SPEECH, &c.

I THANK you for pointing to me. I really wiſhed much to engage your attention in an early ſtage of the debate. I have been long very deeply, though perhaps ineffectually, en⯑gaged in the preliminary enquiries, which have continued without intermiſſion for ſome years. Though I have felt, with ſome degree of ſenſibility, the natural and inevitable impreſ⯑ſions of the ſeveral matters of fact, as they have been ſucceſſively diſcloſed, I have not at any time attempted to trouble you on the merits of the ſubject; and very little on any of the points which incidentally aroſe in the courſe of our pro⯑ceedings. But I ſhould be ſorry to be found to⯑tally ſilent upon this day. Our enquiries are now come to their final iſſue:—It is now to be deter⯑mined whether the three years of laborious par⯑liamentary reſearch, whether the twenty years [2] of patient Indian ſuffering, are to produce a ſubſtantial reform in our Eaſtern adminiſtration; or whether our knowledge of the grievances has abated our zeal for the correction of them, and whether our very enquiry into the evil was only a pretext to elude the remedy which is demanded from us by humanity, by juſtice, and by every principle of true policy. Depend upon it, this buſineſs cannot be indifferent to our fame. It will turn out a matter of great diſgrace or great glory to the whole Britiſh nation. We are on a conſpicuous ſtage, and the world marks our de⯑meanour.

I am therefore a little concerned to perceive the ſpirit and temper in which the debate has been all along purſued, upon one ſide of the Houſe. The declamation of the Gentlemen who oppoſe the bill has been abundant and vehement, but they have been reſerved and even ſilent about the fitneſs or unfitneſs of the plan to attain the direct ob⯑ject it has in view. By ſome gentlemen it is taken up (by way of exerciſe I preſume) as a point of law on a queſtion of private property, and corporate franchiſe; by others it is re⯑garded as the petty intrigue of a faction at court, and argued merely as it tends to ſet this man a little higher, or that a little lower in ſitua⯑tion and power. All the void has been filled up with invectives againſt coalition; with alluſions to the loſs of America; with the activity and in⯑activity of miniſters. The total ſilence of theſe gentlemen concerning the intereſt and well-being of the people of India, and concerning the intereſt which this nation has in the commerce and reve⯑nues of that country, is a ſtrong indication of the value which they ſet upon theſe objects.

[3]It has been a little painful to me to obſerve the intruſion into this important debate of ſuch com⯑pany as Quo Warranto, and Mandamus, and Certiorari; as if we were on a trial about mayors and aldermen, and capital burgeſſes; or engaged in a ſuit concerning the borough of Penryn, or Saltaſh, or St. Ives, or St. Mawes. Gentlemen have argued with as much heat and paſſion, as if the firſt things in the world were at ſtake; and their topics are ſuch, as belong only to matter of the loweſt and meaneſt litigation. It is not right, it is not worthy of us, in this manner to depreci⯑ate the value, to degrade the majeſty of this grave deliberation of policy and empire.

For my part, I have thought myſelf bound, when a matter of this extraordinary weight came before me, not to conſider (as ſome Gentlemen are ſo fond of doing) whether the bill originated from a Secretary of State for the home department, or from a Secretary for the foreign; from a miniſ⯑ter of influence or a miniſter of the people; from Jacob or from Eſau^*. I aſked myſelf, and I aſked myſelf nothing elſe, what part it was fit for a member of parliament, who has ſupplied a mediocrity of talents by the extreme of diligence, and who has thought himſelf obliged, by the re⯑ſearch of years, to wind himſelf into the inmoſt receſſes and labyrinths of the Indian detail, what part, I ſay, it became ſuch a member of parlia⯑ment to take, when a miniſter of ſtate, in con⯑formity to a recommendation from the throne, has brought before us a ſyſtem for the better govern⯑ment of the territory and commerce of the Eaſt. In this light, and in this only, I will trouble you with my ſentiments.

[4]It is not only agreed but demanded, by the Right Honourable gentleman^*, and by thoſe who act with him, that a whole ſyſtem ought to be produced; that it ought not to be an half meaſure; that it ought to be no palliative; but a legiſlative proviſion, vigorous, ſubſtantial, and effective.—I believe that no man who under⯑ſtands the ſubject can doubt for a moment, that thoſe muſt be the conditions of any thing deſerving the name of a reform in the Indian government; that any thing ſhort of them would not only be deluſive, but, in this matter which admits no medium, noxious in the ex⯑treme.

To all the conditions propoſed by his adver⯑ſaries the mover of the bill perfectly agrees; and on his performance of them he reſts his cauſe. On the other hand, not the leaſt objec⯑tion has been taken, with regard to the efficiency, the vigour, or the completeneſs of the ſcheme. I am therefore warranted to aſſume, as a thing admitted, that the bills accompliſh what both ſides of the Houſe demand as eſſential. The end is completely anſwered, ſo far as the direct and immediate object is concerned.

But though there are no direct, yet there are various collateral objections made; objections from the effects, which this plan of reform for Indian adminiſtration may have on the privileges of great public bodies in England; from its pro⯑bable influence on the conſtitutional rights, or on the freedom and integrity of the ſeveral branches of the legiſlature.

[5]Before I anſwer theſe objections I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that if we are not able to con⯑trive ſome method of governing India well, which will not of neceſſity become the means or govern⯑ing Great Britain ill, a ground is laid for their eternal ſeparation; but none for ſacrificing the people of that country to our conſtitution. I am however far from being perſuaded that any ſuch in⯑compatibility of intereſt does at all exiſt. On the contrary I am certain that every means, effectual to preſerve India from oppreſſion, is a guard to pre⯑ſerve the Britiſh conſtitution from its worſt cor⯑ruption. To ſhew this, I will conſider the ob⯑jections, which I think are four.

• 1ſt. That the bill is an attack on the chartered rights of men.
• 2dly. That it increaſes the influence of the crown.
• 3dly. That it does not increaſe, but diminiſhes, the influence of the crown, in order to pro⯑mote the intereſts of certain miniſters and their party.
• 4thly. That it deeply affects the national credit.

As to the firſt of theſe objections; I muſt ob⯑ſerve that the phraſe of ‘"the chartered rights of men,"’ is full, of affectation; and very unuſual in the diſcuſſion of privileges conferred by char⯑ters of the preſent deſcription. But it is not dif⯑ficult to diſcover what end that ambiguous mode of expreſſion, ſo often reiterated, is meant to anſwer.

The rights of men, that is to ſay, the natural rights of mankind, are indeed ſacred things; and if any public meaſure is proved miſchievouſly to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that [6] meaſure, even if no charter at all could be ſet up a⯑gainſt it. If theſe natural rights are further affirm⯑ed and declared by expreſs covenants, if they are clearly defined and ſecured againſt chicane, againſt power, and authority, by written inſtruments and poſitive engagements, they are in a ſtill better condition: they partake not only of the ſanctity of the object ſo ſecured, but of that ſolemn pub⯑lic faith itſelf, which ſecures an object of ſuch importance. Indeed this formal recognition, by the ſovereign power, of an original right in the ſubject, can never be ſubverted, but by rooting up the holding radical principles of government, and even of ſociety itſelf. The charters, which we call by diſtinction great, are public inſtruments of this nature; I mean the charters of King John and King Henry the Third. The things ſecured by theſe inſtruments may, without any deceitful ambiguity, be very fitly called the chartered rights of men.

Theſe charters have made the very name of a charter dear to the heart of every Engliſhman—But, Sir, there may be, and there are charters, not only different in nature, but formed on principles the very reverſe of thoſe of the great charter. Of this kind is the charter of the Eaſt India Company. Magna charta is a charter to reſtrain power, and to deſtroy monopoly. The Eaſt India charter is a charter to eſtabliſh monopoly, and to create power. Political power and commercial mono⯑poly are not the rights of men; and the rights to them derived from charters, it is fallacious and ſophiſtical to call ‘"the chartered rights of men."’ Theſe chartered rights, (to ſpeak of ſuch char⯑ters and of their effects in terms of the greateſt [7] poſſible moderation) do at leaſt ſuſpend the natural rights of mankind at large; and in their very frame and conſtitution are liable to fall into a direct violation of them.

It is a charter of this latter deſcription (that is to ſay a charter of power and monopoly) which is af⯑fected by the bill before you. The bill, Sir, does, without queſtion, affect it; it does affect it eſſen⯑tially and ſubſtantially. But, having ſtated to you of what deſcription the chartered rights are which this bill touches, I feel no difficulty at all in acknow⯑ledging the exiſtence of thoſe chartered rights, in their fulleſt extent. They belong to the Company in the ſureſt manner; and they are ſecured to that body by every ſort of public ſanction. They are ſtamped by the faith of the King; they are ſtamped by the ſaith of Parliament; they have been bought for money, for money honeſtly and fairly paid; they have been bought for valuable conſideration, over and over again.

I therefore freely admit to the Eaſt India Com⯑pany their claim to exclude their fellow-ſubjects from the commerce of half the globe. I admit their claim to adminiſter an annual territorial re⯑venue of ſeven millions ſterling; to command an army of ſixty thouſand men; and to diſpoſe, (under the control of a ſovereign imperial diſcretion, and with the due obſervance of the natural and local law) of the lives and fortunes of thirty millions of their fellow-creatures. All this they poſſeſs by charter and by acts of parliament, (in my opinion) without a ſhadow of controverſy.

Thoſe who carry the rights and claims of the Company the furtheſt do not contend for more than this; and all this I freely grant. But granting all this, they muſt grant to me in my turn, that all political power which is ſet over men, and that [8] all privilege claimed or exerciſed in excluſion of them, being wholly artificial, and for ſo much, a derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be ſome way or other exerciſed ultimately for their benefit.

If this is true with regard to every ſpecies of political dominion, and every deſcription of com⯑mercial privilege, none of which can be ori⯑ginal ſelf-derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders, then ſuch rights, or privileges, or whatever elſe you chooſe to call them, are all in the ſtricteſt ſenſe a truſt; and it is of the very eſſence of every truſt to be ren⯑dered accountable; and even totally to ceaſe, when it ſubſtantially varies from the purpoſes for which alone it could have a lawful exiſtence.

This I conceive, Sir, to be true of truſts of power veſted in the higheſt hands, and of ſuch as ſeem to hold of no human creature. But about the application of this principle to ſubordinate derivative truſts, I do not ſee how a controverſy can be maintained. To whom then would I make the Eaſt India Company accountable? Why, to Parliament to be ſure; to Parliament, from whom their truſt was derived; to Parliament, which alone is capable of comprehending the magnitude of its object, and its abuſe; and alone capable of an effectual legiſlative remedy. The very charter, which is held out to exclude Parliament from cor⯑recting malverſation with regard to the high truſt veſted in the Company, is the very thing which at once gives a title and impoſes a duty on us to interfere with effect, wherever power and autho⯑rity originating from ourſelves are perverted from their purpoſes, and become inſtruments of wrong and violence.

[9]If Parliament, Sir, had nothing to do with this charter, we might have ſome ſort of Epicurean excuſe to ſtand aloof, indifferent ſpectators of what paſſes in the Company's name in India and in London. But if we are the very cauſe of the evil, we are in a ſpecial manner engaged to the redreſs; and for us paſſively to bear with op⯑preſſions committed under the ſanction of our own authority, is in truth and reaſon for this Houſe to be an active accomplice in the abuſe.

That the power notoriouſly, groſsly, abuſed has been bought from us is very certain. But this circumſtance, which is urged againſt the bill, be⯑comes an additional motive for our interference; leſt we ſhould be thought to have ſold the blood of millions of men, for the baſe conſideration of money. We ſold, I admit, all that we had to ſell; that is our authority, not our controul. We had not a right to make a market of our duties.

I ground myſelf therefore on this princi⯑ple—that if the abuſe is proved, the contract is broken; and we re-enter into all our rights; that is, into the exerciſe of all our duties. Our own authority is indeed as much a truſt origi⯑nally, as the Company's authority is a truſt deri⯑vatively; and it is the uſe we make of the re⯑ſumed power that muſt juſtify or condemn us in the reſumption of it. When we have perfected the plan laid before us by the Right Honourable mover, the world will then ſee what it is we de⯑ſtroy, and what it is we create. By that teſt we ſtand or fall; and by that teſt I truſt that it will be found in the iſſue, that we are going to ſuper⯑ſede a charter abuſed to the full extent of all the powers which it could abuſe, and exerciſed in the plenitude of deſpotiſm, tyranny, and corruption; [10] and that, in one and the ſame plan, we pro⯑vide a real chartered ſecurity for the rights of men cruelly violated under that charter.

This bill, and thoſe connected with it, are in⯑tended to form the Magna Charta of Hindoſtan. Whatever the treaty of Weſtphalia is to the liberty of the princes and free cities of the empire, and to the three religions there profeſſed—Whatever the great charter, the ſtatute of tallage, the pe⯑tition of right, and the declaration of right, are to Great Britain, theſe bills are to the people of India. Of this benefit, I am certain, their con⯑dition is capable; and when I know that they are capable of more, my vote ſhall moſt aſſuredly be for our giving to the full extent of their capacity of receiving; and no charter of dominion ſhall ſtand as a bar in my way to their charter of ſafety and protection.

The ſtrong admiſſion I have made of the Com⯑pany's rights (I am conſcious of it) binds me to do a great deal. I do not preſume to condemn thoſe who argue a priori, againſt the propriety of leaving ſuch extenſive political powers in the hands of a company of merchants. I know much is, and much more may be ſaid againſt ſuch a ſyſtem. But, with my particular ideas and ſen⯑timents, I cannot go that way to work. I feel an inſuperable reluctance in giving my hand to deſtroy any eſtabliſhed inſtitution of government, upon a theory, however plauſible it may be. My experience in life teaches me nothing clear upon the ſubject. I have known merchants with the ſentiments and the abilities of great ſtateſmen; and I have ſeen perſons in the rank of ſtateſmen, with the conceptions and character of pedlars. Indeed, my obſervation has furniſhed me with [11] nothing that is to be found in any habits of life or education, which tends wholly to diſqualify men for the functions of government, but that, by which the power of exerciſing thoſe functions is very frequently obtained. I mean, a ſpirit and habits of low cabal and intrigue; which I have never, in one inſtance, ſeen united with a capa⯑city for ſound and manly policy.

To juſtify us in taking the adminiſtration of their affairs out of the hands of the Eaſt India Company, on my principles, I muſt ſee ſeveral conditions. 1ſt. The object affected by the abuſe ſhould be great and important. 2d. The abuſe affecting this great object ought to be a great abuſe. 3d. It ought to be habitual, and not acci⯑dental. 4th. It ought to be utterly incurable in the body as it now ſtands conſtituted. All this ought to be made as viſible to me as the light of the ſun, before I ſhould ſtrike off an atom of their charter. A Right Honourable gentleman^* has ſaid, and ſaid I think but once, and that very ſlightly (whatever his original demand for a plan might ſeem to require) that ‘"there are abuſes in the Company's government."’ If that were all, the ſcheme of the mover of this bill, the ſcheme of his learned friend, and his own ſcheme of refor⯑mation (if he has any) are all equally needleſs. There are, and muſt be, abuſes in all govern⯑ments. It amounts to no more than a nugatory propoſition. But before I conſider of what nature theſe abuſes are, of when the gentleman ſpeaks ſo very lightly, permit me to recall to your recol⯑lection the map of the country which this abuſed chartered right affects. This I ſhall do, that you [12] may judge whether in that map I can diſcover any thing like the firſt of my conditions; that is, Whether the object affected by the abuſe of the Eaſt India Company's power be of impor⯑tance ſufficient to juſtify the meaſure and means of reform applied to it in this bill.

With very few, and thoſe inconſiderable inter⯑vals, the Britiſh dominion, either in the Company's name, or in the names of princes abſolutely de⯑pendent upon the Company, extends from the mountains that ſeparate India from Tartary, to Cape Comorin, that is, one-and-twenty degrees of latitude!

In the northern parts it is a ſolid maſs of land, about eight hundred miles in length, and four or five hundred broad. As you go ſouthward, it becomes narrower for a ſpace. It afterwards dilates; but narrower or broader, you poſſeſs the whole eaſtern and north-eaſtern coaſt of that vaſt country, quite from the borders of Pegu. — Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, with Benares (now unfortunately in our immediate poſſeſſion) meaſure 161,978 ſquare Engliſh miles; a territory conſiderably larger than the whole kingdom of France. Oude, with its dependent provinces, is 53,286 ſquare miles, not a great deal leſs than England. The Carnatic, with Tanjour and the Circars, is 65,948 ſquare miles, very conſiderably larger than England; and the whole of the Company's dominion comprehending Bombay and Salſette, amounts to 281,412 ſquare miles; which forms a territory larger than any European dominion, Ruſſia and Turkey excepted. Through all that vaſt extent of country there is not a man who eats a mouthful of rice but by permiſſion of the Eaſt India Company.

[13]So far with regard to the extent. The popu⯑lation of this great empire is not eaſy to be calculated. When the countries, of which it is compoſed, came into our poſſeſſion, they were all eminently peopled, and eminently pro⯑ductive; though at that time conſiderably de⯑clined from their antient proſperity. But ſince they are come into our hands!—! How⯑ever if we take the period of our eſtimate im⯑mediately before the utter deſolation of the Car⯑natic, and if we allow for the havoc which our government had even then made in theſe regions, we cannot, in my opinion, rate the population at much leſs than thirty millions of ſouls; more than four times the number of perſons in the iſland of Great Britain.

My next enquiry to that of the number, is the quality and deſcription of the inhabitants. This multitude of men does not conſiſt of an abject and barbarous populace; much leſs of gangs of ſavages, like the Guaranies and Chiquitos, who wander on the waſte borders of the river of Amazons, or the Plate; but a people for ages civilized and cultivated; cultivated by all the arts of poliſhed life, whilſt we were yet in the woods. There, have been (and ſtill the ſkeletons remain) princes once of great dignity, authority, and opulence. There, are to be found the chiefs of tribes and nations. There is to be found an antient and venerable prieſthood, the depoſitory of their laws, learning, and hiſtory, the guides of the people whilſt living, and their conſolation in death; a nobility of great antiquity and re⯑nown; a multitude of cities, not exceeded in population and trade by thoſe of the firſt claſs in Europe; merchants and bankers, individual [14] houſes of whom have once vied in capital with the Bank of England; whoſe credit had often ſupported a tottering ſtate, and preſerved their governments in the midſt of war and deſolation; millions of ingenious manufacturers and me⯑chanicks; millions of the moſt diligent, and not the leaſt intelligent, tillers of the earth. Here are to be found almoſt all the religions profeſſed by men, the Bramincal, the Muſſulmen, the Eaſtern and the Weſtern Chriſtians.

If I were to take the whole aggregate of our poſſeſſions there, I ſhould compare it, as the neareſt parallel I can find, with the empire of Germany. Our immediate poſſeſſions I ſhould compare with the Auſtrian dominions, and they would not ſuffer in the compariſon. The Nabob of Oude might ſtand for the King of Pruſſia; the Nabob of Arcot I would compare, as ſu⯑perior in territory, and equal in revenue, to the Elector of Saxony. Cheyt Sing, the Rajah of Benares, might well rank with the Prince of Heſſe at leaſt; and the Rajah of Tanjore (though hardly equal in extent of dominion, ſuperior in revenue) to the Elector of Bavaria. The Polygars and the northern Zemindars, and other great chiefs, might well claſs with the reſt of the Princes, Dukes, Counts, Marquiſſes, and Biſhops in the empire; all of whom I mention to ho⯑nour, and ſurely without diſparagement to any or all of thoſe moſt reſpectable princes and gran⯑dees.

All this vaſt maſs, compoſed of ſo many orders and claſſes of men, is again infinitely diverſified by manners, by religion, by hereditary employment, through all their poſſible combinations. This renders the handling of India a matter in an [15] high degree critical and delicate. But oh! it has been handled rudely indeed. Even ſome of the reformers ſeem to have forgot that they had any thing to do but to regulate the tenants of a manor, or the ſhopkeepers of the next county town.

