army againſt his Brother, till his courſe was inter⯑rupted by death, caus'd, as is ſuppos'd, by ſuch helps as Princes liberally afford to their aſpiring Relations. Charles depriv'd his two Sons of their Inheritance, put them in Priſon, and we hear no more of them. His third Brother Griffon was not more quiet, nor more ſucceſsful; and there could be no Peace in Gaſcony, Italy, or Germany, till he was kill'd. But all the Advantages which Charles, by an extraordinary Vertue and Fortune, had purchas'd for his Country, ended with his Life. He left his Son Lewis the Gentle in poſſeſſion of the Empire, and Kingdom of France, and his Grandſon Bernard King of Italy: But theſe two could not agree, and Bernard falling into the hands of Lewis, was depriv'd of his Eyes, and ſome time after kill'd. This was not enough to preſerve the Peace: Lothair, Lewis and Pepin, all three Sons to Lewis, rebel'd againſt him; call'd a Council at Lions, depos'd him, and divided the Empire amongſt themſelves. After five years he eſcap'd from the Monaſtery where he had bin kept, renew'd the War, and was again taken Priſoner by Lo⯑thair. When he was dead, the War broke out more fiercely than ever between his Children: Lothair the Fmperor aſſaulted Lewis King of Ba⯑varia and Charles King of Rhetia; was defeated by them, and confin'd to a Monaſtery, where he dy'd. New Quarrels aroſe between the two Brothers, upon the diviſion of the Countrys taken from him, and Lor⯑rain only was leſt to his Son. Lewis dy'd ſoon after, and Charles getting poſſeſſion of the Empire and Kingdom, ended an inglorious Reign in an unproſperous attempt to deprive Hermingrade, Daughter to his Brother Lewis, of the Kingdom of Arles, and other places left to her by her Fa⯑ther. [172] Lewis his Son, call'd the Stutterer, reign'd two years in much trouble; and his only legitimate Son, Charles the Simple, came not to the Crown till after the death of his two Baſtard Brothers, Lewis and Carlo⯑man, Charles le Gros, and Eudes Duke of Anjou. Charles le Gros was depos'd from the Empire and Kingdom, ſtrip'd of his Goods, and left to periſh thro poverty in an obſcure Village. Charles the Simple, and the Nations under him, thriv'd no better: Robert Duke of Anjou rais'd War againſt him, and was crown'd at Rheims; but was himſelf ſlain ſoon af⯑ter in a bloody battel near Soiſſons. His Son-in-law, Hebert Earl of Ver⯑mandois, gather'd up the remains of his ſcatter'd Party, got Charles into his power, and call'd a General Aſſembly of Eſtates, who depos'd him, and gave the Crown to Raoul Duke of Burgundy; tho he was no other⯑wiſe related to the Royal Blood than by his Mother, which in France is nothing at all. He being dead, Lewis Son to the depos'd Charles was made King; but his Reign was as inglorious to him, as miſerable to his Subjects. This is the Peace which the French enjoy'd for the ſpace of five or ſix Ages under their Monarchy; and 'tis hard to determin whether they ſuffer'd moſt by the Violence of thoſe who poſſeſt, or the Ambition of others who aſpir'd to the Crown; and whether the fury of active, or the baſeneſs of ſlothful Princes was moſt pernicious to them: But upon the whole matter, thro the defects of thoſe of the latter ſort, they loſt all they had gain'd by ſweat and blood under the conduct of the former. Henry and Otho of Saxony, by a Vertue like that of Charlemagne, depriv'd them of the Empire, and ſettled it in Germany, leaving France only to Lewis ſirnam'd Outremer, and his Son Lothair. Theſe ſeem'd to be e⯑qually compos'd of Treachery, Cruelty, Ambition, and Baſeneſs: They were always mutinous, and always beaten: Their frantick Paſſions put 'em always upon unjuſt deſigns, and were ſuch plagues to their Subjects and Neighbours, that they became equally deteſted and deſpis'd. Theſe things extinguiſh'd the veneration due to the memory of Pepin and Charles; and oblig'd the whole Nation rather to ſeek relief from a Stranger, than to be ruin'd by their worthleſs Deſcendents. They had try'd all ways that were in their power, depos'd four crowned Kings within the ſpace of a hundred and fifty years; crown'd five who had no other Title than the People confer'd upon them, and reſtor'd the Deſcen⯑dents of thoſe they had rejected, but all was in vain: Their Vices were incorrigible, the Miſchiefs produc'd by them intolerable; they never ceas'd from murdering one another in battel, or by treachery, and bring⯑ing the Nation into Civil Wars upon their wicked or fooliſh Quarrels, till the whole Race was rejected, and the Crown plac'd upon the head of Hugh Capet. Theſe Miſchieſs rag'd not in the ſame extremity under him and his Deſcendents, but the abatement proceeded from a cauſe no way advantageous to Abſolute Monarchy. The French were by their Cala⯑mitys taught more ſtrictly to limit the Regal Power; and by turning the Dukedoms and Earldoms into Patrimonys, which had bin Offices, gave an Authority to the chief of the Nobility, by which that of Kings was curb'd; and tho by this means the Commonalty were expos'd to ſome Preſſures, yet they were ſmall in compariſon of what they had ſuffer'd in ſormer times. When many great Men had Eſtates of their own that did not depend upon the Will of Kings, they grew to love their Coun⯑try; and tho they chearfully ſerv'd the Crown in all caſes of publick Concernment, they were not eaſily engag'd in the perſonal quarrels of thoſe who poſſeſt it, or had a mind to gain it. To preſerve themſelves [173] in this condition, they were oblig'd to uſe their Vaſſals gently; and this continuing in ſome meaſure till within the laſt fifty years, the Monarchy was leſs tumultuous, than when the King's Will had bin leſs reſtrain'd. Nevertheleſs they had not much reaſon to boaſt; there was a Root ſtill remaining, that from time to time produc'd poiſonous Fruit: Civil Wars were frequent among them, tho not carry'd on with ſuch deſperate mad⯑neſs as formerly; and many of them upon the account of diſputes be⯑tween Competitors for the Crown. All the Wars with England, ſince Ed⯑ward the Second marry'd Iſabella Daughter, and, as he pretended, Heir of Philip Le Bel, were of this nature. The defeats of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, with the ſlaughters and devaſtations ſuffer'd from Edward the Third, the black Prince, and Henry the Fifth, were merely upon Con⯑teſts for the Crown. The Factions of Orleans and Burgundy, Orleans and Armagnac, proceeded from the ſame Spring; and the Murders that ſeem to have bin the immediate cauſes of thoſe Quarrels, were only the effects of the hatred growing from their competition. The more odious, tho leſs bloody Conteſts between Lewis the 11th, and his Father Charles the 7th, with the jealouſy of the former againſt his Son Charles the 8th, aroſe from the ſame Principle. Charles of Bourbon prepar'd to fill France with Fire and Blood upon the like quarrel, when his Deſigns were over⯑thrown by his death in the aſſault of Rome. If the Dukes of Guiſe had bin more fortunate, they had ſoon turn'd the cauſe of Religion into a claim to the Crown, and repair'd the Injury done, as they pretended, to Pepin's Race, by deſtroying that of Capet: And Henry the Third think⯑ing to prevent this by the ſlaughter of Henry le Balafré, and his Brother the Cardinal de Guiſe, brought ruin upon himſelf, and caſt the Kingdom into a moſt horrid confuſion. Our own Age furniſhes us with more than one attempt of the ſame kind, attended with the like ſucceſs. The Duke of Orleans was ſeveral times in arms againſt Lewis the 13th his Brother; the Queen-mother drew the Spaniards to favour him; Montmorency pe⯑riſh'd in his Quarrel; Fontrailles reviv'd it by a Treaty with Spain, which ſtruck at the King's head as well as the Cardinal's, and was ſuppreſt by the death of Cinq Mars and de Thou. Thoſe who underſtand the Affairs of that Kingdom, make no doubt that the Count de Soiſſons would have ſet up for himſelf, and bin follow'd by the beſt part of France, if he had not bin kill'd in the purſuit of his Victory at the Battel of Sedan. Since that time the Kingdom has ſuffer'd ſuch Diſturbances as ſhow, that more was intended than the removal of Mazarin: And the Marechal de Turenne was often told, that the check he gave to the Prince of Condé at Gien, af⯑ter he had defeated Hocquincourt, had preſerv'd the Crown upon the King's Head. And to teſtify the Stability, good Order, and domeſtick Peace that accompanys Abſolute Monarchy, we have in our own days ſeen the Houſe of Bourbon often divided within it ſelf; the Duke of Or⯑leans, the Count de Soiſſons, and the Princes of Condé and Conti in war againſt the King; the Dukes of Angouleſme, Vendome, Longueville, the Count de Moret, and other Baſtards of the Royal Family, following their example; the Houſes of Guiſe, D' Elbeuf, Bouillon, Nemours, Rochefo⯑cault, and almoſt all the moſt eminent in France, with the Parliaments of Paris, Bourdeaux, and ſome others, joining with them. I might alledg ma⯑ny more Examples, to ſhew that this Monarchy, as well as all others, has from the firſt eſtabliſhment bin full of blood and ſlaughter, thro the vio⯑lence of thoſe who poſſeſt the Crown, and the Ambition of ſuch as a⯑ſpir'd to it; and that the end of one Civil War has bin the beginning [174] of another: But I preſume upon the whole, theſe will be thought ſufficient to prove, that it never enjoy'd any permanent Domeſtick Quiet.

The Kingdoms of Spain have bin no leſs diſturb'd by the ſame means; but eſpecially that of Caſtile, where the Kings had more power than in other places. To cite all the Examples, were to tranſcribe their Hiſto⯑rys; but whoever has leiſure to examin them will find, that after many troubles, Alphonſo the Second, notwithſtanding his glorious ſirname of Wiſe, was depos'd by means of his ambitious Son: Don Alonſo, ſirnam'd El Deſheredado, ſupplanted by his Uncle Don Sancho el bravo: Peter the Cruel caſt from the Throne, and kill'd by his baſtard Brother the Conde de Traſtamara. From the time of the above-nam'd Alphonſo to that of Ferdinand and Iſabella, containing about two hundred years, ſo few of them paſt without Civil Wars, that I hardly remember two together that were free from them: And whoſoever pretends that of late years that Monarchy has bin more quiet, muſt, if he be ingenuous, confeſs their Peace is rather to be imputed to the dexterity of removing ſuch Perſons as have bin moſt likely to raiſe Diſturbances (of which num⯑ber were Don John of Auſtria, Don Carlos Son to Philip the Se⯑cond, another of the ſame name Son to Philip the Third, and Don Belthazar Son to Philip the Fourth) than to the rectitude of their Con⯑ſtitutions.

He that is not convinc'd of theſe Truths by what has bin ſaid, may come nearer home, and ſee what Miſchiefs were brought upon Scotland Buchan. de reb. Scot.by the Conteſts between Baliol and Bruce, with their Conſequences, till the Crown came to the Stuart Family; the quiet Reigns and happy Drummond. Melvil.Deaths of the five James's, together with the admirable Stability and Peace of the Government under Queen Mary, and the perfect Union in which ſhe liv'd with her Husband, Son and People, as well as the Happineſs of the Nation whilſt it laſted.

But the Miſerys of England, upon the like occaſions, ſurpaſs all. Wil⯑liam the Norman was no ſooner dead, but the Nation was rent in pieces by his eldeſt Son Robert, conteſting with his younger Sons William and Henry for the Crown. They being all dead and their Sons, the like hap⯑pen'd between Stephen and Maud: Henry the Second was made King to terminate all Diſputes, but it prov'd a fruitleſs Expedient: Such as were more ſcandalous, and not leſs dangerous, did ſoon ariſe between him and his Sons; who beſides the Evils brought upon the Nation, vex'd him to death by their Rebellion. The Reigns of John and Henry the Third were yet more tempeſtuous. Edward the Second's leud, fooliſh, infa⯑mous and deteſtable Government, ended in his depoſition and death, to which he was brought by his Wife and Son. Edward the Third em⯑ploy'd his own and his Subjects Valor againſt the French and Scots; but whilſt the Foundations were out of order, the Nation could never re⯑ceive any advantage by their Victorys: All was calculated for the Glory, and turn'd to the Advantage of one Man. He being dead, all that the Engliſh held in Scotland and in France, was loſt thro the baſeneſs of his Succeſſor, with more Blood than it had bin gain'd; and the Civil Wars rais'd by his wickedneſs and madneſs, ended as thoſe of Edward the Se⯑cond had done. The Peace of Henry the Fourth's Reign was interrup⯑ted by dangerous Civil Wars; and the Victory obtain'd at Shrewsbury had not perhaps ſecur'd him in the Throne, if his Death had not pre⯑vented new Troubles. Henry the Fiſth acquir'd ſuch reputation by his [175] Vertue and Victorys, that none dar'd to invade the Crown during his life; but immediately after his death the Storms prepar'd againſt his Fa⯑mily, broke out with the utmoſt violence. His Son's weakneſs encou⯑rag'd Richard Duke of York to ſet up a new Title, which produc'd ſuch Miſchiefs as hardly any People have ſuffer'd, unlefs upon the like occaſi⯑on: For beſides the ſlaughter of many thouſands of the People, and eſpe⯑cially of thoſe who had bin accuſtom'd to Arms, the devaſtation of the beſt parts of the Kingdom, and the loſs of all that our Kings had inhe⯑rited in France, or gain'd by the blood of their Subjects, fourſcore Prin⯑ces of the Blood, as Philip de Commines calls them, dy'd in Battel, or under the hand of the Hangman. Many of the moſt noble Familys were extinguiſh'd; others loſt their moſt eminent Men. Three Kings and two preſumptive Heirs of the Crown were murder'd, and the Na⯑tion brought to that ſhameful exigence, to ſet up a young Man to reign over them, who had no better cover for his ſordid extraction than a Welch Pedegree, that might ſhew how a Tailor was deſcended from Prince Arthur, Cadwallader and Brutus. But the Wounds of the Nation were not to be heal'd with ſuch a Plaiſter. He could not rely upon a Title made up of ſuch ſtuff, and patch'd with a Marriage to a Princeſs of a very queſtionable Birth. His own meanneſs inclin'd him to hate the Nobility; and thinking it to be as eaſy for them to take the Crown from him, as to give it to him, he induſtriouſly apply'd himſelf to glean up the Remainders of the Houſe of York, from whence a Competitor might ariſe, and by all means to cruſh thoſe who were moſt able to oppoſe him. This exceedingly weaken'd the Nobility, who held the Balance between him and the Commons, and was a great ſtep towards the diſſo⯑lution of our antient Government: but he was ſo far from ſettling the Kingdom in peace, that ſuch Raſcals as Perkin Warbeck and Simnel were able to diſturb it. The Reign of Henry the Eighth was turbulent and bloody; that of Mary furious, and ſuch as had brought us into ſubjection to the moſt powerful, proud and cruel Nation at that time in the World, if God had not wonderfully protected us. Nay, Edward the Sixth, and Queen Elizabeth, notwithſtanding the natural excellency of their Diſpo⯑ſitions, and their knowledg of the Truth in matters of Religion, were forc'd, by that which men call Jealouſy of State, to foul their hands ſo of⯑ten with illuſtrious Blood, that if their Reigns deſerve to be accounted a⯑mongſt the moſt gentle of Monarchys, they were more heavy than the Government of any Commonwealth; and yet their Lives were ne⯑ver ſecure againſt ſuch as conſpir'd againſt them upon the account of Title.

Having in ſome meaſure ſhew'd what Miſerys have bin uſually, if not perpetually brought upon Nations ſubject to Monarchys by the violence of ſome Princes, and the baſeneſs, folly, and cowardice of others, toge⯑ther with what they have ſuffer'd in Conteſts for the ſeveral Crowns, whilſt men divided into divers Factions, ſtrive with as much vehemen⯑cy to advance the Perſon they favour, as if they or their Country were intereſted in the quarrel; and fight as fiercely for a Maſter as they might reaſonably do to have none; I am not able to determin which of the two Evils is the moſt mortal. 'Tis evident the Vices of Princes reſult to the Damage of the People; but whether Pride and Cruelty, or Stupidity and Sloth be the worſt, I cannot tell. All Monarchys are ſubject to be afflicted with Civil Wars: but whether the moſt frequent and bloody do ariſe from the quarrels of divers Competitors for Crowns before any one [176] gain the poſſeſſion of them, or afterwards thro the fears of him that would keep what he has gain'd, or the rage of thoſe who would wreſt it from him, is not ſo eaſily decided. But Commonwealths are leſs trou⯑bled with thoſe Diſtempers. Women, Children, or ſuch as are notoriouſ⯑ly fooliſh or mad, are never advanc'd to the Supreme Power. Whilſt the Laws, and that Diſciplin which nouriſhes Vertue is in force, Men of Wiſdom and Valor are never wanting; and every man deſires to give teſtimony of his Vertue, when he knows 'twill be rewarded with Ho⯑nor and Power. If unworthy Perſons creep into Magiſtracys, or are by miſtake any way prefer'd, their Vices for the moſt part turn to their own hurt; and the State cannot eaſily receive any great damage by the incapa⯑city of one who is not to continue in Office above a year; and is uſually encompaſt with thoſe who having born, or are aſpiring to the ſame, are by their Vertue able to ſupply his defects; cannot hope for a Reward from one unable to corrupt 'em, and are ſure of the favor of the Senat and Peo⯑ple to ſupport 'em in the defence of the publick Intereſt. As long as this good Order continues, private Quarrels are ſuppreſt by the Authority of the Magiſtrate, or prove to be of little effect. Such as ariſe between the Nobles and Commons frequently produce good Laws for the maintenance of Liberty, as they did in Rome for above three hundred years after the expulſion of Tarquin; and almoſt ever terminate with little or no blood. Sometimes the Errors of one or both Partys are diſcover'd by the diſcourſe of a wiſe and good Man; and thoſe who have moſt violently oppos'd one another become the beſt Friends, every one joining to remove the evil that cauſes the diviſion. When the Senat and People of Rome ſeem'd to be moſt furiouſly incens'd againſt each other, the creation of Tribuns, communication of Honors and Marriages between the Patrician and Ple⯑beian Familys, or the mitigation of Uſury, compos'd all; and theſe were not only harmleſs things, but ſuch as gave opportunitys of correcting the defects that had bin in the firſt Conſtitution of the Government, without which they could never have attain'd to the Greatneſs, Glory and Happi⯑neſs they afterwards enjoy'd. Such as had ſeen that People meeting in tumult, running thro the City, crying out againſt the Kings, Conſuls, Senat, or Decemviri, might have thought they would have fill'd all with blood and ſlaughter; but no ſuch thing happen'd. They deſir'd no more than to take away the Kingdom which Tarquin had wickedly u⯑ſurp'd; and never went about ſo much as to puniſh one Miniſter of the miſchiefs he had done, or to take away his Goods, till upon pretence of treating, his Embaſſadors by a new Treachery had caſt the City into greater danger than ever. Tho the Decemviri had by the like Villanys e⯑qually provok'd the People, they were us'd with the like gentleneſs: Appius T. Liv. l. 3. Claudius and Oppius having by voluntary death ſubſtracted themſelves from publick puniſhment, their Collegues were only baniſh'd, and the Magiſtracys of the City reduc'd to the former order, without the effuſion of more blood. They who contended for their juſt Rights, were ſatiſ⯑fy'd with the recovery of them; whereas ſuch as follow the impulſe of an unruly Ambition, never think themſelves ſafe till they have deſtroy'd all that ſeem able to diſturb them, and ſatiated their rage with the blood of their Adverſarys. This makes, as well as ſhews the difference be⯑tween the Tumults of Rome, or the ſeceſſion of the common People to Mount Aventine, and the Battels of Towton, Teuxbury, Eveſhal, Lewes, Hexham, Barnet, St. Albans, and Boſworth. 'Tis in vain to ſay theſe ought rather to be compar'd to thoſe of Pharſalia, Actium, or Philippi; [179] ſor when the Laws of a Commonwealth are aboliſh'd, the Name alſo ceaſes. Whatever is done by force or fraud to ſet up the Intereſts and Luſts of one man in oppoſition to the Laws of his Country, is purely and abſolutely Monarchical. Whatſoever paſt between Marius, Sylla, Cinna, Catiline, Caeſar, Pompey, Craſſus, Auguſtus, Antonius, and Lepi⯑dus, is to be imputed to the Conteſts that ariſe between Competitors for Monarchy, as well as thoſe that in the next age happen'd between Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Veſpaſian: Or, which is worſe, whereas all men in Commonwealths fight for themſelves when there is occaſion, and if they ſucceed, enjoy the fruits of their Victory▪ ſo as even thoſe who remain of the vanquiſh'd party, partake of the Liberty thereby eſtabliſh'd, or the good Laws thereupon made; ſuch as follow'd the Enſigns of thoſe men who ſought to ſet up themſelves, did, rather like beaſts than men, hazard and ſuffer many unſpeakable evils to purchaſe miſery to them⯑ſelves and their Poſterity, and to make one their Maſter, who increaſing in Pride, Avarice, and Cruelty, was to be thrown down again with as much Blood as he had bin ſet up.

Theſe things, if I miſtake not, being in the laſt degree evident, I may leave to our Author all the advantages he can gain by his rhetorical Deſcription of the Tumults of Rome, when Blood was in the Market-place ſuckt up with Sponges, and the Jakes ſtuff'd with Carcaſes; to which he may add the crimes of Sylla's Life, and the miſerys of his Death: But withal I deſire to know what number of Sponges were ſufficient to ſuck up the Blood of five hundred thouſand men ſlain in one day, when the Houſes of David and Jeroboam contended for the Crown of Iſrael, or of four hundred thouſand who fell in one battel between Joaſh and Amaziah on the ſame occaſion; what Jakes were capacious enough to contain the Carcaſes of thoſe that periſh'd in the quarrels between the Succeſſors of Alexander, the ſeveral Competiors for the Roman Empire; or thoſe which happen'd in France, Spain, England, and other places upon the like occaſions. If Sylla for ſome time acted as an abſolute Monarch, 'tis no wonder that he dy'd like one, or that God puniſh'd him as Herod, Philip the ſecond of Spain, and ſome others, becauſe the hand of his fellow▪Ci⯑tizens had unjuſtly ſpar'd him. If when he was become deteſtable to God and Man, he became alſo miſerable, his example ought to deter others ſrom the Crimes that are aveng'd by a Power which none can eſ⯑cape, and to encourage thoſe who defend, or endeavour to recover their violated Libertys, to act vigorouſly in a Cauſe that God dos evidently patronize.

SECT. XXV. Courts are more ſubject to Venality and Corruption than Popular Governments.

THO Court-flatterers impute many evils to Popular Governments they no way deſerve, I could not think any ſo impudent as to lay Corruption and Venality to their charge, till I found it in our Author. They might in my opinion have taken thoſe faults upon themſelves, ſince they certainly abound moſt where Bawds, Whores, Buffoons, Players, Slaves, and other baſe people who are naturally mercenary, are moſt [180] prevalent. And whoſoever would know whether this dos more frequent⯑ly befal Commonwealths than Monarchys, eſpecially if they are abſolute, need only to inquire whether the Cornelii, Junii, Fabii, Valerii, Quintii, Curii, Fabritii, and others who moſt prevail'd in Rome after the expulſion of the Kings, or Sejanus, Macro, Narciſſus, Pallas, Icetus, Tigellinus, Vinnius, Laco, Agrippina, Meſſalina, Lollia, Poppaea, and the like, were moſt ſubject to thoſe baſe Vices: Whether it were more eaſy to corrupt one or two of thoſe Villains and Strumpets, or the Senats and People of Rome, Carthage, Athens, and Sparta; and whether that ſort of Rabble had more power over the Princes they ſerv'd, than ſuch as moſt reſembled them had whilſt the Popular Government continu'd. 'Tis in vain to ſay thoſe Princes were wicked and vile, for many others are ſo likewiſe; and when the Power is in the hands of one man, there can be no aſſurance he will not be like them. Nay, when the Power is ſo plac'd, ill men will always find opportunitys of compaſſing their deſires: Bonus, cautus, opti⯑mus Imperator venditur, ſaid Diocleſian; and tho he was no unwiſe man, yet that which principally induc'd him to renounce the Empire, was the impoſſibility he found of defending himſelf againſt thoſe that were in cre⯑dit with him, who daily betray'd and ſold him. They ſee with the eyes of other men, and cannot reſiſt the frauds that are perpetually put upon them. Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius ſeem to have bin the beſt and wiſeſt of all the Roman Emperors; but the two Fauſtina's had ſuch an aſcendent over them, as was moſt ſhameful to their perſons, and miſ⯑chievous to the Empire and the beſt men in it. Such as theſe may gain too much upon the affections of one man in the beſt regulated Govern⯑ment; but that could be of no great danger to the Publick, when many others equal, or not much inferior to him in authority, are ready to oppoſe whatever he ſhould endeavour to promote by their impulſe: but there is no remedy when all depends upon the Will of a ſingle perſon who is go⯑vern'd by them. There was more of acuteneſs and jeſt, than of truth in that ſaying of Themiſtocles, That his little boy had more power than any man in Greece; for he govern'd his Mother, ſhe him, he Athens, and Athens Greece. For he himſelf was found to have little power, when for private paſſions and concernments he departed from the intereſt of the Publick; and the like has bin found in all places that have bin govern'd in the like manner.

Again; Corruption will always reign moſt, where thoſe who have the power do moſt favour it, where the rewards of ſuch Crimes are great⯑eſt, eaſieſt and moſt valu'd, and where the puniſhment of them is leaſt ſear'd.

1. For the firſt, we have already prov'd that Liberty cannot be pre⯑ſerv'd, if the manners of the People are corrupted, nor abſolute Monar⯑chy introduc'd where they are ſincere; which is ſufficient to ſhew that thoſe who manage free Governments ought always to the utmoſt of their power to oppoſe Corruption, becauſe otherwiſe both they and their Go⯑vernment muſt inevitably periſh; and that on the other hand, the abſo⯑lute Monarch muſt endeavour to introduce it, becauſe he cannot ſubſiſt without it. 'Tis alſo ſo natural for all ſuch Monarchs to place men in power who pretend to love their Perſons, and will depend upon their plea⯑ſure, that poſſibly 'twould be hard to find one in the world who has not made it the rule of his Government: And this is not only the way to cor⯑ruption, but the moſt dangerous of all. For tho a good man may love a good Monarch, he will obey him only when he commands that which [181] is juſt; and no one can engage himſelf blindly to do whatever he is com⯑manded, without renouncing all Vertue and Religion; becauſe he knows not whether that which ſhall be commanded is conſiſtent with either, or directly contrary to the Laws of God and Man. But if ſuch a Monarch be evil, and his Actions ſuch as they are too oſten found to be, whoever bears an affection to him, and ſeconds his deſigns, declares himſelf an Enemy to all that is good; and the advancement of ſuch men to power dos not only introduce, foment, and increaſe Corruption, but fortifys it in ſuch a manner, that without an intire renovation of that State, it can⯑not be remov'd. Ill men may poſſibly creep into any Government; but when the worſt are plac'd neareſt to the Throne, and rais'd to Honors for being ſo, they will with that force endeavour to draw all men to a conformity of Spirit with themſelves, that it can no otherwiſe be pre⯑vented, than by deſtroying them and the Principle in which they live.

