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A DEFENCE OF THE PAMPHLET ASCRIBED TO JOHN REEVES, Eſq.

AND ENTITLED, ‘"Thoughts on the Engliſh Government."’

[Price Two Shillings and Sixpence.]

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A DEFENCE OF THE PAMPHLET ASCRIBED TO JOHN REEVES, ESQ.

AND ENTITLED, ‘"Thoughts on the Engliſh Government."’

BY THE REV. J. BRAND, A. M.

ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE LOYAL ASSOCIATIONS AGAINST REPUBLICANS AND LEVELLERS.

LONDON: PRINTED FOR T. N. LONGMAN, PATERNOSTER-ROW, AND J. OWEN, PICCADILLY; AND SOLD BY ALL THE BOOKSELLERS AT THE ROYAL EXCHANGE.

1796.

INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSED TO THE ASSOCIATIONS AGAINST REPUBLICANS AND LEVELLERS.

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MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN.

MR. REEVES, the Inſtitutor of the Aſſociations, has been charged, as appears by the printed Debates in the Newſpapers, by ſome Speakers in the two Houſes, with having written a ſuppoſed libel on the Conſtitution: a ſimilar crimination has alſo been brought forward againſt Mr. Arthur Young, who firſt ſtated and impreſſed upon the Nation the neceſſity of property being armed to defend itſelf, and thus laid the foundation of the inſtitution of the Yeomanry Cavalry, to be employed againſt external violence, and internal inſurrection. The ſame Gentleman has taken the leading part in both theſe accuſations.

EACH of the above Inſtitutions is hereby expoſed to one common danger. The great majority of mankind judge [ii]of meaſures by their authors. If their general principles be believed to be inimical to the freedom of our mixed Government, the ſame bad quality will be ſuppoſed to lurk in every one of their meaſures; eſpecially ſuch as ſhall not have been frequently ſeen carried into execution; and as this claſs of people judges by names, not things, it is evident to what hazards the ſucceſs of any meaſure requiring the co-operation of multitudes may be expoſed. if an erroneous charge be ſuffered to be attached to the name of its author.

HENCE it appears, that the charge againſt theſe Gentlemen is admirably calculated to excite a jealouſy againſt the plans they have propoſed for the of the public. I now advert particularly to its probable effect on the Aſſociations founded by Mr. Reeves; for it is to the attack upon him that the whole of the following Tract will apply. It was expedient, however, to mention that on Mr. Young, as it is a part of the ſame meaſure, and which, for that reaſon, will be introduced a ſecond time to your conſideration, at its proper place.

THESE jealouſies are eaſily improved into clamours; and theſe again heightened into the alarming appearance of popular diſcontent. This will weaken your Aſſociations; it will draw off a great number of the Aſſociators of the middle claſſes, but terrify many more—the muſcles that make the nerves of the arm effective. For if Diſcontent be unable ſo totally to paralize your Inſtitution, Fear is at hand to aſſiſt it. We have among us thoſe who are not ignorant of the receipt to inflame diſcontent to its higheſt pitch. They want not the hardineſs, in the face of day, to conduct it on preciſely to that very [iii]point, which immediately precedes the extreme of violence and outrage. If new Meetings of the Aſſociations become neceſſary, numbers will be thus kept away. Thoſe who ſhall venture to come to the ſupport of the effective Conſtitution, will be terrified to ſee three quarters of their force annihilated: they will hear the commands of their inſolent and new maſters, and be glad to compound for ſafety by non-efficiency.

LOOK back to the ſtate of the kingdom, when your Aſſociations firſt were formed. What man, qualified to think on the intereſt of the State, except thoſe intereſted in the ſubverſion of it, who did not in his face carry all the marks of conſternation? But when men who wiſhed well to their country, of all deſcriptions of parties, became united; in their union, in the bonorum omnium conſenſus, they ſaw their ſuperiority: the faction ſeemed to fall before you.

IT is much to be wiſhed on your parts, that the ſame popular favour, the ſame opinion of the Conſtitutional principles on which your Aſſociations were formed, and of the objects they have purſued, might ſtill ſecond you, if they ſhould be again called forth, as the events of every day may add new importance to them. Their continuation and their undiminiſhed vigour may be neceſſary for the preſervation of legal Government. But if the principles of the man who formed the bond of union by which you are cemented, be injuriouſly reputed to be adverſe to the principles of the exiſting limited Monarchy, that union will become the object of popular jealouſy, as I have ſhown before; it will be weakened, and in danger of being rendered nugatory.

[iv]If, therefore, good reaſon ſupport him, you will equitably hear that reaſon. Truth knows no predilection. When you fit in judgment, you muſt diſcard all preconceived ſentiments of favour. I ſhould not indeed preſs you to forget it any longer than until your ultimate ſentence be given. Were I to fit in judgment on ſuch an occaſion, I ſhould bend all my faculties to fulfil the ſevere and neceſſary functions of a Judge, the rational organ of the Law, that knows no affections. But if the innocence of the defendant ſhould extort an acquittal from me, I ſhould then think my awful function at an end; I ſhould riſe from my tribunal to congratulate the brother, or the benefactor, who had ſtood as a culprit before me. When I had finiſhed my duty as a Judge, thoſe of my prior relation would claim the next place. I ſhall only ſay further, that in the defence of the paſſage quoted by Mr. Sheridan from the pamphlet, I impoſe this law upon myſelf: The principles it contains ſhall be proved to be the firſt principles of Engliſh Law, and on the beſt eſteemed authorities, on primâ facie evidence. Where I apprehend a doubt may be attached to the utility of ſuch principles, even though laid down in the law books, they ſhall be ſupported by the authority of political writers, proved by abſtract reaſoning, and the proceſs of a regular induction from hiſtorical examples. The matter purely hiſtorical ſhall alſo be proved from the beſt Engliſh hiſtories, or hiſtorical diſquiſitions on the ſubject, and on primâ facie evidence likewiſe, as in proofs of the firſt deſcription. If theſe arguments ſhall impreſs you with conviction, what your well-weighed judgment ſhall approve you will ſupport. In the hour of exertion or difficulty, much of your effective ſtrength will depend upon it.

[v]BUT, to prevent miſconſtruction, ſomething muſt be added by way of explanation here, before I proceed to another very important conſideration, which muſt find a place in my Addreſs to you. It is not meant that the principle of civil Aſſociations, and thoſe to be conſidered in the extract from the Pamphlet, are ſo connected as neceſſarily to ſtand and fall together. The effect of the latter on the former is purely accidental, as being ſuppoſed to be brought forward by the ſame man; yet in the preſent circumſtances of the times, it muſt be nevertheleſs real, although the principles of the Aſſociations are defenſible on their own proper grounds: and as an attack is recommenced againſt them, I ſtate one of thoſe grounds, among others, which at the moment ſuggeſts itſelf to me. When a body of inſurgents are actually aſſembled, and have juſt begun by open force to attack Government, they are to be repulſed by aſſemblies of loyal ſubjects, and by the like force. If thoſe of the former deſcription unite into bodies, actually or apparently for the ends ſtated above, thoſe of the latter ſhould, by a parity of reaſon, unite or aſſociate to oppoſe and reſiſt them; and by every other means prevent their gathering in ſuch force, or putting themſelves in ſuch ſituations, as might facilitate the attack. No good Government can reject what is a fundamental principle of perfect Government, as this may be ſhown to be; for ſuppoſing a form of Government of plenary and abſolute perfection ſhould begin to exiſt, it muſt include this principle, or it would want one good property which it poſſibly might poſſeſs, the greateſt chance of permanency; which is contrary to the ſuppoſed nature of ſuch a form. It may be ſaid, that a Government ſo conſtituted would reſemble a perfect [vi]machine, and be able to preſerve itſelf in motion without the aſſiſtance of any additional help: but a Government of that deſcription muſt be numbered among the bad forms; for it debaſes the human character, by baniſhing from every breaſt all care about that greateſt intereſt, a Public. Every intereſt that could be advanced or obſtructed would be private. Hence every end purſued would be little; for the range of the mind of a Nation is nearly circumſcribed by the limits of the object it has to purſue; and its energies, employed only on little things, never obtain their natural growth. The empire of China is an imperfect example of ſuch a State. This argument, or others far better, might be urged in vain in favour of the principles of the Aſſociation, if it could be alledged againſt them that they ſpring from a polluted ſource.

I HAVE ſhown how far the utility of theſe Aſſociations is endangered by the accuſations which have been thus urged againſt them. I ſhall now conſider the ends to which theſe accuſations are intended apparently to be ſubſervient.

AT the inſtant they were brought forward, the ferment in the ſpirits of the people was at a height which has been yet unequalled. The populace had been wrought up to attack the King's perſon; laws were introduced into the Houſe to cut up the very root of thoſe machinations by which this atrocious ſpirit had been kindled, the execution of which laws may ultimately rely much on the ſupport of the Aſſociations. The zeal, the alacrity, and the ſtrength of the Cavalry may likewiſe tend much to keep back the firſt appearance of violence: and this Inſtitution might be extended into more counties, [vii]as the approaching neceſſity increaſed. The accuſation of Mr. Reeves and Mr. Young have a direct tendency to prevent ſuch increaſe; to weaken the attachment of the one to the cauſe in which they are engaged; to paraliſe the exertions of the other; and to leave the country open to the treaſons which are meditating.

WHEN I conſider the paſſage which is the object of the legal inquiry to be made, in conjunction with what precedes and follows itThis is requiſite in every fair ſtatement of a Writer's meaning or principles: without it, he may be repreſented as ſpeaking what is different or contradictory to them., the original complaint ſeems to have been intended as a falſe attack only. Nothing was probably expected from it where it was brought forward. But, though the Party imagined it would be inefficacious there, they had conſiderable expectation of the effect the bare name of ſuch a thing might have in another quarter. By a Motion againſt the principles ſaid to have been advanced by Mr. Reeves, and one or two intemperate declamations made in ſupport of it, they had hoped to render the Aſſociations intirely inefficient, at a time when certain ſpeeches upon another topic tended to create ſo urgent a neceſſity for their moſt ſpirited exertions in favour of legal Government.

CONTRARY to expectation, the friends of Government gave way; and ſome admitted the book attributed to Mr. Reeves to be a libel on the Conſtitution. If we ſearch for the cauſe of this ſingular event, it will not be very difficult to diſcover it. It is but at this inſtant, as it were, that men begin to examine the Conſtitution [viii]and its principles, in the only true ſource of information, the letter of the Law. We have all been educated to look for it in brilliant romances of Legiſlation, entirely different therefrom. When practical neceſſity calls upon us to conſider this political Carteſianiſm, one error of it drops to-day, another to-morrow; but the multitude that remain ſtill ſeem almoſt as well rooted as ever, when they are diſcuſſed only as points of ſpeculation. The Writer of the Tract preſented three or four points relating to the legal Conſtitution, as the exiſting laws ſtate them, and that without demonſtration. Theſe, being ſomewhat different from what is to be found in the fine writings I have juſt mentioned, which are judged by many as infallible ſtandards of truth, were haſtily condemned. It might become the dignity of the Commons in future to make it a rule of the Houſe, that in caſe of any writing being there complained of, a Committee ſhould be appointed to ſelect ſuch paſſages from it as they thought required examination; and theſe ſhould be ſent to the printer, or author if avowed, and the book ſhould lie ten days upon the table, before any further proceedings ſhould be had upon it.

WHEN it was now perceived that ſome impreſſion was made, a perſon of more eſtabliſhed weight in the Party ſtepped forward, and converted this falſe attack into a real one, the extent and object of which I ſhall deſcribe. Mr. R [...]eves had, in 1792, ſucceeded in inſtituting two thouſand Aſſociations againſt Republicans and Levellers. Againſt theſe likewiſe, and our foreign enemies, Mr. Young bad ſucceeded in cauſing a fine body of [...]orſe to be raiſed, and ſtationed over the country, and theſe were for [...] ( [...] me [...] i [...]tiu [...] ver [...] [...]) of what Cromwell [ix]thought the beſt materials. This was to effect great things; and it is as much the intereſt of a combination to ruin the men who have done ſuch things, as men who bear great titles; and our factions at preſent know their own intereſt: I find too in this tranſaction an exact reſemblance of the conduct of the leaders of the Long Parliament; not indeed in that part of their conduct which deſerves our praiſes, but in their extreme violence.—Thoſe who they ſuppoſed could effect much for the King, were impeached, (ſome of them had titles indeed,) and their judges were forced by mobs to condemn them.

THIS new aſſailant is reported in the public prints to have ſtated this Pamphlet to be a part of a ſeries of attempts to make the Crown everything and the People nothing. He joins in this cenſure the writings of Soame Jenyns, Dr. Whitaker, and Mr. Young; and by a ſweeping clauſe, he includes an indefinite number of thoſe Gentlemen, who, in concert with Mr. Reeves's Committee, have endeavoured to preſerve the peace and legal Conſtitution of the kingdom. From the encouragement which the ſpirit of reſiſtance to laws, now eſtabliſhed, has lately received from the violent declarations of the Minority, the union of the beſt abilities of ſuch men is likely to become more neceſſary than ever; and at this very juncture, to deter them from employing their beſt faculties in the cauſe of their country, the terror of a Parliamentary proſecution is hung over their heads. Nor are the Aſſociations leſs directly denounced, "whoſe ſyſtem," the ſame Gentleman is declared in theſe Papers to have aſſerted to be, ‘to draw the Lords and Commons into contempt, and to place the King to govern [x]alone:’ adding alſo, that if the powers of the Committee ‘had been enlarged*, in purſuance of the precedent on a like occaſion in 1680, it could have [xi]proved that theſe Aſſociations were part of the ſyſtem of a deep-laid conſpiracy to eſtabliſh military deſpotiſm.’ This charge, it is to be obſerved, includes all the Aſſociations, which are ſtated to amount to two thouſand.

THESE accuſations bear a very cloſe reſemblance (accidental or deſigned) to the conduct of the Long Parliament, ‘who were reſolved to render the moſt conſiderable bodies of the Nation obnoxious to them*.’ The exerciſe of powers ‘warranted by all former precedents, yet not authorized by ſtatute, they declared to be illegal, and the perſons who had aſſumed them delinquents.’ The crime indeed of delinquency they did not exactly define; it is to be underſtood, however, as ſomething inferior to that of changing our mixed Government into a ſimple Monarchy, and eſtabliſhing a military deſpotiſm. To the latter part of the charge I have to obſerve, it ſeems meant to include the ſubſcribers to [xii]the Yeomanry Cavalry, whoſe different meetings were virtually Aſſociations. But as theſe corps were raiſed in purſuance of an Act of Parliament, that has hitherto protected them from being included by name in theſe accuſations, though they appear not obſcurely marked out as part at leaſt of the Janizaries or Praetorians of the new Tyranny. I ſimply trace out the parallel between the ſpirit of the meaſure ſaid to be attempted by Oppoſition now, and thoſe votes of the Long Parliament; ſtrengthened by which, a few vile incendiaries were able to lead the Nation into a civil war, even after Government had been reformed and purified in all its branches. I hope it is ſuperfluous to attempt to awaken your vigilance by a detail of the years of miſery and deſolation in which it involved this kingdom; but to that vigilance I muſt recommend to reflect duly upon the enormity of the declarations which the Papers have lately put into the mouths of ſome great Political Characters. An obedience to temporary reſtraining Laws, the unfortunate fruit of the neceſſity of the times, and meant to terminate with that neceſſity, is held out to the populace, not as a moral duty, but an act of prudence only. To me theſe violent declarations, if really delivered, ſeem not to be accounted for on any other footing than that of ſome confidence the ſpeakers may entertain in the populace, by whoſe aſſiſtance they might be able to give them effect. They will not ſay anything was to be expected from ſuch declarations in the place where they were delivered; their object therefore was the conſequences they might produce beyond the walls of a certain Houſe, and thoſe conſequences you will guard againſt by all your endeavours.

[xiii]THE Pamphlet attributed to Mr. Reeves is ſaid to contain unconſtitutional matter, and this ſeems to have been admitted by an Authority which you have not frequently found reaſon to object to. When any one ſteps forward in defence of a work lying under ſuch cenſure, ſomejealouſy may be entertained of the ſoundneſs of his own principles. I ſhall therefore ſay, that I look upon all ſimple forms of Government, over bodies of people numerous enough to be properly called a Nation, to be bad; and of all compound ſyſtems, that reſulting from the combination of the three forms, as in Britain, to be beſt. But the effect of ſuch a Government on the happineſs of ſociety will be very different, as the proportion of power enjoyed by the three may differ; and I ſhould be a decided enemy to any change in the proportion which now exiſts here by law and in fact; as the force of each was ſo well determined, that this proportion has been preſerved without any great effort of any one of the Eſtates againſt the power of either of the other two above a century; a circumſtance of which no example is to be found in our own Government, and which ſhows the preſent proportion beſt adapted to the Country.

