[] AN ESSAY ON CIRCULATION AND CREDIT, IN FOUR PARTS.

[] AN ESSAY ON CIRCULATION AND CREDIT, IN FOUR PARTS; AND A LETTER ON THE JEALOUSY OF COMMERCE.

From the French of Monſieur DE PINTO.

Tranſlated, with ANNOTATIONS, by the Rev. S. BAGGS, M. A.

LONDON: Printed for J. RIDLEY, in ST. JAMES'S STREET.

MDCCLXXIV.

THE TRANSLATOR's PREFACE.

[i]

IF the mere diligence of a Tranſlator has no claim to reputation, it muſt be confeſſed, that in general we are modeſt enough to be contented with another kind of reward. Tranſlation undoubtedly holds the loweſt office in the republic of letters, unleſs the compilation of an index ſhould be reckoned among the labors of the mind. There is nothing enterpriſing in the genius of a tranſlator. He trades upon the property of others, without hazarding his own capital, conſequently has no extraordinary loſs of credit to fear, or profit to expect. He is no more than the factor of a foreign merchant; and, after having taken abundance of pains to diſpoſe of commodities that do not belong to him, muſt be ſatisfied with the honor of having acted faithfully to his employer, and a trifling commiſſion. But ſince the humility of the office excludes all pretenſions to fame, it is to be hoped that it will, in the ſame proportion, exempt us from cenſure. If we have no good works of our own to plead, on the other hand we have no original ſin to anſwer for. After this humiliating acknowledgement, it ſeems neceſſary for the Tranſlator of the work now offered to the public, to aſſign ſome reaſons for undertaking an employment which he profeſſes to undervalue.

[ii] The great propoſition maintained by the Author of the following Eſſays, that the national debt has been the chief ſource of the preſent wealth and power of Great Britain, though not, as he apprehends, entirely new in this country, had novelty enough however to attract my attention. The book had been favorably received upon the continent, and I underſtood that the author was a man of character and reputation in Holland. I was curious to ſee in what manner, and with what degree of accuracy, ſuch a ſubject could be treated by a foreigner. Though no great adept in the myſtery of finance, I was ſatisfied that, with regard at leaſt to the debts and reſources of England, I muſt know more of the matter than he did. This opinion will not appear very preſumptuous to any man who has had an opportunity of converſing with foreigners, eſpecially the French, upon the internal ſtate of our affairs, and who knows how ignorant they are in general of a ſubject, on which they nevertheleſs are at all times ready to decide. This, however, I found was not the caſe with the work before me. The author appeared to be a man of abilities, who had taken conſiderable pains to be informed. His principal object ſeems to have been to ſupport the credit of the Engliſh funds againſt the prejudices, the ignorance, and the malignity, of the French. At the ſame time, though he takes part with England upon this queſtion, it is evidently not from partial or intereſted motives, but from a thorough conviction of the truth of his doctrine. In other inſtances he is the friend of France. In all inſtances he is the friend of mankind. This favorable character is not meant to include the idea of infallible. The ſyſtem he ſupports may be true in the main, though not logically demonſtrated; or it may be utterly falſe, though ingeniouſly defended. At any rate, conſidering the quantity of foreign property veſted [iii] in our funds, and how much it behoves us to ſupport the reputation of parliamentary faith, and national ſecurity, in the eyes of foreigners, a work of this nature cannot be indifferent to the public. Every argument, that tends to maintain the juſt ſuperiority of our credit over that of other European nations, particularly of France, deſerves to be encouraged; and this is a ſubject, on which a foreigner will be more readily believed abroad than an Engliſhman. With reſpect to the Engliſh reader, I will not venture to promiſe him much information in matters of fact; but his mind will probably be led to a new train of thought upon a queſtion of infinite national importance, and which hitherto ſeems hardly ever to have been conſidered but in one point of view. The declamations againſt the pernicious effects of the national debt have not been confined to the diſcourſes of the vulgar, or to the wiſdom of the news-papers. Some of the ableſt men in the kingdom have treated the ſubject with as much popular violence and paſſion, as if it would not bear an argument, or as if truth and reaſon were unqueſtionably on their ſide, and nothing but ignorance and madneſs on the other. Even Mr. Hume, from whoſe genius we might have expected a clear inveſtigation and ſolution of a deep political problem, had done no more than what an ingenious man, with a tolerable command of language, but no intimate or comprehenſive knowledge of the ſubject, might have done. He conſtantly takes prejudices for principles, and builds good arguments upon falſe or doubtful data. He does not penetrate, with the eye of a maſter, into the ſubſtance of the queſtion. He does not even attempt to reconcile the phaenomena with the reaſoning; nor does he tell us by what deviation of fact from argument we are at this moment a nation. This is [iv] the common defect of almoſt all our writers upon the national debt; and if Mr. Hume be diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, it is not by any marks of that deep intuitive perception, with which he poſſeſſes himſelf of almoſt every other ſubject.

In order to ſupport a doctrine, very different from that which has hitherto prevailed among us, it is not neceſſary to affirm, that all the principles aſſumed by thoſe writers are falſe, or that all their arguments are abſurd. In human ſpeculations the ſources of truth and falſehood lie ſo near each other, that the ſtreams ſoon meet, and are too often confounded together beyond the poſſibility of ſeparation. The majority of mankind drink deep of the mixture, without enquiry or reflection. The philoſopher endeavours to carry his enquiries upward, to aſcend the great ſtream, until he reaches the point of conflux, at which truth and falſehood meet and are united.

The doctrine maintained in the following Eſſay on Credit and Circulation may, in its turn, be liable to the objection of being puſhed too far; but it is a doctrine that carries conſolation and encouragement along with it. Truth is uſually found to mediate between the extremes. The object of the Tranſlator is, to contribute ſomething to a collection of materials, out of which a wiſer and a more methodical head may hereafter form ſome rational ſyſtem of finance. There is no branch of knowledge more neceſſary, nor, I believe, leſs cultivated in this country. The ſpeculative part of ſuch a ſyſtem, inſtead of running into vehement declamations againſt evils either real or imaginary, ſhould, above all things, endeavour to account for facts and appearances, which are manifeſtly inconſiſtent with the reaſoning of former financiers, and which directly give the lye to their determinate and uniform predictions. Until this be done, the [v] mind may be alarmed with difficulties, or puzzled with argument; but it never can be ſatisfied. The practical part of the ſyſtem ſhould propoſe nothing but what the projector himſelf, if he were in the miniſter's place, would, bonâ fide, carry into execution. The circumſtances of the nation will not admit of hazardous experiments; and a good citizen ſhould remember, that, when he propoſes a plauſible ſcheme for the public ſervice, unleſs it be, at the ſame time, and all circumſtances conſidered, a practicable one, he does an eſſential miſchief to ſociety. He firſt of all aggravates the evil, in order to attribute the greater merit to the remedy; he exaſperates the minds of the ignorant, who think their caſe deſperate, and are ready to ſwallow any thing; and he alienates the affections of the people from government, who are ſuppoſed to have remedies within their reach, which they neglect to make uſe of. All this has more than once been done by very honeſt and well-meaning perſons. In England a good and wiſe man will be very cautious of appealing with argument to the paſſions of the people. The Engliſh are a moody, reſtleſs, gloomy people; and, whether right or wrong, they all argue. Whenever they are taught to think that their eſſential intereſts are in queſtion, it requires but a moderate portion of party eloquence to rouſe them into frenzy, or to ſink them into deſpair. Their conſtitutional impatience mingles with their opinions. They ſee every political object in the worſt point of view, and feel a ſtrange gratification in the melancholy patriotiſm of deploring the ruin of their country. To the indulgence of this diſpoſition no object could be better accommodated, than the enormity of the national debt, and the horrible train of evils that are ſuppoſed to attend it. This is a ſtanding diſh, on which an Engliſhman may feaſt his imagination, when he has no particular diſtreſs or injury to conſole him. In the [vi] following Eſſay he will ſee his favorite grievance very much reduced, both in ſize and quality. But will he thank the Author, or the Tranſlator, for the pains they have taken to undeceive him? At the ſame time we do not preſume to ſay that the magnitude of the debt furniſhes no ground whatſoever for apprehenſion; but we affirm, that the dangerous quality of it has been extravagantly over-rated, and that it is accompanied with circumſtances of benefit, for which no adequate allowance has been made. Ever ſince this ſwelling ſtream began to flow, a uniform faſhion has deſcended with it of annexing no ideas to ſuch an object, but thoſe of torrent and deſolation. The people of this country, with the inſtance before their eyes, have hardly ever conſidered that there is a ſort of inundation, that carries riches and fertility, as well as terror, along with it. But we are not afraid to encounter any kind of ſpeculation, let it be ever ſo univerſally adopted, that ſtands in perpetual oppoſition to experience. We think it will appear, upon a diſpaſſionate enquiry, not only that we ſhould not have been ſo powerful a nation, but that we ſhould not have been ſo rich as we are, if we had not run in debt; and that our object ſhould be, not to pay off the debt, but to reduce and keep it within ſuch bounds, as may leave us an ample margin of credit for future exigences. In ſpite of all declamations, the hiſtorical fact is not to be reſiſted. The wealth and power of the Engliſh nation have grown with its debt; and without being bound to prove that they ſtand in the ſtrict relation of cauſe and effect, it is ſufficient to ſilence moſt of our opponents, that the two accidents have gone hand in hand together, and in general preſerved their original proportion to each other. It cannot be denied, that the rate of intereſt is lower by one half at leaſt, if not five eighths, than it was before any public debt exiſted, and that the value of land has riſen ſince [vii] that period in nearly the ſame proportion. A man muſt be blinded not to ſee, and merely obſtinate not to admit, that the general increaſe of the national ſtock, in every article of property and improvement, has kept pace with the increaſe of the debt; and what is ſtill more extraordinary, though not leſs true, that when we owed above a hundred millions ſterling, we were able to borrow ſums, which not only could not have been borrowed, but which could not have been found, at the time when we owed nothing. To thoſe who will not be perſuaded of the truth of a principle ſupported by ſuch a concurrence of unqueſtionable facts, the argument muſt be offered in another ſhape. Admitting the debt to be a national evil of any ſuppoſed magnitude, let it not be exaggerated beyond the poſſibility of relief. If it be a burthen, let us flatter ourſelves that we ſtill have ſtrength enough left to lighten or remove it. The contrary opinion leads directly to inactivity and deſpondence. No man ſets heartily about a taſk, which he thinks he ſhall never be able to accompliſh. If, inſtead of indulging in the peeviſh pleaſure of complaining, or in the childiſh imbecillity of magnifying the object of our fears, the nation could be brought to a more chearful temper on this ſubject, the miniſter would be quickened and encouraged by it to meet this formidable debt in front, and to attack it fairly by ſome vigorous and ſpirited operation. On their own principles, they ought not only to applaud him when his ſchemes ſucceed, but endeavour to animate and conſole him when they fail. Surrounded, as they ſuppoſe him to be, with dangers and terrors of every ſort, they ought to meet him after a defeat, and return him their thanks for not deſpairing of the republic.

But in this, as in every other deliberation that touches the ſafety of the commonwealth, it is eſſentially neceſſary to diſtinguiſh [viii] with caution between vigor and violence, and not to conceive our ſituation to be ſo far hopeleſs, as to admit of none but deſperate remedies. A ſtrong man ſhows his ſtrength in actions that require but a moderate exertion of it. The weak man, on the contrary, betrays his feebleneſs by the violence of his efforts, and by the ſame means uſually haſtens the ruin of a broken or enervated conſtitution.

When we ſpeak of violent meaſures applied to the reduction of the debt, we are far from meaning any ſuch as carry the idea of force, or breach of ſpecific contract with the public creditor. We are equally convinced, that a Britiſh parliament will never entertain a thought of that kind, and that the nation would never adopt it. The caution is directed merely againſt what are commonly called Strokes in Finance, intended to operate ſuddenly to a great extent. The meaſures, that really deſerve that name, are ſlow and gradual, but ſure in their operation, and conſtantly increaſing in their power. They are alſo ſafe in this reſpect, that they do not ſuddenly alter the ſtate and diſpoſition of any conſiderable maſs of property at once, or throw it out of the ordinary channels of circulation. In the courſe of the following work, the reader will meet with hints leading to meaſures of this nature, which may be adopted, or improved, by men better ſkilled in the finances of England than either the author or the tranſlator.

Whatever may be the merit of the tranſlation now ſubmitted to the public, or however defective or incomplete the original may appear to readers thoroughly verſed in the ſubject, the Author himſelf has a powerful claim upon the Engliſh reader, and ſhould be received among us with every poſſible mark of perſonal conſideration and reſpect. The ſervices which Monſieur de Pinto has rendered to the Engliſh nation cannot eaſily be overrated. [ix] He has ſupported the credit of the funds, and aſſerted the power and reſources of this country, againſt two of the moſt dangerous enemies that genius and argument can poſſibly contend with—the malignity of the French, and the ignorance of the reſt of Europe. He has done it with a zeal, ſpirit, ability, and ſucceſs, that entitle him to our utmoſt gratitude and favor. Such advocates, in defence of our national credit, are more wanted, and more uſeful, upon the continent, than people in this country are commonly aware of. They help to diſſuade ſome from withdrawing their property out of the funds; they incite others to veſt it in them; and they contribute to eſtabliſh a favorable opinion, in the councils of other powers, of the extent and ſuperiority of our reſources, as neceſſary perhaps to ſecure us from inſult or attack, as the moſt formidable or menacing apparatus of war. The increaſe of foreign property in the funds is an object, which intereſts the nation in proportion to the ſum total of the debt. The actual quantity of this commodity far exceeds our home conſumption; and it will be [...]mpoſſible to keep it at any tolerable price, without the aſſiſtance of a foreign market. I am not moved by the objection of the [...]nnuity carried out of the nation, becauſe I am convinced that, [...]f we are thrifty, we may gain more by the uſe than we loſe by [...]he intereſt. Would to God that the whole debt could be [...]mmediately purchaſed by, and transferred to, foreigners! What [...]tronger guaranty could we poſſibly invent for preſerving our [...]dependence as a nation, and for the ſecurity of the preſent [...]ſtabliſhment? The writer, whoſe labors in any ſhape con [...]ibute to increaſe the intereſt, which foreigners take in the [...]roſperity of this nation, whether with their inclination or [...]gainſt it, ſhould be conſidered as a public benefactor. His [...]eal deſerves to be honored and encouraged;—his works deſerve [x] to be read. Theſe are not however the only obligations, for which we are indebted to Monſieur de Pinto.

A miſtake in that article of the preliminaries of the laſt treaty with France, which relates to the poſſeſſions of the two Eaſt-India companies, was fortunately obſerved by Monſieur de Pinto, and communicated to the late Duke of Bedford. This anecdote is highly honorable to the Duke's memory. He ſaw, and acknowledged the importance of Monſieur de Pinto's obſervation, and, with a ſpirit infinitely more honorable to him than any diligence that might have prevented the miſtake, he inſiſted peremptorily upon its being corrected in the definitive treaty. The French miniſter ſhrugged his ſhoulders, reſiſted, cavilled, remonſtrated, complained, grimaced, and ſubmitted. Monſieur de Pinto's ſervices on this important occaſion were recommended by the Duke, and rewarded by the Company. They gave him five hundred pounds a year, which he now enjoys, and which, it is to be preſumed, their gratitude and juſtice will always continue to him.

With reſpect to the Notes, after reviewing them deliberately in print, I feel an honeſt inclination to confeſs, that they appear to me to be written with much greater freedom than judgment. They are exempt however from the principal error of commentators, who are apt to run into extravagant and indiſcriminate praiſes of their original. With reſpect to the length of the Notes, a man muſt have dealt in the myſtery of comment and annotation, to know how difficult it is to exerciſe it with brevity, and how much more difficult it is to refrain from printing what has once been written. We authors have a falſe parental tenderneſs about us, which induces us to expoſe our offspring, when perhaps it would be more to our credit, and a much greater act of mercy, to ſtrangle them in their birth. I [xi] am thoroughly ſenſible that the little I have ventured of my own has no chance of being well received, but under the auſpices of the text.

I had at firſt ſome thoughts of ſoliciting the Miniſter's leave to offer the whole work to his protection. An eſſay upon finance ſeemed to fall within his department, though I had no expectation of his honoring it with a peruſal. A miniſter is too much employed in reading men to find leiſure for reading books. Yet the ſanction of his name might have recommended it to others. On farther conſideration however, that idea was given up. Beſides that I had no ſufficient intereſt or introduction to obtain ſuch a favor, I was unwilling that my own ſpeculations, ſuch as they are, ſhould be cramped or qualified by the temporary intereſts or engagements of government, or accommodated to the immediate views of men in office. My ideas of ſerving the public go beyond the opening of a budget, or the ſervice of a year. Perhaps I could not give the reader a more ſatisfactory aſſurance, that they will never be adopted.

THE AUTHOR's PREFACE.

[xiii]

THE firſt part of this Eſſay was written in France in the year 1761. I thought it neceſſary therefore to enter into a detail of various particulars reſpecting the Engliſh funds, with which the French were unacquainted. Several perſons took copies of it at Paris. Some Engliſh noblemen, whom I ſaw there after the peace, did me the ſame honor. It ſeems probable, that this Eſſay will one day or other be printed; and I ſhould have reaſon to apprehend its appearing in a very imperfect ſtate. As it was not drawn up with a view to publication, the proofs, by which many new propoſitions were ſupported, were not carried to that extent, nor to that degree of illuſtration, which the ſubject ſeemed to require. I have even obſerved lately in ſome Engliſh papers, that my ideas began to be received in England; and, conſidering the number of manuſcript copies that have been taken within theſe three years, I am not ſurpriſed at it. Some well-informed Engliſhmen told me at Paris, that my ſyſtem, ſo far as it concerns the national debt, was entirely new.

* A pamphlet has lately been publiſhed, in which, upon my own principles, it is aſſerted, that the oppoſition, which [xiv] King William met with in obtaining ſupplies from parliament, has been the cauſe of the opulence of the kingdom. The contradictions he received from the nation obliged him to introduce the Dutch ſyſtem of loans into England, and the kingdom has been enriched by it. In this ſtroke I diſcovered the adoption of my own principles. On reading the pamphlet, I ſaw that the author had not proved his ſyſtem by the ſame kind of arguments I have done. In the year [xv] 1761 my Eſſay on this ſubject was read by every body at Paris. Some obſcure paſſages were pointed out to me, which eaſily eſcape a writer, who, full of his ſubject, ſuppoſes every thing as clear and intelligible to the reader as to himſelf. Theſe I have endeavoured to correct; and I flatter myſelf, that the principles, on which my ſyſtem is founded, are now proved to demonſtration. The concluſions reſulting from them are not barren truths, nor merely of ſpeculation. They are equally intereſting to the public, and to the principal powers of Europe.

I may venture to affirm, that during my ſtay at Paris, I removed a prejudice which many people had conceived againſt the credit of England. They imagined, that the Engliſh, notwithſtanding their ſucceſſes, had no reſource left; and flattered themſelves they ſhould every minute ſee a national bankruptcy, which would overturn the kingdom. I proved that this was all a deluſion.

The Engliſh in general are little acquainted with the immenſe reſources of France. The French are totally ignorant of thoſe of England. The two nations are formed to eſteem each other, and to live in peace; yet, unfortunately, they quarrel about ſuppoſed intereſts, which at the bottom perhaps are miſunderſtood.

Jealouſy of commerce, and competition for power, create enmity between nations as well as between individuals. They run the ſame career, and aſpiring at the ſame object, are enemies becauſe they are rivals. If princes could be perſuaded, that the real intereſts of commercial powers do not claſh (as I ſhall endeavour to ſhow hereafter) peace and the happineſs of mankind might poſſibly be eſtabliſhed on a durable foundation.

[xvi] The reader ſhould be appriſed, that this Syſtem of Credit and Circulation will require reading deliberately, and oftener than once. The ſubject is of an abſtract nature. In the firſt reading, ſome things, eſſentially neceſſary to make the ſyſtem intelligible, will always eſcape. In the progreſs, and at the end of a diſcourſe, we often find proofs which confirm and explain the firſt aſſertions; and ſometimes it is impoſſible to comprehend the truth of the laſt propoſitions, if the firſt are not thoroughly underſtood.

It has been frequently obſerved, that to liſten well is more difficult than to ſpeak well; at leaſt it is certain, that there are many who ſpeak ſenſibly, for one who liſtens with attention. We hear with diſtraction and prejudice, and in general are more employed in framing a reply, than in conſidering what has been ſaid. The caſe is the ſame with the generality of readers. Inattention in reading is oftentimes unavoidable; but it may eaſily be repaired by a ſecond or third peruſal, particularly of the eſſential articles. Theſe are ſhort, and contain truths of importance. Impatience and vivacity are apt to prejudice the reader againſt a new propoſition. A croud of objections preſent themſelves to his mind. He loſes the phlegm and cold blood that are neceſſary to follow an author, and to examine the ſolutions he propoſes. People wiſh to find the materials of a book comprehended within a page.

They, who are not intereſted in the ſubject, have no buſineſs to read an eſſay not written for their uſe. They, who take a real intereſt in it, will read it oftener than once; and, I hope, with attention. Rouſſeau ſomewhere ſays, that he has not the art of being clear to people who will not be attentive. If that painter of our ideas holds ſuch a language, [xvii] how much greater is the indulgence due to a writer who pretends to nothing but to deliver ſome important truths in a new form! With regard to ſtyle, I have attended only to things, not to words.

Inveterate prejudices were to be removed. I frequently appear to diſpute truths, which in fact I admit, but which, from being improperly applied, have led to dangerous miſtakes. I often ſeem to repeat what others have ſaid, when in effect the difference between us is material. Truth, in the abſtract, is indiviſible, ſimple, and unalterable. No one truth is greater than another. But it is not ſo eaſy to diſtinguiſh the infinite relations, which different truths bear to each other. This I believe is the principal ſource of our miſtakes, every man thinking that the truth he ſet out with continues to ſupport him.

Repetitions will, I hope, be forgiven. They are ſometimes neceſſary, and always uſeful. They revive and illuſtrate fundamental truths. They are not ſo much repetitions, as concluſions, of which the reader ſhould from time to time be reminded. Some ideas muſt be cut into facets to be thoroughly underſtood. If in ſome places I aſſume a figurative ſtyle, it is at leaſt without affectation. Every opportunity ſhould be taken to adorn a ſubject naturally dry and barren of ornament, provided the figures are not too far fetched. When the ſoil is unfruitful, we are glad to meet with flowers.

Some remarks, which would have made the text too diffuſed, and perplexed the tranſitions, are mentioned in notes.

The means, pointed out in the Second Part, for conſolidating the ſinking fund in England, and creating another auxiliary and permanent ſinking fund, applicable to the diſcharge of debt both in peace and war, are only looſe ideas. They ſhow the poſſibility, advantage, and neceſſity, of ſome ſuch meaſures. If [xviii] approved of by the Engliſh nation, it belongs to themſelves to apply them in whatever form may be moſt conſiſtent with their conſtitution. It is not that I dread the ridicule uſually thrown upon projectors. The prejudice againſt them is unjuſt, and ſtill more ridiculous. It often happens that a project is the ſafety of the ſtate. We are not to deſpiſe phyſicians, becauſe there are a multitude of quacks. Voltaire ſays that, when Columbus firſt imagined the exiſtence of the new world, he was told that the thing was impoſſible, and was treated like a viſionary. When he had actually made the diſcovery, he was told that his new world had been diſcovered long before. The contempt, into which projects are fallen, may hinder many people from propoſing good ones. But I am no projector. I point out methods known and practiſed elſewhere. I only ſhow the materials, with which others may erect a ſolid building;

"—fungar vice cotis, acutum
"Reddere quae ferrum valet, exſors ipſa ſecandi."

I flatter myſelf that my refutation of the Marquis de Mirabeau's Theory of Taxation, and of the Bilan of England, will be found to comprehend the elements of a complete ſyſtem of finance. Men of deeper and more methodical underſtanding are called upon to unfold all the principles that belong to it, and to place them in a clearer light, and better order. The Theory of Taxation contains many excellent remarks. I intreat the author to forgive the liberty I have taken in criticiſing his ſyſtem. I admire his underſtanding. I love and reſpect his ſentiments, becauſe they are thoſe of an honeſt man. But his ſyſtem of taxation appears to me to defeat the end he aims at. I once enjoyed the pleaſure of his converſation at my Lord Hertford's, [xix] the Engliſh ambaſſador at Paris, and was delighted with it. A long illneſs prevented me from cultivating his acquaintance as I intended, and profiting by it while I ſtaid at Paris. I believe him too much a philoſopher to be offended at my not being entirely of his opinion. I make the ſame apology to the author of the Bilan of England. In ſome places I refute Mr. Hume, who, far from taking it amiſs, has favored me with many marks of friendſhip and affection, and I feel a pride in acknowledging my gratitude to him. We both aim at the ſame object. Our common view is to ſerve the public. This is not a trial of underſtanding. I ſhould have loſt my own, if I thought myſelf qualified to enter the liſts with thoſe gentlemen upon any other queſtions. They have every advantage over me, except that I have had an opportunity, both from particular ſtudy and perſonal experience, to examine this ſubject in every poſſible ſhape. If I had poſſeſſed their general ſuperiority of knowledge and elegance of ſtyle, this Treatiſe might have been improved to a degree of perfection, which it wants at preſent, but which it may one day acquire in the hands of ſome man of greater abilities. I have nothing more to ſay on my own account. The work itſelf muſt ſay the reſt.

ESSAY ON CIRCULATION AND CREDIT.

[1]

PART 1. The great Advantages of the National Debt, to a certain Amount. How the Commerce or Gaming in the Stocks contributes to the Credit and Circulation of the Public Funds; and what Advantages England has derived from thence.

THE national debt of England, and the funds that compoſe it, known under the name of Annuities, * have for ſome time attracted the attention of princes, and the ſpeculation of individuals. Many perſons, in France and elſewhere, relying [2] on their correſpondents, have engaged in the traffic of the ſtocks, without being thoroughly acquainted with the nature or object of it. I have been often conſulted, and have [3] ſeen with aſtoniſhment, that people of the beſt underſtanding were the moſt at a loſs to comprehend the detail of a traffic, which in Holland and England is perfectly underſtood by heads the moſt deſtitute of ſagacity. It has been obſerved that, in the execution of a ſubaltern poſt, men, born for great employment, are frequently inferior to the moſt ordinary capacities. [4] Beſides this, there are things which can never be well underſtood in theory. Practice alone gives us a thorough inſight into affairs. To know all the windings of the ſeraglio, one muſt be educated within-ſide of it. Yet, if I can engage the reader's attention, I hope to ſpeak plainly enough to make myſelf underſtood. I myſelf have been ſurpriſed at the detail which this object requires, and how abſtracted it ſeems even to ſome who have been accuſtomed to ſtudies infinitely more ſo. A robuſt ſtomach, accuſtomed to digeſt a ſolid food, is often cloyed with a light nouriſhment that ſeems to be of the eaſieſt digeſtion. Another difficulty ariſes from the terms appropriated to this traffic: ſome of them are unknown; others muſt be taken in an acceptation different from the vulgar ſenſe; and this circumſtance requires particular attention. The draught of this picture has engaged me in a diſſertation upon credit and circulation, more important than the traffic of the ſtocks. It will flatter me, if they, who ſearch for information upon ſo important a ſubject, ſhould find it in this paper; and if my ideas of circulation and credit in general ſhould be of any ſervice to the public. I may be deceived; but it is not my intention to miſlead. With reſpect to facts, I cannot be miſtaken, becauſe I advance none which are not certain, and almoſt of public notoriety.

Strictly ſpeaking, there is nothing, but the metals 2 gold, ſilver, and copper, reduced to money, that is really, and by general agreement, the common meaſure and univerſal medium of exchange. Money is the key and inſtrument by which all [5] our wants are ſupplied. The real circulation of money, in the daily and domeſtic expence, which we call Buſineſs, is prodigious. The ſame crown piece may have circulated through fifty different hands in the ſpace of twenty-four hours, and repreſented fifty different things in the courſe of its circulation. If the fifty perſons were to meet at night, they would find, that they had expended and paid fifty crowns, though in fact there had exiſted but one piece of money. Let it only be obſerved, that there is not in the whole univerſe half the money which the expences of the ſingle city of Paris amount to in one year, reckoning all the expences incurred and paid in money from the firſt day of January to the laſt day of December; in all the orders [6] of the ſtate, from the king's houſehold to the beggar, who conſumes a pennyworth of bread every day.

This minute circulation is immenſe, from the multiplicity of ſimultaneous operations repeated in all quarters, and at every minute. But there is another circulation in groſs, ſupported by credit and paper ſecurity, which repreſents money, as money repreſents things. The example of the crown piece ſhows, that a private merchant, 4 whoſe credit is good, independently of the reſpite allowed him for the payment of his purchaſes, may circulate his own paper, avail himſelf of that of others, and multiply the ſprings of his commerce in proportion to the facility of circulation. There are oftentimes ten endorſements upon the ſame bill of exchange, which repreſents the ſame value to ten different perſons. Theſe are important truths: though ſufficiently known, they do not deſerve to be called trivial. There is another ſubject leſs underſtood, and, perhaps, never thoroughly examined: I mean the analyſis of the public funds, and of the ſtock of trading companies, in that political view in which they ought to be conſidered by a ſtateſman. I mean to enquire how far circulation and numerary 5 wealth is augmented by the funds, and to weigh the arguments for and againſt creating them, with reſpect to the [7] intereſt of the ſtate; that is, whether debts are of any ſervice to the ſtate; and afterwards to conſider the uſe and abuſe made of them in that traffic, which we call Stockjobbing.

I know there have been great men, who have ſpoken vaguely upon the ſubject, and, I may venture to ſay, without underſtanding the merits of the queſtion. My Lord Bolingbroke, and the Preſident de Monteſquieu, have conſidered annuitants, whom they ſuppoſed to live in idleneſs upon the funds, at the expence of the induſtrious part of the people, as ſo many hurtful members to the ſtate, which, already overwhelmed by the facility of running into debt, is weakened and enervated by ſupporting its creditors.

Whatever truth there may be in ſuch reflexions, I ſhall demonſtrate that great advantages have reſulted from the creation of loans, and even from the traffic or game carried on in the funds, when once the nature of it is underſtood, and the whole ſubject, combined with all its conſequences, ſhall be thoroughly diſcuſſed. The looſe and imperfect ideas, which ſome perſons have conceived on this point, have given riſe to a number of works, in which the authors have miſtaken the nature, circulation, and credit of the Engliſh funds, and have done a diſſervice to France, by leading her into an error upon a moſt important article. People have been too ready to believe what they ardently wiſhed might be true. When once we ſet out upon a falſe principle, the whole ſyſtem is affected by it.

Who is there that might not be ſeduced at finding it advanced as a certain fact, in a * book much eſteemed and very well written, that the Bank of England unites within itſelf, as in a ſingle point, all the public credit of the nation and all the [8] private credit of individuals? The 6 Bank of England has nothing to do with the national debt: it is a bank of circulation, which bears no other relation to government, than a rich individual bears to the ſtate. A Mount of Piety, a Lombard well eſtabliſhed, might perhaps, in time and under a good direction, do very near as much in France as the Bank does in England.

Government is ſo far from conſidering the Bank, that, at the beginning of the laſt war, they did entirely without its aſſiſtance. Exchequer bills performed the office of the Bank. The terms, in which the author exaggerates the alarm and diſtreſs of the Bank in the year 1745, are no better founded.

[9] 7 It is a common miſtaken notion that, when ſtocks fall, it is owing to want of credit. It is abſurd and ridiculous to ſay that credit fails, while government can borrow ſeveral millions [10] ſterling; but it is natural enough that ſtocks ſhould fall at a time when very conſiderable ſums are demanded for new loans, and when it appears that, from the continuance of the war, the ſame operation muſt be repeated for ſeveral years. As money becomes ſcarce, it becomes more valuable, and riſes in price, like any other commodity, in proportion to the demand. The ſtate, having occaſion for money, is obliged to give a greater intereſt. This, for a moment, ſinks the old ſtocks, becauſe every man finds his account in ſelling out, in order to inveſt his capital in the new loan, or ſubſcription, which offers him a higher rate of intereſt. Other accidents make money ſcarce for a time, and ſink the ſtocks, without its being any way a ſign of a defect of credit. When credit really fails, it is impoſſible to borrow large ſums upon any terms; and then, the more we [11] offer, the leſs we find. England was never in this ſituation in the laſt, or the preceding war. An intereſt of half per cent. more or leſs, made all the difference. Credit, that is the power of finding funds, however exorbitant, to ſupport the expence of the campaign, never wavered a moment, neither in the year 1744, nor in the laſt war. 8

The Bank, on the other hand, had formerly the precaution to give little premiums to moneyed men, who, upon preſſing occaſions, undertook to furniſh ſpecie to be circulated by the Bank in other quarters. The Bank then was always ſure of finding funds to pay the bills which poured in upon it; and, even ſuppoſing the Bank to have gone to the bottom, which is impoſſible, 9 [12] it has no concern with the national debt, which is not demandable, and never can be reclaimed, as all France, and many writers upon this ſubject, have very falſely conceived. As long as the intereſt is paid, there is no other demand. As to the reſt, Bank ſtock is very different from Bank bills. India and South Sea ſtock are again of a different nature; although theſe three corporations (the name appropriated in England 10 to ſuch eſtabliſhments) have all a credit upon government of many millions ſterling in annuities, the capital of which makes part of the national debt, and never can be demanded. 11 The pretended bankruptcy of England has therefore always been [13] imaginary: her debts, never becoming due, and having no critical period to dread, are as if they did not exiſt. The intereſt may be a burthen to the ſtate, but never can be the diſtreſs of a particular point of time.

Beſides, there is annexed to each loan a ſolid, ſeparate, and diſtinct ſecurity for paying the intereſt, for which the whole nation in a body is reſponſible and guarantée, every thing being done with the ſanction of parliament. All the different orders of the ſtate are intereſted in the funds, which conſtitute one part of their property, and give value to the other. The nobility, who have a large portion of the land, have alſo a ſhare in the annuities. The proprietors of land have a great concern in the annuities. Tradeſmen, merchants, and even mechanics, are all of them annuitants. It is mere declamation to repreſent the proprietors of the public funds * ‘"as men who carry their fortunes in their pocket-books; as drones that devour the honey made by the bees; a race of men, enemies to the plough, and to the landed intereſt; and, in ſhort, a public peſt in every ſtate, where they live in ſordid avarice, and labor night and day to accumulate money, to ſwell their accounts, and to increaſe the burthen of the ſtate."’

[14] This whole picture is not only loaded, but entirely falſe and chimerical. If there exiſted ſuch a race of men, diſtinct from the reſt of the nation, and able to ſupply the ſtate, year after year, with twelve millions ſterling at four per cent. firſt, and afterwards for a little more, 12 they would be intitled to reſpect rather than inſult. But in fact it is the whole Engliſh nation in a body, ſupported by their credit with foreigners, and by a few dealers in the ſtocks, who contribute not a little to maintain the circulation and credit of this immenſe volume of annuities. I ſhall explain this point in the ſequel. At preſent I mean only to conſider the annuities of England as a maſs of the largeſt volume, in which there has been the greateſt traffic, and which has lately been the ſubject of great ſpeculation, as it affects the intereſt of individuals as well as of nations. I ſhall begin by explaining, more particularly, what theſe annuities are.

* Almoſt all the national debt of England, as I have already obſerved, conſiſts of annuities ariſing from different loans made [15] to government. We have ſeen that this debt is not demandable; that government has fixed no term for diſcharging it; that a ſolid and permanent fund is engaged to pay the intereſt without interruption, the moment it becomes due; and that every thing is done with the ſanction of parliament; ſo that the whole nation may be ſaid to have concurred in creating theſe annuities, and to have become guarantée and ſecurity for the intereſt. We muſt not forget, that the ſtate is at liberty to diſcharge its debts whenever it thinks proper, 13 except the laſt loans, which cannot be redeemed for ſome years. No embarraſſment then can ever ariſe from being obliged to pay or reimburſe at a certain period, as many foreigners have falſely conceived.

The ſcrupulous and inviolable exactneſs, with which the intereſt has conſtantly been paid, and the idea we have formed of parliamentary faith, have enabled the credit of England to negotiate loans which have aſtoniſhed Europe. The ſinking fund contributes greatly to the ſupport of credit; but credit alone could never have worked the miracle, if it were not for a [16] ſpring and power of faculty and contribution, by which credit is ſupplied. It is this power of faculty, this ſpring, that I mean to explain. The explanation, if I am not miſtaken, will throw a new light upon the ſubject, and correct a number of confuſed notions, which people of the beſt underſtanding have formed upon this important point.

It is not foreigners only who are unacquainted with the nature of the national debt of England; the natives themſelves miſtake the matter. Many Engliſhmen, as well as foreigners, conſider the debt as a counterpoiſe to all their ſucceſſes. Supported by the authority of Lord Bolingbroke, Sir Robert Walpole, Sir John Barnard, and other great men, they look upon the national debt as an unwieldy burthen, that oppreſſes the kingdom and enervates the power of the ſtate. Their apprehenſions, I believe, are founded upon the following principles.—The more a government is indebted, the more the nation muſt be loaded with taxes to ſatisfy the intereſt only; this of itſelf is a great inconvenience. The ſecond, reſulting from the firſt, is, that increaſe of taxes raiſes the price of labour, and injures manufactures. The third is the tribute paid to foreigners who have property in the funds. The fourth, which has been much and long inſiſted on, is the ſpirit of idleneſs, gaming, and ſtockjobbing, introduced into the nation by the traffic carried on in the funds. Theſe four objections ſeem, at firſt ſight, to juſtify every declamation againſt the national debt: yet I think I can demonſtrate, from ſpeculation and experience, that what has been ſaid upon this ſubject is more ſpecious than ſolid; and that people have talked, without entering thoroughly into the queſtion.

I ſhall firſt prove, that the national debt has increaſed the numerary wealth of the nation; that it is neceſſary to the [17] ſupport of circulation, by which it was produced, and of the excentric commerce which Europe, and particularly of that which England carries on in the other quarters of the world; in ſhort, that it is highly uſeful, up to a certain point; that taxes, in a great meaſure, return into the hand that pays them, and, inſtead of injuring, are favorable to induſtry; that the advantages ariſing from ſtockjobbing are far ſuperior to the miſchief it occaſions; that, without the game carried on in the ſtocks, England would not have had the means of making the efforts ſhe has done; and that this laſt article has never been well underſtood by thoſe who have treated of it. They have ſeen the effects, and have always been ignorant of the cauſes. Theſe I mean to explain. England is in the ſituation of a man who finds himſelf extremely well, breathes freely, and enjoys the moſt ruddy health; but who is not ſufficiently verſed in anatomy to know the principles of the health he enjoys. If he be told, that poſſibly ſome lurking diſorder may be concealed under this florid appearance, he at once takes the alarm, perplexes himſelf with apprehenſions, and is a prey to uneaſineſs.

Let us come to the fact. I affirm that the national debt has enriched the nation, and I prove it thus. On every new loan the government of England mortgages a portion of taxes to pay the intereſt, and creates a new artificial capital, which did not exiſt before, which becomes permanent, fixed and ſolid, and by means of credit circulates to the advantage of the public, as if it were in effect ſo much real treaſure, that had enriched the kingdom. Let us take for an example the twelve millions borrowed in the year 1760, and ſee what became of them. Is it not true, that the greateſt part of that money was ſpent within the nation? Nothing but the ſubſidies, and a part of the ſums expended in Germany, can be conſidered as loſt. I ſay a part, [18] for, even in a war upon the continent, the nation profits by furniſhing a variety of articles, as well as by the individuals who are employed there. When they water Germany, they only fertiliſe a ſoil, of which their commerce reaps the benefit. The riches of Germany always turn to the account of trading nations. But I content myſelf with obſerving, that it is indiſputable that a great part of the above loan was employed and circulated within the nation. England then will have preſerved a conſiderable ſhare of theſe twelve millions, diſperſed and abſorbed in the nation itſelf; at the ſame time that the numerary riches of her creditors, who are chiefly Engliſh, are augmented by twelve millions, which did not exiſt before. *

If another ſtill more ſenſible proof be required, that the numerary of about a hundred and thirty millions ſterling, which the Engliſh nation poſſeſſes in annuities, and other factitious funds, would, in a great meaſure, not have exiſted, without the creation of theſe funds, one need only imagine in what would this numerary wealth have conſiſted, if the funds had never been in being? 14 Could it have been in money? Excluſive [19] of plate, there is not ſo much ſpecie in Europe. Could it have been in land? The limits of Great-Britain are not to be extended. Land has already riſen greatly in value, and, without an increaſe of population, will not admit of farther improvement. Could it have been in ſhips and commerce? Theſe two objects alſo have their limits, relative to the number of inhabitants. You cannot amaſs commodities beyond your conſumption; and too many merchants are frequently a prejudice to commerce. When once there is as much money employed as the demands of trade call for, the reſt is uſeleſs. It is not in the nature of things that the commerce of a nation ſhould enlarge continually, and introduce greater and greater ſums in a perpetual progreſſion. Where then would theſe millions have exiſted, which conſtitute ſo great a part of the wealth of the nation? If at all, they muſt have exiſted in foreign countries, which would be dangerous, even if it were poſſible. But no man will maintain ſuch a propoſition; eſpecially ſince it is demonſtrated, that the ſpecie, which produced theſe funds, remained partly in the kingdom, and have ſucceſſively been employed in every loan.

[20] If it were poſſible to add theſe hundred millions (to which nothing but the loans have given an exiſtence) to the current coin, the ſtate would ſuffer a real repletion of ſpecie, by which its oeconomy would be overturned. For this money, if it were poſſible for it to exiſt, would be ſcattered over the nation, not collected in the Exchequer; it would then entirely loſe its quality of a ſign; commodities would riſe to treble their preſent price, and all commercial proportion be deſtroyed. But the ſuppoſition is abſurd. The principles I lay down reſolve the difficulty.

The enormous ſum, of which the national debt is compoſed, never exiſted at once. This maſs of wealth has been ſucceſſively produced with the ſame ſpecie, by the magic of credit and circulation, which ſaves the inconvenience of having ſo large a ſum in ſpecie. The quantity that really exiſts is ſufficient to give an intrinſic value to every portion of the public funds in its turn, without exceeding the limits of an eaſy and uſeful circulation. The public funds have literally a magnetic virtue with reſpect to money.

When the proprietors of the old funds undertook to furniſh new loans to government, they proceeded thus. They not only found money within the nation by ſelling their conſolidated annuities ſomething per cent. lower, but they mortgaged thoſe annuities to foreigners, and ſo were enabled to avail themſelves of much larger ſums, by draughts, than could have been borrowed upon private credit. By theſe means they for a time ſwept away almoſt all the money belonging to foreigners, until circulation had time to recover its level, and the new loans could be divided into a greater number of hands. This is the ſolution of the great problem, or phaenomenon, in finance. The world has been aſtoniſhed at ſeeing eight or twelve millions borrowed for [21] ſeveral years ſucceſſively. It could not poſſibly have been done, but by the countenance and aſſiſtance of the ancient funds, under the auſpices of credit and circulation.

Specie communicates its quality to the funds by means of the revenue they produce, but is not increaſed. The numerary wealth is augmented by the funds acquiring a conſiſtency, and, if I may be permitted to uſe the term, a fixation, of which money is incapable. It rolls, is diſſipated, and paſſes from one hand to another. It is the Proteus of wealth, or rather wealth is the Proteus of money. But when once a fund is created, the numerary remains, and the contributive faculty increaſes as well as circulation, and without too great an increaſe of ſpecie. Current coin is the univerſal medium of expence. It is only when it communicates its quality to a fixed ſtock, that the numerary augments and is preſerved. This augmentation ariſes from the credit created by mortgaging a portion of the public revenue. A light tax is drawn from the nation, into whoſe hands it returns again, with a general benefit to the whole. The reader is requeſted to conſider this principle attentively. It contains a truth demonſtrated, palpable, and inconteſtable, though at firſt ſight not eaſily conceived. It is equally evident, and of the ſame nature with the principle already eſlabliſhed, that the ſame piece of money may in one day paſs through twenty different hands, and repreſent twenty times ſucceſſively its numerary value as a ſign. All my reaſoning turns upon theſe two principles. The important truths, which I maintain in oppoſition to received prejudices, are derived from them.

To make the former principle ſtill more apparent by another example, let us conſider Europe collectively. It will appear that the real money expended by the powers at war muſt remain, for certainly it is not annihilated; and that the ſums they borrow [22] upon credit are an addition of numerary wealth, which did not exiſt before. This addition, created by credit, acquires, by means of credit and opinion, a value both real and artificial, intrinſic as well as of convention; 15 that it circulates as long as credit ſubſiſts, and performs by parts the office of real ſpecie, however chimerical or impoſſible it may be to realiſe the whole. May not this be the reaſon, why the ruin and devaſtation of war is ſometimes ſo ſoon repaired?

Take one example more. It is certain that there are a hundred lords in France and England, whoſe united property exceeds, in numerary value, the current coin of the kingdom. It nevertheleſs obtains its value by circulation, and the fortune of every individual, taken ſeparately, is real and ſolid, although the whole together, that is, the equivalent for it in money, does not appear to exiſt. Succeſſive loans then are always made with the ſame identical ſpecie, which, through the medium of theſe loans, communicates its own value to the new funds or paper created by credit, and returning into general circulation increaſes the power of lending again.

All the millions paid to the king of France, are poured back into the gulph of the nation. The ocean, from whence they ſprung, receives them in return, although there may be ſome baſons in the caſcade, which, not being in their proper place, may prevent a more uſeful diſtribution. But if they were to ſtagnate at their ſource, a beneficial circulation would be loſt to the public.

[23] The man who cultivates the ſoil, is he who really ſuffers by taxes. 16 Statute labor, * impoſed upon the peaſant, deſtroys one ſource of the opulence of France; for it is this part of the nation that in fact nouriſhes the reſt, that gives value to the ſoil, and increaſes the numerary wealth. Population is the real riches of the ſtate. The other orders are indemnified for the taxes they pay. Luxury reſtores what luxury takes away, for [24] vice is tributary from its birth. It is a homage which it owes to virtue.

If we conſider the truth of theſe principles, with the nature, eſſence, and effect of loans made and applied with judgment, it will be found that, inſtead of impoveriſhing, they really enrich the ſtate; that they double the numerary wealth, and of courſe the power of increaſing them. Taxes, for the moſt part, return into the hand that gives them. It is always the rich, or thoſe who ſpend money, that pay the taxes in the laſt reſort, as well from their own expences, as by enabling others. They pay ſo much the dearer for the ſervice and labor of the induſtrious in the inferior ranks, who frequently make taxes a pretence for greater demands. This circulation neceſſarily turns to the advantage of induſtry, which always finds itſelf indemnified for the pretended burthen laid upon it. The truth of this aſſertion may be demonſtrated thus. * The four millions ſterling, [25] annually raiſed by taxes to pay the intereſt of the funds belonging to the Engliſh, produce at leaſt fifteen or twenty millions in circulation, which are laid out for the benefit of induſtry. That this is true, may eaſily be conceived from the example of the crown piece, which may change hands twenty times a day, and perform the ſame daily operation three hundred and ſixty-five times a year; and therefore, in the account of that part of the four millions which comes into conſtant circulation, large allowance is made for that part which may be ſuppoſed not to circulate. The revenues, expended by the rich, undoubtedly enable the inferior ranks to engage in other leſs conſiderable expences with the ſame money. To ſuppreſs one million of revenue, would therefore deſtroy a circulation of ſeveral millions, and diminiſh the contributive power of the inferior ranks, by at leaſt twenty millions in the courſe of the year. I take a year for the general computation, although the example, already quoted and proved, might poſſibly exiſt within the compaſs of a day, perhaps in leſs. Upon this footing, the argument is unanſwerable, and beyond the reach of all objection. They, who do not thoroughly comprehend the principle, will be unable to follow me through the ſyſtem.

In conſidering the ſecond inconvenience, we ſhall be led to reflections which reduce the firſt to nothing, and ſtrengthen my ſyſtem. I affirm, that an advance in the price of labor, and of commodities of the firſt neceſſity, is not owing to taxes, but to other cauſes. This advantage, and even taxes themſelves, are a neceſſary conſequence of having a heap of people collected in the [26] great cities by commerce, luxury, and opulence. The true cauſe of it lies in the nature of that immenſe commerce produced by the diſcovery of America. The gold imported from that country neceſſarily continues the pretended inconvenience. It would be ſtill greater if it did not find a remedy in the augmentation of the numerary wealth, and in the circulation of the national debt. Effects, attributed to other cauſes, have in fact ariſen, on one ſide, from the debaſement of the metals in their quality of ſigns; on the other, from the immenſe tribute of commodities which America demands from Europe. The mines of Peru have produced two effects, which at firſt ſight appear contradictory. Gold and ſilver becoming very abundant, and lowering of courſe in their quality of ſigns, have given birth to a multitude of new wants, and to a moſt extenſive commerce. But to ſupply the new demands, which the lowering of the value of money had itſelf created, it was neceſſary that the quantity of it ſhould be prodigiouſly increaſed. Money then, in its turn, had occaſion to be repreſented by new ſigns, in order to quicken its own circulation; and the advantages, ariſing from the multiplicity of ſigns, are ſuperior to the inconveniences produced by a diminution in the value of the metals.

I affirm, that the poſitive reſources, or metallic wealth of the Engliſh nation, would be inſufficient to anſwer the demands gradually produced by the diſcovery of America, and that the Engliſh government could never have borrowed ſuch immenſe ſums, if it had not been for the circulation ariſing from the creation of theſe very funds. Credit is protected by credit. Circulation favors circulation; paper and public funds ſupport new paper and new funds, by ſupplying different loans ſucceſſively with the ſame ſpecie, through the medium of circulation, [27] and the traffic in the ſtocks. As the numerary wealth multiplies continually, the national debt gives nouriſhment to commerce, and becomes the ſupport and remedy of that luxury, to which, in ſome inſtances, it gives birth. It has enriched the nation, and enabled her to pay her taxes. From theſe principles it follows, that former debts have enabled the nation to contract new ones. The effect of power becomes the cauſe of it. It is the debaſement of gold and ſilver, in their quality of ſigns, that has trebled the nominal price of commodities. When we ſay that every thing is dearer, we mean that money is leſs valuable; and it loſes its value, becauſe there is more of it. It may be ſaid that a man, who has an income of three thouſand crowns, is not richer now than his anceſtor was formerly with a thouſand; but there are twenty people in Europe, who have three thouſand crowns a year, for one who, two hundred and fifty years ago, had a thouſand.

The increaſe of ſpecie was the cauſe of the firſt advance in the price of labor, and of commodities of the firſt neceſſity. On the other hand, gold and ſilver, though prodigiouſly augmented, and become ſo much more common in Europe, have nevertheleſs ſtood in need of being repreſented by new ſigns, in order to anſwer the multitude of new demands, which the firſt abundance of ſpecie gave birth to. Such, in all probability, is the true origin of banks, actions, paper credit, and public funds, and of the facility with which they have been created. 17 They all ſerve to augment the numerary wealth, and to fix [28] and collect the riches of individuals, which, in a great meaſure, would not exiſt, if it were not for the creation of the funds that compoſe the national debt, bank ſtock, and other public ſecurities. I ſay, they fix and collect the riches of individuals. In effect, money in ſpecie is diſſipated and loſt; but having communicated its own quality to the ſigns that repreſent it, it goes away to perform its office elſewhere, and, ſupported by credit, ſtill preſerves that communicative quality, of which ſo many experiments have been made in England, without any proportionate increaſe in the quantity of coin, notwithſtanding the prodigious increaſe of wealth, or of the ſigns that repreſent it.

To comprehend the connection of theſe ſeveral truths, we muſt go back a little, and conſider with attention the revolutions, which have gradually taken place in Europe, ſince the compaſs enlarged our univerſe by the diſcovery of America. The quantity of gold and ſilver increaſed ſo rapidly from that period, that it ſoon lowered their value as ſigns. Induſtry found employment on all ſides. The external luxury of America indemnified the trading nations of Europe for their own internal luxury now carried to exceſs, and raiſed the price of labor in two ways; firſt, by lowering the value of money, and afterwards by the quantity of manufactures exported to America. This external commerce has at the ſame time obviated the fatal effect of the advance upon the prince of things. It were to be wiſhed, that we had an equal compenſation in point of morals, which ſince that period have loſt more than they have acquired. It is ſaid that there is leſs ſimplicity, leſs truth, in each particular ſociety, though ſociety in general be improved. 18 Is it poſſible [29] that political virtue ſhould grow from the extenſion of moral vice? Be that as it may, the diſcovery of the new world has certainly cauſed a notorious revolution, both phyſical and moral, in the old one. New diſorders, new remedies, and new intereſts, have given, as it were, a new form to the paſſions. A taſte for commerce, colonies, marine, navigation, and freſh diſcoveries, is become the univerſal ſyſtem. The cultivation of arts and ſciences is connected with a taſte for commerce, and has added a new varniſh to the politeneſs of Europe. The eaſe, with which a fortune may be acquired, has eſtabliſhed a kind of liberty and equality, that brings the different ranks nearer together, and baniſhes that ſlavery and debaſement, in which a general poverty, compared with the wealth of a very few individuals, ſeemed to plunge the people. This perhaps is the greateſt benefit derived to Europe from the diſcovery of America. The fortune of the Medicis was excluſive and immenſe. From a private ſtation, they became ſovereigns, and enſlaved their country. The ſubjects of Charles V. and Philip II. on the contrary, drew the means of freedom from the reſources of commerce. The world ſeemed to enlarge under the power of the Spaniſh monarchy, and in many reſpects altered its form. A general opulence introduced by the gold and ſilver of the new world, the multitude of hands employed to ſupply the new wants and [30] luxury of America, have created new means of ſubſiſtence. * When the political machines, like the elements of commerce, grew more extenſive, vaſt and complicated, they required ſprings ſtronger and more numerous. It became neceſſary to multiply the circulation of paper, by which the numerary wealth was increaſed. This was done as it were by inſtinct, but with fear and trembling. We ſcarce knew what we were doing, or for what reaſon. Gold and ſilver having loſt three fourths of their value, a great quantity was required to repreſent ſo many things, and to keep the ſame machines going which money had ſet in motion. Means of all ſorts were to be trebled. Without an augmentation of the ſigns of value, which form an artificial wealth, neither commerce nor luxury could have ſubſiſted. It is the diſcovery of America, which, by an extraordinary increaſe in the maſs of gold and ſilver, has extended commerce, luxury, navigation, and manufactures. There required a greater rapidity of circulation; and by a ſingular paradox, as money multiplied and grew common, it required ſo many more ſigns to repreſent it. Public funds, paper and ſtocks, became neceſſary, ſometimes to abſorb an exceſs of ſpecie, and ſometimes, like a ſpunge, to be preſſed and give it back again. They fix, increaſe, and collect the numerary in one quarter, while the ſpecie itſelf circulates in another. The nation is really richer, becauſe it appears ſo, and furniſhes government with greater ſupplies upon critical and deciſive occaſions; without precluding, however, the uſe of proper expedients to relieve the diſtreſs that muſt reſult from too great a ſwell of the national debt.

[31] It has been already proved, that every loan increaſes the numerary wealth. Different loans are always advanced with the ſame money; the numerary is doubled by the creation of an artificial property, and the ſtate is enriched. The Engliſh government, by gradually giving up four millions ſterling a year to their own ſubjects and to foreigners, in return for eſſential aſſiſtance, has enriched the kingdom with more than a hundred millions ſterling; whereas not a tenth part of this numerary would have exiſted, without the creation of the funds. The taxes, drawn from the public to pay the intereſt, and aſſigned or mortgaged for this purpoſe, are poured back again with uſury. It may well be ſaid, that the right hand pays the left. It is exactly as if government remitted to the nation a part of the taxes levied upon the nation. Inequality in the diſtribution does not leſſen the profit in the total. * This inequality is ſtill corrected by the money which the proprietors of the funds ſpend themſelves, and enable others to ſpend. A great part of their revenue is employed in favor of induſtry. Thus every account is balanced, the numerary phantom of artificial riches continues to ſubſiſt, produces its effect, ſupports the proprietors, and is beneficial to others. The maſs of repreſentative ſigns ſupplies the place of a real, ſolid property. Every individual may upon occaſion convert it into ſpecie, although it would be 19 impracticable for them all to do it at once; a caſe that [32] never exiſts. The ſame might be ſaid of lands, houſes, and all kinds of chattels, which have by no means ſo ready and quick a circulation as the public funds.

‘"Among commercial nations," ſays Monteſquieu, "that, which poſſeſſes the moſt money, is not the richeſt and the ſtrongeſt; but that which has the moſt money circulating in property and real commodities, by means of repreſentative ſigns."’ Real money being repreſented by ſomething elſe, its numerary quantity increaſes. This ſurplus, favored by circulation, occaſions a kind of overflow, but is ſoon collected again by the magnetic virtue of commerce and credit, and returns into the ſame hands, with an increaſe of power to repeat a like operation every year. The diſtributive faculty does not wear out, but, inſtead of being enervated, acquires ſtrength by exertion. It is probable then, and indeed I am thoroughly convinced, that, without the circulation of the old debt, the Engliſh government could never have borrowed ſuch large ſums as they did in the laſt war. The more theſe principles are conſidered, the more the truth of them will be felt. *

[33] 20 Let us proceed to the third and greateſt inconvenience of the debt. It is certain, that the powers who borrow become tributary to the foreigner who lends. Yet this inconvenience, [34] real as it is, is nothing in compariſon with the advantages of which we have been ſpeaking. Every thing has its inconvenience. This one however (inferior in itſelf to the advantages [35] it produces) is ſtill farther extenuated by thoſe derived from the foreigner, who furniſhes on demand the ſums wanted, part of which are frequently ſpent in the kingdom. But the point, that moſt deſerves to be conſidered, is that, without this foreign ſupplement, by which the meaſure of power is filled up, which keeps the game alive, and of courſe promotes circulation, England could not have found ſuch extenſive reſources. The want of this ſupplement might perhaps have checked and enfeebled all her operations. I ſhall explain this point in my anſwer to the fourth objection, touching the ſpirit of jobbing and traffic in the ſtocks. The ſame ſolution applies to both objections.

