TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD NORTH, &c., &c.

1. I TAKE it for granted that, whenever it ſhall be thought adviſeable to form a new arrangement for the future govern⯑ment of Bengal, and for the general ſe⯑curity of our acquiſitions and eſtabliſh⯑ments in India, on ſome determinate prin⯑ciple, and under an united authority, the ſubſtance of our public letters to the Court [2] of Directors, and of the ſeveral minutes ſigned by Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and myſelf, as far as they may appear to relate to thoſe objects, will be duly conſidered. We ſpared no pains to procure uſeful information, nor neglected any opportunity of communicating it to the Company and to Government; not confining our reflections to the particular ſubject before us, but extending them generally to the political intereſts and in⯑ternal adminiſtration of the country, as far as the occaſion would permit; and I truſt that, however our efforts, in other reſpects, may have been diſappointed of their immediate aim, the inquiries we made, and the knowledge obtained by them, will not be found uſeleſs to our ſucceſſors. To execute this part of the duty of our appointment as completely as I can, and to enable Government to take ſuch meaſures hereafter, for a final arrangement of India affairs, as may in⯑clude every caſe fit to be provided for, and not be defeated in the execution, I beg leave to ſubmit to your Lordſhip ſome [3] important queſtions, on which we have had no proper opportunity of delivering our opinion, and which, I preſume, cannot be left undecided at home, with⯑out great inconvenience to the public ſer⯑vice here. Many of theſe queſtions are obvious, and will, without doubt, have already occurred to your Lordſhip. I think it neceſſary, nevertheleſs, not to paſs by any point whatever, on which your Lordſhip might poſſibly deſire an opinion or expect information from me.

2. The firſt queſtion, in the ſolution of which that of many others will be in⯑cluded, is of ſo much importance, and united with political conſiderations ſo re⯑mote from the immediate intereſts of Bengal, that I do not preſume to ſtate it in any other ſhape, than ſimply as a queſ⯑tion; viz. ‘"To what extent and in what form the actual ſovereignty of Great Britain over theſe provinces ſhall be avowed?"’ A higher judgment than mine muſt determine, whether any plan of meaſures for the internal Government [4] of Bengal can be perfectly regular, ſyſte⯑matical, or ſecure, which does not ſup⯑poſe and eſtabliſh a unity of dominion. The operations of that power, deſcending from a ſingle ſource, would flow with regularity in their natural channels, and never claſh with each other.

3. In this obſervation, the object is conſidered as it ſtands; a country, in which the principal branches of the ſove⯑reign power are exerciſed by the Eaſt-India Company, where juſtice is admi⯑niſtered partly under the authority of the Subadar, and partly under that of the King of Great Britain, and where the na⯑tives in general acknowledge no King but the Mogul, whoſe rights as Sovereign are admitted by all Indoſtan, under whoſe authority the revenues are collected, and in whoſe name the current money of Bengal is coined. The wiſdom of His Majeſty's Council will determine, in what manner theſe ſeveral rights and powers can now be reconciled or adjuſted; or whether the actual condition of the object [5] will admit of any inſtitutions compleatly free from exception.

4. If meaſures, already taken, and the effects they have produced, had no influence on thoſe, which muſt be pur⯑ſued hereafter, the ſafeſt, the moſt ſim⯑ple, and the leaſt invidious principle, on which this territory could be held, would have been that of a fixed tribute from the native Prince of the country, an armed force ſufficient to inſure his dependence, and one ſtrong poſt for ſecurity or retreat. On this principle, an interference in the internal Government would have defeated our own plan, and deprived us of the be⯑nefit of it. Acts of power, not neceſſary to the ſecurity of the dominion, are moſt felt by the conquered people, who, once ſubmitting to the dominion itſelf, will not repine at meaſures indiſpenſibly ne⯑ceſſary to preſerve it. Such meaſures do not invade the laws, religion, man⯑ners, or prejudices of the people. Obe⯑dience is their ſole object; and that Go⯑vernment will be beſt obeyed, under [6] which the people are limited the leaſt in the enjoyment of their private rights. A wiſe Prince, who had made ſuch a conqueſt as Bengal, would probably have endeavoured to make this uſe of it.

5. By bringing this policy into view, I do not mean to propoſe it for preſent practiſe. Facts, not to be reſiſted, oblige me to baniſh that idea. But, though the inſtitution alluded to be in itſelf unattain⯑able, it does not follow that ſome of it's component principles may not be ſelected and preſerved in raiſing another edifice.

6. Circumſtances, inſeparable perhaps from the Conſtitution of the Eaſt India Company, diſqualified them in every ſenſe for the duty and office, which the acquiſition of a territory in India impoſed upon them. A body of merchants had intereſts to provide for, beſides thoſe, which belonged to them in their aſſumed character of Sovereign. Profit, being the only object of a trading company, became the ſole object of Government, when the [7] two characters were united. Commercial principles of the worſt quality, as derived from the Conſtitution of an excluſive company, were all the principles, which the India Company brought with them into the Government of a great kingdom, and it has been governed accordingly. After raiſing the revenues as nearly as poſſible to the level of the rents, for the ſupport of their Government, they mono⯑polized the produce and labour of the country for the ſupport of their trade. To obtain the higheſt poſſible revenue from the land, they were obliged to avow or countenance a principle ſubverſive of all national proſperity, and not leſs falſe in fact, than abſurd in theory and dan⯑gerous in practice; ‘"that the ruling power was proprietor of the ſoil."’ On this principle, they univerſally diſpoſſeſſed the hereditary and lawful owners, and farmed the country to ſtrangers. In a few inſtances, where the proprietors were employed, it was not in their true cha⯑racter, but as farmers of Government. There is no example, I believe, of ſuch [8] an act of power in the Hiſtory of In⯑doſtan.

7. The Company's ſyſtem, ſuppoſing it to have no view but the advantage of the body corporate, muſt have ruined Bengal, without the aſſiſtance of their ſervants, though not in ſo ſhort a pe⯑riod. ‘"^*Of all deſpotic governments, there is none which oppreſſes itſelf more than where the prince declares himſelf proprietor of the ſoil, and heir of all his ſubjects. It always follows, that the cultivation of the earth is abandoned; but if, beſides this, the prince is a merchant, every ſpecies of induſtry is ruined."’

8. The internal juriſdictions of the country fell with the rights of the Ze⯑mindars, who were naturally, and by in⯑ſtitution, the magiſtrates of the people in the ordinary detail of juſtice, and an⯑ſwerable for the peace of their reſpective [9] Zemindaries. Great caſes were reſerved for the deciſion of the prince.

9. It is true that no attempt has been made to interrupt the natives in the ex⯑erciſe of their religion, much leſs to give them an idea of a better. The ſpi⯑rit of perſecution or converſion is foreign from the Engliſh character; nor could any additional profit have been derived from it. But the decline of the Zemin⯑dars has, in a great meaſure, deprived the lower claſſes of one of their princi⯑pal enjoyments—the ſhews, proceſſions, and pageantry of a ceremonious ſuper⯑ſtition; at the ſame time that the ſources, out of which many charitable and reli⯑gious inſtitutions were ſupported, have been reduced or annihilated.

10. Your Lordſhip will ſoon perceive how much it is the general object of this repreſentation to eſtabliſh an opinion, that, to make the poſſeſſion of Bengal beneficial and permanent, we ſhould re⯑vert to the ancient inſtitutions of the [10] country, as far as we are acquainted with them, and preſent circumſtances will permit. If it were not for the expe⯑rience of ſome years paſt, it might be ſuperfluous to ſay, that we provide for our intereſts when we conſult the happi⯑neſs and proſperity of the people, who labour for us.

11. It appears to have been the Com⯑pany's original policy, or that of Lord Clive, to govern theſe provinces through the medium of the Subadar, and the beſt they could adopt, ſuppoſing them to in⯑terpoſe in any ſhape in the internal go⯑vernment. This ſyſtem was ſoon vio⯑lated in fact, and not long afterwards avowedly renounced. The predominant power of the Council at Calcutta neceſ⯑ſarily reduced the Subadar to a cypher, and left him and his ſubjects, as it always will do, a prey to individuals. Forms and appearances were, however, in ſome degree, preſerved till the death of Syef-ul-Dowla in 1770. From that period we ſee nothing in the adminiſtration of [11] public affairs but enormous abuſes on one ſide, and an abſolute want of power or perſeverance to correct them on the other. But theſe are topics, on which I need not enlarge. Occaſional acts of vigour, on the part of the Court of Directors, were little felt or regarded in Bengal, and neither did nor could pro⯑duce any laſting improvement in the conduct of their repreſentatives. Abuſes, which belong to the nature of the thing, and riſe directly out of it, are not to be corrected by regulations, even if the profeſſed intentions of the Court of Di⯑rectors had been conſtantly and ſincerely ſupported. The Company's government was founded on a falfe and claſhing principle, and would, at all events, have produced the effects it has done, though perhaps by ſlower gradations. A fortu⯑nate choice of men, and a firm admini⯑ſtration, might have checked the rapid growth of abuſes, and delayed the ne⯑ceſſity of an entire change of ſyſtem to a remoter period. Under the Company's government, even this caſual reſource was [12] not to be expected. Their ſervants could not riſe to high ſituations without hav⯑ing ſpent their youth in the ſervice. Their minds, in general, unprepared by education, and ſoftened by the climate, were open to the impreſſions of example. The extraordinary temptations, to which almoſt every degree of power in this country is expoſed, has too direct a ten⯑dency to corrupt the hand, to which it is intruſted. But temptation is converted into neceſſity, or may plauſibly aſſume the ſame colours, when high ſtations are not united with avowed emoluments pro⯑portioned to them. Among other maxims, which belonged to the Company's com⯑mercial inſtitutions, and which they transferred to their political government, one was, not to allow their ſervants directly even a ſubſiſtence. On this principle they treated miniſters of ſtate and rulers of provinces as they had done clerks and factors. They were them⯑ſelves too powerful to be juſt, and neither did nor could reaſonably expect that their ſervants would not follow their [13] example. It was in vain, therefore, that they ſometimes endeavoured or pretended to reconcile regularity and juſtice, in the detail of their adminiſtration, with injuſtice in its fundamental principle—I mean that of uniting the character of Sovereign and merchant, and exerciſing the power of the firſt for the benefit of the ſecond.—‘"^*A government cannot be unjuſt without having hands to exerciſe its injuſtice. Now it is im⯑poſſible but theſe hands will be graſp⯑ing for themſelves. Peculation, there⯑fore, is natural in deſpotic ſtates."’