2. To the ſecond; Man naturally follows that which is good, or ſeems to him to be ſo. Hence it is that in well-govern'd States, where a value is put upon Vertue, and no one honor'd unleſs for ſuch Qualitys as are be⯑neficial to the Publick, men are from the tendereſt years brought up in a belief, that nothing in this world deſerves to be ſought after, but ſuch Honors as are acquir'd by vertuous Actions: By this means Vertue it ſelf becomes popular, as in Sparta, Rome, and other places, where Riches (which with the Vanity that follows them, and the Honors men give to them, are the root of all evil) were either totally baniſh'd, or little re⯑garded. When no other advantage attended the greateſt Riches than the opportunity of living more ſumptuouſly or deliciouſly, men of great Spirits ſlighted them. When Ariſtippus told Cleanthes, that if he would go to Court and flatter the Tyrant, he need not ſeek his Supper under a hedg; the Philoſopher anſwer'd, that he who could content himſelf with ſuch a Supper, neednot go to Court, or flatter the Tyrant. Epaminondas, Ariſtides, Phocion, and even the Lacedemonian Kings, found no inconve⯑nience in Poverty, whilſt their Vertue was honor'd, and the richeſt Prin⯑ces in the world fear'd their Valor and Power. It was not difficult for Curius, Fabricius, Cincinnatus, or Emilius Paulus, to content themſelves with the narroweſt Fortune, when it was no obſtacle to them in the pur⯑ſuit of thoſe Honors which their Vertues deſerv'd. 'Twas in vain to think of bribing a man who ſup'd upon the Coleworts of his own Gar⯑den. He could not be gain'd by Gold, who did not think it neceſſary. He that could riſe from the Plow to the triumphal Chariot, and conten⯑tedly return thither again, could not be corrupted; and he that left the ſenſe of his Poverty to his Executors, who found not wherewith to bury him, might leave Macedon and Greece to the pillage of his Soldiers, with⯑out taking to himſelf any part of the Booty. But when Luxury was brought into faſhion, and they came to be honor'd who liv'd magnificent⯑ly, tho they had in themſelves no qualitys to diſtinguiſh them from the baſeſt of Slaves, the moſt vertuous men were expos'd to ſcorn if they were poor: and that poverty which had bin the mother and nurſe of their Vertue, grew inſupportable. The Poet well underſtood what effect this change had upon the World, who ſaid,

[182] When Riches grew to be neceſſary, the deſire of them, which is the ſpring of all miſchief, follow'd. They who could not obtain Honors by the nobleſt Actions, were oblig'd to get Wealth, or purchaſe them from Whores and Villains, who expos'd them to ſale: and when they were once enter'd into this track, they ſoon learn'd the Vices of thoſe from whom they had receiv'd their Preferment, and to delight in the ways that had brought them to it. When they were come to this, nothing could ſtop them: All thought and remembrance of good was extinguiſh'd. They who had bought the Commands of Armys or Provinces, from Icetus or Narciſſus, ſought only how to draw Mony from them, to enable them to purchaſe higher Dignitys, or gain a more aſſur'd protection from thoſe Patrons. This brought the Government of the World under a moſt infamous Traf⯑fick; and the Treaſures ariſing from it were, for the moſt part, diſſipa⯑ted by worſe vices, than the Rapine, Violence and Fraud with which they had bin gotten. The Authors of thoſe Crimes had nothing left but their Crimes, and the neceſſity of committing more, thro the indigence into which they were plung'd by the extravagance of their Expences. Theſe things are inſeparable from the life of a Courtier: for as ſervile Natures are guid⯑ed rather by ſenſe than reaſon, ſuch as addict themſelves to the ſervice of Courts, find no other conſolation in their miſery, than what they receive from ſenſual pleaſures, or ſuch vanitys as they put a value upon; and have no other care, than to get Mony for their ſupply by begging, ſtealing, brib⯑ing, and other infamous practices. Their Offices are more or leſs eſteem'd according to the opportunitys they afford for the exerciſe of theſe Vertues; and no man ſeeks them for any other end than for gain, nor takes any other way than that which conduces to it. The uſual means of attaining them are, by obſerving the Prince's Humor, flattering his Vices, ſerving him in his Pleaſures, fomenting his Pa [...]ſions, and by advancing his worſt Deſigns, to create an opinion in him that they love his perſon, and are intirely ad⯑dicted to his Will. When Valor, Induſtry and Wiſdom advanc'd men to Offices, it was no eaſy matter for a man to perſuade the Senat he had ſuch Qualitys as were requir'd, if he had them not: But when Princes ſeek only ſuch as love them, and will do what they command, 'tis eaſy to impoſe upon them; and becauſe none that are good will obey them when they command that which is not ſo, they are always encom⯑paſt by the worſt. Thoſe who follow them only for Reward, are moſt liberal in profeſſing affection to them, and by that means riſe to places of Authority and Power. The Fountain being thus corrupted, nothing that is pure can come from it. Theſe mercenary Wretches having the ma⯑nagement of Affairs, Juſtice and Honors are ſet at a price, and the moſt lucrative Traffick in the world is thereby eſtabliſh'd. ^* Eutropius when he was a Slave, us'd to pick Pockets and Locks; but being made a Mini⯑ſter, he ſold Citys, Armys and Provinces: and ſome have undertaken to give probable reaſons to believe, that Pallas, one of Claudius's manumis'd Slaves, by theſe means brought together more Wealth in ſix years, than all the Roman Dictators and Conſuls had done from the expulſion of the Kings to their paſſage into Aſia. The reſt walk'd in the ſame way, us'd the ſame arts, and many of them ſucceeded in the ſame manner. Their Riches conſiſted not oſ Spoils taken from Enemys, but were the baſe product of their own corruption. They valu'd nothing but Mony, and [183] thoſe who could bribe them, were ſure to be advanc'd to the higheſt Offices; and whatever they did, fear'd no puniſhment. Like Effects will ever proceed from the like Cauſes. When Vanity, Luxury and Prodiga⯑lity are in faſhion, the deſire of Riches muſt neceſſarily increaſe in pro⯑portion to them: And when the Power is in the hands of baſe mercenary perſons, they will always (to uſe the Courtiers phraſe) make as much profit of their places as they can. Not only matters of Favor, but of Juſtice too, will be expos'd to ſale; and no way will be open to Honors or Magiſtracys, but by paying largely for them. He that gets an Office by theſe means, will not execute it gratis: he thinks he may ſell what he has bought; and would not have enter'd by corrupt ways, if he had not in⯑tended to deal corruptly. Nay, if a well-meaning man ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be ſo far carry'd away by the ſtream of a prevailing Cuſtom, as to purchaſe Honors of ſuch Villains, he would be oblig'd to continue in the ſame courſe, that he might gain Riches to procure the continuance of his Benefactors protection, or to obtain the favor of ſuch as happen to ſucceed them: And the corruption thus beginning in the Head, muſt ne⯑ceſſarily diffuſe it ſelf into all the Members of the Commonwealth. Or, if any one (which is not to be expected) after having bin guilty of one Villany, ſhould reſolve to commit no more, it could have no other effect than to bring him to ruin; and he being taken away, all things would re⯑turn to their former channel.

Beſides this, whoſoever deſires to advance himſelf, muſt uſe ſuch means as are ſutable to the time in which he lives, and the humor of the perſons with whom he is to deal. It had bin as abſurd for any man void of merit to ſet himſelf up againſt Junius Brutus, Cincinnatus, Papirius Curſor, Camillus, Fabius Maximus, or Scipio; and by bribing the Senat and People of Rome, think to be choſen Captain againſt the Tarquins, Tuſcans, Latins, Samnites, Gauls or Carthaginians, as for the moſt vertu⯑ous men by the moſt certain proofs of their Wiſdom, Experience, Inte⯑grity and Valor, to expect advancement from Caligula, Claudius, and Nero, or the leud Wretches that govern'd them. They hated and fear'd all thoſe that excel'd in Vertue, and ſetting themſelves to deſtroy the beſt for being the beſt, they plac'd the ſtrength of the Government in the hands of the worſt, which produc'd the effects beforemention'd. This ſeems to have bin ſo well known, that no man pretended to be great at Court, but thoſe who had caſt off all thoughts of honor and common honeſty: Revertar cum Leno, Meretrix, Scurra, Cinaedus ero, ſaid one who ſaw what manners prevail'd there; and whereſoever they do prevail, ſuch as will riſe, muſt render themſelves conformable in all corruption and venality. And it may be obſerv'd, that a noble Perſon now living amongſt us, who is a great enemy to Bribery, was turn'd out from a con⯑ſiderable Office, as a ſcandal to the Court; for, ſaid the principal Miniſter, he will make no profit of his place, and by that means caſts a ſcandal up⯑on thoſe that do.

If any man ſay, this is not generally the fate of all Courts, I confeſs it; and that if the Prince be juſt, vertuous, wiſe, of great Spirit, and not pretending to be abſolute, he may chuſe ſuch men as are not merce⯑nary, or take ſuch a courſe as may render it hard for them to deſerve Bribes, or to preſerve themſelves from puniſhment, if they ſhould deflect from his intention. And a Prince of this Age, ſpeaking familiarly with ſome great Men about him, ſaid, he had heard much of vaſt Gains made by thoſe who were near to Princes, and ask'd if they made the like? one [184] of them anſwer'd, that they were as willing as others to get ſomething, but that no man would give them a farthing; for every one finding a free admittance to his Majeſty, no man needed a Sollicitor: And it was no leſs known that he did of himſelf grant thoſe things that were juſt, than that none of them had ſo much credit as to promote ſuch as were not ſo. I will not ſay ſuch a King is a Phenix; perhaps more than one may be found in an Age; but they are certainly rare, and all that is good in their Government proceeding from the excellency of their perſonal Vertues, it muſt fail when that Vertue fails which was the root of it. Experience ſhews how little we can rely upon ſuch a help; for where Crowns are hereditary, Children ſeldom prove like to their Fathers; and ſuch as are elective have alſo their defects. Many ſeem to be modeſt and innocent in private Fortunes, who prove corrupt and vicious when they are rais'd to Power. The violence, pride and malice of Saul, was never diſcover'd till the People had plac'd him in the Throne. But where the Govern⯑ment is Abſolute, or the Prince endeavours to make it ſo, this integrity can never be found: He will always ſeek ſuch as are content to de⯑pend upon his Will, which being always unruly, good men will never comply; ill men will be paid for it, and that opens a gap to all manner of corruption. Something like to this may befal regular Monarchys, or po⯑pular Governments. They who are plac'd in the principal Offices of truſt, may be treacherous; and when they are ſo, they will always by theſe means ſeek to gain Partizans and Dependents upon themſelves. Their deſigns being corrupt, they muſt be carry'd on by corruption: But ſuch as would ſupport Monarchy in its regularity, or popular Govern⯑ments, muſt oppoſe it, or be deſtroy'd by it. And nothing can better manifeſt how far Abſolute Monarchys are more ſubject to this venality and corruption than the regular and popular Governments, than that they are rooted in the principle of the one, which cannot ſubſiſt without them; and are ſo contrary to the others, that they muſt certainly periſh unleſs they defend themſelves from them.

If any man be ſo far of another opinion, as to believe that Brutus, Camillus, Scipio, Fabius, Hannibal, Pericles, Ariſtides, Ageſilaus, Epami⯑nondas or Pelopidas, were as eaſily corrupted as Sejanus, Tigellinus, Vinni⯑us or Laco: That the Senat and People of Rome, Carthage, Athens, Sparta or Thebes, were to be bought at as eaſy rates as one profligate Villain, a Slave, an Eunuch or a Whore; or tho it was not in former Ages, yet it is ſo now: he may be pleas'd to conſider by what means men now riſe to places of Judicature, Church-preferment, or any Offices of truſt, honor or profit under thoſe Monarchys which we know, that either are or would be abſolute. Let him examin how all the Offices of Juſtice are now diſpos'd in France; how Mazarin came to be advanc'd; what traf⯑fick he made of Abbys and Biſhopricks, and what treaſures he gain'd by that means: Whether the like has not continu'd ſince his death, and as a laudable Example bin tranſmitted to us ſince his Majeſty's happy reſtaura⯑tion: Whether Bauds, Whores, Thieves, Buffoons, Paraſites, and ſuch vile wretches as are naturally mercenary, have not more Power at Whitehall, Verſailles, the Vatican, and the Eſcurial, than in Venice, Amſterdam, and Switzerland: Whether H-de, Arl-ngt-n, D-nby, their Graces of Cleveland and Portſmouth, S-nd-rl-nd, Jenkins or Chiffinch, could probably have attain'd ſuch Power as they have had amongſt us, if it had bin diſpos'd by the Suffrages of the Parliament and People: Or laſtly, Whether ſuch as know only how to work upon the perſonal Vices of a man, have more [185] influence upon one who happens to be born in a reigning Family, or upon a Senat conſiſting of men choſen for their Vertues and Quality, or the whole Body of a Nation.

But if he who poſſeſſes or affects an abſolute Power be by his intereſt led to introduce that corruption which the People, Senat, and Magiſtrats who uphold Popular Governments, abhor, as that which threatens them with deſtruction: if the example, arts, and means us'd by him and his dependents be of wonderful efficacy towards the introduction of it: if nothing but an admirable Vertue, which can hardly be in one that enjoys or deſires ſuch a Power, can divert him from that deſign; and if ſuch Vertue never did, nor probably ever will continue long in any one Fami⯑ly, we cannot rationally believe there ever was a race of men inveſted with, or poſſeſſing ſuch a Power, or that there will ever be any, who have not and will not endeavour to introduce that corruption, which is ſo neceſſary for the defence of their Perſons, and moſt important Concern⯑ments, and certainly accompliſh their great Deſign, unleſs they are op⯑pos'd or remov'd.

SECT. XXVI. Civil Tumults and Wars are not the greateſt Evils that befal Nations.

BƲT skin for skin, ſays our Author, and all that a man has will he give for his life. And ſince it was neceſſary to grace his Book with ſome Scripture-phraſes, none could be fitter for that purpoſe than thoſe that were ſpoken by the Devil; but they will be of little uſe to him: For tho I ſhould ſo far recede from truth, as to avow thoſe words to be true, I might ſafely deny the Concluſions he draws from them, That thoſe are the worſt Governments under which moſt men are ſlain; or, that more are ſlain in Popular Governments than in Abſolute Monarchys. For having prov'd that all the Wars and Tumults that have happen'd in Commonwealths, have never produc'd ſuch ſlaughters as were brought upon the Empires of Macedon and Rome, or the Kingdoms of Iſrael, Judah, France, Spain, Scotland or England, by Conteſts between ſeveral Competitors for thoſe Crowns; if Tumult, War, and Slaughter, be the point in queſtion, thoſe are the worſt of all Governments where they have bin moſt fre⯑quent and cruel. But tho theſe are terrible Scourges, I deny that Govern⯑ment to be ſimply the worſt that has moſt of them. 'Tis ill that men ſhould kill one another in Seditions, Tumults and Wars; but 'tis worſe to bring Nations to ſuch miſery, weakneſs and baſeneſs, as to have nei⯑ther ſtrength nor courage to contend for any thing; to have nothing left worth defending, and to give the name of Peace to deſolation. I take Greece to have bin happy and glorious, when it was full of populous Ci⯑tys, flouriſhing in all the Arts that deſerve praiſe among men: When they were courted and fear'd by the greateſt Kings, and never aſſaulted by any but to his own loſs and confuſion: When Babylon and Suſa trem⯑bled at the motion of their Arms; and their valor exercis'd in theſe Wars and Tumults, which our Author looks upon as the greateſt Evils, was rais'd to ſuch a power that nothing upon Earth was found able to reſiſt them: and I think it now miſerable, when Peace reigns within their [186] empty walls, and the poor remains of thoſe exhauſted Nations ſhel⯑tering themſelves under the ruins of the deſolated Citys, have neither any thing that deſerves to be diſputed amongſt them, nor ſpirit or force to repel the Injurys they daily ſuffer from a proud and inſupportable Ma⯑ſter.

The like may be ſaid of Italy: Whilſt it was inhabited by Nations go⯑verning themſelves by their own Will, they fell ſometimes into domeſtick Seditions, and had frequent Wars with their Neighbors. When they were free, they lov'd their Country, and were always ready to fight in its defence. Such as ſucceeded well, increas'd in vigor and power; and even thoſe that were the moſt unfortunate in one Age, found means to repair their greateſt loſſes if their Government continu'd. Whilſt they had a propriety in their goods, they would not ſuffer the Country to be invaded, ſince they knew they could have none if it were loſt. This gave occaſion to Wars and Tumults; but it ſharpen'd their Courage, kept up a good Diſciplin, and the Nations that were moſt exercis'd by them, always increas'd in power and number; ſo that no Country ſeems ever to have bin of greater ſtrength than Italy was when Hannibal inva⯑ded it: and after his defeat, the reſt of the World was not able to refiſt their Valor and Power. They ſometimes kill'd one another; but their Enemys never got any thing but burying-places within their Territorys. All things are now brought into a very different method by the bleſſed Governments they are under. The fatherly care of the King of Spain, the Pope, and other Princes, has eſtabliſh'd Peace amongſt them. We have not in many Ages heard of any Sedition among the Latins, Sabins, Volſci, Equi, Samnites, or others. The thin, half-ſtarv'd Inhabitants of Walls ſupported by Ivy, ſear neither popular Tumults, or foreign Alarms; and their ſleep is only interrupted by Hunger, the crys of their Children, or the howling of Wolves. Inſtead of many turbulent, con⯑tentious Citys, they have a few ſcatter'd ſilent Cottages; and the fierce⯑neſs of thoſe Nations is ſo temper'd, that every raſcally Collector of Taxes extorts without fear from every man, that which ſhould be the nouriſhment of his Family. And if any of thoſe Countrys are free from that pernicious Vermin, 'tis thro the extremity of their Poverty. Even in Rome a man may be circumvented by the fraud of a Prieſt, or poiſon'd by one who would have his Eſtate, Wife, Whore, or Child; but no⯑thing is done that looks like Tumult or Violence. The Governors do as little fear Gracchus as Hannibal; and inſtead of wearying their Sub⯑jects in Wars, they only ſeek, by perverted Laws, corrupt Judges, falſe Witneſſes, and vexatious Suits, to cheat them of their Mony and Inheri⯑tance. This is the beſt part of their condition. Where theſe Arts are us'd, there are men, and they have ſomething to loſe; but for the moſt part the Lands ly waſt, and they who were ſormerly troubled with the diſorders incident to populous Citys, now enjoy the quiet and peaceable eſtate of a Wilderneſs.

Again; there is a way of killing worſe than that of the Sword: for as Tertullian ſays upon a different occaſion, prohibere naſci eſt occidere; thoſe Governments are in the higheſt degree guilty of Blood, which by taking from men the means of living, bring ſome to periſh thro want, drive others out of the Country, and generally diſſuade men from marriage, by taking from them all ways of ſubſiſting their Familys. Notwithſtan⯑ding all the Seditions of Florence, and other Citys of Tuſcany, the horrid Factions of Guelphs and Gibelins, Neri and Bianchi, Nobles and Commons, [187] they continu'd populous, ſtrong, and exceeding rich; but in the ſpace of leſs than a hundred and fifty years, the peaceable Reign of the Medices is thought to have deſtroy'd nine parts in ten of the people of that Pro⯑vince. Amongſt other things 'tis remarkable, that when Philip the ſe⯑cond of Spain gave Sienna to the Duke of Florence, his Embaſſador then at Rome ſent him word, that he had given away more than ſix hundred and fifty thouſand Subjects; and 'tis not believ'd there are now twenty thou⯑ſand Souls inhabiting that City and Territory. Piſa, Piſtoia, Arezzo, Cor⯑tona, and other Towns that were then good and populous, are in the like proportion diminiſh'd, and Florence more than any. When that City had bin long troubled with Seditions, Tumults, and Wars, for the moſt part unproſperous, they ſtill retain'd ſuch ſtrength, that when Charles the eighth of France being admitted as a Friend with his whole Army, which Guicciard.ſoon after conquer'd the Kingdom of Naples, thought to maſter them, the people taking up Arms ſtruck ſuch a terror into him, that he was glad to depart upon ſuch conditions as they thought fit to impoſe. Machiavel reports, that in that time Florence alone, with the Vald' Arno, a ſmall Ter⯑ritory belonging to that City, could, in a few hours, by the ſound of a Bell, bring together a hundred and thirty five thouſand well arm'd men; where⯑as now that City, with all the others in that Province, are brought to ſuch deſpicable weakneſs, emptineſs, poverty and baſeneſs, that they can nei⯑ther reſiſt the oppreſſions of their own Prince, nor defend him or them⯑ſelves if they were aſſaulted by a foreign Enemy. The People are diſ⯑pers'd or deſtroy'd, and the beſt Familys ſent to ſeek Habitations in Ve⯑nice, Genoa, Rome, and Lucca. This is not the effect of War or Peſtilence; they enjoy a perfect peace, and ſuffer no other plague than the Govern⯑ment they are under. But he who has thus cur'd 'em of Diſorders and Tumults, dos, in my opinion, deſerve no greater praiſe than a Phyſician, who ſhould boaſt there was not a ſick perſon in a houſe committed to his care, when he had poiſon'd all that were in it. The Spaniards have eſta⯑bliſh'd the like peace in the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Weſt-Indys, and other places. The Turks by the ſame means prevent Tu⯑mults in their Dominions. And they are of ſuch efficacy in all places, that Mario Chigi, Brother to Pope Alexander the ſeventh, by one ſordid cheat upon the ſale of Corn, is ſaid within eight years to have deſtroy'd above a third part of the people in the Eccleſiaſtical State; and that Coun⯑try, which was the ſtrength of the Romans in the time of the Carthagini⯑an Wars, ſuffer'd more by the covetouſneſs and fraud of that Villain, than by all the defeats receiv'd from Hannibal.

'Twere an endleſs work to mention all the places where this peace⯑able ſolitude has bin introduc'd by abſolute Monarchy; but Popular and regular Governments have always apply'd themſelves to increaſe the Number, Strength, Power, Riches, and Courage of their People, by providing comfortable ways of ſubſiſtence for their own Citizens, invit⯑ing Strangers, and filling them all with ſuch a love to their Country, that every man might look upon the publick Cauſe as his own, and be always ready to defend it. This may ſometimes give occaſion to Tu⯑mults and Wars, as the moſt vigorous Bodys may fall into Diſtempers: When every one is ſolicitous for the Publick, there may be difference of opinion, and ſome by miſtaking the way may bring prejudice when they intend profit: But unleſs a Tyrant dos ariſe, and deſtroy the Government which is the root of their felicity; or they be overwhelm'd by the irreſi⯑ſtible power of a Vertue or Fortune greater than their own, they ſoon re⯑cover, [188] and for the moſt part riſe up in greater Glory and Proſperity than be⯑fore. This was ſeen in the Commonwealths of Greece and Italy, which for this reaſon were juſtly called Nurſerys of Vertue, and their Magiſtrats Preſervers of men; whereas our Author's peace-making Monarchs can deſerve no better title than that of Enemys and Deſtroyers of Mankind.

I cannot think him in earneſt when he exaggerates Sylla's Crueltys, as a proof that the miſchiefs ſuffer'd under free States are more univerſal than under Kings and Tyrants: For there never was a Tyrant in the World if he was not one; tho thro wearineſs, infirmity of body, fear, or perhaps the horror of his own wickedneſs, he at length reſign'd his Power; but the evil had taken root ſo deep, that it could not be remov'd: There was nothing of Liberty remaining in Rome: The Laws were overthrown by the violence of the Sword; the remaining Conteſt was who ſhould be Lord: and there is no reaſon to believe that if Pompey had gain'd the Bat⯑tel of Pharſalia, he would have made a more modeſt uſe of his Victory than Caeſar did; or that Rome would have bin more happy under him than under the other. His Cauſe was more plauſible becauſe the Senat fol⯑low'd him, and Caeſar was the Invader; but he was no better in his per⯑ſon, and his deſigns ſeem to have bin the ſame. He had bin long before ſuarum legum auctor & everſor. He gave the beginning to the firſt Tri⯑umvirat; and 'twere folly to think that he who had bin inſolent when he was not come to the higheſt pitch of Fortune, would have prov'd mode⯑rate if ſucceſs had put all into his hands. The proceedings of Marius, Cinna, Catiline, Octavius, and Antonius were all of the ſame nature. No Laws were obſerv'd: no publick Good intended; the ambition of private perſons reign'd; and whatſoever was done by them, or for their intereſts, can no more be apply'd to Popular, Ariſtocratical or mix'd Governments, than the furys of Caligula and Nero.

SECT. XXVII. The Miſchiefs and Crueltys proceeding from Tyranny, are greater than any that can come from Popular or mix'd Governments.

'TIs now time to examin the reaſons of our Author's general Maxims. The Crueltys, ſays he, of a Tyrant extend ordinarily no farther than ſome particular men that offend him, and not to the whole Kingdom. It is truly ſaid of his late Majeſty King James, A King can never be ſo notoriouſly vicious, but he will generally favour Juſtice, and maintain ſome order. Even cruel Domitian, Dionyſius the Tyrant, and many others are commended in Hiſtorys as great obſervers of Juſtice, except in particular caſes, wherein his inordinate luſts may carry him away. It may be ſaid of Popular Govern⯑ments, that tho a People thro error do ſometimes hurt a private perſon, and that injury may poſſibly reſult to the publick damage, becauſe the man that is offended or deſtroy'd, might have bin uſeful to the Society, yet they never do it otherwiſe than by error: For having the Government in themſelves, whatever is prejudicial to it, is ſo to them; and if they ruin it, they ruin themſelves, which no man ever did willingly and knowingly. But in abſolute Monarchys the matter is quite otherwiſe. A Prince that ſets up an intereſt in himſelf, becomes an Enemy to the Publick: in fol⯑lowing his own luſts he offends all, except a few of his corrupt Creatures, [189] by whoſe help he oppreſſes others with a Yoke they are unwilling to bear, and thereby incurs the univerſal hatred. This hatred is always proporti⯑onable to the injurys receiv'd, which being extreme, that muſt be ſo too; and every People being powerful in compariſon to the Prince that governs, he will always fear thoſe that hate him, and always hate thoſe he fears. When Luigi Farneſe firſt Duke of Parma had by his Tyranny incens'd the People of that ſmall City, their hatred was not leſs mortal to him than that of the whole Empire had bin to Nero; and as the one burnt Rome, the other would have deſtroy'd Parma, if he had not bin prevent⯑ed. The like has bin, and will be every where, in as much as every man endeavours to deſtroy thoſe whom he hates and fears; and the great⯑neſs of the danger often drives this ^*fear to rage and madneſs. For this reaſon Caligula wiſh'd but one Neck to all the People; and Nero tri⯑umph'd over the burning City, thinking by that ruin he had prevented his own danger. I know not who the good Authors are that commend Domitian for his Juſtice: but Tacitus calls him Principem virtutibus infe⯑ſtum; Tacit. in Vit. Agric.and 'tis hard to find out how ſuch a man can be an obſerver of juſtice; unleſs it be juſt, that whoever dares to be vertuous under a vici⯑ous and baſe Prince ſhould be deſtroy'd. Another ^† Author of the ſame time ſpeaking of him, dos not ſay he was unjuſt, but gives us reaſon to think he was ſo (unleſs it were juſt for him, who had a power over the beſt part of the World, to deſtroy it) and that he who by his cruelty had brought it to the laſt gaſp, would have finiſh'd the work, if his rage had not bin extinguiſh'd.

Many Princes not having in themſelves power to deſtroy their People, have ſtir'd up foreign Nations againſt them, and plac'd the only hopes of their ſafety in the publick Calamity; and lawful Kings when they have fall n [...]nto the firſt degree of madneſs, ſo as to aſſume a power above that which was allow'd by the Law, have in fury prov'd equal to the worſt Uſurpers. Cleonymus of Sparta was of this ſort: He became, ſays Plu⯑tarch, an Enemy to the City, becauſe they would not allow him the abſo⯑l [...]e Plut. Vit. Pyrrh.Power he affected; and brought Pyrrhus, the fierceſt of their Ene⯑mys, with a mighty and excellently well diſciplin'd Army, to deſtroy them. Vortigern the Britan call'd in the Saxons with the ruin of his own Mat. Weſtm.People, who were incens'd againſt him for his Leudneſs, Cruelty, and Baſeneſs. King John for the like reaſons offer'd the Kingdom of England to the Moors, and to the Pope. Peter the Cruel, and other Kings of Caſtile brought vaſt Armys of Moors into Spain to the ruin of their own People, who deteſted their Vices, and would not part with their Privileges. Many other examples of the like nature might be alledg'd; and I wiſh our own experience did not too well prove that ſuch deſigns are common. Let him that doubts this examin the Cauſes of the Wars with Scotland in the Years 1639, 1640; the ſlaughters of the Proteſtants in Ireland 1641; the whole courſe of Alliances and Treatys for the ſpace of fourſcore Years; the friendſhip contracted with the French; frequent Quarrels with the Dutch, together with other circumſtances that are already made too pub⯑lick. If he be not convinc'd by this, he may ſoon ſee a man in the Throne, who had rather be a Tributary to France than a lawful King of England, whilſt either Parliament or People ſhall dare to diſpute his [190] Commands, inſiſt upon their own Rights, or defend a Religion inconſi⯑ſtent with that which he has eſpous'd; and then the truth will be ſo evi⯑dent as to require no proof.

Grotius was never accus'd of dealing hardly with Kings, or laying too much weight upon imaginary caſes; nevertheleſs amongſt other reaſons that in his opinion juſtify Subjects in taking arms againſt their Princes, he De Jur. Bel.alledges this, propter immanem ſaevitiam, and quando Rex in Populi exitium fertur; in as much as it is contrary to, and inconſiſtent with the ends for which Governments are inſtituted: which were moſt impertinent, if no ſuch thing could be; for that which is not, can have no effect. There are therefore Princes who ſeek the deſtruction of their People, or none could be juſtly oppos'd on that account.