I HAVE ſuffered the neceſſity I felt myſelf under to do away any jealouſy which might rob what I have to ſay of its weight (be it leſs or more), to get the better of my reluctance to write one paragraph of egotiſm. I conclude my Addreſs to you with the final words of this Pamphlet. This ‘is a ſeaſon when the ſpirits of men, whether good or bad, are moſt in motion; and all YOUR prudence is wanted to preſerve us from folly and wickedneſs.—YOU, therefore, YOU at leaſt watch.’ [xiv]It is with that deference which is due to a ſet of mën who have already preſerved legal Government in the extremity of danger, and will, I truſt, preſerve it from future danger, that I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf.

My Lords and Gentlemen, &c.
Yours, &c. &c. &c. THE AUTHOR.

A DEFENCE, &c. &c. &.

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IN conſidering the Pamphlet which is the ſubject of theſe Obſervations, and which has been attributed to Mr. REEVES, I ſhall firſt ſtate the ſentiments of the Writer on ſeveral points relating to our legal Conſtitution. In the ſecond place, the paragraph read from it by Mr. Sturt will be conſidered on authorities of law and hiſtory. To this will be added, a vindication of the remaining parts of the Letter which have been cenſured.

IT is evident from what paſſed in the Debates upon this tract, "that a reſolution of the Houſe may be reſcinded" in the ſame Seſſion in which it is made. I bring forward here ſome reaſons which may be urged in favour of ſuch a reſciſſion of the Reſolutions on this work, a thing which I ſuppoſe to be perfectly in order; for a Reſolution being the act of one Houſe of Parliament only, it certainly is as legal for an individual to plead for its being reſcinded, as for the repeal of a law, which is the act of the whole Parliament. Beſide, the Houſe of Commons are the guardians and truſtees of every individual; though the firſt term, perhaps, [16]beſt implies their pre-eminence and duty. If a guardian direct a ſuit to be commenced in the name of any perſon for whom he is in truſt ſuch ward may go to him, and lay down his reaſon to induce him to withdraw it; and if there were good ground for the application, the loweſt individual who was guardian to another would have the privilege to comply with it; nor can ſuch an aſſembly as the Houſe of Commons want a privilege collectively that every one poſſeſſes individually in ſimilar caſes.

THE matter which may be urged againſt this Pamphlet I ſhall take from the ſpeeches attributed to the Members of both Houſes in the public prints; they are the beſt authorities people in general have to judge from, and may be received as faithful enough to the principles and leading opinions, though leſs accurate as to the words of the ſpeakers. I therefore do not from thoſe publications quote the name of any ſpeaker.

PART I.

MEN who are friends to our legal Conſtitution, and to the ſpirit of it, agree in all the main outlines, and differ more or leſs only on ſubordinate points; on which, if you find two individuals agreed, you will not find even a ſingle ſubſection of a party, all the members of which bold preciſely the ſame opinion. It is by theſe great outlines, therefore, that the conſtitutional principles of our Author are to be judged.

[17]IN the public prints, one of the conductors of the attack on this Pamphlet is made to declare, that it is part of a ſeries of attempts to make the Crown everything, and the People nothing. There cannot be a fuller contradiction to this charge than certain paſſages contained in the work itſelf. The powers and dignity veſted in the King are declared to be ſufficient for his high ſtation in the following words: We have ‘an hereditary King, who bears all the burthen of Government, who is endued with ALL the power NECESSARY* to carry it on, and who enjoys ALL the honour and pre-eminence NECESSARY TO GIVE SPLENDOR to ſo high a ſtation .’ The word "hereditary" will poſſibly give a little more diſguſt to ſome than will be openly avowed; but it is not neceſſary to guard a part where you know that your adverſary, in his preſent circumſtances, dares not to aim a blow; therefore we will conſider the only objection he will venture to bring forward. The Writer, he might urge, for anything that here appears to the contrary, may conſider the right of the King as divine and indefeaſible. But I think, when an author, ſomewhat elaborately, endeavours to limit his own terms, excluſively, to another and more ordinary ſenſe than they obviouſly bear, he is to be ſuppoſed to wiſh to have them underſtood in that ſenſe only. What that is let him lay down. Now among ‘the high pretenſions, founded on viſionary and refined theories,’ like caſtles in the air, ‘I thought (ſays this Writer), that the divine indefeaſible right of Kings, and other fancies of former times, were exploded;’ and he adds, "becauſe they have no warrant in law." He aſſerts, indeed, that a Monarchy is preferable to the tyranny of ‘five hundred Republicans, that govern by [18]their ordinances, that is, by their own will.’ But what ſpecies of Monarchy is it he here prefers to ſuch a Republic? That under which we are ‘the ſubjects of a King who governs by law*.’ And I obſerve further, that by the term law the context requires us to underſtand the law of the limited Monarchy of England. Some Members of the Minority, I believe, when they have been obliged to ſpeak explicitly on the conſequences of the French oligarchy of deſpots, have gone a little further.

So much for the foundation of the firſt part of the charge, that the Author of this Pamphlet wiſhes to make the King everything. Now let us ſee what ground there is for imputing to him a wiſh to make the People nothing. In the fulleſt and moſt direct contradiction to this, I ſhall ſhow that he admits the influence of the People in terms which prove his high ſenſe of its utility, and even of the neceſſity of its frequent interpoſition. Their actual influence, and its utility, are inferred from theſe words: ‘The people of ſenſe who look on have a great ſway, though not always ſeen, in balancing the weight of parties.’ in what terms is it that he mentions their conſequence, during every Meeting of Parliament? On the deliberations of that Aſſembly, "Engliſhmen, ſays he, ‘this is a ſeaſon when your ſuperintending influence is moſt needed; and we uſually ſee it is then moſt happily predominant.’ What is the good ſenſe of the country but the good ſenſe of the People? Does not this Writer tell us, that ‘nothing can be brought to a ſucceſsful concluſion, unleſs it is approved by the good ſenſe of the country?’ Does he not call the ſway it [19]enjoys "gentle and uſeful*?" Does he not inſiſt at large that it has been the preſervative againſt every party which has been engaged in bad councils? With this the pamphlet begins; and what was the laſt thought dwelling upon his mind at the concluſion? ‘Engliſhmen, the Parliament is now aſſembled.’ *** You, therefore—you! at leaſt, "watch" ! Such are the principles contained in a pamphlet which is part of a ſeries of meaſures, the ſecond object of which is to make the People nothing!

I GO on, with ſomewhat more brevity, to ſtate other principles of this Writer. On our excellent form of Government he ſays, that it is "real and ſubſtantial;" ‘we ſee and feel it; we can take its height and its depth; and we know its movements, becauſe they are regulated by eſtabliſhed and known laws;’and he adds, ‘that this is the only Conſtitution ever ſuppoſed or named by men of ſober minds and ſound underſtanding.’ Now this deſcription certainly includes all that is conſtituted; and he who adds any other things to this idea of the Conſtitution, cannot affirm they are conſtituted; and I would wiſh him for the future, for the ſake of logical diſtinctneſs, to call all ſuch things, the unconſtituted parts of the Conſtitution. But we ſhall have to revert again to the double ſenſe of the term Conſtitution, whence the wildeſt abuſes have ariſen. But of the Conſtitution eſtabliſhed by law he ſays, its ‘beſt title is profeſſed to be, its conformity to the principles of reaſon§.’

HIS ſentiments on the ſubject of Civil Liberty I ſhall introduce by obſerving, that our nobleſt principles never [20]can be diſhonoured but by actual fanaticiſm, or by the viler hypocriſy of thoſe men who, for ends which will not bear the light, put on the wildeſt appearance of that fanaticiſm to kindle the reality in others. Impreſſed with this truth, the Writer of the Pamphlet reprobates thoſe ‘who have rendered the beſt things odious by THEIR corrupt contact; who have made the friendly appellation of Citizen a badge of ſeparation and enmity; and the very name of Liberty ſuſpected to the ear of an Engliſhman *.’ It would require a logic which I am not maſter of to find an enemy to that "beſt" of "things," liberty, in the man who admits it ſo to be, and who cenſures with ſuch vigour thoſe who have brought its name into diſcredit.

THIS act of his political creed would be incomplete without the addition of the Writer's ſentiments on that great event which placed King William on the Throne of theſe kingdoms. This, he ſays, ‘was brought about by the energy, good ſenſe, and firmneſs, of ſome of the beſt and greateſt men in the Nation.’ Yet he ſtands charged in a ſuppoſed ſpeech with ‘having written a libel on the illuſtrious characters who brought it about.’ I know of no more liberal praiſe that imagination could deviſe to give to it than to ſay, it was in everything adequate to the occaſion, and in nothing ſuperfluous. This he does in the following words, in which he ſpeaks of the Reformation at the ſame time: ‘Theſe memorable tranſactions were conducted in a way that was truly Engliſh; the actors in them proceeded with their remedy as far as the diſeaſe reached, and no further;’ [21]and returning to the ſubject, in another place, he fully declares it to be ‘a precedent to be regarded with reverence and with gratitude toward thoſe who made it, but which we hope never to have occaſion to follow*.’ Is this ground for the Houſe to reſolve that he has written "a libel on the Revolution;" that ‘he ſpeaks of it with contempt;’ that he repreſents it as "a farce?" for ſuch are the charges againſt him by the paper ſpeech-makers. The laſt ſentence of the above extract, we ſuppoſe, may give reaſonable grounds of unoſtenſible, though deep, diſguſt to ſome of his enemies. After this ſpirited eulogy of the great movers of the great tranſaction of 1688, and of the tranſaction itſelf, what he ſays of the term Revolution is a queſtion for a court of grammarians, not of law: but that will find its place to be conſidered. He ſeems indeed to me to think, that our ſcience of politics may want a new nomenclature as well as that of chemiſtry: but in this he muſt expect to be ſturdily oppoſed, to the laſt, by the partizans of Dr. Prieſtley and the old phlogiſtic theory.

IT appears therefore, to ſum up the whole, to be this Writer's ſentiments, that the power of the King, with its legal limitations, is ſufficient; that the Good Senſe of the People has, and ought to have, great influence with the Legiſlature, which influence it is their duty to exert; that the events of 1688 were a remedy to the pre-exiſting evil, abſolutely neceſſary and fully adequate; to the authors of which we ought to look up with gratitude and reverence. And in theſe ſentiments extracted from the Pamphlet are fully compriſed the great outlines of the real principles of our Conſtitution.

[22]THERE remains very little more to be ſaid, connected with this branch of my ſubject, except, that if any part of the Pamphlet ſhall, on examination, be found to bear two ſenſes, the firſt of which ſhall be found to agree with what is above laid down or any other part of the context, while the ſecond does not ſo agree, the former ſenſe is to be taken to be the true meaning of the author; that is, every part ſhall be ſo conſtrued (if poſſible) that the whole may ſtand. I now proceed to examine, whether there is anything to be found in the remainder of this Pamphlet inconſiſtent with the extracts already made from it.

PART II.

THE Writer of the Letter, I am conſidering, has divided it into ſix parts, as appears by the ſummary in the title-page. The ſecond part is on the nature of the Engliſh Government, and it contains the paragraph ſaid to be a libel on the Conſtitution. To the conſideration of that paragraph I ſhall prefix a brief analyſis of what precedes it in that ſection, together with the moſt material ſtrictures reported in the papers to have been made upon it.

THE King (makes* or) enacts laws, by and with the advice and conſent of the Lords and Commons.

[23]HE executes theſe laws according to the verdict of a Grand and Petty Jury.

THIS leads us to one ſimple view of the Royal Power, that both in the act of Legiſlation and the execution of Law it is limited by two prior negatives.

THIS deſcription of the Writer ſeems more accurate, and, according to the lax ſenſe of the term, more conſtitutional than the parallel paſſage in Blackſtone: ‘In England, the ſupreme power is divided into two branches; the one Legiſlative, to wit, the Parliament, conſiſting of King, Lords, and Commons; the other executive, conſiſting of the King alone*.’

HERE I have to obſerve, that the newſpapers repreſent a Member of one Houſe to have declared, that this Author has ſtated ‘the Conſtitution of this country to be an abſolute Monarchy;’ and that he has ‘ſaid diſtinctly, that the King makes laws and executes laws,’ totally ſuppreſſing the modifications of this power as laid down above. In the ſame ſpirit was an obſervation there ſaid to have been made in another Houſe, that the Writer inſinuates ‘that all perſonal ſecurity and property is dependent on the King.’ It will be contended, perhaps, that he admits the limitations he has deſcribed above to be parts of the Conſtitution de facto only; and it may be made a queſtion, with what degree of regard he looks upon thoſe two prior negatives of the ſubject, on every exertion of the powers of the Sovereign? In anſwer to this, I will add a few extracts more from his Letter to thoſe already made. [24]He begins his book with complimenting his countrymen upon the poſſeſſion of more good ſenſe than their neighbours; and his leading proof of it is, ‘that he has yet not ſeen,’ elſewhere, ‘equal marks of it in thoſe matters where, of all others, they ſhould be manifeſted; I mean, (ſays he) in their Laws and Government *.’ Conſidered in a ſecond point of view, he calls the exiſting Government ‘an organ of public union and activity, which is adapted to the humour and mode of thinking of thoſe" *** who live under it;’ that humour, the leading quality of which he deſcribes to be the jealouſy of power, without the turbulent ambition of it; that mode of thinking formed by the good ſenſe of a nation whom he holds to poſſeſs more of that quality ‘than any other in the world.’ And almoſt at the concluſion of his work, impreſſed with the general view of the whole ſtructure of our Government, he affirms, ‘that it is ſo compacted in all its parts, that every conceit of politicians muſt vaniſh before it.’

THESE things premiſed, I ſhall give at length the whole of the paragraph in which the paſſage objected to is found; diſtinguiſhing the parts of the latter which form a diſtinct Propoſition, or imply one, by breaks.

I. ‘WITH the exception, therefore, of the advice and conſent of the two Houſes of Parliament; and the interpoſition of Juries, the Government, and the adminiſtration of it in all its parts, may be ſaid to reſt wholly and ſolely on the King, and thoſe appointed by him.§ Thoſe [25]two adjuncts of Parliament and Juries are ſubſidiary and occaſional; but the King's power is a ſubſtantive one, always viſible and active. By his Officers, and in his name, everything is tranſacted that relates to the peace of the realm and the protection of the ſubject. The ſubject eels this, and acknowledges with thankfulneſs a ſuperintending ſovereignty, which alone is congenial with the ſentiments and temper of Engliſhmen.’

II. ‘IN FINE, the Government of England is a Monarchy; the Monarch is the antient ſtock from which have ſprung thoſe goodly branches of the Legiſlature, the Lords and Commons, that at the ſame time give ornament to the tree, and afford ſhelter to thoſe who ſeek protection under it. But theſe are ſtill only branches, and derive their origin and their nutriment from their common parent; they may be lopped off, and the tree is a tree ſtill, ſhorn indeed of its honours, but not like them caſt into the fire.’

III. The Kingly Government may go on in all its functions without Lords or Commons: it has heretofore done ſo for years together, and in our times it does ſo during every receſs of Parliament; but without the King, HIS Parliament is no more.

IV. ‘The King, therefore, alone it is who neceſſarily ſubſiſts without change or diminution; and from HIM alone we unceaſingly derive the protection of Law and Government.’

THE analyſis of this paragraph is as follows: It conſiſts of four parts, as numbered: In the firſt, an account is given of the nature of the Royal Power; in the ſecond, [26]the origin of the Second and Third Eſtates as they now exiſt, and ſome conſequences from their being ſo derived; in the third, he compares the legal powers of the King and the Two Eſtates with regard to one quality or accident of their operation, that is, their perpetuity; and in the fourth, he reverts to the ſubſtantive power of the King affirmed in the firſt.

THE mode in which the citation was made from the whole of the paragraph was this: The whole ſecond part was taken, and, from the firſt period of the third, the firſt colon or member being cut off, was applied to what precedes, as if explanatory thereof.

THIS mode, therefore, of quoting a paſſage for cenſure, is highly cenſurable; for on ſuch occaſions ſo much ought to be quoted as to exhibit the full and perfect meaning of the Writer; and the colon with which the citation ends indicates the ſenſe of the laſt part to be not completed. A common Engliſh Grammar may be cited for this, where we read, that when ‘a member of a ſentence, which of it ſelf would make a complete ſentence, and ſo requires a greater pauſe than a ſemicolon, yet is followed by an additional part, making a more full and perfect ſenſe, may be diſtinguiſhed by a colon*.’ But beyond this colon the accuſers of the Letter-Writer did not read, though three ſentences follow in the period to limit and explain the meaning of the firſt, which they ſevered from them in the citation.

THE additional colon has likewiſe another mark of ſeverance from what precedes it; it contains abſtract matter: all that precedes it is metaphorical: therefore there [27]was a full pauſe of the ſenſe before it; and it can connect only with what follows it. But when this colon, or incompleted meaning, was cut off from the period of which it is a part, and joined to the laſt ſentence of the former, it was deduced from it, that the Writer meant to affirm, ‘that the Lords and Commons may be lopped off without impairing the Conſtitution;’ or, as it was ſaid in another place, that the Conſtitution ſo lopped ‘might and would be complete.’ It is thus that by an illegitimate mode of quotation the paſſage cenſured is rendered uncouth, and then, in conſequence of ſome illegitimate reaſon, which the reporters of theſe debates have entirely concealed, and which cannot be divined, it is further rendered criminal.