It is an empire of this extent, of this compli⯑cated nature, of this dignity and importance, that I have compared to Germany, and the Ger⯑man government; not for an exact reſemblance, but as a ſort of a middle term, by which India might be approximated to our underſtandings, and if poſſible to our feelings; in order to awaken ſomething of ſympathy for the unfortunate na⯑tives, of which I am afraid we are not perfectly ſuſceptible, whilſt we look at this very remote object through a falſe and cloudy medium.

My ſecond condition, neceſſary to juſtify me in touching the charter, is, Whether the Company's abuſe of their truſt, with regard to this great ob⯑ject, be an abuſe of great atrocity. I ſhall beg your permiſſion to conſider their conduct in two lights; firſt the political, and then the commercial. Their political conduct (for diſtinctneſs) I divide again into two heads; the external, in which I mean to comprehend their conduct in their federal capacity, as it relates to powers and ſtates inde⯑pendent, or that not long ſince were ſuch; the other internal, namely their conduct to the coun⯑tries either immediately ſubject to the Company, or to thoſe who, under the apparent government of native ſovereigns, are in a ſtate much lower, and much more miſerable, than common ſub⯑jection.

The attention, Sir, which I wiſh to preſerve to method will not be conſidered as unneceſſary or [16] affected. Nothing elſe can help me to ſelection out of the infinite maſs of materials which have paſſed under my eye; or can keep my mind ſteady to the great leading points I have in view.

With regard therefore to the abuſe of the ex⯑ternal federal truſt, I engage myſelf to you to make good theſe three poſitions:—Firſt, I ſay, that from Mount Imaus, (or whatever elſe you call that large range of mountains that walls the northern frontier of India) where it touches us in the latitude of twenty-nine, to Cape Comorin, in the latitude of eight, that there is not a ſingle prince, ſtate, or potentate, great or ſmall, in In⯑dia, with whom they have come into contact, whom they have not ſold. I ſay ſold, though ſometimes they have not been able to deliver according to their bargain.—Secondly, I ſay, that there is not a ſingle treaty they have ever made, which they have not broken.—Thirdly, I ſay, that there is not a ſingle prince or ſtate, who ever put any truſt in the Company, who is not utterly ruined; and that none are in any degree ſecure or flouriſhing, but in the exact proportion to their ſettled diſtruſt and irreconcileable enmity to this nation.

Theſe aſſertions are univerſal. I ſay in the full ſenſe univerſal. They regard the external and political truſt only; but I ſhall produce others fully equivalent, in the internal. For the preſent, I ſhall content myſelf with explaining my mean⯑ing; and if I am called on for proof whilſt theſe bills are depending (which I believe I ſhall not) I will put my finger on the Appendixes to the Reports, or on papers of record in the Houſe, or the Committees, which I have diſtinctly preſent to my memory, and which I think I can lay before you at half an hour's warning.

[17]The firſt potentate ſold by the Company for money was the Great Mogul—the deſcendant of Tamerlane. This high perſonage, as high as hu⯑man veneration can look at, is by every account amiable in his manners, reſpectable for his piety according to his mode, and accompliſhed in all the Oriental literature. All this, and the title derived under his charter, to all that we hold in India, could not ſave him from the general ſale. Mo⯑ney is coined in his name; In his name juſtice is adminiſtered; He is prayed for in every temple through the countries we poſſeſs—But he was ſold.

It is impoſſible, Mr. Speaker, not to pauſe here for a moment, to reflect on the inconſtancy of human greatneſs, and the ſtupendous revolutions that have happened in our age of wonders. Could it be believed, when I entered into exiſtence, or when you, a younger man, were born, that on this day, in this Houſe, we ſhould be employed in diſcuſſing the conduct of thoſe Britiſh ſubjects who had diſpoſed of the power and perſon of the Grand Mogul? This is no idle ſpeculation. Awful leſſons are taught by it, and by other events, of which it is not yet too late to profit.

This is hardly a digreſſion; but I return to the ſale of the Mogul. Two diſtricts, Corah and Allahabad, out of his immenſe grants, were re⯑ſerved as a royal demeſne to the donor of a kingdom, and the rightful ſovereign of ſo many nations. — After withholding the tribute of £.260,000 a year, which the Company was, by the charter they had received from this prince, under the moſt ſolemn obligation to pay, theſe diſtricts were ſold to his chief miniſter Sujah ul Dowlah; and, what may appear to ſome the worſt part of [18] the tranſaction, theſe two diſtricts were ſold for ſcarcely two years purchaſe. The deſcendant of Tamerlane now ſtands in need almoſt of the com⯑mon neceſſaries of life; and in this ſituation we do not even allow him, as bounty, the ſmalleſt portion of what we owe him in juſtice.

The next ſale was that of the whole nation of the Rohillas, which the grand ſaleſman, without a pretence of quarrel, and contrary to his own de⯑clared ſenſe of duty and rectitude, ſold to the ſame Sujah ul Dowlah. He ſold the people to utter extirpation, for the ſum of four hundred thouſand pounds. Faithfully was the bargain per⯑formed upon our ſide. Hafiz Rhamet, the moſt eminent of their chiefs, one of the braveſt men of his time, and as famous throughout the Eaſt for the elegance of his literature, and the ſpirit of his poetical compoſitions (by which he ſupported the name of Hafiz) as for his courage, was invaded with an army of an hundred thouſand men, and an Engliſh brigade. This man, at the head of inferior forces, was ſlain valiantly fighting for his country. His head was cut off, and delivered for money to a barbarian. His wife and children, perſons of that rank, were ſeen begging an handful of rice through the Engliſh camp. The whole nation, with inconſiderable exceptions, was ſlaugh⯑tered or baniſhed. The country was laid waſte with fire and ſword; and that land diſtinguiſhed above moſt others, by the chearful face of paternal government and protected labour, the choſen ſeat of cultivation and plenty, is now almoſt through⯑out a dreary deſart, covered with ruſhes and briars, and jungles full of wild beaſts.

The Britiſh officer who commanded in the delivery of the people thus ſold, felt ſome [19] compunction at his employment. He repreſented theſe enormous exceſſes to the preſident of Ben⯑gal, for which he received a ſevere reprimand from the civil governor; and I much doubt whether the breach cauſed by the conflict, between the compaſſion of the military and the firmneſs of the civil governor, be cloſed at this hour.

In Bengal, Seraja Dowla was ſold to Mir Jaffier; Mir Jaffier was ſold to Mir Coſſim; and Mir Coſ⯑ſim was ſold to Mir Jaffier again. The ſucceſſion to Mir Jaffier was ſold to his eldeſt ſon;—another ſon of Mir Jaffier, Mobarech ul Dowla, was ſold to his ſtep-mother—The Maratta empire was ſold to Ragoba; and Ragoba was ſold and delivered to the Peiſhwa of the Marattas. Both Ragoba and the Peiſhwa of the Marattas were offered to ſale to the Rajah of Berar. Scindia, the chief of Malva, was offered to ſale to the ſame Rajah; and the Subah of the Decan was ſold to the great trader Mahomet Ali, Nabob of Arcot. To the ſame Nabob of Arcot they ſold Hyder Ali and the kingdom of Myſore. To Mahomet Ali they twice ſold the kingdom of Tanjore. To the ſame Mahomet Ali they ſold at leaſt twelve ſove⯑reign princes, called the Polygars. But to keep things even, the territory of Tinnivelly, belong⯑ing to their Nabob, they would have ſold to the Dutch; and to conclude the account of ſales, their great cuſtomer, the Nabob of Arcot himſelf, and his lawful ſucceſſion, has been ſold to his ſecond ſon, Amir ul Omrah, whoſe character, views, and conduct, are in the accounts upon your table. It remains with you whether they ſhall finally perfect this laſt bargain.

All theſe bargains and ſales were regularly at⯑tended with the waſte and havoc of the country, always by the buyer, and ſometimes by the [20] object of the ſale. This was explained to you by the Honourable mover, when he ſtated the mode of paying debts due from the country powers to the Company. An Honourable gentleman, who is not now in his place, objected to his jumping near two thouſand miles for an example. But the ſouthern example is perfectly applicable to the northern claim, as the northern is to the ſouthern;—for, throughout the whole ſpace of theſe two thouſand miles, take your ſtand where you will, the proceeding is perfectly uniform, and what is done in one part will apply exactly to the other.

My ſecond aſſertion is, that the Company never has made a treaty which they have not broken. This poſition is ſo connected with that of the ſales of provinces and kingdoms, with the negotiation of univerſal diſtraction in every part of India, that a very minute detail may well be ſpared on this point. It has not yet been contended, by any enemy to the reform, that they have obſerved any public agreement. When I hear that they have done ſo in any one inſtance (which hitherto, I confeſs, I never heard alledged) I ſhall ſpeak to the particular treaty. The governor general has even amuſed himſelf and the Court of Directors in a very ſingular letter to that board, in which he admits he has not been very delicate with regard to public faith; and he goes ſo far as to ſtate a regular eſtimate of the ſums which the Company would have loſt, or never acquired, if the rigid ideas of public faith entertained by his colleagues had been obſerved. ^*The learned gentleman over againſt me has indeed ſaved me much trouble. On a former occaſion he obtained no ſmall credit, for the clear and forcible manner in which he [21] ſtated what we have not forgot, and I hope he has not forgot, that univerſal ſyſtematic breach of treaties which had made the Britiſh faith pro⯑verbial in the Eaſt.

It only remains, Sir, for me juſt to recapitu⯑late ſome heads.—The treaty with the Mogul, by which we ſtipulated to pay him £.260,000 annually, was broken. This treaty they have broken, and not paid him a ſhilling. They broke their treaty with him, in which they ſti⯑pulated to pay £.400,000 a year to the Soubah of Bengal. They agreed with the Mogul, for ſervices admitted to have been performed, to pay Nudjif Cawn a penſion. They broke this ar⯑ticle with the reſt, and ſtopped alſo this ſmall penſion. They broke their treaties with the Nizam, and with Hyder Ali. As to the Ma⯑rattas, they had ſo many croſs treaties with the States General of that nation, and with each of the chiefs, that it was notorious, that no one of theſe agreements could be kept without groſsly violating the reſt. It was obſerved, that if the terms of theſe ſeveral treaties had been kept, two Britiſh armies would at one and the ſame time have met in the field to cut each other's throats. The wars which deſolate India, origi⯑nated from a moſt atrocious violation of public faith on our part. In the midſt of profound peace, the Company's troops invaded the Ma⯑ratta territories, and ſurpriſed the iſland and fortreſs of Salſette. The Marattas nevertheleſs yielded to a treaty of peace, by which ſolid ad⯑vantages were procured to the Company. But this treaty, like every other treaty, was ſoon violated by the Company. Again the Com⯑pany invaded the Maratta dominions. The diſaſter that enſued gave occaſion to a new [22] treaty. The whole army of the Company was obliged, in effect, to ſurrender to this injured, betrayed, and inſulted people. Juſtly irritated however, as they were, the terms which they preſcribed were reaſonable and moderate; and their treatment of their captive invaders, of the moſt diſtinguiſhed humanity. But the hu⯑manity of the Marattas was of no power what⯑ſoever to prevail on the Company to attend to the obſervance of the terms dictated by their moderation. The war was renewed with greater vigour than ever; and ſuch was their in⯑ſatiable luſt of plunder, that they never would have given ear to any terms of peace, if Hyder Ali had not broke through the Gauts, and ruſhing like a torrent into the Carnatic, ſwept away every thing in his career. This was in conſequence of that confederacy, which by a ſort of miracle united the moſt diſcordant powers for our deſtruction, as a nation in which no other could put any truſt, and who were the declared enemies of the human ſpecies.

It is very remarkable, that the late controverſy between the ſeveral preſidencies, and between them and the Court of Directors, with relation to theſe wars and treaties, has not been, which of the parties might be defended for his ſhare in them; but on which of the parties the guilt of all this load of perfidy ſhould be fixed. But I am content to admit all theſe proceedings to be per⯑fectly regular, to be full of honour and good faith; and wiſh to fix your attention ſolely to that ſingle tranſaction which the advocates of this ſyſ⯑tem ſelect for ſo tranſcendant a merit as to cancel the guilt of all the reſt of their proceedings; I mean the late treaties with the Marattas.

I make no obſervation on the total ceſſion of [23] territory, by which they ſurrendered all they had obtained by their unhappy ſucceſſes in war, and almoſt all that they had obtained under the treaty of Poor under. The reſtitution was proper, if it had been voluntary and ſeaſonable. I attach on the ſpi⯑rit of the treaty, the diſpoſitions it ſhewed, the proviſions it made for a general peace, and the faith kept with allies and confederates; in order that the Houſe may form a judgment, from this choſen piece, of the uſe which has been made (and is likely to be made, if things continue in the ſame hands) of the truſt of the federal powers of this country.

It was the wiſh of almoſt every Engliſhman, that the Maratta peace might lead to a ge⯑neral one; becauſe the Maratta war was only a part of a general confederacy formed againſt us on account of the univerſal ab⯑horrence of our conduct which prevailed in every ſtate and almoſt in every houſe in India. Mr. Haſtings was obliged to pretend ſome ſort of acquieſcence in this general and ra⯑tional deſire. He therefore conſented, in order to ſatisfy the point of honour of the Marattas, that an article ſhould be inſerted to admit Hyder Ali to accede to the pacification. But obſerve, Sir, the ſpirit of this man (which if it were not made manifeſt by a thouſand things, and parti⯑cularly by his proceedings with regard to Lord Macartney) would be ſufficiently manifeſt by this—What ſort of article think you does he re⯑quire this eſſential head of a ſolemn treaty of ge⯑neral pacification to be? In his inſtruction to Mr. Anderſon, he deſires him to admit ‘"a vague article"’ in favour of Hyder. Evaſion and fraud were the declared baſis of the treaty. Theſe vague articles, intended for a more vague per⯑formance, [24] are the things which have damned our reputation in India.

Hardly was this vague article inſerted, than, without waiting for any act on the part of Hyder, Mr. Haſtings enters into a negociation with the Maratta Chief, Scindia, for a partition of the ter⯑ritories of the prince who was one of the objects to be ſecured by the treaty. He was to be par⯑celled out in three parts—one to Scindia; one to the Peiſhwa of the Marattas; and the third to the Eaſt India Company, or to (the old dealer and chapman) Mahomet Ali.

During the formation or this project, Hyder dies; and before his ſon could take any one ſtep, either to conform to the tenour of the article, or to contravene it, the treaty of partition is renewed on the old footing, and an inſtruction is ſent to Mr. Anderſon to conclude it in form.

A circumſtance intervened, during the pen⯑dency of this negociation, to ſet off the good faith of the Company with an additional brilliancy, and to make it ſparkle and glow with a variety of ſplendid faces. General Matthews had re⯑duced that moſt valuable part of Hyder's do⯑minions called the Country of Biddenore. When the news reached Mr. Haſtings he inſtructed Mr. Anderſon to contend for an alteration in the treaty of partition, and to take the Biddenore country out of the common ſtock which was to be divided, and to keep it for the Com⯑pany.

The firſt ground for this variation was its being a ſeparate conqueſt made before the treaty had actually taken place. Here was a new proof given of the fairneſs, equity, and moderation, of the Company. But the ſecond of Mr. Haſtings's reaſons for retaining the Biddenore as a ſeparate [25] portion, and his conduct on that ſecond ground, is ſtill more remarkable. He aſſerted that that country could not be put into the partition ſtock, becauſe General Matthews had received it on the terms of ſome convention, which might be in⯑compatible with the partition propoſed. This was a reaſon in itſelf both honourable and ſolid; and it ſhewed a regard to faith ſomewhere, and with ſome perſons. But in order to demonſtrate his utter contempt of the plighted faith which was alledged on one part as a reaſon for de⯑parting from it on another, and to prove his im⯑petuous deſire for ſowing a new war, even in the prepared ſoil of a general pacification, he directs Mr. Anderſon, if he ſhould find ſtrong difficul⯑ties impeding the partition, on the ſcore of the ſubtraction of Biddenore, wholly to abandon that claim, and to conclude the treaty on the original terms. General Matthews's convention was juſt brought forward ſufficiently to demonſtrate to the Marattas the ſlippery hold which they had on their new confederate; on the other hand that con⯑vention being inſtantly abandoned, the people of India were taught, that no terms on which they can ſurrender to the Company are to be re⯑garded, when farther conqueſts are in view.

Next, Sir, let me bring before you the pious care that was taken of our allies under that treaty which is the ſubject of the Company's applauſes. Theſe allies were Ragonaut Row, for whom we had engaged to find a throne; the Guickwar, (one of the Guzerat princes) who was to be eman⯑cipated from the Maratta authority, and to grow great by ſeveral acceſſions of dominion; and laſtly, the Rana of Gohud, with whom we had entered into a treaty of partition for eleven ſixteenths of our joint conqueſts. Some of theſe ineſtimable [26] ſecurities, called vague articles, were inſerted in favour of them all.

As to the firſt, the unhappy abdicated Peſhwa, and pretender to the Maratta throne, Ragonaut Row, was delivered up to his people, with an article for ſafety, and ſome proviſion. This man, knowing how little vague the hatred of his countrymen was towards him, and well appriſed of what black crimes he ſtood accuſed (among which our invaſion of his country would not ap⯑pear the leaſt) took a mortal alarm at the ſecurity we had provided for him. He was thunderſtruck at the article in his favour, by which he was ſurren⯑dered to his enemies. He never had the leaſt notice of the treaty; and it was apprehended that he would fly to the protection of Hyder Ali, or ſome other, diſpoſed or able to protect him. He was therefore not left without comfort; for Mr. Anderſon did him the favour to ſend a ſpecial meſſenger, deſiring him to be of good cheer and to fear nothing. And his old enemy, Scindia, at our requeſt, ſent him a meſſage equally well cal⯑culated to quiet his apprehenſions.

By the ſame treaty the Guickwar was to come again, with no better ſecurity, under the dominion of the Maratta ſtate. As to the Rana of Gohud, a long negotiation depended for giving him up. At firſt this was refuſed by Mr. Haſtings with great indignation; at another ſtage it was ad⯑mitted as proper, becauſe he had ſhewn himſelf a moſt perfidious perſon. But at length a method of reconciling theſe extremes was found out, by contriving one of the uſual articles in his favour. What I believe will appear beyond all belief, Mr. Anderſon exchanged the final ratifications of that treaty by which the Rana was nominally ſecured in his poſſeſſions, in the camp of the Maratta [27] chief, Scindia, whilſt he was (really, and not nominally) battering the caſtle of Gualior, which we had given, agreeably to treaty, to this de⯑luded ally. Scindia had already reduced the town; and was at the very time, by various detach⯑ments, reducing, one after another, the fortreſſes of our protected ally, as well as in the act of chaſtiſing all the Rajahs who had aſſiſted Colonel Camac in his invaſion. I have ſeen in a letter from Calcutta, that the Rana of Gohud's agent would have re⯑preſented theſe hoſtilities (which went hand in hand with the protecting treaty) to Mr. Haſtings; but he was not admitted to his preſence.

In this manner the Company has acted with their allies in the Maratta war. But they did not reſt here: the Marattas were fearful leſt the perſons delivered to them by that treaty ſhould attempt to eſcape into the Britiſh territories, and thus might elude the puniſhment intended for them, and by reclaiming the treaty, might ſtir up new diſturbances. To prevent this, they de⯑ſired an article to be inſerted in the ſupplemental treaty, to which they had the ready conſent of Mr. Haſtings and the reſt of the Company's repreſentatives in Bengal. It was this, ‘"That the Engliſh and Maratta governments mutual⯑ly agree not to afford refuge to any chiefs, merchants, or other perſons, flying for protec⯑tion to the territories of the other."’ This was readily aſſented to, and aſſented to without any exception whatever, in favour of our ſur⯑rendered allies. On their part a reciprocity was ſtipulated which was not unnatural for a govern⯑ment like the Company's to aſk; a government, conſcious that many ſubjects had been, and would in future, be driven to fly from its juriſdiction.