If King James was of another opinion, I could wiſh the courſe of his Government had bin ſuted to it. When he ſaid that whilſt he had the power of making Judges and Biſhops, he would make that to be Law and Goſpel which beſt pleas'd him, and accordingly fill'd thoſe places with ſuch as turn'd both according to his Will and Intereſts; I muſt think that by overthrowing Juſtice, which is the rule of civil and moral Acti⯑ons, and perverting the Goſpel which is the light of the ſpiritual man, he left nothing unattempted that he durſt attempt, by which he might bring the moſt extenſive and univerſal evils upon our Nation that any can ſuffer. This would ſtand good, tho Princes never err'd, unleſs they were tranſported with ſome inordinate Luſts; for 'tis hard to find one that dos not live in the perpetual power of them. They are naturally ſubject to the impulſe of ſuch appetites as well as others; and whatever evil reigns in their Nature is fomented by Education. 'Tis the handle by which their Flatterers lead them; and he that diſcovers to what Vice a Prince is moſt inclin'd, is ſure to govern him by rendring himſelf ſubſervient. In this conſiſts the chief art of a Courtier, and by this means it comes to paſs that ſuch Luſts as in private men are curb'd by fear, do not only rage as in a wild Beaſt, but are perpetually inflam'd by the malice of their own Servants: their hatred to the Laws of God or Men that might re⯑ſtrain them, increaſes in proportion with their Vices, or their fears of be⯑ing puniſh'd for them. When they are come to this, they can ſet no li⯑mits to their ſury, and there is no extravagance into which they do not fre⯑quently fall. But many of 'em do not expect theſe violent motives: the perverſity of their own nature carrys them to the extremitys of evil. They hate Vertue for its own ſake, and vertuous men for being moſt un⯑like to themſelves. Vertue is the dictate of Reaſon, or the remains of Divine Light, by which men are made beneficent and beneficial to each other. Religion proceeds from the ſame ſpring, and tends to the ſame end; and the good of Mankind ſo intirely depends upon theſe two, that no People ever enjoy'd any thing worth deſiring that was not the product of them; and whatſoever any have ſuffer'd that deſerves to be abhor'd and fear'd, has proceeded either from the defect of theſe, or the wrath of God againſt them. If any Prince therefore has bin an enemy to Vertue and Religion, he muſt alſo have bin an enemy to Mankind, and moſt eſpecially to the People under him. Whatſoever he dos againſt thoſe that excel in Vertue and Religion, tends to the deſtruction of the People who ſubſiſt by them. I will not take upon me to define who they are, or to tell the number of thoſe that do this: but 'tis certain there have bin ſuch; and I wiſh I could ſay they were few in number, or that they had liv'd only in paſt ages. Tacitus dos not fix this upon one Prince, but [191] upon all that he writes of; and to give his Readers a taſt of what he was to write, he ſays, that Nobility and Honors were dangerous, but that Vertue Tacit, H [...]ſt. l. 1. brought moſt certain deſtruction; and in another place, that after the ſlaugh⯑ter of many excellent men, Nero reſolv'd to cut down Vertue it ſelf, and Annal. l. 4. therefore kill'd Thraſeas Paetus and Bareas Soranus. And whoſoever exa⯑mins the Chriſtian or Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtorys, will find thoſe Princes to have bin no leſs enemys to Vertue and Religion than their Predeceſſors, and conſequently enemys to the Nations under them, unleſs Religion and Vertue be things prejudicial or indifferent to Mankind.

But our Author may ſay, theſe were particular caſes; and ſo was the ſlaughter of the Prophets and Apoſtles, the crucifixion of Chriſt, and all the Villanys that have ever bin committed; yet they proceeded from a univerſal principle of hatred to all that is good, exerting it ſelf as far as it could, to the ruin of mankind: And nothing but the overruling Power of God, who reſolv'd to preſerve to himſelf a People, could ſet bounds to their Rage, which in other reſpects had as full ſucceſs as our Author or the Devil could have wiſh'd.

Dionyſius (his other example of Juſtice) deſerves obſervation: More falſhood, leudneſs, treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, baſeneſs, avarice, impudence and hatred to all manner of Good, was hardly ever known in in a mortal Creature. For this reaſon Diogenes ſeeing him at Corinth, tho in a poor and contemptible condition, ſaid, he rather deſerv'd to have continu'd in the miſery, fears and villanys of his Tyranny, than to be ſuf⯑fer'd peaceably to converſe with honeſt men. And if ſuch as theſe are to be call'd obſervers of Juſtice, it muſt be concluded that the Laws of God and of Men, are either of no value, or contrary to it; and that the deſtruction of Nations is a better work than their preſervation. No Faith is to be obſerv'd: Temples may be juſtly ſack'd; the beſt men ſlain for daring to be better than their Maſters; and the whole World, if it were in the power of one Man, rightly torn in pieces and deſtroy'd.

His Reaſons for this are as good as his Doctrin: It is, ſays he, the mul⯑titude of people and abundance of riches, that are the glory and ſtrength of eve⯑ry Prince: the bodys of his Subjects do him ſervice in War, and their goods ſupply his wants. Therefore if not out of affection to his people, yet out of na⯑tural love unto himſelf, every Tyrant deſires to preſerve the lives and goods of his Subjects. I ſhould have thought that Princes, tho Tyrants, being God's Vicegerents, and Fathers of their People, would have ſought their good, tho no advantage had thereby redounded to themſelves, but it ſeems no ſuch thing is to be expected from them. They conſider Nati⯑ons, as Graſiers do their Herds and Flocks, according to the profit that can be made of them: and if this be ſo, a People has no more ſecurity under a Prince, than a Herd or Flock under their Maſter. Tho he de⯑ſire to be a good Husband, yet they muſt be deliver'd up to the ſlaughter when he finds a good Market, or a better way of improving his Land; but they are often fooliſh, riotous, prodigal, and wantonly deſtroy their Stock, tho to their own prejudice. We thought that all Princes and Ma⯑giſtrats had bin ſet up, that under them we might live quietly and peace⯑ably, in all godlineſs and honeſty: but our Author teaches us, that they only ſeek what they can make of our Bodys and Goods, and that they do not live and reign for us, but for themſelves. If this be true, they look upon us not as Children, but as Beaſts; nor do us any good for our own ſakes, or becauſe it is their duty, but only that we may be uſeful to them, as Oxen are put into plentiful Paſtures that they may be ſtrong for labour, [192] or fit for ſlaughter. This is the divine Model of Government that he of⯑fers to the World. The juſt Magiſtrate is the Miniſter of God for our good: but this Abſolute Monarch has no other care of us, than as our Riches and Multitude may increaſe his own Glory and Strength. We might eaſily judg what would be the iſſue of ſuch a Principle, when the Being of Nations depending upon his will, muſt alſo depend upon his opi⯑nion whether the Strength, Multitude and Riches of a People do con⯑duce to the increaſe of Glory and Power or not, tho Hiſtorys were ſilent in the caſe; for theſe things ſpeak of themſelves. The judgment of a ſingle man is not to be rely'd upon; the beſt and wiſeſt do oſten err, the fooliſh and perverſe always; and our diſcourſe is not of what Moſes or Samuel would do, but what may come into the fancy of a furious or wicked man who may uſurp the ſupreme Power, or a child, a woman, or a fool, that may inherit it. Beſides, the Propoſition upon which he builds his Concluſion, proves often falſe: for as the Riches, Power, Num⯑ber and Courage of our Friends is for our advantage, and that of our Enemys threatens us with ruin; thoſe Princes only can reaſonably believe the ſtrength of their Subjects beneficial to them, who govern ſo as to be aſſur'd of their Affection, and that their Strength will be imploy'd for them: But thoſe who know they are, or juſtly deſerve to be hated, can⯑not but think it will be employ'd againſt them, and always ſeek to dimi⯑niſh that which creates their danger. This muſt certainly befal as many as are leud, fooliſh, negligent, imprudent, cowardly, wicked, vicious, or any way unworthy the places they obtain; for their Reign is a perpetu⯑al exerciſe of the moſt extreme and ruinous Injuſtice: Every man that follows an honeſt Intereſt, is prejudic'd: Every one who finds the Power that was ordain'd for his good, to be turn'd to his hurt, will be angry and hate him that dos it: If the People be of uncorrupted manners, this hatred will be univerſal, becauſe every one of them deſires that which is juſt; if compos'd of good and evil, the firſt will always be averſe to the evil Government, and the others endeavouring to uphold it, the ſafe⯑ty of the Prince muſt depend upon the prevalence of either Party. If the beſt prove to be the ſtrongeſt, he muſt periſh: and knowing himſelf to be ſupported only by the worſt, he will always deſtroy as many of his Enemys as he can; weaken thoſe that remain; enrich his Creatures with their Spoils and Confiſcations; by fraud and rapine accumulate Treaſures to increaſe the number of his Party, and advance them into all places of power and truſt, that by their aſſiſtance he may cruſh his Adverſarys; and every man is accounted his Adverſary, who has either Eſtate, Honor, Vertue or Reputation. This naturally caſts all the Power into the hands of thoſe who have no ſuch dangerous qualitys, nor any thing to recom⯑mend them, but an abſolute reſignation of themſelves to do whatever they are commanded. Theſe men having neither will nor knowledg to do good, as ſoon as they come to be in power, Juſtice is perverted, military Diſci⯑plin neglected, the publick Treaſures exhauſted, new Projects invented to raiſe more; and the Prince's wants daily increaſing, thro their igno⯑rance, negligence, or deceit, there is no end of their devices and tricks to gain ſupplys. To this end ſwarms of Spys, Informers, and falſe Witneſ⯑ſes are ſent out to circumvent the richeſt and moſt eminent men: The Tri⯑bunals are fill'd with Court-Paraſites of profligate Conſciences, Fortunes and Reputation, that no man may eſcape who is brought before them. If Crimes are wanting, the diligence of well▪choſen Officers and Proſe⯑cutors, with the favor of the Judges, ſupply all defects; the Law is made a [193] Snare; Vertue ſuppreſs'd, Vice fomented, and in a ſhort time Honeſty and Knavery, Sobriety and Leudneſs, Vertue and Vice, become Badges of the ſeveral Factions; and every man's converſation and manners ſhew⯑ing to what Party he is addicted, the Prince who makes himſelf head of the worſt, muſt favour them to the overthrow of the beſt, which is ſo ſtreight a way to an univerſal ruin, that no State can prevent it, unleſs that courſe be interrupted.

Theſe things conſider'd, no general Judgment can be made of a Magi⯑ſtrate's Counſels, from his Name or Duty. He that is juſt, and become grateful to the People by doing good, will find his own Honor and Secu⯑rity in increaſing their Number, Riches, Vertue, and Power: If on the other ſide, by doing evil, he has drawn upon himſelf the publick hatred, he will always endeavour to take from them the power of doing him any hurt, by bringing them into the utmoſt weakneſs, poverty, and baſeneſs. And whoever would know whether any particular Prince deſires to in⯑creaſe or deſtroy the bodys and goods of his Subjects, muſt examin whe⯑ther his Government be ſuch as renders him grateful or odious to them; and whether he dos purſue the publick Intereſt, or for the advancement of his own Authority ſet up one in himſelf contrary to that of his People; which can never befal a Popular Government, and conſequently no miſchief equal to it can be produc'd by any ſuch, unleſs ſomething can be imagin'd worſe than corruption and deſtruction.

SECT. XXVIII. Men living under Popular or Mix'd Governments, are more careful of the publick Good, than in Abſolute Monarchys.

OUR Author delighting in ſtrange things, dos in the next place, with an admirable ſagacity, diſcover two faults in Popular Governments, that were never found by any man before him; and theſe are no leſs than Ignorance and Negligence. Speaking of the Care of Princes to preſerve their Subjects, he adds; On the contrary in a Popular State, every man knows the publick Good doth not wholly depend upon his Care, but the Common⯑wealth may be well enough govern'd by others, tho he only tend his private buſi⯑neſs. And a little below, Nor are they much to be blam'd for their Negli⯑gence, ſince it is an even wager their Ignorance may be as great. The Magi⯑ſtrats amongst the people being for the moſt part annual, do always lay down their Office before they underſtand it; ſo as a Prince of a duller underſtanding muſt needs excel them. This is bravely determin'd, and the world is be⯑holden to Filmer for the diſcovery of the Errors that have hitherto bin Epidemical. Moſt men had believ'd, that ſuch as live in Free States, are uſually pleas'd with their condition, deſire to maintain it; and every man finding his own good comprehended in the Publick, as thoſe that ſail in the ſame Ship, employs the Talent he has in endeavouring to preſerve it, knowing that he muſt periſh if that miſcarry. This was an incou⯑ragement to Induſtry; and the continual Labors and Dangers to which the Romans and other free Nations expos'd themſelves, have bin taken for Teſtimonys that they thought themſelves concern'd in the buſineſſes that paſt among them, and that every one did not neglect them thro an opinion that they would be done well enough by others. It was alſo thought [194] that free Citys, by frequent Elections of Magiſtrats, became Nurſerys of great and able Men, every man endeavouring to excel others, that he might be advanc'd to the Honor he had no other title to than what might ariſe from his Merit or Reputation; in which they ſucceeded ſo well, that one of them may be juſtly ſaid to have produc'd more eminent Men, than all the Abſolute Monarchys that have bin in the World. But theſe were miſtakes. Perhaps Brutus, Valerius, and other Roman Senators or Magiſtrats, for the ſpace of three hundred years, might have taken ſome care of the Commonwealth, if they had thought it wholly depended upon one of them: But believing it would be well enough govern'd by others, they neglected it. Camillus, Cincinnatus, Papirius, Fabius, Rullus and Maximus, Scipio Africanus, Amilcar, Hannibal, Pericles, Themiſtocles, Alcibiades, Epaminondas, Philopemen, and others, might have prov'd able Men in affairs of War or Government; but they were remov'd from their Offices before they underſtood them, and muſt needs be excel'd in both by Princes, tho of duller underſtanding. This may be enough to excuſe them for performing their Duty ſo ſlackly and meanly: But 'tis ſtrange that Tacitus, and others, ſhould ſo far overlook the Reaſon, and ſo groſly miſtake the matter of Fact, as not only to ſay, that great and excellent Spirits fail'd when Liberty was loſt, and all Preferments given to thoſe who were moſt propenſe to Slavery; but that there wanted men Tacit. Annal. l. 1.even to write the Hiſtory, Inſcitia Reipublicae ut alienae. They never ap⯑ply'd themſelves to underſtand Affairs depending upon the will of one man, in whom they were no otherwiſe concern'd, than to avoid the ef⯑fects of his Rage; and that was chiefly to be done, by not falling under the ſuſpicion of being vertuous. This was the ſtudy then in requeſt; and the moſt cunning in this Art were call'd Scientes temporum: No other wiſdom was eſteem'd in that and the enſuing Ages, and no more was re⯑quir'd, ſince the Paternal Care, deep Wiſdom, and profound Judgment of the Princes provided for all; and tho they were of duller underſtand⯑ings, they muſt needs excel other Magiſtrats, who having bin created only for a year, left their Offices before they could underſtand the Dutys of them. This was evidenc'd by that tenderneſs and ſincerity of heart, as well as the great purity of manners obſerv'd in Tiberius; the Clemen⯑cy, Juſtice, ſolid Judgment and Frugality of Caligula; the Induſtry, Courage and Sobriety of Claudius; the good Nature and prudent Go⯑vernment of Nero; the Temperance, Vivacity and Diligence of Vitellius; the Liberality of Galba and Veſpaſian; together with the Encouragement given by Domitian, Commodus, Heliogabalus, and many others, to all manner of Vertues, and Favors confer'd upon thoſe that excel'd in them. Ou [...] Author giving ſuch infallible proof of his Integrity and Underſtand⯑ing, by teaching us theſe things that would never have come into our heads, ought ſurely to be credited, tho that which he propoſes ſeems to be moſt abſurd. But if we believe ſuch as liv'd in thoſe times, or thoſe who in later ages have perus'd their Writings, we cannot but think the Princes beforemention'd, and the greateſt part of thoſe who poſſeſt the ſame places, not only to have bin void of all Vertue, and to have ſuffer'd none to grow up under them, but in baſeneſs, ſottiſhneſs and malice, to have bin equal to the worſt of all Beaſts. Whilſt one Prince polluted with [...]uſt and Blood, ſat in his Grotto at Capreae, ſurrounded with an in⯑famous Troop of Aſtrologers, and others were govern'd by Whores, Bardache's, manumis'd Slaves, and other Villains, the Empire was ru⯑in'd thro their negligence, incapacity and wickedneſs; and the City that [195] had flouriſh'd in all manner of Vertue, as much or more than any that has bin yet known in the world, produc'd no more; the Diſciplin was diſſolv'd that nouriſh'd it; no man could hope to advance a publick Good, or obviate an Evil by his diligence and valor; and he who acquir'd repu⯑tation by either, could expect no other reward than a cruel death. If Germanicus and Corbulo, who were born when Liberty was expiring, be brought for Examples againſt the firſt part of my Aſſertion, their ends will juſtify the latter; and no eminent Roman Family is known to have brought forth a man that deſerv'd to be nam'd in Hiſtory ſince their time. This is as probable in reaſon, as true in fact. Men are valiant and indu⯑ſtrious, when they fight for themſelves and their Country; they prove excellent in all the Arts of War and Peace, when they are bred up in ver⯑tuous Exerciſes, and taught by their Fathers and Maſters to rejoice in the Honors gain'd by them: they love their Country, when the good of every particular man is comprehended in the publick Proſperity, and the ſucceſs of their Atchievements is improv'd to the general advantage: They undertake hazards and labors for the Government, when 'tis juſt⯑ly adminiſter'd; when Innocence is ſafe, and Vertue honour'd; when no man is diſtinguiſh'd from the vulgar, but ſuch as have diſtinguiſh'd themſelves by the bravery of their actions; when no honor is thought too great for thoſe who do it eminently, unleſs it be ſuch as cannot be communicated to others of equal merit: They do not ſpare their Perſons, Purſes, or Friends, when the publick Powers are employ'd for the pub⯑lick Benefit, and imprint the like affections in their Children from their Infancy. The diſciplin of Obedience in which the Romans were bred, taught them to command: and few were admitted to the Magiſtracys of inferior rank, till they had given ſuch proof of their Vertue as might de⯑ſerve the Supreme. Cincinnatus, Camillus, Papirius, Mamercus, Fabius Maximus, were not made Dictators, that they might learn the Dutys of the Office; but becauſe they were judg'd to be of ſuch Wiſdom, Valor, Integrity and Experience, that they might be ſafely truſted with the higheſt Powers; and whilſt the Law reign'd, not one was advanc'd to that honor, who did not fully anſwer what was expected from him. By this means the City was ſo repleniſh'd with men fit for the greateſt employ⯑ments, that even in its infancy, when three hundred and ſix of the Fabii, Quorum neminem, ſays Livy, ducem ſperneret quibuſlibet temporibus Senatus, were kill'd in one day, the City did lament the loſs, but was not ſo weak⯑en'd to give any advantage to their Enemys: and when every one of thoſe who had bin eminent before the ſecond Punic War, Fabius Maximus on⯑ly excepted, had periſh'd in it, others aroſe in their places, who ſur⯑paſt them in number, and were equal to them in Vertue. The City was a perpetual ſpring of ſuch men as long as Liberty laſted; but that was no ſooner overthrown, than Vertue was torn up by the roots; the People became baſe and ſordid, the ſmall remains of the Nobility ſlothſul and effeminate; and their Italian Aſſociats becoming like to them, the Empire whilſt it ſtood, was only ſuſtain'd by the ſtrength oſ Foreigners.

The Grecian Vertue had the ſame fate, and expir'd with Liberty: in⯑ſtead of ſuch Soldiers as in their time had no equals, and ſuch Generals of Armys and Fleets, Legiſlators and Governors, as all ſucceeding Ages have juſtly admir'd, they ſent out ſwarms of Fidlers, Jeſters, Chariot-drivers, Players, Bawds, Flatterers, Miniſters of the moſt impure Luſts; or idle, babling, hypocritical Philoſophers, not much better than they. The Emperors Courts were always crouded with this Vermin; and not⯑withſtanding [196] the neceſſity our Author imagins that Princes muſt needs underſtand matters of Government better than Magiſtrats annually cho⯑ſen, they did for the moſt part prove ſo brutiſh as to give themſelves and the World to be govern'd by ſuch as theſe, and that without any great prejudice, ſince none could be found more ignorant, leud, and baſe than themſelves.

'Tis abſurd to impute this to the change of times; for time changes no⯑thing; and nothing was chang'd in thoſe times but the Government, and that chang'd all things. This is not accidental, but according to the rules given to Nature by God, impoſing upon all things a neceſſity of perpetu⯑ally following their Cauſes. Fruits are always of the ſame nature with the Seeds and Roots from which they come, and Trees are known by the fruits they bear: As a Man begets a Man, and a Beaſt a Beaſt; that Society of Men which conſtitutes a Government upon the foundation of Juſtice, Vertue, and the common Good, will always have men to pro⯑mote thoſe ends; and that which intends the advancement of one man's deſires and vanity, will abound in thoſe that will foment them. Men follow that which ſeems advantageous to themſelves. Such as are bred under a good diſciplin, and ſee that all benefits procur'd to their Country by vertuous Actions, redound to the honor and advantage of themſelves, their Children, Friends, and Relations, contract from their infancy a love to the Publick, and look upon the common Concernments as their own. When they have learnt to be vertuous, and ſee that Vertue is in eſteem, they ſeek no other preferments than ſuch as may be obtain'd that way; and no Country ever wanted great numbers of excellent men, where this method was eſtabliſh'd. On the other ſide, when 'tis evident that the beſt are deſpis'd, hated, or mark'd out for deſtruction; all things calculated to the humor or advantage of one man, who is often the worſt, or govern'd by the worſt; Honors, Riches, Commands, and Dignitys diſpos'd by his Will, and his favor gain'd only by a moſt obſequious re⯑ſpect, or a pretended affection to his perſon, together with a ſervile obe⯑dience to his commands, all Applications to vertuous Actions will ceaſe; and no man caring to render himſelf or his Children worthy of great Im⯑ployments, ſuch as deſire to have them will, by little intrigues, corrup⯑tion, ſcurrility and flattery, endeavour to make way to them; by which means true Merit in a ſhort time comes to be aboliſh'd, as fell out in Rome as ſoon as the Caeſars began to reign.

He who dos not believe this, may ſee whether the like did not happen in all the other Commonwealths of Italy and Greece; or if modern exam⯑ples are thought to be of more value, let him examin whether the No⯑blemen of Venice, who are born and bred in Familys that never knew a Maſter; who act for themſelves, and have a part in all the good or evil that befals the Commonwealth, and know that if it be deſtroy'd, the [...] muſt periſh, or at leaſt that all changes are to their prejudice, do neglect the publick Intereſts, as thinking that the whole not depending upon any one of them, things will be well enough govern'd, tho they attend only their private benefit. Let it be obſerv'd whether they do better under⯑ſtand the common concernments, than the great men of France or Spain, who never come to the knowledg of any thing, unleſs they happen to be favor'd by the King or his Miniſters, and know themſelves never to be more miſerable than when their Maſter is moſt proſperous. For my own part, I cannot think it neceſſary to alledg any other proo [...] of this point, than that when Maximilian the Emperor, Lewis the twelfth of [197] France, the fierce Pope Julius the ſecond, and Ferdinand the ſubtil and powerful King of Spain, had by the League of Cambray combin'd againſt the Venetians, gain'd the Battel of La Ghirad'adda, taken Alviano their Paol. Paruta Hiſt. Venet. Guicciard.General priſoner, depriv'd them of all their Dominion on the Terra firma, and prepar'd to aſſault the City, it was, under God, ſolely preſerv'd by the vigor and wiſdom of their Nobility, who tho no way educated to War, unleſs by Sea, ſparing neither perſons nor purſes, did with admirable in⯑duſtry and courage firſt recover Padoüa, and then many other Citys, [...]o as at the end of that terrible War they came off without any diminution of their Territorys. Whereas Portugal having in our age revolted from the Houſe of Auſtria, no one doubts that it had bin immediately reduc'd, if the great men of Spain had not bin pleas'd with ſuch a leſſening of their Maſter's power, and reſolv'd not to repair it by the recovery of that Kingdom, or to deprive themſelves of an eaſy retreat when they ſhould be oppreſt by him or his Favorites. The like thought was more plainly expreſt by the Mareſchal de Baſſompierre, who ſeeing how hardly Rochel was preſt by Lewis the 13th, ſaid, ^* he thought they ſhould be ſuch fools to take it: but 'tis believ'd they would never have bin ſuch fools; and the treachery only of our Countrymen did enable the Cardinal Richlieu to do it (as for his own Glory, and the advancement of the Popiſh Cauſe he really intended) and nothing is to this day more common in the mouths of their wiſeſt and beſt men, tho Papiſts, than the acknowledgment of their own folly in ſuffering that place to fall, the King having by that means gotten power to proceed againſt them at his pleaſure. The brave Mon⯑ſieur de Turenne is ſaid to have carry'd this to a greater height in his laſt Diſcourſe to the preſent King of France: ‘"You think, ſaid he, you have Armys, but you have none; the one half of the Officers are the Baw⯑dy-houſe Companions of Monſieur de xxx, or the Creatures of his Whore Madam de xxx: the other half may be men of experience, and fit for their Imployments; but they are ſuch as would be pleas'd with nothing more than to ſee you loſe two or three Battels, that com⯑ing to ſtand in need of them, you might cauſe them to be better us'd by your Miniſters than of late they have bin."’ It may eaſily be ima⯑gin'd how men in ſuch ſentiments do ſerve their Maſter; and nothing is more evident than that the French in this age have had ſo great advanta⯑ges, that they might have brought Europe, and perhaps Aſia, under their power, if the intereſt of the Nation had bin united to that of the Go⯑vernment, and the Strength, Vigor, and Bravery of the Nobility em⯑ploy'd that way. But ſince it has pleas'd God to ſuffer us to fall into a condition of being little able to help our ſelves, and that they are in ſo good terms with the Turk as not to attack him, 'tis our happineſs that they do not know their own ſtrength, or cannot without ruin to themſelves turn it to our prejudice.

I could give yet more pregnant teſtimonys of the difference between men fighting for their own intereſts in the Offices to which they had bin advanc'd by the votes of numerous Aſſemblys, and ſuch as ſerve for pay, and get preferments by corruption or favor, if I were not unwilling to ſtir the ſpleen of ſome men, by obliging them to reflect upon what has paſt in our own Age and Country; to compare the Juſtice of our Tribunals within the time of our memory, and the integrity of thoſe who for a while manag'd the publick Treaſure; the Diſciplin, Valor and Strength [198] of our Armys and Fleets; the increaſe of our Riches and Trade; the ſucceſs of our Wars in Scotland, Ireland, and at Sea; the glory and reputation not long ſince gain'd, with that condition into which we are of late fallen. But I think, I ſhall offend no wiſe or good man, if I ſay, that as neither the Romans nor Grecians in the time of their Liberty ever perform'd any actions more glorious than freeing the Country from a Civil War that had rag'd in every part, the conqueſt of two ſuch Kingdoms as Scotland and Ireland, and cruſhing the formidable power of the Hollanders by Sea; nor ever produc'd more examples of Valor, Induſtry, Integrity, and in all reſpects compleat, diſintereſted, unmoveable and incorruptible Ver⯑tue than were at that time ſeen in our Nation: So neither of them upon the change of their Affairs did exceed us in weakneſs, cowardice, baſe⯑neſs, venality, leudneſs, and all manner of corruption. We have reaſon therefore not only to believe that all Princes do not neceſſarily underſtand the affairs of their People, or provide better for them than thoſe who are otherwiſe choſen; but that as there is nothing of Greatneſs, Power, Riches, Strength, and Happineſs, which we might not reaſonably have hop'd for if we had rightly improv'd the advantages we had; ſo there is nothing of ſhame and miſery which we may not juſtly fear, ſince we have neglected them.

If any man think that this evil of advancing Officers for perſonal re⯑ſpects, favor or corruption, is not of great extent, I deſire him to conſi⯑der, that the Officers of State, Courts of Juſtice, Church, Armys, Fleets and Corporations, are of ſuch number and power as wholly to corrupt a Nation when they themſelves are corrupted; and will ever be corrupt, when they attain to their Offices by corruption. The good management of all Affairs, Civil, Military, and Eccleſiaſtical, neceſſari⯑ly depends upon good order and diſciplin; and 'tis not in the power of common men to reform abuſes patroniz'd by thoſe in Authority, nor to prevent the miſchiefs thereupon enſuing; and not having power to direct publick actions to the publick good, they muſt conſequently want the induſtry and affection that is requir'd to bring them to a good iſſue. The Romans were eaſily beaten under the Decemviri, tho immediately before the erection, and after the extinction of that Power, none of their Neighbours were able to reſiſt them. The Goths, who with much Glory had reign'd in Spain for about three hundred years, had neither ſtrength nor courage under their leud and odious King Rodrigo, and were in one day ſubdu'd with little loſs of blood by the Saracens, and could not in leſs than eight hundred years free their Country from them. That brave Nation having of late fallen under as baſe a conduct, has now as little heart or power to defend it ſelf: Court-Paraſites have render'd Valor ridiculous; and they who have ever ſhew'd themſelves as much inclin'd to Arms as any people of the world, do now abhor them, and are ſent to the Wars by force, laid in Carts, bound like Calves brought to the Shambles, and left to ſtarve in Flanders as ſoon as they arrive. It may eaſily be judg'd what ſervice can be expected from ſuch men, tho they ſhould happen to be well commanded: but the great Officers, by the corruption of the Court, think only of enriching themſelves; and encreaſing the miſery of the Soldiers by their frauds, both become equally uſeleſs to the State.

