TRACTS, CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE MILITIA.
- I. The ancient Common-Law Right of aſſociating with the Vicinage, in every County, Diſtrict, or Town, to ſupport the civil Magiſtrate in maintaining the Peace.
- II. A general Militia, acting by a well-regulated Rota⯑tion, is the only ſafe Means of defending a free Peo⯑ple.
- III. Remarks concerning the trained Bands of the City of London.
- IV. Hints of ſome general Principles, which may be uſeful to military Aſſociations.
LONDON: PRINTED IN THE YEAR M.DCC.LXXXI.
THE ANCIENT COMMON-LAW RIGHT OF ASSOCIATING WITH THE VICINAGE, In every County, Diſtrict, or Town, to ſupport the Civil Magiſtrate in maintaining the Peace.
[] THE Ancient Common-Law Right OF ASSOCIATING WITH THE VICINAGE, In every County, Diſtrict, or Town, to ſupport the Civil Magiſtrate, in maintaining the Peace.
[]MAN being, by nature, a ſocial creature, it is natural for him to aſſociate with his brethren and neigh⯑bours, for common defence againſt all unjuſt violence; and ſuch aſſociation being juſt and reaſonable, as well as natural, we have not only a right thus to aſſociate, but are even bound to do it, by a branch of the common-law, which cannot legally be changed: for it is fixed upon all men, [6] in their reſpective diſtricts and countries, as an indiſpenſable DUTY, by ‘THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, that we may become aſſiſting’ (ſays Cowel, tit. 2.) ‘both to our parents and country; and REPELL FORCE AND IN⯑JURY: and from hence it comes,’ (ſays he,) ‘that whatſoever we do, for the de⯑fence of our own bodies, is adjudged legal.’ For which he cites Bracton, l. i. c. 6.† [7] num. 7. So the Author of Doctor and Student, in his ſecond chapter, concern⯑ing the law of Nature and Nations, and the law of Reaſon, aſſerts, that, ‘by the law of reaſon, it is lawful to repell force with force; and that it is THE RIGHT OF EVERY ONE’ (fas eſt unicuique ſe tueri, &c.) ‘TO DEFEND HIMSELF [8] AND HIS PROPERTY AGAINST UNJUST VIOLENCE.’ ‡ And again, in his fifth chapter, concerning the firſt foundation of Engliſh law, Reaſon, he again repeats the maxim, that ‘it is lawful to repell force with force for the defence of the body, due circumſtances being obſerved.’ * Now, as the Laws of reaſon and nature are immutable, † this natural right of aſ⯑ſociating [9] for common defence and peace, and the natural right of every individual to repel force with force, in defence of himſelf and property, can never be an⯑nulled by any act of parliament, but muſt ever be eſteemed as immutable rights of the common law, and muſt always remain in force, unleſs the government ſhould unhappily ceaſe to be LEGAL, by ſetting aſide the firſt foundations of the LAW! Ancient ſtatutes, however, though not the foundation of theſe rights, yet bear ample teſtimony to the exerciſe or uſage of them: for, what is ‘the power of the countie,’ ſo often mentioned in the an⯑cient law and ſtatutes, but an armed aſ⯑ſociation of the vicinage?—an aſſociation, from which no layman, from 15 to 60 years of age, was exempt. See Lam⯑bard's Eirenarcha, third book, p. 316, title, "Power of the Countie."— ‘That the Juſtices of the peace, Sherife, or [10] Under-ſherife, ought to have the aide and attendance of ALL the KNIGHTES, GEN⯑TLEMEN, YEOMEN, LABOURERS, SERVAUNTS, APPRENTICES, and VIL⯑LAINES: and likewiſe of WARDES: and of other YONG MEN that be above the age of xv. years; for ALL of that age are bound to have harneſſe * by the [11] ſtatute of Wincheſter.’ See alſo, in page 479 of the Eirenarcha, a farther teſ⯑timony that the law requires all laymen not only to have arms, but alſo to be well exerciſed therein. See title, "Archerie." "If any man, being the QUEEN's ſubject," (the author wrote in the reign of queen Elizabeth,) ‘and not have reaſonable cauſe or impediment, and being within the age of 60 years, (except ſpirituall men, juſtices of one bench or other, [12] juſtices of aſſiſe, and barons of the ex⯑chequer,) have not A LONG BOW AND ARROWES READIE IN HIS HOUSE, or have not USED SHOOTING THEREIN;’ (which is a clear command to be exerciſed in arms;) ‘or have not, for EVERY MAN-CHILD IN HIS HOUSE, (betweene 7 yeeres and 17 of age,) a bow and 2 ſhafts; and for every ſuch, being a⯑bove 17 yeeres, a bow and 4 ſhafts; or have not BROUGHT THEM UP IN SHOOTING, &c. he loſes 6s. 8d. for each month.’ And, under the ſame head, he informs us, that, if any man, above the age of 24 years, ‘have ſhot at any marke under eleven ſcore yards,’ (viz. one furlong, or 220 yards,) ‘with any prick-ſhaft or flight,’ he ſhall "looſe 6s. 8d. for every ſhot." Alſo, ‘if the inhabitants of any towne have not made and continued their Buts as they ought to do,’ — ‘loſe 20s. for every 3 moneths;’ (Eirenarcha, 4 book, p. [13] 478, 479;) for which he cites 33 Hen. VIII. c. 9. in which, indeed, the obli⯑gation for every man to have arms, and be exerciſed therein, is expreſſed ſtill in ſtronger terms, viz. ‘— that butts be made, on this ſide the feaſt of St. Mi⯑chael the Archangel next coming, in e⯑very city, town, and place, by the inha⯑bitants of every ſuch city, town, and place, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF ANCIENT TIMES USED, and that the ſaid inhabitants, and dwellers in every of them, be COMPELLED TO MAKE AND CONTINUE SUCH BUTTS, upon pain to forfeit, for every 3 months ſo lacking, 20s. And that THE SAID IN⯑HABITANTS SHALL EXERCISE THEM⯑SELVES WITH LONG-BOWS IN SHOOTING AT THE SAME, and elſe⯑where, in holy days and other times convenient. And, to the intent that EVERY PERSON may have bows of mean [14] price, be it enacted, &c.’ § iv. and v. Thus the law not only permits, but ab⯑ſolutely requires, EVERY PERSON to have arms, and be EXERCISED in the uſe of them.
The exerciſe of the Long-bow was formerly eſteemed the moſt effectual mi⯑litary diſcipline for the defence of the kingdom, and is ſo declared in another act of parliament of the ſame year, cap. 6.* and, therefore, as the law, at that time, required EVERY MAN to be exer⯑ciſed in the uſe of the then faſhionable weapons, the reaſon of the law holds e⯑qually [15] good, to require the exerciſe of ALL MEN in the uſe of the preſent faſhionable weapons, the muſquet and bayonet.
But even at that time, the uſe of muſ⯑quets, or guns, was allowed to the inha⯑bitants of all cities, boroughs, and mar⯑ket-towns, and for the very fame reaſon, (the defence of the realm,) by a proviſio⯑nal clauſe of the laſt-mentioned act, § vi. ‘Provided alway, and be it enact⯑ed, &c. that it ſhall be lawful, from henceforth, to all gentlemen, yeomen, and ſerving-men of every lord, ſpiri⯑tual and temporal, and of all knights, eſquires, and gentlemen, and to ALL THE INHABITANTS of cities, bo⯑roughs, and market-towns, of this realm of England, to ſhoot with any hand-gun, demihake, or hagbut, at any butt or bank of earth, only in place con⯑venient for the ſame,’ (whereby it ap⯑pears that proper places for exerciſe [16] ſhould be appointed in every town,) ‘ſo that every ſuch hand-gun, &c. be of the ſeveral lengths aforeſaid, and NOT UNDER. And that it ſhall be lawful, to every of the ſaid lord and lords, knights, eſquires, and gentlemen, and the INHABITANTS of EVERY CI⯑TY, BOROUGH, AND MARKET-TOWN, to have and keep in every of their houſes any ſuch hand-gun or hand-guns, of the length of one whole yard, &c. and NOT UNDER, to the intent to uſe and ſhoot in the ſame, at a butt or bank of earth only, as is above ſaid, whereby they and EVERY OF THEM, BY THE EXERCISE THEREOF, in form above ſaid, MAY THE BETTER AID AND ASSIST TO THE DEFENCE OF THIS REALM, WHEN NEED SHALL REQUIRE,’ &c. This ſtatute is ſtill in force.
[17]Every temporal perſon was (formerly) liable to pecuniary penalties; ‘if he have not’ (ſays Lambard) ‘and keep not in readineſſe, ſuch horſes, geldings, weapon, armour, or other furniture for the wars, as, after the proportion of his abilitie, he ought to have and keepe.’ (Eirenarcha, book iv. c. 4, p. 480.) Thus ſtood the law ſo late as the latter end of queen Elizabeth's reign, when the book laſt-cited was publiſhed; and the general tenor of the doctrine, reſpecting the right of Engliſhmen to have arms, hath ſince been confirmed, by the Declaration of Rights in the Act of Settlement, (1 Wm & Mary, ſt. 2, c. 2,) though it ſeems now to be limited to Proteſtant ſubjects, viz. ‘That the ſubjects which are Proteſ⯑tants MAY HAVE ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE, ſuitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.’—This latter expreſſion, "as allowed by law," reſpects the limitations in the above-mentioned act [18] of 33 Hen. VIII. c. 6, which reſtrain the uſe of ſome particular ſorts of arms, meaning only ſuch arms as were liable to be concealed, or otherwiſe favour the deſigns of murderers, as ‘croſs-bows, little ſhort hand-guns, and little hag⯑buts,’ and all guns UNDER CERTAIN LENGTHS, ſpecified in the act; but proper arms for defence (provided they are not ſhorter than the act directs) are ſo far from being forbidden by this ſtatute, that they are clearly authoriſed, and "the exerciſe thereof" expreſsly re⯑commended by it, as I have already ſhewn. And indeed the laws of England always required the people to be armed, and not only to be armed, but to be ex⯑pert in arms; which laſt was particular⯑ly recommended by the learned chancel⯑lor Forteſcue:— ‘et revera, non mini⯑me erit regno accommodum, ut incolae ejus in armis ſint experti.’— ‘Indeed it will be of no ſmall advantage to the [19] kingdom, that the inhabitants be EX⯑PERT IN ARMS.’ (De Laudibus Legum Angliae, c. xliv. p. 106.) And, in the notes and remarks on this book, by the learned Mr. Juſtice Aland, we find the following obſervations to the ſame purpoſe. 'In the Confeſſor's laws' (ſays he) 'it is,' ‘DEBENT* UNIVERSI LIBERI HOMINES, &c. ARMA HABE⯑RE, ET ILLA SEMPER PROMPTA CONSERVARE AD TUITIONEM REG⯑NI,’ &c. "See" (ſays he) ‘the laws of the Conqueror TO THE SAME PUR⯑POSE. The cuſtom of the nation’ (con⯑tinues this learned judge) ‘has been, TO TRAIN UP THE FREEHOLDERS TO DISCIPLINE; v. 13 and 14. C. ii. c. iii. and ib. § 20. and title, WAR, in the table to the ſtatutes.’