To complete the ſyſtem of pacific intention [28] and public faith, which predominate in theſe trea⯑ties, Mr. Haſtings fairly reſolved to put all peace, except on the terms of abſolute con⯑queſt, wholly out of his own power. For, by an article in this ſecond treaty with Scindia, he binds the Company not to make any peace with Tippoo Saheb, without the conſent of the Peiſhwa of the Marattas; and binds Scindia to him by a reci⯑procal engagement. The treaty between France and England obliges us mutually to withdraw our forces, if our allies in India do not accede to the peace within four months; Mr. Haſtings's treaty obliges us to continue the war as long as the Peiſhwa thinks fit. We are now in that happy ſituation, that the breach of the treaty with France, or the violation of that with the Marattas, is inevitable; and we have only to take our choice.

My third aſſertion, relative to the abuſe made of the right of war and peace is, that there are none who have ever confided in us who have not been utterly ruined. The examples I have given of Ragonaut Row, of Guickwar, of the Ranah of Gohud, are recent. There is proof more than enough in the condition of the Mogul; in the ſlavery and indigence of the Nabob of Oude; the exile of the Rajah of Benares; the beggary of the Nabob of Bengal; the undone and captive condition of the Rajah and kingdom of Tanjour; the deſtruction of the Polygars; and laſtly, in the deſtruction of the Nabob of Arcot himſelf, who when his dominions were invaded was found en⯑tirely deſtitute of troops, proviſions, ſtores, and (as he aſſerts) of money, being a million in debt to the Company, and four millions to others: the many millions which he had extorted from ſo many extirpated princes and their deſolated coun⯑tries [29] having (as he has frequently hinted) been ex⯑pended for the ground-rent of his manſion-houſe in an alley in the ſuburbs of Madras. Compare the condition of all theſe princes with the power and authority of all the Maratta ſtates; with the independence and dignity of the Soubah of the De⯑can; and the mighty ſtrength, the reſources, and the manly ſtruggle of Hyder Ali; and then the Houſe will diſcover the effects, on every power in India, of an eaſy confidence, or of a rooted diſtruſt in the faith of the Company.

Theſe are ſome of my reaſons, grounded on the abuſe of the external political truſt of that body, for thinking myſelf not only juſtified but bound to declare againſt thoſe chartered rights which produce ſo many wrongs. I ſhould deem myſelf the wickedeſt of men, if any vote of mine could contribute to the continuance of ſo great an evil.

Now, Sir, according to the plan I propoſed, I ſhall take notice of the Company's internal go⯑vernment, as it is exerciſed firſt on the dependent provinces, and then as it affects thoſe under the direct and immediate authority of that body. And here, Sir, before I enter into the ſpirit of their interior government, permit me to obſerve to you, upon a few of the many lines of difference which are to be found between the vices of the Company's government, and thoſe of the con⯑querors who preceded us in India; that we may be enabled a little the better to ſee our way in an attempt to the neceſſary reformation.

The ſeveral irruptions of Arabs, Tartars, and Perſians, into India were, for the greater part, ferocious, bloody, and waſteful in the extreme: our entrance into the dominion of that country was, as generally, with ſmall comparative effuſion of blood; being introduced by various frauds [30] and deluſions, and by taking advantage of the incurable, blind, and ſenſeleſs animoſity, which the ſeveral country powers bear towards each other, rather than by open force. But the difference in favour of the firſt conquerors is this; the Aſiatic conquerors very ſoon abated of their ferocity, be⯑cauſe they made the conquered country their own. They roſe or fell with the riſe or fall of the territory they lived in. Fathers there de⯑poſited the hopes of their poſterity; and chil⯑dren there beheld the monuments of their fathers. Here their lot was finally caſt; and it is the natu⯑ral wiſh of all, that their lot ſhould not be caſt in a bad land. Poverty, ſterility, and deſolation, are not a recreating proſpect to the eye of man; and there are very few who can bear to grow old among the curſes of a whole people. If their paſſion or their avarice drove the Tartar lords to acts of rapacity or tyranny, there was time enough, even in the ſhort life of man, to bring round the ill effects of an abuſe of power upon the power itſelf. If hoards were made by violence and ty⯑ranny, they were ſtill domeſtic hoards; and do⯑meſtic profuſion, or the rapine of a more powerful and prodigal hand, reſtored them to the people. With many diſorders, and with few political checks upon power, Nature had ſtill fair play; the ſources of acquiſition were not dried up; and therefore the trade, the manufactures, and the com⯑merce of the country flouriſhed. Even avarice and uſury itſelf operated, both for the preſervation and the employment of national wealth. The huſbandman and manufacturer paid heavy intereſt, but then they augmented the fund from whence they were again to borrow. Their reſources were dearly bought, but they were ſure; and the gene⯑ral ſtock of the community grew by the general effort.

[31]But under the Engliſh government all this or⯑der is reverſed. The Tartar invaſion was miſ⯑chievous; but it is our protection that deſtroys India. It was their enmity, but it is our friend⯑ſhip. Our conqueſt there, after twenty years, is as crude as it was the firſt day. The natives ſcarcely know what it is to ſee the grey head of an Engliſhman. Young men (boys almoſt) go⯑vern there, without ſociety, and without ſympathy with the natives. They have no more ſocial ha⯑bits with the people, than if they ſtill reſided in England; nor indeed any ſpecies of intercourſe but that which is neceſſary to making a ſudden fortune, with a view to a remote ſettlement. Animated with all the avarice of age, and all the impetuoſity of youth, they roll in one after ano⯑ther; wave after wave; and there is nothing be⯑fore the eyes of the natives but an endleſs, hope⯑leſs proſpect of new flights of birds of prey and paſſage, with appetites continually renewing for a food that is continually waſting. Every rupee of profit made by an Engliſhman is loſt for ever to India. With us are no retributory ſuperſti⯑tions, by which a foundation of charity compen⯑ſates, through ages, to the poor, for the rapine and injuſtice of a day. With us no pride erects ſtately monuments which repair the miſchiefs which pride had produced, and which adorn a country out of its own ſpoils. England has erected no churches, no hoſpitals^*, no palaces, no ſchools; England has built no bridges, made no high roads, cut no navigations, dug out no reſervoirs. Every other conqueror of every other deſcription has left ſome monument, either of ſtate [32] or beneficence, behind him. Were we to be driven out of India this day, nothing would remain, to tell that it had been poſſeſſed, during the inglorious period of our dominion, by any thing better than the ouran-outang or the tiger.

There is nothing in the boys we ſend to India worſe than the boys whom we are whipping at ſchool, or that we ſee trailing a pike, or bending over a deſk at home. But as Engliſh youth in India drink the intoxicating draught of au⯑thority and dominion before their heads are able to bear it, and as they are full grown in fortune long before they are ripe in principle, neither nature nor reaſon have any opportunity to ex⯑ert themſelves for remedy of the exceſſes of their premature power. The conſequences of their conduct, which in good minds, (and many of theirs are probably ſuch) might produce penitence or amendment, are unable to purſue the rapidity of their flight. Their prey is lodged in England; and the cries of India are given to ſeas and winds, to be blown about, in even break⯑ing up of the monſoon, over a remote and un⯑hearing ocean. In India all the vices operate by which ſudden fortune is acquired; in England are often diſplayed, by the ſame perſons, the vir⯑tues which diſpenſe hereditary wealth. Arrived in England, the deſtroyers of the nobility and gentry of a whole kingdom will find the beſt company in this nation, at a board of elegance and hoſpitality. Here the manufacturer and huſ⯑bandman will bleſs the juſt and punctual hand, that in India has torn the cloth from the loom, or wreſted the ſcanty portion of rice and ſalt from the peaſant of Bengal, or wrung from him the very opium in which he forgot his oppreſſions and his oppreſſor. They marry into your families; [33] they enter into your ſenate; they eaſe your eſtates by loans; they raiſe their value by demand; they cheriſh and protect your relations which lie heavy on your patronage; and there is ſcarcely an houſe in the kingdom that does not feel ſome concern and intereſt that makes all reform of our eaſtern government appear officious and diſ⯑guſting; and, on the whole, a moſt diſcouraging attempt. In ſuch an attempt you hurt thoſe who are able to return kindneſs or to reſent injury. If you ſucceed, you ſave thoſe who cannot ſo much as give you thanks. All theſe things ſhew the difficulty of the work we have on hand: but they ſhew its neceſſity too. Our Indian government is in its beſt ſtate a grievance. It is neceſſary that the correctives ſhould be uncommonly vi⯑gorous; and the work of men ſanguine, warm, and even impaſſioned in the cauſe. But it is an arduous thing to plead againſt abuſes of a power which originates from your own country, and affects thoſe whom we are uſed to conſider as ſtrangers.

I ſhall certainly endeavour to modulate myſelf to this temper; though I am ſenſible that a cold ſtyle of deſcribing actions which appear to me in a very affecting light, is equally contrary to the juſtice due to the people, and to all genuine hu⯑man feelings about them. I aſk pardon of truth and nature for this compliance. But I ſhall be very ſparing of epithets either to perſons or things. It has been ſaid (and, with regard to one of them, with truth) that Tacitus and Machiavel, by their cold way of relating enormous crimes, have in ſome ſort appeared not to diſapprove them; that they ſeem a ſort of profeſſors of the art of tyranny, and that they corrupt the minds of their readers by not expreſſing the deteſtation and horror that naturally belong to horrible and [34] deteſtable proceedings. But we are in ge⯑neral, Sir, ſo little acquainted with Indian de⯑tails; the inſtruments of oppreſſion under which the people ſuffer are ſo hard to be underſtood; and even the very names of the ſufferers are ſo uncouth and ſtrange to our ears, that it is very difficult for our ſympathy to fix upon theſe objects. I am ſure that ſome of us have come down ſtairs from the committee-room, with im⯑preſſions on our minds, which to us were the inevitable reſults of our diſcoveries, yet if we ſhould venture to expreſs ourſelves in the proper language of our ſentiments, to other gentlemen not at all prepared to enter into the cauſe of them, nothing could appear more harſh and diſ⯑ſonant, more violent and unaccountable, than our language and behaviour. All theſe circumſtances are not, I confeſs, very favourable to the idea of our attempting to govern India at all. But there we are; there we are placed by the Sove⯑reign Diſpoſer: and we muſt do the beſt we can in our ſituation. The ſituation of man is the pre⯑ceptor of his duty.

Upon the plan which I laid down, and to which I beg leave to return, I was conſidering the con⯑duct of the Company to thoſe nations which are indirectly ſubject to their authority. The moſt conſiderable of the dependent princes is the Nabob of Oude. ^*My Right Honourable friend, to whom we owe the remedial bills on your table, has already pointed out to you, in one of the Re⯑ports, the condition of that prince, and as it ſtood in the time he alluded to. I ſhall only add a few circumſtances that may tend to awaken ſome ſenſe of the manner in which the condition of the people is affected by that of the prince, and [35] involved in it; and to ſhew you, that when we talk of the ſufferings of princes, we do not lament the oppreſſion of individuals; and that in theſe caſes the high and the low ſuffer together.

In the year 1779 the Nabob of Oude repre⯑ſented, through the Britiſh reſident at his court, that the number of Company's troops ſtationed in his dominions was a main cauſe of his diſtreſs; and that all thoſe which he was not bound by treaty to maintain ſhould be withdrawn, as they had greatly diminiſhed his revenue, and impove⯑riſhed his country. I will read you, if you pleaſe, a few extracts from theſe repreſentations.

He ſtates ‘"that the country and cultivation are abandoned; and this year in particular, from the exceſſive drought of the ſeaſon, deductions of many lacks having been allowed to the far⯑mers, who are ſtill left unſatisfied;"’ and then he proceeds with a long detail of his own diſtreſs, and that of his family, and all his dependants; and adds, ‘"that the new-raiſed brigade is not only quite uſeleſs to my government, but is more⯑over the cauſe of much loſs, both in revenues and cuſtoms. The detached body of troops under European officers bring nothing but confuſion to the affairs of my government, and are entirely their own maſters."’ Mr. Middleton, Mr. Haſ⯑tings's confidential Reſident, vouches for the truth of this repreſentation in its fulleſt extent. ‘"I am concerned to confeſs, that there is too good ground for this plea. The misfortune has been general throughout the whole of the Vizier's [the Nabob of Oude] dominions, obvious to every body; and ſo fatal have been its conſequences, that no perſon, of either credit or character, would enter into engagements with government [36] for farming the country."’ He then proceeds to give ſtrong inſtances of the general calamity, and its effects.

It was now to be ſeen what ſteps the governor general and council took for the relief of this diſtreſſed country, long labouring under the vexa⯑tions of men, and now ſtricken by the hand of God. The caſe of a general famine is known to relax the ſeverity even of the moſt rigorous go⯑vernment.—Mr. Haſtings does not deny, or ſhew the leaſt doubt of the fact. The repreſentation is humble, and almoſt abject. On this repreſentation from a great prince, of the diſtreſs of his ſubjects, Mr. Haſtings falls into a violent paſſion; ſuch as (it ſeems) would be unjuſtifiable in any one who ſpeaks of any part of his conduct. He declares ‘"that the demands, the tone in which they were aſ⯑ſerted, and the ſeaſon in which they were made, are all equally alarming, and appear to him to require an adequate degree of firmneſs in this board, in oppoſition to them."’ He proceeds to deal out very unreſerved language, on the perſon and character of the Nabob and his miniſters. He de⯑clares, that in a diviſion between him and the Nabob, ‘"the ſtrongeſt muſt decide."’ With regard to the urgent and inſtant neceſſity, from the failure of the crops, he ſays, ‘"that perhaps ex⯑pedients may be found for affording a gradual relief from the burthen of which he ſo heavily complains, and it ſhall be my endeavour to ſeek them out:"’ and, leſt he ſhould be ſuſ⯑pected of too much haſte to alleviate ſufferings, and to remove violence, he ſays, ‘"that theſe muſt be gradually applied, and their complete effect may be diſtant; and this I conceive is all he can claim of right."’

[37]This complete effect of his lenity is diſtant indeed. Rejecting this demand (as he calls the Nabob's abject ſupplication) he attributes it, as he uſually does all things of the kind, to the di⯑viſion in their government; and ſays, ‘"this is a powerful motive with me (however inclined I might be, upon any other occaſion, to yield to ſome part of his demand) to give them an abſolute and unconditional refuſal upon the preſent; and even to bring to puniſhment, if my influence can produce that effect, thoſe incendiaries who have endeavoured to make themſelves the inſtruments of diviſion between us."’

Here, Sir, is much heat and paſſion; but no more conſideration of the diſtreſs of the country, from a failure of the means of ſubſiſtence, and (if poſſible) the worſe evil of an uſeleſs and licentious ſoldiery, than if they were the moſt contemptible of all trifles. A letter is written in conſequence, in ſuch a ſtyle of lofty deſpotiſm, as I believe has hitherto been unexampled and unheard of in the records of the Eaſt. The troops were continued. The gradual relief, whoſe effect was to be ſo diſ⯑tant, has never been ſubſtantially and beneficially applied—and the country is ruined.

Mr. Haſtings, two years after, when it was too late, ſaw the abſolute neceſſity of a re⯑moval of the intolerable grievance of this licen⯑tious ſoldiery, which, under a pretence of defend⯑ing it, held the country under military execution. A new treaty and arrangement, according to the pleaſure of Mr. Haſtings, took place; and this new treaty was broken in the old manner, in every eſſential article. The ſoldiery were again ſent, and again ſet looſe. The effect of all his ma⯑noeuvres, from which it ſeems he was ſanguine [38] enough to entertain hopes, upon the ſtate of the country, he himſelf informs us, ‘"the event has proved the reverſe of theſe hopes, and accumu⯑lation of diſtreſs, debaſement, and diſſatisfaction to the Nabob, and diſappointment and diſgrace to me."’ —Every meaſure [which he had himſelf propoſed] has been ſo conducted as to give him ‘"cauſe of diſpleaſure; there are no officers eſta⯑bliſhed by which his affairs could be regularly conducted; mean, incapable, and indigent men have been appointed. A number of the diſ⯑tricts without authority, and without the means of perſonal protection; ſome of them have been murdered by the Zemindars, and thoſe Zemindars, inſtead of puniſhment, have been permitted to retain their Zemindaries, with in⯑dependent authority; all the other Zemindars ſuffered to riſe up in rebellion, and to inſult the authority of the Sircar, without any at⯑tempt made to ſuppreſs them; and the Com⯑pany's debt, inſtead of being diſcharged by the aſſignments and extraordinary ſources of money provided for that purpoſe, is likely to exceed even the amount at which it ſtood at the time in which the arrangement with his Excellency was concluded."’ The Houſe will ſmile at the reſource on which the Directors take credit as ſuch a certainty in their curious account.

This is Mr. Haſtings's own narrative of the effects of his own ſettlement. This is the ſtate of the country which we have been told is in perfect peace and order; and, what is curious, he informs us, that every part of this was foretold to him in the order and manner in which it happened, at the very time he made his arrangement of men and mea⯑ſures.

[39]The invariable courſe of the Company's policy is this: Either they ſet up ſome prince too odious to maintain himſelf without the neceſſity of their aſſiſtance; or they ſoon render him odious, by making him the inſtrument of their govern⯑ment. In that caſe troops are bountifully ſent to him to maintain his authority. That he ſhould have no want of aſſiſtance, a civil gentleman, called a Reſident, is kept at his court, who, un⯑der pretence of providing duly for the pay of theſe troops, gets aſſignments on the revenue into his hands. Under his provident management, debts ſoon accumulate; new aſſignments are made for theſe debts; until, ſtep by ſtep, the whole re⯑venue, and with it the whole power of the coun⯑try, is delivered into his hands. The military do not behold without a virtuous emulation the mo⯑derate gains of the civil department. They feel that, in a country driven to habitual rebellion by the civil government, the military is neceſſary; and they will not permit their ſervices to go unre⯑warded. Tracts of country are delivered over to their diſcretion. Then it is found proper to convert their commanding officers into farmers of revenue. Thus, between the well paid civil, and well rewarded military eſtabliſhment, the ſituation of the natives may be eaſily conjectured. The authority of the regular and lawful government is every where and in every point extinguiſhed. Diſorders and violences ariſe; they are repreſſed by other diſorders and other violences. Wherever the collectors of the revenue, and the farming colonels and majors move, ruin is about them, rebellion before and behind them. The people in crowds fly out of the country; and the frontier is guarded by lines of troops, not to exclude an [40] enemy, but to prevent the eſcape of the inha⯑bitants.

By theſe means, in the courſe of not more than four or five years, this once opulent and flouriſh⯑ing country, which, by the accounts given in the Bengal conſultations, yielded more than three crore of Sicca rupees, that is, above three millions ſter⯑ling, annually, is reduced, as far as I can diſcover, in a matter purpoſely involved in the utmoſt per⯑plexity, to leſs than one million three hundred thouſand pounds, and that exacted by every mode of rigour that can be deviſed. To complete the buſineſs, moſt of the wretched remnants of this revenue are mortgaged, and delivered into the hands of the uſurers at Benares (for there alone are to be found ſome lingering remains of the an⯑cient wealth of theſe regions) at an intereſt of near thirty per cent. per annum.

The revenues in this manner failing, they ſeized upon the eſtates of every perſon of emi⯑nence in the country, and, under the name of reſumption, confiſcated their property. I wiſh, Sir, to be underſtood univerſally and literally, when I aſſert, that there is not left one man of property and ſubſtance for his rank, in the whole of theſe provinces, in provinces which are nearly the extent of England and Wales taken together. Not one landholder, not one banker, not one merchant, not one even of thoſe who uſually periſh laſt, the ultimum moriens in a ruined ſtate, no one farmer of revenue.

