PROSPECTS ON THE RUBICON, &c.
[]RIGHT by chance and wrong by ſyſtem, are things ſo frequently ſeen in the political world, that it becomes a proof of prudence neither to cenſure nor applaud too ſoon.
"The Rubicon is paſt," was once given as a reaſon for proſecuting the moſt expen⯑ſive war that England ever knew. Sore with the event, and groaning beneath a galling yoke of taxes, ſhe has again been led miniſterially on to the ſhore of the ſame [2]deluſive and fatal river, without being per⯑mitted to know the object or the reaſon why.
Expenſive preparations have been gone into; fears, alarms, dangers, apprehenſions, have been miſtically held forth, as if the exiſt⯑ence of the nation was at ſtake, and at laſt the mountain has brought forth a Dutch mouſe.
Whoever will candidly review the pre⯑ſent national characters of England and France, cannot but be ſtruck with ſurprize at the change that is taking place. The people of France are beginning to think for them⯑ſelves, and the people of England reſigning up the privilege of thinking.
The affairs of Holland have been the bubble of the day; and a tax is to be laid on ſhoes and boots (ſo ſay the news-papers) for the ſervice of the Stadtholder of Hol⯑land. This will undoubtedly do honour to the nation by verifying the old Engliſh pro⯑verb, "Over ſhoes, over boots."
But tho' Democrites could ſcarcely have forbore laughing at the folly, yet as ſerious argument and ſound reaſoning are preferable [3]to ridicule, it will be beſt to quit the vein of unprofitable humour, and give the cauſe a fair inveſtigation. But before we do this, it may not be improper to take a general review of ſ [...]d [...]y political matters that will naturally lead to a better underſtanding of the ſubject.
What has been the event of all the wars of England, but an amazing accumulation of debt, and an unparalleled burthen of taxes. Sometimes the pretence has been to ſupport one outlandiſh cauſe, and ſometimes another. At one time Auſtria, at another time Pruſſia, and ſo on; but the conſequence has always been taxes. A few men have enriched themſelves by jobs and contracts, and the groaning multitude bore the bur⯑then. What has England gained by war ſince the year 1738, only fifty years ago, to recompence her for two hundred millions ſterling, incurred as a debt within that time, and under the annual intereſt of which, be⯑ſides what was incurred before, ſhe is now groaning? Nothing at all.
The glare of fancied glory has often been held up, and the ſhadowy recompence im⯑poſed [4]itſelf upon the ſenſes. Wars that might have been prevented have been madly gone into, and the end has been debt and diſcontent. A ſort of ſomething which man cannot account for is mixed in his com⯑poſition, and renders him the ſubject of de⯑ception by the very means he takes not to be deceived.
That jealouſy which the individuals of every nation feels at the ſuppoſed deſigns of foreign powers, fits them to be the prey of Miniſters, and of thoſe among themſelves whoſe trade is war, or whoſe livelihood is jobs and contracts. ‘Confuſion to the politics of Europe, and may every nation be at war in ſix months,’ was a toaſt given in the hearing of the writer.— The man was in court to the Miniſtry for a job.—Ye gentle Graces, if any ſuch there be, who preſide over human actions, how muſt ye weep at the viciouſneſs of man.
When we conſider, for the feelings of Nature cannot be diſmiſſed, the calamities of war and the miſeries it inflicts upon the human ſpecies, the thouſands and tens of thouſands of every age and ſex who are ren⯑dered [5]wretched by the event, ſurely there is ſomething in the heart of man that calls upon him to think! Surely there is ſome tender cord, tuned by the hand of its Creator, that ſtill ſtruggles to emit in the hearing of the ſoul a note of ſorrowing ſympathy. Let it then be heard, and let man learn to feel, that the true greatneſs of a nation is founded on principles of humanity; and that to avoid a war when her own exiſtence is not en⯑dangered, and wherein the happineſs of man muſt be wantonly ſacrificed, is a higher principle of true honour than madly to en⯑gage in it.
But independent of all civil and moral conſiderations, there is no poſſible event that a war could produce either to England or France, on the preſent occaſion, that could in the moſt diſtant proportion recom⯑pence to either, the expence ſhe muſt be at. War involves in its progreſs ſuch a train of unforſeen and unſuppoſed circumſtances, ſuch a combination of foreign matters, that no human wiſdom can calculate the end. It has but one thing certain, and that is increaſe of taxes. The policy of European Courts [6]is now ſo caſt, and their intereſt ſo inter⯑woven with each other, that however eaſy it may be to begin a war, the weight and influence of interfering nations compel even the conqueror to unprofitable conditions of peace.
Commerce and maritime ſtrength are now becoming the faſhion, or rather the rage of Europe, and this naturally excites in them a combined wiſh to prevent either England or France encreaſing its comparative ſtrength by deſtroying, or even relatively weakening the other, and therefore, whatever views each may have at the commencement of a war, new enemies will ariſe as either gains the advantage, and continual obſtacles en⯑ſue to embarraſs ſucceſs.
The greatneſs of Lewis the Fourteenth made Europe his enemy, and the ſame cauſe will produce the ſame conſequence to any other European Power. That nation, therefore, only is truly wiſe, who contenting herſelf with the means of defence, creates to herſelf no unneceſſary enemies by ſeeking to be greater than the ſyſtem of Europe ad⯑mits. The Monarch or the Miniſter who [7]exceeds this line, knows but little of his buſineſs. It is what the poet on another occaſion calls—
Perhaps there is not a greater inſtance or the folly of calculating upon events, than are to be found in treaties of alliance. As ſoon as they have anſwered the immediate purpoſe of either of the parties, they are but little regarded. Pretences, afterwards, are never wanting to explain them away, nor reaſons to render them abortive. And if half the money which nations laviſh on ſpeculative alliances were reſerved for their own immediate purpoſe, whenever the oc⯑caſion ſhall arrive, it would be more pro⯑ductively and advantageouſly employed.
Monarchs and Mini [...]ers, from [...] or reſentment, often contemplate to them⯑ſelves ſchemes of future greatneſs, and ſet out with what appears to th [...] the faireſt proſpect: In the mean while, the great wheel of time and fate revolves unobſerved, and ſomething, never dreamed of, turns up and blaſts the whole. A few fancied or un⯑profitable [8]laurels ſupply the abſence of ſuc⯑ceſs, and the exhauſted nation is huzza'd into new Taxes.
The politics and intereſts of European Courts are ſo frequently varying with re⯑gard to each other, that there is no fixing even the probability of their future conduct. But the great principle of alliancing ſeems to be but little underſtood or little cultivated in Courts, perhaps the leaſt of all in that of England.—No alliance can be operative, that does not embrace within itſelf, not only the attachment of the Sove⯑reigns, but the real intereſt of the nations.
The alliance between France and Spain, however it may be ſpoken of as a mere fa⯑mily compact, derives its greateſt ſtrength from national intereſt. The mines of Peru and Mexico are the Soul of this alliance. Were thoſe mines extinct, the family com⯑pact would moſt probably diſſolve.
There exiſts not a doubt in the mind of Spain, what part England would act, re⯑ſpecting thoſe mines, could ſhe demoliſh the maritime power of France; and therefore the intereſt of Spain feels itſelf continually [9]united with France. Spain have high ideas of honour, but they have not the ſame ideas of Engliſh honour. They conſider Eng⯑land as wholly governed by principles of intereſt, and that whatever ſhe thinks it her intereſt to do, and ſuppoſes ſhe has the power of doing; ſhe makes very little cere⯑money of attempting. But this is not all— There is not a nation in Europe but what is more ſatisfied that thoſe mines ſhould be in the poſſeſſion of Spain, than in that of any other European nation, becauſe the wealth of thoſe mines, ſufficient to ruin Europe in the hands of ſome of its powers, is innocently employed with reſpect to Eu⯑rope, and better and more peaceably diſtri⯑buted among them all, through the me⯑dium of Spain, than it would be through that of any other nation. This is one of the ſecret cauſes that combine ſo large a part of Europe in the intereſt of France, becauſe they cannot but conſider her as ſtanding as a barrier to ſecure to them the free and equal diſtribution of this wealth throughout all the dominions of Europe.