[20]Among the ancient conſtitutions, or ordinances, of the kingdom, recorded in the Myrror of Juſtices, chap. i. § 3. we read that it was ordained, ‘that every one, of the age of 14 years and above, ſhould prepare him’ (ſe appreſtat) ‘to kill mortal offenders in their notorious crimes, or to follow them from town to town with hue and cry.’ &c.
The true purpoſe and advantage of ha⯑ving all the inhabitants of this kingdom trained to arms is farther manifeſted in our old law books and ſtatutes; as in the Weſtminſter Primer, cap. xvii. on the caſe when any cattle are unlawfully taken and driven into any caſtle or ſtrong hold, &c.— ‘Le Viſc•. ou le Bailife priſe ove luy POYAR DE SON COUNTIE, ou de ſa Bail, et voile aſſaier de faire de ceo repl' des avers a celuy qui les aver priſe,’ &c. ‘That the ſheriff or the bailiff ſhall take with him THE POWER OF HIS COUNTY, or of his bailiwick, and [21] ſhall endeavour to make replevin’ (or recovery) ‘of the cattle from him that hath taken them,’ &c. And lord Coke remarks on this: — ‘Nota, EVERY MAN is bound by the Common-Law to aſſiſt not only the Sherife in his Office for the Execution of the King's Writs, (which are the Commandments of the King,) ACCORDING TO LAW;* but alſo his [22] Baily, that hath the Sheriffe's Warrant in that Behalfe, hath the ſame Authori⯑ty,’ &c. (2 Inſt. p. 193.)
[23]The attack of a caſtle or place of arms muſt require diſciplined troops; and therefore it was certainly neceſſary that "EVERY MAN," ſo bound by the common-law to aſſiſt, ſhould be trained to arms, in order to fulfil his duty. And the learned Nathaniel Bacon, in his hiſtorical Diſ⯑courſe of the Uniformity of the Govern⯑ment of England, (1ſt part, p. 64.) re⯑marks, that ‘the Strength conſiſted of the Freemen; and, though many were bound by Tenure to follow their Lords to the Wars, and many were Voluntiers, yet, it ſeems, ALL WERE BOUND UPON CALL, UNDER PERIL OF FINE, AND WERE BOUND TO KEEP ARMS, for the Preſervation of the Kingdom, their Lords, and their own Perſons; and theſe they might neither pawn nor ſell, but leave them to deſcend to their Heirs,’ &c.
The common-law right of the people of England to have arms is alſo clearly ex⯑preſſed [24] by the great and learned judge Bracton, one of the moſt ancient writers of our common-law, who is juſtly eſ⯑teemed of unexceptionable authority.— ‘ei qui juſtè poſſidet, licitum erit cum ar⯑mis contra pacem venientem ut expellat, cum armis repellere, ut per ARMA TU⯑ITIONIS ET PACIS, quae ſunt juſtitiae, repellat injuriam et vim injuſtam, et ar⯑ma injuriae,’ &c. (Bract. lib. iv. c. 4.) i. e.— ‘to him who juſtly poſſeſſes it SHALL BE LAWFUL with arms to re⯑pel him who cometh to expel, with arms againſt the peace, that, by ARMS OF DEFENCE AND PEACE, which are of juſtice, he may repel injury and unjuſt violence, and arms of injuſ⯑tice,’ &c.
The late unhappy tumults prove, that theſe principles of the Engliſh conſtitu⯑tion are as neceſſary to be enforced at pre⯑ſent as ever they were; for, had they not been fatally neglected and diſuſed, the [25] abandoned rioters would have been quel⯑led and ſecured by the neighbouring in⯑habitants of Weſtminſter, &c. in their firſt attempts; or, in caſe they had advan⯑ced towards the city, if the proper barriers had been reſerved, the citizens would have had time to get under arms, to ſupport their own magiſtrates in ſecuring the peace of the city; for any attack upon the gates or poſterns would have juſtified an im⯑mediate diſcharge of fire-arms, or other weapons, againſt the aſſailants, without waiting for the command of a peace-officer: and, as the inhabitants of each city and county are required to make good the damages ſuſtained on ſuch oc⯑caſions by private individuals, it is plain that the inhabitants themſelves, in their collective capacity, do form that proper POWER, from which the law requires the prevention of ſuch damages, and the ſupport and defence of the civil magiſ⯑trates: for, otherwiſe, the law ought to [26] have directed the damages to be deduct⯑ed from the laſt preceding parliamentary grants to the army.
If it be alledged that there can be no occaſion, in theſe modern times, to arm and train the inhabitants of England, becauſe there is an ample military force, or ſtanding army, to preſerve the peace; yet let it be remembered, that, the great⯑er and more powerful the ſtanding army is, ſo much more neceſſary is it that there ſhould be a proper balance to that power, to prevent any ill effects from it: though there is one bad effect, which the balance (howſoever perfect and excellent) cannot prevent; and that is the enormous and ru⯑inous expence of maintaining a large num⯑ber of men, without any civil employment for their ſupport; an expence, which nei⯑ther the land nor trade of this realm can poſſibly bear much longer, without pub⯑lic failure!
[27]No Engliſhman, therefore, can be truly LOYAL, who oppoſes theſe eſſential principles of the Engliſh LAW,* whereby the people are required to have ‘arms of defence and peace,’ for mutual as well as private defence; for a ſtand⯑ing army of regular ſoldiers is entirely re⯑pugnant to the conſtitution of England, and the genius of its inhabitants. †
[28]Standing armies were not unknown, indeed, to our anceſtors in very early [29] times, but they were happily oppoſed by them, and declared illegal. A remarka⯑ble inſtance of this is related by Sir Ed⯑ward Coke, in his 7th rep. p. 443, (Cal⯑vin's caſe,) but with a very erroneous ap⯑plication of the doctrine, (as there are in many other inſtances of that particular report,) for which the chancellor or judges, probably, who ſpoke, and not the reporter, muſt one day be anſwerable. ‘It appeareth, by Bracton, lib. iii. tract 2. c. 15. fol. 134. that Canutus, the Daniſh king, having ſettled himſelf in this kingdom in peace, kept notwith⯑ſtanding (for the better continuance thereof) great armies within this realm.’ [Yet Bracton was more wiſe and honourable than to conceive or hint [30] that great armies, ſo kept by the king, were proper inſtruments ‘for the better continuance of peace;’ for he ſays no ſuch thing, this being only a diſloyal conceit of ſome modern judge, concern⯑ed in the argument of Calvin's caſe: but to return to the words of the reporter.] ‘The peers and nobles of England diſtaſ⯑ting THIS GOVERNMENT, BY ARMES AND ARMIES,* (ODIMUS ACCIPI⯑TREM, QUIA SEMPER VIVIT IN AR⯑MIS,) wiſely and politiquely perſuaded the king, that they would provide for the ſafety of him and his people, and yet his armies, carrying with them many incon⯑veniences, ſhould be withdrawn,’ &c. (This would be a proper language and [31] true policy for a free Britiſh parliament to adopt.) "Hereupon" (ſays the reporter) ‘Canutus preſently withdrew his armies, and within a while after he loſt his crown,’ &c.
Here again the judge, whoever he was that ſpoke, betrayed a moſt diſloyal preju⯑dice in favour of ‘a government by arms and armies,’ which led him into a no⯑torious falſehood! for, though the former part of the ſentence is true, that king Canute "withdrew his armies," yet the latter part, that, ‘within a while after, he loſt his crown,’ is totally falſe; and the judge, by aſſerting that groundleſs circumſtance, ſeemed inclined to inſinu⯑ate, that the withdrawing the armies occa⯑ſioned the (ſuppoſed) loſs of the crown, which was far from being the caſe. The great and noble Canute reaped the bene⯑fit of his prudent and generous conformity to the free conſtitution of this limited mo⯑narchy; for he enjoyed a long and glori⯑ous reign, after he ſent back his Daniſh [32] ſoldiers; which, according to Matthew of Weſtminſter, (p. 403,) was in the year 1018; and he held the crown with dignity and glory to the end of his life, in the year 1035, when he was buried at Wincheſter with royal pomp (regio more, ib. p. 409): and his two ſons alſo, who ſeparately ſucceeded him, died like⯑wiſe, kings of England; for they loſt not the kingdom but by natural deaths, and the want of heirs.
Happy would it have been for Eng⯑land, had all ſucceeding kings been as wiſe and truly politic as the great Canute, who feared not to commit the care of his own perſon, and thoſe of his foreign friends that attended him, to the free laws and limited conſtitution of this king⯑dom.
The old Engliſh maxim, however, againſt ‘a government by arms and ar⯑mies,’ ought never to be forgotten. — ‘Odimus accipitrem, quia ſemper vivit in armis.’
(June, 1780.)
A GENERAL MILITIA, ACTING BY A WELL-REGULATED ROTATION, IS THE ONLY SAFE MEANS OF Defending a free People.