I HAD not had an opportunity of ſeeing this paſſage in the original work when the following Obſervations were drawn up. In them, therefore, it will be found, that it is taken for granted that the quotation was properly made. I now, therefore, proceed to ſhew, that everything contained in the paſſage, as cited for cenſure, is ſtrictly true, both on hiſtorical and legal evidence.

I DIVIDE the whole matter it contains into three Propoſitions, which ſhall be ſeverally proved: the two which are poſitive are placed firſt. As I find the ground taken for theſe proofs is the ſame as that referred to by the Letter-Writer when he enters at all upon proof, theſe co-incidences will be noted in his own words in the margin.

PROPOSITION I. The ſecond and third Eſtate owe their origin to the Crown, or have ſprung out of the Monarchy.

[28]PROPOSITION II. The continuance of the functions of the Houſes is temporary; that of thoſe of the Crown perpetual.

PROPOSITION III. The LEGAL capacity of action may be taken from the Houſes by violence, the effect of which may ſubſiſt ſome time after the violence is removed; but at all times the legal capacity of action remains in the Crown.

—OR the actors of ſuch violence at any period acquiring permanent power, the Peerage of a country, and the families from which the Thrid Eſtate was then taken, may become effectively extinct; while a ſucceſſion of Kings de jure may more probably be preſerved many ages, if not cut off by an act of abdication by an anceſtor in poſſeſſion, from whom they derive*.

THIS is the whole abſtract matter of the paragraph; the truth of the two general principles is to be ſhown from good law authorities, and where neceſſary, from the reaſon of the thing; and the poſſibility or abſolute truth of the facts aſſerted from hiſtory, particularly that of England.

PROPOSITION I.

[29]

THE Second and Third Eſtates have ſprung out of the Monarchy. This is the abſtract ſenſe of the following parts of the paſſage: ‘The Monarch is the ancient ſtock, from which have ſprung thoſe goodly branches of the Legiſlature, the Lords and Commons; but theſe are ſtill only branches, and derive their origin and nutriment from their common parent.’

I CONSIDER this point, firſt, Hiſtorically; ſecondly, Legally; thirdly, It will be ſhewn that this order of the parts of a mixed Government coming into exiſtence, is better than the contrary one.

1. HISTORICAL PROOF.

WITH reſpect to the Peers this is evidently true, for the date of the creation of almoſt every Barony may be aſſigned.

[30]WITH reſpect to the Commons, the Sovereigns of Europe formed Corporations to balance the powers of the Barons; and gathered the Repreſentatives of ſuch Corporations, and thoſe of provincial diſtricts, together in a Third Eſtate, ſtill better to counterpoiſe the power of the Barons, who had before the advantage of an union of force.

IN England this period was forwarded ſome years only, by the Earl of Leiceſter pretending to act in the name of the King: Upon the fall of that nobleman, the continuance and ſtability of the Houſe of Commons was favoured by the Crown, through the policy deſcribed above, even though "planted by ſo unauſpicious a hand." Hume, year 1265. This form of government differed very much from that eſtabliſhed by our Saxon anceſtors: their Wittenagemote, by all the accounts which we have of it, reſembled what has ſubſiſted down to our day in France, under the name of the ‘Aſſembly of Notables;’ it was ſometimes held before the people: but Bacon, in his "Hiſtorical Diſquiſitions," leans to the opinion that they had no voice therein; ſuch a body, he obſerves, ‘would be as monſtrous as the Anthropophagi, whoſe heads were too near their bellies to be wiſe*.’

II. FROM LAW AUTHORITIES.

IT will not be denied, even by thoſe who were the moſt violent in their cenſures of the Letter, that the Sovereignty reſts in the Legiſlature, of which the King is Caput, PRINCIPIUM, et Finis. 4. Inſt. 1, 2. Stat. 1. El. c. 5. Hale of Parl. from Black. Com. vol. 1. p. 153.

[31]HENCE it appears to be a maxim of the law of England, that the Crown is the principium, the ſource or origin of each legal Parliament individually, and conſequently was ſo of the firſt; and the Law of England is deſcriptive of the Conſtitution of England, which no other writing is per ſe; for the Law is what is conſtituted, and nothing but what is ſo conſtituted is of the Conſtitution.

WE may add ſome ſupplementary authorities here: the Convention Parliament of 1660 aſſembled without the King's writ; after his return an Act paſſed declaring this to be a good Parliament, 12. C. 2. c. 2.; the next confirmed its Acts, 12. C. 2. c. 2. c. 14. Bl. Com. b. 1. c. 21. It was then held by many, that the aſſent of the King, whoſe authority alone was wounded, could not heal the defect of the Acts of their aſſembly. If there had been a vacancy of the Throne, this authority veſting in no one could receive no wound; and the confirmation of their Acts would have been unneceſſary. In the ratification of the Acts of the firſt, by the ſecond Parliament, this Aſſembly was guided by its ideas of the theory of law, and nothing can be ſaid againſt the competency of their general deciſions on ſuch points. I ſtate it on the authority of Blackſtone, that they left to the next only one Act to make to carry public law "to theoretical perfection," the Habeas Corpus Act, ‘though the following years were times of great practical oppreſſion*.’

[32]THE following ſeems likewiſe, to me, a fact of great weight: The Peers and Gentlemen who had eſpouſed the cauſe of William, in anſwer to a meſſage of James to that Prince, demanded that the writs which he had iſſued to ſummon a Parliament ſhould be ſuperſeded; ‘We may drive away the King (ſaid the Prince), but it is not ſo eaſy to come by a Parliament*.’ The demand was changed for that of a free Parliament. Hence it is evident that this reaſoning, at that time, met the principles of thoſe great men who brought about the Revolution, and of King William himſelf. I ſtep out of my way here to obſerve, that from theſe words I draw a conſequence totally contrary to that deduced by Macpherſon; they imply, that King William did not then wiſh for the abdication of James. But to return to the ſubject, the ultimate deciſion of William's Council, appears at that inſtant to have been legally right; but they were ſoon reduced by the flight of James, under another law, the jus extremae neceſſitatis, and in that ſtate the ſummoning a Convention was abſolutely legal, according to its proper code; but then they proceeded by the neareſt poſſible approximation to the old forms.

III. FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.

THE beſt conſtituted mixed Monarchies are thoſe in which the Eſtates have ſprung out of the Monarchy; this ſhall be proved by authority, by abſtract reaſon, and by hiſtory.

[33]1. From Authority.

MONARCHY (ſays Lord Bolingbroke, comparing the ſimple forms of Government) is to be preferred to other Governments, becauſe you can better ingraft any deſcription of Republic on a Monarchy, than anything of Monarchy upon the Republican forms*

2. Abſtract Reaſoning.

IT is not neceſſary to underſtand here, that a ſimple Monarchy is the beſt ſimple Government to have lived under, antecedent to the change to a mixed Monarchy; the concluſion will not be weakened if it be admitted to be a bad inn in a dirty village, but from which the beſt road leads to a fine place you are deſirous to go to; for it is to be obſerved, that a mixed Government, generated out of a ſimple Monarchy, may admit the ſame quantity of political liberty, and a greater degree of perſonal freedom, than if generated from a ſimple Republic; for the antecedent habit of allegiance and ſubordination being greater, while it continues ſupported by the conſideration of the legal origin of the Eſtates, the coercion of laws may be leſs, or perſonal freedom greater, and the ſame general regularity be produced.

3. Hiſtorical Evidence.

WE are now to examine this principle by induction, or the experiments thereon recorded in hiſtory; an evidence in theſe matters ſuperior to any furniſhed by abſtract principles.

[34]THE firſt example is that of the Roman Republic: In the ſpeech of Galba in Tacitus, it is ſaid, that the Empire could not be held together without a ſingle perſon at the head of it. I look upon this profound politician as the author of the ſpeech; and the principle, as deduced by him from a retroſpective view of the Roman Hiſtory: This ſingle perſon was in power, though not in title, a Monarch, eſtabliſhed by an armed force. The new ſyſtem eſtabliſhed by Auguſtus was a diſguiſed arbitrary power; and the adminiſtration, at leaſt after his time, tyrannical in the extreme.

ENGLAND was in the laſt century, after the death of Charles I. reduced to a Republic verging to anarchy. A ſingle perſon, in power a Monarch, was eſtabliſhed by an armed force; the new ſyſtem was that of arbitrary power, leſs diſguiſed than that of Rome under Auguſtus; the trials of the ſtate criminals were by high courts of juſtice, without juries*; the Aſiatic ſyſtem of deſpotiſm was introduced, the country being divided into diſtricts, under Major Generals, who had power to decimate the incomes, not of the Royaliſts only, but alſo of other individuals, and who levied the taxes impoſed by the Protector's Council of Fifteen: they were laid aſide by him two years before his death. That he continued his arbitrary taxation to the laſt is evident, for the grants of his laſt Aſſembly amounted to 1,300,000 l. for a year only, and it does not appear that any taxes were voted to raiſe even that ſum; but he levied in taxes, upon an average, two million yearly§. His adminiſtration was rigid, at leaſt to the meaſure of his ſtate neceſſity.

[35]THESE are examples of the government of a ſingle perſon, ingrafted upon a Republic by the aſſiſtance of an armed force, degenerating into tyranny; we paſs on to thoſe which have ſeemingly had a more promiſing origin.

HOLLAND, though not in name, yet in effect was a limited Monarchy, both under its elective and hereditary Stadtholders; or a limited Monarchy ariſing out of a Republican Conſtitution: that it was effectively ſuch a Monarchy we have the authority of King William, who called himſelf Stadtholder of England and King of Holland.

IN this State there were effected four Revolutions in 178 years, ending in 1747; the office of Stadtholder was twice ſuppreſſed by edict, and twice reſtored by popular inſurrections, for a purpoſe which will preſently be ſeen: it is here noted that the mean interval between two Revolutions was forty-four years and a half.

BESIDES theſe, between the eſtabliſhment of the Republic and the year 1787, four other Revolutions were very nearly effected: The firſt by Prince Maurice; the ſecond by his grandſon William; the third, when the City of Amſterdam invited Prince Caſimir to ſet up againſt King William, which he declined; and the fourth, when the preſent Prince of Orange was expelled from the Hague in 1787. Thus in 218 years there were eight Revolutions effected, or nearly effected; and the mean interval between the imminent hazard of one Revolution and another was twenty-ſeven years and a half.

[36]THE longeſt term of fixed government in that country was from the death of King William to the year 1747, or for the term of forty-five years.

IT is to be noted, that the primary cauſe of theſe Revolutions, was the power of a ſingle perſon being grafted upon a Republic; but there is one principle which a commercial Republic will adopt, which will greatly accelerate the fall of the mixed form they may be deſirous to introduce, or deſtroy its ſtability: but as it ariſes out of the ſimple form in ſuch a State, and as all Republics tend thereto, I ſhall not lengthen theſe curſory obſervations with any further notice of it.

THE fourth example will be the French Conſtitution of 1791. The fiction was adopted by the Conſtituent Aſſembly of grafting a Monarchy upon a Republic; all appearances of the principles of the former were ſoon annihilated, by the change of opinion introduced by this novel principle, and by force jointly. This Conſtitution nominally laſted one year.

I DECLINE adding more inſtances, not to lengthen this part of the tract. Of the four examples of mixed Monarchies riſing out of a Republic, two terminated in deſpotiſm; one was perpetually expoſed to Revolutions; and the fourth ended, almoſt as ſoon as it aroſe, in anarchy.

IT is to be obſerved, that all debates upon this queſtion muſt proceed upon a ſuppoſition, that it is in our choice out of which of the two forms of ſimple Government we [37]will originate a mixed Monarchy. If a General had poſſeſſed himſelf of two gates of a town which he wanted to occupy, in the ſtreets leading from one of which he had few or no obſtacles to expect; but he knew that in the quarter into which the other opened all of them were enfiladed by cannon, were guarded by barricades, and full of covered pits and wolf-holes, and the houſes on each ſide of the way occupied by muſqueteers; there is little difficulty to determine which entrance he ought to prefer.

THIS queſtion certainly cannot paſs off without the Conſtitution of America being introduced into it: There is certainly ſomething of limited Monarchy to be found in the office of Preſident, but no concluſion can yet be drawn from it; it has not been eſtabliſhed long enough for its latent vices, if any ſuch exiſt, to break out. Experience ſhews us there was no principle of ſtability in the Conſtitution of Holland, yet the mean interval between one actual Revolution and another was forty-four years and a half; and between a Revolution effected, or nearly effected, twenty-ſeven years and a quarter. That of America has not yet ſtood the ſhorter of thoſe periods; experience has not therefore proved this Conſtitution to be as ſtable as even that of Holland was; beſides ſomething like ſmoke has been before, and is now diſcernibly breaking out of ſome crevices of the building.

‘DIVISION (ſays an eminent American writer) is a calamity which we have more occaſion to ſear; and I ſee with infinite regret that obſtinate factions are beginning to be formed; to what degree they may proceed in decompoſing and diſſolving the preſent harmonious [38]ſyſtem, can be known only to God and to poſterity*

IT is ſtated in the cenſured paſſage, that the two Branches receive their nutriment as well as origin from their Parent Tree: This circumſtance is left out of the abſtract propoſition formed to take in the whole of the reſt. If it can be ſuppoſed to want a particular defence, it may be ſaid, that the continuance of the proſperity of every order in the State, depends on the exerciſe of the legal power of the King, in whoſe ‘name every thing is tranſacted that relates to the peace of the realm and the protection of the ſubject.’ Beſides, the number of the Members of the Upper Houſe would continually decreaſe by the ſucceſſive extinction of Peerages, if the Crown did not keep its numbers up by new creations; and thus, as in the human frame, the Conſtitution would periſh by the inanition of one of its vital parts.

PROPOSITION II. THE continuance of the functions of the Houſes is temporary, and that of thoſe of the Crown perpetual.

IN the interval between two Parliaments neither of the Houſes can be ſaid to exiſt; there are no Repreſentatives; and as no Parliament exiſts, no Peers of Parliament, theſe would be Peers of a non-entity; and even while a [39]Parliament exiſts, the functions of the two Houſes are not permanently neceſſary; thoſe of the Crown are; their commencement and concluſion depend upon the will of the King, being ſummoned and prorogued by him; during the life of the perſon who holds the Crown, the diſcontinuance of the exerciſe of his functions depends, by the Conſtitution, on the act of God alone, as in demiſe, by illneſs, &c. or his own will, declared by an act of abdication.

WHEN the military eſtabliſhments of the Sovereigns of Europe were on ſo limited a ſcale as to give no jealouſy for the ſafety of theſe kingdoms, and we had not taken our place in the great Northern Commonwealth of States, which happened at the period of the Revolution, we wanted no annual eſtabliſhment of what may be called an army of obſervation; no annual land and malt tax: hence, "heretofore," though Kingly Government was permanently neceſſary, Parliaments were not aſſembled "for years together*." In the Bill of Rights it was enacted, that Parliaments ſhould be held frequently; but the term frequently being indefinite, by the ſtatute 6. Will. & Mary, c. 2. it was declared, ‘that a new Parliament ſhould be called within three years after the determination of the former.’ Bl. v. 1. p. 153. This is the preſent legal Conſtitution. I only remark this to ſhew, that the Letter-Writer has not urged all the legal proofs he might have adduced of the ſuperior permanency of the Royal functions.

[40]BLACKSTONE ſays, "that the King" is the only branch of the ‘Legiſlature that has a ſeparate exiſtence, and is capable of performing any act at a time when no Parliament is in being.’ Bl. v. 1. p. 150.

The Letter-Writer, in the paſſage here conſidered, aſſerts, that ‘the Kingly Government may go on, in all its functions, without Lords or Commons.’

THE ſecond extract ſeems to be taken from the firſt; the Commentaries have never been cenſured as an unconſtitutional book by Parliament, on the contrary the work is there frequently quoted as a book of reference. The greateſt difference between the paſſages is, the ſubſtitution of the word function for the more general term act, and the firſt is more definitely conſtitutional than the ſecond; for a function, is the performance of a thing limited and preſcribed; or the power of ſo doing it, moſtly ſignifies miniſtration in ſome legal office, including the notion of ſome prior or external obligation when it is applied to a moral agent; and this obligation muſt ariſe either from a compact, or voluntary engagement, or the lawful command of a ſuperior; the word itſelf is not applicable to the act of an unlimited agent.

WE find the Dictionary-Writers rendering the Latin word officium, the primary meaning of which is duty, by the word function; and, on the other hand, fungor is tranſlated, in its primary ſignification, ‘to diſcharge an office or duty,’ and again "to conform to" a preſcribed mode; and functio, in its primary ſignification, they render the execution of a charge. It became alſo a technical term in the [41]Roman Law, and then ſignified the diſcharge of a debt, not in ſpecie, but by ſome preſentation of equal value, as in commodities, labour, &c.