[10]This alliance of intereſt is likewiſe one of the unſeen cements that prevents Spain and Portugal, two nations not very friendly to each other, proceeding to hoſtilities. They are both in the ſame ſituation, and whatever their diſlikes may be, they can⯑not fail to conſider, that by giving way to reſentment that would weaken and exhauſt themſelves, each would be expoſed a prey to ſome ſtronger power.
In ſhort, this alliance of national intereſt is the only one that can be truſted, and the only one that can be operative. All other al⯑liances formed on the mere will and caprice of Sovereigns, or family connections, un⯑combined with national intereſts, are but the quagmire of politics, and never fail to be⯑come a loſs to that nation who waſtes it preſent ſubſtance on the expectancy of diſtan [...] returns.
With regard to Holland, a man muſ [...] know very little of the matter, not to know that there exiſts a ſtronger principle of ri⯑valſhip between Holland and England i [...] point of commerce, than prevails between England and France in point of power [11]and, therefore, whenever a Stadtholder of Holland ſhall ſee it his intereſt to unite with the principle of his country, and act in con⯑cert with the ſentiments of the very people who pay him for his ſervices, the means now taken by England to render him for⯑midable, will operate contrary to the politi⯑cal expectations of the preſent day.
Circumſtances will produce their own na⯑tural effects, and no other, let the hopes or expectations of man be what they may. It is not our doing a thing with the deſign that it ſhall anſwer ſuch or ſuch an end, that will cauſe it to produce that end; the means taken muſt have a natural ability and ten⯑dency within themſelves to produce no other, for it is this, and not our wiſhes or policy, that governs the event.
The Engliſh Navigation Act was levelled againſt the intereſt of the Dutch as a whole nation, and therefore it is not to be ſuppoſed that the catching at the accidental circum⯑ſtances of one man, as in the caſe of the pre⯑ſent Stadtholder, can combine the intereſt of that country with this. A few years, perhaps a leſs time, may remove him to the [12]place where all things are forgotten, and his ſucceſſor, contemplating his father's troubles, will be naturally led to reprobate the means that produced them, and to repoſe himſelf on the intereſts of his country, in preference to the accidental and tumultuous aſſiſtance of exterior power.
England herſelf exhibits at this day, a ſpecies of this kind of policy. The preſent reign, by embracing the Scotch, has tran⯑quilized and conciliated the ſpirit that diſ⯑turbed the two former reigns. Accuſations were not wanting at that time to reprobate the policy as tinctured with ingratitude to⯑wards thoſe who were the immediate means of the Hanover ſucceſſion. The brilliant pen of Junius was drawn forth, but in vain. It enraptured without convincing; and tho' in the plenitude of its rage it might be ſaid to give elegance to bitterneſs, yet the policy ſurvived the blaſt.
What then will be the natural conſequence of this expence, on account of the Stadthol⯑der, or of a war entered into from that cauſe? Search the various windings and ca⯑verns of the human heart, and draw from [13]thence the moſt probable concluſion, for this is more to be depended upon than the projects or declarations of Miniſters.
It may do very well for a paragraph in a news-paper, or the wild effuſions of roman⯑tic politicians, or the mercenary views of thoſe who wiſh for war on any occaſion, or on no occaſion at all, but for the ſake of jobs and contracts, to talk of French fineſſe or French intrigue; but the Dutch are not a people to be impreſſed by the fineſſe or in⯑trigue of France or England, or any other nation. If there has been any fineſſe in the caſe, it has been between the Electorate of Hanover, the King of Pruſſia, and the Stadt⯑holder, in which it is moſt probable the peo⯑ple of England will be fineſſed out of a ſum of money.
The Dutch, as is already obſerved, are not a people open to the impreſſion of fineſſe. It is loſt upon them. They are impreſſed by their commercial intereſt. It is the po⯑litical ſoul of their country, the ſpring of their actions, and when this principle coin⯑cides with their ideas of freedom, it has all [14]the impulſe a Dutchman is capable of feeling.
The Oppoſition in Holland were the enemies of the Stadtholder, upon a convic⯑tion that he was not the friend of their na⯑tional intereſts. They wanted no impulſe but this. Whether this defect in him pro⯑ceeded from foreign attachment, from bri⯑bery or corruption, or from the well-known defect of his underſtanding, is not the point of enquiry. It was the effect rather than the cauſe that irritated the Hollanders.
If the Stadtholder made uſe of the power he held in the government to expoſe and endanger the intereſts and property of the very people who ſupported him, what other incentive does any man in any country re⯑quire. If the Hollanders conceived the con⯑duct of the Stadtholder injurious to their national intereſt, they had the ſame right to expel him which England had to expel the Stuarts; and the interference of England to re-eſtabliſh him, ſerves only to confirm in the Hollanders the ſame hatred againſt Eng⯑land which the attempt of Lewis the XIVth, to re-eſtabliſh the Stuarts cauſed in England [15]againſt France; therefore, if the preſent po⯑licy is intended to attach Holland to Eng⯑land, it goes on a principle exceedingly erroneous.
Let us now conſider the ſituation of the Stadtholder, as making another part of the queſtion.
He muſt place the cauſe of his troubles to ſome ſecret influence which governed his conduct during the late war, or in other words, that he was ſuſpected of being the tool of the then Britiſh Adminiſtration. Therefore, as every part of an argument ought to have its weight, inſtead of charg⯑ing the French of intriguing with the Hol⯑landers, the charge more conſiſtently lies againſt the Britiſh Miniſtry, for intriguing with the Stadtholder, and endangering the nation in a war without a ſufficient object. That which the Miniſtry are now doing con⯑firms the ſuſpicion, and explains to the Hol⯑landers that colluſion of the Stadtholder againſt their national intereſts, which he muſt wiſh to have concealed, and the expla⯑nation does him more hurt than the unne⯑ceſſary [16]parade of ſervice has done him good.
Nothing but neceſſity ſhould have ope⯑rated with England to appear openly in a caſe that muſt put the Stadtholder on ſtill worſe terms with his countrymen. Had France made any diſpoſition for war, had ſhe armed, had ſhe made any one hoſtile prepa⯑ration, there might then have been ſome pre⯑tence for England taking a ſtep, that cannot fail to expoſe to the world that the ſuſpi⯑cions of the Hollanders againſt the Stadt⯑holder were well founded, and that their cauſe was juſt, however unſucceſsful has been the event.
As to the conſequence of Holland in the ſcale of Europe (the great ſtake, ſay ſome of the news-papers, for which England is con⯑tending) that is naturally pointed out by her condition: As merchants for other nations her intereſt dictates to her to be a neutral power, and this ſhe always will be unleſs ſhe is made war upon, as was the caſe in the laſt war; and any expectation beyond what is the line of her intereſt, that is, beyond neutrality, either in England or France, will prove abor⯑tive. [17]It therefore cannot be policy to go to war to effect that at a great expence, which will naturally happen of itſelf, and beyond which there is nothing to expect.
Let Holland be allied with England or with France, or with neither, or with both, her national conduct, conſequently ariſing out of her circumſtances, will be nearly the ſame, that is, ſhe will be neutral. Alliances have ſuch a natural tendency to ſink into harmleſs unoperative things, that to make them a cauſe for going to war, either to prevent their being formed, or to break any already formed, is the ſillieſt ſpe⯑culation that war can be made upon, or wealth waſted to accompliſh. It would ſcarcely be worth the attempt, if war could be carried on without expence, becauſe almoſt the whole that can be hoped at the riſk and expence of a war, is effected by their natural tendency to inactivity.