I have already obſerved, that the proprietors of the funds are commonly looked upon as mere book-keepers, who live in idleneſs at the expence of the induſtrious. * This is a falſe notion; for the national debt is ſo voluminous, that it is [36] diſperſed all over the nation. Every order of the ſtate has a ſhare in it. There 21 is no diſtinct body of men to do that buſineſs, which in another country is called finance. So far is this intereſt from making them bad ſubjects, that it attaches them to their country. Every man is bound by an equal [37] obligation to ſupport and favor credit. As for ſtockjobbers, they are certainly the levers that move the machine. 22 Circulation could not be carried on without them, nor could [38] government have borrowed ſuch large ſums, without the traffic in the ſtocks. The univerſal turn 23 for gaming, which ſtockjobbers have introduced, greatly facilitates the borrowing of money. In Holland, the Eaſt India company have actions in ſome chambers or departments, where there is no traffic, or where there is nothing done. The actions in that department are of the ſame nature with thoſe of the chamber of Amſterdam, yet bear a much lower price. The ſame thing happens to a ſtock called the Million bank, in London. The fact is unqueſtionable. 24 Whenever a new loan is in agitation in [39] England, the brokers, or dealers in the ſtocks, draw forth all the money hoarded by individuals, and make it circulate for the ſervice of government. Firſt, the facility of ſelling ſtock for time, and of giving and taking premiums upon the ſame ſtock, induces many people to employ their money, who would not do it without ſuch advantages. Secondly, there is a great number of moneyed men, both in England and Holland, who are unwilling to run the riſques of a war, and therefore will not veſt their money definitively in the new funds. Their method is then to lay out ten, fifteen, or twenty thouſand pounds ſterling in annuities, which they ſell, for a ſtated time, to the dealers in the ſtocks. By theſe means they receive good intereſt for their money, without being ſubject to variations in the price of the principal, which go to the account of the jobber; and the negociation is continued for years, to the amount of millions. Aſſiſted by this practice, the Engliſh government has borrowed ſums, which, without the traffic in the ſtocks, and the ingenious contrivances of ſtockjobbers, could never have been raiſed. By ſuch management the Engliſh government has not only ſwept up the money of thoſe who were inclined to veſt their money in the ſtocks, but alſo of thoſe who had no ſuch inclination. This, I believe, is a ſecret which government itſelf was not acquainted with.

The benefit then, derived by government from the dealers in the ſtocks, is unqueſtionably immenſe. If after that I ſhould be aſked what I thought of the employment, I ſhould frankly confeſs, that I would diſſuade my children, friends, and relations, from meddling with it. It is a dangerous trade, and has of late [40] been groſly perverted. It requires a man of great knowledge in the buſineſs, and who makes it his only occupation. When people engage in it, as it often happens, to repair a broken fortune, or to make one rapidly, they find it a more dangerous game than any other. Many a man, who is ſuppoſed to be ruined by ſtockjobbing, had recourſe to it only when he was already, from other cauſes, in the road to ruin, and, in many caſes, might have avoided it, if, inſtead of employing a method ſo full of danger and ſeduction, he had at once cut the miſchief to the quick, by a prudent oeconomy, by lowering his eſtabliſhment, by overcoming the vain opinion of the world, and ſetting himſelf above it. This point would furniſh materials for a long train of reaſoning, and a ſeparate treatiſe.

The traffic in the ſtocks divides into various branches, and forms a very complicated ſubject. It may be carried on with prudence, and with a certain profit, where a man only means to make the moſt of his property without any of the riſques of play. If ſpeculations in the funds do not exceed the abilities of the perſon who ſpeculates, and if he does not ſuffer himſelf to be governed by his broker, there is leſs hazard in this game than any other. I have touched this matter lightly in a ſeparate Eſſay on Stockjobbing. 25

If, without the traffic in the ſtocks, the power of the Engliſh to raiſe money had only amounted to two thirds of what the ſervices demanded, thoſe two thirds would probably have been [41] thrown away. The advantages they gained would not have taken place, and their loſſes would have been as great as their ſucceſſes have been. When a power is wanted equal to ten, and we poſſeſs but five, the proportion is not as two to one, but very often as ten to nothing. We loſe all that we employ, becauſe feeble efforts are not only ineffectual, but dangerous, and turn againſt the party that uſes them. Slowneſs in one degree is the cauſe of it in a greater, and feebleneſs produces feebleneſs. If the Engliſh had ſent a fleet and army, weaker by one third than it was, to conquer the Havanna, the expedition would have miſcarried. Not only the whole expence would have been loſt, but that loſs would have occaſioned many others. Inſtead of the treaſure, and other advantages produced by their ſucceſs, every circumſtance would have been inverted. I do not, therefore, exaggerate in what I ſay of the inequality in the proportion. In politics, the effect of doing all that is wanted, compared with doing two thirds of it, inſtead of being as three to two, is ſometimes as all to nothing. The whole ſucceſs depends upon ſome little ſupplement of power, to which if ſtockjobbing and foreigners contribute, or if they are neceſſary to obtain it, they cannot be too much conſidered and encouraged. Now it is demonſtrated, that, if it were not for the circulation which this gaming excites among foreigners and in the kingdom, moneyed men would never venture to engage ſo deeply in a new loan, or would not find ſupplies, with that aſtoniſhing and requiſite celerity, at the moment they are demanded. It is the ready market that encourages to enterpriſe, and favors circulation. That produced by gaming is prodigious. It is inconceivable how much it facilitates the means of diſpoſing of funded property at every inſtant, and for very conſiderable ſums. To this facility, which individuals find in diſpoſing of their property, England is [42] indebted in part for the eaſe with which ſuch enormous loans have been made, and for the ſignal ſucceſſes that have attended them. The benefit therefore is far ſuperior to the inconvenience reſulting from ſtockjobbers and ſoreign creditors. Both one and the other have been eſſentially uſeful to England, and contributed not a little to the ſucceſs of her military operations. This was the point to be proved.

It appears then, that the national debt, far from being an oppreſſive burthen, has enriched the kingdom, and encouraged commerce; and that the miſchief of taxes and impoſts is in part fallacious. We have ſeen the true cauſes of advance in the price of labor, and commodities of the firſt neceſſity. It has been ſhown how much ſtockjobbing, and the concern which foreigners have in the funds, contribute to credit and circulation. Particular inconveniencies, which I readily admit, can never balance ſuch ſignal advantages.

Theſe principles, however, are not to be carried too far. It is poſſible to accumulate the national debt to a point that would greatly diſtreſs the kingdom. There is a maximum of two ſorts to be equally avoided. One is the amount of the intereſt provided for by taxes. The other concerns the maſs of paper in circulation. I believe we are at a greater diſtance from the firſt than the ſecond. It will appear in the courſe of this work, that all the reſources of England, with reſpect to taxation, are not yet exhauſted; whereas it has been believed, that repreſentative ſigns in paper could not circulate beyond a certain proportion with the current ſpecie. Speculative calculators have limited this proportion to three to one. 20 But uniform experience in [43] England has proved to a demonſtration that it may be carried much farther. Still, however, it demands a limitation. One inconvenience occaſioned by the enormous maſs of paper * is, that the price of ſtocks is more ſenſibly affected now, than [44] formerly, at the leaſt apprehenſion of political events. Theſe convulſions are greater than they uſed to be, and at all times injurious to the public. It is no failure of credit; 27 but the maſs being ſo great, and in ſo many hands, there are a greater number of ſellers, who ſpeculate upon the ſame event. This is one of the chief inconveniencies of the volume of the national debt. In circulation there is a maximum of power, which cannot be exceeded. The public funds are a realiſed alchemy; but we muſt not pierce the crucible. Every thing has its bounds; every thing requires limitation. What the limits of the national debt ſhould be, is more than I can ſay. Perhaps we already touch the border; 28 perhaps we are ſtill [45] at a diſtance from it. Yet we wiſh to aſcertain this maximum, this point, which cannot be paſſed without danger. It is, I think, a difficult problem. The following principles may however lead to the ſolution of it.

A variety of principles muſt be combined with exactneſs, and the reſult of them conſidered. I ſpeak of England only. The application may afterwards be made to other powers. 29 We ſhould firſt compare the maſs of gold and ſilver, with which America annually enriches Europe, with the quantity ſunk in Aſia. If, by an augmentation of ſpecie, the balance inclines in favor of Europe, we are ſo much the farther from the maximum. The progreſs of commerce forms the ſecond combination; [46] particularly that with America, in the conſumption of European manufactures and commodities. The more the Engliſh improve this branch, the leſs their debt will be a burthen to them. The third eſſential article is population and agriculture, which form the natural ſtrength of every ſtate. We all know what phyſical * [47] and moral advantages the Engliſh enjoy, to encourage population. The reſult of theſe combinations determines whether England be ſtill able to ſupport an augmentation of the public revenue by taxation, without overwhelming the nation, or going beyond its intrinſic power, ſo that the harmony of credit and circulation may ſubſiſt. This equilibrium is not ſo ſtrictly exact, but that it may bear a conſiderable weight before it gives way. Notwithſtanding all the declamations in France and England on the ſubject of taxes, they pay much heavier in Holland. Not to reckon other articles, even bread, 30 though [48] of the firſt neceſſity and moſt univerſal conſumption, pays an exorbitant duty; yet it has not much diſcompoſed the ſprings of commerce and manufactures. I would never adviſe any other power to have recourſe to ſuch an expedient. I mean only to ſhow, that the maximum, which we ſometimes appear to touch, may ſtill be conſidered as in a very diſtant point of view; ſince England, with this tax alone, upon the ſame footing with Holland, might borrow many millions ſterling; that is, there [49] would be a fund to pay the intereſt. It is alſo certain, that part of the annuities, or intereſt of the funds, is annually re-inveſted in the ſame funds. It follows then, contrary to the common opinion, that the augmentation of the abſolute maſs of debt is a ſupport, 31 rather than a prejudice, to the relative price. * No man now hoards his money in a cheſt, as in former times. All the money circulates. The miſer is as uſeful to the ſtate, as the man of expence. It is only the prodigal, or rather an exceſs of luxury, that does miſchief. The advantage it produces is momentary. It is exactly cutting the tree at the root. The miſer, no leſs than the oeconomiſt, in ſowing for poſterity, circulates his fortune, and ſupports public credit, paper, and the ſtocks. The exceſs of ſpecie, beyond what is neceſſary for daily expence, trade and commerce, flows back upon the funds; and this ſupply is perpetuated by a circulation of the ſame ſpecie, which returns periodically, with an increaſe received from the treaſures of the new world. For this reaſon 32 it [50] is to be preſumed, that the rate of intereſt will be lowered both in England and Holland; and as ſo moderate an intereſt will not generally agree with the luxury of individuals, people will endeavour to diſpoſe elſewhere of the overplus of American treaſure, ſavings upon their annuities, and profits in trade. France might have availed herſelf of this diſpoſition, if ſhe had taken ever ſo little care to ſupport her credit in the operations of her finances. 33

I think it however eſſential to England (and to every other ſtate) to profit by peace, and to make a good uſe of their ſinking fund, by diſcharging one third of the national debt, and relieving the nation from a part of the taxes. A ſinking fund increaſes as faſt as it is applied, and, with the addition of the growing intereſt multiplied for ſome years, conſtitutes a great power for the diſcharge of debt. But equity requires that there ſhould be a period, at which thoſe taxes ſhould ceaſe, which [51] were only raiſed to pay the intereſt of loans that are diſcharged. I do not know whether this point has ever been much attended to in England; yet it deſerves the attention of every power that is in debt to its own ſubjects. The ſinking fund of England, being compoſed of the ſurpluses of taxes mortgaged to pay the intereſt of different loans, muſt be applied to general reductions, and cannot relieve the nation from the tax immediately relative to each loan. Yet when once the diſcharge of the debt is accompliſhed, it is both juſt and neceſſary to take off the tax created to anſwer the loan. It would be unjuſt to continue it.

34 I affirm then that, admitting the hard neceſſity of ſometimes engaging in war, it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to lighten, as much as poſſible, the debts of the ſtate in time of peace; though too extenſive a diſcharge of debt would be uſeleſs and dangerous, eſpecially when credit is built upon a ſolid foundation. 35 The unſhaken ſtability of public credit in England, proves the truth of theſe principles. They have the actual evidence of three wars, ſupported, ſince the beginning of the preſent century, with glory and vigor. It is not the ſplendor of a day, that glitters and is extinguiſhed in the ſame inſtant. The ſtate of public credit has always been progreſſive. Like fire, [52] if not fed, it diminiſhes. In countries wealthy, and full of reſources, ſuch as France and England, every thing may contribute to entertain and ſupport it. On the other hand, as trifles ſupport, ſo a trifle may overturn. Little matters are not to be neglected. The contempt of them may be of the greateſt conſequence. The moſt inconſiderable cauſe may produce the moſt conſiderable events. Dealers, jobbers, and gameſters, may contribute to the ſucceſs of thoſe great operations of finance, by which the fate of nations is frequently determined. It is not the lading that ſinks the veſſel, but perhaps a little defect in the equilibrium, ſome trifling exceſs in the diſpoſition of the weight. A great veſſel can no more be built without nails, than without beams. We do not always know what kind of nails are moſt wanted. We deſpiſe or neglect, and do not even ſuſpect that they are neceſſary.

Experience, a combination of facts, in a word, the actions performed by the Engliſh, ſince the beginning of the preſent century, and the means they employed, unite in proving, beyond diſpute, the truth of theſe ſpeculative ideas. The obſervations, made upon this nation by the author of the Bilan, are at beſt no more than paradoxes, which require a ſolution. His concluſions are contradicted by facts. The ſpeculation and conjectures of theory can never overturn manifeſt facts and viſible practice. I ſhould alſo obſerve, that this author and others, who have followed Engliſh writers, are very ill founded in appealing to their authority. 36 The opponents of government [53] in England are more violent and partial than in any other nation. Their partiality hurries them into the moſt ridiculous exceſſes. Their authority therefore, with reſpect to the ſtrength and revenue of the kingdom, is very equivocal. I agree, that there are defects in the ſyſtem of adminiſtration. Every thing that glitters is not gold. Their advantages perhaps are not ſo conſiderable as they appear to be; but, to repreſent England in the preſent moment as a declining, enfeebled ſtate, and upon the verge of ruin, is a paradox palpably abſurd, and not to be ſupported.

There is one eſſential point which I ought not to omit. In order to favor the circulation of the funds, to maintain their value, 37 and of courſe to reduce the rate of intereſt, which is the object of finance and the ſign of a flouriſhing credit, one thing is abſolutely and indiſpenſably neceſſary. We have already explained the advantage which England derives from the traffic carried on in the funds. It could never ſubſiſt, but for the facility of mortgaging funded property. This operation ſeems to be forbidden in France by an extenſion of the law, which forbids lending upon pledges. This law therefore, the ſpirit of which never could extend to the funds, ſhould be explained and confined. I do not now enquire whether a Mount of Piety, or a Lombard, might not be of great uſe to France, and the moſt effectual means of preventing that ſhameful uſury, by which ſo many individuals [54] are undone. It is ſufficient to remark, that the inconveniencies, apprehended by the legiſlature, have no relation to the mortgaging of funded property. Neither domeſtic robberies, nor the diſorder which the facility of lending upon pledges may occaſion in families, have any reference to this caſe. Large ſums are lent in Holland, at a moderate intereſt, by men of the ſtricteſt honor, and by the richeſt magiſtrates, on the ſecurity of the funds; and the lenders thereby contribute to keep up the price, as much as if they themſelves were buyers. We all know, that when a man is forced to ſell property of any kind at a moment's warning, the buyer takes his advantage and lowers the price; whereas the facility of pledging waves the neceſſity of ſelling. The owners of ſtock have time to turn themſelves, and are ſeldom, if ever, obliged to ſell at a ſhort notice; by which the price of ſtocks is frequently ſunk for a trifling, inconſiderable object. * On the other hand, there are many people who would be willing to buy large quantities of ſtock upon ſpeculation; but whoſe money not being come in, or not being able to employ it in this way, they give up all thoughts [55] of dealing in the French funds; whereas, in thoſe of Holland and England, twenty thouſand livres in ready money are ſufficient to purchaſe a hundred thouſand livres in ſtock, becauſe it can always be pledged at a moderate intereſt; ſo that, inſtead of paying uſurious intereſt, the ſtock itſelf produces a revenue ariſing from the ſurplus of twenty per cent. which the borrower had beyond what he borrowed. Some people pledge their ſtock for a time, having occaſion for their money elſewhere 38; others merely and ſimply to receive a great intereſt from the ſurplus, ſelling their ſtock to deliver at a ſtated time, and running no riſque. Theſe three numerous claſſes of men draw a quantity of money into the funds, which would not come in without them. Thus the pledging of ſtock prevents a large quantity of it from appearing in the market. A great inconvenience is obviated, or a ſignal benefit obtained. The number of buyers increaſes prodigiouſly, and the number of ſellers diminiſhes. From hence we may conceive the utility of the operation. For the public good, for the good of commerce, credit, and circulation, the laws in France, touching loans upon pledges, cannot be too much ſoftened.

[56] Let us ſay a word of the Dutch funds. It is to be obſerved, in the firſt place, that in France all the funds are confounded under the name of Paper. It is common to ſay, Paper riſes or falls in England. The expreſſion is improper. The funds in England are not in paper, any more than the actions in Holland. For this reaſon, no man can loſe his actions in Holland, nor his funded property in England, as people in France loſe their actions in the funds, or India company. Yet in Holland one may loſe the obligations, or contracts for which the ſtate is ſecurity. Theſe are in paper, ſome payable to the bearer, but the greateſt number to the laſt owner, with certain deeds annexed to prove the title. There are ſome obligations ſecured by the generality, that is, the Seven United Provinces, bearing an intereſt of three per cent. Particular provinces have borrowed money at a higher intereſt; but, excepting Holland, they have no great credit. The province of Holland is accountable for the greateſt number of obligations, to the amount of many hundred millions of florins. Yet this paper, though it bears but two and a half per cent. intereſt, is at par, and above it. Many circumſtances concur to ſupport this enormous credit. The firſt is, that the great riches of the Dutch are in money. It is the country, next to England, where there is the quickeſt circulation both in ſpecie and paper. They have more than the moſt extenſive commerce can employ. The ſpices, with which they alone furniſh all Europe, America, and Africa, maintain and give a periodical increaſe to this abundant circulation. No other nation has lent ſo much as the Dutch to England, France, Saxony, and other powers.

The ſecond reaſon why the paper called Obligation is ſo much ſought after, is that there is a law in Holland, by which the guardians or adminiſtrators of the effects of minors, are obliged [57] to lay out the whole produce in obligations, for which the ſtate is ſecurity. There is in Amſterdam, and other cities of Holland, a chamber called the Chamber of Orphans. The principal magiſtrates are at the head of it. When any perſon dies without a will, they take the direction of the ſucceſſion, and veſt all the produce in obligations. There is much good and much evil in this practice. But it is always a leaven that contributes to ſupport the value and credit of that paper. There are alſo ſome Hollanders of the old ſtock, who have no faith in funds, which they do not ſee, and who will have all their property in their cheſts, in paper ſecured by the ſtate, which they honeſtly think is the moſt ſolid ſecurity in the univerſe. Brokers and notaries have a ſort of brokerage upon ſettling the titles in the different transfers; but this operation is too complicated to admit of a detail.

The actions of the Eaſt and Weſt India companies in Holland, and all the royal funds and other actions in England, are transferable, in the reſpective offices, under the name and to the account of the purchaſer, ſo that he has no paper given him to keep. The books of the office are evidence of the property. A foreigner truſts nothing to his correſpondent. 39 There are even printed liſts in England, in which the names of the proprietors of Bank, India, and South-Sea ſtock, are marked, with one ſtar if they have a capital of five hundred pounds, with two for a thouſand, and three for fifteen hundred; [58] but no farther. This we know is a ſpur to ſome people to be concerned in theſe funds, which in England are called Corporations. Such contrivances ſeparately appear of no moment; yet, taken together, contribute more than we are aware of to promote circulation, and of courſe to the greatneſs and ſplendor of the ſtate. What contributes to it much more is the exactneſs with which the intereſt, and even life annuities, 40 are paid on the day they become due. The delay which people are expoſed to in France, under pretence of being paid in alphabetical order, has given great diſguſt to foreigners, to the prejudice of French credit. This method is not practiſed in London, and I do not know that it is abſolutely neceſſary in France. I ſee no reaſon why a thing, ſo eaſily done upon the banks of the Thames, ſhould not be done upon the banks of the Seine, in parallel circumſtances. It is known beyond a doubt, that the funds are provided at the appointed time as ſcrupulouſly as in London. The delay ſo prejudicial to credit can only ariſe from the clerks who are employed to pay the money. 41

The author of the Bilan is miſtaken in ſuppoſing, that the Engliſh Eaſt-India company, or any other, ſends annually twenty millions of French livres in ſpecie to India in time of peace. In the year 1762 the Engliſh company ſent no ſpecie to India. They may have ſent ſome during the war they maintained upon the coaſt of Coromandel, and in Bengal; yet ſtill I [59] cannot perſuade myſelf that it amounted to ſo large a ſum. This muſt be exaggerated by at leaſt half. It will be found, that in time of peace, the company, one year with another, does not ſend above ſix millions of livres * in bullion to India. All that has been ſaid upon this ſubject, from the time of the Romans to this day, proves too much. I much queſtion whether the India trade was the ruin of the Romans, as the author of the Bilan ſuppoſes. Monſieur de Monteſquieu, in his excellent treatiſe upon the cauſes of the greatneſs and decline of that people, mentions this circumſtance but very lightly, and only as an acceſſary to others of greater importance. It is ſufficient to obſerve, firſt, that, even according to Monteſquieu, the Romans did not extract ſuch quantities of gold and ſilver from their mines, as we do from America. With us theſe metals are commodity as well as ſign. To preſerve their value as ſign, they muſt be exported as commodity. Secondly, the Romans had no eſtabliſhments in India, where individuals make immenſe fortunes, and return with them to Europe. Thirdly, the Romans hoarded their money. Every thing with them contributed to choak circulation, of which they had not the ſmalleſt idea. They knew nothing of bills of exchange, nor annuities, nor government-paper bearing intereſt. All buſineſs was tranſacted with ſpecie. Taxes returned with difficulty into the hand that paid them; and therefore, with a multitude of reſources, they had none when they were moſt wanted. Loans upon critical occaſions were unknown, and would have been impracticable. The Barbarians ranſomed, or plundered, the empire. They had no expedients of credit to reſiſt unforeſeen accidents. Theſe were the reaſons of their decline; and my ſyſtem is [60] ſupported by them. I do not deny that the India trade may be a commerce of mere luxury to certain powers; but it has been demonſtrated, that it is a ſource of riches to England, and the brighteſt jewel in the crown. 42 The ruinous exportation of ſpecie muſt, in the firſt place, be reduced to half the ſum ſtated by the author of the Bilan; the Engliſh company recovers from foreigners infinitely more than he admits; and there is a third circumſtance, which he does not attend to, and which makes good a part of the loſs the nation may ſuffer by the export of money to India; I mean the immenſe fortunes acquired by individuals, and by all the perſons employed by the company in that country. 43 Theſe Aſiatic ſpunges, per fas et nefas, bring home periodically a part of the treaſures of India, without which, Aſia, from the time of the Romans to ours, muſt have exhauſted not only all the money of Europe and Africa, but even of America. The truth of this propoſition requires no other evidence, but to be expreſſed. If the author's aſſertion were [61] true, the money of all the univerſe muſt already be in Aſia. His ſyſtem leads to an abſurdity; and every ſyſtem that does ſo is falſe. The Dutch Eaſt-India company enriches the ſtate, while it impoveriſhes the proprietors; a paradox that cannot be accounted for but upon the principle which I have juſt explained. The prodigious and rapid fortunes, acquired by individuals in India, repair the breaches which a commerce, ruinous in itſelf from the money it exports, may occaſion in the ſtate, and even in Europe. We ſhould be happier perhaps if it were poſſible to do without tea, and other exotic drugs of India, as well as without muſlins, and all the uſeleſs articles of an exceſſive and dangerous luxury. But this luxury being once eſtabliſhed, it would be ſtill more deſtructive to purchaſe the materials of it from foreigners. I believe that Europe, ſooner or later, will recover part of the money, which, after wreſting it with ſo much difficulty from America by the hands of Africans, we have waſted upon Aſia. Before this great event takes place, I affirm, that the individuals eſtabliſhed in India have at all times gleaned a part of the treaſure ſent thither by the merchants of Europe. It is alſo true, that the multiplicity of India companies in Europe has produced various inconveniences. The firſt is, that a greater quantity of ſpecie is exported than is neceſſary to maintain its value here as a ſign, which yet, without the export to Aſia, would be too much reduced. 44 The ſecond is, that [62] a competition in the purchaſe of India manufactures, and other exotic commodities, raiſes the price in Aſia; that is, there is more money wanted to buy the ſame quantity of goods. On the other hand, the ſame competition ſubſiſting in the ſales in Europe, lowers the price of what coſts ſo dear at the fountain head. For this reaſon the companies no longer make the ſame profit they did formerly; whereas the perſons they employ have the cream of the trade, and ſucceed better than ever.

45 The author of the Bilan pretends that the Engliſh buy more than they ſell, and have done ſo for a conſiderable time. [63] If this were true, the nation would not be in a condition to face ſo extenſive a commerce, which yet is ſupported with admirable facility. The expedition with which they equip, the number [64] of their veſſels, the rapidity of their voyages, and the opulence of their cargoes, contradict every thing he advances, from partial or ill-informed Engliſh writers. I ſtill think I ſee a man of a [65] robuſt conſtitution, whom they endeavour to perſuade that he is ſick.

The author founds his aſſertions upon the courſe of exchange, which ſeems to be to the diſadvantage of the Engliſh [66] trade. * 46 But, to make the exchange an exact barometer of the balance of trade between nations, all their commodities [67] muſt be bartered one againſt the other, and, after this operation, the difference muſt be remitted to the winning party. But this is a chimera, and can only be executed in theory. There are a multitude of temporary circumſtances and events, that render the exchange an equivocal ſign. The ſtrongeſt proof that it is ſo, would be the falſehood of the author's own concluſions, even where his obſervations might be ſuppoſed to have been verified. Every man, who has the ſlighteſt political knowledge of Europe, muſt perceive how much he is miſtaken. Metaphyſics, ſupported by calculation, are the moſt plauſible and the moſt fallacious. We loſe our underſtanding by having too much of it, and, by knowing too many things, at laſt know nothing. Commerce is a game, and it is vain to play with people who have nothing to loſe. To win always, with excluſion of every body elſe, is impoſſible. Univerſal commerce is therefore a mere chimera. Every induſtrious nation, ſituated conveniently for trade, has a proportionate ſhare of it. Their opulence is no more durable than a gameſter's luck, unleſs the riches of the ſoil, and the political adminiſtration, contribute to encourage induſtry, and to ſupport the national commerce. In the natural order of things, the advantage may lie on the ſide of France. But, as it is the nature of ſilver and gold to circulate, riches, which give birth to luxury, frequently [68] turn to the account of indigent nations, and always to the account of trading nations. This ſon of Opulence is the father of Poverty. Exceſs of wealth may one day make the ſources of it neglected in England, and pervert the uſe of it. The kingdom may fall, but the preſent does not appear to be the moment of its decline.

* The ſcarcity of ſpecie on the Royal Exchange, mentioned by the author of the Bilan, frequently proceeds from temporary [69] accidents, which are ſoon corrected. As the coin is heavier, and of better allay, it is exported by all ſorts of means. The Engliſh introduce a great quantity of Spaniſh dollars, and export them again with a ſmall drawback. This has an influence upon the courſe of exchange. But, as an individual, immenſely rich, may find himſelf ſhort of money, (his current caſh being exhauſted, perhaps in lucrative undertakings) the ſame thing may happen to a trading nation. The diſtreſs does not laſt long. A remedy is ſoon applied by bills of exchange, ſupported by real property; and it commonly happens that a ſcarcity is ſucceeded by a great abundance of ſpecie. This has been conſtantly obſerved. Let us hear what Monſieur de Monteſquieu ſays upon the ſubject.

‘"In the country of commerce, the money that diſappeared ſuddenly, returns, becauſe the ſtates that received it owe it. The ſcarcity or abundance, which varies the courſe of exchange, is not a real, but a relative ſcarcity or abundance. When France, for example, has more need of a fund in Holland, [70] than the Dutch have of a fund in France, money is then called cheap in France and ſcarce in Holland, and vice verſâ." He ſays, that "money is one merchandiſe more, which Europe receives by way of barter from America, and exports to India. Conſidering the metals as merchandiſe, a great quantity of gold and ſilver is advantageous. It is not ſo, conſidering them as ſigns, becauſe a plenty of them lowers their quality of ſigns, which is in a great meaſure founded upon their ſcarcity."’‘"The exchange," he obſerves in another place, having given men a ſingular facility in conveying money from one country to another, money is no ſooner ſcarce in one place, but it flows in, on all quarters, from the places where it was plentiful. The fixing the rate depends upon a compound ratio of the total of things compared with the total of ſigns, and varies as the accidents of commerce incline the balance one way or the other."’

According to Monteſquieu, all moveables, ſuch as money, notes, bills of exchange, actions in public companies, ſhips, &c. are merchandiſes that belong to the whole world; the nation that poſſeſſes the greateſt ſhare of theſe moveables is the richeſt. That great man knew the principle, but did not perceive the conſequences. When he ſpeaks of public funds, he miſtakes the nature of them. The object was beneath him, and eſcaped his attention. He ſays in another place, ‘"As money is the ſign of a thing, and repreſents it, ſo every thing is the ſign of money, and repreſents it; and the ſtate proſpers, in proportion as, on one ſide, money is a true repreſentative of things, and as things in return are true repreſentatives of money; that is, when, according to their relative value, a man may have the one as ſoon as he has the other."’ This [71] is preciſely the caſe of the public debts, of which he ſpeaks ſo differently in many parts of his works.

If the whole produce of commerce was contained in the amount of the territorial revenue, as the author of the Bilan ſuppoſes, * what would become of Holland, whoſe territorial revenue is almoſt all exhauſted in ſupporting the territory?

It coſts the ſtate more to keep the dykes and high roads in repair, than the revenue of the lands amounts to. Yet the produce of commerce and conſumption is immenſe, notwithſtanding the parcimonious ſpirit of the mechanic, who improves upon French ſobriety, without the ſame good effect, for labor is dearer there than in France. Holland is another proof that an excluſive advantage in commerce is a chimera. Her profits ariſe from the opulence of her neighbours, who would ſuffer in their turn, if any unhappy revolution were to annihilate the republic. It is the bridge of communication, the common mart, the ſupport of which is eſſential to the trade of other powers. Whoever is in poſſeſſion of actions, obligations ſecured by the ſtate, annuities, or other ſtock in England, converts them into money at one per cent. more or leſs, according to the market-price at Amſterdam or London. It is a great advantage to the Engliſh, that their ſtocks are current on the exchange of both countries. It is to be wiſhed, that the ſame commerce were eſtabliſhed in favor of the French funds. Perhaps it might not be impracticable.

I have wandered a little from my ſubject to correct ſome miſtakes, into which the ingenious author of the Bilan has been led by Engliſh writers and others, whom I do not reſpect [72] the leſs, although they are deceived. No man need bluſh at miſtaking a road, in which Monſieur de Monteſquieu has ſo often ſtumbled. Theſe excurſions do not appear quite foreign from my ſubject, to which I now return. The ſeveral concluſions of my ſyſtem unite in this corollary.

I think I have proved on one ſide, that the gold and ſilver with which Europe has been overflown ſince the diſcovery of America, and on the other, that the augmentation of commerce, by which the new world is ſupplied with ſo many commodities and manufactures of the old one, have occaſioned a revolution in the political, moral, and civil ſyſtem of Europe; that theſe metals again require new repreſentatives in their quality of ſigns, becauſe the abundance of them has multiplied the things they repreſent; that nothing contributes to ſupport circulation more than the national debt of England; that it has increaſed the numerary, and co-operated in the fixation of riches; that, without the creation of theſe funds, the three commercial powers would have leſs numerary wealth, and could not circulate money enough to anſwer the triple demand of commerce, finance, and luxury; that taxes return in part into the hand that pays them, and circulate with benefit to the public; that of courſe they are not ſo miſchievous as it is pretended; that the debts of the ſtate are very uſeful, up to a certain point; that they have their limits, beyond which they might become equally dangerous; that a ſinking fund is eſſential to credit, and neceſſary to the ſtate; that in time of peace there cannot be too much care taken to diſcharge a part of the debt, but that it might be dangerous to pay it off entirely. (I think that a proportionate maſs of paper ſhould always be kept in circulation, on terms the leaſt burthenſome to the ſtate). That the greateſt operations depend upon credit. To be uſeful, it [73] muſt flouriſh extremely; if not, it draws no more than the bucket of the Danaides. (Experience ſhows that the traffic in the ſtocks contributes greatly to ſupport the credit and circulation of the public funds, and that without this traffic England never could have negotiated thoſe conſiderable loans, to which ſhe owes her aſtoniſhing ſucceſſes). That, to arrive at the ſame point, we ought, as much as poſſible, to model our conduct upon theirs; conforming however, in the execution, to the reſpective principles of government. I have ſhown that, if it were not for the India trade, money would have ſunk ſtill lower in its quality of ſign; that a great part of it is recovered by individuals, who acquire riches in India, and bring them back to Europe; that the obſervations of the author of the Bilan upon the courſe of exchange are not ſolid; that the exchange is a falſe barometer, a deceitful compaſs, unleſs attention be paid to all the circumſtances obſerved by Monſieur de Monteſquieu; and that, in a word, the national debt has enriched the kingdom, increaſed its numerary wealth, encouraged circulation, commerce, and induſtry, and procured the moſt important ſucceſſes in war; that nothing but its being carried to exceſs can annihilate all theſe advantages; and that ſuch exceſs may be prevented by means of the ſinking fund, the reſources of which ſhall be more particularly explained in the Second Part.

The following Note omitted in its proper Place, the Reader is deſired to refer to Page 8, Line 4.

[]

A Lombard in France ſignifies generally a Uſurer, and particularly a Pawnbroker. The French gave this name to the Venetian and Genoeſe merchants, who formerly came to trade in France, and whoſe commerce chiefly turned upon the exchange of money.—A Mount of Piety is only a Pawnbroker's Shop authoriſed by the ſtate. There are many of them in Italy. Some are inſtituted to receive money only for the uſe of the government, for which they pay a moderate intereſt. Theſe are the reſources of little beggarly ſtates. To ſuppoſe that, on any eſtabliſhment whatſoever, they could anſwer the ſame purpoſe in France that the Bank does in England, is out of all reaſon. "Quid eſt aliud, quam muſcam elephanto conferre?" A mount of piety was attempted in France in 1626, and aboliſhed in the year following. The charitable corporation, in 1731, was formed upon principles apparently the moſt benevolent. The event of it however was ſuch as will probably diſcourage ſuch enterpriſes for the future. The managers embezzled the capital to the amount of ſeveral hundred thouſand pounds, and the proprietors were ruined.—Tranſlator.

PART II. New Means of increaſing the Sinking Fund of England, and paying off Part of the National Debt.

[75]

SINCE there has been a general improvement in knowledge, ſince all the world has taken a ſhare in commerce, and ſince the principles of finance are no longer myſterious, nor confined to the adept, every thing may be reduced to calculation. Credit, which was formerly no more than a creature of the mind, 1 an idol worſhipped through habit, has obtained a real exiſtence, may be acquired by ſyſtem, loſt by accident, and recovered by principle. But there are prejudices in all our opinions. They are the alloy of reaſon, and muſt be reſpected or deſtroyed.

England, with fewer apparent reſources than France, poſſeſſes a more ſplendid credit. 2 The form of government [76] contributes to it. Yet, if France had purſued the ſame principles in the operations of her finances, the prejudice againſt her would have been partly removed. At the beginning of the war in 1755 the French funds wore a better appearance than the Engliſh. Far from ſinking or giving way, the whole maſs of paper ſupported itſelf ſurpriſingly. The bare creation of a ſinking fund had given a conſiſtence as well as a colouring to paper, and ſubdued the old prejudices, by which credit had been deſtroyed. But the plan was not ſufficiently conſidered; the principles were not ſufficiently combined; accidents were not foreſeen. I am perſuaded, that credit would have ſupported itſelf longer, if, when the ſinking fund was created, care had been taken to appriſe the public, that the diſcharge of debt was to be ſuſpended in time of war, with an aſſurance that this fund ſhould then ſerve as a collateral ſecurity for paying the intereſt; the exactneſs and punctuality of which ſhould be inviolable, as it is in England. Every thing ſhould have been done with the concurrence, and under the ſanction, of the parliament. From a want of theſe formalities and precautions, they were ſtopped by rivulets when they had rivers to paſs. In England the uſe of the ſinking fund was more extenſive. This machine of wax yielded to the impreſſion of government, and was applied to the current expences of the war. The funds, by which the intereſt of the debt was ſecured, proceeded without interruption; they were ſolid, ſufficient, and inviolable; no part of the principal could be demanded. In the midſt of a ſtorm, government glided upon a ſmooth river, while in France they were carried, away by a torrent. The French ſinking fund diſappeared like a phantom, and credit was annihilated at the moment it was moſt wanted. This could not have happened if a ſolid, inviolable ſecurity had been aſſigned for the ſeparate [77] intereſt of each loan by a particular tax created, as in England, at the time the loan was made. In France the intereſt upon all the loans is confounded, and charged upon the Aides, Gabelles, 3 [78] and five great Farms, which the people conſider as a ſea without a ſhore.

After theſe facts, ſhall it be ſaid that the operation of a ſinking fund muſt be ſuſpended in time of war, as contradictory to, and incompatible with, the new loans which the ſervice may require? I am far from thinking ſo. The principle may be ſoftened, and greater advantages drawn from it. In France, it was only the form that was defective, and this defect prevailed through all the operations of her finances. In France I have often inſiſted upon the utility of a permanent ſinking fund, both in peace and war. The principles I went upon were not entirely rejected. Some uſe was made of them; but they were neither carried to their extent, nor, in ſome inſtances, ſtrictly adhered to. I am of opinion, that all appearances might have been [79] ſaved, and an equal quantity of debt extinguiſhed, by reducing the intereſt of the redeemable annuities, or paying off thoſe who might not ſubmit to the reduction.

In the year 1750, the Engliſh government, ſupported by peace, by an abundance of money, by credit, and a good adminiſtration, was able to reduce all the four per cent. annuities, of which there was an immenſe quantity, * to three, offering at the ſame time to pay off thoſe who ſhould refuſe their conſent to this arrangement. Government even puniſhed thoſe perſons who refuſed, or heſitated, by declaring that they, who did not come in within a ſhort limited time, ſhould be immediately paid off; whereas the ſubſcribers ſhould enjoy an intereſt of three and a half per cent. for ſeven years longer. By theſe means few people deſired to be paid off. The opportunity was favorable, meaſures were well taken, and there were ſome millions in reſerve. The Bank, India, and South-Sea companies, had been appriſed of the ſcheme, and gained over by government, together with ſome moneyed men, who had nothing better to do with their money. So that an operation, which in theory ſeemed difficult, if not impoſſible, was completed with eaſe, and wonderful ſucceſs. In ſome caſes it is eaſier to execute than to conceive. It is certain that, with five millions only, when credit is well managed, the intereſt of fifty may be reduced, yet without compelling any body, paying off ſome few, and offering to pay off the reſt. Every thing depends upon the opportunity, and method of uſing it. France was upon the point of being able to ſeiſe a like opportunity; but having neglected to make uſe of it, they have ſince been obliged to have recourſe to leſs plauſible and leſs honorable expedients. The example I refer to, is a diſtinguiſhed fact known by the [80] whole world, and might have been followed with advantage. But the moment is paſt, and cannot be recalled.

Let us turn to England, where the fire of Veſta has never been extinguiſhed. The public ſaith, with regard to the credit of the funds, has never been violated, or ſuffered the leaſt diminution. I have ſhown by what means credit has been ſo long ſupported, and proved that the national debt has enriched the nation by increaſing its numerary. I have unfolded the principles of circulation, together with the utility and the neceſſity of the funds; acknowledging at the ſame time, that there was a maximum which muſt be avoided, and that, if wars were to ſucceed each other, without a conſiderable diſcharge of debt in the intervals of peace, the machine might give way, and draw the ruin of the kingdom along with it. For this reaſon, I affirm, that England ſtands in need of an auxiliary, permanent, ſinking fund, to operate in time of war, as well as peace. Great advantages would reſult from it, both to the public and to government. Let us ſuppoſe for a moment, that, after ſome years of peace, the maſs of the national debt ſhould be diminiſhed by ſeveral millions; that when it was reduced, for example, to ſeventy or eighty millions only, which is very practicable, a war ſhould commence; and that government, during the war, ſhould continue to pay off 4 annually a [81] million and a half at par; is it not evident that this would ſupport the current intereſt, and prevent its riſing? An operation of this kind would give elaſticity to circulation. The [82] ſprings of credit would preſerve their activity, and the new loans be raiſed with ſo much the greater eaſe, and upon leſs burthenſome terms. The reader is requeſted to conſider that, [83] ſince the produce of the ſinking fund is not ſufficient to anſwer the extraordinary ſervices in time of war, and ſince it cannot prevent new loans, it is much better to apply it to its true [84] object, by which the price of the old funds is forcibly kept up, the intereſt of money of courſe kept under, and a much greater aſſiſtance given to the new loans, than if, by applying the [85] ſinking fund to the current ſervice, a million leſs ſhould be borrowed. This is a reflection, not to ſay a truth, which I ſubmit to the judgment of thoſe who are acquainted with the magic of circulation and credit. They will be able to unfold the infinite advantages, that might reſult from it to the Engliſh nation. Perhaps it may be no more than a chimera of theory. Let us try whether it might not be realiſed in practice.

To proceed methodically, let us, once again, conſider the national debt and ſinking fund analytically. Let us weigh the two objects, and reduce them to their exact dimenſions. It has been ſhown that, properly ſpeaking, it is only the intereſt that can be a burthen to government. The principal is not demandable. With reſpect to government, it may almoſt be ſaid not to exiſt, though it has ſerved and enriched the public. Yet, if this principle were abuſed, taxes would be perpetuated, and multiply; the weight of the funds would break the ſprings of [86] circulation; credit might fail, and the whole edifice fall to the ground. I affirm that this period is ſtill very diſtant. If it were near at hand, the miſchief perhaps would admit of no remedy. Conſidering the debt as it ſtands, it is evident that, notwithſtanding the immenſe increaſe of capital debt ſince the death of Queen Anne, the burthen immediately falling on the public has not increaſed in the ſame proportion. The nation has continued to borrow ſums, the intereſt of which ſhe would have been unable to diſcharge, if means had not been taken, conſiſtently with juſtice and good faith, to reduce the rate of intereſt; and, although the ſinking ſund (compoſed of the ſurpluses of taxes appropriated to pay the intereſt, and aſſiſted by voluntary reductions of intereſt, to which the creditors conſented rather than be paid off) has not produced all the effect that might have been expected from ſo wiſe and neceſſary an inſtitution, yet it is certain that conſiderable ſums have been paid off, and that public credit has been ſupported by the expectation of a conſtant annual reimburſement. A ſinking fund increaſes in proportion as it is employed. The progreſſive accumulation of annual intereſt ſaved by every diſcharge of debt, and united to the growing capital, in a few years produces a prodigious fund, let the commencement of it, or ſavings upon the firſt payments, have been ever ſo inconſiderable. The geometrical progreſſion of ſuch a fund is immenſe, and aſtoniſhes the imagination. It is a ſhallow ſtream that becomes a river as it flows. It is true however that, to avail themſelves of this progreſſion, the Engliſh have been obliged to continue the taxes, appropriated to pay the intereſt of old loans, after the principal was diſcharged. I ſhall ſpeak hereafter of the means of leſſening this inconvenience.

[87] The ſinking fund was much more conſiderable than it is, and amounted to above three millions ſterling. But it has been charged with eight hundred thouſand pounds a year to ſupport the civil liſt, 5 and to make good the deficiencies of all the appropriated taxes, as well as to ſecure the intereſt and principal of the unfunded debt; which is but juſt. I leave it to the Engliſh to calculate to what ſum the clear applicable produce of their ſinking fund, as it ſtands at preſent, may amount. It is certain that if, after the firſt year, it were every year ſucceſſively augmented with the intereſt of the debt paid off, conformably to the nature of its inſtitution, we ſhould ſee a prodigious increaſe of its power at the end of a dozen years. If at that time (I ſpeak always hypothetically) the diſcharge of the old debt was continued in proportion to the power of the fund, the price of ſtocks could never fall, becauſe the quantity being diminiſhed, and conſined to fewer hands, every creditor would have a chance of being ſoon paid at par. New loans might then with eaſe be negotiated on moderate terms, and with a trifling douceur to the ſubſcriber. But an operation of this kind, in the preſent enfeebled ſtate of the ſinking fund, would be too tedious. The uncertain continuance of peace, the clamour of oppoſition, and the enormous maſs of the debt, conſtantly repreſented as a bugbear, make an impreſſion too ſtrong to agree with ſo ſlow a remedy. Some operation like that of the [88] year 1750 is wanted, brilliant in appearance, and rapid in its effect, by which all the phantoms, that undermine public credit, and ſpread uneaſineſs among the people, might at once be put to flight.

The following, for inſtance, is an operation, by which I conceive twelve millions and a half of the maſs of the national debt might be cancelled, that is, they might be converted into a fund ſo conſtituted as to diſcharge itſelf, by applying 527, 500l. a year out of the ſinking fund for a certain number of years, part of which ſum would be gradually recovered every year. The method I propoſe, would be to open a ſubſcription for creating life annuities 6 at ſeven and a half per cent. and [89] to receive at par, either the four per cents. redeemable in 1761, * or any of the three per cents. or money, without diſtinction. As the three per cents. are ſtill at ten per cent. diſcount, a [90] life annuity at ſeven and a half per cent. is more advantageous. The confidence repoſed in government, and in the good faith of parliament; that extended luxury, which invites almoſt every man to increaſe his income; the great maſs of the annuities; the wiſh that poſſeſſes many fathers of families to ſecure ſome [91] little life annuity to their children, as a reſource in caſe of need; all theſe motives united would, I am perſuaded, in a little time have the effect of converting twelve millions and a half of annuities into life annuities, with the loſs of the principal, and greatly diminiſh the phantom of the national debt. The intereſt of the twelve millions and a half thus diſcharged, viz. of three millions and a half at four per cent. and nine millions at three per cent. would increaſe the ſinking fund in the ſum of £.410,000 a year, and with the help of £.527,500 taken from the ſinking fund, would pay the life annuities without a new tax. The ſinking fund would ſtill remain ſtrong enough to make ſome farther annual reduction of debt. It would every year acquire new ſtrength by the growing intereſt of debt ſo reduced, and by the life annuities gradually falling in by the death of the annuitants. The ſurplus of intereſt diſperſed through the public would in part return into the old funds, where the annuitants veſt their ſavings. As the maſs of ſtock diminiſhes, the price riſes. Credit acquires new ſtrength, and the formidable body of the old debt being reduced, the circulation of it would be ſo much the leſs liable to be embarraſſed.

This operation, I ſhould think, might be repeated with ſucceſs a year or two after the firſt converſion of principal debt into life annuity, and the moſt obſtinate unbelievers be convinced, that it is poſſible to overcome the coloſſus of the national debt, and to reduce it to a ſize which it would be imprudent and dangerous to leſſen; for I have demonſtrated, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to maintain a conſiderable circulation of theſe factitious riches, which were created and are ſupported by credit, and which credit itſelf ſtands in ſo much need of.

[92] By this ſcheme it is poſſible to extinguiſh twenty-five millions of principal debt, converting them into annuities, which gradually diſcharge themſelves, and applying only a part of the ſinking fund. The root of this fund would ſtill be preſerved, with a new produce from year to year, and ſoon recover its original condition by the falling-in of the life annuities. It is alſo to be obſerved, that as ſoon as the maſs of life annuities is annihilated, the ſum of £.527,500 is reſtored to the ſinking fund. The recovery of this ſum would begin to be felt even in the firſt few years, conſidering the multitude of annuitants, and the great maſs of the ſubſcription. Yet there is no fear of the whole ſubſcription's being too great to ſucceed, as well for the reaſons already ſtated, as becauſe in the firſt inſtance it is but ten per cent. upon the national debt. This is certainly very far from being a tenth part of the fortune of individuals, and every man is glad to lay out a ſmall portion of his property in a life annuity. The ſame operation might probably be repeated twice or thrice after the firſt attempt had ſucceeded. The eagerneſs, with which people in France veſted their money in life annuities in tickliſh circumſtances, confirms me in my conjectures.

When theſe operations have taken place, ſome meaſures ſhould be fallen upon to increaſe the ſinking fund, and to divide it; appropriating one part to a perpetual and permanent extinction of debt, not to be interrupted in time of war; the other, incorporated with the ſavings on the life annuities as they fell in, not to be applied, nor to ſubſiſt beyond the diſcharge of a certain number of millions; when theſe are paid off, the nation to be relieved from a proportionate quantity of taxes. There would then be ſome periods at which taxes would be taken off; an eſſential point never thought of in England. It belongs to [93] the profound genius of the Engliſh, to quicken theſe principles, and bring them into practice.

Nothing in my opinion could be more effectual, nor leſs burthenſome, towards creating an auxiliary and permanent ſinking fund, than a tax upon collateral ſucceſſions. 7 It may be objected that, as this would be taxing the funds, there would be a violation of public faith. The objection I think is not well founded; this collateral tax, in the firſt place, has been univerſally adopted ever ſince the time of the Romans. It is the mildeſt, and the leaſt unjuſt. When once impoſed with the concurrence and conſent of the nation, under the ſanction of parliament, there is nothing to be ſaid againſt it. It ſhould be ſoftened in degree, and not take place at all with reſpect to foreigners who have money in the funds; for this would be an [94] injuſtice, and credit might be affected by it. A tax upon collateral ſucceſſions, applied ſtrictly to the uſe of the ſinking fund, would conſiderably diminiſh the coloſſus of the debt. It might be continued no longer than till the debt ſhould be reduced to ſeventy millions ſterling; or it might be continued for ever, and the reſpective taxes, raiſed to pay the intereſt of loans, might be aboliſhed as faſt as the ſeveral loans were paid off. A meaſure of this kind would gratify the nation, relieve the lower orders of the ſtate, and favor manufactures. We ſhould then have a pleaſing proſpect before us. *

I know there is ſtill a more ſimple method to create a new ſinking fund, or to give a conſiderable increaſe to the old one; I mean by an equal land tax. It is admitted in England that, if the land tax were upon a juſt and equal footing, it would produce double what it does. But is there patriotiſm enough to ſubmit to a new aſſeſſment? I queſtion it. Yet neceſſity, fear, [95] and policy, may have an influence upon hearts the leaſt patriotic. To ſupport the ſtrength of my aſſertions it is ſufficient to have ſhown, that reſources are not wanting, and that with a wiſe adminiſtration, a well-conſidered ſyſtem, and a careful oeconomy, (the moſt important, though in England the moſt neglected article of all) this national debt, which is the ſubject of ſo much clamor, is in its own nature very different from what it has been repreſented, and capable, in point of quantity, of a conſiderable diminution; that it depends upon the Engliſh nation, not only to obviate the bad conſequences of their debt, but to render it ſtill more uſeful to credit and circulation, by preventing an exceſſive accumulation, which in time might be fatal.

The ſtrong remonſtrances made by the French parliaments on the ſubject of taxes during the war, though filled with ſublime reflections worthy of thoſe venerable bodies, contributed not a little to the diminution of public credit, and to the low price to which all the royal funds were reduced. This could not fail of greatly embarraſſing every meaſure of finance, and perplexing the miniſtry in their military operations. The writings of perſons, who oppoſe government in England, on the ſubject of the national debt, have contributed to ſink the price of ſtocks ten per cent. below par, and laid a conſtant check on every operation of finance. Yet theſe writings are of a nature widely different from the remonſtrances of the parliaments. The authors are, for the moſt part, apoſtles without miſſion; and for one paper written in good earneſt to inform the nation, and charitably to warn it againſt real danger, there are ten that proceed from mere ill humor. The former are excuſeable at leaſt, if not praiſeworthy. The others have no pleaſure, but in diſcovering the pretended weakneſs of their country. They [96] make no ſcruple of proſtituting that country which is their common mother, without any uſe, and merely for their amuſement.

Anti-miniſterial writers have clamored loudly againſt the miſapplication of the ſinking fund, and at government's having lately departed, in ſome inſtances, from the invariable rule of appropriating ſeparate funds for the intereſt of new loans, and having charged the intereſt of the unfunded debt againſt the ſinking fund. The reproach is not without foundation; but as the inſtances are of no great importance, the conſequences of them have been maliciouſly exaggerated. The arrears of the war amounted to a conſiderable ſum. The laſt loan, in 1761, though not ſufficient to clear them off, met with ſo much contradiction in the article of the cyder tax, and the oppoſition was ſo powerful, that the miniſtry thought that, in time of peace, the ſinking fund might gradually diſcharge the unfunded debt, as it has done in effect from year to year. *

An objection has alſo been raiſed againſt making the ſinking fund anſwerable for the civil liſt, and for all deficiencies in the given produce of the other funds; but, according to the preſent ſyſtem, I do not think the objection founded; eſpecially as, on the other hand, ſome beneficial articles have been incorporated [97] with the ſinking fund, by which, in a little time, it may expect to be augmented.

Yet the clamors of the oppoſition appear to deſerve ſome attention. No poſſible method ſhould be neglected to make the ſinking fund more effectual, and to give it conſiſtence. The means I have pointed out ſeem to me not to be neglected. I inſiſt upon the neceſſity of creating an auxiliary permanent fund of redemption, that may operate equally in peace and war.

A permanent fund of redemption, conſtantly improving by the intereſt of the debt it diſcharges, a tax upon collateral ſucceſſions, a tax upon the transfer of funded property, 8 [98] and periods fixed for lightening the burthen of taxes, are effectual methods to ſupport public credit. The ſyſtem I propoſed in France was not purſued. The reduction of intereſt ſhould have been made without a direct diminution of the capital, and apparently with the free conſent of the proprietors. This, after the peace, was practicable, if a right plan had been purſued. When once the original contracts were violated, there was no remedy. Yet I confeſs the tax upon transfers, attempted in France, might have been of ſervice, if precautions had been taken not to check circulation. In their preſent form, they are too heavy, and produce leſs than a more moderate tax would do, becauſe the transfers are leſs frequent than they would be. No man regards one per cent. more or leſs; but five per cent is an object, and fetters all dealings in the ſtocks. *

[99] The quantum of the tax upon collateral ſucceſſions might be proportioned to the degrees of relation in families, as they are more or leſs removed. There are powerful reaſons, why foreigners ſhould not be ſubject to it. The ſame reaſons do not hold with reſpect to the tax upon transfers.

The French government would have done right in exempting the tontines from the dixieme, or tenth penny; becauſe life annuities and tontines have always been conſidered as an inviolable ſecurity; ſo much ſo, that when credit gave way, and money was not to be had upon any terms, every body ſubſcribed to the life annuities and tontines, and ſunk their capital almoſt at as low a rate of intereſt, as they might have received from the other funds already in the market, on which a conſiderable profit might have been expected at the peace, and [100] has in effect been made. A prejudice of this ſort ſhould have been reſpected and encouraged, as a reſource againſt an extraordinary emergency. The exiſtence of a ſtate is not momentary. Some care ſhould have been taken of poſterity. It is not merely removing a ſymptom. We ſhould go back to the ſource of the diſorder, and endeavour to preſerve the vital principles of exiſtence. Empiriciſm in politics is as dangerous as in medicine.

In the French edicts of the year 1763 it was inſinuated, that the plan of diſcharging the debts of the ſtate was ſo ſerious, that it was propoſed to extend it to the life annuities and tontines. The intention was excellent, but it produced a contrary effect. Life annuities are not of a redeemable nature. 9 To redeem them is, in the firſt place, againſt the intereſt of the ſtate; and, ſecondly, againſt the intention and intereſt of the proprietors. This is leſs a paradox than it may ſeem. Redeeming life annuities is againſt the intereſt of the ſtate, becauſe the burthen of itſelf diminiſhes every year. The fates are inexorable financiers. It was obſerved to me by a man of character, that life annuities make the pot boil at Paris. The increaſed income of individuals circulates to the advantage of the revenue. [101] Beſides, when this ſtring is touched, the ſtate gives up the only reſource it has left in the midſt of failing credit and diſtreſs. To redeem the life annuities is alſo contrary to the intereſt and intention of the proprietors, who purchaſed them with the ſacrifice of their capital. They ſunk their money upon theſe annuities in the heat of the war, when they might have made double the intereſt of it that they could in time of peace, beſides the great chance of the value of their ſtock riſing at the end of the war; whereas they have no opportunity of making the ſame advantage, in caſe they ſhould be paid off. They ſunk their capital with no other view, but to have an inviolable revenue, which their ſituation required, on which ſome have regulated their expences, and many their exiſtence. Others prudently intended to ſecure ſome little reſource to their children againſt a moment of diſtreſs. To redeem theſe annuities would overturn the principle on which they were created. It would make a prodigious alteration to individuals in the means of their ſubſiſtence, and the public would feel the bad effect of it. I know what has been ſaid to the diſadvantage of life annuities. There is ſomething ſpecious in the argument, that they are prejudicial to poſterity. * Every thing has its inconveniencies. [102] Good cannot exiſt without evil. But the world, ſuch as it is, the ſtyle of the age we live in, our luxury, habits, and cuſtoms, make all theſe evils inevitable. Let us become Spartans, let us remove to Lacedaemon, let us new-model our manners, and adopt thoſe of ancient Greece; I ſhall then admit the reality of principles contradictory to thoſe I now eſtabliſh. But, to return to the Engliſh.