12. The Subadar's authority, ſince the Company's acceptance of the Dewanny, has been gradually reduced under three ſucceſſive Nabobs, and is now merely titular in the perſon of Mobarek-ul-Dowla. The adminiſtration of criminal juſtice is, however, ſtill exerciſed, in his name, by the Naib Suba, Mahomed [14] Riza Cawn; and we ſometimes avail ourſelves of the pretence of his authority in our differences with the foreign fac⯑tories. Diveſted of all power, and wholly dependent on the Company's pleaſure, he has nevertheleſs ſuch rights and claims to plead as may embarraſs any new arrangement, in which the office of Subadar is not included. His ſituation, and the difficulties likely to ariſe out of it, deſerve to be conſidered.

13. By the treaty concluded between him and the Company, in March, 1770, they engage to ſecure the Subahdarry to him, and to ſupport him in it, againſt all his enemies. They alſo engage to pay him an annual ſtipend of thirty-two lacks out of the revenues. The admi⯑niſtration of juſtice, in his name, is an acknowledgement of his authority as repreſentative of the Sovereign. The Company approved of preſerving the ſucceſſion in the family of Meer Jaffier, but ordered his ſtipend to be reduced to [15] ſixteen lacks a year during his minority ^*. It is not determined at what period the minority is to end, nor by what autho⯑rity the Company could reduce the ſtipend fixed by the treaty. The Nabob has been marriageable ſome years, and has ſeveral children. His age admits of no pretence to conſider him as a minor; nor, if it did, would the Company, in their aſſumed quality of guardian, be the leſs accountable to him for the ſavings created by the reduction of his ſtipend. We have yet received no inſtructions whatſoever on this ſubject. The Nabob does not ſubmit, without reluctance, to the reſtraints laid upon him. I have reaſon to believe that he has made private applications to the Governor, and may repeat them to the Board, for the remo⯑val of Mahomed Riza Cawn, and to be allowed the enjoyment and exerciſe of whatever rights are left him. He may then demand the full amount and arrears of his penſion; and it is not unlikely [16] that, failing of relief from Government, he may be adviſed to inſtitute a ſuit againſt the Company in the Supreme Court of Judicature. If the deciſion ſhould be favourable to him, the Com⯑pany, I take it for granted, will throw the burden on the territorial revenues, notwithſtanding they have appropriated the ſavings, already made by the reduc⯑tion of his ſtipend, to the proviſion of their inveſtment.

14. With reſpect to the Nabob, the principal points to be determined are, Firſt, ‘"Whether the office of Subahdar ſhall be continued, and on what foot⯑ing?"’ Secondly, ‘"At what period the Nabob's minority is to end?"’ Thirdly, ‘"What meaſures are to be taken in the caſe of his death?"’—Mahomed Riza Cawn's conduct, in his ſtation of Naib Subah, has been hitherto unexceptionable; but it is not to be ex⯑pected that he ſhould act with freedom, or be able to render us any eſſential ſer⯑vice, while the terror of the Governor's [17] actual power and of a claſhing juriſdic⯑tion with the Supreme Court is hanging over him.

15. In ſixing the future eſtabliſhment of the Subahdar and Naib Subah, it muſt be taken into conſideration that the circulation of their penſions is beneficial to the country; that they ſupport a number of Muſſulman families of diſ⯑tinction, which would be reduced to beggary if the penſions were withdrawn; and that the Fouzdarry Courts, now under Mahomed Reza Cawn, compre⯑hend almoſt all the offices, in which Muſ⯑ſulmen can be employed.

16. The ſovereignty aſſumed might authoriſe His Majeſty to remove the Subahdar; but I know not on what prin⯑ciple the Mogul Shaw Allum can be di⯑veſted of his ſovereign rights, unleſs ſome ſatisfactory compromiſe can be made with him. The Company hold the De⯑wanny by his grant. The treaty con⯑cluded by Lord Clive in Auguſt, 1765, [18] not only acknowledges him as King of Bengal, but ſecures to him the full poſſeſſion of Korah and Illahabad as a royal demeſne for the ſupport of his dignity and expences; and by a particular agreement between him and the Company, of the ſame date, they engage themſelves to be ſecurity for the payment of twenty-ſix lacks a year, out of the territorial revenues, in conſideration of His Majeſty's having been graciouſly pleaſed to grant them the Dewanny of Bengal. Your Lordſhip knows how little theſe treaties have been regarded: his tribute was ſtopt, and his country (though avowedly entruſted to our good faith, and accepted as a depoſit) ſold to Sujah Dowla.

17. It was invariably the opinion of Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and myſelf, that the honour of the na⯑tion required that juſtice ſhould be done to the Mogul in ſome ſhape or other, and that it might be made conducive to our intereſt to ſupport him. Conſidering his preſent diſtreſſes, it would not per⯑haps [19] be very difficult to form a plan, in which his ſatisfaction, and the general tranquillity of the empire, might be equally conſulted.

18. After the internal ſettlement of our own territories, the next object ſhould be to lay the foundation of a general peace thro' Indoſtan, and, if poſſible, to give or reſtore an active con⯑ſtitution to the empire. Bengal cannot flouriſh while the neighbouring ſtates are perpetually in arms againſt each other. Returns of wealth are not to be obtained from nations, which have no in⯑duſtry of their own, or that languiſh under the dominion of the ſword. As the firſt ſtep to peace, the authority of the Emperor ſhould be in a conſiderable degree reſtored, and means given him to ſupport it. In return for an acquittance of his claims upon the Company, a reſpec⯑table demeſne might be found for him out of the countries lying north-weſt of Oude, of which Delhy might be the center. This ſtep might lead to and fa⯑cilitate [20] a general pacification, in which the rights of every ſubordinate power might be determined, and to which they ſhould all be invited to accede. The predominant power of the Engliſh ſhould be employed to cut through difficulties, and to guarantee the obſervance of the treaty. As far at leaſt as the ſucceſs of ſuch a plan may be attainable by nego⯑ciation, it certainly deſerves to be en⯑couraged from home, and recommended to the Adminiſtration here.

19. The Britiſh power is now un⯑queſtionably the firſt in India; at leaſt for defence. To make it reſpectable in it⯑ſelf and beneficial to mankind, it muſt be guided by ſolid, judicious principles of policy, and they muſt be ſteadily purſued. Enough has been done to eſtabliſh the reputation of our arms. If we mean to keep what we have acquired, ſome care muſt be taken to eſtabliſh an opinion of our ſteadineſs and juſtice. A continued diviſion in this council, be⯑ſides many other dangerous effects, pro⯑duces [21] one which, I conceive, would have had great weight at home, if it had been foreſeen and conſidered. It expoſes the meaſures of Government, which, at leaſt in every fundamental point, ought to be fixed and uniform, to perpetual altera⯑tions, as the actual power may acciden⯑tally fluctuate from one ſide to the other. The death of Colonel Monſon produced not only a change of Adminiſtration, but a total change of ſyſtem. The death of Mr. Haſtings or Mr. Barwell might have reſtored the courſe of public meaſures to their former channel. Other caſes may now be foreſeen, in which a future ma⯑jority may neither revert deciſively to our principles, nor completely execute the reſolutions of their immediate prede⯑ceſſors. The event will depend on the temper, character, and views of the men who compoſe it, and the new difficulties they may have to contend with. Dimi⯑nution of dignity is not to be ſeparated from a fluctuation of councils; but changes of ſyſtem, which ſhake the foundation, are never accompliſhed with⯑out [22] extraordinary difficulty and hazard; nor is it always open to the wiſeſt men to do perfectly right after much wrong has been done. A new poſition of things creates a new queſtion, in which facts, as well as principles, muſt govern the deciſion.

20. The preſent condition of the Na⯑bob of Oude, and the ſtate of his do⯑minions, is the principal inſtance to which this reaſoning is meant to be ap⯑plied. Your Lordſhip will ſoon ſee what an important ſhare belongs to it in the political intereſts of Bengal.

