PART I.

MEN who are friends to our legal Conſtitution, and to the ſpirit of it, agree in all the main outlines, and differ more or leſs only on ſubordinate points; on which, if you find two individuals agreed, you will not find even a ſingle ſubſection of a party, all the members of which bold preciſely the ſame opinion. It is by theſe great outlines, therefore, that the conſtitutional principles of our Author are to be judged.

[17]IN the public prints, one of the conductors of the attack on this Pamphlet is made to declare, that it is part of a ſeries of attempts to make the Crown everything, and the People nothing. There cannot be a fuller contradiction to this charge than certain paſſages contained in the work itſelf. The powers and dignity veſted in the King are declared to be ſufficient for his high ſtation in the following words: We have ‘an hereditary King, who bears all the burthen of Government, who is endued with ALL the power NECESSARY^* to carry it on, and who enjoys ALL the honour and pre-eminence NECESSARY TO GIVE SPLENDOR to ſo high a ſtation ^†.’ The word "hereditary" will poſſibly give a little more diſguſt to ſome than will be openly avowed; but it is not neceſſary to guard a part where you know that your adverſary, in his preſent circumſtances, dares not to aim a blow; therefore we will conſider the only objection he will venture to bring forward. The Writer, he might urge, for anything that here appears to the contrary, may conſider the right of the King as divine and indefeaſible. But I think, when an author, ſomewhat ela⯑borately, endeavours to limit his own terms, excluſively, to another and more ordinary ſenſe than they obviouſly bear, he is to be ſuppoſed to wiſh to have them underſtood in that ſenſe only. What that is let him lay down. Now among ‘the high pretenſions, founded on viſionary and refined theories,’ like caſtles in the air, ‘I thought (ſays this Writer), that the divine indefeaſible right of Kings, and other fancies of former times, were exploded;’ and he adds, "becauſe they have no warrant in law^‡." He aſſerts, indeed, that a Monarchy is preferable to the ty⯑ranny of ‘five hundred Republicans, that govern by [18]their ordinances, that is, by their own will.’ But what ſpecies of Monarchy is it he here prefers to ſuch a Re⯑public? That under which we are ‘the ſubjects of a King who governs by law^*.’ And I obſerve further, that by the term law the context requires us to underſtand the law of the limited Monarchy of England. Some Members of the Minority, I believe, when they have been obliged to ſpeak explicitly on the conſequences of the French oligarchy of deſpots, have gone a little further.

So much for the foundation of the firſt part of the charge, that the Author of this Pamphlet wiſhes to make the King everything. Now let us ſee what ground there is for imputing to him a wiſh to make the People nothing. In the fulleſt and moſt direct contradiction to this, I ſhall ſhow that he admits the influence of the People in terms which prove his high ſenſe of its utility, and even of the neceſſity of its frequent interpoſition. Their actual influence, and its utility, are inferred from theſe words: ‘The people of ſenſe who look on have a great ſway, though not always ſeen, in balancing the weight of parties^†.’ in what terms is it that he men⯑tions their conſequence, during every Meeting of Parlia⯑ment? On the deliberations of that Aſſembly, "Engliſh⯑men, ſays he, ‘this is a ſeaſon when your ſuperin⯑tending influence is moſt needed; and we uſually ſee it is then moſt happily predominant^‡.’ What is the good ſenſe of the country but the good ſenſe of the People? Does not this Writer tell us, that ‘nothing can be brought to a ſucceſsful concluſion, unleſs it is approved by the good ſenſe of the country^‖?’ Does he not call the ſway it [19]enjoys "gentle and uſeful^*?" Does he not inſiſt at large that it has been the preſervative againſt every party which has been engaged in bad councils^†? With this the pam⯑phlet begins; and what was the laſt thought dwelling upon his mind at the concluſion? ‘Engliſhmen, the Parliament is now aſſembled.’ *** You, therefore—you! at leaſt, "watch" ^‡! Such are the principles contained in a pamphlet which is part of a ſeries of meaſures, the ſecond object of which is to make the People nothing!