One country for a while remained, which ſtood as an iſland in the midſt of the grand waſte of the Company's dominion. My Right Honour⯑able friend, in his admirable ſpeech on moving the bill, juſt touched the ſituation, the offences, and the puniſhment, of a native prince, called [41] Fizulla Khân. This man, by policy and force, had protected himſelf from the general extirpa⯑tion of the Rohilla chiefs. He was ſecured (if that were any ſecurity) by a treaty. It was ſtated to you, as it was ſtated by the enemies of that unfortunate man— ‘"that the whole of his country is what the whole country of the Rohillas was, cultivated like a garden, without one neglected ſpot in it."’ —Another accuſer ſays, ‘"Fyzoolah Khan though a bad ſoldier [that is the true ſource of his misfortune] has approved himſelf a good aumil; having, it is ſuppoſed, in the courſe of a few years, at leaſt doubled the population, and revenue of his country."’ —In another part of the correſpondence he is charged with making his country an aſylum for the oppreſſed peaſants, who fly from the territories of Oude. The im⯑provement of his revenue, ariſing from this ſingle crime, (which Mr. Haſtings conſiders as tanta⯑mount to treaſon) is ſtated at an hundred and fifty thouſand pounds a year.

Dr. Swift ſomewhere ſays, that he who could make two blades of graſs grow where but one grew before, was a greater benefactor to the human race than all the politicians that ever exiſted. This prince, who would have been dei⯑fied by antiquity, who would have been ranked with Oſiris, and Bacchus, and Ceres, and the divinities moſt propitious to men, was, for thoſe very merits, by name attacked by the Company's government, as a cheat, a robber, a traitor. In the ſame breath in which he was accuſed as a rebel, he was ordered at once to furniſh 5,000 horſe. On delay, or (according to the technical phraſe, when any remonſtrance is made to them) "on evaſion," he was declared a violator of trea⯑ties, and every thing he had was to be taken from [42] him.—Not one word, however, of horſe in this treaty.

The territory of this Fizulla Khân, Mr. Speaker, is leſs than the county of Norfolk. It is an in⯑land country, full ſeven hundred miles from any ſea port, and not diſtinguiſhed for any one con⯑ſiderable branch of manufacture whatſoever. From this territory a punctual payment was made to the Britiſh Reſident of £.150,000 ſterling a year. The demand of cavalry, without a ſhadow or de⯑cent pretext of right, amounted to three hundred thouſand a year more, at the loweſt computation; and it is ſtated, by the laſt perſon ſent to negotiate, as a demand of little uſe, if it could be complied with; but that the compliance was impoſſible, as it amounted to more than his territories could ſupply, if there had been no other demand upon him—four hundred and fifty thouſand pounds a year from an inland country not ſo large as Norfolk!

The thing moſt extraordinary was to hear the culprit defend himſelf from the imputation of his virtues, as if they had been the blackeſt offences. He extenuated the ſuperior cultivation of his country. He denied its population. He endea⯑voured to prove that he had often ſent back the poor peaſant that ſought ſhelter with him.—I can make no obſervation on this.

After a variety of extortions and vexations, too fatiguing to you, too diſguſting to me, to go through with, they found ‘"that they ought to be in a better ſtate to warrant forcible means;"’ they therefore contented themſelves with a groſs ſum of 150,000 pounds, for their preſent demand. They offered him indeed an indemnity from their [43] exactions in future, for three hundred thouſand pounds more. But he refuſed to buy their ſecu⯑rities; pleading (probably with truth) his poverty: but if the plea were not founded, in my opinion very wiſely; not chooſing to deal any more in that dangerous commodity of the Company's faith; and thinking it better to oppoſe diſtreſs and un⯑armed obſtinacy to uncoloured exaction, than to ſubject himſelf to be conſidered as a cheat, if he ſhould make a treaty in the leaſt beneficial to him⯑ſelf. Thus they executed an exemplary puniſhment on Fizulla Khân for the culture of his country. But, conſcious that the prevention of evils is the great object of all good regulation, they deprived him of the means of encreaſing that criminal cul⯑tivation in future, by exhauſting his coffers; and, that the population of his country ſhould no more be a ſtanding reproach and libel on the Company's government, they bound him, by a poſitive engagement, not to afford any ſhelter whatſoever to the farmers and labourers who ſhould ſeek refuge in his territories, from the exactions of the Britiſh Reſidents in Oude. When they had done all this effectually, they gave him a full and complete acquittance from all charges of rebellion, or of any intention to rebel, or of his having originally had any intereſt in, or any means of rebellion.

Theſe intended rebellions are one of the Com⯑pany's ſtanding reſources. When money has been thought to be heaped up any where, its owners are univerſally accuſed of rebellion, until they are acquitted of their money and their trea⯑ſons at once. The money once taken, all accu⯑ſation, trial, and puniſhment ends. It is ſo ſettled a reſource, that I rather wonder how it comes to be omitted in the Directors account; [44] but I take it for granted this omiſſion will be ſupplied in their next edition. The Company ſtretched this reſource to the full extent, when they accuſed two old women, in the remoteſt corner of India (who could have no poſſible view or motive to raiſe diſturbances) of being engaged in rebellion, with an intent to drive out the Engliſh nation in whoſe protection, purchaſed by money and ſecured by treaty, reſted the ſole hope of their exiſtence. But the Company wanted money, and the old women muſt be guilty of a plot. They were accuſed of rebellion, and they were convicted of wealth. Twice had great ſums been extorted from them, and as often had the Britiſh faith guaranteed the remainder. A body of Britiſh troops, with one of the military farmers general at their head, was ſent to ſeize upon the caſtle in which theſe helpleſs women reſided. Their chief eunuchs, who were their agents, their guardians, protectors, perſons of high rank ac⯑cording to the Eaſtern manners and of great truſt, were thrown into dungeons, to make them diſcover their hidden treaſures; and there they lie at preſent. The lands aſſigned for the main⯑tenance of the women were ſeized and confiſ⯑cated. Their jewels and effects were taken, and ſet up to a pretended auction in an obſcure place, and bought at ſuch a price as the gentlemen thought proper to give. No account has ever been tranſmitted of the articles or produce of this ſale. What money was obtained is un⯑known, or what terms were ſtipulated for the maintenance of theſe deſpoiled and forlorn crea⯑tures; for by ſome particulars it appears as if an engagement of the kind was made.

Let me here remark, once for all, that though [45] the act of 1773 requires that an account of all proceedings ſhould be diligently tranſmitted, that this, like all the other injunctions of the law, is totally deſpiſed; and that half at leaſt of the moſt important papers are intentionally withheld.

I wiſh you, Sir, to advert particularly, in this tranſaction, to the quality and the numbers of the perſons ſpoiled, and the inſtrument by whom that ſpoil was made. Theſe ancient matrons called the Begums or Princeſſes, were of the firſt birth and quality in India, the one mother, the other wife, of the late Nabob of Oude, Sujah Dowlah, a prince poſſeſſed of extenſive and flou⯑riſhing dominions, and the ſecond man in the Mogul empire. This prince (ſuſpicious, and not unjuſtly ſuſpicious, of his ſon and ſucceſſor) at his death committed his treaſures and his fa⯑mily to the Britiſh faith. That family and houſhold, conſiſted of two thouſand women; to which were added two other ſeraglios of near kindred, and ſaid to be extremely nu⯑merous, and (as I am well informed) of about fourſcore of the Nabob's children, with all the eunuchs, the ancient ſervants, and a multitude of the dependants of his ſplendid court. Theſe were all to be provided, for preſent maintenance and future eſtabliſhment, from the lands aſſigned as dower, and from the treaſures which he left to theſe matrons, in truſt for the whole family.

So far as to the objects of the ſpoil. The inſtrument choſen by Mr. Haſtings to deſpoil the relict of Sujah Dowlah was her own ſon, the reigning Nabob of Oude. It was the pious hand of a ſon that was ſelected to tear from his mother and grandmother the proviſion of their age, the maintenance of his brethren, and of [46] all the ancient houſehold of his father. [Here a laugh from ſome young members]—The laugh is ſeaſonable, and the occaſion decent and proper.

By the laſt advices ſomething of the ſum ex⯑torted remained unpaid. The women in de⯑ſpair refuſe to deliver more, unleſs their lands are reſtored and their miniſters releaſed from priſon: but Mr. Haſtings and his council, ſteady to their point, and conſiſtent to the laſt in their conduct, write to the Reſident to ſtimulate the ſon to accompliſh the filial acts he had brought ſo near to their perfection.—"We deſire," ſay they in their letter to the Reſident (written ſo late as March laſt) ‘"that you will inform us if any, and what means, have been taken for recovering the balance due from the Begum [Princeſs] at Fizabad; and that, if neceſſary, you recommend it to the Vizier to enforce the moſt effectual means for that pur⯑poſe."’

What their effectual means of enforcing de⯑mands on women of high rank and condition are, I ſhall ſhew you, Sir, in a few minutes; when I repreſent to you another of theſe plots and rebellions, which always, in India, though ſo rarely any where elſe, are the offspring of an eaſy condition, and hoarded riches.

Benares is the capital city of the Indian reli⯑gion. It is regarded as holy by a particular and diſtinguiſhed ſanctity; and the Gentûs in general think themſelves as much obliged to viſit it once in their lives as the Mahometans to perform their pilgrimage to Mecca. By this means that city grew great in commerce and opulence; and ſo effectually was it ſecured by the pious veneration [47] of that people, that in all wars and in all violences of power, there was ſo ſure an aſylum, both for poverty and wealth, (as it were under a divine protection) that the wiſeſt laws and beſt aſſured free conſtitution could not better provide for the relief of the one, or the ſafety of the other; and this tranquillity influenced to the greateſt degree the proſperity of all the country, and the terri⯑tory of which it was the capital. The intereſt of money there was not more than half the uſual rate in which it ſtood in all other places. The reports have fully informed you of the means and of the terms in which this city and the territory called Gazipour, of which it was the head, came under the ſovereignty of the Eaſt India Company.

If ever there was a ſubordinate dominion plea⯑ſantly circumſtanced to the ſuperior power, it was this; a large rent or tribute, to the amount of two hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds a year, was paid in monthly inſtalments with the punctuality of a dividend at the Bank. If ever there was a prince who could not have an intereſt in diſturb⯑ances, it was its ſovereign, the Rajah Cheit Sing. He was in poſſeſſion of the capital of his religion, and a willing revenue was paid by the devout people who reſorted to him from all parts. His ſovereignty and his independence, except his tri⯑bute, was ſecured by every tie. His territory was not much leſs than half of Ireland, and diſplayed in all parts a degree of cultivation, eaſe, and plenty, under his frugal and paternal management, which left him nothing to deſire, either for honour or ſatisfaction.

This was the light in which this country ap⯑peared to almoſt every eye. But Mr. Haſtings beheld it aſkance. Mr. Haſtings tells us that it [48] was reported of this Cheit Sing, that his father left him a million ſterling, and that he made annual acceſſions to the hoard. Nothing could be ſo ob⯑noxious to indigent power. So much wealth could not be innocent. The Houſe is fully ac⯑quainted with the unfounded and unjuſt requiſi⯑tions which were made upon this prince. The queſtion has been moſt ably and concluſively cleared up in one of the Reports of the Select Com⯑mittee, and in an anſwer of the Court of Directors to an extraordinary publication againſt them by their ſervant, Mr. Haſtings. But I mean to paſs by theſe exactions, as if they were perfectly juſt and regular; and, having admitted them, I take what I ſhall now trouble you with, only as it ſerves to ſhew the ſpirit of the Company's govern⯑ment, the mode in which it is carried on, and the maxims on which it proceeds.

Mr. Haſtings, from whom I take the doctrine, endeavours to prove that Cheit Sing was no ſo⯑vereign prince; but a mere Zemindar or common ſubject, holding land by rent. If this be granted to him, it is next to be ſeen under what terms he is of opinion ſuch a land-holder, that is a Britiſh ſubject, holds his life and property under the Company's government. It is proper to under⯑ſtand well the doctrines of the perſon whoſe ad⯑miniſtration has lately received ſuch diſtinguiſhed approbation from the Company. His doctrine is—‘"that the Company, or the perſon delegated by it, holds an abſolute authority over ſuch Zemindars;—that he [ſuch a ſubject] owes an implicit and unreſerved obedience to its authority, at the forfeiture even of his life and property, at the DISCRETION of thoſe who held or fully repreſented the ſovereign authority;—and that theſe rights are fully delegated to him Mr. Haſtings."’

[49]Such is a Britiſh governor's idea of the condi⯑tion of a great Zemindar holding under a Britiſh authority; and this kind of authority he ſuppoſes fully delegated to him; though no ſuch delegation appears in any commiſſion, inſtruction, or act of parliament. At his diſcretion he may demand, of the ſubſtance of any Zemindar over and above his rent or tribute, even what he pleaſes, with a ſovereign authority; and if he does not yield an implicit unreſerved obedience to all his commands, he forfeits his lands, his life, and his property, at Mr. Haſtings's diſcretion. But, extravagant and even frantic as theſe poſitions appear, they are leſs ſo than what I ſhall now read to you; for he aſſerts, that if any one ſhould urge an exemption from more than a ſtated payment, or ſhould conſider the deeds, which paſſed be⯑tween him and the board, ‘"as bearing the quality and force of a treaty between equal ſtates,"’ he ſays, ‘"that ſuch an opinion is itſelf criminal to the ſtate of which he is a ſubject; and that he was himſelf amenable to its juſtice, if he gave coun⯑tenance to ſuch a belief."’ Here is a new ſpecies of crime invented, that of countenancing a be⯑lief—but a belief of what? A belief of that which the Court of Directors, Haſtings's maſ⯑ters, and a Committee of this Houſe, have de⯑cided as this prince's indiſputable right.

But ſuppoſing the Rajah of Benares to be a mere ſubject, and that ſubject a criminal of the higheſt form; let us ſee what courſe was taken by an upright Engliſh magiſtrate. Did he cite this culprit before his tribunal? Did he make a charge? Did he produce witneſſes? Theſe are not forms; they are parts of ſubſtantial and eternal juſtice. No, not a word of all this. Mr. Haſtings concludes him, in his own mind, to be [50] guilty; he makes this concluſion on reports, on hear-ſays, on appearances, on rumours, on con⯑jectures, on preſumptions; and even theſe never once hinted to the party, nor publicly to any hu⯑man being, till the whole buſineſs was done.

But the governor tells you his motive for this extraordinary proceeding, ſo contrary to every mode of juſtice towards either a prince or a ſubject, fairly and without diſguiſe; and he puts into your hands the key of his whole conduct:— ‘"I will ſuppoſe, for a moment, that I have acted with unwarrantable rigour towards Cheit Sing, and even with injuſtice.—Let my MOTIVE be con⯑ſulted. I left Calcutta, impreſſed with a belief that extraordinary means were neceſſary, and thoſe exerted with a ſteady hand, to preſerve the Company's intereſts from ſinking under the ac⯑cumulated weight which oppreſſed them. I ſaw a political neceſſity for curbing the overgrown power of a great member of their dominion, and for making it contribute to the relief of their preſſing exigencies."’ This is plain ſpeaking; after this it is no wonder that the Rajah's wealth and his offence, the neceſſities of the judge, and the opulence of the delinquent, are never ſepa⯑rated, through the whole of Mr. Haſtings's apolo⯑gy. ‘"The juſtice and policy of exacting a large pecuniary mulct."’ The reſolution ‘"to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's diſtreſſes."’ His determination ‘"to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to execute a ſevere vengeance for paſt delinquency."’ That ‘"as his wealth was great, and the Company's exigencies preſſing, he thought it a meaſure of juſtice and policy [...] exact from him a large pecuniary mulct for their relief."’ —"The ſum (ſays Mr. Wheler, bearing evidence, at his deſire, to his intentions) [51] ‘"to which the governor declared his reſolution to extend his fine; was forty or fifty lacks, that is four or five hundred thouſand pounds; and that if he refuſed, he was to be removed from his ze⯑mindary entirely; or by taking poſſeſſion of his forts, to obtain, out of the treaſure depoſited in them, the above ſum for the Company."’

Crimes ſo convenient, crimes ſo politic, crimes ſo neceſſary, crimes ſo alleviating of diſtreſs, can never be wanting to thoſe who uſe no proceſs, and who produce no proofs.

But there is another ſerious part (what is not ſo?) in this affair. Let us ſuppoſe that the power, for which Mr. Haſtings contends, a power which no ſovereign ever did, or ever can veſt in any of his ſubjects, namely, his own ſovereign authority, to be conveyed by the act of parliament to any man or body of men whatſoever; it certainly was never given to Mr. Haſtings. The powers given by the act of 1773 were formal and official; they were given, not to the governor general, but to the major vote of the board, as a board, on diſ⯑cuſſion amongſt themſelves, in their public cha⯑racter and capacity; and their acts in that charac⯑ter and capacity were to be aſcertained by re⯑cords and minutes of council. The deſpotic acts exerciſed by Mr. Haſtings were done merely in his private character; and, if they had been moderate and juſt, would ſtill be the acts of an uſurped au⯑thority, and without any one of the legal modes of proceeding which could give him competence for the moſt trivial exertion of power. There was no propoſition or deliberation whatſoever in coun⯑cil, no minute on record, by circulation or other⯑wiſe, to authorize his proceedings. No delega⯑tion of power to impoſe a fine, or to take any ſtep [52] to deprive the Rajah of Benares of his government, his property, or his liberty. The minutes of conſultation aſſign to his journey a totally dif⯑ferent object, duty, and deſtination. Mr. Whe⯑ler, at his deſire, tells us long after, that he had a confidential converſation with him on various ſubjects, of which this was the principal, in which Mr. Haſtings notified to him his ſecret intentions; ‘"and that he beſpoke his ſupport of the meaſures which he intended to purſue towards him (the Rajah.)"’ This confidential diſcourſe, and be⯑ſpeaking of ſupport, could give him no power, in oppoſition to an expreſs act of parliament, and the whole tenor of the orders of the Court of Di⯑rectors.

In what manner the powers thus uſurped were employed, is known to the whole world. All the Houſe knows, that the deſign on the Rajah proved as unfruitful as it was violent. The unhappy prince was expelled, and his more unhappy coun⯑try was enſlaved and ruined; but not a rupee was acquired. Inſtead of treaſure to recruit the Company's finances, waſted by their wanton wars and corrupt jobbs, they were plunged into a new war, which ſhook their power in India to its foundation; and, to uſe the governor's own happy ſimile, might have diſſolved it like a magic ſtructure, if the taliſman had been broken.

But the ſucceſs is no part of my conſideration, who ſhould think juſt the ſame of this buſineſs, if the ſpoil of one Rajah had been fully acquired, and faithfully applied to the deſtruction of twenty other Rajahs. Not only the arreſt of the Rajah in his palace was unneceſſary and unwarrantable, and calculated to ſtir up any manly blood which re⯑mained in his ſubjects; but the deſpotic ſtyle, [53] and the extreme inſolence of language and demeanour, uſed to a perſon of great condition among the politeſt people in the world, was in⯑tolerable. Nothing aggravates tyranny ſo much as contumely. Quicquid ſuperbia in contumeliis was charged by a great man of antiquity, as a prin⯑cipal head of offence againſt the governor general of that day. The unhappy people were ſtill more inſulted. A relation, but an enemy to the family, a notorious robber and villain, called Uſſaun Sing, kept as a hawk in a mew, to fly upon this nation, was ſet up to govern there, inſtead of a prince honoured and beloved. But when the buſineſs of inſult was accompliſhed, the revenue was too ſerious a concern to be entruſted to ſuch hands. Another was ſet up in his place, as guardian to an infant.