For the preſent it is ſufficient to obſerve, that, if in England the neceſſities of the ſtate ſhould be ever ſo preſſing, yet, before a national bankruptcy, with which the public is unreaſonably threatened, could take place, recourſe would certainly be had to the expedients I have pointed out, viz. An application of the preſent ſinking fund, a new aſſeſſment of the land-tax, a tax upon collateral ſucceſſions, a light tax upon transfers, a capitation, 10 a ſmall duty upon articles of conſumption, upon offices and employments, and an operation of finance, by which, with the aſſiſtance of the ſinking fund, a portion of capital debt might be converted into life annuities. None of theſe reſources have yet been touched, but all of them will probably be [103] exhauſted before the kingdom is reduced to that ſituation which was prognoſticated at the death of king William, when it owed no more than twenty millions ſterling. Diogenes, to prove the reality of motion againſt the ſophiſtry of Zeno, got up and walked. We need only follow the hiſtory of facts, to refute by experience every thing that has been ſaid concerning the national debt, ſince the beginning of the preſent century. My ſyſtem is proved by a concurrence of unqueſtionable facts, which ſhow how much we have been miſled and alarmed by phantoms of our own creating. If this Treatiſe on Circulation had been written ſeventy years ago, the theory of it would have been every year confirmed by practical evidence. The principles, on which it reſts, are demonſtrated by experiment concurring with ſpeculation.

Of all the writers, who have been deceived with regard to the national debt, none ſurpriſed me more than the celebrated Mr. Hume. I had the honor of knowing him at Paris, and obſerved with infinite pleaſure, that his diſpoſition was ſuperior to his underſtanding. It is to truth that he is indebted for this elogium. * This great man, before the laſt peace, had written an Eſſay on Public Credit, which I had not ſeen when I drew up the firſt part of my Eſſay on Circulation. It was mentioned to me afterwards, and I was concerned to find that my own Treatiſe ſeemed exactly a refutation of his. He read it ſome time after at Paris, together with the Letter in which I have endeavoured to prove that the jealouſy of commerce is ill underſtood, and that the true intereſts of princes are not at variance; and he was pleaſed to expreſs his approbation of the two eſſays in terms which I [104] cannot venture to repeat. That ſublime genius had alſo touched the ſubject of the jealouſy of commerce. If he had unfolded the principles of his ſyſtem more at large, I ſhould have ſuppreſſed my letter. The hope that he will do it one day or other, and the approbation with which he honored that little treatiſe, determined me to publiſh it. I flatter myſelf, that Mr. Hume will alſo correct ſome of his ideas on circulation and public credit. He may be right in a certain ſenſe, when he foretells, that either the nation muſt deſtroy public credit, or public credit will deſtroy the nation. It muſt undoubtedly happen ſo, if precautions were not taken. I believe I have made him eaſy upon that point; yet I cannot refrain from ſuggeſting to him, with all the ſubmiſſion due to his underſtanding, that he advances another propoſition, the conſequences of which might be as dangerous, as the principles on which it reſts appear to me to be queſtionable. Mr. Hume ſays, that, if a ſpunge were applied to the national debt, thouſands would be ſacrificed to the ſafety of millions. Without enquiring whether honor is, in any caſe, to be ſacrificed to advantage, I affirm only, that the millions would for a long time feel the ſacrifice of the thouſands. Mr. Hume did not conſider, that if three millions ſterling, paid in annuities within the kingdom, were ſuppreſſed, the ſuppreſſion of thoſe three millions would ſtop a circulation that repreſents perhaps thirty millions in expence; that every order of the ſtate, even to the beggar, would feel the effects of it; and that the ſource of taxation would be dried up. Conſider the example of the circulation of a ſingle crown piece, ſtated in the Firſt Part of this Work. If ſuch an event ſhould ever take place, people would kneel at the ſight of a guinea. We have ſeen an inſtance of this diſtreſs in France, where things were never carried to that extremity; yet the French funds never [105] had an eaſy circulation. The conſtitutions of the two kingdoms are very different. The reſources of France are infinite; yet, upon the fall of Law's ſyſtem, the deſolation was almoſt univerſal, although the ſpunge was very far from extending to the whole national debt. In that caſe commerce would be at a ſtand; a public bankruptcy would draw along with it the bankruptcy of a great part of the merchants, whoſe means and credit would be annihilated; induſtry, for a time, would ceaſe to exiſt, or be compelled to quit the country; agriculture would feel the conſequences. The fire would extend far and near, and the confuſion become univerſal. The ſtate, the government, would be without reſources. So dangerous a convulſion would bring us to that fatal period, at which the breath of an infant might overturn the ſtate. We might then ſay, with Monteſquieu, that there would be nothing left of the picture of the ſtate except the frame, liable to be broken by the leaſt external effort.

I am perſuaded that, when Mr. Hume wrote the above eſſay, he had not yet made an exact and commercial analyſis of circulation, of the nature of the funds, and of the effects of annuities. He had been ſtruck with ſome truths diſadvantageous to paper and credit, and which had interrupted the ſight of others, calculated to correct the inconveniences attending it. Thus it often happens, that truth leads to error, and error to truth. To arrive at truth, we muſt ſeparate deluſions, and ſift falſehood to the bottom. Mr. Hume obſerved, that multiplying the repreſentative ſigns lowered the value of ſpecie. But he did not conſider the neceſſity of having ſuch ſigns to repreſent the multitude of things, which the abundance of gold and ſilver has in ſome meaſure rendered neceſſary. Let us new model our manners; let us go twenty centuries back; let us reduce human nature to its primitive condition; let us baniſh thoſe factitious [106] wants which we have changed into neceſſities; let us be philoſophers, and with Diogenes reject the earthen veſſel, and drink out of the hollow of the hand; let us be poor and virtuous, and Mr. Hume's principles may then be applied. But ſince there is no likelihood of ſuch an alteration ſor ſome centuries, we may as well purſue our courſe, and endeavour to correct abuſes. Let us imitate Solon, who gave the Athenians the beſt laws they were capable of receiving. We muſt often live with our enemies, and compound with our infirmities. Imperfection is our inheritance, and little inconveniences muſt be preferred to great ones. Though we may be aſſured that death will come, let us not kill ourſelves for fear of dying. Every ſtate, let its political conſtitution be ever ſo well deviſed, carries within itſelf the principle of its diſſolution. If Rome and Sparta periſhed, what ſtate can hope to endure for ever? We muſt not attempt to govern a corrupted people by the ſame laws which ſuit a virtuous people. The expreſſion is ſevere; but the principle of that auſtere philoſopher may be applied to the queſtion before us. England, in all appearance, will ſuffer the fate of other ſtates that have gone before her. But let us not encroach upon providence. The period ſeems yet at a great diſtance.

"Tu ne quaesîeris fcire nefas, quem mihi, quem tibi,
"Finem Dii dederint."

They, who have undertaken to apologiſe for luxury, have run into another extreme. Their view of that multiplied circulation, which encourages induſtry and commerce, has not been complete. They did not conſider, that circulation is maintained by a daily expence, permanent, ſolid, and conſtantly kept up; [107] whereas exceſſive luxury, by diſordering the various ſprings on which the fortunes of individuals are balanced, and exhauſting their reſources, is injurious to induſtry and circulation. The numerary wealth of a great number of individuals is annihilated by a forced luxury, and is not diſperſed through the public, as hath been falſely imagined. This is the great point of the queſtion. I do not condemn that expence, or relative luxury, which is proportioned to the means and rank of the individual; but that which confounds all ranks, which renders ſo many perſons the victims of opinion ill underſtood, makes them glitter for a moment, then baniſhes them to obſcurity, from which they never emerge. This is the luxury which I affirm is deſtructive.

Exceſſive luxury in England has given birth to another vice, to which the enormous increaſe of the debt may truly be aſcribed. The character of the nation is to carry every thing to exceſs; virtue, vice, every quality is puſhed to an extreme. The Engliſh have no oeconomy in their expences in time of war. They do that with more, which might be done with leſs. No man, I preſume, will venture to deny, that they might have done as much with one third leſs expence. The immenſe and rapid fortunes, made by their contractors in Germany, exceed all that we have heard of by the financiers in France. Plunder, waſte, and rapine, as we are told, were carried to the higheſt pitch; and how could it be otherwiſe, when the annual expence amounted to near three times as much as in the war of 1744? The annual loans were then from three millions to three and a half; in the laſt years of the late war they were carried to twelve. The efforts, I confeſs, were more vigorous, and the ſucceſſes more brilliant; but by no means in that proportion. [108] A prudent oeconomy is the moſt eſſential method of all to recover the finances. *

The frugality and manners of the Swiſs have made the canton of Berne very rich, in ſpite of a barren ſoil, and a territory without ſea-ports, mines, or manufactures. A Venetian ambaſſador once obſerved to cardinal Richelieu, that France, in order to be rich and eaſy, wanted nothing but to know how to ſpend the money ſhe loſt in waſte and diſſipation. The obſervation might equally be applied to England.

The Engliſh are naturally prodigal. They readily give into extremes, and know nothing of moderation. The legiſlature will find it ſo much the more difficult to ſet bounds to avarice, and to re-eſtabliſh an oeconomy ſo neceſſary to the well-being of their affairs. Sooner or later they will be compelled to have recourſe to the means I point out to increaſe their preſent ſinking fund, and to create another of an auxiliary and permanent nature; to eſtabliſh a more oeconomical adminiſtration, and to adopt a pacific ſyſtem for the future.

PART III. Of Finances, Taxes, and Agriculture, conſidered principally with reſpect to France. Refutation of the Principle, which reduces every thing to the Territorial Produce.

[109]

MONSIEUR de Mirabeau, in his Theory of Taxation, affirms, that it would be the philoſopher's ſtone to the ſtate, to make the machine of finance move in regular tracks, not only without exaction, without rigor, or expence, but from a ſpirit of emulation. He thinks he has diſcovered the ſecret, but I fear he is deceived. His heart has miſled his underſtanding. The works of this virtuous citizen, this amiable philoſopher, are replete with genius, ſublime ideas, and views equally new and profound. True patriotiſm, humanity, and the friend of mankind, appear in every part of them. Yet, in his Theory of Taxation, I think he has deluded himſelf with an impracticable ſyſtem. He firſt of all thought he ſaw devouring monſters, and ruin near and inevitable, where at the worſt there were only inconveniences, and grievous abuſes. The principles he ſets out with are ſometimes true. In the application to practice, and deduction of conſequences, I think he loſes his way. Other principles, which he lays down as axioms, are contradicted by experience. Nobody will diſpute with him, for inſtance, that agriculture is the organical action of a ſtate, whoſe riches belong to the ſoil; or that reſtraints upon agriculture debilitate the [110] powers of the ſtate, and retard that action which gives life to its proſperity. It will be admitted that the collection of taxes in France is too complicated, too expenſive and ſevere, and by that means too heavy, and in ſome articles oppreſſive. It ſhould certainly be reduced to greater ſimplicity in the mode; it ſhould be alleviated, and ſoftened in degree; and abuſes ſhould be corrected. But to repreſent France as on the brink of ruin, or to conceive that the taxes, in their preſent ſtate, far exceed the ſphere of the contributive faculty, is an exaggeration, which experience does, and will long, contradict.

The reſult of the Theory of Taxation amounts to this. Firſt, that a ſtate like France, whoſe riches belong to the ſoil, has no real revenue but its territorial produce. Secondly, that taxes ſhould be laid at the ſource of production. Thirdly, that there ſhould be an entire exemption in favor of labor and induſtry; that all the preſent taxes and duties ſhould be aboliſhed, and the very name of finance and farm be proſcribed. Fourthly, that a general capitation tax ſhould be eſtabliſhed, which, by ſuppreſſing the expence of collection, may produce more, and coſt leſs. This expence, according to him, abſorbs a third of the taxes, and is the cauſe of general deſtruction. Fifthly, that this office ſhould be intruſted to the municipal magiſtrates. Sixthly, the author affirms, that the real revenue of France does not at preſent amount to any thing near the taxes that are levied, and that loans are ruinous.

This ſyſtem is almoſt the ſame with that of the author of the Bilan with reſpect to England. I ſhall therefore confine myſelf to one general argument on the ſubject, and examine in a ſummary way ſome of Monſieur de Mirabeau's detached maxims, in order to confirm the principles I have already laid [111] down, and throw a new light upon the preceding parts of this work.

The Theory of Taxation dwells much upon the high price of articles of conſumption. We have already obſerved, that the quantity of the metals has lowered the value of money in its quality of ſign. A man now, with a much greater numerary wealth, is not richer in proportion than he was a century ago. But it is in vain to ſay that the mark of ſilver is nominally worth double what it was in the time of Harry IV. and that Lewis XV. with a greater numerary, is not ſo rich as his predeceſſors. 1 There muſt be ſome fallacy in the aſſertion; for [112] every thing is not doubled. The ſoldier's pay ſtands as it did in the time of Harry IV. and bread, as well as many other important articles, are nearly at the ſame rate they were then. Beſides, as Voltaire obſerved, it coſts no more at preſent to be well and agreeably lodged, than it did under Harry IV. A houſe may be adorned with beautiful glaſſes of modern manufacture, [113] at a much lower price than it could have been formerly with the little glaſſes imported from Venice. Our fine ſhowy ſilks are not ſo dear, yet much better than thoſe which we uſed to purchaſe of foreigners. Beſides this, it cannot be denied, that the number of people, rich and at their eaſe, is much greater than in the time of Harry IV. nor that the income of many perſons is doubled and trebled, which cannot fail of increaſing the revenue of the prince in the ſame proportion.

It is alſo to be obſerved, that if the firſt wants, being the moſt urgent, are ſupplied out of the firſt half of a man's income, the power of contribution ariſing from the other half may not only be double, but quadruple what it would be if he had only half his income. Let me explain myſelf by an example. A man, whoſe annual income is fifty thouſand crowns, is twice as rich, in point of numerary, as one who has only twenty-five thouſand with the ſame eſtabliſhment; but his power of faculty and contribution is in a much higher proportion, as well with reſpect to articles of fancy, as to works of charity, and expences of ornament and vanity; whereas he who has only twenty-five thouſand crowns, finds his revenue abſorbed in the [114] firſt wants annexed to his ſtation, ſuppoſing him to figure in the world, and to maintain a certain rank or eſtabliſhment. He has but little left to gratify his fancy. If, therefore, Lewis XV. be not quite twice as rich, nor twice as powerful, as Harry IV. yet, ſince the numerary of his revenue is doubled, and ſince he has a greater number of wealthy ſubjects, he muſt at all events be conſiderably ſuperior both in wealth and power. As for thoſe fiſcal abuſes, imputed to the preſent age, they have prevailed at all times, and, with a weak adminiſtration, enervated, in ſome degree, the contributive faculty of the ſubject. It is a fever incident to great ſtates. The ſeeds of ſuch diſorders are as inevitable as thoſe which undermine the human conſtitution. Yet the remedy ſhould be ſought, and where ſpecifics cannot be found, palliatives may be applied. But I affirm boldly, on a train of reaſoning confirmed by experience, that the project, which has ſo long ſeduced the world, of reducing all taxes to a ſingle one, by way of capitation, and of aboliſhing all other taxes whatſoever with the expences of collection, is a chimera in ſuch countries as France, England, and Holland. The attempt was made in Holland in the year 1749, and the fallacy was ſoon perceived. It was found to be utterly impoſſible to levy thoſe ſums upon the public, which the ſtate had occaſion for, by any other means but duties upon articles of conſumption, where the tax is confounded with the price. This method is the leaſt felt, and the only one feaſible. The inconveniences reſulting from it, how great ſoever they may appear, are far from being ſo dangerous as they are repreſented. I have ſhown the truth of this poſition in the Firſt Part of this Eſſay, and in the ſequel ſhall offer freſh proofs in ſupport of it.

Holland itſelf conſtitutes a demonſtration, that Monſieur de Mirabeau's principles are not well founded. If taxes were not to [115] be collected, but immediately at the ſource of the ſubject's revenue, as Monſieur de Mirabeau ſuppoſes, and if nothing were to be exacted but a portion of the territorial produce, Holland long ago muſt have ceaſed to exiſt. Her alimentary productions are but few; ſhe has ſcarce any arable land, vineyards, or woods. On this ſide all her reſources conſiſt in a few meadows; yet the republic pays troops, maintains a marine, and has often figured on a level with the firſt powers of Europe. Taxes of every kind are heavier than in France or England; yet the ſtate is not ruined by them, but ſubſiſts with opulence. If the jealouſy of her commerce had not excited ſuch a number of competitors, the ſtate would ſcarce have felt the effect of the exorbitant taxes levied upon the ſubject. Bread, an object of the firſt neceſſity, pays a duty that nearly doubles the price. Every article of conſumption pays more than in France. Capital ſtock of all kinds, ſuch as houſes, actions, contracts, lands, are ſtill more loaded. Yet Holland flouriſhes, and the machine of finance preſerves its courſe. It is the magic of credit and circulation that produces theſe ſalutary effects. This credit and circulation are not therefore ſo miſchievous in practice as Monſieur de Mirabeau ſuſpects. We muſt yield to the evidence of a conſtant, uniform, deciſive experience. The opulence of the rich man, through the medium of circulation, ſupplies the poor man and the beggar wherewithal to pay a tax to the ſtate, in the conſumption of the edibles on which he ſubſiſts. The beggar obtains the mere phyſical neceſſaries of life more eaſily at Paris, London, or Amſterdam, than at Montauban, York, or Overyſſel. Circulation and credit are two ſprings, the play of which is not thoroughly underſtood. All the gold and ſilver of Europe and America, that is waſted in Indoſtan, does not enrich the inhabitants of that country. The Indians are poor; their [116] princes amaſs treaſures and ſtop circulation, which has no credit to ſupport it. Taxes upon conſumption not only make the beggar, but even animals, beneficial to the revenue, and conſequently to the ſtate. They, who have been ſeduce by the idea of a ſingle tax, and of ſuppreſſing the various ramifications of taxation, do not know that, in the richeſt and moſt opulent ſtates, the number of perſons who poſſeſs a real fortune (I mean, of thoſe who would be ſubject to a capitation, and who, in Holland, are called the Capitaliſts) is very ſmall in compariſon with the other inhabitants; whereas the number of thoſe who, without any real fortune, live at their eaſe, and at a higher expence than common houſekeepers, is very conſiderable. It is their induſtry, employments, and various talents, that conſtitute their reſources. They are not rich, yet they live as expenſively as if they were ſo. They cannot poſſibly be taxed in that high proportion, which would be neceſſary to form an equivalent for the ſuppreſſion of all other taxes. It has been found impoſſible. I ſpeak from fact. This point has been thoroughly examined by the ableſt financiers in Holland. When the tax is charged upon edibles, the circulating money returns in part into the public treaſury, from which it iſſued. It multiplies as it runs, and circulating ſucceſſively through twenty different hands, enables each of them to continue the expence of the preceding year, and always with the ſame ſpecie. A great man, who ſpends a hundred thouſand florins a year, at once returns twenty thouſand to the public treaſury on the head of his firſt expence; but this is nothing compared to the reverberation of expences, which the inferior ranks, and theſe again ſubdivided into ſtill lower orders of men, are, by his magnificence, enabled to engage in; ſo that, at the end of the year, it is poſſible that the whole hundred thouſand florins may have paſſed with benefit [117] through the public treaſury, and iſſued out again to ſupply the various channels of circulation. In ſpite of all that has been ſaid to the contrary, the annuitants contribute greatly to maintain this happy circulation. Taxes are, in reality, no more than a momentary reverſion of certain portions of property, which individuals ſuffer to paſs annually through the treaſury, for their own preſervation, and which return wholly, or in part, into the hand that pays them. There is a perpetual circle of retribution from the ſovereign to the ſubect, and from the ſubject to the ſovereign. All the declamations, that contradict this definition, prove too much, and lead to the abſurd.

We are for ever told, that France and England are undone, though experience ſhows us that the two kingdoms are ſtill in a flouriſhing condition. There are enormous abuſes, I confeſs; yet even theſe abuſes prove the vigor of the conſtitution. The ſubſtance ſaves the form. They will never be corrected by the means of an univerſal tax, much leſs by a land tax to be paid in kind; another chimera in our European conſtitutions. Such modes of taxation might anſwer in a ſacerdotal government. Among a people collected into a ſmall territory, a tithe in kind of the productions of the earth, with the aſſiſtance of a ſmall capitation, might be ſufficient to anſwer all purpoſes. But ſince the powers of Europe have thought it neceſſary to their tranquillity at home, and ſecurity abroad, to maintain armies and fleets in time of peace, ſuch a plan would be ineffectual. Beſides, there is no ſtate now in Europe, except Poland, that conſiſts merely of farmers. Commerce, the fiſheries, luxury, paper ſecurity, the public funds, various manufactures multiplied in every branch, factitious riches, now conſtitute the maſs of property. In the general ſyſtem, the ſecret of adminiſtration conſiſts in combining theſe different objects, without ſuffering [118] them to interfere with each other. To proſcribe, to aboliſh, or decry them, would be overturning the edifice. But, as the ſyſtem itſelf is, in ſome degree, a new ſcience, * we have yet got no farther than the elements of it, and are ſtill groping our way. From hence have ariſen the miſtakes of ſo many ingenious people, who have diſcourſed upon the public funds, credit, and circulation, applying obſolete principles to the preſent ſtate of taxation, finance, population, and agriculture. Some great genius will, one day or other, diſcover the true proportion of the new ſyſtem of policy, by analyſing the ſprings that give it motion, and explaining the internal play of the wheels. In the mean time it will happen, as Monſieur de Mirabeau obſerves, that, while we endeavour to accelerate the motion of the wheel, the impreſſion will be too heavy upon ſome parts, and diſcompoſe the reſt, by which the progreſs of the machine will ſometimes be ſtopped. In the preſent ſtate of things, the moſt important object of all political ſcience is the mode of collecting the revenue; for on this point, undoubtedly, the whole effect of it depends, as well as the harmony of the ſtate. The queſtion is to find out rules clear, exact, and certain; hoc opus, hic labor eſt.

There is one great inconvenience, attending an univerſal tax by capitation, which, if in itſelf it were a practicable meaſure, would ſtill make it a dangerous one. Such a tax would take too great a quantity of money out of circulation at once, and make ſpecie extremely ſcarce at every period of collection; which can never happen, as long as it paſſes through the multiplied channels of conſumption. The intervals between receipt and diſtribution are kept in equilibrium; and this is ſo true, that [119] in Holland, where the plenty of money has made it a kind of merchandiſe, ſpecie became extremely ſcarce, from an accident of the above nature, in the year 1747. To anſwer the demands of the war, a method had been thought of to raiſe a large ſum of money, without borrowing. All the ſubjects of the republic were induced to contribute, 2 by way of free gift, the fiftieth penny of their whole property at four periods. The amount muſt of courſe be conſiderable. To prevent the inconvenience above mentioned, the treaſury were obliged to make out receipts, which they diſtributed among a number of private perſons for the reſpective periods of paying in the fiftieth penny, in order to prevent that ſtagnation, or ſtop of circulation, which muſt have happened, if ſo large a ſum had been depoſited in the treaſury at one payment. This paper facilitated circulation, and brought forth ſpecie, which would not have appeared without it.

To amaſs at once, for any given time, let it be ever ſo ſhort, a great quantity of money in the public treaſury, muſt neceſſarily choak circulation, and produce the heavieſt inconveniences. [120] This can never happen in the mode of laying the tax upon conſumption, where the collection is inſenſible, ſucceſſive and gradual, and thereby gives time for the money to iſſue out of the public treaſury, and circulate again through the public. A hundred obſervations, confirmed by experience, prove the truth of what I advance.

Nothing is more changeable than the fortune of individuals. Some are enriched while others are impoveriſhed. A capitation, or univerſal tax, muſt be rectified every year; and in the firſt inſtance it muſt be a heavy tax that is an equivalent for all the reſt. The machine would be for ever out of order. What an embarraſſment! The impoſſibility of the project ſtrikes in every view. A capitation can never be any thing but a ſupplemental meaſure; it never can produce a tenth part of the tax upon conſumption. The utmoſt uſe that could be made of it would be to redeem the taxes which interrupt and retard the labor of the plough. In this ſingle view it might perhaps be practicable and beneficial. As for the reſt, experience muſt be our guide. It is certain, that formerly the farmers general in France amaſſed fortunes with an indecent rapidity; but this abuſe is now greatly diminiſhed. We no longer ſee that opulent quarantine, 3 nor thoſe armies of one part of the nation employed to ruin the other. Among the number of financiers, there are true patriots, men of ſenſe, and virtuous citizens. Their occupation is odious, but it appears to be neceſſary. Their ſubalterns ſometimes commit acts of atrocious violence. But abuſes of this kind exiſt in armies commanded by the beſt generals. Many of theſe financiers and their adherents, when they do not ruin themſelves by an exceſſive, inſulting luxury, are, without doubt, highly ſerviceable [121] to the ſtate. They are enabled to aſſiſt circulation and credit, and in ſpite of all that can be ſaid by people who do not underſtand the principles of finance, it is the combination of thoſe two agents that ſupports the machine. In Holland, the farms ſubſiſt, although the farmers are aboliſhed. Collectors have been ſubſtituted in their room. The change of name was intended to ſatisfy the people, who never can be ſatisfied. The wiſdom and patriotiſm of the ſtadtholder, ſupported by the zeal of the magiſtrates, have improved the finances, and corrected in part the abuſes they were ſubject to, yet without aboliſhing the farms. The ſame thing ought to have been done in France, where the abuſes are more conſiderable, and perhaps more difficult to correct, from the complication of laws and privileges in every province, and their diſtance from the centre of adminiſtration. I have endeavoured to make myſelf maſter of the management of the farms in France. It appears to me that misfortunes are often imputed to the farmers general, which it is not in their power to remedy, and which are always exaggerated. Yet, for the welfare of the kingdom, it were to be wiſhed, that proper meaſures might be taken to remedy theſe inconveniences, which are not the leſs dreadful becauſe they appear unavoidable. Heavy taxes are collected in England upon a more ſimple and leſs expenſive plan. Their method perhaps may be aſſiſted by the conſtitution and local circumſtances of the country. Whether or no it be practicable in France, or whether it be poſſible to inſtitute that regiſter which all the world talks of, and nobody underſtands, is a queſtion yet undetermined.

Monſieur de Mirabeau affirms, that the magiſtrates and municipal officers are the natural collectors of the tribute, which the ſubjects, in their reſpective juriſdictions, owe to their ſovereign. The idea is ſeducing, and perhaps the meaſure may [122] be right. Yet I do not know whether it would not meet with inſurmountable difficulties in practice, and whether, after a certain interval, the ſame things would not be ſaid of them, that are ſaid of the perſons now employed in the collection of the revenue. It is not generally admitted that the provinces of France, which remain en pays d'Etat, have any advantage over the reſt. I am not ſufficiently acquainted with the fact to pronounce upon that mode of collection. The miniſter undoubtedly perceives the effect of it, and probably knows what to truſt to. He will adopt it, if it be ſuch as it is repreſented. The ſucceſſion of ſteps and hierarchical juriſdictions, which Monſieur de Mirabeau would fain proſcribe, ſeem in ſome degree indiſpenſable in every mode of collection. The increaſe of expence, ariſing from them, will be a ſtumbling-block in every ſyſtem. As for the reſt, I confeſs, that in the Theory of Taxation there are ſome ſublime ideas, which I admire and reſpect. All that the author ſays upon the ſubject of ſalt and tobacco ſeems to deſerve the attention of the French miniſtry. It has often been obſerved, before Monſieur de Mirabeau, that the produce of duties is in proportion to their lightneſs. A moderate duty ſhould naturally put a ſtop to contraband, and ſave the waſteful expences of management. The over burthen of theſe expences falls upon the ſale of the commodity, and leſſens the conſumption. Theſe truths appear inconteſtable; yet in Holland we have often ſeen, that the diminution of duties at the cuſtom-houſe has not taken effect, nor prevented contraband. European nations, though Chriſtians, do not always follow the goſpel; they do not always give unto Caeſar the things that are Caeſar's. Every tax, every duty, every cuſtom, is paid with reluctance. We ſhould endeavour to prevent this abuſe; for the principles above mentioned appear to me eſſential. The ſame [123] thing cannot, in my opinion, be ſaid of his other principles. Such is the neceſſity, he ſuppoſes, of conſtituting a public treaſure. I ſhall hereafter prove it to be a hurtful, dangerous, and uſeleſs meaſure. I have the ſame notion of his project of aboliſhing every impoſition upon barren property, on ſtocks, houſes, ſubſiſtence, employments, deeds, and luxury. It is a patriotic enthuſiaſm, founded upon metaphyſical ideas, which never can be applied to the actual conſtitution of things. His declamation againſt the public funds, credit, and circulation, is of the ſame nature, and has been already refuted. Another obſervation occurs to me. The ſovereigns of Spain and Portugal, with all their treaſures of Peru, Mexico, and the Brazils, never conceived the idea of creating theſe public funds, to which the value of ſpecie might be communicated, which might collect and give fixation to money, while it circulated elſewhere, and call it in again, in caſe of need, by the magic of circulation, and the credit imparted to thoſe funds. Who knows whether this may not be preciſely the reaſon why thoſe kingdoms have not been enriched by their mines? There was no prop to ſupport the building, while they were working upon the repairs. Spain and Portugal, depopulated by moral cauſes, might, I believe, in ſome degree, have recovered their population and agriculture, if the numerary riches of convention had realiſed the momentary paſſage of the gold and ſilver of their mines. Factitious property would have produced induſtry, and ſupplied a fund for improving the ſoil, with all thoſe natural productions, which, in ſo fortunate a climate, are ripened by the ſun. Commerce, opulence, and circulation, might perhaps have invited a number of new inhabitants of the religion of the country, ſince the want of a toleration does not admit others to ſettle there. Even this odious difficulty might have been ſurmounted [124] by intereſt; whereas, at preſent, the inhabitants, notwithſtanding they pay fewer taxes, are poorer than thoſe of France or England. I do not ſtate this conjecture as the only cauſe of the diſproportion between the actual condition of Spain and Portugal, and the ſources of metallic wealth, which both of them poſſeſs. I mean only to mark the advantage produced by circulation in countries where the metals are not ſo plentiful. The miſerable ſtate of the Spaniards in Peru and Mexico is a ſtill ſtronger proof that gold and ſilver are nothing of themſelves, but ſo far as they readily paſs in exchange for articles of neceſſity and convenience. Monſieur de la Condamine aſſures us, that the people, who ſhowed him the mines of Peru, were wretches without ſhoes to their feet.

Spain and Portugal are not in that condition. If, added to the fertility of the ſoil, and happineſs of the climate, the two kingdoms were as well peopled as they ought to be, the productions of nature and induſtry, independent of their mines, would make them the moſt plentiful countries in the world. The exchange of their commodities might even create a commercial balance in their favor beyond the produce of their mines. But as this neither is, nor for a long time can be, the caſe, we muſt for the preſent conſider the metals as a merchandiſe of their own growth, and the extraction thereof, to a certain degree, as neceſſary and uſeful. I am even inclined to think, that if all the advantages of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, exiſted with activity in Spain and Portugal; and if at the ſame time they were to continue in poſſeſſion of the gold and ſilver of Peru, Mexico, and the Brazils; the metals then, by reaſon of their abundance, might almoſt always perform their office in perſon, without factitious ſigns, or the circulation of paper credit. I am nevertheleſs perſuaded, that ſuch a repletion of [125] ſpecie would produce inconveniences eventually fatal to the manners, and even to the commerce and proſperity of the two nations, and that providence has not undeſignedly given them the cuſtody, or rather the diſtribution, of the treaſures of America.

If Portugal had preſerved the Moluccas and Ceylon, which it was in poſſeſſion of before the mines of Brazil were diſcovered, the harmony of the commerce of Europe muſt have been deſtroyed. But if Holland had kept the Brazils, that harmony would ſtill have been maintained. Holland, as we have frequently obſerved, has nothing to give in exchange. Induſtry, commerce, and ſpice trade, conſtitute all her opulence, and are ſupported by thoſe factitious funds, to which credit gives circulation, and which enlarge the contributive faculty of the people to pay the taxes impoſed upon them. Taxes follow opulence and eaſe. Competition in the market, and a greater conſumption, of courſe raiſe the price of proviſions. Yet taxes are not to be multiplied without urgent neceſſity, and every prudent meaſure of police ſhould be employed to prevent the exorbitant price of proviſions. But, to return to my ſubject.

Many attempts have been made to calculate the proportion that ought to be preſerved between ſpecie and paper. It has been a long time fixed at the rate of three to one; that is, that there may ſafely be three times as much paper in circulation as money. Yet experience has evidently ſhown, that the quantity of paper may be conſiderably enlarged, and yet ſupport itſelf without difficulty. To call this a diſproportion is creating monſters on purpoſe to fight with them. It is contradicting experience, eſpecially as the ſame pretended diſproportion will be found to ſubſiſt between money and riches of every ſort, ſuch as land, houſes, ſhips, jewels, &c. Yet we are not to confound bank notes, or bills of credit repreſenting money, with [126] that paper which conſtitutes the public ſunds, and bears intereſt; although, in ſome reſpects, there is a great analogy between them. A much greater quantity of ſtock may be created than of bank notes. The public funds do not exactly repreſent ſpecie, though the creation of them augments the numerary wealth. They form a ſolid property, as much as land or houſes, and yield a revenue without repairs or cultivation. The greateſt advantage attending them is, that they make money, and that which repreſents it, circulate with more rapidity. Taken by parts, they may, in a certain ſenſe, be conſidered as ſo much ready money, the office of which they frequently perform. A hundred thouſand pounds in annuities may be converted into ſpecie in 'Change Alley within four and twenty hours, with ſcarce any alteration in the price, and millions may be ſold for time. Theſe are facts not to be diſputed. Of all kinds of property, this is the only one that partakes, as it were, of the quality of money, at the ſame time that, by the eſſence of its nature, it is a ſolid property. The obſervation is important, and I believe has not been made before. I ſhall add but one reflection more; that gold and ſilver coin has an arbitrary value of convention, and that there is no phyſical reaſon why it ſhould repreſent all commodities, as well as the articles of firſt neceſſity, in preference to paper, by which itſelf is repreſented. The Indians make the ſame uſe of ſhells; and all the plauſible objections to the creation of artificial ſigns in paper may be applied equally to the metals, which we can neither eat nor drink. But as in the preſent ſyſtem a barter of commodities is impracticable, ſome general medium of exchange is wanted to be the meaſure of every thing; and this quality no more belongs to metal than it does to ſtocks and paper, when the circulation of them is [127] ſupported by credit and good faith, and by the intereſt they produce.

Monſieur de Mirabeau's principles are much the ſame with thoſe of the author of the Bilan, to reduce every thing to the territorial produce. Yet I think the fallacy of them appears even from his own ſtatements of the territorial revenue of France compared with experience. His ſyſtem is open to objections, becauſe it is contradicted by facts. How would it have been poſſible for France to have exceeded her ſtrength in the article of taxation during ſo long a period, without having been expoſed to ſome more fatal, and as it were more palpable, political convulſions? I ſhall hereafter make it appear, that the diſorders in France have not ſo much proceeded from taxes, as from the long wars, and the want of credit in borrowing money. I have already proved, that credit and circulation are the only means to correct and ſoften the ſeverity of taxes, and ſhall ſupport my opinion by farther evidence. Obſervation, enquiries, and calculations of the territorial revenue, may be of ſervice, if they are properly applied without exaggeration, and if they do not lead to conſequences inconſiſtent with known facts, or to meaſures either impoſſible in practice, or whoſe ſuppoſed effect is not juſtified by experience. Yet, as it is poſſible that, without Galileo and Kepler, Newton might never have analyſed the rays of light, or thoroughly diſcuſſed the principles of gravitation, it is to be hoped, that the works of ſpeculative politicians will in like manner aſſiſt others in explaining the true principles, on which the ſinances ſhould be adminiſtered for the welfare and happineſs of mankind.

We are children ſtill. Our children perhaps may be men. I cannot comprehend how Monſieur de Mirabeau can lay the whole burthen of taxation upon the territorial produce, after [128] having ſo clearly demonſtrated, that the vexations heaped upon the huſbandman deſtroy thoſe riches which, without ſuch vexations, would be annually renewed; that large tracts of land lie fallow and deſerted; that decay of population of courſe diminiſhes conſumption, which he ought to conſider as the ſource of the ſovereign's revenue; that ſpoliation withers up the ſoil; that the arbitrary land tax, repairs of the roads, and other vexations, ought to be aboliſhed. Yet he ſubſtitutes the ſame burthen under another denomination, and gives no relief to that part of the nation. He ſeems to me to contradict himſelf, when he propoſes to lay the whole tax at the ſource of production; yet this is his favorite principle. Perhaps it may be my own fault; but I confeſs my ignorance; I do not underſtand his ſyſtem; it appears to me to involve a contradiction. He advances another principle, which, in the abſtract, ſeems nearer to truth, and more important; that no province, or city, or perſon, ſhall pretend, by virtue of any privilege or immunity, to be exempted from a general contribution. This is juſt. But to confine it to a capitation, or perſonal tax, proportioned to the rent of houſes or lodgings, would be inſufficient to anſwer the ſervice, even if it were poſſible for the tax to be ſtrictly collected. A capitation can be no more than a ſupplementary meaſure. He proſcribes the only taxes that can ever anſwer the demands of government, viz. thoſe upon edibles, luxury, and objects of conſtant uſe. The reader will find freſh proofs of this aſſertion in the ſequel. All theſe ſchemes have been already attempted in Holland, in the year 1748, with a view to ſubſtitute one general tax in the room of all the duties upon conſumption. Speculations of this kind embarraſs the finances. They amuſe the people with hopes, and make them pay with more reluctance the taxes on which their own welfare and preſervation depend. [129] The firſt principle laid down in the Theory of Taxation, and in the Bilan of England, is, that a cultivating ſtate has no revenue but the produce of the earth, and that the whole is collected within the territorial revenue. This might be true, if there were any ſtate in Europe that confined itſelf merely to the cultivation of the ſoil. The ſtate of France, as well as of England, is compoſed of farmers, ſhepherds, fiſhermen, hunters, merchants, manufacturers, artiſts, and ſoldiers. Why then ſhould we reduce the various produce of all the branches to the annual return of territorial revenue? Is it not repreſenting the coloſſus of France under the figure of a ſkeleton? The principle, that the territorial produce is to be conſidered as the only ſource of revenue, has ſeduced many people; yet it is abſolutely falſe, as well as the conſequence drawn from it, that taxes ſhould be laid at the ſource of production; a maxim deſtructive to cultivation, and that counteracts the author's purpoſe. To prove, with ſtill ſtronger evidence, that it does ſo, let us draw a ſhort analytical picture of all the kinds of property, of which a ſtate is compoſed. We ſhall then diſcover from what ſources an exact account of the finances of a kingdom is to be collected, and ſee at once upon what articles taxes may be impoſed with the leaſt degree of inconvenience, and in what claſs each ſtate is to be reckoned.

Landed property is the firſt. This is incapable of being deſtroyed; but its value, more or leſs, depends upon cultivation, and without labor it makes no return. Its productions are neither voluntary, nor gratuitous. They require not only care, but expence; and before they nouriſh, they employ. But the annual fruits of the earth are conſumed, and at the end of the year ceaſe to exiſt; or, if conſumption fails, they putrify, and are loſt. The ſtate can only be enriched by the internal conſumption, [130] and by the ſurplus exported to foreigners. In this firſt claſs I reckon arable lands, woods, and vineyards.

The ſecond kind of property, which Monſieur de Mirabeau has almoſt forgotten, and yet is very conſiderable, conſiſts of cattle, and the fields where they are fed. Cattle return more to the earth than they take from it. Some give milk twice a day, which ſupplies us with cheeſe. The ox not only contributes his labor to our ſervice, but even his fleſh and his ſkin. The ſheep furniſhes the firſt elements of the moſt uſeful manufactures. Wool is a ſource of riches to England and Spain.

The fiſheries are a third kind of property. The ſea contributes to nouriſh the inhabitants of the earth, as much as the earth itſelf, with ſtill leſs expence. The great fiſheries form an article of conſiderable importance in commerce, yet omitted in the Theory of Taxation.

Houſes are the fourth. The rent, or the occupation, is ſo much real revenue. The object itſelf is periſhable, but neceſſity and luxury keep it in conſtant repair. The laborer, the mechanic, and the artiſt, are employed.

The fifth kind of property conſiſts of ſhips, wares, magazines, and in ſhort of that innumerable detail of commercial articles, which furniſh ſubſiſtence to a prodigious multitude of people, and produce immenſe ſums every year, at the ſame time that the offices performed by money are multiplied by circulation. The revenue of this branch is of far different importance from that of the territorial produce, to which we are told that every thing ſhould be reduced.

The ſixth kind conſiſts of notes, public funds, actions, royal ſecurities bearing intereſt, the fruits or intereſt of which are not deſtroyed by conſumption, like thoſe of the earth, but are permanent and unperiſhable, and multiply in every hand they [131] paſs through, yet, under the auſpices of credit and circulation, preſerve their fertility. This (with ſubmiſſion to thoſe who are unacquainted with the true principles of finance) is the reaſon why a numerary, exceeding all the money in Europe, is annually expended in Paris and London, and why the ſtate can levy ſo many taxes without ruin to the nation; a paradox, which ſpeculative financiers are unable to comprehend, becauſe they have no true idea of circulation and credit. Theſe are the powers that create and multiply, that give life and activity, that produce and reproduce. They ſuffer nothing to ſtop or ſtagnate, but remove all obſtructions, and circulate the blood through every vein.

The ſeventh kind of property conſiſts of places of honor, offices and employments. From this ſource a number of perſons are ſupplied with the means of expence, from which others again derive their ſubſiſtence. Induſtry and circulation are encouraged, and the public revenue improved, even by thoſe who live at the expence of it.

The eighth kind conſiſts of magazines of all ſorts, fixtures, jewelry, trinkets, diamonds, gold and ſilver plate, curioſities, pictures, and books; all which augment the numerary, and, notwithſtanding their ſlow circulation, contribute to ſupport credit, and to prop the building.

The ninth conſiſts of manufactures, principally thoſe for exportation, by which foreigners are laid under contribution, and the ſubject enriched. Thoſe of Lyons, and other places in France, far from deſtroying agriculture, encourage it. But this might be the ſubject of another diſſertation, and would lead me too far. In the Elogium of Sully, one of the maſter-pieces of Monſieur Thomas, there is an argument upon this point, which appears to me too bold.

[132] The tenth is a ſupernumerary to France. I mean the multitude of foreigners, whom curioſity attracts to Paris, and pleaſure detains there. Their expence is a real numerary, which not only augments that of the kingdom, but at the ſame time increaſes the materials and circulation of ſpecie. Combined with the expences of thoſe, through whom their money circulates, it improves the ſovereign's revenue, which, though never ſtationary in his hands, always exiſts within the nation. The exorbitant price of furniſhed lodgings at Paris and upon the road, and the hire of carriages for the uſe of foreigners, is a kind of territorial produce, created by foreigners, without the charges of exportation.

The eleventh kind of property, conſiſting of mines of coal, tin, and iron, where there are any, has eſcaped Monſieur de Mirabeau.

Such is the true picture of the riches of a country, widely different from that impoveriſhed ſtate preſented to us in the Theory of Taxation. In this picture the apparent contradictions between the objects and the produce of taxes, as well as between the faculties of the ſubject and the demands of the ſtate, are reconciled. The gradation of taxes, according to this faithful repreſentation, ſhould proceed in the inverſe ratio to that of Monſieur de Mirabeau's ſyſtem. The ſources of production, the earth and its firſt harveſt, ſhould be loaded leaſt of all. The progreſs of taxes ſhould follow the detail of conſumption, and multiply upon every article of luxury. The mode of collection is another object, the abuſes of which I am not qualified to diſcuſs. But taxes return for the moſt part into the hand that pays them; and this, I preſume, is the line of direction upon which the whole myſtery of finance dep [...]nds. In time it may be carried to perfection. For the preſent it is ſufficient to obſerve, that by the aſſiſtance of circulation [133] the revenues of France amount to at leaſt ten times the ſum ſtated in the Theory of Taxation; and that it is abſurd to ſay, that a man, whoſe income is but four hundred millions, pays ſix. If, as it is ſaid, the collection coſts near a third of the produce, it is certainly a ſhameful depredation; but quaere, whether Monſieur de Mirabeau be not again miſtaken in his aſſertion. The principles I adhere to are founded upon facts, and on the uniform experience of England, France, and Holland. They do not therefore involve ſuch contradictions as appear upon the face of ſpeculative writings, which flatter the people without giving them any real conſolation or aſſiſtance, and promiſe them a relief not to be realiſed in practice, and which they never can receive. It is the univerſal remedy, or philoſopher's ſtone, perpetually ſought after, and never to be diſcovered. A nation that would ſubmit to pay heavy taxes without reluctance, and that, as the author ſuppoſes, would pay them from a ſpirit of emulation, and where the application of the revenue ſhould be conſtantly directed to the public good, without any part of it being diverted, would be a nation of angels, or rather of gods, and ſuch a one as never will exiſt upon this maſs of earth. My own ſyſtem is reducible to this concluſion. 1o. That the pretended principle, of confining the whole contributive faculty of taxes entirely to the territorial produce, is fallacious; for, though the landed revenue forms an important article, it is ſtill the ſmalleſt portion of the faculties of the ſubject. * 2o. That to lay taxes at the ſource of [134] production would injure agriculture, which ought to be protected and encouraged at its ſource by every privilege and recompence imaginable. 3o. That nothing but articles of conſumption and luxury can produce a revenue proportioned to the neceſſities of the ſtate; and that it is proved by practice and experience, that circulation in a great meaſure repairs the inconveniences that may be occaſioned by taxes. 4o. That the mode of collection ſhould be the leaſt expenſive or burthenſome to the nation, taking particular care not to oppreſs the farmer; but this is a difficult point. Let me add, 5o. That the ſtate of exports at the cuſtom-houſe is the thermometer of a flouriſhing commerce, in a farming and manufacturing nation; that duties upon exports ſhould be moderate; and that exportation, in ſome caſes, ſhould be encouraged by bounties.

Importation is of a different nature. It is a tribute paid to foreigners. In France and England it may be loaded without inconvenience, except the firſt elements of manufactures, which ought to be free. It is not the ſame with a power entirely commercial, ſuch as Holland, that buys in order to ſell, and to which the carrying trade is eſſentially neceſſary. The conſtitution of Holland is ſingular and peculiar, and the country muſt be governed by rules that are an exception to all others. It is a phenomenon in politics. Hiſtory gives us no model of ſuch a conſtitution. The thermometer of import and export at the cuſtom-houſe in Holland, is ſometimes in an inverſe ratio [135] to what it is in other countries. In this place it may be proper to inſert a fine obſervation, which I lately met with in an Engliſh author. It is ſuppoſed that the bounty, granted by government upon the exportation of corn, is an expence to the ſtate, or that the revenue ſuffers a diminution of £. 150,000 which the bounty amounts to. But this, ſays the author, is a miſtake; for the cuſtom-houſe recovers that ſum with intereſt, by that increaſe in the duties on imports, which ariſes from a large exportation of corn. A conſiderable part of this export is exchanged for articles of luxury, which the nation is fond of, and which pay heavy duties at the cuſtom-houſe. So that the encouragement given to agriculture turns to the profit of the cuſtoms. There is another obſervation equally curious, that the price of corn has not riſen in England, ſince the inſtitution of the bounty, nor even ſo far back as ſince the time of Edward III. making allowance for the different value of the mark of ſilver at the different periods. I have ſhown that France might follow this example, and encourage agriculture, yet without any diminution of the opulence of England.

Monſieur de Monteſquieu obſerves, that a tax upon perſons is the moſt natural to ſlavery, and a tax upon merchandiſes the moſt natural to liberty, becauſe it does not refer ſo directly to the perſon. A capitation can never ſupply the place of every other tax, on account of the ſmall number of perſons on whom it would fall, in proportion to the multitude who, through the medium of conſumption, inſenſibly ſwell the revenue, at the ſame time that the very money they pay is furniſhed in the laſt reſort by the wealthy, on whom alone it is meant that the weight of the capitation ſhould fall. Natural conſumption, and even that of luxury, by means of a circulation multiplied [136] through various channels, can alone ſupply ſuch conſiderable ſums, without exhauſting the ſources, or ſtopping the current of circulation.

From what I have ſaid it follows, 6o. That the treaſury reſtores to the public the money it receives, increaſing the contributive faculty by the annuities and penſions it pays. The retribution, however, is not always exactly equal, with reſpect to individuals, but muſt be taken in groſs. 7o. That the public funds increaſe riches, commerce, induſtry, conſumption, and the contributive faculty. They are neceſſary in themſelves, and differ widely from the idea hitherto conceived of them. 8o. That nevertheleſs the public debt ſhould be redeemed to a certain point, in order to diminiſh taxes, which always appear to be an evil, conſtantly magnified by opinion; otherwiſe, if they were multiplied too far, ſome great difficulties would ariſe in the courſe of thoſe fatal wars, which recur too often. 9o. That the true and exact diſtribution of all the branches of finance is a ſcience, all the principles of which are not yet underſtood.

10o. That good order is not deſtroyed by exacting a contribution to the public ſtock, from all thoſe who poſſeſs no capital, but live upon the retribution yielded to their labor. They receive it from the rich, from people in eaſy circumſtances, and even from the ſtate. Their labor becomes a little dearer, but the inconvenience ſtill falls upon thoſe who, it is meant, ſhould bear this portion upon the plan of a ſingle tax. The effect is the ſame. You only endeavour to alter the form, and the form you wiſh to ſubſtitute can never be adhered to in practice. It is the multitude of little ſtreams that conſtitute the river. It is the number of ſubdiviſions of claſſes that alone can [137] ſupply heavy taxes. The addition of the duty 4 is confounded with the price of the commodity, and in effect is paid by the thing, not by the perſon. This is order itſelf, not the confuſion of order.

‘""Power," ſays Monſieur de Mirabeau, "cannot be exerted beyond the natural ſtrength. Efforts that exceed our ſtrength produce weakneſs."’ This is true; but the principles themſelves ſhow how ill they are applied. France, England, and Holland more particularly, ſubſiſt ſtill, and have ſubſiſted for a conſiderable time, upon the very ſyſtem now ſo much decried. In ſpite of the dreams of melancholy, they ſubſiſt and flouriſh. Yet this, I muſt repeat, is no reaſon why we ſhould not labor, with conſtant attention, zeal, and ardor, to relieve the people by every poſſible method, and to proſcribe for ever the deteſtable maxim, current in France in the laſt century, that vexation and oppreſſion made the people work, and that eaſe made them indolent and lazy. Nothing but the civil wars, which were but lately ended, could have dictated ſo barbarous a maxim.

11o. That manufactories ſhould be conſidered as one of the principal arteries of the public revenue. The exemption granted to raw materials increaſes the return they make to the treaſury.

[138] 12o. To deny, as Monſieur de Mirabeau does, the reality of that ſucceſſive enjoyment, which credit and circulation procure to every individual with the ſame ſpecie, and to treat this truth as a plauſible fallacious hypotheſis, is as much as to affirm, that there is nothing intrinſically valuable but bread and water, and that every thing elſe is a ſuperfluity of mere convention and opinion. At this rate one might affirm, that the landlord of a thouſand acres in fact poſſeſſes but two feet when he ſtands up, and ſix when he lies down, becauſe this is all the ſpace he occupies. The ſophiſtry is the ſame. Gold and ſilver, as ſigns, have no real intrinſic advantage over the objects, which multiply ſpecie through the medium of circulation, and repreſent it through the medium of credit.

13o. The capital, in every country, is the central focus of conſumption and luxury. Some benefits ariſe from it. The country round the capital is improved. Still however it is ſaid to produce a number of miſchiefs. If the population of the metropolis bears no proportion to the reſt of the kingdom, the provinces may languiſh, the limbs of the political body may decay. The reader will ſee my opinion of the matter in the Fourth Chapter. An adminiſtration, that ſhould correct the bad effects of this diſproportion, and give life to the provinces, would render an eſſential ſervice to the ſtate.

14o. The accumulated expence, which the ſprings of circulation enable every individual to ſupport, is the ſource of taxation. If, as Monſieur de Mirabeau affirms, the total amounts to ſix hundred and twenty-five millions that circulate through the ſtate, this is the block out of which taxes are cut. He ſays, he has proved in another place, that the maſs of coined 5 [139] money in a ſtate ought never to be higher than the level of the total revenue, and that this is a truth long ſince admitted by every man, who underſtands the ſubject. Every thing elſe, ſays he, is only circulation. I am not ſufficiently acquainted with this great principle, which, after all, may be a falſe one. But it has been proved that the total revenue conſiderably exceeds the territorial produce; that the return of circulation, from which he collects his ſtate of expence, is infinitely greater than the maſs of ſpecie. Its exiſtence in the public treaſury is tranſitory and ſucceſſive, but not the leſs real. The ſpecie does not ſtagnate in the exchequer, but returns into circulation, and diſſipates all the gloomy conſequences created by the imagination.

15o. From what has been ſaid, I would not have it underſtood that I any way deny the importance of agriculture, or the neceſſity of protecting it. What I affirm is, that to make it the only object, the univerſal inſtrument, the general agent, is a mere whim, 6 or madneſs, an ideal being, an abſtraction [140] of the mind, produced by patriotiſm ill underſtood, and degenerating into enthuſiaſm. It tends to deſtroy the true principle of finance; and though finance may be an evil, it is as neceſſary [141] to the ſtate, as eating is to the body. By eating too much, we contract crudities and indigeſtions.

16o. A continued peace, united with a prudent oeconomy in the collection and application of the revenue, is the only way to relieve the people. Peace removes all impediments, creates plenty, encourages population, increaſes conſumption, extends commerce, and quickens cultivation; while theſe, in their turn, augment the revenue. Taxes might then be leſſened, without diminiſhing the public revenue, at the ſame time that the demands of the ſtate would decreaſe.

17o. A capitation can never be any thing, in practice, but a ſupplementary meaſure.

18o. The ſpecious principle of the Theory of Taxation, ‘"That idleneſs is the loſs, and labor the profit of the ſtate,"’ is an axiom without meaning; pompous words, that promiſe much, and ſignify nothing. An idle man, whoſe expence is decent, who pays taxes, who gives wages, whoſe money circulates, who cauſes a uſeful conſumption, and ſupplies others with the means of doing the ſame, is not a burthen to the ſtate. It is mere ſophiſtry under the maſk of a ſentence. Labor is uſeful and neceſſary, but it is not always a profit to the ſtate, unleſs it be a kind of labor that bears ſome analogy to the public welfare. The golden mine to the ſtate is honeſt induſtry, not mere labor. Many a man labors to his own ruin, as well as to that of the ſtate. So true it is that ſpecious ſentences, when thoroughly examined, are frequently no more than ſounding expreſſions. We may reckon in the ſame claſs another apothegm of Monſieur de Mirabeau, ‘"That all labor is receipt, and that all idleneſs is expence, to the exchequer."’ Fine words without reality.

[142] 19o. I muſt again repeat that, as things are now conſtituted, circulation and credit muſt be rckoned in the firſt rank among the means of proſperity.

20o. The eternal oppoſition, to which the moſt neceſſary taxes are expoſed, make them at once more burthenſome, and leſs beneficial.

21o. Of all the kinds of property in a kingdom, manufactures ſuffer the moſt by taxes. If the price of labor, or of raw materials, be ever ſo little raiſed, it becomes impoſſible to export in competition with foreigners. Yet there are eaſes, in which a cultivating nation, with a great extent of territory, may flouriſh, and become as powerful as its condition admits, by the mere induſtry of an internal commerce, without any conſiderable intercourſe with foreigners.

22o. Independent of taxes, wherever there is moſt wealth, there every thing will be the deareſt. From hence I conjecture, that France is not ſo wealthy as England. The gentry in England, I believe, are much richer than in France; whereas the higher nobility, including the princes of the blood, are richer in France. The middle rank in England undoubtedly has the advantage. The peaſant, the laborer, and mechanic, are much more at their eaſe. Riches in general are much more equally diſperſed through the Engliſh than through the French people; yet, in particular inſtances, there may always be exceptions. A ſingle branch of manufacture may decline. Two hundred workmen, diſtreſſed and out of employment, make as much clamor with their diſtreſs, as if the whole world were periſhing with hunger. The echo is repeated on all ſides; the enemies of government join the chorus; and they, who liſten to their clamors, think every thing is loſt. To judge truly, we ſhould extend our view to the whole maſs.

[143] 23o. ‘"Political oeconomy," ſays Monſieur de Mirabeau, "conſiſts in making the people pay as much as poſſible, yet think they pay as little."’ This can only be effected by taxing articles of conſumption, where the tax is confounded with the price.

24o. ‘""To ruin the farmer," ſays he,is deſtruction to the alimentary police. The rights of the plough-ſhare ſhould be as ſacred as thoſe of the church, and never touched without reſpect."’ Sed eſt modus in rebus.

25o. Certainly nothing can be more deſtructive than the devaſtation which ariſes from the oppreſſion of the farmer, and perſecution in matter of religion. The ravages of war are tranſitory, and the ſoil by degrees recovers from its own ruins. The value of it may be annihilated by the rapine of finance, and I believe it has ſometimes happened ſo in France; but the wiſdom of government is employed in correcting this abuſe.

