A VIEW Of the real Dangers of the SUCCESSION, FROM The Peace with France, &c.
[3]THE Proteſtant Succeſſion is a Thing of that Conſequence to this Nation, and upon which the Peace and Pro⯑ſperity of the People does ſo entirely depend, as from its Nature and Conſequences very much juſti⯑fies the Anxieties of our Minds about it; this is the reaſon of moſt of that Uneaſineſs in the ſeveral publick Tranſactions, which many People expreſs, for fear leſt that Se⯑curity for this Succeſſion, which we have ſo much depended upon, ſhould Suffer, be Leſ⯑ſen'd, Invaded, or any way made Precarious.
[4]Theſe Fears have been very much en⯑creaſed among us, and the common People render'd very Jealous, by the publick Re⯑ports ſo frequent, and ſo warmly ſpread among us, of the Encreaſe of the Pretender's Intereſt; the Concert between the Friends of the Pretender at Home, and their Confede⯑rates Abroad; particularly the terrible Ac⯑counts of the French Power, which are now repreſented to us, not only as Formidable, but as alſo firmly Engaged to Aſſiſt and Rein⯑ſtate the Intereſt, and Title, and Perſon, of the Pretender.
Thoſe have been the Reaſons why many People have been ſo warm againſt the Treaty of Peace with France: And indeed, what⯑ever may have been objected by the Friends of the Miniſtry againſt thoſe Fears, and Uneaſineſſes of the People about the Peace, this muſt be own'd, that if all that has been ſaid on the other Side be true, thoſe Fears and Uneaſineſſeſs may be very rational. No one can reaſonably blame People for diſlike⯑ing the Peace, if that Peace is calculated for bringing in the Pretender, and by Conſe⯑quence for over-throwing our Proteſtant Settlement, on which our Religion, Proper⯑ties, Liberties, Trade, and General Peace do entirely depend.
As the Diſcontents on one Hand have been fomented, or encreaſed, upon thoſe Suppoſi⯑tions as aboveſaid, viz. that the Peace was ill [5] Made; that there was no Security in it for the Proteſtant Succeſſion; that the French King was Strengthen'd by it to ſuch a De⯑gree, as to make him more Dangerous than ever; and, that he was not diſcouraged by it from the Jacobite Intereſt; ſo, on the other Hand, it was Confronted at firſt by little or nothing of Argument founded upon Fact. But in general aſſuring the People, that it was not ſo; that the Succeſſion was confirm'd; the Power of France reduced; the Pretender ba⯑niſh'd; the Succeſſion recognized, and the like: But nothing appearing on either Side, the People remain'd fluctuating between va⯑rious Uncertainties. Influenc'd as to Hopes and Fears, as their Parties, their Inſtructers, or rather Deceivers, on both Sides, prevail'd; and as the Inſinuations they offer'd work'd upon their Paſſions. In this unfix'd Poſture of Mens Minds, it is no wonder if the Gene⯑rallity of the People fall into the worſt; for Fear of Evil is ſo eaſily capable to prevail above the Hope of Good, having natural Propenſity always ready to fall into the Scale with it, that it is not to be wonder'd at, if the Reaſoning part was over-come, and we began Univerſally to diſtruſt, that the Pretender was hid in the Secret of the Peace, and that the Treaty was but a French Maſk to deceive the People.
While the Treaty remain'd an Embrio, Imperfect, and Unfiniſh'd, it could not be [6] expected that this Uncertainty on both Sides could be Maſter'd, or that Satisfactory Ar⯑guments could be given, either by one Par⯑ty or other, to confirm what they had al⯑ledged before, and gain the People one Way or other.
That Difficulty is now over; the Treaty is finiſhed; the Peace made; the Ratifications exchang'd; and the Articles made publick: It has been the receiv'd Opinion, that the End and Deſign of Publications in ſuch Caſes is allow'd to be in order to general Satisfac⯑tion; and we are thereby tacitly admitted to Reaſon upon, Debate, and Explain to one another the Subſtance and Meaning of the Treaty, that we may know what it is we have obtain'd by the War; what Confirm'd, Gain'd, and Eſtabliſhed by the Peace; and upon what Foundation of Security our Li⯑berties, Religion, and Eſtates ſtand for the time to come. To do this Calmly, and Im⯑partially, is the Deſign of this Work; and the End is the more juſt, in that two Things of great Conſequence are propoſed to be inclu⯑ded in the Deſign of doing it.
- 1. If any Difficulties ſhould offer, as pri⯑vate By-ſtanding Judgments may ſome⯑times give hints to publick Tranſactions, which even the Perſons acting, how⯑ever Wiſe, might not foreſee, it may not be too late to obtain ſuch Proviſion [7] againſt them, or againſt the Conſequen⯑ces of them, as may make up the De⯑ficiencies, if any ſuch were, in the firſt Part of the Conduct; that ſo the Evil may be anticipated, and the Diſſatis⯑factions which attend ſuch Things prevented.
- 2. That if there are no Difficulties, but that all Things are provided for, ſuffi⯑ciently eſtabliſh'd, and the Peace, Li⯑berty, and Religion of the Nation ſecu⯑red by all the needful and due Pro⯑viſion which was poſſible, being made for the Safety and Certainty of the Proteſtant Succeſſion, People may be made duly Senſible of it; their Doubts, Fears, Jealouſies, and Apprehenſions be removed, and the real Securities of their State placed in ſuch a true Light, that they may no more be capable of being made uneaſy by Miſrepreſenta⯑tions, and Suggeſtions of Perſons wick⯑edly diſpoſed.
There are divers other good Ends and Pur⯑poſes contain'd in a Deſign ſo uſeful as this, of Diſcuſing the Articles of Peace; which, perhaps, may, in the following Work, be hinted at, particularly the Stating and Exa⯑mining into the real Power and Capacity of the French King to impoſe upon Europe, after this Peace; the Validity of the Renun⯑ciations [8] of the Spaniſh King, and the Proba⯑bility which there is, or is not before us, that theſe Treaties ſhall be kept ſacred by the French, as they are like to be by us. In brief, the great queſtion of the Validity of a Treaty as ſuch with the French, may be Exa⯑mined as it reſpects not his Honour and Faith only, which ſome People, in Matters of Peace and War, have been very free with; but as it reſpects the Power and Influence the Britiſh Court may hereafter have in the World, to enforce the Treaty, and to do the Nation Juſtice on the Agreſſors in any Contraven⯑tions that may happen.