But here, Sir, mark the effect of all theſe extra⯑ordinary means, of all this policy and juſtice. The revenues which had been hitherto paid with ſuch aſtoniſhing punctuality, fell into arrear. The new prince guardian was depoſed without cere⯑mony; and with as little, caſt into priſon. The government of that once happy country has been in the utmoſt confuſion ever ſince ſuch good order was taken about it. But, to complete the contumely offered to this undone people, and to make them feel their ſervitude in all its degradation, and all its bitterneſs, the govern⯑ment of their ſacred city, the government of that Benares which had been ſo reſpected by Perſian and Tartar conquerors, though of the Muſſul⯑man perſuaſion, that, even in the plenitude of their pride, power, and bigotry, no magiſtrate of that ſect entered the place, was now delivered over [54] by Engliſh hands to a Mahometan; and an Ali Ibrahim Khân was introduced, under the Compa⯑ny's authority, with power of life and death, into the ſanctuary of the Gentû religion.

After this, the taking off a ſlight payment, chearfully made by pilgrims to a chief of their own rites, was repreſented as a mighty benefit. It remains only to ſhew, through the conduct in this buſineſs, the ſpirit of the Company's govern⯑ment, and the reſpect they pay towards other pre⯑judices not leſs regarded in the Eaſt than thoſe of religion; I mean the reverence paid to the female ſex in general, and particularly to women of high rank and condition. During the general confuſion of the country of Gazypore, Panna, the mother of Cheit Sing, was lodged with her train in a caſtle called Bidgé Gur, in which were likewiſe depoſited a large portion of the treaſures of her ſon, or more probably her own. To whomſoever they be⯑longed was indifferent; for, though no charge of rebellion was made on this woman (which was rather ſingular, as it would have coſt nothing) they were reſolved to ſecure her with her fortune. The caſtle was beſieged by Major Popham.

There was no great reaſon to apprehend that ſoldiers ill paid, that ſoldiers who thought they had been defrauded of their plunder on former ſervices of the ſame kind, would not have been ſufficiently attentive to the ſpoil they were ex⯑preſsly come for; but the gallantry and gene⯑roſity of the profeſſion was juſtly ſuſpected, as being likely to ſet bounds to military rapaciouſ⯑neſs. The Company's firſt civil magiſtrate diſ⯑covered the greateſt uneaſineſs leſt the women ſhould have any thing preſerved to them. Terms, [55] tending to put ſome reſtraint on military violence, were granted. He writes a letter to Mr. Pop⯑ham, referring to ſome letter written before to the ſame effect, which I do not remember to have ſeen; but it ſhews his anxiety on this ſub⯑ject. Hear himſelf:— ‘"I think every demand ſhe has made on you, except that of ſafety and reſpect to her perſon, is unreaſonable. If the reports brought to me are true, your rejecting her offers, or any negotiation, would ſoon ob⯑tain you the fort upon your own terms. I apprehend ſhe will attempt to defraud the captors of a conſiderable part of their booty, by being ſuffered to retire without examination. But this is your concern, not mine. I ſhould be very ſorry that your officers and ſoldiers loſt any part of the reward to which they are ſo well entitled; but you muſt be the beſt judge of the promiſed indulgence to the Ranny: what you have engaged for I will certainly ratify; but as to ſuffering the Ranny to hold the purgunna of Hurlich, or any other zemindary, without be⯑ing ſubject to the authority of the Zemindar, or any lands whatſoever, or indeed making any condition with her for a proviſion, I will never conſent."’

Here your governor ſtimulates a rapacious and licentious ſoldiery to the perſonal ſearch of wo⯑men, leſt theſe unhappy creatures ſhould avail themſelves of the protection of their ſex to ſecure any ſupply for their neceſſities; and he poſitively orders that no ſtipulation ſhould be made for any proviſion for them. The widow and mother of a prince, well informed of her miſerable ſituation, and the cauſe of it, a woman of this rank became [56] a ſuppliant to the domeſtic ſervant of Mr. Haſ⯑tings (they are his own words that I read); ‘"imploring his interceſſion, that ſhe may be re⯑lieved from the hardſhips and dangers of her pre⯑ſent ſituation; and offering to ſurrender the fort, and the treaſure and valuable effects contained in it, provided ſhe can be aſſured of ſafety and protection to her perſon and honour, and to that of her family and attendants."’ He is ſo good as to conſent to this, ‘"provided ſhe ſurren⯑ders every thing of value, with the reſerve only of ſuch articles as you ſhall think neceſſary to her condition, or as you yourſelf ſhall be diſpoſed to indulge her with.—But ſhould ſhe refuſe to execute the promiſe ſhe has made, or delay it beyond the term of twenty-four hours, it is my poſitive injunction, that you immediately put a ſtop to any further intercourſe or negociation with her, and on no pretext renew it. If ſhe diſappoints or trifles with me, after I have ſub⯑jected my Duan to the diſgrace of returning ineffectually, and of courſe myſelf to diſcredit, I ſhall conſider it as a wanton affront and in⯑dignity which I can never forgive; nor will I grant her any conditions whatever, but leave her expoſed to thoſe dangers which ſhe has choſen to riſque, rather than truſt to the cle⯑mency and generoſity of our government. I think ſhe cannot be ignorant of theſe conſe⯑quences, and will not venture to incur them; and it is for this reaſon I place a dependance on her offers, and have conſented to ſend my Duan to her."’ The dreadful ſecret hinted at by the merciful governor in the latter part of the letter, is well underſtood in India; where thoſe who [57] ſuffer corporeal indignities, generally expiate the offences of others with their own blood. However, in ſpite of all theſe, the temper of the military did, ſome way or other, operate. They came to terms which have never been tranſmitted. It appears that a fifteenth per cent. of the plunder was reſerved to the captives, of which the unhappy mother of the prince of Benares was to have a ſhare. This antient matron, born to better things [a laugh from certain young gentlemen]—I ſee no cauſe for this mirth. A good author of antiquity reckons among the calamities of his time, Nobiliſſimarum foemi⯑narum exilia et fugas. I ſay, Sir, this antient lady was compelled to quit her houſe with three hun⯑dred helpleſs women, and a multitude of children in her train; but the lower ſort in the camp it ſeems could not be reſtrained. They did not for⯑get the good leſſons of the governor general. They were unwilling ‘"to be defrauded of a con⯑ſiderable part of their booty, by ſuffering them to paſs without examination."’ —They examined them, Sir, with a vengeance, and the ſacred protec⯑tion of that awful character, Mr. Haſtings's maitre d'hotel, could not ſecure them from inſult and plunder. Here is Popham's narrative of the affair:— ‘"The Ranny came out of the fort, with her family and dependants, the 10th at night, owing to which ſuch attention was not paid to her as I wiſhed; and I am exceedingly ſorry to inform you, that the licentiouſneſs of our followers was beyond the bounds of con⯑troul; for, notwithſtanding all I could do, her people were plundered on the road of moſt of the things which they brought out of the fort, by which means one of the articles of ſurrender [58] has been much infringed. The diſtreſs I have felt upon this occaſion cannot be expreſſed, and can only be allayed by a firm performance of the other articles of the treaty, which I ſhall make it my buſineſs to enforce."’

‘"The ſuſpicions which the officers had of trea⯑chery, and the delay made to our getting poſ⯑ſeſſion, had enraged them, as well as the troops, ſo much, that the treaty was at firſt regarded as void, but this determination was ſoon ſuc⯑ceeded by pity and compaſſion for the unfor⯑tunate beſieged."’ —After this comes, in his due order, Mr. Haſtings; who is full of ſorrow and indignation, &c. &c. &c. according to the beſt and moſt authentic precedents eſtabliſhed upon ſuch occaſions.

The women being thus diſpoſed of, that is, completely deſpoiled, and pathetically lament⯑ed, Mr. Haſtings at length recollected the great object of his enterprize, which, during his zeal leſt the officers and ſoldiers ſhould loſe any part of their reward, he ſeems to have forgot; that is to ſay, ‘"to draw from the Rajah's guilt the means of relief to the Company's diſtreſſes."’ This was to be the ſtrong hold of his defence. This compaſſion to the Company, he knew by expe⯑rience would ſanctify a great deal of rigour to⯑wards the natives. But the military had diſtreſſes of their own, which they conſidered firſt. Neither Mr. Haſtings's authority, nor his ſupplications, could prevail on them to aſſign a ſhilling to the claim he made on the part of the Company. They divided the booty amongſt themſelves. Driven from his claim he was reduced to petition for the ſpoil as a loan. But the ſoldiers were too [59] wiſe to venture as a loan, what the borrower claimed as a right. In defiance of all authority, they ſhared amongſt themſelves about two hun⯑dred thouſand pounds ſterling, beſides what had been taken from the women.

In all this there is nothing wonderful. We may reſt aſſured, that when the maxims of any government eſtabliſh among its reſources extra⯑ordinary means, and thoſe exerted with a ſtrong hand, that ſtrong hand will provide thoſe extra⯑ordinary means for itſelf. Whether the ſoldiers had reaſon or not (perhaps much might be ſaid for them) certain it is, the military diſcipline of India was ruined from that moment; and the ſame rage for plunder, the ſame contempt of ſubordi⯑nation, which blaſted all the hopes of extraor⯑dinary means from your ſtrong hand at Benares, have very lately loſt you an army in Myſore. This is viſible enough from the accounts in the laſt Gazette.

There is no doubt but that the country and city of Benares, now brought into the ſame order, will very ſoon exhibit, if it does not already diſ⯑play the ſame appearance with thoſe countries and cities which are under better ſubjection. A great maſter, Mr. Haſtings, has himſelf been at the pains of drawing a picture of one of theſe countries, I mean the province and city of Far⯑ruckabad. There is no reaſon to queſtion his knowledge of the facts; and his authority (on this point at leaſt) is above all exception, as well for the ſtate of the country, as for the cauſe. In his minute of conſultation, Mr. Haſtings deſcribes forcibly the conſequences which ariſe from the degradation into which we have ſunk the native government. ‘"The total want (ſays he) of all [60] order, regularity, or authority, in his (the Nabob of Farruckabad's) government, and to which, among other obvious cauſes, it may no doubt be owing that the country of Farruckabad is become almoſt an entire waſte, without culti⯑vation or inhabitants; that the capital, which, but a very ſhort time ago, was diſtinguiſhed as one of the moſt populous and opulent com⯑mercial cities in Hindoſtan, at preſent exhibits nothing but ſcenes of the moſt wretched poverty, deſolation, and miſery; and that the Nabob himſelf, tho' in the [...]ſſeſſion of a tract of country which, with only [...]mmon care, is notoriouſly capable of yielding [...] annual revenue of be⯑tween thirty and forty lacks, (three or four hundred thouſand pounds) with no military eſtabliſhment to maintain, ſcarcely commands the means of a bare ſubſiſtance."’

This is a true and unexaggerated picture, not only of Farruckabad, but of at leaſt three-fourths of the country which we poſſeſs, or rather lay waſte, in India. Now, Sir, the Houſe will be de⯑ſirous to know for what purpoſe this picture was drawn. It was for a purpoſe, I will not ſay laudable, but neceſſary, that of taking the un⯑fortunate Prince and his country out of the hands of a ſequeſtrator ſent thither by the Nabob of Oude, the mortal enemy of the Prince thus ruined, and to protect him by means of a Britiſh Reſident, who might carry his complaints to the ſuperior Reſident at Oude, or tranſmit them to Calcutta. But mark, how the reformer per⯑ſiſted in his reformation. The effect of the mea⯑ſure was better than was probably expected. The Prince began to be at eaſe; the country began to recover; and the revenue began to be [61] collected. Theſe were alarming circumſtances. Mr. Haſtings not only recalled the Reſident, but he entered into a formal ſtipulation with the Nabob of Oude, never to ſend an Engliſh ſubject again to Farruckabad; and thus the country, de⯑ſcribed as you have heard by Mr. Haſtings, is given up for ever to the very perſons to whom he had attributed its ruin, that is to the Sezawals or ſequeſtrators of the Nabob of Oude.

Such was the iſſue of the firſt attempt to relieve the diſtreſſes of the dependent provinces. I ſhall cloſe what I have to ſay on the condition of the northern dependencies, with the effect of the laſt of theſe attempts. You will recollect, Sir, the ac⯑count I have not long ago ſtated to you as given by Mr. Haſtings, of the ruined condition of the deſtroyer of others, the Nabob of Oude, and of the recal, in conſequence, of Hannay, Middleton, and Johnſon. When the firſt little ſudden guſt of paſſion againſt theſe gentlemen was ſpent, the ſentiments of old friendſhip began to revive. Some healing conferences were held between them and the ſuperior government. Mr. Hannay was per⯑mitted to return to Oude; but death prevented the further advantages intended for him, and the future benefits propoſed for the country by the provident care of the council general.

Theſe three gentlemen were accuſed of the groſſeſt peculations. The Court of Directors were informed, by the governor general and council, that a ſevere enquiry would be inſtituted againſt the two ſurvivors; and they requeſted that court to ſuſpend its judgment, and to wait the event of their proceedings. But no enquiry has been inſtituted, nor any ſteps taken towards it. By means of the bland and conciliatory diſpoſitions of the charter [62] governors, and proper private explanations, the public enquiry has died away, the ſuppoſed pecu⯑lators and deſtroyers of Oude repoſe in all ſecurity in the boſoms of their accuſers; whilſt others ſuc⯑ceed to them to be inſtructed by their example.

It is only to complete the view I propoſed of the conduct of the Company, with regard to the dependent provinces, that I ſhall ſay any thing at all of the Carnatic, which is the ſcene, if poſ⯑ſible, of greater diſorder than the northern pro⯑vinces. Perhaps it were better to ſay of this center and metropolis of abuſe, whence all the reſt in India and in England diverge; from whence they are fed and methodized, what was ſaid of Carthage—de Carthagine ſatius eſt ſilere quam parum dicere. This country, in all its de⯑nominations, is about 46,000 ſquare miles. It may be affirmed univerſally, that not one perſon of ſubſtance or property, landed, commercial, or mo⯑nied, excepting two or three bankers, who are ne⯑ceſſary depoſits and diſtributors of the general ſpoil, is left in all that region. In that country the moiſture, the bounty of Heaven, is given but at a certain ſeaſon. Before the aera of our influence, the induſtry of man carefully huſbanded that gift of God. The Gentûs preſerved, with a pro⯑vident and religious care, the precious depoſit of the periodical rain in reſervoirs, many of them works of royal grandeur; and from theſe, as occaſion demanded, they fructified the whole country. To maintain theſe reſervoirs, and to keep up an annual advance to the cultivators, for ſeed and cattle, formed a principal object of the piety and policy of the prieſts and rulers of the Gentû religion.

[63]This object required a command of money; and there was no Pollam, or caſtle, which in the happy days of the Carnatic was without ſome hoard of treaſure, by which the governors were enabled to combat with the irregularity of the ſeaſons, and to reſiſt or to buy off the invaſion of an enemy. In all the cities were multitudes of merchants and bankers, for all occaſions of mo⯑nied aſſiſtance; and on the other hand, the native princes were in condition to obtain credit from them. The manufacturer was paid by the return of commodities, or by imported money, and not, as at preſent, in the taxes that had been originally exacted from his induſtry. In aid of caſual diſtreſs, the country was full of choultries, which were inns and hoſpitals, where the traveller and the poor were relieved. All ranks of people had their place in the public concern, and their ſhare in the common ſtock and common proſperity; but the chartered rights of men, and the right which it was thought proper to ſet up in the Nabob of Arcot, introduced a new ſyſtem. It was their policy to conſider hoards of money as crimes; to regard moderate rents as frauds on the ſovereign; and to view, in the leſſer princes, any claim of exemption from more than ſettled tribute, as an act of rebellion. Accordingly all the caſtles were, one after the other, plundered and deſtroyed. The native princes were expelled; the hoſpitals fell to ruin; the reſervoirs of water went to decay; the merchants, bankers, and manufacturers diſappeared; and ſterility, indi⯑gence, and depopulation, overſpread the face of theſe once flouriſhing provinces.

The Company was very early ſenſible of theſe miſchiefs, and of their true cauſe. They gave preciſe [64] orders, ‘"that the native princes, called Polygars, ſhould not be extirpated.—That the rebellion [ſo they chooſe to call it] of the Polygars, may (they fear) with too much juſtice, be attributed to the mal-adminiſtration of the Nabob's collectors."’ That ‘"they obſerve with concern, that their troops have been put to diſagreeable ſervices."’ They might have uſed a ſtronger expreſſion with⯑out impropriety. But they make amends in an⯑other place. Speaking of the Polygars, the Di⯑rectors ſay, that ‘"it was repugnant to humanity to force them to ſuch dreadful extremities as they underwent."’ That ſome examples of ſe⯑verity might be neceſſary, ‘"when they fell into the Nabob's hands,"’ and not by the deſtruction of the country. ‘"That they fear his government is none of the mildeſt; and that there is great oppreſſion in collecting his revenues."’ They ſtate, that the wars in which he has involved the Carnatic, had been a cauſe of its diſtreſſes. ‘"That theſe diſtreſſes have been certainly great; but thoſe by the Nabob's oppreſſions we believe to be greater than all."’ Pray, Sir, attend to the reaſon for their opinion that the govern⯑ment of this their inſtrument is more cala⯑mitous to the country than the ravages of war.—Becauſe, ſay they, his oppreſſions are ‘"with⯑out intermiſſion.—The others are temporary; by all which oppreſſions we believe the Nabob has great wealth in ſtore."’ From this ſtore nei⯑ther he nor they could derive any advantage what⯑ſoever, upon the invaſion of Hyder Ali in the hour of their greateſt calamity and diſmay.

It is now proper to compare theſe declarations with the Company's conduct. The principal rea⯑ſon which they aſſigned againſt the extirpation [65] of the Polygars was, that the weavers were pro⯑tected in their fortreſſes. They might have added, that the Company itſelf, which ſtung them to death, had been warmed in the boſom of theſe unfortunate princes: for, on the taking of Madras by the French, it was in their hoſpitable Pollams, that moſt of the inhabitants found refuge and pro⯑tection. But, notwithſtanding all theſe orders, rea⯑ſons, and declarations, they at length gave an in⯑direct ſanction, and permitted the uſe of a very direct and irreſiſtible force, to meaſures which they had, over and over again, declared to be falſe policy, cruel, inhuman, and oppreſſive. Having, however, forgot all attention to the princes and the people, they remembered that they had ſome ſort of intereſt in the trade of the country; and it is matter of curioſity to obſerve the protection which they afforded to this their natural object.

Full of anxious cares on this head, they direct, ‘"that in reducing the Polygars they (their ſer⯑vants) were to be cautious, not to deprive the weavers and manufacturers of the protection they often met with in the ſtrong holds of the Polygar countries;"’—and they write to their inſtrument, the Nabob of Arcot, concerning theſe poor people in a moſt pathetic ſtrain. ‘"We en⯑treat your Excellency (ſay they) in particular, to make the manufacturers the object of your tendereſt care; particularly when you root out the Polygars, you do not deprive the weavers of the protection they enjoyed under them."’ When they root out the protectors in favour of the oppreſſor, they ſhew themſelves religiouſly cau⯑tious of the rights of the protected. When they extirpate the ſhepherd and the ſhepherd's dogs, they piouſly recommend the helpleſs flock to the [66] mercy, and even to the tendereſt care, of the wolf, This is the uniform ſtrain of their policy, ſtrictly forbidding, and at the ſame time ſtrenuouſly encouraging and enforcing, every meaſure that can ruin and deſolate the country committed to their charge. After giving the Company's idea of the government of this their inſtrument, it may appear ſingular, but it is perfectly conſiſtent with their ſyſtem, that, beſides waſting for him, at two different times, the moſt exquiſite ſpot upon the earth, Tanjour, and all the adjacent countries, they have even voluntarily put their own ter⯑ritory, that is, a large and fine country adjacent to Madras, called their Jaghire, wholly out of their protection; and have continued to farm their ſubjects, and their duties towards theſe ſubjects, to that very Nabob, whom they them⯑ſelves conſtantly repreſent as an habitual oppreſſor, and a relentleſs tyrant. This they have done without any pretence of ignorance of the objects of oppreſſion for which this prince has thought fit to become their renter; for he has again and again told them, that it is for the ſole purpoſe of exerciſing authority he holds the Jaghire lands; and he affirms (and I believe with truth) that he pays more for that territory than the revenues yield. This deficiency he muſt make up from his other territories; and thus, in order to fur⯑niſh the means of oppreſſing one part of the Car⯑natic, he is led to oppreſs all the reſt.