THE ſimilitude of the ſubject, and of the manner in which it is to be treated, renders it not improper here to enter into the conſideration of what is to be found further in the Letter relating to the Royal power, which has not been conſidered before, or will not become the ſubject of the next Propoſition. Thoſe points I ſhall ſtate in the Writer's own words in one column, and over-againſt them thoſe of Blackſtone:

LETTER.COMMENTARIES.
WITH the exception of the advice and conſent of the two Houſes of Parliament, and the interpoſition of Juries, the Government, and the adminiſtration of it in all its parts, may be ſaid to reſt wholly and ſolely on the King, and thoſe appointed by him. Page 12, l. 4.AFTER what has been premiſed in this chapter (the Limitations on the Crown) I ſhall not, I truſt, be, conſidered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when I lay it down as a principle, that in the exertion of lawful prerogative, the King is and ought to be abſolute; that is, ſo far abſolute that there is no legal authority that can either delay or reſiſt him. Bl. v. 1. p. 250.
 THE King of England is not only the chief, but properly the ſole Magiſtrate of the nation; all others acting in commiſſion from, and in due ſubordination to him. Ibid.

[42]IT is to be concluded from this, that the principle laid down in the Letter would not, in the judgment of Judge Blackſtone, ſhew the Writer an advocate for arbitrary power. He continues thus:

LETTER.COMMENTARIES.
THOSE two adjuncts of Parliament and Juries are ſubſidiary and occaſional. Page 12. l. 9.WE are to conſider the King with regard to his Councils; for in order to aſſiſt him in the diſcharge of his duties, the Law has aſſigned him a diverſity of Councils to adviſe with.
 THE firſt of theſe is the High Court of Parliament. Bl. v. 1.227.

HERE we ſee the High Court of Parliament ſtated to be ſubſidiary or aſſiſtant to the King, terms of the ſame import. The Letter-Writer ſeems to conſider its functions to be to inform the King's legiſlative will, and that of Juries to inform his executive conſcience; placing the firſt in the rank it is ordinarily held, and the latter ſomewhat higher*. He further, after having admitted its limitations, goes on thus: [43]

LETTER.COMMENTARIES.
BUT the King's power is a ſubſtantive one, always viſible and active.—And again, p. 13. l. 8. The King alone it is who neceſſarily ſubſiſts without change or diminution.PREROGATIVES are either direct or incidental; the direct, are ſuch poſitive and ſubſtantial parts of the Royal character and authority as are rooted in, and ſpring from the King's political perſon, conſidered merely by itſelf, without reference to any other extrinſic circumſtance. V. 1. p. 240. And firſt of "theſe ſubſtantive or "direct prerogatives," he names the Royal character or dignity. Ibid. p. 241.

THE latter part of each of theſe quotations from the Letter relates to the perpetuity of the exerciſe of the Royal functions, which has been before conſidered. If the whole of what Blackſtone has ſaid of the ſubſtantive power of the Crown could have had a place here, the following concluſion would have been apparent: That in every point hitherto compared, the laſt but one excepted, he has expreſſed himſelf in ſtronger and fuller terms on the dignity of the Crown than this Writer; and in the excepted inſtance with equal force.

PROPOSITION III. EVEN the legal capacity of acting may be taken from the Houſes by violence, the effect of which muſt ſubſiſt ſome time after the violence is removed; but at [44]all times the legal capacity of action remains in the Crown.

FIRST, To avoid the neceſſity of repetition, I note here, once for all, that throughout this article it is to be taken for granted, that no act of abdication has taken place on the part of the King.

THE legal capacity of the Houſes to act depends upon their being aſſembled, which may be prevented by the violence ſtated; and after ſuch violence is removed, ſome interval of time muſt paſs before they can be legally reaſſembled by the Crown; and the term may extend ſo long, that the Parliament which was in exiſtence at its commencement may be brought to an end, by the act of the law, before ſuch force is removed. But the legal powers of the Crown will not be ſo extinguiſhed, although it be impoſſible to exert them in act.

BEFORE I conſider the ſecond part or ſenſe of this Propoſition, I tranſcribe the paſſage in the paragraph in which it is found: ‘THEY (the Lords and Commons) are only branches, and derive their origin and nutriment from the common parent; they may be lopped off, and the Tree is a Tree ſtill; ſhorn indeed of its honours, but not, like them, caſt into the fire.’—I ſhall afterwards conſider the expreſſion, and prove the following, with what has preceded, to be the only ſenſes of it; having made one obſervation in this place on the ſtyle: Through the whole of the Letter it is equable, though correct and even elegant; without thoſe bolder figures which proſe, on ſome occaſions, may admit. The paſſage which is cenſured, [45]taken without the laſt ſentence, ſevered from the following period, is perfectly inſulated; it looks like a ſingle hill ſtarting up out of a plain, whoſe ſurface is indeed waving and diverſified. Thus placed, we meet a paſſage highly metaphorical, and continued to a conſiderable length: Who would not pronounce in ſuch a caſe, where a Writer departs from his own manner, that the cauſe was ſome ſudden and ſtrong impreſſion on his mind, operating at the moment, though he ſuppreſſes the mention of it? and there are recent circumſtances of that kind dwelling in every man's mind. Is the paſſage very different from a portrait of the ſituation of Louis XVI. when a limited Sovereign, in the laſt year of his reign? Nobility aboliſhed by a law he was compelled to aſſent to; and even every man of the Third Eſtate, diſtinguiſhed by virtue and ability, was driven into exile, or at leaſt forced to fly from the Aſſembly: The goodly branches of the Legiſlature were lopped off; the Tree remained indeed, in name, a Tree ſtill, ſhorn of its honours, and not yet like them caſt into the fire. Or to come to the immediate inſtant when we muſt ſuppoſe the paragraph to have been written, Was not the King of France then in exile? her Nobility half exterminated, half begging ſuſtenance in foreign countries? or, Were the Commons of the realm repreſented by the vile inſtruments of Robeſpierre, Barrere, or Tallien? Hence the Writer will be thought to have had at that time before his eye that dreadful calamity, in which the Nobles and the more opulent and reſpectable individuals of the commonalty were involved, and the annihilation rapidly advancing upon them; and perhaps his more eager cenſurers may become inclined to admit, if they can ſuppoſe it poſſible only that he wrote with ſuch impreſſions, that he did not look upon the philoſophical politics of lopping [46]and burning, and the ſublime proceſs of regenerating by annihilating with an unconſtitutional approbation. This premiſed, I come to the ſecond ſenſe of the paſſage.

SECONDLY, The actors of ſuch violence at any period acquiring permanent power, the Peerage of a country, and the families from which the Third Eſtate was then taken, may become effectively extinct, while a ſucceſſion of Kings de jure may probably be preſerved for many ages.

A FAMILY is ſaid to be effectively extinct when it has no known repreſentative; no one who can eſtabliſh himſelf to be ſuch upon proof. We learn from Caeſar that the feudal ſyſtem was eſtabliſhed among the Gauls, whoſe inſtitutions thoſe of the Britons perfectly reſembled. They too had their order of Nobility or Lords*; but their Nobility is totally extinct. And the ſame is true of the Saxon Nobility and greater Gentry; we have no Peers with a Saxon title; and few Gentry who can ſhew themſelves deſcendants of an opulent Saxon family. Thoſe ornamental branches of the Royalty of the Britiſh and Saxon line, have, by the violence of the ſword of the ſucceſſive conquerors of the kingdom, been lopped off and caſt into the fire: while the fortune of the parent ſtem, was little attended to, as we ſhall ſee, on deciſive authority, hereafter.

[47]BUT the extermination of the Lords and the greater families of the Commons has not been in this country, and in latter ages, poſſible only; it is a danger which, in the opinion of the moſt judicious modern hiſtorian, Mr. Hume, has been very probable; has been ſuſpended over their heads by a very ſlender thread indeed. At the end of his account of the Reſtoration he obſerves, that ‘the violence of the Engliſh Parties exceeded anything we can now imagine; had they continued but a little longer, there was juſt reaſon to dread all the horrors of the antient maſſacres and proſcriptions’ from ‘the military uſurpers*.’

IF Providence had at that time viſited the Nation with this dreadful yet probable calamity, the Writer aſſerts the tree would have remained a tree ſtill; for it ſhall be ſhown that a caſe reſembling this is the only one he could have had in contemplation when he wrote. If this tragedy had been effected, it is paying no undeſerved tribute to the moral ſenſe of the lower orders in this country, to ſay, that the perpetrators would have been held in ſuch execration, that the ſuppoſition of their being favourable to a Reſtoration is no violent aſſumption. In that caſe, by the legal prerogatives attached to and ſtill remaining in the perſon of the King (according to the Author's aſſertions), a Houſe of Peers might have been formed, and by his writs a lawful Houſe of Commons aſſembled; and he would have been legally able to have formed the wheels, and ſet together again the whole machine of Government. Thus, by the operation of the Law of the Land, as adequate a remedy as poſſible would have [48]been found for ſuch a calamity: a better ſource to derive it from than the jus extremae neceſſitatis; or the ſuppoſition that the Civil Government was quite diſſolved. And only ſuch a caſe as this, it muſt be granted, the writer had in his eye For when he ſuppoſed ſuch an extermination, he muſt have ſuppoſed it effected by ſome agent or agents; by the King, or by rebels, or foreign force. The firſt it is incredible he ſhould think lightly of; the ſecond we have recently ſeen attempted, and almoſt effected; the laſt does not enter into the queſtion.

THE King de jure (Charles II.) being abroad, would have eſcaped this calamity; ſhorn of his branches, but not like them caſt into the fire; and in the kingdoms where the principle of Salic Law is not in force, the Royal Families moſtly marrying their daughters to foreign Princes (events of which faithful records are preſerved), are not nearly ſo liable to become apparently extinct as even the exiſting claſſes of Nobility and Gentry.

A VERY ſingular inſtance of the truth of this occurs in our own hiſtory. The title of the Britiſh Sovereigns was in the Welch Princes. By the marriage of Gladys, ſiſter of Llewellyn ap Jorwerth the Great, their title ultimately fell into the houſe of Mortimer. Thus Edward the IVth united the Norman title in the York line with that of the Britiſh Princes. By the marriage of his daughter Elizabeth with Henry, heir of the line of Lancaſter, there was an union of three titles in their deſcendants; which at laſt veſting in thoſe of her daughter Margaret Queen of Scotland, the Crown paſſed to James the Iſt; and in his perſon a fourth title was added [49]to the former three. Margaret daughter of Edward the Outlaw, ſon of Edmund Ironſide, married to Malcolm King of Scotland: ſhe was ſiſter to Edgar Atheling, cui de jure (ſays Matthew Paris) debebatur regnum Anglorum. He died without iſſue; and thus, after an interval of 586 years, the lineal repreſentative of Edmund Ironſide was ſeated on the Engliſh throne; uniting in his ſingle perſon the claims of the Britiſh, the Saxon, the York, and the Lancaſter lines. The particulars of this deſcent here given I have taken out of Blackſtone, b. i. c. 3. He remarks, that this accumulation of titles ſuggeſted to a Prince of more learning than wiſdom, that his hereditary title was indefeaſible: and it may be added, that thoſe of his age, and for a conſiderable time after, who were moſt zealouſly attached to our Liberty and Laws, which are ultimately derived from the Saxon race, might, in their affection to the memory of thoſe excellent Sovereigns to whom they were indebted for them, think they diſcovered the immediate hand of Providence in the reſtoration of this line, and even carry the conſequences they deduced from it to an erroneous length.

IN a word, the heir of Edmund Ironſide, Llewellyn the Great, and William the Norman, in the Proteſtant line, is now ſeated on the Throne. But is there a ſingle perſon to be found in the kingdom who can ſhew himſelf to be the repreſentative of a Britiſh or a Saxon Lord? or many who can derive their deſcent from the Saxon Gentry? Theſe claſſes have twice become extinct. The repreſentative of the dynaſties wears the Crown.

PART III. ON THE DICTION OR EXPRESSION OF THE PARAGRAPH.

[50]

IT is neceſſary to be unuſually particular in the remarks upon this topic, becauſe the circumſtance of the Pamphlet being made the ſubject of Parliamentary inquiry, ſeems to me to hang much upon it. The greateſt part of it is metaphorical; and one of the metaphors has, I preſume, given offence to many of the Members of the Houſe who have voted upon the ſubject.

THE Lords and Commons are deſcribed as branches ſpringing from the antient ſtock of Monarchy; the honours of the tree; goodly, and giving it ornament, and affording ſhelter to thoſe who take protection under it. Here is much ſaid of the utility and beauty of the Eſtates; and the matter of their origination being true, which was proved above, their good qualities are as warmly painted as we uſually find them, and perhaps it may be ſaid to be more ſo.

To meet the objection to be conſidered afterwards, it becomes neceſſary here to obſerve, that all this imagery is of the ſchool of the Hebrew poetry: a ſecondary mark of the peculiar genius of which was, to confine ſome particular metaphors almoſt excluſively to certain ſubjects; as a cedar, or any majeſtic tree, to expreſs a King or Prince. The image is of this ſort. If any one ſhould ſay that its proximate ſource is to be found in Shakeſpear, [51]in a poetical compliment to James the Iſt, I ſhall not diſpute it with him.

He ſhall flouriſh,
And, like a mountain cedar, reach his branches
To all the plains about him.

BUT I muſt have the liberty of adding Hurd's Note on this paſſage: ‘It is eaſy to ſee his cedar is not of Engliſh growth, but tranſplanted from Judea*.’

THE ſubject leads the Writer to add another circumſtance to this deſcription; the abſtract matter of which is, that the Three Eſtates may be deſtroyed, but the Monarch remain. As he began metaphorically, this he has rightly expreſſed in the ſame manner. Yet in this ſecond metaphor is to be found one great part, and I believe the principal part, of the ground of the cenſure. This deſtruction is thus expreſſed: ‘The branches may be lopped off—and caſt into the fire.’ The charge certainly is not weakened by thus removing theſe phraſes out of their places and putting them into uxta-poſition.

j

IN this metaphor the word may is capable of being conſtrued in two ſenſes; the firſt limited to a ſimple poſſibility of the thing; the ſecond, that it is not only poſſible but right to be done. Now when a word bears two ſenſes (and there are few in common uſe which do not), the meaning in which the writer intends to be underſtood is to be determined by the context. In which ſenſe [52]the verb may is here uſed, is to be gathered from what he has ſaid of the qualities of the two branches. Now as their utility and beau [...]y have been warmly painted, as has been particularly ſhewn before, it is to be conſtrued in the firſt ſenſe, that the branches may eventually or poſſibly happen to be lopped off, and caſt into this fire; not that they ought to be ſo, becauſe they do not produce good fruit.

YET in theſe two phraſes, as they are here put together, the Writer has copied one verbally, and only made a ſlight alteration in the words of another, from the concluſion of a beautiful allegory, which is a fine example of the Hebrew ſchool: ‘Every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit, is hewn down, and caſt into the fire. The words of the latter part of this quotation may recall the former to memory; but it has been particularly ſhewn above, that the Writer did not mean that theſe branches did not bring forth good fruit; for ſuch fruits he has ſpecified; and even ſuppoſing this had not been capable of ſuch proof, it would be rightly ſaid, that the adoption of images in this mode, forms a kind of cento in proſe: but when a man is compoſing a cento, if he takes the laſt hemiſtich of a verſe in Virgil to conclude his own, is it to be ſuppoſed that he means the former part to be underſtood before it?

BUT it will be aſked, ‘Was it not enough for this writer to have once expreſſed, figuratively, the deſtruction of the two Eſtates? Was it not ſufficiently deſcribed by the phraſe, they may be lopped off? Why does he affectedly repeat it, dwelling on the idea, and [53]add, as if in contempt, they may be caſt into the fire? To this it is anſwered, that it is that quality of the figurative ſtyle of the Hebrew ſchool, which may be called its eſſential difference, to give that impreſſion to its images by reduplication, which the Europeans effect by epithets. I take this from Lowth's Praelections on the Hebrew Poetry; and I tranſlate his Latin Example.—1ſt. My inſtruction ſhall deſcend as a ſhower;—2d. My ſpeech ſhall fall as the dew;—3d. As the fine ſhowers on the plants;—4th. As the thick dew drops on the graſs.

