A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PROTESTING CATHOLIC DISSENTER AND A CATHOLIC.

THE preſent diſputes, about the oath of allegiance, have raiſed ſtrange commotions through⯑out the kingdom, among the Catholics. I fear we ſhall be a divided people. Pray, Sir, let you and I diſcuſs the matter together, perhaps we may clear the difficulty, by explaining our meaning.

I ſincerely wiſh ſomething of this ſort had been done ſome time back. I am perſuaded that a can⯑did and calm diſcuſſion of this buſineſs would have prevented the Committee from proceeding, with any thing, which they apprehended to be wrong; and on the other hand, would have enſured the hearty concurrence of the Biſhops, in every thing, where the rights of religion and conſcience were left un⯑touched. What can be done in the preſent ſtage [2] of the buſineſs, I do not know; but am very willing to diſcuſs the matter with you, provided that no harſhneſs or aſperity be admitted in our conver⯑ſation.

Agreed. Invectives embitter the heart, but never enlighten the mind. However I think it will be neceſſary to advert occaſionally to the conduct of the Biſhops; as you, perhaps, may do, to that of the Committee; to point out the errors of either, with⯑out acrimonious cenſures of their intentions, will not injure their characters, and may ſerve to diſcover truth. I ſincerely wiſh the Biſhops had not been ſo very intractable; they have, almoſt from the begin⯑ning, refuſed to treat with the Committee; and this is the ſole cauſe of our preſent critical ſituation.

Perhaps that may be true: but I believe the Biſhops did not know how to to proceed, with ſafety. They had, after all, ſome reaſons to look on the pro⯑ceedings of the Committee, with a jealous eye. I fancy eccleſiaſtical hiſtory will not furniſh a ſingle example of a ſimilar nature. They are confeſſedly the guardians of religion, according to the inſtitu⯑tion of Chriſt, and we are bound to hear and obey them, in matters of religion; the Committee there⯑fore were cenſurable, firſt in attempting to impoſe an oath on the Catholics, without the previous ap⯑probation of the Biſhops; 2dly, in attempting to ſupport their proceedings againſt the poſitive cen⯑ſure the Biſhops had jointly publiſhed: for although the two Biſhops, from whatever motives, did not publiſh the Circular letter, in their reſpective di⯑ſtricts, [3] yet, it is well known, that the ſaid letter was originally agreed to, by all four aſſembled. Now I wiſh to know, in what hiſtory we hear of any thing of the kind, in paſt ages: either as to the attempt originally, or, a fortiori, where the attempt had been oppoſed by the poſitive cenſure of the Biſhops.

The Committee had proceeded, with calm⯑neſs, under a clear conviction of doing good, and rendering eſſential ſervice to the Catholic body. They had moreover two Biſhops, and one of the moſt learned eccleſiaſtics in the kingdom, at their head, they had the Proteſtation to guide them, which was ſigned by the beſt heads and hearts in the nation; hence they framed an oath, ſtrictly conformable to the tenor of the proteſt, and never had a thought that it would be objected to. The two Biſhops and the learned Doctor, their fellow members, had approved of the oath; and ſtill ap⯑prove of it, at leaſt the two ſurviving perſons. But the Biſhops met, and cenſured the oath as inadmiſ⯑ſible, in general terms, without aſſigning any rea⯑ſon. What could the Committee do, but write an apology, both to the Biſhops themſelves and the Catholics at large? For although the Biſhops are the natural guardians of religion, yet they are not the tyrants of their ſubjects. The Committee there⯑fore had an undoubted right to explain themſelves, to the Catholics of England, and to requeſt the Bi⯑ſhops to re-conſider the caſe, and to inſiſt on know⯑ing their reaſons for ſo raſhly cenſuring an oath, [4] which was no more than a civil teſt of allegiance, in which they had no right to interfere.

This brings us to a very ſerious debate, and which can not be managed ſo well by a general an⯑ſwer: if you pleaſe, we will divide the ſubject, and treat the different parts ſeparately. Let us then conſider firſt the article of the Proteſtation. 2. The right of the Biſhops to cenſure the oath without aſ⯑ſigning their reaſons for ſo doing; the Committee's appeal to the nation will be hinted at under the ſe⯑cond head; you will ſee, that we ſhall be obliged to examine whether the oath is a mere teſt of civil allegiance, or a religiou oath. I would not willing⯑ly enter upon a diſcuſſion of the merits or talents of the three eccleſiaſtics, who were members of the Committee; we are to try the merits of the cauſe, even againſt the perſons who ſupported it: and therefore their authority, however great, is out of the queſtion. I could wiſh however that we ſhould previouſly diſcuſs the propriety of the title: Proteſt⯑ing Catholic Diſſenter: this comes in order, before the other heads, and, if you have no objection, we will examine if even this title itſelf be admiſſible.

I willingly accept the challenge, both as to the diviſion of the matter, and to the previous diſ⯑cuſſion of the title. We ſhall then have another debate on the oath itſelf; for I wiſh to clear up every difficulty concerning the whole affair. I can⯑not however conceive what uneaſineſs the title ſhould create. We are under legal reſtrictions, [5] enacted from miſapprehenſion, or miſrepreſentation of our principles, we ſeek for redreſs of our grievan⯑ces, Government will not grant it to us as Catholics, what are we to do? A nick-name will do us no very great detriment; and at all events, one more humiliat⯑ing can never be invented than that of Papiſt [...] by which we have alwas been diſtinguiſhed in the pe⯑nal ſtatutes.

It was a remark worthy of the Right Rev. Dr. Challoner, that it is no diſgrace to the Church of Chriſt to be called, by any opprobrious appellations, by her rebellious children; this ever has, and will ever be the caſe: but it is a ſure mark of hereſy or ſchiſm, when any body of Chriſtians adopt a diſtinc⯑tive appellation, different from their holy mother. The word Catholic, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, has ever been a mark of the true Church; and has always diſcriminated her from every ſet of ſectaries. To abandon this, or to adopt a new ap⯑pellation, is to allow that we do not belong to the true Church, but are really a new ſect. I will ven⯑ture to ſay, if theſe affairs go on, that the word Ca⯑tholic will ſoon be left out of your title; then you will only be Proteſting Diſſenters. Papiſt is a nick-name impoſed upon us; this title is aſſumed by ourſelves; the Committee have told us, ‘"that on the propriety of its invention, and its probable efficacy, the merits of this plan chiefly reſts."’ It is then an appellation, a nick-name adopted, by themſelves: not impoſed upon them, and would ſoon, in fact, as in name, ſeparate them from the [6] great body of the Catholic Church. This Church will never admit, as its members, any perſons, who give up her ancient hereditary ſirname, and adopt a new denomination. If then our Legiſlators are ſtill ſo far worked up, by their prejudices, or ſo weak, as to fear popular commotions, that they will not grant us redreſs of our grievances, on any other terms; we ought to ſubmit to providence, and wait, with patience, for better times, rather than ſhamefully diſgrace ourſelves, by ſubmitting to humiliating con⯑deſcenſions, beneath the dignity of men, of Citi⯑zens, of Chriſtians and Catholics.

I can not ſee this title in that light. We certainly are proteſting againſt certain pernicious doctrines attributed to us: we belong to the great body of the Catholic Church: and we certainly diſſent, or differ from the eſtabliſhed Church: We are then Proteſting Catholic Diſſenters. We can not expect that the legiſlature will grant us relief on our own terms: if this name in our ſtatute books ſhould be ſubſtituted in the place of that odious ap⯑pellation of Papiſt, where is the harm? After all, though the Committee have agreed to the appella⯑ion, it is not their own act and deed; they could not obtain relief on any other conditions.

Pleaſe to recollect that the Committee were not bound to ſeek relief; and therefore if it were not to be obtained, but on too hard conditions, the matter ſhould have reſted there. It is therefore ſtrictly true that this title is their own; and, as I remarked before, they glory in the invention. But Sir, though [7] I grant we are proteſting, yet I do not underſtand the addition of Diſſenters. There is a great diſ⯑parity between differ and diſſent, in matters of religion. You may differ in opinion from one man, or from all the world: the word imports neither priority nor majority: but the word diſſent implies both; you cannot then diſſent from the eſtabliſhed Church, as a Catholic. Every ſect is a diſſent from the Catholic Church: ſhe diſſents from no other Church; ſhe cannot therefore adopt this title. How then can you, if you remain a Catholic? You have moreover a proof, from the Committee's letter to the Catholics, that they are leaning towards a ſepa⯑ration from the Church, by dividing themſelves from its members. You recollect that the probable efficacy of this title depends intirely on the ſup⯑poſition, that Proteſting Catholic Diſſenters are not of the ſame belief, with thoſe perſons, who are always diſtinguiſhed by the ſtile and title of Papiſts, in our penal ſtatutes.

True, Sir, Papiſts are thoſe, who hold doc⯑trines, againſt which, we proteſt. Doctrines inimical to Civil government, and who, of courſe, are not worthy of protection. The penal laws are enacted againſt ſuch perſons, and in my opinion very juſtly. I am quite of the opinion of our Committee, that the preſent oath will ſhew who are Papiſts, and who are not, and thoſe who are, and dare avow them⯑ſelves, let them meet their deſerts, in the execution of the laws. I can ſee no harm in ſeparating from [8] ſuch perſons, whom I conſider as monſters in ſociety.