21. On the death of the late Sujah Dowla, Mr. Haſtings delivered a formal opinion to the Council, and afterwards to the Court of Directors^*, ‘"that we could not with juſtice make any fur⯑ther demands upon his ſucceſſor."’ He admitted, ‘"that the treaty concluded by Mr. Briſtow was very advantageous [23] to the Company,"’ but he recom⯑mended ‘"that their orders might be ſuch as might tend to conciliate the mind of the Nabob, and to remove the apprehenſion of any future in⯑croachments on his dominions."’

22. The arguments, which prevailed with a majority of the Board againſt the firſt opinion of Mr. Haſtings, appear at large on our proceedings. We reſolved, that the engagements which had ſub⯑ſiſted between Sujah Dowla and the Company were perſonal, and expired with him. On this principle, denied by Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Barwell, and ſince diſavowed by the Company, (who have availed themſelves of the conſequences derived from it,) the treaty of Fyzabad with the preſent Nabob of Oude was concluded in May 1775. The terms of it were as favourable to us as our real intereſt demanded, and more ſo than could have been obtained in other cir⯑cumſtances. In return for the ceſſion of Ghazipore we granted him nothing but [24] a guarantee of the dominions originally poſſeſſed by his father, with an expreſs excluſion of his late conqueſts. For the defence of theſe dominions, we agreed to continue a brigade in his ſervice, but obliged him to make a conſiderable ad⯑dition to the former ſubſidy. His own undiſciplined troops were, however, a greater burthen to him, and drained all his reſources without the poſſibility of doing him any ſervice. To leave his army on this footing was, in effect, to expoſe him and his country to deſtruc⯑tion; and he was ſenſible of it. The reſolution to ſupply him with a moderate number of Britiſh officers was ſubſe⯑quent to the treaty. A corps of thirteen battalions of ſepoys, and three regiments of cavalry, was formed out of his diſ⯑orderly troops, and put under the com⯑mand of theſe officers; but it was ſtill his army. A conſiderable number of the reſt were reduced. This was the utmoſt extent of the interpoſition of our Govern⯑ment in the Nabob's affairs; and at this point we were determined to ſtop. The [25] internal adminiſtration of his country might be expoſed to abuſes, but we were perfectly ſure that they would never be corrected by our taking charge of it.

23. Since the power of this Council devolved to Mr. Haſtings, other ideas have prevailed. The recall of Mr. Briſ⯑tow and the appointment of Mr. Mid⯑dleton were the firſt ſteps to the new ſyſtem. An entire change of conduct towards the Nabob was talked of very ſoon after colonel Monſon's death. I know not by what ſecret motives Mr. Haſtings has been guided, nor how far the anxiety of his mind and the delicacy of his ſituation may have influenced his con⯑duct, at points of time when apparently it was too late to deliberate. The noto⯑rious fact is, that in all his late arrange⯑ments of the Nabob's government, he has reſolved haſtily and executed ſlowly. The reſolution to transfer the Nabob's troops under Britiſh officers to the Com⯑pany's eſtabliſhment, did not appear till May laſt, though it was publicly known [26] ſeveral months before; and near three months more have been ſuffered to elapſe before the new officers were appointed. General Clavering's remonſtrances and mine againſt the meaſure were ſcarcely liſtened to, though accompanied with urgent and repeated repreſentations to Mr. Haſtings, not to neglect the defence of Bengal, while he was providing for that of Rohilcund and other diſtant coun⯑tries, in which the Company had no concern. In a few days after, the Go⯑vernor reſolved to inſiſt on the Nabob's diſmiſſing ſome perſons in his ſervice who were obnoxious to us, and on his committing the internal adminiſtration, without reſerve, to a Miniſter named by the Board. The next ſtep was, to offer the Company's protection to Sadut Ally, the Nabob's brother, who had fled from his court, and was the immediate object of his jealouſy, and to invite him to re⯑ſide within theſe provinces. By the lateſt letters from Mr. Middleton it appears, that, under pretence of ſecuring the Company's debt, he has taken the col⯑lection [27] of the greateſt part of the re⯑venues into his own hands.

24. The reſult is, that the Nabob is reduced to a cypher, that all power is veſted in Mr. Middleton, that the coun⯑try, delivered up to aliens, who neither underſtand its intereſts nor have any con⯑cern for its proſperity, is falling into ir⯑retrievable ruin, that the revenues have long been unequal to the expences, and that nothing is collected but by military execution. On this footing it cannot laſt long. The perſonal character of the Nabob offers no reſource againſt the con⯑tinuance of ſuch miſchiefs. I fear he has neither virtue nor capacity to make a proper uſe of power, if power was re⯑ſtored to him; certainly not, in circum⯑ſtances which demand an extraordinary proportion of both. Such is the ſituation we ſtand in at preſent. On the 4th of Auguſt, when Mr. Haſtings recom⯑mended the appointment of the new of⯑ficers, he was pleaſed to declare, that ‘"if the adminiſtration of the Company's [28] affairs ſhould finally reſt in other hands, what he now did would be of little conſequence, as it would be undone of courſe, and the whole ſyſ⯑tem, of which it was but a part, an⯑nulled on the principles on which it was oppoſed."’

25. Without admitting the neceſſity of this concluſion from any act or decla⯑ration of ours, and deeming it highly unjuſtifiable to carry meaſures of ſuch importance into execution under any ex⯑pectation of their being ſpeedily reverſed, I am compelled to confeſs, that the whole ſtate of facts taken together con⯑ſtitutes a queſtion beyond the reach of any degree of wiſdom exiſting in Bengal. We ſhall probably be governed by events for a ſhort period, and, I fear, obliged to abandon the country at the end of it.

26. Before your attention is drawn di⯑rectly to Bengal, permit me to ſtate to your Lordſhip one queſtion more, in which the general ſecurity of the Britiſh [29] empire in India is concerned. The con⯑trolling power, veſted by Parliament in this Government over the other Preſi⯑dencies, is either not extenſive enough, or not defined with clearneſs and preciſion ſufficient to anſwer the purpoſes intended by it. We have not only met with ſlight and diſobedience, in the exerciſe of our au⯑thority in India, but I am ſorry to obſerve, that the Court of Directors themſelves ſeem to view it with jealouſy and diſtruſt. Your Lordſhip cannot but be apprized of the ſupport they have given to the Pre⯑ſidency of Bombay, in oppoſition to the meaſures unanimouſly reſolved on here, for concluding a peace with the Mahrat⯑tas. In their letter of the 24th of De⯑cember laſt, paragraph 45, they charge us with exceeding our lawful authority, when we prohibited the Preſidency of Madras from ſending troops out of their own diſtricts to aid the ſettlement of Bom⯑bay, and they diſapprove our interference in that caſe. I apprehend that the power of declaring and making war includes that of determining in what quarter it [30] ſhall be conducted with the greateſt ge⯑neral advantage, and proſpect of ſucceſs. But every arrangement of ours may be defeated, if the other Preſidencies are permitted to alter the diſpoſition of their reſpective forces, without our conſent, and of courſe without regard to any ge⯑neral plan of operations. Whether this obſervation be well or ill founded, it is plain that the Court of Directors ſought for an occaſion to limit our authority, and to diſcountenance us in the eyes of the other Preſidencies. The fact in queſ⯑tion was of too old a date, and of too little moment in itſelf, to be revived for any other purpoſe. In their letter of the 5th February laſt^*, they cenſure us for relinquiſhing ſome of the ceſſions made by Ragoba in his treaty with the Preſi⯑dency of Bombay, concluded (ſeveral months after our arrival in Bengal) not only without our conſent and approba⯑tion, but without our knowledge. They alſo inſtruct us to take advantage of any [31] failure, on the part of the Mahratta Go⯑vernment, in the execution of the late treaty with them, and to renew the al⯑liance with Ragoba, on the ſame terms which the Preſidency of Bombay had ob⯑tained from him. It is but too probable that, with ſo much encouragement from home, the Governor and Council of Bombay may ſoon find pretences for re⯑ſuming their favourite projects, and in⯑volve us in a general war with the Mah⯑rattas. Whether that conſequence fol⯑lows or not, your Lordſhip will judge, from theſe inſtances, how ineffectual and hazardous any endeavours of ours muſt be to preſerve the peace of India, as long as the determination of peace and war is ſubjected to a claſhing juriſdiction. If it was the original intention of the Legiſla⯑ture, that the whole force of the Britiſh empire in India ſhould be united under one direction, and move together, I muſt ſubmit my opinion to your Lordſhip, that other proviſions, more ſtrict and deciſive than any that exiſt at preſent, are indiſ⯑penſably neceſſary to carry that intention [32] into effect. The latitude ſtill left with the other Preſidencies, to make peace and war, where they ſhall have received ſpecial orders from the Company, without any communication with us, or control on our part, defeats the general view of uniting the political meaſures of the three Governments under one ſyſtem and au⯑thority; becauſe the exception muſt al⯑ways be too powerful for the rule.