26o. Another of Monſieur de Mirabeau's great maxims is, ‘"That it is better to ſell the raw materials, than to abate any thing of the firſt price, in favor of manufactures, which, with reſpect to profit, have no other object but the price of the labor; a profit which, in fact, is only a return of the money it coſts."’ This obſervation deſerves to be conſidered.

27o. He ſays, that an unlimited power of impoſing taxes would deſtroy all the rights of property, and, after ruining the nation, lay fetters upon itſelf. The ſubject cannot pay beyond his ſtrength. An arbitrary tax could not fail of defeating its own purpoſe. There muſt be a proportion between the tax, on one ſide, and the nature of the thing on which it falls, and the perſons who pay it (whether for luxury or neceſſity) on the other. The produce of the earth undoubtedly ariſes from a combination of two agents, the labor of man, and the bounty [144] of nature. To ſeparate them, ſays Monſieur de Mirabeau, is the great object of finance. He thinks that, by his method, he can diſtinguiſh between the ſheaf that belongs to cultivation, and that which belongs to revenue. But his metaphyſics in finance can never be reduced to practice.

28o. He ſays, that war is the moſt ſevere and fatal accident to a ſtate. The revenue of the nation diminiſhes, while its expences increaſe. The greateſt contribution is demanded when there is the leaſt ability to pay it. To avoid war as much as poſſible, is the only remedy. The expedient, pointed out by the author, of providing a public treaſure againſt unforeſeen accidents, would increaſe the evil, becauſe a conſiderable quantity of ſpecie locked up would obſtruct circulation, the effect of which is proportioned not to the ſum, but to its current activity. The treaſure muſt either be very conſiderable or uſeleſs. If it were ſufficient to ſupport a war for two years only, it would do the nation incomparably greater miſchief, than the evil we endeavour to avoid. Hiſtory proves that the reign of diſſipation, which uſually ſucceeds the reign of oeconomy, does infinite prejudice to the ſtate. Monſieur de Mirabeau gives no ſatisfactory anſwer to theſe objections. He pretends that the fortunes made, and depredations committed, by the farmers general, are inconveniences without any mixture of benefit. It is not ſo; theſe pretended fortunes circulate through the public.

29o. The indirect channels and ſtrainers, through which taxes are drawn, ſhould be made as ſimple as poſſible, in order to reduce the expence of collection. But pulling down the houſe is not the way to ſtrengthen the foundation.

30o. It is not credit that has ruined the finances of France, as Monſieur de Mirabeau pretends. On the contrary, it was the failure of credit in time of need, that did the miſchief, and [145] probably was the chief cauſe of the late diſaſters. If credit had been ſupported as it might have been, France would have been leſs in debt. At the beginning of the year 1715, the king was obliged to negotiate thirty-two millions in bills, in order to raiſe eight in ſpecie. * 7 If faith had been kept to the public creditor as inviolably in France, as it has been in England, half the preſent debt might have been avoided; the rate of intereſt would have been leſs than half what it is, and the ſtate have gained infinitely more than it has done by thoſe violent operations, which have annihilated credit. Expenſive operations of finance, together with exorbitant intereſt, ariſing from nothing but want of credit, have cauſed debts to be contracted without value received. On one ſide, the funds to ſupport the war were borrowed at a higher intereſt; on the other, failure of credit raiſed the price of every article purchaſed for the ſervice. In this view the inconvenience is double; not to reckon loſs of time, which follows want of credit, and makes every operation ineffectual. To find the ſupplies at the exact moment, or at the moment afterwards, determines the ſucceſs of a campaign. Superior credit undoubtedly was the principal cauſe of the other advantages, which England had over France in the laſt war, [146] becauſe it enabled the nation to exert and avail itſelf of the reſt. The fact has been confirmed by other proofs in the firſt Chapter. It depended only upon France herſelf to have re-eſtabliſhed her credit, if peace, ſo neceſſary to Europe, could have been firmly ſecured.

It may be laid down as certain, that the eſtabliſhment of public funds depends upon the following regulations and circumſtances. 1o. That the loans be national; that is, that the body of the nation ſhall be anſwerable for them, as in England; and although the French parliament is far from having the ſame weight in the conſtitution with that of England, yet the parliamentary creation of funds, and the ſecurity of that auguſt body, would contribute not a little to ſupport the credit of them. 2o. That funds to pay the intereſt ſhould be ſecured, without the poſſibility of interruption; and that every loan ſhould have its ſeparate ſecurity. 3o. That the ſinking fund be faithfully applied to the diſcharge of debt, and that its operation be uniform and uninterrupted. 4o. That, in order to gain the confidence of the public, every meaſure of finance be laid open, and all appearance of myſtery baniſhed. 5o. That with the ſame view an aſſurance be given to the nation, and to foreigners, with reſpect to future operations, that their intereſt ſhall never be reduced under any pretence whatſoever, without offering to repay the principal; and that the principal ſhall, at no time hereafter, be ſubject to any tax or defalcation, as it has happened heretofore; that in this reſpect the example of the Engliſh ſhall be followed, and that a loan of a hundred ſhall be always paid off at par, notwithſtanding any ſpecious arguments to the contrary; that this eſſential article ſhall no longer depend upon the miniſter's way of thinking. When the ſecurity offered [147] by government is intimately united with that of the parliament, the public confidence may then be recovered.

Credit and confidence being reſtored upon this ſolid foundation, the French government will gain infinitely more by following the ſame plan inviolably, than they have hitherto gained by operations of a different nature. The rate of intereſt will be lowered, and when money is wanted, it will be raiſed without difficulty upon moderate terms. I ſpeak of the future; but what I ſay is founded upon experience, not upon theory or ſpeculation. It is the hiſtory of credit, ſtated with ſimplicity, zeal, and honeſt intentions. There are other meaſures, by which it is poſſible to diſcharge a conſiderable portion of debt, and to recover credit for a time; but it will fail when the occaſion is moſt critical and important. I believe that France might have had ſome advantages over England, that would in part have compenſated for the difference of the two conſtitutions, and given her a credit and circulation almoſt as extenſive as that of the Engliſh, if proper meaſures had been ſeriouſly taken, and the peace had laſted long enough to have carried them into execution. But after all the confuſion that has happened, this is not the buſineſs of a day.

31o. I have already ſhown, that exceſſive luxury is as ruinous to a nation, as an expence, proportioned to the wealth of individuals and their rank in life, is beneficial to it. A man ruined is a fruitful plant withered up, with reſpect to the public; his numerary wealth does not exiſt within the nation, as many people think, who do not underſtand the laws of circulation, and the nature of factitious property. Exceſſive luxury ſeems to encourage induſtry for a moment, and abandons it for ever. At the ſame time it corrupts the manners, enervates the ſtrength, and has always been one of the principal cauſes of the ruin of a ſtate. It would be an important ſecret in legiſlation to [148] find the middle term, at which exceſſive luxury might be ſtopped, yet without enacting ſumptuary laws to reſtrain that decent expence, which is allowed to every ſubject, in proportion to his rank and fortune.

The following quotation from the Spirit of the Laws may alſo be conſidered as a general rule. ‘"Taxes may be increaſed in proportion to the liberty of the ſubject. As ſlavery gains ground, they muſt of neceſſity be reduced. The rule is taken from nature, and never varies. It operates in every country, from England and Holland, through the various degradations of liberty, until it ends in Turkey. Switzerland ſeems to be an exception. The Swiſs pay no taxes. But there is a particular reaſon for it, which confirms the rule. In thoſe barren mountains proviſions are ſo dear, and the country ſo populous, that a Swiſs pays four times as much to nature, as a Turk does to the ſultan."’ If this principle be as evident as the author affirms, the conſequences to be drawn from it would confirm my ſyſtem of taxation.

If it were poſſible for England, by means of a continued peace, by the application of the ſinking fund, and an increaſe of commerce, to diſcharge almoſt all the national debt, it ought not to be done. It would be highly prejudicial to the kingdom not to preſerve ſixty millions at leaſt of theſe fictitious treaſures. The uſe and neceſſity of it has been already proved. If once the debt were reduced to this ſum, parliament ſhould relieve the nation from whatever taxes appeared the moſt burthenſome, and employ the reſidue of the ſinking fund in the encouragement of manufactures, the ſettlement of colonies, and in other uſeful enterpriſes. A total diſcharge of the debt would be abſolutely againſt the intereſt of the nation. I ſhall be of the ſame opinion with reſpect to France, whenever the government [149] ſhall have ſucceeded in giving currency to the royal ſecurities, and in reſtoring the faith and credit of thoſe ſecurities at a lower rate of intereſt. This might eaſily happen in a few years, if, in their future operations of finance, they would follow the ſyſtem I propoſe. The French miniſtry are too well informed not to know the intrinſic contributive powers of the kingdom, and too humane to exact more than its ſtrength can ſupport.

There ſeems to be an eaſy way, as far as the nature of the thing will admit, to form a picture or barometer of theſe powers, by executing the plan laid down by Lewis XIV. in the year 1698, for the information of the duke of Burgundy.

* ‘"He ordered each of the intendants to draw up a particular deſcription of his province. By this means an exact account of the kingdom might have been obtained, and a juſt enumeration of the inhabitants. It was a uſeful work; though all the intendants had not the capacity and attention of Monſieur de Lamoignan de Baville. Had what the king directed been as well executed, in regard to every province, as it was by this magiſtrate in his account of Languedoc, the collection would have been one of the moſt valuable monuments of the age. Some of them are well done; but the plan was imperfect, becauſe all the intendants were not confined to the ſame rules. It were to be wiſhed, that each of them had given, in columns, the number of inhabitants in each election; the nobles, citizens, laborers, artiſans, and mechanics; the cattle of every kind; the good, the indifferent, and the bad lands; all the clergy, regular and ſecular; their revenues, thoſe of the towns, and thoſe of the communities."’

[150] ‘"All theſe heads, in moſt of their accounts, are confounded; the ſeveral articles are not ſufficiently examined, nor ſtated with exactneſs, and it is often neceſſary to ſearch with great care and pains to find what is wanted; though a miniſter ought to have theſe things ſo diſpoſed, as to be able inſtantly to diſcover the ſtrength, the neceſſities, and the reſources, of his country. The deſign was excellent, and would have been of the greateſt ſervice, had it been executed with judgment and uniformity."’

I agree with Mr. Voltaire in thinking that ſuch a plan, well executed, would be of conſiderable aſſiſtance. But we are not to flatter ourſelves, that it would be poſſible to aſcertain the fortunes of wealthy individuals reſident in cities. The fortune of the merchant, and of the citizen, ſhould always be a myſtery with reſpect to the public. * The regiſter which has been ſo much talked of can never be complete, and in its nature muſt be ſubject to a variety of reſtrictions.

As we have travelled through the whole region of finance, it may be proper to ſay a word of the clergy. I cannot do better than inſert what Mr. Voltaire has ſaid upon the ſubject.

‘"It is matter of aſtoniſhment to all Europe, as well as to France, that the clergy ſhould pay ſo little, ſeeing they are ſuppoſed to poſſeſs a third of the revenue of the whole kingdom. Were this the caſe, it is paſt diſpute that they ought to bear likewiſe a third of the public charge, which, one year with another, would come to near thirty millions, independent of the duties on periſhable commodities, which they pay in common with the reſt of the ſubjects. But error and prejudice prevail in almoſt every thing. The church is ſuppoſed to poſſeſs a third of the whole annual revenue of the kingdom; juſt as we ſay at random that Paris contains a [151] million of inhabitants. Were we but to take the trouble of computing the revenues of the biſhopricks, it would appear, by the leaſes granted about fifty years ago, that their whole annual amount at that time was not ſuppoſed to exceed four millions, and the commendatory abbies were rated at four million five hundred thouſand livres. It is true, the declared eſtimate of the leaſes was about a third below the real value; and if to this we add the increaſe of the landed revenue ſince, the total ſum of the rents of all the conſiſtorial benefices will make about ſixteen millions; but we ought to remember, that a confiderable part of this ſum goes yearly to Rome, and is ſo much abſolutely loſt to the nation. It muſt be allowed a great inſtance of liberality in the king towards the holy ſee, to ſuffer it to plunder the ſtate of more than four hundred thouſand marks of ſilver in the ſpace of a century; which, in time, could not fail to impoveriſh the kingdom, did not commerce abundantly repair the loſs.’

‘"To theſe benefices, which pay annates to Rome, we muſt join the curacies, convents, collegiate churches, and all the other eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhments in the kingdom. If we compute them at fifty millions yearly upon the whole, I believe we ſhall come pretty near the truth.’

‘"Thoſe, who have examined this matter with the utmoſt ſeverity and attention, have not been able to extend the revenues of the whole Gallican church, ſecular and regular, beyond eighty million of livres. The ſum is far from being exorbitant, when we conſider it as deſtined to ſupport ninety thouſand monks and nuns, and about an hundred and ſixty thouſand eccleſiaſtics, which was the number in 1700. And of theſe ninety thouſand monks one third is maintained by alms and maſſes. There are many conventual monks, who do not coſt their monaſtery two hundred livres a year; there are [152] regular abbots, whoſe income exceeds two hundred thouſand livres. It is this enormous diſproportion that occaſions ſo many complaints and murmurs. We are concerned for a country curate, whoſe laborious diſcharge of the duties of his profeſſion entitles him only to a ſcanty income of three, four, or five hundred livres, while a lazy monk, not the leſs lazy for being made an abbot, enjoys an immenſe fortune, and exacts pompous titles from thoſe under his juriſdiction. Theſe abuſes are much more glaring in Flanders, in Spain, and eſpecially in the catholic circles of Germany, where we ſometimes meet with monks who are princes.’

‘"Abuſes, by degrees, paſs into laws in almoſt all countries. Were a number of the wifeſt men to aſſemble with deſign to compoſe a body of laws, what ſtate would be ſuffered to ſubſiſt exactly in its preſent form?"’

The ſketch I have laid before the reader will, I hope, convince him that the abuſes, which in every country attend the collection of taxes, are frequently exaggerated, and that the means of correcting them are not what the public may conceive. In the Fourth Chapter I ſhall again inſiſt upon the multitude of claſſes which form the picture of the ſtate, and upon the frequent wars which have depopulated Europe. It is in vain to take reſtoratives, if the convaleſcent continues to bleed every day. His health and vigor will never be recovered by jellies or cordials. This is exactly the caſe of Europe with reſpect to population. Modern writers upon population, commerce and taxes, lament the evil, and preſcribe analeptics; but they forget the regimen, without which no medicine can ſucceed. The regimen is peace. A truth ſo important cannot be too clearly illuſtrated, nor repeated too often.

PART IV. New Conſiderations upon the ſame Subjects.

[153]

IT has long been affirmed, that the kingdom of France, though enlarged by the acquiſition of Franche Comté, Alſace, Lorraine and French Flanders, has not more inhabitants than before thoſe acquiſitions were made. We are alſo told that the unequal diſtribution of taxes, the confuſion occaſioned by the Aides and Gabelles, the arbitrary land tax, and repair of the high roads, are the true and only cauſes of the depopulation of France; and that, in conſequence of taxes and oppreſſion, large tracts of land, from which a conſiderable return was collected before the reign of Lewis XIV. are actually uncultivated. The general cry of the nation cannot be entirely without foundation. Reaſon, common ſenſe, and experience, tell us, that, when the huſbandman is oppreſſed, and the cultivation of the ſoil coſts ſo much that the produce is hardly ſufficient to maintain him, he is compelled to abandon it. It is a general complaint, that all the duties impoſed upon the tranſportation of commodities from one province to another, as well as upon exportation at the cuſtom-houſe, are ſo many fetters laid upon ſale and conſumption, and muſt diminiſh the revenue by the very means employed to improve it.

Without doubt there is a great deal of truth in theſe complaints. The vexations they refer to muſt have contributed in part to the waſte of ſo much land; but I cannot perſuade [154] myſelf that they were the principal cauſe of it. It muſt rather be attributed to a ſudden failure of conſumption, ariſing from a violent and continued depopulation. This depopulation has proceeded chiefly from the long wars which Lewis XIV. carried on with armies much more numerous than ever were kept up by any of his predeceſſors. Since that period, a ſingle campaign deſtroys more men than three campaigns in the time of Harry IV. The marine, navigation, and the colonies, prevent the progreſs of population. The revocation of the edict of Nantz, want of toleration, the multitude of religious of both ſexes, and exceſſive luxury, have done the reſt. Wars and colonies have alſo depopulated England, but not in the ſame proportion. 1o. Becauſe the refugees have in ſome meaſure repaired the breach. 2o. Becauſe there are fewer unmarried perſons. 3o. Becauſe their armies, beſides being leſs numerous, have been compoſed of foreigners. In ſpite of theſe advantages depopulation begins to be felt in England. Projects to prevent it ſignify nothing. The great miſchief is not to be repaired but by time and a continued peace, without which every other expedient will be found inſufficient, uſeleſs, or impracticable.

France and England are as rich in land and money as they can be. Their wealth and power can receive no addition, but by collecting their ſtrength towards the centre of the ſtate. Conſumption increaſes circulation. A greater circulation creates new property, and gives life to all the riches of the ſtate. A million of ſubjects more, ſettled in Great Britain, would add more to the revenue of the nation, and of the exchequer, and to the power of the ſovereign, than all the produce of Canada and the colonies. France could maintain three or four millions more inhabitants. The circulation, produced by this increaſe of conſumption, would be more profitable to the ſovereign than [155] the poſſeſſion of Mexico and Peru. The circulation of ſpecie quickens rapidly as it paſſes through the inferior ranks. It is the great conſumption of the multitude that enlarges the revenue. That part of the people in France has been diminiſhed by wars, and want of toleration. Taxes have heightened the miſchief, and made it more ſenſibly felt; but they were not the cauſe of it. The wars of Lewis XIV. and the revocation of the edict of Nantz, have coſt more men than all the wars of the two preceding centuries. The depopulation of Germany will be felt in France and England, as well with reſpect to commerce, as to manufactures. Theſe are loſſes which a whole century cannot repair. Monſieur Voltaire has obſerved upon this ſubject, ‘"That Sir William Petty had proved, that for a nation to increaſe one twentieth in a hundred years requires the moſt favorable circumſtances. His calculation ſhows the folly of writers who people the earth with a ſtroke of their pen, and in a century or two cover the globe with inhabitants. If it be aſked, Why there is a third more people in England now, than in the time of Queen Elizabeth? the anſwer is exactly, Becauſe England has been in the moſt favorable circumſtances; becauſe multitudes of Germans, Flemiſh, and French, have eſtabliſhed themſelves in the country; becauſe it is computed, that ſixty thouſand monks, ten thouſand nuns, and ten thouſand ſecular prieſts, have been reſtored to propagation, and to the ſtate; and becauſe population has been encouraged by plenty. The reverſe of what we obſerve in the pope's territory and Portugal has happened in England. Govern your farm-yard ill, and you will have no poultry. Govern it well, and you will have poultry in abundance."’

[156] Population is not the work of a day. It may be encouraged in time of peace; but continual wars, in the modern ſtyle, will defeat every meaſure that the wiſeſt adminiſtration can poſſibly employ for this important purpoſe.

I have lately ſeen a very ſcarce and curious book, called A Detail of France under the preſent Reign, printed at Bruſſels in 1712. It was written about the end of the laſt century, and printed at Rouen in 1698. * This work is attributed to Bois Guillebert, attorney-general in the parliament of Rouen. It contains the ſubſtance of Monſieur de Mirabeau's Theory of Taxation, the remonſtrances made by the parliaments, and all the viſionary projects of finance, with which France has been over-run, upon the ſubject of taxes, duties, cuſtoms, agriculture, &c. I ſhall begin my remarks upon it with one preliminary obſervation. Though written before thoſe calamities, which attended the latter part of Lewis the XIVth's reign, it repreſents the kingdom as then upon the verge of deſtruction. Seventy years have ſince elapſed, and in the courſe of that time there has been a period, under the adminiſtration of Cardinal Fleury, at which commerce was carried to its greateſt extent, and every thing flouriſhed in the kingdom. Of three wars, which have happened within the laſt ſeventy years, the ſecond was ruinous, though accompanied with brilliant ſucceſſes; the third was very unfortunate. And yet I am convinced that France, after all her diſaſters, is not in a worſe condition than in the year 1698, when the book was firſt publiſhed; though (ſetting aſide the conqueſts) the ſtate of the kingdom may perhaps be worſe than it was in the year 1660. [157] Part of the abuſes, particularly the arbitrary land-tax, have been corrected; though it is but lately that the miniſtry have been ſeriouſly employed in going to the bottom of thoſe vexations, which ſtop the progreſs of agriculture and commerce. The meaſures they are now taking will, I believe, in time, produce conſiderable advantages; but I affirm that, without a laſting peace to encourage population, which of itſelf increaſes conſumption, and of courſe muſt quicken circulation, all the expedients they can adopt will only give a momentary coloring to the ſurface. The deſtructive ſyſtem, on which war has been carried on both by ſea and land, ſince the end of the laſt century, is the true primordial ſource of depopulation. The loſs of conſumption, that follows it, leſſens the relative revenue of the ſovereign, and the ſtrength of the nation. If it were not for the factitious circulation created by loans, the ravages of war, and religious perſecution, which have done ſo much miſchief to population and agriculture, would have been ſtill more ſenſibly felt. Let us conſider this important queſtion again, and turn it in every poſſible ſhape. We cannot examine it with too much attention.

We vie with each other in praiſing the Duke of Sully; and God forbid I ſhould undervalue the diſtinguiſhed merit of that great man. Yet it ought to be conſidered, that his upright intentions were aſſiſted by circumſtances, of which the miniſters who ſucceeded him had not the advantage.

France, juſt relieved from the horrors of a civil war, was in the ſituation of a robuſt and vigorous young man, who, after a violent fit of ſickneſs, eſcapes from the jaws of death with new ſtrength, and a healthier conſtitution. The kingdom had not been impoveriſhed, becauſe the wars had been carried on chiefly within the country, or immediately upon the frontiers, and with ſmall armies. Spain, in order to ſupport the league, had [158] ſpent money enough in France to enrich the kingdom. The Huguenots had drawn large quantities of plate out of the churches and monaſteries, which was coined and circulated. The ſeeds of opulence exiſted every where. To unfold and bring them forward, required nothing but peace and a prudent adminiſtration. Sully corrected the abuſes which oppoſed this ſalutary work, and gave life to every branch of adminiſtration. The wants were inconſiderable, the reſources were copious, and he availed himſelf of them all. The ſplendor of his adminiſtration glitters to this day, and will never be eclipſed in the eyes of poſterity. But it would be unjuſt to expect that his ſucceſſors, under circumſtances of greater difficulty, ſhould make an equal progreſs in the ſame time. France was like a beautiful woman ill dreſſed, who wanted nothing but a better habit to appear with diſtinction. Harry IV. had none of that pomp which now is thought eſſential to the luſtre of the crown. Verſailles, Marli, Bellevue, which have ſwallowed up ſo much money, were not then in exiſtence. The wants of government are multiplied ſince that time. When ſickneſs and frequent bleeding have weakened the conſtitution, it is with difficulty the convaleſcent recovers.

It is alſo to be obſerved that, according to the Detail of France, Cardinal Richelieu, who ſoon ſucceeded Sully, made an equal progreſs in improving the finances; the king's revenue having doubled under the Cardinal's adminiſtration. He was far from poſſeſſing the merit of Sully, but the nerve of the ſtate was ſtill in its vigor. Sully had ſhown what it was capable of performing. We ſhould apply to him what Monteſquieu ſays of Richelieu, ‘"He drew the principles of the monarchy out of chaos, taught France the ſecret of her ſtrength, and Spain the ſecret of her weakneſs."’ In ſpite of abuſes of adminiſtration, the progreſs of improvement [159] appeared more and more, until the work was completed by Colbert. This was the period of the higheſt proſperity to France. From that time, the kingdom inſenſibly loſt its ſtrength by abuſing it, in the midſt, and even in conſequence, of the moſt brilliant ſucceſſes. They were purchaſed with the loſs of ſo many men, that the ſovereign, though conſtantly enlarging his dominion, and extending his frontiers, did not increaſe the number of his ſubjects. Land loſt its value more and more, for want of cultivation and conſumption. In theſe circumſtances every tax upon land had a fatal effect; and if commerce and the circulation of government ſecurities had not, in ſome meaſure, repaired the miſchief, the kingdom would really have been reduced to that deplorable condition in which it has been deſcribed. The picture, now too much loaded, would then have been true. The fact is, that France has not increaſed her power in proportion to her conqueſts; that the oppreſſion of the huſbandman, and the difficulties impoſed upon commerce, both foreign and domeſtic, augment the evil; that failure of credit, in borrowing money, has made the matter worſe; that the circulation, which ſtill ſubſiſts, in ſome degree repairs the miſchief; that theſe abuſes may and ought to be corrected; but that, without a continued peace, no remedy can be effectual.

I find, in the Detail of France, the ſame principle which I have already refuted; that all revenue is reduced to the territorial produce. This work however contains many excellent obſervations, though disfigured by exaggeration, or improperly applied. The author ſees every object with a microſcopic eye, and by conſtantly mixing error with truth, deſtroys the utility of his work. It may be true, that the mode of levying a tax (whether land tax, wine duty, or cuſtoms) may be more grievous than the tax itſelf; and theſe oppreſſions may be conſidered as [160] one reaſon why large tracts of land, which formerly made a great return, are now left uncultivated. The conſequences extend to conſumption and commerce, and even to population.

The author pretends that, in the year 1696, France had already loſt half her wealth, and that the national revenue was leſs by five hundred millions than it was forty years before. He obſerves that, from the death of Charles VII. in 1461 to the year 1660, the revenues of the kingdom had gradually doubled every thirty years; whereas it would appear that, ſince the year 1660, the king's revenue had only increaſed about a third, (even including the conqueſts, all which pay a complete tithe to government) and that the national revenue had not quite increaſed in the proportion of one half. He affirms, that any diminution in the revenue of land always occaſions a diminution in the revenue of induſtry. The cauſe of the ruin of conſumption, ſays he, is the only point we need enquire into. Two things eſſentially contribute to it; the uncertainty of the land tax, and the duties paid not only upon exportation at the cuſtom-houſe, but upon conveyance from one province to another within the kingdom. Internal conſumption diminiſhes, exportation is impoſſible, and the produce of the earth periſhes on the ſpot where it grew. They, who by their employment are exempt from land tax, fling the whole burthen upon the merchant and mechanic, who have no fund but their induſtry. The author proves, by arguments equally ſolid and ingenious, that the loſs reverts even upon the perſons who are exempted. He does not blame the taxes ſo much as the mode of collecting them. He lays it down as a principle, that conſumption and revenue are the ſame, conſequently that any check to conſumption is loſs of revenue. The principle is true; but his application of it is defective, becauſe he conſiders nothing but the ſoil. [161] In his eyes nothing elſe has an exiſtence. 'Bating a few exaggerations, all that he ſays is literally true with reſpect to cultivation, the produce of which might however be reduced to one half, without the whole kingdom's declining in the ſame proportion. He is deceived in thinking, that abuſes are the only cauſe of depopulation. Long wars are the principal occaſion of it. I believe he exaggerates in ſaying, that a duty, which only produces a hundred thouſand livres to the king, deſtroys a conſumption equal to two millions upon the price or the quantity. This, in fact, means a diminution of two millions in revenue. ‘"All the provinces (ſays he) loſe for want of a commercial intercourſe with each other, and conſumption becomes impracticable."’ This abuſe undoubtedly was of a moſt grievous nature; his whole argument upon the ſubject is clear and ſatisfactory.

Some of his principles are not ſo evident. He ſays, for inſtance, that it is beyond contradiction, that a diminution in the revenue of land has diminiſhed the revenue of induſtry. The principle is not univerſally true. In Holland and Switzerland the barrenneſs of the ſoil has improved the induſtry and revenue of the inhabitants. I make this obſervation, by the bye, to ſhow the fallacy of general rules. The author ſaw that, from a concurrence of various circumſtances, the province of Normandy and the election of Mantes were fallen to decay; and that taxes, provincial duties, and other exactions, were the principal cauſe of it. He was ſtruck with ſeveral abſtract truths reſpecting circulation, conſumption, the connection of intereſts, and ſocial harmony of all the orders of the ſtate. He compared the hiſtory of the preceding century with that of his own; and all theſe ideas, ſeparately true in themſelves, mixed with the zeal of patriotiſm, and fermented in his mind. The [162] volume of every object ſwelled in his view beyond its ſolid ſubſtance. He exaggerates every thing, and with the ſureſt principles and deepeſt knowledge miſleads the underſtanding. His idea of the general ſtate of the kingdom was collected from what he ſaw in Normandy, and the election of Mantes. He ſays, that the difficulty of communication between one province and another has ſunk the value of their reſpective produce, at the ſame time that duties upon exportation have annihilated commerce, and impoveriſhed the kingdom. All this may, in ſome degree, be true; but to pretend that it has diminiſhed the revenue of the kingdom one half, that it has occaſioned an annual loſs of fifteen hundred millions, beſides deſtroying millions of ſubjects, and that all this may be recovered in four-and-twenty hours, and with a few days labor, is to the laſt degree extravagant. Writers, who have followed him in treating the ſame ſubject, have ſoftened his exaggerations, which time had confuted; yet ſtill they almoſt all go too far, not being able to renounce their firſt falſe principle, that every thing is comprehended in the territorial produce; nor conſidering, that ſucceſſive wars have been the chief cauſe of depopulation, and that conſumption of courſe diminiſhed for want of conſumers. Yet there are a number of fine and uſeful remarks in this work, provided we confine them to their true value. The author had a tolerably clear idea of circulation; yet even this he carries too far. He ſays, for inſtance, that a hundred crowns, taken from the laborer for the expence of collection, create a loſs of five or ſix thouſand livres to the body of the ſtate. He repeatedly aſſerts, that in his time the revenues of France had ſunk above fifteen hundred millions in the ſpace of forty years; whereas the increaſe of revenue to the ſovereign, which occaſioned that loſs, was not more than a hundred millions. All this proves too [163] much. If in fact there be ſuch quantities of land in France entirely deſerted becauſe the produce does not anſwer the expence of cultivation, I believe that means might be found to cultivate it on the king's account. I am ſurpriſed, that nobody has yet ſeriouſly thought of carrying ſuch a project into execution. It would appear perhaps to be the moſt beneficial and practicable ſcheme that has yet been imagined. The operation of a few millions employed by the king in reinſtating his own ſubjects, who are reduced to miſery, and in ſecuring a portion of property to foreigners, would ſhortly be felt. Aſſiſted by peace and commerce, it would ſoon reſtore population, conſumption, and circulation, revive the paralytic branches of the ſtate, and in a few years conſiderably increaſe the revenue of the ſovereign, yet leſſen the burthen of taxes. Such a plan of agriculture might be executed in England with ſtill greater eaſe and expedition. In France there are more obſtacles to be removed. The rubbiſh of old ruins would at firſt retard the conſtruction of a new building. All difficulties of communication between the provinces, all checks upon exportation, ſhould be previouſly removed. The oppreſſions heaped upon the farmer ſhould ceaſe. The privileges, as well as the property granted to foreigners, ſhould be firmly ſecured. A plan of this nature may be reckoned among the number of political viſions. Yet ſome of my readers may be ſenſible of the value of it, eſpecially when they obſerve the ſucceſs it has already had in the following example. Frederick William of Pruſſia formed the project, and had the good fortune to carry it into execution. His country was a vaſt deſert. With an expence of only twelve millions of florins he cleared the land, built villages, and filled them with inhabitants. He brought whole families from Suabia and Franconia. He invited emigrants from Saltzbourg, and ſupplied them with the means [164] of ſettling, and with implements of labor. He formed a new ſtate, which gave him a new power. Europe has felt the weight of it, without profiting by the example. Such an inſtance is worth more than a hundred treatiſes upon agriculture and finance. The Engliſh have done the ſame, in many parts of America, that Frederick William did in Europe, with ſingular advantages to the nation. The premature population of the colonies has not much weakened Great Britain, becauſe the Engliſh have had accidents in their favor. The multitude of refugees who ſettled in England after the revocation of the edict of Nantz, as well as of emigrants from Germany and elſewhere, enabled them to people their colonies without depopulating the mother country. Yet if, on the Pruſſian plan, they had begun by improving the whole of their ſoil in Europe, and encouraged population as far as the extent of their territory and commercial advantages might admit, I believe their power would have been fixed upon a more ſolid foundation. The ſubſequent ſettlement of colonies would have proceeded with ſo much the more rapidity, as the kingdom would then have men to ſpare, and wanted a vent for the ſurplus of its ſubjects. England and France may yet be in this ſituation, if the divine ſyſtem of peace ſhould prevail through the principal courts of Europe. In the mean time it is abſurd to deny, that the Engliſh derive eſſential advantages from their colonies. The apprehenſion, that the American colonies may one day become independent of the mother country, is, for the preſent, a mere chimera. That event at leaſt can only be looked forward to in a very diſtant perſpective. Excluſive of the example of the Spaniards, who have long been the ſubject of theſe gratuitous predictions, it is certain that the Engliſh colonies can never enter into alliances dangerous to the mother country, as well from the connection of their intereſt [165] with Great Britain, as from the ſpirit of jealouſy and rivalſhip which prevails among themſelves. None of theſe countries ſeparately can ever arrive at independence, and to unite them is impoſſible. With a moderate degree of conſiſtency in the adminiſtration at home, Great Britain will long preſerve her authority over theſe vaſt eſtabliſhments. In theory they may perplex the politician, but the management of them in fact will eaſily be compaſſed by a prudent government. From this digreſſion, which I thought material, I now return to the attorney general of Rouen.

His account of the finances of France is extremely curious. He ſays that, after the death of Francis I. Catharine of Medicis, who loved pomp and luxury, ſent for Italians to adminiſter the king's revenues, and that the ſcience of finance and raiſing money by loans was taught by thoſe people. They were baniſhed by Sully, recalled by Mary of Medicis, ſet aſide by Richelieu, and after his death appeared upon the ſtage again. The parallels drawn by the author between different periods preceding the reign of the financiers, and particularly ſome hiſtorical remarks upon the time of Francis I. are plauſible and ſeducing. He attributes every thing to a ſingle cauſe, as Deſcartes explains all difficulties with the help of ſubtle matter. Yet he condeſcends to admit that Francis I. had not quite ſuch numerous armies as are maintained at preſent. Is it not ridiculous and extravagant to compare the neceſſities of the ſtate and the luſtre of the crown, in the reign of that monarch, with the preſent condition of the kingdom? 1

[166] Nothing can be more judicious, nor profound, than his remarks upon the exportation of corn. He proves that, the more corn is carried out of France, the leſs reaſon there will ever be to apprehend any extreme ſcarcity; and that the very low price of corn is a ſign of indigeſtion in the ſtate, ariſing from too great an abundance, and prejudicial to every rank of life. It is a worm that gnaws, and gradually undermines the ſtate. What he ſays on this article is deep in itſelf, and has been confirmed by the experience of France and England. The ſubject now engages the whole attention of the French miniſtry, and I believe would have done ſo long ago, if truth had been repreſented with leſs heat, and not puſhed to an abſurdity; as, for inſtance, where he ſays that abuſes in theſe branches, in the firſt inſtance, occaſioned a real loſs to the kingdom of five hundred millions, and that the loſs now is treble what it was at firſt. Exaggerations of this nature have ſpoiled a picture in itſelf true and affecting. The ſame defect prevails through all the writings that have been copied [167] upon this work. An empirical way of repreſenting the diſorder has probably retarded the application of a remedy. They aſſign only one cauſe for an evil, that ſprings from a complication of diſorders. The chief of theſe are frequent wars, and the new method of conducting them. By this kind of empiriciſm, inſtead of healing the wound, they only encourage the patient to expoſe himſelf to the ſame dangers; they inflame the diſorder, and make the cure of it impoſſible. The true cure conſiſts in a regimen, without which no other remedy can operate; and that regimen is peace.

Violent exaggerations being always contradicted by experience, even truth itſelf at laſt is ſuſpected, and paſſes for ſpeculation. If a Spaniſh or Portugueſe Jew, ſettled at Conſtantinople or Amſterdam, ſhould affirm, that the unjuſt expulſion of the people of his religion out of Spain had done great miſchief to that kingdom as well as to Portugal, he certainly would have reaſon on his ſide. The Jews in Spain and Portugal were a very innocent ſet of people, quiet ſubjects, and uſeful citizens to the ſtate. They were very numerous, and kept induſtry and commerce alive. Many of them were men of learning, and much reſpected. They had even been admitted to a ſhare in the adminiſtration. Alphonſus the Fifth of Portugal truſted Abarbanel with the moſt important employment, and was ſerved by him with zeal, honor, and ability. Our Jew might add, with ſtrict truth, that the expulſion of theſe people contributed to depopulate Spain and Portugal. He might even obſerve, that particular cities were ruined by it. All this is very poſſible; but if his enthuſiaſm carried him ſo far beyond the line of truth as to affirm, that the violence offered to the Jews was the ſingle and only cauſe of the depopulation of Spain, the aſſertion would be too abſurd to be ſupported. This is exactly the way of reaſoning [168] of the attorney-general of Rouen. He judged of the whole kingdom of France from what he ſaw in a particular province, where the effect of fiſcal abuſes might perhaps have been more ſenſibly obſerved. His enthuſiaſm has carried him as far beyond the truth as our honeſt Iſraelite's reaſoning about Spain. The prodigious devaſtation of that kingdom ariſes from the baniſhment of the Jews, the diſcovery of America, the expulſion of the Moors, the multitude of religious orders, and the frequent wars carried on by Charles V. and his ſucceſſors. To reduce all theſe cauſes to one, is falſe and ridiculous. A refugee might truly affirm, that the maſſacre of St. Bartholomew, and the revocation of the edict of Nantes, have been very prejudicial to population, commerce, and induſtry, in France. The fact is unqueſtionable; but it would be equally falſe and ridiculous to pretend, that theſe events alone occaſioned the decline of the kingdom. The vexations heaped upon the farmer may have contributed to it in ſome meaſure, though not ſo much as the revocation of the edict of Nantes, nor any thing like ſo much as the author pretends. Exceſſive luxury does its part, and monaſtic orders contribute not a little. But it is the continued ſucceſſion of bloody wars that has been the immediate, efficient cauſe of the depopulation of France. Spain, from a number of peculiar circumſtances, is ſtill more depopulated. A variety of cauſes may concur in producing the ſame effect. A man, who obſerves only one of them, is dazzled by the ſingle object before him. With one general ſolution he accounts for every appearance, and leads himſelf inſenſibly to the moſt abſurd concluſions.

A judicious reader, who corrects the errors of exaggeration, will find in this work a number of curious, uſeful, and ſolid obſervations. It is a pity that an author, who ſets out with true [169] principles, and the moſt ſublime ideas, ſhould be led aſtray by enthuſiaſm. I am inclined to think, that ſucceeding writers upon the ſame ſubject have ſaid nothing material, that may not be found in his treatiſe. It is true, that, in the diſcuſſion of exactly the ſame queſtions, it is hardly poſſible that the ideas of different authors ſhould not ſometimes concur. Of all the writings I have ſeen, no one comes ſo near as this to my own ideas of circulation. In truth, he is the only author who ſeems to me to have had a clear conception of the ſubject. All the other writers, I have ſeen, wander from the mark. Yet it is poſſible there may be many excellent performances, which have not come to my knowledge. I have always confined myſelf to an attentive obſervation of facts, and to my own meditations. After I had committed my firſt ideas to writing, I looked for farther inſtruction from books. My labors, I hope, will not be wholly unprofitable. The welfare of mankind is my object. I have no view to intereſt or reputation. My career is almoſt ended, and the world has loſt its charms. All I wiſh, is to leave it with tranquillity. But to return to my ſubject.

The moſt exact juſtice in the diſtribution of taxes in the interior of the kingdom, and the care to be taken not to eſtabliſh expenſive offices of collection for the ſake of a trifling revenue, are objects of ſuch importance, that I perſuade myſelf ſome remedy muſt have been thought of in all the time ſince abuſes in theſe matters have been complained of. We have ſeen a wretch, who had nothing but his hands to ſupport himſelf and his family, reduced to ſuch miſery as to be obliged to ſell even the tools with which he earned his ſubſiſtence. The author of the Detail of France affirms, that it was matter of public notoriety, that theſe abuſes occaſioned the annual loſs of three hundred thouſand ſouls, that periſhed in miſery, particularly infants; [170] that there was not ſubſiſtence for half the children of the poor at that age. The mother extenuated with labor and want of nouriſhment, the infant periſhing at the breaſt for want of milk, and even thoſe of a more advanced age, having nothing to live on but bread and water, without bedding, clothes, or medicine in caſe of ſickneſs, were all involved in the ſame wretchedneſs, and ſunk under it. If, inſtead of three hundred thouſand, only twenty thouſand ſouls were annually loſt, what glory would it be to a ſovereign, what pleaſure, what happineſs, to be able to relieve ſo many complicated diſtreſſes!—To be the father, the tutelar god of the unfortunate, and to reſtore them to happineſs; this is the only real charm that can alleviate the burthen of a crown. I ſhould think as I do, if all the expence were to be loſt to the ſovereign, without any return to his revenue, but the happineſs of his people; how much more ſo, when his own intereſt equally invites him to it! The ſame operation, that relieved the ſubject, would give wealth and power to the crown.

The author, ſenſible of the effect of circulation, judiciouſly obſerves that a crown, taken from a man of fortune, is never (he ſhould have ſaid ſeldom) any more than a crown, as well with reſpect to the individual, as to the body of the ſtate; whereas, if taken from the indigent laborer, or little tradeſman, it annihilates at one ſtroke a conſumption equal to a hundred crowns in the courſe of a year. Among that claſs of people, every thing perhaps turns upon the ſingle crown. This little ſum, conſtantly reviving from one hand to another, conſtitutes all their circulation. If all his calculations were as exact as this, he would not have computed the annual loſs of the ſtate at fifteen hundred millions. Notwithſtanding all the corrections added to it, the ſum is too extravagant. If the tenth part of the money, ſpent [171] by ſovereign princes in deſtroying mankind, (out of which a hundred, or two hundred individuals, may perhaps make their fortunes) were applied, for ten years together, in promoting the happineſs of their own ſubjects, and of foreign ſettlers, who might be willing to employ their ſtrength and induſtry in the improvement of the ſoil, population would ſenſibly recover, the earth would be cultivated, and manufactures encouraged. The king's revenue, even with a diminution of taxes, could not fail of improving conſiderably from the prodigious increaſe of conſumption, and the quickening of circulation through every order of the ſtate.

As long as the ſtate of Europe bears any reſemblance to its fabulous origin, depopulation will continue to be felt. In vain may Cadmus ſow the dragon's teeth, if the children of the earth are to riſe in arms, and employ them in deſtroying one another. Princes, as well as individuals, look for happineſs and advancement at a diſtance, when perhaps they might find both one and the other at home. Real power is only to be acquired by living in peace with our neighbours, and preſerving order and tranquillity among ourſelves.

A new work has lately appeared, called the Rural Philoſopher, in which there are ſome very fine obſervations, though clouded by the enthuſiaſm of agriculture. The author's whole argument turns upon the ſame falſe principle, which I have already refuted in the other Treatiſe. Every thing is confined to the territorial produce. This is his motto, and the burthen of his ſong. In his opinion all the reſt is fallacy and ruin. Annuitants are nothing but devouring wolves. He does them the honor of placing them in the rank of beggars. Manufactures are pernicious. Money is a chimera. In ſhort, it is a mere enthuſiaſm, borrowing enchanting colors from calculation. Theſe arbitrary calculations, on ſubjects no way ſuſceptible of them, [172] are enough to make reaſon itſelf run mad. When Monſieur de Mirabeau, for inſtance, in ſupporting his ſyſtem, finds himſelf embarraſſed by facts, and by the experience of ſuch a nation as Holland, he tells us that that country, which ſome people call a nation, is only an open factory, where money tranſactions are carried on upon momentary credit. This is a ſtrange way of treating a people, who formerly defended their liberty againſt the firſt power in Europe; who were powerful enough to conquer almoſt all the Spaniſh poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies as well as the Brazils, and upon whoſe reſolutions the fate of Europe has frequently depended. Without the aſſiſtance of loans and fictitious riches, neither England nor the republic could have carried on ſo extenſive a commerce as they have done, nor ſupported ſuch enormous expences abroad. Facts and expeperience are for ever at variance with Monſieur de Mirabeau's general rules. In this new treatiſe he affirms that, if the national debt were carried to ſuch an extreme, that the ſtate of the annuitant ſhould be choſen in preference to any other, we might then bid adieu to all expence; annuities, commerce, lands, every thing would be alienated, every thing would be overthrown, and fall to ruin. Yet it is to be obſerved, that land in England is better cultivated, and has riſen conſiderably in value, ſince the national debt has increaſed the number of annuitants, or rather of thoſe who have part of their property in annuities, and who for the moſt part are either men of rank who improve their eſtates, or capital merchants, or wealthy tradeſmen. The author pretends to prove, upon evidence of fact, that annuities are to the profit of him who receives them, and to the detriment of him who pays them.

‘"What creditable family is there that does not conſider it as the firſt object, in matter of buſineſs, to pay off every mortgage [173] that incumbers their eſtate? Is there a father of a family, who wiſhes for an independent fortune with reſpect to his expences, and for an idle life with reſpect to the place of his reſidence; and do we not hear him affirm, ever ſince this unhappy cuſtom has prevailed, that, to be at his eaſe, he muſt have at leaſt a third of his property placed out at intereſt? The proof then is, that every man thinks it his intereſt to lend, but no man to borrow; that annuities are to the profit of him who receives, and to the prejudice of him who pays; and that money lent at intereſt is ruinous to the borrower. Whatever is inconſiſtent with the intereſt of a ſingle family, muſt be equally inconſiſtent with the intereſt of all the families in a ſtate. The ſtate itſelf is only one great family, formed by the union of ſeveral. The ſeparate ruin of each is the aggregate ruin of the nation. The univerſe is one immenſe ſtate, compoſed of great families under the title of nations. The ſame cauſes, that deſtroy a nation, operate equally to the ruin of the world, and of mankind."’

This is an admirable ſermon, but unluckily it miſſes the mark. The principle is not univerſally true, and the application is defective. Money lent at intereſt, ſo far from injuring the borrower, is of ſervice to the merchant, and promotes trade. In Holland, England, and all commercial countries, many of the wealthieſt merchants borrow money at three or four per cent. and by employing it in trade make double and triple the profit by it. This advantage, which merchants firſt met with in Holland, has contributed not a little to facilitate commerce, and to the glory and welfare of the ſtate. Monſieur de Mirabeau has no true idea of theſe matters. The liberty of drawing upon a correſpondent, the intereſt paid him for the money he advances, are ſo many loans in effect, infinitely to the advantage of the [174] borrower. When the father of a family veſts all his property in annuities, (which ſeldom happens) he then, and only then, may be ſaid to give up all thoughts of buſineſs, and to aim at nothing but an independent ſubſiſtence. In that caſe it may be his intereſt to pay off every debt that incumbers his family. We ſee then how much the principle muſt be qualified, to make it true with reſpect to individuals. The application of it to the ſtate is abſolutely falſe. That which ruins an individual, does not always ruin the ſtate. The money a man lays out for his ſubſiſtence, or in articles of luxury, does not return again into his family; whereas the internal expences of a monarch, or of the ſtate, return into the nation, encourage and improve it. The nation in a body pays theſe expences, or rather lends the money for its own advantage. With the aſſiſtance of loans a war may be ſupported by moderate taxes, in compariſon with what the nation would otherwiſe be obliged to pay, at the ſame time that the numerary wealth and circulation increaſe with the debt, as we have already demonſtrated. If other obſtacles did not lie in the way, we ſhould find that both population and agriculture would be promoted by that quick and eaſy motion which loans impreſs upon the ſprings of a prudent adminiſtration. Loans judiciouſly made, and wiſely applied, under favor of peace, conſtitute the only means of recovering population, and improving the ſoil.

It is not true that, in the revealed law, God forbids all intereſt on money borrowed, as uſurious. That paſſage in the Holy Scriptures has never been underſtood, and has given occaſion to many atrocious calumnies againſt the Jews, which, inſtead of affecting that people, are ſo many blaſphemies againſt the word of God. In the Hebrew language there are two expreſſions; neſſeg, which ſignifies Intereſt; and tarbit, which ſignifies Uſury. [175] How often has Voltaire affirmed, that, in the maledictions pronounced by Moſes againſt the Jews, he threatens them, that they ſhall borrow on uſury, and not be able to lend on the ſame terms? The charge is falſe and ſcandalous. In the chapter of Benedictions, the text ſays, Thou ſhalt lend to divers nations, and thou ſhalt not borrow. In the chapter of Curſes, the text ſays, Thou ſhalt borrow of divers nations, and thou ſhalt not lend; without one word of uſury or intereſt. I could not avoid taking notice of ſo groſs a miſtake. It is true, however, that among the Jews the rich are forbidden from taking intereſt of the poor; but Moſes does not extend the prohibition to people of fortune among one another. The Jewiſh government was theocratical, depending merely on the cultivation of the ſoil, which was diſtributed among the people with an exact equality. The legiſlature appointed a jubilee for the abolition of debts, and for the reſtoration of every family to the lands they had alienated; but inſolvent debtors paid for this advantage with the loſs of their liberty, until the period of reſtitution arrived. Their political conſtitution is no way applicable to Europe. In the ſame ſpirit Moſes permits the Jews to take intereſt of ſtrangers; but it is abſurd to ſay, that uſury was ever commanded. Lanochry taſſig. Taſſig comes from neſſig, and can only ſignify Legal Intereſt, which they were permitted to take from ſtrangers. Tarbit ſignifies Augmentation, or Uſury, which God never commanded his people to exact. A reproach of this kind is blaſphemy in the mouth of a Chriſtian, and folly in the mind of a philoſopher. But to return.

An equal diſtribution of property was much in the ſpirit of the Greek and Roman legiſlation. We know what agitation was produced by the agrarian law among the Romans. In our conſtitutions this chimerical ſyſtem is given up. The number [176] of new claſſes created by induſtry, commerce, and abundance, have eſtabliſhed a ſort of diſtribution unknown to the ancients. Through the medium of national loans, the poſſeſſors of this new property become co-uſufructuaries of the ſoil, with ſignal advantage to the ſtate. From the whole of this treatiſe it appears that they multiply the numerary, quicken circulation, and encourage commerce, manufactures, agriculture, revenue, and population.

Gold and ſilver are uſeleſs in a deſert; whereas theſe metals, or whatever repreſents them, in a populous country ſurrounded by poliſhed nations, ſupply every want, and quicken every reſource, by means of a general convention. The wiſe man had reaſon to ſay, "Money anſwers to every thing." To deny theſe propoſitions, is an abuſe of truth, and of the underſtanding, and confounds the ſimpleſt ideas. All men cannot be proprietors of land. To proſcribe the other claſſes is an inſupportable abſurdity. The anathema, pronounced againſt them by the Rural Philoſopher, is equally unjuſt and ridiculous. The number of mere annuitants is very inconſiderable. Their pretended idleneſs is not ſupported by the labor of others. They, on the contrary, ſupport that labor by their expence. But theſe idle annuitants, who have neither land, nor office, nor employment civil or military, are very rare. Intereſt on money is uſeful and neceſſary. Uſury is dangerous and deſtructive. To confound the two objects, is to forbid the uſe of fire, becauſe it burns thoſe who go too cloſe to it.

The Rural Philoſopher is very ſevere upon manufactures. It is true the manufacturer, the artiſt, the merchant, and the banker, can more eaſily remove into another country. Their property is not ſo intimately attached to the ſtate, or rather to the ſoil. ‘"Their wealth," ſays he, is diſperſed and unknown. [177] And all riches that depend upon ſeculation, or are capable of being hoarded, give no hold to the ſovereign power."’ This rule however is not univerſally true. It can only hold with reſpect to individuals, not to the whole claſs. For example, half a dozen manufacturers of Lyons, a few merchants belonging to Marſeilles, or St. Maloe's, and a banker of Paris, may quit their country without difficulty in the courſe of a day, and eſtabliſh themſelves elſewhere. In the ſame manner a landlord may ſell his eſtate, and purchaſe land in another country; but it is abſurd to ſuppoſe that all the manufacturers of Lyons, that all the merchants of Marſeilles or Bourdeaux, or that all the bankers of Paris, can find occupation elſewhere for their trade, induſtry, and abilities.

The landlord would be the firſt to ſuffer, if the merchant, the mechanic, the annuitant, the nobility, and even the artiſt of luxury, did not give a venal value to the ſuperfluous produce of the earth, by quickening circulation and conſumption. To decide this queſtion, or to ſtate it in rational terms, I ſhould be glad that theſe profound, eternal calculators, who pretend to underſtand the art of agriculture ſo thoroughly, would make a ſimple, exact, and unexaggerated calculation of the number of people neceſſary to cultivate and improve all the ſoil of France; that is, as much of it as is ſuited to the production of corn, or fit to be laid out in vineyards. The woods are neceſſary for various uſes, and occupy but a few hands. The improvement of the heaths at Bourdeaux is not to be reckoned, while ſuch quantities of good land remain uncultivated. It will not eaſily be believed how few hands are neceſſary to make a rich ſoil produce ſufficient nouriſhment for a great number of conſumers. The earth is ſo fertile, and nature is ſo bountiful, [178] that multitudes may ſubſiſt upon the labor of a few. Nothing but commerce, mutual intercourſe, and free exportation, can give a venal value to all the ſuperfluous produce. Every reſtraint upon the vent of it is injurious to the body of the ſtate, and checks population in other branches. As theſe claſſes, ſo ſeverely proſcribed by Monſieur de Mirabeau, multiply in the ſtate, internal conſumption will increaſe, and foreign trade and exportation become ſo much the leſs neceſſary. As manufactures flouriſh, the freedom of commerce will improve. Annuitants, bankers, merchants, and other citizens, will circulate ſo much the more money, and employ ſo many more hands in mercantile occupations, which we are told are ſo unfruitful a ſoil. Population will improve, and agriculture be much more encouraged, by the conſumption of the manufacturer, than population can be encouraged by agriculture. But to return to the calculation. It will be found that, if wars, colonies, and ſome particular moral cauſes had not depopulated Europe, the lands in general would have been better cultivated, and their value improved; and that this conſumption and value would proceed from the multitude of uſeful and induſtrious citizens, whoſe expence and circulation ſet every thing in motion. England in proportion is much better peopled than France, and the ſoil more improved. Yet their exportation of corn is immenſe. The internal conſumption and population of the kingdom might therefore be much greater than they are. But this population, which of courſe would increaſe the claſs of farmers, could not exiſt without a proportionate increaſe in all thoſe claſſes, againſt which the enthuſiaſtic apoſtles of agriculture have pronounced their anathema. I ſhould willingly concur with them in opinion, if they were contented with extolling the [179] immenſe utility of their favorite object, without excluding others equally uſeful, and even neceſſary to the improvement of agriculture itſelf. An able calculator might demonſtrate that, if other nations did not cavil with the Dutch about thoſe branches of induſtry which have fallen to their lot, and which in truth are their only inheritance, Amſterdam, Middleburgh, Dort, and Rotterdam, might contain double their preſent number of inhabitants, with a conſiderable addition to the general opulence of the republic. Population, which in Holland is much greater in proportion than in any part of Europe, would continue to increaſe, with prodigious advantage to thoſe nations that cultivate their ſoil. This ſingle reflection qualifies all exaggerations, and reduces the queſtion to thoſe terms of policy and reaſon, which I am endeavouring to eſtabliſh.

Let us not deceive ourſelves. The harmony of a ſtate ariſes from the agreement of its various parts. They borrow a mutual aſſiſtance from each other. Time, that conſumes every thing, will correct a number of miſtakes. The new world, which now in the philoſopher's eye ſeems uſeleſs, hurtful, and even dangerous to the old one, ſhall one day or other become neceſſary, when the population of Europe ſhall be carried to its higheſt point of improvement. We know that in China the legiſlature are obliged to check population; the example of China and Holland proves the truth of what I advance. If all the arable land in Europe were laid out in the production of corn, a great part of it, I am convinced, would periſh for want of conſumers. To create a conſumption equal to ſo extenſive a cultivation, we muſt multiply the population of great cities, towns and villages. There neither ſhould, nor can be, more than one Paris in France, nor one London in England; but there might be, as in China, [180] fifty cities more populous than Lyons, Nantes, Rochelle, and Bourdeaux; and every village might be better inhabited than it is. This is the way to raiſe the power of the prince, and the value of land; which never can be accompliſhed but by a continued peace, and by removing thoſe moral obſtacles that make it difficult for the farmer to ſubſiſt, and counteract population. A free exportation of the produce of the earth is eſſential. The reſt is the work of time, and of a good adminiſtration, under which, commerce, manufactures, circulation, and public credit act their reſpective parts, and all concur in promoting the ſame purpoſe. But every branch has its limits and relative proportion to the reſt. While they preſerve this proportion, they aſſiſt, when they depart from it, they deſtroy one another.

The inhabitants of cities, ſays Monſieur de Monteſquieu, judge of the opulence of a kingdom by the glittering luxury of thoſe who are the ruin of it. They deceive themſelves undoubtedly. At the ſame time we are not to judge of the ſtate of a whole kingdom from the decay of a ſingle province. The metropolis, we are told, with all its barren opulence, is only a magazine, like ancient Rome, in which the ſpoils of the provinces are collected; but the difference is very material. Paris and London are inhabited by induſtrious claſſes of men, who promote agriculture, commerce, and conſumption. The extent of the two cities exceeds their due proportion to the ſtate, which is depopulated by other cauſes. For this reaſon, Paris appears, in the philoſopher's eye, a maſs of ſeveral cities tranſplanted, and which might be more advantageouſly ſituated elſewhere. This tranſplantation, ſays Monſieur de Mirabeau, can only have been effected by a ſort of chymical extraction, conſidering the loſs of all the alimentary juices imbibed by the channels through [181] which they paſs, before they reach the capital. The ſurplus, received by the metropolis, may perhaps be ill diſtributed, varīable, precarious, and tranſitory, owing to a concurrence of various effects, which prevent the proportionate population of the kingdom, and the cultivation of the ſoil. But I affirm that France might be more populous, the land better cultivated, and Paris as great, and even better inhabited, than it actually is; and that, if a due harmony and proportion were preſerved in the other parts, the greatneſs of the capital, and multitude of its citizens, would be an encouragement to agriculture, which muſt ſtand ſtill, if it were not for the number of conſumers in the different claſſes of citizens. Such, in ſhort, is my opinion upon this important queſtion.