This is harſh indeed. You conſented to my propoſal, that no aſperity ſhould be admitted in our converſation. I have often heard that language, but never without horror. I allow that the penal laws are enacted againſt perſons called Papiſts. I allow alſo that Proteſtants, in general, miſrepreſent them, as holding doctrines inconſiſtent with the ſafety of the ſtate. But I poſitively deny that the penal ſtatutes were either enacted againſt ſuch only, who avowed thoſe doctrines, or on account of holding them. The ſtatutes ſpeak for themſelves. They are againſt the doctrines of tranſubſtantiation, invo⯑cation of ſaints and other articles of our creed. They are againſt Prieſts and Jeſuits, againſt being reconciled to the Church of Rome, &c. &c. not a word, that I remember, of thoſe ſuppoſed doctrines of reputed Papiſts. And although Proteſtants have generally ſuppoſed all Papiſts to be dangerous ſubjects, this idle ſuppoſition ſhould be traced to its proper ſource, the venom and hatred, which the enemies of the Church have ever entertained againſt its members: and ſhould be treated with the ſame contempt, as the ſlanders of the Pagans during the ten perſecutions. Indeed, Sir, you muſt know well, that moſt of the doctrines againſt which we proteſt, never were the opinions of any number of Catholics in the world. Moreover the infallibility of the Pope and his indirect power, in ſome extra⯑ordinary caſes, over their temporal authority, which [9] I think, are the only doctrines that have been maintained, by thoſe, whom you ſtile Papiſts, are no part of their religion: no more than the denial of theſe doctrines is a part of your own. Why then would you wiſh to ſeparate from them? Did any one of them hold the reſt of the doctrines abjured, by the oath, he would neither be Catholic nor Papiſt, even according to the new faſhioned interpre⯑tation of the word. In fine, Sir, the penal ſtatutes are enacted againſt thoſe, who profeſs the Catholic religion, whether they do or do not hold any of the doctrines, which you proteſt againſt. The preſent oath is a bad criterion to diſcover thoſe, whom you ſtile Papiſts; as, ſhould it paſs into a law, every one who refuſes to take it, muſt of courſe be ſtigma⯑tized as a Papiſt, though he ſhould abjure every one of thoſe doctrines, as ſincerely and heartily as yourſelf. Now, Sir, I will venture to aſſert that a great majority of the Catholics in England will refuſe to take this captious, equivocal oath. Though perhaps not one in a thouſand maintains any of the doctrines abjured by it: and although no one Catholic ſhould maintain any of the doctrines, which are, even conſtructively, contrary to the ſafety of the ſtate. Thus, Sir, you wiſh to ſeparate, not only from real Papiſts, as you call them, which I firmly believe do not exiſt, only in the brain of the Com⯑mittee, but even from perſons, who are as good ſubjects and better Catholics than yourſelf: you moreover wiſh to ſee the ſword of perſecution once more unſheathed againſt them; and by ſupporting [10] the preſent meaſures, as much as depends on you, you imbrue your hands in all the innocent blood, that may be ſhed on that account. I think, Sir, it would redound more to the credit of the Committee to abandon the cauſe, which muſt produce a di⯑viſion fatal to religion, if no worſe comes of it, than obſtinately to perſevere in the meaſure, againſt the poſitive commands of the Biſhops, and againſt the inclinations and wiſhes of ſo conſiderable a part of the body.

To ſum up all this. We were happy and content: but if the Committee, on honourable terms, could have procured a relaxation or repeal of the laws, which, as yet, are in force againſt Catholics, we ſhould have acknowledged our obligation; but I fear this new appellation is neither honourable nor ſafe. It ſhould not then have been adopted, or ſubmitted to. It can never ſerve as a criterion to diſcover real Papiſts; it is both a falſe title, and an uſeleſs, nay a pernicious expedient.

It is indeed hard for any conſcientious per⯑ſons to be involved in the diſagreeable dilemma, of taking the oath againſt their conſciences: or being reputed Papiſts for refuſing it: but after all, it is their own faults. They ſigned the proteſtation; the Committee had every right to ſuppoſe, that they would ſwear to what they had ſigned. The Com⯑mittee had drawn up an oath according to the tenor of the proteſt, with very few additions or alterations, theſe trivial in themſelves and required by the heads [11] of adminiſtration: thus they were compelled to abide by the oath, or forfeit their credit as men of honour, by revoking their ſignatures to the proteſtation.

It is harder ſtill that this dilemma ſhould be the conſequence of meaſures adopted and purſued by the Committee. Their own rules preſcribed that nothing of any conſequence, regarding the generality of Catholics, ſhould be done, without the approbation of a previous general meeting. A pe⯑tition from the North was preſented to them, re⯑queſting that nothing, which concerned religion, ſhould even be treated of, without the concurrence of the Vicars Apoſtolic. This drew a declaration from the noble chairman, at a ſubſequent meeting, that nothing of the kind had been, or would in future be done, without their conſent and appro⯑bation. They have therefore infringed their own rules, have exceeded the limits of their delegated power, and broken their own promiſes: and thus have involved themſelves and us in a very diſagree⯑able ſituation. Either they muſt commit themſelves to the Miniſtry, by abandoning the project, to ſatisfy thoſe, who refuſe to take the oath; or they muſt throw a great number of conſcientious Catho⯑lics into the far worſe dilemma juſt mentioned. I do not heſitate to ſay that the former is the more generous, and what, I think, they are ſtrictly bound to. The proteſtation is no plea in their favour. From its internal evidence, and from the means made uſe of to bring it about, it is an in⯑ſtrument, [12] which can never authoriſe the preſent proceedings, nor give ſanction to the oath.

Why not? Sir. But this brings us to the ſecond part according to the diviſion we agreed upon: or rather the firſt part, as, thus far we have only been diſcuſſing preliminaries. If the oath does not differ from the proteſtation; how can we refuſe it? As to the means you mention, I am not acquainted with any improper ones. The proteſt was framed by Proteſtants, they had offered their objections againſt our principles, in as much as they were ſuppoſed to be inimical to Civil government; they had alſo anſwered theſe objections, in terms, which they deemed ſatisfactory to government, and to the na⯑tion. This compoſition, entirely their own, was preſented to the Committee; theſe Gentlemen, after ſome alterations, approved of it, preſented it to the Clergy, in a numerous meeting, who all ſigned it; and it was afterwards ſigned, by all the Clergy and Gentry in the nation, with very few exceptions; if we recede from this, we ſhall really prove what Proteſtants object againſt us; that nothing will bind us, that we will not abide by any proteſtations or oaths whatſoever; for I ſee no difference between one and the other; I ſhould make no ſcruple of ſwearing to any deed or inſtrument, to which I had ſigned my name.

Under favour, Sir, there was another tri⯑bunal to which this matter ſhould have been referred, previous to the approbation of the Committee. The Biſhops ſhould have taken the lead. It belongs to [13] their province to approve religious doctrines, or to abjure and renounce falſe ones. Then indeed the Committee would have had ſome plea for their ſub⯑ſequent proceedings: but they firſt gave their fiat, and then endeavoured to bar out alterations. How⯑ever there is a great difference between an oath and a proteſtation.—

Under favour, Sir, you, in your turn, do not obſerve the bounds of moderation agreed on between us. What inſinuations you throw out! What were thoſe means and endeavours you ſpeak of?

I ſuppoſe the Committee were convinced that the proteſt could and ought to be ſigned, but appre⯑hending that ſome perſons, from ſcruples, others from too much zeal for ſcholaſtic accuracy, would object againſt it; hence they made uſe of means, which they thought effectual, and which proved ſuch, to elude every argument, and obtain the ſig⯑natures of the meeting, without any alterations. Theſe were as follows: Letters were ſent to corre⯑ſpondents in the country to diſpoſe the minds of the Clergy and Gentry: they were informed that the proteſt had been agreed to, by every one, object⯑ed to, by no one; and this, when no one knew that ſuch a thing exiſted, except themſelves, and a very few of their confidents. Then a meeting was called of a choſen few of the clergy, about twelve in num⯑ber, at which the Secretary to the Committee pre⯑ſided. The beſt part of theſe gentlemen, already in the ſecret, being gained over, were to engage the reſt, to eſpouſe the good cauſe. Objections were [14] ſtarted againſt the wording of it; the anſwers were; that the proteſt was a bare abjuration of the perni⯑cious doctrines, which proteſtants falſely imputed to us; that it was only a declaration of our civil alle⯑giance, which had no connection with religious te⯑nets, ſtated in the objections; and finally that no alteration would be admitted. Nothing of all this however could ſatisfy one of the characters preſent, till they agreed to ſign an explanatory proteſt, in which they declared the ſenſe, in which it was pre⯑ſented, in which themſelves underſtood and ſigned it. As this explanation had done away the difficul⯑ties of thoſe, who oppoſed the proteſtation, they all ſigned it, and by this, were bound to ſupport it, in the general meeting of the Clergy held ſoon after. In this meeting, the ſame means were made uſe of, perſons were employed to ſound and perſuade the leading characters, who invariably aſſerted that no oath would be exacted, that no alteration would be ſuffered.

The meeting was then opened by the right reve⯑rend Preſident. The Secretary of the Committee read the conſultations of the univerſities, which were foreign to the purpoſe, not one of their an⯑ſwers having any reference to what was objected againſt the proteſt. Then a ſort of explication was read which was conſidered, by many, as introduced to intimidate, and enforce the Gentlemen to ſub⯑ſcribe.

Several however did object, not againſt the gene⯑neral tenor of the proteſt; but againſt the wording [15] of it; not againſt renouncing any doctrine, conſi⯑ſidered as pernicious, or inimical to civil govern⯑ment, but againſt the terms in which they were ab⯑jured. They thought that the abjuration of thoſe doctrines was done in ſuch looſe, inaccurate, ambi⯑guous and equivocal terms, that ſound doctrines, as well as pernicious were equally rejected, that truth as well as falſehood were equally renounced, or might conſtructively be abjured and rejected, accord⯑ing to the plain, common and natural ſenſe of the words of the proteſtation. Then again the uſual anſwers. None of the abettors of the proteſt pre⯑tended to call in queſtion the principles of religion, which the oppoſers of it held forth as injured, by it; but they contended, that the proteſt went no farther than to ſecure our civil allegiance, by re⯑nouncing the doctrines, which were conſidered as inconſiſtent with the rights of government, that the preamble declared it ſuch, that the meaning of the fra⯑mers of it was ſuch; and finally that no alteration would be admitted. A third declaration, from the Chair, that we were not called together to examine and diſ⯑cuſs, but to ſign, put an end to the debate; and all preſent ſigned it on that day, or the next; and ſoon after great part of the Clergy and Laity in the na⯑tion followed the example, by ſigning themſelves, or ſome one ſigning for them. I have heard and read of ſuch proceedings among Arians, Iconoclaſts, Jan⯑ſeniſts, &c. but never among Catholics.

I do not ſee how you can complain of the Committee. They are not anſwerable for what [16] others may do. They intended an open meeting, a free and candid diſcuſſion of the matter; if this was hindered, by the Preſident, he is to blame; but after all, how came you to let yourſelves be drawn in, if you diſapproved of the meaſure? you ſhould have ſtood out like men. You ſigned however and are bound by your ſignatures. If you retract, you fall under the juſt cenſure of Proteſtants; caſt an odium on the tenets of your religion, and hinder the Catholics from emancipating themſelves from the preſſure of the penal laws.

I do not indeed think, that all the members of the Committee were engaged in theſe meaſures: I think that ſeveral knew nothing of them. But ſure⯑ly ſome of them ſuggeſted theſe meaſures to perſons whom they thought proper to conduct them: The fact is, they were practiſed. The character of the Preſident renders this beyond a doubt, that he ne⯑ver would have proceeded in the manner he did, if he had not been tampered with. In this caſe the perſon, who drew him into the ſnare, is more to blame than himſelf.

