AN ESSAY, &c.

PEACE, (without other En⯑comiums) it is ſufficient to ſay, merits every Man's Approbati⯑on, and tho' the whole Town is agitated and angry about it; yet no Man will be found among us, but what will readily own he is for PEACE.

It would be happy for us all, if we could talk of Peace with a little more of it in our Tempers, that we could be at Peace when we pretend to deſire Peace; it is to me the ſtrangeſt Thing in the World, that we are all falling together by the Ears, and making War about Peace. If you talk of one Man, who otherwiſe we lik'd well enough, hang him, he is a Rogue, he is come over, he is for Peace. The other Side are even with us, and they talking with this or that Acquain⯑tance; who? Tom... or Jack?... Ay, He is an Honeſt Fellow enough, a good Natur'd Fellow enough, but he is got in [7] with theſe furious People, he is all for Blood, nothing but carrying on the War, and puſhing all things to Extremities; Death and Deſtruction are always in his Mouth, he is Mad if you do but talk of Peace to him.

Unhappy Nation! What End can theſe Things lead us to? Not a Publick Socie⯑ty, not a Coffee-houſe, not a Meeting of Friends, not a Viſit; but like Jehu to Jeza⯑bel, who is on my Side? Who? Who is for Peace? Who is for carrying on the War? Society is converted into Cabal, all Publick Meetings appear ſorted into Committees, or bandyed into Sides as their Notions of Peace or War encline them.

I cannot but make one brief Obſervati⯑on, which may have ſome Philoſophy in it; and I dare ſay it is all natural; the Note may have its Uſes in it, which eve⯑ry one may improve as they ſee fit. When you find Men ſitting in a Publick Room, ſay a Coffee-houſe, or Tavern, and talking of the Publick, Two to One of my Mo⯑ney, before you hear a Word they ſay that I tell you at firſt who are for Peace, and who are for War. The Gentlemen who are for PEACE, you hear them but at a ſmall Diſtance, their Voices are low, their Speech deliberate, their Words are ſoft, calm; and ſpoken eaſie like the Subject they ſpeak of [8] The other Side that are for War, you may hear them into the Street, or down the Stairs, their Voices are Thunder; they ſpeak the Word War with ſomething of the Noiſe of War, as if they were giving in the Field the Word of Command, or bidding a Platoon give Fire. Again, look in their Faces, the Men of Peace have it in their Countenances, their Faces are co⯑vered with Smiles, a ſort of Calm and Smoothneſs of Temper ſits on their Brow; they look pleaſed and ſerence, like the Spi⯑rit that poſſeſſes them. The Men that are for War ſeem in a Ferment, their Eyes ſparkle, ſomething Boiſterous appears in their Faces, they look as uneaſie as they talk, and the averſion they have to Peace, ſhows it ſelf in their Countenances; ſome croſs Lines ſeem to be drawn over their Faces, by which they diſcover the Tem⯑per they ſtand in as to the Thing that they have in Debate.

Well however, come near to theſe Gentle⯑men, and Argue cloſely with them, and you ſhall find them all join in this, that Peace in its general Acceptation is a Bleſſing, which no Man can have a real ſtated Averſion to; the Off-ſpring of Heaven, and an Emblem of Eternal Bleſſedneſs; no Man can open his M [...]uth againſt Peace, as ſuch; nor are the Gentlemen I am ſpeaking of, who are a⯑gainſt [9] Peace at this Time, againſt it in this Senſe; let no Man miſtake me, I am not writing a Satyr againſt any Body. 'Tis the unhappy Circumſtances of the preſent Na⯑tional Temper, that I am ſpeaking of, that we are uneaſie to one another, Differing, Diſ⯑puting, Caballing, and ſometimes down⯑right Quarelling, and about what? Not Peace in General, no, every one is for that; but the Peace now to be treated of between the Confederates and the King of France, that's the Uneaſineſs.

Nor to do every one Juſtice is the Que⯑ſtion among us, whether we ſhall make Peace with France or no; every Man of Senſe, every Man of Principle, every Man that has any knowledg of the Circum⯑ſtances of the Nation, or Concern for its Proſperity and Happineſs, wiſhes for Peace, no Man will ſay that he is not for Peace; the very War is made for Peace; it is the Condition of every Manifeſto, every De⯑claration, all the Alliances, all the Articles of the Confederacies, which lay down the Cauſes and Beginnings of the War, are full of it. Peace, Peace; to reſtore the Tran⯑quility of Europe, to reſtore the Liberty of Europe, to reſtore the Ballance of Power in Europe, the whole War turns upon this Point. And to be very plain, the Juſtice, the Honour, and the Reputation of the [10] Confederacy can be ſupported, and defend⯑ed upon no other Foundation, nothing elſe can juſtifie the Allies for taking up Arms, neither do they pretend to any other Juſtifi⯑cation of it; the Word is, the Neceſſity they are driven to, there being no other way left them to obtain Peace. Indeed, no War is juſt, but what is made for Peace; no⯑thing but Peace can make War lawful. So that Peace being the only thing pre⯑tended to in the undertaking this War, for any Man to ſay they do not deſire Peace, is to ſay, they Fight as the Great Turk does, for his Pleaſure, for Encreaſe of his Dominions, for Conqueſt, and the extend⯑ing his Power; which is juſt as much to be Defended as the Pyrates of Madagaſcar, or as Robbing on the Highway, and no other⯑wiſe.

But to come to the Point, the particular Objection lies another way; it is not a Peace in General that our People object againſt, but the Nature and Circumſtances of the Peace; and here we give the Peace an Epithet, which requires ſome Enquiry into; A GOOD PEACE, this is the Diſtinction, this alone it is that our whole Diſpute turns upon, and the Expoſition of the true Meaning, or Acceptation of this Word, is the Subject of this Undertaking.

[11] A GOOD PEACE ſay the Objectors we are all for, but not ſuch a Peace as you would have, or as you would make; and this is the ſtate of the Caſe. Two Men quar⯑relling together in this Town, One a Weſt Countryman, the other a North Country⯑man; among ſome Scurrility that paſt be⯑tween them, ſays Weſt to his Antagoniſt, I am no Yorkſhireman; why, ſays North, What have you to ſay to Yorkſhire? Are there not a great many Honeſt Men in Yorkſhire? I would have you know, There are as Honeſt Men in Yorkſhire, as in any Part of England; Ay, ay, ſays Weſt, that may be true for ought I know; but that is called Honeſty in Yorkſhire, which is not Honeſty in other Places.

