A Further Search INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES, &c.

THE Reception a former Work of this Kind has met with in the World, and the little which has been ſaid againſt it, as to Mat⯑ters of Fact, muſt be acknowledged to be all owing to the Truth, coming with an irreſiſtible Force upon the Minds of Men, and which always carries its own Evidence along with it; when we have met with the Enemy deſcanting upon it, we have [4] heard them, even in the midſt of a Thou⯑ſand Curſes, and hard Names, which they caſt upon the Author, yet at every Pauſe cry out, Damn the Circumſtance, I doubt there is too much Truth in it, tho' I hate the Deſign of making it Publick. This makes it clear, which has often, and upon many other Occaſions, been ſaid, that our late People had a kind of Popery in their Politicks, (viz.) that much of their Succeſs conſiſted in keeping the People Blind and Ignorant in the Main and moſt Eſſential Points of their Affairs, and which it was moſt neceſſary for them to know; that they were ſo far from know⯑ing what Uſage they had received Abroad from their Allies, that when they came to be a little rightly inform'd, they could not Frame Idea's of ſo much Knavery in their Heads, or think it poſſible that any People, who called themſelves Allies, could at the ſame time carry themſelves in ſuch a Manner, to thoſe for whom they had made the leaſt Profeſſions of any Reſpect, or for whoſe common Safety they had the leaſt Concern.

As the Truth of what has been thus ſpo⯑ken, is hereby acknowledged and con⯑feſt by the Enemy, which is the beſt kind of Evidence; ſo the Seaſonableneſs of making that Truth Publick in the Man⯑ner it hath been by the former Tract, and as it ſhall or may be in this, is juſtified [5] and clear'd beyond all Poſſibility of Ob⯑jection, by the late Publick Reſolutions of the Honourable Houſe of Commons, where it comes into the World with the Sanction and Authority of the great Repreſentative of the Nation; it is true, the Particulars in the Votes amount to a moſt exceſſive Height; and tho' it was known and be⯑lieved by many to be very great, yet I muſt confeſs few imagined them to be ſo ſurprizing, the Account ſo large, and the Particulars ſo many, as they appear to be; alſo one Thing is obtain'd by this Re⯑port of the Houſe of Commons, which the Credit of a ſingle Author was by no Means ſufficient for, (viz.) that the Dutch had any Share in the Deficiency, and in the Injuries which this Nation has ſuffered under the Weight of this Confederacy; many would be brought by the Power of Reaſoning, and the Force of Demon⯑ſtrations, which are Things all People are not equally furniſhed to reſiſt; they would, I ſay, be brought to confeſs, that there might have been Defects in general, and that thoſe Defects appeared in the Affairs of the Empire, the Portugueſe, and ſuch like, any Thing but the Dutch; but ſuch an Aſcendant had the Influence of the Poli⯑ticks, and the Confederacy of the late Ad⯑miniſtration with the Parties concern'd, ob⯑tain'd over the People, that tho' any thing would go down with them againſt other [6] People, yet if the Dear Dutch came into the Diſpute, nothing could be born with, but all the reſt was the pure Effect of Ja⯑cobitiſm, and the French.

How fatal this has been to us I may hereafter have Leiſure to examine, and every Day is like to diſcover more and more of it to us; indeed Things were mounted to ſuch a violent Prepoſſeſſion up⯑on us in Favour of the Dutch, that we began to think even our own Conſtitution ſtood in need of further Security from them, and politickly brought the Dutch into our National Concerns; thus making ourſelves beholden to them for a Guarantee, or Safety to the Succeſſion of Hannover, that this might be a Handle to our doing other Things for them, ſo exorbitant in their own Nature, as that no Nation, but ſuch as depended upon them for ſomething very weighty and ſignificant, would ever conſent to, or could upon any other Pretence be perſwaded into; yet this was not all, for when we had brought our People to ſtoop to ſo mean a Thought, as that our Succeſſion, Ratified by both King⯑doms, and Incorporated by both the Par⯑liaments of England and Scotland, in the late Solemn Treaty of Union, could receive any Addition of Strength from Abroad, more than that of the Intereſt and Alliance of ſo powerful a Prince, as his Electoral High⯑neſs of Hannover, and his Allies; that we [7] ſtood in Need of that incoherent Article of a Dutch Guarantee; when I ſay we had ſtoop'd ſo low, as to level our Conſtitution to the Common Notion of Leagues and Treaties between other and differing Nati⯑ons, and that it ſhould receive a farther Sanction thereby, it was not hard then to fill the Heads of the poor People with a Belief, that whoever made the leaſt Obje⯑ction againſt any Thing hereafter, which either the Dutch might do by us, or which we might do by them, acted therein againſt the Proteſtant Succeſſion: This was a Point ſo well gain'd by the Dutch, that on the Faith of a Man, if they gain'd it for no⯑thing, it was the beſt Bargain they made during the whole War; and if our late Managers granted it ſo alſo, they muſt either have given up their Sences to the Dutch, or had moſt deſpicable Thoughts of the Strength of Great-Britain, and of our be⯑ing able to ſupport our own Settlement; or which I ſpeak moſt unwillingly, there muſt have been ſome private Bargain driven, of which I ſhall venture to ſay no more, but that I hope no Engliſhman could be found that would be guilty of it.

To wave therefore a Reflection ſo un⯑welcome, let us go back to the Obſervation before, viz. this Threefold End we have ſeen it anſwer to the Dutch; what End it will ever anſwer to us remains a Myſtery, and will in all Probability remain ſo for [8] many Years to come, if not for ever; the Ends which I ſay it anſwered for the Dutch were Three.

1. The Barrier Treaty, which with the ſeparate Article, was join'd as the Advance Money of a Loan, by Way of what our People call Prompt-Payment, and which the Dutch had the Confidence to Paum up⯑on us as a ſmall Matter, and a Thing due to them for the great Kindneſs done for us by them, in taking upon them to ſe⯑cure our Succeſſion. I am not ignorant of that weak and fooliſh Uſe which the Enemies of Peace made of that Objection ſpoken of in the other foremention'd Tract, p. 21. viz. ‘"That it may not be right in Point of Policy, or good Senſe, that a Foreign Power ſhould be call'd in to confirm our Succeſſion, by Way of Guarantee, but only to acknoledge it; otherwiſe we put it out of the Power of our own Le⯑giſlature to change our Succeſſion with⯑out the Conſent of that Prince or State who is Guarantee. However, our Po⯑ſterity may hereafter, by the Tyranny and Oppreſſion of any ſucceeding Prin⯑ces, be reduced to the Fatal Neceſſity of breaking in upon the Excellent and Hap⯑py Settlement now in Force."’

This by all Means they will have as an Aim taken for the Pretender, as if, be⯑cauſe we ought not to put it out of the [9] Power of our Legiſlature to limit the Suc⯑ceſſion, whatever Neceſſity may happen; even when this Race may be all in their Graves; that therefore we have an imme⯑diate Alteration of the Succeſſion in our View; theſe People who contend thus, forget the mighty Noiſe we have had from them about Parliamentary Limitations, a Word the Whigs have made ſo Sacred, that it has been like the Magna Charta of their Liberties, and with which they run down the Hereditary Right of their Princes, as if there had been nothing at all in it but Ty⯑ranny, and Arbitrary Government, till at Length it was happily diſcovered, that they were very well conſiſtent together; and that they who beſt underſtood He⯑reditary Right, had proved it to be agree⯑able to Parliamentary Limitation, and then all was well again. But after all this Bu⯑ſtle, was it to be imagined that the ſame People could ſo eaſily give up the Parlia⯑ments Right of limiting the Succeſſion to a Foreign Nation; and by making a League of Guarantee for the Succeſſion, legitimate the Impertinence of Strangers, who may hereafter intermeddle with our Conſtitution, and may tell a Britiſh Parliament, they have no Power to alter or meddle with the Set⯑tlement of the Crown, for that it is already Settled, and they are Guarantees of it? What has been, may be; and what may be, may be ſuppoſed to be; if then any of [10] the Family of Hannover ſhould Tyrannize or Abdicate, or the ſame, or like Circumſtances ſhould happen, as have happened before, the Parliament would be diſabled from declaring the Throne vacant, and filling up the ſame with ſuch other of the Family as they find convenient; which according to all the Whig Principles which we have ſo often heard of, is inſeparable from the Conſtitution, and much more Sacred than any Thing which has been Hereditary in the World. I do not encline to concern theſe Papers with the popular Diſputes which have troubled the World ſo much and ſo long, about the Difference between Hereditary and Parliamentary Right; how far they are the ſame, or which is beſt fur⯑niſhed with Authorities, and Originals, whether of Divine or Civil Right; it is enough to take hold here of the Whigs own Argument, and allowing all they have ſaid on this Head to be Orthodox, whether it really be ſo or no; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that this Parliamentary Right can⯑not, or ought not, to be given out of our Hinds, and put, by a Treaty, into the Hands of Foreigners; ſo that it ſhall be in their Power to put their Negative into our next Limitation of the Crown. If this be not to give away our Liberties, I would be glad to know what it is to keep them; if there be any Choice of Tyrants, and if it weighs any Thing, when our Priviledges are given [11] up, who is it they ſhould be given up to? I confeſs myſelf more willing to be a Slave at Home than Abroad, and to be tyran⯑niz'd on by a Prince of our own, than by a Foreign Nation; and if there were no other Reaſon for that than this, it would be ſuf⯑ficient to juſtifie the Choice, (viz.) that there are more Ways to avoid the Miſchief of it, that an oppreſſing Prince has ſome times chang'd his Meaſures, or he may be reſtrain'd, or may die, and thereby a Nation may be delivered; but ſuch a Convention as this, made with a Foreign Nation, en⯑gages that whole Nation upon all Occaſions to embark itſelf, and its whole Strength, in Defence of the Capitulation agreed on; and thus by this Method the Power of Parlia⯑ment in future Limitations of the Crown ſeems to be effectually given up: How the Whigs would have liked this Doctrine if it had come from any one but themſelves, may be beſt gueſs'd at by the Warmth they ſhewed about the League ſaid to be made by the late King James and the King of France; which put this whole Nation into a Flame, and Reaſon good ſo far as that League appear'd; for what was it, or what could we imagine it to be, but a Treaty of Guarantee with the French for the ſecu⯑ring the Succeſſion of Popery in England? Whereas the Settling the Religion and Li⯑berties of this Nation was the undoubted Right of the People in Parliament, and ſo [12] by the ſame Rule muſt the Succeſſion of our Princes be. The Sum of all this is, that by the Whigs own Arguments, and by their own Principles, which they have al⯑ways profeſſed, and adher'd to, and by the ſame Rule from which they acted in the Revolution, the accepting a Guarantee, for the ſecuring the Succeſſion of the Crown of this Kingdom to any Family, or Branch of a Family, Race, or Line whatſoever, is no leſs than giving up the Privileges of the People, and diveſting the Parliament of the Power of limiting the Succeſſion to the Crown.

It may be remember'd, that in the late Treaty of Union with Scotland, ſome Se⯑cret Overtures were made, to have engaged the Dutch to be Guarantees of that Treaty; and though that Propoſal ſeem'd to come from ſuch Hands, as gave Reaſon to be⯑lieve it was rather a Deſign to deſtroy, than ſecure the ſaid Treaty, the Dutch having at that Time diſcover'd Willingneſs enough to have prevented the Concluſion of that Treaty, yet thoſe that knew any Thing of the Reſentment expreſſed at that Time here againſt that Propoſal, as diſ⯑honourable to England, and deſtructive of the Conſtitution of both Kingdoms, would wonder that ever the ſame Miniſtry ſhould ſo far change their Notions, as to admit the ſame Guarantee in ſo Nice an Affair, as the Succeſſion to their own Crown, which [13] they rejected with Contempt in a Treaty with the Neighbouring Nation.