However pompous the declarations of an alliance may be, the object of many of them is no other than good-will and reciprocally ſecuring, as far as ſuch ſecurity can go, that neither ſhall join the enemies of the other in any war that may happen. But the na⯑tional [18]circumſtances of Holland, operate to enſure this tranquility on her part as effec⯑tually to the power ſhe is not allied with, as the engagement itſelf does to the power with whom ſhe is allied; therefore the ſecurity from circumſtances is as good as the ſecu⯑rity from engagement.
As to a cordial union of intereſt between Holland and England, it is as unnatural to happen as between two individual rivals in the ſame trade: And if there is any ſtep that England could take to put it at a ſtill greater diſtance, it is the part ſhe is now acting. She has increaſed the animoſity of Holland on the ſpeculative politics of inte⯑reſting the Stadtholder, whoſe future repoſe depends upon uniting with the Oppoſition in Holland, as the preſent reign did with the Scotch. How fooliſh then has been the policy, how needleſs the expence, of endan⯑gering a war on account of the affairs of Holland.
A cordiality between England and France is leſs improbable than between England and Holland. It is not how an Engliſhman feels but how a Dutchman feels, that decides [19]this queſtion. Between England and France there is no real rivalſhip of intereſt; it is more the effect of temper, diſpoſition, and the jealouſy of confiding in each other, than any ſubſtantial cauſe, that keeps up the animoſity. But on the part of Holland towards England, there is over and above the ſpirit of animoſity, the more powerful mo⯑tives of intereſted commercial rivalſhip, and the galling remembrance of paſt injuries. The making war upon them under Lord North's adminiſtration, when they were taking no part in the hoſtilities, but merely acting the buſineſs of merchants, is a cir⯑cumſtance that will not eaſily be forgotten by them. On theſe reaſons, therefore, which are naturally deduced from the ope⯑rative feelings of mankind, any expectation of attaching Holland to England as a friendly power, is vague and futile. Nature has her own way of working in the heart, and all plans of politics not founded thereon will diſappoint themſelves.
Any one who will review the hiſtory of Engliſh politics for ſeveral years paſt, muſt perceive that they have been directed with⯑out [20]ſyſtem. To eſtabliſh this, it is only neceſſary to examine one circumſtance freſh in the mind of every man.
The American war was proſecuted at a very great expence, on the publicly declared opinion, that the retaining America was ne⯑ceſſary to the exiſtence of England; but America being now ſeparated from England, the preſent politics are, that ſhe is better without her than with her. Both theſe cannot be true, and their contradiction to each other ſhews a want of ſyſtem. If the latter is true, it amounts to an impeachment of the political judgment of Government, becauſe the diſcovery ought to have been made before the expence was gone into. This ſingle circumſtance, yet freſh in every man's mind, is ſufficient to create a ſuſpi⯑cion, whether the preſent meaſures are more wiſely founded than the former ones; and whether experience may not prove, that going to war for the ſake of the Stadtholder, or for the hope of retaining a partial intereſt in Holland, who, under any connection can. from circumſtances, be no more than a neu⯑tral [21]power, is not as weak policy as going to war to retain America.
If England is powerful enough to main⯑tain her own ground and conſequence in the world as an independent nation, ſhe needs no foreign connection. If ſhe is not, the fact contradicts the popular opinion that ſhe is. Therefore, either her politics are wrong, or her true condition is not what ſhe ſup⯑poſes it to be. Either ſhe muſt give up her opinion to juſtify her politics, or renounce her politics to vindicate her opinion.
If ſome kind of connection with Holland is ſuppoſed to be an object worthy ſome ex⯑pence to obtain, it may be aſked why was that connection broken by making war upon her in the laſt war. If it was not then worth preſerving without expence, is it now worth re-obtaining at a vaſt expence? If the Hol⯑landers do not like the Engliſh, can they be made to like them againſt their wills? If it ſhall be ſaid that under the former connec⯑tion they were unfriendly, will they be more friendly under any other? They were then in as free a ſituation to chuſe as any fu⯑ture circumſtances can make them, and, [22]therefore, the national governing ſentiment of the country can be eaſily diſcovered, for it ſignifies not what or who a Stadtholder may be, that which governs Holland is, and al⯑ways muſt be, a commercial principle, and it will follow this line in ſpite of politics. In⯑tereſt is as predominant and as ſilent in its ope⯑rations as love; it reſiſts all the attempts of force, and countermines all the ſtratagem of controul.
The moſt able Engliſh Stateſmen and Politicians have always held it as a principle, that foreign connections ſerved only to em⯑barraſs and exhauſt England. That, ſurround⯑ed by the ocean, ſhe could not be invaded as countries are on the Continent of Europe, and that her inſular ſituation dictated to her a different ſyſtem of politics to what thoſe countries required, and that to be enleagued with them was ſacriſicing the advantages of ſituation to a capricious ſyſtem of politics. That tho' ſhe might ſerve them, they could not much ſerve her, and that as the ſervice muſt at all times be paid for, it could always be procured when it was wanted; and that it would be better to take it up in this line [23]than to embarraſs herſelf with ſpeculative alliances that ſerved rather to draw her into a Continental war on their account, than extricate her from a war undertaken on her own account.
From this diſcuſſion of the affairs of Hol⯑land, and of the inadequacy of Holland as an object for war, we will proceed to ſhew that neither England nor France are in a condition to go to war, and that there is no preſent object to the one or the other to recompence the expence that each muſt be at, or atone to the ſubjects of either for the additional burthens that muſt be brought upon them. I defend the cauſe of the poor, of the manufactures, of the tradeſman, of the farmer, and of all thoſe on whom the real burthen of taxes fall—but above all, I defend the cauſe of humanity.
It will always happen, that any rumour of war will be popular among a great num⯑ber of people in London. There are thou⯑ſands who live by it; it is their harveſt; and the clamour which thoſe people keep up in news-papers and converſations, paſſes unſuſpiciouſly for the voice of the people, [24]and it is not till after the miſchief is done, that the deception is diſcovered.
Such people are continually holding up in very magnified terms the wealth of the nation, and the depreſſed condition of France, as reaſons for commencing a war, without knowing any thing of either of theſe ſubjects.
But admitting them to be as true, as they are falſe, as will be hereafter ſhewn, it cer⯑tainly indicates a vileneſs in the national diſpoſition of any country, that will make the accidental internal difficulties to which all nations are ſubject, and ſometimes en⯑cumbered with, a reaſon for making war upon them. The amazing encreaſe and magnitude of the paper currency now float⯑ing in all parts of England, expoſes her to a ſhock as much more tremendous than the ſhock occaſioned by the bankruptcy of the South Sea funds, as the quantity of credit and paper currency is now greater than they were at that time. Whenever ſuch a cir⯑cumſtance ſhall happen, and the wiſeſt men in the nation are, and cannot avoid being, impreſſed with the danger, it would be looked upon a baſeneſs in France to make [25]the diſtreſs and misfortune of England a cauſe and an opportunity for making war upon her, yet this hedious infidelity is publicly avowed in England. The bank⯑ruptcy of 1719, was precipitated by the great credit which the funds then had, and the confidence which people placed in them. Is [...]ot credit making infinitely greater ſtrides now than it made then? Is not confidence equally as blind now as at that day? The people then ſuppoſed themſelves as wiſe as they do now, yet they were miſerably de⯑ceived, and the deception that has once hap⯑pened will happen again from the ſame cauſes.
Credit is not money, and therefore it is not pay, neither can it be put in the place of money in the end. It is only the means of getting into debt, not the means of get⯑ting out, otherwiſe the national debt could not accumulate; and the deluſion which nations are under reſpecting the extention of credit is exactly like that which every man feels reſpecting life, the end is always nearer than was expected; and we become bank⯑rupts [26]in time by the ſame deluſion that na⯑tions become bankrupts in property.
The little which nations know, or are ſome times willing to know, of each other, ſerves to precipitate them into wars which neither would have undertaken, had ſhe fully known the extent of the power and circumſtances of the other; it may there⯑fore be of ſome uſe to place the circum⯑ſtances of England and France in a compa⯑rative point of view.