In doing this an entire Impartiallity is neceſſary, neither on the one Hand adher⯑ing too warmly to thoſe Opinions, who give up the Securities of this Treaty as entirely Void, and Inſignificant, with reſpect to the Faith and Honour of the Parties we have Treated with; and run down as Ridiculous and Abſurd, the Notion of Britain's holding the Ballance, or being able to enforce the Performance in time to come: And on the other Hand, not altogether ſuppoſing that there is nothing of Danger, either in the Will or Abillity of the French Court to make unjuſt Improvements, and Advantages, in breach of the Treaty hereafter.
In order to come directly to the Caſe, it is neceſſary to give the Reader an Abſtract of what Proviſions are really made in the Trea⯑ty [9] with France, for the Security of the Pro⯑teſtant Succeſſion in Great Britain; for that many who may, perhaps, ſee this Tract, may not have ſeen the Treaty itſelf, or may not have the Articles by them to refer to.
I'll take no Advantage here of what, how⯑ever, I do really believe, viz. That the Trea⯑ty is very ſurprizing to ſome People; who, having been made to believe that there was no Care taken in it for the Proteſtant Succeſ⯑ſion, did not expect to find two ſuch Articles as the Fourth and Fifth to be incerted in it, and that they ſhould be Worded in ſuch a Manner. And therefore, before we proceed to Animadvert on that Opinion, or to Exa⯑mine, whether that Surprize is juſt, or, whe⯑ther the Objections others make againſt the Security of thoſe Articles are ſufficient to continue the general Diſſatisfactions, it will be neceſſary to place the Articles themſelves in View as follows:
IV. Furthermore for adding a greater Strength to the Peace which is reſtored, and to the faithful Friendſhip which is never to be violated, and for cutting off all Occaſions of diſtruſt, which might at any time ariſe from the eſtabliſhed Right and Order of the Hereditary Succeſſion to the Crown of Great Britain, and the Limitation thereof by the Laws of Great Britain (made and enacted in the Reigns [10] of the late King William the Third, of glorious Memory, and of the preſent Queen) to the Iſſue of the aboveſaid Queen, and in default thereof, to the moſt Serene Princeſs Sophia, Dowager of Brunſwick-Hanover, and her Heirs in the Proteſtant Line of Hanover. That therefore the ſaid Succeſſion may remain ſafe and ſecure, the moſt Chriſtian King ſincerely and ſolemnly acknowledges the aboveſaid Limitation of the Succeſſion to the Kingdom of Great Britain, and on the Faith and Word of a King, on the Pledge of His own and His Succeſſors Honour, He does declare and engage, That He accepts and approves the ſame, and that His Heirs and Succeſſors do and ſhall accept and approve the ſame for ever. And under the ſame Obliga⯑tion of the Word and Honour of a King, the moſt Chriſtian King promiſes, That NO ONE beſides the Queen Her Self, and Her Succeſſors, according to the Series of the ſaid Limitation, ſhall ever by Him, or by His Heirs or Succeſſors, be acknow⯑ledged, or reputed to be King or Queen of Great Britain. And for adding more ample Credit to the ſaid Acknowledgment and Promiſes, the moſt Chriſtian King does engage, That whereas the Perſon who, in the Life-time of the late King James the Second, did take upon him [11] the Title of Prince of Wales, and ſince his Deceaſe, that of King of Great Bri⯑tain, is lately gone, of his own accord, out of the Kingdom of France, to reſide in ſome other place, He the aforeſaid moſt Chriſtian King, His Heirs and Suc⯑ceſſors, will take all poſſible Care, that he ſhall not at any time hereafter, or un⯑der any pretence whatſoever, return into the Kingdom of France, or any the Do⯑minions thereof.
V. Moreover the moſt Chriſtian King pro⯑miſes, as well in His own name, as in that of His Heirs and Succeſſors, That they will at no time whatever Diſturb, or give any Moleſtation to the Queen of Great Britain, Her Heirs and Succeſſors, deſcended from the aforeſaid Proteſtant Line, who poſſeſs the Crown of Great Britain, and the Dominions belonging thereunto. Neither will the aforeſaid moſt Chriſtian King, or any one of His Heirs, give at any time any Aid, Succour, Favour, or Council, directly or indirect⯑ly, by Land, or by Sea, in Money, Arms, Ammunition, Warlike Proviſion, Ships, Soldiers, Seamen, or any other way, to any Perſon or Perſons, whoſoever they be, who for any Cauſe, or under any Pre⯑text whatſoever, ſhould hereafter, en⯑deavour [10] [...] [11] [...] [12] to oppoſe the ſaid Succeſſion, either by open War, or by fomenting Se⯑ditions, and forming Conſpiracies againſt ſuch Prince or Princes who are in Poſ⯑ſeſſion of the Throne of Great Britain, by Virtue of the Acts of Parliament a⯑forementioned, or againſt that Prince or Princeſs, to whom the Succeſſion to the Crown of Great Britain ſhall be open ac⯑cording to the ſaid Acts of Parliament.
Immediately after theſe Two Articles fol⯑lows the formal Renunciations of the King of Spain, which, as they are not within the Compaſs of our preſent Conſiderations, ſo it will be needleſs to repeat them here; nei⯑ther will the narrow Compaſs of this Tract admit of it. But it may not, nevertheleſs, be amiſs to ſet down a few Words of the In⯑troduction to thoſe Renunciations, as they ſeem to lay down the Foundation upon which the whole Treaty ſtands, and upon which much of the preſent Peace, and Secu⯑rity of Europe depends. The Words are theſe: ‘VI. Whereas the moſt deſtructive Flame of War, which is to be extinguiſhed by this Peace, aroſe chiefly from thence, That the Security and Liberties of Europe could by no means bear the Union of the Kingdoms of France and Spain under [13] one and the ſame King; And whereas it has at length been brought to paſs by the Aſſiſtance of the Divine Power, upon the moſt earneſt Inſtances of Her Sacred Royal Majeſty of Great Britain, and with the Conſent both of the moſt Chriſtian, and of the Catholick King, that this Evil ſhould in all times to come be obviated, by means of Renunciations drawn in the moſt effectual Form, and executed in the moſt ſolemn Manner.’