This is ſomething like our Caſe; as one Sort who are charg'd with being againſt Peace juſtifie themſelves, and ſay no, we are not againſt Peace, but are for a Good Peace or none. So thoſe on the other Side, who are for Peace ſay, they are for no Peace but a Good Peace alſo. But the Caſe will lye very much here, and indeed only here, whether that is not called a Good Peace by one Side, which is not called a Good Peace by the other; and ſo we are brought down by both Parties to the great Enquiry, which is the Subject of the preſent Diſcourſe, viz.

[12] What is to be underſtood, by a GOOD PEACE?

In purſuing this Enquiry impartially, it will come of courſe that we conſider the Miſtakes which People are naturally led in⯑to about this Queſtion, and the various Conſtructions which the Men of this Day are pleaſed to put upon this Word; which Conſtruction varies as Intereſt, Party and Opinion leads them.

I ſhall not ſpend Time to enquire how it comes to paſs, that there are at this time ſuch Miſtakes, and ſo many Opini⯑ons upon ſo plain a Queſtion; and how a Nation ſo clear-ſighted as we are, comes to ſee with ſuch differing Views, put ſuch a differing Senſe upon a Word of ſuch Conſequence at ſuch a Time as this. For really the unhappy Breach of Parties a⯑mong us, and the Prejudices which con⯑ſtantly attend thoſe Party-Diviſions, give us but too plain a Method how to account for them: And it muſt be, that Men be⯑ing blinded by their Paſſions, and their Prejudices, are deprived of the clear, and uninterruped Uſe of their Judgment, give their Opinions with partiality, as the ſeveral Intereſts of the Parties they eſ⯑pouſe influence their Judgments.

[13] To come at a right underſtanding of what we call a good Peace, it ſeems neceſſa⯑ry, with plainneſs and freedom, to lay down a little Hiſtorically the State of the War as it reſpects Britain, and her Allies; and this I ſhall do as plainly and briefly as I can.

After the Peace of Reſwick, for I ſhall go back no farther; the King of France hav⯑ing recognized King William, ſettled all the Reunions, and ſurrendred to the Confede⯑rates what was agreed to be Surrendred; Europe had a pleaſing Proſpect of a happy and a laſting Peace; there was but one Event which had any thing in it Fatal, or Threatning to the Tranquility of this Part of the World, and this was the Death of Charles II. King of Spain without Iſſue; which tho' it was not then happened, yet it was probable could not be far off. However, to prevent the Evil Conſequen⯑ces which ſuch an Event might bring up⯑on Europe; and as the Preamble to the Treaties of Partition ſays to prevent a new War: The Two Kings of England and France, with the States-General, entred in⯑to a Convention or Treaty, for bringing all the Claims, and Pretenſions to that Suc⯑ceſſion to a Ballance, this is the ſo much controverted Treaty, called The Treaty of Partition; in the Preamble to which, are [14] the following Words relating to what I am now treating of.

After the end of this Tranſaction, Europe was in a perfect Tranquility, I mean as to Nations; for as to Peace at Home, God knows we enjoy'd leſs of it than ever. But Hea⯑ven healed our needleſs Breaches, by ma⯑king two real Breaches upon us; and find⯑ing the Nation Sick, and Surfeited with the little Peace we had; he viſited us with a New War, and the Death of the King.

The New War began purely on the French ſide, who made himſelf Agreſſor by [15] two Steps taken in a direct Contravention to the Solemn Treaties he had made; tho' thoſe Treaties were ratify'd, and exchang'd in due Form, and ſo fairly executed, that Europe, and eſpecially England entirely diſ⯑arm'd, laid by their Fleets, and broke their Troops, reducing the Eſtabliſhment of Forces to the Stint or Limitation of a pro⯑found Peace.

The two Steps, I ſpeak of, which the French took to break this Peace, were (1.) The Owning, Declaring, and Compliment⯑ing the Pretender by the Stile and Titles due to King William, as King of England, Scot⯑land and Ireland, notwithſtanding the Article in the Treaty of Reſwick, by which he had before acknowledg'd King William. (2.) The other, was the Seizing and Taking Poſſeſſion of the whole Spaniſh Monarchy, by Virtue of a Will, or pretended Will of King Charles II. to the Duke of Anjou, and declaring the ſaid Duke of Anjou, King of Spain, &c. notwith⯑ſtanding his Agreement and ſolemn Ratifica⯑tion of the Treaty of Partition then in Force.

Theſe things produced a War as Univer⯑ſal to this Part of Europe as ever was engag'd in; which has now been carry'd on Nine Year and 6 Months, from May the 4th, 1701. to Octob. the 7th, 1711. Of the Succeſſes and probable End of which I need not en⯑large here, it may come to be ſpoken of again.

[16] I muſt do his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty that Juſtice, as to ſay, I never ſaw or heard, that in all his Manifeſtoes or Declarations of, or concerning this War, he ever ſtoop'd to give many Reaſons, why he took either of the Steps, except only his own Will and Pleaſure, viz. That ſo he had thought fit to do; (viz.) We have thought fit ra⯑ther to accept the ſaid Gift of the late King Charles to Our ſaid Grandſon, &c.—and we have thought fit to ſalute the ſaid Prince (meaning the Pretender) by ſuch and ſuch Titles, and the like.

But the more his Majeſty thought fit to take thoſe unccommon Steps, and the leſs Reaſon he was pleaſed to give for them, the greater and the juſter Reaſons they were, why the Confedetates ſhould enter again into that War which was the Conſe⯑quence of it; and this is evidently taken hold of in that Senſe by the Engliſh and the Dutch in their Reſpective Declarations of War, as follows:

Whereas, inſtead of giving the Satisfaction that ought juſtly to be expected, the French King has added thereunto (Note, that is, unto the Seizing the Spaniſh Monarchy) a great Affront and Indignity to US and Our King⯑doms, in taking upon him to declare the Pre⯑tended Prince of Wales, King of England, [17] Scotland and Ireland, and has alſo influenc'd Spain to concur in the ſame Affront and Indig⯑nity; we find Our Selves obliged for maintain⯑ing the Publick Faith for Vindicating the Ho⯑nour of Our Crown, and to prevent the Miſchiefs which all Europe is threatned with, to declare War, &c.

I recapitulate theſe things, becauſe from theſe Foundations will beſt be inferr'd what ought to be eſteem'd by all the Confe⯑derates, A GOOD PEACE; which is bring⯑ing it down to the Caſe before me, and of which I ſhall ſpeak again in its Courſe.

When the King of France had thought fit, as above, to take theſe two Steps, Europe immediately broke out into a Flame, the People of England reſented in a particular Manner, the Affront put upon their King, in the King of France ſetting up a Pretender againſt him, after he had ſolemnly own'd his Title, and made Treaties with him as King; and Addreſſes flow'd from all Parts of the Kingdom to the King, expreſſing their Deteſtation of that Treatment, and preſſing His Majeſty to a War.