Notwithſtanding the ſeeming proſperity of France, matters there are not much better manag'd. The warlike temper of that people is ſo worn out by the frauds and crueltys of corrupt Officers, that few men liſt them⯑ſelves willingly to be Soldiers; and when they are engag'd or forc'd, they [199] are ſo little able to endure the miſerys to which they are expos'd, that they daily run away from their Colors, tho they know not whither to go, and expect no mercy if they are taken. The King has in vain at⯑tempted to correct this humor by the ſeverity of martial Law; but mens minds will not be forc'd; and tho his Troops are perfectly well arm'd, cloth'd, and exercis'd, they have given many teſtimonys of little worth. When the Prince of Condé had by his own Valor, and the Strength of the King's Guards, broken the firſt line of the Prince of Orange's Army at the battel of Seneff, he could not make the ſecond and third line of his own Army to advance and reinforce the firſt, by which means he loſt all the fair hopes he had conceiv'd of an intire Victory. Not long after, the Mareſchal de Crequi was abandon'd by his whole Army near Trier, who ran away, hardly ſtriking a ſtroke, and left him with ſixteen horſe to ſhift for himſelf. When Monſieur de Turenne, by the excellency of his Conduct and Valor, had gain'd ſuch a Reputation amongſt the Soldiers, that they thought themſelves ſecure under him, he did not ſuffer ſuch diſgraces; but he being kill'd, they return'd to the uſual temper of forc'd and ill-us'd Soldiers: half the Army was loſt in a retreat, little differing from a flight; and the reſt, as they themſelves confeſs, ſav'd by the bra⯑very of two Engliſh Regiments. The Prince of Condé was ſoon after ſent to command; but he could not with all his courage, skill and repu⯑tation, raiſe their fallen Spirits, nor preſerve his Army any other way, than by lodging them in a Camp near Schleſtadt, ſo fortify'd by Art and Nature that it could not be forc'd.

To theſe we may add ſome Examples of our own. In our late War the Scots Foot, whether Friends or Enemys, were much inferior to thoſe of the Parliament, and their Horſe eſteem'd as nothing. Yet in the year 1639 and 1640, the King's Army, tho very numerous, excellently arm'd and mounted, and in appearance able to conquer many ſuch King⯑doms as Scotland, being under the conduct of Courtiers, and affected as men uſually are towards thoſe that uſe them ill, and ſeek to deſtroy them, they could never reſiſt a wretched Army commanded by Leven; but were ſhamefully beaten at Newborn, and left the Northern Countys to be ravag'd by them.

When Van Tromp ſet upon Blake in Foleſton-Bay, the Parliament had not above thirteen Ships againſt threeſcore, and not a man that had ever ſeen any other fight at Sea, than between a Merchant-ſhip and a Pirat, to op⯑poſe the beſt Captain in the world, attended with many others in valor and experience not much inſerior to him. Many other difficultys were obſerv'd in the unſetled State: Few Ships, want of Mony, ſeveral Fa⯑ctions, and ſome who to advance particular Intereſts betray'd the Publick. But ſuch was the power of Wiſdom and Integrity in thoſe that ſat at the Helm, and their diligence in chuſing men only for their Merit, was bleſt with ſuch ſucceſs, that in two years our Fleets grew to be as famous as our Land Armys; the Reputation and Power of our Nation roſe to a grea⯑ter height, than when we poſſeſt the better half of France, and the Kings of France and Scotland were our Priſoners. All the States, Kings and Potentates of Europe, moſt reſpectfully, not to ſay ſubmiſſively, ſought our Friendſhip; and Rome was more afraid of Blake and his Fleet, than they had bin of the great King of Sweden, when he was ready to invade Italy with a hundred thouſand men. This was the work of thoſe, who, if our Author ſays true, thought baſely of the publick Concernments; and believing things might be well enough manag'd by others, minded only [200] their private Affairs. Theſe were the effects of the negligence and igno⯑rance of thoſe, who being ſuddenly advanc'd to Offices, were remov'd before they underſtood the Dutys of them. Theſe Diſeaſes, which pro⯑ceed from popular corruption and irregularity, were certainly cur'd by the reſtitution of that Integrity, good Order and Stability that accompany divine Monarchy. The Juſtice of the War made againſt Holland in the year 1665; the probity of the Gentleman, who without partiality or bribery, choſe the moſt part of the Officers that carry'd it on; the Wiſ⯑dom, Diligence and Valor manifeſted in the conduct, and the Glory with which it was ended, juſtifys all that our Author can ſay in its commenda⯑tion. If any doubt remains, the ſubtilty of making the King of France deſire that the Netherlands might be an acceſſion to his Crown; the inge⯑nious ways taken by us to facilitate the conqueſt of them; the Induſtry of our Embaſſadors in diverting the Spaniards from entring into the War till it was too late to recover the Loſſes ſuſtain'd; the honourable Deſign upon the Smyrna Fleet, and our frankneſs in taking the quarrel upon our ſelves, together with the important Figure we now make in Europe, may wholly remove it; and in confirmation of our Author's Doctrin, ſhew, that Princes do better perform the Offices that require Wiſdom, Induſtry and Valor, than annual Magiſtrats; and do more ſeldom err in the choice of Officers, than Senats and popular Aſſemblys.

SECT. XXIX. There is no aſſurance that the Diſtempers of a State ſhall be cur'd by the Wiſdom of a Prince.

BƲT, ſays our Author, the Vertue and Wiſdom of a Prince ſupplys all. Tho he were of a duller underſtanding, by uſe and experience he muſt needs excel all: Nature, Age, or Sex, are, as it ſeems, nothing to the caſe. A Child as ſoon as he comes to be a King, has experience; the head of a Fool is fill'd with Wiſdom, as ſoon as a Crown is ſet upon it, and the moſt vicious do in a moment become vertuous. This is more ſtrange than that an Aſs being train'd to a Courſe, ſhould outrun the beſt Arabian Horſe; or a Hare bred up in an Army, become more ſtrong and fierce than a Lion: for Fortune dos not only ſupply all natural defects in Princes, and correct their vices, but gives them the benefit of uſe and experience when they have none. Some Reaſons and Examples might have bin expected to prove this extraordinary Propoſition: But according to his laudable cuſtom, he is pleas'd to trouble himſelf with neither; and thinks that the impudence of an Aſſertion is ſufficient to make that to paſs, which is repugnant to experience and common ſenſe, as may appear by the following diſcourſe.

I will not inſiſt upon terms; for tho duller underſtanding ſigniſys no⯑thing, in as much as no underſtanding is dull, and a man is ſaid to be dull only becauſe he wants it; but preſuming he means little underſtanding, I ſhall ſo take it. This defect may poſſibly be repair'd in time; but to conclude it muſt be ſo, is abſurd, for no one has this uſe and experience when he begins to reign. At that [...]ime many Errors may be committed to the ruin of himſelf or people, and many have periſh'd even in their be⯑ginning. Edward the fifth and ſixth of England, Francis the ſecond of [201] France, and divers other Kings have dy'd in the beginning of their youth: Charles the ninth liv'd only to add the furys of youth to the follys of his childhood; and our Henry the ſecond, Edward the ſecond, Richard the ſecond, and Henry the ſixth, ſeem to have bin little wiſer in the laſt, than in the firſt year of their Reign or Life. The preſent Kings of Spain, France, and Sweden, came to the Crowns they wear before the ſixth year of their Age; and if they did then ſurpaſs all annual Magiſtrats in Wiſ⯑dom and Valor, it was by a peculiar Gift of God, which, for any thing we know, is not given to every King, and it was not Uſe and Experi⯑ence that made them to excel. If it be pretended that this Experience, with the Wiſdom that it gives, comes in time and by degrees; I may modeſtly ask, what time is requir'd to render a Prince excellent in Wiſ⯑dom who is a Child or a Fool? and who will give ſecurity that he ſhall live to that time, or that the Kingdom ſhall not be ruin'd in the time of his folly? I may alſo doubt how our Author, who concludes that every King in time muſt needs become excellent in Wiſdom, can be reconcil'd to Solomon, who in preferring a wiſe Child before an old and fooliſh King that will not be advis'd, ſhews that an old King may be a Fool, and he that will not be advis'd is one. Some are ſo naturally brutiſh and ſtupid, that neither education nor time will mend them. 'Tis probable that Solomon took what care he could to inſtruct his only Son Rehoboam; but he was certainly a Fool at forty years of age, and we have no reaſon to believe that he deſerv'd a better name. He ſeems to have bin the very Fool his Father intended, who tho bray'd in a mortar would never leave his folly: He would not be advis'd, tho the hand of God was againſt him; ten Tribes revolted from him, and the City and Temple was pil⯑lag'd by the Egyptians. Neither experience nor afflictions could mend him, and he is call'd to this day by his own Countrymen Stultitia Gen⯑tium. I might offend tender ears, if I ſhould alledg all the Examples of Princes mention'd in Hiſtory, or known in our own Age, who have liv'd and dy'd as fooliſh and incorrigible as he: but no man, I preſume, will be ſcandaliz'd if I ſay, that the ten laſt Kings of Meroveus his Race, whom the French Hiſtorians call Les Roys faineants, were ſo far from ex⯑celling other men in underſtanding, that they liv'd and dy'd more like beaſts than men. Nay, the Wiſdom and Valor of Charles Martel ex⯑pir'd in his Grandchild Charles the Great; and his Poſterity grew to be ſo ſottiſh, that the French Nation muſt have periſh'd under their conduct, if the Nobility and People had not rejected them, and plac'd the Crown upon a more deſerving Head.

This is as much as is neceſſary to be ſaid to the general Propoſition; for it is falſe, if it be not always true; and no concluſion can be made upon it. But I need not be ſo ſtrict with our Author, there being no one fou d part in his Aſſertion. Many Children come to be Kings when they h [...]e no experience; and die, or are depos'd, before they can gain any. Many are by nature ſo ſottiſh that they can learn nothing: Others fal⯑ling under the power of Women, or corrupt Favorites and Miniſters, are perſuaded and ſeduc'd from the good ways to which their own natural un⯑derſtanding or experience might lead them; the Evils drawn upon them⯑ſelves or their Subjects, by the Errors committed in the time of their ig⯑norance, are o [...]ten grievous, and ſometimes irreparable, tho they ſhould be made wiſe by time and experience. A perſon of royal Birth and ex⯑cellent Wit, was ſo ſenſible of this as to tell me, ‘"That the condition of Kings was moſt miſerable, in as much as they never heard Truth till [202] they were ruin'd by Lies; and then every one was ready to tell it to them, not by way of advice, but reproach, and rather to vent their own ſpite, than to ſeek a remedy to the evils brought upon them and the people."’ Others attain to Crowns when they are of full Age, and have experience as Men, tho none as Kings; and therefore are apt to commit as great miſtakes as Children: And upon the whole matter all the Hiſtorys of the world ſhew, that inſtead of this profound Judgment and incomparable Wiſdom which our Author generally attributes to all Kings, there is no ſort of men that do more frequently and intirely want it.

But tho Kings were always wiſe by nature, or made to be ſo by expe⯑rience, it would be of little advantage to Nations under them, unleſs their Wiſdom were pure, perfect, and acompany'd with Clemency, Magna⯑nimity, Juſtice, Valor and Piety. Our Author himſelf durſt hardly have ſaid, that theſe Vertues or Graces are gain'd by Experience, or annex'd by God to any rank of Men or Familys. He gives them where he plea⯑ſes without diſtinction. We ſometimes ſee thoſe upon Thrones, who by God and Nature ſeem to have bin deſign'd for the moſt ſordid Offices; and thoſe have bin known to paſs their lives in meanneſs and poverty, who had all the Qualitys that could be deſir'd in Princes. There is like⯑wiſe a kind of ability to diſpatch ſome ſort of Affairs, that Princes who continue long in a Throne may to a degree acquire or increaſe: Some men take this for Wiſdom, but K James more rightly call'd it by the name of Kingcraft; and as it principally conſiſts in Diſſimulation, and the arts of working upon mens Paſſions, Vanitys, private Intereſts or Vices, to make them for the moſt part inſtruments of Miſchief, it has the advance⯑ment or ſecurity of their own Perſons for its object, is frequently exercis'd with all the exceſſes of Pride, Avarice, Treachery and Cruelty; and no men have bin ever found more notoriouſly to deflect from all that deſerves praiſe in a Prince, or a Gentleman, than thoſe that have moſt excel'd in Tacit. An. l. 11, 12.it. Pharaſmenes King of Iberia, is recorded by Tacitus to have bin well vers'd in this Science. His Brother Mithradates King of Armenia had marry'd his Daughter, and given his own Daughter to Rhadamiſtus Son of Pharaſmenes. He had ſome Conteſts with Mithradates, but by the help of theſe mutual Alliances, nearneſs of Blood, the diligence of Rhada⯑miſtus, and an Oath, ſtrengthen'd with all the Ceremonys that amongſt thoſe Nations were eſteem'd moſt ſacred, not to uſe Arms or Poiſon againſt him, all was compos'd; and by this means getting him into his power, he ſtifled him with a great weight of clothes thrown upon him, kill'd his Children, and not long after his own Son Rhadamiſtus alſo. Louis the eleventh of France, James the third of Scotland, Henry the ſe⯑venth of England, were great Maſters of theſe Arts; and t [...]oſe who are acquainted with Hiſtory, will eaſily judg how happy Nations would be if all Kings did in time certainly learn them.

Our Author, as a farther teſtimony of his Judgment, having ſaid that Kings muſt needs excel others in Underſtanding, and grounded his Do⯑ctrin upon their profound Wiſdom, imputes to them thoſe baſe and panick ſears which are inconſiſtent with it, or any royal Vertue: and to carry the point higher, tells us, There is no Tyrant ſo barbarouſly wicked, but his own reaſon and ſenſe will tell him, that tho he be a God, yet he muſt die like a Man; and that there is not the meaneſt of his Subjects, but may find a means to revenge himſelf of the Injurys offer'd him: and from thence concludes, that there is no ſuch Tyranny as that of a Multitude which is ſubject to no [205] ſach fears. But if there be ſuch a thing in the World, as a barbarous and wicked Tyrant, he is ſomething different from a King, or the ſame; and his Wiſdom is conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with Barbarity, Wickedneſs, and Tyranny. If there be no difference, the praiſes he gives, and the rights he aſcribes to the one belong alſo to the other: and the excellency of Wiſdom may conſiſt with Barbarity, Wickedneſs, Tyranny, and the panick fears that accompany them; which hitherto have bin thought to comprehend the utmoſt exceſſes of Folly and Madneſs; and I know no better teſtimony of the truth of that Opinion, than that Wiſdom always diſtinguiſhing good from evil, and being ſeen only in the rectitude of that diſtinction, in following and adhering to the good, rejecting that which is evil, preferring ſafety before danger, happineſs before miſery, and in knowing rightly how to uſe the means of attaining or preſerving the one, and preventing or avoiding the other, there cannot be a more extravagant deviation from Reaſon, than for a man, who in a private condition might live ſafely and happily, to invade a Principality: or if he be a Prince, who by governing with Juſtice and Clemency might obtain the inward ſatisfaction of his own Mind, hope for the bleſſing of God upon his juſt and vertuous Actions, acquire the love and praiſes of men, and live in ſafety and happineſs amongſt his ſafe and happy Subjects, to fall into that Barbarity, Wickedneſs, and Tyranny, which brings upon him the diſ⯑pleaſure of God, and deteſtation of men, and which is always attended with thoſe baſe and panick fears, that comprehend all that is ſhameful and miſerable. This being perceiv'd by Machiavel, he could not think Diſcorſ. ſopra T. Liv. l. 1. c. 10.that any man in his ſenſes would not rather be a Scipio than a Ceſar; or if he came to be a Prince, would not rather chuſe to imitate Ageſilaus, Ti⯑moleon, or Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionyſius; and imputes the contrary choice to madneſs. Nevertheleſs 'tis too well known that ma⯑ny of our Author's profound wiſe men in the depth of their Judgment, made perfect by uſe and experience, have fallen into it.

If there be a difference between this barbarous wicked Tyrant, and a King, we are to examin who is the Tyrant, and who the King; for the name confer'd or aſſum'd cannot make a King, unleſs he be one. He who is not a King, can have no Title to the rights belonging to him who is truly a King: ſo that a People who find themſelves wickedly and barbarouſly oppreſt by a Tyrant, may deſtroy him and his Tyranny without giving offence to any King.

But 'tis ſtrange that Filmer ſhould ſpeak of the Barbarity and Wicked⯑neſs of a Tyrant, who looks upon the World to be the Patrimony of one man; and for the foundation of his Doctrin, aſſerts ſuch a power in eve⯑ry one that makes himſelf maſter of any part, as cannot be limited by any Law. His Title is not to be queſtion'd; Uſurpation and Violence confer an inconteſtable Right: the exerciſe of his Power is no more to be diſputed than the Acquiſition: his will is a Law to his Subjects; and no Law can be impos'd by them upon his Conduct. For if theſe things be true, I know not how any man could ever be call'd a Tyrant, that name having never bin given to any unleſs for uſurping a Power that did not be⯑long to him, or an unjuſt exerciſe of that which had bin confer'd upon him, and violating the Laws which ought to be a rule to him. 'Tis alſo hard to imagin how any man can be call'd barbarous and wicked, if he be oblig'd by no Law but that of his own Pleaſure; for we have no other notion of wrong, than that it is a breach of the Law which determins what is right. If the lives and goods of Subjects depend upon the Will [206] of the Prince, and he in his profound Wiſdom preſerve them only to be beneficial to himſelf, they can have no other right than what he gives, and without injuſtice may retain when he thinks fit: If there be no wrong, there can be no juſt revenge; and he that pretends to ſeek it, is not a free man vindicating his Right, but a perverſe ſlave riſing up againſt his Maſter. But if there be ſuch a thing as a barbarous and wicked Ty⯑rant, there muſt be a rule relating to the acquiſition and exerciſe of the Power, by which he may be diſtinguiſh'd from a juſt King; and a Law ſuperior to his Will, by the violation of which he becomes barbarous and wicked.

Tho our Author ſo ſar forgets himſelf, to confeſs this to be true, he ſeeks to deſtroy the fruits of it by ſuch flattery as comprehends all that is moſt deteſtable in Profaneneſs and Blaſphemy, and gives the name of Gods to the moſt execrable of men. He may by ſuch language deſerve the name of Heylin's Diſciple; but will find few among the Heathens ſo baſe⯑ly ſervile, or ſo boldly impious. Tho Claudius Ceſar was a drunken ſot, and tranſported with the extravagance of his Fortune, he deteſted the im⯑pudence of his Predeceſſor Caligula, (who affected that Title) and in his Reſcript to the Procurator of Judea, gives it no better name than turpem Caii inſaniam. For this reaſon it was rejected by all his Pagan Succeſſors, who were not as furiouſly wicked as he: yet Filmer has thought fit to renew it, for the benefit of Mankind, and the Glory of the Chriſtian Religion.

I know not whether theſe extreme and barbarous Errors of our Au⯑thor are to be imputed to wickedneſs or madneſs; or whether, to ſave the pains of a diſtinction, they may not rightly be ſaid to be the ſame thing: but nothing leſs than the exceſs of both could induce him to attri⯑bute any thing of good to the fears of a Tyrant, ſince they are the chief cauſes of all the miſchiefs he dos. Tertullian ſays they are Metu quam fu⯑rore ſaeviores; and Tacitus, ſpeaking of a moſt wicked King, ſays, that he did Saevitiam ignaviae obtendere: and we do not more certainly find that Cowards are the cruelleſt of men, than that wickedneſs makes them Cowards; that every man's fears bear a proportion with his guilt, and with the number, vertue, and ſtrength of thoſe he has offended. He who uſurps a power over all, or abuſes a Truſt repos'd in him by all, in the higheſt meaſure offends all; he fears and hates thoſe he has offended, and to ſecure himſelf, aggravates the former Injurys: When theſe are publick, they beget a univerſal Hatred, and every man deſires to extin⯑guiſh a Miſchief that threatens ruin to all. This will always be terrible to one that knows he has deſerv'd it; and when thoſe he dreads are the body of the People, nothing but a publick deſtruction can ſatisfy his rage, and appeaſe his fears.

I wiſh I could agree with Filmer, in exempting multitudes from fears; for they having ſeldom committed any injuſtice, unleſs thro fear, would, as far as human fragility permits, be free from it. Tho the Attick Oſtraciſm was not an extreme Puniſhment, I know nothing uſually practis'd in any Commonwealth, that did ſo much ſavor of injuſtice: but it proceeded ſolely from a fear that one man, tho in appearance vertuous, when he came to be rais'd too much above his fellow-Citizens, might be tempted to invade the publick Liberty. We do not find that the Athenians, or any other free Citys, ever injur'd any man, unleſs thro ſuch a jealouſy, or the perjury of Witneſſes, by which the beſt Tribunals that ever were, or can be eſtabliſh'd in the world, may be miſled; and no injuſtice could [207] be apprehended from any, if they did not fall into ſuch fears.

But tho Multitudes may have fears as well as Tyrants, the Cauſes and Effects of them are very different. A People, in relation to domeſtick Affairs, can deſire nothing but Liberty, and neither hate or fear any but ſuch as do, or would, as they ſuſpect, deprive them of that Happineſs: Their endeavors to ſecure that ſeldom hurt any except ſuch as invade their Rights; and if they err, the miſtake is for the moſt part diſcover'd be⯑fore it produce any miſchief; and the greateſt that ever came that way, was the death of one, or a few men. Their Hatred and deſire of Revenge can go no farther than the ſenſe of the Injury receiv'd or fear'd, and is extinguiſh'd by the death or baniſhment of the Perſons; as may be ga⯑ther'd from the examples of the Tarquins, Decemviri, Caſſius, Melius, and Manlius Capitolinus. He therefore that would know whether the hatred and fear of a Tyrant, or of a People, produces the greater miſ⯑chiefs, needs only to conſider, whether it be better that the Tyrant de⯑ſtroy the People, or that the People deſtroy the Tyrant: or at the worſt, whether one that is ſuſpected of affecting the Tyranny ſhould periſh, or a whole People, amongſt whom very many are certainly innocent; and experience ſhows that ſuch are always firſt ſought out to be deſtroy'd for being ſo: Popular furys or fears, how irregular or unjuſt ſoever they may be, can extend no farther; general Calamitys can only be brought upon a People by thoſe who are enemys to the whole Body, which can never be the Multitude, for they are that Body. In all other reſpects, the fears that render a Tyrant cruel, render a People gentle and cautious; for every ſingle man knowing himſelf to be of little power, not only fears to do in⯑juſtice becauſe it may be reveng'd upon his Perſon, by him, or his Friends, Kindred and Relations, that ſuffers it; but becauſe it tends to the over⯑throw of the Government, which comprehends all publick and private Concernments, and which every man knows cannot ſubſiſt unleſs it be ſo eaſy and gentle, as to be pleaſing to thoſe who are the beſt, and have the greateſt power: and as the publick Conſiderations divert them from do⯑ing thoſe Injurys that may bring immediate prejudice to the Publick, ſo there are ſtrict Laws to reſtrain all ſuch as would do private Injurys. If neither the People nor the Magiſtrats of Venice, Switzerland, and Hol⯑land, commit ſuch extravagances as are uſual in other places, it dos not perhaps proceed from the temper of thoſe Nations different from others, but from a knowledg, that whoſoever offers an injury to a private perſon, or attempts a publick miſchief, is expos'd to the impartial and inexorable Power of the Law; whereas the chief work of an abſolute Monarch is to place himſelf above the Law, and thereby rendring himſelf the Au⯑thor of all the evils that the People ſuffer, 'tis abſurd to expect that he ſhould remove them.

SECT. XXX. A Monarchy cannot be well regulated, unleſs the Powers of the Monarch are limited by Law.

OUR Author's next ſtep is not only to reject Popular Governments, but all ſuch Monarchys as are not abſolute: for if the King, ſays he, admits the People to be his Companions, he leaves to be a King. This [208] is the language of French Lackeys, Valet de Chambre's, Taylors, and others like them in Wiſdom, Learning and Policy, who when they fly to England for fear of a well deſerv'd Gally, Gibbet, or Wheel, are rea⯑dy to ſay, Il faut que le Roy ſoit abſolu, autrement il n'eſt point Roy. And finding no better men to agree with Filmer in this ſublime Philoſophy, I may be pardon'd if I do not follow them, till I am convinc'd in theſe en⯑ſuing points.

1. It ſeems abſurd to ſpeak of Kings admitting the Nobility or People to part of the Government: for tho there may be, and are Nations with⯑out Kings, yet no man can conceive a King without a People. Theſe muſt neceſſarily have all the power originally in themſelves; and tho Kings may and often have a power of granting Honors, Immunitys, and Privileges to private Men or Corporations, he dos it only out of the publick Stock, which he is entruſted to diſtribute; but can give nothing to the People, who give to him all that he can rightly have.

2. 'Tis ſtrange that he who frequently cites Ariſtotle and Plato, ſhould unluckily acknowledg ſuch only to be Kings as they call Tyrants, and deny the name of King to thoſe, who in their opinion are the only Kings.

3. I cannot underſtand why the Scripture ſhould call thoſe Kings whoſe Powers were limited, if they only are Kings who are abſolute; Deut. 17.or why Moſes did appoint that the power of Kings in Iſrael ſhould be li⯑mited (if they reſolv'd to have them) if that limitation deſtroy'd the be⯑ing of a King.

4. And laſtly, how he knows that in the Kingdoms which have a ſhew of Popularity, the Power is wholly in the King.

The firſt point was prov'd when we examin'd the beginning of Monar⯑chys, and found it impoſſible that there could be any thing of juſtice in them, unleſs they were eſtabliſh'd by the common conſent of thoſe who were to live under them; or that they could make any ſuch eſtabliſhment, unleſs the right and power were in them.

Secondly, Neither Plato nor Ariſtotle acknowledg either reaſon or ju⯑ſtice in the power of a Monarch, unleſs he has more of the Vertues con⯑ducing to the good of the Civil Society than all thoſe who compoſe it; and employ them for the publick advantage, and not to his own pleaſure and profit, as being ſet up by thoſe who ſeek their own good, for no other reaſon than that he ſhould procure it. To this end a Law is ſet as a rule to him, and the beſt men, that is ſuch as are moſt like to himſelf, Plat. de Leg. Ariſt. Polit.made to be his Aſſiſtants, becauſe, ſay they, Lex eſt mens ſine affectu, & quaſi Deus; whereas the beſt of men have their affections and paſſions, and are ſubject to be miſled by them: Which ſhews, that as the Monarch is not for himſelf nor by himſelf, he dos not give, but receive power, nor ad⯑mit others to the participation of it, but is by them admitted to what he has. Whereupon they conclude, that to prefer the abſolute power of a man, as in thoſe Governments which they call Barbarorum regna, be⯑fore the regular Government of Kings juſtly exerciſing a power inſti⯑tuted by Law, and directed to the publick good, is to chuſe rather to be ſubject to the luſt of a Beaſt, than to be govern'd by a God. And becauſe ſuch a choice can only be made by a Beaſt, I leave our Author to find a de⯑ſcription of himſelf in their Books, which he ſo often cites.

But if Ariſtotle deſerves credit, the Princes who reign for themſelves and not for the People, preferring their own pleaſure or profit before the publick, become Tyrants; which in his language is Enemys to God and [209] Man. On this account Boccalini introduces the Princes of Europe raiſing a mutiny againſt him in Parnaſſus, for giving ſuch definitions of Tyrants as they ſaid comprehended them all; and forcing the poor Philoſopher to declare by a new definition, that ^* Tyrants were certain men of antient times whoſe race is now extinguiſh'd. But with all his Wit and Learning he could not give a reaſon why thoſe who do the ſame things that render'd the antient Tyrants deteſtable, ſhould not be ſo alſo in our days.