The Houſe perceives that the livery of the Com⯑pany's government is uniform. I have deſcribed the condition of the countries indirectly, but moſt ſubſtantially, under the Company's authority. And now I aſk, whether, with this map of miſgovern⯑ment before me, I can ſuppoſe myſelf bound by my [67] vote to continue, upon any principles of pre⯑tended public faith, the management of theſe countries in thoſe hands. If I kept ſuch a faith (which in reality is no better than a fides latronum) with what is called the Company, I muſt break the faith, the covenant, the ſolemn, original, indiſpen⯑ſable oath, in which I am bound, by the eternal frame and conſtitution of things, to the whole human race.

As I have dwelt ſo long on theſe who are in⯑directly under the Company's adminiſtration, I will endeavour to be a little ſhorter upon the countries immediately under this charter govern⯑ment.—Theſe are the Bengal provinces. The condition of theſe provinces is pretty fully de⯑tailed in the Sixth and Ninth Reports, and in their Appendixes. I will ſelect only ſuch principles and inſtances as are broad and general. To your own thoughts I ſhall leave it, to furniſh the detail of oppreſſions involved in them. I ſhall ſtate to you, as ſhortly as I am able, the conduct of the Company;—1ſt, towards the landed intereſts;—next, the commercial intereſts;—3dly, the na⯑tive government;—and laſtly, to their own go⯑vernment.

Bengal, and the provinces that are united to it, are larger than the kingdom of France; and once contained, as France does contain, a great and independent landed intereſt, compoſed of princes, of great lords, of a numerous nobility and gentry, of freeholders, of lower tenants, of religious communities, and public foundations. So early as 1769, the Company's ſervants perceived the decay into which theſe provinces had fallen under Engliſh adminiſtration, and they made a ſtrong repreſentation upon this decay, and what they [68] apprehended to be the cauſes of it. Soon after Mr. Haſtings became preſident of Bengal. Inſtead of adminiſtering a remedy, upon the heels of a dread⯑ful famine, in the year 1772, the ſuccour which the new preſident and the council lent to this afflicted nation was—ſhall I be believed in relat⯑ing it?—the landed intereſt of a whole kingdom, of a kingdom to be compared to France, was ſet up to public auction! They ſet up (Mr. Haſtings ſet up) the whole nobility, gentry, and freeholders, to the higheſt bidder. No preference was given to the ancient proprietors. They muſt bid againſt every uſurer, every temporary adventurer, every jobber and ſchemer, every ſervant of every Eu⯑ropean, or they were obliged to content them⯑ſelves, in lieu of their extenſive domains, with their houſe, and ſuch a penſion as the ſtate auctioneers thought fit to aſſign. In this general calamity, ſeveral of the firſt nobility thought (and in all appearance juſtly) that they had better ſub⯑mit to the neceſſity of this penſion, than continue, under the name of Zemindars, the objects and in⯑ſtruments of a ſyſtem, by which they ruined their tenants, and were ruined themſelves. Another reform has ſince come upon the back of the firſt; and a penſion having been aſſigned to theſe un⯑happy perſons, in lieu of their hereditary lands, a new ſcheme of oeconomy has taken place, and deprived them of that penſion.

The menial ſervants of Engliſhmen, perſons (to uſe the emphatical phraſe of a ruined and patient Eaſtern chief ‘"whoſe fathers they would not have ſet with the dogs of their flock,"’ entered into their patrimonial lands. Mr. Haſtings's banian was, after this auction, found poſſeſſed of territories yielding a rent of one hundred and forty thouſand pounds a year.

[69]Such an univerſal proſcription, upon any pre⯑tence, has few examples. Such a proſcription, without even a pretence of delinquency, has none. It ſtands by itſelf. It ſtands as a mo⯑nument to aſtoniſh the imagination, to confound the reaſon of mankind. I confeſs to you, when I firſt came to know this buſineſs in its true nature and extent, my ſurpriſe did a little ſuſpend my indignation. I was in a manner ſtupified by the deſperate boldneſs of a few obſcure young men, who having obtained, by ways which they could not comprehend, a power of which they ſaw nei⯑ther the purpoſes nor the limits, toſſed about, ſubverted, and tore to pieces, as if it were in the gambols of a boyiſh unluckineſs and malice, the moſt eſtabliſhed rights, and the moſt an⯑cient and moſt revered inſtitutions, of ages and nations. Sir, I will not now trouble you with any detail with regard to what they have ſince done with theſe ſame lands and land-holders; only to inform you, that nothing has been ſuffered to ſettle for two ſeaſons together upon any baſis; and that the levity and inconſtancy of theſe mock legiſlators were not the leaſt afflicting parts of the oppreſſions ſuffered under their uſur⯑pation; nor will any thing give ſtability to the pro⯑perty of the natives, but an adminiſtration in Eng⯑land at once protecting and ſtable. The country ſuſtains, almoſt every year, the miſeries of a revo⯑lution. At preſent, all is uncertainty, miſery, and confuſion. There is to be found through theſe vaſt regions no longer one landed man, who is a reſource for voluntary aid, or an object for particular rapine. Some of them were, not long ſince, great princes; they poſſeſſed treaſures, they levied armies. There was a Zemindar in Bengal (I forget his name) that, on the threat of an invaſion, ſupplied the Soubah of theſe provinces with the loan of a [70] million ſterling. The family this day wants credit for a breakfaſt at the bazar.

I ſhall now ſay a word or two on the Com⯑pany's care of the commercial intereſt of thoſe kingdoms. As it appears in the Reports, that perſons in the higheſt ſtations in Bengal have adopted, as a fixed plan of policy, the deſtruction of all intermediate dealers between the Company and the manufacturer, native merchants have diſ⯑appeared of courſe. The ſpoil of the revenues is the ſole capital which purchaſes the produce and manufactures; and through three or four foreign companies tranſmits the official gains of indi⯑viduals to Europe. No other commerce has an exiſtence in Bengal. The tranſport of its plunder is the only traffic of the country. I wiſh to refer you to the Appendix to the Ninth Report for a full account of the manner in which the Company have protected the commercial intereſts of their dominions in the Eaſt.

As to the native government and the adminiſtra⯑tion of juſtice, it ſubſiſted in a poor tottering man⯑ner for ſome years. In the year 1781, a total revo⯑lution took place in that eſtabliſhment. In one of the uſual freaks of legiſlation of the council of Ben⯑gal, the whole criminal juriſdiction of theſe courts, called the Phoujdary Judicature, exerciſed till then by the principal Muſſulmen, was in one day, with⯑out notice, without conſultation with the magiſtrates or the people there, and without communication with the directors or miniſters here, totally ſub⯑verted. A new inſtitution took place, by which this juriſdiction was divided between certain Engliſh ſervants of the Company and the Gentû Zemindars of the country, the latter of whom ne⯑ver petitioned for it, nor, for ought that appears, ever deſired this boon. But its natural uſe was [71] made of it; it was made a pretence for new extortions of money.

The natives had however one conſolation in the ruin of their judicature; they ſoon ſaw that it fared no better with the Engliſh government itſelf. That too, after deſtroying every other, came to its period. This revolution may well be rated for a moſt daring act, even among the ex⯑traordinary things that have been doing in Bengal ſince our unhappy acquiſition of the means of ſo much miſchief.

An eſtabliſhment of Engliſh government for civil juſtice, and for the collection of revenue, was planned and executed by the preſident and council of Bengal, ſubject to the pleaſure of the Directors, in the year 1772. According to this plan, the country was divided into ſix great diſtricts, or provinces. In each of theſe was eſtabliſhed a provincial council, which adminiſ⯑tered the revenue; and of that council one mem⯑ber, by monthly rotation, preſided in the courts of civil reſort; with an appeal to the council of the province, and thence to Calcutta. In this ſyſtem (whether, in other reſpects, good or evil) there were ſome capital advantages. There was in the very number of perſons in each provincial council, authority, communication, mutual check, and controul. They were obliged, on their mi⯑nutes of conſultation, to enter their reaſons and diſſents; ſo that a man of diligence, of reſearch, and tolerable ſagacity, ſitting in London, might, from theſe materials, be enabled to form ſome judgment of the ſpirit of what was going on on the furtheſt banks of the Ganges and Burrampûter.

The Court of Directors ſo far ratified this eſtabliſhment, (which was conſonant enough to their general plan of government) that they gave [72] preciſe orders, that no alteration ſhould be made in it, without their conſent. So far from being appriſed of any deſign againſt this conſti⯑tution, they had reaſon to conceive that on trial it had been more and more approved by their council general, at leaſt by the governor general, who had planned it. At the time of the revolu⯑tion, the council general was nominally in two perſons, virtually in one. At that time meaſures of an arduous and critical nature ought to have been forborne, even if, to the fulleſt council, this ſpecific meaſure had not been prohibited by the ſuperior authority. It was in this very ſituation, that one man had the hardineſs to conceive, and the temerity to execute, a total revolution in the form and the perſons compoſing the government of a great kingdom. Without any previous ſtep, at one ſtroke, the whole conſtitution of Bengal, civil and criminal, was ſwept away. The coun⯑ſellors were recalled from their provinces. Up⯑wards of fifty of the principal officers of go⯑vernment were turned out of employ, and rendered dependent on Mr. Haſtings for their immediate ſubſiſtence, and for all hope of future proviſion. The chief of each council, and one European col⯑lector of revenue, was left in each province.

But here, Sir, you may imagine a new govern⯑ment, of ſome permanent deſcription, was eſta⯑bliſhed in the place of that which had been thus ſuddenly overturned. No ſuch thing. Leſt theſe chiefs without councils ſhould be conceived to form the ground plan of ſome future government, it was publicly declared, that their continuance was only temporary and permiſſive. The whole ſubordinate Britiſh adminiſtration of revenue was then veſted in a committee in Calcutta, all [73] creatures of the governor general; and the pro⯑vincial management, under the permiſſive chief, was delivered over to native officers.

But, that the revolution, and the purpoſes of the revolution, might be complete, to this committee were delegated, not only the func⯑tions of all the inferior, but, what will ſurprize the Houſe, thoſe of the ſupreme adminiſtra⯑tion of revenue alſo. Hitherto the governor general and council had, in their revenue de⯑partment, adminiſtered the finances of thoſe king⯑doms. By the new ſcheme they are delegated to this committee, who are only to report their pro⯑ceedings for approbation.

The key to the whole tranſaction is given in one of the inſtructions to the committee, ‘"that it is not neceſſary that they ſhould enter diſ⯑ſents."’ By this means the ancient plan of the Company's adminiſtration was deſtroyed; but the plan of concealment was perfected. To that moment the accounts of the revenues were tolerably clear; or at leaſt means were furniſhed for enquiries, by which they might be rendered ſatisfactory. In the obſcure and ſilent gulph of this committee every thing is now buried. The thickeſt ſhades of night ſurround all their tranſactions. No ef⯑fectual means of detecting fraud, miſmanage⯑ment, or miſrepreſentation, exiſt. The Directors, who have dared to talk with ſuch confidence on their revenues, know nothing about them. What uſed to fill volumes is now compriſed under a few dry heads on a ſheet of paper. The natives, a people habitually made to con⯑cealment, are the chief managers of the reve⯑nue thoughout the provinces. I mean by na⯑tives, ſuch wretches as your rulers ſelect out of them as moſt fitted for their purpoſes. As a [74] proper key-ſtone to bind the arch, a native, one Gunga Govind Sin [...], a man turned out of his em⯑ployment by Sir John Clavering, for malverſation in office, is made the correſponding ſecretary; and indeed the great moving principle of their new board.

As the whole revenue and civil adminiſtration was thus ſubverted, and a clandeſtine govern⯑ment ſubſtituted in the place of it, the judicial inſtitution underwent a like revolution. In 1772 there had been ſix courts formed out of the ſix provincial councils. Eighteen new ones are appointed in their place, with each a judge, taken from the junior ſervants of the Company. To maintain theſe eighteen courts, a tax is le⯑vied on the ſums in litigation, of 2 ½ per cent. on the great, and of 5 per cent. on the leſs. This money is all drawn from the provinces to Cal⯑cutta. The chief juſtice (the ſame who ſtays in defiance of a vote of this Houſe, and of His Ma⯑jeſty's recal) is appointed at once the treaſurer and diſpoſer of theſe taxes, levied, without any ſort of authority, from the Company, from the Crown, or from Parliament.

In effect, Sir, every legal regular authority in matters of revenue, of political adminiſtration, of criminal law, of civil law, in many of the moſt eſſential parts of military diſcipline, is laid level with the ground; and an oppreſſive, irregular, capricious, unſteady, rapacious, and peculating deſpotiſm, with a direct diſavowal of obedience to any authority at home, and without any fixed maxim, principle, or rule of proceeding, to guide them in India, is at preſent the ſtate of your charter-government over great kingdoms.

As the Company has made this uſe of their truſt, I ſhould ill diſcharge mine, if I refuſed to [75] give my moſt chearful vote for the redreſs of theſe abuſes, by putting the affairs of ſo large and valuable a part of the intereſts of this nation and of mankind, into ſome ſteady hands, poſſeſſing the confidence, and aſſured of the ſupport of this Houſe, until they can be reſtored to regularity, order, and conſiſtency.

I have touched the heads of ſome of the grievances of the people, and the abuſes of go⯑vernment. But I hope and truſt, you will give me credit, when I faithfully aſſure you, that I have not mentioned one fourth part of what has come to my knowledge in your committee; and further, I have full reaſon to believe, that not one fourth part of the abuſes are come to my knowledge, by that or by any other means. Pray conſider what I have ſaid only as an in⯑dex to direct you in your enquiries.

If this then, Sir, has been the uſe made of the truſt of political powers internal and external, given by you in the charter, the next thing to be ſeen is the conduct of the Company with regard to the commercial truſt. And here I will make a fair offer:—If it can be proved that they have acted wiſely, prudently, and frugally, as merchants, I ſhall paſs by the whole maſs of their enormities as ſtateſmen. That they have not done this their preſent condition is proof ſufficient. Their diſtreſſes are ſaid to be owing to their wars. This is not wholly true. But if it were, is not that readineſs to engage in wars which diſtinguiſhes them, and for which the Committee of Secrecy has ſo branded their politics, founded on the falſeſt principles of mer⯑cantile ſpeculation?

The principle of buying cheap and ſelling dear is the firſt, the great foundation of mercantile [76] dealing. Have they ever attended to this prin⯑ciple? Nay, for years have they not actually authorized in their ſervants a total indifference as to the prices they were to pay?

A great deal of ſtrictneſs in driving bargains for whatever we contract, is another of the prin⯑ciples of mercantile policy. Try the Company by that teſt! Look at the contracts that are made for them. Is the Company ſo much as a good commiſſary to their own armies? I en⯑gage to ſelect for you, out of the innumerable maſs of their dealings, all conducted very nearly alike, one contract only, the exceſſive profits on which during a ſhort term would pay the whole of their year's dividend. I ſhall undertake to ſhew, that upon two others, that the inordi⯑nate profits given, with the loſſes incurred in order to ſecure thoſe profits, would pay a year's dividend more.

It is a third property of trading men, to ſee that their clerks do not divert the dealings of the maſter to their own benefit. It was the other day only, when their governor and coun⯑cil taxed the Company's inveſtment with a ſum of fifty thouſand pounds, as an inducement to perſuade only ſeven members of their board of trade to give their honour that they would ab⯑ſtain from ſuch profits upon that inveſtment as they muſt have violated their oaths if they had made at all.

It is a fourth quality of a merchant to be exact in his accounts. What will be thought, when you have fully before you the mode of accounting made uſe of in the treaſury of Ben⯑gal?—I hope you will have it ſoon. With re⯑gard to one of their agencies, when it came to the material part, the prime coſt of the [77] goods on which a commiſſion of fifteen per cent. was allowed, to the aſtoniſhment of the factory to whom the commodities were ſent, the accountant general reports that he did not think himſelf authorized to call for vouchers relative to this and other particulars,—becauſe the agent was upon his honour with regard to them. A new principle of account upon honour ſeems to be regularly eſtabliſhed in their dealings and their treaſury, which in reality amounts to an entire annihilation of the principle of all accounts.

It is a fifth property of a merchant, who does not meditate a fraudulent bankruptcy, to calcu⯑late his probable profits upon the money he takes up to veſt in buſineſs. Did the Company, when they bought goods on bonds bearing 8 per cent. in⯑tereſt, at ten and even twenty per cent. diſcount, even aſk themſelves a queſtion concerning the poſſi⯑bility of advantage from dealing on theſe terms?

The laſt quality of a merchant I ſhall advert to, is the taking care to be properly prepared, in caſh or goods, in the ordinary courſe of ſale, for the bills which are drawn on them. Now I aſk, whether they have ever calculated the clear pro⯑duce of any given ſales, to make them tally with the four million of bills which are come and coming upon them, ſo as at the proper periods to enable the one to liquidate the other? No, they have not. They are now obliged to borrow money of their own ſervants to purchaſe their inveſt⯑ment. The ſervants ſtipulate five per cent. on the capital they advance, if their bills ſhould not be paid at the time when they become due; and the value of the rupee on which they charge this intereſt is taken at two ſhillings and a penny. Has the Company ever troubled them⯑ſelves to enquire whether their ſales can bear the [78] payment of that intereſt, and at that rate of ex⯑change? Have they once conſidered the dilemma in which they are placed—the ruin of their credit in the Eaſt Indies, if they refuſe the bills—the ruin of their credit and exiſtence in England, if they ac⯑cept them? Indeed no trace of equitable government is found in their politics; not one trace of com⯑mercial principle in their mercantile dealing; and hence is the deepeſt and matured wiſdom of Par⯑liament demanded, and the beſt reſources of this kingdom muſt be ſtrained, to reſtore them; that is, to reſtore the countries deſtroyed by the miſ⯑conduct of the Company, and to reſtore the Com⯑pany itſelf, ruined by the conſequences of their plans for deſtroying what they were bound to preſerve.

I required, if you remember, at my outſet a proof that theſe abuſes were habitual. But ſurely this it is not neceſſary for me to conſider as a ſeparate head; becauſe I truſt I have made it evident beyond a doubt, in conſidering the abuſes themſelves, that they are regular, permanent, and ſyſtematical.

I am now come to my laſt condition, without which, for one, I will never readily lend my hand to the deſtruction of any eſtabliſhed government; which is, That in its preſent ſtate, the government of the Eaſt India Company is abſolutely incor⯑rigible.

Of this great truth I think there can be little doubt, after all that has appeared in this Houſe. It is ſo very clear, that I muſt conſider the leaving any power in their hands, and the determined reſolution to continue and counte⯑nance every mode and every degree of peculation, oppreſſion, and tyranny, to be one and the ſame thing. I look upon that body incorrigible, from the fulleſt conſideration both of their uniform [79] conduct, and their preſent real and virtual con⯑ſtitution.

If they had not conſtantly been apprized of all the enormities committed in India under their authority; if this ſtate of things had been as much a diſcovery to them as it was to many of us; we might flatter ourſelves that the de⯑tection of the abuſes would lead to their refor⯑mation. I will go further: If the Court of Di⯑rectors had not uniformly condemned every act which this Houſe or any of its Committees had condemned; if the language in which they ex⯑preſſed their diſapprobation againſt enormities and their authors had not been much more vehement and indignant than any ever uſed in this Houſe, I ſhould entertain ſome hopes. If they had not, on the other hand, as uniformly commended all their ſervants who had done their duty and obeyed their orders, as they had heavily cenſured thoſe who rebelled; I might ſay, Theſe people have been in an error, and when they are ſenſible of it they will mend. But when I reflect on the uniformity of their ſupport to the objects of their uniform cenſure; and the ſtate of inſignificance and diſ⯑grace to which all of thoſe have been reduced whom they approved; and that even utter ruin and premature death have been among the fruits of their favour; I muſt be convinced, that in this caſe, as in all others, hypocriſy is the only vice that never can be cured.