[35]A GENERAL MILITIA, ACTING BY A WELL-REGULATED ROTATION, IS THE ONLY SAFE MEANS OF Defending a free People.
[]THE eſtabliſhment of ſtanding armies is, perhaps, the moſt dan⯑gerous of all political expedients, and has been fatal to the liberty of every na⯑tion upon earth that has adopted it; and, therefore, though the doctrine of neceſſity is generally pleaded to excuſe the mea⯑ſure, [36] yet there ſeems rather a neceſſity of abſolutely rejecting it; and of forming the national defence upon ſome other leſs dangerous plan.
The ſervice of a national militia may be divided into equal proportions of at⯑tendance, by rotation, ſo as to inculcate and diffuſe a ſufficient knowledge of arms and military diſcipline throughout the whole body of a nation or people; and thereby ſuperſede the baneful neceſſity of keeping regular troops, or ſtanding armies of mercenaries.
Whenever the public ſafety demands the aſſembling and continuance of a large body of troops in actual ſervice, to watch and reſiſt the motions of any powerful in⯑vader, a regular military ‘Roſter of Service,’ from the whole national mi⯑litia, is the ſafeſt and beſt means of forming and continuing ſuch an army in the field; becauſe it would be, not only, the leaſt burthenſome to individuals, but [37] alſo leſs dangerous to the community at large; for, if the regularity of rotation were duly obſerved, no man would be ſo long detained from his ordinary calling and occupation as to loſe his civil capa⯑city and way of livelihood at home, nor be thereby unwarily drawn into a ſeparate intereſt from his fellow-citizens; which was unhappily the caſe of the Parliament's army in 1647; for, after having bravely defended the national liberty for ſome years, this very army became the inſtru⯑ment of a moſt hateful national bondage, under a military tyrant!
The nature of a Roſter is well deſcri⯑bed by General Bland, in his Treatiſe of military Diſcipline, from p. 287 to 312. When a great army is formed by ſeveral nations in alliance, which ſend into the field, each of them, a different number of battalions, a Roſter is eſteemed the beſt expedient for regulating and dividing the general ſervice into due proportions [38] amongſt them all: and General Bland has given, in p. 290 of the above-men⯑tioned Treatiſe, the form of ſuch ‘a Roſter general for the detaching of bat⯑talions, according to that in Flanders, in 1708.’ He has alſo given ‘Tables of Proportion for detaching private men,’ that is, for detaching them from the ſeve⯑ral battalions in the field, that the dan⯑ger and fatigue of the ſervice (eſpecially at ſieges) may be equally divided among them. And, nearly on the ſame plan, tables might be formed, for detaching the individuals of a national militia from the ſeveral pariſhes, or diſtricts, to which they belong, in due proportion to the number of males enrolled in each of them; whereby the hardſhip and inconveniences of mili⯑tary duty for the common ſafety would be equally divided among the whole na⯑tion; and, of courſe, the time of actual ſervice would be moſt profitably diminiſh⯑ed [39] to each individual, whilſt the know⯑ledge of arms and diſcipline would be re⯑gularly circulated into all parts of the country; and with it alſo ſuch a ſenſible perception, to each individual, of his fel⯑lowſhip, or incorporation, with the whole national community, as would plainly tend to prevent all partial and undue emu⯑lation of particular counties or diſtricts a⯑gainſt their neighbours: for, by ſuch provincial jealouſies, the ancient ſtates of Greece were unhappily diſunited, and their attention withdrawn from that true mutual intereſt and defence of each other, without which none of them could long ſubſiſt in freedom: whereas, if (on the contrary) they had been inured to the ſo⯑cial duty of ſerving in one common army, drawn equally from each confederate ſtate, by a proper "Table of Proportion," and duly changed by rotation, (to pre⯑vent them from becoming mere ſoldiers,) there would have been no juſt cauſe to [40] be jealous of each other's power (as be⯑tween the Athenians and Lacedaemoni⯑ans, &c.); for all ſucceſſes, as well as loſſes, would have been equally divided among them; ſo that no particular ſtate could have acquired, by victory, any en⯑viable advantages, peculiar to itſelf, to in⯑cite the jealouſy of the reſt; but every individual, in every part, would, by theſe means, have been led to conſider himſelf, not merely as a member of a ſin⯑gle petty ſtate or diſtrict, but (with a more enlarged idea of his own ſocial cha⯑racter) as a member, rather, of the whole community of free citizens throughout all Greece: for the circulation* of the [41] Roſter would have been a moſt effectual bond of union to ſecure the connexion and communication of the moſt diſtant branches of the confederacy; and, by preſerving the general body of the peo⯑ple in their civil capacity and ordinary occupations, it would alſo have rendered them leſs liable to be drawn from the common intereſt of the ſtate at large, partially to favour the arbitrary deſigns of any uſurping commander in chief or pet⯑ty tyrant: for no general-officer (had ſuch a confederacy of national union been [42] duly eſtabliſhed) would have been able to aſſume more power and authority, than what was fairly delegated by the ma⯑jority of ſuffrages, in one great united general council of choſen citizens from e⯑very part.
The general body of individuals, in ſuch a caſe, indeed, ſubmit themſelves to ſerve, by rotation, the humble ſtation of private ſoldiers; but the time of ſer⯑vice being limited, and equal to all men in duration, it would be no great hard⯑ſhip, eſpecially if each freeman that bears arms was allowed his natural right of ſuffrage in the ſtate, his due ſhare of legiſlative influence, to controul the commanders, and regulate the ſervice.
In a nation conſiſting of ſix millions of ſouls, (which number England is com⯑monly ſaid to contain,) the number of males capable of bearing arms (and who, according to natural right, are juſtly en⯑titled alſo to a ſhare in the legiſlature) [43] would be eſtimated at a fourth part of that number, according to the moſt ge⯑neral mode of eſtimation, viz. 1,500,000 men; from which number a Roſter of ac⯑tual ſervice from home, only for one month each man in the ſpace of a whole year, would ſupply a conſtant army in the field of 125,000 men, if ſo many were neceſſary. A continual change every month, or every fourteen days, of half a battalion at a time out of each diſtrict, or ſtill in ſmaller proportions, viz. a few companies at a time (or even by half-companies, from ſmaller diviſions or pa⯑riſhes) would be moſt adviſeable, that every part of the country might always re⯑tain nearly the proportion of eleven parts out of twelve of its own militia, as well for the purpoſes of guarding it, as to carry on the ordinary culti⯑vation, and other neceſſary local occupa⯑tions, without interruption. Perſons a⯑bove the common rank might ſerve in ſquadrons of horſe, (if they preferred [44] that kind of ſervice,) as equites, or eſ⯑quires. Thoſe men whoſe time of ſervice approached, as being next upon the eſ⯑tabliſhed Roſter, ſhould be more carefully exerciſed at home, after the hours of la⯑bour, for one month at leaſt before their time of marching. By theſe means they would be prepared for the ſervice; and the very march, if properly conducted, would add to their diſcipline. The cer⯑tainty of returning, when relieved by companies of their neighbours, in ſo ſhort a time as one month, (if they lived ſo long,) or two months, allowing for the march out and home, would much reduce the anxiety of parting from their families and friends.
It will probably be objected, that a national militia, which has been exerciſed only in ſmall bodies, is incapable of ef⯑fectual ſervice againſt an enemy: but for this a remedy may be found. Let the army be firſt formed in a ſeparate en⯑campment, [45] at ſuch convenient diſtance from the enemy, that they may not be liable to an immediate attack.
A central ſituation muſt, of courſe, be choſen for this camp of diſcipline, where the ſeveral companies from the whole nation may be regimented under proper general-officers, and be daily ex⯑erciſed, in large bodies, for a whole month (or ſix weeks, if neceſſary) be⯑fore they are brought to face the enemy. And, for this reaſon, it would be expe⯑dient to require from each individual (I mean the firſt time he is entered on the Roſter) one month or ſix weeks atten⯑dance, more than the generally eſta⯑bliſhed proportion of time on the Roſter, (which would be only once in his whole life-time, and therefore no great hard⯑ſhip,) in order to be exerciſed with a large body of troops in ſome of the principal and moſt neceſſary movements and evolutions for the field; and, after the month or ſix weeks training in the camp of diſcipline, [46] an army of 125,000 men might be marched to the camp or camps of actual ſervice, to do duty for the time allotted to each upon the Roſter againſt the com⯑mon enemy; and the number might be continually kept up by monthly detach⯑ments of battalions from the firſt camp of diſcipline, in proportion as the time of ſervice (allotted to each of the former companies upon the Roſter) ſhould ex⯑pire. The country would alſo be guard⯑ed by the returning diſciplined compa⯑nies diſperſed in every part; and the knowledge of arms and diſcipline, by the time a ſingle circulation of the Roſter was completed, (viz. in one year,) would be diffuſed throughout the whole nation; which would thereby be enabled after⯑wards to exert itſelf gloriouſly upon any ſudden emergency; for it might afford to bear even the loſs of ſix ſuch capital ar⯑mies of 125,000, viz. in all, 750,000, men, before it would be neceſſary to in⯑creaſe the time of ſervice from one month [47] to two months actual ſervice, for each diſciplined man, in a whole year. With ſo ſmall a portion of time employed in military ſervice, every man might pre⯑ſerve his ordinary occupation, either in trade or huſbandry, and maintain his rank and ſituation in life with his family, as a free citizen, in his own diſtrict, at all other times, when the Roſter of public ſervice did not demand his perſonal at⯑tendance from home. But when, by a contrary method, a national militia is ſo long continued in actual ſervice, without rotation, as to inure the individuals to a neglect and diſuſe of their ordinary em⯑ployments, in their reſpective counties and diſtricts, they gradually loſe their civil capacity, and, from free citizens, are apt to become mere ſold-iers, depen⯑dent on their military Sold, or ſti⯑pend, and the favour of ſuperiors; where⯑by they acquire ſuch a ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion to COMMAND, be it juſt or unjuſt, that [48] they readily undertake to execute thoſe very meaſures and deſigns, which they themſelves, perhaps, have previouſly condemned; alledging, that ‘a ſoldier has no right to judge for himſelf,’ (thus indiſcriminately applying, to the general propriety or impropriety of any military undertaking, a principle, which proper⯑ly relates only to the neceſſary diſcipline and mode of conducting it in the field, after a man has abſolutely conſented and engaged to ſerve in it,) ‘and that a ſol⯑dier muſt go’ (ſay they) ‘wherever he is ordered, without any demur about the propriety or injuſtice of the ſervice.’ So that they eſtabliſh not only a paſſive, but an active, obedience to the will of others, which makes the profeſſion diſ⯑honourable! — diſhonourable, I mean, in thoſe who admit this doctrine of unlimi⯑ted obedience, which is derogatory to their natural dignity, as men; for they give up an indiſpenſible quality of human nature, [49] the right of diſcerning between good and evil, (which is nothing leſs than a deſer⯑tion, or apoſtatiſing, from the duty which every man owes to God and his eternal laws!) and thereby render themſelves and their profeſſion the bane of every ſtate where they are eſtabliſhed, and a diſgrace to human nature!