Secondly, Another End anſwered by this Treaty of Guarantee, was giving an Oppor⯑tunity to the Dutch to play their own Game with us, with Reſpect to other Treaties, Quo⯑ta's, Proportions of Payments, Ships, Troops, and the like; of this ſo much has been ſaid already, and is yet like to be ſaid farther in Publick, that I ſhall need ſay the leſs to it here, my Deſign being rather to juſtifie the Reſentment all honeſt Men entertain, at the mean Politicks and Submiſſions of our Peo⯑ple here, and to ſhow the Neceſſity of ta⯑king wiſer for the future, than to Animate People againſt any of our Confederates. I am as forward as any to agree, that the Advantages of a ſtrict Union among the Confederates are very great; and that, as Her Majeſty expreſt it, the Intereſt of the States of Holland be looked upon as our own; but this by no means hinders us from deſiring that the Dutch ſhould uſe us well, ſhould ſhew a Reciprocal Kindneſs, and ſhould act with a mutual Concern for the General Confederated Intereſt; and that we ſhould not be willing to ſee them im⯑poſe upon us in any of thoſe Particulars, or be eaſie, and ſubmit quietly to it when they do; and this is ſo much Juſtice, that none can object againſt; and what is the beſt, if not the only Way, to cultivate and maintain that Friendſhip, and good Un⯑derſtanding, [14] on both Sides, which is ſo much the Intereſt of the Confederacy in General, and of the Dutch themſelves in Particular. They who contend, that the enquiring into theſe Things ſeems to ſhow a Diſregard to the Confederacy in General, or to the ſeveral Parties concerned in Par⯑ticular, ſeem to make ſeverer Satyrs upon the Dutch than they are aware of. The Deficiencies of the Performance they can⯑not deny, the want of a due Regard then to the Confederacy muſt certainly lye rather in thoſe that have been the Cauſe of thoſe Deficiencies, than thoſe that have not; for who are moſt juſtly to be charged with ſlighting and diſregarding the mutual In⯑tereſt of the Conſederacy, they that have failed in the Performance of the Conditi⯑tions, or they that complain of it, in or⯑der to have them performed? Britain has all along ſhown, by a Zeal Fatal to herſelf, her Willingneſs to puſh on the War with all imaginable Vigour; in order to which, when Her deficient Allies, having leſs Con⯑cern for the general Good, have run the Venture of Miſcarriage, to ſhorten their Expence; Britain, as if the whole Charge of the War had been her Due to pay, has zealouſly ſupply'd both their Quota's, and her own: While ſhe was willing to do thus, her Confederates daily encreas'd their De⯑ficiencies, and her Expence, as they might very well do, finding her ſo eaſie; and [15] while ſhe was willing to ſit ſtill, and ſee herſelf, thus uſed, it was very remarkable how Augmentations, and Increaſe of For⯑ces, was every Year propoſed by the Con⯑federates, as well in Flanders, as in Spain, and none ſo forward as the Emperor him⯑ſelf to increaſe the Quota's of the Troops, and the Charges of the War, upon the reſt of his Confederates; quietly waiting for their ſupplying Additional Troops, and taking Care to have very few of his own.

While we ſubmitted to all theſe Things, the War went quietly on, but whether ſo ſucceſsfully, or no, as it might have done, if the Allies had anſwered what we had Reaſon to expect from them, is left for them to Anſwer. At laſt, the Britiſh Court entering into a more narrow Inſpe⯑ction of Things, have not thought fit ſo calmly to ſuffer the Weight of the War to lye heavier upon one Shoulder than ano⯑ther; and tho' equally willing to bear their Share of the Burthen, yet not forward to carry that Load, which ought to lye up⯑on other Shoulders. They are now calling upon their Confederates, to conſider a little the Juſtice of their ſeveral Treaties, and to look back, and ſee what they are obliged to do, if they expect the War ſhould be carried on any farther; if they are diffident of the Succeſs of theſe Remonſtrances from their Experience, how fruitleſs the like [16] have been before, and have therefore at the ſame Time embrac'd the Occaſion that has offer'd, towards putting an End to the War, by an Honourable Peace; they will be juſtified in it before all the World, both now, and for ever; when it ſhall be at the ſame Time underſtood, in what Man⯑ner, and for how many Years, this War has been carried on; nor can the Artifices of an Adverſe Party among us delude ma⯑ny in their ſuggeſting to the World, that the Government here is in the Intereſt of France, ſince they can have no other Reaſon to back that Suggeſtion, than that they were not willing to carry on a War upon unequal Terms, and in a Confederacy with Allies, who would not perform their own Con⯑ditions, and in which thoſe, who expected the greateſt Advantages from it, paid the leaſt Part of the Expence towards it.

Thirdly, the Third End which this ge⯑neral Complaint againſt a Peace has been Calculated to Anſwer, and which the Party has taken Care to make as popular as they can, is a general Notion, that thoſe who are for a Peace, do it with a Deſign, by the Aſſiſtance of France, to introduce the Pretender; however weak and inconſiſtent ſuch a Conſequence may be, nothing is more certain, than that many innocent, and well-meaning People, have been prevailed upon to believe it; and tho' the Impro⯑bilities of the Thing in its own Nature, [17] and the ſteady Zeal of the Perſons who they charge with it, and who have all along, in a Courſe of many Years, teſtified their Ab⯑horrence of that Intereſt, and taken ſuch Steps againſt it, as have been moſt effectual to the cutting off all Hope, both from him and his Party, might ſuffice to any reaſonable People; yet this ſeems to be one of thoſe Difficulties which can be ſolved only by a little Patience and Time: To thoſe who will be convinced by Argument, it ſeems ſufficient, that our putting a ſtop to a War, which we carried on at ſo much Diſadvan⯑tage, and which had in View rather an utter Empoveriſhing the Nation, than a timely Reducing our Enemies to Reaſon, however, was not only neceſſary on many other Accounts, but greatly our Advantage on this Account, in eſpecial Manner; that thereby we might be left in a Condition to defend our Conſtitution, and to preſerve Power to maintain our Succeſſion, as our Parliament had thought fit to limit it, with⯑out the Help of the Dutch, and without being put to ſo weak, ſo ſcandalous, and ſo diſhonourable a Shift, as to accept of the Guarantee of Foreign States, to pre⯑ſeve our own Acts of Parliament.

When I look farther into this ſcandalous Thing, called a Guarantee for our Succeſ⯑ſion, methinks it repreſents to me our People on their Knees to the Dutch for the Mighty Favour of taking us into their High [18] and Mighty Protection; and indeed, when this is compared with the Manner with which the States of Holland carried on the Geentruydenbergh Treay, wherein the ma⯑king a Peace for us was alſo left wholly to, or engroſſed by, the States of Holland, the Thing ſeems very much of a Peice. The Barrier Treaty alſo has much of the ſame Manner in it, which being handled at large by itſelf, I ſay no more to here. I have obſerved, that at the Time when we be⯑gan to talk here of Peace, and when the French Articles began to appear, we were mightily amuſed with the Dutch making Offers, that they would take away the Ex⯑cuſe from us of want of Money, or Cre⯑dit, and the Dutch would advance to us Four Millions Sterling, to encourage us to carry on the War. That the Dutch made ſuch an Offer Publickly in Form is known to be a Miſtake; but that the Dutch might be willing to lend, or to give as much as that amounts to, to have the Sole Direction of making the Peace, that ſo their particu⯑lar Intereſt, which they never forget, might be principally provided for, this there can be no great Queſtion of; and the Dutch are not without Cunning enough to make it ſo well worth their while, as that ſuch a Sum of Money ſhould not be ill laid out. But thoſe People ſhould do well to conſi⯑der Two or Three Things which lye hid in this Notion, of the Dutch lending us ſo [19] much Money, and which by Way of Co⯑rollary, may be of great Uſe to us, in the underſtanding of other Parts of Manage⯑ment on that Side. (1.) That if the States of Holland for the carrying on the War, could ſpare us ſo much Money to encou⯑rage us that we might not make a Peace without them, tho' that has not yet been thought of, them however, all they thought fit to ſay in former Times, of their being impoveriſhed, and exhauſted, and not in a Condition to pay their Quota's, muſt be a manifeſt Fraud and Cheat, and muſt be with Deſign to put upon us the Neceſſity of carrying it on upon unequal Conditions; and this they could not have entertained a Thought of, without firſt being ſenſible that they had us at ſo much Advantage, as that they knew, whenever they thought fit to eaſe their own Charge, they might-put the Hardſhip upon us. (2.) Since it was obtained by the Arts of their other Conduct, that the Dutch had the Sole Di⯑rection of the Peace, it followed then, that we were under an Obligation to carry on the War at their bidding; from whence it was moſt natural to believe, they were not dark-ſighted enough not to make their other Advantages. (3.) Theſe Things make it no longer a Myſtery, why the Dutch would advance any Sum of Money for the en⯑couraging us to carry on the War, becauſe it followed, that we ſhould carry it on [20] under the ſame Inequalities and Diſadvan⯑tages which we did before; but now theſe Things are detected, and if we ſhould come to a Neceſſity of carrying on the War, which God forbid, yet that it ſhould be more than probable we may not only demand that they begin upon a new Foot, and make up all their Quota's for the Time to come, but alſo may call upon them for what is paſt; alſo it is more than probable, that they may then plead Poverty with us, as they did before, and talk no more of the great Sums they would lend us. (4.) There is yet another Remark to be made upon this Head, viz. of the Dutch advancing ſuch great Sums of Money to us; we have never found but theſe Sums were to be all lent upon good Parliamentary Security and on the In⯑tereſt current in England; and we might not be thought ungrateful to the Lenders, if we asked them, where was the Advantage of all that? Was it to us, or to themſelves? They muſt not know the Dutch ſo well as we have Reaſon to know them, who ex⯑pect to find them ever forgetful of their own Intereſt in any Propoſal they may make. It is true, we have complained of our being impoveriſlſed and exhauſted, and not in a Condition to carry on the War, eſpe⯑cially at the rate which it hath been carried on at, without great Inconveniencies, and Involving, Mortgaging, and Anticipating for us, and our Poſterity, at a Rate, which [21] neither are like to ſee the End of; but what is our Defect? We do not want Lenders, but Funds to borrow upon; we have Uſurers enough among us to devour us, we want no Help from the Dutch; we are not with⯑out a Sort of Men among us, who having little or no Intereſt in the Freehold, have amaſſed infinite Sums of Money in Caſh, with which they Trade upon the reſt, and live upon the Blood and Vitals of the Go⯑vernment; theſe, like the Eagles where the Carkaſs falls, gather together; and if the Parliament can but find Funds, tho' they boaſt of having the Power of Credit in themſelves, and often think of making themſelves Formidable, by threatning the Government that they will lend no Money, and that they can ruin the Publick Credit, by refuſing to advance their Money, yet they can no more forbear, than a Vulture can forbear his Prey; the Funds are the Carkaſs they feed on; they are as Hungry for them, as a Lion that has been Hunting, and found no Food; and in ſpight of their Faith, often Pledg'd to their Party and Friends, to run down Credit, and lend no Money, let but the Miniſtry find a Fund, and the Parliament eſtabliſh a Lottery, or Subſcription, or Loan, and they are ready to trample one another to Death to get in their Money. So that after all that hath been ſaid of the Dutch lending us Money, we ſee nothing to be ſaid to it, but what [22] was ſaid in Anſwer to ſome Bantering Lines in the Time of King Charles II. made upon the King, which his Majeſty by Repartee anſwered himſelf thus.