In the third place, The Scriptures declare the neceſſity of ſetting bounds to thoſe who are plac'd in the higheſt dignitys. Moſes ſeems to have had as great abilitys as any man that ever liv'd in the world; but he alone was not able to bear the weight of the Government, and therefore God ap⯑pointed Seventy choſen men to be his aſſiſtants. This was a perpetual Law to Iſrael; and as no King was to have more power than Moſes, or more abilitys to perform the Dutys of his Office, none could be exempted from the neceſſity of wanting the like helps. Our Author therefore muſt confeſs that they are Kings who have them, or that Kingly Government is contrary to the Scriptures. When God by Moſes gave liberty to his People to make a King, he did it under theſe conditions. He muſt be one Deut. 17. of their Brethren: They muſt chuſe him: he muſt not multiply Gold, Silver, Wives, or Horſes: he muſt not lift up his Heart above his Brethren. And Joſephus paraphraſing upon the place, ſays, He ſhall do nothing without the Antiq. Jud. advice of the Sanhedrin; or if he do, they ſhall oppoſe him. This agrees with the confeſſion of Zedekiah to the Princes (which was the Sanhedrin) The King can do nothing without you; and ſeems to have bin in purſuance of the Law of the Kingdom, which was written in a Book, and laid up Jer. [...]8.before the Lord; and could not but agree with that of Moſes, unleſs they ſpake by different Spirits, or that the Spirit by which they did ſpeak was ſubject to error or change: and the whole ſeries of God's Law ſhews, that the Pride, Magnificence, Pomp and Glory uſurp'd by their Kings was utterly contrary to the will of God. They did lift up their hearts above their Brethren, which was forbidden by the Law. All the Kings of Iſrael, and moſt of the Kings of Judah, utterly rejected it; and every one of them did very much depart from the obſervation of it. I will not deny that the People in their inſtitution of a King intended they ſhould do ſo: they had done it themſelves, and would have a King that might uphold them in their diſobedience; they were addicted to the Idolatry of their accurſed Neighbours, and deſir'd that Government by which it was maintain'd amongſt them. In doing this they did not reject Samuel; but they rejected God that he ſhould not reign over them. They might perhaps believe that unleſs their King were ſuch as the Law did not per⯑mit, he would not perform what they intended; or that the name of King did not belong to him, unleſs he had a power that the Law deny'd. But ſince God and his Prophets give the name of King to the chief Magiſtrate, endow'd with a power that was reſtrain'd within very narrow limits, whom they might without offence ſet up, we alſo may ſafely give the ſame to thoſe of the ſame nature, whether it pleaſe Filmer or not.

4. The practice of moſt Nations, and (I may truly ſay) of all that deſerve imitation, has bin as directly contrary to the abſolute power of one man as their Conſtitutions: or if the original of many Governments lie hid in [210] the impenetrable darkneſs of Antiquity, their progreſs may ſerve to ſhew the intention of the Founders. Ariſtotle ſeems to think that the firſt Monarchs having bin choſen for their Vertue, were little reſtrain'd in the exerciſe of their Power; but that they or their Children falling into Cor⯑ruption and Pride, grew odious; and that Nations did on that account either aboliſh their Authority, or create Senats and other Magiſtrats, who having part of the Power, might keep them in order. The Spartan Kings were certainly of this nature; and the Perſian, till they conquer'd Babylon. Nay, I may ſafely ſay, that neither the Kings which the fran⯑tick people ſet up in oppoſition to the Law of God, nor thoſe of the bor⯑dering Nations, whoſe example they choſe to follow, had that abſolute power which our Author attributes to all Kings as inſeparable from the name. Achiſh the Philiſtin lov'd and admir'd David; he look'd upon him as an Angel of God, and promis'd that he ſhould be the keeper of 1 Sam. 29.his Head for ever: but when the Princes ſuſpected him, and ſaid he ſhall not go down with us to Battel, he was oblig'd to diſmiſs him. This was not the language of Slaves, but of thoſe who had a great part in the Govern⯑ment; and the King's ſubmiſſion to their will, ſhows that he was more like to the Kings of Sparta, than to an abſolute Monarch, who dos what⯑ever pleaſes him. I know not whether the Spartans were deſcended from the Hebrews, as ſome think; but their Kings were under a regulati⯑on much like that of the 17th of Deuter. tho they had two: Their Senate of twenty eight, and the Ephori, had a power like to that of the Sanhedrin; and by them Kings were condemn'd to fines, impriſonment, baniſhment, and death, as appears by the examples of Pauſanias, Cleony⯑mus, Leonidas, Agis, and others. The Hebrew Diſciplin was the ſame; More Nevo⯑chim. Reges Davidicae ſtirpis, ſays Maimonides, judicabant & judicabantur. They gave teſtimony in judgment when they were call'd, and teſtimony was given againſt them. Whereas the Kings of Iſrael, as the ſame Au⯑thor Ibid.ſays, were ſuperbi, corde elati, & ſpertores legis, nec judicabant, nec judicabantur; proud, inſolent, and contemners of the Law, who would neither judg, nor ſubmit to judgment as the Law commanded. But the Fruits they gather'd were ſutable to the Seed they had ſown, and their Crimes were not left unpuniſh'd: they who deſpis'd the Law were deſtroy'd without Law; and when no ordinary courſe could be taken againſt them for their exceſſes, they were overthrown by force, and the Crown within the ſpace of few years was tranſported into nine ſeveral Familys▪ with the utter extirpation of thoſe that had poſſeſt it. On the other hand, there never was any Sedition againſt the Spartan Kings; and after the moderate Diſciplin, according to which they liv'd, was eſta⯑bliſh'd, none of them dy'd by the hands of their Subjects, except only two, who were put to death in a way of Juſtice: the Kingdom continu'd in the ſame races, till Cleomenes was defeated by Antigonus, and the Go⯑vernment overthrown by the Macedonians. This gave occaſion to thoſe beſtial Tyrants Nabis and Machanidas to ſet up ſuch a Government as our Author recommends to the World, which immediately brought deſtructi⯑on upon themſelves, and the whole City. The Germans, who pretend⯑ed to be deſcended from the Spartans, had the like Government. Their [...] de [...] Germ.Princes according to their merit had the credit of perſuading, not the power of commanding; and the queſtion was not what part of the Government they would allow to the Nobility and People, but what the Nobility and People would give to their Princes: and 'tis not much material to our preſent diſpute, whether they learnt this from [...]ome obſcure knowledg of [211] the Law which God gave to his People, or whether led by the light of Reaſon, which is alſo from God, they diſcover'd what was altogether conformable to that Law. Whoever underſtands the affairs of Germany, knows that the preſent Emperors, notwithſtandiug their haughty Title, have a power limited as in the days of Tacitus. If they are good and wiſe, they may perſuade; but they can command no farther than the Law allows. They do not admit the Princes, Noblemen, and Citys to the power which they all exerciſe in their general Diets, and each of them within their own Precincts; but they exerciſe that which has bin by publick conſent beſtow'd upon them. All the Kingdoms peopled from the North obſerv'd the ſame rules. In all of them the powers were divided between the Kings, the Nobility, Clergy, and Commons; and by the Decrees of Councils, Diets, Parliaments, Cortez, and Aſſem⯑blys of Eſtates, Authority and Liberty were ſo balanc'd, that ſuch Prin⯑ces as aſſum'd to themſelves more than the Law did permit, were ſeverely puniſh'd; and thoſe who did by force or fraud invade Thrones, were by force thrown down from them.

This was equally beneficial to Kings and People. The Powers, as Theopompus King of Sparta ſaid, were moſt ſafe when they were leaſt envy'd and hated. Lewis the 11th of France was one of the firſt that broke this Golden Chain; and by more ſubtil Arts than had bin formerly known, ſubverted the Laws, by which the fury of Kings had bin re⯑ſtrain'd, and taught others to do the like; tho all of them have not ſo well ſav'd themſelves from puniſhment. James the third of Scotland was one of his moſt apt Scholars; and ^* Buchanan in his Life ſays, That he was precipitated into all manner of Infamy by men of the moſt abject condition; that the corruption of thoſe times, and the ill Example of neighbouring Prin⯑ces, were conſiderable motives to pervert him: for Edward the fourth of England, Charles of Burgundy, Lewis the 11th of France, and John the ſecond of Portugal, had already laid the Foundations of Tyranny in thoſe Countrys; and Richard the third was then moſt cruelly exerciſing the ſame in the Kingdom of England.

This could not have bin, if all the Power had always bin in Kings, and neither the People nor the Nobility had ever had any: For no man can be ſaid to gain that which he and his Predeceſſors always poſſeſt, or to take from others that which they never had; nor to ſet up any ſort of Government, if it had bin always the ſame. But the aforeſaid Lewis the 11th did aſſume to himſelf a Power above that of his Predeceſſors; and Philip de Commines ſhews the ways by which he acquir'd it, with the miſerable effects of his Acquiſition both to himſelf and to his people: Modern Authors obſerve that the change was made by him, and for that reaſon he is ſaid by Mezeray, and others, to have brought thoſe Kings out of ^† Guardianſhip: they were not therefore ſo till he emancipated them. Nevertheleſs this Emancipation had no reſemblance to the unlimited Power of which our Author dreams. The General Aſſemblys of Eſtates were o [...]ten held long after his death, and continu'd in the exerciſe of the Sovereign Power of the Nation. Davila, ſpeaking of the General Aſ⯑ſembly Hiſt. delle Guerre Civ. [212] held at Orleans in the time of Francis the ſecond, aſſerts the whole Thuan. Hiſt. l. 1.Power of the Nation to have bin in them. Monſieur de Thou ſays the ſame thing, and adds, that the King dying ſuddenly, the Aſſembly con⯑tinu'd even at the deſire of the Council, in the exerciſe of that Power, till they had ſettled the Regency, and other Affairs of the higheſt impor⯑tance, according to their own judgment. Hottoman, a Lawyer of that Hottom. Fran⯑co-Gallia.Time and Nation, famous for his Learning, Judgment, and Integrity, having diligently examin'd the antient Laws and Hiſtorys of that King⯑dom, diſtinctly proves that the French Nation never had any Kings but of their own chuſing; that their Kings had no Power except what was confer'd upon them; and that they had bin remov'd, when they exceſ⯑ſively abus'd or render'd themſelves unworthy of that Truſt. This is ſufficiently clear by the forecited examples of Pharamond's Grandchildren, and the degenerated Races of Meroveus and Pepin; of which many were depos'd, ſome of the neareſt in Blood excluded; and when their Vices ſeem'd to be incorrigible, they were wholly rejected. All this was done by virtue of that rule which they call the Salique Law: And tho ſome of our Princes pretending to the Inheritance of that Crown by marrying the Heirs Ge⯑neral, deny'd that there was any ſuch thing, no man can ſay that for the ſpace of above twelve hundred years, Females, or their Deſcendents, who are by that Law excluded, have ever bin thought to have any right to the Crown: And no Law, unleſs it be explicitely given by God, can be of greater Authority than one which has bin in force for ſo many Ages. What the beginning of it was is not known: But Charles the ſixth reced⯑ing from this Law, and thinking to diſpoſe of the Succeſſion otherwiſe than was ordain'd by it, was eſteem'd mad, and all his Acts reſcinded. And tho the Reputation, Strength and Valor of the Engliſh, commanded by Henry the fifth, one of the braveſt Princes that have ever bin in the world, was terrible to the French Nation; yet they oppos'd him to the utmoſt of their power, rather than ſuffer that Law to be broken. And tho our Succeſs under his Conduct was great and admirable; yet ſoon af⯑ter his death, with the expence of much Blood and Treaſure, we loſt all that we had on that ſide, and ſuffer'd the Penalty of having unadviſedly enter'd into that Quarrel. By virtue of the ſame Law, the Agreement made by King John when he was Priſoner at London, by which he had alie⯑nated part of that Dominion, as well as that of Francis the firſt, conclud⯑ed when he was under the ſame Circumſtances at Madrid, were reputed null; and upon all occaſions that Nation has given ſufficient teſtimony, that the Laws by which they live are their own, made by themſelves, and not impos'd upon them. And 'tis as impoſſible for them who made and depos'd Kings, exalted or depreſt reigning Familys, and preſcrib'd Rules to the Succeſſion, to have receiv'd from their own Creatures the Power, or part of the Government they had, as for a man to be begotten by his own Son. Nay, tho their Conſtitution was much chang'd by Lewis the 11th, yet they retain'd ſo much of their antient Liberty, that in the laſt Age, when the Houſe of Valois was as much deprav'd as thoſe of Meroveus and Pepin had bin, and Henry the third by his own Leud⯑neſs, Hypocriſy, Cruelty and Impurity, together with the baſeneſs of his Minions and Favorites, had render'd himſelf odious and contemptible to the Nobility and People; the great Citys, Parliaments, the greater and (in political matters) the ſounder part of the Nation declar'd him to be fallen from the Crown, and purſu'd him to the death, tho the blow was given by the hand of a baſe and half-diſtracted Monk.

[213] Henry of Bourbon was without controverſy the next Heir; but neither the Nobility nor the People, who thought themſelves in the Government, would admit him to the Crown, till he had given them ſatisfaction that he would govern according to their Laws, by abjuring his Religion which they judg'd inconſiſtent with them.

The later Commotions in Paris, Bourdeaux, and other places, toge⯑ther with the Wars for Religion, ſhew, that tho the French do not com⯑plain of every Grievance, and cannot always agree in the defence and vindication of their violated Libertys, yet they very well underſtand their Rights: and that, as they do not live by, or for the King, but he reigns by, and for them; ſo their Privileges are not from him, but that his Crown is from them; and that, according to the true Rule of their Government, he can do nothing againſt their Laws, or if he do, they may oppoſe him.

The Inſtitution of a Kingdom is the act of a free Nation; and whoe⯑ver denies them to be free, denies that there can be any thing of right in what they ſet up. That which was true in the beginning is ſo, and muſt be ſo for ever. This is ſo far acknowledg'd by the higheſt Monarchs, that in a Treatiſe publiſh'd in the year 1667, by Authority of the preſent King of France, to juſtify his pretenſions to ſome part of the Low Coun⯑trys, notwithſtanding all the Acts of himſelf, and the King of Spain to extinguiſh them, it is ſaid, ^* That Kings are under the happy inability to do any thing againſt the Laws of their Country. And tho perhaps he may do things contrary to Law, yet he grounds his Power upon the Law; and the moſt able and moſt truſted of his Miniſters declare the ſame. About the year 1660, the Count D' Aubijoux, a man of eminent quality in Lan⯑guedoc, but averſe to the Court, and hated by Cardinal Mazarin, had bin try'd by the Parliament of Tholouſe for a Duel, in which a Gentle⯑man was kill'd; and it appearing to the Court (then in that City) that he had bin acquitted upon forg'd Letters of Grace, falſe Witneſſes, power⯑ful Friends, and other undue means, Mazarin deſir'd to bring him to a new Trial: but the Chancellor Seguier told the Queen-Mother it could not be; for the Law did not permit a man once acquitted to be again que⯑ſtion'd for the ſame Fact; and that if the courſe of the Law were inter⯑rupted, neither the Salique Law, nor the ſucceſſion of her Children, or any thing elſe could be ſecure in France.

This is farther prov'd by the Hiſtorys of that Nation. The Kings of Meroveus and Pepin's Races, were ſuffer'd to divide the Kingdom a⯑mongſt their Sons; or, as Hottoman ſays, the Eſtates made the Diviſion, and allotted to each ſuch a part as they thought fit. But when this way was found to be prejudicial to the Publick, an Act of State was made in the time of Hugh Capet, by which it was ordain'd, that for the future the Kingdom ſhould not be diſmembred; which Conſtitution continuing in force to this day, the Sons or Brothers of their Kings receive ſuch an A⯑pannage (they call it) as is beſtow'd on them, remaining ſubject to the Crown as well as other men. And there has bin no King of France ſince that time (except only Charles the ſixth) who has not acknowledg⯑ed that he cannot alienate any part of their Dominion.

Whoever imputes the acknowledgment of this to Kingcraft, and ſays, that they who avow this when 'tis for their advantage, will deny it on a [214] different occaſion, is of all men their moſt dangerous Enemy. In laying ſuch fraud to their charge, he deſtroys the veneration by which they ſub⯑ſiſt, and teaches Subjects not to keep Faith with thoſe, who by the moſt malicious deceits ſhow, that they are ty'd by none. Human Societys are maintain'd by mutual Contracts, which are of no value if they are not obſerv'd. Laws are made, and Magiſtrats created to cauſe them to be perform'd in publick and private matters, and to puniſh thoſe who vio⯑late them. But none will ever be obſerv'd, if he who receives the greateſt benefit by them, and is ſet up to overſee others, give the example Suarum legum lator & ever⯑ſor. Tacit.to thoſe who of themſelves are too much inclin'd to break them. The firſt ſtep that Pompey made to his own ruin was, by violating the Laws he himſelf had propos'd. But it would be much worſe for Kings to break thoſe that are eſtabliſh'd by the Authority of a whole People, and con⯑firm'd by the ſucceſſion of many Ages.

I am far from laying any ſuch blemiſhes on them, or thinking that they deſerve them. I muſt believe the French King ſpeaks ſincerely, when he ſays he can do nothing againſt the Laws of his Country: And that our King James did the like, when he acknowledg'd himſelf to be the Ser⯑vant of the Commonwealth; and the rather, becauſe 'tis true, and that he is plac'd in the Throne to that end. Nothing is more eſſential and fundamental in the Conſtitutions of Kingdoms, than that Diets, Parlia⯑ments, and Aſſemblys of Eſtates ſhould ſee this perform'd. 'Tis not the King that gives them a right to judg of matters of War or Peace, to grant Supplys of men and mony, or to deny them; and to make or abrogate Laws at their pleaſure: All the Powers rightly belonging to Kings, or to them, proceed from the ſame root. The Northern Nations ſeeing what miſchiefs were generally brought upon the Eaſtern, by refer⯑ring too much to the irregular will of a man; and what thoſe who were more generous had ſuffer'd, when one man by the force of a corrupt mercenary Soldiery had overthrown the Laws by which they liv'd, fear'd they might fall into the ſame miſery; and therefore retain'd the greater part of the Power to be exercis'd by their General Aſſemblys, or by Delegates, when they grew ſo numerous that they could not meet. Theſe are the Kingdoms of which Grotius ſpeaks, where the King has his part, and the Senat or People their part of the ſupreme Authority; and where the Law preſcribes ſuch limits, that if the King attempts to ſeize that part which is not his, he may juſtly be oppos'd: Which is as much as to ſay, that the Law upholds the Power it gives, and turns againſt thoſe who abuſe it.

This Doctrin may be diſpleaſing to Court-Paraſites; but is no leſs pro⯑fitable to ſuch Kings as follow better Counſels, than to the Nations that live under them: the Wiſdom and Vertue of the beſt is always fortify'd by the concurrence of thoſe who are plac'd in part of the Power; they always do what they will, when they will nothing but that which is good; and 'tis a happy impotence in thoſe, who thro ignorance or malice deſire to do evil, not to be able to effect it. The weakneſs of ſuch as by defects of Nature, Sex, Age, or Education, are not able of themſelves to bear the weight of a Kingdom, is thereby ſupported, and they together with the People under them preſerv'd from ruin; the furi⯑ous raſhneſs of the Inſolent is reſtrain'd; the extravagance of thoſe who are naturally leud, is aw'd; and the beſtial madneſs of the moſt violent⯑ly wicked and outrageous, ſuppreſt. When the Law provides for theſe matters, and preſcribes ways by which they may be accompliſh'd, every [215] man who receives or fears any Injury, ſeeks a remedy in a legal way, and vents his Paſſions in ſuch a manner as brings no prejudice to the Commonwealth: If his Complaints againſt a King may be heard, and redreſt by Courts of Juſtice, Parliaments, and Diets, as well as againſt private men, he is ſatisfy'd, and looks no farther for a Remedy. But if Kings, like thoſe of Iſrael, will neither judg nor be judg'd, and there be no Power orderly to redreſs private or publick Injurys, every man has re⯑courſe to force, as if he liv'd in a Wood where there is no Law; and that force is generally mortal to thoſe who provoke it: No Guards can preſerve a hated Prince from the vengeance of one reſolute hand; and they as often fall by the Swords of their own Guards as of others: Wrongs will be done, and when they that do them cannot or will not be judg'd publickly, the injur'd Perſons become Judges in their own caſe, and Exe⯑cutioners of their own ſentence. If this be dangerous in matters of pri⯑vate concernment, 'tis much more ſo in thoſe relating to the publick. The leud extravagances of Edward and Richard the Seconds, whilſt they acknowledg'd the power of the Law, were gently reprov'd and re⯑ſtrain'd with the removal of ſome profligate Favorites; but when they would admit of no other Law than their own Will, no relief could be had but by their Depoſition. The lawful Spartan Kings, who were obe⯑dient to the Laws of their Country, liv'd in ſafety, and dy'd with glory; whereas 'tis a ſtrange thing to ſee a lawleſs Tyrant die without ſuch in⯑famy and miſery, as held a juſt proportion with the wickedneſs of his Life. They did, as Plutarch ſays of Dionyſius, many miſchiefs, and ſuf⯑fer'd Vit. Timoleon▪ more. This is confirm'd by the examples of the Kingdom of Iſrael, and of the Empires of Rome and Greece; they who would ſubmit to no Law, were deſtroy'd without any. I know not whether they thought themſelves to be Gods, as our Author ſays they were; but I am ſure the moſt part of them dy'd like Dogs, and had the burial of Aſſes rather than of Men.

This is the happineſs to which our Author would promote them all. If a King admits a People to be his companions, he ceaſes to be a King, and the State becomes a Democracy. And a little farther: If in ſuch Aſſemblys, the King, Nobility, and People, have equal ſhares in the Sovereignty, then the King has but one voice, the Nobility likewiſe one, and the People one; and then any two of theſe voices ſhould have power to overrule the third: Thus the Nobility and Commons ſhould have a power to make a Law to bridle the King, which was never ſeen in any Kingdom. We have heard of Nations that admitted a man to reign over them (that is, made him King) but of no man that made a People. The Hebrews made Saul, David, Jeroboam, and other Kings: when they return'd from Captivity, they confer'd the ſame Title upon the Aſmonean race, as a reward of their Valor and Ver⯑tue. The Romans choſe Romulus, Numa, Hoſtilius, and others to be their Kings; the Spartans inſtituted two, one of the Heraclidae, the other of the Aeacid [...]e. Other Nations ſet up one, a few, or more Magiſtrats to govern them: and all the World agrees, that Qui dat eſſe, dat modum eſſe; He that makes him to be, makes him to be what is: and nothing can be more abſurd than to ſay, that he who has nothing but what is given, can have more than is given to him. If Saul and Romulus had no other title to be Kings, than what the People confer'd upon them, they could be no otherwiſe Kings than as pleas'd the People: They therefore did not admit the People to be partakers of the Government; but the People who had all in themſelves, and could not have made a King if [216] they had not had it, beſtow'd upon him what they thought fit, and re⯑tain'd the reſt in themſelves. If this were not ſo, then inſtead of ſaying to the multitude, Will ye have this man to reign? they ought to ſay to the man, Wilt thou have this multitude to be a People? And whereas the No⯑bles of Arragon us'd to ſay to their new made King, We who are as good as you, make you our King, on condition you keep and maintain our Rights and Libertys, and if not, not; he ſhould have ſaid to them, I who am better than you, make you to be a People, and will govern you as I pleaſe. But I doubt whether he would have ſucceeded, till that Kingdom was join'd to others of far greater ſtrength, from whence a power might be drawn to force them out of their uſual method.

That which has bin ſaid of the Governments of England, France, and o⯑ther Countrys, ſhows them to be of the ſame nature; and if they deſerve not the name of Kingdoms, and that their Princes will by our Author's Arguments be perſuaded to leave them, thoſe Nations perhaps will be ſo humble to content themſelves without that magnificent Title, rather than reſign their own Libertys to purchaſe it: and if this will not pleaſe him, he may ſeek his glorious ſovereign Monarchy among the wild Arabs, or in the Iſland of Ceylon; for it will not be found among civiliz'd Nations.

However more ignorance cannot be expreſt, than by giving the name of Democracy to thoſe Governments that are compos'd of the three ſimple ſpecies, as we have prov'd that all the good ones have ever bin: for in a ſtrict ſenſe it can only ſute with thoſe, where the People retain to them⯑ſelves the adminiſtration of the ſupreme Power; and more largely, when the popular part, as in Athens, greatly overbalances the other two, and that the denomination is taken from the prevailing part. But our Author, if I miſtake not, is the firſt that ever took the antient Governments of Iſrael, Sparta and Rome, or thoſe of England, France, Germany and Spain, to be Democracys, only becauſe every one of them had Senats and Aſſem⯑blys of the People, who in their Perſons, or by their Deputys, did join with their chief Magiſtrats in the exerciſe of the ſupreme Power. That of Iſrael, to the time of Saul, is call'd by Joſephus an Ariſtocracy. The ſame name is [...]ven to that of Sparta by all the Greek Authors; and the great conteſt in the Peloponneſian War was between the two kinds of Go⯑vernment; the Citys that were govern'd Ariſtocratically, or deſir'd to be ſo, following the Lacedemonians, and ſuch as delighted in Democracy, taking part with the Athenians. In like manner Rome, England, and France, were ſaid to be under Monarchys; not that their Kings might do what they pleas'd, but becauſe one man had a preheminence above any other. Yet if the Romans could take Romulus, the Son of a man that was never known, Numa a Sabin, Hoſtilius and Ancus Martius pri⯑vate men, and Tarquinius Priſcus the Son of a baniſh'd Corinthian, who had no Title to a preference before others till it was beſtow'd upon them; 'tis ridiculous to think, that they who gave them what they had, could not ſet what limits they pleas'd to their own gift.

But, ſays our Author, The Nobility will then have one Voice, and the Peo⯑ple another, and they joining may overrule the third, which was never ſeen in any Kingdom. This may perhaps be one way of regulating the Monar⯑chical Power, but it is not neceſſary, nor the only one: There may be a Senate, tho the People be excluded; that Senate may be compos'd of men choſen for their Vertue, as well as for the Nobility of their Birth: The Government may conſiſt of King and People without a Senate; or the [217] Senate may be compos'd only of the Peoples Delegates. But if I ſhould grant his aſſertion to be true, the reaſonableneſs of ſuch a Conſtitution cannot be deſtroy'd by the conſequences he endeavors to draw from it; for he who would inſtruct the world in matters of State, muſt ſhow what is, or ought to be, not what he fancys may thereupon enſue. Beſides, it dos not follow, that where there are three equal Votes, Laws ſhould be always made by the plurality; for the conſent of all the three is in many places requir'd: and 'tis certain that in England, and other parts, the King and one of the Eſtates cannot make a Law without the concur⯑rence of the other. But to pleaſe Filmer, I will avow, that where the Nobles and Commons have an equal Vote, they may join and over-rule or limit the power of the King: and I leave any reaſonable man to judg, whether it be more ſafe and fit, that thoſe two Eſtates comprehending the whole body of the Nation in their Perſons, or by repreſentation, ſhould have a right to over-rule or limit the power of that man, woman, or child, who ſits in the Throne; or that he or ſhe, young or old, wiſe or fooliſh, good or bad, ſhould over rule them, and by their vices, weakneſs, folly, impertinence, incapacity, or malice, put a ſtop to their proceedings; and whether the chief concernments of a Nation may more ſafely and prudently be made to depend upon the votes of ſo many emi⯑nent Perſons, amongſt whom many wiſe and good men will always be found if there be any in the Nation, and who in all reſpects have the ſame intereſt with them, or upon the will of one, who may be, and often is as vile, ignorant, and wretched as the meaneſt Slave; and either has, or is for the moſt part made to believe he has, an intereſt ſo contrary to them, that their ſuppreſſion is his Advancement. Common ſenſe ſo naturally leads us to the deciſion of this Queſtion, that I ſhould not think it poſſible for Mankind to have miſtaken, tho we had no examples of it in Hiſtory: and 'tis in vain to ſay, that all Princes are not ſuch as I repre⯑ſent; for if a right were annex'd to the being of a Prince, and that his ſingle judgment ſhould over-balance that of a whole Nation, it muſt be⯑long to him as a Prince, and be enjoy'd by the worſt and baſeſt, as well as by the wiſeſt and beſt, which would inevitably draw on the abſurditys above mention'd. But that many are, and have bin ſuch, no man can deny, or reaſonably hope that they will not often prove to be ſuch, as long as any preference is granted to thoſe who have nothing to recom⯑mend them, but the Familys from whence they derive; a continual ſucceſſion of thoſe who excel in Vertue, Wiſdom, and Experience, being promis'd to none, nor reaſonably to be expected from any. Such a Right therefore cannot be claim'd by all; and if not by all, then not by any, unleſs it proceed from a particular grant in conſideration of perſonal Vertue, Ability, and Integrity, which muſt be prov'd: and when any one goes about to do it, I will either acknowledg him to be in the right, or give the reaſons of my denial.

However this is nothing to the general Propoſition: nay, if a man were to be found, who had more of the qualitys requir'd for making a right judgment in matters of the greateſt importance, than a whole Nation, or an Aſſembly of the beſt men choſen out of it (which I never heard to have bin, unleſs in the Perſons of Moſes, Joſhua, or Samuel, who had the Spirit of God for their guide) it would be nothing to our purpoſe; for even he might be biaſs'd by his perſonal Intereſts, which Governments are not eſtabliſh'd to promote.