REMARKS CONCERNING THE Trained Bands OF LONDON.
[53]REMARKS CONCERNING THE Trained Bands OF LONDON.
[]THE Militia, or Trained Bands, of London have never been known to miſbehave in actual ſervice, however deſpicable they may appear in their annual muſters.
Citizens of London, from the moſt ancient times, were required to keep arms in their houſes. The annual muſ⯑ter is rather a muſter of the arms than of the men, who would probably go out to [54] actual ſervice, if there ſhould be really occaſion for them; but even the meaneſt of the men, as they now are generally ſent out, (being for the moſt part ſubſtitutes,) if they were exerciſed for a few hours three times a week, only for one month, and reſtrained from the uſe of ſtrong li⯑quors during the time of exerciſe, would be found more ſerviceable (if there was any real occaſion of public defence) than is generally conceived.
Of this real facts afford the beſt proof: the irregularity of the Trained Bands and want of diſcipline were as conſpicuous and notorious, it ſeems, in the year 1642, as at preſent: for, when Capt. Skippon (afterwards Major-General) was directed by the parliament to attend them, as a guard, with two companies of the Trained Bands of London, Lord Clarendon's account of that matter is expreſſed in the folloWing contemptuous terms; ‘This man’ (ſays he, meaning Skippon) [55] ‘marched that day in the head of their TUMULTUARY ARMY to the parlia⯑ment-houſe.’ * Yet Lord Clarendon himſelf makes ample reparation to the Trained Bands for this contempt, when he ſpeaks of their unexpected behaviour at the battle of Newbery; for, though he allows their inexperience both of danger and ſervice, he expreſſly attributes to the ſteadineſs of the Trained Bands the preſer⯑vation of the parliament's army. No troops in the kingdom had at that time been able to withſtand the ſpirited char⯑ges of Prince Rupert's well-diſciplined horſe, till this tumultuary army, (which ſeems to be an exact deſcription alſo of their preſent muſters,) for the firſt time, compelled them to wheel about.
Rapin ſpeaks of the brave defence of the infantry on that day in very high terms, but without mentioning what par⯑ticular troops they were; ſo that no rea⯑der would ſuſpect that he deſcribed the [56] actions of the "tumultuary army" of the city.
‘After the Prince had routed the ca⯑valry of the enemy,’ (ſays Rapin, meaning the parliament's cavalry,) ‘he fell upon their infantry, which, though deprived of the help of the cavalry, received him with ſo much intrepidity, that he was repulſed ſeveral times, without being able ever to penetrate.’ * But Lord Clarendon candidly attributes the glory of the day to thoſe whom he before deſpiſed as a tumultuary army.
"The London Trained Bands" (ſays he) ‘and auxiliary regiments (of whoſe IN⯑EXPERIENCE of DANGER, or ANY KIND OF SERVICE, beyond the eaſy practice of their poſtures in the Artil⯑lery-garden, men had till then TOO [57] CHEAP AN ESTIMATION) behaved themſelves to wonder; and were, in truth, the preſervation of that army that day. For they ſtood as a BULWARK AND RAMPIRE TO DEFEND THE REST;’ (whereby he attributes to them the chief reſiſtance;) ‘and, when their wings of horſe were ſcattered and diſperſed, kept their ground SO STEA⯑DILY, that, though Prince Rupert him⯑ſelf led up THE CHOICE HORSE to charge them, and endured their ſtorm of ſmall ſhot, he could make no impreſſion upon their ſtand of pikes, BUT WAS FORCED TO WHEEL ABOUT: of ſo ſovereign be⯑nefit and uſe is that readineſs, order, and dexterity, in the uſe of their arms, which hath been ſo much neglected.’ Bk. VII. p. 347.
Thus the City Pike-men are commend⯑ed as a ſtandard pattern of military diſci⯑pline, (viz. for their ‘readineſs, order, and dexterity, in the uſe of arms,’) by [58] the very ſame hiſtorian who had entitled them a tumultuary army a very ſhort time before this occaſion which extorted his commendation. A moderate and ſuffi⯑cient diſcipline, for real ſervice, is more eaſily and ſooner acquired than people generally conceive; and nothing is want⯑ing to the preſent eſtabliſhment of City Trained Bands but more frequent muſ⯑ters, for about an hour or an hour and a half at a time, after the hours of labour: for, if they were allowed this advantage, they would be nearly upon the ſame foot⯑ing as the Militia of New England, Con⯑necticut, &c. which lately conquered the well-diſciplined army of General Bur⯑goyne: they would be nearly upon the ſame footing, I ſay, except in one point; which is, that the New England Militia have always maintained the ancient con⯑ſtitutional right of chooſing their own officers in the public Folkmotes: which the learned Judge Atkins, by the beſt autho⯑rities, [59] has proved to be the original conſti⯑tution of our national Militia. Polit. Tracts, p. 254.
The preſent eſtabliſhment of the county regiments of Militia ſavours too much of a ſtanding army, both in diſci⯑pline, and the effect of the ſervice upon the common men; who, by being abſent too long a time from their families and ordinary occupations, are apt to become mere ſoldiers, deſpiſing their former trades and employments, and conſequently cea⯑ſing to be citizens.
Nothing, ſurely, can be more dange⯑rous to a free ſtate than ſuch an effect as this; for the profeſſed ſoldier generally gives up to ſuperior COMMAND * that indiſ⯑penſible [60] human right of judging between good and evil, which alone conſtitutes [61] the diſtinction between men and brutes; and, through a falſe notion of military [62] honour, the ſoldier is apt to think that his duty requires an implicit active obedi⯑ence [63] on all occaſions; whereby the ſtanding armies of all nations are con⯑ſtantly [64] and regularly the tools of deſpo⯑tiſm, and the bane of all good and limi⯑ted government.
[65]A national militia, therefore, ought to be conſtituted upon principles as op⯑poſite [66] to thoſe of ſtanding armies as poſ⯑ſible; and no rules or arrangements [67] whatever, that may tend to detach men from their ordinary callings and employ⯑ments, [68] as free citizens, ought, on any account, to be admitted.
[69]The City-Militia, even upon its pre⯑ſent eſtabliſhment, was always reſpecta⯑ble, when real ſervice was wanted.
HINTS OF SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES, WHICH MAY BE USEFUL TO Military Aſſociations.
[73]HINTS OF SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES, WHICH MAY BE USEFUL TO Military Aſſociations.
[]AS the ſole purpoſe of Military Aſ⯑ſociations is to ſupport the Civil Magiſtrate, and to join ‘the power of the countie,’ when legally ſummoned by ſheriffs, &c. for common defence, it is ne⯑ceſſary that each aſſociated company be formed, upon principles as oppoſite to thoſe of ſtanding armies (valour and good diſcipline excepted) as can poſſibly be deviſed.
[74]The freedom and equal natural rights of individuals, and the preſervation of their civil capacity, muſt therefore be conſidered as objects of the utmoſt impor⯑tance and conſideration; in order to which the freedom of election in the ap⯑pointment of officers, and a frequent re⯑newal of choice therein, are abſolutely neceſſary to be maintained.
Let the whole corps of Aſſociators in every neighbourhood, or vicinage, di⯑vide themſelves into ſmall bodies, of ten perſons each, in their reſpective diſtricts; and let each ten, or decennary, chooſe from among themſelves a tithing-man, or ſerjeant, to ſuperintend the diſcipline of the ten, and to receive and communi⯑cate to them all ſummonſes from the Ci⯑vil Magiſtrate, or orders from the Com⯑mittee of Aſſociation, and to tranſact ſuch other buſineſs as the nature of the Aſſoci⯑ation may require: the power of the ſer⯑jeants, nevertheleſs, to be ſubject to the con⯑troul [75] of a majority of the ten, who chooſe them reſpectively; and no other military of⯑ficers ſhould be appointed, except officers of Platoons for a ſingle day; viz. when the corps is divided into Platoons for exerciſe (agreeable to the mode recommended by General Bland, p. 66): at which time each platoon ought to chooſe its own leader, whoſe power ſhould ceaſe with that day's exerciſe. An experienced per⯑ſon muſt, however, be choſen at a pre⯑vious general meeting, to inſtruct and di⯑rect the corps in the general manoeuvres and evolutions of the field, who ſhould, from time to time, be appointed Com⯑manding-officer of the day. In times of actual ſervice, the Lord-Mayor, or ei⯑ther of the ſheriffs that are preſent, muſt be conſidered as the legal commander of the aſſociation.
As three decennaries, or ſerjeants guards, will be the proper complement for a pla⯑toon, ſo two platoons, or ſix decennaries, [76] (being ſixty men,) will be a convenient number for a company, and ten ſuch com⯑panies a ſufficient number for a battalion, or ward diviſion; as it will be equal to two townſhips or two county hundreds.