I GO on, with ſomewhat more brevity, to ſtate other principles of this Writer. On our excellent form of Government he ſays, that it is "real and ſubſtantial;" ‘we ſee and feel it; we can take its height and its depth; and we know its movements, becauſe they are regulated by eſtabliſhed and known laws;’and he adds, ‘that this is the only Conſtitution ever ſuppoſed or named by men of ſober minds and ſound underſtanding^‖.’ Now this deſcription certainly includes all that is conſtituted; and he who adds any other things to this idea of the Conſtitu⯑tion, cannot affirm they are conſtituted; and I would wiſh him for the future, for the ſake of logical diſtinctneſs, to call all ſuch things, the unconſtituted parts of the Conſtitu⯑tion. But we ſhall have to revert again to the double ſenſe of the term Conſtitution, whence the wildeſt abuſes have ariſen. But of the Conſtitution eſtabliſhed by law he ſays, its ‘beſt title is profeſſed to be, its conformity to the principles of reaſon^§.’

HIS ſentiments on the ſubject of Civil Liberty I ſhall introduce by obſerving, that our nobleſt principles never [20]can be diſhonoured but by actual fanaticiſm, or by the viler hypocriſy of thoſe men who, for ends which will not bear the light, put on the wildeſt appearance of that fana⯑ticiſm to kindle the reality in others. Impreſſed with this truth, the Writer of the Pamphlet reprobates thoſe ‘who have rendered the beſt things odious by THEIR corrupt contact; who have made the friendly appellation of Citizen a badge of ſeparation and enmity; and the very name of Liberty ſuſpected to the ear of an Engliſh⯑man ^*.’ It would require a logic which I am not maſter of to find an enemy to that "beſt" of "things," liberty, in the man who admits it ſo to be, and who cen⯑ſures with ſuch vigour thoſe who have brought its name into diſcredit.

THIS act of his political creed would be incomplete without the addition of the Writer's ſentiments on that great event which placed King William on the Throne of theſe kingdoms. This, he ſays, ‘was brought about by the energy, good ſenſe, and firmneſs, of ſome of the beſt and greateſt men in the Nation^†.’ Yet he ſtands charged in a ſuppoſed ſpeech with ‘having written a libel on the illuſtrious characters who brought it about.’ I know of no more liberal praiſe that imagination could deviſe to give to it than to ſay, it was in everything ade⯑quate to the occaſion, and in nothing ſuperfluous. This he does in the following words, in which he ſpeaks of the Reformation at the ſame time: ‘Theſe memorable tranſ⯑actions were conducted in a way that was truly Engliſh; the actors in them proceeded with their re⯑medy as far as the diſeaſe reached, and no further^‡;’ [21]and returning to the ſubject, in another place, he fully declares it to be ‘a precedent to be regarded with reve⯑rence and with gratitude toward thoſe who made it, but which we hope never to have occaſion to follow^*.’ Is this ground for the Houſe to reſolve that he has written "a libel on the Revolution;" that ‘he ſpeaks of it with contempt;’ that he repreſents it as "a farce?" for ſuch are the charges againſt him by the paper ſpeech-makers. The laſt ſentence of the above extract, we ſup⯑poſe, may give reaſonable grounds of unoſtenſible, though deep, diſguſt to ſome of his enemies. After this ſpirited eulogy of the great movers of the great tranſaction of 1688, and of the tranſaction itſelf, what he ſays of the term Revolution is a queſtion for a court of grammarians, not of law: but that will find its place to be conſidered. He ſeems indeed to me to think, that our ſcience of poli⯑tics may want a new nomenclature as well as that of che⯑miſtry: but in this he muſt expect to be ſturdily oppoſed, to the laſt, by the partizans of Dr. Prieſtley and the old phlogiſtic theory.

IT appears therefore, to ſum up the whole, to be this Writer's ſentiments, that the power of the King, with its legal limitations, is ſufficient; that the Good Senſe of the People has, and ought to have, great influence with the Legiſlature, which influence it is their duty to exert; that the events of 1688 were a remedy to the pre-exiſting evil, abſolutely neceſſary and fully adequate; to the authors of which we ought to look up with gratitude and reverence. And in theſe ſentiments extracted from the Pamphlet are fully compriſed the great outlines of the real principles of our Conſtitution.