[218] I may go a ſtep farther, and truly ſay, that as ſuch vaſt Powers cannot be generally granted to all who happen to ſucceed in any Familys without evident danger of utter Deſtruction, when they come to be executed by children, women, fools, vicious, incapable or wicked perſons, they can be reaſonably granted to none, becauſe no man knows what any one will prove till he be try'd; and the importance of the Affair requires ſuch a trial as can be made of no man till he be dead. He that reſiſts one Temptation may fall under the Power of another; and nothing is more common in the world, than to ſee thoſe men fail groſly in the laſt actions of their lives, who had paſs'd their former days without reproach: Wiſe and good men will with Moſes ſay of themſelves, I cannot bear the burden; and every man who is concern'd for the publick Good, ought to let fools know they are not fit to undergo it, and by Law to reſtrain the fury of ſuch as will not be guided by reaſon. This could not be deny'd, tho Governments were conſtituted for the good of the Governor. 'Tis good for him that the Law appoints helps for his Infirmitys, and reſtrains his Vices: but all Nations ought to do it tho it were not ſo, in as much as Kingdoms are not eſtabliſh'd for the good of one man, but of the People; and that King who ſeeks his own good before that of the People, departs from the end of his Inſtitution.

This is ſo plain, that all Nations who have acted freely, have ſome way or other endeavour'd to ſupply the defects, or reſtrain the vices of their ſupreme Magiſtrats; and thoſe among them deſerve moſt praiſe, who by appointing means adequate to ſo great a work, have taken care that it might be eaſily and ſafely accompliſh'd: Such Nations have always flouriſh'd in Vertue, Power, Glory, and Happineſs, whilſt thoſe who wanted their Wiſdom, have ſuffer'd all manner of Calamitys by the weakneſs or injuſtice of their Princes, or have had their hands perpetual⯑ly in Blood to preſerve themſelves from their fury. We need no better example of the firſt, than that of the Spartans, who by appointing ſuch Limits to the power of their Kings as could hardly be tranſgreſt, conti⯑nu'd many Ages in great union with them, and were never troubled with civil Tumults. The like may be ſaid of the Romans from the expulſion of the Tarquins, till they overthrew their own Orders, by continuing Marius for five years in the Conſulat, whereas the Laws did not permit a man to hold the ſame Office two years together; and when that rule was broken, their own Magiſtrats grew too ſtrong for them, and ſubver⯑ted the Commonwealth. When this was done, and the power came into the hands of one man, all manner of evils and calamitys broke in like a flood: 'Tis hard to judg, whether the miſchiefs he did, or thoſe he ſuffer'd were the greater. He who ſet up himſelf to be Lord of the World, was like to a Beaſt crown'd for the ſlaughter, and his greatneſs was the forerunner of his ruin. By this means ſome of thoſe who ſeem not to have bin naturally prone to evil, were by their fears put upon ſuch courſes to preſerve themſelves, as being rightly eſtimated, were worſe than the death they apprehended: and the ſo much celebrated Conſtantine the Great dy'd no leſs polluted with the Blood of his neareſt Relations and Friends, than Nero himſelf. But no place can ſhow a more lively [...] de [...] de [...].picture of this, than the Kingdoms of Granada, and others poſſeſt by the Moors in Spain, where there being neither Senate nor Aſſemblys of the Nobility and People, to reſtrain the violence and fury of their Kings, they had no other way than to kill them when their vices became inſup⯑portable; which happening for the moſt part, they were almoſt all mur⯑der'd; [219] and things were brought to ſuch extremity, that no man would accept a Crown, except he who had neither Birth nor Vertue to de⯑ſerve it.

If it be ſaid that Kings have now found out more eaſy ways of doing what they pleaſe, and ſecuring themſelves; I anſwer, that they have not prov'd ſo to all, and it is not yet time for ſuch as tread in the ſame ſteps to boaſt of their ſucceſs: many have fallen when they thought their deſigns accompliſh'd; and no man, as long as he lives, can reaſonably aſſure himſelf the like ſhall not befal him. But if in this corrupted Age, the treachery and perjury of Princes be more common than formerly; and the number of thoſe who are brought to delight in the rewards of injuſtice, be ſo increas'd, that their partys are ſtronger than formerly: this rather ſhows that the balance of Power is broken, or hard to be kept up, than that there ought to be none; and 'tis difficult for any man, without the Spirit of Prophecy, to tell what this will produce. Whilſt the antient Conſtitutions of our Northern Kingdoms remain'd intire, ſuch as conteſted with their Princes, ſought only to reform the Governments, and by re⯑dreſſing what was amiſs, to reduce them to their firſt Principles; but they may not perhaps be ſo modeſt, when they ſee the very nature of their Government chang'd, and the foundations overthrown. I am not ſure that they who were well pleas'd with a moderate Monarchy, will ſubmit to one that is abſolute; and 'tis not improbable, that when men ſee there is no medium between Tyranny and Popularity, they who would have bin contented with the reformation of their Government, may proceed farther, and have recourſe to Force, when there is no help in the Law. This will be a hard work in thoſe places where Vertue is wholly aboliſh'd; but the difficulty will lie on the other ſide, if any ſparks of that remain: if Vice and Corruption prevail, Liberty cannot ſubſiſt; but if Vertue has the advantage, arbitrary Power cannot be eſtabliſh'd. Thoſe who boaſt of their Loyalty, and think they give teſtimonys of it, when they addict themſelves to the will of one Man, tho contrary to the Law from whence that Quality is deriv'd, may conſider, that by putting their Maſters upon illegal courſes, they certainly make them the worſt of men, and bring them into danger of being alſo the moſt miſerable. Few or no good Princes have fallen into diſaſters, unleſs thro an extremity of corrup⯑tion introduc'd by the moſt wicked; and cannot properly be call'd unhap⯑py, if they periſh'd in their Innocence; ſince the bitterneſs of Death is aſſuag'd by the tears of a loving People, the aſſurance of a glorious me⯑mory, and the quiet of a well-ſatisfy'd mind. But of thoſe who have abandon'd themſelves to all manner of Vice, follow'd the impulſe of their own fury, and ſet themſelves to deſtroy the beſt men for oppoſing their pernicious deſigns, very few have dy'd in peace. Their Lives have bin miſerable, Death infamous, and Memory deteſtable.

They therefore who place Kings within the power of the Law, and the Law to be a guide to Kings, equally provide for the good of King and People: Whereas they who admit of no participants in power, and ac⯑knowledg no rule but their own Will, ſet up an intereſt in themſelves againſt that of their People, loſe their affections, which is their moſt im⯑portant Treaſure, and incur their hatred, from whence reſults their greateſt danger.

SECT. XXXI. The Libertys of Nations are from God and Nature, not from Kings.

WHatſoever is uſually ſaid in oppoſition to this, ſeems to proceed from a groundleſs conceit, that the Libertys enjoy'd by Nations ariſe from the Conceſſions of Princes. This point has bin already treated: but being the foundation of the Doctrin I oppoſe, it may not be amiſs far⯑ther to examin how it can be poſſible for one man, born under the ſame condition with the reſt of Mankind, to have a Right in himſelf that is not common to all others, till it be by them or a certain number of them confer'd upon him; or how he can without the utmoſt abſurdity be ſaid to grant Libertys and Privileges to them who made him to be what he is.

If I had to do with a man that ſought after Truth, I ſhould think he had bin led into this extravagant opinion by the terms ordinarily us'd in Patents and Charters granted to particular men; and not diſtinguiſhing between the Proprietor and the Diſpenſer, might think Kings had given, as their own, that which they only diſtribute out of the publick Treaſury, and could have had nothing to diſtribute by parcels, if it had not bin given to them in groſs by the Publick. But I need not uſe our Author ſo gently. The perverſity of his judgment, and obſtinate hatred to Truth, is ſufficient to draw him into the moſt abſurd errors, without any other inducement; and it were not charity, but folly to think otherwiſe of one who attributes in general to all Princes, without any regard to the ways by which they attain to their Power, ſuch an Authority as never juſtly belong'd to any.

This will be evident to all thoſe who conſider, that no man can confer upon others that which he has not in himſelf: If he be originally no more than they, he cannot grant to them or any of them more than they to him. In the 7th, 8th, 9th, and ſubſequent Sections of the firſt Chapter, it has bin prov'd that there is no reſemblance between the paternal Right, and the abſolute Power which he aſſerts in Kings: that the right of a Father, whatever it be, is only over his Children; that this right is equally inherited by them all when he dies: that every one cannot in⯑herit Dominion; for the right of one would be inconſiſtent with that of all others: that the right which is common to all is that which we call Li⯑berty, or exemption from Dominion: that the firſt Fathers of Mankind after the Flood had not the exerciſe of Regal Power; and whatſoever they had was equally devolv'd to every one of their Sons, as appears by the examples of Noah, Shem, Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob, and their Children: that the erection of Nimrod's Kingdom was directly contrary to, and in⯑conſiſtent with the paternal right, if there was any regality in it: that the other Kingdoms of that time were of the ſame nature: that Nimrod not exceeding the age of threeſcore years when he built Babel, could not be the Father of thoſe that aſſiſted him in that attempt: that if the ſeventy two Kings, who, as our Author ſays, went from Babylon upon the con⯑ſuſion of Languages, were not the Sons of Nimrod, he could not govern them by the right of a Father; if they were, they muſt have bin very voung, and could not have Children of their own to people the Kingdoms they ſet up: that whoſe Children ſoever they were, who out of a part of [221] Mankind did within a hundred and thirty two years after the Flood, di⯑vide into ſo many Kingdoms, they ſhew'd that others in proceſs of time might ſubdivide into as many as they pleas'd; and Kingdoms multiply⯑ing in the ſpace of four thouſand years ſince the 72, in the ſame proporti⯑on they did in one hundred and thirty two years into ſeventy two, there would now be as many Kings in the World as there are men; that is, no man could be ſubject to another: that this equality of Right and exemption from the domination of any other, is call'd Liberty: that he who enjoys it cannot be depriv'd of it, unleſs by his own conſent, or by force: that no one man can force a Multitude, or if he did, it could con⯑fer no right upon him: that a Multitude conſenting to be govern'd by one man, dos confer upon him the power of governing them; the pow⯑ers therefore that he has, are from them, and they who have all in themſelves can receive nothing from him, who has no more than every one of them, till they do inveſt him with it. This is prov'd by ſacred and profane Hiſtorys. The Hebrews in the creation of Judges, Kings, or other Magiſtrats, had no regard to Paternity, or to any who by ex⯑traction could in the leaſt pretend to the right of Fathers: God did never direct them to do it, nor reprove them for neglecting it: If they would chuſe a King, he commanded them to take one of their Brethren, not one who call'd himſelf their Father: When they did reſolve to have one, he commanded them to chuſe him by lot, and caus'd the Lot to fall upon a young man of the youngeſt Tribe: David and the other Kings of Iſrael or Judah had no more to ſay for themſelves in that point than Saul: All the Kings of that Nation before and after the Captivity, ordinarily or extra⯑ordinarily ſet up, juſtly or unjuſtly, were rais'd without regard to any Pre⯑rogative they could claim or arrogate to themſelves on that account. All that they had therefore was from their elevation, and their elevation from thoſe that elevated them: 'Twas impoſſible for them to confer any thing upon thoſe from whom they receiv'd all they had; or for the People to give power to Kings, if they had not had it in themſelves; which Power univerſally reſiding in every one, is that which we call Liberty. The method of other Nations was much like to this. They plac'd thoſe in the Throne who ſeem'd beſt to deſerve ſo great an Honour, and moſt able to bear ſo great a Burden: The Kingdoms of the Heroes were nothing elſe but the Government of thoſe who were moſt beneficent to the Nations amongſt whom they liv'd, and whoſe Vertues were thought fit to be rais'd above the ordinary level of the World. Tho perhaps there was not any one Athenian or Roman equal to Theſeus or Romulus in courage and ſtrength, yet they were not able to ſubdue many: or if any man ſhould be ſo vain to think that each of them did at firſt ſubdue one man, then two, and ſo proceeding by degrees conquer'd a whole People, he cannot without madneſs aſcribe the ſame to Numa, who being ſent for [...]rom a ſoreign Country, was immediately made King of a fierce People, that had already conquer'd many of their Neighbours, and was grown too boiſterous even for Romulus himſelf. The like may be ſaid of the firſt Tarquin, and of Servius; they were Strangers: and tho Tullus Hoſtilius and Ancus Martius were Romans, they had as little title to a Dominion over their Fellow-Citizens, or means of attaining to it, as if they had come ſrom the fartheſt parts of the Earth. This muſt be in all places, unleſs one man could prove by a perfect and uninterrupted Genealogy, that he is the eldeſt Son of the eldeſt Line of Noah, and that Line to have [222] continu'd perpetually in the Government of the World: for if the Power has bin divided, it may be ſubdivided to infinity; if interrupted, t [...]e chain is broken, and can never be made whole. But if our Author can perform this for the ſervice of any man, I willingly ſurrender my Arms, and yield up the Cauſe I defend. If he fail, 'tis ridiculous to pretend a Right that belongs to no man, or to go about to retrieve a Right which for the ſpace of four thouſand years has lain dormant; and much more to create that which never had a ſubſiſtence. This leads us neceſſarily to a concluſion, That all Kingdoms are at the firſt erected by the conſent of Nations, and given to whom they pleaſe; or elſe all are ſet up by force, or ſome by force, and ſome by conſent: If any are ſet up by the con [...]ent of Nations, their Kings do not confer Libertys upon thoſe Nations, but re⯑ceive all from them, and the general Propoſition is falſe. If our Author therefore, or his Followers, would confute me, they muſt prove that all the Kingdoms of the World have their beginning from force, and that Force dos always create a Right; or if they recede from the general Pro⯑poſition, and attribute a peculiar right to one or more Princes, who are ſo abſolute Lords of their People, that thoſe under them have neither Li⯑berty, Privilege, Property or Part in the Government, but by their Con⯑ceſſions, they muſt prove that thoſe Princes did by force gain the Power they have, and that their Right is deriv'd from it. This Force alſo muſt have bin perpetually continu'd; for if that force be the root of the Right that is pretended, another force by the ſame rule may overturn, extinguiſh or transfer it to another hand. If Contracts have interven'd, the force ceaſes; and the Right that afterwards dos accrue to the perſons, muſt proceed from, and be regulated according to thoſe Contracts.

This may be ſufficient to my purpoſe: For having already prov'd, that the Kingdoms of Iſrael, Judah, Rome, Sparta, France, Spain, England, and all that we are concern'd in, or that deſerve to be examples to us, did ariſe from the conſent of the reſpective Nations, and were frequently re⯑duc'd to their firſt Principles, when the Princes have endeavour'd to tranſgreſs the Laws of their Inſtitution; it could be nothing to us, tho Attila or Tamerlan had by force gain'd the Dominions they poſſeſt. But I dare go a ſtep further, and boldly aſſert, that there never was or can be a man in the world that did, or can ſubdue a Nation; and that the right of one grounded upon force, is a mere whimſy. It was not Agathocles, Dionyſius, Nabis, Marius, Sylla or Ceſar, but the mercenary Soldiers, and other Villains that join'd with them, who ſubdu'd the Syracuſans, Spar⯑tans, or Romans: And as the work was not perform'd by thoſe Tyrants alone, if a right had bin gain'd by the violence they us'd, it muſt have bin common to all thoſe that gain'd it; and he that commanded them could have had no more than they thought fit to conſer upon him. When Plut. in V [...]t. C [...]. Miltiades deſir'd leave to wear an Olive Garland, in commemoration of the Victory obtain'd at Marathon, an Athenian did in my opinion rightly ſay, ‘"If you alone did fight againſt the Perſians, it is juſt that you only ſhould be crown'd; but if others did participate in the Victory, they ought alſo to have a part in the Honor."’ And the principal difference that I have obſerv'd between the moſt regular proceedings of the wiſeſt Senats or Aſſemblys of the people in their Perſons or Delegats, and the ſury of the moſt diſſolute Villains, has bin, that the firſt ſeeking the publick good, do uſually ſet up ſuch a Man, and inveſt him with ſuch Powers as ſeem moſt conducing to that Good: whereas the others follow⯑ing [223] the impulſe of a beſtial rage, and aiming at nothing but the ſatisfacti⯑on of their own luſts, always advance one from whom they expect the greateſt advantages to themſelves, and give him ſuch Powers as moſt con⯑duce to the accompliſhment of their own ends: but as to the Perſon 'tis the ſame thing. Ceſar and Nero did no more make themſelves what they were, than Numa; and could no more confer any Right, Liberty or Privilege upon the Army that gave them all they had, than the moſt regu⯑lar Magiſtrate could upon the Senat or People that choſe him.

This alſo is common to the worſt as well as the beſt, that they who ſet up either, do, as into a publick Treaſury, confer upon the Perſon they chuſe, a Power of diſtributing to particular men, or numbers of men, ſuch Honors, Privileges and Advantages, as they may ſeem, according to the Principles of the Government, to deſerve. But there is this diffe⯑rence, that the ends of the one being good, and thoſe of the other evil, the firſt do for the moſt part limit the Powers, that ſomething may remain to reward Services done to the Publick, in a manner proportion'd to the merit of every one; placing other Magiſtrats to ſee it really perform'd, ſo as they may not, by the weakneſs or vices of the Governor, be turn'd to the publick detriment: the others think they never give enough, that the Prince having all in his Power, may be able to gratify their moſt exor⯑bitant deſires, if by any ways they can get his favour; and his infirmi⯑tys and vices being moſt beneficial to them, they ſeldom allow to any o⯑ther Magiſtrate a power of oppoſing his Will, or ſuffer thoſe who for the publick good would aſſume it. The World affords many examples of both ſorts, and every one of them have had their progreſs ſutable to their Conſtitution. The regular Kingdoms of England, France, Spain, Po⯑land, Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, and others, whether elective or here⯑ditary, have had High Stewards, Conſtables, Mayors of the Palace, Rixhofmeiſters, Parliaments, Diets, Aſſemblys of Eſtates, Cortez, and the like, by which thoſe have bin admitted to ſucceed who ſeem'd moſt fit for the publick Service; the unworthy have bin rejected; the infir⯑mitys of the weak ſupply'd; the malice of the unjuſt reſtrain'd; and when neceſſity requir'd, the Crown transfer'd from one Line or Family to another. But in the furious Tyrannys that have bin ſet up by the vio⯑lence of a corrupted Soldiery, as in the antient Roman Empire, the King⯑doms of the Moors and Arabians, the Tyrannys of Ezzelino of Padoa, thoſe of the Viſconti and Sforzeſchi of Milan, Caſtruccio Caſtraccani of Lucca, Ceſar Borgia, and others, there was nothing of all this. The Will of the Prince was a Law; all Power was in him, and he kept it, till ano⯑ther ſtept up and took it from him, by the ſame means that he had gain'd it. This fell out ſo frequently, that tho all the Roman Emperors endea⯑vour'd to make their Power hereditary, it hardly continu'd three Gene⯑rations in one Line from Auguſtus to Auguſtulus, unleſs in that of Conſtan⯑tine, and that with extreme confuſion and diſorder. They who had madly ſet up a Man to be their Head, and expos'd ſo much of the World as was under their power, to be deſtroy'd by him, did by the like fury throw him down, and never ceas'd till they had brought the Empire to utter ruin.

But if this paternal Sovereignty be a mere fiction that never had any effect; and no Nation was ever commanded by God to make it their rule, nor any reprov'd for the neglect of it; none ever learnt it from the light of nature, nor were by wiſe men taught to regard it: If the firſt Fathers claim'd no Privilege from it when every man's Genealogy was [224] known; and tho there were ſuch a thing in nature, it could be of no uſe at this day, when the ſeveral Races of men are ſo confus'd, that not one in the world can prove his own Original: If the firſt Kingdoms, whether well or ill conſtituted, according to the Command of God, or the Inventions of Men, were contrary to, and incompatible with it; and there can have bin no juſtice in any, if ſuch a Rule was to have bin obſerv'd; the continuance of an unjuſt uſurpation can never have created a Right, but aggravated the in⯑juſtice of overthrowing it: If no man could ever by his own ſtrength and courage ſubdue a multitude, nor gain any other right over them, if he did, than they might have to tear it from him; Whoever denies King⯑doms or other Magiſtracys to have bin ſet up by men, according to their own will, and from an opinion of receiving benefit by them, accuſes all the Governments that are, or ever have bin in the world, of that outra⯑geous injuſtice in their Foundation which can never be repair'd. If there be therefore, or ever was any juſt Government amongſt men, it was conſti⯑tuted by them; and whether their Proceedings were regular or violent, juſt or unjuſt, the Powers annex'd to it were their Donation: The Magiſtracys erected by them, whether in one or more men, temporary or perpetual, elective or hereditary, were their Creatures; and receiving all from them, could confer nothing upon them.

SECT. XXXII. The Contracts made between Magiſtrats, and the Nations that created them, were real, ſolemn, and obligatory.

OUR Author having with big words and little ſenſe inveigh'd a⯑gainſt Popular and Mix'd Governments, proceeds as if he had prov'd that they could not, or ought not to be. If it be, ſays he, unna⯑tural for the Multitude to chuſe their Governors, or to govern, or to par⯑take in the Government; what can be thought of that damnable Concluſion which is made by too many, that the Multitude may correct or depoſe their Princes, if need be? Surely the unnaturalneſs and injuſtice of this Poſition cannot ſufficiently be expreſt. For admit that a King make a Contract or Paction with his People originally in his Anceſtors, or perſonally at his Coro⯑nation (for both theſe Pactions ſome dream of, but cannot offer any proof of either) yet by no Law of any Nation can a Contract be thought broken, except firſt a lawful trial be had by the ordinary Judg of the breakers thereof; or elſe every man may be both Party and Judg in his own caſe, which is abſurd once to be thought: for then it will lie in the hands of the headleſs multitude, when they pleaſe, to caſt off the Yoke of Government that God has laid upon them, and to judg and puniſh him, by whom they ſhould be judg'd and puniſh'd them⯑ſelves. To this I anſwer firſt briefly, That if it be natural for the Mul⯑titude to chuſe their Governors, or to govern, or to participate of the Government as beſt pleaſes themſelves; or that there never was a Govern⯑ment in the World that was not ſo ſet up by them, in purſuance of the Power naturally inherent in themſelves; what can be thought of that damnable Concluſion, which has bin made by Fools or Knaves, That the Multitude may not, if need be, correct or depoſe their own Magiſtrats? Surely the unnaturalneſs and injuſtice of ſuch a Poſition cannot be ſuffi⯑ciently expreſt. If that were admitted, all the moſt ſolemn Pacts and [225] Contracts made between Nations and their Magiſtrats, originally or per⯑ſonally, and confirm'd by Laws and mutual Oaths, would be of no value. He that would break the moſt ſacred Bonds that can be amongſt men, ſhould by perjury and wickedneſs become Judg of his own caſe, and by the worſt of crimes procure impunity for all. It would be in his power, by folly, wickedneſs and madneſs, to deſtroy the Multitude which he was created and ſworn to preſerve, tho wiſe, vertuous and juſt, and headed by the wiſeſt and juſteſt of men; or to lay a Yoke upon thoſe who by the Laws of God and Nature ought to be free: He might in his own caſe judg that Body by which he ought to be judg'd; and who in conſidera⯑tion of themſelves and their own good, made him to be whatſoever he is more than every one of them: The Governments inſtituted for the pre⯑ſervation of Nations, would turn to their deſtruction: It would be im⯑poſſible to check the fury of a corrupt and perfidious Magiſtrate: The worſt of men would be rais'd to a height that was never deſerv'd by the beſt; and the aſſurance of indemnity would, by increaſing their inſo⯑lence, turn their other vices into madneſs, as has bin too often ſeen in thoſe who have had more power than they deſerv'd, and were more hardly brought to account for their actions than ought to have bin; tho I never heard of any who had ſo much as our Author aſſerts to be in all, nor that any was abſolutely aſſur'd he ſhould not be queſtion'd for the abuſe of what he had.

Beſides, if every People may govern, or conſtitute and chuſe one or more Governors, they may divide the Powers between ſeveral Men, or ranks of men, allotting to every one ſo much as they pleaſe, or retaining ſo much as they think fit. This has bin prac⯑tis'd in all the Governments, which under ſeveral forms have flou⯑riſh'd in Paleſtine, Greece, Italy, Germany, France, England, and the reſt of the World. The Laws of every place ſhow what the Power of the reſpective Magiſtrate is, and by declaring how much is allow'd to him, declare what is deny'd; for he has not that which he has not, and is to be accounted a Magiſtrate whilſt he exerciſes that which he has.

If any doubts do hereupon ariſe, I hope to remove them, proving in the firſt place, that ſeveral Nations have plainly and explicitly made Con⯑tracts with their Magiſtrats.

2. That they are implicit, and to be underſtood, where they are not plainly expreſt.

3. That they are not dreams, but real things, and perpetually obliging.

4. That Judges are in many places appointed to decide the Conteſts ariſing from the breach of theſe Contracts; and where they are not, or the party offending is of ſuch force or pride that he will not ſubmit, Na⯑tions have bin oblig'd to take the extremeſt courſes.

To the firſt: I ſuppoſe it will not be deny'd, that the annual Magi⯑ſtrats of divers Commonwealths are under ſome Compact, and that there is a power of conſtraining them to perform the contents, or to puniſh them for the violation. The modeſt behaviour of the Roman Conſuls and Dictators (as long as their Laws were in force) might not probably proceed from their good nature. Tho the people had not bin, as our Au⯑thor ſays, mad, fooliſh, and always deſirous to chuſe the worſt men for being moſt like to themſelves, but admirably wiſe and vertuous, 'tis not to be imagin'd that in the ſpace of three or four hundred years they ſhould never have fallen upon one who would have tranſgreſt, if he could have done it ſafely, tho they had us'd the utmoſt caution in their choice. [226] But the power of the Conſuls being only for a year, that of the Dictator for ſix months at moſt, and the Commiſſion that he ſhould take care ^*the Commonwealth might ſuffer no damage, ſhow the end and con⯑dition upon which they were choſen; and tho their Power is by ſome thought to have bin abſolute, yet the Conſuls were frequently oppos'd and brought into order by the Senat, Tribuns, or People, and ſome⯑times Plut. Vit. Camil.the Dictator himſelf. Camillus in his fourth Dictatorſhip was threa⯑ten'd by the Tribuns with a great Fine, and by that means oblig'd to ab⯑dicate his Magiſtracy. I have already mention'd Marcus Fabius Maximus, who in the behalf of his Son Quintus condemn'd to die by Papirius the Dictator, appeal'd to the ^†People: And when the Conduct of Fabius in the War againſt Hannibal was not approv'd, the Tribun thought he made a very modeſt Propoſition, in that he did not deſire his Magiſtracy ſhould be abrogated; but that the Maſter of the Horſe ſhould be made equal to him in power, which was done accordingly. 'Tis agreed by all, that the Conſuls were in the place of Kings, and that the Power of the Dictator was at leaſt equal to what theirs had bin. If they there⯑fore were under ſuch a rule, which they could not tranſgreſs, or might be reduc'd to order if they did, and forc'd to ſubmit to the People, as the Kings had done, the Kings were alſo made upon the ſame conditions, and equally oblig'd to perform them.

The Scripture is more clear in the caſe. The Judges are ſaid to have bin in power equal to Kings; and I may perhaps ackowledg it, with re⯑lation to the Deuteronomical King, or ſuch as the People might have choſen without offending God. The Gileadites made a Covenant with Jephtha, that he ſhould be their Head and Captain: He would not return to his Country till they had done it. This was perform'd ſolemnly be⯑fore the Lord in Miſpeth, and all Iſrael follow'd them. They might therefore make a Covenant with their Kings, for the difference of name dos not increaſe or diminiſh the Right. Nay, they were in duty oblig'd to do it: The words of the 17th of Deuter. He ſhall not multiply Wives, &c. that his Heart be not lifted up above his Brethren, can have no other ſigni⯑fication, than that they ſhould take care he did it not, or, as Joſephus ſays, hinder him if he attempt it; for the Law was not given to the King who was not, but thoſe who might make him if they thought fit. In purſu⯑ance of this Law—

[The reſt of this Chapter is wanting in the Original Manuſcript.]

SECT. I. Kings not being Fathers of their People, nor excelling all others in Ver⯑tue, can have no other juſt Power than what the Laws give; nor any title to the privileges of the Lord's Anointed.