A number of examples might be quoted, but they would lead me into a detail of the proportions and balance to be preſerved in every claſs. When one claſs invades another, the prejudice they ſuffer is reciprocal. The firſt advantage may ſeem ſpecious, but the loſs of harmony and proportion makes it tranſitory and deſtructive. The many paſſages in hiſtory, which ſhow the political inconvenience of too copious a population, would lead us too far. The eternal laws of providence have implanted the ſeed of generation and perpetuity in every ſubſtance, but they ſeem alſo to have ſet bounds to their multiplication. The works of nature ſubſiſt by devouring one another. Every thing in its turn is paſture and a grave. Final cauſes are placed beyond our reach. The quantity of acorns loſt or conſumed is prodigious. Very few produce oaks. Every thing has its uſe. Out of a thouſand melon-ſeeds ſcarce one perpetuates the plant. The attraction, which the Author of nature has annexed to the act that perpetuates our being, is oftener a dream of pleaſure, than [182] an effort to immortaliſe the ſpecies. If nature, in ſome inſtances, appears too prodigal, it is becauſe we are unacquainted with the immutable laws by which her oeconomy is directed. America perhaps, after depopulating Europe, may ſerve hereafter to relieve us from too abundant a population.

To make it apparent that there is a maximum in agriculture and population, the reader is requeſted to employ his imagination upon the following remarks. Suppoſe, in the firſt place, that all Europe were as well peopled as it might be. By computation it would contain four or five times as many inhabitants, as it has at preſent. In that caſe, it would be indiſpenſably neceſſary to cultivate every foot of land, in order to maintain ſuch a multitude of people; and let it be admitted that, by a ſuperior ſyſtem of legiſlation and government, the ſeveral claſſes ſhould be diſtributed in due gradations; and, in a word, that an exact proportion and harmony ſhould be preſerved among all the parts of ſo many different ſtates. When Europe had once arrived at this period of agriculture and population, what would be the conſequence? Muſt the farther progreſs of population be ſtopt? By what means could it be done? We ſhould be compelled to ſend colonies to America and elſewhere. Even this reſource would not be ſufficient. The fatal aſſiſtance of war would be called in, to ſupply the office of peſtilence and famine. They too in their turn would ſoon be ſeverely felt. The very population we ſuppoſe would introduce them. The annual produce of the earth would be annually conſumed by the reſpective inhabitants of every country. Now it is certain that, after a few years, the harveſt fails in all countries. All of them then muſt ſucceſſively periſh by famine; becauſe every country would want the whole of its own produce for the internal conſumption [183] of its inhabitants, and could ſpare nothing for the ſupply of its neighbours.

Some naturaliſts pretend, that our terreſtrial globe is only ſurrounded by a vegetative cruſt, gradually exhauſted by cultivation, until at laſt it becomes dry and unfruitful. They tell us that the deſerts of Arabia were once a fertile country, and the earlieſt habitation of mankind. Without ſifting the queſtion too minutely, we all know that the earth recovers its youth, and preſerves its fertility, by repoſe. We know with what eager impatient vegetation a new ſoil rewards the firſt labors of the plough. To promote the order, harmony, and preſervation of the whole, there muſt be an alternate ſucceſſion of cultivation and repoſe; a ſtore of proviſions muſt be reſerved; ſome lands muſt be fallow; ſome countries muſt be uninhabited; it probably does not enter into the deſign of Providence, that the earth ſhould be equally peopled and cultivated all over. Such a ſtate of perfection and opulence, if it could exiſt for a moment, would introduce the ſevereſt calamities. We know not what our ſupreme good conſiſts in. Apparent imperfections contribute to the general ſecurity. We only ſee part of the picture, and are dazzled by falſe lights. Perfection cannot belong to the ſingle part before us, but muſt reſult from the whole.

Exceſſive population has conſtantly given birth to war, which, turning againſt its parent, diminiſhes and deſtroys it.

To multiply men, ſays Monſieur de Mirabeau, without multiplying ſubſiſtence, is devoting them to the miſery of famine. The phenomenon is rare, and can never happen, but through ſome defect in adminiſtration and police. On the other hand, to multiply ſubſiſtence without multiplying conſumers, is a ruinous chimera, that never can hold above a year. The phyſical [184] limits of population in any country are not inviolably confined by the produce of its own territory, when trade and navigation proſper, and are aſſiſted by credit, circulation, and fictitious wealth. Let Holland be the example. It is rather true that cultivation is inviolably confined by the internal conſumption, or precarious foreign exportation. When population exceeds wealth, the defect is inherent in the body of the ſtate. The whole political machine is out of order. Whenever this happens, every part will demand our attention at the ſame moment. The remedy muſt be general, and equally applied to every defect. We muſt then, as Lord Bacon obſerves upon another ſubject, endeavour to imitate the great operations of nature, not thoſe of art, which are always ſlow, feeble, and imperfect. The ſtatuary forms his ſtatue ſucceſſively by parts; ſometimes working upon the head, ſometimes upon the limbs; but it is our buſineſs to follow the conduct of nature in whatever ſhe produces; rudimenta partium omnium ſimul parit et producit. She at once lays the plan of the whole being, and furniſhes all the parts together. Vegetables and animals increaſe in ſize, and improve in their ſtrength; but they are the ſame from the moment they begin to exiſt. There muſt be one coercive power to confine the ſeveral orders of the ſtate, as the key-ſtone of the arch holds the building together. In a great kingdom, to preſerve the harmony of the ſtate, the good order and proſperity of the nation, agriculture, commerce, manufactures, circulation, public credit, internal police, finance, military eſtabliſhment, colonies, navigation, marine, and moderate luxury, ſhould proceed together in a reciprocal proportion.

Extent of frontier alone does not conſtitute the power of a ſtate; but it is a conſiderable advantage, as it offers a ſubſiſtence [185] to a greater number of ſubjects. Yet number alone, with a mere phyſical ſubſiſtence, is not enough. They muſt ſubſiſt with eaſe; and, to make a great number ſubſiſt with eaſe, they muſt be divided into claſſes. To confine them to the ſingle occupation of agriculture, is impoſſible. If the population of France were complete, the external vent or exportation of corn would be of little or no uſe. As things are circumſtanced, exportation muſt be conſidered as a ſupplementary conſumption, in favor of agriculture, or as a remedy for the want of population. This vehicle of commerce ſupports agriculture, and increaſes the number of ſubjects. But the increaſe of population is not the true ſecret of government; it conſiſts in maintaining the harmony of parts, and the equilibrium of the whole.

THE END.

LETTER UPON THE JEALOUSY OF COMMERCE.

[]

THOSE times, in which mankind are robbed of their inheritance, thoſe ages of barbariſm, in which every thing periſhes, are always introduced by war, and attended by ſamine and depopulation. Mankind, who have no power but in number no ſtrength but in ſociety, no happineſs but in peace, are mad enough to take up arms againſt one another, and to employ them in their mutual deſtruction. Excited by inſatiable avarice, or blinded by ambition ſtill more inſatiable, they bid adieu to all ſentiments of humanity, turn their ſtrength againſt each other, endeavour to deſtroy, and fatally ſucceed in their deſign. At laſt, when the days of blood and carnage are over, when the vain cloud of glory is diſperſed, they contemplate their own work with ſorrow; they ſee the earth depopulated, arts overwhelmed, nations diſperſed, the human race enfeebled, their own happineſs deſtroyed, and their real power reduced to nothing.—Buffon.

LETTER UPON THE JEALOUSY OF COMMERCE.

[189]
SIR,

YOU abſolutely inſiſt upon it, that I ſhall treat, ſeriouſly and in writing, the propoſition which I advanced the other day at your houſe. Permit me then to remind you of the corrective I added to it. I ſaid, that the proof required a head better furniſhed than mine. The lights I poſſeſs are not ſufficiently extenſive; my knowledge is too ſuperficial to demonſtrate ſo complicated a truth, which yet I feel myſelf, though unable to make it evident to others. Such is this propoſition. ‘"The eſſential intereſts of commercial powers, rivals and neighbours, would not claſh, at leaſt in the degree that is believed, if private intereſts did not frequently intervene."’

Private intereſt uſually aſſumes the maſque of public good. I believe it poſſible to reconcile the ſeparate intereſts of every nation with the common and reciprocal advantage of them all. From that moment the ſyſtem of the Abbé de St. Pierre would ceaſe to be conſidered as the dream of an honeſt man. The happineſs of a ſtate conſiſts in the number of its ſubjects, the facility of their ſubſiſtence, and in the power of the prince. This power is at its higheſt point, when it procures to its ſubjects every [190] advantage that the territory will admit of, when every claſs or gradation of inhabitants enjoys its reſpective condition, and all the claſſes find themſelves ranged in a political proportion. If the nature of the ſoil or climate refuſes any thing to convenience or opinion, it is the buſineſs of commerce and induſtry to obtain a ſupply of that deficiency from foreigners, to whom in return we ſhould endeavour to diſpoſe of our own ſuperfluity, whether it be of that produce which the nature of the ſoil furniſhes for the ſupport of the inhabitants, or of the produce of their induſtry. This, I believe, is the cleareſt idea of the origin, utility, and neceſſity of commerce.

At firſt it was the neceſſity of receiving from our neighbours whatever fell ſhort at home in the ſupply of our real wants; afterwards, in the ſupply of our ſenſuality; and laſtly, in that of our luxury. If on our ſide there be a ſuperfluity which our neighbours want, we only make an exchange. But as the meaſure cannot at all times be equal, the ſurplus conſtitutes the balance of trade, which the more indigent of the two parties, on cloſing their account, pays in money to the other, which, at that moment, happens to be the richer. Since wants are reciprocal, and ſince the winning parties can have no profit but at the expence of ſome one who pays the ſurplus, or balance, in money, it follows, that they cannot deſtroy the loſing party without exhauſting the ſource of their own happineſs. What would one ſay of a man who ſhould cut the udder of a cow in order to draw more milk from it? All profeſſions, in every country, labor for each other, and lend each other a mutual ſupport. When they ſupply the wants of their neighbours, they are in fact ſecuring their own exiſtence. One profeſſion deſtroyed would alter the harmony of ſociety, or the well-being of almoſt all. No man buys a commodity, or any part of the produce of [191] his neighbour's induſtry, but under a tacit condition, that the ſeller ſhall do as much by the buyer, either immediately himſelf, or by the interpoſition of ſeveral hands who are concerned in the circulation; and money is the pledge for the performance of the condition. If the intereſt, or utility, be not in ſome ſenſe reciprocal, the advantage is fallacious; like a meteor that diſappears and alarms at the moment that it glitters. But the ſame thing, which happens among the different profeſſions in the ſame country, would alſo happen among neighbouring commercial powers.

Commerce is a game, and with beggars it is impoſſible to win. If we were to win conſtantly, in every article, and from every body we played with, we muſt agree to return the chief part of our winnings, in order to begin the game again. Such a devouring commerce would deſtroy itſelf. Our neighbours, reduced to miſery, would not have wherewithal to pay for our commodities, or our induſtry. This principle ſhows that a univerſal commerce, and all excluſive or exceſſive advantages, are as abſurd as they are unjuſt. If a political harmony conſiſts in a proportionate though unequal diſtribution of various advantages, the greateſt advantage of each party would be to poſſeſs that which ſuited itſelf the beſt, without injuring others; and I am perſuaded that ſome of thoſe ſpecious advantages, which we moſt affect, would, if taken out of the hands of a neighbour, whom we are jealous of without reaſon, be in effect prejudicial to us. It often happens that the profits, derived to us indirectly, are reaſonable enough, and perhaps greater, and leſs embarraſſing, than if we had a direct poſſeſſion of the object ourſelves.

It is clear, that the preſervation and happineſs of the whole conſtitute the preſervation and happineſs of every part. This principle is inconteſtable. There is another equally true, that [192] a particular commercial advantage, almoſt uſeleſs to one nation, is neceſſary and eſſential to the preſervation of another. The poſſeſſion of the Molucca Iſlands would be as uſeleſs to Portugal, ſince her diſcovery of the mines of Brazil, as it is neceſſary to the republic of Holland. Portugal already poſſeſſes too much metal. There would be a repletion of it, if the cultivation and other advantages of the kingdom were in a ſtate of activity. Gold may be conſidered there as a merchandiſe, the exportation of which is uſeful; whereas Holland, deſtitute of territorial wealth, and from the high price of labor incapable of a competition in manufactures, would ſoon be undone, if it were not for ſome important article, that reſtores the equilibrium of money, and creates a balance in her favor, which all the other ſtates profit by, as will appear hereafter.

‘"From theſe two principles I would venture to draw a third, That it is frequently the intereſt of all the commercial powers, that ſome particular advantage ſhould belong to ſome one particular power, in preference to any other; and that, far from being a juſt cauſe of jealouſy to other powers, it is on the contrary their intereſt to preſerve it."’ A fourth principle, which alſo to me appears evident, though it be little obſerved, is, That we ſeldom poſſeſs any branch of commerce in all its parts. We are compelled to have recourſe to our neighbours, and as it were to divide the cake. The party, that ſeems to be in poſſeſſion, frequently has the ſmalleſt ſhare. Another principle, of which I am perſuaded, is, That Europe being a family, or body compoſed of various members, it is impoſſible to deſtroy one of them without damage to the reſt; and that Holland is the power, to which this principle moſt manifeſtly applies. In the ſequel I hope to prove it clearly.

[193] I muſt premiſe, that I conſider Europe as it is now conſtituted, and mankind according to their preſent manners, which I do not mean to criticiſe. Otherwiſe it would be neceſſary to enter into a philoſophical enquiry, whether commerce, the actual whim of the age, be eſſential to human happineſs; to what degree luxury is uſeful, at what point it becomes miſchievous, and how far it has been abuſed. The preſent queſtion is only to catch the ſpirit of the age we live in, and endeavour to combine, in the moſt juſt proportion poſſible, the ſeveral branches of reciprocal wants between different nations, in order to procure the importation of foreign productions, and the exportation of our own. It is certain that, if any ſtate could ſucceed in obtaining, what all parties ſeem to purſue, the means of ſupplying itſelf with a ſubſiſtence entirely national, it might from that moment exiſt as an inſulated ſtate. No longer making a part of the whole, commerce would be of no uſe to it. But ſuch a ſtate, though not repugnant to nature, from which we have too far departed, is incompatible with our manners. Hunting, fiſhing, and agriculture, originally furniſhed the univerſal ſubſiſtence. Factitious multiplied wants have given birth to commerce and manufactures, the children of induſtry and pleaſure. But we labor to no purpoſe. There is ſuch a concatenation in the intereſts of commerce, that no one party can carry it on alone. We muſt neceſſarily have recourſe to our neighbours, who divide the profit with us.

Let us come to a particular example. England has lately made the acquiſition of Canada. I believe it is a miſtake to ſuppoſe that this part of the world is entirely loſt to the commerce of France. There are a number of things, without which, I conceive, the commerce of Canada muſt decline, and which the Engliſh are obliged to receive from France. The wines for [194] the uſe of the colony, and the brandies, of which the ſavages, unfortunately for them, make ſo great a conſumption, muſt be furniſhed by France. I ſhall here obſerve, by the by, that however great the opulence of England, or of any other commercial power, may be, that part of it, which reſults from commerce and credit, is always more precarious than that which ariſes from the nature of the ſoil. It is more caſual, and depends upon a train of lucky accidents, which contrary accidents may deſtroy.

The baſe may loſe its proportion to the reſt of the building. The kernel perhaps, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, might in time be inſufficient to nouriſh the rind. In many caſes we muſt have recourſe to our neighbours, and ſhare with them. The Engliſh can never make their ſoil produce wine. To procure this pleaſure for themſelves, and to ſupply their colonies, they will always enrich France.

The Engliſh will probably never catch the taſte of this nation for inventing faſhions, nor overcome the inclination of others to adopt them. French manufactures will always be preferred, from caprice, fancy, faſhion, and becauſe they are always the cheapeſt. Labor in France is not ſo dear as in England, and might be ſtill cheaper, if, by means of a continued peace, it were poſſible to re-eſtabliſh the finances, to encourage population, and leſſen the weight of taxes. The immenſe tribute, which the reſt of Europe pay to France in return for trifles, will increaſe in proportion to the moderate price of manufactures. At preſent it is ſufficient to ſhow that France already derives a real profit from the Engliſh colonies in general, and even from thoſe which ſeem to be entirely loſt to her in point of commerce. The Engliſh will undoubtedly for the future import from France more wines, brandy, ſalt, vinegar, oil of [195] Provence, linens, thread, ſilks, ribbands, and even ſugar and indigo, than they did before; becauſe Canada cannot ſubſiſt without theſe articles. Add to this the ſaving of men, (far more valuable than any commodities) which it coſt France to ſupport this colony, and it will appear that, although England may have gained greatly, France has not loſt the whole.

The iſland of Grenada, and the Grenadillas, muſt in time make a rich return to England. But, beſides the treaſures which it coſt to conquer them during the war, the Engliſh have purchaſed them a ſecond time at the peace, having paid large ſums to France for the plantations and improvements already made there. The French inhabitants, on quitting the iſland, ſold the ſoil to the Engliſh for double what the ſame plantations were worth before the laſt war. This circumſtance ſurely ſhould cure us of the rage of conqueſt. France had gained a real and ſolid increaſe of its numerary wealth returned into the kingdom, while the profits of the Engliſh were yet in expectation. Theſe iſlands at preſent make a great return to England. Let it be obſerved that, when I ſay theſe poſſeſſions have coſt the Engliſh large ſums, it is becauſe I think that the poſſeſſions yielded to them by the peace ſhould be conſidered as the only equivalent for the expences of the war, and for the loſs of ſo many men. On one ſide then we muſt reckon Canada, Florida, the Grenadillas, and Senegal; on the other, the whole expence of the war, and loſs of men; then make the computation. I queſtion whether the Engliſh government will, for a long time, receive an increaſe of revenue proportioned to the load of intereſt due on the new loans; or whether the nation in general will ſoon receive a compenſation more than ſufficient to balance the new burthen of taxes, and the intereſt paid to foreigners concerned in the public funds. In an abſtract view, the kingdom muſt be a loſer, [196] if a part, or rather the whole of its taxes, did not return again into the hands of the nation; and if its numerary wealth were not augmented by the increaſe of the national debt, as I have demonſtrated elſewhere. Without this compenſation, and the ſecurity of their former ſettlements, the advantage of England in the laſt peace would have been very inconſiderable.

But without attempting a complete ſolution of this problem, let us continue to enquire into the intereſts of nations as they actually ſtand. France undoubtedly draws a profit from the commerce of Canada, and the other Engliſh colonies, owing to the connection of intereſts inſeparable in a commercial ſyſtem. The more theſe colonies flouriſh, the greater will be their demand for French commodities, now become neceſſary to them. On the other hand, the more France ſhall flouriſh, and the more plentiful her harveſts are, at ſo much the cheaper rate will ſhe be able to afford her commodities; and the happineſs of France will revert upon England. The eſſential intereſts of commercial powers, rivals and neighbours, far from claſhing, are a reciprocal ſupport to each other. As France increaſes in opulence, ſhe will draw from Great Britain a greater quantity of coals, leather, corn, lead, tin, allum, tallow, cheeſe, rice, tobacco, ſalt beef, ſoap, &c. Here then we ſee a reciprocal reverberation of mutual intereſt, which places the ſyſtem I profeſs in the faireſt point of view; a ſyſtem, the moſt uſeful to mankind, if it could be demonſtrated; the moſt fortunate, if it could be purſued. The benefit of one party conſtituting the benefit of the other, it becomes their mutual intereſt to lend aſſiſtance to each other. Every monopoly, exerciſed againſt our neighbours, lays a new burthen upon, and injures the quality of, thoſe productions which muſt be offered to us in return for our own. It is the ſaying of a ſage, that a miſguided covetouſneſs defeats its [197] own purpoſe. Let us proceed to another article. The fiſhery, for example, is phyſically, and even morally neceſſary to France. A Frenchman is a fiſh-eater, not only from pleaſure, but a principle of religion. A ſupply of fiſh is eſſential to a people, who are frequently obliged to abſtain from fleſh-meat. This nutritive art is at the ſame time a nurſery for ſeamen. It is their occupation in time of peace. But to carry on a fiſhery, in order to form ſeamen for war, is a ſanguinary motive that tends to the deſtruction of the ſpecies. To carry it on for the ſuſtenance of our people, is a motive of preſervation. I take it for granted then, that, to maintain that harmony of mutual intereſts, which I have in view, France muſt preſerve an extenſive cod fiſhery. She can no more do without it, than Holland can without the herring fiſhery, which is almoſt as eſſential to the republic as the ſpice trade. Her preſervation depends upon it, and upon her preſervation depends that of almoſt all the commerce of Europe.

Holland is a very rich country, almoſt the whole of whoſe riches, being artificial, factitious, and of convention, exiſt only by commerce, by the fiſheries, by credit, and circulation. The ready money in Holland ſerves as a prop to an infinity of imaginary riches in veſſels, commodities, paper, and public funds; and the commercial powers of Europe are ſo cloſely connected with the Dutch, that the latter are, as it were, their factors, their partners, and, if I may be allowed to ſay it, their bankers. The artificial currency of Holland gives value to the artificial currency of France and England; and if, by any misfortune, the city of Amſterdam ſhould happen to decline, which muſt be the caſe as ſoon as her commerce, fiſheries, and credit fail her, from that moment the whole currency of France and England muſt ſink prodigiouſly. In the year 1763, the fall of one or [198] two commercial houſes in Holland produced loſſes in all quarters. The commerce of Europe ſeemed to be ſhaken. The Engliſh ſtocks fell ten per cent. The convulſion, occaſioned by this little accident in all places of trade, ſhows us what would be the conſequence of a more general failure. It is not the ſame with the republic of Holland, as with other ſtates. It may be indifferent, for inſtance, to Europe, whether Sileſia belong to the houſe of Auſtria, or to the great Prince who has been able to preſerve his glorious conqueſt; although the number of men loſt in the war, occaſioned by this province, be not a matter of indifference to Europe. Commerce feels it. Decreaſe of inhabitants is decreaſe of conſumption. Whereas, if the republic of Holland were conquered, it would no longer be the ſame ſtate. The ſoil is next to nothing. The riches of Holland would diſappear. Amſterdam, Rotterdam, Middleburgh, would no longer be a bridge of communication, the mart of Europe, the magazines of the univerſe. Their paper, which gives value to that of every other ſtate, would be annihilated, and choak up circulation. Millions of currency would diſſolve in an inſtant. Half the merchants of Europe would be ruined. Sovereigns would be affected, and half a century would not be ſufficient to repair the miſchief. Some great revolution muſt enſue. I may venture then to affirm, as a principle not to be diſputed, that almoſt all the powers of Europe are intimately concerned in the preſervation of the republic. Holland is undoubtedly a maſterpiece of induſtry and labor. Her exiſtence is nevertheleſs very precarious. It is only to the internal wiſdom of her government, and to the moderation of her neighbours, that ſhe owes her preſervation. I ſay, their moderation; for I ſuppoſe them unhappily not ſufficiently convinced of my great principle, that the opulence of Holland communicates itſelf to her neighbours, [199] and that the prejudice they muſt ſuffer from her deſtruction, or decline, would be immenſe. The cauſes, which produced the greatneſs of the republic, no longer exiſt. The competition in commerce, now more extenſive; Hamburgh, now become the ſtaple of the north; and other circumſtances, have not only ſtopped the farther progreſs of the republic, but have already occaſioned her decline. Oeconomy, the ſource of her power, degenerates into a luxury incompatible with her conſtitution. The excluſive ſpice trade, and the herring fiſhery, are the only advantages ſhe has left for her preſervation, and to ſupport her in that commerce, in which ſhe meets with competition. Theſe are the two hinges, on which the remainder of the machine ſtill turns. The profits of the carrying trade, ſo neceſſary to theſe republicans, diminiſh every day. Holland was once enabled, by her commerce of oeconomy, to purchaſe in one country, and ſell in another, frequently upon cheaper terms, than if thoſe countries had traded directly with each other. A great kingdom may do without this trade. 1 Nolo eundem populum imperatorem et portitorem eſſe terrarum. I do not like, ſays Tully, that the ſame people ſhall be at once the lords and carriers of the world.

[200] The more Holland and her commerce flouriſh, the greater will be her importation, from France, of wines of all ſorts, brandies, vinegar, ſalt, oil of Provence, ſugars, indigo, coffee, [201] all ſorts of drapery, mercery, hardware, plate glaſs, clock work watches, ſilk and cotton ſtuffs, laces, and tapeſtry. All Europe has an intereſt in maintaining the republic in its preſent ſtate, [202] and ſhould concur in ſecuring to her the poſſeſſion of the two branches above mentioned. Of all Europe, Holland is the ſtate, whoſe value and produce moſt exceed the produce and [203] value of her territory, of which however ſhe makes a greater advantage than nature ſeems to permit. It is a ſort of political creation. France and England are ſtill very far from having all their ſoil in improvement, as well as from that degree of population, of which the two kingdoms are capable. Until we arrive at that point, an excentric commerce, and diſtant colonies, are leſs neceſſary. A palpable truth, though little known, or little obſerved in practice.

I return to Holland, which I conſider as the rudder of the commercial veſſel of Europe. She furniſhes the ſails too. It is ſhe that blows the gale of factitious credit, and facilitates the motion of a very heavy machine. Her deſtruction would produce a univerſal palſy, and ſhe wants the ſupport and aſſiſtance of her neighbours. It is an old oak, whoſe leaves ſtill appear green, but whoſe root begins to decay, and that threatens to cruſh its neighbours by its fall. 2 It is not ſo much a dangerous rival, as a uſeful aſſociate. A country of little [204] extent, that has no arable land, no woods, no vineyards, no mines, whoſe ſoil is ungrateful, barren and expenſive, ſhould not be the object of jealouſy. To envy her commerce and her fiſheries, is a ſignal injuſtice, to which the apologue of the prophet to David may well be applied. This injuſtice muſt appear the greater, as it is contrary to the intereſt of thoſe who are guilty of it, conſidering the conſumption of their commodities and manufactures in Holland. The artificial currency of Holland ſupports that of France and England, and vice versâ. Theſe three powers, by their reciprocal harmony, partake of the commerce of Spain, that mother from whom they derive their nouriſhment, and who perhaps feels the effect of nouriſhing three ſuch children. France derives a conſiderable advantage from the riches of Holland, in the large conſumption of her wines, and in the utterance of her manufactures of all ſorts. France unqueſtionably gains more by the opulence of Holland, than ſhe would have done if Lewis XIV. had ſucceeded in deſtroying the republic. England alſo has her advantage, ſince ſhe ſells to the Dutch more than ſhe buys of them. They ſupply her with money in time of war. Holland ſerved as a bridge of communication in the laſt war, and with no leſs benefit to France than to England. Holland, it is true, has [205] profited by it. But ought this to be a ſubject of jealouſy? It is an accidental tribute, which her ſituation makes neceſſary to her. Without ſuch caſual profits, and without her ſpices, the commerce of the republic muſt long ſince have been annihilated. A fall of the fortune of Holland would revert, with ſenſible miſchief, upon the commerce of France and England. Hitherto the competitors of the Dutch have frequently benefited themſelves at their expence, becauſe the Dutch had traded with ſcarce any competition, and by a concurrence of various accidents had for ſome time enjoyed an almoſt univerſal and excluſive commerce. But thoſe times are paſt. To cavil with them upon the little they have left, cannot but be prejudicial to Europe in general, and in particular to the cavillers themſelves. It appears then clearly from all that has been ſaid, that all the powers are intereſted in preſerving Holland in her preſent ſtate. 3 But this [206] will be impoſſible, if ſhe be thwarted in thoſe objects which are eſſential to her preſervation. The commerce of the republic is more precarious than that of any other power. We have ſeen [207] a perfect picture of it in thoſe well digeſted remonſtrances, which were preſented by ſome able merchants to the late ſtadtholder, of glorious memory, a little before his death. They went back to the original cauſes, which, in former times, ſo prodigiouſly favored a commerce eſfential to the conſtitution of the ſtate, marking out, and diſtinguiſhing at the ſame time, thoſe cauſes of its decline which are inevitable, from thoſe which might ſtill admit of a remedy. The following, as well as I can recollect, are the topics, on which this important memorial turned.

They ſet forth the total change of ſyſtem in the commerce of Europe, and examined into the cauſes, which formerly concurred in fixing it, with ſo much advantage, in the republic. In tracing theſe original cauſes, they diſtinguiſhed, firſt the phyſical, ſecondly the moral, and laſtly the accidental cauſes, which had concurred with the others. The phyſical cauſes, for inſtance, conſiſt in the advantageous ſituation of the country. The republic, placed between the northern and ſouthern ſeas, ſtands as a centre to Europe, and of courſe lies conveniently for traders of all nations to make it an univerſal ſtaple. Here they aſſembled from every quarter to exchange their merchandiſes, ſupplying the neceſſities of ſome with the ſuperfluity of others to their mutual advantage.

[208] The barrenneſs of the ſoil contributed to their ſucceſs, by compelling the inhabitants to exert their induſtry to provide themſelves with the neceſſaries of life. It made them more induſtrious, more laborious, and obliged them to ſeek for that ſupply in other countries, which failed them in their own. The ſituation of the republic puts it in her reach to avail herſelf of the fiſhery in the neighbouring ſeas, where the abundance of fiſh has not only enabled her to provide for her own ſubſiſtence, but to ſupply foreigners. In the produce of her fiſhery ſhe finds a compenſation for that dearth of proviſions, which attends a barren ſoil, and a very limited territory.

Among the moral cauſes we may reckon liberty of conſcience, as one of the means which have contributed moſt to people the Seven Provinces, by inviting a multitude of foreigners to reſide there. The protection, granted to foreigners againſt the violence of perſecution, has been another ſource of opulence. The Dutch have profited by the perfecutions in other countries. Strangers, who found an aſylum here, brought with them not only their property and their money, but their induſtry; introducing various fabrics, manufactures, trades, arts, and ſciences; and this too, in ſpite of the difficulty they met with, in finding themſelves unprovided with all the elements or firſt materials of manufactures, which the country itſelf does not produce, and which they are obliged to import from abroad at a conſiderable expence.

The conſtitution of their government, and the civil liberty reſulting from it, has contributed not a little to the proſperity of their commerce. The adminiſtration of juſtice has always been unblemiſhed, without reſpect of perſons. It were to be wiſhed, that we had equal reaſon to be ſatisfied with the ſpeedy diſpatch of proceedings, ſince this point has a great influence upon commerce. [209] Among the moral and political cauſes of their former ſucceſs in commerce, we may reckon their wiſe policy and circumſpection in avoiding war, and preſerving peace, without looking for chimerical advantages in ruinous wars. Such are the political maxims which have conſtituted the glory of the republic, which have inſpired foreigners with that confidence they have always repoſed in her government, and which of courſe have invited a multitude of uſeful citizens, who have increaſed her commerce and her riches.

Among the accidental and external cauſes, which have contributed to the ſucceſs of her commerce, the following may be obſerved.

At the time when the republic put in practice the wiſe maxims, which ſhe had adopted for protecting her trade, that of her neighbours was almoſt entirely neglected. We need only read the hiſtory of thoſe times to ſee how much the perſecution, on the ſcore of religion, in Spain, Flanders, and other kingdoms, have contributed to advance the commerce of the republic. The civil wars in France and Germany, and afterwards in England, have contributed not a little to the eſtabliſhment of her manufactures. In the very heat of the war, which Holland maintained againſt Spain and Portugal, a period in other reſpects ruinous to commerce, thoſe two powers neglected their marine, while that of the republic grew formidable, and was at once in a condition to protect her own commerce, and to deſtroy that of her enemies. Such are the principal cauſes which have eſtabliſhed and encouraged the commerce of the republic. Before we ſpeak of its actual ſtate, it may be proper to enquire which of theſe cauſes ſtill ſubſiſt, and which have diſappeared; the ſureſt way to diſcover the means of promoting commerce in its different branches.

[210] As to natural and phyſical cauſes, it is certain that things are nearly in the ſame ſituation, except perhaps ſome little alteration in the mouths of rivers, where ſand may have collected, and made the paſſage of veſſels more difficult. As to the ſea, the Dutch had once the ſole poſſeſſion of the fiſhery. At preſent they ſhare it with their neighbours. From thence ariſes the diminution of their herring, cod, and whale fiſhery. As to accidental cauſes, and any changes among the powers which ſurround the republic, it cannot be denied that revolutions have happened, fatal to her commerce, which had thriven by the perſecutions in other countries, by the contempt her neighbours entertained for commerce, their negligence in the practice, and their ignorance of the theory. All theſe circumſtances are evidently altered. The powers of Europe have adopted the maxims of the republic. With the advantages of ſoil and territorial production, they vie with each other in protecting trade, manufactures, fabrics, and fiſhery. This cannot but have a fatal influence upon the commerce of ſo ſmall a ſtate. She feels too ſenſibly the progreſs of her neighbours. Our Dutch merchants complain, that formerly they ſupplied the north and eaſt country with the productions, fruits, and commodities, of France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and theſe in return with the productions of the former; whereas, at preſent, the expence of freight and other charges are managed without them. It is but a very few years ſince Amſterdam was a general magazine, of indigo among the reſt, and other drugs uſed in dyeing. Hardly any traces of it remain at preſent. Germany has begun for ſome years to import directly what merchandiſes ſhe wants from France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, introducing them by way of Altena and Hamburgh.

[211] The merchants obſerved that, by the laſt accounts of the exportation of ſugar, coffee, and indigo, from the 1ſt of June, 1750, to the 31ſt of May, 1751, and by a compariſon of the ſame articles exported from Nantz to Amſterdam and Hamburgh, from the 1ſt of October, 1750, to the 1ſt of Auguſt, 1751, it appears that not above a fourth of thoſe articles were ſhipped for Holland, and that the remaining three fourths were ſhipped directly for Hamburgh. A little before this period, the proportion was in the inverſe ratio.

Where are now, ſay the merchants, thoſe ladings which we formerly uſed to ſee of hemp, flax, and other merchandiſes of the Baltic, for Spain, France, and Portugal? We need only conſult the regiſters of the Sound, to ſee that all theſe nations import thoſe merchandiſes without our aſſiſtance. We no longer ſee any Dutch houſes in Spain. It is aſtoniſhing how little the republic is concerned in the galloons, and how low her Levant trade is fallen. The great number of preſſes for printing cotton, houſes for refining of ſugars, and other fabrics eſtabliſhed within a ſhort time paſt at Hamburgh and Bremen, and very lately in Flanders and Brabant, are ſo many proofs of a decay in the commerce of the republic. Formerly ſhe alone carried on the trade of all Europe. Strangers paid her without enquiry whatever ſhe demanded, their ignorance in matter of commerce not permitting them to think of reducing their expences by means of a direct navigation. But ſince the laſt century, the ſyſtem of Europe is wholly changed. Foreign nations obſerved, that it was by commerce only that the republic had arrived at that degree of power. This conſideration, added to that of the taxes they paid in Holland, ſuggeſted to them the idea not only of applying themſelves to commerce, but of doing entirely without the Dutch, by conveying the ſuperfluity of their [212] own productions directly to the places where the conſumption was greateſt, and, on the other hand, by repairing to the fountain head for what they wanted themſelves.

Such are, in general, the chief cauſes of the greatneſs and decay of the commerce of Holland. Exceſſive taxes, cuſtom-houſe duties, and other impoſitions, with which the neceſſities of the public have loaded commerce, operate as acceſſary cauſes, have haſtened, and continue to haſten its decline. On this ſide the merchants affirmed that the remedy muſt be ſought; or at leaſt that the duties muſt be diminiſhed, to ſtop the progreſs of the decay. A deep enquiry into this matter would lead us too far, and does not concern the reſt of Europe. I ſhall only repeat that they obſerved, that an increaſe of the duties of importation at the cuſtom-houſe is fallacious; and they proved it thus. After the ſevere winter of the year 1740, all the produce of the earth being deſtroyed, the mortality which happened among the cattle occaſioned a conſiderable increaſe in the revenues of the cuſtom-houſe, on account of the great introduction of foreign commodities and foreign cattle, to anſwer the internal conſumption. We ſhould be groſsly deceived, if we attributed this kind of increaſe to any augmentation of commerce. The Engliſh give a drawback, or reſtitution of the duties of importation upon commodities and merchandiſes of paſſage, in order to favor the exportation and ſale in foreign countries; the ſign of a flouriſhing commerce. There is this difference between Holland and other commercial countries, that, having unfortunately ſcarce any thing of her own growth, her commerce, as far as it concerns navigation, conſiſts ſolely in the exchange of foreign commodities introduced for the ſingle purpoſe of ſending them abroad; an operation which ſhould be favored and encouraged in the republic by every method imaginable. If exceſſive luxury had not altered the manners of the [213] Dutch, this country would be the only one proper for a general fair. The oeconomy of the inhabitants, 4 and the low intereſt of money, enable the Dutch to benefit both themſelves and their neighbours, by acting as carriers for them in certain articles of trade, particularly in the herring fiſhery, which they alone know how to manage with the neceſſary oeconomy and cleanlineſs.

[214] To the ſituation of the republic, to the rivers and canals which interſect the country, we may add the oeconomy of her inhabitants. In this article their ſeafaring people ſurpaſs every other nation. They equip a veſſel with eighteen men, for which other nations require twenty-ſix or twenty eight. The ſparing diet of their ſeamen, the conſtruction of their veſſels, and the long time they make them laſt by a cleanlineſs which appears trifling; all theſe circumſtances united, enable the Dutch to be the carriers of certain articles at a lower rate than any other nation. It is unjuſt to envy them ſuch an advantage. The abundance of money among them, and the moderate profits that ſatisfy the Dutch, are benefits that revert upon their neighbours. It is not fair then to cavil with them continually, or to deprive them from day to day of thoſe feeble advantages of which they ſtill preſerve ſo inconſiderable a ſhare. But without entering into a more minute detail, I flatter myſelf this picture ſhows, that the commerce of Holland, upon its preſent footing, far from being an object of jealouſy to her neighbours, ought, on the contrary, to be conſidered as neceſſary to their own preſervation and proſperity; that any greater decay of it muſt be attended with ruin to the republic; and that her ruin would be the cauſe of irreparable miſchief to the reſt of Europe, whoſe commerce proſpers by that circulation and conſumption, which Holland maintains in a greater degree than any other nation. It is alſo for the common good, if I do not deceive myſelf, that Spain ſhould have the poſſeſſio [...] [...] rather the cuſtody, of the treaſures of America. [...] every thing that can render her kingdom rich and [...] ſtrength enough to deter others from attempting [...] her. England has all the poſſeſſions neceſſ [...] [...] advantage to maintain the [...] at its apogeum, and rather liable to [215] be bloated than nouriſhed by any farther augmentation. There is a meaſure which cannot be exceeded. To paſs that point, is to overſhoot the mark. When the conſumption of any commodity is arrived at its higheſt period of gradation, the quantity cannot be increaſed without overſtocking the trade, which ends in a decay. Nature has preſcribed limits to the human ſtature, on either ſide of which ſhe makes dwarfs or giants; ſo, with regard to the happieſt conſtitution of a ſtate, there is a certain boundary, to which it ought to reach, and beyond which it ought not to be extended. In every political body there is a maximum of ſtrength, not to be exceeded. Beyond that point, to aggrandiſe is to enervate. In ſome caſes, undoubtedly, a moiety is worth more than the whole. The Midas of the fable may be found in hiſtory. Every nation, I think, ſhould be divided into ſeveral claſſes. In each order of ſociety, the number ſhould be proportioned to the rank; that is, the inferior ranks ſhould be the moſt numerous; otherwiſe the harmony of the ſtate is diſcompoſed. The proportion I ſpeak of ſhould reſemble the ſtructure of a pyramid, enlarging in extent as it approaches to its baſis. A body too great for its conſtitution depreſſes itſelf, and ſinks under its own weight. Let us, for a moment, conceive a ſtate, in which every body ſhould be rich. It could not ſubſiſt without calling in the ſervice of indigent foreigners. The ſovereign power is the ſummit of the building; it ſhould be ſingle in itſelf, and gradually ſupported by the inſerior orders, of which the people are the foundation. Too much wealth, whether accumulated or diſperſed, ſuppoſes us to wiſh for a pyramid, while we deſtroy the eſſence of it, or that a body may be ſupported without feet. I do not inſiſt upon the diſorder reſulting from it in point of morality, which yet has a greater effect than we are aware of in every political [216] ſyſtem. A very rich nation may ſubdue another leſs rich than itſelf, but poor nations will always ſubdue the moſt opulent.

Let England therefore conſider (and in England there are many reſpectable perſons of this opinion) that a greater commerce may become not only injurious to her, but fatal. The greedy branches exhauſt the trunk. It was ſaid to Croeſus, ‘"You have gold in abundance; but he who underſtands the uſe of iron better than you do, will plunder you of your gold."’—Too much wealth extinguiſhes induſtry. Corruption of manners prevails through every rank, and all is loſt. I indulge myſelf in the hope, that the deep and ſublime imagination of the Engliſh may brood over theſe principles, and quicken them into practice. They will improve in fertility, and human nature will profit by it. I ſee the truth, though faintly. I feel it myſelf. But I want the power of expreſſion to place it in the cleareſt point of view, and to make it equally ſenſible to others.

The ſame political progreſs may be applied to other powers. It will appear that, if men would live like brothers, all parties would find their account in it.

It cannot be diſputed, that political ſtrength conſiſts in having a greater number of ſubjects who ſubſiſt with eaſe; who cauſe an extenſive conſumption, who turn the ſoil to advantage, and exert their induſtry to ſubſiſt as much as poſſible without the aſſiſtance of foreigners, whom yet they ſupply with the produce of their ſoil, and the labor of their hands. The labor and induſtry of many are infinitely more uſeful to the ſovereign, than the accumulated riches of a few. There is then a maximum for riches alſo. Even too great a population might do miſchief. It might produce ſickneſs, epidemical diſeaſes, plague, famine, and revolt. Every exceſs is dangerous. In politics it [217] very often happens, that nothing is leſs true than what appears moſt probable. An apparent proſperity is frequently a maſk to the ruin of the ſtate. A great misfortune ſometimes brings great advantages along with it. Take the following inſtance. The loſs of Minorca, which the Engliſh ſuffered in the beginning of the war, ſeemed to threaten them with ſtill greater diſaſters, and to be greatly to their diſadvantage. Far otherwiſe. Beſides that this extraordinary event rouſed the nation, whoſe errors are ſoon corrected by their fortunate conſtitution, and where concord often ariſes from diſunion itſelf, as harmony in muſic reſults from diſcords.

The loſs of Minorca made them ſtill greater mariners than they were, by forcing them to defy all ſeaſons in the Mediterranean; the Engliſh ſquadrons formerly loitered at Mahon, and the porters of the Mediterranean frequently left the key in the door. In the war of 1744, we have often ſeen the French and Spaniſh ſquadrons unite, and ſail into or out of the Mediterranean, while the Engliſh were at Minorca. In the laſt war, 8a diviſion of Monſieur De la Clue's ſquadron, intended to carry troops and ammunition to Cape Breton, was intercepted before Carthagena, in the middle of winter, by the Engliſh fleet, which, in ſo ſevere a ſeaſon, would probably have been at Mahon, if the Engliſh had been in poſſeſſion of the iſland. Upon this ſingle event perhaps may have depended almoſt all their ſubſequent ſucceſſes in America. It appears then, that misfortunes frequently give birth to ſucceſſes, which in their turn bring about the greateſt diſaſters; an important leſſon, and too little conſidered.

[218] The ſymptoms of opulence in a ſtate are often equivocal. An increaſe, for inſtance, in the revenue of the cuſtoms, is a very defective barometer to determine whether commerce flouriſhes or not. Exportation is the only criterion. It appears that, from the year 1740, the revenue of the cuſtom-houſe, which they call the Admiralty in Holland, had increaſed conſiderably; yet, that this augmentation was ruinous to the ſtate, becauſe it aroſe from a mortality among the horned cattle, large ſupplies of which were introduced from Denmark, and paid for with money that never returned. In the ſame manner, if England purchaſes more foreign commodities to ſupply her colonies, the revenue of the cuſtoms may increaſe, to the prejudice of the kingdom; unleſs the return from the colonies ſhall introduce, in exchange, a ſuperabundance of commodities, which, being carried to a foreign market, may make good the firſt loſs, and convert it into a real profit. Time will prove the advantage; a good adminiſtration may procure it. Markets, at which the growing manufactures of a country may be diſpoſed of, are a real advantage, becauſe they neceſſarily increaſe the number of manufacturers, and conſequently population and conſumption. Manufactures uſually invite foreigners, who repair the breach made by the colonies in the population of the mother country. All theſe principles muſt be combined, to judge of the importance and utility of a new colony.

If then it be almoſt problematical, whether great acquiſitions, in conſequence of great ſucceſſes in war, be hardly a compenſation for the evils it creates; ſo much the more reaſon is there never to commence a war in the uncertainty of ſucceſs. If we reaſoned from our principles, this ſhould henceforward be the age of peace; ſince, it ſeems, it is the general wiſh, that commerce [219] ſhould be protected in the principal countries of Europe, in France, England, Spain, Holland, Portugal, and all the north. It is the general intereſt of theſe powers to maintain a profound peace, and to compoſe or baniſh thoſe petty diſputes among princes, which tend to involve their neighbours in a war. While the commercial powers are united in eluding all occaſions of war, it may with eaſe be avoided. One great difficulty preſents itſelf, I confeſs; the Engliſh, for their own ſecurity, to ſupport their ſplendor, and to indulge their taſte for expence, and the generoſity natural to the nation, think they ſhould maintain a ſuperiority at ſea. Their ſituation, the conſtitution of their government, and that extenſive commerce, which they ſeem to have more need of than any other power, appear to require it. But it is not yet time to enter into the detail of this important queſtion. Let us firſt ſay a word of the India trade.

The commerce to the Indies is ſuppoſed to be deſtructive, on account of the money ſent thither, if a conſiderable part of the returns are not again diſpoſed of to foreigners. The great principle however, univerſally cited, ‘"That, if we are obliged to purchaſe the commodities of India from foreigners for our own conſumption, it is rather our intereſt to import them ourſelves, may be liable to ſome exceptions;"’ for this reaſon. The money we carry into Aſia is loſt to Europe; whereas the money we ſpend among our neighbours increaſes the general circulation, and we ourſelves profit by it. The greater number of rivals we ſend into Aſia, ſo much the more do we advance the price of India goods, ſo many more riſques do we run, and ſo much the more do we reciprocally injure one another.

This trade, at firſt ſo lucrative to one or two nations, is at length become of little importance, not to ſay more, to the [220] others that have engaged in it. It is inconvenient, therefore, that all the powers ſhould meddle with it; I mean, it is not for the general intereſt of Europe. Upon this point I have hardly courage to deliver my opinion; I leave it to men of greater abilities and experience to unfold, and go to the bottom of my own principles. This alone I believe I may aſſert, that it is for the benefit of all Europe, that the Dutch in particular ſhould preſerve a conſiderable ſhare in the India trade, eſpecially in the articles of ſpice and cinnamon. If France or England poſſeſſed the Moluccas, Ceylon, Peru, Mexico, and the Brazils, they would in a little time engroſs all the money in Europe, and be made unhappy by the diſproportion among the inferior claſſes, ſo productive of diſſenſion and cabal, and by the jealouſy of all their neighbours, whoſe poverty would make them formidable. In a great kingdom the gradations from opulence to poverty ſhould be numerous; and at every ſtep of the deſcent, the number of individuals ſhould be greatly augmented.

The republic of Holland is not an active, dangerous power, but paſſive and vivifying. Amidſt the marſhes ſhe has drained, ſhe has no reſource but commerce, no ſubſiſtence but induſtry. Peace is her element. The preſervation of her ſtate is all her ambition. She is ſerviceable to her neighbours, and can never give umbrage while they leave her unmoleſted. Yet, if driven to deſpair, ſhe might ſtill become formidable. Without the herring fiſhery (by two thirds leſs at preſent than it was before the wars with Cromwell and Charles II.) and without the India and carrying trade, the republic could not long ſubſiſt. It is the intereſt of Europe to maintain her in poſſeſſion of theſe three objects, for the general good, and to ſupport the actual ſyſtem of Europe, the ſyſtem of commerce, credit, circulation, [221] public funds, imaginary and artificial riches, manufactures, and luxury. Few people know that Holland, maintained in a flouriſhing ſtate, is one of the main arches of the building. If ever, as appearances ſeem to threaten, the mines of Mexico and Peru ſhould be exhauſted like thoſe of Spain, this whole ſyſtem muſt fall to the ground. From that moment the India trade will become, in every ſenſe, pernicious, and impoveriſh Europe. All the currency of paper credit will vaniſh; the eſtabliſhments and fortunes of individuals will be ſucceſſively and rapidly over-turned. There will be a revolution in the univerſal ſyſtem. But this event being yet at a diſtance, it is certain, that the Dutch, by means of an artificial circulation ſupported by a due proportion of ſpecie, and by means of their oeconomy, may ſupply their neighbours, from one to the other, with commodities cheaper than if they were directly to import them themſelves. No other nation has ſucceeded in pickling herrings, either ſo well, or at ſo low a rate. Their neighbours, I preſume, would gain more by furniſhing them with ſalt, than by engaging in the pickling trade themſelves. This ſupports one of the principles I advanced in the beginning of my letter.

If the harmony of the political picture of commercial Europe be attended to, it will be found, that it is no way incompatible with the common intereſt of all parties, that the mines of Peru ſhould belong to Spain, thoſe of Brazil to Portugal, the ſpice trade and herring fiſhery to Holland; the ſugars, indigo, and other produce of St. Domingo, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, as well as a ſhare in the great fiſheries, to France; and that England, at the ſame time, may and ought to preſerve an univerſal command over all the commerce, of which North America, Jamaica, and the Great Indies (except the Moluccas and Ceylon) are the baſis. If the principal ſugar colonies [222] belonged to the Engliſh, their commerce with Portugal might ſuffer by it. I believe the Engliſh, by their commerce, encourage the produce of the Brazils, and are well rewarded for it by the tribute they draw from that country. But it cannot be denied, that it is the intereſt of all Europe, that the principal ſugar colonies ſhould belong to France, in order to ſupply the conſumption of Germany, and the trade of Holland. Firſt, becauſe France can furniſh ſugar at a lower rate, which is an immediate advantage to Germany, Holland, and the north country. Secondly, if England had all the other ſugar colonies, thoſe of Brazil would be uſeleſs to Portugal. That kingdom would ſuffer by it; and England, in the diminution of her Portugal trade, would loſe a great part of the exceſſive, but fallacious profits, which ſhe might gain on the other ſide, to the prejudice of all Europe. If I were better acquainted with the detail of commerce, I am perſuaded that other examples might be produced in ſupport of theſe principles. * England is united with Portugal by mutual intereſts; their reciprocal commerce is neceſſary to the two nations; one conſumes the produce of the other, without any great diſadvantage to other powers, who enjoy other compenſations.

Let it not be thought that I mean to introduce into politics the optimiſm of Leibnitz. I do not pretend to ſay that all is exactly right; ſome arrangements might certainly be better than they are. But I affirm, that all the commercial powers may, in time of peace and on the preſent footing, ſubſiſt in a ſtate of proſperity; and if there be any branch of commerce not exactly in its place, or which we may think we have occaſion for, it is better to go without it, than, in order to obtain it, to engage in a war which deſtroys all the other branches. It is better to [223] endure a ſlight diſtemper, than to ruin the conſtitution by violent remedies.

A paſſage in the Hiſtory of the Age of Lewis XIV. by Voltaire, is worth quoting. ‘"In Chriſtian monarchies, the people have ſcarce ever any intereſt in the wars carried on by their ſovereigns. Mercenary armies, raiſed by order of a miniſter, and commanded by a general, who blindly obeys that miniſter, make ſeveral ruinous campaigns; while the princes, in whoſe name they fight, neither expect nor intend to poſſeſs themſelves of the patrimony of each other. The nation that conquers, never gains any thing by the ſpoils of the conquered party, yet pays all the expence. In the ſucceſs of their arms they ſuffer as much as when they miſcarry; and peace becomes almoſt as neceſſary after the greateſt victory, as when the enemy are in poſſeſſion of their frontier towns. This is almoſt always true. The exceptions are rare."’

Rouſſeau, in his project for a perpetual peace, confirms my principles; let us liſten to this great writer. ‘"If all princes are not yet cured of the folly of making conqueſts, it ſeems at leaſt, that the wiſeſt of them begin to perceive that they ſometimes coſt more than they are worth. Without entering into diſtinctions that would lead us too far, it may be ſaid in general, that a prince, who to extend his frontier loſes as many of his ancient ſubjects as he gains of new ones, weakens himſelf by increaſing his greatneſs; becauſe, with a greater territory to defend, he has no greater numbers to defend it. But it cannot be unknown that, in the way in which war is conducted at preſent, the leaſt part of the depopulation occaſioned by it, is that which happens immediately in the field. That loſs is indeed the moſt apparent and ſenſible; but the loſs, which the whole ſtate ſuffers at the ſame time, [224] is more grievous and more irreparable than that of the men who periſh; the loſs of thoſe who are not born, the increaſe of taxes, the interruption of commerce, the deſertion from the country, and the abandoning of agriculture. This is an evil not perceived at firſt, but cruelly felt in its conſequences. We then wonder at finding ourſelves ſo weak, with ſuch an apparent addition of ſtrength. What renders conqueſts leſs intereſting is, that we now underſtand by what means power may be doubled and trebled, not only without extending our territory, but, as the Emperor Adrian did very wiſely, ſometimes by contracting it. We know that men alone conſtitute the ſtrength of kings. This propoſition flows from what I have already ſaid, that of two ſtates, containing an equal number of inhabitants, that which occupies the ſmalleſt territory is in reality the ſtronger. It is by good laws, by a wiſe police, and by great oeconomical views, that a judicious prince is ſure of increaſing his ſtrength, without committing any thing to chance. The uſeful eſtabliſhments, which he forms in his own dominions, are the only real conqueſts made over his neighbours; every ſubject he acquires is an enemy deſtroyed."’

The corollary reſulting from theſe obſervations confirms my principles, and comes in aid of my ſyſtem. The devaſtation of Bavaria, in 1743, affected the whole commerce of Europe. The ruin of ſo many provinces in Germany, in the laſt war, will be felt for a conſiderable time. The powers concerned in the commerce with Poland perceive a gradual diminution of their profits from year to year. That kingdom, having nothing but corn to give in exchange for the many commodities ſhe wants, is impoveriſhed; the ſources of her commerce are exhauſted. Theſe ancient Salmatians will become ſo much the more formidable. The poor nations of the north formerly plundered and [225] conquered all Europe, and the maſters of Mexico and Peru have loſt a conſiderable part of their dominions. European nations would be leſs to blame, if, inſtead of tearing one another to pieces, they turned their arms towards Africa. Thoſe barbarous ſtates perpetually inſult us; to civiliſe ſuch barbarians, and to revive in Africa the times of the Carthaginians, of Syphax, and Maſſaniſſa, might be attended with advantage. An object, ſtill more eaſy and leſs unjuſt, would be to turn our views to America, not for acts of hoſtility, but for eſtabliſhments of commerce. In that quarter, the commercial powers have buſineſs enough to employ them for ſome ages. As we advance in making the Americans ſenſual and voluptuous, by means of good treatment, mildneſs, and humanity, their luxury will increaſe, and the commerce of Europe flouriſh in proportion. They would be kept in a ſtate of dependence, and perhaps, in another point of view, made miſerable by their improvement. But man muſt have an object to occupy his ambition. To civiliſe ſavages by ſubduing them, ſeems to be a good mixed with evil; which of the two preponderate, is a problem not eaſily reſolved. Rouſſeau, the poet, tells us that inſtinct conducts the ſavage, while reaſon leads us aſtray.

"La nature, en treſors fertile,
"Lui fait abondamment trouver
"Tout ce qui lui peut être utile,
"Soigneuſe de le conſerver.
"Content du partage modeſte
"Qu'il tient de la bonté céleſte,
"Il vit ſans trouble & ſans ennui;
"Et ſi ſon climat lui refuſe
"Quelques biens dont l'Europe abuſe,
"Ce ne ſont pas des biens pour lui.
[226] "Couché dans un antre ruſtique,
"Du nord il brave la rigueur,
"Et notre luxe Aſiatique
"N'a point énervé ſa vigueur.
"Il ne regrette point la perte
"De ces arts, dont la découverte
"A l'homme a couté tant de foins;
"Et qui, devenus néceſſaires,
"N' ont fait qu' augmenter nos miſeres,
"En multipliant nos beſoins."

We all have theſe verſes by heart, but the heart is not penetrated with the truth of them. It is becauſe the factitious and artificial man is always at variance with man in his original and natural ſtate. We are conſtantly ſtriving to exiſt out of ourſelves, and ſeldom turn our thoughts inwards to reduce ourſelves to our true dimenſions. We depart from what we are, and loſe the knowledge of ourſelves for ever. What happens to an individual, happens to a nation. An European nation thinks that by increaſing her wants, and by eſtabliſhing herſelf at the ſame moment in Aſia, Africa, and America, ſhe multiplies her being, and extends her exiſtence. From thence follow the contradictory concluſions of ſpeculation and experience, of theory and practice. Every thing belonging to man is a contradiction. The biſhop of Cloyne, after enumerating the prodigious quantity of beef, pork, butter, and cheeſe, exported every year from Ireland, aſks, how a ſtranger can conceive that half the inhabitants ſhould die of hunger in ſo plentiful a country. It is one of the contradictions incident to human nature, and not to be otherwiſe accounted for. The tin mines of Cornwall are rich; the county itſelf is poor; becauſe the wealthy merchant, who works the mine, reſides in London, not in the province. Our [227] inconſiderate eagerneſs to be happy prevents us from being ſo. This is a truth, which holds equally with reſpect to individuals, and with reſpect to nations. The powers of Europe would almoſt always find thoſe advantages in the preſervation of peace, which they vainly ſeek for in war.