Attend, I pray you, to the ſituation and proſ⯑perity of Benfield, Haſtings, and others of that ſort. The laſt of theſe has been treated by the company with an aſperity of reprehenſion that has no parallel. They lament, ‘"that the power of diſ⯑poſing of their property for perpetuity, ſhould fall into ſuch hands."’ Yet for fourteen years, [80] with little interruption, he has governed all their af⯑fairs, of every deſcription, with an abſolute ſway. He has had himſelf the means of heaping up im⯑menſe wealth; and, during that whole period, the fortunes of hundreds have depended on his ſmiles and frowns. He himſelf tells you he is incum⯑bered with two hundred and fifty young gentle⯑men, ſome of them of the beſt families in Eng⯑land, all of whom aim at returning with vaſt fortunes to Europe in the prime of life. He has then two hundred and fifty of your children as his hoſtages for your good behaviour; and loaded for years, as he has been, with the execrations of the natives, with the cenſures of the Court of Directors, and ſtruck and blaſted with reſolutions of this Houſe, he ſtill maintains the moſt deſpo⯑tic power ever known in India. He domineers with an overbearing ſway in the aſſemblies of his pretended maſters; and it is thought in a degree raſh to venture to name his offences in this Houſe, even as grounds of a legiſlative remedy.

On the other hand, conſider the fate of thoſe who have met with the applauſes of the Directors. Colonel Monſon, one of the beſt of men, had his days ſhortened by the applauſes, deſtitute of the ſupport, of the Company. General Clavering, whoſe panegyric was made in every diſpatch from England, whoſe hearſe was bedewed with the tears, and hung round with eulogies of the Court of Directors, burſt an honeſt and indig⯑nant heart at the treachery of thoſe who ruined him by their praiſes. Uncommon patience and temper, ſupported Mr. Francis a while longer under the baneful influence of the commen⯑dation of the Court of Directors. His health however gave way at length; and, in utter deſpair [81] he returned to Europe. At his return the doors of the India Houſe were ſhut to this man, who had been the object of their conſtant admiration. He has indeed eſcaped with life, but he has for⯑feited all expectation of credit, conſequence, party, and following. He may well ſay, Me nemo mi⯑niſtro fur erit, atque ideo nulli comes exeo. This man, whoſe deep reach of thought, whoſe large legiſ⯑lative conceptions, and whoſe grand plans of po⯑licy, make the moſt ſhining part of our Reports, from whence we have all learned our leſſons, if we have learned any good ones; this man, from whoſe materials thoſe gentlemen who have leaſt acknow⯑ledged it have yet ſpoken as from a brief; this man, driven from his employment, diſcounte⯑nanced by the Directors, has had no other reward, and no other diſtinction, but that inward ‘"ſun⯑ſhine of the ſoul"’ which a good conſcience can always beſtow upon itſelf. He has not yet had ſo much as a good word, but from a perſon too inſignificant to make any other return for the means with which he has been furniſhed for per⯑forming his ſhare of a duty which is equally urgent on us all.

Add to this, that from the higheſt in place to the loweſt, every Britiſh ſubject, who, in obe⯑dience to the Company's orders, has been active in the diſcovery of peculations, has been ruined. They have been driven from India. When they made their appeal at home they were not heard; when they attempted to return they were ſtopped. No artifice of fraud, no violence of power, has been omitted, to deſtroy them in character as well as in fortune.

Worſe, far worſe, has been the fate of the poor creatures, the natives of India, whom the hypo⯑criſy of the Company has betrayed into complaint [82] of oppreſſion, and diſcovery of peculation. The firſt woman in Bengal, the Ranni of Rajeſhahi, the Ranni of Burdwan, the Ranni of Amboa, by their weak and thoughtleſs truſt in the Company's honour and protection, are utterly ruined: the firſt of theſe women, a perſon of princely rank, and once of correſpondent fortune, who paid above two hundred thouſand a year quit-rent to the ſtate, is, according to very credible information, ſo com⯑pletely beggared as to ſtand in need of the relief of alms. Mahomed Reza Khân, the ſecond Muſſulman in Bengal, for having been diſtin⯑guiſhed by the ill-omened honour of the counte⯑nance and protection of the Court of Directors, was, without the pretence of any enquiry whatſo⯑ever into his conduct, ſtripped of all his employ⯑ments, and reduced to the loweſt condition. His ancient rival for power, the Rajah Nundcomar, was, by an inſult on every thing which India holds reſpectable and ſacred, hanged in the face of all his nation, by the judges you ſent to protect that people; hanged for a pretended crime, upon an ex poſt facto Britiſh act of parliament, in the midſt of his evidence againſt Mr. Haſtings. The ac⯑cuſer they ſaw hanged. The culprit, without acquittal or enquiry, triumphs on the ground of that murder: a murder not of Nundcomar only, but of all living teſtimony, and even of evidence yet unborn. From that time not a complaint has been heard from the natives againſt their gover⯑nors. All the grievances of India have found a complete remedy.

Men will not look to acts of parliament, to re⯑gulations, to declarations, to votes, and reſolu⯑tions. No, they are not ſuch fools. They will aſk, what is the road to power, credit, wealth, and honours? They will aſk, what conduct ends in [83] neglect, diſgrace, poverty, exile, priſon, and gibbet? Theſe will teach them the courſe which they are to follow. It is your diſtribution of theſe that will give the character and tone to your go⯑vernment. All the reſt is miſerable grimace.

When I accuſe the Court of Directors of this habitual treachery, in the uſe of reward and pu⯑niſhment, I do not mean to include all the indi⯑viduals in that Court. There have been, Sir, very frequently, men of the greateſt integrity and virtue amongſt them; and the contrariety in the declarations and conduct of that Court has ariſen, I take it, from this:—That the honeſt Directors have, by the force of matter of fact on the records, carried the reprobation of the evil meaſures of the ſervants in India. This could not be prevented, whilſt theſe records ſtared them in the face; nor were the delinquents, either here or there, very ſolicitous about their reputation, as long as they were able to ſecure their power. The agreement of their partizans to cenſure them, blunted for a while the edge of a ſevere proceed⯑ing. It obtained for them a character of impar⯑tiality, which enabled them to recommend, with ſome ſort of grace, what will always carry a plau⯑ſible appearance, thoſe treacherous expedients, called moderate meaſures. Whilſt theſe were un⯑der diſcuſſion, new matter of complaint came over, which ſeemed to antiquate the firſt. The ſame circle was here trod round once more; and thus through years they proceeded in a compromiſe of cenſure for puniſhment; until, by ſhame and de⯑ſpair, one after another, almoſt every man, who preferred his duty to the Company to the inte⯑reſts of their ſervants, has been driven from that Court.

This, Sir, has been their conduct; and it has been the reſult of the alteration which was inſenſibly [84] made in their conſtitution. The change was made inſenſibly; but it is now ſtrong and adult, and as public and declared, as it is fixed beyond all power of reformation. So that there is none who hears me, that is not as certain as I am, that the Company, in the ſenſe in which it was for⯑merly underſtood, has no exiſtence. The queſtion is not, what injury you may do to the proprietors of India ſtock; for there are no ſuch men to be injured. If the active ruling part of the Company who form the general court, who fill the offices, and direct the meaſures (the reſt tell for no⯑thing) were perſons who held their ſtock as a means of their ſubſiſtence, who in the part they took were only concerned in the govern⯑ment of India, for the riſe or fall of their dividend, it would be indeed a defective plan of policy. The intereſt of the people who are governed by them would not be their primary object; perhaps a very ſmall part of their conſi⯑deration at all. But then they might well be depended on, and perhaps more than perſons in other reſpects preferable, for preventing the pe⯑culations of their ſervants to their own prejudice. Such a body would not eaſily have left their trade as a ſpoil to the avarice of thoſe who received their wages. But now things are totally reverſed. The ſtock is of no value, whether it be the qua⯑lification of a director or proprietor; and it is impoſſible that it ſhould. A director's qualifica⯑tion may be worth about two thouſand five hun⯑dred pounds—and the intereſt, at eight per cent. is about one hundred and ſixty pounds a year. Of what value is that, whether it riſe to ten, or fall to ſix, or to nothing, to him whoſe ſon, before he is in Bengal two months, and before he de⯑ſcends the ſteps of the council chamber, ſells the grant of a ſingle contract for forty thouſand [85] pounds? Accordingly the ſtock is bought up in qualifications. The vote is not to protect the ſtock, but the ſtock is bought to acquire the vote; and the end of the vote is to cover and ſupport, againſt juſtice, ſome man of power who has made an obnoxious fortune in India; or to maintain in power thoſe who are actually employ⯑ing it in the acquiſition of ſuch a fortune; and to avail themſelves in return of his patronage, that he may ſhower the ſpoils of the Eaſt, ‘"barba⯑ric pearl and gold,"’ on them, their families, and de⯑pendents. So that all the relations of the Company are not only changed, but inverted. The ſervants in India are not appointed by the Directors, but the Directors are choſen by them. The trade is carried on with their capitals. To them the re⯑venues of the country are mortgaged. The ſeat of the ſupreme power is in Calcutta. The houſe in Leadenhall Street is nothing more than a change for their agents, factors, and deputies to meet in, to take care of their affairs, and ſupport their intereſts; and this ſo avowedly, that we ſee the known agents of the delinquent ſervants mar⯑ſhalling and diſciplining their forces, and the prime ſpokeſmen in all their aſſemblies.

Every thing has followed in this order, and ac⯑cording to the natural train of events. I will cloſe what I have to ſay on the incorrigible con⯑dition of the Company, by ſtating to you a few facts, that will leave no doubt of the obſtinacy of that corporation, and of their ſtrength too, in re⯑ſiſting the reformation of their ſervants. By theſe facts you will be enabled to diſcover the ſole grounds upon which they are tenacious of their charter. It is now more than two years that, upon account of the groſs abuſes and ruinous ſituation of the Compa⯑ny's affairs, (which occaſioned the cry of the whole world long before it was taken up here) that we [86] inſtituted two Committees to enquire into the miſ⯑managements by which the Company's affairs had been brought to the brink of ruin. Theſe enqui⯑ries had been purſued with unremitting diligence; and a great body of facts was collected and printed for general information. In the reſult of thoſe enquiries, although the Committees conſiſted of very different deſcriptions, they were unanimous. They joined in cenſuring the conduct of the In⯑dian adminiſtration, and enforcing the reſponſi⯑bility upon two men, whom this Houſe, in con⯑ſequence of theſe reports, declared it to be the duty of the Directors to remove from their ſta⯑tions, and recal to Great Britain, ‘"becauſe they had acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India, and enormous expences on the Eaſt India Company."’

Here was no attempt on the charter. Here was no queſtion of their privileges. To vindicate their own honour, to ſupport their own intereſts, to enforce obedience to their own orders; theſe were the ſole object of the monitory reſolution of this Houſe. But as ſoon as the general court could aſſemble, they aſſembled to demonſtrate who they really were. Regardleſs of the proceed⯑ings of this Houſe, they ordered the Directors not to carry into effect any reſolution they might come to for the removal of Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Hornby. The Directors, ſtill retaining ſome ſha⯑dow of reſpect to this Houſe, inſtituted an enquiry themſelves, which continued from June to Octo⯑ber; and after an attentive peruſal and full conſi⯑deration of papers, reſolved to take ſteps for re⯑moving the perſons who had been the objects of our reſolution; but not without a violent ſtruggle againſt evidence. Seven Directors went ſo far as to enter a proteſt againſt the vote of their court. [87] Upon this the general court takes the alarm; it re-aſſembles; it orders the Directors to reſcind their reſolution, that is, not to recal Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Hornby, and to deſpiſe the reſolution of the Houſe or Commons. Without ſo much as the pretence of looking into a ſingle paper, without the formality of inſtituting any committee of en⯑quiry, they ſuperſeded all the labours of their own Directors, and of this Houſe.

It will naturally occur to aſk, how it was poſſi⯑ble that they ſhould not attempt ſome ſort of examination into facts, as a colour for their reſiſt⯑ance to a public authority, proceeding ſo very de⯑liberately; and exerted, apparently at leaſt, in favour of their own? The anſwer, and the only anſwer which can be given, is, that they were afraid that their true relation ſhould be miſtaken. They were afraid that their patrons and maſters in India ſhould attribute their ſupport of them, to an opinion of their cauſe, and not to an attachment to their power. They were afraid it ſhould be ſuſpected, that they did not mean blindly to ſup⯑port them in the uſe they made of that power. They determined to ſhew that they at leaſt were ſet againſt reformation; that they were firmly reſolved to bring the territories, the trade, and the ſtock of the Company, to ruin, rather than be wanting in fidelity to their nominal ſervants and real maſters, in the ways they took to their pri⯑vate fortunes.

Even ſince the beginning of this ſeſſion, the ſame act of audacity was repeated, with the ſame circumſtances of contempt of all the decorum of enquiry, on their part, and of all the proceedings of this Houſe. They again made it a requeſt to their favourite, and your culprit, to keep his poſt; and thanked and applauded him, without calling for a paper which could afford light into the [88] merit or demerit of the tranſaction, and with⯑out giving themſelves a moment's time to con⯑ſider, or even to underſtand, the articles of the Maratta peace. The fact is, that for a long time there was a ſtruggle, a faint one indeed, between the Company and their ſervants. But it is a ſtruggle no longer. For ſome time the ſupe⯑riority has been decided. The intereſts abroad are become the ſettled preponderating weight both in the Court of Proprietors, and the Court of Directors. Even the attempt you have made to enquire into their practices and to reform abuſes, has raiſed and piqued them to a far more regular and ſteady ſupport. The Company has made a common cauſe, and identified themſelves, with the deſtroyers of India. They have taken on themſelves all that maſs of enormity; they are ſupporting what you have reprobated; thoſe you condemn they applaud; thoſe you order home to anſwer for their conduct, they requeſt to ſtay, and thereby encourage to proceed in their practices. Thus the ſervants of the Eaſt India Company triumph, and the repreſentatives of the people of Great Britain are defeated.

I therefore conclude, what you all conclude, that this body, being totally perverted from the purpoſes of its inſtitution, is utterly incorrigible; and becauſe they are incorrigible, both in conduct and conſtitution, power ought to be taken out of their hands; juſt on the ſame principles on which have been made all the juſt changes and revolu⯑tions of government that have taken place ſince the beginning of the world.

I will now ſay a few words to the general prin⯑ciple of the plan which is ſet up againſt that of my Right Honourable friend. It is to re-com⯑mit the government of India to the Court of Directors. Thoſe who would commit the refor⯑mation [89] of India to the deſtroyers of it, are the enemies to that reformation. They would make a diſtinction between Directors and Proprietors, which, in the preſent ſtate of things, does not, cannot exiſt. But a Right Honourable gentleman ſays, he would keep the preſent government of India in the Court of Directors; and would, to curb them, provide ſalutary regulations;—wonderful! That is, he would appoint the old offenders to correct the old offences; and he would render the vicious and the fooliſh wiſe and virtuous, by ſalutary regulations. He would appoint the wolf as guar⯑dian of the ſheep; but he has invented a curious muzzle, by which this protecting wolf ſhall not be able to open his jaws above an inch or two at the utmoſt. Thus his work is finiſhed. But I tell the Right Honourable gentleman, that controuled depravity is not innocence; and that it is not the labour of delinquency in chains, that will cor⯑rect abuſes. Will theſe gentlemen of the direc⯑tion animadvert on the partners of their own guilt? Never did a ſerious plan of amending of any old tyrannical eſtabliſhment propoſe the au⯑thors and abettors of the abuſes as the reformers of them. If the undone people of India ſee their old oppreſſors in confirmed power, even by the reformation, they will expect nothing but what they will certainly feel, a continuance, or rather an aggravation, of all their former ſufferings. They look to the ſeat of power, and to the per⯑ſons who fill it; and they deſpiſe thoſe gentle⯑men's regulations as much as the gentlemen do who talk of them.

But there is a cure for every thing. Take away, ſay they, the Court of Proprietors, and the Court of Directors will do their duty. Yes; as they have done it hitherto. That the evils in India have ſolely ariſen from the Court of Proprietors, [90] is groſsly falſe. In many of them, the Directors were heartily concurring; in moſt if them they were encouraging, and ſometimes commanding; in all they were conniving.

But who are to chooſe this well-regulated and reforming Court of Directors?—Why, the very proprietors who are excluded from all manage⯑ment, for the abuſe of their power. They will chooſe undoubtedly, out of themſelves, men like themſelves; and thoſe who are moſt forward in reſiſting your authority, thoſe who are moſt en⯑gaged in faction or intereſt with the delinquents abroad, will be the objects of their ſelection. But Gentlemen ſay, that when this choice is made, the proprietors are not to interfere in the meaſures of the Directors, whilſt thoſe Directors are buſy in the control of their common pa⯑trons and maſters in India. No, indeed, I believe they will not deſire to interfere. They will chooſe thoſe whom they know may be truſted, ſafely truſted, to act in ſtrict conformity to their common principles, manners, meaſures, intereſts, and con⯑nections. They will want neither monitor nor con⯑trol. It is not eaſy to chooſe men to act in con⯑formity to a public intereſt againſt their private: but a ſure dependance may be had on thoſe who are choſen to forward their private intereſt, at the expence of the public. But if the Directors ſhould ſlip, and deviate into rectitude, the puniſhment is in the hands of the general court, and it will ſurely be remembered to them at their next election.

If the government of India wants no reforma⯑tion; but gentlemen are amuſing themſelves with a theory, conceiving a more democratic or ariſ⯑tocratic mode of government for theſe depen⯑ances, or if they are in a diſpute only about pa⯑tronage; the diſpute is with me of ſo little con⯑cern, that I ſhould not take the pains to utter an [91] affirmative or negative to any propoſition in it. If it be only for a theoretical amuſement that they are to propoſe a bill; the thing is at beſt frivolous and unneceſſary. But if the Company's government is not only full of abuſe, but is one of the moſt corrupt and deſtructive tyrannies, that probably ever exiſted in the world (as I am ſure it is) what a cruel mockery would it be in me, and in thoſe who think like me, to propoſe this kind of remedy for this kind of evil!

I now come to the third objection, That this bill will increaſe the influence of the Crown. An Honourable gentleman has demanded of me, whether I was in earneſt when I propoſed to this Houſe a plan for the reduction of that influence. Indeed, Sir, I was much, very much, in earneſt. My heart was deeply concerned in it; and I hope the public has not loſt the effect of it. How far my judgment was right, for what concerned per⯑ſonal favour and conſequence to myſelf, I ſhall not preſume to determine; nor is its effect upon me of any moment. But as to this bill, whether it encreaſes the influence of the Crown, or not, is a queſtion I ſhould be aſhamed to aſk. If I am not able to correct a ſyſtem of oppreſſion and tyranny, that goes to the utter ruin of thirty mil⯑lions of my fellow-creatures and fellow-ſubjects, but by ſome increaſe to the influence of the Crown, I am ready here to declare, that I, who have been active to reduce it, ſhall be at leaſt as active and ſtrenuous to reſtore it again. I am no lover of names; I contend for the ſubſtance of good and protecting government, let it come from what quarter it will.