[22]THERE remains very little more to be ſaid, connected with this branch of my ſubject, except, that if any part of the Pamphlet ſhall, on examination, be found to bear two ſenſes, the firſt of which ſhall be found to agree with what is above laid down or any other part of the context, while the ſecond does not ſo agree, the former ſenſe is to be taken to be the true meaning of the author; that is, every part ſhall be ſo conſtrued (if poſſible) that the whole may ſtand. I now proceed to examine, whether there is anything to be found in the remainder of this Pamphlet inconſiſtent with the extracts already made from it.

PART II.

THE Writer of the Letter, I am conſidering, has divided it into ſix parts, as appears by the ſummary in the title-page. The ſecond part is on the nature of the Engliſh Govern⯑ment, and it contains the paragraph ſaid to be a libel on the Conſtitution. To the conſideration of that paragraph I ſhall prefix a brief analyſis of what precedes it in that ſection, together with the moſt material ſtrictures reported in the papers to have been made upon it.

THE King (makes^* or) enacts laws, by and with the advice and conſent of the Lords and Commons.

[23]HE executes theſe laws according to the verdict of a Grand and Petty Jury.

THIS leads us to one ſimple view of the Royal Power, that both in the act of Legiſlation and the execution of Law it is limited by two prior negatives.

THIS deſcription of the Writer ſeems more accurate, and, according to the lax ſenſe of the term, more conſti⯑tutional than the parallel paſſage in Blackſtone: ‘In England, the ſupreme power is divided into two branches; the one Legiſlative, to wit, the Parliament, conſiſting of King, Lords, and Commons; the other executive, conſiſting of the King alone^*.’

HERE I have to obſerve, that the newſpapers repreſent a Member of one Houſe to have declared, that this Author has ſtated ‘the Conſtitution of this country to be an ab⯑ſolute Monarchy;’ and that he has ‘ſaid diſtinctly, that the King makes laws and executes laws,’ totally ſuppreſſing the modifications of this power as laid down above. In the ſame ſpirit was an obſervation there ſaid to have been made in another Houſe, that the Writer inſinu⯑ates ‘that all perſonal ſecurity and property is dependent on the King.’ It will be contended, perhaps, that he admits the limitations he has deſcribed above to be parts of the Conſtitution de facto only; and it may be made a queſtion, with what degree of regard he looks upon thoſe two prior negatives of the ſubject, on every exertion of the powers of the Sovereign? In anſwer to this, I will add a few extracts more from his Letter to thoſe already made. [24]He begins his book with complimenting his countrymen upon the poſſeſſion of more good ſenſe than their neigh⯑bours; and his leading proof of it is, ‘that he has yet not ſeen,’ elſewhere, ‘equal marks of it in thoſe matters where, of all others, they ſhould be manifeſted; I mean, (ſays he) in their Laws and Government ^*.’ Conſidered in a ſecond point of view, he calls the exiſting Govern⯑ment ‘an organ of public union and activity, which is adapted to the humour and mode of thinking of thoſe" *** who live under it^†;’ that humour, the leading quality of which he deſcribes to be the jealouſy of power, with⯑out the turbulent ambition of it^‡; that mode of thinking formed by the good ſenſe of a nation whom he holds to poſſeſs more of that quality ‘than any other in the world^‖.’ And almoſt at the concluſion of his work, impreſſed with the general view of the whole ſtructure of our Government, he affirms, ‘that it is ſo compacted in all its parts, that every conceit of politicians muſt vaniſh before it.’

THESE things premiſed, I ſhall give at length the whole of the paragraph in which the paſſage objected to is found; diſtinguiſhing the parts of the latter which form a diſtinct Propoſition, or imply one, by breaks.

I. ‘WITH the exception, therefore, of the advice and conſent of the two Houſes of Parliament; and the inter⯑poſition of Juries, the Government, and the adminiſtra⯑tion of it in all its parts, may be ſaid to reſt wholly and ſolely on the King, and thoſe appointed by him.^§ Thoſe [25]two adjuncts of Parliament and Juries are ſubſidiary and occaſional; but the King's power is a ſubſtantive one, always viſible and active. By his Officers, and in his name, everything is tranſacted that relates to the peace of the realm and the protection of the ſubject. The ſubject eels this, and acknowledges with thankfulneſs a ſuperintending ſovereignty, which alone is congenial with the ſentiments and temper of Engliſhmen.’