But to begin with the Proteſtant Succeſſion, as the main thing upon which our Eyes are fix'd in this Treaty, and without which the whole is of very little Conſequence to us: And here it is neceſſary to lay down a ſhort View of the Reaſons, and Foundation of the War, which, without doubt, are to be alſo ſome part of the Reaſon and Foundation of the Peace, or elſe the War will be no more to be juſtify'd than the Peace, or the Peace to be thought adequate to the Neceſſity of the War. The Reaſons and Foundation of the War are abundantly expreſs'd in the ſeveral Declarations made as well by the Queen, and the late King William, as by the ſeveral Prin⯑ces and States, their Confederates; in which, if the Safety of the Proteſtant Intereſt is laid down, as the Thing moſt at Heart among the Confederates, the ſame ought to be alſo the main Deſign, or at leaſt moſt Regarded in the [14] making a Peace; for no Peace can be ſup⯑poſed to be effectual, but ſuch as anſwers the Ends of the War; ſuch as are ſquared to the Purpoſes, which in the ſaid Declarations of the War, are laid down to be the juſt Reaſon for the Breach at the Beginning.
In the Declaration of War againſt France, Publiſhed in England by King William and Queen Mary, May the 7th, 1689, among divers other Reaſons for the ſame, it is ex⯑preſs'd in theſe Words: And, laſtly, as the ſaid King of France has, for divers Years paſt, endeavoured, by Inſinuations, and Promiſes of Aſſiſtance, to Over-throw the Government of England. And in the Preamble to the ſaid Declaration it is thus expreſs'd: To the ut⯑moſt to promote the Welfare of our People, by preventing the Miſeries which threaten them from Abroad.
In the ſecond Declaration of War againſt France, enter'd into by Her Preſent Majeſty, and publiſh'd May the 4th 1702. The Rea⯑ſons and Cauſes of the War are thus enume⯑rated.
- 1. The Exorbitant Power of France, which muſt be reduced.
- 2. The Alliances which Great-Britain ſtands engaged in, particularly the Grand Alliance, and that thoſe Allies ought to have reaſonable ſatisfaction.
- [15]3. And eſpecially the following Particu⯑lars, The French King has not only pro⯑ceeded to farther Violence, but has ad⯑ded thereunto a great Affront and In⯑dignity to us and our Kingdoms, in ta⯑king upon him to declare the pretended Prince of Wales King of England, Scot⯑land, and Ireland, and has alſo Influ⯑enced Spain to concur in the ſame Af⯑front and Indignity, as well as in other Oppreſſions: Wherafore we find our ſelves oblig'd for maintaining the publick Faith, for Vindication of the Honour of our Crown, and to prevent the Miſchiefs which all Europe is threatned with, to declare War, &c. Vide the Declaration.
Theſe being the propoſed Reaſons, and the juſt Occaſions of the preſent War, there ſeems ſeveral Arguments to occur here, which I ſhall mention previous to the enſuing Diſ⯑courſe.
- 1. If the French King's owning and recei⯑ving the Prince of Wales as King of England, &c. was a juſt Ground of the War; the revoking that Acknowledg⯑ment; diſowning him as ſuch; recog⯑nizing Her Majeſty's Rightful and Law⯑ful Title to the Crown, and ſecuring as much as could be required of him that Title, and Her Majeſty's quiet Poſſeſſion [16] thereof, ought to be a Capital Conſide⯑ration of the Peace; otherwiſe the End for which the War was begun was not ſufficiently anſwer'd; the Repoſe of Europe not atall obtain'd by the Trea⯑ty; the Queen's Honour ſufficiently repair'd, or the Affront given made amends for.
- 2. If the French King's bare Owning and Receiving the Pretender as King of Great Britain, was made a ſufficient Foundation of the War; though he had then made no Effort for his Eſtabliſh⯑ment, or had any way attempted to place him on the Throne; then the ſaid French King retracting the ſaid Owning and Recieving, &c. and pro⯑miſing, as by the Treaty of Peace, Ar⯑ticle the 4th he does, on the Faith and Word of a King, &c. Never to Receive him again, or any way to Aid or Aſſiſt him, &c. in Diſturbing Her Majeſty, or Her Succeſſors in the Line of Han⯑over, is as much Security as could be aſk'd of the French King, and may be taken in full Satisfaction of that Parti⯑cular, till France makes ſome viſible Infraction of that Engagement.
For the firſt of theſe that the King of France Revoking, &c. the Acknowledgment [17] he had made of the Pretender, and Recog⯑nizing, &c. the Queen and the Succeſſion ought to be a Capital Conſideration of the Peace; there ſeems to be no occaſion to enter into any Debate about it; eſpecially ſince the King of France has yielded to the Juſtice of it in Expreſſions ſo full, and to the utmoſt Extent of all that could be deſi⯑red, as appears by the Fourth Article: But it is chiefly mention'd here as matter of Wonder, that any among us ſhould object againſt the Meaſures taken at the Beginning, and indeed thro' the Progreſs of this Treaty, as if the moſt ſolemn Recognitions of Her Majeſty's Title to the Crown, and of the Eſtabliſh'd Succeſſion in the Proteſtant Line of Hanover could be forgotten.