As to the reſt ſtanding out; I own they were to blame in giving a ſanction to what might be made an ill uſe of. But ſwayed as they were, by ſuch an appearance of eandour, on the one hand, ſuch plau⯑ſible explications, and poſitive aſſeverations of the meaning of the proteſt, on the other; then again the great authority which awed them, it is no won⯑der that they fell into the ſnare, They had no ſuſ⯑picions of intrigue or deceit, and honeſtly thought [17] themſelves authoriſed to ſign a declaration of their principles, in a modified ſenſe, as they thought; but which was the real ſenſe of the proteſt, according to the abettors of it, notwithſtanding they allowed that it was looſely and inaccurately worded. It was, on all hands, agreed, that the principles of religion ſhould remain untouched, and that the doctrines, abjured in the proteſt, were pernicious, except the infallibility of the Pope, which we ſhall examine hereafter: it was alſo agreed, by the abettors of the proteſt, that the ſenſe in which the oppoſers ſigned, was the only ſenſe in which they themſelves could conſcientiouſly ſet their names to it. Theſe me⯑thods have often ſucceeded, in other occaſions; and once were employed with ſucceſs againſt a Council of about 300 Biſhops. I dare not even think that the ſame malevolent intention guided the promoters of the proteſt; but it ſeems to have had the ſame effect, thus far, and ſhews how we ought to guard againſt every ſpecies of novelty, even in uſing new words to expreſs our ideas, in matters of religious import. This I will venture to aſſert, that, if the matter had been fairly and candidly diſcuſſed, the proteſt would never have paſſed without ſeveral alterations, to ren⯑der it both clear and accurate, for as it ſtands, it is neither one nor the other. In the preſent ſtage of the buſineſs, it ſeems that we are pledged to take the oath, by having ſigned the proteſt. This is certainly a miſtake; for it is well known, that ſeveral have retracted their ſignatures; on account of the ill uſe that has been made of them, and becauſe they are [18] apprehenſive that the ſenſe, in which they ſigned, is not the plain and obvious ſenſe of the words, as they were told it was. Theſe cannot take the oath, But even thoſe who have not retracted their ſigna⯑tures, can not be bound to take the oath. For, as I ſaid, there is a great difference.—

Previous to that diſcuſſion, pray reflect on the difficulties and danger of ſupporting that doctrine. How will Proteſtants ever give credit even to our oaths, if we retract our ſignatures ſo ſolemnly pledg⯑ed? What can they think of our principles and our practice? How can we hope for redreſs of our grievances, if we confirm them, in one of the worſt of their prejudices againſt us, that no oaths can bind us. Firſt anſwer this, and then I will attend to your proceeding with what you have twice at⯑tempted, excuſe the interruption.

If Proteſtants are candid, they will applaud us, and condemn you. They will ſee that we retract, not becauſe we think our oaths or promiſes do not bind us, but becauſe we fear that we have raſhly, though honeſtly ſigned an inſtrument, which we ought not to have ſigned. Not that we approve of any of the pernicious doctrines abjured in the pro⯑teſt; but becauſe we fear leſt the looſe and cap⯑tious terms, in which they are abjured, ſhould, either by implication or directly involve the principles of religion. They muſt then approve of our conduct. But they will ſee that undue influence has been uſed to procure ſubſcriptions, and the ſuſpicion will fall heavy on the Committee and their abettors, they will [19] naturally infer that ſuch perſons are ready to ſwal⯑low any oaths, to get indulgences, acquire the rights of citizens, &c. At all events, they muſt condemn you for ſupporting and purſuing meaſures, which are ſo ſeriouſly condemned as hoſtile to religion, by ſo conſiderable a part of the Catholic bodyWas St. Auſtin wrong for writing his Retractations? Were the Fathers of Ariminum in the wrong, when they retracted their ſignatures, by which they had been trick⯑ed into Arianiſm, contrary to their intention? Was the great Fenelon a prevaricator becauſe he retracted his writings, when he found they had been condemned, by the Apoſtolic See? The old Latin proverb ſhould be remem⯑bered: Humanum eſt errare, ſed diabolicum eſt perſeverare..

It can not be ſuppoſed that Proteſtants will condemn us for ſtanding to our ſignatures. But let me hear what difference you find between an oath and a proteſtation.

They differ widely. I may ſign my name to a proteſtation, as an opinion. But I can not ſwear to an opinion. In a proteſtation I may paſs over tri⯑vial inaccuracies of the framer; in an oath, I muſt have the niceſt accuracy, in the wording of it. In a proteſtation I may admit an accommodated mode of expreſſion, eſpecially if it is the declared ſenſe of the author; in an oath, this would be perjury, if we ſwear to the plain, natural and obvious ſenſe of the words. For an accommodated ſenſe, is certain⯑ly an expoſition foreign to the natural import of the terms. The preamble may ſix the ſenſe of a proteſt, but can not fix that of an oath.

If this is true, how many are perjured?

It would go beyond the limits of our plan to treat this ſubject at large. Pleaſe to refreſh your memory with your former ideas on the conſtant doctrine of the Church, in her approved divines, and I believe you will find that juſtice, judgment and truth, which have ever been thought neceſſary conditions of a lawful oath, will go to prove the conditions I require: moreover an oath ſtands upon its own ground, without any reference to a preamble, or to any accommodated ſenſe of the propoſer; and therefore no preamble can affect the intrinſic merits of it; and where the ſtrict and natural ſenſe of the words is ſworn to, any accommodated ſenſe, unleſs it were known and agreed to, would be a mental reſtriction; which is not juſtiſiable in any oath whatſoever.

As this is only a converſation, on amicable terms, between us, I wiſh not to puſh this matter any further, at preſent; we may both find it worth our while to look over the treatiſe De juramento, in ſome approved Divine, and have another diſcourſe on the ſubject, on ſome future occaſion. I think we may here leave the ſubject of the proteſtation; as to its intrinſic merits, we ſhall occaſionally advert to them, when we come to diſcuſs the oath. Let us therefore paſs to the ſecond article, of our propoſed plan; the right of the Biſhops to cenſure the oath, in globo, without aſſigning any reaſon for ſo doing; we have a right to know their reaſons, and they are bound to give them, in a tone of ſobriety. I ſay ra⯑ther [21] they had no righr at all to interfere, as the oath is a mere civil teſt of allegiance, no ways connected with religion: and therefore by no means ſubjected to the juriſdiction of the Biſhops.

Indeed, Sir, this is ſtrange language, and which I never expected to have heard from any one, who pretends to be a Catholic. I always underſtood, by the article of my creed, the holy Catholic Church, that the Biſhops are conſtituted and appointed, as our fathers in religion, to inſtruct, govern and direct us, in the paths of faith and virtue, and that we are bound to hear and obey them in matters appertain⯑ing to their charge. It was therefore the duty of the Biſhops to conſider whether the oath left the rights of religion untouched; on this they met, and de⯑cided in the negative. It was then the duty of their flock to ſubmit; at leaſt till their ſentence ſhould be reverſed, by a ſuperior tribunal: but it appears that you Gentlemen Diſſenters do not wiſh to ap⯑peal to Rome; but to the Catholics of England.

Suppoſing that right in the Biſhops, they are bound to give their reaſons. They are our fathers, but not our maſters; they are appointed to feed us, as the Greek text has it, but they are not authoriſed to domineer over us; much leſs to fleece or butcher us. We are not bound to blind obedience; and therefore we inſiſt on knowing what harm the oath will do to religion; this they will not, dare not, or can not tell us. We complain of this: and appeal to our fellow Catholics, by explaining our conduct and our motives, that they may all ſee how injuri⯑ouſly [22] we are treated. I ſay, we, for I moſt heartily approve of the Committee's letter. We ſhall not appeal to ultramontane principles, for the deciſion of a cauſe, to which we think ourſelves perfectly competent.

I grant that Biſhops are fathers, not tyrants, that they are appointed to feed us, if you will, for I can ſee no difference; how can they ſeed us, unleſs we are bound to boey? You ſeem to allow a ſort of obedience, but will not ſubmit blindly. So far I agree. But pray who is to decide between a Biſhop and his flock? According to the original appoint⯑ment of Biſhops, they are the guardians of religion, they are to guide their flocks into ſalutary paſtures, and point out the poiſonous weeds, which they occa⯑ſionally meet with; thus far is their duty; the man⯑ner how they are to perform it, is left to their diſ⯑cretion. They are not to exerciſe a haughty and im⯑perious command over their ſubjects; but this ought never to be ſuppoſed, much leſs urged againſt them, without manifeſt reaſons, which admit of no doubt. They are anſwerable to God for their conduct; but not to their flocks. It is true we are not bound to blind obedience; i. e. to ſubmit againſt the dictates of reaſon: but where ſhall we ſix the limits? If we are always to inſiſt upon their giving reaſons for their conduct, we ſhall ſoon do away their autho⯑rity: If we are to be the judges of their proceed⯑ings, then we are their ſuperiors. An appeal from them to the public at large, in that caſe, would be legal and proper. But I dare aſſert that there never [23] has been a ſchiſm in the Church, no reſiſtance ever happened to epiſcopal authority, which would not be juſtifiable on the ſame grounds. Let the abettors of any ſchiſmatical diviſion only appeal from the au⯑thority of Biſhops to the public, or rather to their own judgment, and then the epiſcopal authority will be ſubjected to the private judgment of every capri⯑cious innovator. Pray, Sir, what has the refor⯑mation done more?

In one word. The Biſhops, though ſuperiors, have no right to exact unlimitted and blind obedi⯑ence. But neither have their flocks an unlimited right to examine and decide on the exerciſe of their authority. Now, by your leave, Sir, I will point out the land mark, which was originally fixed, and firmly eſtabliſhed, by the great founder of our reli⯑gion, and which has ever been acknowledged, by all true Catholics from the firſt foundation of Chri⯑ſtianity. Every Biſhop is a competent judge of controverſy to his flock, and they are bound to ſubmit to his deciſion, in every caſe, whatſoever, unleſs, 1ſt. his deciſion is evidently wrong; or 2d. unleſs his ſentence ſhould be reverſed, by a ſuperior court; and to this court, you frankly own, you dare not appeal.