II. ‘IN FINE, the Government of England is a Monar⯑chy; the Monarch is the antient ſtock from which have ſprung thoſe goodly branches of the Legiſlature, the Lords and Commons, that at the ſame time give orna⯑ment to the tree, and afford ſhelter to thoſe who ſeek protection under it. But theſe are ſtill only branches, and derive their origin and their nutriment from their common parent; they may be lopped off, and the tree is a tree ſtill, ſhorn indeed of its honours, but not like them caſt into the fire.’

III. ‘The Kingly Government may go on in all its functions without Lords or Commons: it has heretofore done ſo for years together, and in our times it does ſo during every receſs of Par⯑liament; but without the King, HIS Parliament is no more.’

IV. ‘The King, therefore, alone it is who neceſſarily ſubſiſts without change or diminution; and from HIM alone we unceaſingly derive the protection of Law and Government.’

THE analyſis of this paragraph is as follows: It conſiſts of four parts, as numbered: In the firſt, an account is given of the nature of the Royal Power; in the ſecond, [26]the origin of the Second and Third Eſtates as they now exiſt, and ſome conſequences from their being ſo derived; in the third, he compares the legal powers of the King and the Two Eſtates with regard to one quality or accident of their operation, that is, their perpetuity; and in the fourth, he reverts to the ſubſtantive power of the King affirmed in the firſt.

THE mode in which the citation was made from the whole of the paragraph was this: The whole ſecond part was taken, and, from the firſt period of the third, the firſt colon or member being cut off, was applied to what pre⯑cedes, as if explanatory thereof.

THIS mode, therefore, of quoting a paſſage for cenſure, is highly cenſurable; for on ſuch occaſions ſo much ought to be quoted as to exhibit the full and perfect meaning of the Writer; and the colon with which the citation ends in⯑dicates the ſenſe of the laſt part to be not completed. A com⯑mon Engliſh Grammar may be cited for this, where we read, that when ‘a member of a ſentence, which of it ſelf would make a complete ſentence, and ſo requires a greater pauſe than a ſemicolon, yet is followed by an additional part, making a more full and perfect ſenſe, may be diſ⯑tinguiſhed by a colon^*.’ But beyond this colon the accuſers of the Letter-Writer did not read, though three ſentences follow in the period to limit and explain the meaning of the firſt, which they ſevered from them in the citation.

THE additional colon has likewiſe another mark of ſeverance from what precedes it; it contains abſtract mat⯑ter: all that precedes it is metaphorical: therefore there [27]was a full pauſe of the ſenſe before it; and it can connect only with what follows it. But when this colon, or in⯑completed meaning, was cut off from the period of which it is a part, and joined to the laſt ſentence of the former, it was deduced from it, that the Writer meant to affirm, ‘that the Lords and Commons may be lopped off without impairing the Conſtitution;’ or, as it was ſaid in ano⯑ther place, that the Conſtitution ſo lopped ‘might and would be complete.’ It is thus that by an illegitimate mode of quotation the paſſage cenſured is rendered un⯑couth, and then, in conſequence of ſome illegitimate rea⯑ſon, which the reporters of theſe debates have entirely concealed, and which cannot be divined, it is further ren⯑dered criminal.

I HAD not had an opportunity of ſeeing this paſſage in the original work when the following Obſervations were drawn up. In them, therefore, it will be found, that it is taken for granted that the quotation was properly made. I now, therefore, proceed to ſhew, that everything contained in the paſſage, as cited for cenſure, is ſtrictly true, both on hiſtorical and legal evidence.

I DIVIDE the whole matter it contains into three Pro⯑poſitions, which ſhall be ſeverally proved: the two which are poſitive are placed firſt. As I find the ground taken for theſe proofs is the ſame as that referred to by the Letter-Writer when he enters at all upon proof, theſe co-incidences will be noted in his own words in the margin.

PROPOSITION I. The ſecond and third Eſtate owe their origin to the Crown, or have ſprung out of the Monarchy.

[28]PROPOSITION II. The continuance of the functions of the Houſes is temporary; that of thoſe of the Crown perpetual.

PROPOSITION III. The LEGAL capacity of action may be taken from the Houſes by violence, the effect of which may ſubſiſt ſome time after the violence is removed; but at all times the legal capacity of action remains in the Crown.