And firſt the Objection, as it was former⯑ly made againſt the Six Propoſals of France, called (however miſtakenly) Preliminaries, viz. That the French King did not ſufficient⯑ly Acknowledge the Queen's Rightful and Lawful Title to the Crown. This I think ought to be anſwer'd in the ſame manner that the Germans at this time reply to the Propoſals of Peace made by France to the Emperor; where the French King offers it as an Article, that he will acknowledge the Emperor as ſuch: I ſay, it ought to be an⯑ſwer'd in the ſame Manner, viz. with Con⯑tempt [18] ſignifying, That the Imperial Crown having not the leaſt dependence upon the Vote Suffrage, or Acknowledgment of the King of France, they can by no means make his Acknowledging, or not Acknowledging the Election of the Perſon of his Imperial Ma⯑jeſty to that Crown to be an Article of a Treaty; or accept of ſuch his Acknowledg⯑ment as any Condition of Peace. But that his bare Treating of Peace with his Imperial Majeſty, as it is neceſſarily attended with ſuch Acknowledgment, ſo his Imperial Ma⯑jeſty cannot be Treated with, under any o⯑ther Title, Figure, or Denomination: For Example; that it would be abſur'd to treat with an Arch-Duke of Auſtria in the Affairs and Properties of the Imperial Crown, or with the Empire, in the Matter of the Rights and Succeſſion of the Houſe of Auſtria.
Thus, in the Caſe of Her Majeſty's Right⯑ful Poſſeſſion of the Regal Titles, and Sove⯑reign Authority of Great Britain, there was no need to Capitulate with the French King to acknowledge Her Majeſty in the uſual Forms; for that the Crowns of Great Bri⯑tain and Ireland, and the Succeſſion of Her Majeſty, having no manner of Dependence upon the French King, or the French Go⯑vernment, or upon any Vote Suffrage, or Recognition, on the part of France to be [19] made. It would derogate from the Honour of the Britiſh Nation, from the Perſonal Right of Her Majeſty, and the Authority of Parliament, to accept of any ſuch Recog⯑nition of the Queen's Title from the King of France, as any Condition, Article, or Pre⯑liminary to an Article, in any Treaty what⯑ſoever. But that, in the very Act of Treat⯑ing, ſuch Recognition is ſo effectually ſup⯑ply'd and contain'd, that nothing can be more compleat; ſince the French King can⯑not commence any Treaty, but in the Name of Her Majeſty, and with Her Majeſty in Perſon, as repreſented by Her Plenipotentia⯑ries, Clothed with all the Royal Stile and Dignity, Titles, and Appellations which at⯑tend the Perſons of the Kings and Queens of Great Britain; which Names, Stile, Titles, Appellations, and Dignities are of meer Courſe, and by the Uſage and Cuſtom of all Treaties, always expreſs'd in the very firſt Powers produced by the Miniſters and Ambaſſadors of each Prince, or Sovereign, ſo Treating; and accepted by the other; and after that, are again neceſſarily repeated in the very Title and Introduction to ſuch Treaty, or Agreement, which ſhall after⯑ward be made, and as is for Example in the ſeveral Treaties as well of Peace as of Com⯑merce, now under Conſideration; in theſe Words in Latin and in Engliſh. ‘[20]Tractatus Pacis & Amicitiae inter Sereniſſi⯑mam ac Potentiſſimam, Principem Annam, Dei Gratiâ, magnae Britanniae, Franciae, & Hiberniae, Reginam.’ In Ingliſh thus:‘A Treaty of Peace and Friendſhip between the moſt Serene and moſt Potent Princeſs Anne, by the Grace of God, Queen of Great Britain, France, and Ireland.’
Mark, the King of France here owns Her Majeſty to be Queen of Great Britain, &c. and that She is ſo by the GRACE OF GOD; not atall ſuppoſing Her Title de⯑pended upon his Recognition, or received any confirmation thereby.
Having then acknowledged Her Majeſty to be Rightful and Lawful Queen of Great Britain, the French King could make no Scruple of coming into the reſt, viz. to ac⯑knowledge the Succeſſion of the Houſe of Hanover, which is a Conſequence of the Revolution; upon which, as the Occaſion, Her preſent Majeſty's Right of Poſſeſſion is built, and which is ſettled upon the Baſis of Par⯑liamentary Limitation; which Parliamenta⯑ry Authority is the Rightful and Lawful [21] Power, among others, from which Her Majeſty's Right of Claim immediately pro⯑ceeds.
Having alſo acknowledg'd the Proteſtant Succeſſion, recognized the Authority that Eſtabliſh'd it, and own'd the Proteſtant Race of Hanover to be the only Rightful and Lawful Heir to the Britiſh Crown, the reſt fell in as natural Conſequences, viz. Firſt, That he ſhould Expunge, Diſown, and Baniſh from his Dominions, the Perſon of the Pretender, engaging never to admit him to come again into his Kingdoms. And, Secondly, That he ſhould, in the ſolemneſt Manner poſſible, engage never to Aid or Aſſiſt him, or any one for him, directly, or indirectly, in making any Claim to the Crown of Great Britain, or in offering any Diſturbance, either to Her Majeſty's Poſ⯑ſeſſion, or to the Hanover Succeſſion, as it is Eſtabliſhed by the Britiſh Parliament.
Let us then enquire how this is done, and in what manner expreſſed, that the great Queſtion may afterwards come to be clearly Diſcuſs'd, viz. What Security this is to the Proteſtant Succeſſion?
The Words of the Article are as ſtrongly expreſs'd, and as full as can be deviſed: And [22] I hear many People expreſs themſelves with an agreeable Surprize that it is ſo; for tho' all that is alledg'd of the Perfidy and Diſ⯑ingenuous Principles of the French King, were to be acknowledg'd; yet, ſince Verbal Aſſurances are ſometimes to be taken; and, perhaps, no other can be obtain'd in ſome things, of which this is one; it is as ſa⯑tisfactory as the Nature of the Thing will allow, that thoſe Verbal Aſſurances be full and compleat.
The Nature of Treaties is now ſuch, and the Conduct of Princes Abroad is allow'd ſuch a Latitude, that, in ſome reſpect, it may be ſaid of all Treaties, nothing is to be Depended on but what either you have Power to Enforce, or the other gives ſuffici⯑ent Security to Perform.