It is apparent in our Caſe we want no Lenders; we have been devoured with Harpies already, who think, as no doubt the Dutch would alſo think, and perhaps ſay too, that the Borrower is Servant to the Lender. But we muſt acknowledge we want Funds to borrow, and where to find them, ſuch excepted as will plunge us yet farther and farther into a Gulph, whence no leſs than a Hundred Years can redeem us, is paſt the Skill of the beſt Advocates for a War to find out; indeed I cannot but won⯑der, that in all the Noiſe the Faction have made at theſe Things, they have not de⯑ſcended to one Argument againſt the Diffi⯑culty of raiſing Funds; they have indeed told us Great Things, a la Gaſconade, that there are Funds enough, that England is vaſtly rich, that there is Money enough, that we can with Eaſe carry on the War this Seven Years, and ſuch Rhodomontade, that they have Surfeited the People with it for ſome Time; but we do not ſee one of them that offers any Scheme how, and up⯑on what deſtructive ruinous Fund, this [23] Money may be raiſed, that the People may judge whether what is alledged be true, yea, or no; and whether thoſe Funds they ſhall ſo propoſe, ſhall not be as fatal to the general Good, as thoſe that have gone before; with ſuch fallacious Ways have the People been managed, till they have led them on to the brink of inevitable Ruin; and now, as if it were not enough, that the Nation hath for ſo many Years been oppreſſed by the War, through the Negli⯑gence or Knavery of our Conſederates, we are modeſtly deſired to proceed in the War upon the ſame Foot. I confeſs, this among our own People is a Sign of ſome National Stupidity and Blindneſs, which one would hardly think poſſible; but for our Neighbours, whether the States Gene⯑ral, or others, to deſire in, ſeems to ſmell of ſomething we want a Word for in our Tongue, and may be better expreſs'd in French by Marveillieux Surprenant, and the like. I muſt needs ſay I have not yet met with any Man ſo weak, but what begins to feel the Force of this Argument enter in⯑to his Soul, if the Allies have not perform'd according to their Agreement, they ſhould be reminded of it; and if we cannot pre⯑vail with them to make up former Defects, we ought at leaſt to be careful that they comply punctually for the Time to come. Can any People be ſo beſotted to a Party, as to expect or deſire that a Nation, already [24] impoveriſhed by the unfair Impoſitions of Her Allies, and not able to carry on the War on the Terms ſhe hath done for ſome Time, ſhould not inſiſt upon more Juſtice for the future, that ſhe may be able to hold it out?

Neither is this an unneceſſary Argument at this Time, for if we can carry on this War at the Expence of Three Millions and Half Yearly, inſtead of Seven, then we are bet⯑ter able to go on Two Years upon the Square with our Allies, than One Year upon the unequal Foundation we have gone upon all along; ſo that to bring our Allies to do us Juſtice, and to exert themſelves to the utter⯑moſt, in carrying on the War, is the trueſt and beſt Step towards the main Point, (viz.) of carrying it on, if we are aſſured we ſhall no more be impoſed upon; if we ſee the full Quota's of Troops in the Field, the full Numbers of Ships in the Mediterranean, and all Things in Readineſs in Time, and fit for Action; if any Thing will revive the droop⯑ing Spirits of the Nation it muſt be this; it muſt be that they have ſome Hopes of not being cheated again, and that the powerful Aſſiſtance of the Allies will be a Means of putting a happy and ſpeedy End to the War, that a ſafe Peace may follow; and it is eaſie to find that nothing but this wil [...] do it; nothing elſe can perſwade an ex⯑hauſted Nation to bleed anew, but ſome Aſſurance that they ſhall not be ſuffered by [25] their Allies to bleed to Death, that there ſhall be ſome End of their Sorrows and Miſeries, and that every Hand is fairly engaged in bringing Things to a happy End.

But theſe Things ſeem to call for no further Remark from us, they are ſo natural and plain in themſelves, that every Child in theſe Affairs may underſtand them; for if we muſt carry on the War; it muſt be needful that we ſuffer ourſelves to be no more abuſed by our Allies; if we are not to expect Juſtice from our Allies, then we muſt be unaccountably beſot⯑ted if we carry on the War; nay, tho' a worſe Peace were to follow than Her Ma⯑jeſty hath good Reaſon to expect from the Negotiations now on Foot.

But it may not be amiſs to enquire here what Proſpect there appears of theſe Things, and what Hopes our Allies do put us in, of expecting for the future better Treatment; and that in the Purſuit of the War they will go on upon a different Foot from that which they have hitherto gone upon; for if there was but ſome Appearance of an A⯑mendment for the future, it might be ſome Encouragement to us to think of proſecuting the enſuing Campaigns with more Comfort; but inſtead of this, all we yet ſee amounts to little that Way, for at Home all the Fruit of the Diſcovery ſhows only a kind of Re⯑gret that it is made publick, an inward fretting that the Fact is too obvious, ſo that [26] they cannot contradict it, and an envious Warmth at the Juſtice done their own Countrey in it, becauſe it touches upon the States-General, as if to touch them were fatal to us all; and perhaps it may indeed be fatal to ſome Projects the Party had ſer on Foot here, deſtructive enough to the Liber⯑ty of their Country, and of which a little Time may give us a farther View: This is clear, in that all the Reply we have here to the detecting the hard Uſage we have met with from our Allies, iſſues in Exclamations at our expoſing the Dutch, and falling upon the Dutch, ſpreading Reports that we de⯑ſign to fall out with the Dutch, and that we are for a Peace with France, and a VVar with the Dutch; as if we muſt refrain a due Inſpection into our own Affairs, for fear of the Effects it will or may have upon the Hollanders; it is no leſs the Duty of every. Faithful Repreſentative to enquire how other Nations may impoſe upon the People, and waſte and deſtroy us, than it is how we are embezzelled at Home, for every Breach of Treaty is in this kind a Depredation upon the People; and it is moſt reaſonable, that when they have thus diſcovered the Fraud, and by who, as well as by what Means, the Nation is exhauſted and worn out, they ſhould ſo far expoſe the Matters of Fact, and the Perſons, that the People may know by what Means they are impoveriſhed; this hath been the conſtant Method and [27] Uſage of Parliaments, and the Members of Parliament could not have diſcharged the Truſt they have committed to them by the People they Repreſent, it they had omitted it. Nor can this be called expoſing the Dutch; they lay open the Truth, if that expoſes the Dutch, or any other Perſons or States, the Misfortune is their own to be liable to ſuch a Charge; but let ſuch People anſwer what they would have had the Houſe of Commons have done, when upon Enquiry into the State of the War, they found that we had not been fairly uſed by the Confederates; if they had held their Peace, had they not been Criminally Silent? Had they not betrayed their Countrey? Had they not been Acceſſary to all the Frauds of the like Kind which ſhould have happen'd for the Future? And what would the Lan⯑guage of Poſterity have been, when they ſhould have ſeen that the Houſe of Com⯑mons knew theſe Things, but took no No⯑tice of them, or any Care to have the Nati⯑on informed of them? Muſt it not have been a juſt Reproach upon them, as it is now up⯑on thoſe who knew it before, and yet took no. Notice of it, or made any Application to former Parliaments to have it redreſſed? But it is evident theſe People, who make now ſuch loud Complaints of the Reflections caſt upon our Allies, appear more concerned that the Matter is made Publick, than that it is true; and are ſo far from deſiring any Cure [28] for the Diſeaſe, that they ſpend all their Heat and Reſentment at the Diſcoveries of it; and it is to be obſerved from their Con⯑duct, that they make Ten Reflections upon the Houſe of Commons, and the Preſent Miniſtry, for the Induſtry and Pains taken in finding out how, and by whom, the Nation has been abuſed, for One juſt Remark upon the Integrity and Zeal in the War of thoſe Allies, who have uſed us in ſuch a Manner: Whence ſuch a Spirit can proceed, and what Reaſon can be given for it, is not ſo hard to find out, as it is melancholy to reflect, that ſo it ſhould be.

I might go forward in this Obſervation to expoſe the Foundation from whence all this proceeds, and by which we ſhould ſoon ſee for what Uſes and Purpoſes ſome People are ſo deſirous of puſhing on the War; and how to do it they care not, upon what Diſadvantages, and unequal Conditions, they did it; being willing to bear any part of the Burthen, nay, all the Burthen, ſo the beloved War were but to be purſued; the Enquiry into this will open many Scenes of private Treachery, not yet brought to Light, and for that I purpoſe to do it in a Tract by itſelf; I ſhall leave it to a fit Oc⯑caſion.

It falls next in View to Interrogate the Miniſters at Ʋtrecht, how they proceed, and ſee thereby what Meaſures the Dutch take to convince us, that we ſhall have a better, [29] and more equal, Ballance kept up among us, in caſe the War is to be continued. But here you ſhall find Meaſures calculated rather to compel the Queen of Great-Bri⯑tain to carry on the War, than to invite Her Majeſty to it by Aſſurances of perform⯑ing Treaties better than in the Times paſt. This is a Temper ſo different from what might be expected from a People, who had ſo treated their Allies, to us who complain of being ſo treated, that it is as before, Marvellieux; or to put it plainer, a kind of throwing off the Mask; as if we were obli⯑ged to ſubmit to be cheated, after we had firſt diſcovered that it was ſo; and that what before was done covertly, and under the Appearance of a Treaty, was now to be done more effectually, openly, avowed⯑ly, and in the Teeth of the reſt of the Allies.

This appeared upon the firſt Conference after the French Plenipotentiaries had deli⯑vered in their Paper of Explanation, as they called it, on the Propoſals of the Peace, which they had formerly given in. It came then to the Turn of the Allies to conſider in what manner to deliver in their Anſwer to the French Propoſals; this it was reſolved ſhould be by the Confederate Miniſters de⯑livering in their Demands, or the ſeveral Pretenſions of their reſpective Principles, without taking any Notice of the Project contain'd in the Paper given in by the Mini⯑ſters [30] of France; it ſhould have been noted here in the firſt Place, that after all the Dutch had ſaid, and after all that had been ſaid to them, in order to come to this Trea⯑ty, prepared to preſerve a good Under⯑ſtanding among the Allies, and to bring the Treaty to the deſired Concluſion, viz. a good Peace: The Dutch Miniſters ap⯑peared there without any Character, having neither Powers as Plenipotentiaries, or as Ambaſſadors, or any Thing more than meer Commiſſioners, Empowered only to hear what was ſaid, make Report to their Maſters the States, and give back their Anſwers, which one of the Queen's common Meſſengers may as well do on our Side. Nor were the Perſons, the Equipa⯑ges, or the Sallaries allowed to their ſaid Commiſſioners, any more than what was ſuitable to common Meſſengers, whoſe Bu⯑ſineſs it was to carry a Meſſage, and return with an Anſwer; ſo that in the Conferences, either General or Particular, there was no debating Things with them, only juſt giv⯑ing in what any one had to ſay, and all the Anſwer theſe Men could give, was that they would Report it to their High-Migh⯑tineſſes the States General, and would bring their Anſwer. The French Plenipotentia⯑ries preſently objected againſt theſe Powers, as not ſufficient to admit the Dutch Mini⯑ſters into the Conferences. The Britiſh Ple⯑nipotentiaries, tho' they were ſenſible of the [31] Affront offered in it to their Royal Miſtreſs, after ſuch Aſſurances on Her Majeſties Part, of Her ſincere Intention to make the Intereſt of all Her Allies to be as Her own, yet wil⯑ling to wave every Thing that might give an Obſtruction to the happy Iſſue of the Peace, did not inſiſt on this; though they could not but complain that it greatly ob⯑ſtructed that happy Concert of Meaſures, which they hoped might have been the conſtant Fruit of the private Conferences of the Confederate Miniſters, which the Dutch having no Powers that extended any farther than barely to Hear, and Report, and bring back a Reſolution; was for want of thoſe Powers quite diſappointed; ſo that the Dutch Miniſters might as juſtly be deemed and termed Porters, as Plenipotentiaries. Well, notwithſtanding all this, the Britiſh Plenipotentiaries, willing to promote the great End for which they aſſembled, which, as the Lord Biſhop of Briſtol expreſt it, was in the Name of God, to bring the Wars to a happy Concluſion, in an Equitable and Honourable Peace, all theſe Obſtructions were paſt over on their Side, and they la⯑bour'd to have the Powers of the Dutch Mi⯑niſters accepted, as at laſt they were, with ſome Difficulty; and thus they proceed to the Affair of the Demands, as above, which were to be delivered in as the 5th of March. The Dutch Miniſters concealing the Reſolu⯑tion taken at the Hague, to give in no De⯑mands, [32] but the very immediate Copy of the Preliminaries laſt treated on, inſiſted that all the Confederates Demands ſhould be formed into one Inſtrument, and be given in jointly by all the Plenipotentiaries, as the general Demands of the whole Alliance. This, tho' ſomething ſurprizing in itſelf, yet was the leſs ſo, when it was more known that this was, in order to execute the Mea⯑ſures above noted, (viz.) of bringing in the Preliminaries of Geertruydenbergh, as the Summary Demands of the Allies. But the Britiſh Plenipotentiaries taking Notice of it, inſiſted, that this ſeem'd to be deſtructive of the Treaty itſelf, that France had Twice ventured to carry on the War, rather than agree to thoſe Preliminaries. That they had been declared Impracticable, and could not be treated on here; and to inſiſt on the very literal Form of thoſe Preliminiaries now, and preſcribe the Plenipotentiaries to treat on them, was to declare againſt a Treaty at all. That this Meeting was underſtood by all Parties, to be not a Treaty of Prelimina⯑ries in order to a Treaty of Peace, but a Ge⯑neral Treaty of Peace itſelf, wherein the Specifick Demands of every Ally were to be heard, debated, and finally diſcuſſed, ad⯑juſted, and anſwered, to their Satisfaction, which could by no Means be done by Preli⯑minary Articles, which had in them ſeveral References to a farther Treaty, and ſome ſuggeſted Demands left to be farther diſcuſ⯑ſed [33] at another Time; whereas they were now met to make a final and general Con⯑cluſion of all Demands and Pretenſions what⯑ſoever, that there might be no more Blood ſhed in the Chriſtian World, that an End might be put to the Miſeries of Europe; it was alſo alledged, that the ſaid Prelimina⯑ries had not been concerted with a due Re⯑gard to the Intereſt of all the Allies; in eſpecial Manner it was asked, what Article there was to be found in them which re⯑garded the Intereſt of Her Britannick Maje⯑jeſty, farther than what meerly reſpected Her Title to the Crown, and the Baniſh⯑ment of the Pretender; whereas there ſeemed a great deal of Reaſon for admitting farther Demands for the Security, and enlarging the Commerce and Poſſeſſions of Her Majeſty, and Her Subjects; for this Reaſon, as well as in Behalf of the reſt of the Confede⯑rates, the ſaid Britiſh Plenipotentiaries in⯑ſiſted upon giving in the Inſtrument of their Demands in particular, every Ally by them⯑ſelves.