HAVING prov'd that the right of Fathers is from Nature, and incommunicable, it muſt follow, that every man dos per⯑petually owe all love, reſpect, ſervice, and obedience to him that did beget, nouriſh, and educate him, and to no other un⯑der that name. No man therefore can claim the right of a Father over any, except one that is ſo; no man can ſerve two Maſters; the extent and perpetuity of the Duty which every man owes to his Father, ren⯑ders it impoſſible for him to owe the ſame to any other: This right of Father cannot be devolv'd to the Heir of the Father, otherwiſe than as every Son by the Law of Nature is Heir to his Father, and has the ſame right of commanding his Children, as his Father had of commanding him when he was a Child: no man can owe to his Brother that which he ow'd to his Father, becauſe he cannot receive that from him which he had from his Father: but the utmoſt of all abſurditys that can enter into the Heart of man is, for one to exact the rights due to a Father, who has no other title than force and uſurpation, it being no leſs than to ſay, that I owe as much to one who has done me the greateſt of all Injurys, as to him who has confer'd upon me the greateſt Benefits: or, which is yet worſe, if poſſible, that as theſe uſurpations cannot be made but by rob⯑bing, ſpoiling, impriſoning, or killing the Perſon in poſſeſſion; that Duty, which by the eternal Law of Nature I owe to my Father, ſhould oblige me to pay the ſame veneration, obedience, and ſervice, to the man that has ſpoil'd, impriſon'd, or kill'd my Father, as I ow'd to him; or that the ſame Law which oblig'd me to obey and defend my Father, be⯑cauſe he was ſo, ſhould oblige me to obey and defend his enemy, becauſe he has impriſon'd or kill'd him; and not only to paſs over the Law of God, which makes me the avenger of my Father's Blood, but to re⯑ward his Murderer with the rights that comprehend all that is moſt tender and ſacred in Nature, and to look upon one that has done me the greateſt of all injuſtices and injurys, as upon him to whom I owe my Birth and Education. This being evident to all thoſe who have any meaſure of common ſenſe, I ſuppoſe it may be ſafely concluded, that what right ſoever a Father may have over his Family, it cannot relate to that which a King has over his People; unleſs he, like the man in the Iſland of Pines, mention'd before, be alſo the Father of them all. That which is [228] abſolutely unlike in manner and ſubſtance, inſtitution and exerciſe, muſt be unlike in all reſpects; and the Concluſions, which have their ſtrength from Similitude and Parity, can have none when there is not the leaſt ſimilitude of either. And tho it were true, that Fathers are held by no contracts, (which generally 'tis not; for when the Son is of age, and dos ſomething for the Father to which he is not oblig'd, or gives him that which he is not bound to give, ſuppoſe an Inheritance receiv'd from a Friend, goods of his own acquiſition, or that he be emancipated, all good Laws look upon thoſe things as a valuable conſideration, and give the ſame force to contracts thereupon made, as to thoſe that paſs between ſtrangers) it could have no relation to our queſtion concerning Kings. One prin⯑cipal reaſon that renders it very little neceſſary by the Laws of Nations, to reſtrain the power of Parents over their Children is, becauſe 'tis pre⯑ſum'd they cannot abuſe it: they are thought to have a Law in their Bowels, obliging them more ſtrictly to ſeek their good, than all thoſe that can be laid upon them by another Power; and yet if they depart from it, ſo as inhumanly to abuſe or kill their Children, they are puniſh'd with as much rigor, and accounted more unpardonable than other men. Igno⯑rance or wilful malice perſuading our Author to paſs over all this, he bold⯑ly affirms, That the Father of a Family governs it by no other Law than his own Will; and from thence infers, that the condition of Kings is the ſame. He would ſeem to ſoften the harſhneſs of this Propoſition by ſaying, That a King is always ty'd by the ſame Law of Nature to keep this general ground, that the ſafety of the Kingdom is his chief Law. But he ſpoils it in the next page, by aſſerting, That it is not right for Kings to do injury, but it is right that they go unpuniſh'd by the People, if they do; ſo that in this point it is all one, whether Samuel deſcribe a King or a Tyrant, for patient obedience is due un⯑to both; no remedy in the Text againſt Tyrants, but crying and praying unto God in that day. In this our Author, according to the cuſtom of Thea⯑ters, runs round in a Circle, pretends to grant that which is true, and then by a lie endeavours to deſtroy all again. Kings by the Law of Na⯑ture are oblig'd to ſeek chiefly the good of the Kingdom; but there is no remedy if they do it not: which is no leſs than to put all upon the Con⯑ſcience of thoſe who manifeſtly have none. But if God has appointed that all other tranſgreſſions of the Laws of Nature, by which a private man receives damage, ſhould be puniſh'd in this world, notwithſtanding the right reſerv'd to himſelf of a future puniſhment; I deſire to know, why this alone, by which whole Nations may be, and often are deſtroy'd, ſhould eſcape the hands of Juſtice? If he preſume no Law to be neceſſary in this caſe, becauſe it cannot be thought that Kings will tranſgreſs, as there was no Law in Sparta againſt Adultery, becauſe it was not thought poſſible for men educated under that diſciplin, to be guilty of ſuch a Crime; and as divers Nations left a liberty to Fathers to diſpoſe of their Children as they thought fit, becauſe it could not be imagin'd that any one would abuſe that power; he ought to remember that the Spartans were miſtaken, and for want of that Law which they eſteem'd uſeleſs, Adul⯑terys became as common there as in any part of the world: and the other error being almoſt every where diſcover'd, the Laws of all civiliz'd Na⯑tions make it capital for a man to kill his Children; and give redreſs to Children, if they ſuffer any other extreme injurys from their Parents, as well as to other perſons. But tho this were not ſo, it would be nothing to our queſtion, unleſs it could be ſuppos'd, that whoever gets the power of a Nation into his hands, muſt be immediately fill'd with the ſame tender⯑neſs [229] of affection to the People under him, as a Father naturally has to⯑wards the Children he has begotten. He that is of this opinion, may examin the lives of Herod, Tiberius, Caligula, and ſome later Princes of like inclinations, and conclude it to be true, if he find that the whole courſe of their actions, in relation to the People under them, do well ſute with the tender and ſacred name of Father; and altogether falſe, if he find the contrary. But ſince every man that conſiders what has bin, or ſees what is every day done in the world, muſt confeſs, that Princes, or thoſe who govern them, do moſt frequently ſo utterly reject all thoughts of tenderneſs and piety towards the Nations under them, as rather to ſeek what can be drawn from them, than what ſhould be done for them, and ſometimes become their moſt bitter and publick enemys; 'tis ridiculous to make the ſafety of Nations to depend upon a ſuppoſition, which by daily experience we find to be falſe; and impious, to prefer the luſts of a man who violates the moſt ſacred Laws of Nature, by deſtroying thoſe he is oblig'd to preſerve, before the welfare of that People for whoſe good he is made to be what he is, if there be any thing of juſtice in the Power he exerciſes.

Our Author fooliſhly thinks to cover the enormity of this nonſenſe, by turning Salutem Populi into Salutem Regni: for tho Regnum may be taken for the power of commanding, in which ſenſe the preſervation of it is the uſual object of the care of Princes, yet it dos more rightly ſignify the Body of that Nation which is govern'd by a King. And therefore if the Maxim be true, as he acknowledges it to be, then Salus Populi eſt Lex ſuprema; and the firſt thing we are to inquire is, whether the Government of this or that man dos conduce to the accompliſhment of that ſupreme Law, or not; for otherwiſe it ought to have bin ſaid, Salus Regis eſt Lex ſuprema, which certainly never enter'd into the head of a wiſer or better man than Filmer.

His Reaſons are as good as his Doctrin: No Law, ſays he, can be im⯑pos'd on Kings, becauſe there were Kings before any Laws were made. This would not follow, tho the Propoſition were true; for they, who impos'd no Laws upon the Kings they at firſt made, from an opinion of their Vertue, as in thoſe call'd by the Antients Heroum regna, might lay re⯑ſtrictions upon them, when they were found not to anſwer the expecta⯑tion conceiv'd of them, or that their Succeſſors degenerated from their Vertue. Other Nations alſo being inſtructed by the ill effects of an un⯑limited Power given to ſome Kings (if there was any ſuch) might wiſe⯑ly avoid the Rock upon which their Neighbours had ſplit, and juſtly mo⯑derate that Power which had bin pernicious to others. However a Pro⯑poſition of ſo great importance ought to be prov'd; but that being hard, and perhaps impoſſible, becauſe the original of Nations is almoſt wholly unknown to us, and their practice ſeems to have bin ſo various, that what is true in one is not ſo in another; he is pleas'd only to affirm it, without giving the leaſt ſhadow of a reaſon to perſuade us to believe him. This might juſtify me, if I ſhould reject his aſſertion as a thing ſaid gratis: but I may ſafely go a ſtep farther, and affirm, That men liv'd under Laws before there were any Kings; which cannot be deny'd, if ſuch a Power neceſſarily belongs to Kings as he aſcribes to them. For Nimrod, who eſtabliſh'd his Kingdom in Babel, is the firſt who by the Scripture is ſaid to have bin a mighty one in the Earth. He was therefore the firſt King, or Kings were not mighty; and he being the firſt King, Mankind muſt have liv'd till his time without Laws, or elſe Laws were made before [230] Kings. To ſay that there was then no Law, is in many reſpects moſt abſurd; for the Nature of man cannot be without it, and the violences committed by ill men before the Flood, could not have bin blam'd if there had bin no Law; for that which is not, cannot be tranſgreſt. Cain could not have fear'd that every man who met him would ſlay him, if there had not bin a Law to ſlay him that had ſlain another. But in this caſe the Scripture is clear, at leaſt from the time that Noah went out of the Ark; for God then gave him a Law ſufficient for the ſtate of things at that time, if all violence was prohibited under the name of ſhedding Blood, tho not under the ſame penalty as Murder. But Penal Laws be⯑ing in vain, if there be none to execute them, ſuch as know God dos nothing in vain, may conclude that he who gave this Law, did appoint ſome way for its execution, tho unknown to us. There is therefore a Law not given by Kings, but laid upon ſuch as ſhould be Kings, as well as on any other Perſons, by one who is above them; and perhaps I may ſay, that this Law preſſes moſt upon them, becauſe they who have moſt power, do moſt frequently break out into acts of Violence, and moſt of all diſdain to have their Will re⯑ſtrain'd: and he that will exempt Kings from this Law, muſt either find that they are excepted in the Text, or that God who gave it has not a Power over them.

Moreover, it has bin prov'd at the beginning of this Treatiſe, that the firſt Kings were of the accurſed race, and reign'd over the accurſed Nations, whilſt the holy Seed had none. If therefore there was no Law where there was no King, the accurſed Poſterity of Cham had Laws, when the bleſſed Deſcendents of Shem had none, which is moſt abſurd; the word Outlaw or Lawleſs, being often given to the wicked, but never to the juſt and righteous.

The impious folly of ſuch Aſſertions goes farther than our Author per⯑haps ſuſpected: for if there be no Law where there is no King, the Iſrae⯑lites had no Law till Saul was made King, and then the Law they had was from him. They had no King before, for they ask'd one. They could not have ask'd one of Samuel, if he had bin a King. He had not bin offend⯑ed, and God had not imputed to them the ſin of rejecting him, if they had ask'd that only which he had ſet over them. If Samuel were not King, Moſes, Joſhua, and the other Judges were not Kings; for they were no more than he. They had therefore no King, and conſequently, if our Author ſays true, no Law. If they had no Law till Saul was King, they never had any; for he gave them none; and the Prophets were to blame for denouncing judgments againſt them for receding from, or breaking their Law, if they had none. He cannot ſay that Samuel 1 Sam. 10.gave them a Law; for that which he wrote in a Book, and laid up be⯑fore the Lord, was not a Law to the People, but to the King. If it had bin a Law to the People, it muſt have bin made publick; but as it was only to the King, he laid it up before God, to teſtify againſt him if he ſhould adventure to break it. Or if it was a Law to the People, the matter is not mended; for it was given in the time of a King by one who was not King. But in truth it was the Law of the Kingdom by which he was King, and had bin wholly impertinent, if it was not to bind him; for it was given to no other perſon, and to no other end.

Our Author's Aſſertion on which all his Doctrin is grounded, That there is no Nation that allows Children any action or remedy for being unjuſtly go⯑vern'd, is as impudently falſe as any other propos'd by him: for tho a Child [231] will not be heard that complains of the Rod; yet our own Law gives relief to Children againſt their Fathers, as well as againſt other perſons that do them injurys, upon which we ſee many ill effects, and I do rather relate than commend the practice. In other places the Law gives relief againſt the extravagances of which Fathers may be guilty in relation to their Children, tho not to that exceſs as to bring them ſo near to an equality as in England: They cannot impriſon, ſell, or kill their Chil⯑dren, without expoſing themſelves to the ſame puniſhments with other men; and if they take their Eſtates from them, the Law is open, and gives relief againſt them: but on the other ſide, Children are puniſh'd with Death, if they ſtrike or outrageouſly abuſe their Parents; which is not ſo with us.

Now, if the Laws of Nations take ſuch care to preſerve private men from being too hardly us'd by their true and natural Fathers, who have ſuch a love and tenderneſs for them in their own Blood, that the moſt wicked and barbarous do much more frequently commit crimes for them than againſt them; how much more neceſſary is it to reſtrain the fury that Kings, who at the beſt are but phantaſtical Fathers, may exerciſe to the deſtruction of the whole People? 'Tis a folly to ſay that David and ſome other Kings have had, or that all ſhould have as tender an affection towards their People as towards their Children; for beſides that even the firſt Propoſition is not acknowledg'd, and will be hard⯑ly verify'd in any one inſtance, there is a vaſt diſtance between what men ought to be, and what they are. Every man ought to be juſt, true and charitable; and if they were ſo, Laws would be of no uſe: but it were a madneſs to aboliſh them upon a ſuppoſition that they are ſo; or to leave them to a future puniſhment, which many do not believe, or not regard. I am not oblig'd to believe that David lov'd every Iſraelite as well as his Son Abſalom; but tho he had, I could not from thence infer that all Kings do ſo, unleſs I were ſure that all of them were as wiſe and vertuous as he.

But to come more cloſe to the matter: Do we not know of many Kings who have come to their Power by the moſt wicked means that can enter into the heart of man, even by the moſt outrageous injurys done to the People, ſometimes by a foreign aid? as Kings were by the power of the Romans impos'd upon the Britans, that they might waſt the Forces, and break the Spirits of that fierce people. This Tacitus acknowledges, and ſays, ^* That among other inſtruments of inſlaving Nations, they im⯑pos'd Kings upon them. The Medices were made Maſters of Florence by the force of Charles the Fifth's Army. Sometimes by a corrupt party in their own Country they have deſtroy'd the beſt men, and ſubdu'd the reſt; as Agathocles, Dionyſius, and Ceſar did at Rome and Syracuſe. Others taking upon them to defend a People, have turn'd the Arms with which they were entruſted againſt their own Maſters; as Franceſco Sforza, who being choſen by thoſe of Milan to be their General againſt the Venetians, made peace with them, and by their aſſiſtance made himſelf Prince, or, in our Author's phraſe, Father of that great City. If theſe be acts of ten⯑derneſs, love, juſtice, and charity, thoſe who commit them may well think they have gain'd the affections of their People, and grow to love thoſe from whom they fear nothing, and by whom they think they are [232] lov'd. But if on the other hand they know they have attain'd to their greatneſs by the worſt of all Villanys, and that they are on that account become the object of the publick hatred, they can do no leſs than hate and fear thoſe by whom they know themſelves to be hated. The Italians ordinarily ſay that ^*he who dos an injury never pardons, becauſe he thinks he is never pardon'd: But he that enſlaves and oppreſſes a People dos an injury which can never be pardon'd, and therefore fears it will be re⯑veng'd.

Other Princes who come to their Thrones by better ways, and are not contented with the power that the Law allows, draw the ſame hatred upon themſelves when they endeavour by force or fraud to enlarge it; and muſt neceſſarily fear and hate their own People as much as he who by the ways beforemention'd has betray'd or ſubdu'd them. Our Author makes nothing of this; but taking it for granted that it was all one whether Samuel ſpoke of a King or a Tyrant, declares that the ſame patient obe⯑dience is due to both; but not being pleas'd to give any reaſon why we ſhould believe him, I intend to offer ſome why we ſhould not.

Firſt, there is nothing in the nature or inſtitution of Monarchy that obliges Nations to bear the exorbitances of it when it degenerates into Tyranny.

In the ſecond place, we have no precept for it.

Thirdly, we have many approv'd examples, and occaſional particular commands to the contrary.

1. To the firſt: The point of Paternity being explain'd; the duty of Children to Parents prov'd to proceed from the benefits receiv'd from them, and that the power over them, which at the firſt ſeems to have bin left at large, becauſe it was thought they would never abuſe it, has long ſince bin much reſtrain'd in all civiliz'd Nations, and particularly in our own; We may conclude that men are all made of the ſame paſte, and that one ows no more to another than another to him, unleſs for ſome benefit re⯑ceiv'd, or by virtue of ſome promiſe made. The duty ariſing from a benefit receiv'd muſt be proportionable to it: that which grows from a promiſe is determin'd by the promiſe or contract made, according to the true ſenſe and meaning of it. He therefore that would know what the Babylonians, Hebrews, Athenians, or Romans did owe to Nimrod, Saul, Theſeus or Romulus, muſt inquire what benefits were receiv'd from them, or what was promis'd to them. It cannot be ſaid that any thing was due to them for the ſake of their Parents; they could have no prerogative by birth: Nimrod was the ſixth Son of Chuſh the Son of Cham, who was the youngeſt Son of Noah; his Kingdom was erected whilſt Noah and his elder Sons Shem and Japhet, as well as Cham, Chuſh and his elder Sons were ſtill living. Saul was the Son of Chiſh, a man of Benjamin, who was the youngeſt Son of Jacob; and he was choſen in the moſt Democra⯑tical way by Lot amongſt the whole People. Theſeus according to the cuſtom of the times pretended to be the Son of Neptune; and Rhea was ſo well pleas'd with the Soldier that had gotten her with child, that ſhe reſolv'd to think or ſay that Mars was the Father of the Children, that is to ſay they were Baſtards; and therefore whatever was due to them was [233] upon their own perſonal account, without any regard to their Progeni⯑tors. This muſt be meaſur'd according to what they did for thoſe Na⯑tions before they were Kings, or by the manner of their advancement. No⯑thing can be pretended before they were Kings: Nimrod roſe up after the con⯑fuſion of Languages, and the People that underſtood the tongue he ſpoke, follow'd him; Saul was a young man unknown in Iſrael; Theſeus and Ro⯑mulus had nothing to recommend them before other Athenians and Romans, except the reputation of their Valor; and the Honors confer'd upon them for that reaſon, muſt proceed from expectation or hope, and not from gratitude or obligation. It muſt therefore proceed from the manner by which they came to be Kings. He that neither is nor has any title to be a King, can come to be ſo only by force or by conſent. If by force, he dos not confer a Benefit upon the People, but injures them in the moſt out⯑rageous manner. If it be poſſible therefore or reaſonable to imagin that one man did ever ſubdue a multitude, he can no otherwiſe reſemble a Father, than the worſt of all Enemys who dos the greateſt miſchiefs, reſembles the beſt of all Friends who confers the moſt ineſtimable bene⯑fits; and conſequently dos as juſtly deſerve the utmoſt effects of hatred, as the other dos of love, reſpect, and ſervice. If by conſent, he who is rais'd from amongſt the people, and plac'd above his Brethren, receives great honors and advantages, but confers none. The obligations of gra⯑titude are on his ſide, and whatſoever he dos in acknowledgment to his Benefactors for their love to him, is no more than his duty; and he can demand no more from them than what they think fit to add to the favors already receiv'd. If more be pretended, it muſt be by virtue of that contract, and can no otherwiſe be prov'd than by producing it to be exa⯑min'd, that the true ſenſe, meaning, and intention of it may be known.

This Contract muſt be in form and ſubſtance according to a general Rule given to all mankind, or ſuch as is left to the will of every Nation. If a general one be pretended, it ought to be ſhown, that by inquiring into the contents, we may underſtand the force and extent of it. If this cannot be done, it may juſtly paſs for a fiction, no concluſion can be drawn from it; and we may be ſure, that what Contracts ſoever have bin made between Nations and their Kings, have bin fram'd ac⯑cording to the will of thoſe Nations; and conſequently how many ſoever they are, and whatſoever the ſenſe of any or all of them may be, they can oblige no man, except thoſe, or at the moſt the Deſcendents of thoſe that made them. Whoever therefore would perſuade us, that one or more Nations are, by virtue of thoſe Contracts, bound to bear all the inſolences of Tyrants, is oblig'd to ſhow, that by thoſe Contracts they did for ever indefinitely bind themſelves ſo to do, how great ſoever they might be.

I may juſtly go a ſtep farther, and affirm, That if any ſuch ſhould ap⯑pear in the world, the folly and turpitude of the thing would be a ſuffi⯑cient evidence of the madneſs of thoſe that made it, and utterly deſtroy the contents of it: but no ſuch having bin as yet produc'd, nor any reaſon given to perſuade a wiſe man, that there has ever bin any ſuch, at leaſt among civiliz'd Nations, (for whom only we are concern'd) it may be concluded there never was any; or iſ there were, they do not at all relate to our ſubject; and conſequently that Nations ſtill continue in their na⯑tive Liberty, and are no otherwiſe oblig'd to endure the inſolence of Ty⯑rants, than they, or each of them may eſteem them tolerable.

[234] 2. To the ſecond: Tho the words of Samuel had imply'd a neceſſity incumbent upon the Hebrews to bear all the Injurys that their Kings ſhould do to them, it could no way relate to us; for he dos not ſpeak of all Kings, but of ſuch as they had ask'd, even ſuch as reign'd over the ſlaviſh Aſia⯑ticks their Neighbors, who are no leſs infamous in the world for their baſeneſs and cowardice, than deteſtable for their idolatry and vices. It was not a plot or trick of Samuel to keep the Government in himſelf and Family; ſuch ſcurrilous expreſſions or thoughts are fit only for Filmer, Heylin, and their Diſciples: But the Prophet being troubled at the folly and wickedneſs of the people, who choſe rather to ſubject themſelves to the irregular Will of a Man, than to be govern'd by God and his Law, did, by the immediate command of God, declare to them what would be the event of their fury; that ſince they would be like to their Neigh⯑bors in ſin and folly, he told 'em they ſhould be like to them in ſhame and miſery; ſince they deſir'd to caſt off the thing that was good, they ſhould ſuffer evil as the product of their own Counſels; and that when they ſhould cry to the Lord from a ſenſe of their miſerys, he dos not tell them, as our Author falſly ſays, they ſhould have no other remedy againſt Ty⯑rants but crying and praying, but that their crys and prayers ſhould not be heard. It was juſt that when they had rejected God, he ſhould reject them, and leave them under the weight of the calamitys they had brought upon themſelves. In all other caſes God had ever ſaid, that when his People return'd to him, he would hear and ſave them. When they cry'd by reaſon of the oppreſſions they ſuffer'd under the Egyptians, Cananites, Midianites, Philiſtins, and others, tho their crimes had deſerv'd them all, yet God heard and reliev'd them. But when they meditated this final defection from his Law, and rejection of his Government, God ſeem'd to change his Nature, and forget to be gracious; When ye ſhall cry to me by reaſon of your King, I will not hear you. This was the ſtrongeſt de⯑hortation from their wicked Intention that can be imagin'd; but being not enough to reclaim them, they anſwer'd, Nay, but we will have a King. They were like to their Neighbors in folly and vice, and would be like to them in Government; which brought all the Calamitys upon them that the others ſuffer'd. But I know not what concluſion can be drawn from hence in favor of our Author's Doctrin, unleſs all Nations are oblig'd furiouſly to run into the ſame crimes with the Iſraelites, or to take upon themſelves the ſame puniſhment, tho they do not commit the ſame crimes.

If this was not a Precept to the Iſraelites, inſtructing them what they ſhould do, but a denunciation of what they ſhould ſuffer for the evil which they had committed, the Old Teſtament will afford none; and I hope in due time to anſwer ſuch as he alledges from the New. Nay, we may conclude there can be none there, becauſe being dictated by the ſame Spirit, which is always uniform and conſtant to it ſelf, it could not agree with the 17th of Deuteron. which ſo extremely reſtrains ſuch a King as God allow'd, as not to ſuffer him in any manner to raiſe his heart above his Brethren; and was ſaid in vain, if at the ſame time it gave him a Power which might not be reſiſted, or forbad others to reſiſt him if he would not obey the Law.

3. To the third: Whatſoever was done by the Command of God a⯑gainſt Pharaoh King of Egypt, and againſt the Kings of the Cananites, Midianites, Moabites, Edomites, Amorites or Philiſtins, by Moſes, Joſhua, [235] Ehud, Barak, Gideon, Sampſon, Jephtha, Samuel, and the reſt of the Judges, comes expreſly under the particular Precepts and Examples promis'd by me, to ſhow, that God had occaſionally commanded, and his Servants executed his Commands in reſiſting and deſtroying the Perſons of Kings, who were their own Kings alſo, if Poſſeſſion was only to be regarded. And tho this be ſufficient to overthrow our Author's Doctrin; That we are not to examin the Titles of Kings, whether they be from uſurpation, or any other means; but only to look upon the Power: Yet they who ſeek Truth, ought not to content themſelves merely with Victory; or to eſteem that a Victory, which is obtain'd by what the Schools call Argumentum ad hominem, grounded upon a falſe Propoſition, and is of no force except againſt thoſe who are ſo ill advis'd to advance it. Therefore laying aſide the advantages that may be juſtly taken againſt Filmer, for the folly of aſſerting the ſame Right to be in a Uſurper as in a lawful Prince; and confeſſing that tho ſuch as have no Title, may and ought to be ſuppreſt as Enemys and Robbers, when reſpect and obedience is due to thoſe who are rightly inſtituted; I ſay, that none can be claim'd by a Prince lawfully inſtituted, if he aſſumes to himſelf a Power which is not grant⯑ed to him by the Law of his Inſtitution, ^*becauſe, as Grotius ſays, his legal Power does not extend ſo far; or turn the Power that is given him, to ends contrary to thoſe for which it was given, becauſe he thereby deſtroys it, and puts himſelf into the ſame condition as if it had never bin. This is prov'd by the Example of Saul; Tho the people ſinn'd grievouſly in asking a King, yet God aſſenting to their demand, no Prince was ever more ſolemnly inſtituted than he. The People choſe him by Lot from amongſt all the Tribes, and he was plac'd in the Throne by the general conſent of the whole Nation: But he turning his lawful Power into Ty⯑ranny, diſobeying the word of the Prophet, ſlaying the Prieſts, ſparing the Amalekites, and oppreſſing the Innocent, overthrew his own Right; and God declar'd the Kingdom, which had bin given him under a con⯑ditional promiſe of perpetuity, to be intirely abrogated. This did not only give a right to the whole People of oppoſing him, but to every par⯑ticular man; and upon this account David did not only fly from his fury, but reſiſted it. He made himſelf head of all the diſcontented Perſons that would follow him: he had at firſt four, and afterwards ſix hundred men; he kept theſe in Arms againſt Saul, liv'd upon the Country, and reſolv'd to deſtroy Nabal with all his Houſe, only for refuſing to ſend Proviſions for his men. Finding himſelf weak and unſafe, he went to Achiſh the Philiſtin, and offer'd his ſervice even againſt Iſrael. This was never re⯑puted a ſin in David, or in thoſe that follow'd him, by any except the wicked Court-flatterer Doeg the Edomite, and the drunken fool Nabal, who is ſaid to have bin a man of Belial.

If it be objected, That this was rather a Flight than a War, in as much as he neither kill'd Saul nor his men, or that he made war as a King anointed by Samuel; I anſwer, that he who had ſix hundred men, and entertain'd as many as came to him, ſufficiently ſhew'd his intention rather to reſiſt than to fly: And no other reaſon can be given why he did not farther purſue that intention, than that he had no greater power: and he who arms ſix hundred men againſt his Prince, when he can have no more, can no more be ſaid to obey patiently, than if he had ſo many [236] hundreds of thouſands. This holds, tho he kills no man, for that is not the War, but the manner of making it: and 'twere as abſurd to ſay David made no War, becauſe he kill'd no men, as that Charles the eighth made no War in Italy, becauſe Guicciardin ſays, he conquer'd Naples without breaking a Lance. But as David's ſtrength increas'd, he grew to be leſs ſparing of Blood. Thoſe who ſay Kings never die, but that the right is immediately transfer'd to the next Heirs, cannot deny that Iſhboſheth inherited the right of Saul, and that David had no other right of making war againſt him, than againſt Saul, unleſs it were confer'd upon him by the Tribe of Judah that made him King. If this be true, it muſt be confeſt that not only a whole People, but a part of them, may at their own pleaſure abrogate a Kingdom, tho never ſo well eſtabliſh'd by common conſent; for none was ever more ſolemnly inſtituted than that of Saul; and few Subjects have more ſtrongly oblig'd themſelves to be obedient. If it be not true, the example of Nabal is to be follow'd; and David, tho guided by the Spirit of God, deſerves to be condemn'd as a fellow that roſe up againſt his Maſter.

If to elude this it be ſaid, That God inſtituted and abrogated Saul's Kingdom, and that David to whom the right was tranſmitted, might therefore proceed againſt him and his Heirs as privat men: I anſwer, that if the obedience due to Saul proceeded from God's Inſtitution, it can ex⯑tend to none but thoſe who are ſo peculiarly inſtituted and anointed by his Command, and the hand of his Prophet, which will be of little advan⯑tage to the Kings that can give no teſtimony of ſuch an Inſtitution or Unction; and an indiſputable right will remain to every Nation of abro⯑gating the Kingdoms which are inſtituted by and for themſelves. But as David reſiſted the Authority of Saul and Iſhboſheth, without aſſuming the Power of a King, tho deſign'd by God, and anointed by the Prophet, till he was made King of Judah by that Tribe; or arrogating to himſelf a Power over the other Tribes till he was made King by them, and had enter'd into a Covenant with them; 'tis much more certain that the Per⯑ſons and Authority of ill Kings, who have no title to the Privileges due to Saul by virtue of his inſtitution, may be juſtly reſiſted; which is as much as is neceſſary to my purpoſe.