Thus, where Security could be obtain'd in this Affair of the Treaty, Her Majeſty made a demand of ſuch Security that ſhe might be in a Condition to Enforce the Ex⯑ecution: As for Example, The French King Offers, on a Peace, to Demoliſh Dunkirk. How ſhall I be ſure of that? ſays Her Maje⯑ſty. Will you put it into my Hands immedi⯑ately, that I may have Power to ſee that Promiſe put in Execution? The French King Conſents, ſo that now the Queen of Great [23] Britain demoliſhes Dunkirk, not the French King; that is, She holds it in Poſſeſſion till it is done, and Her Forces are to Encamp in the Neighbourhood to ſee the Execu⯑tion.
It is but too well known a Truth, that there are ſome People, beſides the Jacobites, who are ſurpriz'd, and ill-pleaſed to ſee this Affair ſo remarkably ſettled by the Treaty, and that the French King has thereby ſtoop'd to ſuch Declarations and Proteſtations againſt the Intereſt of the Pretender: And theſe are thoſe who, for other Ends, had much rather have been furniſh'd from the Articles them⯑ſelves with ſufficient Grounds of Complaint, that the Proteſtant Succeſſion had been neg⯑lected; and the Intereſt of the Pretender had not been ſufficiently Weakned, and Diſ⯑courag'd. Such a Complaint being in its Nature very Eſſential to the Publick Good, and to the Eſtabliſhment of Things in this Nation, would have been very Popular, and would have been capable of many ways of Improvement, to the Advantage of thoſe who ſtudy to keep the People uneaſie, and diſtemper'd, about the Publick Manage⯑ment of Affairs, and to whom nothing has contributed ſo much, as the Notion of the Danger of the Pretender.
[24]The Complaints of theſe People have been ſo loud, that no one could have thought but that they really knew what France was act⯑ing in this Affair; and that, even in the Articles themſelves, there had appear'd more Foundation for their Diſſatisfactions; it was no more queſtion'd by thoſe who ſuppoſed all thoſe Complaints were well Grounded; I ſay, it was no more queſtion'd, but that when the Articles came to be made Publick, it would appear, that the Succeſſion of Han⯑over was very ſlightly taken Notice of, and that room was left for the Intereſt of the Pretender to be carry'd on; ſo that the French King might at any time, after the Queen was Deceaſed, concern himſelf in that Mat⯑ter, without any dammage to his Honour and Faith; and any Branch of his Treaty with the Queen to the contrary, in any⯑wiſe notwithſtanding.
But I do not find, upon a ſerious Reviſing the Articles, but that theſe People, the firſt movers of thoſe Complaints only excepted, are under very great Diſappointments upon the Articles firſt appearing in Publick; nay, the moſt Angry have not yet been able to find the leaſt Fault in the Recognitions and Proviſions made, either on the Part of the French, or on Our Part, for the Security of the Houſe of Hanover; or, to ſay what they [25] could have demanded of the French King more than is Granted by the Treaty, with reſpect to that Particular. The Truth of the Caſe being this, that the French King was not able to do more; or was it Hon⯑ourable for the Britiſh Plenipotentiaries to aſk more of him in that Particular.
It might be thought ſome Teſtimonial to the Validity of theſe Articles, That the Ja⯑cobites in Great Britain are ſo univerſally Thunder-ſtruck with them, that there is ſo profound a Silence thro' the whole Nation among them; nothing is heard from them of the uſual Boaſts they have, for ſome time, made of their Growing Intereſt, and of the great Aſſiſtance their Prince ſhould receive, upon any Occaſion, for the Eſtabliſhing him on the Throne of Great Britain. Where⯑as now nothing is heard among them but very ſecret and private Reproaches, and Re⯑flections upon the French King, for ſuffer⯑ing himſelf to yield to ſuch ſevere Condi⯑tions, and ſo effectually to bind himſelf againſt the Intereſt of their Prince, as they call him, as never to Aſſiſt him after the Queen's Death, and never to admit him to return into France again.
Theſe Complaints, I ſay, are very ſecret⯑ly and ſoftly expreſs'd among them too; [26] for they cannot, without manifeſt Ingrati⯑tude, complain of any one Step the French King has taken; they cannot deny, with⯑out the Reproaches of the whole World, but that the French King has gone a greater Length for the Propagation of the Jacobite Intereſt in Great Britain, than any Prince in the World could have done; and has done more for them than all the Popiſh Powers in the World would have done. The hazard of a Ruinous War, undertaken for the Reſtoring King James II. and car⯑ry'd with no other View, thro' innumerable Diſaſters to the Peace of Ryſwick; the Un⯑dertaking this ſecond War under that diſad⯑vantageous Step to France, of Acknowledg⯑ing the preſent Pretender as King of Great Britain, which juſtly Enflam'd and Pro⯑vok'd this Nation to ſuch a Degree, as to make all the Parts of the Iſland Addreſs the late King William to renew the War, which otherwiſe the Nation, at that time, were not much inclin'd to. Theſe things, at⯑tempted by the King of France, for the Jacobite Intereſt, leave the Friends of the Pretender no room to Exclaim againſt him, as otherwiſe they would have done, as a Man abandoning his Friend.
On the contrary, to reckon the divers Attempts, Hazards, Loſſes, and Expence [27] the French King has been at, in Behalf of the Pretender, and of King James II. would be to Write the greateſt Panegyrick upon the Friendſhip, Conſtancy, and Generoſity of the King of France that could poſſibly be Written: In which the Armies ſent into Ireland to his Relief; the Loſs of his Fleet at La Hogue; the Attempt upon Scotland; the conſtant Expence of Supporting the Court of St. Germans, and all its Hangers on, and Dependencies, for above Twenty Four Years, muſt come to be reckon'd up; all which being conſider'd, it is but in ſilent Murmurs that the Jacobites can complain of the French King, for giving up the Cauſe of the Pretender as he has done.
On the other Hand, his own Circumſtan⯑ces tell them plainly, that he has eſpouſed their Cauſe as long as he was able to ſupport himſelf; and that his Affairs were reduc'd to that Extremity, that he could no longer car⯑ry on the War with ſafety; nor could he make any Peace without relinquiſhing, en⯑tirely, a Prince, and an Intereſt which he was not able to ſupport.