Were I to cloſe with you on your own terms, I ſhould ſtill have good grounds to aſſert that the Bi⯑ſhops are in the wrong, and therefore we are not obliged to ſubmit to their deciſion. I apprehend that even yourſelf, Sir, will require two conditions, in the ſentence emanent from Epiſcopal authority, without which, it will never have the force of law: [24] the 1ſt. that the Biſhops ſhall proceed with calmneſs and deliberation, and not pronounce finally, till they have duly weighed and properly diſcuſſed the ſubject in debate: the 2d. that the matter itſelf ſhall be ſubjected to their authority, and not purely of a temporal nature; for otherwiſe, any ſentence of Biſhops would be out of the province of their juriſ⯑diction; and of no force whatever: now, Sir, as to the firſt condition; it is very well known ‘"that the Biſhops, on their arrival in London, were viſibly prepoſſeſſed, they did not conſult any individual in London, and proceeded without the leaſt deli⯑beration or diſcuſſion to cenſure indiſcriminately the bill, the proteſtation and the oath; whereas, in ſtrict juſtice, nothing ought to have been the ſubject of their deliberations, but that part of the oath, which differs from the proteſtation."’ As to the ſecond condition, I ſhall beg leave to obſerve, that, as the oath is barely a teſt of Civil allegiance, that, religion is no ways concerned in it, only in as much as we are called upon to abjure thoſe perni⯑cious tenets, which our adverſaries have falſely attributed to our religion, it does not appertain to the juriſdiction of the Biſhops: and therefore their cenſure is null and void, for want of competency in the judges; even if they had proceeded with that calmneſs and deliberation, which becomes their dig⯑nity, and which, I obſerved, they did not.

I admit your two conditions; but you will pleaſe to obſerve, that there are certain degrees of deliberation and diſcuſſion, not all, equally neceſ⯑ſary in every controverſy. Sometimes the queſtion [25] is obſcure and perplexed; on other occaſions it is clear and obvious: The Biſhops, therefore, are to proceed with calmneſs, and that neceſſary diſcuſſion which the matter requires: and here again they only are competent to judge, when they have taken the neceſſary ſteps for information. Every inno⯑vator, the moſt daring heretic, from the ſame principle, might call in queſtion the deciſions of every Biſhop, and every general Council from the origin of Chriſtianity, till this day: he has only to ſay that they did not proceed with all the caution neceſſary on the occaſion, and therefore the deci⯑ſion is informal; whether given by four Vicars Apoſtolic, or by five hundred Biſhops in a general Council. This, you ſee, is a method of ſetting aſide their authority, as effectual as any that has ever been attempted, by any heretic that ever exiſted.

You ſay the Biſhops were viſibly prepoſſeſſed; I believe they were; this again is an objection which Luther might equally have urged againſt the Coun⯑cil of Trent, the Iconoclaſts againſt the ſecond of Nice, and Arius againſt the firſt, &c. The Bi⯑ſhops are jealous of the rights of religion; are ever watchful over the ſacred depoſitum committed to their care, and as they are commanded to deliver it to after generations, without ſpot or blemiſh, as they had received it from their fathers, they ſtart at the leaſt innovation. Should they afterwards proceed to cenſure, they muſt be prepoſſeſſed with the im⯑preſſions of truth againſt error and novelty. But they conſulted no one in London? Really, Sir, this is not quite the truth. But I ſuppoſe you mean [26] that they conſulted none of the Committee, or of their friends. Indeed I ſee no neceſſity they had to conſult any one on this ſide of the queſtion. They had already received all the information they had any right to expect from that quarter. They had a book in folio to inſtruct them, and a poſitive aſſurance that not one tittle of the oath would be ſuffered to be altered; as if the ſame meaſures were again to ſuc⯑ceed, as had been practiſed with regard to the pro⯑teſtation. The Biſhops, however, by this time, found they had been drawn into a ſnare, and there⯑fore were reſolved that their ſignature of the proteſt ſhould be no hindrance to the ſentence they deter⯑mined to paſs upon the oath. They had previouſly had the opinions of ſome of the beſt Divines of their reſpective diſtricts, and moreover took the advice of thoſe, even in London, whom they thought they could truſt, and then proceeded to condemn, not, as you ſay, the Bill, the Proteſtation, and the Oath; but the oath only; and ſome reſtric⯑tive cauſes of the bill, by which we were placed in a worſe condition, than before, and to which, they thought, we ought not to ſubmit.

The caſe therefore appearing clear, they had every degree of information neceſſary; and there⯑fore their deciſion was regular and legal. Our ſub⯑miſſion muſt follow of courſe, unleſs this ſentence is reverſed, by a higher court, which, I fancy, you will never ſolicit, and ſhould you, it would not be granted. I ſhall now proceed to examine the right of interference in the Biſhops.

[27] I own I am perfectly aſtoniſhed that ſuch a plea ſhould ever be made. I once more return to my retortion. This plea would equally ſerve to ſupport every error that ever exiſted.

The author and promoter of every hereſy might ſay, and has always ſaid, that the interference of Biſhops is illegal, that they mean not to infringe on the rights of religion, that they ſupport no doctrines contrary to faith, &c. Let the oath of ſupremacy itſelf be propoſed as a teſt of Civil allegiance, why could not this be equally taken, on the ſame grounds? At all events, that oath might go down, by means of an explication. We need only be told that the Committee have conſulted perſons of the firſt rate abilities, who have long been exerciſed in conſti⯑tutional diſquiſitions, from whom the people of England receive their notions, both of names and things; that theſe great men do not underſtand the oath of ſupremacy, as ſubverſive of the Pope's juriſ⯑diction, in as much as it is purely ſpiritual; but only ſo far as it is coercive, and to be enforced, by means of a temporal nature: if then is added, that go⯑vernment and the public are thoſe who are to be ſatisfied, that they inſiſt on this oath, and will accept of no other, then, I ſay, we have ſummed up the beſt reaſons for the preſent oath; and which are equally ſtrong in favour of that of ſupremacy, in ſimilar circumſtances.

May not government require, as a teſt of our Civil allegiance, that we renounce tranſubſtanti⯑ation, or any other article of our creed? You [28] might equally ſwallow that, and pretend that you only reject it ſo far, as it is inimical to Civil govern⯑ment, viz. none at all; to what abſurdities would theſe principles lead us? A teſt of civil allegiance! why then are religious topics introduced? A mere teſt of allegiance has nothing to do with religion. We are ready to ſwear allegiance to his Majeſty, in as full and ample a manner, as any government in the world has a right to exact it, from a ſubject of any denomination. But we muſt renounce certain opinions inimical to civil government? or they cannot truſt, even to our oaths? What abſurdity! If they will not believe our actions, they would not believe, though even one was to riſe from the dead, to aſſure them of our ſidelity. If they ſuppoſe that no oaths can bind us; how can this one? If we can get diſpenſations for oaths, or evade their force, by mental reſtrictions; why have we not done ſo with thoſe oaths, which have all along been exacted by government? Why have we, for two hundred years, ſuffered diſabilities, ſines, impriſonment, and death itſelf; when a diſpenſation, or mental reſtric⯑tion would have ſet us on a level with our fellow ſubjects? or were thoſe our real principles, could we not equally follow them, in the preſent queſtion? we certainly ſhould follow them, and take the oath without further examination, and then get over it, either by a mental reſtriction or diſpenſation. But after all we are ready to ſatisfy them, and renounce thoſe principles, which are any ways repugnant to the duties of civil and ſocial life. Yet we are told [29] that this is to be done, in terms preſcribed, by men in power, and that they muſt be ſatisfied. An oath is therefore framed for the purpoſe, which equally rejects truth with ſalſehood, ſound doctrines with error.

Hold, Sir, this is too much. Were that the caſe, I ſhould not attempt to defend it. The oath of ſupremacy, and others you have hinted at, cannot be taken by a Catholic, as they reject the principles of our faith. But the preſent oath is a mere teſt of civil allegiance, and no ways affects the rights of religion. Although ‘"this oath has been before government and the nation for above a year, yet no one has ever been able to point out a ſingle deviation from the rules of faith or morality."’ It is therefore only a teſt of civil allegiance, and the Biſhops had no right to interfere.

Sir, a bare aſſertion is no proof. However, you muſt grant that if this oath does contain any thing contrary to ſound doctrine, then it cannot be taken: therefore the queſtion finally reſts on the intrinſic merits of the oath: the oath then muſt be examined; by whom? once more I aſſert, it belongs to the Biſhops to examine, whether an oath con⯑tains any thing contrary to religion: they have done this, and condemned it. Shall we adhere to our Paſtors, or to the Committee? The Biſhops ſay, children take not that oath; it contains a poiſon, which will contaminate your ſouls. The Committee ſays, Gentlemen, do not mind your Biſhops, the oath is only a teſt of allegiance. Their [30] proof of this is, the C— the M— &c. un⯑derſtand it only in that ſenſe. Is this the way that Chriſtians uſed formerly to reaſon on the tenets of their religion? Did they go to the Emperors or their miniſters, to be informed what was ſound doctrine, and what was not?

But no one has ever been able to point out wherein it deviates from faith or morality? Indeed, Sir, ſeveral propoſitions have been pointed out, which, without doubt, expreſs doctrines contrary to the principles of our religion, either directly, or by juſt and neceſſary inference, the only anſwer that has ever been given is, in effect, that the oath does not mean what it ſays. But, if you pleaſe, we will now examine the oath itſelf: for after all your preliminaries and aſſertions, your cauſe muſt be decided by the intrinſic merits of the oath.

I own that the queſtion muſt be ſinally deter⯑mined, by the oath itſelf. I have heard ſome diffi⯑culties, but none of any conſequence. They were all grounded either in an apprehenſion of being trappaned into error; or too ſtrong an adheſion to ſcholaſtic nicety. However I am willing to diſcuſs the oath itſelf: and wiſh you to ſtate your difficul⯑ties againſt it, from beginning to end; that we may leave nothing unexamined which can be objected againſt it.

I ſhall then begin with the clauſe, in the oath, by which we ſwear to maintain, ſupport and defend the ſucceſſion in the proteſtant line exclu⯑ſively. What right has any government on earth to [31] exact ſuch a clauſe in an oath of allegiance? ſo compleatly foreign to the purpoſe of ſuch an oath? I could write a treatiſe againſt it; but ſhall only remark for the preſent, that, if government required it, we might as well ſwear to maintain, ſupport and defend all the penal laws, which ſtand in our ſtatute books, to the ſcandal of an enlightened age, and the diſgrace of a nation, which boaſts of its freedom. In this ſuppoſition, ſhould the nation at large, with its King at their head, be reconciled to the Catholic Church, by virtue of this curious oath, I am bound to fight, till death, againſt the King and the nation, becauſe they have jointly come over to my religion! Nay even, though on one in the nation, ſhould turn to the Catholic religion; ſhould the decendants of Sophia, Ducheſs of Hanover, at any future period, forfeit their right to the crown, and another family be placed on the throne, I ſhould equally be bound, by this oath, to enliſt under the banners of Don Quixote, and encounter every windmill or ſlock of ſheep, which ſhould declare in favour of the new King, againſt the family of Brunſwick.