27. I have already, in my repreſenta⯑tions to the Company, declared my opi⯑nion ſo fully on many of the moſt im⯑portant branches of the internal Admini⯑ſtration of Bengal, that very little remains for me to ſay on this ſubject. With re⯑ſpect to the amount and collection of the revenues, the Court of Directors and Government are in poſſeſſion of all the lights and materials, I have been able to collect; and theſe, I hope, will enable them to determine, on what footing the land tax of the country ſhall be ſettled hereafter. The principal queſtions are, whether the lands ſhall be reſtored to the [33] hereditary owners. Whether the reve⯑nue, payable to Government, ſhall be fixed immutably at a certain ſum, and by what rule or ſtandard that ſum ſhall be aſcertained. To the two firſt queſtions I have invariably given an affirmative anſwer, founded on reaſons, which I deem incontrovertible. The third muſt be determined by the capacity of the country, eſtimated from an average of the actual collections, and combined with the indiſpenſible demands of Govern⯑ment.

28. The farming ſyſtem was adopted as the act of a proprietor, with a profeſſed view of diſcovering the ultimate value of the eſtate, or the utmoſt that could be obtained from it. Your Lordſhip will judge, how far the end, ſuppoſing it at⯑tainable, could juſtify the means. To General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and myſelf, it always appeared an arbi⯑trary, unexampled act of power, with⯑out a ſhadow of right to ſupport it. The principle, on which it went, annihilated [34] every idea of private property, while in fact it has been ruinous to the country, for the ſole benefit of the Company's ſer⯑vants, and their banians. But, even if the farms had, in every inſtance, been fairly allotted to the higheſt bidders, the meaſure could have produced no other conſequence, than that of forcibly alienat⯑ing the whole landed property of the country, in favour of indigent ſtrangers and adventurers, equally ignorant of the value and circumſtances of the farm, and careleſs how much they offered for immediate poſſeſſion. The laſt ſettle⯑ment, made by the Committee of Circuit, promiſed an immoderate increaſe of reve⯑nue, at a time, when the famine had ſwept away one third of the inhabitants, and when the country was repreſented to be in a general ſtate of decay. Extraor⯑dinary merit was pleaded with the Com⯑pany for this imaginary addition to their reſources. What the real object of the meaſure was, may be collected from the ſucceſs of it. The balances and remiſ⯑ſions, on the ſettlements of the laſt five [35] years, amount to the enormous ſum of two hundred and thirty lacks of Sicca ru⯑pees. The plain truth is, that overrate⯑ment and remiſſion play into each other's hands. If the country be exorbitantly taxed, the Governor and Council muſt be truſted with a diſcretionary power to make remiſſions. This latitude once given or aſſumed, it may be impoſſible to determine in what manner it is applied, or where the remiſſions center at laſt; ſince the diſtribution may be ſo formed, as to intereſt all parties in concealing it. If we had no facts or experience to guide our conjectures, it is apparent that a country, expoſed to arbitrary variations in the annual aſſeſſments, at the diſcre⯑tion of a Council of State, eſpecially at this immenſe diſtance from the ſeat of empire, offers temptations to the Mem⯑bers of ſuch a Council, which will not be always reſiſted. Improvements, in ſuch a ſtate of things, are not to be ex⯑pected; for who will employ his money or his labour in the cultivation of a ſoil, that does not belong to him, or when he [36] has no ſecurity that the whole produce may not be extorted from him by a new aſſeſſment? The wealth of Bengal was ſo great, that the ſevereſt oppreſſion has not yet been ſufficient to beggar it intirely. But the richeſt mines may be exhauſted; and I am moſt deliberately of opinion that if private property be not once for all ſe⯑cured on a permanent footing, the public revenue will ſink rapidly with the general produce of the country. The ſame ſyſtem of taxation, which annihilates the pro⯑perty, attacks the induſtry of the ſubject, invades the ſources of production, and in the end obliges Government to depend for it's revenue on the fidelity of farmers and agents, who have no intereſt in the proſperity of the object, or on the preca⯑rious, periſhable reſources of direct vio⯑lence and extortion.

29. The laſt orders^* of the Court of Directors are favourable to the Zemindars, and other hereditary proprietors of the [37] lands, and amount to an indirect acknow⯑ledgement of the injuſtice they have ſuf⯑fered. They expreſs a ſatisfaction ‘"at finding it in their power to yield pro⯑per relief to the natives, without in⯑volving the Company in the leaſt incon⯑venience;"’ and they direct ‘"that ſuch Zemindars, or renters, as have fulfilled their engagements to our ſatisfaction, ſhall not be diſpoſſeſſed of their lands, or compelled to pay an advanced rent, without the moſt ſubſtantial reaſons."’—Without queſtioning the ſincerity of theſe profeſſions, it is apparent that the lati⯑tude taken in the expreſſion will ſoon defeat their intention. In a caſe, deter⯑minable by fixed general rules, it is equally unſafe and unneceſſary to rely on accidental motives of action, ſuch as the firmneſs, ability, or integrity of the per⯑ſons intruſted with the adminiſtration. What real appeal have the natives of Bengal to the directing Power in Eng⯑land, againſt acts ſuppoſed to be beneficial to that Power, and adorned with flatter⯑ing repreſentations, in which juſtice and [38] profit are apparently united? Your Lord⯑ſhip will judge by what ſort of tenure the natives hold their property, while the convenience of the Eaſt-India Com⯑pany, and the diſcretion of the rulers here, are to regulate the ſtandard by which it is to be taxed. The concluſion, to which this argument leads, is too ob⯑vious to be miſtaken. If I am not greatly deceived, the truths I am endeavouring to eſtabliſh are ſelf-evident, and proved the moment they are ſtated.

30. The annual demand of revenue, once fixed on a reaſonable and permanent eſtabliſhment, would operate to the be⯑nefit of the country in other ſenſes, be⯑ſides that of immediate relief, ſecurity, and improvement. It would ſtop one of the principal ſources of litigation, and facilitate the adminiſtration of civil juſtice by the country Courts. The weight of the revenue preſſes ſo heavily on almoſt all ranks of people, that it becomes every man's ſtudy how to ſhift the burden from himſelf, and of courſe to haraſs his neigh⯑bour. [39] Let the cauſe of action be what it may, it ſeldom happens that the public revenue is not, ſome way or other, con⯑cerned in the origin of the ſuit, or liable to be affected by the iſſue. On the other hand, the introduction of a myſterious ſcience, under the title of the Farming Syſtem, with its endleſs train of princi⯑pal farmers, nominal farmers, ſecurities, counter ſecurities, agents, and cutkin⯑nadars, has not only perplexed the buſi⯑ſineſs of the collections, but increaſed the number of ſuits in the Dewanny Courts, and the difficulty of deciding them. This difficulty is ſo great, and the cauſes de⯑termined are ſo few, in compariſon with the multitude that remain unheard, that, in reality, it amounts to a general denial of juſtice. The little that is done, per⯑haps, is too often mixed with motives of influence or favour. If the revenue were once fixed on a moderate footing, and the people made tolerably eaſy in their cir⯑cumſtances, the ſpirit of litigation muſt gradually ſubſide. At the ſame time, the diſputes between Government and the [40] proprietors of the lands, and of the latter with their under-tenants and ryots, would either vaniſh entirely, or admit of an eaſy and ſummary deciſion. The amount of the rents being unalterably ſettled, would reduce the preſent intricate accounts of demands, receipts, and balances, to a ſimple account current, the balance of which might be authenticated beyond the poſſibility of a diſpute. It muſt be un⯑derſtood, however, that proper meaſures are taken by Government to extend the plan of fixing the rents, to every claſs of people concerned in paying them. In other words, that the ſame ſecurity, which Government gives to the tenant in chief, ſhould, for the ſame reaſons, deſcend to the under-tenants in their ſeveral grada⯑tions, ſo that every rank of ſociety, and every member of it, may have ſomething to call his own. A great part of this bu⯑ſineſs, which ſeems difficult and perplex⯑ed in the detail, will gradually execute itſelf, when once it is perceived, that a wiſe and ſolid ſyſtem is adopted at the Fountain-Head, and ſteadily adhered to. [41] But it is in vain to correct abuſes of admi⯑niſtration, while the principle of the Go⯑vernment is itſelf an abuſe.

31. General Clavering, Colonel Mon⯑ſon and I, had, on many occaſions, but more particularly in our minute dated the 21ſt of March 1776 declared our delibe⯑rate opinion that, ‘"under the general application of the Britiſh laws, or of any form of juſtice adminiſtered gene⯑rally to the natives by the Judges of His Majeſty's Supreme Court of Judi⯑cature, Bengal cannot be held by Great Britain."’ The truth of a ſimilar pro⯑poſition has already been ſo ably defended by Mr. Verelſt, that I need not attempt to eſtabliſh our opinion on other ground. The Dewanny Courts undoubtedly re⯑quire reformation, and I conceive that it would not be difficult to fix them on a footing of ſuch independence, (at leaſt until the Zemindarry juriſdiction can be gradually and completely reſtored) as would remove the moſt plauſible objec⯑tion, made by the Judges, to the inſtitu⯑tion [42] of ſuch Courts; viz. ‘"That, as they are at preſent conſtituted, the moſt powerful of the parties, in every revenue cauſe, is in effect the Judge."’