In order to do this the accidental circum⯑ſtances of a nation muſt be thrown out of the account. By accidental circumſtances is meant, thoſe temporary disjointings and de⯑rangements of its internal ſyſtem which every nation in the world is ſubject to, and which, like accidental fits of ſickneſs in the human body, prevents in the interim the full exertion and exerciſe of its natural powers.
The ſubſtantial baſis of the power of a nation ariſes out of its population, its wealth and its revenues. To theſe may be added the diſpoſition of the people. Each of theſe will be ſpoken to as we proceed.
[27]Inſtances are not wanting to ſhew that a nation confiding too much on its natural ſtrength, is leſs inclined to be active in its operations than one of leſs natural powers who is obliged to ſupply that deficiency by encreaſing its exertions. This has often been the caſe between England and France. The activity of England ariſing from its fears, has ſometimes exceeded the exertions of France repoſing on its confidence.
But as this depends on the accidental diſ⯑poſition of a people, it will not always be the ſame. It is a matter well known to every man who has lately been in France, that a very extraordinary change is working itſelf in the minds of the people of that na⯑tion. A ſpirit that will render France ex⯑ceedingly formidable whenever its govern⯑ment ſhall embrace the fortunate opportu⯑nity of doubling its ſtrength by allying, if it may be ſo expreſſed, (for it is difficult to expreſs a new idea by old terms) the Ma⯑jeſty of the Sovereign with the Majeſty of the nation; for of all alliances this is infi⯑nitely the ſtrongeſt and the ſafeſt to be truſted to, becauſe the intereſt ſo formed, [28]and operating againſt external enemies can never be divided.
It may be taken as a certain rule, that a ſubject of any country attached to the go⯑vernment on the principles above-mentioned is of twice the value he was before. Free⯑dom in the ſubject is not a diminution, as was formerly believed, of the power of go⯑vernment, but an increaſe of it. Yet the progreſs by which changes of this kind are effected, requires to be nicely attended to.
Were governments to offer freedom to the people, or to ſhew an anxiety for that pur⯑poſe, the offer moſt probably would be re⯑jected. The purpoſe for which it was of⯑fered, might be miſtruſted. Therefore the deſire muſt originate with, and proceed from the maſs of the people, and when the im⯑preſſion becomes univerſal, and not before, is the important moment for the moſt ef⯑fectual conſolidation of national ſtrength and greatneſs that can take place.
While this change is working, there will appear a kind of chaos on the nation; but the creation we enjoy aroſe out of a chaos, [29]and our greateſt bleſſings appear to have a confuſed beginning.
Therefore, we may take it for granted, that what has at this moment the appear⯑ance of diſorder in France, is no more than one of the natural links in that great chain of circumſtances by which nations acquire the ſummit of their greatneſs. The Pro⯑vincial Aſſemblies already began in France, are as full, or rather a fuller repreſentation of the people than the Parliaments of Eng⯑land are.
The French, or, as they were formerly called, the Franks, (from whence came the Engliſh word Frank and Free) were once the freeſt people in Europe; and as nations appear to have their periodical revolutions, it is very probable they will be ſo again. The charge is already began. The people of France, as is before obſerved, are begin⯑ing to think for themſelves, and the people of England reſigning up the prerogative of thinking.
We ſhall now proceed to compare the pre⯑ſent condition of England and France as to population revenues and wealth, and to ſhew [30]that neither is in a condition of going to war, and that war can end in nothing but loſs, and, moſt probably, a temporary ruin to both nations.
To eſtabliſh this point ſo neceſſary for both nations to be impreſſed with, a free inveſtigation of all the matters connected with it is indiſpenſible: If, therefore, any thing herein advanced ſhall be diſagreeable, it muſt be juſtified on the ground that it is better to be known in order to prevent ruin, than to be concealed, when ſuch con⯑cealment ſerves only to haſten the ruin on.
OF POPULATION.
The Population of France being upwards of twenty-four millions, is more than double that of Great Britain and Ireland; beſides which France recruits more ſoldiers in Swiſſerland than England does in Scot⯑land and Ireland. To this may likewiſe be added, that England and Ireland are not on the beſt terms. The ſuſpicion that Eng⯑land governs Ireland for the purpoſe of keep⯑ing her low to prevent her becoming a rival in trade and manufactures, will always ope⯑rate [31]to hold Ireland in a ſtate of ſentimental hoſtilities with England.
REVENUES.
The Revenues of France are twenty-four millions ſterling. The Revenues of Eng⯑land fifteen millions and an half. The taxes per head in France are twenty ſhillings ſterling; the taxes per head in England are two pounds four ſhillings and two pence. The national debt in France including the life annuities (which are two-fifths of the whole debt, and are annually expiring) at eleven years purchaſe, is one hundred and forty-two millions ſterling. The national debt of England, the whole of which is on perpetual intereſt, is two hundred and forty-five millions. The national debt of France contains a power of annihi⯑lating itſelf without any new taxes for that purpoſe; becauſe it needs no more than to apply the life annuities as they expire to the purchaſe of the other three-fifths, which are on perpetual intereſt: But the national debt of England has not this advantage, and therefore the million a year that is to be [32]towards reducing it is ſo much addi⯑tional tax upon the people, over and above the current ſervice.
WEALTH.
This is an important inveſtigation, it ought therefore to be heard with patience, and judged of without prejudice.
Nothing is more common than for people to miſtake one thing for another. Do not thoſe who are crying up the wealth of the nation, miſtake a paper currency for riches? To aſcertain this point may be one of the means of preventing that ruin which cannot fail to follow by perſiſting in the miſtake.
The higheſt eſtimation that is made of the quantity of gold and ſilver in Britain at this preſent day is twenty millions: and thoſe who are moſt converſant with money tranſactions, believe it to be conſiderably below that ſum. Yet this is no more money than what the nation poſſeſſed twenty years ago, and therefore, whatever her trade may be, it has produced to her no profit. Certainly no man can be ſo unwiſe [33]as to ſuppoſe that encreaſing the quantity of bank notes, which is done with as little trouble as printing of news-papers, is na⯑national wealth.
The quantity of money in the nation was very well aſcertained in the years 1773, 74, and 76, by calling in the light gold coin.
There were upwards of fifteen millions and a half of gold coin then called in, which, with upwards of two millions of heavy gui⯑neas that remained out, and the ſilver coin, made above twenty millions, which is more than there is at this day. There is an amazing increaſe in the circulation of Bank paper, which is no more national wealth than news-papers are; becauſe an increaſe of promiſſary notes, the capital remaining unin⯑creaſed, or not increaſing in the ſame propor⯑tion, is no increaſe of wealth. It ſerves to raiſe falſe ideas which the judicious ſoon diſcover, and the ignorant experience to their coſt.
Out of twenty miilions ſterling, the pre⯑ſent quantity of real money in the nation, it would be too great an allowance to ſay [34]that one fourth of that ſum, which is five millions, was in London. But even admitting this to be the caſe, it would require no very conjuring powers to aſcertain pretty nearly what proportion of that ſum of five millions could be in the Bank. It would be ridi⯑culous to ſuppoſe it could be leſs than half a million, and extravagant to ſuppoſe it could be two millions.
It likewiſe requires no very extraordinary diſcernment to aſcertain how immenſe the quantity of Bank Notes, compared to its ca⯑pital in the Bank muſt be, when it is con⯑ſidered, that the national taxes are paid in Bank Notes, that all great tranſactions are done in Bank Notes, and that were a loan for twenty millions to be opened at the meet-of Parliament, it would moſt probably be ſubſcribed in a few days: Yet all men muſt know the loan could not be paid in money, becauſe it is at leaſt four times greater than all the money in London, including the Bankers and the Bank amount too. In ſhort, every thing ſhows that the rage that over⯑run America, for paper money, or paper cur⯑rency, has reached to England under another [35]name. There it was called Continental Money, and here it is called Bank Notes. But it ſignifies not what name it bears, if the capital is not equal to the redemption.