Theſe things ſtop their Mouths, I ſay as to Complaint, and therefore they teſtify their Surprize and Deſpair, by a profound Silence; which Silence alſo tacitly acknow⯑ledges, [28] that they look upon the Acknowledg⯑ments and Recognitions made by the French King, of the Hanover Succeſſion to be too effectual a Blow to their Intereſt in Britain, which, on the other Hand, is an Argument to us to look upon it as ſome Security to the ſaid Succeſſion.
With the Silence of the Jacobites Party, and as a Conſequence thereof, the Fears and Apprehenſions of Honeſt and Well-minded People abate alſo; I mean of ſuch People who, being guided by no Party-Intereſt, kept their Eyes only upon the Publick Good, yet were made uneaſie, and alarm'd by the continued Suggeſtions of others, that the Miniſtry, and even the Queen Herſelf, were in the Inte⯑reſt of the Pretender. It might take up ſome room here to Convince you that ſuch Peo⯑ple were made Uneaſie, and by what Me⯑thod, on what Account, by Whom, and for what Reaſon. But I am willing to forget thoſe Things; the remembrance whereof ſerve only to promote that which will help to Divide us, and to make us yet Uneaſie to one another.
That many good People were alarm'd with the Notion of the Pretender being at hand; and poſſeſs'd with a belief that the Miniſtry and the French King were in Con⯑cert [29] for the Reſtoring him in theſe King⯑doms. This is what needs no Evidence; the very Inſolence of the Jacobites as it was gi⯑ven for a Reaſon of their Apprehenſions, ſo it was a Confirmation of the Arguments others had uſed for the raiſing thoſe Jealouſies and Apprehenſions in the People.
They were told, that the Miniſtry encou⯑rag'd and employ'd none but Jacobites; that the profeſs'd Friends of the Pretender had diſtinguiſhing Marks of Favour ſhow'd them; that even the Dialect ſpoken at Court was different from what uſed to be the Lan⯑guage in the Caſe of the Succeſſion; that Addreſſes were preſented, in which not on⯑ly the Houſe of Hanover was not mention⯑ed, but in which the Intereſt of the Pretender was expreſſlly recommended; and, that yet ſuch Addreſſes were equally accepted, and received equally Graciouſly with others; that the greateſt Inſolences of ſeveral Per⯑ſons upon the Name of Hanover, and the Proteſtant Succeſſion, were left Unpuniſhed, and the like.
The Buſineſs of the Hanover Memorial was in the next Place mention'd, and the Reſentments expreſs'd by the Queen and Miniſtry at the Publication thereof, with ſe⯑veral other Things which were call'd to [30] mind, to confirm the Suſpicions, and to per⯑ſwade the People here, that the ſame Af⯑fection which promoted the Settlement of the Crown upon that Houſe was not now to be found among us, &c.
While the Treaty of Peace was in Agi⯑tation, theſe Suſpitions encreaſed; and it was expected by ſome, that the Intereſt of the Pretender was in immediate agitation; that the French Influence having a Governing Power among us, would not fail to attempt that by Treaty which they had ſo often, and ſo long attempted in the Field by the Sword.
It was a happy ſurprize then to ſuch Peo⯑ple as theſe, to find the aforeſaid Articles Incerted in the Treaty of Peace, where the moſt they could expect in favour of the Suc⯑ceſſion was, that nothing expreſly, on the other Side, ſhould be incerted; and that the French King ſhould be prevail'd with to leave the Pretender to his own Fortunes, and to ſay nothing of him; nay, ſome Peo⯑ple would have thought this a great deal, and would even have compounded with us for ſuch a Thing as a Favour to the Succeſ⯑ſion of Hanover, which they had ſcarce rea⯑ſon to expect.
[31]What then could ſuch People ſay, when they found the utmoſt Care taken, and the ſtrongeſt Engagements enter'd into with the French King, for the Proteſtant Succeſſion, and the Recognizing, upon all Occaſions, the Houſe of Hanover as the Rightful and Law⯑ful Succeſſor to the Crown.
What could they ſay, but acknowledge themſelves Surpriz'd, Satisfy'd, and Pleas'd; as alſo, that they had been impos'd upon before: When they found the French King brought to Compliment the Queen of Great Britain, with the ſolemn and declar'd Ex⯑pulſion of the Perſon of the Pretender from, not the Succeſſion of Britain only, but even from the Dominions of France; and en⯑gaging to make that Expulſion Perpetual, and that he ſhall never be admitted to ſet his Foot within the Kingdom of France again.
Would any Man have thought that the King of France, who had formerly acted ſo avowedly in the Intereſt of the Pretender, and had voluntarily brought down upon his Kingdom ſo heavy a War, by the meer de⯑claring him by the Titles of Britain; who had made ſuch Efforts for him, and had Pro⯑miſed never to forſake his Intereſt till he had eſtabliſhed him on the Throne, would [32] be brought ſo entirely to give him up, ſo effectually to relinquiſh his Intereſt and Concerns, as to engage never to Own him again by thoſe Titles, which he himſelf had before acknowledged to him.
Theſe Things having been ſo openly de⯑clar'd againſt before, by the French King, it was the more Rational to expect, that the Party here might have been prevail'd upon, and Influenced by the French to have Coun⯑tenanced that Intereſt, or at leaſt to have contented themſelves with very moderate Proviſions againſt him; and till the contrary appear'd, there was too much force in their Reaſoning the other way, not to take with the People whoſe Minds were already pre⯑judiced as aboveſaid.
But when the Articles appear, theſe People ſeem'd ſurpriz'd; began to exclaim at the Injuſtice done the preſent Miniſtry, and to approve of what was done in behalf of the Hanover Succeſſion; till they met with new Scruples and Suggeſtions, in order to keep up the Temper of Complaint, and to bring the Notions of the Danger of the Pretender into play again; and theſe were the ill Opinions which Common Fame had deeply Imprinted in the Minds of the People, of the French King being to the laſt Degree Perfidious; [33] that he made no Scruple of breaking in up⯑on the moſt ſacred Engagement when ever his Ambition, Avarice, Superſtition, of eſpe⯑cially Thirſt of Glory, prompted; that he made no farther Uſe of Treaties and Poſtu⯑lations, Articles and ſolemn Conventions, than to amuſe and ſeparate the Conjunction and Confederacies of his Enemies; and made it his conſtant avow'd Practice, or Maxim, to keep the moſt ſacred Engagements of Treaties no longer than till he had the Op⯑portunity to break them to his Advantage, and much more to this Purpoſe.