The other Allies, as much reſenting the King of France's ſezing upon the Monar⯑chy of Spain, and ſetting up his Grandſon Philip V. prepar'd for War alſo upon that Account. Upon theſe mutual Grievances, was form'd the Treaty call'd the Grand [18] Alliance; in which the particular Demands of the Allies, without which it is made Unlawful for them on either Hand, to make Peace, are particularly ſtipulated; with this expreſs Condition alſo, ‘"That it ſhall not be lawful to any of the Confederates to treat of Peace with the Enemy, without the mutual Aſſent and Advice of the reſt of the Confederates."’—And here again you may have a ſtated Foundation for what we ought to call a Good Peace. Nor is there in any of theſe things, any feign'd Conſtru⯑ction, or forc'd Senſe, by which any one can be led to make the Terms of Peace, more or leſs: For this, like the Statutes of a Nation, is the Rule to go by.—To the Law, and to the Teſtimony, was the Word of of Old: To the Grand Alliance, and to the Declaration of the Reaſons of the War, is the Word with me, and I believe will be ſo with all Impartial Men in the World—Here is the Cauſe of your making War; here is your declar'd Reſolution when it ſhall End, and 'till when it ſhall not End; and when theſe Ends are anſwer'd, the Cauſes, the Reaſon, and the Original Mo⯑tion of the Grand Alliance ceaſe.

And here I muſt touch a very nice Point, and which yet I ſhall do plainly, and with Re⯑ſpect, I ſhall be the laſt Man in Britain that ſhall endeavour to leſſen the Duty and Re⯑gard [19] that the People of this Nation ought to pay to the Votes, Opinion or Declara⯑ [...]ions of the Parliament, which is our [...]rue Repreſentative, and whoſe Actions are our own.—But ſpeaking in the Language of the Confederacy, I ſay, with humble Submiſſion, no Vote, no Addreſs, no de⯑clar'd Opinion of the Parliament, as to the Terms of the Peace, can alter at all the Foundation of the War, or bind the reſt of the Confederates beyond the Obliga⯑tions they are under, by Virtue of the Al⯑ [...]iances and Stipulations of Confederacy they are already engag'd in.

Thus as it is not in the Power of any of the Confederates, legally to make Peace, or treat of Peace, without common Con⯑ſent, &c. So neither is it in the Power of any of the Confederates to impoſe farther Conditions upon the reſt, or to ſay we will not make Peace, unleſs ſuch or ſuch things be obtain'd, although thoſe things are not expreſs'd in the ſaid Grand Alliance, which is the only obligatory Limitation of Peace and War.

To explain my ſelf yet farther, with all poſible Reſpect and Regard to the Confe⯑derates; if any one of the Confederates, or the States or Parliament of their Country ſhould Vote or Declare, That no Peace ſhould be made with France, till ſuch or [20] ſuch Conditions were obtain'd, were it put⯑ting the whole Spaniſh Monarchy into ſuch or ſuch Hands as they pleaſe to name; if ſuch Conditions are not expreſs'd in the Grand Alliance, I humbly conceive the reſt of the Confederates are not oblig'd by that Vote.

I come ſtill nearer to the Point, for as I hope, I ſay nothing offenſive, ſo I need cover it with no Allegory or Similies, for I hate Diſguiſes.—Our Parliament Voted, and Addreſſed, and gave it as their Opinion; and her Majeſty concurr'd with that Opi⯑nion, That no Peace could be Safe and Honourable, while any Part of the Spaniſh Monarchy remain'd in the Poſſeſſion of the Houſe of Bourbon.—

But if this is neither expreſs'd or imply'd in the ſaid Grand Alliance, which is the Compact and the binding Principle of the War, I leave it to any impartial Hand to make out, how far would theſe Votes or Ad⯑dreſſes be binding upon the reſt of the Con⯑federates.

This is to me an unanſwerable Proof, that the Grand Alliance is the Teſt, the Foundation to judge of the Condition of the Peace by; and whatever Treaty a⯑mouns to, or gives to us, all that is agreed to be demanded by that Treaty, may be called A GOOD PEACE, tho' it ſhould not come up to the future Opinions of any ſet of People whatſoever.

[21] From the Votes and Addreſſes of the Britiſh Parliament, I come to the late Treaty, if it be proper to call it a Treaty, of the Preliminaries ſettled at the Hague by Mon⯑ſieur Torcy, and the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies.

If by theſe Preliminaries, the Confede⯑rates puſh'd France to a farther Length than the Treaty of Grand Alliance had concerted, well and good; my Anſwer is this,

The Queſtion before me is, What is the proper Foundation of A GOOD PEACE at this time? To which my Anſwer is, as before, The Grand Alliance is the Teſt of a Good Peace; yet as much more as you can, I will never be the Complainer: But I dare not ſay, that when what is there demand⯑ed, can be obtain'd, you have any juſt Rea⯑ſon to carry on the War to obtain more; at leaſt, unleſs all the Confederates agree to do ſo; for nothing beyond it can be Obligatory upon the whole.

It remains then, that all which ſhall be ſaid farther relating to a Peace, muſt be a Comment upon this Text.

There is an Event happened ſince the making that Alliance, which in that Alli⯑ance there is no Proviſion made for; and which, had it been foreſeen, the Allies no doubt, would have made ſome proper Arti⯑cle to have ſettled, This is the Death of the Emperor; and this Accident may give us Room to enquire, Whether it does not make ſome needful Alterations in the Terms on which we are to inſiſt for Peace?

[23] My Anſwer is plain, I wiſh ſome People would bear with my plainneſs; I ſay it does not: And here without Fear, or Regard to Power, or Parties, I ſhall ſay ſome Things which I do believe will ſtartle Man kind a little in this Caſe; at leaſt, if we conſider the popular Notions which ſpread among us.

We have been puſh'd on, to ſet up the taking Spain from King Philip, as the REST or Stay of the Confederates; as a Thing that we are all ruin'd and undone without; and the Parliament Vote, Ad⯑dreſs, and Declare their Opinion, as be⯑fore, That no Peace can be Safe, or Honou⯑rable without it. And yet I muſt tell you,

There is not one Word of Recovering all the Spaniſh Monarchy, out of the Hands of the Houſe of Bourbon, in all the Grand Al⯑liance; ſo that none of the Confederates are under any Obligations to go that par⯑ticular Length, and not make Peace with⯑out it.