—OR the actors of ſuch violence at any period ac⯑quiring permanent power, the Peerage of a country, and the families from which the Thrid Eſtate was then taken, may become effectively extinct; while a ſucceſſion of Kings de jure may more probably be preſerved many ages, if not cut off by an act of abdication by an anceſtor in poſſeſſion, from whom they derive^*.

THIS is the whole abſtract matter of the paragraph; the truth of the two general principles is to be ſhown from good law authorities, and where neceſſary, from the reaſon of the thing; and the poſſibility or abſolute truth of the facts aſſerted from hiſtory, particularly that of England^†.

PART III. ON THE DICTION OR EXPRESSION OF THE PARAGRAPH.

IT is neceſſary to be unuſually particular in the re⯑marks upon this topic, becauſe the circumſtance of the Pamphlet being made the ſubject of Parliamentary inquiry, ſeems to me to hang much upon it. The greateſt part of it is metaphorical; and one of the metaphors has, I pre⯑ſume, given offence to many of the Members of the Houſe who have voted upon the ſubject.

THE Lords and Commons are deſcribed as branches ſpringing from the antient ſtock of Monarchy; the ho⯑nours of the tree; goodly, and giving it ornament, and affording ſhelter to thoſe who take protection under it. Here is much ſaid of the utility and beauty of the Eſtates; and the matter of their origination being true, which was proved above, their good qualities are as warmly painted as we uſually find them, and perhaps it may be ſaid to be more ſo.

To meet the objection to be conſidered afterwards, it becomes neceſſary here to obſerve, that all this imagery is of the ſchool of the Hebrew poetry: a ſecondary mark of the peculiar genius of which was, to confine ſome particular metaphors almoſt excluſively to certain ſubjects; as a cedar, or any majeſtic tree, to expreſs a King or Prince. The image is of this ſort. If any one ſhould ſay that its proximate ſource is to be found in Shakeſpear, [51]in a poetical compliment to James the Iſt, I ſhall not diſ⯑pute it with him.

BUT I muſt have the liberty of adding Hurd's Note on this paſſage: ‘It is eaſy to ſee his cedar is not of Engliſh growth, but tranſplanted from Judea^*.’

THE ſubject leads the Writer to add another circumſtance to this deſcription; the abſtract matter of which is, that the Three Eſtates may be deſtroyed, but the Monarch remain. As he began metaphori⯑cally, this he has rightly expreſſed in the ſame manner. Yet in this ſecond metaphor is to be found one great part, and I believe the principal part, of the ground of the cenſure. This deſtruction is thus expreſſed: ‘The branches may be lopped off—and caſt into the fire.’ The charge certainly is not weakened by thus removing theſe phraſes out of their places and putting them into uxta-poſition.

j

IN this metaphor the word may is capable of being conſtrued in two ſenſes; the firſt limited to a ſimple poſ⯑ſibility of the thing; the ſecond, that it is not only poſſi⯑ble but right to be done. Now when a word bears two ſenſes (and there are few in common uſe which do not), the meaning in which the writer intends to be underſtood is to be determined by the context. In which ſenſe [52]the verb may is here uſed, is to be gathered from what he has ſaid of the qualities of the two branches. Now as their utility and beau [...]y have been warmly painted, as has been particularly ſhewn before, it is to be conſtrued in the firſt ſenſe, that the branches may eventually or poſſibly happen to be lopped off, and caſt into this fire; not that they ought to be ſo, becauſe they do not produce good fruit.

YET in theſe two phraſes, as they are here put toge⯑ther, the Writer has copied one verbally, and only made a ſlight alteration in the words of another, from the concluſion of a beautiful allegory, which is a fine exam⯑ple of the Hebrew ſchool: ‘Every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit, is hewn down, and caſt into the fire.’ The words of the latter part of this quotation may recall the former to memory; but it has been par⯑ticularly ſhewn above, that the Writer did not mean that theſe branches did not bring forth good fruit; for ſuch fruits he has ſpecified; and even ſuppoſing this had not been capable of ſuch proof, it would be rightly ſaid, that the adoption of images in this mode, forms a kind of cento in proſe: but when a man is compoſing a cento, if he takes the laſt hemiſtich of a verſe in Virgil to con⯑clude his own, is it to be ſuppoſed that he means the for⯑mer part to be underſtood before it?