It muſt be ſomething aſtoniſhing to ſuch true Lovers of their Countrey, who can look back on theſe Things with unprejudiced Judgements, to reflect on the Temper reign⯑ing in this Part of Europe at the Time of the Treaty aforeſaid, when in all the nume⯑rous Articles adjuſted at the Hague, and af⯑terwards debated again at Geertruydenberg by [34] the Dutch and French, the former left out nothing which concerned their own Intereſt, Security or Advantage; nay, engaged the Bri⯑tiſh Court to concern and engage themſelves for their particular Security and Advantages, but not one Word. Clauſe, Article, or Debate, was ever thought of for the Engliſh, either as to the Security of their Commerce, as it then ſtood, or the Encreaſe of it for the future. On the other Hand, all the Streſs on the Britiſh Side, and for which we were to think ourſelves infinitely obliged to the Dutch, was to engage their Aſſiſtance to keep out the Pretender, and ſecure the Suc⯑ceſſion of the Crown of Great-Britain to his Electoral Highneſs of Hannover; a Thing which is ſo the Univerſal Reſolution of all the People and Parties in Britain, and to which they think all the Oppoſition that can be made from either French, or any elſe, is ſo trifling and inſignificant, that they cannot be ſenſible of the exceeding Obligation on that Behalf to their Confederates, or of the great Danger which they were in of the Pretender, although no Foreign Aſſi⯑ſtance had been engaged on that Behalf, eſteeming the Favourers of the Preten⯑der in Britain, not withſtanding their great Clamours of a Party among us, to be ſo ſew, and ſo inconſiderable, as that there is nothing to be ſeared from them; but ſup⯑poſing there had been more Danger of this [35] Clauſe, (viz.) the Succeſſion, then we are willing to hope there is Ground to appre⯑hend it cannot but be reminded, that it is as much the Intereſt of the States-General to ſecure that Succeſſion in the Illuſtrious Houſe of Hannover, as it is even of Great⯑Britain itſelf, and much more than it can be ſuppoſed to be to Britain to ſecure to them the Barrier of Flanders; for ſhould the Dominions of her Britannick Majeſty ever fall into the Hands of a Popiſh or French Inte⯑reſt, or into the Hands of a Prince, who is or may be in the Intereſt of France, the Ter⯑ritories of the States-General being ſtript of the Powerful Aſſiſtance of the Britiſh Troops by Land, and Fleets by Sea, muſt inevita⯑bly be expoſed to the Powerful Invaſion of French and Britiſh Fleets united, and their Trade in particular eaten up and deſtroyed, as was verified by woful Experience to the ſaid States in the Year 1672, when, if the Engliſh Court had not broken off from the ſaid French Alliance, the States-General had inevitably ſunk under the Power of France, and their Government been diſſolved and deſtroyed; ſo that upon the whole it is ma⯑nifeſt there was no need on our Part to engage the Dutch to appear for the Security of our Succeſſion to the Houſe of Hannover; for that the Sovereign Law of their own Preſervation will always put them under a Neceſſity of doing it, the contrary being moſt ſure to be a great Step in their Injury, [36] if not their evident Deſtruction: It may be argued, that in Rules of Government we are not to depend upon this or that State being obliged by their own Intereſt to aſſiſt us, but we are to regard what Neceſſity, either for Security of Trade, common Safe⯑ty of Government, or other Political Inte⯑tereſt, we are in, or may be in, of the Aſ⯑ſiſtance of the Powers we are treating with, and if that Neceſſity appears it is a ſufficient Reaſon for us to ſecure that Aſſi⯑ſtance; and this we have frequent Exam⯑ples of, as of the Dutch themſelves treating with us in 1676, when notwithſtanding it was the undoubted Intereſt of England not to let Holland upon any Terms whatever fall into the Hands of France; and if ever the French do again make that Attempt, we ought to aſſiſt the Dutch with all our Troops and Power; and that not ſo much from any Care and Kindneſs to them as a Nation, but for our own Intereſt and Preſervation; yet the Dutch knowing the Eyes of a Nation are not always open to their own Intereſt, thought fit to tie us to aſſiſt them in that Caſe, and even Articled with us for the Proportion, viz. the Number of Ten Thou⯑ſand Men. This is brought for a Reaſon why, not withſtanding its being ſo much the Intereſt of the States of Holland to preſerve the Succeſſion of the Houſe of Hannover to the Crown of Great-Britain, we ought alſo to bind them to it by Treaty: But tho' we [37] were to grant all this, it will not follow that this Treaty ſhould have ſuch a Price put upon it, that the Dutch ſhould demand of us all they want for this little Equivalent; and the Reaſons above, tho' they ſhould not be allowed to ſubſiſt againſt the Treaty of Guarantee itſelf, will certainly take off much of that High Price which the Dutch have put upon it, as if we were under ſuch Infinite Obligations to them to ſecure it for us, as that we were quite out of Condition to defend it ourſelves, or as if they had no Concern, or were to receive no Security, Benefit, or Advantage, at all by it to them⯑ſelves: Again, it might paſs for ſome Ar⯑gument in this Caſe, that if any Power in Europe ought to have ſought this Guarantee from the States-General, it ſhould have been the Elector himſelf, who on his Part might probably have ſome more Occaſion to ſe⯑cure his Paſſage over to England, and the March of any Troops which his Highneſs might find neceſſary to bring with him, to aſſiſt his Faithful People of Britain to place him on the Throne, in Caſe a French or Popiſh Intereſt ſhould make Oppoſition. Here indeed the States-General might be very uſeful Allies, and his Electoral High⯑neſs would have thought very well of ſuch a Guarantee of the States; but it cannot be conceived that Britain can be under like Neceſſity of ſuch a Security: The Succeſſion, which is their own Act and Deed, being uni⯑verſally [38] approved by the whole Nation, a few People excepted, who are contemptible either for their Number or Intereſt; ſo that on all theſe Accounts it ſeems however a Treaty of Guarantee may be uſeful enough for our Succeſſion, and no Harm in it; yet it cannot be a Thing of that Weight as to have ſo great a Value ſet upon it, and that Britain ſhould ſuffer herſelf ſo much to be impos'd upon for it, as it is apparent to all the World ſhe has been on that Account.

We return now to the Manner of the carrying on of the Treaty of Peace at Ʋtrecht: The Britiſh Plenipotentiaries having, as I ſaid above, inſiſted upon the giving in the Demands of the Allies in a ſeparate Manner, have by this Means an Occaſion of ſecu⯑ring for the Subjects of Her Majeſty ſome other Advantages than by the former Trea⯑ty was thought of; and the People of Bri⯑tain may now ſee, not only on what Diſad⯑vantage for us the former Treaty was nego⯑tiated, when we were to have our Markets made for us by our Dutch Neighbours; but they may ſee that all the Noiſe that hath been made of the Preſent Miniſtry; and of the preſent Managers being in the Intereſt of France, amounts only to this, That whereas the other gave up all our Intereſt to the Dutch and the Emperor, theſe Men are careful that Britain may reap ſome Advan⯑tages by the Treaty as well as the reſt of the Confederates.

[39] Indeed it has been ſomething wonderful in the common Diſcourſe of the People on theſe Subjects to find the Generality poiſon⯑ed by theſe ſelf-denying Notions, viz. that all which can be obtained from France muſt be given to the Emperor, and the Dutch, and the King of Portugal, but nothing to the Queen of Great-Britain; as if our Strength were no Acquiſition, or our Power any Safe⯑ty, to the Alliance; nay, rather, as if it were dangerous to the Confederacy to entruſt any Part of that we have fought ſo long for, and bought ſo dear, to the Queen of Great-Britain: One would think the Dutch themſelves went on that Notion, when, as was apparent, they appeared uneaſie and jealous at the Preparations made by Her Majeſty to ſend a Fleet and Forces to Canada; while not know⯑ing the Deſign, they apprehended it to be for the taking Poſſeſſion of ſome Place or other in the Spaniſh America, altho' by the [...]th Article of the Grand Alliance it was agreed that Her Majeſty might lawfully have done ſo if ſhe had thought fit. Theſe Things, however of no other Conſequence, yet ſerve to let us ſee how different, as reſpecting us, the Manner of the Allies hath been in all the Tranſactions of this War, and how different their Views have been in all their Steps towards a Peace, from our conſtant Behaviour in the ſame Heads as they reſpe⯑cted them; and that in all theſe Occaſions it has been the conſtant Maxim of our Con⯑federates, [40] that we were to have no Share in any Thing, but that the Dutch, under a Notion of a Barrier and Security to their Frontiers, ſhould make large Acquiſitions, both to their Territory and their Commerce, both which have been conſented to from hence; whether it be to the Honour or to the Infa⯑my of thoſe who have given in to theſe Meaſures is left to the Impartial Part of Man⯑kind to determine: It is evident that at length the Juſt Repreſentations of the Bri⯑tiſh Miniſters took Place, and the Dutch after much Difficulty have yeilded that the De⯑mands of the Allies be given in to the French, altho' in one and the ſame Inſtrument, yet in ſeparate Heads; and the Britiſh Plenipo⯑tentiaries agree and propoſe to add at the End of every Head this General and Satisfa⯑ction of all the reſt of the Allies, a Clauſe ſuf⯑ficient to remove the Scandal and Reproach early caſt upon the Preſent Management, (viz.) That they deſigned to make a Separate Peace, and had actually concluded the Con⯑ditions there of with France before the Congreſs was to begin; I muſt crave Pardon if I make theſe ſeveral Inſtances of the Uſage of Her Majeſty hath met with from Her Allies, Rank in with their other Conduct relating to Forces and Quota's, which have already been made Publick, and all together to come under the Title of Deficiencies; for if there had been a more diſintereſted Con⯑junction of Counſel and Aſſiſtance of Mea⯑ſures [41] in the Proceedings of the Allies, to and with Her Britannick Majeſty, and Her Miniſters, no Queſtion this Treaty had been with more Eaſe brought on, with more Mutual Aſſiſtance to, and Confidence in one another entred into, and perhaps the Succeſs might have been more promi⯑ſing alſo.