Indeed, Sir, theſe ſuppoſitions are too lu⯑dicrous to deſerve a ſerious anſwer. However, ſup⯑poſe the caſes propoſed, this law would be reverſed by the nation, and therefore this oath would no longer be binding. But, Sir, ‘"this is the oath of abjuration taken by all the King's ſubjects, and which for the ſake of unformity, the preſent government inſiſts on being tendered equally to [32] Catholics, as to every other deſcription of men. The Catholics have in fact already taken it; and the Crown lawyers have determined that the oath of 1778 involves every conſequence of the common oath of allegiance and abjuration. Whoever op⯑poſes the act of ſettlement incurs a premunire, if in diſcourſe; high treaſon, if in writing or action. By recognizing his preſent Majeſty, and his ſuc⯑ceſſors, to be lawful kings of this realm, their title to the throne is equally recognized; and that title is grounded ſolely on the act of ſettlement."’

Theſe are knock down arguments, with a wit⯑neſs. It is high treaſon to oppoſe the act of ſettle⯑ment; therefore I am obliged in conſcience to ſwear to maintain, ſupport and defend it: I have ſworn to ſupport the ſucceſſion in his Majeſty's family; therefore I have ſworn to oppoſe any of his Maje⯑ſty's ſucceſſors, ſhould they come over to my faith: I have ſworn to depoſe even his Majeſty now on the throne, ſhould he become a Catholic! This is a depoſing power, which I ſwear to ſupport and de⯑fend; and this power is to be exerciſed, for no other reaſon, than a conſcientious practice of that religion, which I believe to be the only true one: in one part I ſwear againſt the depoſing power, here I ſwear to maintain, ſupport and defend it. But, the Crown lawyers have defined and decided the que⯑ſtion; ſo I am bound, by oath, to every conſequence, which their learned heads can draw from an oath, by wreſting it, from its plain and obvious ſenſe! I ſhall endeavour to prove, that this oath deſtroys the [33] boaſted omnipotence of Parliament: this is a conſe⯑quence which the Crown Lawyers probably have not attended to, but to which I equally ſwear as to the other. For, Sir, by virtue of this oath, the reigning family is as firmly eſtabliſhed on the throne, as if it were appointed, by God himſelf, or had an hereditary right altogether indefeaſible: and there⯑fore the Parliament, even with the conſent of the nation at large, can never alter the ſuc⯑ceſſion, in any given caſe whatſoever? You ſay indeed, in the caſes referred to before, that this law would be reverſed. But, Sir, the perſon who ſhould propoſe the repeal of the act of ſettlement would be perjured, he who ſeconds it would be perjured, eve⯑ry man in the nation that aſſents to it would equally be perjured; and even every one who does not uſe his utmoſt endeavours to prevent the repeal would incur the guilt of perjury. I may then truly ſay, that this act can never be repealed, while this oath ſtands; as it cannot be repealed without ſtigmatizing a whole nation with the guilt of perjury. I think this oath is a flat contradiction to the very funda⯑mental principles of our happy conſtitution: Let the act of ſettlement remain till Parliament and the nation think proper to repeal it, but let no man be bound to ſwear to maintain, ſupport and defend it to the utmoſt of his power; for this is evidently o⯑verturning the conſtitution, as ſettled, by that very act.

I beg leave to obſerve, that the omnipotence of Parliament has its bounds: there is another court, [34] before which the members of the Britiſh ſenate muſt one day appear; they will then know whether they had a right to deprive a man of his Crown, his eſtate or his life on account of his religion. Till then I ſhall neither oppoſe nor write againſt the act of ſettlement; but I can not, in honour and con⯑ſcience, as an Engliſhman, who admires the conſti⯑tution of his country, I can not ſwear to maintain, ſupport and defend it, to the utmoſt of my power: for at ſome future period, the wiſdom of the nation may think proper to alter it; it may, for any thing we know, be neceſſary to alter it, and this can never be effected, while this oath ſtands. I hope, Sir, you will not ſay that Parliament can diſpenſe with the obligation of this oath. Will you pleaſe to drop this ſubject, as it is of too delicate a nature to be treated with freedom.

With all my heart. What then is the next clauſe you object to? I hope you are not ſo nar⯑row-minded as to cavil at the word heretical. ‘"No Catholic heſitates, to call the depoſing and king-killing doctrines antichriſtian, contrary to the word of God and the tradition of the fathers: ma⯑terially heretical in one part, and both materially and formally heretical in the other. Beſides this is the oath of the kingdom, and if Catholics wiſh to ſhare in the privileges of citizens, they muſt bind themſelves by the ſame ties, with their fellow ſubjects."’

Indeed, Sir, I do make ſo very ſerious an ob⯑jection againſt that word, that, although every other [35] difficulty ſhould be removed, I would not take the oath. For that doctrine, however falſe, erroneous or whatever elſe it be called, is not heretical. He⯑reſy has always been defined an error in articles of faith; you know well, that nothing can be an ar⯑ticle of faith, unleſs 1, it be a revealed doctrine, and 2, unleſs it be propoſed, by the Church, to be believed as ſuch. I hope you will not pretend that the oppoſite doctrine to the depoſing tenet is pro⯑poſed by the Church, to be believed as revealed. Then the contrary doctrine is not heretical.

Your obſervation of material hereſy is not juſt. For what is only materially heretical, is not properly heretical in the plain and obvious ſenſe of the word, to which we ſwear. Hence, ſwearing that you be⯑lieve that doctrine to be heretical, is perjury, unleſs you reſtrain the term from its plain and obvious meaning, to an improper ſenſe: and this is a mental reſtriction, contrary to the ſenſe of the oath, which the illiterate multitude do not underſtand, and which thoſe, who framed, or thoſe, who tender the oath, have never thought of.

But, Sir, although it is not ſtrictly heretical in a Catholic ſenſe, it is heretical, as Proteſtants un⯑derſtand it; and this is quite ſufficient for me to ſwear it; as I muſt take the oath, in that ſenſe, in which it is propoſed. Now, Sir, that doctrine is heretical, in their ſenſe of the term, which is con⯑trary to the word of God: I hope, you will allow this doctrine to be contrary to the word of God: it is then heretical.

So then, for the ſame reaſon, I might equally ſwear that the contrary doctrine is an article of faith. What! becauſe Proteſtants have given a wrong ex⯑plication of the term, I may ſwear to it, without explication or qualification? Indeed, Sir, if Prote⯑ſtants ever are informed of theſe principles, I fear they will think that you make very light of oaths. You will, however, pleaſe to remember the argu⯑ment of John Almond, alias Lathome, urged a⯑gainſt Dr. King Biſhop of London, recorded in the Memoirs of Miſſionary Prieſts, by which he ſilen⯑ced the Biſhop, and proved, beyond a reply, that the depoſing doctrine is not heretical, even in the proteſtant ſenſe of the word: his argument was this: ‘"No poſition, on your grounds, can be heretical, un⯑leſs it be expreſsly cenſured for heretical, by the word of God, or the contradictory expreſsly con⯑tained in the word of God; but this poſition (the depoſing doctrine) is not expreſsly cenſured for heretical, by the word of God; nor is the con⯑tradictory expreſsly contained in the word of God: ergo it is not heretical."’ This was his argument, it is now mine. Should you aſk, with the Biſhop, you would have it cenſured in expreſs words? I an⯑ſwer, with the martyr, ‘"You are bound to bring a cenſure in expreſs words; which becauſe I ſee you can not, anſwer this conſequence; this poſi⯑tion is not ſet down at all in the bible: ergo it can not be cenſured, by the bible."’ The only anſwer the Biſhop made was, that Almond was a proud ar⯑rogant Jack. This, Sir, you muſt know is an unan⯑ſwerable [37] argument, in proteſtant principles; which cannot admit of an article of faith, without expreſs warrant from ſcripture. In a word, the depoſing doctrine is not properly heretical, either in the Ca⯑tholic or the Proteſtant acceptation of the term: therefore this oath can not lawfully be taken, either by Catholics or Proteſtants.

To what you add, that this is the oath of the kingdom, &c. I ſhall only ſay, that the ſame political motives would equally prove the lawfulneſs of the oath of ſupremacy, or any other, which diſgrace our ſtatute books, to the eternal ſhame of an enlightened age.

I do not ſee any ſenſe in this logical acuteneſs; too cloſe an adheſion to ſcholaſtic accuracy, is very ill timed: we may ſometimes over-ſhoot the mark, by too great nicety: I think it is a pity that ſuch cavils ſhould hinder our emancipation from the preſ⯑ſure of the penal laws. Suppoſe the word heretical were not exactly accurate, as it is only inſerted for a ſtrong mark of averſion to ſuch doctrines, I do not ſee why we may not be authoriſed to admit of it.

Indeed, Sir, this doctrine will not do, when we ſwear to the plain and ordinary ſenſe of the words. I ſuppoſe you remember, that the taſk of qualifying bad doctrines, by proper epithets, is per⯑haps one of the hardeſt, in dogmatical theology. There are doctrines, which, though not heretical, are nevertheleſs, nearly heretical, ſuſpected of hereſy; others, though not ſchiſmatical, are leading to [38] ſchiſm; others again erroneous, ſuſpicious, ſcanda⯑lous, raſh, offenſive of pious ears, &c. &c. It is, I ſay, a very difficult matter to fix the preciſe quali⯑fication to every propoſition: but where the qualifi⯑cation is evidently wrong, which is really the caſe, in our preſent debate, no Catholic can, in conſci⯑ence, ſubſcribe to it; for that defect falſifies the whole propoſition. For although it be true, that the depoſing doctrine is falſe, erroneous, ſeditious, and perhaps impious, in as much as it is a violation of our duty to Kings, commanded, by the fourth precept of the law, yet it is moſt certainly not here⯑tical. As for the word damnable, I do not ſee what preciſe ſenſe it bears, and therefore would have it expunged as uſeleſs.