My Argument turns upon this Point then, of which this is the Abſtract:

If in this way of Arguing, I am put to prove the Aſſumption, (viz.) That a Peace may be Honourable, if made according to the Tenour of the Grand Alliance; I make it out thus: The Grand Alliance is a Conventi⯑on of all the Allies, declaring all the Grie⯑vances for which they make War, and on what Terms only they will make Peace.

If all the Reaſons inducing the War are anſwered, and all the Demands upon which the War is Declar'd are obtain'd, it can be no longer Juſt to make War; when it is no longer Juſt to make War, it is Juſt we ſhould make Peace; and what⯑ſoever is Juſt in this Caſe, is Honourable.

I return to the Grand Alliance, I ſay, There is not one Word of the Terms of Peace, which are mentioned in the Ad⯑dreſs of the Parliament, to be found in the Grand Alliance.

The Terms of Peace limitted by the Grand Alliance are theſe, and none but theſe.

• 1. An equitable and reaſonable Security to his Imperial Majeſty, for his Pretenſions to the Spaniſh Succeſſion.
• 2. A particular and ſufficient Security of the Kingdoms, Provinces, Dominions, [25] Navigation and Commerce for the Sub⯑jects of his Majeſty of Great Britain, and the States General. See for this, the Treaty of Grand Alliance, entred into by the Three Powers, the Empire, England, and Holland; Septemb. 7. 1701. Articl 1. and 8.

The Obſervation therefore is not mine [...]nly, it is the Nature of the thing; let any [...]ne tell me how from hence does it ap⯑pear, that we muſt fight particularly till [...]ot one Branch of the Spaniſh Monarchy [...]emain to the Houſe of Bourbone, or that [...]ur Peace will be neither Safe nor Honou⯑ [...]able without it.

Nor was this all; But, 3. The Parlia⯑ment was kept at hand by ſmall Adjourn⯑ments, in order, if need were, to have th [...] Neceſſity of receding from that Vote, o [...] Addreſs, or Opinion, call it what you will in order to a Peace, made appear, Theſe ar [...] the Things which I ſay may ſtartle Mankind.

Now, Gentlemen, pray let me ask, Doe [...] the Vote, or Opinion of the Parliamen [...] make the Conditions of a Peace Safe and Honourable? Or is it ſo in the Conſequence and by the Nature of the thing it ſelf? I de⯑ſire to pay a juſt Deference to the Opinion of Parliaments, but never againſt the Rea⯑ſon and Nature of Things.

Again, the Parliament was to have been deſir'd if it had been found neceſſary, to have receded from that Vote,—What would they have ſaid to the Houſes? Would they have ask'd them to Vote for a Peace, which was in their Opinion, not Safe or Honourable? No, no, they would have al⯑ledged, That ſuch and ſuch things being agreed, it was judg'd both Safe and Honou⯑rable, and the Houſe muſt have been de⯑ſir'd to alter their Opinion.

[27] And now, Gentlemen, let no Man mi⯑ [...]ake me, I am not reflecting on the late [...]iniſtry in this, or on the late Parliament; [...] is what they ought to have done: No [...]dubt, as Caſes and Things alter, the [...]pinions of Men muſt alter, and Reaſon [...]quires that they ſhould alter their Opini⯑ [...]ns; let them be Kings, Queens, Parlia⯑ [...]ents, or any Body of Men in the World.

This was the Caſe in the Treaty of Par⯑ [...]tion; what paſs'd upon that Affair, I need [...]ot repeat: But if ſuch a Treaty ſhould yet [...]e found neceſſary, I make no Queſtion, it [...]hall be yet voted Safe and Honourable; all [...]ther and former Opinions to the contrary [...]n any wiſe notwithſtanding.

I have hinted this, becauſe I know our People run away with it, That the Parlia⯑ment having made that Addreſs, and given [...]t as their Opinion, That no Peace can be good, i. e. Safe and Honourable, but as before, that all the Spaniſh Monarchy be taken from the Houſe of Bourbon; and that therefore this only is the Teſt of A GOOD PEACE, which I think is fairly, and I hope modeſtly too, confuted.

I have nothing to do in this Diſcourſe, with whom this or that Part of the Spa⯑niſh Monarchy ſhould be given to▪ I am upon the General, and with all Humble Submiſſion to Parliaments Addreſſes An⯑ſwers, [28] That I think it appears with a Non ob⯑ſtante to what of that Kind has paſt, viz. Tha [...] a Safe and Honourable Peace may be made▪ tho' every Branch of the Spaniſh Monarchy ſhould not be recovered from the Houſe of Bourbon.

This I lay down as my General.

I cannot diſmiſs this Head, without ob⯑ſerving two Things, which being rightly underſtood, will take off all that any one may think in this is reflecting upon the late Parliament.

• 1. That as the Caſe ſtood then, that Vote was agreeable to the State of Things in the World; and to the Proſpect the Confederates had before them, both of the Poſſibility of that Conqueſt, and of the Neceſſity of it.
• 2. That as the Caſe ſtands now, it is more than probable, that ſame Par⯑liament, in the ſame Intereſt, and with the ſame Deſigns, would have been of another Opinion.

Alteration of Circumſtances muſt for ever be allow'd to be a Reaſon for Altera⯑tion of Opinion, in all Caſes in the World; nor is it any Reproach to the Wiſdom or Integrity of that Parliament, to ſay, That what might be abſolutely neceſſary then, may be otherwiſe now.

[29] I am none of them that leave my Readers to gueſs at Caſes, or need that any one ſhould ask, What are theſe Alterations of Circumſtances which have happened ſince, and which make this Difference, or whether, and how it is more ſafe to leave part of the Spaniſh Monarchy in the Houſe of Bourbon now, than it was before?

My Anſwer is direct, The Revolution which has happened in the Houſe of Auſtria ſince that time, whereby the Imperial Crown' is fallen to the ſame Perſon to whom was then allotted the Crown of Spain; is the Alteration which I ſpeak of; and I cannot but believe, that according to the Treaty of Partition, and according to the receiv'd Opinion of Europe, for ſome Ages, it would never be judged Safe that the Crown of Spain ſhould ever be permitted to be given to the Perſon of an Emperor, any more than of a King of France.—This is an Opinion founded upon all the Principles of Safety, which the Princes of Europe have acted upon for above 70 Years paſt, (viz.) The Balance of Power, which by ſuch a Coalition or Conjunction of Power would be entirely broken and diſſolved.

Will any Man believe of the laſt parli⯑ament, that they would have been of the Opinion, to have given the whole Spaniſh Monarchy to the Perſon of an Emperor of [30] Germany? Will any man ſay, that no Peace can be Safe or Honourable, but what ſhall put all the Dominions of the Spaniſh Crown into the Hands of Charles VI.? It is not Diſ⯑honourable Account to give of his Imperial Majeſty, to ſay it would make him too Great for the reſt of Europe to be eaſie un⯑der; I think I might be allow'd to ſay the ſame of the Queen of England.