There ſhould be, within each ward, ſe⯑veral places appointed for drilling, or teach⯑ing the common exerciſe to ſmall parties; and alſo one place, more ſpacious, for thoſe that are become expert in handling their arms, to be taught the platoon ex⯑erciſe, to form themſelves into compa⯑nies, to march, wheel, &c. But, if a place cannot be found within the ward, ſufficiently ſpacious for ſuch a general ex⯑erciſe of the whole body, it is probable that two or three places may be found therein ſufficient for the exerciſe of ſingle companies, or at leaſt of ſingle platoons, which ſhould be appropriated accordingly; and none of theſe places of exerciſe ſhould be open to the inſpection of ſtrangers, as it muſt be irkſome to gentlemen to be over⯑looked, [77] before they have acquired ſome tolerable knowledge of the military diſci⯑pline. One place of general rendezvous ſhould likewiſe be appointed within each ward, for the neighbours to aſſemble in caſe of any ſudden alarm.
To prevent the individuals of the Aſſo⯑ciation from being injured in their civil ca⯑pacity, care muſt be taken, that the times of drilling and private exerciſe be appoint⯑ed both before and after the uſual hours of labour; and that an option be given to the learners of attending either at the mor⯑ning or evening exerciſe, as ſhall be moſt convenient to themſelves, that no man may be induced to neglect or injure his ordi⯑nary calling or occupation, by which his civil capacity is maintained: and, for the ſame reaſon, the times of public exerciſe in larger bodies ſhould not be more fre⯑quent than is abſolutely neceſſary for ac⯑quiring a moderate and uſeful diſcipline, rather than a critical nicety in the military [78] manoeuvres; which latter would take up more time than men of buſineſs can uſu⯑ally ſpare; and which muſt finally have the bad effect of tiring out many of the moſt uſeful members of ſociety: and, therefore, it is not only neceſſary to re⯑ſtrain the too great frequency of ſuch meet⯑ings, but alſo the duration of each meet⯑ing, that as little time may be loſt to the individuals as poſſible; and that thoſe who attend may not incur the neceſſity of taking any refreſhment whatſoever while they are out on exerciſe, or in going or re⯑turning, which would otherwiſe occa⯑ſion many inconveniences too obvious to be mentioned, beſides an unneceſſary ex⯑pence to individuals, which ought cer⯑tainly to be avoided in large promiſcuous ſocieties, becauſe all cannot equally afford it. But, if any man has acquired ſo de⯑praved an appetite, that he cannot endure four or ſix hours exerciſe (and a general review, if properly conducted, will not [79] require more time) without taking food or liquor, he ought to be eſteemed totally unqualified for the Aſſociation, till he can cure himſelf of ſuch an unmanly and diſgraceful habit, which is entirely in⯑conſiſtent with the military duty even of a citizen.
Single decennaries, ſingle platoons, or even ſingle companies, ſhould not be per⯑mitted to march into the country, with their arms and uniforms, by way of ex⯑erciſe or amuſement to themſelves, without an expreſs leave, given by a general meeting of the aſſociators, nor without due caution to be taken for preſerving good order, by the attendance of a ſuffi⯑cient number of peace-officers, to prevent any diſputes or affrays with ſtrangers, leſt the indiſcretion of a few individuals of the corps, on ſuch an excurſion, ſhould injure the reputation of the whole body of aſſociators. And the third rule, given by a very ingenious and learned [80] writer, in a tract, entitled ‘An Inquiry into the legal Mode of ſuppreſſing Riots,’ ſhould be ſtrictly obſerved; that the Aſ⯑ſociation ſhould ‘not, UNNECESSARILY, march through ſtreets or highroads, nor make any the leaſt MILITARY PARADE, but conſider themſelves entirely as a part of the CIVIL STATE.’ And they ought alſo carefully to obſerve the caution referred to by his fifth rule, reſpecting the uſe of arms in ſuppreſſing RIOTS, viz. ‘that it is extremely hazardous for pri⯑vate perſons to proceed to thoſe extremi⯑ties in common caſes;’ and that they ſhould not attend to any private perſon that ſhall ‘PRESUME to raiſe the power of the county, which is the province of the ſheriff, under-ſheriff, or magiſtrate,’ but let them wait for a legal ſummons from thoſe that have the proper authority, before they take their arms to aſſiſt in keeping the peace; though they have [81] certainly a right to aſſemble as neighbours, without their arms, to conſult, and uſe all peaceable endeavours to allay or pre⯑vent the ill conſequences of any ſudden commotion that has occaſioned an alarm.
By the conſtitution of this kingdom, as well as by many expreſs laws ſtill in force, apprentices, wards, and indeed lay⯑men, of all ranks and conditions, from fifteen to ſixty years of age, are required to have arms, and be duly exerciſed in the uſe of them, for the national defence. (See p. 9-24.) It would therefore well become the houſekeepers of every ward, and par⯑ticularly thoſe who are members of any ward-aſſociation, to encourage their ap⯑prentices, ſervants, and dependents, to learn their military exerciſe, (with the common militia-arms belonging to each houſe,) at ſuch places in the ward as may be appointed for that purpoſe; the ex⯑pence of which ſhould firſt be defrayed [82] by the reſpective ward-aſſociations, until the utility of the meaſure is rendered ob⯑vious to the wards at large, that the houſe-keepers at each wardmote maybe induced to adopt it. For, by theſe means, the houſe-keepers might always have a ſufficient number of able and well-inſtructed ſubſti⯑tutes, to ſerve for them in the militia, which would thereby be reſcued from the oppro⯑brium of incapacity, with which it has ſo frequently of late been charged; and the neceſſity of any new reform of the City-Militia (which might be attended with very dangerous conſequences to the rights and liberties of citizens) would be there⯑by precluded. And if, in caſe of any more tumults or riots, an armed City-watch ſhould again be thought neceſſary, theſe diſciplined Militia-ſubſtitutes in each ward might be enrolled in a Roſter for that particular ſervice, under the proper Militia-officers; and their attendance might be ſo divided and diminiſhed, by [83] a due Roſter, as to be very little burthen⯑ſome to the individuals enrolled; where⯑by a ſmall ſtipend to each, for the time of his actual attendance, would be ſuffi⯑cient to render the ſervice voluntary. *
The appearance, alſo, of the City Mi⯑litia might be rendered more reſpectable, by the addition of drill-jackets, with ſome proper diſtinction of uniform facings, to denote the ward or diſtrict of each com⯑pany.
Appendix A INDEX.
[85]- ABSOLUTE WILL of a monarch over his ſubjects, a mark of the beaſt, 61, n.
- Acherley, Mr. cited, 68, n.
- Adomar, biſhop of Wincheſter, 68, n.
- Aland, Mr. Juſtice Forteſcue, cited, 19, 27.
- All perſons, of all ranks, that are laymen, (apprentices, ſervants, labourers, wards, &c.) required to have arms, and be exerciſed in the uſe of them, 9-24, 81.
- Antidote againſt the evil of royal will, 61, 2d n.
- Apprentices, &c. ſhould be encouraged by the houſe⯑keepers to learn the military exerciſe, 81.
- Archery, 11, 12, 13, 14.
- Armour, 10.
- Arms of defence and peace, 6, 17, 19, 24, 27.
- Arms of offence and robbery, 7, n.
- Army; ſee Standing army.
- Aſſociation. To aſſociate for common defence is a right of the people, founded on the law of reaſon and nature, and therefore an immutable right of the common-law, which can⯑not be annulled by act of parliament, 5-9. Ancient ſtatutes bear teſtimony to this popular right of aſſocia⯑tion, and the being exerciſed in arms, 9-18. Theſe rights as neceſſary, at preſent, as ever, 24. Had they not been fatally neglected, the late rioters would have been quel⯑led in their firſt attempts, 25. The purpoſe of military Aſſociations, 73. They ſhould be formed on principles as oppoſite as poſſible to thoſe of ſtanding armies, ibid. viz. in preſerving the civil capacity of individuals, and by the freedom of election in the appointment of officers, 74. The choice of tithing-men, or ſerjeants, ibid. The lord-mayor or ſheriff the legal commander of them, 75. [86] Platoon-exerciſe recommended, 75, 76. Places for dril⯑ling to be appointed, 76. alſo a general rendezveous in each ward, 77. Precautions, that the civil capacity of individuals may not be injured, 77-79. Small parties ſhould not be permitted to march into the country, with⯑out leave from a general meeting, and due caution for the peace, 79. Aſſociations ſhould not unneceſſarily march through ſtreets or high roads, nor make any military parade, but conſider themſelves as part of the civil ſtate; not to uſe arms in common caſes; not to attend to any private perſon that ſhall preſume to raiſe the power of the county, but wait for a legal ſummons, before they take their arms to aſſiſt in keeping peace; 80. but may aſſem⯑ble, as neighbours, without their arms, to uſe all peace⯑able endeavours, &c. 81.
- Atkins, judge, cited, 58, 59.
- Babylonian government deſcribed, 61-64.
- Bacon, Nathaniel, cited, 23.
- Barriers of the city ought to have been reſerved, 25.
- Beaſts are the prophetical emblems of arbitrary domi⯑nion among men, 60-64. Beaſt of the Babylonian mo⯑narchy, 61-64, n. Beaſt of the Medo-Perſian monarchy, 64, n. Beaſt of the Grecian monarchy, 64, n. The laſt, or 4th, Beaſt, which ſtill exiſts in power, 65, n. The law of England guards againſt the beſtial power, by requiring due limitations in government, 65-69.
- Belluina poteſtas: what it is, 60-61. how introduced, by innovations, corruptions, and ſtanding armies, 69, n.
- Bland, general, his deſcription of a roſter, 37, 38. His account of the platoon-exerciſe, 75.
- Bows and Arrows, 11, 12, 13. called the continual defence of the realm of England, 14. Legal diſtance for ſhooting with them at a mark, 12.
- Bracton, cited, 6, 21, 22, 24, 29, 65, 67.
- Butts, 12, 13, 15, 16.
- Calvin's caſe, reported by lord Coke, contains many inſtances of erroneous doctrines, 29.
- [87] Camp of diſcipline, 45. Camp of ſervice, 46.
- Canutus the great; a notable inſtance of his virtue and juſtice, in withdrawing his armies from this realm, on the requiſition of the peers of England: the conſequences of that noble action are miſrepreſented by the judge who ci⯑ted it on Calvin's caſe, 29-32.