32. The Zemindar, as Lord of the Manor, might immediately adminiſter juſtice, in petty caſes, between his te⯑nants. An appeal from him, or the ori⯑ginal ſuit, in caſes where he himſelf or his officers might be parties, ſhould reſt with the Dewanny or Superior Civil Court of the Diſtrict. This Court ſhould be placed under the ſuperintendance of an Engliſh gentleman, properly quali⯑fied, with ſufficient appointments, under an oath to act faithfully, and not remov⯑able during his good behaviour. He ſhould have Judges of the Hindoo and Mahomedan laws to aſſiſt him, and his deciſions, under a certain amount, ſhould be final. For greater ſums, an appeal might be allowed to the Governor and Council, or to one ſuperior court eſtab⯑liſhed centrically by their authority and formed on the ſame principles of inde⯑pendance. [43] I mean only to trace the out⯑lines of a clear and ſimple plan for the benefit of the natives, not reſident in Calcutta, and would recommend that the execution or improvement of it ſhould be referred to the Governor and Council here, with power to eſtabliſh ſuch inſti⯑tutions as they may deem adviſeable, and to put them in force, until farther orders can be received from England. But, in whatever hands it may be thought fit to place the adminiſtration of juſtice, I am clearly and immoveably of opinion, that the conſtitution and manners of the natives, fixed as they are to the ſoil which gave them birth, and never to be remov⯑ed from it without the ſevereſt oppreſ⯑ſion, do indiſpenſibly require that juſtice ſhould be carried home to their doors. My wiſh is to revert, as nearly as poſ⯑ſible, to the ancient inſtitutions of the country, which, however perverted by the occaſional violence of an arbitrary Government, or corrupted by abuſes, will, I believe, be found judicious in them⯑ſelves, and better accommodated to the [44] genius of the people, than any ſyſtem forcibly introduced from the other ſide of the globe. Whatever grievance they might have ſuffered, by an abuſe of their own inſtitutions, it could not be greater than thoſe, which belong to an admini⯑ſtration of juſtice ſuppoſed to be guided by other principles, and pretending to be gratuitous. It is not in England at leaſt, that juſtice is adminiſtered without delay or vexation, or perhaps ever obtained without exorbitant expences. Inconve⯑niences of this nature, if felt in Weſt⯑minſter Hall, muſt unavoidably be ag⯑gravated on the natives of this country, who, from their ignorance of our lan⯑guage, laws, and cuſtoms, and of the forms of the Court, are left intirely at the mercy of their interpreters, advocates, and attornies.

When theſe important queſtions come to be conſidered, I truſt they will be de⯑cided by men qualified to give laws to nations, and on principles more liberal and extenſive, than can be derived from [45] any degree of ſkill in the interpretation of acts of Parliament, or from the prac⯑tice of our Courts.

33. The Zemindars have, for ſome years paſt, been affectedly, and for a pur⯑poſe ſufficiently obvious, ſtiled collectors of the revenue. This idea ſeems to have been adopted for the ſupport of another, equally ill founded, that the ruling Power is proprietor of the ſoil. A doctrine, which annihilated private property, muſt find ſome cauſe to account for the exiſtence of ſuch perſons as the Zemindars. It con⯑verted them into Collectors ^*, without ven⯑turing to deny their hereditary poſſeſſion of the lands, or the reality of their tenure, under the Mogul government, by an un⯑alterable quit rent. The facts and the doctrine are not to be reconciled. The hiſtory and conſtitution of the country, if they had ever been attended to, would have removed all difficulties. The Ze⯑mindars, it is true, were Officers and Magiſtrates, obliged by their ſunnuds to [46] the performance of certain civil duties, which relieved the Prince in the admi⯑niſtration of his internal government. But it was the poſſeſſion of landed pro⯑perty, which naturally impoſed thoſe duties on the Zemindars, and ipſo facto made them the Magiſtrates of the coun⯑try. There could not be a wiſer policy, either for the Prince, to whom the men of property were made reſponſible, or for the people, who had juſtice brought home to them, and adminiſtered by men who had a ſtake in the country, and a na⯑tural permanent intereſt in its proſperity.

34. I have nothing farther to add on this ſubject to our minute of the 21ſt March, 1776, and to our letter to your Lordſhip of the 16th May following, to which I beg leave to refer you.

35. On the ſtate of the coinage, and the expediency of eſtabliſhing one ſilver coin for the general currency of the provinces, every thing has been ſaid, in our repreſentations to the Court of Di⯑rectors, [47] which the ſubject has hitherto ſug⯑geſted to us. The main queſtions to be de⯑termined at home are, What the ſtandard and weight of the coin ſhall be [...] What name or title ſhall be ſtamped upon it? And whether a gold coin ſhall be ad⯑mitted as a legal tender^*?—One of theſe queſtions depends on the declara⯑tion of the ſovereignty, and muſt be decided by it. The ſecond muſt be ſubmitted to men of knowledge and experience, and proper perſons and in⯑ſtruments ſent out to execute whatever plan may be reſolved on. The third is more eaſily determined in theory than in fact. The current coin ought to be confined to one of the precious metals; but, in the preſent condition of Bengal, I doubt whether there be a ſufficient quantity of ſilver in the provinces to anſwer the ordinary demands of circu⯑lation, without the aſſiſtance of a gold coinage. This point, I apprehend, muſt [48] be left to the diſcretion of the Governor and Council.

36. Suppoſing the ſeveral articles al⯑ready touched upon to be now in ſome degree explained and underſtood, I may aſſure your Lordſhip, that there ſtill remains a number of abuſes to be cor⯑rected, which, though of leſs compara⯑tive importance, are ſufficient to diſtreſs and perplex any government, and to harraſs the people ſubject to it.

Firſt, The mode of keeping public accounts here, beſides that they are kept in a barbarous unknown language, ſome in Perſian, and others in the Bengal dia⯑lect, is involved in obſcurity by a con⯑fuſed reference to different aeras, and to different ſyſtems of dividing the year. Few perſons can fairly find their way through ſuch a labyrinth; but every man, concerned either in paying or re⯑ceiving the revenues, may ſome way or other find his account in the confuſion that ariſes from it.

[49] Secondly, The barbarous terms affect⯑edly made uſe of in all our records con⯑ſtitute a ſeparate ſcience, which, tho' not difficult to learn upon the ſpot, tends to make our letters unintelligible in England. This practice might eaſily be corrected. The beſt remedy, per⯑haps, for the confuſion in the accounts and mode of reckoning, would be to in⯑troduce the Chriſtian aera at once into Bengal, ſo that the ruling power and their ſubjects might compute by one and the ſame meaſure of time. I ſuggeſt this idea rather as a queſtion than as an opinion, deſiring only that it may be conſidered.

37. If, with the Chriſtian aera, the Engliſh language could be introduced into the tranſaction of buſineſs, as the Perſian was by the Mogul Conqueror^*, [50] I conceive it would be attended with convenience and advantage to Govern⯑ment, and no diſtreſs or diſadvantage to the natives. To qualify themſelves for employment, they would be obliged to ſtudy Engliſh inſtead of Perſian. If ſchools were eſtabliſhed in the diſtricts, with proper encouragement to the maſ⯑ters, a very few years would produce a ſet of young men qualified for buſineſs, whoſe example and ſucceſs would ſpread, and graft the inſtitution gradually into the manners of the people. The natives would ſoon find it one of the moſt effec⯑tual barriers againſt the oppreſſion of Europeans. Every man then would be able to ſpeak for himſelf, and every complaint would be underſtood.

38. I come now, my Lord, to the moſt delicate and hazardous part of my taſk. With an unlimited confidence in your Lordſhip's candour, and in your approbation of the principles on which I act, I cannot be inſenſible of the danger of always appearing in a charac⯑ter [51] of hoſtility to the intereſts of indi⯑viduals, and of incurring perſonal en⯑mity without a certainty of perſonal ſupport. My late colleagues and I fre⯑quently met this danger, whatever it might be; and I muſt diſregard it now, in a more important inſtance, or not acquit myſelf of perhaps the moſt eſſen⯑tial duty implied by my appointment.

39. Suppoſing that, in a future ar⯑rangement, the trade to the Eaſt Indies is not to be laid open, (for, if it were, the preſent queſtion would be altered) it muſt be conſidered in what manner the Company's commercial intereſts are to be provided for, and whether any and what degree of influence, over the internal government of Bengal, ſhall be reſerved to them. In delivering an opi⯑nion on a queſtion of ſuch delicacy and importance, I ſhall not ſtop to guard and qualify my expreſſions. Your Lord⯑ſhip will diſtinguiſh the ſubſtance from the form, and allow for the ſtrong im⯑preſſions [52] which an immediate view of facts has made upon my mind.