In our own times we ſee a contradiction ſtill more fatal. Almoſt all the princes, who reign at preſent, are inclined to peace, from motives of wiſdom and humanity; yet, by ſome unhappy fatality, have been often engaged in the moſt deſtructive wars. It is to be wiſhed, that they may not recur ſo frequently hereafter. They who think, ſays Voltaire, that kings and their miniſters ſacrifice every thing to their ambition inceſſantly, and without meaſure, are as much deceived as if they thought that kings and miniſters ſacrificed every thing to the happineſs of mankind. I do not know whether we may flatter ourſelves, that mankind, as they grow older, may one day or other grow wiſer upon ſome ſubjects in which their happineſs and well-being are concerned. The art of war, ſo generally underſtood, is carried to ſuch a point, that almoſt every country is now ſecure from thoſe ſudden invaſions by which kingdoms are overturned. The expences of a campaign are become ſo great, and the advantage to be drawn from ſucceſs ſo inconſiderable, owing to the reſources which the enemy ſtill poſſeſſes, even after a defeat, that the moſt violent ambition is balanced by the counterpoiſe of avarice, or rather by the impoſſibility of ſupporting the continual expences of a war. A monarch, cotemporary with us, and not inferior to Alexander or to Caeſar, has, like them, been obliged to exhauſt all the reſources of military art and labor to preſerve a province, the conqueſt of which, under favor of certain circumſtances, was eaſy to him at firſt. Yet even this ſucceſs is a phenomenon which aſtoniſhes [228] Europe. The expences, to which the Engliſh owe their great ſucceſſes, cannot be mentioned too often. This balance of Europe, purchaſed with the blood of our anceſtors, is now ſo well eſtabliſhed, that we need not for a long time dread a ſuperiority in any one power, ſufficient to diſturb the reſt of Europe. Commerce is become the apple of diſcord; yet, if we reflect, that peace is the element, and war the deſtruction of trade, it is to be hoped, that we ſhall be more circumſpect in departing from the one to engage in the other.

Reaſon and intereſt concur with our increaſing inability to ſupport continued wars. In former times, war was ſupported by annual taxes equal to the expence of it. This at preſent is impoſſible. One time or other it will be felt, that to aggrandiſe a kingdom, or the territory of a kingdom, is not increaſing the power of the prince, which conſiſts in a great number of ſubjects ſubſiſting at their eaſe. Experience ſhows what reſources an enemy may diſcover after the ſevereſt loſſes. It is only beginning again upon a new account. The famine in 1709, and the general ruin of France, ſupplied Lewis XIV. with a fatal reſource, but an uſeful one for the moment. As the country remained uncultivated, the poverty of the people facilitated the levy of recruits, ſo that France brought armies into the field more numerous than her enemies, who were always ſucceſsful. She gained time, and was ſaved by accidents that always happen when we have time to wait for them. But, aſſuredly, no monarch would willingly expoſe himſelf to ſuch a criſis, though it be in the order of events. In our own times we have ſeen more than one ſketch of this picture. In a word, it is poſſible, that the general knowledge which every day enlightens the world, that humanity, experience, and wiſdom, concurring with intereſt and neceſſity, may in time eſtabliſh a ſolid and durable [229] peace in Europe, and ſecure the happineſs of mankind. In this point the wiſhes of every reaſonable and humane perſon ſhould unite. Their wit, their intereſt, and their knowledge, ſhould all be exerted to inſpire others with the ſame ſentiments, and to eſtabliſh the ſame ſyſtem.

There is ſtill ſomething to be ſaid in favor of the Engliſh, whom, according to this ſyſtem, I may be accuſed of depreſſing too much. No, Sir, I am a citizen of the world; not cold and indifferent, but zealous, and humane. I love all nations, becauſe in all nations there are men who deſerve to be beloved, and they all belong to human kind. I behold every national enmity with horror, becauſe nothing is ſo unjuſt. I am pleading the cauſe of humanity. I affirm, that the Engliſh nation, now at the height of their glory, (if, by a wiſe adminiſtration, they make a proper uſe of it) have need of great precautions to guard their independence. It is not ſurpriſing that they ſhould be jealous of advantages, which we all agree are precarious. France, by her extent, the number of her inhabitants, the goodneſs of her ſoil, the frugality and induſtry of her people, and by her ſituation, muſt always be a powerful kingdom, even without an extenſive commerce, or without colonies. Her vaſt, compact dominion, and her double frontiers, are a ſecurity againſt a ſudden invaſion. But England, by her phyſical poſition, having nothing to depend upon but her wooden walls, and the ſuperiority of her commerce, ſhould endeavour to preſerve an advantage, in point of marine, over a power which, in every other article, carries it againſt her. The Engliſh are not alarmed without reaſon; their fears are not quite imaginary; and here lies the fatal point which alone can diſturb that fortunate harmony and proportion, which I wiſh to eſtabliſh for the happineſs of Europe, of human nature, and of two nations the moſt [230] powerful in the univerſe, and the moſt deſerving of eſteem. To find this juſt combination, to unfold this ill-digeſted maſs of propoſitions, which I ſet forth with confidence, even in their preſent ſhapeleſs ſtate, is a taſk, in which every honeſt man is invited to aſſiſt.

There are Engliſhmen who pretend to ſay, that, if it had not been for the preparations made in France in 1751 and 1752, and for the augmentation of the French marine, war would not have been declared, and that the differences in Aſia and America would have been amicably adjuſted; that they had every reaſon to dread their own deſtruction, if they had waited until the French marine had arrived at a ſtate of conſiſtency; that their ſecurity and preſervation obliged them to prevent it. I ſhall not examine into the validity of this reaſoning; but no good citizen can conſider the conſequences of it, without ſeeing how much it concerns humanity to obviate them for the future. France has an equal right to maintain a reſpectable marine for the defence of her colonies. The poſſeſſion of them is precarious without it. France however ſeems to have no other occaſion for a marine but to preſerve an important acceſſory; whereas it is eſſential to the exiſtence of England. Since all the powers of Europe aſpire to the advantages of commerce, I conjure them to conſider how much the long peace, which ſucceeded the war occaſioned by the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, was beneficial to them all, and how prejudicial war has been to population, and to various branches of commerce, even in that nation, whoſe aſtoniſhing ſucceſſes have diſcovered to her the ſecret of her ſtrength. If prodigious ſucceſſes are ſcarce ſufficient to compenſate the miſchief done by war, why ſhould we ſo often run the riſque of it? Of the three ſcourges to which nature has expoſed us, war is the only one that providence has left in our own hands, and it recurs the [231] ofteneſt. What would become of us, if we were at liberty to introduce peſtilence and famine?

‘"But," ſay the Engliſh, if a neighbouring power, whoſe coaſts we cannot remove, which has double the number of inhabitants, thrice the extent, and greater reſources than we have, ſhould poſſeſs a marine ſuperior or even equal to ours, we ſhould be expoſed to the imminent danger of invaſion and conqueſt. It is not a commercial jealouſy, but a reaſonable apprehenſion of her ſuperior ſtrength, that makes us active.—France would have preſerved her colonies, if ſhe had not been afraid of loſing them."’ How far France may carry her marine for the protection of her colonies, without alarming a neighbour always anxious for the ſecurity of her coaſt and of her commerce, is a queſtion I am not qualified to decide; ‘Non noſtrum inter vos tantas componere lites.’ But I am perſuaded that, if friendſhip and confidence could be eſtabliſhed upon the foundation of mutual intereſt and convenience well underſtood, and demonſtrated in conformity to my principles, it would not be impoſſible to find the point in queſtion, yet without fixing any poſitive and determinate rule about it. It cannot be denied, that a formidable marine is neceſſary to a great iſland, which has no other defence but her fleet againſt an invaſion; that it is neceſſary for the defence of colonies, and diſtant poſſeſſions, and even to ſucceed in the expenſive conqueſt of the diſtant colonies of other powers, who have a weak or inferior marine. It is in this ſenſe only, that they, who are maſters at ſea, can now be ſaid to be maſters at land; and that ‘The trident is the ſceptre of the world.’ [232] Whoever examines this propoſition ſhould attend to the reſtrictions annexed to it.

Since each ſtate is diſtinguiſhed from every other by local ſituation, extent, climate, ſoil, religion, external relations, and by the nature of its government, it follows, that each ſtate muſt have a different political conſtitution. The marine of the Athenians, Carthaginians, and Romans, (abſtracted from commerce, which was then in its infancy) and conſidered only as conſtituting the naval power of the ſtate, was of a different nature from ours. At that time the rival fleets always ſought an engagement; at preſent they frequently endeavour to avoid one. 6 At Salamis, Plataea, and Actium, the ſea ſeemed to be boarded over, and immoveable under their galleys. They inevitably approached by means of their oars, ruſhed together with a ſhock, and deſtroyed each other with fire and ſword. Victory made the conqueror maſter both of ſea and land. A battle or two at land had the ſame effect. At preſent every frontier is bordered with fortreſſes. The conqueror is obliged to ſtop at every ſtep he takes. Turenne, Condé, Marlborough, Villars, Eugene, and Marſhal Saxe, have gained more victories than Alexander and Caeſar; yet the conqueſts of our modern heroes bear no proportion to thoſe of the ancient. If the cauſes of theſe great and aſtoniſhing changes be thoroughly examined, diverſity of circumſtances will ſhow us the neceſſity of departing from ſome of our political maxims, that ſeem the moſt fundamental. When the means are no longer proportioned to the [233] effect they ought to produce, they ſhould be improved, corrected, or abandoned.

To judge how little a maritime force in Europe contributes to conqueſts upon terra firma, let us obſerve the ſucceſs of our great armaments in the laſt ages. Setting aſide the invincible armada of Philip II. let us come nearer to our own times. Have the powerful and numerous fleets of England, France, and Holland, ever produced an effect proportioned to their ſtrength, or to the enormous expence of equipping them? Have not the Engliſh, in the laſt war, miſcarried on the coaſts of France? Was Lewis XIV. with a formidable marine, even able to conquer Ireland, where king James had a party that favored his deſigns? Formerly the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, with inferior forces, conquered England. If the time, foretold by the prophet, of a new heaven and a new earth, be not yet arrived, we muſt agree that the form at leaſt is altered in every thing that regards the military. In this inſtance we have a new world, widely different from the ancient. The invention of gunpowder, the art of engineering, the ſtudies of Vauban and Coehorn, the ſcience of marches brought to perfection by Turenne, by Condé, and Montecuculi, have prolonged and multiplied the reſources of defence. Experience proves that the great actions performed by Ruiter, Du Queſne, and Blake, were fitter to excite admiration, than to procure any ſolid advantages. It is in the diſtant conqueſts of iſlands and colonies that the Engliſh have diſtinguiſhed themſelves, and met with prodigious ſucceſs. General engagements at ſea are almoſt entirely given up; boarding is out of the queſtion; and I much doubt whether, in France at leaſt, the advantages to be expected from great naval armaments are in any degree anſwerable to the enormous expence of them. I do not mean that the marine ſhould be entirely neglected; I only wiſh that the [234] degree, to which it may be uſeful or neceſſary, as well as the time and means of forming it, were carefully conſidered. I wiſh that a compariſon were made between real and imaginary loſſes, between what is ſaved by the marine, and what it coſts; that it ſhould be calculated what naval force is neceſſary to a power, which, in time of peace, maintains two hundred thouſand men; whether the maintenance of a marine, equally formidable, may not ſafely be diſpenſed with, and whether the immenſe expences of this ſervice might not be employed to greater advantage in other branches of adminiſtration; and that the eſſential diſtinction between this nation, and thoſe which are called maritime powers, ſhould be thoroughly underſtood, in order that the apprehenſion of future danger may not expoſe to immediate diſaſters. I know that I am attacking a received principle, an univerſal prejudice; and yet I wiſh that, once for all, it might be ſeriouſly enquired, whether the kingdom of France might not find a ſource of riches more ſolid, and leſs precarious, within her own boſom, in her ſoil, in her entrails, and in the labor and increaſe of her inhabitants, than thoſe which are ſought after at a diſtance, with ſo much toil, danger, and expence; and whether too great a navigation, as well as too many colonies upon diſtant continents, be not contrary to the conſtitution, and injurious to a country, in which there are already ſo many cauſes of depopulation, ſo much luxury, and ſo many perſons in a ſtate of celibacy. Every ſort of commerce is not equally fit for every country. One branch of commerce may enrich individuals, and be prejudicial to the ſtate; or it may ſuit one nation, and be dangerous for another.

The moſt brilliant branch of commerce frequently coſts more blood and treaſure to preſerve it by a war, than it pays for by its returns during the ceſſation of arms. Peace, unhappily, is in general only the interval in which open hoſtilities ſubſide, in [235] order to begin again with greater vigor. Every age has its ſyſtem of politics, as well as philoſophy. The new diſcoveries in Aſia and America ſucceeded to the cruſades; then came the wars of religion; and afterwards the pretended ſyſtem of equilibrium, or balance of power. For ſome time paſt, nothing has been thought of but commerce, navigation, and marine. The moſt diſtinguiſhed ſucceſſes of Lewis XIV. happened before the great marine was formed. It never can be eſtabliſhed but at the expence of the land forces; ſo true it is, that we cannot ſerve two maſters at a time. The progreſs which a collection of fiſhermen have made, by means of commerce and their India company, has dazzled Europe, and turned the eyes of every body towards trade. But let it be conſidered that circumſtances are very different from what they were; the ſituation of this people in a country overflowed by the ſea, the neceſſity of making ſome advantage of an element which threatens them inceſſantly, the impoſſibility of doing better, and their laborious oeconomy, have enriched them in a commerce which was a long time excluſive. But things have greatly altered ſince other nations have ſhared in the profits; the maſs of wealth has loſt in depth what it has gained in ſurface.

France, within her own boſom, has a lucrative and ſuperior commerce, which nothing can affect, as long as the price of labor is lower than in any other nation. The taſte and frugality of her artiſans is an inexhauſtible ſource for the conception of new manufactures, the contrivance of precious trifles, ſtudied conveniences, and faſhions of every ſort. All Europe is fond of French faſhions; and Faſhion, that fickle daughter of Levity and Caprice, governs and exacts a tribute from all other nations, while ſhe ſubmits to the dominion of France. The vineyards are a real Peru to that country. The cod fiſhery is an important [236] object, not ſo much as a nurſery for ſeamen, as becauſe it is itſelf a nutritive art. But, in ſuch a country as France, agriculture and manufactures ſhould be the firſt ſpring in a wiſe adminiſtration.

One cannot pay too great an attention to a truth which I have heretofore ſo often endeavoured to inculcate, viz. that one, and perhaps the principal cauſe of the increaſed greatneſs of the Engliſh power, is the care they have taken to forward the cultivation of their lands. Corn has been a new mine, to which government, in the firſt inſtance, ſacrificed ſome fallacious duties. The bounty upon exportation has been the ſupport of agriculture. By giving money to the farmer to export his corn, all the ſoil has been brought into improvement; and this has ſupported the power of the nation. If half the treaſure, which a ſtate is often obliged to laviſh upon her marine, or in a war that might be deferred, were employed upon this object, it would, in ten years, produce wherewithal to form and maintain a marine upon ſolid principles. Upon the whole, I conclude that commercial powers would do infinitely better to leave the deciſion of their differences, whenever differences unfortunately ariſe, to the event of a ſort of lottery, than to the fate of arms. War, at all times dreadful, in general offers us nothing but a fatal alternative between humiliating misfortunes and expenſive ſucceſſes. It was no exaggeration to affirm, that all the vices of every age, and every country, do not equal the evils produced by a ſingle campaign; and that war is a crime, which includes all other crimes. It is a deſtructive madneſs, which makes the earth the habitation of robbers, one vaſt and horrible ſepulchre.

The conſequences to be drawn from all theſe vague reflections and principles might perhaps lead us to diſcover the middle term, at which the marine of one nation may be conſiderable [237] enough to defend her commerce and her colonies, yet without giving umbrage to another. Preſervation and defence do not require ſo powerful an effort. When once we baniſh the idea of hoſtile projects, great expence and labor may be ſpared on both ſides, yet without departing from their reciprocal proportion. An intimate alliance with the commercial powers, a ſolemn and mutual guarantee of colonies, poſſeſſions, and commercial privileges, founded upon common intereſt and the general good, might eſtabliſh confidence, and erect a new ſyſtem, which would be the happineſs of mankind, and the glory of the age. Theſe powers acting always in concert, and with good faith to each other, might contribute to appeaſe, or prevent a rupture among the reſt. Twenty years peace would be ſufficient to make every nation happy.

When the preſent picture of Europe ſhall be well underſtood, every power may find its preſervation and proſperity therein, provided they do not thwart each other for imaginary intereſts. Every commercial power has employment for at leaſt twenty years, to re-eſtabliſh and improve its internal adminiſtration, and that commerce which lies within the ſphere of its ſtrength. Until all theſe objects are accompliſhed, and every poſſible advantage made of them, diſtant objects, which by their extent go beyond the ſphere of ſtrength, are foreign and hurtful to commerce, and to the real intereſt of nations; this is a truth demonſtrated by the event of almoſt all our wars. We ſhould never engage in hoſtilities, if attention were paid to ſo many important objects, which cannot be thought of but in a profound and continued peace. I ſhall mark briefly what theſe objects are, as a ſhort recapitulation of the whole.

It is only in peace that a good adminiſtration can protect the provinces waſted to ſupport the opulence of the capital. The [238] more the head enlarges, beyond its proportion with the limbs, ſo much the more does the body politic repreſent the infancy of the natural body, and the feebleneſs of that age.

Agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, may reſtore a proportion, now loſt, between the head and the limbs. They, who reproach Colbert with having protected manufactures too much, did not attend to the turn of the age. Since luxury is become a neceſſary or unavoidable evil, every poſſible advantage muſt be made of it. We muſt weigh and conſider circumſtances as they exiſt, without regarding poſſible ſuppoſitions. It is agreed, that manufactures are of a tranſitory precarious nature, and liable to be removed by any trifling event. For this reaſon, in my political picture, I give them but the ſecond rank after agriculture, which holds the firſt in the oeconomical order of the ſtate. It is not of a periſhable quality, ſince it furniſhes the firſt materials, and belongs to nature, and to the ſoil. But arts and trades follow cloſe upon agriculture. We may, if we pleaſe, conſider manufactures as the remedy of an evil; but the evil exiſts, and would be mortal without the remedy. External commerce with our neighbours ſucceeds to manufactures; and next to this follows the eccentric or diſtant commerce of colonies, which is only neceſſary when a too great abundance of people, and a ſuperfluity of productions, require an outlet, and when they bring back a plentiful return, which may be exported to foreigners, and procure a new ſource of fertility to the ſtate. All the unneceſſary wars, undertaken for this diſtant object, have been made at the expence of objects more important, more immediately urgent, more uſeful, neceſſary, and eaſy, and which nothing but a continued peace could bring to perfection. When France and England ſhall have brought all their ſoil into improvement, when all their provinces ſhall have arrived at the [239] higheſt degree of population that their territory allows of, when a circulation and political proportion ſhall be eſtabliſhed between the capital and the provinces, when the theory of taxation ſhall have fixed an exact equilibrium between the ſervices and the means, when manufactures ſhall have found every poſſible internal and external channel of ſupplying the nation, the foreigner, and the colonies which theſe two nations poſſeſs at preſent—when all theſe objects are accompliſhed, that will be the period, at which it may become a queſtion—Whether new pretenſions can be advantageous to either of them? But to arrive at this point, would require a peace of fifty years continuance at leaſt. Nothing appears to me more evident than theſe principles. They reſt upon proofs, which I defy any man to invalidate. Enough has been ſaid for thoſe who are willing to underſtand me; too much perhaps for thoſe who are determined never to adopt ſuch a ſyſtem. It cannot however be condemned, ſince every part of it breathes humanity and the public welfare. 118

I have the honor to be Your's, &c.

[240][241][242][243][244][245][246][247]
THE END.

Appendix A ERRATA.

[]
Page 9,line 17, for draws read draw.
27,laſt line but one, for Ragnal read Reſnel.
211,line 16, for galloons read galleons.
[]
[...]
Notes
*

An Eſſay on the Conſtitution of England, publiſhed in the year 1765.—The author ſays, that the very obſtructions and difficulties, which King William met with in obtaining ſupplies from parliament, were the means of raiſing the nation to a degree of glory unknown to former ages. He explains this aſſertion by obſerving, ‘"that before the reign of King William no method was known of raiſing money for the exigencies of the year, except that of levying equivalent taxes or impoſitions; which, when great, as muſt neceſſarily happen in times of war, were much felt and complained of by the people in general, without any part of them being gainers by the public loſs; ſo that, although a foreign war was often made a pretence by former kings and miniſters in order to obtain a ſum of money, there was nothing in reality they more dreaded. But now a method was happily deviſed of abundantly ſupplying the crown without burthening the people, by means of voluntary contributions of thoſe who were eager to contribute any ſums of money, in conſideration of ſeven or eight per cent. while the good people of England were kept eaſy, by having no more taxes impoſed on them than were barely ſufficient to pay the annual intereſt of the ſums ſo advanced.’

‘"As this method was tried at firſt with caution, both by thoſe who borrowed and thoſe who lent the money, the good effects of it were little felt during the reign of King William; who lived to the laſt in a factious and tottering ſtate; but from the firſt diſcovery of this ſcheme of anticipation we may date that great change in the conſtitution, which has brought Great-Britain to that height of power, to which it is ſince arrived. From that moment the ability of England for carrying on foreign war began to manifeſt itſelf, firſt in unprofitable ſquabbles about what is called the Balance of Europe; but afterwards in uſeful conqueſts on her own account in all quarters of the globe. From that moment the conſtitution of England began to be actuated by a ſpirit ſomewhat ſimilar to that which actuated the conſtitution of ancient Rome, where a foreign war never failed to ſtop the mouths of the ſeditious, and to put an end to domeſtic broils. War in England became advantageous to almoſt every rank of men. The poor wiſhed for it, as the greater demand for laborers increaſed the price of labor. The rich wiſhed for it, as the greater the demand for money, the greater the advantage to thoſe who were poſſeſſed of it; while thoſe in the adminiſtration of government were eaſily perſuaded into a meaſure, which, with ſuch univerſal approbation, puts ſuch unlimited power into their hands. With the debt of the nation ſo grew in proportion its credit."’

There is much truth in theſe arguments; yet, in the deduction of conſequences, a lively imagination may be miſled by them. In my Treatiſe on the National Debt, the ſame arguments are employed, but with greater moderation.

*

The annuities in England are of a different nature from thoſe in France, though under the ſame denomination. Thoſe of France are extinguiſhed in a few years by a reimburſement of part of the principal, which every year accompanies the payment of the intereſt; whereas, in thoſe of England, nothing is provided for but the intereſt: the reimburſement of the debt depends upon the pleaſure of government: the principal can never be demanded. On the other hand, the intereſt can never be reduced without offering to repay the principal. For this reaſon, in the late loans, the lenders, at the beginning of the war, demanded of government an intereſt of three and a half per cent. for a certain number of years: that is, that government ſhould not offer to repay the principal before a ſtipulated term; at the end of which thoſe annuities ſhould ſtand reduced to three per cent. and government be at liberty to diſcharge them. It is proper to obſerve that all the annuities, created before the laſt war, were reduced, in the year 1750, to three per cent. an offer being made to pay off thoſe who refuſed to conſent to the reduction; and that there are no annuities at three and a half and four per cent. but the loans made ſince the year 1755, and theſe only for a certain number of years. Let us admire the effect of credit. The lenders make it part of their bargain not to be paid off for a long time; they inſiſt upon having time to enjoy an intereſt of three and a half and four per cent. which they think might be redeemed by the ſtate, and conſequently be reduced in time of peace. It muſt alſo be obſerved that, although annuities are not actions, the whole commerce, carried on in the funds, paſſes under the general name of Stockjobbing, or Jeu d' Actions. 1 —Author.

1.

On this note of the author it is to be obſerved, that in Queen Anne's time various duties were granted by different acts of parliament, for eſtabliſhing funds to pay off the principal and intereſt of particular loans within a given number of years. Since the produce of all theſe ſeparate funds was united by the Aggregate Act, they became mutual ſecurities for each other; and the ſurplus upon the whole, after paying the annuities charged upon each diſtinct fund, is carried to the ſinking fund, which, being benefited by all ſurpluſes, ſtands as a collateral ſecurity for all deficiencies. But although it has been found convenient to depart from the old mode of aſſigning ſeparate ſecurities for ſeparate loans, and applying the ſurplus of each fund to the diſcharge of the principal, it is equally the miniſter's duty to take care that the tax or fund, appropriated to pay the intereſt of every new loan, ſhall produce a ſurplus in ſome degree proportioned to the maſs of new debt contracted, and which may be carried to the improvement of the ſinking fund. As long as this principle is, or can be, firmly adhered to in practice, public credit will ſupport itſelf, notwithſtanding the increaſed maſs of the debt; becauſe the creditor will ſee that the neceſſity of borrowing does not exceed the means of repaying; at leaſt, that the two objects are equally in the contemplation of parliament. On the contrary, the ſureſt way to deſtroy public credit is to depart from this principle; that is, to aſſign funds whoſe produce falls ſhort of the charge they are intended to ſupport; in conſequence of which the ſinking fund not only receives no improvement, but is obliged to make good a deficiency. This fund is given as a ſecurity to the preſent creditor. A new creditor has no right to be benefited by it, unleſs the fund, created with the loan, produces a ſurplus that ſhall bear the ſame proportion to the new debt, which the preſent ſinking fund does to the preſent debt. Credit depends upon opinion; and what is ſo likely to lower the general opinion of the good faith or means of government, as to ſee that taxes do not produce what they are given for? and that conſequently a ſecurity, which was ſuppoſed to be conſined to a certain quantum of debt, is, in effect, from year to year extended, to make good new engagements? The former creditor in the firſt inſtance ſuffers an injuſtice, of which government in its turn will ſoon feel the bad effect.

The ſtate of public credit is much altered ſince the year 1733, when the public creditor dreaded nothing more than to be obliged to receive his money from the ſinking fund. At that period the moneyed men and public companies were under a kind of ſubjection to government.

But the author is miſtaken in ſuppoſing, that the bargain made by the lender, in ſome of the late loans at three and a half and four per cent. not to be paid off within a certain number of years, was an admirable effect of credit. It was the increaſe of intereſt that induced the creditor to inſiſt upon this unreaſonable condition; and it was in ſome meaſure the failure of credit, ariſing from the enormous expences of the war, that obliged government to comply with it. The author does not ſeem to be aware, that there are various degrees of public credit between that ſtate, at which government ſecurities are at or above par, and the impoſſibility of borrowing on any terms whatſoever. A man who can borrow a hundred pounds at three per cent. has undoubtedly a better credit than he who cannot borrow under four, although they equally contract a debt of one hundred pounds.

Beſides the increaſe of intereſt from three to three and a half and four per cent government was obliged to give conſiderable douceurs to the ſubſcribers to every new loan in the courſe of the laſt war. By theſe means the nominal rate of intereſt was kept down; but, if the value of theſe douceurs were computed, it would appear, perhaps, that government in many caſes gave an advantage to the lender, equal to five or ſix per cent. upon the money borrowed.—Tranſlator.

2.
Silver is not only the common meaſure of commerce, but alſo a depoſit. The ſanction of government might make other things, ſuch as paper, parchment, or leather, a common meaſure; but it could never make them an adequate depoſit.—Tranſlator.
Take the following example:—Paul, on Monday morning, pays a crown to his baker; the baker buys a crown's worth of faggots; the ſeller pays a crown which he owed at the tavern; the tavern-keeper gives it to his wife, who buys a fan; the fan-maker pays for ſomething elſe with the ſame crown; and it is poſſible that at night it may return to Paul, who wins it at Quinze, and ſo on. 3—A perſon of rank, who is well informed, has furniſhed me with a fact, by which this principle is practically confirmed. During the ſiege of Tournay, in the year 1745 and ſome time before it, all communication being cut off, they were in great diſtreſs about paying the garriſon, for want of ſpecie. At laſt it was reſolved to borrow 7000 florins from the ſuttlers, which was all they had. At the end of the week theſe 7000 florins had returned to the ſuttlers, from whom the ſame ſum was borrowed a ſecond time: this operation was repeated for ſeven weeks, until the ſurrender of the place; ſo that the ſame 7000 florins performed the office of 49,000.—Author.
3.
This example proves nothing in favour of circulation. The operation would have been more ſimple, and equally effectual, if the ſuttlers, inſtead of lending the ſame ſum every week ſucceſſively, had given a continued credit to the garriſon for every article they were ſupplied with during the ſeven weeks ſiege: but in this caſe the accounts between the pay-maſter and the army could not have been regularly kept; the garriſon could not have been regularly paid; and, what is more material, the ſoldier would have been deprived of the apparent liberty of laying out his money with the ſuttler, or not, as he thought proper. So powerful is the effect of habit, that all our ideas of value refer to the ſigns of it. In tranſactions of property, the mind is not thoroughly ſatisfied, without the real or ſuppoſed intervention of money, even where it prolongs the operation without altering the ultimate effect.—Tranſlator.
4.
It is ſaid that Sir Samuel Fludyer, who was factor to moſt of the great clothiers, uſed to ſend them their balance in his own notes inſtead of money, which circulated in Glouceſterſhire, and the parts adjacent, for two, three, or four years, without returning to him to be liquidated in bank bills or ſpecie.—Tranſlator.
5.
By the word Numerary the author means the fictitious value of ſtocks, effects, and property of every kind, ſuppoſed to be reduced into ſpecie. As long as this reduction is performed partially and ſucceſſively, the numerary has a real value equivalent to ſpecie. An attempt to realiſe the whole at once would reduce its value to nothing.—Tranſlator.
*
Remarks upon the Advantages and Diſadvantages of Great Britain and France.
6.
It is true, that immediately the Bank of England has no other connexion with the national debt, than that which a great creditor has with his debtor; and yet it may be queſtioned, whether the failure of the Bank would not be almoſt as fatal in its conſequences as a general bankruptcy; or whether either of thoſe events would not neceſſarily produce the other: if it were poſſible to ſeparate, and indiſpenſably neceſſary to chooſe between them, the great queſtion would not turn upon the quantity of fictitious property, that would be annihilated in either caſe, or on the number of individuals ruined; but whether it would be ſafer to annihilate the active, or the inactive, maſs of property. It is the credit of the Bank, that in a great meaſure gives circulation to the funds. But theſe are dangerous or uſeleſs ſpeculations: a wiſe man will not ſuppoſe a caſe, againſt which no human wiſdom can provide a remedy. That the Bank unites within itſelf the whole credit of individuals, is not ſo unwarrantable a propoſition as the author ſeems to apprehend: he is not, perhaps, acquainted with the detail of expedients by which mercantile credit has for a long time been ſupported in this country. The profits of the Bank, by diſcounting private notes, muſt be immenſe. A merchant or tradeſman, whoſe notes they refuſe, is not very far from bankruptcy: their honor and juſtice in the application of this formidable power has never been queſtioned. Whenever they have thought it neceſſary to lay any general check upon diſcounting, it has always been attended with a proportionate ſtagnation of trade and private credit.—Tranſlator.
7.
Theſe ideas of the author, with reſpect to public credit, do not appear to me ſtrictly correct. The ſtate of credit is not to be meaſured by the ſums that may be borrowed, but by the terms on which they may be borrowed. A great nation can hardly be reduced to ſuch a ſtate of diſcredit, as not to be able to raiſe money by offering exorbitant advantages. In this caſe the lender proportions his terms to the apparent weakneſs of the ſecurity or diſtreſs of the borrower. When France was already overwhelmed with debt, and every poſſible reſource of finance ſeemed to be exhauſted, Lewis XIV. ſtill found means to raiſe eight millions of livres in ſpecie, for which he was obliged to charge his revenue with a debt of thirty-two millions. Between borrowing on ſuch terms, and not being able to borrow at all, the difference is not very conſiderable. A new loan in England naturally tends to lower the value or price of the old funds, for two reaſons. Firſt, the general increaſe of the maſs leſſens the general value of the commodity. Secondly, the advantageous terms offered by government draws into the new ſubſcription that money, which would have been inveſted in the old funds. The author's ſuppoſition, that the proprietors of the old funds would find their account in ſelling out, in order to purchaſe into the new ſubſcription, does not operate, I believe, ſo generally as he apprehends. The terms of every new ſubſcription are regulated by the current price of the three per cents. If, for example, the three per cents. are at ſeventy-five, government muſt give four per cent. to be upon a par with the old ſtocks. But a mere equality will not tempt any man to alter the ſituation of his property. A conſiderable douceur muſt be added, not only ſufficient to indemnify the lender againſt a fall in the price of his ſtock, which he propoſes to ſell, but to reward him for the riſque he runs of not being able to diſpoſe of his ſhare in the new ſubſcription to advantage. Now this is all matter of ſpeculation, in which either the advantage is not clear and certain, conſequently not likely to tempt the holder of the three per cents. to ſell at a low price; or, if it be clear and certain, it will of courſe draw all the money in the market immediately into the new ſubſcription. Admitting it then to be advantageous to the holder of the three per cent. annuities to ſell out, and ſubſcribe to the new loan, where is he to find a purchaſer? The moneyed man knows his intereſt too well to place himſelf in a ſituation which the other thinks it adviſeable to quit. It is he, on the contrary, who will ſubſcribe to the new loan, and inveſt his money at once in that fund which offers him the greateſt advantage. To ſay that he will be tempted by the low price of the three per cents. to veſt his money in the old funds, is a bad argument; becauſe, if thoſe ſtocks are very low, the holder of them will get nothing by changing the ſituation of his property, conſequently will not ſell. Money once veſted in the funds, is conſidered in ſome meaſure as locked up till the end of the war. For this reaſon people, who underſtand making the moſt of their money, employ it in the purchaſe of navy and victualling bills, (which muſt be paid off at par from time to time, and are therefore ſeldom at any great diſcount) or in India bonds. By this means they have their money ready to take advantage of the neceſſities of government. Upon the whole, it ſeems at leaſt very queſtionable, whether the chief or any conſiderable part of the new ſubſcription is filled by the ſale of the old annuities. Active and intelligent men, conſtantly attending upon the ſpot, may perhaps find their advantage in ſelling old ſtock to make good their ſubſcriptions. Dealing in large ſums, and calculating every minute profit, ſuch as that of paying by inſtallments, the riſe of lottery tickets, &c. they may undoubtedly turn their practice to account. But advantages of this ſort, I conceive, muſt neceſſarily be confined to the adepts, who cannot be very numerous.—Tranſlator.
8.
It is true that the faith of parliament to the public creditor has never yet been violated in the minuteſt inſtance, and that government has borrowed ſums that exceeded the moſt ſanguine ideas of the reſources of the nation. But it is not ſo true that the credit of the nation has never been ſhaken, nor that an intereſt of half per cent. more or leſs made all the difference. We have ſeen our funds at forty per cent. diſcount. The neceſſities of government in this country, as well as every other, have obliged the miniſter to ſubmit to whatever conditions the moneyed men thought proper to impoſe. When theſe conditions were the moſt favorable to government, the douceurs amounted to as much as the increaſe of intereſt. If in fact the reſources of England have never been exhauſted, it may yet be prudent to remember that, at the end of the ſeſſion, 1765, above two years after the laſt peace, Mr. Grenville was obliged to leave an unfunded debt of four millions; a conſiderable part of which was a charge upon the ſinking fund.—Tranſlator.
9.
The author's idea, that it is impoſſible for the Bank to go to the bottom, is totally groundleſs. He admits, that the Bank is no more than a rich individual in the ſtate. Now a corporation, or a private banker, may be ruined by exactly the ſame means, viz. by extending their credit beyond their faculties. The firſt alarm or ſuſpicion brings all their notes upon them at once; and whether they refuſe payment, or delay it by tricks and contrivances, they are equally bankrupts; their note is not paid on demand. The diſtreſs of the Bank in 1745 is not capable of exaggeration. Their notes were at diſcount; they were obliged to pay in ſilver; their clerks induſtriouſly made miſtakes in counting, in order to gain time. Yet all theſe expedients would have ſignified nothing, if a number of private perſons had not agreed to take their notes in payment. This ſpirited patriotic aſſociation ſaved the Bank.—Tranſlator.
10.
Theſe companies are incorporated by charter and act of parliament, therefore called Corporations.—Tranſlator.
11.
The principal debt is not demandable; that is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, it is in the breaſt of parliament to pay off the public creditor at ſuch periods, and in ſuch proportions, as they think proper, either at par, or on terms voluntarily agreed to by the creditor. Still however the faith of parliament is engaged to apply the ſinking fund as far as poſſible to the diminution of the debt. The creditor has a right to conſider that fund as the ſource, out of which the principal is to be gradually diſcharged. To divert it to other purpoſes, is in no ſmall degree a breach of parliamentary faith, excepting in thoſe caſes of neceſſity, in which extraordinary ſervices may require extraordinary ſupplies. The author's idea, that the ſtate is bound by no obligation to its creditors, but for the punctual payment of the intereſt, or, in other words, that the debt is only a perpetual annuity, will never be adopted by a wiſe or honeſt miniſter. At the original formation of the ſinking fund, it was declared by the legiſlature to be appropriated to the diſcharge of debts contracted before December, 1716; and the proof that it has been always conſidered as a ſecurity for the principal debt is, that whenever it has been miſapplied, ſtocks have conſtantly fallen.—Tranſlator.
*
A quotation from the Bilan general de L'Angleterre.
When the author of the Bilan treats theſe pretended book-keepers as bad citizens, he forgets the text of the Goſpel which ſays, that, Where your treaſure is, there will your heart be alſo. A treaſure of more than a hundred millions attaches many hearts to a country, and ſo much the more as all this money would vaniſh into ſmoke, if the ſtate were overturned. This cannot happen to landed property; the ſoil cannot be annihilated. An intereſt in the public funds is therefore more likely to maintain a ſort of patriotiſm, than to extinguiſh it; it attaches even ſtrangers to a country where they have a great ſtake. How much more ſtrongly muſt it attach the natives, whoſe private intereſt is ſo intimately connected with the public cauſe! This claſs of people then muſt of neceſſity be very numerous, very rich, and powerful; and no way reſembles the picture drawn of it by the author of the Bilan.—Author.
12.
There was no year of the late war, in which any conſiderable ſum, much leſs twelve millions, could be borrowed at four per cent. or a little more. In the great loans negotiated in the latter years of the war, government was obliged to allow an advantage to the ſubſcribers, equal in many caſes to five and ſix per cent. and perhaps more; that is, computing the value of the life annuities, long annuities, profits on lottery tickets, paying by inſtallments, and other douceurs. As long as ſuch enormous ſums were to be raiſed, it was impoſſible for government to make a thrifty bargain. Perhaps it would have been better oeconomy to have raiſed the rate of intereſt at once to ſix per cent. upon annuities redeemable by parliament, than to have had recourſe to long or life annuities in any ſhape.—Tranſlator.
*
I ſay almoſt, becauſe, in the national debt, there are ſtill ſome fragments of life annuities, tallies, and other annuities, upon the plan of thoſe in France, which were created in the reign of King William and Queen Anne. But as all this amounts only to a ſmall ſum, and forms a very inconſiderable part of the national debt, it deſerves no particular attention, and ſeldom enters into the traffic of the ſtocks. As theſe old debts are gradually extinguiſhed, the intereſt goes to the increaſe of the ſinking fund.—Author.
13.
That is at par, or on terms voluntarily accepted by the proprietor. The condition, which for the ſake of the public ſhould, if poſſible, be obtained in all loans, viz. that they ſhall be redeemable at the pleaſure of parliament, gives a ſignal advantage to the debtor over the creditor. If there be a plenty of money, parliament can either pay you off, or reduce your intereſt, ad libitum; whereas, though money be ever ſo ſcarce, when conſequently the creditor might employ it to infinitely greater advantage than in the funds, he cannot call in his capital. In conſidering the increaſed maſs and preſent ſtate of the funds, it is not likely that the intereſt they bear can ever be reduced below three per cent. nor, perhaps, for the public good, is ſuch an operation very deſireable, unleſs the nation were immediately relieved from a proportionate quantity of taxes, or unleſs we could be aſſured that parliament would religiouſly apply the ſavings to the diſcharge of public debt; otherwiſe, as Doctor Price obſerves, reductions of intereſt only furniſh with more money for ſupplying the defieiencies ariſing from bad management, and facilitate the means of running into debt.—Tranſlator.
*
It is evident then, that in the year 1761, there muſt have beeen many people in England, who had enriched themſelves by the expenditure made by government of the twelve millions borrowed in 1760, and who in return were able to lend money to the ſame government by whom they were enriched; and this is actually the caſe. They lend back the ſame money they received, and the creditors of the preceding year acquire a new fund of credit, under the protection of which they procure freſh ſupplies of money, (either from foreigners or their own countrymen) which they again engage in the new ſubſcriptions. This proves, Firſt, the augmentation of the numerary wealth by loans. Secondly, that the new loans are almoſt always made with the ſame money. Thirdly, that the old loans favor the new ones; and, Fourthly, that they have enriched the nation.—Author.
14.
In anſwer to this queſtion it may ſafely be affirmed, that the money lent to government for the ſupport of wars deſtructive of agriculture, commerce, and population, might have been in a great meaſure abſorbed in the cultivation of immenſe tracts of waſte lands both in Great-Britain and Ireland, in the encouragement of induſtrious foreigners to ſettle among us, and in the improvement of our colonies ad infinitum. Light taxes would have encouraged population, becauſe they do not load the means of ſubſiſtence. The price of labor would have been reduced; manufactures found an eaſy vent abroad; or, if the foreign market failed, the demands of the colonies would have employed all the induſtry of the nation. Population and conſumption would have increaſed rapidly together. Conſidering the colonies as conſolidated with the mother country, and their mutual advantages improved as far as they might be, the Britiſh empire might ſubſiſt alone, and maintain its greatneſs, without any dependence on foreign trade. This is the ſtate of political perfection, to which, as the author himſelf acknowledges, every great kingdom ſhould aſpire. Inſtead of being employed to theſe ſalutary purpoſes, the hundred and thirty millions lent to the ſtate have ſupported a conſtant war againſt population, and prevented the exiſtence of millions of uſeful ſubjects.—Tranſlator.
15.
There can be no intrinſic value in a ſpecies of property, which depends merely on opinion to determine whether it be worth a hundred pounds, or fifty, or nothing.—Tranſlator.
16.
Foreigners are much offended at the light tax which they are obliged to pay upon our turnpike roads, not conſidering how natural and juſt it is, that the perſon who uſes the road ſhould be at the expence of repairing it. In France the caſe is exactly reverſed. The wretched peaſant, who ſeldom poſſeſſes either waggon or horſe, is compelled to keep the roads in repair, while the traveller pays nothing. I have ſeen whole families of peaſants, with their wives and children, employed in this ſlaviſh work, at many miles diſtance from their habitations. Theſe poor people, for want of other cattle, are often obliged to harneſs their cows in the carts that convey the ſtone or gravel to the road. The ſight is ſhocking to humanity. After all this oppreſſion of the poor, and notwithſtanding the beauty of many of their high roads between the principal cities, which is all that foreign travellers are likely to obſerve, there are few of the more civiliſed parts of Europe, where the communication between the provinces is ſo impracticable as in France. The want of croſs roads is a material check to agriculture. The great roads improve the lands within a moderate diſtance, but the major part of the kingdom receive no benefit from them. A French writer, who ſeems thoroughly informed of every thing relative to the internal oeconomy of the kingdom, affirms that the rich corn provinces have no means to convey ſupplies into thoſe parts where they are wanted, but on the backs of mules, becauſe the roads or lanes will not admit of carriages; that canals, for internal communication, have been equally neglected; and that it coſts leſs, in ſome quarters of the kingdom, to bring corn from England or Africa, than to convey it ten leagues by land carriage in France. The ſame writer obſerves that, if the millions, expended in forming the canal of Languedoc, had been laid out in ſmaller canals of communication in the interior of the kingdom, they would have been leſs ſplendidly perhaps, but much more uſefully, employed. One end of this immenſe work was periſhing while they were finiſhing the other.—Tranſlator.
*
Corvées.
*
When taxes are not ſo violent as to wither the hand that pays them, the momentary collection of them in the Exchequer, and ſubſequent diſtributions, through the various channels of annuities, penſions, and other expences, form a new property, which did not exiſt before. This created property gives birth to a new circulation, in favor and for the benefit of thoſe who paid the taxes. A tax, before it is raiſed, is divided and diſperſed over ſo many millions of ſubjects, that its exiſtence is hardly perceivable. The portion paid * by each individual would probably remain in his pocket, or in his cheſt, and the produce of ſo much induſtry be loſt; little or nothing would come into circulation. If, for example, a tax of a penny each were laid upon the million of perſons, who inhabit Paris, for a ſingle day, obliging the rich to pay for the poor, it is certain that the collection of ſuch a ſum would ſcarce be perceived by any individual; yet if this ſum were given to one induſtrious man, it would make his fortune, and enable him to give an aſſiſtance to circulation, induſtry, and conſumption, far beyond the diminution thoſe articles would have felt by the loſs of the penny taken ſeparately from ſo many individuals. In another inſtance, if twenty or thirty drops of water were to fall upon the whole ſurface of the earth, ſo inſenſible a ſupply would ſoon be dried up, without fertiliſing the ſoil, or relieving any man's thirſt; whereas, if theſe twenty or thirty drops were received into a funnel, the collection might form a ſtream capable of the moſt vivifying operations. There muſt be a focus to collect a number of beings, which ſeparately have no power, but grow active as they unite. This example, I believe, will not appear indifferent, eſpecially to thoſe whoſe tact is fine enough for the contemplation of objects of this nature;—it completely anſwers a ſubtle objection which might be made to my firſt propoſition, and helps us to comprehend by what ſteps a tax may reflect a benefit upon the public, by encouraging induſtry, as ſoon as the ſums it produces come to a conſiſtency in the centre of collection to which they belong—Author.
*
The principle however muſt always be ſoftened in the caſe of the laborer.
17.
They, who firſt recommended the ſyſtem of loans in England, had, probably, no other view but to ſupply the immediate neceſſities of government, without burthening the people. In other countries, money has been borrowed by government with a political deſign of ſecuring the attachment of wealthy individuals to the ſtate. The Abbé Ragnal ſays, that the Venetians were the firſt who borrowed money of their ſubjects on this principle.—Tranſlator.
18.
The word improved is equivocal. We have exchanged one ſet of manners for another. The poliſh waſtes the ſubſtance. The ſame refinements, that quicken our ſenſations, enervate the power of indulging them. It is not poſſible that either the mind or body can be at the ſame moment delicate to feel, and vigorous to enjoy. Every ſtate has its compenſations. In the midſt of our refinements, we triumph without reaſon over the uncultivated ſimplicity of our anceſtors. They felt perhaps as ſenſible a gratification in their barbarous ſtruggles for public liberty, as any of their enlightened poſterity can derive from perſonal enjoyment. No two minds refer to the fame ſtandard of pleaſure. The prodigal who ſquanders the eſtate, has little or no advantage over the miſer who collected it.—Tranſlator.
*
The number of perſons, in affluent or eaſy circumſtances, is conſiderably increaſed in Europe ſince the diſcovery of America. There are more means of gaining a livelihood. I do not at preſent enquire whether the neceſſitous, the poor, and the indigent, may not be more ſo than in former times. Abſtractedly, it may be in ſome ſhape more difficult to obtain the bare neceſſaries of life. Want, ſtrongly contraſted with overgrown wealth, is more ſenſibly felt.—Author.
*
The proprietors of the French; Dutch, and Engliſh funds, are, I confeſs, become joint uſufructuaries of the territorial revenue of each country, and, in ſome meaſure, joint owners of the ſoil. But, ſo far from being an evil, I conſider it as a benefit which lightens the burthenſome part of taxation.—Author.
19.
That the artificial property veſted in the funds cannot at once be realiſed, or converted into ſpecie, is no argument againſt the national debt's conſtituting part of the numerary wealth of the nation. An hundred millions in lands, goods, and houſes, notwithſtanding their intrinſic value, are no more convertible into ſpecie than a hundred millions in the ſtocks. At firſt ſight it ſhould ſeem that the failure of public credit muſt immediately raiſe the value of other more ſolid ſecurities. Yet facts unqueſtionably prove the contrary. In thoſe countries where there is no fictitious property, or where the circulation of it is checked for want of credit, the value of land is always low in proportion; and ſo vice verſa.—Tranſlator.
*
From all this reaſoning with reſpect to America, and the revolutions occaſioned by the diſcovery of that country, it may be concluded, that the high price of labor is a neceſſary conſequence of riches, luxury, commerce, opulence, and the great conſumption produced by an increaſe of demands, and of population, in an induſtrious nation. In this reſpect, the population of Europe and America is the ſame. Taxes contribute to raiſe the price of labor; but, as they alſo are a conſequence of wealth, eaſe, and liberty, the miſchief they do is overbalanced by other advantages. The number of the rich being augmented by the creation of factitious funds, gives birth to a new property, and redoubles the means of encouraging induſtry, arts, manufactures, agriculture, and commerce. The four millions ſterling raiſed by taxes, and which on one ſide are a clog to induſtry, produce twenty millions in circulation, which, as I have already ſhown, are all employed in favor of induſtry.—Author.
20.

The extraction of our ſpecie to pay the intereſt due to foreigners has always been conſidered as a ſevere drain to the nation, and one of the greateſt miſchiefs attending the national debt. The arguments or declamations on this topic are endleſs; yet it may be doubted, whether they have ever been candidly compared with the fact. The moſt plauſible ſpeculations muſt ſubmit to experience. An internal principle of decay, conſtantly operating, can never be reconciled to a continued appearance of health and vigor. In arguments of this nature, ſome little fact, miſtaken or omitted in the premiſes, makes a wide difference in the concluſion; and then the longer we argue, the farther are we at laſt from hitting the mark. Miniſters, and others, who have had all the means of information before them, have found it impoſſible to aſcertain, with exactneſs, the quantity of ſtock poſſeſſed by foreigners. The author, in another place, affirms from his own obſervation, that it cannot much exceed one ſeventh of the debt; againſt which it is but fair to ſet the ſums which Britiſh ſubjects have in foreign funds, particularly in thoſe of France, which pay a higher intereſt. If the general ſuppoſition be true, that the foreign property amounts to one ſixth of the whole debt, or about twenty-two millions, a certain annual drain of ſix hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds, added to the great ſums ſpent by our travellers on the continent, or ſent over to purchaſe foreign finery, muſt inevitably exhauſt all our reſources, carry all the ſpecie out of the kingdom, and keep the courſe of exchange conſtantly againſt us. Or, admitting that this loſs might be made good by the general profits of our trade, ſtill the nation could never have thriven and flouriſhed as it has done, if the whole or greater part of its earnings were conſtantly drained away as faſt as they came in. There muſt be ſome fallacy in an argument which evidently proves too much for the fact. Upon the ſtricteſt enquiry that it has been poſſible for me to make into this matter, I have found reaſon to believe, that, ſetting aſide ſome extraordinary occaſions, the greateſt part of the intereſt due to foreigners has not been remitted to them as faſt as it became due, but has been reinveſted in the funds; and that this is ſtill the caſe. The greater part by far of thoſe foreigners, who veſt their money in our funds, are not people who mean to ſubſiſt upon the intereſt of it. They leave a portion of their property to accumulate here, either as a reſource for old age, or as a ſecurity for their children, while they themſelves continue in that occupation in which they acquired their money. The juſt opinion, which every foreigner, who knows any thing of the matter, conceives of parliamentary faith, and the certainty that no violent meaſures will ever be attempted againſt the public creditors, naturally draws all their idle money into this country; and that they leave a conſiderable part of the intereſt to accumulate, ſeems farther probable from this fact, that, in peaceable times, immediately after every dividend (deducting the value of the dividend itſelf) ſtocks are conſtantly obſerved to riſe. The money thus reinveſted returns into circulation, and, giving birth or encouragement to new induſtry, creates a new revenue, which not only pays the foreign annuitant, but leaves a profit of ſuperlucration within the kingdom. After all, admitting the annuity paid to foreigners to be ever ſuch a burthen to the nation, it does not feem that diſcharging the principal would mend the matter. All the difference would then be, whether we ſhould exhauſt the nation of its caſh at once, or by degrees; in other words, whether we ſhould take this great capital out of commerce and circulation, or continue to pay moderate intereſt for a ſum, the improvement of which, with good management, may produce double what we pay for the uſe of it. Inſtead of general declamations againſt paying a great annuity to foreign ſtates, the only rational enquiry ſeems to be, whether we gain more by the uſe, than we loſe by the intereſt.

It is ſaid, that the debt due to foreigners leaves the nation at their mercy, and that, upon any critical occaſion, they can ſink the ſtocks at pleaſure, and diſtreſs government. This conſideration would be very important, if it were poſſible for a foreign court to oblige their ſubjects to call in all their funded property at once. The preſent king of France has attempted it in vain, by iſſuing mandatory edicts, in which he reproaches his ſubjects with want of affection to their country. But this is but a ſecond-hand policy. Individuals in all countries conſult their own intereſt firſt; and ſo far have they been from complying with the political views of the ſtates they belong to, that it has been obſerved that, in time of war and apprehenſion, they have always been moſt ready to ſend their money to England. If they were to attempt to ſell out all, or the greateſt part of their property at once, they muſt loſe immenſely upon their capital. We ſhould of courſe pay them off at a great diſadvantage to themſelves, and the nation would clearly gain the difference between the high price, at which they bought, and the low one, at which they would be obliged to ſell. Money borrowed of foreigners in time of war, beſides anſwering the great political purpoſe of ſupply, prevents our drawing an equal ſum out of trade, or diverting the application of it from beneficial improvements. To extend our trade, or improve our eſtates, with other people's money, is good oeconomy in itſelf, and implies credit.—Tranſlator.