Object. But David's Heart ſmote him when he had cut off the skirt of Saul's Garment, and he would not ſuffer Abiſhai to kill him. This might be of ſome force, if it were pretended that every man was oblig'd to kill an ill King, whenſoever he could do it, which I think no man ever did ſay; and no man having ever affirm'd it, no more can be concluded than is confeſt by all. But how is it poſſible that a man of a generous Spirit, like David, could ſee a great and valiant King, choſen from amongſt all the Tribes of Iſrael, anointed by the command of God and the hand of the Prophet, famous for victorys obtain'd againſt the enemys of Iſrael, and a wonderful deliverance thereby purchas'd to that People, caſt at his feet to receive Life or Death from the hand of one whom he had ſo furi⯑ouſly perſecuted, and from whom he leaſt deſerv'd, and could leaſt expect mercy, without extraordinary commotion of mind, moſt eſpecially when Abiſhai, who ſaw all that he did, and thereby ought beſt to have known his thoughts, expreſt ſo great a readineſs to kill him? This could not but make him reflect upon the inſtability of all that ſeem'd to be moſt glorious in men, and ſhew him that if Saul, who had bin nam'd even among the Prophets, and aſſiſted in an extraordinary manner to accompliſh ſuch great things, was ſo abandon'd and given over to fury, miſery and ſhame; [237] he that ſeem'd to be moſt firmly eſtabliſh'd ought to take care leſt he ſhould fall.

Surely theſe things are neither to be thought ſtrange in relation to Saul, who was God's Anointed, nor communicable to ſuch as are not: Some may ſuppoſe he was King by virtue of God's unction (tho if that were true, he had never bin choſen and made King by the People) but it were madneſs to think he became God's Anointed by being King: for if that were ſo, the ſame Right and Title would belong to every King, even to thoſe who by his command were accurs'd and deſtroy'd by his Servants Moſes, Joſhua and Samuel. The ſame men, at the ſame time, and in the ſame ſenſe, would be both his anointed and accurs'd, lov'd and deteſted by him, and the moſt ſacred Privileges made to extend to the worſt of his enemys.

Again; the War made by David was not upon the account of being King, as anointed by Samuel, but upon the common natural right of de⯑fending himſelf againſt the violence and fury of a wicked man; he truſt⯑ed to the promiſe, that he ſhould be King, but knew that as yet he was not ſo: and when Saul found he had ſpar'd his Life, he ſaid, I now know well that thou ſhalt ſurely be King, and that the Kingdom of Iſrael ſhall ſurely be eſtabliſh'd in thy hand; not that it was already Nay David him⯑ſelf was ſo far from taking upon him to be King, till the Tribe of Judah had choſen him, that he often acknowledg'd Saul to be his Lord. When Baanah and Rechab brought the head of Iſhboſheth to him, he commanded them to be ſlain; Becauſe they had kill'd a righteous man upon his Bed, in 2 Sam. 4. his own Houſe; which he could not have ſaid, if Iſhboſheth had unjuſtly detain'd from him the ten Tribes, and that he had a right to reign over them before they had choſen him. The Word of God did not make him King, but only foretold that he ſhould be King; and by ſuch ways as he pleas'd prepar'd the hearts of the People to ſet him up; and till the time deſign'd by God for that work was accompliſh'd, he pretended to no other Authority, than what the ſix hundred men who firſt follow'd him, afterwards the Tribe of Judah, and at laſt all the reſt of the Peo⯑ple, confer'd upon him.

I no way defend Abſalom's revolt; he was wicked, and acted wicked⯑ly: but after his death no man was ever blam'd or queſtion'd for ſiding with him; and Amaſa who commanded his Army, is repreſented in Scripture as a good man, even David ſaying, that Joab, by ſlaying Abner and Amaſa, had kill'd two men who were better than himſelf: which could 2 Sam. 20▪ [...]not have bin, unleſs the People had a right of looking into matters of Go⯑vernment, and of redreſſing abuſes; tho being deceiv'd by Abſalom, they ſo far err'd, as to prefer him, who was in all reſpects wicked, before the man, who, except in the matter of Ʋriah, is ſaid to be after God's own heart. This right was acknowledg'd by David himſelf, when he com⯑manded Huſhai to ſay to Abſalom, I will be thy Servant, O King; and by 2 Kings. Huſhai in the following Chapter, Nay, but whom the Lord and his People, and all the men of Iſrael chuſe, his will I be, and with him will I abide: which could have no ſenſe in it, unleſs the People had a right of chuſing, and that the choice in which they generally concur'd, was eſteem'd to be from God.

But if Saul, who was made King by the whole People, and anointed by the command of God, might be lawfully reſiſted when he departed from the Law of his Inſtitution; it cannot be doubted that any other for the like reaſon may be reſiſted. If David, tho deſign'd by God to be [236] [...] [237] [...] [238] King, and anointed by the hand of the Prophet, was not King till the People had choſen him, and he had made a Covenant with them; it will, if I miſtake not, be hard to find a man who can claim a right which is not originally from them. And if the People of Iſrael could erect and pull down, inſtitute, abrogate, or transfer to other Perſons or Familys, King⯑doms more firmly eſtabliſh'd than any we know, the ſame right cannot be deny'd to other Nations.

SECT. II. The Kings of Iſrael and Judah were under a Law not ſafely to be tranſgreſt.

OUR Author might be pardon'd if he only vented his own follys; but he aggravates his crime, by imputing them to men of more Credit; and tho I cannot look upon Sir Walter Raleigh as a very good In⯑terpreter of Scripture, he had too much underſtanding to ſay, That if practice declare the greatneſs of Authority, even the beſt Kings of Iſrael and Judah were not ty'd to any Law, but they did whatſoever they pleas'd in the greateſt matters; for there is no ſenſe in thoſe words. If Practice declares the greatneſs of Authority, even the beſt of Kings were ty'd to no Law, ſigni⯑fies nothing, for Practice cannot declare the greatneſs of Authority. Peter the Cruel of Caſtille, and Chriſtiern the 2d of Denmark, kill'd whom they pleas'd; but no man ever thought they had therefore a right to do ſo: and if there was a Law, all were ty'd by it, and the beſt were leſs likely to break it than the worſt. But if Sir Walter Raleigh's opinion, which 2 L. Hiſt. c. 19.he calls a conjecture, be taken, there was ſo great a difference between the Kings of Iſrael and Judah, that as to their general proceedings in point of Power, hardly any thing can be ſaid which may rightly be apply'd to both; and he there endeavours to ſhow, that the reaſon why the ten Tribes did not return to the houſe of David, after the deſtruction of the houſes of Jeroboam and Baaſha, was, becauſe they would not endure a Power ſo abſolute as that which was exercis'd by the houſe of David. If he has therefore any where ſaid that the Kings did what they pleas'd, it muſt be in the ſenſe that Moſes Maimonides ſays, The Kings of Iſrael committed many extravagances, becauſe they were ^* inſolent, impious, and deſpiſers of the Law. But whatſoever Sir Walter Raleigh may ſay (for I do not remember his words, and have not leiſure to ſeek whether any [...]ch are found in his Books) 'tis moſt evident they did not what they pleas'd. The Tribes that did not ſubmit to David, nor crown him till they thought fit, and then made a Covenant with him, took care it might be obſerv'd whether he would or not. Abſalom's Rebellion follow'd by almoſt all Iſrael, was a terrible check to his Will. That of Sheba, the Son of Bichri, was like to have bin worſe, if it had not bin ſuppreſt by Joab's diligence; and David often confeſt the Sons of Zerviah were too hard for him. Solomon indeed, overthrowing the Law given by Moſes, multiplying Gold and Silver, Wives and Horſes, introducing Idolatry, [239] and lifting up his heart above his Brethren, did what he pleas'd; but Re⯑hoboam paid for all: the ten Tribes revolted from him, by reaſon of the heavy burdens laid upon them; ſton'd Adoram who was ſent to levy the Tributes, and ſet up Jeroboam, who, as Sir Walter Raleigh ſays in the place before cited, had no other Title than the courteſy of the People, and utterly rejected the houſe of David. If practice therefore declares a right, the practice of the People to avenge the injurys they ſuffer'd from their Kings, as ſoon as they found a man fit to be their Leader, ſhews they had a right of doing it.

'Tis true, the beſt of the Kings, with Moſes, Joſhua, and Samuel, may in one ſenſe be ſaid to have done what they pleas'd, becauſe they deſir'd to do that only which was good. But this will hardly be brought to con⯑fer a right upon all Kings: And I deny that even the Kings of Judah did what they pleas'd, or that it were any thing to our queſtion if they did. Zedekiah profeſt to the great men (that is, to the Sanhedrin) that without Jerem. 38. them he could do nothing. When Amaziah, by his folly, had brought a great ſlaughter upon the Tribe of Judah, they conſpir'd againſt him in Publick Council; whereupon he fled to Lachiſh, and they purſuing him 2 Kings 14.thither, kill'd him, avow'd the Fact, and it was neither queſtion'd, nor blam'd: which examples agree with the paraphraſe of Joſephus on Deut. Antiq. Jud17. He ſhall do nothing without the conſent of the Sanhedrin; and if he at⯑tempt it, they ſhall hinder him. This was the Law of God, not to be ab⯑rogated by Man; a Law of Liberty directly oppoſite to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to the will of a man. This was a Gift beſtow'd by God upon his Children and People; whereas ſlavery was a great part of the Curſe denounc'd againſt Cham for his wickedneſs, and perpetually incumbent upon his Poſterity. The great Sanhedrin were conſtituted Judges, as Grotius ſays, moſt particularly of ſuch matters as concern'd their Kings; and Maimonides affirms, that the Kings were judg'd by them: The diſtri⯑bution of the power to the inferior Sanhedrins, in every Tribe and City, with the right of calling the People together in general Aſſemblys as often as occaſion requir'd, were the foundations of their Liberty; and being added to the Law of the Kingdom preſcrib'd in the 17th of Deuteronomy, if they ſhould think fit to have a King, eſtabliſh'd the Freedom of that People upon a ſolid foundation. And tho in their fury they did in a great meaſure wave the benefits God had beſtow'd upon 'em; yet there was enough left to reſtrain the Luſts of their Kings. Ahab did not treat with Naboth as with a Servant, whoſe Perſon and Eſtate depended upon his Will; and dos not ſeem to have bin ſo tender-hearted to grieve much for his refuſal, if by virtue of his Royal Authority he could have taken away his Vineyard and his Life: But that failing, he had no other way of ac⯑compliſhing his deſign, than by the fraud of his accurſed Wife, and the perfidious Wretches ſhe imploy'd. And no better proof that it did fail, can reaſonably be requir'd, than that he was oblig'd to have recourſe to ſuch ſordid, odious, and dangerous Remedys: But we are furniſh'd with one that is more unqueſtionable; Haſt thou kill'd, and alſo taken poſſeſſion? 1 Kings 21. In the place where Dogs lick'd the blood of Naboth, ſhall they lick thy Blood, even thine. This ſhews that the Kings were not only under a Law, but under a Law of equality with the reſt of the People, even that of Reta⯑liation. He had rais'd his heart above his Brethren; but God brought him down, and made him to ſuffer what he had done; he was in all reſpects wicked, but the juſtice of this ſentence conſiſted in the Law he had broken, which could not have bin, if he had bin ſubject to none. But [240] as this Retaliation was the ſum of all the Judicial Law given by God to his People, the Sentence pronounc'd againſt Ahab in conformity to it, and the execution committed to Jehu, ſhews, that the Kings were no leſs oblig'd to perform the Law than other men, tho they were not ſo eaſily puniſh'd for tranſgreſſing it as others were; and if many of them did eſcape, it perfectly agrees with what had bin foretold by Samuel.

SECT. III. Samuel did not deſcribe to the Iſraelites the glory of a free Monarchy; but the Evils the People ſhould ſuffer, that he might divert them from deſiring a King.

THO no reſtraint had bin put upon the Hebrew Kings, it could be no prejudice to any other Nation. They deflected from the Law of God; and rejecting him that he ſhould reign over them no longer, they fell into that miſery which could affect none but thoſe who enjoy the ſame Bleſſings, and with the ſame fury deſpiſe them. If their Kings had more Power than conſiſted with their welfare, they gave it, and God renounces the inſtitution of ^*ſuch. He gave them a Law of Liberty; and if they fell into the ſhame and miſery that accompanys ſlavery, it was their own work. They were not oblig'd to have any King; and could not without a crime have any but one, who muſt not raiſe his heart above the reſt of them. This was taught by Moſes: And Samuel, who ſpoke by the ſame Spirit, could not contradict him; and in telling the People what ſuch a King as they deſir'd would do when he ſhould be eſtabliſh'd, he did announce to them the miſery they would bring upon themſelves, by chuſing ſuch a one as he had forbidden. This free Mo⯑narchy, which our Author thinks to be ſo majeſtically deſcrib'd, was not only diſpleaſing to the Prophet, but declar'd by God to be a rejection of him, and inconſiſtent with his reign over them. This might have bin ſufficient to divert any other people from their furious reſolution; but the Prophet farther enforcing his diſſuaſion, told them, that God (who had in all other caſes bin their helper) would not hear them when they ſhould cry to him by reaſon of their King. This is the majeſtick deſcrip⯑tion of that free Monarchy with which our Author is ſo much pleas'd: It was diſpleaſing to the Prophet, hateful to God, an aggravation of all the crimes they had committed ſince they came out of Egypt, and that which would bring (as it did) moſt certain and irreparable deſtruction upon them.

But it ſeems the Regal Majeſty in that Age was in its infancy, and little in compariſon of that which we find deſcrib'd by Tacitus, Suetonius, and others in later times. He ſhall take your Sons, ſays Samuel, and ſet them over his Chariots, and your Daughters to make them Confectioners and Cooks; but the Majeſty of the Roman Emperors was carry'd to a higher pitch of Glory. Ahab could not, without employing treachery and fraud, get a ſmall ſpot of ground for his mony to make a Garden of Herbs: But [241] Tiberius, Caligula and Nero kill'd whom they pleas'd, and took what they pleas'd of their Eſtates. When they had ſatiated their cruelty and ava⯑rice by the murders and confiſcations of the moſt eminent and beſt men, they commonly expos'd their Children to the Luſt of their Slaves. If the power of doing evil be glorious, the utmoſt exceſs is its perfection; and 'tis pity that Samuel knew no more of the effects produc'd by unreſtrain'd Luſt, that he might have made the deſcription yet more majeſtick: and as nothing can be ſuffer'd by man beyond conſtupration, torments and death, inſtead of ſuch trifles as he mention'd, he might have ſhew'd them the effects of Fury in its greateſt exaltation.

If it be good for a Nation to live under ſuch a Power, why did not God of his own goodneſs inſtitute it? Did his Wiſdom and Love to his People fail? or if he himſelf had not ſet up the beſt Government over them, could he be diſpleas'd with them for asking it? Did he ſeparate that Nation from the reſt of Mankind, to make their condition worſe than that of others? Or can they be ſaid to have ſin'd and rejected God, when they deſir'd nothing but the Government, which by a perpetual Ordinance he had eſtabliſh'd over all the Nations of the World? Is not the Law of Nature a Rule which he has given to things? and the Law of man's Na⯑ture, which is Reaſon, an emanation of the divine Wiſdom, or ſome footſteps of divine Light remaining in us? Is it poſſible that this which is from God, can be contrary to his Will; and can he be offended with thoſe who deſire to live in a conformity to that Law? Or could it juſtly be ſaid, The People had choſen that which is not good, if nothing in Go⯑vernment be good but what they choſe?

But as the worſt men delight in the worſt things, and Fools are pleas'd with the moſt extreme abſurditys, our Author not only gives the higheſt praiſes to that which bears ſo many marks of God's hatred; but after hav⯑ing ſaid that Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob, and Moſes were Kings, he tells us, The Iſraelites beg'd a King of Samuel; which had bin impertinent, if the Magiſtrats inſtituted by the Law were Kings: and tho it might be a folly in them to ask what they had already, it could be no ſin to deſire that which they enjoy'd by the Ordinance of God. If they were not Kings, it follows that the only Government ſet up by God amongſt men wanted the principal part, even the Head and Foundation, from whence all the other parts have their action and being; that is, God's Law is againſt God's Law, and deſtroys it ſelf.

But if God did neither by a general and perpetual Ordinance eſtabliſh over all Nations the Monarchy which Samuel deſcribes, nor preſcribe it to his own People by a particular Command, it was purely the Peoples Crea⯑ture, the production of their own fancy, conceiv'd in wickedneſs, and brought forth in iniquity, an Idol ſet up by themſelves to their own de⯑ſtruction, in imitation of their accurſed Neighbours; and their Reward was no better than the conceſſion of an impious Petition, which is one of God's heavieſt Judgments. Samuel's words are acknowledg'd by all Interpreters, who were not malicious or mad, to be a diſſuaſion from their wicked purpoſe; not a deſcription of what a King might juſtly do by virtue of his Office, but what thoſe who ſhould be ſet up againſt God and his Law would do when they came to have the power in their hands: And I leave ſuch as have the underſtandings of men, and are not aban⯑don'd by God, to judg what influence this ought to have upon other Na⯑tions, either as to obligation or imitation.

SECT. IV. No People can be oblig'd to ſuffer from their Kings what they have not a right to do.

OUR Author's next work is to tell us, That the ſcope of Samuel was to teach the People a dutiful obedience to their King, even in the things that they think miſchievous or inconvenient: For by telling them what the King would do, he indeed inſtructs them what a Subject muſt ſuffer: Yet not ſo that it is right for Kings to do injury, but it is right for them to go unpuniſh'd by the People if they do it; ſo that in this point it is all one whether Samuel deſcribe a King or a Tyrant. This is hard, but the Concluſion is grounded upon nothing. There is no relation between a Prediction that a thing ſhall be attempted or done to me, and a Precept that I ſhall not defend my ſelf, or puniſh the perſon that attempts or dos it. If a Prophet ſhould ſay that a Thief lay in the way to kill me, it might reaſonably perſuade me not to go, or to go in ſuch a manner as to be able to defend my ſelf; but can no way oblige me to ſubmit to the violence that ſhall be offer'd, or my Friends and Children not to avenge my death if I fall: much leſs can other men be depriv'd of the natural right of defending themſelves, by my imprudence or obſtinacy in not taking the warning given, whereby I might have preſerv'd my life. For every man has a right of reſiſting ſome way or other that which ought not to be done to him; and tho human Laws do not in all caſes make men Judges and A⯑vengers of the Injurys offer'd to them, I think there is none that dos not juſtify the man who kills another that offers violence to him, if it appears that the way preſcrib'd by the Law for the preſervation of the Innocent cannot be taken. This is not only true in the caſe of outrageous attempts to aſſaſſi⯑nate or rob on the high way, but in divers others of leſs moment. I knew a man who being appointed to keep his Maſter's Park, kill'd three men in one night that came to deſtroy his Deer; and putting himſelf into the hands of the Magiſtrate, and confeſſing the Fact both in matter and manner, he was at the publick Aſſizes not only acquitted, but commended for having done his duty; and this in a time when 'tis well known Juſtice was ſeverely adminiſter'd, and little favor expected by him or his Ma⯑ſter. Nay, all Laws muſt fall, human Societys that ſubſiſt by them be diſſolv'd, and all innocent perſons be expos'd to the violence of the moſt wicked, if men might not juſtly defend themſelves againſt injuſtice by their own natural right, when the ways preſcrib'd by publick Autho⯑rity cannot be taken.

Our Author may perhaps ſay, this is true in all except the King: And I deſire to know why, if it be true in all except the King, it ſhould not be true in relation to him? Is it poſſible that he who is inſtituted for the obtaining of Juſtice, ſhould claim the liberty of doing Injuſtice as a Privi⯑lege? Were it not better for a people to be without Law, than that a Power ſhould be eſtabliſh'd by Law to commit all manner of violen⯑ces with impunity? Did not David reſiſt thoſe of Saul? Did he not make himſelf head of the Tribe of Judah, when they revolted againſt his Son, and afterwards of the ten Tribes that rejected his Poſte⯑rity? [243] Did not the Iſraelites ſtone Adoram who collected the Taxes, revolt from the Houſe of David, ſet up Jeroboam; and did not the Prophet ſay it was from the Lord? If it was from the Lord, was it not good? If it was good then, is it not ſo for ever? Did good proceed from one root then, and from another now? If God had aveng'd the Blood of Naboth by fire from Heaven, and deſtroy'd the Houſe of Ahab, as he did the two Cap⯑tains and their men who were ſent to apprehend Elijah, it might be ſaid, he reſerv'd that vengeance to himſelf; but he did it by the Sword of Jehu and the Army (which was the People who had ſet him up) for an Ex⯑ample to others.

But 'tis good to examin what this dutiful Obedience is that our Author mentions. Men uſually owe no more than they receive. 'Tis hard to know what the Iſraelites ow'd to Saul, David, Jeroboam, Ahab, or any other King, whether good or bad, till they were made Kings: And the Actof the People by which ſo great a dignity was confer'd, ſeems to have laid a duty upon them, who did receive more than they had to give: ſo that ſomething muſt be due from them, unleſs it were releas'd by vir⯑tue of a Covenant or Promiſe made; and none could accrue to them from the people afterwards, unleſs from the merit of the perſon in rightly exe⯑cuting his Office. If a Covenant or Promiſe be pretended, the nature and extent of the Obligation can only be known by the contents expreſt, or the true intention of it. If there be a general form of Covenant ſet and agreed upon, to which all Nations muſt ſubmit, it were good to know where it may be found, and by whoſe Authority it is eſtabliſh'd, and then we may examin the ſenſe of it. If no ſuch do appear, we may ra⯑tionally look upon thoſe to be Impoſtors, who ſhould go about from thence to derive a right: And as that which dos not appear, is as if it were not, we may juſtly conclude there is no other, or none that can have any effect, but ſuch as have bin made by particular Nations with their Princes; which can be of no force or obligation to others, nor to themſelves, any farther than according to the true intention of thoſe that made them. There is no ſuch thing therefore as a dutiful obedience, or duty of being obedient, incumbent upon all Nations by virtue of any Co⯑venant; nor upon any particular Nation, unleſs it be expreſt by a Cove⯑nant: and whoever pretends to a right of taking our Sons and Daugh⯑ters, Lands or Goods, or to go unpuniſh'd if he do, muſt ſhow that theſe things are expreſt or intended by the Covenant.

But tho Nations for the moſt part owe nothing to Kings till they are Kings, and that it can hardly be conceiv'd, that any people did ever owe ſo much to a man, as might not be fully repaid by the honor and advan⯑tages of ſuch an advancement; yet 'tis poſſible that when they are made Kings, they may by their good Government lay ſuch Obligations upon their Subjects, as ought to be recompens'd by obedience and ſervice. There is no mortal Creature that deſerves ſo well from mankind, as a wiſe, valiant, diligent and juſt King, who as a Father cheriſhes his People; as a Shepherd feeds, defends, and is ready to lay down his life for his flock; who is a terror to evil doers, and a praiſe to thoſe that do well. This is a glorious Prerogative, and he who has it is happy. But before this can be adjudg'd to belong to all, it muſt be prov'd that all have the Vertues that deſerve it; and he that exacts the dutiful Obedi⯑ence that ariſes from them, muſt prove that they are in him. He that dos this, need not plead for impunity when he dos injurys; for if he do them, he is not the man we ſpeak of: Not being ſo, he can have no title [244] to the duty by human Inſtitution or Covenant; nor by divine Law, ſince, as is already prov'd, God has neither eſtabliſh'd Kings over all Nations by Precept, nor recommended them by Example, in ſetting them over his own People. He has not therefore done it at all; there is no ſuch thing in nature; and Nations can owe nothing to Kings merely as Kings, but what they owe by the Contract made with them.

As theſe Contracts are made voluntarily, without any previous obli⯑gation, 'tis evident that men make them in conſideration of their own good, and they can be of force no longer, than he with whom they are made perform his part in procuring it; and that if he turn the power which was given to him for the publick good, to the publick inconveni⯑ence and damage, he muſt neceſſarily loſe the benefit he was to receive by it. The word think is fooliſhly and affectedly put in by our Author; for thoſe matters are very often ſo evident, that even the weakeſt know them. No great ſagacity is requir'd to underſtand that leud, ſlothful, ignorant, falſe, unjuſt, covetous and cruel Princes bring inconveniences and miſchiefs upon Nations; and many of them are ſo evidently guilty of ſome or all theſe Vices, that no man can be miſtaken in imputing them; and the utmoſt Calamitys may rationally be expected from them, unleſs a Remedy be apply'd.

But, ſays he, Samuel by telling them what the King would do, inſtructs them what the Subjects muſt ſuffer, and that 'tis right he ſhould go unpuniſh'd. But, by his favor, Samuel ſays no ſuch thing; neither is it to be conclud⯑ed, that becauſe a King will do wickedly, he muſt be ſuffer'd, any more than a private man, who ſhould take the ſame Reſolution. But he told them, that when they ſhould cry to the Lord by reaſon of their King, he would not hear them. This was as much as to ſay, their ruin was una⯑voidable; and that, having put the power into the hands of thoſe, who inſtead of protecting would oppreſs them; and thereby having provok'd God againſt them, ſo as he would not hearken to their cries, they could have no relief. But this was no ſecurity to the Authors of their Calamity. The Houſes of Jeroboam, Baaſha and Omri, eſcap'd not unpuniſh'd, tho the People did not thereby recover their Liberty. The Kings had intro⯑duc'd a Corruption that was inconſiſtent with it. But they who could not ſettle upon a right Foundation to prevent future miſchiefs, could a⯑venge ſuch as they had ſuffer'd, upon the heads of thoſe who had caus'd 'em, and frequently did it moſt ſeverely. The like beſel the Romans, when by the violence of Tyranny all good Order was overthrown, good Diſci⯑plin extinguiſh'd, and the People corrupted. Ill Princes could be cut in pieces, and miſchiefs might be reveng'd, tho not prevented. But 'tis not ſo every where, nor at all times; and nothing is more irrational, than from one or a few Examples to conclude a general neceſſity of future E⯑vents. They alter according to Circumſtances: and as ſome Nations by deſtroying Tyrants could not deſtroy Tyranny; others in removing the Tyrant, have cut up Tyranny by the roots. This variety has bin ſeen in the ſame Nation at different times: The Romans recover'd their Liber⯑ty by expelling Tarquin; but remain'd Slaves notwithſtanding the ſlaugh⯑ter of Ceſar. Whilſt the Body of the People was uncorrupted, they cur'd the Evil wrought by the Perſon, in taking him away. It was no hard matter to take the Regal Power that by one man had bin enjoy'd for life, and to place it in the hands of two annual Magiſtrats, whilſt the Nobility and People were, according to the condition of that Age, ſtrong and ready to maintain it. But when the miſchief had taken deeper root; [245] when the beſt part of the people had periſh'd in the Civil Wars; when all their eminent men had fallen in battel, or by the Proſcriptions; when their Diſciplin was loſt, and Vertue aboliſh'd, the poor remains of the diſtreſt people were brought under the power of a mercenary Soldie⯑ry, and found no relief. When they kill'd one Tyrant, they often made room for a worſe: It avail'd them nothing to cut off a rotten Branch, whilſt the accurſed Root remain'd, and ſent forth new Sprouts of the ſame nature to their deſtruction, Other generous Nations have bin ſub⯑du'd beyond a poſſibility of recovery; and thoſe that are naturally baſe, ſlide into the like miſery without the impulſe of an exterior Power. They are Slaves by nature, and have neither the underſtanding nor courage that is requir'd for the conſtitution and management of a Government within themſelves. They can no more ſubſiſt without a Maſter, than a flock without a Shepherd. They have no comprehenſion of Liberty, and can neither deſire the good they do not know, nor enjoy it if it were beſtow'd upon them. They bear all burdens; and whatever they ſuffer, they have no other remedy or refuge, than in the mercy of their Lord. But ſuch Nations as are naturally ſtrong, ſtout, and of good underſtanding, whoſe vigor remains unbroken, manners uncorrupted, reputation unble⯑miſh'd, and increaſing in numbers; who neither want men to make up ſuch Armys as may defend 'em againſt foreign or domeſtick Enemys, nor Leaders to head them, do ordinarily ſet limits to their patience. They know how to preſerve their Liberty, or to vindicate the violation of it; and the more patient they have bin, the more inflexible they are when they reſolve to be ſo no longer. Thoſe who are ſo fooliſh to put them upon ſuch courſes, do to their coſt find there is a difference between Lions and Aſſes; and he is a fool who knows not that ^*Swords were given to men, that none might be Slaves, but ſuch as know not how to uſe them.