But I am not obliged to have recourſe to this expedient. Much, very much the contrary. I am ſure that the influence of the Crown will by no means aid a reformation of this kind; which [92] can neither be originated nor ſupported, but by the uncorrupt public virtue of the repreſentatives of the people of England. Let it once get into the ordinary courſe or adminiſtration, and to me all hopes of reformation are gone. I am far from knowing or believing, that this bill will encreaſe the influence of the Crown. We all know, that the Crown has ever had ſome influence in the Court of Directors; and that it has been extremely in⯑creaſed by the acts of 1773 and 1780. The gen⯑tlemen who, as part of their reformation, propoſe ‘"a more active controul on the part of the Crown,"’ which is to put the Directors under a Secretary of State, ſpecially named for that pur⯑poſe, muſt know, that their project will increaſe it further. But that old influence has had, and the new will have, incurable inconveniences, which cannot happen under the parliamentary eſtabliſh⯑ment propoſed in this bill. ^*An Honourable gentleman not now in his place, but who is well acquainted with the India Company, and by no means a friend to this bill, has told you that a miniſterial influence has always been predominant in that body; and that to make the Directors pliant to their purpoſes, Miniſters generally cauſed perſons meanly qualified to be choſen Directors. According to his idea, to ſecure ſubſerviency, they ſubmitted the Company's affairs to the di⯑rection of incapacity. This was to ruin the Com⯑pany, in order to govern it. This was certainly influence in the very worſt form in which it could appear. At beſt it was clandeſtine and irreſpon⯑ſible. Whether this was done ſo much upon ſyſ⯑tem as that gentleman ſuppoſes, I greatly doubt. But ſuch in effect the operation of Government on that court unqueſtionably was; and ſuch under a ſimilar conſtitution, it will be for ever. [93] Miniſters muſt be wholly removed from the management of the affairs of India, or they will have an influence in its patronage. The thing is inevitable. Their ſcheme of a new Secretary of State, ‘"with a more vigorous control,"’ is not much better than a repetition of the meaſure which we know by experience will not do. Since the year 1773 and the year 1780, the Company has been under the control of the Secretary of State's office, and we had then three Secretaries of State. If more than this is done, then they annihilate the direction which they pretend to ſupport; and they augment the influence of the Crown, of whoſe growth they affect ſo great an horror. But in truth this ſcheme of reconciling a direction really and truly deliberative, with an office really and ſubſtantially controlling, is a ſort of machinery that can be kept in order but a very ſhort time. Either the Directors will dwindle into clerks, or the Secretary of State, as hitherto has been the courſe, will leave every thing to them, often through deſign, often through neglect. If both ſhould affect activity, colliſion, procraſtina⯑tion, delay, and in the end, utter confuſion muſt enſue.

But, Sir, there is one kind of influence far greater than that of the nomination to office. This gentlemen in oppoſition have totally overlooked, although it now exiſts in its full vigour; and it will do ſo, upon their ſcheme, in at leaſt as much force as it does now. That influence this bill cuts up by the roots; I mean the influence of protection. I ſhall explain myſelf:—The office given to a young man going to India is of trifling conſequence. But he that goes out an inſigni⯑ficant boy, in a few years returns a great Nabob. Mr. Haſtings ſays he has two hundred and fifty of that kind of raw materials, who expect to be [94] ſpeedily manufactured into the merchantable qua⯑lity I mention. One of theſe gentlemen, ſup⯑poſe, returns hither, loaded with odium and with riches. When he comes to England he comes as to a priſon or as to a ſanctuary; and either are ready for him, according to his demeanor. What is the influence in the grant of any place in India, to that which is acquired by the protection or compromiſe with ſuch guilt, and with the command of ſuch riches, under the domi⯑nion of the hopes and fears which power is able to hold out to every man in that condition? That man's whole fortune, half a million per⯑haps, becomes an inſtrument of influence, without a ſhilling of charge to the Civil Liſt; and the influx of fortunes which ſtand in need of this protection is continual. It works both ways; it influences the delinquent, and it may cor⯑rupt the miniſter. Compare the influence ac⯑quired by appointing for inſtance even a go⯑vernor general, and that obtained by protecting him. I ſhall puſh this no further. But I wiſh gentlemen to roll it a little in their own minds.

The bill before you cuts off this ſource of influence. Its deſign and main ſcope is to re⯑gulate the adminiſtration of India upon the prin⯑ciples of a Court of Judicature; and to exclude, as far as human prudence can exclude, all poſ⯑ſibility of a corrupt partiality, in appointing to office or ſupporting in office, or covering from enquiry and puniſhment, any perſon who has abuſed or ſhall abuſe his authority. At the board, as appointed and regulated by this bill, reward and puniſhment cannot be ſhifted and reverſed by a whiſper. That commiſſion becomes fatal to cabal, to intrigue, and to ſecret repreſenta⯑tion, thoſe inſtruments of the ruin of India. [95] He that cuts off the means of premature fortune, and the power of protecting it when acquired, ſtrikes a deadly blow at the great fund, the Bank, the capital ſtock of Indian influence, which cannot be veſted any where, or in any hands, without moſt dangerous conſequences to the public.

The third and contradictory objection, is, That this bill does not increaſe the influence of the Crown. On the contrary, That the juſt power of the Crown will be leſſened, and transferred to the uſe of a party, by giving the patronage of India to a commiſſion nominated by par⯑liament, and independent of the Crown. The contradiction is glaring, and it has been too well expoſed to make it neceſſary for me to inſiſt upon it. But paſſing the contradiction, and taking it without any relation, of all objections that is the moſt extraordinary. Do not gentlemen know, that the Crown has not at preſent the grant of a ſingle office under the Company, civil or military, at home or abroad? So far as the Crown is concerned, it is certainly rather a gainer; for the vacant offices in the new com⯑miſſion are to be filled up by the King.

It is argued as a part of the bill, derogatory to the prerogatives of the Crown, that the commiſſioners named in the bill are to continue for a ſhort term of years (too ſhort in my opinion) and becauſe, during that time, they are not at the mercy of every predominant faction of the court. Does not this objection lie againſt the preſent Directors; none of whom are named by the Crown, and a proportion of whom hold for this very term of four years? Did it not lie againſt the governor general and council named in the act of 1773—who were inveſted by name, as the preſent commiſſioners are to be ap⯑pointed [96] in the body of the act of parliament, who were to hold their places for a term of years, and were not removable at the diſcretion of the Crown? Did it not lie againſt the re⯑appointment, in the year 1780, upon the very ſame terms? Yet at none of theſe times, what⯑ever other objections the ſcheme might be liable to, was it ſuppoſed to be a derogation to the juſt prerogative of the Crown, that a commiſſion created by act of parliament ſhould have its members named by the authority which called it into exiſtence? This is not the diſpoſal by parliament of any office derived from the authority of the Crown, or now diſpoſable by that authority. It is ſo far from being any thing new, violent, or alarming, that I do not recollect, in any par⯑liamentary commiſſion, down to the commiſſioners of the land tax, that it has ever been otherwiſe.

The objection of the tenure for four years is an objection to all places that are not held during pleaſure; but in that objection I pronounce the gentlemen, from my knowledge of their com⯑plexion and of their principles, to be perfectly in earneſt. The party (ſay theſe gentlemen) of the miniſter who propoſes this ſcheme will be ren⯑dered powerful by it; for he will name his party friends to the commiſſion. This objection againſt party is a party objection; and in this too theſe gentlemen are perfectly ſerious. They ſee that if, by any intrigue, they ſhould ſucceed to office, they will loſe the clandeſtine patronage, the true inſtru⯑ment of clandeſtine influence, enjoyed in the name of ſubſervient Directors, and of wealthy trembling Indian delinquents. But as often as they are beaten off this ground, they return to it again. The miniſter will name his friends, and perſons of his own party.—Who ſhould he name? Should he name his adver⯑ſaries? Should he name thoſe whom he cannot truſt? [97] Should he name thoſe to execute his plans, who are the declared enemies to the principles of his reform? His character is here at ſtake. If he propoſes for his own ends (but he never will pro⯑poſe) ſuch names as, from their want of rank, fortune, character, ability, or knowledge, are likely to betray or to fall ſhort of their truſt, he is in an independent Houſe of Commons; in an Houſe of Commons which has, by its own virtue, deſtroyed the inſtruments of parliamentary ſubſer⯑vience. This Houſe of Commons would not en⯑dure the ſound of ſuch names. He would periſh by the means which he is ſuppoſed to purſue for the ſecurity of his power. The firſt pledge he muſt give of his ſincerity in this great reform will be in the confidence which ought to be repoſed in thoſe names.

For my part, Sir, in this buſineſs I put all indi⯑rect conſiderations wholly out of my mind. My ſole queſtion, on each clauſe of the bill, amounts to this:—Is the meaſure propoſed required by the ne⯑ceſſities of India? I cannot conſent totally to loſe ſight of the real wants of the people who are the objects of it, and to hunt after every matter of party ſquabble that may be ſtarted on the ſeveral proviſions. On the queſtion of the duration of the commiſſion I am clear and decided. Can I, can any one who has taken the ſmalleſt trouble to be informed concerning the affairs of India, amuſe himſelf with ſo ſtrange an imagination, as that the habitual deſpotiſm and oppreſſion, that the mono⯑polies, the peculations, the univerſal deſtruction of all the legal authority of this kingdom, which have been for twenty years maturing to their preſent enormity, combined with the diſtance of the ſcene, the boldneſs and artifice of delinquents, [98] their combination, their exceſſive wealth, and the faction they have made in England, can be fully corrected in a ſhorter term than four years? None has hazarded ſuch an aſſertion—None, who has a regard for his reputation, will hazard it.

Sir, the gentlemen, whoever they are, who ſhall be appointed to this commiſſion, have an under⯑taking of magnitude on their hands, and their ſta⯑bility muſt not only be, but it muſt be thought, real;—and who is it will believe, that any thing ſhort of an eſtabliſhment made, ſupported, and fixed in its duration, with all the authority of par⯑liament, can be thought ſecure of a reaſonable ſtability? The plan of my Honourable friend is the reverſe of that of reforming by the authors of the abuſe. The beſt we could expect from them is, that they ſhould not continue their ancient pernicious activity. To thoſe we could think of nothing but applying control; as we are ſure, that even a regard to their reputation (if any ſuch thing exiſts in them) would oblige them to cover, to conceal, to ſuppreſs, and conſequently to prevent, all cure of the grievances of India. For what can be diſcovered, which is not to their diſgrace? Every attempt to correct an abuſe would be a ſa⯑tire on their former adminiſtration. Every man they ſhould pretend to call to an account, would be found their inſtrument or their accomplice. They can never ſee a beneficial regulation, but with a view to defeat it. The ſhorter the tenure of ſuch perſons, the better would be the chance of ſome amendment.

But the ſyſtem of the bill is different. It calls in perſons no wiſe concerned with any act cen⯑ſured by parliament; perſons generated with, and for the reform of which, they are themſelves the [99] moſt eſſential part. To theſe the chief regula⯑tions in the bill are helps, not fetters; they are authorities to ſupport, not regulations to reſtrain them. From theſe we look for much more than innocence. From theſe we expect zeal, firmneſs, and unremitted activity. Their duty, their cha⯑racter, binds them to proceedings of vigour; and they ought to have a tenure in their office which precludes all fear, whilſt they are acting up to the purpoſes of their truſt; a tenure without which, none will undertake plans that require a ſe⯑ries and ſyſtem of acts. When they know that they cannot be whiſpered out of their duty, that their public conduct cannot be cenſured without a public diſcuſſion; that the ſchemes which they have begun will not be committed to thoſe who will have an intereſt and credit in defeat⯑ing and diſgracing them; then we may enter⯑tain hopes. The tenure is for four years, or during their good behaviour. That good be⯑haviour is as long as they are true to the princi⯑ples of the bill; and the judgment is in either Houſe of Parliament. This is the tenure of your judges; and the valuable principle of the bill is, to make a judicial adminiſtration for India. It is to give confidence in the execution of a duty, which requires as much perſeverance and forti⯑tude as can fall to the lot of any that is born of woman.

As to the gain by party, from the Right Ho⯑nourable gentleman's bill, let it be ſhewn, that this ſuppoſed party advantage is pernicious to its object, and the objection is of weight; but until this is done, and this has not been at⯑tempted, I ſhall conſider the ſole objection, from its tendency to promote the intereſt of a party, as altogether contemptible. The kingdom is [100] divided into parties, and it ever has been ſo di⯑vided, and it ever will be ſo divided; and if no ſyſtem for relieving the ſubjects of this kingdom from oppreſſion, and ſnatching its affairs from ruin, can be adopted, until it is demonſtrated that no party can derive an advantage from it, no good can ever be done in this country. If party is to derive an advantage from the reform of India, (which is more than I know, or believe) it ought to be that party which alone, in this king⯑dom, has its reputation, nay its very being, pledged to the protection and preſervation of that part of the empire. Great fear is expreſ⯑ſed, that the commiſſioners named in this bill will ſhew ſome regard to a miniſter out of place. To men made like the objectors, this muſt ap⯑pear criminal. Let it however be remembered by others, that if the commiſſioners ſhould be his friends, they cannot be his ſlaves. But dependants are not in a condition to adhere to friends, nor to principles, nor to any uniform line of conduct. They may begin cenſors, and be obliged to end accomplices. They may be even put under the direction of thoſe whom they were appointed to puniſh.

The fourth and laſt objection is, That the bill will hurt public credit. I do not know whether this requires an anſwer. But if it does, look to your foundations. The ſinking fund is the pillar of credit in this country; and let it not be forgot, that the diſtreſſes, owing to the miſmanagement of the Eaſt India Company, have already taken a million from that fund by the non-payment of duties. The bills drawn upon the Company, which are about four millions, cannot be accepted without the conſent of the treaſury. The trea⯑ſury, acting under a parliamentary truſt and [101] authority, pledges the public for theſe millions. If they pledge the public, the public muſt have a ſecurity in its hands for the management of this intereſt, or the national credit is gone. For otherwiſe it is not only the Eaſt India Company, which is a great intereſt, that is undone, but, clinging to the ſecurity of all your funds, it drags down the reſt, and the whole fabric periſhes in one ruin. If this bill does not provide a direction of integrity and of ability competent to that truſt, the objection is fatal. If it does, public credit muſt depend on the ſupport of the bill.

It has been ſaid, if you violate this charter, what ſecurity has the charter of the Bank, in which public credit is ſo deeply concerned, and even the charter of London, in which the rights of ſo many ſub⯑jects are involved? I anſwer, In the like caſe they have no ſecurity at all—No—no ſecurity at all. If the Bank ſhould, by every ſpecies of miſma⯑nagement, fall into a ſtate ſimilar to that of the Eaſt India Company; if it ſhould be oppreſſed with demands it could not anſwer, engagements which it could not perform, and with bills for which it could not procure payment; no charter ſhould protect the miſmanagement from correc⯑tion, and ſuch public grievances from redreſs. If the city of London had the means and will of deſtroying an empire, and of cruelly oppreſſing and tyrannizing over millions of men as good as themſelves, the charter of the city of London ſhould prove no ſanction to ſuch tyranny and ſuch oppreſſion. Charters are kept, when their purpoſes are maintained: they are violated when the pri⯑vilege is ſupported againſt its end and its object.

Now, Sir, I have finiſhed all I propoſed to ſay, as my reaſons for giving my vote to this Bill. If [102] I am wrong, it is not for want of pains to know what is right. This pledge, at leaſt, of my rec⯑titude I have given to my country.

And now, having done my duty to the Bill, let me ſay a word to the author. I ſhould leave him to his own noble ſentiments, if the un⯑worthy and illiberal language with which he has been treated, beyond all example of parliamentary liberty, did not make a few words neceſſary; not ſo much in juſtice to him, as to my own feelings. I muſt ſay then, that it will be a diſtinction ho⯑nourable to the age, that the reſcue of the greateſt number of the human race that ever were ſo grievouſly oppreſſed, from the greateſt tyranny that was ever exerciſed, has fallen to the lot of abilities and diſpoſitions equal to the taſk; that it has fallen to one who has the enlarge⯑ment to comprehend, the ſpirit to undertake, and the eloquence to ſupport, ſo great a meaſure of hazardous benevolence. His ſpirit is not owing to his ignorance of the ſtate of men and things; he well knows what ſnares are ſpread about his path, from perſonal animoſity, from court intrigues, and poſſibly from po⯑pular deluſion. But he has put to hazard his eaſe, his ſecurity, his intereſt, his power, even his darling popularity, for the benefit of a people whom he has never ſeen. This is the road that all heroes have trod before him. He is traduced and abuſed for his ſuppoſed motives. He will remember, that obloquy is a neceſſary in⯑gredient in the compoſition of all true glory: he will remember, that it was not only in the Roman cuſtoms, but it is in the nature and conſtitution of things, that calumny and abuſe are eſſential parts of triumph. Theſe thoughts will ſupport [103] a mind, which only exiſts for honour, under the burthen of temporary reproach. He is doing in⯑deed a great good; ſuch as rarely falls to the lot, and almoſt as rarely coincides with the deſires, of any man. Let him uſe his time. Let him give the whole length of the reins to his benevolence. He is now on a great eminence, where the eyes of mankind are turned to him. He may live long, he may do much. But here is the ſummit. He never can exceed what he does this day.

He has faults; but they are faults that, though they may in a ſmall degree tarniſh the luſtre, and ſometimes impede the march of his abilities, have nothing in them to extinguiſh the fire of great virtues. In thoſe faults, there is no mixture of deceit, of hypocriſy, of pride, of ferocity, of complexional deſpotiſm, or want of feeling for the diſtreſſes of mankind. His are faults which might exiſt in a deſcendant of Henry the Fourth of France, as they did exiſt in that father of his country. Henry the Fourth wiſhed that he might live to ſee a fowl in the pot of every peaſant of his kingdom. That ſentiment of homely benevo⯑lence was worth all the ſplendid ſayings that are recorded of kings. But he wiſhed perhaps for more than could be obtained, and the goodneſs of the man exceeded the power of the King. But this gentleman, a ſubject, may this day ſay this at leaſt, with truth, that he ſecures the rice in his pot to every man in India. A poet of antiquity thought it one of the firſt diſtinctions to a prince whom he meant to celebrate, that through a long ſucceſſion of generations, he had been the pro⯑genitor of an able and virtuous citizen, who by force of the arts of peace, had corrected [104] governments of oppreſſion, and ſuppreſſed wars of rapine.

This was what was ſaid of the predeceſſor of the only perſon to whoſe eloquence it does not wrong that of the mover of this bill to be compared. But the Ganges and the Indus are the patrimony of the fame of my Honourable friend, and not of Cicero. I confeſs, I anticipate with joy the re⯑ward of thoſe, whoſe whole conſequence, power, and authority, exiſt only for the benefit of man⯑kind; and I carry my mind to all the people, and all the names and deſcriptions, that, relieved by this bill, will bleſs the labours of this Parlia⯑ment, and the confidence which the beſt Houſe of Commons has given to him who the beſt de⯑ſerves it. The little cavils of party will not be heard, where freedom and happineſs will be felt. There is not a tongue, a nation, or religion in India, which will not bleſs the pre⯑ſiding care and manly beneficence of this Houſe, and of him who propoſes to you this great work. Your names will never be ſeparated before the throne of the Divine Goodneſs, in whatever lan⯑guage, or with whatever rites, pardon is aſked for ſin, and reward for thoſe who imitate the Godhead in his univerſal bounty to his creatures. Theſe honours you deſerve, and they will ſurely be paid, when all the jargon, of influence, and party, and patronage, are ſwept into oblivion.

[105]I have ſpoken what I think, and what I feel, of the mover of this Bill. An Honourable friend of mine, ſpeaking of his merits, was charged with having made a ſtudied panegyric. I don't know what his was. Mine, I am ſure, is a ſtudied panegyric; the fruit of much meditation; the reſult of the obſervation of near twenty years. For my own part, I am happy that I have lived to ſee this day; I feel myſelf overpaid for the labours of eighteen years, when, at this late period, I am able to take my ſhare, by one hum⯑ble vote, in deſtroying a tyranny that exiſts to the diſgrace of this nation, and the deſtruction of ſo large a part of the human ſpecies.