*
It is poſſible that, at the end of the laſt century, before the credit of England had arrived at this prodigious elevation, the high intereſt of money in the funds might have diverted ſome individuals from commerce and labor, and confined them to the indolent ſtate of idle annuitants. It actually happened ſo; but ſince the funds have yielded only a moderate intereſt, it is no longer the caſe. It is alſo true, that the facility of veſting money in the funds, of buying for time, of giving premiums, and of winning large ſums in a ſhort time, has been the ruin of many individuals. This game has overturned the fortunes of ſeveral, but it has eſtabliſhed as many others, and people might equally ruin themſelves in any other traffic.—Author.
21.
When the buſineſs of advancing money to government is monopoliſed by a particular ſet of men, as it is in France by the farmers general, circulation cannot be ſo quick and eaſy as in thoſe countries where every man, who has money, is admitted to ſubſcribe to public loans, without preference or diſtinction. On the other hand, government cannot negotiate with a monopoly on ſuch favorable terms, as they might with the public at large. The ſyſtem, on which the finances of France are conducted, leave the king, as well as his ſubjects, at the mercy of a ſet of men, who ought to be no more than the collectors of the revenue. In behalf of this ſyſtem it is ſaid, that, in the moment of neceſſity and diſtreſs, the ill-gotten riches of the financiers are a certain reſource to government, and that, in every arbitrary ſtate, it is good policy to ſuffer and encourage one particular order of men to enrich themſelves by plundering the people. Having rendered themſelves univerſally odious, it is a ſatisfaction to the nation to ſee them plundered in their turn; and when the ſovereign extorts from them, by main force, what they had extorted by fraud and injuſtice from their fellow ſubjects, he has the credit of doing an act of juſtice to his people. This is one of the wiſe maxims of ſtate ſuppoſed to have been recommended to Lewis XIV. by Mr. de Louvois. The ſame upright miniſter, in another place, recommends the employing a multiplicity of officers and collectors in every branch of the revenue. He obſerves that the dexterity of theſe perſons, in multiplying and perpetuating law-ſuits, and obtaining deciſions in favor of the contractors, are of ſingular uſe to mortify the nobility, and to reduce the people into that ſtate of annihilation, which is ſo neceſſary to keep them quiet. ‘"Les officiers, qui ſavent adroitement multiplier les procès, les perpetuer, ou les juger au profit des traitans, ſont d'un grand ſecours à entretenir le peuple dans I'etat d'aneantiſſement, ou il faut qu'il ſoit pour demeurer paiſible, et à mortifier la nobleſſe par mille voïes indirectes."’ Whether theſe be the words of Louvois or not, it is certain that they contain the great fundamental principle of French government. By adhering to it with a laudable ſteadineſs, Lewis XIV. reduced both his people and himſelf to the moſt deplorable beggary, and was very near overturning the monarchy.—Tranſlator.
22.
The author's principle, that ſtockjobbing has facilitated the negociation of large loans, may, in a great meaſure, be well founded. But his earneſtneſs to prove it ſo, hurries him into the aſſertion of propoſitions too falſe and dangerous to paſs unnoticed, and which in effect he ſoon retracts. He obſerves, in another place, that a man ruined is a fruitful plant withered up, whoſe numerary wealth ceaſes to exiſt. Nothing is leſs likely to be true in argument, or certainly more falſe in fact, than that the ruin of any number of individuals, who loſe their fortunes in 'Change alley, or by any other ſpecies of gaming, is the making or eſtabliſhment of an equal number of other fortunes. Great ſums, eaſily gained, are ſquandered in an extravagance which not only brings diſtreſs along with it, but diſables the mind from returning to habits of oeconomy and active induſtry. The inſtances of perſons, prudent and reſolute enough to retire with their winnings, are ſo very few, that, if they deſerve to be conſidered at all, it is only as exceptions, by which a general rule is confirmed. In the mean time the enormous expence of the game itſelf, and the total diſregard of money, which naturally ariſes from a quick ſucceſſion of great profits and great loſſes, and from a continual circulation of large ſums, operates uniformly and without intermiſſion, and in the end is the ruin of all parties. It is alſo very material to obſerve that, if gaming produced no other effect but that property ſhould ſuddenly change hands, the elevation of one man is no compenſation to ſociety for the ruin of another. They are both, perhaps, equally miſchievous in their effect. It is not merely a transfer of property, indifferent to all but the parties themſelves; nor is it merely a change of place, to which the minds of men are eaſily accommodated. Both parties are apt to be corrupted by the novelty of their ſituation. On one ſide we ſee folly, inſolence, vanity, extravagance, and a pernicious example; on the other, a total loſs of ſpirit, pride, honor, and independence. If this ſudden transfer of wealth, inſtead of being confined to a few individuals, were to become univerſal, the ſtate could not ſubſiſt a moment. It is true, that a merchant may be ruined in any other kind of traffic; but the circumſtances of the two caſes are no way parallel. In the ordinary courſe of a ſucceſsful trade, a great fortune is ſlowly acquired. In a loſing trade the approach to ruin is gradual. By care and management it may be ſtopped at different ſtages; by ſtrenuous reſolution it may be recovered at the laſt. In the mean time a branch of commerce, by which an individual is ruined, may furniſh employment for thouſands; and misfortunes in trade are not, like loſſes at play, a diſgrace to the man who ſuffers them. They excite the compaſſion, and never fail to engage the aſſiſtance, of ſociety. As for thoſe extenſive enterpriſes, and unlimited ſpeculations, by which a fortune may be loſt or acquired in a moment, they are not founded on true commercial principles, but belong to the chapter of Gaming. A merchant, ruined by ſuch ſchemes, deſerves as little mercy as a gameſter.—Tranſlator.
23.
With reſpect to ſtockjobbing, it is very true, that thoſe particular funds, the three per cents. conſolidated for example, in which moſt gaming is carried on, always bear the beſt price, notwithſtanding the maſs is greater, and the ſecurity and intereſt no better, than in the other three per cents. The difference between the price of the conſols and India annuities is generally from three to four per cent. and India bonds, when they bear only three per cent. are frequently above par. Caeteris paribus, the marketable quality of a commodity increaſes its value. By the Million bank, the author means the million raiſed in 1726, by lottery at three per cent. and which has not been united with the conſolidated three per cents.—Tranſlator.
24.
It is certain that every contrivance that facilitates the diſpoſition, ſale, transfer, mortgaging, &c. of ſtock, or any other property, improves the circulation of that property, and thereby adds a new value to it. The author's idea, that moneyed men purchaſe ſtock in order to lend, or ſell it for time to the brokers, ſeems plauſible and ingenious; but I doubt whether it be founded in fact. It is uſually the gameſter, or ſpeculatiſt, who pledges his ſtock to the banker, or moneyed man, and of courſe on diſadvantageous terms, as prudence always lays folly under contribution.—Tranſlator.
25.
This eſſay, relating chiefly to the practice in Holland, is not tranſlated. No good purpoſe can be anſwered by explaining a ſcience, which it is no honeſt man's intereſt to ſtudy, and which no man can be maſter of, without engaging in the practice. To ſpeculate with ſafety, the author makes it a condition that you ſhall not be governed by your broker. The condition alone amounts to an interdiction.—Tranſlator.
20.
This muſt be an arbitrary ſuppoſition, taken at random, without facts or data. In England all the ſpeculations and prophecies on this ſubject have been conſtantly confuted by experience. The higheſt computations carry our ſpecie but a little beyond thirty millions. Others reduce it to eighteen or twenty. Taking it at a medium of twenty-five millions, the debt alone, compared with the ſpecie, is above five to one. If to the maſs of the public debt we add the quantity of paper iſſued by the Bank, the ſtock of trading companies, notes of bankers and private traders, India bonds, exchequer bills, &c. perhaps it would be reaſonable to ſuppoſe (for certainty is not to be had) that paper in this country is to ſpecie in the proportion of ten to one at the leaſt. In the year 1719, Mr. Law's new Bank and Weſt-India Company had iſſued paper, or created actions, within a very ſhort ſpace, to the amount of above ſix thouſand one hundred and thirty-eight millions of livres, when the whole ſpecie in the kingdom did not exceed twelve hundred millions. This, perhaps, conſidering the nature of the French government, and the rapidity of the operation, is one of the moſt extraordinary facts in the whole hiſtory of finance. A very ingenious French writer obſerves upon it, ‘"That ſo great a diſproportion might perhaps have been ſupported in a free country, if it had been gradually introduced. The people, accuſtomed to conſider the nation as a permanent body, accept of national ſecurity the more readily, from not knowing the exact extent of the reſources, at the ſame time that they conceive a favorable opinion, uſually founded upon experience, of the juſtice of the nation. Under this prejudice, credit is often carried beyond all the reſources, and all the ſecurities. England is a proof of it. It is not the ſame in abſolute monarchies, eſpecially in thoſe which have often violated their engagements. If, during a moment of delirium, an unlimited confidence ſhould happen to be repoſed in government, that confidence always ends in the folly that gave it birth. Their inſolvency then ſtrikes every eye. The good faith of the monarch, the funds, the ſecurity, every thing appears to be imaginary. The creditor, recovered from his firſt deluſion, demands his money with an impatience proportioned to his anxiety. The truth of this obſervation is confirmed by the Hiſtory of Law's System."’ —Hiſtoire Philoſophique des Etabliſſemens dans les Indes, ii. 52.—Tranſlator.
*
Under the name of Paper the author here includes ſtock, and every kind of fictitious wealth.
27.
Though it does not amount to bankruptcy, it is certainly in degree a failure of credit. A merchant, whoſe notes paſs current at par, has a better credit, and can extend his operations much farther, than he whoſe ſecurities are at ten or fifteen per cent. diſcount. The caſe is the ſame with a nation. The true maximum of power in circulation is, when paper exactly repreſents ſpecie; that is, when the public or private ſecurity for a hundred pounds may eaſily be exchanged for a hundred pounds in ſpecie, or paſs inſtead of it, ſubject to no other deduction but that of the legal intereſt to the diſcounter. This maximum may be, and is, every day exceeded; that is, both public and private credit are ſtretched beyond it; in conſequence of which, paper ceaſes to repreſent ſpecie exactly, and loſes a portion of its value. Increaſe the cauſe, or ſtretch your credit ſtill farther and farther beyond the maximum, and the effect will attend it in the ſame proportion, until at laſt your paper will be worth nothing.—Tranſlator.
28.
There cannot be a clearer proof that we are very near the maximum of public credit, than that every little event or rumour has a ſenſible effect upon the ſtocks. While there was a power of credit in one ſcale conſiderably more than ſufficient to raiſe the weight of debt in the other, the tricks of intereſted men, or the apprehenſion of political events, made little or no impreſſion. The beam was immoveable. Even at the higheſt pitch of the rebellion, ſtocks were not below par. But the enormous addition of debt, incurred in the laſt war, has brought credit and debt ſo nearly to an equipoiſe, that the weight of a grain, the breath of an infant, inclines the balance. A dextrous miniſter may keep it even for a time. A wiſe and honeſt miniſter will never reſt till he has given a clear, unqueſtionable preponderance to the ſcale of credit, which can no way be effected but by lightening the debt. That the weight of the debt is the only or principal cauſe of its depreſſed ſtate, is plain from this fact. In the year 1751, that is, only three years after the peace of Aix la Chapelle, when we owed only ſeventy-five millions, the three per cents. were at a hundred and one; whereas now, after a peace of eleven years, their conſtant regular price has been twelve, thirteen, or fourteen per cent. under par. It was Sir John Barnard's opinion, that the price of ſtocks did not depend upon the whole maſs, but upon the quantity brought to market combined with the demand. It does not appear that the two propoſitions contradict each other. They are both unqueſtionably true, and have a mutual relation as cauſe and effect. The quantity brought to market depends upon the whole maſs. If the latter be doubled, the marketable or circulating quantity will alſo be doubled; and unleſs the demand riſes in the ſame proportion (which cannot reaſonably be preſumed) there muſt be a glut in the market, conſequently the price of the commodity muſt fall. In theſe matters, men of great abilities are apt to wander into refinements, as if common ſenſe were not the foundation of all right reaſoning.—Tranſlator.
29.
The author ſeems to have inverted the natural order of theſe three combinations. The firſt ſtate of improvement depends on population and agriculture. The progreſs of commerce forms the ſecond. The augmentation of ſpecie, or balance of trade, is the laſt object of the three.—Tranſlator.
*
Phyſical cauſes proceed from the Engliſh climate, (rather cold than temperate) which makes the women more fruitful, and continue longer ſo, than in warmer countries; and alſo from the ſoil, which produces the moſt ſubſtantial nouriſhment, and makes the men more robuſt. We need only obſerve the horſes and cattle of that country; the agility of an Engliſh horſe, the ſubſtance of Iriſh cattle, and the conſtruction of the human body. A native of Scotland, Ireland, or England, without having the coloſſal figure of a German, is handſomely proportioned. The conſideration of moral cauſes might lead me into a long diſſertation. The moſt apparent are thoſe which reſult from the eſtabliſhed religion and political conſtitution of the country. There is a great diſproportion, with regard to the number of unmarried perſons, in proteſtant and catholic countries. Monſieur de Monteſquieu calls convents, the gulphs in which future generations are buried. Some modern writer conſiders all monks as a lazy voracious body, that conſtantly conſumes, without ever producing. The military order, another body that devours its own members, is not carried to exceſs in England. Toleration has repaired the waſte of population, which the new world has occaſioned in the old one. To all theſe moral cauſes it may be added, that the worſhip paid to women, or the idolatry of the ſex, not being carried ſo far among the Engliſh, as it is in a neighbouring powerful nation, that amiable half of the ſpecies fulfills more exactly the purpoſe for which it was intended by nature. The women are not afraid of having a multitude of children at the expence of their beauty. They do not turn againſt propagation the attraction given to encourage it. The men, not thinking their children degraded by commerce, do not look upon a numerous family as a diſtreſs. Exceſſive luxury may make them depart from manners ſo favorable to propagation. The laborer and peaſant are at their eaſe. Not being oppreſſed, they multiply, and ſupply the ſtate with huſbandmen, mechanics, mariners, and workmen. Every nation might enjoy the ſame advantage. Coloniſation and celibacy, which formerly were uſeful and neceſſary to the political ſyſtem, are become miſchievous. Too great a heap of poor, neceſſitous, uncleanly people, crouded together, was dangerous among our anceſtors. It brought on revolutions, tumults, inſurrections, epidemics, and peſtilence. Men, ſays a modern writer, are not made to be piled up on an ant-hill, but to be diſperſed over the earth, which it is their buſineſs to cultivate. Thus, in ſpite of the celibacy of ſo many monks and nuns, population was ſtill too great before the diſcovery of America. Cruſades, at that time, did what colonies do at preſent. Add to this, the civil wars of France, under the Valois; thoſe of York and Lancaſter, in England, under the White and Red Roſes; and the wars between nation and nation, particularly thoſe of Italy, that vaſt charnel-houſe and grave of Europe; and it will appear that Europe was better peopled formerly, than it is at preſent. If we conſider the maſs, or rather the volume, of the human ſpecies at any given time, and compare it with the preſent, we ſhall be aſtoniſhed at the breach made in it by America, by numerous armies, by luxury and colonies. It will be objected, that we no longer ſee thoſe ſwarms of Goths and Vandals, that iſſued from the north to overflow ſo many countries; yet that they are not in the caſe of having waſted by peopling America. I anſwer, that theſe people ſettled at once in the countries which they had conquered and laid waſte; that polygamy was permitted among them, and that the north has always been, and is ſtill, the magazine of other nations. Neither the Engliſh, nor the Dutch, could poſſibly have ſupported their marine, without a recruit of ſailors from the north. Even at this day perhaps the northern countries are proportionably better people than any other. I believe alſo that reaſons, drawn from nature and the ſtudy of phyſic, might be aſſigned for the decreaſe of the human ſpecies, or at leaſt for the progreſs of depopulation. Still however it will be found to proceed in part from America, and from the numerous armies kept up ſince the end of the laſt century. A new diſeaſe attacks the ſource of exiſtence, and operates upon poſterity. The immoderate and daily uſe of warm liquids enfeebles the ſex, creates vapours, which waſte the conſtitution much more than infirmities, corrupt the blood, and produce children already kneaded with a morbific leaven. The exceſſes of the children are added to thoſe of their parents. The uſe of ſtrong diſtilled liquors, which the Arabs firſt invented, and gradually introduced into Europe when they over-ran Spain, has greatly debilitated the human ſpecies. Theſe ſugared poiſons deprive us of ſtrength and vigor, and deſtroy the moſt robuſt conſtitutions. They ravage the world much more than fire and ſword. I believe that a conſiderable part of the human ſpecies is enfeebled, and that, if care be not taken, there will be the ſame decrepitude in the ſpecies that there is in the individual.—Author.
30.
A tax on bread would be highly abſurd in England, where it is thought good policy to give a bounty on the exportation of corn. This would be checking the conſumption at home while we encourage it abroad, and make good the complaint already urged, that we feed the foreign manufacturer at an eaſy rate, while we ſtarve our own. Nor would the produce of the tax be ſo great as the author imagines. Duties on conſumption are in general moſt oppreſſive to the ſubject, and the moſt expenſive in the collection. Sir Mathew Decker affirms, that the exciſes on ſalt, ſoap, leather, candles, &c. almoſt treble themſelves to the people for what they raiſe to government. If bread were to be taxed in the baker's ſhop, the conſequence would be, that every private houſekeeper would bake his own bread; and to controll this liberty, by ſending exciſe officers every day into private houſes, would be ſuch an intolerable oppreſſion as no augmentation of revenue could compenſate for. The policy of Holland is, no more than that of France, an example for England. The legiſlation of every country muſt correſpond with the prevailing ſpirit or temper of the people. With reſpect to taxation, a Dutchman conſiders nothing but the quantum of the tax. An Engliſhman conſiders not only the burthen, but the mode of impoſing it. In England the prevailing paſſion is liberty, well or ill underſtood. The argument, that England is not arrived at the maximum of its reſources, becauſe ſome few articles of general neceſſity are ſtill left untaxed, is not concluſive. There muſt be a period of taxation on the whole, beyond which the people cannot pay. Puſhing it beyond this point, is conſtantly attended with diminution of revenue. The magnifying power defeats itſelf, and the object is loſt in confuſion and obſcurity. If the taxes, which the ſubject already pays, be upon the whole as much as he can ſupport, and he ſhould nevertheleſs be compelled to pay a new tax upon ſome of the neceſſaries of life, the conſequence would be, that he muſt either quit the country (of which almoſt every province in France is an example) or he muſt retrench his expences in the conſumption of other leſs neceſſary articles. In one caſe the ſtate loſes its ſubject, who carries ſo much induſtry and conſumption away with him; in the other, government incurs the expence of collection, and gains nothing by the tax.—Tranſlator.
31.
Admitting that a part of the annuity is annually re-inveſted in the ſtocks, and that this contributes to keep up the price of the capital, it does not follow that this advantage increaſes by the augmentation of the maſs of debt. The ſavings out of the annuity, now paid to the public creditor, are no greater in proportion to the preſent debt, than they were when the debt was but half what it is. On the contrary, as luxury and expence have increaſed rapidly through all ranks of people, it is to be preſumed, that a much ſmaller part of the annuity, in proportion to the preſent amount of it, is ſaved and re-inveſted in the ſtocks, than was twenty or thirty years ago.—Tranſlator.
*
Exceſſive luxury diminiſhes this advantage every day.—Author.
32.
The increaſe of debt has a natural and inevitable tendency to raiſe the rate of intereſt, inſtead of reducing it. The quantity of the commodity ſinks the value of it; and as the national rate of intereſt follows the ordinary price of the three per cents. as theſe ſink, intereſt riſes. No man, for example, will lend his money at four per cent. on private ſecurity, if he can buy one hundred pounds ſtock in the three per cents. for ſeventy-five pounds. The miniſter, who by a zealous, oeconomical adminiſtration of the finances, and a judicious exertion of the reſources of the nation, ſhall bring the debt fairly to par, will by that operation reduce the rate of intereſt, and throw an immenſe capital into trade, or landed improvement, which is now drawn out of it. He will be the patron of commerce, agriculture, and population. In ſpite of the prejudices of party, it cannot be denied, that neither zeal, nor ability, are wanting at the head of this department. But to carry through, with ſucceſs, a great meaſure of finance, requires a general concurrence and ſupport.—Tranſlator.
33.
A higher rate of intereſt has tempted many people in Holland and England to truſt their money in the French funds, where they have ſince been obliged to ſubmit to an arbitrary reduction both of intereſt and principal. They are deſervedly puniſhed for their folly. In an arbitrary government there can be no ſolid ſecurity to the public creditor; and the high terms they offer, being in fact a ſign of the weakneſs of the ſecurity, inſtead of tempting, ought to deter. In ſome countries the earneſtneſs of an invitation is a warning to the gueſt againſt the danger of accepting it.—Tranſlator.
34.
Since war returns periodically upon almoſt every nation in Europe, we ought to conſider peace in the ſame light with a leaſe renewable every ſeven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, but ſubject to a fine. During the continuance of the leaſe we ought to lay up a ſum ſufficient to pay the fine upon the renewal. The only difference is, that diſcharging debt is a much more beneficial operation than hoarding money.—Tranſlator.
35.
The credit of England, comparatively with that of France, may truly enough be ſaid to have ſtood unſhaken. But it is too much to affirm, that the credit of this country has not been materially affected by her expences. After a peace of ten years the funds have been ſtationary at twelve per cent. below par.—Tranſlator.
36.
The French read our party writings with avidity, and adopt with rapture every idea that tends to lower the dignity, credit, and reſources, of this kingdom. In the year 1762 there was not a man in France who did not firmly believe, as well as moſt devoutly wiſh, that we were upon the verge of bankruptcy. It muſt be confeſſed, that in the courſe of the laſt war they met with ſome unpleaſant Diſinganhos, or undeceptions, if ſuch a word may be admitted. Doctor Brown had perſuaded them that the martial character and ſpirit of this nation had totally degenerated, and Mr. Mauduit had proved that we were undone. In the midſt of theſe charitable perſuaſions, they found themſelves beaten in every quarter of the globe.—Tranſlator.
37.
The rate of intereſt can never be reduced as long as the three per cents. continue below par.—Tranſlator.
*
The expedient of pledging funded property, which formerly favored circulation, has of late been fatally abuſed in England. The caſe is this. Many perſons, who had lent money upon ſtock, began immediately to ſell on ſpeculation for time, at a high price, upon their own account. Then, with the aſſiſtance of falſe news, of which there is an inexhauſtible manufacture in London, they alarmed the public, and ſold for ready money a part of the ſtock, which had been pledged to them, at five and even ten per cent. under the market price. A ſmall ſum, ſold for ready money, commands the market. As the alarm gained ground, they continued this game, until they compelled the perſons, upon whoſe ſtock they had lent money, to ſell againſt their will at the loweſt price. This has been done for a year and a half paſt, both in India and Bank ſtock, to the ruin of public credit, as well as private fortunes. A ſhameful deſtructive proceeding. There are ways to prevent theſe miſchievous intrigues, without checking circulation. It is an object that deſerves the attention of government; and the court of King's Bench, I hear, has lately condemned ſuch proceedings, upon a complaint made in a particular caſe. But this is not ſufficient to prevent them for the future. Without diſtreſſing circulation, more effectual means ſhould be employed, and ſhall be pointed out in proper time and place.—Author.
38.
All the ideas of the author, with reſpect to pledging of ſtock, ſeem very doubtful and obſcure. Pledging of ſtock is the conſequence of diſtreſs, or want of money; and the banker, or moneyed man, who lends, muſt make his own terms, of courſe not much to the advantage of the borrower. With reſpect to the general price of ſtocks, the mortgage or the ſale of a large quantity has exactly the ſame effect upon the market. A mortgage is in fact a temporary ſale, or alienation of ſo much revenue, and generally on worſe terms to the borrower than if he was to ſell his property outright. Pawn-brokers of all denominations take care to exact an exorbitant intereſt for their money. At the ſame time, it is not to be denied that they anſwer ſome purpoſes of convenience, and that property of every kind ſhould be as little fettered as poſſible. The facility of bringing it into circulation is a real addition to its value.—Tranſlator.
39.
A foreigner in the firſt inſtance truſts every thing to his correſpondent; having no evidence that ſuch a quantity of ſtock has been purchaſed on his account, and ſtands in his name, except the aſſurance of the perſon he employs to act for him. This however being once done, his property is ſecure. His agent, or correſpondent, can neither transfer the ſtock, nor receive the intereſt upon it, without a particular power; and if any fraud ſhould be committed, the Bank, or company to which the ſtock belongs, are anſwerable to the proprietor.—Tranſlator.
40.
The life annuities now ſubſiſting are very inconſiderable. The long annuities are paid with as much exactneſs, and transferred with as much eaſe, as any other ſtock.—Tranſlator.
41.
A ſhort paragraph is here omitted by the author's deſire. The firſt part of it relates to the Dutch funds; and, if it could be made intelligible, would be uſeleſs to the Engliſh reader. What he ſays of the common way of ſtating the price of ſtocks in England is a miſtake.—Tranſlator.
*
£. 245, 833: 6: 8 ſterling.
42.
The author, from the concluſion of the late peace, had entertained the higheſt ideas of the flouriſhing ſtate of our Eaſt-India company, and the moſt ſanguine expectations of the riſing value of their ſtock. Since he wrote this Eſſay he has ſeen India ſtock fall above a hundred and forty per cent. upon the capital, and the dividend reduced as low as it was before the company made their great territorial acquiſitions. His hopes have been diſappointed, becauſe the calculations of a good man ſeldom make ſufficient allowance for the folly and knavery of mankind.—Tranſlator.
43.
The company's ſervants are ſeldom able to collect and remit the whole of their fortunes to England. Great ſums have undoubtedly been brought home by individuals, but ſtill greater perhaps have been left behind. Their impatience to return makes them leave their affairs in diſorder. Their agents take but little care of the main article of remittance; ſo that, after a few years of diſſipation in this country, with great expence and little enjoyment, many gentlemen find themſelves obliged to go back again to collect or recover the remainder of their fortunes.—Tranſlator.
44.
The quantity of ſpecie or bullion exported to India has been a conſtant topic of declamation againſt the Eaſt-India trade. Perhaps it has never been fairly conſidered that, if a conſiderable proportion of ſilver were not annually ſunk in Aſia, it would in a little time be impoſſible for Europe to procure a ſupply of it from America. We quarrel with the market that in fact creates the ſupply. The quantity of ſilver continually accumulating in Europe would leſſen its value as a ſign to ſuch a degree, that, within a very ſhort period, the produce of the mines would not pay the expence of working them. The price of European goods would be always proportioned to the whole quantity of ſilver in Europe; that is, as the value of ſilver fell, the price of every thing ſaleable would riſe. But as the produce of the mines, inſtead of increaſing in that proportion, rather diminiſhes every day, it would happen that the ſame bale of European goods, which in one year might ſell in America for a hundred ounces of ſilver, in the next perhaps could not be afforded under a hundred and fifty, and ſo on till the advance of price upon the American amounted to an abſolute impoſſibility of purchaſing. At this period he would of courſe give up the working of the mines, and endeavour to manufacture for himſelf. The ſtroke would immediately revert upon the arts, manufactures, and general induſtry of Europe. In this progreſſion the ſigns of wealth become the ſource of poverty. We ſhould have ſo much ſilver that our own colonies could not afford to purchaſe the produce of our induſtry. The fountain of real wealth would be choaked up. To recover it again, we muſt open the channel, and ſuffer the ſtream to flow into another country, contented with its fertiliſing paſſage through our own. A ſpeculation of this kind does not want the experience of facts to ſupport it. The concluſion it leads to is as clear and certain as mathematical demonſtration.—Tranſlator.
45.

The author of the Bilan, or Balance of England, publiſhed in 1762, ſeems to be a man of ſome ability, and no ſmall application to the ſtudy of our political and party writings. Theſe qualities, added to the rage of ſyſtem and political arithmetic, has made many an ingenious man argue himſelf and his readers out of their ſenſes. The writer above mentioned calculates, down to a Iivre, our annual loſs of ſpecie by the debt due to foreigners, and by the increaſe of our imports beyond our exports; and having it warmly at heart to ſatisfy his countrymen, that England is in the high road to deſtruction, has laid a train of hypothetical arguments, fortified and intrenched in figures, by which he has proved to his own content, that we have for a long time paſt bought more than we have ſold; that the balance of trade is againſt us; that our caſh is gone, or going very faſt; in ſhort, that England is a ruined nation.

Declamations of this kind, borrowed for the moſt part from our party writers, or London news-papers, after a deal of perplexing logic, and ſtill more perplexing arithmetic, uſually end in concluſions manifeſtly inconſiſtent with appearances. Inſtead of following ſuch writers through a train of ſophiſtry, by which the cleareſt ideas of truth and falſehood may be confounded, the beſt way is to attack them directly upon their facts. Whenever they depart from general reaſoning, and unwarily hazard a plain particular aſſertion, they may be ſaid to march out of their intrenchments, and to reduce an endleſs war of argument to a ſhort deciſive iſſue. The author of the Bilan * affirms, that, from the 14th of March, 1716, to the 31ſt December, 1738, we had paid off only three hundred thouſand pounds of the national debt. Unluckily for him, the fact ſtands thus:

 Principal.Intereſt.
Public debt due on 31ſt December, 1715£. 54,167,015 15 52,871,800 19 1
Ditto—on 31ſt December, 173846,661,767 0 51,962,053 0 8
 7,505,248 15 0909,747 18 5

ſo that in the period, in which he ſays we had paid off but three hundred thouſand pounds, it appears that the principal debt was reduced above ſeven millions and a half, and the annual intereſt above nine hundred thouſand pounds, notwithſtanding a conſiderable miſapplication of the ſinking fund.

He affirms, in direct contradiction to the certain knowledge of every man in England, that the value of lands and rate of rents have been gradually lowering ſince the Revolution; and this too, notwithſtanding a greater cultivation, conſiderable improvements in the art of farming, and an increaſe upon the whole of the territorial revenue. ‘"Les proprietaires n'en ont pas moins vû diminuer peu à peu le prix de leurs baux; cela ne pouvoit pas être autrement."’

He repeatedly affirms, that we are forced to borrow money to pay the intereſt of debt already contracted abroad. ‘"Il reſte toujours pour certain que depuis le commencement de 1751, ce n'eſt qu'en empruntant que l'Angleterre a pû payer les interêts des ſommes qu'elle doit au dehors."’ *

There may be ſome latent, myſterious meaning in theſe words, which I am not able to dive into. In their plain and obvious ſenſe, they contain a manifeſt falſehood. The funds, appropriated to pay the intereſt of the national debt, have not only been ſufficient to anſwer that purpoſe, but have left a conſtant annual ſurplus, which has been applied from year to year, either to the current ſervice, or to the diſcharge of debt, to the amount of many millions. On ſuch wild ſuppoſitions as theſe, the author treats the Engliſh nation with an indecency and intemperance of language, which in effect reverts upon himſelf. Mad, blind, and ignorant, inſenſée, ignorante, & aveugle, are the mildeſt epithets he beſtows upon a little country, which, however, by mere dint of ſuperior policy, courage, and credit, has repeatedly brought the enervated coloſſus of France to the ground. The credit of this country may, in point of prudence, have been ſtretched too far. But even the enormous extent of the debt itſelf is a proof of the high opinion entertained by individuals, both at home and abroad, not only of the good faith, but of the reſources, of the nation.

§ He pretends to ſpeak moderately and within compaſs, when he ſays that a third of the whole debt belongs to foreigners, and that the extraction of ſpecie to pay the intereſt, amounts to one million four hundred thouſand pounds a year. On this I ſhall only obſerve, that no man in England ever conceived that the foreign property in the funds exceeded one ſixth of the debt; and that many judicious perſons, who are moſt likely to be well informed on this ſubject, reduce it to a ſeventh, and even to an eighth. In England, ſuch mean diſhonorable endeavours to ruin our credit would be received with contempt. In France they are readily accepted for proof, and help to keep up the ſpirits of the people.

The following inſtance will ſhew that his abſtract knowledge is much upon a footing with his facts. He ſays, *‡ that, ‘'after the peace of Aix la Chapelle, the balance of trade being conſtantly againſt us, and great ſums being ſent out to pay that balance as well as the intereſt due to foreigners, ſpecie became ſo ſcarce, that in the years 1753 and 1754, it was a difficult matter to make a banker pay a hundred pounds in the legal gold of the country; as for ſilver, there was ſcarce any left. People were obliged to ſubmit to be paid either in bank bills, which are refuſable by law, or in Portugueſe moidores, which are equally refuſable, and which are generally under weight.'’‘"Mais après la paix, n'y ayant plus d'emprunts, ce rempliſſage ruineux avoit ceſſé; & l'Angleterre étant obligée de payer aux dehors la balance qui alloit contre elle, les eſpeces devinrent ſi rares, qu'en 1753 & 1754 on avoit de la peine à recevoir chëz un banquier de Londres le payement de cent livres ſterling en or legal du pays: quant aux monnoyes d'argent, il n'y en avoit preſque plus. On étoit donc contraint de recevoir en payement, ou des billets de banque qui ſont refuſables par la loi, ou des moiedors de Portugal qui ſont également refuſables, qui ſont rarement de poids, & qui paſſent, lorſqu'ils le ſont, pour environ trois quarts pour cent plus qu'ils ne valent."’

One would think it impoſſible even for a Frenchman to collect ſuch a quantity of falſehood and nonſenſe into ſo ſmall a compaſs. In the firſt place, it was but in the year 1750, that the uncommon plenty of money had enabled government to reduce the intereſt of fifty eight millions ſterling, from four to three and a half, and afterwards to three per cent. A man who will deny that a reduction of intereſt, where no ſort of violence is offered to the public creditor, is an infallible ſign of the plenty of money, may diſpute his own exiſtence; but who will argue with him? Secondly, to ſay that people were obliged to accept of a ſort of payment, which by law they might have refuſed, is a contradiction in terms. Thirdly, the immenſe quantity of Portugueſe gold at that time in circulation, proves that the balance of trade, particularly that of Portugal, was conſiderably in our favor. The profits of that trade have declined rapidly within theſe fifteen years, and the conſequence is, that we ſee no more of their gold in circulation. Fourthly, he affects to conſider it as a great hardſhip, that a draught upon a banker ſhould be paid in bank notes, as if it did not depend upon the choice of the party himſelf, to take notes, or ſpecie, as he thought proper; or as if he might not carry his note to the Bank, and have it immediately changed into guineas. Bankers paid in Portugal coin, becauſe they had great quantities of it poured in upon them by their cuſtomers, and not becauſe there was any ſcarcity of guineas. Fifthly, a ſix-and-thirty, or a moidore, is as liable to be ſweated as a guinea; but it is certain that in the ſtate, in which they iſſue from the mint in Portugal, they are worth more than what they paſs for in tale; and it is notorious that ſuch of thoſe pieces, as have not been filed or ſweated, have been conſtantly bought up by the Jews and others, at a premium, and either melted down or exported. Sixthly, with reſpect to the ſcarcity of ſilver, the author ſhould have known that, where there is a plenty of one of the precious metals in a nation, a ſcarcity of the other can only be accidental and temporary. In general, the price of ſilver in Europe muſt always be higher than that of gold, in proportion to their reſpective value, becauſe there is a greater profit upon the exportation of ſilver to the Eaſt Indies. I ought to make an apology to the Engliſh reader, for taking any notice of the wild, extravagant fancies of this ill-informed, paſſionate writer. Theſe few remarks however may help to undeceive foreigners, who in general know nothing of our affairs, and are ready to believe any thing. It is the policy of the French to endeavour to undermine our credit abroad, and this undoubtedly is an object that deſerves our attention. We are indebted to Mr. de Pinto for the zeal and ſucceſs with which he has counteracted their endeavours. As for the French themſelves, their ſituation entitles them to indulgence. The loſing gameſter may be allowed to conſole himſelf with calumny and invective, in the midſt of real humiliation and diſhonor. Yet, when they affect to undervalue the ſtrength, credit, and reſources of this country, their arguments, in effect, return againſt themſelves. If we are really in that degraded ſtate, to which without doubt they would gladly reduce us, to what a deplorable condition muſt the great empire of France be reduced, when ſhe ſubmits to receive the law from a kingdom leſs by one third in extent and population, overwhelmed with debt, enervated by luxury, and exhauſted by extravagance!—Tranſlator.

*
Page 163.
Page 26.
*
Page 199.
§
Page 204.
*‡
Page 187.
*
Since the peace the courſe of exchange ſhows, upon the author's own principles, that the balance of trade is in favor of the Engliſh.—Author.
46.
Excepting always the caſe of extraordinary events, which have an immediate and violent influence on public credit, it is certain that the courſe of exchange is a true barometer to ſhow where the balance of trade, and all occaſional money concerns included in the general account, lies. Mr. Poſtlethwaite juſtly obſerves, that miſtakes in this matter have ariſen from conſidering the courſe of exchange as the characteriſtic of the balance of trade only. During the late war, the courſe of exchange was generally to the diſadvantage of England, owing to the immenſe remittances made to Germany to pay ſubſidies, and to maintain the Britiſh army in that country. A ſimilar cauſe muſt have affected the exchange between Great Britain and our own colonies. In theſe extraordinary caſes the courſe of exchange proves nothing with reſpect to the balance of trade.—Tranſlator.
*
There are great abuſes in England with reſpect to the coin. The profit to be made by it carries almoſt all the coin to the crucible; but this might be the ſubject of a ſeparate treatiſe. The greateſt inconvenience ſeems to ariſe from the diſproportion between the coined money and the intrinſic value of the metal. This diſproportion, according to Mr. Karſſeboom, proceeds from a conſtant and ſcrupulous attachment to the proportion fixed by the act of the 43d of Elizabeth. 47 Locke, as great a man as he was, ſeems to have miſtaken this point, and has been refuted by Lowndes. Sir John Barnard, and Mr. Schirtz, have treated the queſtion at large. It ſeems eſſential to correct the old eſtabliſhed proportion, which gives a profit of ten per cent. by melting the ſilver coin, and is the ſource of the ſcarcity; a fallacious ſcarcity, that no way diminiſhes the riches of the kingdom. It is true, that the abuſe is a charge to government, and coſts them great ſums. It might be remedied by means which would prevent the apparent ſcarcity, and keep up an abundance of ſpecie in conſtant circulation. The ſmaller coins might alſo be multiplied, after the example of Portugal; but every thing depends upon the proportion. Since the time of Charles the Bold, and Mary of Burgundy, ſilver has ſunk from thirty to forty per cent. in its relative value to gold. It has been thought, by perſons of great knowledge, that prohibitions againſt exporting gold and ſilver are uſeleſs; and that, with money as with corn, ſcarcity is the natural effect of ſuch prohibitions.—Author.
47.

Coinage is a ſubject which the tranſlator by no means pretends to underſtand. He believes it however to be true in general, that the corruption of the coin in England does not ariſe from any defect or diſproportion in the ſtandard between gold and ſilver. If it did, the evil would be without remedy. The price of bullion riſes or falls every day, according to the quantity imported, or the demand in the market. Now it is impoſſible for the mint to follow the fluctuations of the price of bullion. The ſtandard cannot be altered every day, and, if it could, the expence of recoinage would be inſupportable. The evil we complain of, with reſpect to ſilver coin, is inherent in the nature of the thing, and not capable of a direct remedy. A general recoinage, inſtead of anſwering the end propoſed, would only be putting the public to a great expence, and making a preſent to the crucible of the difference between the real and nominal value of the coin. The indirect remedy is ſlow, but infallible. Encourage trade, promote induſtry and oeconomy. The balance of trade will then be univerſally in our favor, and, inſtead of ſeeing our coin melted down, we ſhall ſee plenty of ſilver carried to the mint. If, on the contrary, the balance of trade be conſtantly againſt us, our ſilver will infallibly go, and for its intrinſic value only, let it bear what ſtamp it will.

With reſpect to baſe coin already in the market, the only complete and effectual remedy is, to cry down all bad or light money at once, whenever the price of bullion will permit government to ſubſtitute good money in the place of bad. Nothing could be more violently exaggerated than the inconveniencies attending the late act relative to the gold coin in this kingdom; yet we ſee by experience that a few months were ſufficient to get the better of them all. General abuſes are not to be remedied without particular inconveniencies; but theſe are only temporary, and ſoon give way to general remedies.—Tranſlator.

*
A refutation of this principle will be found in the third part of this work.—Author.
When this Treatiſe was written, the French funds were more current than at preſent.—Author.
1.
Credit is more than a creature of the mind, and has always had a real exiſtence, though, like any other reſource, it may be deſtroyed by an injudicious exertion. Like the precious metal, whoſe place it ſupplies, credit may be extended ad infinitum; but as they both loſe in ſolidity what they gain in ſurface, a breath of air is ſufficient to blow the golden leaf away.—Tranſlator.
2.
Perhaps it might be more truly affirmed, that England, having a more brilliant credit, has therefore more reſources than France. The quarrels of nations are not decided by the whole maſs of their reſpective ſtrength, but by that portion of it which their reſpective circumſtances, in point of conſtitution, adminiſtration, and credit, will permit each of them to bring into actual uſe and circulation. Reſource implies exertion. The only ideal power is that which cannot be exerted. The paper in circulation is real wealth. The ſpecie in the cheſt has no exiſtence to the ſtate.—Tranſlator.
3.

Gabelles ſignify the duties on ſalt, levied within the kingdom of France. The whole internal commerce of ſalt is in the hands of the king, who fixes the price, and directs the ſale and diſtribution, by means of his farmers, and under the juriſdiction of officers created expreſsly for this branch of the revenue. The whole kingdom is not equally ſubject to what they call the Groſſe Gabelle. Beſides the exemption which particular perſons are ſtill allowed in virtue of their offices, ſeveral provinces of Old France, and in general all the frontier provinces, conquered or ceded to the crown in the courſe of the laſt century, are diſtinguiſhed by the name of Païs de Franc-Salé. In theſe countries, the duty on ſalt is lighter, the king taking it on the footing on which he found it eſtabliſhed at the time of the acquiſition. But as the other taxes are heavier, the inhabitants loſe as much on one ſide as they gain on the other.

Nothing can be conceived more iniquitous and oppreſſive than the Groſſe Gabelle, as well with reſpect to the quantum of the tax, as the mode of levying it. Salt, which ought to be one of the cheapeſt articles of conſumption, is, by various tricks and contrivances, made ſo dear to the confumer, that, notwithſtanding its univerſal uſe and neceſſity, the government is obliged to force the ſale of it by compulſory regulations. In conſequence of bad management, the produce to the king bears no proportion to the enormous expence of collection. As the duty is not equal in all parts of the kingdom, the king is obliged to maintain an army of cuſtom-officers to prevent the tranſportation of it from one province to another; and as it is alſo exceſſively heavy, the peaſant and the poor in general do not conſume the tenth part of what they would do, if the commodity were cheap. In the year 1707, Marſhal Vauban ſays, that the dearneſs of ſalt had created a kind of famine in the kingdom, ſenſibly felt by the lower rank of people, who, for want of ſalt, were deprived of the means of pickling, particularly pork, ſo eſſential to their ſubſiſtence. With the ſevereſt oeconomy, they had not enough for daily uſe. The difference of price in the different provinces ſends a multitude of ſmugglers to the gallies. In thoſe parts where every individual is compelled to take a certain quantity of ſalt (which among the poor is uſually more than they can afford to pay for) they are not allowed to make uſe of what they ſave in one year, to ſerve them for the next. This cruel and abſurd regulation expoſes the people to all ſorts of vexations on the part of the king's officers, who ranſack every corner of their houſes, in hopes of diſcovering ſalt not declared, and where they find none, often bring it themſelves, and pretend to have found it ſecreted, in order to vex and oppreſs thoſe againſt whom they have any private pique. The ſel d'impoſt, or annual quantity, which every maſter of a family is compelled to buy at the king's magazine, is computed at the rate of one minot, or four buſhels, for fourteen perſons, including infants. This ſalt can only be employed in the daily uſes of the family. They are forbid to uſe it in any of the conſiderable articles of pickling.

In the provinces, where the people are not compelled to take a limited quantity, they uſe as little as poſſible themſelves, and give none to their cattle; for want of which they are weak, ſpiritleſs, and unhealthy; and the duty of courſe is inconſiderable. It would be endleſs to enumerate the particular abuſes, with which the whole plan of the Gabelles is attended. Fraud againſt the king, and oppreſſion to the ſubject, are the natural conſequence of every arbitrary ſyſtem of taxation, where no proportion is obſerved between the quantum of the tax and the nature of the commodity, nor any regard had to the condition and means of that rank of the people, on whom the chief weight of it muſt fall. Tyranny in general defeats its own purpoſe. The people are oppreſſed, and the revenue ſuffers.

Aides are one of the king's general farms, conſiſting principally of the duties levied on wine.—Tranſlator.

*
£. 57, 703, 475: 6: 4½
4.

With great ſubmiſſion to the author, his idea of paying off a million and a half at par, even in time of peace, when ſtocks are only eleven or twelve per cent. under it, is out of all reaſon, and would be conſidered as little ſhort of madneſs in this country. It would be making a preſent of eleven or twelve pounds to every proprietor of a hundred, who might have the good fortune to be firſt paid off. It is not neceſſary to ſuggeſt in what manner that advantage might be diſtributed. The purſuing ſuch a plan in time of war would be ſtill more waſteful and unreaſonable. To pay off a debt at three per cent. with one hand, while government is obliged to borrow money at four or five per cent. with the other, leads directly ad abſurdum. You pay off a creditor whom you are not obliged to pay off; you do it at a time when you want money moſt; the ſame money is lent you again at a higher intereſt than it ſtood at before, and you muſt lay a new tax upon the people to pay the intereſt of the new loan. This, I preſume, will not bear an argument.

When a perſon of great abilities propoſes any thing that ſeems to carry an inſurmountable objection upon the face of it, inferior men ought to ſuſpect their own want of apprehenſion, and confeſs that they are more likely to miſunderſtand, than he to miſtake. A very able Engliſh writer affirms, that when money is wanted for the public ſervice, the difference, between borrowing a million and taking it out of the ſinking fund, is infinitely in favor of the former. Upon this I obſerve, firſt, that the laying a new tax on the people is an objection to his ſcheme, to which he does not give a ſatisfactory anſwer; yet, without a new tax, he cannot avail himſelf of the compound intereſt of the debt he diſcharges; and how new taxes are to be raiſed in this country to any conſiderable amount, is a queſtion much more eaſily anſwered by projectors in the cloſet, than by miniſters in the cabinet. Secondly, his ſuppoſition, that when you pay off a million of the four per cents. at par, you can immediately borrow an equal ſum at the ſame intereſt, ſeems totally gratuitous and unwarrantable. As at preſent there are no four per cents. redeemable, let us apply his propoſition to the three per cents. With reſpect to the argument it is the ſame thing. The medium price in time of war may fairly be taken at ſeventy-five pounds. The queſtion then is, whether paying off a million at par will raiſe the price of ſtocks twenty-five per cent. If not, it is ſelf-evident, that government cannot borrow a million at three per cent. for the current ſervice. If the medium price of a debt of a hundred and thirty millions be ſeventy-five per cent. the proportionate price of a hundred and twenty-nine millions would be only £. 75 11 6 6/12. But to ſpeak largely, let us ſuppoſe, that ſtocks would riſe to eighty, which ſurely is an allowance beyond all probability. The reſult of the operation would then be, that government to-day pays off a million at three per cent. and borrows it again to-morrow at three and three quarters, without reckoning the value of the douceur that muſt be given to the ſubſcriber to tempt him to prefer the new ſubſcription to the old funds.

At the ſame time I do not mean to deny the uſe and benefit of a permanent ſinking fund to operate in war as well as peace, with this ſuppoſition always, that the utmoſt advantage is taken of the low price of ſtocks, and that taxes be not ſo multiplied as to defeat themſelves. The ſtate then makes a compound intereſt of the ſum it applies to the diſcharge of debt, whereas it pays only a ſimple intereſt for the ſum it borrows; and it is to be preſumed, that the people would chearfully ſubmit to ſome increaſe of taxes, provided they ſaw the produce of the ſinking fund prudently as well as ſtrictly applied to the diſcharge of debt.

It is highly to the honor of the Noble Lord now at the head of the treaſury, that the idea of diſcounting the public debt was firſt adopted in his adminiſtration. The ſignal ſucceſs of the firſt attempt in 1771, will undoubtedly encourage him to perſevere in the ſame ſyſtem, whenever the ſituation of public affairs will admit of it. Speculative or fanciful objections are not to be regarded, when the public is manifeſtly benefited, and the creditor, who is the party immediately concerned, is not only ſatisfied with the terms offered him, but eager to ſubſcribe to them. A ſcheme of this nature has a double edge. It either raiſes the price of ſtocks, or gives the public the advantage of diſcharging its debts at a low price. The very decline of public credit increaſes the power of reſtoring it.

To this plan there ſeems to be but one poſſible improvement. If, after an impartial conſideration, it ſhould be thought worthy of trial, the immenſe importance of the object will, it is to be hoped, unite all parties in promoting its ſucceſs. To thwart or embarraſs a plan evidently calculated to ſerve the public, without the poſſibility of anſwering any miniſterial purpoſe, would diſgrace a patriotic oppoſition. Every public-ſpirited meaſure ſhould have the privilege of holy ground, on which, amidſt the war of parties, it ſhould be deemed ſacrilege to commit hoſtilities. The general idea of making the utmoſt advantage of the low price of the funds, in favor of the public, is obvious enough, and has often occurred to others, though no plan of this kind has yet been ſeriouſly attempted. It is propoſed, that the legiſlature ſhould, from year to year, intruſt a committee of the houſe of commons with a power of purchaſing ſtock for the uſe of the public at the market price, at ſuch times, and in ſuch proportions, as they ſhould think proper, to the amount of the available ſurplus of the ſinking fund. There might be difficulties in the execution, as there are in every new enterpriſe; but they would not be inſurmountable. In theory I ſee no ſolid objection. The choice of the committee ought to be determined by one at leaſt out of three qualifications, high office, great property, and perſonal character. It is eſſential to the execution of ſuch a ſcheme, that no ſtep be taken without the concurrence of government, repreſented by ſome of its principal miniſters. The private property of the committee would be a ſecurity againſt fraud and miſmanagement; at the ſame time that the perſonal reputation of the managers would give credit to the ſcheme, and engage the confidence of the public. There are but two grounds on which it might be oppoſed with any appearance of argument, and theſe ſeem rather topics of declamation than of ſolid objection. It will be ſaid, that it is diſgraceful to a great nation to buy up its own debts in the market at a lower rate than that at which they were contracted. It will alſo be ſaid, that the committee will have it in their power to raiſe or ſink the ſtocks at pleaſure, and by that means to buy and ſell for their private advantage. To the firſt I anſwer, that there is no diſgrace where there is no injuſtice; and that, where no violence is offered to the creditor, he cannot be ſaid to ſuffer injuſtice. Volenti non fit injuria. It is in his option to ſell or not, as he thinks proper. If he ſells, it muſt be totally indifferent to him whether government or a private perſon be the purchaſer. Far from being injured by government's acting in competition with other purchaſers, the value of his property would inevitably be improved by it. The objection on the ſcore of national dignity muſt at this time be thought particularly frivolous, after the ſucceſs of the plan for the year 1771. In that inſtance government paid off a debt of a hundred with ninety; and, though the mode be a little different, the effect is the ſame. The man who voluntarily ſells his ſtock to government at eighty-eight, is as much a ſubſcriber to this ſcheme as he who ſubſcribed it in at ninety was a ſubſcriber to the other; nor can there be a doubt that, if all the three per cents. were at once paid off at eighty-eight, the preſent body of proprietors would receive a greater ſum than their ſtock originally coſt them. In ſhort, the circumſtances of the nation are ſuch as juſtify any meaſures tending to leſſen the incumbrance of the public debt, except violence to the creditor, or breach of parliamentary faith. Generoſity at this ſeaſon to the public creditor would but ill agree with the debtor's ſituation; and, after all, who is the public creditor? A perſon, or number of perſons, who, when money has been wanted, have taken every poſſible advantage of the diſtreſs or neceſſities of government. To the ſecond objection I anſwer, that no great operation whatſoever can be executed without placing a confidence ſomewhere. This confidence would be annual, and ſubject to a parliamentary reviſion. But it is unſair and unwarrantable to ſuppoſe, that ten or twelve gentlemen, of the firſt conſequence in the kingdom, of different parties, views, and connexions, would enter into a combination (for without it they could do nothing) to avail themſelves of a fluctuation in the price of ſtocks; and, if they did, the fluctuations would not be great or quick enough to enable them to do much miſchief. It may be added that, as their only buſineſs would be to buy, they could only raiſe and never ſink the market price of the commodity; and it would be eaſy to reſtrain them from inveſting large ſums at once. On the other hand, the poſitive advantages of the ſcheme would be numerous and important.

The committee would buy up ſtock on better terms than could be obtained by a ſubſcription, becauſe they would buy at the current price, and always prefer that ſtock that happened to be loweſt in the market. Together with the principal they would purchaſe the growing intereſt, which might go in aid of their fund, and be reinveſted in the purchaſe of capital ſtock; and very ſmall ſums might be inveſted with the ſame proportionate advantage as great ones; ſometimes perhaps with greater advantages. The continued expectation of the committee's inveſtment would keep up the price of ſtocks, as it would take place by degrees; and no man could poſitively know when their whole fund was exhauſted. In this reſpect the effect of a ſubſcription is momentary.

But of all the advantages attending ſuch a ſcheme, the moſt material is, that it is to be carried through without the aſſiſtance of a lottery. The conſtant uſe of this expedient in time of peace is like the daily uſe of wine to young men. In one inſtance we anticipate the reſources of war and diſtreſs; in the other, we anticipate the comforts of decrepitude and old age. In both we raiſe a momentary ſupply of falſe ſpirits, at the expence of health and conſtitution. Without entering minutely into the numberleſs objections againſt lotteries, it may be ſufficient to obſerve in general, that ſince every ſpecies of gaming is deſtructive of induſtry, that game muſt be moſt ſo that offers the greateſt temptation to the lower rank, who, for the benefit of the ſtate, as well as their own, ſhould conſtantly be employed. At any other game a great profit is not expected from ſucceſs. In a lottery, the man who buys but the ſixteenth of a ticket, fixes his eye upon the great prize, and expects to make his fortune. The lottery offices, by accommodating their ſchemes to every man's circumſtances, lay all the laboring rank of people under a grievous contribution, and extort a tax even from wretches who pay nothing to the ſtate. Great miniſters cannot know or conceive to what extent theſe abuſes are carried, nor how much they tend to corrupt the morals of the people. But great miniſters ſhould know at leaſt, that loſs of induſtry in the ſubject is loſs of revenue to the ſtate. Even an intermiſſion of a year or two might have this good effect, that a lottery would appear with ſo much the more novelty, and be filled by thoſe who have money enough to purchaſe entire tickets. Other abuſes might be corrected by the legiſlature.—Tranſlator.

5.
As the ſeveral duties, appropriated to the ſupport of the civil liſt, are now carried into, and made part of, the aggregate fund, it is but juſt that this fund ſhould firſt make good the charge of the civil liſt, before the ſurplus or any part of it is carried to the ſinking fund. As the above duties produce more than the limited ſum of Eight hundred thouſand pounds, which his preſent Majeſty was pleaſed to accept for the ſupport of his civil government, the difference is a conſiderable improvement to the ſinking fund.—Tranſlator.
6.

Before we enter into the general queſtion of the benefit or diſadvantage of converting a part of the capital debt into life annuities, it may be proper to take notice of the defects and inaccuracy of the author's ſcheme, as they appear upon the face of it. He propoſes that the four per cents. or three per cents. ſhall be received at par; and that ſubſcriptions in money ſhall be received indiſcriminately with ſtock. In the firſt place it is clear, that no money would be ſubſcribed; nor indeed does he reckon upon it. But it is equally certain, that none of the redeemable four per cents. would have been ſubſcribed. If a proprietor of a four per cent. annuity intended to change it into a life annuity of ſeven and a half, he would of courſe ſell it, and buy ſtock at three per cent. and ſubſcribe the latter, pocketing the difference between the market price of the two ſtocks. The calculation therefore requires an amendment. As no ſtock, but the three per cents. would be ſubſcribed, the ſinking fund muſt contribute a larger ſum than the author ſuppoſes to pay the life annuities. The intereſt of twelve millions and a half at three per cent. is only 375, 000l. conſequently the ſum taken in the firſt year out of the ſinking fund would be 562, 500l. This however is only an error of calculation eaſily rectified. Another much more material objection is, that, by receiving the three per cents. at par, when in the market they could only be ſold at eighty-ſeven or eighty-eight, the author makes a preſent of twelve or thirteen per cent. to every ſubſcriber, in addition to the life annuity. It is not neceſſary to remark how extravagant and unthrifty a bargain this would be for the public.

The firſt great advantage, which the author propoſes by converting a portion of the debt into life annuities, would be the taking ſuch a quantity of ſtock at once out of the market, which of courſe would raiſe the value of the remainder. He conceives that, if the average price of the three per cents. be eighty-ſeven, when the whole debt is one hundred and thirty millions, an operation that paid off, or relieved the market of ſixteen millions nine hundred thouſand pounds (which is thirteen per cent. upon the whole debt) ought to raiſe the price of ſtocks to par; and this is an advantage which he thinks cannot be purchaſed too dear. The ſecond advantage he expects from life annuities, is the increaſe of conſumption and expence, which ultimately turns to the improvement of the revenue. A man whoſe annuity is raiſed from three pounds to ſeven and a half, contributes, by his expence, more than double what he did, to the taxes upon every article of conſumption; and the ſtate by this means recovers a conſiderable part of the additional annuity. Perhaps alſo it may deſerve the attention of a mere financier, that increaſing the means of luxury tends to ſhorten the lives of the annuitants, whoſe annuities fall in ſo much the ſooner, and improve the ſinking fund. Upon this principle, the value of an apoplexy might be computed, and a general indigeſtion be conſidered as one of the reſources of the ſtate. The probable mortality among the annuitants has been ſeriouſly reckoned upon, in France, as a good argument in favor of granting life annuities. The third advantage to be expected from them is, that whatever portion of the ſinking fund is ſet apart for this ſervice, ceaſes to be in the diſpoſition of parliament, and conſequently is not liable to be miſapplied.

On the other ſide of the queſtion, the objections to life annuities are numerous and important. Firſt, they are a check to induſtry, and an encouragement to idleneſs, by enabling the annuitant to live upon his income. In England, the claſs of people who do nothing is ſufficiently ſtocked. Secondly, they are a check to marriage and population, becauſe they exhauſt all the reſources of the individual in ſecuring an affluent ſubſiſtence for himſelf, and leave no proviſion for poſterity. Thirdly, they are expenſive and injudicious, merely as a meaſure of finance, becauſe none but the beſt lives would be given in. An aged or infirm perſon can make more than ſeven and a half per cent. by ſinking his capital. Doctor Price has demonſtrated that, if the ſame annual ſum, which muſt be ſet apart for paying the additional annuity, were applied as far as it would go, together with the ſavings of intereſt, to pay off principal debt at par, it would diſcharge more than double the quantity of debt that would be extinguiſhed by the falling-in of the life annuities in a given period. This objection is fatal, and makes it unneceſſary to inſiſt on any others.

With reſpect to the appropriation of a large portion of the ſinking fund, in order to take it, as much as poſſible, out of the diſpoſition of parliament; it is to be obſerved that, by carrying our diſtruſt in parliament to an extreme, the nation may be deprived of a great reſource upon the approach of ſome critical emergency, when money at any rate muſt be had, to ſave the ſtate. Taxed and loaded as we are, the miniſter has by no means a plentiful choice of reſources before him; and ſuppoſing the ſinking fund as ſtrictly approprrated to the diſcharge of principal, as the other funds are to pay the intereſt of debt, it concerns the public creditor very nearly, to conſider in what way parliament is to raiſe an extraordinary ſupply in ſuch a moment of diſtreſs, as may threaten the ſafety of the commonwealth. In one caſe there would be a temporary miſapplication of a fund intended to reduce the capital debt; in the other there would be no remedy, but applying part of the intereſt to the current ſervice. The election then propoſed to the public creditor is, whether he would have the payment of his principal debt deferred, or run a very manifeſt hazard of a reduction of intereſt. Beſides this, if we look back to facts, we are not warranted to ſuſpect, that parliament will not continue to apply the ſinking fund, in ſome tolerable degree, to the payment of debt. They have done much more than the author pretends to do with his life annuities, though it muſt be confeſſed, that there have been conſiderable miſapplications of the ſinking fund, and that with better management a much greater portion of debt might have been diſcharged—Tranſlator.

*
This was written in 1763, when the redeemable four per cents. had not been redeemed. The ſcheme however may be applied to any other ſtock upon ſimilar terms.—Author.
In the year 1763, they were about ninety.—Author.
7.