I HAVE but a ſingle metaphorical ſentence more in the citation to remark upon. The branches being lopped off, "the tree is a tree ſtill, ſhorn indeed of its honours." How he formed the idea has been pointed out before; it muſt now be ſhown where he had his colouring. This imagery has a different ſource from the former; but blends very well with it. Here we may infallibly detect the paſſage or paſſages of a great Poet whom the writer had in his eye; and they will give us the picture then preſent to his mind, of the ſtate of a monarch whoſe greater ſubjects were involved in ſuch utter ruin. The impreſſions they make upon us were the impreſſions he felt when he wrote, and endeavoured to excite in us by the alluſion to be pointed out. I need not quote Hurd's 5th or 6th marks of imitation, to prove that the phraſe "ſhorn of its honours" is borrowed from Milton; it ſuggeſts to us directly the picture

Of glory obſcur'd; as when the ſun, new riſen,
Looks through the horizontal miſty a [...]r
SHORN OF HIS BEAMS; or from behind the moon,
[54] In dim eclipſe diſaſtrous twilight ſheds
On half the Nations; and with fear of change
Perplexes Monarchs.

AND in the ſame page, fifteen lines further, by the h [...]re change of the ſingular number for the plural, we read,

How he ſtands.
His glory withered. As when heaven's fire
Has ſcathed a foreſt oak or mountain pine;
With finged top his ſtately growth, though bare,
Stands on the blaſted heath.

FROM theſe two paſſages the Writer moſt probably took the whole of that here conſidered; ‘the tree is a tree ſtill, ſhorn indeed of its honours’ (branches); and the latter might ſuggeſt to him to add what immediately follows, "but not like them caſt into the fire." The firſt ſentence of the paſſage quoted is left ſimple, probably to avoid the appearance of ſervile imitation, or the giving to the whole an air of poetry too much above the cuſtomary ſtyle in which ſubjects of the nature of his pamphlet are generally treated.

THE concluſion I draw from the whole is, that in this paragraph we have the advantages of the two Houſes fairly ſtated, and the dignity of the Sovereign more fully inſiſted on, yet from circumſtances proved by general experience and law; and if either of the other two parts of the Conſtitution had been now attempted to be ſubverted, any one of its advocates (and I hope they would have been numerous, zealous, and able) ought to have proceeded in the ſame manner; that is, briefly but fully [55]acknowledging the utility of the two unattacked parts, then directing all his attention to the defence of the third. Whether it were the Commons or the Lords, it would then be doubtleſs pretended, as it is now, when ſo many engines are at work to weaken or deſtroy the Crown, that no attack was intended againſt that particular part of the Conſtitution. But it is to be obſerved, with reſpect to ſuch caſes, that it has very frequently happened, when one army has marched out of its trenches, in the dark, to attack another, they have lighted up every tent to make their adverſaries believe that they were very quietly at ſupper. And if it be ſtill conſtitutional to defend the Government eſtabliſhed by law, it is conſtitutional to give a ſummary of the Royal prerogatives acknowledged by it, and point out their utility. This muſt be allowed by thoſe who feel themſelves inclined to ſtop ſomewhat ſhort of the doctrine of Blackſtone, as the Writer actually has done, who ſays, ‘the maſs of mankind will be apt to grow inſolent and refractory, if taught to conſider their Prince as a man of no greater perfection than themſelves. The law therefore aſcribes to the King, in his high political character, not only large power and emoluments which form his prerogative and revenue, but likewiſe certain attributes of a great and tranſcendant nature, by which the people are led to conſider him in the light of a ſuperior being, and to pay him that awful reſpect which may enable him with greater eaſe to carry on the buſineſs of Government. This (he adds) is what I underſtand by the Royal dignity*.’ And this defence has been ſo conducted by the Letter-Writer, that the [56]ſtrength of Blackſtone's expreſſion (quoted frequently as unſuſpected authority in both Houſes) appears almoſt perpetually lowered by him. If therefore the Pamphlet be, as it was deſcribed in the Houſe of Commons, ‘a practical Exhortation, addreſſed to the Plain Senſe of the People,’ there appears to lie no crimination againſt the Parts hitherto conſidered. Whether any criminating matter is to be found in the remainder, we are now to proceed briefly to enquire.

PART IV. FIRST.—ON THE REVOLUTION PART OF THE WORK.

I NOW come to conſider what the Letter-Writer has ſaid on the Revolution; a motion having been made in the Houſe to declare this alſo a libel. In the Firſt Part of this Tract it has been ſhewn, that he had ſpoken of that even with all the warmth of praiſe. It certainly therefore is not doing him great juſtice to ſever the remainder, which is judged unexceptionable, from that context, and conſider it apart: yet ſuch is the method here adopted in his defence, moſt favorable to his accuſers, and leaſt ſo to the accuſed.

[57]OMITTING all thoſe kinds of revolutions of States, whoſe cauſes or effects are external, our obſervations muſt be directed to civil or internal revolutions, and theſe are of the following kinds: Firſt, thoſe which change the form of Government: Secondly, the governors; theſe are ſimple revolutions: or, in the third place, both conjointly, or compound revolutions. Infinite varieties fall under the third head. As for inſtance, a compound revolution may fix a new Dynaſty upon the throne, and the firſt principles of the old form of Government and the Laws may undergo a very great or total change. Or it may fix a family derived from a new common ſtock upon the throne; while the changes in the form of the old Government and the Laws are much leſs than in the former caſe; and ſuch as do not, per ſe, approach to a revolution of the other kind.

EVERY friend of legal liberty muſt unreſervedly approve of the tranſactions which placed William and Mary on the throne, as juſt and neceſſary; but fully impreſſed with that ſentiment, men may ſo far differ as to number the Revolution among events either of the firſt or the ſecond kind, and [...], in ſo doing, traduce or libel the Revolution.

THERE are authorities on both ſides; I ſhall ſtate what I look upon as the beſt, and begin with thoſe for the firſt opinion.

[58] ‘IN the Declaration of Rights (Mr. Hume ſays) all the points which had of late years been diſputed between King and People, were finally determined; and the powers of the Royal Prerogative were more narrowly circumſcribed, and more exactly defined, than in any former period of the Engliſh Government*.’ It does not indeed follow from this that the diſputable points were many or few; the remedy of more or leſs extent; the change of the legal form of Government conſiderable only, or intitled to be called a total change therein. His idea of the magnitude of that change is to be found in the following paſſage: ‘That great event (the Revolution) not only put a period to the hereditary ſucceſſion of the houſe of Stuart, but made a new ſettlement of the whole Conſtitution.’

I LOOK upon the opinion, that we had no Conſtitution until the Revolution, or that that event drew it out of the chaos in which it was involved, to have been derived from theſe and ſome other paſſages of Mr. Hume's works; at leaſt I know no other reſpectable ſource of ſuch an opinion. According to that, we are to ſuppoſe that he underſtoo [...] [...] Declaration or Bill of Rights to be the "Corinthian capital" wanted ſtill to finiſh that column of Britiſh Freedom, the Conſtitution, and complete the moſt beautiful ordonnance that human art had ever formed. Yet, on this occaſion, he only ſays of it, at ſuch a time ſuch a member was put upon the top of the ſhaft, without any account of its form or proportion; while he deſcribes certain parts of [59]the pedeſtal and baſe, and their mouldings and ornaments, with the moſt minute detail and attention. I ſay, if he thought thus of the Bill of Rights, contrary to his ordinary manner, he has, in the body of his Hiſtory (which concludes with the firſt quotation), given only ſeven lines to an account of it in general terms. On the occaſion of ſome former ameliorations of the Conſtitution, which he muſt have eſteemed as of much leſs conſequence, he has been infinitely more particular. His known manner is, on treating on ſuch ſubjects, to ſtate every topic that could be urged by a profound politician on both ſides, and he practically ſhews us, that Tacitus has been indebted to warm imaginations for ſome part of the praiſes he has received. And would not ſuch a writer have been glad to have concluded his Hiſtory with ſo fine and ſo important a cloſe, as a finiſhed diſſertation on the vicious redundances which remained to be taken away, and the improvements to be adopted, to complete a Conſtitution held in ſuch eſteem, by a Declaration of Rights, claimed on a change of the ſucceſſion to the throne? Does he not ſcorn thus even to apply a capital to the beſt column of his own immortality? Inſtead of doing this, we find no one article of its contents, not one argument for or againſt it; he condenſes the account of it into a ſingle period of ſeven lines; while to the Petition of Rights, brought forward in the reign of Charles the Firſt, the articles of which are not ſo many in number, he has given twenty pages*; containing the Petition at length, ſome full and fine extracts from the debates, and an elaborate diſſertation of his own for and againſt it. From this circumſtance [60]ſome people may be inclined to think, that he felt he could not give the Declaration the ſame conſequence with which he had treated the Petition; though they may keep back their aſſent, from the opinion of Macpherſon on the former; who ſays, ‘that the Rights that were claimed had been recognized in the moſt arbitrary reigns, though they were ſometimes evaſively invaded*.’

THAT ſomething muſt be ſubtracted from the weight Mr. Hume's authority gives to the poſition, that the Revolution ‘made a new ſettlement of the whole Conſtitution,’ in the ſenſe in which it is commonly underſtood, appears likewiſe on another ground. In commenting on the uſurpations and illegal acts of the houſe of Stuart later authors had thought fit to judge and condemn them on the laws and the principles now univerſally eſtabliſhed. This proceeding he contends to be analogous to trying a man by an ex poſt facto law. This is true, in many inſtances, in reſpect to the firſt two ſovereigns of that family. But he did not ſufficiently conſider what great approaches were made in the firſt part of the reign of Charles the Second toward that Conſtitution we have now the happineſs to enjoy. Hence, in the laſt of theſe paſſages, he ſeems to hold out the idea, that the nation paſſed, per ſaltum, at a ſingle ſtep, from the old and confuſed ſyſtem, almoſt as it exiſted under the laſt of the Tudors, to the new and ſettled form of Government. His ground for an apology for the houſe of Stuart is happy, but his affection for it has drawn him to a certain length into the error oppoſite to that which he attacks; and although his deviations be by no means ſo [61]groſs as thoſe of the writer's he has in his eye, yet to conſider how he fell into them leads us directly to the authority on which the queſtion before us ought to be decided: this inquiry I therefore now enter upon.

IF, as it is laid down above, great improvements had been made in Legiſlation during the former part of the reign of Charles the Second; yet as they were brought forward ſucceſſively, and not in a maſs, under a ſingle ſtatute, like the Petition of Right in 1628, they muſt be found ſcattered up and down among facts of that eventful period, which were more ſtriking to the imagination of the reader, and even that of the hiſtorian. When the miſcellaneous materials of hiſtory are ſo joined together, he is not able by a retroſpective glance upon the aſſemblage of all of them to obtain a diſtinct view of one claſs of events; as for example, the changes of the ſpirit or letter of Laws. To give a preciſe idea of theſe intereſting particulars, proper epochs muſt be ſelected in the courſe of a Hiſtory, and at each term the ſtate of the Laws ſhould be accurately delineated; then the variation from term to term ſhould be truly and carefully aſſigned, and it ſhould be ſhewn, by way of reſult, whether they were in a gradual ſtate of improvement, or the contrary. Theſe periodical reviews, or balances, Mr. Hume has not drawn out; but admit him to have attempted it, it is certain he would have been much better qualified for the taſk, if that acuteneſs and judgment in which he excelled had been principally employed in the ſtudy of the ſtatute books, and the whole theory, practice, and hiſtory of our Laws. He then would have been intitled to entire credit with regard to what he had ſaid on the change of the legal Conſtitution [62]at the acceſſion of King William, on the maxim, Cuilibet ſuâ in arte credendum.

Now what Hume omitted, and what he was not, from a long and neceſſary courſe of ſtudy, ſo well able to effect, has been done by Judge Blackſtone, at the end of his Commentaries on the Laws of England. After he had recently finiſhed a full ſyſtematical account of the whole, he gives a hiſtory of the variations the Law has undergone, divided into periods, as above deſcribed. The reign of Charles the Second forms a period by itſelf, and the fifth in order; and from ſo complete a view of the ſubject he lays it down, that ‘the Conſtitution of England had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between Liberty and Prerogative was happily eſtabliſhed by Law in the reign of King Charles the Second*;’ ‘wicked, ſanguinary, and turbulent,’ as he had before admitted it to have been. He adds, in a note below, that ‘the point of time at which he would chuſe to fix this theoretical perfection in our public Law, is in the year 1679; though thoſe which followed it were times of great practical oppreſſion.’ And in the laſt paragraph of his work, he ſtates that our Laws and Liberties were totally eclipſed at the Norman Conqueſt, and ‘were not thoroughly and completely regained till after the Reſtoration of King Charles; nor fully and explicitly acknowledged and defined till the aera of the happy Revolution.’ Thoſe liberties, when they were fully and completely regained, were then as ſecurely ours as law, in the turbulent ſtate of ſociety which then obtained, could render them; and the explicit acknowledgement [63]of ſome pre-exiſting laws and their principles cannot be conſidered as even a change of them; it cannot amount to new-modelling a Conſtitution; or what Mr. Hume (as quoted above) calls a new ſettlement of the whole Conſtitution: nor is ſuch a change to be found in the improvement of a definition. The greateſt alteration made in the Law was, that the King ſhould be of the Proteſtant religion. Otherwiſe, the Bill of Rights, though containing matter of great conſequence, was abſolutely declaratory; ſtating certain points either to be already the Law of the Land, or contradictory thereto. In a word, the Conſtitution of England, as exiſting in 1679, ſtood on the footing of Law in 1688; and if we admit with Blackſtone, that it had attained theoretical perfection at the firſt period, I ſhould hold it a libel on the Revolution to ſay after Mr. Hume, that a new ſettlement was then made of the whole, or that any other Conſtitution was then eſtabliſhed. What then was the Revolution, as it affected the Conſtitution? A ſucceſsful reſiſtance againſt an attempt to overthrow the ſyſtem of Government eſtabliſhed by the Laws. And what is it now to act upon Revolution principles? To reſiſt all attempts, whether popular, ariſtocratical, or regal, to ſubvert ſuch Government. The Revolution was the conſervation of the Conſtitution already eſtabliſhed by Law, which was arrived at ſuch perfection, that any attempts, by violence, at a ſuppoſed improvement of it, would have been in the higheſt degree criminal.

THE preſent general intereſt in the queſtion, how far the Revolution was a change of the pre-eſtabliſhed form of Government and of the Laws, has led me into a conſiderable length, perhaps more than neceſſary, from my [64]direct object. In what precedes, however, it will be found, that the principles, on which what the Author of the Letter has ſaid on the Revolution, which ſeems to have given offence, may be juſtified at their full extent. I come now to their application. It is not of the nature of a Conſtitution to be free from the attempts of external force: but ſo early as the year 1679, that ‘of England had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between liberty and prerogative*.’ The people had ſufficient power, reſiding in ‘their own hands, to aſſert and preſerve that liberty if invaded;’ as the event proved in 1688. The Conſtitution therefore wanted neither formation nor eſtabliſhment; the exertion of power already poſſeſſed was become, indeed, highly neceſſary; it was well exerted, and the Conſtitution was ſaved. Hence the Letter-Writer juſtly reprobates thoſe who, diſguiſing other principles under the name of Revolutional, "idolize a Revolution in the abſtract;" that is, any change of governors or legal forms of Government; thoſe who ‘have no love for the Conſtitution, but for that which was formed at the Revolution, previouſly to which it was perfectly formed, and, according to the opinion of Blackſtone, eſtabliſhed in full vigour, and before James the Second aſcended the throne; and hence the Author very rightly laughts at the ‘diſappointment and diſcomfiture of theſe idolizers of a Conſtitution ſuppoſed to be eſtabliſhed at the Revolution, on diſcovering, at length, that they have beſtowed their applauſe and affection upon ſhreds and patches of old date,’ which they ſo oſtentatiouſly affect to deſpriſe, [65]although the records of what they had imagined to be a new Conſtitution made in 1688. It is likewiſe by the ſame reſpectable, and I ſuppoſe Conſtitutional authority, that of the Commentaries, we are informed, that public law had attained its theoretical perfection in 1679; though the years which immediately followed it were times of great practical oppreſſion*. This has been cited before for another purpoſe; but I may ſay here, that on ſuch authority the Letter-Writer might very well pronounce of the politicians deſcribed above, ‘that if they had lived in the wicked reigns of Charles the Second and James the Second, they would have enjoyed in theory, though not in practice, (and theory, of the two, is more conſidered by modern reformers,) as good a Conſtitution as they have had ſince, with the ſingle exception of a Proteſtant King.’