40. The return of a permanent tri⯑bute to Great Britain, whether it conſiſts of ſpecie or manufactures, and whether exported on the Company's account or that of individuals, is an evil attached to the political ſituation of Bengal, under which, I fear, it will ſink at laſt. It is impoſſible that the internal reſources of any country ſhould anſwer a conſtant demand on one ſide, without a propor⯑tionate ſupply from other quarters. The fact is againſt Bengal, in both inſtances. Even oeconomy and good government, if ſuch things exiſted, would not alone be ſufficient to avert the conſequence. A country, that gives, muſt receive, or its power of giving muſt ſoon be at an end. But our principal India markets are loſt in the ruin of Perſia and Indoſ⯑tan, and Europe returns nothing. It is unneceſſary to enter into a detail of the diſadvantages, under which the in⯑ternal traffic and induſtry of this coun⯑try [53] labour. The ſame principle of go⯑vernment, if it deſerves that name, which unites the Sovereign and the mer⯑chant in the ſuppoſed perſon of the Company, naturally extends thro' every branch of their commercial admi⯑niſtration, and communicates ſome por⯑tion of their own arbitrary power to the loweſt agent or factor in their ſervice. The abuſes that follow are minute in their operation, and ſpare nothing. They reach to perſons and property, which no other ſyſtem of power could deſcend to, but which cannot eſcape the penetrating eyes of men acquainted with all the little channels, thro' which the loweſt order of manufacturers de⯑rive their ſubſiſtence. To this unpro⯑tected claſs of men no money has been ſhewn: nor could it be otherwiſe in a country where the Sovereign has views and intereſts incompatible with that cha⯑racter, and profeſſes them;—where the ſame power, or they who adminiſter it, take the rents of the lands as proprietor,—engroſs all the merchantable produce [54] as monopoliſt, and all the induſtry of the manufacturer for the pretended ſup⯑ply of their inveſtment.—^*Not longer ago than March, 1775, the Court of Directors, after expreſſing an unwilling⯑neſs to return to the former coercive ſyſtem of providing an inveſtment, ex⯑preſsly ordered us ‘"to prohibit all per⯑ſons whatever, under their protection, from trading in any of thoſe articles which compoſe their inveſtment, di⯑rectly or indirectly, until it was com⯑pleated."’ This, among other regu⯑lations, was ordered ‘"to be forth with publiſhed throughout the provinces, and conſidered as a ſtanding order of the Company in all time to come."’

41. You will judge, my Lord, what kind of power devolves to the Com⯑pany's commercial ſervants under co⯑lour of ſuch inſtructions. If, at any time, it ſhould be thought neceſſary to [55] inveſtigate this ſubject with greater par⯑ticularity, a petition from the merchants of Dacca, (entered on our Revenue Con⯑ſultations of the 24th of September, 1776) with the papers annexed, will afford a thorough inſight into it. The ſyſtem itſelf, united with the increaſe of taxes, could produce no other con⯑ſequences but thoſe, which the Com⯑pany themſelves have felt and com⯑plained of,—the ruin of the manufac⯑turers, a conſiderable debaſement in the quality of the goods, and an equal ad⯑vance upon the price. For the purpoſe of this repreſentation, it is ſufficient to mark the principle, on which the Com⯑pany have acted, without purſuing the practice through all its operations. In ſtating the cauſe, we aſcertain the effect. The nation is not leſs intereſted than the Company in removing both. Under the preſent ſyſtem, the manufactures muſt gradually ſink to the level of the demand for the Europe markets, or very little more; but all this inveſtment, whether exported by the Company, by their [56] ſervants, or by the foreign factories, being really paid for by the money of the country, adds nothing to its ſtock or ability to ſupply many other channels, thro' which its wealth is extracted.

42. I apprehend that the decline of Bengal takes its origin too high to be recovered by any vigour of Adminiſtra⯑tion, or even by a correction of abuſes. A new principle muſt be aſſumed for the government of the country, or it muſt fall. Meaſures, of any other quality, may perhaps delay the criſis, but cannot prevent it. I muſt be permitted to ſup⯑poſe that the government is not to be continued in the hands of a mercantile body, ſince I cannot admit the poſſibility of uniting ſuch power any longer to ſuch intereſt, without deſtruction to the object. On this ſuppoſition, permit me to ſtate freely to your Lordſhip my ideas of the terms, which ought to be ſettled in favour of Bengal. I confine my view to this point only, not preſu⯑ming to enter into any of the other con⯑ſiderations, [57] which muſt naturally in⯑fluence a general arrangement between Government and the Company. The whole ſubject may be comprehended under four general queſtions.

• ‘1. "What proportion of the net territorial revenues ſhall be reſerved for the proviſion of an inveſtment?"’

• ‘2. "In what manner ſuch inveſtment ſhall be provided?"’

• ‘3. "Whether any and what ſums ſhall be appropriated to ſupply the other Preſidencies?"’

• ‘4. "Whether the Company ſhall mo⯑nopolize any of the productions or manufactures of the country?"’

Your Lordſhip has ſeen an eſtimate ſent home by me in January 1776, in which ninety-three lacks of current ru⯑pees are allotted to the inveſtment and all commercial charges, and twenty lacks to the other ſettlements. That eſtimate, compared with accounts ſent home in former times, is moderate in ſtating the reſources of the country. The diſtribu⯑tion of them muſt be confirmed or cor⯑rected [58] by a higher authority than mine. Your Lordſhip will obſerve, however, that the Court of Directors, in their let⯑ter of the 24th of December, 1776^*, though very well ſatisfied with the above appropriation of 113 lacks to their ſer⯑vice, ſeem inclined to reſerve ſome of the articles on the credit ſide of the eſti⯑mate, under pretence that ſuch deduc⯑tions fall upon the unappropriated ſur⯑plus, but ſtill leave part of it after all eſtabliſhments and ſervices are provided for. Among the articles ſo intended to be reſerved by the Company, are the produce of the Europe cargoes here, and the amount of the bills which they have allowed their ſervants to draw upon them, and which the eſtimate ſuppoſes will be continued, equal in all to twenty-five lacks of current rupees. But I ſub⯑mit it to your Lordſhip, that they have not treated the eſtimate fairly. A con⯑ſiderable reſerve againſt unforeſeen emer⯑gencies is as neceſſary to be provided for [59] as any article of eſtabliſhed expence, and more ſo in this country than any other. On the leaſt alarm of an invaſion, it is morally certain that every rupee in the hands of the natives would inſtantly diſ⯑appear. Without an unappropriated ſur⯑plus of thirty lacks, no prudent man would undertake to anſwer for the ſafety of the Government; much leſs to inſure an inveſtment of ninety-three lacks againſt all accidents. If therefore the Company do not think fit to throw the amount of the articles above mentioned into the general fund, it will be indiſ⯑penſibly neceſſary that an equal ſum ſhould be dedicated from the allotment made to them out of the revenues. The annual ſupply of twenty lacks to Madras and Bombay is a ruinous drain to Bengal, and ought to be the firſt article of re⯑trenchment; the remainder muſt fall upon the inveſtment.

43. If the Company ſhould reſolve not to allow their ſervants to draw upon them to the uſual amount of one hun⯑dred [60] and ſeventy-five thouſand pounds, ſome conſideration muſt be had of the conſequences, and of the difficulties, to which individuals may be driven. Thoſe difficulties will, in the end, be ſur⯑mounted; and poſſibly by means equally prejudicial to Bengal, to themſelves, and to the Company; that is, by loans to the foreign factories, or by the direct extraction of ſpecie. A remittance in Bengal manufactures is ſo diſadvanta⯑geous, (owing to the advanced price here, and the ſtate of the Europe markets) that no private perſons could afford to remit their fortunes by that channel if they were openly at liberty to do ſo. The Company at preſent are not ſenſible of the loſs they ſuſtain between the coſt and ſale of their inveſtment, becauſe the whole is given them by Bengal. Your Lordſhip will judge from the decline and poverty of the country on one ſide, and the wealth of individuals on the other, how far it may be probable that the enormous ſum charged upon the re⯑venues on account of the inveſtment has [61] been fairly laid out. The Commercial Board have now above a million ſterling annually at their diſpoſal.

44. The ſecond queſtion, ‘"In what manner the inveſtment ſhall be pro⯑vided,"’ will depend on the influence reſerved to the Company over the inter⯑nal government of the country. In what⯑ever degree ſuch influence is continued, it will aſſuredly be employed, as it has been hitherto, in promoting the views of individuals, under the formidable name of the Company's commercial rights and intereſts, and forcing the meaſures of Government to bend to that ſingle conſideration. If the Company are no longer to govern directly, it will be no leſs neceſſary that their right to engroſs the induſtry of the manufactu⯑rers, or to provide an inveſtment by force, ſhould not ſurvive their political power. Their preſent ſervants, I fear, have been too long in the lucrative ha⯑bits of monopoly and command to ſub⯑mit to any terms of equality between [62] the manufacturers and themſelves. They follow the path of their predeceſſors, and inherit their ideas. But, my Lord, this is not a time to conſult the paſſions, or prejudices, or intereſts of individuals; the plain and ſimple remedy, and indeed the only one, for abuſes of power, in a caſe where power, however exerciſed, is itſelf a violation of right, is to oblige the Company to revert to their original principles, to renounce the unnatural character in which they have lately act⯑ed, and, if it be poſſible, to become mer⯑chants again.