There is likewiſe another circumſtance that cannot fail to ſtrike with ſome force when it is mentioned, becauſe every man that has any thing to do with money tranſ⯑actions, will feel the truth of it, tho' he may not before have reflected upon it. It is the embarraſſed condition into which the gold coin is thrown by the neceſſity of weighing it, and by refuſing guineas that are even ſtanding weight, and there appears to be but few heavy ones. Whether this is intended to force the Paper Currency into circulation, is not here attempted to be aſſerted, but it certainly has that effect to a very great de⯑gree, becauſe people, rather than ſubmit to the trouble and hazard of weighing, will take paper in preference to money. This was once the caſe in America.
The natural effect of encreaſing and con⯑tinuing to increaſe paper currencies is that of baniſhing the real money. The ſhadow [36]takes place of the ſubſtance till the country is left with only ſhadows in its hands.
A trade that does not increaſe the quan⯑tity of real money in a country, cannot be ſtiled a profitable trade; yet this is certainly the caſe with England: and as to credit, of which ſo much has been ſaid, it may be founded on ignorance or a falſe belief, as well as on real ability.
In Amſterdam, the money depoſited in the Bank is never taken out again. The de⯑poſitors, when they have debts to pay, tranſ⯑fer their right to the perſons to whom they are indebted, and thoſe again proceed by the ſame practice, and the transfer of the right goes for payment; now could all the money dopoſited in the Bank of Amſterdam be pri⯑vately removed away, and the matter be kept a ſecret, the ignorance, or the belief that the money was ſtill there, would give the ſame credit as if it had not been removed. In ſhort, credit is often no more than an opi⯑nion, and the difference between credit and money is that money requires no opinion to ſupport it.
[37]All the countries in Europe annually in⯑creaſe in their quantity of gold and ſilver ex⯑cept England. By the regiſters kept at Liſ⯑bon and Cadiz, the two ports into which the gold and ſilver from South America are imported, it appears that above eighty mil⯑lions ſterling have been imported within twenty years*. This has ſpread itſelf over Europe, and increaſed the quantity in all the countries on the Continent, yet twenty years ago there was as much gold and ſilver in England as there is at this time.
The value of the ſilver imported into Eu⯑rope exceeds that of the gold, yet every one can ſee there is no increaſe of ſilver coin in England; very little ſilver coin appearing except what are called Birmingham ſhillings, which have a faint impreſſion of King Wil⯑liam on one ſide, and are ſmooth on the other.
In what is the profits of trade to ſhew it⯑ſelf but by increaſing the quantity of that [38]which is the object of trade, money. An increaſe of paper is not an increaſe of na⯑tional profit any more than it is an increaſe of national money, and the confounding paper and money together, or not attending to the diſtinction, is a rock that the nation will one day ſplit upon.
Whether the payment of intereſt to fo⯑reigners, or the trade to the Eaſt-Indies, or the nation embroiling itſelf in foreign wars, or whether the amount of all the trade which England carries on with different parts of the world, collectively taken, balances itſelf without profit; whether one or all of theſe is the cauſe, why the quantity of money does not encreaſe in England is not, in this place, the object of enquiry. It is the fact and not the cauſe that is the matter here treated of.
Men immerſed in trade and the concerns of a counting houſe, are not the moſt ſpecu⯑lative in national affairs, or always the beſt judges of them. Accuſtomed to run riſks in trade, they are habitually prepared to run riſks with Government, and tho' they [39]are the firſt to ſuffer, they are often the laſt to foreſee an evil.
Let us now caſt a look towards the ma⯑nufactures. A great deal has been ſaid of their flouriſhing condition, and perhaps a great deal too much, for it may again be aſked, where is the profit if there is no en⯑creaſe of money in the nation.
The woollen manufacture is the ſtaple manufacture of England, and this is ev⯑dently on the decline, in ſome, if not in all, its branches. The city of Norwich, one of the moſt populous cities in England, and wholly dependant on the woollen manufac⯑ture, is, at this day in a very impoveriſhed condition, owing to the decline of its trade.
But not to reſt the matter on a general aſſertion, or embarraſs it with numerous ſtatements, we will produce a circumſtance by which the whole progreſs of the trade may be aſcertained.
So long as thirty years ago the price paid to the ſpinners of wool was one ſhilling for twenty-four ſkains, each ſkain containing five hundred and ſixty yards. This, according to the term of the trade, was called giving a [40]ſhilling for a ſhilling. A good hand would ſpin twelve ſkains, which was ſixpence a day.
According to the increaſe of taxes, and the increaſed price of all the articles of life, they certainly ought now to get at leaſt fif⯑teen pence, for what thirty years ago they got a ſhilling for. But ſuch is the decline of the trade, that the caſe is directly the contrary. They now get but ninepence for the ſhilling, that is, they get but nine pence for what thirty years ago they got a ſhilling for. Can theſe people cry out for war, when they are already half ruined by the decline of trade, and half devoured by the encreaſe of taxes.
But this is not the whole of the misfortunes which that part of the country ſuffers, and which will extend to others. The Norfolk farmers were the firſt who went into the practice of manuring their land with marle: But time has ſhewn, that though it gave a vigour to the land for ſome years, it operated in the end to exhauſt its ſtamina; that the lands in many parts are worſe than before they began to marle, and that it will not an⯑ſwer to marle a ſecond time.
[41]The manufactures of Mancheſter, Bir⯑mingham and Sheffield have had of late a conſiderable ſpring, but this appears to be rather on ſpeculation than certainty. The ſpeculations on the American market have failed, and that on Ruſſia is becoming very precarious. Experience likewiſe was want⯑ing to aſcertain the quantity which the treaty of commerce with France would give ſale to, and it is moſt probable the eſtimations have been too high, more eſpecially as Eng⯑liſh goods will now become unpopular in France, which was not the caſe before the preſent injudicius rupture.
But in the beſt ſtate which manufactures can be in, they are very unſtable ſources of national wealth. The reaſons are, that they ſeldom continue long in one ſtay. The market for them depends upon the caprice of faſhions, and ſometimes of politics in foreign countries, and they are at all times expoſed to rivalſhip as well as to change. The Americans have already ſeveral manu⯑factures among them, which they prefer to the Engliſh, ſuch as axes, ſcythes, ſickles, houghs, planes, nails, &c. Window glaſs, [42]which was once a conſiderable article of export from England to America, the Americans now procure from other countries, nearly as good as the Engliſh Crown glaſs, and but little dearer than the common green window glaſs.
It is ſomewhat remarkable that ſo many pens have been diſplayed to ſhew, what is called the increaſe of the commerce of Eng⯑land, and yet all of them have ſtopt ſhort of the grand point, that is, they have gone no farther than to ſhew that a larger num⯑ber of ſhipping, and a greater quantity of tonnage have been employed of late years than formerly: But this is no more than what is happening in other parts of Europe. The preſent faſhion of the world is com⯑merce, and the quantity encreaſes in France as well as in England.
But the object of all trade is profit, and profit ſhews itſelf, not by an increaſe of paper currency, for that may be nationally had without the trouble of trade, but by an in⯑creaſe of real money: therefore the eſtimation ſhould have ended, not in the comparative quantity of ſhipping and tonnage, but in [43]the comparative quantity of gold and ſil⯑ver.
Had the quantity of gold and ſilver in⯑creaſed in England, the miniſterial writers would not have ſtopt ſhort at ſhipping and tonnage; but if they know any thing of the matter, they muſt know that it does not increaſe, and that the deception is occaſion⯑ed by the increaſe of paper inſtead of money, and that as paper continue to increaſe, gold and ſilver will diminiſh. Poorer in wealth and richer in deluſion.
Something is radically wrong, and time will diſcover it to be putting paper in the room of money.