I ſhall finiſh my obſervations on this head, with a remark on the ungenerous treatment we are forced to ſubmit to, from our proteſtant brethren, in this particular.—

It is a known fact, that the Popes have never yet attempted to dethrone Princes, who were born and bred up Proteſtants, but ſuch only as were Catho⯑lics, and excommunicated for their crimes, real or ſuppoſed, or invaſion of the rights of the Church: It is alſo a notorious lamentable fact, that moſt of the principal reformers preached and practiſed, when in their power, the depoſing doctrine of Catholic prin⯑ces, whenever they oppoſed the preaching of the word of God, as they termed it. The expulſion of the Queen of Scots, by her rebellious ſubjects, and the ſubſequent murder of that independent ſovereign [39] Princeſs, by Queen Elizabeth, are an indelible diſ⯑grace to Great Britain. However, we are ſtill to be abuſed and reviled, for teaching the king-killing doctrine, which we have ever abhorred, and the depoſing doctrine, which never was a principle of our religion, and which we are all ready to abjure, in any terms, which do not imply a falſehood.

You will pleaſe to reflect, Sir, that this very act, by which Catholics are permitted to enjoy ſome few only of the inalienable rights of man, enforces this very doctrine of depoſing kings, by declaring a Ca⯑tholic to be deprived of the right to the crown. Proteſtants, who have preached and practiſed theſe doctrines, are willing to grant a legal exerciſe of our religion, which they are aſhamed to refuſe, yet ſtill confined under ſuch legal reſtrictions, as are never elſewhere eſtabliſhed; and all this on condition that we ſhall be compelled to abjure and renounce as heretical a doctrine, which was the univerſal doc⯑trine of the firſt reformers, without which the refor⯑mation had never been propagated, and which is ſupported and confirmed, by this very act! Sure, Sir, this is an indignity to which I hope you will not ſubmit. It is moſt certainly a diſgrace to Proteſtants, to propoſe it. If you pleaſe, we will paſs to the next clauſe in the oath.

Agreed. I ſuppoſe it is that about the Pope's authority. But Catholics are not called upon to explain, how far the authority of the Pope really extends. ‘"They are only required to ſay that it does not affect the conſtitution, nor the legal eſta⯑bliſhment [40] of the Church, nor the rights of the ſubject; all temporal concerns undoubtedly; and when by a negative oath Catholics have diſclaim⯑ed any temporal interference, they are left at full liberty to believe and practiſe whatever their con⯑ſciences may tell them to be conformable to the revelation of Chriſt, or the decrees of the Church."’ I hope you do not allow of any power or right in the Pope to interfere in temporals.—

Indeed, Sir, I am as willing as yourſelf to ab⯑jure the Pope's right of interference in concerns of a temporal nature; but the oath, as it ſtands, either directly, or by juſt and neceſſary conſequences, ab⯑jures alſo his ſpiritual juriſdiction, in ſome caſes, to which it has always been believed to extend. I will point out the particular difficulty, in this paragraph, and then we will examine it calmly and candidly.

I abjure, with you, all right of interference which can directly or indirectly affect the independence, ſovereignty or conſtitution of this kingdom, or with the civil government thereof; or with the tempo⯑ral rights, or civil liberty or property of the ſubject. But as to the laws of the nation, the eccleſiaſtical government, as by law eſtabliſhed, and the perſons of the ſubjects of theſe realms, I think no Catholic can ſwear away the right of the Pope's interference, without abjuring the Catholic doctrine of his prima⯑cy. Now, Sir, if you pleaſe we will diſcuſs theſe articles ſeparately, for the ſake of perſpicuity.

Firſt, then, as to the laws: I was once of opinion that this might be admitted, if the ſtrict definition [41] of law were attended to: becauſe a neceſſary con⯑dition of a law is that it ſhall be juſt and lawful, I thought that the ſanguinary penal laws, as alſo eve⯑ry other ſtatute, in this kingdom, if repugnant to the laws of God or the Church, would not be com⯑prehended under that name. And, as I do not allow any right of interference with the juſt laws of any nation, it appeared that the laws in England could not be ſubjected to any ſort of controul of the Pope. But the nation at large would certainly underſtand every act of parliament as comprehended under the name of law; and therefore to abjure the right of interference, in the Pope, in this unlimited man⯑ner, would be abjuring his ſpiritual ſupremacy and juriſdiction, which he holds from God alone. For, in virtue of his primacy, he is bound to watch over the laws of God and the Church, and to enforce the obſervance of both, by commands, cenſures and other ſpiritual means: and of courſe, to command the non-obſervance of the laws of any kingdom, when ſuch laws are contrary to thoſe of God and the Church. In England, not to mention other matters, ſeveral impediments of matrimony are done away, by the laws of the realm. Should then Ca⯑tholics marry, under any of theſe diſabilities, which have not the ſame effect, by the laws of the land; the Pope, in virtue of his primacy, has an undoubt⯑ed right to command a ſeparation, to enforce his commands, by eccleſiaſtical cenſures.

Now, Sir, I apprehend this is to interfere in the laws of the land, at leaſt in an indirect manner. To [42] recall or abrogate the laws, would be a direct inter⯑ference; to command, or bind the conſcience to the non-obſervance of the laws, would be interfering indirectly.

I agree to your diviſion of the ſubject. Now to what you have advanced on the right of inter⯑ference in the laws of the land, I have only to remark, that the difficulty evidently originates in miſconception. The legal meaning and force of the terms are chiefly to be conſidered. Words, in every language, may alter their prior ſignification, and carry a different import. ‘"The lawyers and thoſe whoſe lives are ſpent in attending to great legiſlative queſtions . . . from whom the people of England are in the habit of deriving their notions both of words and things."’ Such men, I ſay, are the beſt qualified to aſcertain the preciſe meaning and import of the oath. Now our Committee aſſures us that they have not met a ſingle perſon of this de⯑ſcription, who does not underſtand and reaſon on the expreſſion, in queſtion, in the ſame manner as they do: that is, that the oath only abjures an interference of a coercive nature: they ſay, that they only intend to deny the right ‘"to legiſlate in tem⯑poral concerns; or to enforce his (the Pope's) ſpiritual legiſlation, by a coercion of a temporal nature."’ Surely you will not allow any ſuch power in the Pope.

I allow of no temporal power in the primacy; whatever territorial juriſdiction he may have, from grants of ſovereign Princes, or otherwiſe, in as much [43] as ſuch authority is given, by men as to a Prince, not, by Jeſus Chriſt as to a Biſhop and Primate of the Church, it muſt neceſſarily be confined to his own dominions; out of which he has no tem⯑poral authority whatſoever. But, Sir, in virtue of his ſpiritual authority, he is bound to watch over the laws of God and the Church, and to enforce the obſervance of them, any temporal laws or con⯑ſtitutions to the contrary notwithſtanding. When⯑ever then the laws of a kingdom, are contrary to the laws of God or the Church, as was always and ſtill is the caſe, where the Catholic is not the eſta⯑bliſhed religion, the Pope, by virtue of his ſpiritual authority, is bound to exert the power of the Keys committed to him, by commanding the non-obſer⯑vance of ſuch temporal laws: and ſhould the Paſtors be remiſs in watching over the execution of ſuch his commands, he has an undoubted right to compell them to obedience, by cenſures of excommuni⯑cation, ſuſpenſion or interdict as he judges neceſ⯑ſary. It were triſling with the plain and ordinary ſenſe of words to ſay, that this is not the inter⯑ference meant, by the oath. This oath expreſsly abjures every right of interference, direct or indirect in the laws of the land: I cannot conceive how a command to violate the laws, or cenſure againſt any one for not violating them, can be ſaid not to interfere, at leaſt indirectly. There is not a dictionary extant that will authoriſe the ſuppoſition. The Committee's appeal to the lawyers, &c. is foreign to the purpoſe; it is not to any new expoſi⯑tion [44] or import of the words, nor to any learned interpretation of them, that we are called to ſwear, but to the plain obvious and ordinary ſenſe; which of courſe, ought to be as well underſtood, by every man of ſound judgment in the nation, as by the Lord Chancellor himſelf. I beg leave, Sir, to aſſert, from the Committee's Letter to the Biſhops, that a com⯑mand or cenſure is an interference. My Lords, they ſay, ‘"to this imprudent interference of Paul the Vth, Engliſh Catholics may aſcribe, in a great mea⯑ſure, all the odium, and all the oppreſſion under which they have ſince groaned."’ Paul the Vth, then really did interfere; the Committee ibid. will tell you how; he ſulminated a condemnation of this political oath: meaning the oath of James I. he declared it inconſiſtent with faith, and hoſtile to ſalvation, and enjoined the Engliſh Catholics not to take it, as they ſay in their appeal from the cenſure of the Biſhops to the Catholics of England. A com⯑mand, a prohibition, a cenſure are therefore an interference, even as the Committee underſtand the term: but they allow a right of commanding, &c. in the laſt mentioned letter,: page 6. ‘"If one province of a kingdom, were, without juſtice or reaſon to rebel againſt the ſtate . . . . if one ſtate were to exerciſe undue ſovereignty over another—if the conſtitution of a ſtate were eſſentially wicked—if the government of a ſtate were to be tyranical and unjuſt, &c. are not theſe as much ſins in the eye of God, as they are crimes in the eye of man? As ſuch, are they not ſubject to the [45] ſpiritual power of the Church, to her teaching, preaching, and cenſuring."’ In this paſſage they only mention the Church, but from their manner of reaſoning, in the fifth page, they evidently ſup⯑poſe this ſame right in the Pope: he then has a right to iſſue his commands, prohibitions and cen⯑ſures; but, as you have ſeen, from the letter to the Biſhops, commands, or prohibitions and a fortiori cenſures are a real interference. He has then an undoubted right to interfere in the laws, when they are contrary to the laws of God or the Church.

I own I was rather ſurpriſed at reading the laſt quoted paſſage; it gives a power to the Church, or the Pope, which ſuppoſes a right of inſpection over the politi⯑cal conſtitution, the right of ſovereignty, or reſi⯑ſtance; for without ſuch a right, how can he pronounce, in any of the caſes above mentioned. I rather think this was an unguarded conceſſion, as a few lines below we find the following words: ‘"that the Church has no juriſdiction or authority, that can directly or indirectly, affect or interfere with the civil independence, ſovereignty, con⯑ſtitution or government of a ſovereign ſtate is acknowledged, by our beſt writers."’ He has no right to interfere in the Civil independence, or ſovereignty of a ſtate; yet he may pronounce againſt the independence of any part of an empire, ſhould it unjuſtly rebel. He has no right to interfere in the conſtitution, but he may pronounce it eſſentially wicked: he has no right to interfere in the govern⯑ment of a ſtate, but he may declare it tyranical [46] and unjuſt. What can all this mean? I fear we muſt go to the C— to underſtand it. The Committee here grants a power to the Pope, which very few Pontiffs have ever aſſumed. The Pope did not attempt to decide whether Great Britain was tyranical, or America unjuſt in rebel⯑ling. The preſent Pope indeed has written to the Biſhops in the Netherlands, to exhort them to uſe their influence in re-eſtabliſhing order, and ſub⯑miſſion to their new Prince; but the Biſhops thought proper to judge for themſelves, and anſwered his Holineſs accordingly, though with due reſpect: we have not heard of his interfering any further.