- Cherubim, a type of the hoſts of Iſrael, acting by rota⯑tion, 40, 41, n.
- Choice of Officers by public folkmotes, 58. by decenna⯑ries, 74. by platoons, 75. by a general meeting, 74, 75.
- City pike-men, 57.
- Civil capacity of individuals, ſerving in the militia, may be preſerved by the regularity of rotation, and precau⯑tion in training, &c. 37, 41, 43, 47, 74, 77, 78. but is gradually loſt by long continuance in ſervice, whereby the national militia are rendered mere ſoldiers, 47.
- Clarendon, lord, cited, 54-58.
- Coke, lord, cited, 21, 22, 29-31.
- Command, when not duly limited, is merum imperium and belluina poteſtas, 59, n. &c.
- "Commandment of the king, according to law," 21, n.
- Commandment of the king, which falls not within this deſcription, not binding, 21.
- Confeſſor's laws, cited, 19.
- Connecticut, 58.
- Cowell, Dr. quoted, 6.
- Cromwell, the uſurper, kept up an army to ſupport him⯑ſelf and his tyranny, 27, n.
- Daniel, quoted, 60, 61.
- Decennaries ſhould chooſe their own tithing-men, or ſer⯑jeants, 74.
- Declaration of rights, 17.
- Defence, againſt unjuſt violence, a natural right of man, 6-9.
- Devil. He is a miniſter of the Devil who commits in⯑juſtice, 22, n. 66, n.
- Diſcipline, (military,) ſufficient for real ſervice, eaſily acquired, 58.
- [88] Diſloyalty, 30, n.
- Doctor and Student, quoted, 7, 8.
- Drilling and private exerciſe in arms, 76, 77.
- Earth is filled with violence, 7, 62, n.
- Eirenarcha; ſee Lambard.
- Elements of tempeſt and fire reſerved to execute God's wrath, 7, n.
- Emperor, the original ſignification of that title, 59, n.
- Engliſhman. No Engliſhman can be loyal, who oppoſes the principles of the Engliſh law, which require the peo⯑ple to be armed, 27, 30.
- Executive power of this limited monarchy cannot legally flow through any other channels than the king's courts of juſtice, by due proceſs of the law, 21, n.
- Exerciſe, (military,) 11-14, 16, 18, 54, 58, 81. Places for it ſhould be appointed in each ward, 76. and hours for it, both in the morning and evening, 77. Public exerciſe, in large bodies, not to be more frequent than is neceſſary for a moderate and uſeful diſcipline, 77. No food or li⯑quor to be taken while out on exerciſe, 78, 79.
- Fire; ſee Elements.
- Fleta, 22, n.
- Force. It is lawful to uſe force to repel force and unjuſt violence, 6-9.
- Forteſcue, chancellor, 18, 19.
- Freemen. None but freemen ought to be truſted with arms in a free country, 30, n.
- Giſarms; what they are, 11, 2d n.
- Good and evil. The right of judging between good and evil indiſpenſible to man, to diſtinguiſh him from the brutes, 60-64.
- Government, by arms and armies, odious to the ancient Engliſh nobility, 30, 32. Every Engliſhman, who has not the ſame diſtaſte, is diſaffected to the true conſtitution, and may be juſtly charged with diſloyalty, 27, 30, n.
- [89] Grecian dominion, or empire, 64, n.
- Greece. Cauſes of diſunion among the ancient ſtates thereof, 39, 40.
- Harneſſe, 10.
- Hue and Cry, 20.
- Image of tyranny, 60, n.
- Inhabitants of every city, borough, and market-town, may have guns, and exerciſe themſelves in the uſe thereof, 16, 17, 18. Ought all to be armed, and be expert in arms, 18—20. Are themſelves the proper POWER to prevent damages by rioters, 20—25. There is a greater neceſſity for arming and training them than formerly, 26.
- Innovations. Triennial and ſeptennial elections, 69, n.
- Inquiry into the legal Mode of ſuppreſſing Riots, cited, 80.
- Iſraelites. The Laws of God were to openly tendered to the people, and by them ſo amply confirmed by repeat⯑ed declarations of popular aſſent, that they became the regular ſtatutes of that nation, 61, 2d n.
- "King can do no wrong;" this doctrine explained, 21, n. Has no prerogative which may derogate from juſ⯑tice and equity, 21, 22, n. Ceaſes to be the miniſter of God, and becomes the miniſter of Satan, when he preſumes to rule contrary to law, 22, 66. No legal king, where WILL governs, and not LAW, 22, 61, 2d n. 65, 66. Antidote againſt royal WILL, 61, 62, 2d n. King ſhould be limited by the laws of God, and is bound to read therein, that he may "not lift up his heart above his brethren," 62, 2d n. for, if duly limited, the crown (or dominion) will not be liable to be broken by the approaching kingdom of God, 63. King is ſupreme in perſonal rank, but not in power, 66, 67, n. King has a ſuperior, viz. God; alſo the Law, alſo his Court, (i. e. of parliament, earls, barons, &c.) 67, n. King Canute, 29—32. King Richard II. 27. King Henry VII. 27, n. King Henry VIII. 13, 14, 18, 27, n. Queen Elizabeth, 17. King Charles I. 66. King Charles II. 27. King William, 28, n.
- [90] Kingdom of God will deſtroy the tyranny of all temporal empires and kingdoms, and will fill the whole earth, 60, n. under the whole heaven, 63, 2d n. Nothing but righteouſ⯑neſs and the due limitation of WILL, by the laws of God and the juſt rights of the people, can ſave any crown (or regal dominion) from being broken to pieces by this ap⯑proaching KINGDOM, 63, n.
- Lacombe, Mr. 11, n.
- Lambard's Eirenarcha, cited, 9, 11, 12.
- Laws of reaſon and nature immutable, 8. Thoſe who attempt to ſubvert the ancient laws loſe the benefit of the laws, 27, n.
- Laymen, of all ranks and conditions, required to have arms, and be exerciſed in the uſe of them, 9—24, 81.
- Limitation of government. The want of it induces the princes of the world "to lift up their heads above their bre⯑thren," whereby they are rendered dreadfully obnoxious to the vengeance of the approaching kingdom of God, 62, 63. The want of it is an abomination in the eye of the Engliſh common-law, 65, n.
- London. If the proper barriers had been reſerved, the ci⯑tizens would have had time to get under arms on the firſt notice of the late riots, and might have preſerved the peace of the city: an attack upon the gates would have juſtified an immediate diſcharge of fire-arms, 25. The inhabitants themſelves form that proper power, from which the law requires the prevention of damages from rioters, 25, 26.
- Long-bow. To be exerciſed in the uſe of it was formerly the duty of every man, 14. The reaſon of the law doth equally require the general exerciſe of all men in the uſe of the muſquet and bayonet, 15.
- Lord-mayor and ſheriffs, the legal commanders of mili⯑tary aſſociations, 75.
- Loyalty. No Engliſhman can be loyal, who oppoſes the principles of the Engliſh law, whereby the people are required to have arms of defence and peace, 27. nor who does not diſtaſte a government by arms and armies, 30.
- Matthew, of Weſtminſter, cited, 32.
- Medo-Perſian dominion, 64, n.
- Merum imperium, 60, n.
- Metaſtaſius, (Leopold,) cited, 60, n.
- MILITIA. A general militia, acting by rotation, the only ſafe means of defending a free people, 35—49. The militia of England might ſupply a conſtant army in the field of 125,000 men, and yet retain, in every part of the country, eleven parts out of twelve of its ſtrength, duly trained by the rotation, 42, 44, 46. Might afford to loſe ſix ſuch capital armies, before it would be neceſſary to double the time of ſervice on the roſter, 46, 47. Militia, without rotation, becomes a ſtanding army of mere ſold-iers, 47. Militia of London; ſee Trained Bands. Militia of the counties; the preſent eſtabliſhment thereof ſavours too much of a ſtanding army, 59. Should be conſtituted on principles as oppoſite as poſſible to ſtanding armies, 66—68. Militia of New-England and Connecticut, 58. A free militia the only juſt means of internal national defence, 69, n.
- Minſheu, cited, 10.
- Muſquet and Bayonet. The laws, which required every man to be exerciſed in the uſe of the long-bow, when eſ⯑teemed the moſt effectual weapon, by parity of reaſon, do equally require the exerciſe of the preſent faſhionable weapons, the muſquet and bayonet, 14, 15.
- Muſquets, or hand-guns, the right of all the inhabitants of cities, boroughs, and market-towns, to be armed there⯑with, acknowledged by ſtatute, 15, 16, 17, 18.
- Myrror of Juſtices, cited, 20.
- Neceſſity of rejecting the dangerous expedient of keeping ſtanding armies for defence, 36.
- Newbery. Account of the battle near that place, 55-57.
- New-England militia, 58.
- Odimus aecipitrem, &c. an old Engliſh maxim never to be forgotten, 30-32.
- Parliaments ought to be newly elected every ſeſſion, 68, n. and in an equal proportion of repreſentation, which would be moſt conducive to the true intereſt both of king and people, 69, n.
- People. Their right to aſſociate for common defence, 5—9. and to repel force and injury with force, 6, 7, 8. To have armour, harneſs, arms, 10—13. To be exerci⯑ſed in the uſe of ſuch arms as are eſteemed the beſt for the ſafeguard of the realm, 14—24. Their power (viz. the power of the commons in parliament) is independent, 68, n.
- Perſian Government; ſee Medo-Perſian.
- Petrus de Montford, 68, n.
- Platoons, 75, 76.
- Power of the commons is independent, of which an ex⯑ample is cited, 68, n. There is no ſupreme power with⯑out their concurrence, 68, 69, n.
- Power of the county, 9, 20.
- Power of the king is not ſupreme, 66—69, n.
- Prerogative. No prerogative of the king againſt juſtice [...], 22, n.
- Proceſs of the law, through the king's courts, is the on⯑ly proper mode of exerting the executive power in this li⯑mited monarchy, 21, n. and the ſheriffs, attended by the power of the countie, muſt execute the king's (legal) writs, 20, 21.