IN the beginning of the page from which the laſt citation is made, he affirms that ‘the other points, which were twelve in number, were, as I have ſaid, known to be the Law of the Land before, and were now declared and ſecured by expreſs definition in Parliament.’ This was done by the Bill of Rights. Theſe obſervations on the effect of the tranſactions of that time on the Conſtitution, cannot be cloſed without a brief expoſition of the nature of that Bill. Its object, according to the Letter-Writer, was ‘only, that what had been the recent cauſe of alarm, what was ſo deeply impreſſed on the minds of all, and what might be thought, from late experience, to be of a nature that required it ſhould be ſolemnly inculcated, might be held up for admonition to future [66]ages* In theſe two paſſages nothing more is to be found than the ſentiments that Blackſtone had expreſſed, with a little more vivacity, that ‘our Liberties and Laws, extinguiſhed by the Norman Conqueſt,’ ‘were thoroughly and completely regained before the Revolution,’ and ‘at that happy aera explicitly acknowledged and defined.’ Both theſe writers agree that the object of the Bill of Rights was to reaſſert thoſe parts of the Laws and Conſtitution which had been violated in act, or of which doubts were entertained; and another authority of great weight may be brought to ſhow (what is indeed obvious in itſelf), that all change of the legal Conſtitution was ſedulouſly avoided, even ſuch as might appear evident ameliorations, and which recent experience ſeemed to call for. ‘One thing (ſays Dalrymple) very remarkable in the Declaration of Rights is, that it condemns not the ſuſpending and diſpenſing powers, but only thoſe powers as exerciſed by King James.’‘And in the laſt great article of all,’ (that Parliaments ſhould be frequently aſſembled,) ‘the words—frequent Parliaments—left the intervals of their aſſembling, and the duration of their ſitting, as undeterminate as ever.’

THE ſpirit with which this Declaration was penned may be gathered from what paſſed at the vote of Abdication, when ‘the wiſer part of the Whigs, at the head of whom was Mr. Sommers, perſuaded their Party to make their own ſentiments of liberty bend to the nature of the Conſtitution, and to the principles of the Tories;’ ‘ſome of them having pointed at laying [67]ſuch reſtrictions upon the authority of either King or Regent, as would have reduced the offices almoſt to empty titles*.’ This ſober ſyſtem, though tranſient, was adhered to in drawing up the Declaration of Rights: if in any part of it they had aimed at even an amelioration of the legal Conſtitution, we might expect to have ſeen it done with regard to the ſuſpending power, and the aſſembling of Parliaments. But on ſo fair a ground they ſcrupulouſly abſtained from it, and confined themſelves to the ſimple declaration of the letter of the exiſting Conſtitution, on thoſe points in which it had been endangered. The Revolution conſiſted in the voluntary abdication of James; his will being demonſtrated by three overt acts, ſpecified in the Vote of the Convention; and its proper definition is, a Revolution by Abdication. But as the whole definition is too long, either for converſation or writing, it were to be wiſhed, that in giving a ſhorter name to this event, we had formed it upon the language of Parliament, and called it the Abdication. The name contains a moral leſſon of ſufficient ſtrength to any future Prince inſtructing him, that a certain period gravi documento in poſterum ſancitum fuit; ne quis unquam Populo injuriam opportunam reputaret . It likewiſe holds out no equivocal ſenſe, like the term Revolution, which a pernicious demagogue can catch hold of, to ſubvert that very Conſtitution which the tranſactions of 1688 ſaved from ſubverſion, intire and without change.

[68]THE term Revolution itſelf, being equally applicable to all changes of Government or Governors, good or bad, is generical. There are many ſpecies of Revolutions, and bad men avail themſelves of the ambiguity of the term. From the praiſes of the Revolution of 1688, the populace are eaſily induced to believe a Revol [...]tion of another ſpecies muſt be likewiſe good; in the event they may find it the greateſt of evils. The botaniſts tell us, that that excellent root the potatoe is of the genus Solanum; yet if any perſon, deſcribing its wholeſomeneſs and good qualities to one not acquainted with the plant, ſhould inſtruct him only in its generical character or marks, which he afterwards diſcovering very clearly in the nightſhade, ſhould eat it with confidence, his life would pay for the error he was led into: and into this error our political botaniſts appear to have led a neighbouring nation.

THERE is a circumſtance of ſome curioſity in the hiſtory of the Bill of Rights; to which, as it tends to juſtify the Letter-Writer's account of the ſtate of Parties at the Revolution, which has been obj [...]cted to with much aſperity, I ſhall here give a place. After the Convention became a Parliament, the Commons, in which [69]the Whig Party intirely prevailed*, turned the Declaration of Rights into a Bill, which they ſent up to the Peers, in which Houſe the Tories had a majority. Upon the ſuggeſtion of the King, Biſhop Burnet propoſed, as an additional clauſe, that the Princeſs Sophia of Hanover, and her poſterity, ſhould ſucceed to the Crown in caſe of the death of the daughters of James the Second without lineal heirs. This Amendment was adopted by the Lords; and the Bill of Rights, with this addition tacked to it, was flung out of the Houſe of Commons, and by the Whig Party. In the following Seſſions they again declined to admit the ſucceſſion of the Houſe of Hanover as a part of the Bill; but the obnoxious clauſe being ſtruck out, at laſt it was ſuffered to paſs.

[70]To render the King's revenue annual would abſolutely deſtroy his independence, and render him a cypher in the Conſtitution; reducing it to a government of the two Houſes, or ultimately to that of an Elective National Aſſembly. Yet this very party, in the Houſe of Commons, having poſtponed the ſettlement of the revenue till the 10th of December 1689, voted it then for one year only*.

WITH theſe events in his recollection, any man, attached to this ſolemn Declaratory Act, to the Houſe of Hanover, or to a mixed Monarchy, may ſay, if the authors of theſe meaſures were active in producing the Revolution, that although ‘that event was brought about by the energy, good ſenſe, and firmneſs of ſome of the beſt and greateſt men in the Nation, it was of a nature unlike moſt good things) to be helped on by the concurrence and approbation of ſome of the worſt men that could be found.’ But in the defence of theſe men and their meaſures, I do not ſee that thoſe Whigs, ‘who mean no otherwiſe than well toward the antient Government and Laws of the Land,’ are any further intereſted than the members of the Church of England in the vindication o [...] the Anabaptiſts at Munſter in the laſt century, becauſe the latter called themſelves Proteſtants. But perhaps the time is not yet come when any Party will venture to claim the national confidence by a deciſive cenſure of the evils that have been committed or attempted by thoſe who have aſſumed and perhaps uſurped their names; and the ſucceſſors of theſe men were too long permitted to range themſelves among them. [71]However, the fermentation of the time has been of uſe to the dignity of the Whig Party; a natural ſeparation has taken place, and this feculence has ſubſided. They are completely ſeparated from that ſubdiviſion, formerly incorporated with them, the ſchool of the Eclectics, who combined a profeſſion of the political theory of Harry Vane with the political practice of Lord Shaftefbury, and who had obtained to be of the number, or, in the words of the Letter-Writer, ‘had taken their ſtand among the Whigs* before 1688. I ſhall conclude what I have to ſay about the Revolution, by proving this point; that after having cleared the Writer of the accuſation of having treated that event as a farce, I may not be involved in it myſelf for having ſaid that the change then effected in the Conſtitution itſelf was minute, and that the object of the Bill of Rights was to preſerve the Conſtitution in its then exiſting form. It may alſo teach thoſe who venerate our legal liberties, and even the independence of the popular Eſtate of the Legiſlature on the power of the Crown, ſo to continue to diſtinguiſh themſelves from this faction, that they may never again have the appearance of belonging to them, to aid them in their deſigns to overwhelm both in one common ruin. I ſhall therefore here ſhew the neceſſity of the Revolution in one point of view, in which our more elegant and popular hiſtorians have not diſtinctly placed it.

AFTER the ſeizing of the charter of the City of London, in the reign of Charles the Second, many of the richer Corporations purchaſed new ones. There appears to have been no diſpoſition to grant them gratis, even [72]upon voluntary ſurrender*. The terms of theſe new charters were ſuch as to leave the nomination of the repreſentatives of thoſe Corporations almoſt entirely in the power of the Crown. After this wide breach in the Conſtitution, the ſervility of James's firſt and laſt Parliament was not ſufficient to anſwer all his purpoſes. The charters of the moſt numerous claſs of the Corporations, that is of the poorer boroughs, had not been yet called in. To induce them to a general ſurrender, he determined to grant new ones without fees. Under theſe new charters the Crown had ultimately the power of nominating to all offices: but to add to this influence in elections, all which fell little ſhort of abſolute nomination, James inſtituted a ſet of officers, called Regulators, to examine the qualifications of electors, and exclude all ſuch as adhered to the Teſt and penal ſtatutes. The Houſe of Commons then conſiſted of 513 members; of which, by this arrangement, 421 would have been effectually nominated by the Crown. Nor did he want agents to aſſiſt him in the completion of his plan to render his power predominant in all the Corporations; a plan which his brother had left imperfect: he might dread, or he might be averſe to the experiment. I copy the words of Coke, a cotemporary writer, a zealot for the principles of Whiggiſm, and therefore an unexceptionable evidence, when cenſuring the conduct of that Party. ‘The Whigs were but too forward to congratulate the King on his deſigns, and in humouring him in giving him up their charters; as the Tories, in King Charles's reign, in their abhorrences of the [73]King's calling a Parliament, and as forward then, as the Whigs now in ſurrendering their charters*.’ It muſt be admitted here, that this charge upon the Whigs is too general. There then exiſted a numerous body among them who were, to uſe the language of the times, "Tories in the Church, and Whigs in the State." Theſe muſt have been in the moſt diametrical oppoſition to the plans of James. The ſection of the Whig Party here meant, muſt be ſuch of the bigoted ſectaries who mingled with them; and we may add to theſe, all who could, by the emoluments of office, or the love of power, or the deſire of trampling upon their formidable rivals, be blinded to a danger, apparently both diſtant and contingent. But unfortunately that ſpirit was then extremely prevalent: and the diſtribution of rewards by James points out that the agents of this ſervice are here rightly aſſigned. The offices of all the Corporations whoſe charters were ſurrendered, had, before this, been filled with thoſe who had oppoſed the Excluſion Bill: ‘theſe were now turned out with diſgrace, and thoſe who appeared moſt violently againſt him were put into the magiſtracy;’ the Corporation of London was filled up with Diſſenters, and afterwards that of every other town.

THUS the King had completed, or nearly completed, the ſeizing into his own hands the effective nomination [72]of 421 Members of the Houſe of Commons, and, by reducing it to a total dependence upon himſelf, annihilated the Third Eſtate, by annihilating its uſe: and with an independent income of £. 2,150,000 a year, which he managed with a rigid oeconomy, he dictated his arbitrary will to the Nation at the head of a regular army of 20,000 men. Such were the formidable machines which he had prepared to batter down the bulwarks of the Conſtitution. There were likewiſe other violations of Law, and uſurped powers, which alone would have rendered the meaſures purſued againſt him neceſſary. He had, it is true, begun to retract; but the wind ſhifted, it blew the Dutch fleet back, and he re-retracted; and the Revolution conſiſted, almoſt ſolely, in the expulſion of ſuch a Sovereign*.

[73]EVERY Revolution muſt be defended on the neceſſity of the individual caſe; and no arguments drawn from this example can be brought to juſtify a Revolution in any [74]caſe, not of the ſame kind, much leſs Revolutions in general. As for inſtance: It is a common belief that the firſt Revolution in Poland was a good one; yet not one particular argument in favour of that of 1688, will apply to the latter; nor can any conſequences be drawn from a Revolution of perſons or governors, whereby the Laws and Conſtitution were intended to be preſerved, to prove the utility of a Revolution, whoſe end is to effect a change in them, let the nature of that change be what it will; and he ſeems to me to be ignorant of the merits [75]of the Revolution, or to traduce it, who commends it for being what it was not. It would be ignorance, in an eulogium of Newton to praiſe him as a ſublime poet, or Locke for his ſkill in naval tactics; and if I were to celebrate the perſonal courage of Auguſtus, or the conjugal fidelity of Henry the Fourth, I ſhould be ſuppoſed to be advancing ſome ſly invectives againſt them. Perhaps not to find in one Revolution ſufficient grounds for another, may be to make it of no conſequence; to make a farce of it: for nothing, with ſome perſons, can be of conſequence in the firſt, which is not ground for a ſecond: but to others it may ſtill ſeem that the right of reſiſtance is one of the jura extremae neceſſitatis; and therefore it may be of ſome danger to be always inculcating it into the minds of the populace. We know that by the ſame laws of extreme neceſſity, a man may take a loaf of bread or a few pounds of meat from his neighbour to ſave himſelf from periſhing; but if in all the churches and chapels of his Majeſty's dominions, this were to be perpetually preached and enforced in every pulpit, upon the great principle of ſelf-preſervation, the enlightened populace would always conceive themſelves to be in extreme neceſſity, and hold themſelves in readineſs to exerciſe this right.

FROM what has been ſaid above on the Conſtitution, and the different ſenſes given to that term, it appears the Letter-Writer is a friend to the Laws and Liberties of his country; and equally ſo in the unreſerved approbation, which in the Firſt Part he has been ſhown to have given to the national moderation, dignity, and greatneſs, manifeſted in the Revolution in 1688; and in cenſuring the equivocal uſe of the term to effect a ſecond, different [76]in its nature and conſequences. The equivocal uſe of the word Conſtitution is of equal danger, as it is perverted to the ſame purpoſes; and he treats it in the ſame manner, both as to its genuine and adulterated ſenſe, which at the proper places I ſhall ſhow as I go on.

ONE might think the word Conſtitution* rather more untractable, and leſs liable to perverſion, than the term Revolution; but by a dextrous treatment it has been moulded down to ſerve the ſame purpoſes. It will be of uſe, therefore, to commence theſe obſervations with a definition of the term Conſtitution, in its genuine and original ſenſe. Our Laws are diviſible into two claſſes: Thoſe which relate to the ſubject as ſuch; and thoſe which relate to the Governors as ſuch; or in the exerciſe of the functions of Government. The whole maſs of the latter form the Conſtitution of Government; the parts of which are found ſcattered up and down in the Statute and Common Law; and the Conſtitution is, in this ſenſe, what is ſo already conſtituted, and nothing elſe. But the preſent Conſtitution might have been called by the ſame name when it was future, and the ſame liberty is now taken. Another Conſtitution, which ſome perſons are deſirous of eſtabliſhing, is called the Conſtitution; and neglecting to diſtinguiſh which they [77]mean, they attribute to the word uſed in the ſecond ſenſe, that which is true of the firſt—the obligation to venerate and ſupport it, &c.

IT is of a Conſtitution differing from that which is defined by Law, that the Letter-Writer ſpeaks thus: ‘The Government we know, and the Laws we know, but the Conſtitution we know not*.’ This ſtrong diſjunction ſhows him to have meant a ſyſtem of Government different from what the Laws have here eſtabliſhed, and this admits of plain proof. The preceding page is taken up in ſhewing that it has become a doctrine in ſome other countries, That nothing is intitled to be called a Conſtitution, but a ſyſtem ſpringing out of an act declaratory of abſtract principles, as of the Rights of Man; whence they tell us that we have ‘no Conſtitution’. To this he ſubjoins, that we ‘may, without yielding anything, take theſe Conſtitution-makers at their word; and at once allow that we have no Conſtitution in the ſenſe in which they underſtand it.’ And continuing to employ the word in the ſame ſenſe, ſix lines after follows the paſſage quoted: ‘The Government we know—and the Laws we know—but the Conſtitution we know not. There is no doubt that certain general principles may be inferred from the Laws, relating to our Governors as ſuch; but theſe inductions are not a part of the body of the Law. The object of Civil Law is human acts: it ordains what is right or expedient in act, and forbids the contrary: theſe are its limits, and it extends no further. Therefore [78]ſuch abſtract principles are not the objects or ſubject-matter of Law. Nor ought a ſyſtem of ſuch opinions, to be declared by a particular law, to form a foundation for all the reſt. And thoſe who would do this, either in the whole or in part, are the Conſtitution-makers againſt whom he in many places declares Let us at leaſt extract wiſdom from what muſt long be a ſource of grief even to us; but when the curtain draws up, and we ſee a Conſtitution brought forward upon the ſtage, dreſſed with this lofty [...]thuraus to give it ſtrut and dignity, depend upon it the piece that is going to be performed is a tragedy.

LET us now examine what the Letter-Writer has ſaid on the exiſting Conſtitution, by Law eſtabliſhed. In the ſame paragraph from whence the laſt paſſage is cited, he gives his opinion, that ‘the Engliſh Government is real and ſubſtantial; we ſee and feel it; we can take its height and its depth; we know its movements, becauſe they are regulated by eſtabliſhed and known Laws. This is the only Conſtitution ever ſuppoſed or named by men of ſober minds and ſound underſtanding; that is,—the Conſtitution of our Government, or the Conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Law*.’ I have no occaſion to ſhow that he holds out this idea of the Conſtitution as a preſervative againſt Republican principles, or at leaſt thoſe which tend to incline many greatly to increaſe the weight in the popular ſcale, and thus endeavours to repreſent them as viſionary and fantaſtic theories. But this fact which he lays down may be employed to another purpoſe: it may be applied with [79]equal ſucceſs againſt the reveries of unlimited Monarchymen; and we find, in effect, he had before expreſsly thus applied it. "I always thought," ſays he, ‘that Engliſhmen required plain and defined ſentences for the Charter of their Rights and Liberties; that they claimed to have known, written, and expreſs Laws to govern them.’ ‘That the divine indefeaſible rights of Kings, with other fancies of former times, were exploded principally, becauſe they were poſitions that had no warrant from the known expreſs Laws of the Land, but reſted on general reaſoning, from topics not known to the uſage and Laws of the Country

IT is in the Common Law and Statutes alone that we are to ſearch for the rules which regulate the actions of our Governors as ſuch, or for the Conſtitution. Proteſtants ſearch for the principles of their religion only in the letter of the Revelation; and Engliſhmen for the principles of the Conſtitution in the letter of the Law. It is not acceſſible in the original, indeed, to every one, to whom ſome knowledge of thoſe principles is neceſſary. Expoſitors and Commentators are of high utility, but their authority is to be eſtimated excluſively by the care with which they follow the letter of theſe originals, and explain with equal accuracy, fullneſs, and force, what regards the conſtituent powers of the Conſtitution. The real Conſtitution, and the hiſtory of its variations, are finely delineated in Blackſtone's Commentaries; and although I would not ſubſcribe to everything he lays down, where he comes to treat certain parts of the ſubject philoſophically, yet a diligent ſtudy of this work I eſteem as [80]the beſt preſervative againſt the flux and reflux of popular errors, which at different paſt periods have made the general idea of the Conſtitution ſhift like a looſe ſandbank.