As for the word Coercion, it is perhaps equally ambiguous, as the term interference.

Should a man be forced by ſuſpenſion or excommunication to reſtore the Church's patri⯑mony unjuſtly ſeized, or ſhould a kingdom be laid under an interdict to enforce a compliance with the laws of God or the Church, would not theſe means be called coercive? It were folly to ſwear that the Pope has no right to ſend an army to enforce ſubmiſſion to his mandates.

Indeed, Sir, this too cloſe adheſion to nicety will do us no good. We have a fair and candid expoſition of the oath, given by the Committee; they declare poſitively that this expoſition is the real ſenſe of it, and that it is underſtood in that ſenſe, by all the great men in the nation: you know it is a maxim in law, that you muſt take an oath in the ſenſe of the framer and propoſer of it; why therefore ſhould we refuſe this oath, on account of [47] this clauſe, which confeſſedly only abjures coercive interference; which even yourſelf do not allow of? The explication of the Committee is orthodox, and moreover gives the true ſenſe of the oath.

I am very willing to ſubmit to the judgment of a man, in his own art, of which I am ignorant. Granting then every degree of competency, to the deciſions of thoſe great men, you allude to, in legal and conſtitutional diſquiſitions, am I alſo to allow them to be competent judges, in religious queſtions? Muſt I give them an infallibility, in this dogmatical fact, which they require of me to refuſe to the Pope, even in doctrines? Muſt I appeal to the adverſaries of my faith, to know how far their tenets injure my Creed? Theſe queſtions carry their anſwers with them. Would you, Sir, take the oath of ſupremacy, were the Chancellor to tell you, that no ſpiritual juriſdiction is meant to be abjured thereby, except ſuch as is enforced, by coercive meaſures, of a temporal nature? I muſt then ſay, I cannot admit of their expoſition; which, if it be the right one, they can have no rational objection to alter; that the terms expreſſing their meaning, ſhall otherwiſe be ſo couched, as to calm the fears of Catholics.

The explication of the Committee is not ortho⯑dox, in the article of diſpenſing with the obligation of oaths; nor in the abjuration of the Pope's infal⯑libility, as a pernicious doctrine. It is captious and enſnaring, in the abjuration of the ſpiritual power of the Pope, and the title of Proteſting Catholic Diffenter. It does not touch upon ſeveral real [48] difficulties; it is not then admiſſible. The true, plain, obvious and ordinary ſenſe of an oath appears naturally on the firſt reading of it, not from learned expoſitions. What was the ſenſe of the oath, in the opinion of almoſt all Catholics, previous to the explication? What is ſtill the opinion of our Di⯑vines abroad? Even the explication itſelf has not convinced one half of the nation. It remains then not plainly and obviouſly orthodox, but at beſt obſcure and equivocal: it ſhould not then be ad⯑mitted.

What you ſay, of the maxim of Canon Law, is very juſt, in this ſenſe, that you are not to wreſt an oath, from the ſenſe of the propoſers, by private interpretation, mental reſtriction, &c. But this will not authoriſe you to ſwear to an error, in the plain and ordinary ſenſe of the words; although perhaps the error would be removed, by a private interpretation of the framers of it.

Remember, Sir, the private intrepretation given, by Urſarius and Valens, in the Council of Ariminum; and of the Engliſh Biſhops, when they granted the ſupremacy to King Henry the VIIIth. Re⯑member alſo, the fatal conſequences of acceding to meaſures, which were not lawful, without theſe private interpretations. You know well, that the Biſhops ſhamefully prevaricated, in both caſes. In the former, they ſacrificed the word conſubſtantial, conſecrated by the Council of Nice. In the latter, they gave up an article of faith. Have we not every reaſon to fear the ſame dire effects in our [49] times? Suppoſe we take the oath, in the explained ſenſe; put the following caſe, ſhould any Catholic take advantage of the laws of the land, having divorced his wife for Crim. Con. marry again, dur⯑ing her life time; in this caſe I ſay, ſhould the Pope interfere, by commands or cenſures, would not every perſon, who accedes to, or ſubmits to this interference, be conſidered as a prevaricator, againſt his oath? Theſe reaſons, you ſee, equally prove the other two exceptions, of the eccleſiaſtical go⯑vernment, and the perſons of his Majeſty's ſubjects, to be inadmiſſible. For if he has a right to com⯑mand, and if commanding is a real interference, then this oath cannot be reconciled with the rights of his primacy.

I do not ſee what the Pope has to do with the eccleſiaſtical government of the nation, as by law eſtabliſhed; for as ſuch, it is a civil and temporal concern, in which you do not allow of any inter⯑ference. As to the perſons of Engliſhmen, he has no further to do with them, than to teach them their duty as their Primate, when it becomes neceſ⯑ſary, to exert his authority ſo far.

So I ſuppoſe, were this oath taken, and the act paſt, that you would deny the Pope every right of juriſdiction over the Catholic religion, as, in that caſe, it would alſo be eſtabliſhed, by law, and of courſe a temporal concern, as you are pleaſed to term it. But, Sir, whether the religion eſtabliſhed, by law, be Catholic or Proteſtant, we Catholics cannot deny, but that the ſovereign Pontiff is the [50] real Paſtor of every one, who has entered the Church, by baptiſm: and that he is, by right of the primacy, the proper ſuperior of every lawful eccle⯑ſiaſtical government; and moreover that he is in⯑veſted with a right of controul over ever unlawful eccleſiaſtical government. You ſee, Sir, from the quo⯑tation above, that the Committee allows a right of inſpection even over the civil government, when it is eſſentially wicked or tyranical; Is not every un⯑lawful ſpiritual Government ſuch? I muſt indeed obſerve, that, when an eccleſiaſtical government, whether eſtabliſhed by law, or not, has caſt off the authority of the See of Rome, eſpecially when it has ſubſiſted for a long ſeries of years, it would be idle and nugatory, in the ſovereign Pontiff to iſſue his commands or cenſures, where, he muſt know, they would be equally diſregarded. But the right of chief Paſtor is one thing; the power of exerciſing this right is another. It were folly to ſwear againſt the power of executing his decrees; for plain fact declares that he has none; but we are called upon to ſwear againſt the right, which, as Catholics, we cannot do: for, Sir, no violent diviſion of unity, or ſeparation from the communion of the Catholic Church, can ever deprive him of the right of eccle⯑ſiaſtical controul, which he has received from God himſelf.

I ſay the ſame as to the perſons; for, in quality of primate of the Church, all Catholics owe him eccleſiaſtical obedience: now his cenſures or com⯑mands, although in matters purely ſpiritual, might have, at leaſt, an indirect interference, with the [51] liberty and perſons of Catholics. I fancy a ſentence of ſuſpenſion, depoſition or excommunication ful⯑minated againſt any Clergyman on account of the oath, would ſit very uneaſily on his ſhoulders, and would no doubt be conſidered as interfering, with his liberty and perſon too. Nay, I dare ſay, it would be called an interference, in temporals, by the abet⯑tors of the Committee, who are pleaſed to ſay, that the oath is merely civil and political.

I ſhall now proceed, to the next clauſe in the oath; which I ſhall only note, becauſe it is very ill worded, and might induce ſome ignorant perſon to think that we abjured the power of forgiving ſin, by means of the ſacrament of penance. This we cannot do, any more than Proteſtants can abjure the power of forgiving ſins, by means of baptiſm. It is indeed very true that no Prieſt or Prelate can forgive ſins at his will and pleaſure, without the previous and neceſſary conditions of a ſincere re⯑pentance: and although I believe that the Com⯑mittee underſtand it, in this ſenſe, yet, as it ſtands, worded, by our adverſaries, it is very ſuſpicious, and as ſuch not admiſſible.

There is no doubt, but that the Committee, and the framers of it, underſtand this clauſe, in the ſenſe in which you have explained it; this ſcrupu⯑lous exactneſs, which you require throughout; as I have all along remarked, greatly injures our cauſe. Pray what is your next nicety?

The hiſtory of the Proteſtation compells us to be cautious, in admitting any thing, which might, perhaps, be miſconſtrued, and wreſted from [52] our real meaning. My next difficulty is, that no breach of faith with any perſon can ever be juſtified, under pretence that ſuch perſon is an inſidel. I have no difficulty in the clauſe as far as it concerns here⯑tics; nor even as it touches inſidels, provided that the breach of faith be reſtrained to common deal⯑ings, promiſes, or engagements between men. But, as you have obſerved, I am become ſo very nice, that I will not admit of any expreſſion, which is not ſtrictly accurate; now, Sir, you will pleaſe to recollect that a marriage with an inſidel, or one, who has not been baptized, is null and void, by the laws of the Church; would not a ſeparation, from ſuch perſon, after a marriage contracted, be deemed a breach of ſaith, pledged in the moſt ſolemn and awful manner? It is however juſtifiable, ſhould that perſon refuſe to be baptiſed, and re-married, barely becauſe that perſon is an inſidel.

I will paſs, with your leave, from nicety, to a difficulty of a more ſerious nature, contained, in the next clauſe, wherein, I am called upon to ſwear, that no eccleſiaſtical power whatever can diſpenſe with the obligation of any oath whatſoever. I have extracted thus much only, of this clauſe, becauſe, I allow of no power of diſpenſing, in civil compacts or bargains, nor yet in oaths of allegiance. But this univerſal propoſition, which denies the power of diſpenſing in any oath whatever, is erroneous, and, not to ſay more of it, contrary to the univerſal practice of the Church.

You mean, I ſuppoſe, promiſſory oaths made to God. But, Sir, the bill does ‘"not refer to vows, or other ſolemn promiſes made to God,"’ but only ſuch as affect the rights of third perſons. Now, Sir, in ſuch promiſſory oaths, between man and man, no prieſt or prelate can diſpenſe. An oath may be taken under ſuch circumſtances as to be abſolutely void; and then no diſpenſation is neceſſary: for example, in caſe an ‘"oath were extorted, by great perſonal violence, or threats of immediate death. In ſuch caſes, there may be a queſtion, whether the obligations exiſt: but if they do exiſt, no power can diſpenſe from them."’ This is the doc⯑trine of our Committee, page the 6th of their letter to the Catholics of England: and which they learned from ſome of the ableſt divines of the kingdom.