From theſe Things they aſk us now, what ſignify all the Treaties and Engagements which the French King has made in the Affair of the Proteſtant Succeſſion; and what Dependance can we, or ought we to have upon them?
Now it is a Miſtake if any Reader ex⯑pects to find this Tract attempting to take off any of the above Reproaches caſt upon the Honour and Character of the French King, his regard to his Word, or holding ſacred the Engagements he has enter'd into.—Not at all: This ſhall be no part of my Taſk; let it go; let it be taken all for gran⯑ted, if they pleaſe; or not taken for granted, as you ſhall pleaſe. But the two Queſtions [34] to be aſk'd here, and which contains the whole of the Caſe, are theſe.
- 1. What more could be done by the French King to ſecure us againſt him, or give us Satisfaction in his future Conduct, with relation to the Pretender?
- 2. How, with ſafety to the Honour and Reputation of our Arms, could we aledge, that our Safety againſt the Pretender was not ſufficiently ſecured by this?
- 1. What more could be done by the French King to ſecure us againſt him, or give us Satisfaction in his future Conduct, with relation to the Pretender.
This Queſtion has been aſk'd before now, and ſo many abrupt and abſurd Anſwers have been given to it, that even the Per⯑ſons who have given thoſe Anſwers, deſire not to have the Queſtion repeated; and are willing to hear as little of it as they can. Some have anſwer'd, the French King ſhould have deliver'd him up to us: But this is liable to many Exceptions; and to ſpeak in general only, the beſt Friends of the Houſe of Hanover have declared, they did not deſire to have that Method taken as [35] a dangerous Experiment for many Reaſons, ſome of them fitter to be gueſs'd at than expreſs'd. Some have ſuggeſted, That the French King ſhould have cauſed him to be made away privately, rather than to have ſuffered himſelf to be brought to ſo Diſ⯑honourable a Submiſſion, as to Forſake, and Abandon a Perſon who had, from his Infancy, been ſhelter'd under his Pro⯑tection. But this was too Barbarous and Unhoſpitable, for even the worſt Enemies of the Pretender, if they were Chriſtians, to approve of; and no one could maintain it without Horror, even at the ſame time that they were for entirely Expelling him from hence. Others ſuggeſted, That we ſhould have procur'd him to be Confin'd in the Pierre Enciſe in France, where Priſoners for Life are generally ſent, near Lyons; and that he ſhould be ſuffer'd there to end his Days quietly: But this was liable to the ſame Objections of the French King's break⯑ing his Word, that the preſent Articles are liable too; ſince he might cauſe the Gates to be Opened when ever he thought fit, and might let him out from thence with the ſame Eaſe that he may now Recall him into his Dominions.
What, then, can we propoſe that the King of France could have done, in reſpect [36] to the Diſpoſing the Perſon of the Pre⯑tender, more than firſt having cauſed him, or deſired him (call it as you pleaſe) Vo⯑luntarily to withdraw out of his Domi⯑nions; to engage, in the ſolemneſt man⯑ner, not to admit him to Return thither any more; and no more to own him for ever hereafter under the Titles of King of Eng⯑land, Scotland, and Ireland, King of Great Britain, or, in ſhort, any of Her Majeſty's Titles and Royal Stile, as he did be⯑fore.
It is true, The French King may break his Word, may renounce the Faith and Honour of a King, pledg'd to Her Maje⯑ſty, and the Faith and Honour of the ve⯑ry Throne of France, which he has en⯑gaged, as far as in him lies, in the Name of all his Succeſſors; and there is no help⯑ing this: But I do not ſee what farther could be done; what more could have been aſked of the King of France; or what more he could have granted, to have made us more ſafe.
Pledges of Towns, Poſſeſſion of Fron⯑tiers, and Cautionary Gariſons, could be of no ſignification here; neither did ever any one of the other Opinion ſay what Town or City they would accept as a [37] ſufficient Caution, or Pledge, for the Se⯑curity of his Performance: Nor, indeed, could any thing the French King poſſeſſes have given us the leaſt Security in ſuch a Caſe. On the contrary, had any of the Poſſeſſions of the Kingdom of France been made over in a way of Security, or as a Preliminary for the performance of this Negative, and to aſſure us, That he never would Aſſiſt, or Entertain this Pretender again: This would, even itſelf, have been a moſt forcible Motive to the French King to have broke that very Engagement, and to have made the Attempt, that having ſet him up here, and obtain'd the Poſſeſ⯑ſion of the Engliſh, or Britiſh Crown for him, He, the Pretender, ſhould clear him, the French King, of thoſe Engagements, and reſtore to him thoſe Pledges.
Nor in ſuch a Caſe would there have lain ſo much of the Charge of a breach of Honour, or a Charge of Perfidiouſneſs, ſince he that takes Security is ſuppoſed not to depend upon the Promiſe, or Engagement, but relinquiſhing the Honour of the Per⯑ſon takes the Equivalent, viz. the Pledge for his Satisfaction.
What then, any Ambaſſador, or Pleni⯑potentiaries, could have aſk'd more than [38] the preſent Treaty has taken: Or, indeed, what could have been propoſed farther to the French King to have done for our Security and Satisfaction in this Caſe, re⯑mains for any to ſet down that knows, for I do not pretend to it.
- 2. How, with ſafety to the Honour and Re⯑putation of our Arms, could we aledge, that our Safety againſt the Pretender was not ſufficiently ſecured by this?