THERE are other ſchools in which this knowledge is ſometimes ſought. Debates in Parliament will have their uſe in giving perfection and ornament to it. But here conſiderable caution is required: they are to be read as the arguments of Advocates in a court, giving the moſt ſpecious dreſs to the ſide on which they are retained; not as the judgment of the Bench. When the State is divided into Parties, either of them will tell you this is true of their opponents. But there is one caution here particularly neceſſary: when we are examining the arguments of the Party who propoſed any law, we ought to inſpect very cloſely whether the principles they lay down do not extend farther than the actual law itſelf; for to the principle, in that extent, that law has given a tacit negative: it is therefore unconſtitutional. And I believe an obſervance of this caution would have ſuppreſſed in embryo many very brilliant remarks on the nature of the Conſtitution.

THE Codes which contain our civil and religious duties are liable to the ſame abuſes of miſinterpretation: the Conſtitution has its Methodiſt Preachers. There were [...]y enthuſiaſts formerly, who could ſee nothing in the Laws but what made for the Royal power. There were [...] Lawyers of this claſs formerly, and there is a numerous body of ignorant fanatic Preachers now belonging to it, who reſolutely overlook all theſe texts, and can ſee nothing but what exalts the popular branch of the [81]Government over the other two. There is likewiſe another ſet of profeſſors of Conſtitutional Science, formed upon the model of the Socinians, who now uſurp the name of Rational Divines. Theſe men borrow a good deal from the ſchool of the Metaphyſical Politicians, whom I ſhall preſently notice. Theſe expoſitors of the Law and Conſtitution thus furniſhed the plan of their relations, the Divines. The profeſſional man of this ſect, when he finds anything in his book which will not ſquare with them, cuts the knot by affirming it is not Law; becauſe Law being the perfection of reaſon, muſt concur with his reaſon. And ſometimes he goes another way to work; impoſing his own ſenſe upon the words of Law; for which purpoſe he has a private code of verbal criticiſms, which the grammarians who have ſeen it, declare to be ſo profound as to ſurpaſs their comprehenſion. At ſome ſeaſons the whole weight of popular favour will be ſo flung into one ſcale, as almoſt to overſet the balance of the Conſtitution; and at other times it ſhall be caſt into the other. The error of the Multitude is always called by them a Conſtitutional Truth. At ſuch times he will obtain the reputation of a Conſtitutional Lawyer, who flings his whole weight into the overloaded ſcale.

LAST, but not for their inferiority in rank to either of the preceding claſſes, we may place the Metaphyſical Politicians. And theſe are divided into two ſects: one, ſetting out from the doctrine of the good effects of union of power, concenter it abſolutely; the other, now, from the abuſe of it, diſperſe it to the utmoſt, by equaliſing every man's ſhare. Theſe walk in the "via regia," the "high priori road" of the ſcience of politics; and make [82]a ſhort cut to all their concluſions, by the uſe of certain things called Abſtract Principles; and of theſe they prepare the bread of life for the Conſtitution. Now an abſtract principle is a thing very like a Caſſava root; if you grate it, and preſs the virulent juices out of it, it makes a very nouriſhing food; but if you uſe it without that preparation. it is a poiſon. Theſe philoſophers formerly have gone very ſlightly through this courſe of manipulation; but now they omit it entirely, and the Abbé Sieyes has condemned it as an ‘attaint upon principle.’

BUT I paſs from theſe men, and the confuſion they have introduced into our notions of the Conſtitution, to deſcribe one dangerous but ſp [...]cious ſource of error, in arguing on it. When we conſider the power of any one of its conſtituent parts ſeparately, and the reaſons urged for it, we may ſometimes [...], by analogy, that more ſhould be added to it; and [...]y will, at firſt view, conclude that this is an argument for ſo doing. But it will be [...]ſily ſhewn that this is not concluſive; for by adding [...]o any one power. we deſtroy the pre-eſtabliſhed balance and proportion of the three: and if the Conſtitution were good before, if the effect of the change be ſmall, it is almoſt a movement without a motive; if great, it is an evil; it generates a new Conſtitution, different from that found before by experience to be good. The identity of mixed Conſtitutions depends upon the ſame conſtituent parts being combined in the ſame manner and in the ſame proportion, like that of a medical compoſit on; for if you vary the proportion of the ingredients of the latter, though you preſerve the number, its effect may greatly vary; in one proportion [83]the compound may reſtore a man to health, in a dangerous illneſs; in another, put an end to his exiſtence.

IT follows from this, that when any man or ſet of men are charged with wiſhing to make a great change in the exiſting Conſtitution; if they barely declare themſelves friends to a Government by King, Lords, and Commons, they do not thereby diſclaim that charge. For this purpoſe they muſt make an addition to this declaration, and ſay, that each ought to poſſeſs the ſame powers they now hold. For a Party who may wiſh to bring the Government of Great Britain very near to a Democracy, to an Ariſtocracy, or to pure Deſpotiſm, with two almoſt non-effective pageants of power, to ſupport the names of its other two conſtituent parts, may with equal truth make the ſame declaration. Of the equivocation I am deſcribing, it is to be feared there are too many inſtances. I illuſtrate this matter farther, by examples taken from our own hiſtory.

HENRY the Eighth trampled upon the Lords and Commons; in the reign of Henry the Sixth, during ſome time before the civil wars, the Nobility tyrannized over the King and the people; and before Charles the Firſt quitted the metropolis, the Commons had effectively reduced the Peers and the King to cyphers; and if any of theſe three uſurpations had been confirmed by the forms of Law, it would have been a Government by King, Lords, and Commons: but it could not take place now without a ſubverſion of the exiſting Conſtitution.

[84]THE defence of the Conſtitution, as it is now fixed by Law and Cuſtom, is and ought to be the common center of union, both to thoſe who conſider it as arrived at that degree of practical perfection, that no farther experiments ſhould be tried upon it, and thoſe who, allowing much that is excellent in it, full retain an idea that it might be worth the while to attempt ſome farther moderate ameliorations of it. I freely declare in favour of the former, and even on ſpeculative principles; but on the points in which theſe allies differ I urge nothing. In the little I have to [...]. I hope to be in concurrence with the ſentiments of the latter. While the preſent fermentation in the minds of the populace is kept up by every claſs of ſe [...]tious agit [...]rs, to attempt any change in the exiſting proportion of the [...]ree powers, does not ſeem mo [...]e ſafe than the c [...]ging of the poſition of an army wh [...]n the enemy [...] approached cloſe up to it, and is about inſtantly to commence [...] attack, which almoſt inevitably muſt terminate in a total rout. If you ſhould carry your point now, your victory the agitators will repreſent as theirs, and they will meet with ready belief. They and their Party will grow in courage, in number, in force, and in conſequence, moſt probably too high for you and your former opponents, if united, to make a ſtand againſt them; and the Conſtitution you will have to live under, will at leaſt be much more remote from what you have fixed upon in your minds as a ſtandard, than the preſent.

WITH two or three miſcellaneous obſervations, I ſhall cloſe a Tract, that has grown to a much greater length than I expected. I muſt remark on the Letter-Writer, that Calvin did not concur with Beza on the [85]ſubject of Church Government by Biſhops*. There is no Divine of the Church of England now, who would ſpeak the language of the former. I have not his works, but I find in the Preface to the Clergyman's Vade Mecum, that in his Anſwer to the artful and elegant work of Cardinal Sadolet againſt the firſt Reformers, he certainly does ‘anathematize all thoſe who do not revere and pay the moſt profound obedience to that hierarchy in which Biſhops retain their eminence; but ſo as to ſubmit to Chriſt Jeſus, and depend on him as their Head.’ Now I have never heard even of Archbiſhop Laud. that he fulminated an anathema againſt all who did not "moſt profoundly revere" the Epiſcopal Church Government in England. But of Beza, the Marquis D'Argens informs us, that at the conferences at Poiſſi, by his declaration againſt the Epiſcopal Government, ‘he loſt the fineſt opportunity poſſible of introducing a thorough reformation in the Gallican Church.’ If Bayle had known this particular, he would not have been perplexed to aſſign the reaſon why thoſe conferences were ſo unexpectedly broken off. We alſo find in the Hiſtory of Geneva, that the citizens founded a College for the education of foreigners reſorting thither; and the circumſtance immediately following it is, that the Duke of Savoy and Charles the Ninth of France remonſtrated ſtrongly with the Republic, that the ſtudents on their return excited their ſubjects to diſobedience and ſedition [86] * The name of Hugonot, according to De Thou, was not originally that of a ſect, but of a political Party, and borrowed from Geneva, which was divided into two claſſes; the Eignots, or confederates by oath; and the Mamalues, or Egyptian ſl [...]ves; which ſeem very well to anſwer the modern terms of Party in France. What a leaven of Republicaniſm they there got and diffuſed in their native conntries, debaſing the ſuperior purity of their doctrines, we ſee in an unmived and unequivocal light in one part of the hiſtory of that kingdom. The Edict of Nantz had been paſſed ſeven years; Henry the Fourth, their patron, was ſtill on the throne; his adminiſtration with reſpect to them was ſuch, that they wiſhed him immortal. It is the Proteſtant Duke of Sully that is their accuſer. If we may believe that great man, ‘a ſcheme had been formed for eſtabliſhing a kind of a Commonwealth; or at leaſt a body apart from the reſt of the kingdom, by an aſſociation among the Proteſtants.’ He names the men who formed it. The hiſtorian continues — ‘The body of the Proteſtants did not ſee the thing in this light, and when they did, they diſapproved it.’ Sully muſt have been ſo willing to be ſatisfied, that I cannot ſuppoſe he was not. We all ſtop ſhort, by a kind of inſtinct, in the inveſtigation of facts, the reſult of which will give us pain. His declaration likewiſe by no means exculpates thoſe who guided their councils. It was perhaps impolitic, when the ſtorm was weathered, to draw aſide the veil attempted to be drawn over the conſpiracy. The Hugonots had been formed [87]into ſomething like an imperium in imperio for years; and it is not likely that the diſciples of Geneva ſhould form a Republic without knowing it. Though I admit, if a man were to ſet up the frame of a houſe upon my ground, and upon my threatening a proſecution he were to conſent to remove it, and were to tell me, that when he cut out his timbers into proper ſcantlings, adapted them to one another, framed and pinned them together, he did not know it was a houſe which he had been framing, and that "he looked upon it in another light," the point ſeems to me ſo exceedingly difficult of proof, that I ſhould not conteſt it, though I knew he had been educated in a carpenter's ſhop.

IT remains to conſider what the Letter-Writer has ſaid on the late Trials of certain perſons for Treaſon. The material part of it is as follows: ‘They were indeed acquitted by a Jury, but they have been ſince found guilty by their Country, on the evidence of the proceedings at the Trial*.’ This is firſt brought as a proof, that he does not treat Juries with due reverence. I ſubſcribe without heſitation to their abſolute neceſſity, as I do to our mode of making Laws; but as I do not ſuppoſe myſelf treating the Legiſlature of the kingdom with contempt, when I find fault with a law enacted by it, which muſt have been ſo often debated, and have received three ſuch important ſanctions, every Engliſhman has ſurely the full right to treat the verdict of a Jury, decided at once, with the ſame freedom, without an imputation of want of reverence for that excellent inſtitution. The voice of the Law itſelf is on this ſide. To [88]guard our liberties, and in tenderneſs to perſons arraigned, no ſecond trial takes place in criminal caſes at the ſuit of the Crown; but it is not to be ſuppoſed that Juries are more infallible when ſitting on ſuch cauſes than in civil caſes, in which the Law itſelf ſuppoſes that they may give a verdict contrary to evidence, by allowing a new trial in ſuch caſes.

THE Jury mentioned before were acknowledged by the Judge to have diſplayed "the moſt unwearied attention "and the moſt diligent inveſtigation." They alſo brought in their verdict after much private deliberation. But what does this amount to? That they went through all the forms of buſineſs with the ſtricteſt attention to decorum. The point where he ſtopped directs the attention decidedly to what he was ſilent upon. I think to remember having obſerved this when I firſt ſaw the words. It is a "ſilence that ſpeaks;" and I think on the ſide of the Letter-Writer. Do not Judges frequently expreſs their ſatisfaction at a verdict? and did this Judge appear to have been backward in giving approbation where he could do it with propriety? Theſe conſtructions of ſilence, when certain decorums impoſe it, are at leaſt as old as Menander, whom I quote in the margin, and who obſerves, "they ſpeak many things *." And if the authority of a Poet will not do, we may bring that of an Hiſtorian; that when by the ſtate of political affairs great men are induced to ſhow ſome things and keep others back, the public attention is ſtrongly called to the latter. Was not the memory of Brutus and Caſſius impreſſed upon every Roman's mind moſt ſtrongly, becauſe [89]the diſcretion of one of their deſcendants concealed their ſtatues on a well-known occaſion?

LET the queſtion now be conſidered in another point of light. We are to obſerve that the word Evidence bears, in common converſation, two ſenſes; according to the ſpecies thereof conſidered; hiſtorical or judicial evidence. The evidence may be enough to make any man believe the exiſtence of a plot, or come up to the point here called hiſtorical; but it may fall ſhort of that degree of ſtrength the Law requires to take away the life of an individual, or judicial evidence. And where the evidence is only of the firſt magnitude, or (as it may do) where it much exceeds the weight required by the firſt, but ſtill falls ſhort of the ſtandard of the ſecond, the Public MUST condemn, and the Jury MUST acquit; each with the ſame matter before them. The national tranſactions with foreign Nations in peace and war, are ſolely guided by the firſt ſpecies of evidence. Senates proceed in their declarative deciſions on the firſt ſpecies of evidence, when they think the State in danger, to give the watch-word to the People: Courts of Juſtice on the ſecond. If nothing but judicial evidence were hiſtorical evidence, hiſtory muſt be a blank, or at leaſt half the inſtructive, leſſons it holds out to mankind muſt be blotted out: and upon that evidence men muſt ſpeak, or be reduced to mutes.

JURIES are adjuncts to the Royal Executive Power; and the Letter-Writer is charged with having ſaid that they may be "lopped off" without detriment to the State. But in effect, he nowhere ſuppoſes the axe applied [90]to this ſubſidiary and occaſional power at all: and when in other caſes he ſuppoſes it to be applied, he repreſents the monarchical trunk as being in conſequence "ſhorn of its honours;" and if he holds the latter may be done without detriment to the State, he is a Republican; if both conjointly, an Anarchiſt. But I have never heard that the ſuppoſed Author of the Letter holds any ſuch political hereſies, which I am ſure are not to be found there. It is true, however, that when the kingly power was in this country ‘ſhorn of its honours,’ Juries, in caſes then called caſes of High Treaſon, were "lopped off." We are expreſsly told, that Cromwell and the Parliament ſet them aſide, and erected "High Courts of Juſtice*." And to ſuperſede them in like manner, very ſoon after they were introduced, the French Republicans copied this precedent in their Revolutionary Tribunals; and if the ſame Republican uſurpation ſhould again take place in this country, Juries may be once more ‘lopped off.’

THERE is another charge of a ſimilar formation brought againſt what the Writer has ſaid on the late Verdicts. A great Orator has been made in the public papers to declare, that it is aſſerted in the Letter, that ‘the verdict of Juries is not a final deciſion in trials at Bar.’ This I have not ſeen there; no more did he, if by Bar he means the legal Bar. But there is another and an awful Bar, at which ſuch verdicts have been often ſet aſide, as contrary to evidence; that of impartial poſterity; [93]that of hiſtory; that even of the men who live at the time when they are given, after the [...]erment attending ſuch a cauſe has ſubſided; for even this laſt muſt be granted, unleſs we ſuppoſe truth to be a volatile ingredient like camphor, which being mixed in that compound called a verdict, it ſhall thus retain, as to ſenſe, the full odour thereof for a given time or number of years; ſmell faintly for a ſecond term; and be quite flat always afterwards.