Indeed, Sir, this ſtrange explication does not amend the clauſe: but rather adds to its malignity. Although the Bill does not mention vows, yet it cer⯑tainly comprehends every oath, even thoſe made to God alone; and roundly aſſerts that no power can diſpenſe with the obligation of any ſuch oath; this, I once more aſſert, is erroneous. If you pretend, as ſome have done, that ſuch oaths are to be conſi⯑dered as vows, I have only to anſwer, that your ex⯑plication is equally erroneous, with the aſſertion: no orthodox Divine ever yet pretended to confound the nature of an oath, with that of a vow. They differ widly; as you will eaſily diſcover, on the ſlighteſt inſpection, into any approved Divine. I muſt refer you to thoſe, who have treated the mat⯑ter, [54] as it would go beyond our limits, to enter into particulars.

The doctrine of the Committee, is not accurate. Thoſe able Divines, who taught them, ſhould be ſent to ſchool to re-ſtudy their leſſon. I grant, that, in ſome caſes, an oath may be null and void, as when it is unlawful to be taken, then indeed there is no need of a diſpenſation: but in the caſes al⯑luded to, of an oath extorted, either by perſonal vio⯑lence, or ſome preſſing neceſſity, the oath is not void, unleſs the thing promiſed be wicked, or the oath be otherwiſe invalidated. A ſimple promiſe given, and accepted, creates an obligation, in juſtice, to the performance: ſhould this promiſe be con⯑firmed, by oath, then there ariſes an obligation from the tie of religion. Force, violence or fraud would deſtroy the obligation of juſtice, ariſing from the promiſe; but not the tie of religion, ariſing from the oath: for although the man, who has extorted the oath, has no right to exact the performance; yet the reverence due to the ſacred name of God, re⯑quires that I ſhould perform, what I have ſworn to do, when I can lawfully do it. This obligation therefore ſtill ſubſiſts, until it is taken away, by diſ⯑penſation. This is the doctrine of orthodox Di⯑vines; and would not have been called in queſtion, by the Committee Divines, but for the crooked purpoſes of worldly policy. When they, like Me⯑lancthon, had advanced too far to retreat, they were driven to theſe paltry ſhifts to defend a bad cauſe. They may deceive the Committee, and perhaps [55] themſelves too, but will never deceive an orthodox Divine of any information.

Under favour, Sir, you are too hard upon thoſe good men, with whom the Committee have diſcuſ⯑ſed this matter. By a diſpenſation I underſtand, a declaration, that the law has ceaſed to bind. Hence the reaſons for diſpenſing are either good and ſuffi⯑cient, and then nothing is wanted, but the declara⯑tion; or they are bad, and then no power on earth can or ought to grant a diſpenſation. Now, Sir, it may happen that the reaſons, for diſpenſing, are too plain and obvious to ſtand in need of a declaration, as is really the caſe, where fraud or violence are made uſe of to extort an oath; and therefore no diſpenſation is neceſſary.

From one error you are driven to another. The firſt error is, that no oath can be diſpenſed with; to ſupport this, you aſſert another error, that all oaths made to God are vows. In oaths made to man, you again deny a power of diſpenſing; ano⯑ther error; but finding that ſome ſuch oaths admit of a diſpenſation, you take your laſt refuge under the protection of a new definition of a diſpenſation; and this definition is perhaps as erroneous, as any of your former aſſertions. Pray, Sir, what orthodox Divine, ever before, gave ſuch a definition? Even Canoniſls are not ſo looſe: they give the following deſcription of diſpenſation; it is a prudent relaxa⯑tion of the common law. Divines, however, are more accurate, and ſay; it is a prudent relaxation of the common law, in particular caſes, where it would other⯑wiſe [56] bind. This addition is only for the ſake of per⯑ſpicuity: for, even according to Canoniſls, a diſpen⯑ſation is not a mere declaration that the law ceaſes, but a relaxation of the law; then it takes away an obligation, which would otherwiſe ſubſiſt. Were your definition admitted, a diſpenſation could not releaſe or take away any obligation, but only de⯑clare it already removed: now, Sir, let us ſee a few abſurdities, which would neceſſarily follow: were there ſufficient reaſons to grant a diſpenſation for any of the impediments of matrimony, for example, for a ſub-deacon to marry; for couſin-germans, &c. &c. the law would really be removed, previous to the diſpenſation; and ſhould the Pope refuſe to grant it, from whatever motives, and the parties marry without a diſpenſation, the marriage would be va⯑lid: all that could be objected againſt ſuch a mar⯑riage, would be, that it would be irregular; but it could not be void; becauſe the law forbidding the union had really ceaſed: a Deacon, Prieſt or Bi⯑ſhop might pretend that he had reaſons equally for⯑cible, in his favour; and, by the ſame reaſon, might marry, and might laugh at every command, or cen⯑ſure, which ſhould be iſſued againſt him.

I forbear urging this further. If you pleaſe we will proceed to examine the next and laſt exception⯑able clauſe, in the oath, the infallibility of the ſo⯑vereign Pontiſſ.

Agreed: but I wiſh previouſly to note, that we only deny his perſonal infallibility, independent of the general body of the Church. This ſuppoſed, [57] I can not ſee a difficulty; it is no part of our reli⯑gion, it is exploded from every univerſity, and is not believed, by any one, on this ſide the Alps. Proteſtants think, that, if we believe the Pope to be infallible, he may command us to do what he plea⯑ſes, and we are bound to obey. To remove this odium, we are called upon to renounce this infal⯑libility; if we do it, it will be one great means of rooting out the inveterate prejudices of our prote⯑ſtant brethren, conceived on account of our ſuppoſed ſubjection to the See of Rome.

You are very kind and indulgent to the pre⯑judices of Proteſtants: but why content them, by halves? Renounce the infallibility of the Church, and you will ſatisfy them compleatly.

The opinion of the ſovereign Pontiff's infallibi⯑lity is as harmleſs, as that of the Church's infallibi⯑lity; we are not bound to obey his commands, be⯑cauſe he is infallible; but becauſe he is our lawful ſuperior; and this he certainly is, whether he is, or is not infallible; hence we are bound to obey, whenever his commands are just, though we ſhould abjure this infallibility, which you affect to call per⯑ſonal, or independent of the body of the Church; pray, Sir, what is the meaning of this? What other infallibility did Bellarmine contend for? Now, Sir, although a perſon ſhould not allow of any ſort of infallibility, in his Holineſs, and therefore might lawfully ſign a declaration againſt it; yet no one I think can ſwear againſt it. Might he not alter his opinion? how then could he take this oath, if ten⯑dered [58] a ſecond time? How terrible the conſequence of his refuſal? Should any one believe his Holineſs poſſeſſed of this prerogative, he could not take this oath; he muſt then be branded with the titles of a dangerous ſubject, hoſtile and dangerous to the ſtate; in one word, he muſt be a modern Papiſt! What folly this? and how foreign to an oath of allegiance?

But, Sir, this is not all; the Committee, in their letter to the Catholics, have told us, that we are called upon to renounce this opinion, among others, as a pernicious doctrine. page 3. ‘"If the doctrines proteſted againſt, by the oath, be pernicious,—the propriety of the expreſſion, Proteſting Catholic Diſſenter, is unqueſtionable."’ What theſe doc⯑trines are, they tell us a few lines below; among the reſt is, that the Pope is inſallible. It is then to be abjured, in the oath, as a pernicious doctrine. Will you ſwear ſimply, and without explication, that it is a pernicious doctrine, becauſe Proteſtants think it ſuch?

By way of confirmation of what I have ſaid before of that odious title, I ſhall remark, from the ſame letter, ibid. ‘"that, if, by the oath, any doctrine be proteſted againſt, which is not pernicious: or, a fortiori, if any doctrine be proteſted againſt, which is an article of faith, the preamble (the title Proteſting Catholic Diſſenter) cannot be acquieſ⯑ced in, by any Catholic, with a ſafe conſcience."’ They promiſe to examine later, whether any doc⯑trines, abjured in the oath, be pernicious, or articles [59] of faith; but this we are yet to look for. Now, Sir, I will aſſert, 1. that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility will never be proved pernicious to the ſtate: 2. That ſeveral other doctrines abjured in the oath, are ſo cloſely connected with articles of faith, that without them faith itſelf would be altered: and this I hope I have proved: Then, Sir, no Catholic can, with a ſafe conſcience acquieſce, in the title, or take the oath.

I think we are now at an end of our examina⯑tion, and I muſt own that your reaſons have not made me a convert Let every man therefore think for himſelf, and let him that can, take the oath. We need not quarrel for this difference of opinion in temporal concerns: if your delicacy will not allow you to take the oath, you ought not to hinder thoſe, who think they ought to ſtand forth, and regain their rights as citizens, by removing the odium, which in⯑veterate prejudice has caſton their religion.

This doctrine is evidently calculated to de⯑ſend and ſupport a ſchiſm among Engliſh Catholics. Although what I have ſaid has not convinced you, that the oath contains heterodox doctrines; you ſhould be convinced, that the queſtion, between us, is not purely of a political and temporal nature: no, Sir, it is of a dogmatical fact: which muſt be ultimately ſubmitted to the ſupreme eccleſiaſtical Court; that is, whether this oath does, or does not contain doctrines, which a Catholic cannot ſubſcribe to. When the ſovereign Pontiff had condemned the five celebrated propoſitions of Janſenius; his fol⯑lowers, [60] after ſome reſiſtance, acquieſced in the cen⯑ſure; but, to ſupport their ſinking cauſe, contended that theſe propoſitions were not found in the book intitled Auguſtinus: This alſo was condemned by the Pope, who declared, that they were really ex⯑tracted, from the ſaid book, in the ſenſe therein ex⯑preſſed. You know, Sir, that the Church diſperſed aquieſced, in the ſentence; and that thoſe who ap⯑pealed from it, to a future General Council, were ever conſidered as cut off from the body of the Church. Should the ſovereign Pontiff declare this oath unlawful to be taken, as inconſiſtent with faith, and hoſtile to ſalvation, if the Biſhops diſperſed were ſilent, would you ſtill think it lawful; would you ſtill call it a mere temporal and political con⯑cern? if ſo, what would become of the infallibility of the Church diſperſed? Would not ſuch or ſuch⯑like pretences excuſe any ſchiſmatic that ever ex⯑iſted? Indeed, Sir, if this queſtion were decided, by the Pope, and the Church diſperſed did not reclaim againſt the ſentence, I ſhould think myſelf bound, in conſcience, not only to ſubmit to the decree; but alſo to ſeparate from every refractory perſon, who ſhould [...], or appeal.