Out of one hundred millions ſterling of gold and ſilver, which muſt have been im⯑ported into Europe from South America ſince the commencement of the peace before laſt, it does not appear that England has de⯑rived or retains any portion of it.
Mr. Neckar ſtates the annual increaſe of gold and ſilver in France, that is, the proportion which France draws of the annual importa⯑ [...]ion in to Europe, to be upwards of one million [...]terling: But England, in the ſpace of twenty [44]years, do not appear to have encreaſod in any thing but paper currency.
Credulity is wealth while credulity laſts, and credit is, in a thouſand inſtances, the child of credulity. It requires no more faith to believe paper to be money, than to believe a man could go into a quart bottle; and the nation whoſe credulity can be impoſed upon by bottle conjuring, can, for a time, be im⯑poſed upon by paper conjuring.
From theſe matters we paſs on to make ſome obſervations on the national debt, which is another ſpecies of paper currency.
In ſhort to whatever point the eye is di⯑rected, whether to the money, the paper, the manufactures, the taxes, or the debt, the in⯑ability of ſupporting a war is evident, unleſs it is intended to carry it on by fleecing the ſkin over peoples ears by taxes; and there⯑fore the endangering the nation in a war for the ſake of the Stadtholder of Holland, or the King of Pruſſia, or any other foreign af⯑fairs, from which England can derive no poſſible advantage, is an abſurd and ruinous ſyſtem of politics.
[45]France perhaps is not in a better ſituation, and, therefore, a war where both muſt loſe, and wherein they could only act the part of ſeconds, muſt hiſtorically have been deno⯑minated a boyiſh, fooliſh, unneceſſary quarrel.
But before we enter on the ſubject of the national debt, it will be proper to take a general review of the different manner of carrying on war ſince the Revolution to what was the practice before.
Before the Revolution the intervals of peace and war always found means to pay off the expence, and leave the nation clear of incumbrance at the commencement of any ſucceeding war; and even for ſome years after the Revolution this practice was continued.
From the year 1688, (the aera of the Revo⯑lution) to the year 1702, a period of fourteen years, the ſums borrowed by Government at different times, amounted to forty-four mil⯑lions; yet this ſum was paid off almoſt as faſt as it was borrowed: thirty-four mil⯑lions being paid off, at the commencement of the year 1702. This was a greater exer⯑tion [46]than the nation has ever made ſince, for exertion is not in borrowing but in paying.
From that time wars have been carried on by borrowing and funding the capital on a perpetual intereſt, inſtead of paying it off, and thereby continually carrying forward and accumulating the weight and expence of every war into the next. By this means that which was light at firſt, becomes im⯑menſely heavy at laſt. The nation has now on its ſhoulders the weight of all the wars from the time of Queen Anne. This practice is exactly like that of loading a horſe with a feather at a time till you break his back.
The national debt exhibits at this day a ſtriking novelty. It has travelled on in a cir⯑cular progreſſion till the amount of the annual intereſt has exactly overtaken, or be⯑come equal to, the firſt capital of the na⯑tional debt, NINE MILLIONS. Here begins the evidence of the predictions ſo long fore⯑told by the ableſt calculators in the nation. The intereſt will in ſucceſſion overtake all the ſucceeding capitals, and that with the proportioned rapidity with which thoſe ca⯑pitals [47]accumulated; becauſe by continuing the practice, not only higher and higher pre⯑miums muſt be given for loans, but the money, or rather the paper, will not go ſo far as it formerly did, and therefore the debt will encreaſe with a continually encreaſing velocity.
The expence of every war, ſince the na⯑tional debt began, has, upon an average, been double the expence of the war preceeding it: the expence therefore of the next war will be at leaſt two hundred millions, which will encreaſe the annual intereſt to at leaſt ſeven⯑teen millions, and conſequently the taxes in the ſame proportion; the following war will encreaſe the intereſt to thirty-three millions, and a third war will mount up the intereſt to ſixty-five millions. This is not going on in the ſpirit of prediction, but taking what has already been as a rule for what will yet be, and therefore the nation has but a miſerable proſpect to look at. The weight of accu⯑mulating intereſt is not much felt till after many years have paſſed over; but when it begins to be heavy, as it does now, the bur⯑then encreaſes like that of purchaſing a horſe [48]with a farthing for the firſt nail of the ſhoe and doubling it.
As to Mr. Pitt's ſcheme of reducing the national debt by a million a year, applied to the purchaſe of ſtock, it will turn out, to ſay no worſe of it, a ridiculous and frivolous project: For if a Miniſter has not experience enough to diſtinguiſh a feather in the air, and ſuch there always will be, from the God of War, nor the clamours and in⯑tereſt of thoſe who are ſeeking for jobs and contracts, from the voice and intereſt of the people, he will ſoon precipitate the nation into ſome unneceſſary war: and therefore, any ſcheme of redemption of the debt, founded on the ſuppoſed continuance of peace, will, with ſuch conduct, be no more than a balloon.
That the funding ſyſtem contains within itſelf the ſeeds of its own deſtruction, is as certain as that of the human body contain⯑ing within itſelf the ſeeds of death. The event is as fixed as fate, unleſs it cannot be taken as a proof that becauſe we are not dead we are not to die.
[49]The conſequence of the funding ſcheme, even if no other event takes place, will be to create two violent parties in the nation. The one goaded by taxes continually encreaſ⯑ing to pay the intereſt, the other reaping a benefit from the taxes by receiving the inte⯑reſt. This is very ſtrongly ſhadowed forth, like the hand-writing on the wall, by the in⯑genious author of the Commercial Atlas, in his obſervations on the national debt.
The ſlumber that for ſeveral years has over-ſhadowed the nation in all matters of public finance, cannot be ſuppoſed to laſt for ever. The people have not yet awakened to the ſubject, and this is taken for granted they never will. But, if a ſuppoſed unne⯑ceſſary expenditure of between five and ſix millions ſterling in the finances of France, (for the writer undertakes not to judge of the fact) has awakened that whole nation, a people ſuppoſed to be perfectly docile in all national matters, ſurely the people of Eng⯑land will not be leſs attentive to their rights and properties. If this ſhould not be the caſe, the inference will be fairly drawn, that England is loſing the ſpirit that France is [50]taking up, and that it is an ingenious device in the Miniſtry to compoſe the nation to un⯑popular and unneceſſary taxes, by ſhamming a victory when there was no enemy at hand.
In ſhort, every war ſerves to encreaſe every kind of paper currency in the nation, and to diminiſh the quantity of gold and ſilver, by ſending it to Pruſſia and other foreign countries.
It will not be denied that credulity is a ſtrong trait in the Engliſh character; and this has in no inſtance ſhewn itſelf more than in miſtaking paper for money, except it be in the unaccountable ignorance of miſtaking the debt of the nation for riches. But the ſuſpicion is beginning to awake.
We will cloſe this article with obſerving that a new kind of paper currency has aroſe within a few years, which is that of country Bank Notes; almoſt every town now has its Bank, its Paper Mint, and the coinage of paper is become univerſal. In the mean time the melting down the light guineas, and recoining them, paſſes with thoſe who know no better for an encreaſe of money; becauſe every new guinea they ſee, and [51]which is but ſeldom, they naturally ſuppoſe to be a guinea more, when it is really nothing elſe than an old guinea new caſt.
From this account of the money, paper, and national debt of England, we proceed to compare it with the money, paper, and na⯑tional debt of France.
It is very well known that paper has not the credit in France which it has in Eng⯑land, and that, conſequently there is much leſs of it. This has naturally operated to en⯑creaſe the quantity of gold and ſilver in France, and prevent the encreaſe of paper.
The higheſt eſtimation of the quantity of gold and ſilver in England, as already ſtated, is twenty millions ſterling, and the quantity of paper grafted thereon, immenſe.