But I meet with an Objection here, which ſhould be ſpoken to, (viz.) What is this to the Purpoſe? The Parliaments Vote is not upon who you ſhall give it to, but who you ſhall take it from; not who ſhall have it, but who ſhall not have it. To this Cavil, for it is no more, I anſwer, that nei⯑ther do I ſay who ſhould have it, but who ſhould not; and let this lie for thoſe to Anſwer to whom it belongs: I know the Queſtion is invidious and enſnaring; and tho' I could Anſwer it, I believe, Effectual⯑ly, and to Satisfaction, yet it is not to our Purpoſe here, and for that Reaſon I wave it.

The Two Negatives lye before us; The Houſe of Bourbon muſt not have it, ſay the Addreſſes. The Nature of the Things ſays Now, the Perſon you would have given it to, muſt not have it; What then will you do with it?

And this brings me home to the Original Queſtion, What is to be called A GOOD [31] PEACE? As then I have thus ſtated the Queſtion, I ſhall come to a direct An⯑ſwer as freely as poſſible.

• 1. That alone can be A GOOD PEACE, where none of the Parties are veſted with ſo much Power as overthrows the Balance of Europe.
• 2. That alone can be A GOOD PEACE, wherein the Great Articles of the Grand Alliance, which were the Be⯑ginning, and are the Foundation of the War, are fully anſwered.

In theſe two Generals are compriſed all the Particulars, which require any Ex⯑planation in this Affair.

• 1. None of the ſeveral Parties are to be veſted with ſo much Power as over⯑throws the Ballance of Europe; that this would be the Caſe of the Spaniſh Monarchy were it united either in the Perſon of a King of France, or of an Emperor of Germany, ſeems ſo plain, as needs no farther Debate, and the Reader is only referr'd for Proof of it.

I'll give it you under both their Hands, if any Man can quote better Authority, he is wellcome.

[32] 1. The King of France: His moſt Chriſti⯑an Majeſty very frankly acknowleges for his part, That it is not Safe for Eu⯑rope, that the Crown of Spain ſhould be enjoy'd by the SAME PERSON who is King of France, this you have in the Propoſals of Peace, made in his Name, and now under Conſideration, Signed by Monſieur Meſnager as fol⯑lows;

That he will freely and bonâ fide con⯑ſent, to the takeing of all juſt and reaſo⯑nable Meaſures, for hindring that the Crowns of France and Spain may never be united on the Head of the ſame Prince; His Majeſty being perſwaded that this Exceſs of Power would be contrary to the Good and Quiet of Europe. Vide the 11th Propoſal.

2. The late King William: His Majeſty, Declares in the Solemn Treaty be⯑tween England, Holland and France, called The Second Treaty of Partition; That that Treaty being made for the Good and Safety of Europe, and to prevent future Wars between the Confdeerates therein named, That the Crown of Sqain ſhould never come to be enjoy'd by the Perſon of an Empe⯑ror, or a King of France, in theſe Words;

[33] If the moſt Serene Arch-Duke ſhould die without Iſſue, either before or after the Death of the Catholick King, the Share which is hereby aſſigned to him, ſhall come to ſuch Male Child of the Emperor, or of the King of the Ro⯑mans, Except the King of the Romans, MARK THAT, as his Imperial Maje⯑ſty ſhall aſſign it to; but on Condition that the ſaid Part ſhall never be United, nor belong to the Perſon of him who ſhall be Emperor, or King of the Ro⯑mans, or is become one or the other, be it by Succeſſion, Will, Contract of Marriage, Donation, Exchange, Ceſ⯑ſion, Appeal, Rebolt, or otherwiſe; as in like manner, the ſaid Share of the Serene Arch-Duke ſhall never come, or belong to the Perſon of a Prince, that is or ſhall be King, or Dauphine of France.

Thus you have the Royal Authority of both theſe Crown'd Heads, to prove what I have aſſerted in the Firſt General.

2. That alone can be A GOOD PEACE wherein the Great Articles of the Grand Alliance, which were the Beginning, and are the Founda⯑tion of the War, are fully anſwer'd.

For Evidence of this, we need go no far⯑ther than the Grand Alliance it ſelf.

[34] The Terms of the Grand Alliance, are theſe:

1. That an Equitable and Reaſonable Sa⯑tisfaction be given to his Imperial Majeſty, for his Pretenſion to theSpa⯑niſh Succeſſion. Vide Grand Alliance, Artic. 11.

Note, here, If the Allies had underſtood that the whole Spaniſh Monarchy had de⯑volv'd to him as his Right, let me ask theſe Queſtions:

• 1. Why is it called SATISFACTION FOR the Succeſſion? Why is it not rather ſaid, 'Till he be put into POS⯑SESSION of the Spaniſh Monarchy? It would certainly have been expreſs'd otherwiſe, if it had been meant, He ſhould ever poſſeſs it as Emperor.
• 2. Why is it call'd his Imperial Majeſty's Pretenſion to the Succeſſion, and yet put into the Hands of his Brother King Charles?

I muſt be excus'd making two Remarks upon this: 1. Satisfaction for the Succeſ⯑ſion plainly infers, His Imperial Majeſty was never underſtood to be the Perſon that ſhould ſucceed? It would never elſe have [35] been called Satisfaction for it. This implies an Equivalent with which he was to be ſatiſ⯑fied inſtead of it, and plainly acknowledges, that the Confederrates never dreamt of ma⯑king an Emperor of Germany to be alſo King of Spain. 2. Whereas it is called his Impe⯑rial Majeſty's Right of Succeſſion, why, then was it given to King Charles? It is evident, this transferring the Crown by Gift to King Charles III. at the ſame time that we exploded King Charles II. deviſing it by Gift to King Philip, was but an odd Title, and gave ſuch a Handle to Confirm K. Philip's Right (his Gift being prior to the other) as I never yet could ſee anſwer'd. But waving that which I have formerly inſiſted on, and which is now no more a Queſtion, the Emperor being dead. This Argu⯑ment may be drawn from it, which I be⯑lieve can never be anſwer'd; That the Em⯑peror demitted his Right to his Brother, becauſe it never could be allow'd tolerable, nor ſo much as to be thought of, that ever the Allies would agree, an Emperor of Germany ſhould have it, as the very ſame Foundation of Exorbitance which they were then declaring and fighting againſt in the King of France.