There ſeems to be no Occaſion here of Entring into the Clauſes which the Dutch have obtain'd in any of their Treaties and Agreements with us, by which they have gain'd Advantages in Commerce, particu⯑larly to our Prejudice, becauſe even the Dutch themſelves acknowledge them in their late Letter to Her Majeſty; only de⯑claring. That they do not deſign to take the Advantage of thoſe Articles. I am ve⯑ry willing to believe the States-General, eſ⯑pecially while a good Underſtanding among the Allies, and particularly between Them and Us, is ſo neceſſary to them, would not make Uſe of the Advantages which were given them by that Treaty; but this does by no Means deny, nay, it not Tacitly on⯑ly, but even Explicitly, as it ſeems to Indif⯑ferent Judgments, grants that ſuch Advan⯑tages are given to the Dutch by that Trea⯑ty. See the Declaration of the Dutch on this Head more particularly, as follows.

‘'For having learnt that the Principal Ex⯑ceptions taken to the ſaid Treaty were, that it might prove Prejudicial to the [42] Commerce of Her Majeſty's Subjects in the Spaniſh Netherlands; and that ſome had entertain'd an ill-grounded and erro⯑neous Opinion, that the States might de⯑ſign to take Advantage by it to make themſelves Maſters of the ſaid Spaniſh Ne⯑therlands, their High Mightineſſes did declare poſtively, and by this Letter do voluntarily repeat it, that it never was their Intention, nor ever will be, to make uſe of the ſaid Treaty, or of their Garri⯑ſons in the Fortified Places of the Country, to prejudice in any Manner the Com⯑merce of Her Majeſty's Subjects; but that their Opinion is, That whatever re⯑lates to Navigation and Commerce there, ought to be ſettled on an intire Equality, that ſo Her Majeſty's Subjects may not be charged with higher Duties of Importa⯑tion or Exportation than theirs, to the end Commerce may be carried on there by both Nations on an equal Foot.'’

Here the States-General acknowledge, That whatever relates to Navigation and Commerce in the Spaniſh Netherlands ought to be ſettled on an entire Equality: This is owning what Her Majeſty has ſince claimed to be Juſt, and yet that it has not been ſo is apparent alſo; and in the ſame Letter they acknowledge it again, by ad⯑ding. ‘'That if there be ſome Articles of the ſaid Treaty which without affecting the Eſſentials of it, may be thought to [43] want Explanation, Her Majeſty ſhall find them willing and ready to treat there⯑upon, with all the Facility and Con⯑deſcenſion that can reaſonable be required of them.'’

Now however Satisfactory ſuch an Offer is from the Dutch, who indeed cannot be ſuppos'd to be Ignorant of the Juſtice of Her Majeſty's Demands in this Caſe, as not to come to a farther Explanation on theſe Heads; yet all this adds to, and confirms, the Com⯑plaint againſt the Conduct, at leaſt of thoſe employ'd from hence, who in behalf of their own Country could paſs ſuch a Trea⯑ty, and ſign ſuch a Convention, by which it appears, were not the Dutch willing to explain themſelves upon it, there was Ef⯑fectually given up to them both the Sove⯑reignty and the Commerce of the Spaniſh Netherlands, the laſt being Excluſive of the Engliſh. There is no doubt to me that this was evident at that Time, and therefore it is that I cannot place it to the Account of Ignorance or Inadvertency; for the Duke of Marlborough ſaw into it, and therefore how willing ſoever in other Caſes to oblige the Dutch, he had not ſo little Concern for his own Safety, as not to know a Britiſh Parliament would certainly one Time or o⯑ther call a Treaty ſo Diſhonourable and Prejudicial to Britain in queſtion, and there⯑fore no doubt whatever other Reaſons his Grace might have alſo, he thought fit not [44] to be drawn in to ſet his Hand to it, but refus'd to be a Party to it, tho' at that Time a Plenipotentiary from hence; but another Hand and other Management ef⯑fected it; and now the Dutch are willing to explain theſe Things to our Satisfaction, which would admit of many Remarks as to the former Part of it, which I omit, be⯑cauſe Satisfaction will be now obtain [...]d: Only this cannot in Juſtice to the Preſent Miniſtry and Parliament be omitted, viz. That if this Enquiry into theſe Things had not been begun, thoſe Explanations had ne⯑ver been obtain'd, and the Dutch had been left in a Capacity when they thought fit to exclude the Subjects of Britain from all Trade and Commerce in the Spaniſh Ne⯑therlands; and had been enabled, whenever their Occaſions made it for their Purpoſe, to have ſeiz'd upon the Spaniſh Netherlands, and have made themſelves entire Maſters thereof; ſo that the preventing theſe Things ſeems wholly owing to the Vigilance of the Preſent Miniſtry, and to the vigorous Reſolutions of the Preſent Parliament.

There ſeems indeed one Clauſe in the ſaid Letter, which ſome People are very forward here to take hold of; inſinuating, That the Dutch complain of being trick'd in England into a Conſent to a Negotiation of Peace, by being put in Hopes, that after they ſhould do ſo, the other Affair of the Barrier ſhould be adjuſted to their Satisfacti⯑on; [45] the Words are theſe, ‘'That however, having not long ſince been inform'd, that in England ſome were of Opinion, that the ſaid Treaty in ſome Articles might be prejudicial to Her Majeſty's Subjects, the Commiſſioned M. Buys, their Envoy Extraordinary then going to England to inquire what thoſe Points were that might be thought Grievances, and authorized to treat about them with Her Majeſty's Miniſters, and to remove, it poſſible, the Difficulties by all the Explanations that ſhould appear neceſſary; which they were put in Hopes would not be very hard to do, when once they ſhould have conſented to con⯑cur with Her Majeſty, as they did, to pro⯑cure a Congreſs for the Negotiation of a Ge⯑neral Peace. But that the Misfortune was, that the ſaid M. Buys, during his Reſidence in England, was not able to fi⯑niſh that Affair to reciprocal Satisfaction; and that it having been remitted to the Hague, no Way has hitherto been found to terminate it there neither; tho' their High Mightineſſes think they have ſhewn all the Readineſs to comply with any Juſt Expedient that could reaſonably be expect⯑ed from them.'’

This ſeems to be very ill turn'd by a Party among ourſelves, and implies, as they pretend, as if the Britiſh Court had made Light of the Matter, and promiſed to adjuſt it if the Dutch would do ſo and ſo; but [46] that after the Dutch had complied and con⯑curr'd with Her Majeſty to procure a Congreſs for the Negotiation of a General Peace, they could never obtain the promiſed Condition, altho they had ſhewn ‘'all the Readineſs to comply with any juſt Expedient that could reaſonably be expected from them.'’

This is a Black Charge, and had not the Dutch with much more Integrity than theſe People, anticipated this Calumny, and gi⯑ven the true Reaſon for their ſaid Concur⯑ring with Her Majeſty, to be their Diſpoſi⯑tion and Perſuaſion of the Abſolute Neceſ⯑ſity there was in the preſent Conjuncture, for the Cultivating and Maintaining a good Friendſhip, Perfect Confidence and Ʋnion, be⯑tween their ſaid States and Her Majeſty, which for the better Authority, I give you alſo from their own Letter, ‘'That during the whole Courſe of Her Majeſty's Glori⯑ous Reign they have had nothing more at Heart than to cultivate and maintain with Her a Good Friendſhip, Perfect Con⯑fidence and Union, and to corroborate them the moſt they poſſibly could; ha⯑ving always judged them abſolutely Ne⯑ceſſary, and eſpecially in the preſent Con⯑juncture. That they likewiſe judged they could not give a better Proof of this their Diſpoſition and Perſuaſion, than that which they lately gave in agreeing to the Propoſition which Her Majeſty had cau⯑ſed to be made to them, to begin the Ne⯑gotiation [47] of a General Peace with the E⯑nemy, and in concurring with Her Maje⯑ſty to facilitate the bringing together of the Miniſters of all the High Allies to the Congreſs at Ʋtrecht.'’

This effectually Contradicts what as before is ſuggeſted, viz. That they were induced ‘'to concur with Her Majeſty, as they did, to procure a Congreſs for the Negotiation of a General Peace.'’ Upon their being put in Hopes that it would not be very hard to do after they had conſented ſo to concur with Her Maje⯑ſty; I ſay, this is ſo contradicted by what is ſaid before, that I was tempted to doubt both the ſaid Paragraphs could not be in one and the ſame Letter; and indeed it ſeems ſhocking to any Reader, that their High Mightineſſes ſhould ſay in one Part of their Letter, that they concurr'd with Her Ma⯑jeſty, to give the beſt Proof of their Diſpoſi⯑tion to cultivate a good Friendſhip, Perfect Confidence and Ʋnion with Her Majeſty, and in another Part of the ſame Letter to ſay, that they concurr'd ‘'with Her Majeſty, as they did, to procure a Congreſs for the Nego⯑tiation of a General Peace.'’

Theſe Conſiderations being too hard for my Underſtanding, are left to the Logical Diſcuſſion of the Party here, whole Talent ſo eminently lyes in Equivocation and Inſigni⯑ficant [46] [...] [47] [...] [48] Railery; who when they have chew⯑ed it, and mumbled it, like an Aſs upon Thi⯑ſtles, will bring it out the ſame thorny crab⯑bed Inconſiſtency that they found it.

But while we are leaving them to this difficult Work, it may be needful to look farther, for we have yet much more Work cut out from Holland than in the foregoing Piece; the States-General having receiv'd a new Bruſh from the Britiſh Parliament, are very ſolicitous to waſh their Negro Skin as clean as they can from the Impu⯑tations which have lain ſo plainly againſt them; but now they find it more difficult than they did before; for till now they had only Pamphlets and general Clamours to anſwer, ſuch as the Suſpicions of the Peo⯑ple, and the Information of a Few had made loud; and which began to make them uneaſy, theſe were treated with ſome Con⯑tempt by the States, and more by their Friends here.

But the Parliament finding more Truth in theſe Things than perhaps they expected, and much more than the Faction pretend⯑ed, thought it requir'd an Extraordinary Sanction to make them leſs diſputed, and thought it Juſt to make them Publick with an undiſputed authority, that the People ought to be undeceiv'd, and that the Quarrels a⯑bout the Truth of Fact ought to ceaſe among the People; for this Reaſon, having cau⯑ſed [49] all the Particulars to be exactly and faithfully laid before them, by the Report of the Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, and other proper Officers, and thoſe Parti⯑culars to be critically examin'd, they dedu⯑ced from thence the Matters of Fact as they really were, and making all the Caſes plain in which the Government had been impos'd upon by their Allies, and the Dutch Defici⯑ent among others; they came to ſeveral Reſolves about the ſame, and drawing thoſe Reſolves up into General Heads, referring to the Particulars for their Demonſtration, they Humbly repreſented all in an Addreſs to Her Majeſty, and cauſed both the ſaid Reſolves and the Addreſs to be Printed, for the Conviction of all Her Majeſty's good Subjects, and to confute and ſilence a Par⯑ty, who, as aboveſaid, had made it their Buſineſs to ridicule all that had been ſaid of theſe Matters as falſe and empty Notions infuſed into Peoples Heads, to raiſe ill Blood and create Prejudices againſt the Dutch. If theſe Things coming forth with ſuch an undiſputed Authority did a little ſurprize the World, and conſequently open the Eyes of the People, much more would they ſurpriſe the States-General, whoſe In⯑tereſt it had ſo long been to have the Peo⯑ple of Britain kept as ignorant as poſſible of theſe Matters; and finding it abſolutely Ne⯑ceſſary that ſomething ſhould be ſaid to puzzle the Cauſe a little, and to furniſh [50] their Friends with Arguments for their De⯑fence, they iſſue a Paper, Entituled, as fol⯑lows.‘A Memorial, ſerving to prove that the States-General of the Ʋnited Netherlands are un⯑juſtly charged by the Reſolutions or Votes of the Houſe of Commons of the Parliament of Great-Britain, and by the Subſequent Ad⯑dreſs of the ſaid Houſe of Commons there⯑upon preſented to Her Majeſty the Queen of Great-Britain, with having been deficient in divers Reſpects during the preſent War, in furniſhing what according to their Quota or Contingent they ſtood engaged for, towards carrying on the ſaid War.’