- Prot [...]ſtant ſubjects may have arms for their defence, 17.
- Rapin, cited, 55, 56.
- Reaſon, the firſt foundation of Engliſh law, 8. The laws of reaſon are immutable, ibid.
- Rendezvous (general) ſhould be appointed in every ward, in caſe of ſudden alarm, 77.
- Reſ [...]ſtance againſt unjuſt violence lawful, 6—9, 24.
- Right of aſſociating, for common defence and peace, a n [...]ral right, and therefore immutable, 6, 8, 9.
- R [...]ght [...] alone can eſtabliſh the throne, 22, 63.
- R [...]ters (the late) would have been quelled in their firſt attempts, had not the ancient Engliſh conſtitution, re⯑ſpecting the uſe of arms, been fatally neglected, 24, 25.
- [93] Roman dominion, 65, n. 69, n.
- Roſter, or rotation of ſervice, as propoſed for a gene⯑ral national militia, 36-47. A general rotation of public duty may be compared to the cherubim, repreſenting the hoſts of Iſrael, 40, 41, n. and would preſerve the people in their civil capacity and ordinary occupations, 41. and li⯑mit the power of commanders, without injuring individu⯑als, 42. The proportion of a roſter for England, 42, 43. Roſter for the city watch, 82, 83.
- Rupert, (prince,) with the choice horſe, repulſed by the city trained-bands, 55-57.
- Scriptures, (holy,) cited: Exod. xxiv. 37. p. 61.— Deut. xvii. 18, 20. p. 61. — Pſ. lxxv. 6. lxxvi. 12. p. 63. lxxxiii. 13-15. cxlviii. 8. p. 7, n. — Iſa. xvii. 13. p. 7, n. — Dan. ii. 35. p. 7, n. ii. 35-44. p. 60, 61.—v. 19, 20. p. 63.— vii. 27. p. 63. — vii. 4. p. 64. — xi. 3. p. 64.—xi. 36. p. 65. — 2 Theſſ. i. 8. p. 7, n.— 2 Pet. iii. 7. p. 7, n.—Rev. xi. 18. p. 61.
- Skippon, (major general,) 54.
- Serjeants, 74.
- Servants, &c. ſhould be encouraged to learn the mili⯑tary exerciſe, 81. that there may be always a ſufficient number of perſons well inſtructed, to ſerve as ſubſtitutes in the militia, or armed city-watch, 82.
- Sheriffs to raiſe the power of the county, 9, 10, 20, 21.
- Sold-iers, dependent on their military ſold, are apt to acquire a ſlaviſh and diſhonourable ſubmiſſion to command, 47-49, 59, 60, n. and to give up the indiſpenſible human right of judging between good and evil, 60-62. whereby ſtanding armies are conſtantly the bane of all good and li⯑mited government, 63, 64.
- Standing army. The eſtabliſhment thereof in England affords no argument againſt arming and training the in⯑habitants in general, 26. The expence of the ſtanding army enormous and ruinous, 26. and the eſtabliſhment of it repugnant to the conſtitution of England and the geni⯑us of its inhabitants, 27, 28 Is dangerous and fatal to the liberties of every nation upon earth, 35, 49, 60. as well as to the true permanent intereſt of legal kings, 63, 2d n. Is the bane of all limited government, 63, 64. and is the re⯑gular [94] means of introducing the belluina poteſtas of imperial will, againſt which divine vengeance is announced, 69. n. The firſt appointment of guards, and the encroachments that enſued, 27-29, n.
- Statutes, cited, 13-18, 20.
- Supreme power; what, 66, 67, n. if corrupted by inno⯑vations, venality, and inequality of repreſentation, will be⯑come a ſupreme evil, 69, n.
- Taylor, (biſhop,) cited, 66, 67, n.
- Tempeſt and fire reſerved to execute God's wrath, 7, n.
- Tithing-men, 74.
- Trained-bands of London have never miſbehaved in ac⯑tual ſervice, 53, 69. Their annual muſters are rather muſ⯑ters of arms than men, 53. The utility of training and ex⯑erciſing them, 54. Attended, as a guard, to the parliament, 54. Called a tumultuary army, 55. Nevertheleſs, by their ſteady behaviour at the battle of Newbery, they re⯑peatedly repulſed prince Rupert's choice cavalry, 55-57. Recommended as a pattern of military diſcipline by lord Clarendon, 57. A moderate and ſufficient diſcipline for them may eaſily be acquired after the hours of labour, 58. A new reform of the city-militia dangerous at this time, 82. Their appearance might be rendered more reſpectable by uniforms, 83.
- Traitors, the adviſers of illegal meaſures, or of ſuch meaſures as require an undue influence in parliament, 22, n. 30, 69, n.
- Vicar and miniſter of the eternal King. Such is a king who limits his power by juſtice and law, 22, n. 65, n.
- Voluntary ſervice, in an armed city-watch, or as militia ſubſtitutes; how to be promoted, 82, 83.
- Voluntas; ſee Will.
- War againſt trade, 7, n.
- Watch-duty. Volunteers to it, how to be encouraged, 83.
- [95] Weapons. Such as are liable to be concealed, unlaw⯑ful, 18.
- Will, (or voluntas,) when it governs, and not law, de⯑ſtroys the legal authority of the ſovereign, 22, n. 65, 66, n.
- Will, (unlimited,) or merum imperium, is belluina poteſ⯑tas, a beaſtly power, the characteriſtical property of all the figurative beaſts in prophecy, 60-65. See alſo King.
- Wolſey, (cardinal,) 27.
Giſarms, properly "GUISARME," (cu) ‘PERTUISANE, arm [...] militaire fait comme une lance, ou comme une longue bayonnette.’
Dictionnaire du vieux Language François, par M. Lacombe.
— ‘Divers gentlemen, yeomen, and ſerving-men, now of late have laid apart the good and laudable exer⯑ciſe of the Long-bow, which always heretofore hath been the ſurety, ſafeguard, and continual defence, of this realm of England, and an ineſtimable aread and terror to the enemies of the ſame.’ (Extract from the preamble to the act of 33 Hen. VIII. c. 6.)
Hence it is plain, that ‘gentlemen, yeomen, and ſerving men,’ were required, by law, to be exerciſed in the uſe of ſuch arms as were eſteemed the beſt for the ſafe⯑guard and defence of the realm.
A Rotation, or general circulation of public duty, may be compared to thoſe "wheels within wheels," which give life, vigour, and activity, to a whole com⯑munity, by enabling it (howſoever extenſive and ſcat⯑tered, with reſpect to local ſituation) to move and ex⯑ert itſelf as one united living body, actuated by one ſpirit, like as the hoſts, or armies, of the commonwealth of Iſrael are typified by the Cherubim, or four living creatures, (as repreſented in the ſtandards of the four principal tribes,) united in one animated ſyſtem of action, moving altogether with wheels (or rotations) and wings, full of eyes within and without.
For, in a ſtate that is perfectly free, (and in ſuch on⯑ly,) the eyes of the ſeveral individuals of which it is compoſed are permitted to look forward, with effect, to the true intereſts of the community at large; and may well be conſidered as the eyes, figuratively repreſented in the whole body of the Cherubim, and in all their parts; (their backs, and their hands, and their wings, and the wheels full of eyes round about;) every eye in that great united figurative body of the Cherubim help⯑ing to enlighten the intention, and thereby influence the motion or government of the whole.
Command is properly imperium, the eſſence of em⯑pire [...] for, the title of imperator (or emperor) originally ſignified nothing more than the commander in chief of the army: and, though this power of command, was gene⯑rally delegated, at firſt, by the election and appointment of the people, or ſenate, and of courſe was eſteemed ſubject to their controul, yet, by the uſurpations of ſuc⯑ceſsful military chiefs, (when the forces under their command have been detained ſo long in actual ſervice as to loſe their civil capacity and become a ſtanding army of mere ſold-iers dependent on their ſold, or military pay, inſtead of their former civil connections and uſeful occupations,) it has always been liable to be changed from a limited command to "merum imperium," or abſo⯑lute dominion, which Leopold Metaſtafius, a learned Roman Advocate, very properly ſtiles "belluina poteſtas," a beaſtly power; a term which moſt aptly characterizes the enormity, and conſequent illegality, of unlimited mo⯑narchy! And this uſe of the term, belluina poteſtas, is ſtrictly legal and juſtifiable; becauſe it is the very mark by which the prophets of God have branded all the ar⯑bitrary dominations of mankind, from the Babylo⯑nian head of the great and terrible image of Tyranny down to its very toes, the preſent divided kingdoms of the earth, which ſtill exiſt in power, (and muſt ſo con⯑tinue for ſome little time longer,) for the puniſhment and deſtruction of depraved man, until it ſhall pleaſe God, in his mercy, to break them in pieces by his eter⯑nal kingdom, which will then become a mountain, (or earthly eſtabliſhment of government,) and fill the whole earth, (Dan. ii. 35. 44.) For all the ſaid temporal em⯑pires and kingdoms are included in the prophetic repre⯑ſentation of four great and terrible beaſts; (ſee Dan. vii.) ſo that the belluina poteſtas is undeniably attributed to all of them; and, that we may more clearly demonſtrate that the term denotes a power, unlimited by law and due popular controul, it is neceſſary to remark, that the characteriſtical property of each of theſe beaſtly em⯑pires is, "to do according to his WILL;" that is, with⯑out limitation of law, right, or other juſt controul in favour of the people: ſuch unlimited WILL at is called "abſolute;" i. e. "looſed from" all due reſtraint of the people, or other obligation whatſoever. This beſtial mark of abſolute will was the characteriſtical property of the firſt beaſt, the Babylonian head or winged lion of the Chaldees; "whom he WOULD" (NAY, the proper Chaldee word for WILL, both verb and noun) ‘he ſlew, and whom he WOULD’ ( [...]) ‘he kept alive, and whom he WOULD’ ( [...] again) ‘he ſet up, and whom he WOULD’ ( [...] once more) "he put down:" (Dan. v. 19. So that the will of the monarch was manifeſtly the only law of that empire; and the unhappy effects of ſuch unlimited power, even to the monarch himsſelf, is ſtrongly marked in the very next verſe; ‘But, when his heart was lifted up,’ (the natural conſe⯑quence of ſuch undue exaltation*,) ‘and his mind hardened in PRIDE, he was depoſed from his kingly throne, and they took his glory from him: and he was dri⯑ven from the ſons of men, and his heart was made like the BEASTS,’ (a notable inſtance of God's vengeance againſt the belluina poteſtas of royal will and pleaſure,) "and his dwelling was with the WILD ASSES," &c. (Dan. v. 19, 20, &c.) By this very example did the holy prophet reprove a wicked and unbridled deſcendant of the ſame monarch, juſt before the total diſſolution of his empire, as he had alſo previouſly warned the royal anceſtor himſelf, to ‘break off his ſins by RIGH⯑TEOUSNESS,’ &c. which would have effectually reſtored due limitations to his government, and deſtroyed the baneful "belluina poteſtas" which occaſioned the warning; but the counſel was neglected, and, of courſe, the monarch was humbled, and his empire ruined! for then were the wings of the BEAST of Babylon plucked, and his dominion taken away. (Dan. vii. 4.)