The King of France then, and the Em⯑peror finding that on both Sides, the taking the Crown of Spain to themſelves, would [36] not go down with the reſt of Europe, they reſpectively put a Third Perſon in the Place. Philip, and Charles, and both of them, claim the Crown of Spain by Gift, neither having any real Title.

Fate now has decided the Point on one Side, for King Charles is taken out of the Contention, and made Emperor.—Can he then be King of Spain? Certainly, by any of the former Notions of Europe, he can ne⯑ver be ſo received.—Well, what is next? Have we any other Branch of the Houſe of Auſtria to make a Gift to? If we have, let us ſee him; if we have not, what follows, but to make ſuch a Treaty as in which the Balance of Europe may be ſecured, and ſuch Powers erected as may reciprocally prevent either the Houſe of Bourbon, or Auſtria, overrunning Europe; and this I ſhall call A GOOD PEACE, let who will find out the Medium to bring it to paſs.—

The firſt thing I ſhall hint from this Ob⯑ſevation, is—This makes me eaſie, and I believe, if conſider'd, would make us all eaſie on the Subject of a Treaty.

Let who will be the Agents, let what will be the Propoſals, the Nature of the thing is ſuch, no Party can ſuggeſt that we ſhould not have a Regard to the Balance of Europe; no Peace can be treated on, but upon this Foot: The eſtabliſhing ſome Rule [37] of Power, ſome Generals for the Boun⯑daries of National Intereſt, ſuch as may li⯑mit the Princes of Europe, and prevent fu⯑ture Encroachments one upon another.

For this Reaſon, I cannot but think we ſhould all be willing to come to talk of theſe things—Certainly, to Treat of them, can be of no prejudice; nor can I allow it to be a good Argument, to ſay, That the French always gain upon us by a Treaty. This is to call all the Confederates Fools, and ſay, they do not know what they would have; that they make War for they know not what; that they have Generals to fight, but no States Men to treat; that they have Hands, but no Heads; and that all Europe are not able to maintain their Ar⯑guments againſt Five French-Men, Plenipo⯑tentiaries.

The French make Propoſals; they would put by the Way of treating by Prelimina⯑ries, and come to a General Treaty at once; And why ſhould we not venture them at a Treaty? We can inſiſt upon every thing at a General Treaty, as well as at a particular, and can ſtand to all the neceſſary Points of the Grand Alliance, as well there as at an⯑other time.

The treating brings us not the nearer; if France does not come up to reaſonable Things, we are where we were. The [38] War goes on, nothing is abated of the Vi⯑gour of our Armies, or of the needful Pre⯑parations; the War indeed may influence the Treaty: Thus it was at the Treaty of Weſtphalia, which held at leaſt Eight Years; thus it was at the Treaty of Nimeguen, which laſted Two Campaigns, yet both at laſt came to a Concluſion, and ſo may this perhaps; if it does not, we are never the farther off of Victory, nor the Enemy ever the nearer the End they aim at.

It ſeems therefore ſomething wonder⯑ful to me, that People ſhould be allarm'd at a Propoſal to treat; we may treat without a Peace, but we can never have a Peace without treating. All that we are allarm'd at hitherto, is the Suggeſtion or Suſpicion of a private Treaty; to bring it then to an open fair Publick Treaty, is the moſt effe⯑ctually way both to remove the Suſpitions of ſuch a Treaty on one Hand, and to take away the Pretenſions for it on the other.

Some alledge a Party among us are a⯑gainſt Peace, are for perpetuating the War, and have their private Ends in view, to be purſued at the Publick Expence. I am in hopes there are no ſuch People among us; however, thoſe People oppoſing a Treaty, give the beſt Argument that thoſe that think ſo can wiſh for, to ſupport that Al⯑legation; it is alledged on the other Hand, [39] That Clandeſtine Negotiations are on Foot, and thoſe that ſay ſo, fill the People with Suſpicions, and Apprehenſions of ſuch Things as I hope are not in any One's Head to at⯑tempt. A Treaty would effectually remove all thoſe Jealouſies, and clear up the Repu⯑tation of both Parties.

At a Treaty, all the Allies will be pre⯑ſent by their Plenipotentiaries, every Thing will be fully, fairly and openly diſcuſs'd; if any Member of the Confederates are eaſier, and willinger to be impoſed upon than they ought to be, they will be ſet to Rights in Judgment, or over-rul'd in Vote by the o⯑ther; if any Member of the Confederacy is more rigid, or more backward, harder to be ſatisfied with Reaſon, or forwarder to continue the War than conſiſts with the General Intereſt, he will be reduced to Reaſon by the Perſwaſions, or over-rul'd by the Voices of the other.

The French are not ſo conſiderable an E⯑nemy, that we ſhould be afraid to Engage with them any farther in the War; or ſo in⯑conſiderable, that we ſhould think it below us to Treat; a Treaty takes off all Objecti⯑ons, tho' they do not propoſe enough to form a Good Peace, yet in a Treaty we may bring them to it. I can ſee many Objecti⯑ons againſt their Propoſals indeed, but I can⯑not ſee one againſt a Treaty.

[40] In a Treaty a Thouſand Things may occur, and be ſaid, that may in the End happily Iſſue this Great Affair in A GOOD PEACE; as I ſaid in the beginning, I find every one joining in their deſire to have a good Peace, but how ſhall they obtain it without a Treaty? A Treaty takes it out of the Hands of thoſe you may ſuſpect, and puts it into the Hands of the Confederates in General; if any Conceſſions are made to France, which you are afraid of, there they will be diſcuſſed, there they will be examin⯑ed; the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies on eve⯑ry Side will be watchful, that the Diſtributi⯑on of the Dominions be not partial and une⯑qual to one or to another; that every one has Juſtice, and that no Advantage be gi⯑ven more on one hand than another. The Plenipotentiaries of all the Parties are Arbi⯑trators of every particular Intereſt reſpe⯑ctively.

Certainly a Treaty would end all this Strife; if the French are Sincere in their Of⯑fers, and in their Propoſals for a General Peace, it will appear; if they are not, they will be detected: The Securities they will offer, will be here diſputed, the Vali⯑dity of them determined; if they are re⯑jected, the Reaſons for rejecting them will appear; and if we muſt carry on the War again, the Neceſſity will appear; ſo that [41] People will be ſatisfied with it, and the more Chearfully bear the Expence. More⯑over, the Scandal of deſigning to perpetuate the War will be removed, and every one will ſee for themſelves, why the Treaty broke off, and why the War is carryed on: If a Peace enſues, it is not the leſs likely to be A GOOD PEACE, for having the whole Body of the Confederate Miniſters conſenting to it, and coming into it.