BUT it will be aſked, ‘Was it not enough for this writer to have once expreſſed, figuratively, the deſtruc⯑tion of the two Eſtates? Was it not ſufficiently de⯑ſcribed by the phraſe, they may be lopped off? Why does he affectedly repeat it, dwelling on the idea, and [53]add, as if in contempt, they may be caſt into the fire?’ To this it is anſwered, that it is that quality of the figurative ſtyle of the Hebrew ſchool, which may be called its eſſential difference, to give that impreſſion to its images by reduplication, which the Europeans effect by epithets. I take this from Lowth's Praelections on the Hebrew Poetry; and I tranſlate his Latin Exam⯑ple.—1ſt. My inſtruction ſhall deſcend as a ſhower;—2d. My ſpeech ſhall fall as the dew;—3d. As the fine ſhowers on the plants;—4th. As the thick dew drops on the graſs.

I HAVE but a ſingle metaphorical ſentence more in the citation to remark upon. The branches being lop⯑ped off, "the tree is a tree ſtill, ſhorn indeed of its honours." How he formed the idea has been pointed out before; it muſt now be ſhown where he had his colouring. This ima⯑gery has a different ſource from the former; but blends very well with it. Here we may infallibly detect the paſſage or paſſages of a great Poet whom the writer had in his eye; and they will give us the picture then pre⯑ſent to his mind, of the ſtate of a monarch whoſe greater ſubjects were involved in ſuch utter ruin. The impreſ⯑ſions they make upon us were the impreſſions he felt when he wrote, and endeavoured to excite in us by the alluſion to be pointed out. I need not quote Hurd's 5th or 6th marks of imitation, to prove that the phraſe "ſhorn of its honours" is borrowed from Milton; it ſuggeſts to us directly the picture

AND in the ſame page, fifteen lines further, by the h [...]re change of the ſingular number for the plural, we read,

FROM theſe two paſſages the Writer moſt probably took the whole of that here conſidered; ‘the tree is a tree ſtill, ſhorn indeed of its honours’ (branches); and the latter might ſuggeſt to him to add what immediately follows, "but not like them caſt into the fire." The firſt ſentence of the paſſage quoted is left ſimple, pro⯑bably to avoid the appearance of ſervile imitation, or the giving to the whole an air of poetry too much above the cuſtomary ſtyle in which ſubjects of the nature of his pamphlet are generally treated.

THE concluſion I draw from the whole is, that in this paragraph we have the advantages of the two Houſes fairly ſtated, and the dignity of the Sovereign more fully inſiſted on, yet from circumſtances proved by general ex⯑perience and law; and if either of the other two parts of the Conſtitution had been now attempted to be ſub⯑verted, any one of its advocates (and I hope they would have been numerous, zealous, and able) ought to have proceeded in the ſame manner; that is, briefly but fully [55]acknowledging the utility of the two unattacked parts, then directing all his attention to the defence of the third. Whether it were the Commons or the Lords, it would then be doubtleſs pretended, as it is now, when ſo many engines are at work to weaken or deſtroy the Crown, that no attack was intended againſt that parti⯑cular part of the Conſtitution. But it is to be obſerved, with reſpect to ſuch caſes, that it has very frequently happened, when one army has marched out of its tren⯑ches, in the dark, to attack another, they have lighted up every tent to make their adverſaries believe that they were very quietly at ſupper. And if it be ſtill conſtitu⯑tional to defend the Government eſtabliſhed by law, it is conſtitutional to give a ſummary of the Royal pre⯑rogatives acknowledged by it, and point out their utility. This muſt be allowed by thoſe who feel themſelves in⯑clined to ſtop ſomewhat ſhort of the doctrine of Black⯑ſtone, as the Writer actually has done, who ſays, ‘the maſs of mankind will be apt to grow inſolent and re⯑fractory, if taught to conſider their Prince as a man of no greater perfection than themſelves. The law therefore aſcribes to the King, in his high political cha⯑racter, not only large power and emoluments which form his prerogative and revenue, but likewiſe certain attributes of a great and tranſcendant nature, by which the people are led to conſider him in the light of a ſuperior being, and to pay him that awful reſpect which may enable him with greater eaſe to carry on the buſineſs of Government. This (he adds) is what I underſtand by the Royal dignity^*.’ And this de⯑fence has been ſo conducted by the Letter-Writer, that the [56]ſtrength of Blackſtone's expreſſion (quoted frequently as unſuſpected authority in both Houſes) appears almoſt perpetually lowered by him. If therefore the Pamphlet be, as it was deſcribed in the Houſe of Commons, ‘a prac⯑tical Exhortation, addreſſed to the Plain Senſe of the People,’ there appears to lie no crimination againſt the Parts hitherto conſidered. Whether any criminating matter is to be found in the remainder, we are now to proceed briefly to enquire.