Abſolute will was alſo the eſſential property of the ſucceeding empire, or the ſecond beaſt; viz. the Medo-Perſian monarchy, deſcribed elſewhere under the figure of an impetuous ram, which puſhed weſtward, and northward, and ſouthward, ‘ſo that no BEASTS might ſtand before him, neither (was there any) that could deliver out of his hand, but’ (the prophet now adds the principal beſtial, or brutal, mark) ‘HE DID AC⯑CORDING TO HIS WILL, and became great.’ (Dan. viii. 4.) For, after the Perſian monarchs had once ac⯑quired the baneful "belluina poteſtas," by the eſtabliſh⯑ment of ſtanding armies in every province, even the once-boaſted laws of the Medes and Perſians became as vague and uncertain as the royal will and pleaſure to which they were, of courſe, ſubjected, howſoever un⯑changeable they might have been reputed in the com⯑mencement of that empire.
Neither was the third beaſt (the cruel four-headed fly⯑ing leopard of the Grecian empire) without the ſame characteriſtical mark of abſolute will, though it is not expreſly annexed to Daniel's deſcription of that com⯑pound of Tyranny in his ſeventh chapter; but, in the farther deſcription of the Grecian empire, (chap. xi. v 3.) the ſame wilful or unlimited dominion is clearly foretold; ‘A mighty king ſhall ſtand up, that ſhall rule with great dominion,’ (and then follows the mark of the beaſt,) "and ſhall do according to his WILL."
The king, mentioned in the 36th verſe, that ‘ſhall do according to his WILL, and exalt himſelf, and magnify himſelf above every God,’ is generally underſtood to denote the fourth and laſt beaſt, or empire, which ſtill ex⯑iſts; being that moſt noxious and tremendous beaſt with iron teeth, (deſcribed in Dan. vii. 21.) ‘which devour⯑ed, brake in pieces, and ſtamped the reſidue under his feet;’ i. e. in the moſt violent and beaſtlike manner, which is plainly to "do according to his WILL!" We ſee then how aptly unlimited command, or merum impe⯑rium, is expreſſed by the term, "belluina poteſtas."
The unlimited will of a king is ſo great an abomina⯑tion in the eye of the Engliſh Common-law, that the ex⯑erciſe of it in this country is declared to be an effectual diſqualification or abaſement from the regal dignity, ‘for there is NO KING, where WILL governs, and not law.’ — ‘Non eſt enim rex, ubi dominatur VOLUNTAS, et non lex.’ (Bract lib. i. c. 8.)
A king of England ceaſes to be king, when he ceaſes to be limited by the LAW; for it is a rule of the com⯑mon-law, that "a king can do nothing" (i. e. by virtue of his office) ‘on earth, while he is the miniſter and vicar of God, except that alone which BY LAW he may.’ — "Nihil enim poteſt rex in terris," &c. ‘niſi id ſolum quod de JURE poteſt,’ &c. (See the note in pages 21 and 22.) And, therefore, when the law is ſuſpend⯑ed, or ſet aſide, (which is the higheſt and moſt bane⯑ful injuſtice,) the king's power ceaſes to be "ae jure," for, in the eye of the law, he is eſteemed ‘Miniſter di⯑aboli, dum declinet ad injuriam;’ ſo that he and his miniſters reduce themſelves thereby to the common level of all other bad men; and whatſoever power, or force, in that caſe they may be able to exert, has no better foundation than the temporary power of banditti, which may be lawfully and conſcientiouſly reſiſted by all men.
A king of England, therefore, though he is ſupreme, (or ſovereign,) in perſonal dignity and rank, yet he is not ſo in will and power; becauſe, in theſe, the law (to avoid the belluina poteſtas of abſolute monarchy) requires that he ſhould be duly limited by the people: a neceſſary diſtinction this, reſpecting ſupremacy, of which the un⯑fortunate K. Cha. I. ſeems not to have been aware, or he would not, with his dying breath, have denied the people's right to a ſhare in the government; ſaying,— ‘It is not for having ſhare in government, ſir; that is nothing pertaining to them; a ſubject and a SOVEREIGN are clear different things,’ &c.—and ſo they certainly are, with reſpect to perſonal dignity, or rank, when com⯑pared as individuals; and yet the ſovereignty, or ſupreme power, belongs of right to the people, i. e. to the ma⯑jority of them, or to the majority of their duly elected repreſentatives. "And therefore," (we may ſay with that learned caſuiſt, Bp Taylor, in his Ductor Dubi⯑tantium, lib. iii. c. rule 1, p. 522.) ‘it is but a weak and uſeleſs diſtinction when we ſpeak of kings and princes, (by them meaning the SUPREME POWER,) to ſay that ſome are ABSOLUTE, ſome are LIMITED in their power.’ — That is, the diſtinction is weak and uſeleſs only when we mean to ſpeak of the ſupreme power: this is clearly the biſhop's meaning, as the following con⯑text will ſhew; for otherwiſe the diſtinction to be made between abſolute and limited "kings and princes" is ſo far from being weak and uſeleſs, that it is the neceſſary and proper criterion between the illegal and legal dominion of kings; the limited alone being legal in this kingdom. ‘For (the biſhop adds) it is true that ſome princes are ſo’ (i. e. are LIMITED in their power); "but then" (ſays he) they "are NOT the SUPREME power." (This is directly to the point in queſtion; and he adds a farther illuſtration of it:) ‘It is a contradiction (ſays he) to ſay that the SUPREME POWER is limited or reſtrained; for that which RE⯑STRAINS it is SUPERIOR to it, and therefore the other is NOT SUPREME.’ That a king ought not to have the ſupreme power is clearly laid down by the beſt wri⯑ters on the Engliſh Common Law; and particularly by Judge Bracton, one of the moſt ancient as well as the moſt reſpectable authorities. ‘Rex ſub Deo et Lege. Rex habet SUPERIOREM, Deum, (ſcilicet,) item LE⯑GEM, per quam factus eſt rex; item CURIAM SUAM, viz. comes, barones,’ &c. Bract. lib. 2. c. xvi. p. 34. "Lex fraenum eſt potentiae," &c.
That ſuch a power of RESTRAINT is veſted in the LAW, as well as in the LEGISLATORS of this limited monarchy, is clearly proved by Mr. Acherley in his book on free parliaments. He argues from the words of the original writs of ſummons to parliament, — that the determining or deciſive power, demanded by the ſaid writs, (ad faciendum ea, i. e. the inſuperable and urgent buſi⯑neſſes for which the parliament is called,) is derived from the people, and is independent; and his inference is good; and he gives a remarkable inſtance of this inde⯑pendent power in the people; which is their anſwer to the pope reſpecting the baniſhment of Adomar, Bp of Win⯑cheſter, in 1258. Ann 43. Hen, 3. Viz. ‘Si dominus rex et regni majores hoc vellent, COMMUNITAS tamen ipſius (Adomar) ingreſſum in Angliam jam nullatenus ſuſtineret.’ ‘That, if the king and lords would do this thing, (meaning, if they would revoke the baniſh⯑ment) yet the commons WOULD NOT SUFFER or bear Adomar's reſidence in England.’ ‘And the commons cauſed their ſpeaker, Petrus de Montford, 'vice totius communitatis,' to ſign, and he did ſign, this anſwer.’ p. 9.
From this example, therefore, as well as from a great multitude of other inſtances of the power of the Engliſh commons, it is manifeſt that there is no ſupreme power in England without the concurrence and aſſent of the peo⯑ple: not a general aſſent, once for all, to throw the ſupre⯑macy into other hands, but an eſpecial aſſent for every new circumſtance that may be liable to affect their in⯑tereſt. For which cauſe, alſo, parliaments ought (indiſ⯑penſably) to be newly elected every ſeſſion, according to ancient uſage, i. e. ‘every year once, and more often if need be’; and that in as equal a proportion of repreſentation as poſſible; becauſe, the more equitable in this point it is made, the more conducive it will ſurely be to the happineſs and true permanent intereſt both of king and people.
But if, on the contrary, by the modern innovations of triennial and ſeptennial elections, reduction of the right of voting, venality of almoſt depopulated boroughs, &c. the ſupreme power ſhould be gradually corrupted, it muſt become a ſupreme evil to the deſtruction of good government and peace! for, in ſuch a corrupted ſtate, nothing can thrive under it but ſtanding armies, and that which always regularly attends their eſtabliſhment throughout all the branches of the fourth, or Roman, tyranny, I mean the belluina poteſtas of imperial will and command, againſt which the vengeance of the Al⯑mighty is clearly denounced; ſo that thoſe perſons, who yield themſelves inſtruments to promote either the one or the other, are guilty of the groſſeſt impiety! A free militia, therefore, is the only juſt and legal means of internal national defence.
- Citation Suggestion for this Object
- TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 5116 Tracts concerning the ancient and only true legal means of national defence by a free militia. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-58C8-0