45. Before the Company obtained a political influence in the country, their inveſtment was provided at Calcutta and Dacca by contract with native merchants called Dadneys. Preſent circumſtances may require that ſuch contracts ſhould be open to merchants of all denomina⯑tions. The Company will benefit by the competition of ſellers at Calcutta, as the manufacturers would do by the com⯑petition of purchaſers at the Aurungs. [63] In a few years even contracts would be unneceſſary. No tolerable reaſon can be aſſigned for not reverting to a practice apparently ſafe and oeconomical to the Company, and equally beneficial to the country. It may not anſwer the pur⯑poſe of their ſervants. It does not ad⯑mit of expenſive eſtabliſhments in the diſtricts, where chiefs, ſuperintendants, and banians, detached from the Preſi⯑dency, and armed with deſpotic power to ſupport the pretended commercial in⯑tereſts of the Company, have taken poſ⯑ſeſſion of the markets, excluded all com⯑petition, enſlaved the manufacturers, and, in ſome inſtances, obliged private merchants to purchaſe from themſelves, at an immoderate advance of price, the ſame goods which they had ſeized and ſet the Company's ſeal upon in the loom, under pretence that they were wanted for the public inveſtment.

46. I do not mean to intimate that practices of this nature have been carried on with equal violence in all the diſ⯑tricts; [64] but I am well aſſured that, more or leſs, they have generally prevailed, and have not been confined to the Com⯑pany's ſervants. Adventurers of the loweſt order have frequently found their way into the diſtricts, aſſuming a law⯑leſs dominion over the people, who have loſt the protection of their native Prince, and, in fact, have no other to appeal to. If it be ſeriouſly meant to reſtore the trade of the country, the manufacturers muſt be relieved from this oppreſſion, and left at liberty to work for whom⯑ſoever they think proper. Regulations, pretending to check the miſconduct of individuals, will have no effect. In my judgment, there is but one courſe to be purſued. The inveſtment muſt be pro⯑vided by contract, as it was heretofore, until the general increaſe and improve⯑ment of the manufactures will admit of its being provided by ready-money pur⯑chaſes. The employment of Europeans in the diſtricts, whether with or without authority, or even Gomaſtas with autho⯑rity, muſt be ſtopped at all events; and [65] this, in my opinion, is a meaſure of in⯑diſpenſible neceſſity, that will admit of no qualification. I do not affirm that no difficulties or inconveniences will attend it at the outſet; but, if it be ſeriouſly meant to prefer the Company's true and permanent intereſts to thoſe of indivi⯑duals, the Court of Directors will liſten with reſerve and ſuſpicion to any repre⯑ſentations they may receive from their ſervants on this ſubject. If the meaſure ſhould be adopted, the burthen and odi⯑um of it muſt not be impoſed on the Adminiſtration here, much leſs muſt we be loaded with an excluſive reſponſibility for the event. A ſimple approbation or permiſſion will not arm us with power ſufficient to reſiſt and defeat the general combination that would be formed againſt us. The orders from home muſt be po⯑ſitive, and binding on all parties. It is a groſs and daring fallacy to aſſert, that the manufacturers would not have ſold their goods as readily to the Company as to any other merchant, provided they had been paid for them. If the Com⯑pany's [66] ſervants had been compelled to do equal juſtice to the natives and to their employers, it is not poſſible that power or privilege ſhould have been wanted to inſure to the Company every commercial advantage they ought to aim at. The ſuperior weight of their purſe would naturally have ſecured to them, or to the perſons who contracted with them, a preference in every market, and defeated any competition for the articles which compoſe their inveſtment. The free vent and exportation of the remain⯑ing produce of the country cannot be too liberally encouraged. I ſubmit my opinion to higher judgement, that the cuſtom houſes ſhould be new modelled, if not aboliſhed. They check the ope⯑rations of foreign trade in a country which properly ſells to all the world, and buys nothing, except ſome raw ma⯑terials of manufacture, and neceſſaries from England for the conſumption of Europeans. The inland cuſtoms fetter the induſtry of the natives in all its mi⯑nuteſt branches. The revenue, collected [67] by theſe eſtabliſhments, is either not worth the attention of Government, eſ⯑pecially at the expence of oppreſſion to the ſubject and of many embarraſſments to the export trade; or, ſuppoſing it ne⯑ceſſary, the amount might be levied, with leſs inconvenience, directly from the land.

47. When theſe capital diſcourage⯑ments are removed, the productions of induſtry will increaſe, their quality will improve. The country, then, having ſomething to ſell to other nations, will have ſomething to give to England; and tho' a time muſt come, when the nominal revenue can no longer be realized, when the inveſtment muſt be retrenched, and every eſtabliſhment contracted; in other words, when a great and wealthy ſtate, which ought to flouriſh by its expences, can only exiſt by its oeconomy, ſtill it is not a point of little moment to protract that event, if poſſible, to a diſtant, un⯑certain period. The actual choice lies between a diſeaſe, which threatens im⯑mediate [68] diſſolution, and a remedy, which at leaſt gives time for deliberation. We know not what favourable turns may appear during an interval of repoſe; but, at any rate, we ſhould not haſten a criſis, at which neither prudence nor fortune can ſave the object.

48. The annual ſupplies of the other Preſidencies, in time of peace, amount to about twenty lacks of current rupees. I have ſubmitted my opinion to the Com⯑pany, that Bengal, in its preſent circum⯑ſtances, is not able to bear the continu⯑ance of ſo great a drain of its reſources. The future amount of this ſupply will, I preſume, be conſidered in the allow⯑ance reſerved for the inveſtment out of the territorial revenues, and determined by it. The revenue acquired on the Malabar coaſt, by the late treaty with the Marattas, if faithfully applied to the ſupport of the Company's eſtabliſhments at Bombay, ought, in a great meaſure, to relieve Bengal from any further de⯑mand for that ſervice. Since the firſt of [69] May, 1774, we have remitted to Bom⯑bay alone the ſum of current rupees 81, 20, 777. I will not pronounce deci⯑ſively on the uſes of maintaining that ſettlement at ſo exorbitant an expence; but the queſtion deſerves an attentive conſideration. Notwithſtanding this great ſupply from hence, they have incurred a debt of thirty lacks, (chiefly in the above period) which carries an intereſt of nine per cent.

49. Fort St. George, in time of peace, ought to ſupport itſelf. China will be ſufficiently ſupplied by individuals here, without an extraction of ſilver from Eng⯑land, if the Company think proper to open their treaſury at Canton, and grant bills at a reaſonable rate. If not, the mo⯑ney they refuſe will be lent to the French, Danes, and Swedes, whoſe imports from China ſtand in immediate competition with the Company, even for the con⯑ſumption of the Britiſh dominions. The ſupplies ſent from hence to Fort Marl⯑borough, [70] and St. Helena, are not worth notice.

50. The fourth and laſt queſtion, ‘"Whether the Company ſhall monopo⯑lize any of the productions or manu⯑factures of the country?"’ would, perhaps, be more properly ſtated, and better underſtood, if it were expreſſed in the following terms: ‘"Is Bengal inca⯑pable of a greater produce, than the Company's inveſtment requires; or ſhall it be prohibited from producing more than will ſupply that demand?"’ This ſtate of the queſtion is, in effect, the true one, and includes the anſwer. No man will affirm, that the Company's inveſtment is equal to the actual produce of the country, much leſs to what it is capable of producing; and if it were, Bengal, having no ſurplus to ſell, would, in a very ſhort period, have nothing to give. It is not even true, that the por⯑tion of the revenues, appropriated to the purchaſe of the inveſtment, returns un⯑diminiſhed into the provincial circulation, [71] from which it was taken. In the ex⯑penditure of an immenſe capital, agency will pay itſelf, and every man will make ſomething. Whatever this annual defal⯑cation may amount to, whether a fifth or a ſixth of the net ſum allotted to the inveſtment, it is the worſt of all taxes, becauſe it is taken directly from the ſources of production. But if this evil be no more avoidable than the obvious conſequences of it, the wiſdom of Go⯑vernment is ſo much the more power⯑fully called upon, to qualify abuſes by improvements, and to balance a weight, which no policy can remove.

51. I have ſuppoſed the merchant to be no longer Sovereign, nor charged with the general protection of the people:—Shall he retain the power of oppreſſing them in detail? My Lord, I am ſirm in my opinion, that the very monopolies, which the Company have appropriated to the ſupply of their inveſtment, or to the increaſe of their revenues, and which they were ready enough to condemn in [72] the hands of individuals, would ere long defeat the purpoſes they were intended to promote. They are now in excluſive poſſeſſion, or think they are, of the raw ſilk, ſaltpetre, opium, and ſalt, manu⯑factured in Bengal. At the ſame time, the produce of the loom is apparently at their command. If the practice had been ſtrictly and entirely conformable to the principle, the reſources of Bengal, in⯑ſtead of declining by any gradations, muſt have ſunk precipitately. A partial re⯑medy, or palliation of ſome of the evils, attending the Government inſtituted or exerciſed by the Company's ſervants, has been derived from its exceſſive ſeverity and injuſtice. When poſitive laws are oppoſed to every dictate of natural juſtice, humanity, and right reaſon, it is not eaſy to carry them, by any degree of power, into complete execution. Even private frauds, which, conſidering their quality and extent, denote a want of vi⯑gour and fidelity in the adminiſtration, have in ſome degree defended the coun⯑try againſt public inſtitutions. This, I [73] conceive, is the laſt ſtate of miſrule into which a nation can fall, while any forms whatſoever are preſerved,—Fundamen⯑tal errors of inſtitution counteracted, but not removed by abuſes of Adminiſtration, by deviations from principle, and by unit⯑ing all ranks of men in a regular con⯑nected ſyſtem of fraud againſt Govern⯑ment.