The quantity of gold and ſilver in France, is upwards of ninety millions ſterling, and the quantity of paper grafted thereon, trifling. France, therefore, has a long run of credit yet in reſerve, which England has already expended; and it will naturally follow, that when the Government of France and the nation ſhall adjuſt their differences by an amicable embrace of each other, that this [52]reſerved credit will be brought forth, and the power of France will be at leaſt doubly encreaſed. The adjuſtment of theſe diffe⯑rences is but the buſineſs of a day, whenever its government ſhall ſee the proper moment for doing it, and nothing would precipitate this event more than a war. The cry of war, from the injudicious provocations given by the Britiſh Miniſtry, and the diſadvanta⯑geous effect of the Commercial, Treaty, is becoming popular in France.
The near ſituation of France to Spain and Portugal, the two countries which import gold and ſilver, and her manufactures being better adapted to the warm climate of theſe countries, than the manufactures of Eng⯑land, give her ſuperior opportunities of drawing money into the nation, and as ſhe has but little trade to the Eaſt Indies, the money ſo drawn in is not drawn out again as in England. Another advantage is, that from the greatneſs of her dominions ſhe has no occaſion to waſte her wealth in hiring foreign troops, as is the practice with Eng⯑land; and a third advantage is, that the money which England ſquanders in Pruſſia [53]and other countries on the Continent ſerves to encreaſe the wealth of France, becauſe a conſiderable part of it centers there through the medium of her commerce.
Admitting Great Gritain and Ireland to contain ten millions of inhabitants, the quan⯑tity of money per head is forty ſhillings; the money per head in France is three pounds fifteen ſhillings, which is nearly double.
The national debt of England, compared to the whole amount of money in the na⯑tion, is as twelve is to one, that is, the debt is twelve times greater than all the money amounts to.
The national debt of France, compared to the whole amount of her money, is conſider⯑ably leſs than as two is to one, that is, her debt is not ſo much as twice the amount of her money. France, therefore, as already ſtated, has an immenſe credit in reſerve whenever the ſettlement of her preſent internal differ⯑ences ſhall furniſh her with the means of employing it, and that period, ſo much to be dreaded by England, is haſtening on.
[54]The annual intereſt of the national debt of England and France are nearly equal, be⯑ing NINE MILLIONS ſterling; but with this difference, that above three millions and a half of the annual intereſt of France are only life annuitles. The intereſt, therefore, of her debt leſſens every year, and ſhe will have a ſurplus up to the amount of three millions and a half, to apply to the purchaſe of that part of the debt which is on perpetual in⯑tereſt; therefore, without any new taxes for that purpoſe, ſhe can diſcharge her whole debt in leſs than a third of the time on which it can be done in England, according to Mr. Pitt's plan, with his additional tax of a million a year.
But let the event of Mr. Pitt's plan be what it may, as to reducing the debt, there is one circumſtance that cannot fail to accompany it, which is, that of making it the intereſt of Government, in execut⯑ing this plan, to undermine the intereſt of its creditors, or the value of the funds, for the purpoſe of purchaſing at a cheaper rate.
The plan is founded on the preſumption of a long uninterrupted peace, and that fu⯑ture [55]loans would not be wanted, which can not now be expected, for France in her turn is getting into a temper for war. The plan naturally ſtrikes at the credit of Govern⯑ment, in contracting further debts, for were a loan to be opened to-morrow, the ſubſcribers, naturally perceiving that it was the intereſt of Government to undermine them as ſoon as they became creditors, would conſequent⯑ly ſeek to ſecure themſelves, by demand⯑ing higher premiums at firſt. It is a queſtion, whether a premium of thirty per cent. is now as good as ten was before, and therefore the plan, in caſe of a war, inſtead of leſſening the debt, ſerves to puſh it more ra⯑pidly on.
The Miniſter certainly never underſtood the natural operation of his plan, or he would not have acted as he has done. The plan has two edges, while he has ſuppoſed it to have only one. It ſtrikes at the debt in peace, and at the credit in war.
The gentleman who originally furniſhed the Miniſter with this plan, now gives it totally up. He knew its operation both in peace and war, but the Miniſter appears not to [56]have comprehended it: But if he has made a miſtake, his youth and inexperience muſt be his apology.
The plan, unleſs it ſhould be altered, that is given out for providing for the expence of the late armaments, is in reality no other than the American plan of paper money, and it is very probable that the Miniſter has re⯑ceived it from ſome American refugee.
The plan given out is, that the Miniſter is to borrow the MONEY of the Bank. Here is the deluſion. The name of MONEY co⯑vers the deception. For the caſe is, that the Bank do not lend the real money, but it iſſues out an emiſſion of Bank-paper, and the preſumption is, that there will be no run upon the Bank in conſequence of ſuch an ex⯑traordinary emiſſion, but if there ſhould, no man can be at a loſs in foreſeeing the iſſue.
There are thoſe who remember that on a former run, the Bank was obliged to prolong the time by paying ſhillings and ſixpences, and it is univerſally credited that a quantity of ſilver is now preſerved in the Bank for the ſame purpoſe; but the device, to every perſon of reflection, ſhews that the capital [57]is not equal to the demands, and that the Chapter of Accidents is part of the Bible of Bank.
It may be aſked why do not the Govern⯑ment iſſue the paper inſtead of the Bank? The anſwer is, that it is exactly the ſame thing in the end, only with this difference in the mode, that were the Government to do it, it would be too viſible a ſyſtem of pa⯑per currency, and that a diſguiſe is neceſ⯑ſary.
Having recourſe to the Bank, is a kind of playing the Bank off againſt the Funds. Fighting one kind of paper againſt another, and in the combat both will be ſuf⯑ferers.
In ſhort, the deluſion of paper riches is working as rapidly in England as it did in America. A young and inexperienced Mi⯑niſter, like a young and inexperienced Con⯑greſs, may ſuppoſe that he ſees mines of wealth in a printing-preſs, and that a nation cannot be exhauſted while there is paper and ink enough to print paper money. Every new emiſſion, until the deluſion burſts, will appear to the nation an increaſe of wealth. [58]Every merchant's coffers will appear a trea⯑ſury, and he will ſwell with paper riches till he becomes a bankrupt.
When a Bank makes too free with its paper, it expoſes itſelf in much the ſame manner which a Government does that makes too free with its power; too much credit is as bad as too little; and there is ſuch a thing as governing too much as well in a Bank as in a Government. But nothing expoſes a Bank more than being under the influence, inſtead of the protection of Go⯑vernment, and whenever either the property or the credit of a Bank can be commanded or influenced by a Government, or a Mini⯑ſter, its deſtruction is not far off.
We have now ſtated the comparative con⯑dition of England and France as to money matters. But there yet remain ſome things neceſſary to be touched upon.
It is an error very frequently committed in the world to miſtake diſpoſition for con⯑dition.
France with a much better permanent con⯑dition for war than England, is in a leſs diſ⯑poſition to enter into one, and this want of [59]diſpoſition in her is miſtaken in England for want of condition; and on the other hand, the apparent diſpoſition in England for war is miſtaken by her for a condition to under⯑take and carry one on.
There appears a uniformity in all the works of Nature, from individual animals up to nations. The ſmaller animals are always the moſt fretful, paſſionate, and inſulting. They miſtake temper for ſtrength, and often fall a ſacrifice to vexatious impetuoſity, while larger ones go calmly on, and require re⯑peated provocations to incenſe them. France may yet be aggravated into war, and very probably will. Where the condition exiſts the diſpoſition may at any time take place. We may create temper, but we cannot create ſtrength.
While the literature of England preſerves an honourable rank among the nations of Europe, her national character is moſt miſerably ſuffering in the world through her news-papers. The moſt bare⯑faced perſidiouſneſs, the moſt abandoned principles are daily propagated. A total diſ⯑regard to all the obligations of national faith [60]and honour are publicly profeſſed. Inſtead of that true greatneſs of heart, that calm grandeur of ſentiment, that generous diſ⯑dain of vulgar littleneſs that ought always to accompany the diſputes of nations, ſcarce⯑ly any thing is to be ſeen but mean abuſe and low ſcurrility. This is not the caſe in any other country in the world but Eng⯑land.