YET if we grant this, as highly probable, to thoſe who contend for this philoſophical hypotheſis, they muſt, according to their own principles, at the ſame time admit it to be poſſible, that it may be ſometimes infuſed therein in a liquid form like aether; and in caſes where the ingredient is only ſo blended in the compound, a man ſhall appear as the innocent victim of State perſecution to-night, and be univerſally believed an acquitted felon to-morrow; for evaporate this aether will. You may as eaſily fix "Hermes," which it is known cannot be done without the powder of precipitation. I have ſaid it before, and I repeat it again, Juries are of the moſt abſolute neceſſity to guard ſubjects againſt the oppreſſion of governors: but it does not follow that any dozen of reputable ſhop-keepers, or farmers, or merchants, or eſquires, in his Majeſty's dominions, are jointly veſted with the ſublime gift of infallibility. The ſublimeſt monuments of human wiſdom and virtue are diſhonoured by being praiſed for what they are not. When we find them dreſſed out in ſuch fantaſtical attributives, we ſuſpect, perhaps, the deſign of ſuch needleſs extravagance, but we directly ſtrip off the frippery. [94]And I believe any man of taſte would do the ſame, if a French taylor and a French perruquier had exhauſted all the wonders of their art upon the Farneſian Hercules.

To return to the doctrine I am conſidering; which is, that the verdict, which is deciſive in a trial, ſhould decide every man's opinion. Thoſe who hold this doctrine are prepared, I ſuppoſe, to defend the legality of the deciſion on Algernon Sidney, and all the verdicts in the war of legal murders carried on by both the factions in the latter end of the reign of Charles the Second. To me it appears, that during all the time in the laſt century, in which the Republican Party appeared viſibly in exiſtence and in action, until it dwindled into obſcurity, the political Trials by Jury form no ornament to the page of our hiſtory: a brilliant exception or two may, however, be alledged.

FOR theſe reaſons I think the Letter-Writer guiltleſs, in toto, of all the charges I have ſeen brought againſt him. If the Public attributes the work to the true Author, it is every man's duty, who thinks as I do of his paſt merits and the general importance of his political character, and who has opportunities, to take up his defence.

THIS Tract was ſent to the preſs without the Writer's being able to read the whole together. He had the choice of abiding the cenſures of all inaccuracies ſo cauſed; or to have delayed the publication [95]too long; and he has choſen the former, becauſe on all ſuch occaſions, that little ſacrifice ought to be made. It ought, alſo, to be announced; becauſe, in ſuch a circumſtance, a Writer is intitled to certain allowances.

THE END.

Appendix A Lately publiſhed by the ſame Author,

[]

The ALTERATION of the CONSTITUTION of the HOUSE OF COMMONS, and the INEQUALITY of the LAND-TAX, conſidered conjointly. Price Three Shillings and Sixpence.

A FAST SERMON. Price One Shilling.

ALSO, POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS on the TEST-ACT. Price One Shilling and Sixpence.

Notes
*

What precedent was ſelected to favour ſuch enlargement? That of a Committee of the Commons in 1680. And what was one of the offences of Janes and Weſton? They had ſaid that Calvin was a favourer of Democracy. I cite the Univerſal Hiſtory'.—Did he not ultimately maintain the liberty of the Republic of Geneva as ſuch, when it was in danger of falling as ſoon as it roſe?—This particular inquiry was inſtituted to keep up the ferment of the Nation about the Popiſh Plot;—a diſgrace to our hiſtory;—and by a Houſe of Commons. "who greatly lamented the death of Bedloe "as a material witneſs, on whoſe teſtimony they much depended;" who endeavoured by their countenance and protection to purge off the extreme infamy of Dangerfield (pilloried four times, and an outlaw), and to reſtore him to a capacity of being a witneſs; embracing the moſt incredible texture of falſehood and wickedneſs, and ſupporting the belief of it by a ſeries of legal murders, to introduce the Excluſion Bill, whatever the conſequences of that meaſure might have been. The popular violences and anarchy of the inſurrection at Munſter, had at firſt flung a load of odium on the Proteſtants in general, and Luther had found it neceſſary to refute the charges brought againſt himſelf and his diſciples. But it is needleſs to make any obſervations on the worſe part of the conduct of the Parliament of 1640, pieced with ſome links of the chain of meaſures taken up by that of 1680.

If the matter which is here ſtated from the public papers was really brought forward in the Houſe. I feel ſome aſtoniſhment at the impolicy of its introduction. Men had preſently after ſome late State Trials, reflected pretty much upon thoſe which took place before London Juries at the time of the Popiſh Plot; the period of our hiſtory the Newſpapers ſtate to have been referred to. Can it [xi]be doubted but Faction led on ſome, and fear for their own ſafety, amidſt enemies they could not at all times guard againſt, induced others, to find thoſe guilty whoſe innocence was ſufficiently eſtabliſhed by evidence? And is it not to be ſuppoſed, that a guilty perſon, with proofs as ſtrong againſt him, would even with more facility have been declared innocent, if the Juries had been influenced that way by the ſame motives? And we find charges of this kind, when the offenders were of the popular party, ſtrongly urged againſt the Juries of the metropolis in the laſt century. (See Hume, v. 8. p. 171. 173. Dalrymple's Mem. 410. 1771. p. 4. 15.) The mention of the Committee of 1680, points out, as with a ſeſcue, the trials ſo connected with it.

[x]
V. 32. p. 299.
P. 121.
P. 129.
*
Hume, 8vo. 1767. v. 6. p. 309.
Ibid. p. [...]10.
*
That is, all that is neceſſary, and no more.
P. 9. l. 22.
P. 47. l. 1.
*
P. 16 l. 6.
P. 59. l. 8.
P. 80. l. 3.
P. 4. l. 2.
*
P. 4. l. 9.
P. 3. the whole.
Laſt words of Pamphlet.
P. 57. l. 24.
§
P. 13. laſt line.
*
P. 72. l. 21.
P. 43. l. 2.
P. 25 l. 11.
*
P. 40. l. 8.
*
Words of Legiſlation, "the King wills it" (i. e.) by and with &c.
*
Comm. vol. i. p. 147.
*
P. 2. l. 3.
P. 9. l. 11.
P. 5. l. 14.
P. 2. l. 10.
§
P 68 l. 20.
*
Lowth's Grammar, 1776, p. 154.
*

I am afraid the cenſure of the paſſage would have been much aggravated if the Author had added as a concluſion to it, ‘The King is ſuperior to both Houſes in dignity;’ yet this is laid down as a principle by Blackſtone, v. 1. p. 150.

The matters contained in the extract, the Writer ſtates to be ſuch ‘as can be demonſtrated from the inconteſtable evidence of hiſtory [29]and records.’ Page 13. Where I looked for his defence, thither I find he has referred all his readers: The points of law to be quoted will be taken from "Blackſtone's Commentaries;" which a Noble Lord in oppoſition at the time when this matter was agitated, ſpeaking of another ſubject, declared it to be the duty of every Magiſtrate to ſtudy. The edition made uſe of is that of 1773, in 8 vo; and as Hume is quoted as evidence by the cenſurers of the Letter, I ſhall take my principal hiſtorical authorities from him (8 vo. 1767) and the former writer. [28]
*
Page 61, 410. 1647.
*
Bl. v. 4. p. 439.
*
Clarendon's Diary in Macpherſon's Hiſtory, v. 1. p. 534.
Burnet's Occaſional Serm [...]ns, Pref. p. 14. Edit. 1713.
*
From Burke's "Reflections," 4th edit. p. 187.
*
Hume, vol. 7. p. 245.
Ibid. p. 252.
Ibid. p. 285.
§
Ibid. p. 347.
*
Sermon at a Public Thankſgiving, preached at Philadelphia, Feb. 19, 1795, by Dr. Stanhope Smith, Vice-Perſident, &c. &c. in the College of New Jerſey.
Letter, p. 12. l. 12.
*
Letter, p. 13. l. 4.
*

In addition to what I have ſaid above it may be re-obſerved, that the point of view in which this writer has placed the two limitations of the Royal Power, ſhews that quality, in that part of the plan of our Conſtitution (conſidered apart from its effects), which is called unity of deſign.

*
Bacon's Hiſt. Diſc.

I do not think that any Deputies of the Commons formed a part of the Saxon Great Councils. He that ſhall prove this opinion to be erroneous will ſtrengthen the cauſe of the Letter-Writer on the one hand, more than he will weaken it on the other, by furniſhing a proof that the popular branch may be cut off by violence, and that the monarchical Trunk may preduce a new one, even after the lapſe of two Centuries.

*
V. 7. p. 339.
*
Hurd's Horace, v. 3, p. 164.
*
V. 1. p. 241.
*
Hume, v. 8. p. 309.
Ib. v. 8. p. 310.
Burke on the French Revolution.
*
V. 6. pp. 277-196 incluſive.
*
Hiſtory, v. 1. p 568.
*
V. 4. p. 439.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 442.
*
Bl. v. 4. p. 439.
Ib. p. 440.
Let. p. 40. l. 25.
Let. p. 53. 11.
*
Bl. v. 4. p. 439.
Let. p. 53. l. 15.
*
Let. p. 53. l. 1.
Bl. v. 4. p. 442.
Dal. Part i. p. 208.
*
Dal. Part I. p. 194.
Ibid. p. 209.
Livy.
The ſpirit of Adminiſtration is a point of great conſequence in every Government; but that always depends upon the temper of the governors and that of the people conjointly: it admits no ſpecific definition, any more than the ſeveral gradations of light between total darkneſs and ſun-riſe. It can be marked only in general terms, incapable of legal preciſion in their ſenſes; it therefore cannot be eſtabliſhed by law. The ſpirit of Adminiſtration in Government has been very much ameliorated ſince the Revolution; but this could ariſe from no change of an actual Conſtitution; it is totally to be attributed to the ſalutary leſſon the Abdication conve [...]ed, and a change of manners and ideas.
*

From an anecdote extracted by Dalrymple from Clarendon's Diary, it ſeems very probable that many of the more reſpectable Commoners of the Whig Party loſt their elections to the Convention Parliament; I mean thoſe who acceded to the coalition with the Tories in James's time, whom I preſume to have been the moſt moderate men, who did not run into ſuch diametrical extremity of oppoſition to them. Theſe joined the Prince, and were in his camp when James iſſued his writs for the calling of a Parliament. It filled them with alarm for their ſeats; ſo much ſo, as to induce them to propoſe to William, and ſtrongly to inſiſt upon a very ſtrange meaſure; and, when he ſummoned the Convention, many of them muſt have found they had begun their canvas too late. The ſame I ſuppoſe to have been the diſappointment of many of the Tories of moderate principles and of fidelity to their engagements. At firſt things went on well, under the direction of Mr. Sommers; but the latent diſtempers ariſing from the bad formation of the Houſe, ſoon broke out, and ſuffer us little to regret its diſſolution in about one year; and leſs to wonder either that King William ſhould attempt it, or ſucceed without ſhaking his new throne.

Dal. Part II. p. 69.410.1771.
Ib. p. 102.
Ib. p. 105.
*
Dal. Part II. p. 106.
Let. p. 43. l. 1.
Ibid. p. 66. l. 6.
*
Let. p. 44 l. [...].
*
Coke's Detection, e. 2. p. 207.
Ib. p. 434.
Hume, 7.8. p. 255.
Coke's Detection, p. 385.
*

Coke's Detection, p. 464. The paſſage is given as it ſtands, without any alteration of its conſtruction. Coke is frequently quoted by Hume.

Dal. Mem. Part II. p. 20.
Burnet's Hiſt. 12 mo. 1725. p. 1197.
Hume, v. 8. p. 255.
*

I might have proceeded farther, and ſaid, that the conferring of the Crown and the intire adminiſtration upon William, preſerved the Kingly power in the Conſtitution. The attempts to annihilate it at the beginning of his reign have been ſhown; all his policy, his cool determination and vigour were requiſite to preſerve it. If a Regency had been ſet up, or the ſceptre had been placed in the hands; of Mary, it could not have been maintained. By his arrival William preſerved one integral part of the Conſtitution from virtual annihilation, the Popular Eſtate. In little more than a year he was called to a new taſk; the Conſtitution was again threatened with deſtruction, by meaſures which would have ended in the abolition of Royalty, and he preſerved it, by an act of the greateſt political courage and vigour (the diſſolution of the Parliament which had placed him on the Throne), from becoming a turbulent Democracy.

I cannot help making one obſervation, to which I ſhould be inc [...]ned to give a place in the natural hiſtory of Parties, that the practical opinions of better men in each differ very much, from [73]what their Agitators lay down as principles, and their conſequences; for all Parties have their Agitators, and ſometimes even men of ſome figure are found in this forlorn hope. Following the order of time, I ſhall take from the Tories the firſt example of this truth. When real danger threatened the popular part of the Conſtitution, ‘from them, it is certain, the moſt preſſing calls to the Prince of Orange came*.’ Sir Edward Seymour, who was the leader of that Party, was the firſt who, rearing the ſtandard of Liberty, joined the Prince with a conſiderable force; bringing with him the Gentlemen of Dorſetſhire and Somerſetſhire: he planned the famous Aſſociation.

The generous ſupport the Tories then gave to legal liberty, we now ſee the whole body of Whigs, with few exceptions worth regarding, pay to legal Kingly power. With a Conſtitutional nobility of ſpirit they have thronged around the ſtandard of legal mixed Monarchy; and the beſt men of either Party (if there be any ſpeculative Tories now) might, with a little change of two lines of Cowley's celebrated Poem upon Craſhaw, ſay of their opponents ſo acting,

Their ſaith, perhaps, in ſome nice tenets might
Be wrong; their lives, I'M SURE, were in the right.

Little doubt, I ſuppoſe, can be made but the Agitators and Bigots of the Tory Party (for I ſuppoſe they had not the "ſturdy morality" to deny leave to the Abſolute Monarchy-men to call themſelves by their name) were not wanting on this occaſion to call theſe generous defenders of the Conſtitution apoſtates, and their declarations againſt the exceſſes of their unconſtitutional fanaticiſm, deſertion of [74]principle; holding all principles that are barely general to be univerſally true; for people of this ſort have been always-very charitable to a parcel of poor words, whoſe lot it has been to be held in diſcredit; [...]o [...]e [...]ing their unfortunate lot very much, by applying them to ſubjects to which nothing bad can attach, ſo taking off moſt of the odium in which they have been formerly held. But I cannot equally praiſe the goodnature of [...] perſons at this day, in the exerciſe of the abſolute power they have over the Engliſh language, with reſpect to the poor-word "Patriot;" which, though it may retain its honours in the graver ſtyle, yet by their too frequent application of it, they have made it in common converſation and familiar writing ſynonymous to "Political Tartuſſe;" and my love of Engliſh literature is ſuch, that I beſeech, nay even, with Dr. Bentley, "vehemently exhort." the ſaid Legiſlators in Language, that they will ſend to the Gentleman who is (as I hear) now compiling a Dictionary of the Engliſh Language at Oxford, a liſt of all ſuch words as they purpoſe to employ in the next five years, either in panegyric or reprehenſion (that it may not be in part obſolete before it comes out); together with the day on which they intend firſt ſo to uſe the ſame; as for example, July the 14th, 1798; whereby he may warn the purchaſers of his work, that until July the 14th, 1798, the word is to be underſtood in its preſent eſtabliſhed ſenſe; but that at 12 o'clock on that day, and ever after, it is to be uſed in burleſque only, or in that figure to which the Greek [...]ricians have given the name of Irony.

[72]
*
Dal. Part I. p. 133.
Whitworth's Davenant, Vol. IV. p. 134, Dal. V. I. Part I. p. 161. Burnet, p. 1332.
*
I find the term Conſtitution, in its true ſenſe, to have been in common uſe in 1628. "Why do we trouble ourſelves," ſays Sir F. Seymour, in the debates on the Petition of Right, ‘with diſputes about a Conſtitution and franchiſes?’ The term I ſuppoſe to have grown into diſuſe, and to have been revived in the days of North, who mentions it as a new term, ‘commonly brought forward with a Republican face.’—Let. p. 46. l. 2.
*
Let. p. 57. l. 15.
Subſtance of p. 56 of the Letter.
*
Let. p. 57. l, 24.
Let. p. 46. l. 23.
*
It will be ſeen that this does not invalidate his general ſtatement.
Second Edit. Pref. p. 36.
Jewiſh Letters. Let. 178.—Tranſlation.
*
Modern Univerſal H [...] v. 32. p. 304. paragraph abridged.
Ibid. p. 26 [...].
Ibid. v. [...]1. p. [...]1.
*
Let. p. 73. l. 24.
*
[...] S. Poetae Men. p. 489.
*
Hume, v. 7. p. 208, 209.
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TextGrid Repository (2020). TEI. 3578 A defence of the pamphlet ascribed to John Reeves Esq and entitled Thoughts on the English government By the Rev J Brand A M Addressed to the members of the loyal associations against Republ. University of Oxford Text Archive. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.T11991/0000-001A-5D43-1