Good uſe might be made of this idea of a tax upon collateral ſucceſſions. At the ſame time I am by no means ſatisfied with the arguments, by which the author ſupports his propoſal. Firſt, its being univerſally adopted as a tax ſince the time of the Romans, proves nothing with reſpect to the right which a nation has to depart from its engagements to its creditors. Secondly, the mildneſs of the tax depends upon the quantum, and does not of itſelf juſtify the principle. Thirdly, the nation, as debtor, is party againſt its creditors. The conſent of the nation therefore, repreſented or expreſſed by parliament, would not juſtify a violation of ſpecific agreements with the public creditor. If it would, the national debt might ſoon be reduced to nothing. Fourthly, an exemption in favor of foreigners, beſides the difficulty, not to ſay the impoſſibility of diſtinguiſhing foreign property, would be highly unreaſonable and unjuſt. Natives and foreigners lend their money to government exactly upon the ſame ſecurity, and under the ſame engagements. On what principle of juſtice therefore ſhall the property of the one be exempt from a burthen which is impoſed upon the other? So unfair a diſtinction would be received with indignation, and could not fail of defeating the meaſure.

If a tax of this nature ſhould hereafter be adopted, it muſt not be confined to the funds, but muſt be extended generally to all perſonal property, and even to real eſtates. When collateral ſucceſſions of every kind are made the object of a general tax, there will be no reaſon to exempt the funds.—Tranſlator.

*
There is a tax more equitable than any other, which England might make uſe of with ſignal advantage to the kingdom, I mean a tax upon ſervants, on the ſame footing as in Holland. That exceſſive luxury, which multiplies the number of idle, lazy, uſeleſs ſervants, is injurious to the whole body of the ſtate. It forms an inſolent army, that carries on a perpetual war with virtue and good manners. Servants are the inſtruments and encouragers of vice, libertiniſm, and debauchery, a heap of uſeleſs hands taken from the plough, from manufactures, army, and marine. They, who through pride, oſtentation, and vanity, are determined to feed and clothe theſe deſerters of their poſt, ought to make good the loſs to the ſtate by ſome ſort of equivalent. I would have thoſe, who keep only two or three ſervants, which may be decent and neceſſary, pay only ten ſhillings a head. They who keep four ſhould pay one pound a head; two pounds a head for five, four pounds a head for ſix, and ſo on, doubling the tax upon every ſervant beyond the number allowed. Great advantages would ariſe from the inſtitution of ſuch a tax. People of rank and fortune would contribute largely to the revenue. Immenſe ſums would be received from the hands of Plutus, pride, and vanity. This is drawing taxes from their true ſource. The lower ranks of men would make ſome uſeful reflections, and recover from the folly of multiplying their domeſtic enemies. They would reſtore a number of ſubjects to the ſtate, whom neceſſity would reſtore to the uſeful employments of arts or agriculture. This tax ſhould alſo be inviolably conſecrated to the increaſe of the ſinking fund.—Author.
*
It has been a thouſand times repeated, and many people believe, that England, ſince the peace, has conſtantly contracted new debts to pay the intereſt of the old ones. Nothing can be more falſe. Government has almoſt every year negotiated a loan at three per cent. with the aſſiſtance of a lottery, in order to convert the navy bills (which made part of the unfunded debt) and other four per cent. annuities into three per cents. Excluſive of this converſion, government has every year redeemed and extinguiſhed ſome portion of the above debt; ſo that, from the concluſion of the peace of Fontainbleau to the year 1770 incluſive, about eleven millions of capital debt have been actually paid off, without reckoning reductions of intereſt. In the preſent year, 1770, government has paid off a million and a half at three and a half per cent, borrowed in 1756, and a hundred thouſand pounds of navy debt, not to reckon a quantity of the four per cents. reduced to three.—Author.
8.
As the public debt is at preſent circumſtanced, the idea of a tax upon the transfer of ſtock is wholly chimerical. To impoſe it by mere authority of the legiſlature would be a direct violation of the faith of parliament to the public creditor, and ſerve as a precedent for other operations of the ſame nature. Yet it muſt be confeſſed that the author's ſcheme is ingenious, and by no means impracticable in the caſe of any future loan. People, who inveſt their money in the ſtocks, ſeldom think of ſelling out in a ſhort time. The difference between ſelling ninety-nine inſtead of a hundred, at a diſtant period, would make very little difference in the preſent value of one hundred pounds ſtock, on which the purchaſer receives the complete intereſt of a hundred pounds, as long as he continues to hold the ſtock. The effect of ſuch a condition, annexed to the transfer of ſtock, would be ſlow and inſenſible, with reſpect to the diminution of the capital debt; but, as the operation would be conſtant, the debt would be gradually lowering every day, and in time be diſcharged. Small means conſtantly operating are congenial to our political conſtitution. Violent or rapid meaſures belong to arbitrary governments, and in all governments are a ſign of diſtreſs. In the preſent depreſſed ſtate of our funds, the miniſter has but very few expedients within his reach. If, by exerting all the means within his power, the price of the three per cents. could be raiſed a little above par, meaſures might then be fallen upon, to engage the proprietors to ſubſcribe in their ſtock, ſubject to the condition of being transferred to every future purchaſer ſucceſſively at one per cent. leſs than what it ſtood at in the name of the laſt proprietor, and the intereſt to decreaſe in the ſame proportion, and the deduction upon both principal and intereſt to commence from the next enſuing day of paying the dividends. This would be a ſtroke of finance ſuperior to any thing that has ever been attempted or thought of in this country. Inſtead of truſting entirely to the zeal and oeconomy of future miniſters, we ſhould at once put the debt into a courſe of diſcharging itſelf, and annex a periſhable quality to an evil, which, in its preſent ſtate, ſeems to be immortal.—Tranſlator.
*
I cannot ſuppreſs an idea that occurs to me, with reſpect to the tax upon the transfer of funded property. I know with how much repugnance it was received in France, and I foreſee what would be the conſequence in England, if this ſtring ſhould ever be touched. Yet I intreat every judicious Engliſhman to lend a little of his attention to the following reflections. Suppoſe the financier, who firſt introduced the ſyſtem of loans upon annuities, had conceived the following ſcheme; I aſk whether any perſon would have objected to it, and whether credit and circulation would not have been ſupported with ſtill greater eaſe than they have been. Suppoſe government, in the firſt inſtance, had demanded only ninety-nine pounds from the ſubſcriber, yet agreed to pay intereſt upon a hundred, on condition that, when he ſold that ſtock, he ſhould only be allowed to transfer ninety-nine, and the purchaſer to receive intereſt upon ninety-nine, but ſubject to the ſame condition of transferring only ninety-eight, and ſo on. Nobody would have regarded the paltry defalcation of one per cent. but conſidered it as eſſential to the nature of the fund, and the beſt method of ſecuring the credit of it. An inſtitution of this ſort would annex a redemption to the eſſence of the fund, which, in the courſe of frequent transfers, would inſenſibly be reduced to nothing. The national debt could never have reached its preſent exceſſive volume. Our anxiety for poſterity would be removed, and every auxiliary analagous meaſure, directed to the ſame object, would be ſo much the more eaſy and effectual. This, I apprehend, is a plain, palpable truth, within every man's comprehenſion. But it will be ſaid, What ſignifies regretting what is paſt? Will it cure the preſent evil? I leave the anſwer to the reader. The importance and utility of the meaſure are ſufficiently obvious. A time may come, when neceſſity may oblige the nation to ſacrifice a ſmall part to the preſervation of the whole. Sooner or later it muſt be done. The mode of doing it is the point to be conſidered. In the mean time it is certain that if, during ten years of peace, a light tax upon the ſale or transfer of all the real and funded property of the kingdom were employed in paying off the national debt, it might be reduced to a point, below which it could not be lowered without imprudence. Government would then be at its eaſe to ſecure peace abroad, diminiſh taxes in general, and take off thoſe which might be moſt burthenſome to the nation. If this method ſhould ever be adopted, whether from neceſſity or patriotiſm, I muſt add this warning to it, that with reſpect to the ſtocks, it is in my opinion eſſential, that the one per cent. ſhould never be received in money as a tax entitling the holder to transfer a hundred pounds of ſtock. That money might be applied to other purpoſes, and the remedy would be empirical. At every ſucceſſive transfer, the purchaſer muſt receive a capital of one per cent. leſs than the laſt holder. This is more eſſential than people may be aware of. If it were poſſible for the nation to reliſh ſuch a meaſure, together with a tax upon collateral ſucceſſions, and the converſion of a portion of the principal debt into life annuities, I would anſwer that, under a prudent adminiſtration, peace might be firmly eſtabliſhed, and that, in leſs than ten years, things would be in a condition to admit of a ſenſible diminution of taxes.—Author.
9.
Life annuities are as much of a redeemable nature as any other, provided they are redeemed with the conſent of the proprietors. With this condition the repurchaſe of ſuch annuities is not liable to any of the objections ſtated by the author. The project of the French government was to the higheſt degree unjuſt and impolitic, becauſe they meant to force the proprietors to give up their annuities for the original purchaſe-money; by which they would have made it impoſſible to raiſe money hereafter by the ſale of annuities, let the diſtreſs of the ſtate be ever ſo urgent. In fact, it was a mere gaſconade on the part of the French miniſtry, by which they alarmed the annuitants, and injured the credit of government, to no purpoſe. Their intention was to give the public a great opinion of their reſources, by intimating that they had money in hand, which in reality they had not.—Tranſlator.
*
They, who ſink their capital upon the above motives, conſult their own intereſt, as well as that of their ſucceſſors. The ſucceſs of the plan depends upon the luck of the annuitant. It can never be ſaid, that theſe people ſacrifice the property of their poſterity to their own eaſe. This, like any other way of laying out one's money, is a queſtion of ſpeculation and convenience. As for unmarried perſons, or libertines, it would be the ſame thing. They would equally waſte their fortunes, without reſerving the ſame reſource. In this matter the propoſitions of theory and ſpeculation are contradicted by practice. The remonſtrances of the parliament againſt life annuities are a maſter-piece of eloquence and patrotiſm. Yet, for one family ruined by the loſs of its capital, there are ten that are ſupported by life annuities. The benefit at leaſt, which the nation in general derives from them, is far ſuperior to the miſchief they have done to individuals. The great maſs of them conſiſts of perſons who lay out their money for the intereſt of their families, and of their poſterity. The reprobate claſs ſo juſtly condemned by the parliament, forms but a ſmall portion of the whole.—Author.
10.
A apitation or poll-tax is not the reſource of a rich or a free country. In all countries it is a check to circulation, and a ſure ſign of a languiſhing, exhauſted conſtitution. Things are in a bad way when every tax on general conſumption is run to the dregs, and when the ſtate can only be ſupported by the real, exiſting riches of a few of its ſubjects. The diſtribution of a poll-tax muſt be arbitrary and unequal, without a previous inquiſition into every man's perſonal fortune, which would be inſupportable to the people, and raiſe an univerſal odium againſt government; at the ſame time that ſuch an inquiſition could never be carried to any tolerable certainty or exactneſs. On the other hand, a light tax laid indiſcriminately, without diſtinction of fortune, would not anſwer in point of produce, and be liable to the fatal objection of taxing the poor as high as the rich. In England a poll-tax has conſtantly been held in deteſtation by the ſubject, without anſwering the purpoſe or expectation of government.—Tranſlator.
*
Eſſential ſervices, which I have ſince received from him in London, entitle him to my warmeſt gratitude.—Author.
*
‘"Optimum, et in privatis familiis, et in republicâ, vectigal duco eſſe parſimoniam."—Cicero.
1.

Increaſing the numerary wealth, and raiſing the nominal value of the coin, are two different things, which in this place the author ſeems to confound. The firſt is done by increaſing either the quantity of ſpecie without altering the ſtandard, or by multiplying the ſigns that repreſent it, and which, as long as credit is ſupported, anſwer all the purpoſes of ſpecie. The ſecond, in an arbitrary government, may be done ad infinitum; that is, you may coin an ounce of ſilver into ten pieces, or twenty, inſtead of five, and call each piece a ſhilling; but neither the king nor nation will be one penny the richer by it. Suppoſe, for example, the whole ſpecie of the kingdom conſiſted of a million of guineas. If the notes of a bank, or company, or government ſecurities, can be circulated at par to the amount of another million, the numerary wealth of the nation is actually doubled. But if, inſtead of this operation, it ſhould be thought adviſeable to recoin the million of guineas into two million of pieces, and ſtill to call each piece a guinea, the effect would not be the ſame. The numerary wealth of the nation would not be doubled, but remain exactly as it was. In ſpite of the nominal value, the new money would in effect be reduced to its intrinſic value, that is, the new guinea would not purchaſe more than half the old one. I ſpeak of a ſtate that has intercourſe with other nations. An inſulated ſtate, that had no foreign connections whatſoever, might agree upon arbitrary ſigns of wealth among themſelves, without any regard to intrinſic value. On the above principles, admitting the nominal revenue of Lewis XV. to double that of Harry IV. it does not neceſſarily follow, that the real wealth of the former ſhould ſurpaſs that of the latter.

By the following calculation it appears, that the revenue of the preſent king falls far ſhort of that of his immediate predeceſſor, as it ſtood in the year 1683; from which period the royal revenues, though improved by new taxes, and nominally increaſing, have conſtantly declined in real value.

In 1683, Lewis the XIVth's fixed revenue amounted to 116, 873, 476 livres.

In 1754, Lewis the XVth's fixed revenue amounted to 200,000,000 ditto.

But if a computation be made of the intrinſic value of the livre at thoſe different periods, it will appear that Lewis XIV. had a much greater revenue than his ſucceſſor, without reckoning the increaſe in the price of things. In 1683, twenty-eight livres were equal to the mark of ſilver. In 1754, the mark of ſilver was worth 49 livres, 16 ſols. Now

116, 873, 476 livres, at 28 to the mark, are worth4,174,052 5/7 marks of ſilver.
200,000,000 livres, at 49,16 to ditto,—4,116,466 ditto.
Difference in favor of Lewis XIV.57,586 5/7

N. B. The ſum of two hundred millions ſeems to be taken as a round ſum for the preſent king's revenue. The following particular ſtate, given by Monſieur de Mirabeau, raiſes it higher.

STATE of the REVENUES of the EXCHEQUER.
Taxes not farmed.Livres.
Land Tax 43,158,159103,091,502
Winter Quarters 9,074,480
Particular Duties 3,135,944
Capitations 25,192,000
Free Gifts 12,603,865
Capitation of the Pays d'Etats 9,927,054

General and particular Farms, &c.Livres.
Brought over 103,091,502
General Farms 110,000,000
Farms of Poiſſy500,0003,834,000
Farms of Lorraine3,334,000
Nett Produce of Duties on Leather 1,166,000
Caſual Revenue 1,000,000
Total 219,091,502

Which, reckoning the crown of three livres at 2s. 5d. ½, amounts to £. 8,976,665: 14: 1 ¾ ſterling.—Tranſlator.

*
It was only towards the end of the laſt century that loans began to be reduced to ſyſtem.—Author.
2.

This operation required an explanation, with which the author has favored me. The fiftieth penny was to be paid at four periods. The treaſury, or rather the ſtate, was preſſed for money. It was apprehended, that private perſons would keep their money locked up, in order to have it ready to make good their reſpective payments, which would have checked circulation. To prevent this inconvenience, and at the ſame time to obtain an immediate ſupply of money, they iſſued receipts bearing intereſt, upon which private perſons advanced money. Theſe receipts were afterwards paid in at the treaſury, on account of the tax, as the reſpective periods came round. By theſe means the ſtate obtained an immediate ſupply, circulation was promoted, the payment of the tax was facilitated, and the repreſentative ſigns of the current ſpecie were augmented for a time.

The produce of the above tax did not anſwer the expectations of government. Few people gave in an exact ſtate of their property; ſo that, inſtead of two percent. ſcarce one half per cent. was actually paid, and government was obliged to have recourſe to a lottery and other expedients.—Tranſlator.

3.
The farmers general are forty in number, with a ſtanding army under them of clerks, taxgatherers, exciſemen, &c.—Tranſlator.
*
While this work was in the preſs, I met with a new treatiſe, entitled "Dialogues on the Corn Trade." The remarks it contains are excellent, uſeful, brilliant, profound, and inſtructive. In this book the cultivation and exportation of corn are placed in their true point of view, without enthuſiaſm. Notwithſtanding the familiar ſtyle of dialogue, every article is treated analytically. I found in it ſome of my own ideas. In other inſtances, where my ideas were looſe and confuſed, I found myſelf corrected. Speaking of taxes, he ſays, ‘"That, ſince the great Colbert, the nature of taxation is underſtood. A diſtinction is made between duties for the purpoſe of revenue, and duties for the purpoſe of encouragement. The virtue and effect of the book of rates are underſtood. Some duties, it is well known, are no more than political ſluices, that direct the levels of the different canals of commerce; that they muſt be laid upon the importation of foreign manufactures, to encourage our own; and upon the exportation of raw materials, in order to promote the internal manufactures of the country."’ —Author.
4.
One of the beſt arguments in favor of duties upon imports at the cuſtom-houſe is, that they are the leaſt felt by the people. ‘"If prudently managed, the people hardly conſider that they pay them at all; for the merchant is eaſy, being ſenſible he does not pay them for himſelf; and the conſumer, who really pays them, confounds them with the price of the commodity, in the ſame manner as Tacitus obſerves, That the emperor Nero gained the reputation of aboliſhing the tax on the ſale of ſlaves, though he only transferred it from the buyer to the ſeller; ſo that it was, as he expreſſes it, remiſſum magis ſpecie quam vi; quia cum venditor pendere juberetur, in partem pretii emptoribus accreſcebat."’ Blackſtone, i. 306.—Tranſlator.
5.
Monſieur de Mirabeau writes pecule, which conveys no ſenſe in this paſſage. It is ſuppoſed he meant pecune, coined money.—Tranſlator.
6.
The encouragement of manufactures has long ſince ceaſed to be a favorite, or rather a faſhionable theme, among thoſe French political writers, who have the good of their country moſt vehemently at heart. Within theſe few years it has been diſcovered in France, that their neglect of agriculture, and their attention to manufactures, have been the ruin of the nation. The upright and ingenious Monſieur de Mirabeau was one of the firſt, who ſounded the alarm to his countrymen, and warned them of the danger of providing for the luxuries at the expence of the neceſſaries of life. Every ignorant pamphleteer now takes up the argument where Monſieur de Mirabeau left it, and carries it to an extreme that is only not ridiculous in a Frenchman. Surpriſed at the extraordinary efforts made and ſupported by the Engliſh nation, and ſtruck with the ſingularity of our giving a bounty upon the exportation of corn, they conceive that our only or principal reſource depends upon agriculture; and that, in order to acquire and maintain a ſuperiority over us, proportioned to their greater extent of territory and number of inhabitants, they have nothing to do but to deſtroy their looms, and ſend all France to the plough. Some of theſe writers have carried their fancies ſo far, as to aſſert, that it has long been the * deliberate inſidious policy of England to withdraw the attention of France from the cultivation of the ſoil, by ſuffering and encouraging her to take the lead of us in the ſofter arts of elegance and refinement; that, in order to make ourſelves maſters of the great article of firſt neceſſity, we have diverted their induſtry from its natural channel; that, inſtead of the manly labors of the field, we have furniſhed them with a delicate and ſedentary employment in the ſhade, and thereby not only enervated the vigor of the nation, but obliged our enemies to depend upon ourſelves for ſubſiſtence. To this curious plan of policy they never fail to attribute all our military ſucceſſes againſt them. The bounty on the exportation of corn accounts for victories and triumphs in every corner of the world. We have artfully cut off the territorial reſources of a ſuperior enemy, and conquered the giant by lifting him from the earth. Such are the chimeras with which national vanity endeavours to compenſate for national diſgraces. It may be affirmed, with greater appearance of truth, that neither the mind nor body of a Frenchman are qualified for the vigorous but patient labors of the plough. Nature diſtributes her bounty in different proportions among her children. Our neighbours have received from her a quick, lively, preſuming ſpirit, that qualifies them to ſucceed in the lighter arts of foppery or fancy. The ſedentary manufacture, the embelliſhment of dreſs, the refinements of taſte without the ſolid materials of luxury, fill up the circle of their induſtry.
"Vobis picta croco & fulgenti murice veſtis,
"Deſidiae cordi; juvat indulgere choraeis."
Their occupations require the agility of the finger, rather than the vigor of the arm; or, if they expoſe themſelves to the ſun, it is only to tend the vine, that they may ſupply the pleaſures of a richer and a wiſer nation.—Tranſlator.
*
‘"Les Anglois, en recevant nos manufactures, nous ouvrirent euxmêmes une porte à la ruine de la culture de nos terres. Le piége etoit blen tendû; il etoit difficile de reſiſter à l'appas; notre miniſtere s'y laiſſa ſurprendre."—Interets de la France, i. 23.
*
Voltaire, Age of Lewis XIV. ch. 28.
7.
It ſeems hardly credible, and yet it is unqueſtionably true, that Lewis XIV. a little before his death, in order to raiſe eight millions in ſpecie, for which he had a preſſing occaſion, was obliged to make uſe of the credit of a private perſon and his partners, to circulate reſcriptions, or aſſignments upon the revenue, to the amount of thirty-two millions, chiefly among foreigners; ſo that, for every hundred he received, he incurred a debt of four hundred. No wonder that, at this rate, he left a debt of above one hundred and eighty-four millions ſterling. The firſt advice given to the regent was to make a general bankruptcy. Money at that time was ſo ſcarce, that the beſt bills could not be diſcounted at leſs than twenty, twenty-five, or thirty per cent.—Tranſlator.
*
Age of Lewis XIV. ch. 27.
*
Cadaſtre, 9.
Age of Lewis XIV. ch. 31.
*
The title of the Rouen edition is, Detail of France, or Eſſay on the Cauſe of the Diminution of the Property of the Kingdom, and the Means of correcting it. There was another edition much enlarged in 1707, and a third in 1708, under the title of Political Teſtament of Marſhal Vauban, without naming where it was printed.—Author.
1.
During the reign of Lewis XIV. the ſplendor, which ſurrounded the throne and perſon of the monarch, ſupported the pride and courage of the people for a long time after the real foundation of national pride and courage was removed. The French ſoldier, who had never ſeen a Louis d'or, felt a noble compenſation for his poverty, in the ſpirit of ſaying, I have the honor to be a Frenchman. Since that time, the ſtate of France has ſuffered a woeful reduction. The pride of national ſuperiority is gone, and the French monarch does not know what he has loſt. No man now ſays, I have the honor to be a Frenchman. The character of the people is altered, not ſo much by private diſtreſs, though univerſal, as by the mortifying ſenſe of national degradation. The French are actually the graveſt people in Europe; and, what is not always applicable to their deportment, they have good reaſon for being ſo. Yet their ingenuity finds a ſalvo for their vanity. When diſtreſs has driven a Frenchman to lay down his coach, and walk the ſtreets in a frock, he calls it a philoſophical imitation of Engliſh ſimplicity; and, when you ſee deſpair painted in his countenance, he tells you, with a politeneſs very expreſſive of condeſcenſion, that Engliſh gravity is becoming, and that a wiſe man may profit by the example of his inferiors. But this is a wretched farce, which no degree of vanity can long ſupport. He ſinks under his ſituation, and in every inſtance yields the precedence to the Engliſh.—Tranſlator.
1.

This paſſage can have no relation to the powers of Europe, unleſs ſome one of them ſhould arrive at univerſal empire. But nothing could be more juſt than Cicero's application of it to the Roman people. He thought it both diſhonorable and impolitic, that, in a great empire, compoſed of various nations, the governing people ſhould employ themſelves in any thing but governing; that, if they engaged in commerce, they ſhould at leaſt abſtain from the inferior branches of it; that they ſhould leave all articles of petty profit to the nations under their ſubjection, and that the maſter's employment ſhould be, as much as poſſible, diſtinguiſhed from that of the ſervant. Beſides the apprehenſion of degrading the ſuperior power in point of dignity and reputation, he was too wiſe a man not to ſee, and too good a man not to feel, the conſequence of ſuffering the governing people to be rivals to their ſubjects. We ourſelves have ſeen it in an inſtance perhaps of as great magnitude and importance, as any political or commercial abuſe, that could poſſibly have exiſted in the Roman empire. The moment our greateſt trading company became ſovereigns in India, both juſtice and policy required, that the perſons, to whom the executive and legiſlative authority of their government in that country was committed, ſhould ceaſe to be merchants. Their engaging in the internal trade of the country amounted, in effect, to a prohibition againſt the natives. There can be no competition between the ſovereign and the ſubject. Freedom and equality of privileges, at leaſt to all the ſubjects of the ſame ſtate, are the foundation of commerce. Every excluſive privilege, every favorable diſtinction, whether granted to individuals or to communities, counteract the firſt principles of commerce, create monopolies, and, inſtead of being beneficial to trade, in general defeat the purpoſe they were intended to promote. But when the moſt extravagant exemptions are aſſumed by authority, and maintained by violence; when the ſovereign, or his immediate repreſentatives, appear in a character incompatible with their political duties; when they engage as merchants in a traffic, which their power as legiſlators enables them to monopoliſe; where could ſo unnatural, ſo anti-commercial a ſyſtem be expected to end, but where it has done, in the ruin of trade and induſtry, the depopulation of the country, and finally in the deſtruction or manifeſt hazard of the governing power? Private plunder and rapine could have gone no farther than to the corruption of individuals, and to the annual embezzlement of the public revenue. But for the governing power to engage upon their own terms, and with the advantage of their ſituation, in the inland trade of the country, could not fail to deſtroy all freedom of trade, and at once cut off the ſource of all future revenue. Mere peculation and miſmanagement may be recovered by care and oeconomy. But trade, once loſt or diverted, is not eaſily brought back to its former channel; but induſtry, once checked, is not eaſily revived; nor is it eaſy to repeople a great country, of which a government equally abſurd and oppreſſive, if indeed it deſerves the name of government, has made a deſert. You cannot recall the merchant whom you have baniſhed; much leſs can you recover the confidence of a timid, helpleſs people, whom your tyranny has driven to deſpair. This at leaſt muſt be the work of time, and the conſequence of a new ſyſtem of meaſures. Thoſe meaſures muſt be conducted by men acting under another and higher authority than that of the company; by men whoſe great appointments leave them equally without temptation to treſpaſs, or without excuſe if they depart from their duty; by men, in ſhort, whoſe continuance in office does not depend upon the pleaſure of a company, which hitherto has neither known how to reward merit, or puniſh demerit, among their own ſervants. The train of facts, to which theſe obſervations refer, are, by this time, tolerably well underſtood in England. Yet among the proceedings of the company's ſervants at Bengal, there is one fact, to which they have a more immediate reference, and which deſerves to be recorded and inſiſted on, not only for its great ſingularity, but as a proof how dangerous it is to truſt the mercantile ſpirit with the powers of ſovereignty. At the ſame time, when we ſee a rich and powerful body of men, unexpectedly involved in difficulties that approach to ruin, it may be a moral leſſon to remember, that fraud and injuſtice were the ſource of them. From the period, at which Meer Jaffier was raiſed to the dignity of nabob, the company's ſervants began to entertain new ideas of the extent of their privileges. Under color of the original firmaun, granted to the company by the Mogol, and to which they gave their own arbitrary interpretation, they claimed, and for ſome years exerciſed, a right of carrying on the inland trade of the country, free from any duties whatſoever. But the exemption, which they demanded for themſelves, would have been of little benefit to them, if they had ſuffered it to be extended to the natives of the country. Not contented with paying no duties themſelves, they inſiſted that no relief ſhould be given to the country merchants; and when Coſſim Ally Kawn, the nominal ſovereign of the country, ſeeing his revenues reduced to nothing, his own merchants excluded from a traffic which naturally belonged to them, his officers inſulted, and his ſubjects univerſally oppreſſed, had determined to lay the trade open by aboliſhing all duties whatſoever in his dominions, it was reſolved by a great majority of the council at Fort William, that this juſt and neceſſary act of ſovereignty was a breach of the company's privileges, and that the nabob ſhould be poſitively required to recall it. If we ſhudder at the maſſacre of a ſmall number of our own countrymen, is it poſſible to reflect without indignation upon the conduct of a ſet of men, whoſe avarice, folly, and injuſtice, were not only the cauſe of that ſhocking event, but of the murder of thouſands, and of the ruin of millions? In this country we have already ſeverely felt the effect of a ſudden glut of wealth, acquired without induſtry, and unnaturally forced without digeſtion into the maſs of circulation. But of evils of this kind we ſhall probably have no reaſon to complain hereafter. Inanition is the natural remedy of repletion. The firſt ſtep to a reformation of abuſes in India is to confine the merchant, as much as poſſible, to that trade which is properly his buſineſs. That the ſame perſons, who act as merchants upon the ſpot, ſhould enjoy any ſhare in the ſovereign or executive power, is almoſt as evident a contradiction to natural juſtice, as that the party ſhould be judge.

The reflections, contained in A View of the Engliſh Government in Bengal, upon the impoſſibility of introducing our laws into that country, are drawn up with equal ſtrength of argument, and elegance of compoſition. Yet, I think, the author has concluded too haſtily, at leaſt without premiſes ſufficient to ſatisfy a reader otherwiſe uninformed, that a new arrangement will ſoon revive the induſtry of the inhabitants, bring the waſte lands into cultivation, reſtore the manufactures and internal trade of the country, and improve the revenue. ‘"Bengal may reach a height of proſperity heretofore unknown in India. The wounds, which this country has ſuſtained, are great; and the checks, which induſtry has here received, might, in a more northern climate, almoſt ſtarve a people. But in Bengal, where the demands of nature are few, where manufactures, from various cauſes, have been preſerved amidſt ſucceſſive revolutions, theſe loſſes will be quickly retrieved."’ It is much to be feared, that all theſe good purpoſes will not be ſo eaſily accompliſhed, as the author apprehends. If in Bengal the wants of nature are few, how does it happen, that they are ſo ill ſupplied, that provinces are ſometimes depopulated by famine? Should it be ſaid, that theſe calamitous accounts have been groſsly exaggerated on one ſide, to ſerve an intereſted purpoſe, there may be reaſon to ſuſpect, that they are palliated with ſome intention on the other. It may be doubted whether the promiſe of a better government for the future will recall the inhabitant, whom the experience of the worſt government poſſible has driven away, and who has either periſhed in miſery, or found a ſettlement elſewhere. It may be queſtioned whether trade, though invited by every advantage of climate and ſituation, will ſo eaſily revert to a channel it has once deſerted; and when we conſider with what cruelty the manufacturers have been treated, and how long their country has been the ſeat of war, plunder, and oppreſſion, we may reaſonably doubt the poſſibility of manufactures having been preſerved in any degree of elegance or perfection. General maxims, founded upon the invariable experience of other nations, certainly make againſt the author, and exceptions to ſuch maxims require a clear explanation. Some of the letters from the ſelect committee acknowledge the almoſt total loſs of the foreign trade, without any proſpect of recovering it. The annual balance of that trade, in favor of Bengal, amounted, not many years ago, to more than a million ſterling, but was reduced to nothing in the year 1767. A melancholy proof of the decay of manufactures, which formerly found their way to the remoteſt parts of Indoſtan, when ſpecie flowed in by a thouſand channels, which are at preſent loſt or obſtructed; and that the ſelect committee and Mr. Verelſt himſelf had too much reaſon to deſcribe Bengal, as a ſinking country—a declining and exhauſted country. Vide page 59 and 87 of the Appendix.—Tranſlator.

2.
Theſe metaphors are too much crouded, and not ſtrictly correct. In ſtyle perhaps there is nothing more injudicious than a curious endeavour to adorn a ſubject, in itſelf not ſuſceptible of ornament, or only of ſuch as are grave and rich, not fanciful. Books, like men, ſhould be dreſſed in character. A ſerious writer, upon a ſerious ſubject, may be heated by the motion of his own thoughts, and ſometimes alter his pace; but it is only from ſlow to quick, from grave to animated, from progreſs to expedition. A thoughtful mind, intent upon its object, is often rapid, never nimble. Between the beſt Engliſh and French writers I think I perceive this conſtant diſtinction of ſtyle, that whereas the Engliſhman proceeds without meaſuring his ſteps, and heats himſelf without intending it, the Frenchman, on the contrary, minces his motions when he means to be genteel, or cuts capers to keep himſelf warm.—Tranſlator.
3.

Though we ſhould agree with the author in his main propoſition, that Holland, in her preſent ſtate, is not an object of jealouſy, and that it is the general intereſt of Europe to ſupport the republic; his way of proving it does not ſeem quite concluſive, nor conſiſtent with ſome of his own principles. If Holland be in reality ſo deſtitute, as he repreſents her, of all internal reſources, it follows, that whatever wealth ſhe acquires muſt, ſome way or other, be at the expence of her neighbours. If commerce be a game, and there be no winning with beggars, upon what terms is an opulent nation to trade with a people, who have neither commodities to exchange for ours, nor ſpecie to pay for what they purchaſe? Such a people may not now be the object of jealouſy, but their operations ſhould at all times be obſerved with ſuſpicion; and though at preſent there be but little appearance of their being able to renew thoſe ſcenes of fraud and violence, to which, much more than to their induſtry, they are indebted for the eſtabliſhment of the moſt lucrative branches of their trade, the character which produced thoſe ſcenes, if it ſhould not appear to be greatly improved, deſerves a conſtant attention. The offenſive part of it ſhould ſet other trading nations upon their guard. The prudent part of it may ſerve them for an example. Their policy in purchaſing raw materials from their neighbours, in order to employ their own manufacturers, is certainly not to be condemned. Yet the fact, upon the face of it, ſuppoſes them to exiſt by a trade of contraband. Their neighbours are themſelves manufacturers, and the laws of every manufacturing nation concur in prohibiting the exportation of raw materials. The ſpice trade is their own, and they poſſeſs it without a rival.

With reſpect to their fiſheries, the ſea is undoubtedly open to their induſtry. Whatever they draw from that ſource, is an addition of wealth to the common ſtock of Europe. But whether the liberty of fiſhing in the open ſeas implies a right of fiſhing immediately upon the coaſts of their neighbours, is a queſtion of greater political than commercial importance. It is no leſs than whether the immediate coaſts of a maritime ſtate make part of its territorial domain. If they do not, we have no property in our creeks, bays, rivers, or any other waters, that communicate with the ſea. A neutral power has no right to prohibit acts of hoſtility between neighbouring powers at war with each other, though they ſhould be committed within a few yards of the ſhore, or even in their harbours. If they do, the ſtranger who without licence avails himſelf of the produce of the ſea upon that coaſt, invades his neighbour's territorial right. The next ſtep is to reap the harveſt upon the ſhore. Rights of property, among nations as well as among individuals, are poſitive, and, for the peace of ſociety, muſt be ſtrictly preſerved. In former times, the Dutch never preſumed to begin their fiſhery upon the Engliſh coaſt, without firſt obtaining leave from the governors of Scarborough caſtle. The man, who takes what belongs to his neighbour, though for an innocent or uſeful purpoſe, eſtabliſhes a dangerous precedent againſt himſelf. Pretences for injuſtice are but too eaſily invented. But ſuppoſing the right to be in theory as doubtful and obſcure, as the learning of a Selden and a Grotius can make it, there is no doubt whatſoever, that the exerciſe of it muſt always be invidious, and naturally tend to create jealouſy and ill blood between nations, that otherwiſe might live in amity, and purſue their ſeparate intereſts without interfering with each other.

Through all this author's writings there is an apparent biaſs in favor of Holland, which, ſuppoſing him to be a native of that country, does him no diſhonor. But it is not neceſſary that the tranſlator, or the reader, ſhould implicitly adopt every opinion of the author; nor does it leſſen the merit of an ingenious writer, that all his opinions are not to be adopted. The beſt book is not that, perhaps, which contains the greateſt quantity of direct information; but rather that which invites, or compels the reader to think for himſelf. Wealth and indolence have the mean, unhappy privilege of ſubſiſting upon the genius, or induſtry, of others. If the cultivation and improvement of our faculties were regarded, we ſhould prefer that kind of inſtruction, which leaves ſomething for ourſelves to finiſh, which ſupplies us with the raw materials of thinking, and ſets the underſtanding to work. The mind itſelf has a commercial intereſt, and, if not capable of the firſt invention, in ſome degree appropriates whatever it improves.—Tranſlator.

4.
There is not perhaps oeconomy enough in the genius of the Engliſh to qualify them for ſucceeding in any branch of trade, or in any other enterpriſe, in which they muſt, ab initio, be contented to take a great deal of pains, without the hopes of more than a moderate profit. Perhaps the form and magnitude of their commerce place them above the neceſſity of little traffic, which paſſes under the name of Pedling. A kingdom, that has a great ſtock of its own, and that can preſerve itſelf without a great naval power, may certainly do without the carrying trade; that is, its people may be better employed. It is alſo true, in a mere commercial view to profit, that, ſince every advance upon the freight is in effect an advance in the price of all imports and exports, it is both the merchant's and the conſumer's intereſt to employ thoſe carriers who ſerve them upon the moſt moderate terms. But, beſides that there is a wide difference between not carrying for others, and employing others to carry for us, a great maritime power muſt attend to the increaſe and maintenance of a large body of ſeamen. We may be huſbandmen and manufacturers; but if we do not trade in our own ſhips, and navigate them with our own ſeamen, we muſt renounce that naval ſuperiority, which, if it were not eſſentially neceſſary to our ſecurity, ſhould be ſtill maintained for oſtentation. A real, or fancied national pre-eminence cannot be purchaſed too dear. It exalts the ſpirit of the people, and qualifies them for great actions. It is in view to this object, and to the ſecurity of the dependence of the colonies on the mother country, that the navigation act may be ſaid to be founded in principles of political wiſdom. The commercial intereſt, ſingly conſidered, of a nation that has an extenſive territory to cultivate, and a great natural produce to diſpoſe of, does not, in the firſt inſtance at leaſt, depend upon [...], or ſeamen. It rather conſiſts in inviting as many foreigners as [...] buyers or ſellers, to traffic with you in your own harbours. Your [...] at a low price, and your ſelling your own at a high one, depends upon [...] of ſellers and buyers who frequent the market. The diſcourageme [...] [...] upon foreigners, ariſe from the jealous ſpirit of [...] belong to the liberal genius of commerce.— [...]
8.
(5.) The action, to which the author refers, happened on the 28th of February, 1758. Cape Breton was taken in July following.—Tranſlator.
*
See the Note at the end of the Letter.
6.
The author would be puzzled to name an inſtance of a Britiſh fleet, or any part of it, having avoided an engagement. Excepting in the undecided affair off Mahon, 1756, it does not appear that our admirals or captains ever regarded the ſuperiority of the enemy.—Tranſlator.
118

(7.) ‘"L'Angleterre eſt unie avec le Portugal par des intérêts mutuels. Ce commerce reciproque eſt néceſſaire aux deux nations. L'une conſomme les produits de l'autre, et cela ne fait pas grand tort aux autres puiſſances, qui jouiſſent d'autres compen [...]ations."’—Page 266.

* ‘'England is united with Portugal by mutual intereſts. Their reciprocal commerce is neceſſary to the two nations. One conſumes the produce of the other, without any great diſadvantage to other powers, who enjoy other compenſations.'’—Pa. 222. Tranſlation.

*

The union of Great Britain and Portugal is undoubtedly founded on their mutual intereſt. It would probably have been ſtricter and more cordial than it has been, if the intereſts, on which it was originally founded, and which muſt be the ſupport of it as long as it laſts, had been better underſtood by both nations, or a little more reſolutely maintained by one of them. Our affairs in Portugal could hardly have taken the unfavorable turn they have done of late years, if there had been either true wiſdom in the councils of Portugal, or a greater degree of firmneſs in thoſe of Great Britain. I am not ſufficiently acquainted with the preſent ſtate of facts, to know whether this be a ſubject any longer intereſting to the public. If it be, it may receive ſome light from an opinion, that mediates between the merchant and the miniſter. If merchants have been too apt to urge their complaints with violence and aſperity, miniſters have been equally ready to conclude that they complained without reaſon. So eaſy a concluſion gave facility to buſineſs, and leſſened the burthen of office. The great miſtake with reſpect to the union of England and Portugal, and which ſeems to have hitherto governed the argument, is, that it is founded in an equal and reciprocal conceſſion of commercial advantages. It is an undoubted truth, though not readily admitted by Portugal, that Great Britain and Ireland are the only nations, with which Portugal can trade to advantage. No other nations take off their wines and fruit in the quantity that we do. But this is a benefit ariſing from the favorable turn their trade has taken, and from the indulgence of this country, not from the form or ſpirit of treaties. Compared, as a fact, with the true principle of union between the two nations, it improves and enforces the national argument againſt Portugal. The leſs we owe them in the ſcale of commerce, ſo much the more it will be found they are our debtors in the political balance. The principle they now contend for, that commercial equality is the baſis of the alliance, if once admitted on our part, or not firmly denied, muſt open an endleſs field for negotiation with a court, one of whoſe principal reſources, to maintain its dignity, confiſts in negotiation. I am far from meaning to lower the importance of a crown reſpectable in itſelf, and raiſed by its alliance with this country. But it is time that ſome regard ſhould be paid to truth, as well as to ceremony, and that we ſhould no longer be diverted, by forms, from the neceſſary ſupport of eſſential intereſts. A Britiſh miniſter, who is not poſſeſſed of the true meaning and ſpirit of our treaties with Portugal, who does not conſider the ſcope of thoſe treaties in a general view, will find it difficult to anſwer the court of Portugal, when they juſtify the breach of particular ſtipulations in our favor, by alledging ſome general declarations of equality of privileges, which are to be found in all the treaties; and when they conclude from thence, that our claim is no farther valid than as we, in our turn, admit theirs to be equal to it. Upon the idea that commercial intereſts only are the baſis of the alliance, their argument would be unanſwerable. If nothing but an apparent equality of commercial privileges had been in contemplation, there could be no reaſon why we ſhould be allowed a judge conſervator at Liſbon, or a right (hitherto not exerciſed) of employing our own factors in their American ſettlements, unleſs we allowed the Portugueſe the ſame privileges in return. It is not to be conceived that Portugal would have ſubmitted to ſuch conditions, without receiving an equivalent in ſome ſhape or other. The queſtion then remains, Of what nature was the equivalent intended to be? If equal compenſations of a commercial nature were intended, why were they not ſpecifically ſtipulated, or why have they never been formally demanded? The uſe the court of Portugal make of their newly-aſſumed principle is, to defend their invaſion of our privileges, not to aſſert any commercial claims of their own. If it were better founded than it is, or if, by common conſent, the connection between the two countries were reduced to mere commercial intercourſe, without any particular claim to preſerence or favor on either ſide, and without any tacit or ſpecific terms of alliance or political engagements whatſoever; I believe it would be found that this nation, as things are now ſituated, would be no loſer by the agreement. We might then open the wine trade with France on terms of infinitely greater advantage to this country than any that ariſes from the fale of our woollen goods in Portugal, which only maintain their ground there from their ſuperior quality and cheapneſs, not from any favor on the part of the Portugueſe government, who, contrary to an expreſs ſtipulation, for which we give them an equivalent, have, till very lately, admitted French woollen goods, as readily as ours. We ſhould not then be called upon, particularly and ſingly, to bear the burthen of protecting a nation, incapable of aſſiſting us if we wanted her aſſiſtance, and from which we receive no preference in point of trade, the only way in which it is poſſible for them to offer us a compenſation. We ſhould ceaſe to think ourſelves bound by an obligation, after the condition of it was withdrawn. The original and only rational principle of union between the two nations, is, that great commercial advantages, yielded on one ſide, ſhall be the compenſation for national protection on the other. This may be a topic ungrateful and offenſive to the ears of a Portugueſe miniſter, therefore unfit to be urged in every petty difference or diſcuſſion that may occur between the two courts; but it is abſolutely neceſſary to be inſiſted upon and admitted, once for all, as the baſis of all negotiation between them, and the only foundation of their alliance. If the advantages we once enjoyed in Portugal are withdrawn, if the nature of the commerce be altered, or if it be the policy of the court of Portugal to lay their trade open to all the nations of Europe indifferently; it follows, that Portugal puts nothing in the ſcale to balance the expence and hazard at which England conſtantly engages in her defence, and that whatever intereſt this country has in maintaining the independence of the crown of Portugal is only an intereſt common to us with the other trading nations of Europe, who all trade to Portugal upon the ſame, if not better terms than we do. It is not neceſſary to ſupport ſo plain and diſpaſſionate an argument, by a detail of grievances repeatedly ſet forth by the merchants, or by inſiſting upon inſtances of particular enmity, apparent in the councils of Portugal, againſt the Britiſh nation. A great part of it may have ariſen from perſonal ill-will, or want of wiſdom, in the reigning miniſter, and perhaps may ceaſe with his adminiſtration. The reſt is only a mean, ill-founded jealouſy, ariſing from a total ignorance of the true principles of commerce, and which could not exiſt in a more enlightened court. They are yet to learn, that it is the induſtry of the other European nations, which brings the gold into Portugal; and that, if it were not for the manufactures of thoſe nations, which produce this ſplendid return from the Brazils, they themſelves would loſe even the tranſitory benefit of its paſſage through Portugal. But without deſcending to engage in ill-tempered and uſeleſs altercations, without entertaining the moſt diſtant idea of hoſtility againſt Portugal, it is but juſt and reaſonable that the councils of England ſhould no longer be governed by principles, which ceaſe to be motives of conduct, when they ceaſe to correſpond with the actual ſtate of facts. If the ſyſtem of trade between the two countries be totally altered, and if there be no likelihood of recovering the advantages we have loſt, it follows that a new ſyſtem of policy alſo ſhould be adopted for the future. The independence of the crown of Portugal is not now an object of particular moment to Great Britain. If it ſhould be attacked hereafter, it may perhaps be thought adviſable to contribute ſomething to its defence. But common ſenſe and ſound policy require that our contribution ſhould be proportioned to our real intereſt in the object, and that Holland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and France, ſhould be called upon to take a ſhare in the burthen. The conſequence of adhering firmly to this ſimple and rational ſyſtem of conduct would be, that Portugal, in the moment of danger, would find herſelf deſerted by every other ſtate, and have no reſource left, but in the ſingle arm of Great Britain. We ſhould then have an opportunity of inſiſting upon ſome reaſonable equivalent for the expence and hazard, in which the defence of her cauſe might involve us, and of ſhowing a court, which preſumes upon our forbearance, that Oliver Cromwell and Charles II. have not left us a wiſe example to no purpoſe. It is not many years ſince ſuch an opportunity preſented itſelf, and was unaccountably neglected; but ere long it cannot fail of occurring to us again.

Having imputed the oppreſſion of our merchants, and the ruin of our trade with Portugal, in a great meaſure, to want of wiſdom in the reigning miniſter, it may be neceſſary to juſtify that opinion. It is not eaſy to ſay what idea the Portugueſe themſelves may entertain of the rate and extent of his abilities. They have but few opportunities of expreſſing their ſentiments with freedom, and perhaps their abſtract information may not reach far enough to judge of the wiſdom of political or commercial meaſures, but as they feel themſelves affected by the conſequences. Their general deteſtation of his perſon and government concludes only againſt that part of the human character, on which he places the loweſt value, not immediately againſt his underſtanding. In England it is the general turn to conſider him as a miniſter perſonally and politically hoſtile to the intereſts of this country, but in other reſpects active, ſagacious, and intrepid. No man has yet been hardy enough to queſtion his abilities; much leſs to pronounce upon evidence, that he is defective in every quality that conſtitutes a clear, ſolid, ſuperior underſtanding. To ſtate this matter impartially, may be of importance to both nations. Though his own life cannot laſt long, his ſyſtem of commerce and politics may exiſt after him. His long influence over the councils of Portugal has given a biaſs to the ideas of that court, which his ſucceſſors may not have judgment or reſolution enough to correct. The opinion of his great ſuperiority, impreſſed upon the mind of his royal maſter, and of a ſubordinate council compoſed of his own pupils, may perpetuate the plan of his adminiſtration. If this opinion can be ſhaken, or removed; if it can be made evident that he is, in no ſhape, qualified to conduct the affairs of a nation; it will not follow that he can be diſpoſſeſſed of the confidence of his ſovereign; but it may produce this happy effect, that his authority may not extend beyond the period of his power, and that the ſyſtem of his policy may be ſuffered to periſh with him. When we ſee a miniſter for twenty years together inveſted with unlimited power, meeting with no controul whatſoever, domeſtic or external, profeſſing to have the intereſts of his country at heart, and perpetually occupied in one project or other, with infinite induſtry and perſeverance, it ſeems natural to aſk, What good has he done? Are agriculture and manufactures upon a better footing in Portugal than when he firſt aſſumed the reins of government? Has he recovered commerce from a languiſhing ſtate, and is he likely to leave it in a flouriſhing condition? Has he ſecured the independence of the defenceleſs crown of Portugal, by confirming ancient alliances, or contracting new ones? In ſhort, are the people richer and happier than he found them? The anſwer which every man, acquainted with the ſtate of Portugal, makes to theſe queſtions, is a direct negative, and the concluſion againſt his abilities is impoſſible to be evaded. They who inſiſt warmly upon his zeal however unſucceſsful, and urge the rectitude of his intentions however unhappily diſappointed, forget they are deciding ſeverely againſt his underſtanding. It is not in fortune, conſtantly to defeat a miniſter, who poſſeſſes abſolute power, and uniformly employs it in the ſupport of wiſe and judicious meaſures. His pretended zeal for the improvement of agriculture, and increaſe of population, produced the excluſive wine company which monopoliſes the chief produce of the ſoil. The ſilk manufacture at Liſbon, undertaken in the laſt reign at a great expence, aſſiſted by prohibitions, and ſupported by all the influence of the court, has languiſhed under his care, and is actually in a ſtate of decay. The other manufactures may contribute a little to the ſupply of the lower ranks in the internal conſumption of the kingdom; but neither are they objects of importance, nor do they owe any thing to his encouragement. The trade of Portugal was in as proſperous a ſtate, as that of any country can be, which has not produce enough of its own to anſwer the demand of great and populous colonies. The colonies, it is true, were chiefly ſupplied by the induſtry of other nations, who only performed an office which the reſources of the mother country were not equal to. But Portugal was the mart of trade, and centre of communication. Inſtead of vainly attempting to detain the gold in the country, ſometimes by tricks and contrivances, ſometimes by fraud and violence, the object of Portugal ſhould have been to encourage a large importation into the colonies, by which her own navigation muſt of courſe be extended, and by making the mother country profit, as much as poſſible, by an immenſe and rapid circulation. All the commercial ideas of the miniſter are founded upon one general maxim, that trade, in order to be proſperous, ſhould not be free. Accordingly, he has heaped project upon project, and regulation upon regulation; and deſtroyed a healthy conſtitution, by confining it to a ſickly regimen, and by loading it with preſcriptions. He has made it his ſtudy to diſtreſs foreign merchants, and to drive them out of the kingdom. He has put the vineyards and their produce, the only internal ſource of wealth to Portugal, under the check and controul of a monopoly; and he has confined a conſiderable part of the Brazil trade to two excluſive companies, the principle and ſpirit of which is, to make the greateſt profits upon the ſmalleſt outſet or venture. If the Pernambucco and Maranham companies had ſucceeded, it was his intention to have taken the ſame care of the Bahia and Rio trade. But the firſt ſubſcriptions were completed with ſo much difficulty, that it would have been in vain to attempt new ones. One would think that he meant to contract the commerce of his country, and to ſtifle induſtry at its birth. The event has correſponded with the deſign. In the year 1759, the fleet from Pernambucco conſiſted of forty-five ſhips. In the year 1772, the trade to that ſettlement employed only eighteen. To ſupport the credit of the new companies, he thought it adviſable * to iſſue an edict, which ordered that their actions ſhould be a legal tender, and be accepted, at an arbitrary valuation fixed by the directors, as ſo much ſpecie; that is, in other words, that the natives, who are conſtantly the debtors, ſhould remove the burthen from themſelves, and impoſe it upon their foreign creditors. This, however, was an attempt too extravagant to be ſupported. Such are the general plans, and ſuch the temporary expedients, from which we are to collect an opinion of the miniſter's capacity. The facts I reſer to are notorious. In a country, where the true principles of trade are underſtood, it is unneceſſary to prove that, in theory, no better conſequences were to be expected from a ſyſtem ſo falſe and anti-commercial. The Portugueſe muſt be taught by experience.

To form a judgment of his political meaſures, we ſhould compare the defenceleſs ſtate of Portugal with the general plan of ambition of the united houſe of Bourbon, and the particular claims and enmity of the crown of Spain. The independence of Portugal can only be maintained by cultivating the friendſhip of the other powers of Europe, particularly by confirming the ancient alliance with the only nation that ever has, or ever can engage effectually in her defence. Theſe are eſſential objects, not to be compared with any temporary advantages, and from which a wiſe miniſter will not ſuffer his attention to be diverted. It is needleſs to ſay how little they have been regarded in the political ſyſtem of the Marquis of Pombal. Upon the whole, it muſt be admitted, that the proofs of his miniſterial abilities are of an extraordinary nature. His commercial experience and information have led him to divide the trade of his country into monopolies. His policy has taught him to provoke the natural enemies, and to alienate the natural allies, of the crown. His two ſyſtems correſpond and co-operate with each other. In conſequence of receiving all foreigners upon the ſame footing in Portugal, and of laying all foreign trade under equal reſtraint, it ceaſes to be a great natural intereſt to any one nation to maintain the independence of the kingdom. A union of inferior ſtates, in favor of a court with whom they have no ſolid foundation of alliance, is not to be expected, nor would it be effectual. His country then, with a ſmall internal force, and deſtitute of all alliance, is left expoſed to the invaſion of a ſuperior enemy, whoſe claims are not obſolete, and who do not always wait for juſt or decent pretences to act againſt Portugal; nor is there a power in Europe, to which his Moſt Faithful Majeſty can ſay with truth, ‘"It is your intereſt to protect me."’

The laſt queſtion to be conſidered is, Whether he has made the Portugueſe a richer or a happier people than he found them? If he has, it muſt be confeſſed, that the means he makes uſe of would hardly have produced that effect in any other country. If he has not, his maxim, that ſovereigns are not to be reſtrained by treaties from conſulting the internal welfare of their ſubjects, leaves him without the poſſibility of a defence. If the meaſures, which he calls expedient, fail of ſucceſs, he is precluded from pleading any obſtructions that might ariſe from the engagements of the crown with foreign nations. The concluſion reverts, with accumulated force, againſt the wiſdom and mildneſs of his adminiſtration. Hitherto it has been only marked by the blood of the principal nobility, and univerſal oppreſſion of the people. There can be no increaſe of wealth in a country where induſtry is effectually diſcouraged, and no man's property ſecure. There can be no domeſtic content or happineſs among a people, one half of which are ſpies upon the other. Racks, gibbets, and dungeons, are the emblems and reſources of his government. It is but the natural conſequence of ſuch a government, that the Portugueſe, with many advantages of perſonal character, and local ſituation, are the meaneſt and moſt degraded people, and the crown of Portugal the leaſt reſpected, of any in Europe.

Sir Benjamin Keene, who knew the Marquis of Pombal early in life, emphatically deſcribes him as a conceited and puzzled head. How far the intrepidity of his ſpirit may deſerve the opinion conceived of it, can only be determined by experiment. He may have penetration enough to ſee into the genius of the people he treats with, and may proportion his own firmneſs to their apparent want of it. But this part of his character has never been fairly put to the proof, at leaſt by Great Britain. If any farther preſumption in favor of his abilities ſhould be drawn from his having raiſed himſelf to an abſolute dominion over his country, and maintained it ſo long, it may be weakened by conſidering, that the government of Portugal is deſpotic, and that the talents and intrigues which ingratiate a ſervant with his maſter are ſometimes the leaſt likely to qualify him for the government of a kingdom. He is ſagacious; but having ſeldom the good fortune to reaſon upon right principles, his ſagacity, in many important inſtances, ſerves only to miſlead him. He has had experience; but ill-conſidered facts, without principles or inſtruction, have perplexed his underſtanding. Of this we ſee a ſignal inſtance in the concluſions he drew from the eſtabliſhment of one or two great excluſive trading companies in England and Holland. If his zeal for the good of his country be ardent, it certainly is not luminous. He is induſtrious beyond meaſure; but his induſtry, ſupported by a jealouſy of all competition with him, has this dangerous effect, that while he engroſſes more of the executive branch than he can poſſibly ſupport, no one office of the ſtate is executed as it ſhould be, and buſineſs ſtands ſtill. It is alſo to be apprehended, that, by his excluding the inferior miniſters from confidence and information, the kingdom at his death will probably be left without a man in office, any way qualified to ſucceed him. This is the common policy of favorites; but it preſents no idea of a great, ſuperior mind. Conſidering his uniform plan of conduct towards the natural allies and natural enemies of Portugal, we may allow him a degree of perſonal intrepidity, which does no great honor to his diſcretion. The proofs of it, in his internal government, are more equivocal. It does not ſeem to require much firmneſs or reſolution to employ an armed force in the oppreſſion of a poor, ſpiritleſs, unreſiſting people. Tyrants, who have trembled on their thrones, have done it with ſucceſs.

*
In the royal edict of the 21ſt of June, 1766, it is aſſerted, that to refuſe the actions of a trading company, as ſo much ready money, is contrary to the univerſal practice of all the commercial nations of Europe, oppoſta à pratica univerſal do commercio de toda a Europa; and the miniſter was ignorant enough to imagine, that the authority of government in Portugal would produce the ſame effect that credit does in other countries. He was ignorant enough not to know, that the interpoſition of arbitrary power in matters of trade and property deſtroys all credit and confidence among men. The decree has ſince been repealed.
Greater powers than Portugal have thought it no diminution of their ſovereignty to ſubmit to ſpecial reſtraints of this kind, for the ſake of other advantages. By the commercial treaties between France and Holland, each party is expreſsly reſtrained from granting new privileges to their own ſubjects, to the prejudice of the other, ‘"ſans qu'il ſoit permis à l'un ou à l'autre de conceder, ou de faire à leurs ſujets des immunités, benefices, dons gratuits, ou autres avantages, par deſſus ceux de l'autre, ou à leur prejudice."’
Distributed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License

Citation Suggestion for this Object
TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 5030 An essay on circulation and credit in four parts and a letter on the jealousy of commerce From the French of Monsieur de Pinto Translated with annotations by the Rev S Baggs M A. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5F2B-B