I cannot imagine upon what Foot any one can pretend to be backward to a Treaty, and I am the freer to put this Notion of mine in here at this length, becauſe I think it is the only Method to bring the variety of Opinions now among us, to a Point; to reconcile us to one another a lit⯑tle, and to eſtabliſh our private Peace, by putting an end to the preſent Diſputes a⯑mong us; a Thing every good man wiſhes for, and a Thing none can deny we ex⯑treamly want.

I cannot but think thoſe People very much miſtaken, both on one Side or other, who oppoſe a Treaty; ſome ſay a Treaty will be to no Purpoſe, and will but amuſe us, and all Europe; that it is plain, the Con⯑federates will inſiſt on the Surrendring all the Spaniſh Monarchy to the Houſe of Au⯑ſtria, and that the French will not part with [42] it, and therefore the War muſt go on, till the French find themſelves in ſuch Circum⯑ſtances as to be obliged to quit that ſweet Morſel to ſave the reſt: That a Treaty in the mean time is but amuſing us, and is a particular Service to the King of France, as it buoys up his People in hopes of a Peace, and urges them to exert their utmoſt for a⯑while longer, upon a proſpect of a ſpeedy Iſſue of all their Troubles. On the other Hand, ſome ſay a Treaty is deſign'd only to bring the Confederates into ſome Confu⯑ſion about the Spaniſh Monarchy; and that ſome appearing leſs tenacious on that Head than others, will make them Jealous of one another, divide them in Opinion; and that the French have more Room in a Trea⯑ty to lay hold of, and make Advantages from thoſe Differences; and ſo a Treaty may be a Means to deſtroy the good Har⯑mony of the Confederates, rather than to iſſue in a good Peace.

As to the Firſt, It ſeems to have no ſtrength of Reaſoning at all in it; 'tis begging the Que⯑ſtion, to ſay the Confederates will inſiſt upon the evacuating the whole Spaniſh Domi⯑nions to the Houſe of Auſtria; it is evident, as before the Confederates did appear en⯑clin'd at the laſt Treaty, to yield ſome Point to France, and to allow King Philip to [43] keep Poſſeſſion of ſome part of that Monar⯑chy, rather than continue the Deſolations of Europe; and this, when there was a diſtinct Branch of the Houſe of Austria to poſſeſs the reſt; it ſeems probable they may be enclin'd to make larger Conceſſions now. The Conſideration of Europe's Deſola⯑tions being as ſtrong as before, and the Houſe of Auſtria having now but one Head to receive the reſt; to which Head there cannot be equal Reaſon for giving the reſt, to what there was before; and of which Head there may be ſo many juſt Fears of the Danger of his poſſeſſing it—⯑The Notion then of the Confederates be⯑ing reſolved to inſiſt poſitively upon the Evacuation of the Spaniſh Monarchy with⯑out any Reſerve, is not well grounded, and therefore not a juſt way of Argu⯑ing.

As to a Treaty being a Help to France, as it buoys up the Spirits of his People; by ſo much as he reaps an Advantage by that Mo⯑mentary, Imaginary Aid—by ſo much, if it fails, will he ſuffer then in the Deſpair he will find his People reduc'd to, when they ſhall ſee thoſe Hopes vaniſh, and that their Miſeries are like ſtill to be continued by the Obſtinacy of their King, in hazarding their Ruine, to preſerve not themſelves [44] as France, but the Poſſeſſion of the whole Spaniſh Monarchy, by which they can pro⯑poſe to receive little or no Benefit when it is obtain'd, and will be expos'd to the ut⯑moſt Deſolation in the Diſappointment.

This Digreſſion brings me back to the Notion of the Confederates upon ſuch a Treaty, making Conceſſions to France of ſome Part of the Spaniſh Monarchy—And this the People who object, ſay, cannot conſiſt with A GOOD PEACE.

This Point muſt be clear'd up as we go, and therefore I reſume it now; it is appa⯑rent, that as before, two Accidents make the Circumſtances differ.

• 1. That there was even at the laſt Treaty, an apparent Willingneſs in the Confe⯑derates, to have made ſome Conceſ⯑ſions to King Philip, which neverthe⯑leſs were thought to be conſiſtent with A GOOD PEACE.
• 2. That there is not now, as there then was, a Branch of the Houſe of Auſtria, whom there was no Danger to Europe in Eſtabliſhing on the Spaniſh Throne, and that therefore farther Conceſſions perhaps may not only be found con⯑ſiſtent with, but may be eſſential to A GOOD PEACE.

It needs not that I ſhould embarraſs my ſelf here with that enſnaring Party ma⯑king Queſtion, What, and how much of the Spaniſh Monarchy may, and ſhould, upon a Treaty, be given to the preſent Poſ⯑ſeſſor. But to keep to the Text, viz, The Explanation of the General Term, A Good Peace, I ſhall lay down ſome Heads, which without Partiality or Reſpect to Parties in the leaſt, but ſpeaking really, and bona fide, with all poſſible Indifference, ſeem to me to be natural Deductions from the preſent State of Affairs in Europe; and by which, if cooly conſider'd, we may come to underſtand what is the true and genuine Meaning of the thing we are upon, (viz.) what we may call A GOOD PEACE.

• 1. That if on a Treaty, France ſhould con⯑ſent entirely to evacuate the Spaniſh Monarchy, and the Confederates ſhould give up that Monarchy to the Emperor, the Ballance of Power in Europe would be entirely deſtroy'd, and therefore ſuch a Concluſion could not be allow'd to be A GOOD PEACE.
• 2. That altho' ſome Part (God forbid I ſhould ſay what part, I have nothing to do with that) of the Spaniſh Monarchy ſhould [46] be conceded to King Philip upon a Treaty, yet ſuch Parts of it might be alſo given to the Emperor, as might be an equitable and reaſonable Satisfaction to his Imperial Majeſty for his Pretenſi⯑ons to the Spaniſh Succeſſion, accord⯑ing to the very Words of the Treaty of the Grand Alliance quoted before.
• 3. That although ſome part of the Spaniſh Succeſſion ſhould by a Treaty re⯑main to King Philip V. yet ſuch fit⯑ting Security MAY be given by the King of France, and by King Philip reſpectively, as may be ſufficient and Satisfactory to the Queen of Great Britain, and the States General, and their Allies, for their Kingdoms and Provinces, and for the Navigation and Commerce of their Subjects.
• 4. That ſuch Treaty as ſhall end in ob⯑taining ſuch equitable and reaſonable Satisfaction to the Empreror, and ſuch Security to the reſt of the Allies, may iſſue in a Firm, Laſting, Safe, Ho⯑nourable and GOOD PEACE, al⯑though ſome Part of the Spaniſh Mo⯑narchy ſhould remain to the preſent King Philip V.