This is the Paper which I come now to examine, and in which if I ſhould diſcover that the States-General have really been ſo far from clearing themſelves of the Charge ſo poſitively laid upon them in Parliament, that in every Part they either directly or ta⯑citly acknowledge it, then there will re⯑main little Force in the reſt of their Paper.

In conſidering this New and Great Af⯑fair of the Dutch Memorial, it ſeems ve⯑ry proper to make as few Circumlocutions as poſſible, and come directly to the Point. Our Introduction therefore ſhall conſiſt ra⯑ther of laying down a Liſt of the Particu⯑lars which we ſhall leave out, than of what we ſhall put into the following Tract; what [51] ſhall be dropp'd as foreign to the Caſe in Hand, and not worth either the Author's while to Note, or the Readers to be con⯑cern'd about. As Firſt, It ſhall take up lit⯑tle of our Time to animadvert on the Inſo⯑lence Unparallell'd, of a Scandalous Merce⯑nary, who in Defiance of a Britiſh Parlia⯑ment, and while that Parliament was actu⯑ally ſitting, ſhould have the Face to pub⯑liſh the Anſwer or Defence of a Foreign Nation againſt his own Country.

If a Man have receiv'd an Affront from another, and meets one of his Servants, and ſays to him, you Jack, or you Thomas, pray tell your Maſter I ſay he is a Villain and a Raſcal; will not the Servant if he have any Manners or Senſe of his Duty ſay to him, Sir, let him be what he will, he is my Maſter, and it is not fit for me to tell him ſo, pray employ Somebody elſe? On the other Hand, if the Ignorant. Fellow ſhould have ſo little Wit or Manners as to carry this Meſſage to his Maſter, would not the Maſter ſay to him, let the Man be what he will, you are an Unmannerly Raſcal for bringing me ſuch a Meſſage, ſince you were my Servant, and not his? And would he not very juſtly cane him, and turn him out of his Service for his Impudence.

This Caſe, as it is unprecedented, unleſs in the ſame Perſon who did the like once before, ſo it will be doubly unprecedented in the Publick Juſtice, if he is uncorrected [52] for it. Nay, by how much more the Par⯑ty glory in and boaſt of having inſulted the Parliament and the Government in this Publication, by ſo much the more Neceſſi⯑ty they bring upon the ſaid Parliament to vindicate themſelves, and puniſh the Per⯑ſons with their utmoſt Rigour: But this is Humbly left and ſubmitted to the Parlia⯑ment, who no doubt will do themſelves and their Defender Juſtice in this Caſe.

Next it ſhall take up no Part of this Diſ⯑courſe to enquire whether the Dutch have ordered theſe Sheets to be thus publiſhed in England, or no. We are not ignorant how many Ways of Late the Foreign Powers concern'd in this War have privately en⯑deavour'd to make themſelves and their Actings with Her Majeſty Popular here, appealing at it were from Her Majeſty to her Subjects; but we ſhall not ſuppoſe however that they are yet arrived to ſuch a Contempt of their Alliances with Her Britannick Majeſty, as to appear in an Acti⯑on which derogates ſo much from the uſual Civilities due from one Ally to another, as that they ſhould openly and avowedly make an Attempt of this Nature.

This Leads us to conſider how prudent⯑ly the Parliament of Britain has acted in this Caſe, in which perhaps the Dutch, as ſubtle a Nation as they are, and how good ſoever their Politicks have been in other Caſes, will be put to it, how to behave [53] themſelves between the Two Extreams of Owning or Diſowning this Publication of their Memorial.

The Parliament have firſt ſtigmatiz'd the Paper itſelf as a Falſe and Scandalous Li⯑bel, but in this Cenſure they do not call it the Memorial of the States-General, but a Pretended Memorial: Now as the Lie is here given by the whole Britiſh Nation, and that moſt juſtly alſo, it remains for the Dutch to ſhow us how they pleaſe to take it; if they own the Paper and the Publica⯑tion of it here, they take the Lie aforeſaid to themſelves, and are obliged to fall under the Charge, huſh it up, and thereby own in Juſt, or reſent it, which we ſuppoſe they will conſider of, before they go about it. On the other Side, if they take upon them to mention, anſwer, or vindicate this Pa⯑per, they own not the Paper only, but the mean Step of Cauſing it to be publiſhed in England in eſpecial Inſult to Her Majeſty, and to the Parliament of Britain then ſitting, and what evil Conſequences may follow ſuch a Thing muſt lye at their Doors. It is true, that as the Parliament has not thought fit to take it but as a ſpurious and pretended Paper, we might very well do ſo alſo; but as we ſee it publiſhed in all Parts of Europe, as allow'd in thoſe Prints in Holland, who are ſaid to write cum Privi⯑legio; and as it is in theſe Countries ſtiled, The Anſwer of the States, &c. we cannot [54] but treat it as ſuch, or at leaſt as an Anſwer for the States, if not, The Anſwer of the States. And that this may be juſtified by good Evidence, the Reader may obſerve, that our Prints after the Reſentment of the Parliament of Britain had made it too dangerous for our Newſmen to go on with the Printing it, gave this Account, A⯑pril 4th.‘Hague April 17. All our Publick Prints, Publiſhed by Authority, have been and continue full of the States Reply to the Reſolutions of the Commons of Bri⯑tain, in Vindication of their Conduct.’

This we cannot but think gives ſufficient Authority to a Writer, whether the States-General are concern'd in the Publication at London or no, to ſuppoſe them to be the real Authors of the Paper itſelf, and that it is really the States Reply, as above, and as ſuch we ſhall therefore conſider it.

The Firſt Thing meet for Obſervation in it, is what we ought not by any Means to paſs over, viz. That the States-General confeſs the Charge, acknowledging the Fact, directly, viz. That the Quota's for Sea Ser⯑vice were not ſupply'd, or as the Reſoluti⯑on of the Houſe of Commons expreſs it, viz. That the States-General have been deſici⯑ent in their Quota's for Sea Service in Propor⯑tion [55] to the Numbers of Ships provided by Her Majeſty, &c.

To this the States in their Memorial, after a very long Introduction, anſwer Two Things; Firſt, That the Quota the Britiſh Court propoſed to fit out, particularly in the Years 1704 and 1705, were too many, or more than was needful for the Service; viz. More than was needed to make the Confederates Superior to the French in the Mediterranean, and that therefore they the States did not think themſelves obliged to furniſh ſo many. That whereas we ſhould have Seventy-four Ships the Year 1704, and Seventy-nine the Year 1705, they thought the Rate of Twenty-four Ships of their State a Proportion againſt Sixty of Her Majeſty's, and that they concerted it ſo with Admiral Mitchel. So that it is plain here from this very Memorial, that the States do no Manner of Way deny the Defi⯑ciency itſelf, but evade the Force of the Charge by Diſputing the Proportions; and explaining what they underſtood by the Two Fifths to Three Fifths, ſo inſiſted on by the Parliament, and how they ought to be underſtood by others. Again, they would patch up the Deficiency aforeſaid, by bringing in the Number of their Men of War employ'd in the North Seas to make up their Quota, and they expreſs this very Subtilly, as a Thing which they think ought to be ſet againſt the Number of Ships [56] employ'd by the Britiſh in the Narrow Seas; this may be conſider'd immediately in their own Terms; but Firſt, it is fit to Note, that both theſe Arguments confeſs the Charge in Fact, only offer theſe Expla⯑nations or Extenuations: So that the Truth of what the Parliament has publiſh'd in their Repreſentation and Addreſs ſtand faſt, is acknowledg'd and confeſs'd by the States, and needs no farther Defence. But it comes next of Courſe to ſee what Force this Alle⯑gation of the Dutch as to their Ships in the North Seas ought to have in this Argument; and if it appears that theſe are not, and ought not to be reckon'd in the Proportion above, and that they were not reckon'd in the Firſt Proportion ſtated and agreed with the States-General, then all the Conſequen⯑ces drawn from thoſe Proportions will ſtand the States in no Stead, as to any Defence to be made by them againſt the Charge. In the Examination of this, we meet with this Clauſe in the State of Proportions laid before the Houſe; by the Lords of the Admiralty, which ſtands Diametrically Oppoſite to what the States alledge in their Memorial, in theſe Words, viz. That by the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States-General, their Proportion of the Ships of the Line of Battle, to act in Conjunction with thoſe of this Kingdom in the Channel, and in and about the Mediterranean, ought to be Three to our Five. The Firſt Obſervation meet to [57] be made here, is, that the Treaties be⯑tween the Queen of Great-Britain and the States, have expreſly ſettled their Reſpe⯑ctive Proportions, which indeed the Memo⯑rial ſeems to evade, by alledging, that in the Grand Alliance the Reſpective Parties were to aſſiſt with all their Forces; then Complimenting Britain (I do not ſay Flat⯑tering) with being more Powerful than the States, they thence deduce the Reaſonable⯑neſs of the Forces of one being more than the other. But the States-General would think themſelves but ill anſwer'd if this Way of Argument was made uſe of with them, for what is all this to the Equality of Proportions? Have not the Dutch always, as the Memorial acknowledges, treated every Year with the Queen upon the juſt Propor⯑tions of every Year's Service? And has not the Queen ſent Admiral Mitchel always to ſettle that Point? Now the preſent Queſtion is not whether Nation is moſt Powerful, or whether we are to ſend more Troops than the States-General, or more Ships; but whether the Proportions being ſettled An⯑nually by Agreement, the States-General have ſupply'd the Numbers agreed on by thoſe Treaties, and ſent as many as they a⯑greed to ſend or no; if they have done this, then it is true, the Firſt ſettled Proportions are of no Weight. On the other Hand, if they have not the General Treaty of Em⯑polying [58] all their Forces, or any other are Equally of no Force.

Now it is apparent that the States-Gene⯑ral have not ſupply'd their Quota of Ships for the Services for which they agreed to ſup⯑ply them, and therefore we on our Side juſtly Complain, and the Account as it was laid before the Houſe by the Lords Commiſſio⯑ners of the Admiralty, and by Her Majeſty Command, is very plain in the Caſe, admitting of no Diſpute; wherefore we have for a further and more effectual Con⯑vincing the Advocates for the States-Gene⯑ral in this Caſe, cauſed it to be annexed at large, and is as follows.‘By the Lords Commiſſioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great-Britain, Ireland, &c. of all Her Majeſty's Plantatious.’

HER Majeſty's Pleaſure having been ſignify'd to Us by Mr Secretary St. John, that we ſhould in Purſuance of an Addreſs from the Houſe of Commons) pre⯑pare an Account of the Quota's of Her Ma⯑jeſty's Ships and thoſe of Her Allies during this preſent War, and what Agreements and Conventions have been made for the ſaid Quota's, and how the ſame have been ob⯑ſervd, We do in Obedience to Her Majeſty Command Humbly Report.