52. I have already taken notice of the orders received in December 1775, ‘"for prohibiting all perſons under the Com⯑pany's protection from trading in any of the articles, which compoſe their inveſtment, until it was completed,"’ which never could happen, as the inveſt⯑ment proceeds the whole year round, with little relaxation. Theſe orders have ſince been qualified, in conſequence of ſtrong repreſentations from hence; but under ſuch limitations, and with condi⯑tions ſo hazardous to the perſons, whom the Court of Directors ſuppoſed to be in poſſeſſion of the Government, that, even if the change they expected had taken [74] place, their laſt inſtructions could have produced no effect. ^*They empower the Governor General and Council ‘"to ſuſpend the execution of ſuch part of their orders, as impoſe reſtrictions on the commerce of individuals, provided we are abſolutely certain it may be done, conſiſtent with the due proviſion of an ample and well-choſen inveſtment for the Company, and without riſking the timely proviſion of their inveſt⯑ment, the amount whereof muſt on no account be hazarded, even for a ſingle ſeaſon."’

53. Under conditions of this nature, their moſt favoured Adminiſtration could not have acted with ſafety. But when they add, that, ‘"to indulge their com⯑mercial ſervants in every branch of trade, not prohibited by law, is a meaſure, which nothing but the greateſt fidelity in their ſervants can render conſiſtent with the intereſt of the [75] Company,"’ I apprehend they at once miſtake the fact, and preclude the re⯑medy. Their ſervants derive too many advantages from the Company's mono⯑poly, to wiſh for an avowed and general freedom of trade, in which others might participate; and what aſſurance have the Company, that the truſt, repoſed in their ſervants, is not as much abuſed under apparent reſtrictions, and as effectually for their own intereſts, as it could be, if all reſtrictions were aboliſhed? The firſt prohibitory orders, dated the 3d of March, 1775, ſtill remain in force, without any attempt whatever to correct them by the laſt.

54. The queſtion of the ſalt trade has been ſufficiently canvaſſed in England, and ought to be thoroughly underſtood. The Company, it ſeems, have received new lights on this ſubject. Your Lord⯑ſhip knows how long, and with what ve⯑hemence, the monopoly of ſalt had been reprobated by them. In May 1766, they thought it ‘"neither conſiſtent with their [76] honour nor their dignity, to promote ſuch an excluſive trade; they could not ſuffer themſelves to indulge a thought towards the continuance of it on any conditions whatſoever; and that no regulations could be effectual to pre⯑vent the like conſequences, which they had ſeen.—They conſidered it too as diſgraceful, and below the dignity of their preſent ſituation, to allow of ſuch a monopoly, and that, were they to allow of it, under any reſtrictions, they ſhould conſider themſelves as aſſenting and ſubſcribing to all the miſchiefs, which Bengal had preſented to them for the four years paſt."’

55. In their letter of the 24th of De⯑cember laſt^*, they ſay, ‘"that the mo⯑nopoly, on its preſent footing, can be no grievance to the country, and they direct that, for the preſent, the plan adopted by their late Preſident and Council be continued."’ This plan is [77] a rigorous monopoly, for the ſuppoſed excluſive profit of the Company. In the firſt two years of the contract, it raiſed the price above fifty per cent to the con⯑ſumer, and produced an immoderate im⯑portation of foreign ſalt, by which the Company has been conſtantly underſold, in one of the ſtaple commodities of Ben⯑gal, at their own markets. In conſe⯑quence of this importation, frauds in the management, ſmuggling, &c., the Com⯑pany have gained nothing by their con⯑tracts in the third and fourth years, and now they have an enormous quantity upon their hands, which can only be ſold at a long credit, and never without a conſiderable loſs. Theſe notorious facts have determined Mr. Haſtings him⯑ſelf to renounce the monopoly, even againſt the Company's inſtructions.

56. With reſpect to ſalpetre, the Company's monopoly, or rather that ex⯑erciſed by their ſervants, has produced the effect, which it always muſt do, of diminiſhing the produce, until they at [78] laſt find it difficult to procure even the trifling quantity wanted for their inveſt⯑ment. The ſcarcity perhaps is exagge⯑rated for private purpoſes. But ſaltpetre ought naturally to be one of the moſt cheap and plentiful productions of the ſoil, and would be ſo, if the natives were allowed the free uſe of their own lands, and the free diſpoſal of their own in⯑duſtry.

57. The opium of Bahar has been for many years monopolized, formerly by the favourites of the country Govern⯑ment, with ſome degree of juſtice and lenity to the riots; and, in later times, by the Company's ſervants, out of whoſe hands it was taken by Mr. Haſtings in the year 1773, and engroſſed for the benefit of the Company. It was not likely that any abuſes in the former practice, or any of the uſual effects of a monopoly, ſhould be corrected by this alteration. The ſer⯑vants of Government might poſſibly have been reſtrained by checks, which cannot be impoſed on Government itſelf. [79] A doubt whether, in the preſent ſtate of things, the trade could be really and ef⯑fectually laid open, and whether it would not revert, in fact, to the gentlemen in ſtation at Patna, produced an early diffe⯑rence of opinion between Sir John Cla⯑vering and myſelf, on the expediency of continuing the opium contract, but by no means touched the general principles, on which we invariably concurred in con⯑demning monopolies. We agreed, that whenever there was a Government ſuffi⯑ciently firm and independent to execute its own reſolutions, and to enforce obe⯑dience to them, the monopoly of opium ſhould be aboliſhed. The deplorable ſtate of Bahar makes it neceſſary, that this ſhould be one of the firſt meaſures of ſuch a Government. The Company have lately^* authorized us to give up this commodity as an article of commerce; but the contract was already diſpoſed of for the three enſuing years, before the receipt of their orders.

[80] 58. Raw ſilk is not ſubject to a de⯑clared monopoly at preſent. The quan⯑tity of this article is greatly increaſed. The ſtate of the India markets throws it chiefly into the Company's hands, with⯑out competition. The demand ſeems to increaſe in Europe.

59. One general objection occurs, in this country, to monopolies exerciſed by Government, which does not perhaps exiſt in any other. The commodity to be engroſſed is always provided by ad⯑vances of money out of the public trea⯑ſury. A proportion of theſe advances muſt be paid at an early period, before the ſeed is ſown, as in the caſe of opium, or before the work is under⯑taken, and muſt be continued as the buſineſs proceeds. The riſque of the capital advanced, which is not inconſide⯑rable, and the value of the intereſt, ought to be calculated, and deducted from the ultimate profits of the mono⯑poly. A number of accidents may oc⯑caſion partial loſſes on the money ad⯑vanced. [81] An invaſion or any general calamity would be the loſs of the whole. The Company have experienced the truth of this opinion in another part of their practice. Their outſtanding de⯑ſperate balances, ariſing on advances made to the weavers, amount to a very conſi⯑derable ſum. On the other hand, it makes a wide difference to the country whether advances, to be repaid out of future production, are made by Govern⯑ment, or by individuals. In the firſt caſe, a multitude of perſons are pre⯑cluded from engaging in the buſineſs engroſſed by Government, and from em⯑ploying to advantage whatever means and credit they have left. The circulation of ſo much private property is loſt, and the proprietor compelled to live with parſimony on his capital. At the ſame time, the ſums, iſſuing from the trea⯑ſury to the contractor, flow in one large ſtream, under the direction of a deſpotic monopoliſt, whoſe eaſe and convenience lead him to contract with as few people, and to confine his advances to as few [82] places, as poſſible. This is the funda⯑mental principle of monopoly. On the contrary, a free trade invites numbers to engage in it, who, in the face of a general competition, could never ſucceed but by fair dealing and ſuperior in⯑duſtry; and whoſe fortune, circulating in a variety of little channels, might extend to the remoteſt corners of the country, and act directly on the induſ⯑try of the loweſt orders of men.

60. It is not for me to attempt to lead your Lordſhip's opinion, on the general queſtion of monopolies, by any other information than that of the facts before me. In this country, the exerciſe of them, under the direct authority and for the ſuppoſed benefit of a deſpotic go⯑vernment, has manifeſtly united an in⯑tereſt and a power, which ought never to have met in the ſame hands. Such a union, in the caſe of oppreſſion, whe⯑ther real or pretended, conſtitutes the plaintiffs parties againſt Government, and leaves no indifferent tribunal to ad⯑miniſter [83] juſtice to them. I ſubmit to judgement, whether it ought to be abo⯑liſhed or continued.

61. I will not, my Lord, add a uſe⯑leſs apology to the trouble I have already given you. If the contents of this let⯑ter ſhould not juſtify the length of it, I have nothing to plead, but the ſame error of judgement which has uniformly governed my conduct, and from which no man has hitherto ſuffered any thing but myſelf.

I have no perſonal intereſt, immediate or remote, in the ſucceſs of this repre⯑ſentation. Before it can produce any effect in Bengal, the period of my ap⯑pointment will probably be expired.