The Safety of Britain muſt be eſteem'd by us to be very weakly Defended, and our Eſtabliſhment to be in a very preca⯑rious Condition, if we may ſuppoſe it to depend ſo entirely upon the French King's performance of his Engagements, as that without it we are given up, and loſt to the Pretender. Thoſe who are thus Flegmatick in the Caſe of the Proteſtant Succeſſion, very much Diſhonour their own Country, and the Confidence they have either in the Power or Unanimity of the People of Great Britain; that they ſhould think we ſhould be ſo much at the Mercy of the French King, that when ever he pleaſes to break his Engagements, we are to be ſubdued to the Intereſt of the Pretender.
It is true, The Intereſt of the Preten⯑der, [39] back'd by the Power of the French King, is not to be diſpiſed; nor the Dan⯑ger of it to be made light of; and there⯑fore, every thing that is reaſonable and practicable ought to be done, to keep that Apprehenſion off: And the Treaty has made ſo much Proviſion, that whether it be ſufficient or no, it ſeems to be all that the Nature of the Caſe would admit of; and all that was really practicable in the Thing: To be Flegmatick and Diſmay'd now, would ſuggeſt to us, that our own Power is of no weight in this Caſe; that we muſt de⯑pend entirely upon the Conduct of the French King to preſerve the Succeſſion; and, that we are to be Happy or Miſerable, juſt as he is, or is not pleaſed to be faith⯑ful to his Engagement.
This, I muſt acknowledge, I think is Complimenting the French King too much at our own Expence, and placing the Britiſh Strength at ſo low an Ebb, as no reaſon can be given for.
Britain, or the People of Britain, no doubt, were we Hearty and Unanimous in the Intereſt of the Nation, are able to keep up the Reſolutions already taken in the Affair of the Succeſſion, and are able to Support our own Laws and Conſtitution [40] againſt the whole World: And tho' it is highly reaſonable that, on a Treaty, the French King ſhould engage, as he has done, to relinquiſh the Pretender, and acknow⯑ledge the Succeſſor, yet our Safety is very far from depending entirely on the Perfor⯑mance of that Engagement; and we ought to be in very little Concern, whether the French King will perform his Promiſes or not.
The Queſtion, therefore, does not ſo much reſt upon this Point, whether the French King will perform the Treaty he has made or no; but whether any thing farther could have been done for our Se⯑curity or no in a Treaty, whether with the French King, or any-body elſe; what the French King could have granted farther, or what we could Honourably to our ſelves have demanded farther, that we may ſee if the People that mady the Treaty have been faithful or no.
I ſhall readily grant, that if our Securi⯑ty depends upon the French King's per⯑formance of his Promiſes and Engagements, the Proteſtant Succeſſion may be a very pre⯑carious Thing. The Faith and Honour of the beſt Princes in the World being too weak a Baſis to build a Thing of that Conſequence upon, eſpecially while, accor⯑ding [41] to the preſent Practices, the Faith and Honour of Treaties are always Interpreted by Princes their own way, when they have any Pretenſions to make, or find it for their Conveniency to break in upon their Word given.
And for this Reaſon thoſe People who lay ſo great a ſtreſs upon our Treaty with France, and place ſo much weight there, as if the whole, and only Security of our Proteſtant Settlement depended upon this Treaty; not only Diſhonour our own Na⯑tion, but really Weaken the Succeſſion itſelf. Do ſuch People know, or conſider, that the Proteſtant Succeſſion is our Fundamental Se⯑curity for the Peace, Proſperity, Liberty, Pro⯑perty, Religion, Poſterity of this Nation, and all that is, or can be dear to us, or them, now and for ever? What a Condition ſhould we be all in, if theſe Things, of ſo much Conſequence to us, depended for their Safety, upon the Veracity, Faith, and Honour of the French King; aye, or any King upon Earth? Such People have too mean an Opinion of our Conſtitution, and of our Power to maintain it. It is, no doubt, convenient and ſafe for us to tye up the Hands of thoſe who are Enemies to the Succeſſion as far as poſſible: And it ſeems to be as much done that way as it was [42] poſſible could be done in the Treaty. But when all that is over, we hope the Secu⯑rity of our Eſtabliſhment has better Foun⯑dations than any that could be furniſhed from Foreign Contracts, or provided in a Treaty with France.
As far as Treaty could provide, as far as could either be offer'd by the French King, or propoſed by us in a Treaty, ſeems to be Obtain'd and Settled by this Treaty; and it is yet unknown what thoſe People who complain of the Inſufficiency of this Treaty, do propoſe; either as what might have been done, or as what would have been ſufficient if it had been done in the Treaty, I mean as it relates to the Prote⯑ſtant Succeſſion.
If then, nothing can be thought of far⯑ther for the Security of the Proteſtant Suc⯑ceſſion, which either was in the Power of the French King to grant, or which we ought to have accepted from him, or pro⯑poſed to him, then the preſent Treaty is as ſufficient a Security to the Succeſſion as it was poſſible to make it be, or as a Treaty could admit.
The ſame Thing might be ſaid in the Caſe of the Spaniſh Renunciations, which [43] lay it down as a Foundation, that France and Spain ought to be joyn'd together in the ſame Perſon; ſince then the Poſſeſſor King Philip was not driven Out; and that yet it appear'd neceſſary to make a Treaty of Peace on all Sides. Nothing more effectual could be deviſed, or propoſed than thoſe Renunciations: And however Invalid Re⯑nunciations have been, in like Caſes, thro' the Accidents that may have happen'd, yet upon a due Examination, it will appear that ſuch Formal Proceedings are not eſteem'd ſo very Inſufficient as we now make them, or ſo appointed to be broken, as that they cannot be kept; and in the Proſecution of this Argument there ſhall be ſhewn in due time.
- 1. That the preſent Renunciations are of a different kind from all that ever were propoſed in an Affair of the like Na⯑ture, as far as Hiſtory can inſtruct us in the Caſe.
- 2. That there is ſomething in the Nature of the Thing, that makes theſe Valid; and that tho' all the former Contracts of the like Nature in the World have, or had proved ineffectual, yet that theſe cannot do ſo.
- [44]3 That King William accepted of Re⯑nunciations, in Caſes of like Nature, as the only Method to bind Princes, in Caſes where other Obligations could not be taken or given.
But theſe Things are reſerved to a Trea⯑tiſe of the Renunciations, which may be Publiſhed by itſelf.