[59] That by the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States-General, their Proportion of the Line of Battel to act in Conjunction with thoſe of this Kingdom in the Channel and in and about the Mediter⯑ranean, ought to be Three to our Five.

That ſince the Commencement of this War, not only Sir David Mitchel but Sir James Wiſhart have been appointed by Her Majeſty's Command to go to Holland, and adjuſt with the States-General or their De⯑puties, the Quota's of their Ships of War to act in Conjunction with thoſe of Her Majeſty's, as aforeſaid, and what was done in Purſuance of thoſe Treaties was ſent to Her Majeſty's Principal Secretary of State, to which we Humbly refer.

And as to the Number of Ships in the Line of Battle which the States-General each Year during the War have join [...]d to Her Majeſty's on the foremention'd Ser⯑vices, the ſame will appear by the following Account, which hath been computed with as much Exactneſs as the Nature of the Things will bear, viz. In the Year 1702, Her Majeſty had Forty four Ships employ'd in the Channel and Soundings of the Line of Battel, and Thirty in and about the Medi⯑terranean, making in the whole Seventy-four, and they were join'd with no more than Thirty-three of the States-General, whereas they ſhould have been Forty-four.

[60] 1703, Seventy-nine of Her Majeſty's Ships were employ'd in the aforeſaid Ser⯑vices, and but Twenty-two of the States-General, which ſhould have been Forty⯑ſeven.

1704, There was Seventy-four of the Queen's Ships and Eighteen Dutch, which ſhould have been Forty-four.

1705, Seventy-nine of Her Majeſty's Ships and Twenty-eight Dutch, which ſhould have been Forty-ſeven.

1706, There were but Fifteen Ships of the Dutch acted in Conjunction with Seven⯑ty-eight of the Queen's Ships, whereas they ſhould have been Forty-ſix.

1707, To Seventy-two of Her Majeſty's, they were no more than Twenty-ſeven of the States-General, inſtead of Forty-three.

1708, The States-General join'd Twenty⯑five Ships of the Line to Sixty-nine of Her Majeſty's, inſtead of Forty-two.

1709, No more than Eleven Ships of the States were join'd to Sixty-ſeven of the Queen's, inſtead of Forty-three.

1710, Her Majeſty had Sixty-two em⯑ploy'd in the aforeſaid Service, and the States-General appointed no more than Thirteen to act in Conjunction with them, inſtead of Thirty-ſeven.

1711, There was no more than Twelve Dutch Ships inſtead of Thirty-five appoint⯑ed to act with Fifty-nine of the Queen's Ships, which as well as thoſe in the Pre⯑ceeding [61] Year were employ'd in the Mediter⯑ranean, and not ſo much as one allotted by the States-General to act in Concert with thoſe of Her Majeſty againſt the Enemies Ships at Dunkirk and in the Channel.

Here ſeemeth a moſt convincing Proof of the Matter of Fact. Now let us ſee what Dutch Cunning will bring them off of this, for it is a home Charge, and they will not eaſily parry the Thruſt. The Memorial in Truth does not attempt it, and therefore the Matter of Fact as I ſaid before ſtands granted. But they plead then that we have not treated them fairly, for ſay they, ‘'Se⯑condly, It muſt be obſerv'd, that in the aforeſaid Account Notice is taken only of the Ships of this State, which in Conjun⯑ction with thoſe of Her Majeſty were em⯑ploy'd in the Mediterr anean and the Chan⯑nel, and that the North Sea, which this State, during the War, has generally had the Care of, is wholly omitted: Which Mention of thoſe Ships only of this State which have acted in Conjunction with thoſe of Her Majeſty, and the Omiſſion of the North Sea, make ſo great a Dif⯑ference between the Number of Ships reckoned by the foreſaid Account to have been furniſhed by Great-Britain, and that ſaid in the ſame Account to be furniſhed by this State, that probably this Difference gave Occaſion to the forming the foreſaid prejudicial Reſolution or Vote of the [62] Lower Houſe, which poſſibly would not have been formed, might this State have firſt been heard upon it.'’

This Plea needs no farther Examination than to look back to the Second Paragraph of the Admiralty's Report above, where it is affirm'd, ‘'That by the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States-General, their Proportion of Ships of the Line of Battle to act in Conjunction with thoſe of this Kingdom in the Channel and in about the Mediterranean, ought to be Three to our Five.'’

It muſt be ſurprizing to all that read the Memorial of the States, to hear them inſiſt with ſo many Introductory Paragraphs, and lay ſo much ſtreſs upon their Employing Ships in the North Seas, when it is thus proved that the North Seas are quite left out of the Queſtion, and the Treaties they had made were only for Ships to be em⯑ploy'd in the Channel in and about the Medi⯑terranean. Now if they have furniſhed their Quota as agreed upon with us for the Chan⯑nel and the Mediterranean, tho' they had ſent no Ships to the North Seas, we conceive the Commons had made no Repreſentation; nor had they any Reaſon, for there was no mention of it in the Agreements of Treaties aforeſaid; but if they have not furniſhed their Quota's for the Channel, altho' they had ſent an Hundred Sail to the North Seas, it had been nothing to the Caſe any more [63] than their ſending Ships to Batavia, for the ſame Reaſon as above; the North Sea Guard being not mention'd in the ſaid Trea⯑ties and Annual Agreements. To what Pur⯑poſe then is all the long Deſcription of the Neceſſity of the ſending Ships to the North Seas? And what can be more ſurprizing than to find their High Mightineſſes arguing what is, or was their Sentiments, againſt what is and was at that very Time concert⯑ed and adjuſted by them, with the Perſons actually ſent over by the Queen of Great-Britain for that Purpoſe; and which in the very ſame Paragraph they acknowledge was ſo concerted and adjuſted. For the more ready aſſiſting the Reader to make a Full and Free Judgment hereof, the long pretend⯑ed Defence on that Head is here copied out of the ſaid Memorial, and is as follows, viz. ‘'It muſt be obſerv'd, That by the Seventh Article of the Treaty of the Ninth of June 1703, by which that Agreement was renewed, 'Tis provided, that the Number of Ships of War to be furniſhed by each for their whole Quota according to the ſaid Agreement, ſhould be regula⯑ted every Year, and that the Rendezvous, as well as the Places where the Ships ſhould be employed, ſhould likewiſe be agreed upon every Year; accordingly this has been concerted Yearly, Her Majeſty having to that Purpoſe for ſeveral Years ſent over one of Her Admirals, at which [64] Times Two Things principally were ta⯑ken into Deliberation, namely, the Num⯑ber of Shipping and the Places where they ſhould be employ'd; upon which the Pro⯑jects on the Part of Her Majeſty propoſed commonly the employing a greater Num⯑ber than was propoſed by this State, and alſo more Regard was had to the Channel than to the North Sea, of which North Sea not the leaſt Mention is made in the aforeſaid Account of the Lords Commiſ⯑ſioners of the Admiralty, from which O⯑miſſion it partly comes that they reckon ſo low what this State has furniſhed to the Sea-ſervice. The Sentiment of this State upon this Subject has alway been, that the Number of Ships to be ſent Year⯑ly to Sea ought to be regulated according to the Force which it might reaſonably be judged the Enemy could Yearly bring into the Mediterranean, the Channel, and the North Sea, ſo that Men might be morally ſure that the Fleets and Squa⯑drons which on the Part of Great-Britain and this State ſhould act in Conjunction or Seperately, would be ſuperiour to thoſe of the Enemy. The Term, in Conjun⯑ction or Separately, was uſed, becauſe it was ever the Opinion of this State, that Her Majeſty's Ships, and thoſe of this State, ſent to Portugal and the Medi⯑terranean, ought to act in Conjunction; and that the Security of the Channel ought to be left to the Care of Her Majeſty, [65] and that of the North Sea to the Care of this State, becauſe the Channel is beſt ſi⯑tuate for Great-Britain with reſpect to its Countries, Harbours, and Commerce, and the North Sea for this State with reſpect to its Countries, Harbours and Com⯑merce; yet ſo, that if unexpectedly the Enemy ſhould bring any Fleet or conſi⯑derable Squadrons into the Channel, or into the North Sea, then the Squadrons on both Sides, in Whole or in Part, ac⯑cording to the Circumſtances of Affairs, might join each other.'’

It is obſerved here, the States General Firſt acknowledge in this Paragraph of their Memorial, That both the Number of Ships to be furniſh'd by each Party, and the Places where thoſe Ships ſhould be employ'd, was concerted Yearly, Her Majeſty having to that Purpoſe for ſeveral Years ſent over one of Her Admirals: Nay, they repeat it a⯑gain, viz. At which Times Two Things prin⯑cipally were taken into Deliberation, viz. The Number of Shipping, and the Places where they ſhould be employ'd. We can have no Occaſion to make Anſwer to this in any o⯑ther Manner than by Appeal to the States⯑General themſelves, and Enquiring then whether in the Quota's of Ships at thoſe Times agreed on, and the Place where they ſhould be employ'd, any Place but the Channel and in and about the Mediterranean was ever included or incerted: If it were, [66] then we muſt give it againſt the Repreſen⯑tation of the Houſe of Commons, and ac⯑quit the States-General: But if not, what means all the Preamble and Circumlocution of this long Memorial? And to what Pur⯑poſe is it ſaid this or that was the Senti⯑ments of the States-General? The Repre⯑ſentation and Addreſs of the Commons, and the Report of the Britiſh Admiralty, can ſay nothing to what was, or was not, the Sentiments of the States-General. But to what was their Agreement, and what was concerted Yearly between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States, that they may enquire about, and that they do re⯑preſent Fairly and Faithfully, viz. That the Dutch have not furniſhed the Quota's which they were obliged by Treaty to do, for the Service of the Conſederates in the Channel, and in or about the Mediterra⯑nean; what they did in the North Seas as being no Part of the ſaid Agreement, the ſaid Repreſentation has no Ground to meddle with it, nor does it take the leaſt Notice of it as is ſuppoſed for that Reaſon.

It may not be foreign to this Caſe to en⯑quire a little here into the Reaſon and E⯑quity alſo of this Argument about the North S as Service, in doing whereof, if it ſhall be found that this Service ought not to be thought of in Eſtabliſhing the ſaid Quota's of Ships, as being wholly and ſole⯑ly a Work of Intereſt, Protecting their own [67] Commerce Fiſhing, &c in which the Allies have no Concern, and that the Engliſh had at the ſame Time ſeveral Squadrons in thoſe Seas which were never eſteemed Part of the ſaid Quota on the Britiſh Side, and therefore that the like ought not to be in⯑ſiſted on on the Part of the States-Gene⯑ral, then all the Argument drawn from theſe Things will fall to the Ground, and the Impreſſions which thoſe Reſolutions of the Houſe of Commons have made on the People muſt neceſſarily remain.

It is not queſtion'd at all, nor does it ſeem material to this Caſe, but that in the ſeveral Alliances made between England and the States-General they were Mutual⯑ly oblig'd to aſſiſt each other with all their Forces. But this is ſo far from taking off the Edge of the Complaint, that it rather fixes and confirms the ſame; for that we alledge that the Dutch have not aſſiſted with all their Forces, and to determine the Signification of the ſaid Term, and how the ſame is to be underſtood, we are to obſerve, that leſt it ſhould create here⯑after any Miſunderſtanding among the Al⯑lies, the ſeveral Quota's or Proportions of the Allies were ſettled between every the particular Nations Annually. Now the Parliament's Complaint is clear in this, nor does the Memorial of the States offer one Word of Anſwer to it; they do not com⯑plain in general, that the States have not [68] ſupply'd their whole Forces, but that they have not ſupply'd thoſe ſeveral Proporti⯑ons by which their whole Forces were by vertue of their Subſequent Agreement to be underſtood; and this appears from the very Memorial itſelf, where their High Mighti⯑neſſes acknowledge it, and better Proof cannot be deſired. See their own Words.