We will now proceed to conclude with a few additional obſervations on the ſtate of politics.
For ſeveral weeks the nation was amuſed with the daily rumours of ſome great Ca⯑binet ſecret, and admiring how profoundly the ſecret was kept, when the only ſecret was, that there was no ſecret to divulge.
But this opinion of a ſecret very well ſhews that the opinion of the nation was different to the opinion of the Miniſter, or the ſuppoſition of ſome great ſecret would not have taken place, as the affairs of the Stadtholder were then publicly known. It ſhews that the nation did not think the Stadtholder of Holland a ſufficient reaſon for laying n [...]w taxes on England, and running into the riſk [61]and expence of a war, and great was the ſurpriſe when the declaration and counter declaration like twin mice peeped from the Cabinet.
But there is one ſecret that requires to be inveſtigated, which is, whether the Miniſter did not know that France would not engage in a war, and whether the preparations were not an idle parade, founded on that know⯑ledge.
Whether it was not meanly putting Eng⯑land under the banners of Pruſſia, and tak⯑ing thereby a diſhonourable advantage of the internal perplexity which France was then in, and which in its turn may happen to England, to aſſume the air of a challenge, which it muſt be known would not be ac⯑cepted, becauſe there was nothing to make the acceptance neceſſary.
Whether this conduct in the Miniſter does not miſchievouſly operate to deſtroy the har⯑mony that appeared to be growing up be⯑tween the two nations; to leſſen, if not to⯑tally deſtroy, the advantages of the Com⯑mercial Treaty, and to lay the ſeeds of fu⯑ture [62]wars, when there was a proſpect of a long and uninterrupted peace.
When there are two ways of accompliſh⯑ing the ſame object, it almoſt always happens that the one is better than the other, and whether the Miniſter has not choſen the worſt. A few obſervations will elucidate this point.
It ſignifies not what airy ſchemes, projects, or even treaties may be formed, eſpecially if done under the point of the bayonet, for all that can be expected from Holland is neutra⯑lity. Her trade is with all nations, and it is from her neutrality that this trade has ariſen. Deſtroy this neutrality and Holland is de⯑ſtroyed. Therefore it matters not what party ſentiments men may be of in Holland as to the Stadtholderſhip, becauſe there is ſtill a ſuperior banner under which all will unite.
Holland will not expoſe her trade to the devaſtations of England by joining France in a war, neither will ſhe expoſe it to France by joining England. It may very well be aſked, what are England or France to Hol⯑land, that ſhe ſhould join with either in a [63]war, unleſs ſhe is compelled to it by one or the other making war upon her, as was the caſe in the laſt war.
Events may ſoon happen in Europe to make all the force that Pruſſia can raiſe ne⯑ceſſary to her own defence, and Holland muſt be wiſe enough to ſee, that by joining Eng⯑land ſhe not only expoſes her trade to France but likewiſe her dominions, becauſe France can invade her in a quarter in which England cannot defend her, for Holland lies open to France by land. It is, therefore, more immediately the intereſt of Holland to keep on good terms with France, neither can England give her any equivalent to ba⯑lance this circumſtance. How fooliſh then are the politics which are directed to unna⯑tural and impoſſible objects. Surely the ex⯑perience of a century paſt is ſufficient to ſhew to any man, except one of yeſterday, what the conduct of Holland in all caſes muſt be.
But there is another circumſtance that do not fail to impreſs foreigners, and eſpecially Holland, which is, that the immenſity of the national debt of England, the proſpect of its ſtill encreaſing, and the exorbitancy of her [64]paper currencies, render her too inſecure in herſelf to be much confided in by foreign na⯑tions for any length of time. Becauſe that which muſt happen may ſoon happen.
Concerning the reſcript delivered by the French Miniſter, there is one certain expla⯑nation to be put upon it, which is, that if France had been diſpoſed for war, ſhe would not have made that communication. The very making it goes to a full explanation of the parts; and as ſoon as Mr. Pitt obtained this knowledge, it appeared to him a ſafe moment to gird on his ſword, and when he found that France was as well weaponed as himſelf to propoſe to take it off again. This is in a few words the whole hiſtory of the campaign. A war Miniſter in peace, and a peace Miniſter in war. Brave where there is no danger, and prudent when there is.
The reſcript could be nothing elſe than an explanation, on the part of France, of the ſituation ſhe conceived herſelf to be ſubject to, and the probable conſequences that might follow from it. This ſhe was not obliged to make, and therefore her making it was a matter of civil communication towards a [65]power ſhe was at peace with, and which in return entitled her to a ſimilar communica⯑tion on the part of the Britiſh Cabinet. All this might have been done without either the expence, the tumult, the provocations, or the ill-blood that has been created.
The alliance between France and the Dutch, was formed while the Stadtholder was a part of the Government, therefore France could not from that alliance take a part either for or againſt him. She could only act when the whole intereſt of the Repub⯑lic was expoſed to a foreign enemy, and it was not certain that this might not be the caſe.
The reſcript, therefore, inſtead of being taken as a ground for war, was in itſelf a ground for peace, becauſe it tended to bring on a diſcuſſion of all the circumſtances of France and England relative to Holland, which could not have failed to place Hol⯑land in a ſtate of neutrality, and that only will be the final event now; becauſe, inde⯑pendent of all parties, no other is conſiſtent with the whole national intereſt of that Re⯑public.
[66]But this not being done, it is now left to the Dutch to do it for themſelves.
An alliance with England, at the ſame time there is one exiſting with France, will ſecure this neutrality ſo neceſſary to the Dutch republic. By this ſtroke of Politics ſhe will be free from all obligations to join with either in a war, and be guaranteed by both. Her alliance with England will de⯑bar England from moleſting her trade by ſea, and that with France will debar France from the ſame thing, and like⯑wiſe from invading her by land in all future caſes. There are ſo many probable circum⯑ſtances to ariſe on the Continent of Europe, that the ſituation of Holland requires this ſafeguard, more eſpecially from France, on account of her land connection.
The riſing greatneſs of the Ruſſian Em⯑pire, the probable union of the intereſt of this Empire with that of Germany and France, and conſequently with Spain, whoſe intereſts cannot be ſeparated, and the probability of a rupture between the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, are matters that cannot fail to im⯑preſs the Dutch with the neceſſity of ſe⯑curing themſelves by land as well as by ſea, [67]and to prevent their being drawn into the quarrels either of England or France.
Upon the whole, as there was a civil as well as an uncivil line of politics to be pur⯑ſued, every man of humane and generous ſen⯑timents muſt lament it was not choſen.
A diſpoſition for peace was growing up in every part of France, and there appeared at the ſame time a mutual one riſing in England. A ſilent wiſh on both ſides, was univerſally expanding itſelf, that wars, ſo fatal to the true intereſt, and burthen ſome by taxes to the ſubjects of both countries might exiſt no more, and that a long and laſting peace might take place.
But inſtead of cultivating this happy op⯑portunity, the pettiſh vanity of a young and unexperienced Miniſter, who balanced him⯑ſelf between peace and war to take his choice of circumſtances, inſtead of principles, and who went into an expenſive armament when there was none to contend with, and not till after the affairs of Hol [...]and might be ſaid to be termi⯑nated, has deſtroyed thoſe ſeeds of harmony that might have been rendered of more value to both nations than their fleets and armies.
[68]He has permitted the nation to run mad under the univerſal influence of a groundleſs belief of vaſt hoſtile armaments in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, and the ſuppoſition of a ſe⯑cret that never exiſted. By this means the ſparks of ill-will are afreſh kindled up be⯑tween the nations, the fair proſpect of laſt⯑ing peace is vaniſhed, and a train of future evils fills up the ſcene, and that at a time when the internal affairs of France, however confuſed they at preſent appear, are natu⯑rally approaching to a great and harmonious encreaſe of its power.