PART IV. FIRST.—ON THE REVOLUTION PART OF THE WORK.

I NOW come to conſider what the Letter-Writer has ſaid on the Revolution; a motion having been made in the Houſe to declare this alſo a libel. In the Firſt Part of this Tract it has been ſhewn, that he had ſpoken of that even with all the warmth of praiſe. It certainly therefore is not doing him great juſtice to ſever the remainder, which is judged unexceptionable, from that context, and conſider it apart: yet ſuch is the me⯑thod here adopted in his defence, moſt favorable to his accuſers, and leaſt ſo to the accuſed.

[57]OMITTING all thoſe kinds of revolutions of States, whoſe cauſes or effects are external, our obſervations muſt be directed to civil or internal revolutions, and theſe are of the following kinds: Firſt, thoſe which change the form of Government: Secondly, the gover⯑nors; theſe are ſimple revolutions: or, in the third place, both conjointly, or compound revolutions. Infinite varieties fall under the third head. As for inſtance, a compound revolution may fix a new Dynaſty upon the throne, and the firſt principles of the old form of Go⯑vernment and the Laws may undergo a very great or total change. Or it may fix a family derived from a new common ſtock upon the throne; while the changes in the form of the old Government and the Laws are much leſs than in the former caſe; and ſuch as do not, per ſe, approach to a revolution of the other kind.

EVERY friend of legal liberty muſt unreſervedly ap⯑prove of the tranſactions which placed William and Mary on the throne, as juſt and neceſſary; but fully im⯑preſſed with that ſentiment, men may ſo far differ as to number the Revolution among events either of the firſt or the ſecond kind, and [...], in ſo doing, traduce or libel the Revolution.

THERE are authorities on both ſides; I ſhall ſtate what I look upon as the beſt, and begin with thoſe for the firſt opinion.

[58] ‘IN the Declaration of Rights (Mr. Hume ſays) all the points which had of late years been diſputed be⯑tween King and People, were finally determined; and the powers of the Royal Prerogative were more nar⯑rowly circumſcribed, and more exactly defined, than in any former period of the Engliſh Government^*.’ It does not indeed follow from this that the diſputable points were many or few; the remedy of more or leſs ex⯑tent; the change of the legal form of Government con⯑ſiderable only, or intitled to be called a total change therein. His idea of the magnitude of that change is to be found in the following paſſage: ‘That great event (the Revolution) not only put a period to the hereditary ſucceſſion of the houſe of Stuart, but made a new ſet⯑tlement of the whole Conſtitution^†.’