‘'By the Seventh Article of the Treaty of the Ninth of June 1703, by which that Agreement was renewed, 'tis pro⯑vided, that the Number of Ships of War to be furniſhed by each for their whole Quota according to the ſaid Agreement ſhould be regulated every Year, and that the Rendezvous, as well as the Places where the Ships ſhould be employed, ſhould likewiſe be agreed upon every Year; accordingly this has been concert⯑ed Yearly, Her Majeſty having to that Purpoſe for ſeveral Years ſent over one of Her Admirals, at which Times Two Things principally were taken into Deli⯑beration, namely, the Number of Ship⯑ping and the Places where they ſhould be employ'd.'’

Here it is acknowledg'd by the States that the Quota's were adjuſted between us and them, both as to Number of Ships, and where to be employ'd. There are but Two Objections which the Memorial pre⯑tends to make after this, the Firſt is, Whe⯑ther the Ships which the States furniſhed [69] for the Guard of the North Seas ſhould not be eſteemed Part of their Quota, and Secondly, Whether the Number of Ships mentioned to be employ'd by Her Majeſty in the Channel and in the Mediterranean were neceſſary; theſe are alſo their own Words, to which may be briefly anſwer'd, Firſt, That after they had acknowledged, as above is ſaid, That the Number of Ships and Places where the ſame ſhould be employ'd were every Year concerted, it can no more be asked whether they were neceſſary; the Queſtion rather lyes fairly, Whether the Numbers concerted were reſpectively ſup⯑ply'd, if there had appear'd any ſubſe⯑quent Alteration in the Face of the War. So that if it had ſeem'd to the States leſs ne⯑ceſſary to ſend ſo large a Number of Ships as was agreed, it muſt have been reaſona⯑ble that a new Concert between the Allies ſhould have been made, and ſome mutual Agreement offer'd for leſſening the ſaid Number on both Sides. But to agree Firſt that ſuch a Number on both Sides ſhould be ſupplied, and then ſhortning that Number on their Side, without ſignifying to the Britiſh Court that they thought few⯑er Ships enough, ſo that the Britiſh ſhould be left to ſend their full Quota as agreed, and the States only make an Abatement, this can be no Fair Treatment of the Bri⯑tiſh, nor is it eſteemed fair Dealing in our Country, whatever it may be in Holland; [70] therefore the Complaint of the Com⯑mons in this Caſe ſeems very juſt, and is not at all anſwer'd by this Memorial, for that the States-General did not ſupply the Number of Ships which by their Annual Agreement was concerted between them and Her Majeſty; Secondly, But ſay the States, we did ſupply a great Squadron in the North Seas, which ought to be eſteem⯑ed a Part of our Proportion, and all the Reaſons given for this Way of acting are, that ſuch were the Sentiments of the States⯑General; yet in another Part of the ſaid Memorial it is own'd, and in the Report of the Commiſſioners of the Admiralty it is expreſly ſaid, thoſe Quota's were ſettled only for ſuch Ships as were to act Con⯑junctly or Separately in the Channel and the Mediterranean. But becauſe this Argument is of too much Value to have it depend up⯑on the dubious Conſtruction of Terms, it may be obſerv'd, Firſt, That there is no Parity or Equality in this Argument, for that the Concert of Proportions of Ships to be ſupply'd by us and the States re⯑ſpected only the particular Seas, in which the Power of the French was particularly Formidable, and where their main Fleets were to be expected, as in the Streights, and the Channel, or on the Coaſts of Portu⯑gal and Spain. And that the Britiſh Nation have kept great Squadrons and Fleets out in ſundry other Parts of the World, as the [71] Dutch have done in the North Sea, with⯑out reckoning any ſuch Ships into the Quota or Proportions of the Fleets to be furniſhed as before, for the Carrying on the War, ſuch have been the Fleets and Ships conſtantly ſent to the Weſt-Indies, to St. Helena, to the Canaries, &c. by which it appears, that whatever the Sen⯑timents of the States of Holland have been, as above, the Sentiments of the Britiſh Court have always been, that each Ally ought to have ſupply'd their full Quota of ſuch Ships as were concerted for the Ser⯑vice of the War in the Channel and in the Mediterranean, without eſteeming ſuch Ships as Part thereof which they reſpective⯑ly were obliged to furniſh for the Prote⯑ction of their Commerce in any other Part of the World; and that this was the real Sentiments of the States-General as well as of Her Majeſty, appears for that in all the Ships ſent by either of the Powers into o⯑ther Parts of the World, as into the North Seas, the Baltick, the Weſt-Indies, St. He⯑lena, and the like, they very ſeldom acted in Conjunction, but ſent their reſpective Squadrons ſeparately, as the Neceſſity of their Affairs requir'd. Nor did thoſe Ships act in Conjunction on any Occaſion, ſave only as they found it neceſſary to take the Ships of each other Nation under Convoy, or in their Protection, and made uſe of the Harbours of each Confederate as there [72] might be Occaſion. This is manifeſt, in that notwithſtanding the great Fleets which the States-General have upon all Occaſions ſent to the North Seas, as is al⯑ledg'd, the Britiſh Court have been oblig'd alſo to ſend Annual Squadrons to thoſe Seas for the Safety of their Trade, as well to Ruſſia as to the Eaſt-Country, the Elbe and the Weſer, as alſo for the Defence of the Coaſt of Scotland and Ireland; which Ships, tho' equal, if not ſuperiour, to the Numbers ſent into thoſe Seas by the States-General, have not been accounted by Her Maj [...]ſty as any Part of the Proportion of Ships concerted as aboveſaid with the States.

This therefore can never be the Reaſon of the Report of the Commiſſioners of the Admiralty; and it is ſurprizing to all thoſe who know the State of thoſe Things, to hear the Memorial ſay, the States General had the Care of the North Seas, as they do when they ſum up that Part of their Caſe as follows, viz. ‘'It muſt be obſerved, that in the aforeſaid Ac⯑count Notice is taken only of the Ships of this State, which in Conjunction with thoſe of Her Majeſty were employed in the Mediterranean and the Channel; and that the North Sea, which this State, du⯑ring the War, has generally had the Care of, is wholly omitted: Which Two Things, namely, the Mention of thoſe [73] Ships only of this State which have acted in Conjunction with thoſe of Her Ma⯑jeſty, and the Omiſſion of the North Sea, make ſo great a Difference be⯑tween the Number of Ships reckoned by the foreſaid Account to have been furniſhed by this State, that probably this Difference gave Occaſion to the forming the foreſaid prejudicial Reſolu⯑tion or Vote of the Lower Houſe, which poſſibly would not have been formed might this State have firſt been heard upon it.'’

It ſhould ſeem Needful here to enter into an Enquiry what Number of Ships Her Majeſty has from Time to Time ſent into the North Seas, and how the States-General may be ſaid to have had the Care of the North Seas, when it is well known the Britiſh Trade, nay, and even often the Dutch to Arch-Angel, have been Convoy'd Out and Home by Her Majeſty's Ships; and the Coaſt of Scotland, the Mouth of the Baltick, and the Elbe, have been con⯑ſtantly Guarded by the Britiſh Ships.

Thus by the plaineſt Reaſoning in the World the Memorial is fallacious, for that the Deſiciencies complain'd of remain conſeſt by the States themſelves, the Reaſons pretended to juſtify themſelves are directly contrary to the concerted Pro⯑portions and Treaties made between the ſaid States-General and the Queen's Ma⯑jeſty; [74] and this is exactly agreeable to the Report of the Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, and the Reſolutions of the Houſe of Commons.

The like fallacious Way of Arguing ap⯑pears in the Caſe of the Land-Forces or Troops, in which ſtill their High Migh⯑tineſſes do not deny the Matter of Fact alledged in the ſaid Addreſs, but excuſe and extenuate the ſame by their Efforts otherways, as particularly, they alledge an Article of their Raiſing Troops before us, and this they ſay deſerves ſome Com⯑penſation; that is, that they having rai⯑ſed Fifty Thouſand Men before us, they ſhould be therefore allowed to maintain Fewer than they agreed for afterwards; or to ſpeak plainly, that becauſe they were obliged to a quicker Armament than the Britiſh, therefore they were to have leave to break in upon future Concert, and fail in the Numbers they were to bring in afterward: This ſeems no un⯑fair Conſtruction of the Firſt Clauſe of the Memorial relating to the Troops, which is as follows.

‘'In the Firſt Place, it muſt not be omitted to obſerve on the ſaid Eſtimate, that in the general Charge for the Year 1701, the Forty-four Thouſand Nine Hundred Ninety-two Men which the Ʋnited-Netherlands kept up after the Peace of Ryſwick, are mixed with the [75] Thirty-four Thouſand Eight Hundred Sixty-ſix Men which were taken into Service immediately after the Death of Charles the Second King of Spain; and that for the Year 1702, not only the Troops which this State took into Ser⯑vice that Year, but thoſe hired the Beginning of the foregoing Year, are reckon'd all together; which if put down more diſtinctly would have ſhewn, that this State had reinforced their I roops with above Fifty Thouſand Men a con⯑ſiderable Time before Great-Britain came to make any particular Augmentation; which earlier Arming, to the exceſſive Expence of this State, well deſerved to be allowed for by ſome kind of Com⯑penſation.'’

What can the Words deſerve ſome Com⯑penſation be ſuppos'd to ſignify, but that the States-General concluded from thence that their future Deficiency was to be al⯑low'd becauſe of their more Arming than the Engliſh? Which any one that remem⯑bers the Occaſion may find other Rea⯑ſons to give for, and which the States-General themſelves ſeem to acknowledge, or at leaſt to hint at, which was in ſhort, that the Parliament and People of England did not come into the Meaſures for the laſt War, or perhaps believe it ſo ne⯑ceſſary at firſt as the States did, and therefore did not Vote ſuch large Sums [76] for their Proportion as the States-Gene⯑ral requir'd, and this they now alledge ſhould be made up afterwards. This is gathered from the following Words in the Memorial.

‘'This State were obliged to be con⯑tent with Great-Britain's furniſhing in the Beginning of the War no more than Forty Thouſand Men in the Ne⯑therlands, in ſo great a Diſproportion with reſpect to this State; not becauſe there was any Convention or Agree⯑ment made about it, or that it was at all reaſonable, but becauſe no more was conſented to by the Parliament, the Reaſons of which are probable freſh ſtill in the Remembrance of many; and at that Time the only Courſe this State could take, was to burthen itſelf with ſo great a Diſproportion, and to wait till in the Continuance of the War it ſhould be made good to them'’

This may imply that the States-Gene⯑ral deſired to have this Diſproportion made good to them afterwards by the Engliſh, but does not prove that it ought to have been made good, or that the Queen of Great-Britian had agreed to make it good much leſs did it ſignifie that they were thereby Entituled to make it good to themſelves by a Deficiency in ſuch Quota's and Proportions as they [77] ſhould agree afterwards to bring into the Field.

Upon the whole then it ſeems the Sum of the Caſe is this, that the Dutch have really been Deficient in the ſaid Quo⯑ta's, but that according to their own Senti⯑ments they might lawfully be ſo, notwith⯑ſtanding expreſs Treaties and Conventions to the contrary; and that theſe Sentiments ariſe from their thinking fit to make Repri⯑zal or Stoppage upon England, for the Dutch coming into the War a Year before us; and becauſe we did not think fit to come into the Alliance ſooner, they are making us pay for our ſtanding out.

More or leſs than this cannot be made of their long Memorial, and as to the Juſtice and Equity of this the World is left to judge of that Affair.

The Author of this had reſolved to add here ſome Remarks about the Pretence of carrying on the War with all their Forces; and the States ſaying that Britain is more Powerful, and therefore muſt bring in more Forces, making themſelves Judges of who is, or is not, moſt Powerful; but Her Ma⯑jeſty's Anſwer to the States, ſince publiſhed, has made this ſo clear, and preſt it ſo cloſe upon the Dutch, that it ſeems needleſs to ſay any more to that Point.