This, I think, may be allow'd, accor⯑ding to my Title, to be a full and plain Expoſition of the Word A GOOD PEACE; and may tell us all, what we are to under⯑ſtand by it. Nor may it be altogether uſeleſs to us, in helping us to judge calmly and coolly of the Steps that are, or ſhall be taken towards it, either by Us, or by Our Allies.

By this we may determine, when theſe are too forward, and yield too much to France; or thoſe too backward or refracto⯑ry, as not to ſee when good Terms may be obtain'd; both which will prevent the mutual Reproaches which paſs now on either Side, with ſo much ill Nature.

I know we have ſome, who fill our Ears with Clamours againſt our Enemies; and anſwer all Arguments, with telling us, that the King of France is ſincere in no⯑thing; that he deſigns to keep no Treaty any farther, or longer, than till he is in a Condition to break it.—That he vi⯑ſibly deſign'd, from the beginning, to an⯑nex the Spaniſh Monarchy to the Kingdom of France, and does ſo ſtill; and the Con⯑ſequence of this, is, by their own Confeſ⯑ſion, That we ſhould neither treat of Se⯑curity, or Evacuation, or any Thing elſe; but that our only Safety conſiſts in re⯑ducing the King of France.

[48] To what we muſt reduce him, how, and when it ſhall be done, and when we ſhall be allow'd to have reduc'd him e⯑nough, they do not undertake to deter⯑mine. Indeed, theſe are Gentlemen I can⯑not join with; and I doubt, it is ſuch as theſe that give ſome People ſo much Ground to ſay, That there are a Party; who are for perpetuating the War.—I am as willing to be Sanguine upon the War as any Body; and if it were continued, ſhould be as willing to be hopeful of Suc⯑ceſs.—But to ſay, that the King of France cannot put us into ſuch a Caſe by a Peace, as MAY effectually prevent him ever annexing Spain to France, and that this is his avow'd Deſign in this, and in all Treaties, is ſuch a Confirmation of what has been all along offer'd by others, viz. that a few Years would make King Philip as much a Spaniard and as much an Enemy to France as any King of Spain before him, that I wonder to hear Men of Senſe bring it for an Argument; and a Man can hardly re⯑frain telling ſuch Men, that they are ar⯑guing for our giving up Spain to King Philip.

Lewis XIV. has ſet up Philip Duke of An⯑jou, upon the Spaniſh Throne, and has fought hard to keep him in Poſſeſſion; in Gratitude [49] and Duty to his Grand-father, I doubt not but Philip V. would on all Occaſions do any thing for his Grand-father that lay in his Power; but if now after a Peace ſhould be made (ſup⯑poſing, for Argument ſake, that Peace were to give Spain to King Philip;) let us bring in the King of France writing ſuch a Letter as this to his Grandſon.

Will any Man ſay that Philip will immedi⯑ately Obey, reſign his Crown and Kingdom, to the King of France, tho' he is his Grand-father, or had been his immediate Father, or were a thouſand times nearer, if that could be?

Would not King Philip rather write a ſub⯑miſſive Letter to him, acknowledging his Fa⯑vour in preferring him to ſo great a Dignity, and his Kindneſs in maintaining him therein unto a General Peace; profeſſing his Zeal for his Majeſty's Intereſt, and his Readineſs to hazard himſelf, and all his Kingdoms in his Majeſties Service; But that he is now ſo en⯑dear'd to his Subjects, whoſe Fidelity has [50] been ſo manifeſt, and they are ſo endear'd to him that he is become the Father of his Peo⯑ple▪ and that he hopes his Grand-father will not put him to ſuch an Extremity to quit thoſe Kingdoms, and the Spaniſh Nation, who have ſpent ſo much Blood to keep him in Poſ⯑ſeſſion, and ſo in ſhort Excuſe himſelf, that is, make a Decent Refuſal.

If upon this, the King of France, went about to Invade him, Would he not ſay to him, that his Spaniſh Subjects would by no means conſent to his Abandoning them, &c. and that they are reſoly'd to defend themſelves; and would he not rather fight his Grand-father, after all he has done for him, than quit his Poſſeſſion? And I am ſure you will all ſay, he would be in the right to do ſo—And what would be the Conſequence of ſuch Fighting? but that very King Philip joining with the Allies, and ſeeking to them for help againſt France.

And if this would be ſo under his Grand-father, let any Man tell us what it would pro⯑bably be in half an Age after to his Elder Brother, if he being King of France, ſhould make ſuch a Demand? Would not he, Philip, Laugh at him, and bid him do his worſt; and in both Caſes, fly to the Confederates, viz. to England, Holland, and to the Empire for help?

This is ſo Natural and ſo unanſwerably Juſt to ſuppoſe—That let theſe People but make it out, that this is the King of France's Deſign, and that he is only making a Shew of King Philip, but really reſolves to annex Spain to the Kingdom of France; I ſay, let them but make [51] this good; and they have brought on the Stage the ſtrongeſt Reaſon that ever was yet given, or ever will be, why all the Spaniſh Monarchy ſhould be given to King Philip, and I Challenge them to Anſwer it if they can.

Let any one but enſure the Confederates, that the King of France will endeavour to annex Spain to the Crown of France after a Peace; I dare ſay, none of the Confederates would ſcruple leaving King Philip upon that Throne—But this is ſo wild a Notion, that I think it Merits to have no more Notice taken of it.

Two things this Diſcourſe tends to: 1. To remove that Notion, gotten among us, that all is Loſt and Given up, if King Philip is not entirely Depos'd and Un-king'd, and the whole Spaniſh Monarchy taken out of his Hands by the Confederates; a thing, I muſt confeſs, however I acquieſce in the Opinion of our Superiors, I never ſaw either Rational to be ſo ſtrictly limited, or poſſible to be brought to Practiſe; and a thing which thoſe who adher'd to, yet tacitly own'd themſelves wrong in, by keeping the Houſes, by ſhort Adjournments, juſt at Hand, to alter as they ſaw Occaſion. 2. To Allarm us, and that with great, Reaſon too, to Conſider, Suppoſe we could take it from King Philip; What the Danger of giving it now to the ſame Perſon to whom we would have given it before, will be; and Laſtly, To Convince us all, how reaſonable it is that the Powers of Europe ſhould in ge⯑neral [52] Congreſs, Meet, Treat and Debate, of theſe great Affairs, that if poſſible, out of all thoſe Interfering Intereſts, ſome Happy Me⯑dium may be found to Re-eſtabliſh the Tran⯑quility of Europe in a GOOD PEACE.