I LOOK upon the opinion, that we had no Conſtitu⯑tion until the Revolution, or that that event drew it out of the chaos in which it was involved, to have been derived from theſe and ſome other paſſages of Mr. Hume's works; at leaſt I know no other reſpectable ſource of ſuch an opinion. According to that, we are to ſuppoſe that he underſtoo [...] [...] Declaration or Bill of Rights to be the "Corinthian capital^‡" wanted ſtill to finiſh that column of Britiſh Freedom, the Conſtitu⯑tion, and complete the moſt beautiful ordonnance that human art had ever formed. Yet, on this occaſion, he only ſays of it, at ſuch a time ſuch a member was put upon the top of the ſhaft, without any account of its form or proportion; while he deſcribes certain parts of [59]the pedeſtal and baſe, and their mouldings and orna⯑ments, with the moſt minute detail and attention. I ſay, if he thought thus of the Bill of Rights, contrary to his ordinary manner, he has, in the body of his Hiſtory (which concludes with the firſt quotation), given only ſeven lines to an account of it in general terms. On the occaſion of ſome former ameliorations of the Con⯑ſtitution, which he muſt have eſteemed as of much leſs conſequence, he has been infinitely more particular. His known manner is, on treating on ſuch ſubjects, to ſtate every topic that could be urged by a profound politician on both ſides, and he practically ſhews us, that Tacitus has been indebted to warm imaginations for ſome part of the praiſes he has received. And would not ſuch a wri⯑ter have been glad to have concluded his Hiſtory with ſo fine and ſo important a cloſe, as a finiſhed diſſertation on the vicious redundances which remained to be taken away, and the improvements to be adopted, to complete a Conſtitution held in ſuch eſteem, by a Declaration of Rights, claimed on a change of the ſucceſſion to the throne? Does he not ſcorn thus even to apply a capital to the beſt column of his own immorta⯑lity? Inſtead of doing this, we find no one article of its contents, not one argument for or againſt it; he con⯑denſes the account of it into a ſingle period of ſeven lines; while to the Petition of Rights, brought forward in the reign of Charles the Firſt, the articles of which are not ſo many in number, he has given twenty pages^*; containing the Petition at length, ſome full and fine ex⯑tracts from the debates, and an elaborate diſſertation of his own for and againſt it. From this circumſtance [60]ſome people may be inclined to think, that he felt he could not give the Declaration the ſame conſequence with which he had treated the Petition; though they may keep back their aſſent, from the opinion of Macpherſon on the former; who ſays, ‘that the Rights that were claimed had been recognized in the moſt arbitrary reigns, though they were ſometimes evaſively in⯑vaded^*.’

THAT ſomething muſt be ſubtracted from the weight Mr. Hume's authority gives to the poſition, that the Revolution ‘made a new ſettlement of the whole Con⯑ſtitution,’ in the ſenſe in which it is commonly un⯑derſtood, appears likewiſe on another ground. In com⯑menting on the uſurpations and illegal acts of the houſe of Stuart▪ later authors had thought fit to judge and con⯑demn them on the laws and the principles now univerſally eſtabliſhed. This proceeding he contends to be analogous to trying a man by an ex poſt facto law. This is true, in many inſtances, in reſpect to the firſt two ſovereigns of that family. But he did not ſufficiently conſider what great approaches were made in the firſt part of the reign of Charles the Second toward that Conſtitution we have now the happineſs to enjoy. Hence, in the laſt of theſe paſſages, he ſeems to hold out the idea, that the nation paſſed, per ſaltum, at a ſingle ſtep, from the old and con⯑fuſed ſyſtem, almoſt as it exiſted under the laſt of the Tudors, to the new and ſettled form of Government. His ground for an apology for the houſe of Stuart is happy, but his affection for it has drawn him to a cer⯑tain length into the error oppoſite to that which he attacks; and although his deviations be by no means ſo [61]groſs as thoſe of the writer's he has in his eye, yet to conſider how he fell into them leads us directly to the authority on which the queſtion before us ought to be decided: this inquiry I therefore now enter upon.

IF, as it is laid down above, great improvements had been made in Legiſlation during the former part of the reign of Charles the Second; yet as they were brought forward ſucceſſively, and not in a maſs, under a ſingle ſtatute, like the Petition of Right in 1628, they muſt be found ſcattered up and down among facts of that event⯑ful period, which were more ſtriking to the imagination of the reader, and even that of the hiſtorian. When the miſcellaneous materials of hiſtory are ſo joined together, he is not able by a retroſpective glance upon the aſſem⯑blage of all of them to obtain a diſtinct view of one claſs of events; as for example, the changes of the ſpirit or letter of Laws. To give a preciſe idea of theſe intereſting particulars, proper epochs muſt be ſelected in the courſe of a Hiſtory, and at each term the ſtate of the Laws ſhould be accurately delineated; then the varia⯑tion from term to term ſhould be truly and carefully aſſigned, and it ſhould be ſhewn, by way of reſult, whether they were in a gradual ſtate of improve⯑ment, or the contrary. Theſe periodical reviews, or balances, Mr. Hume has not drawn out; but admit him to have attempted it, it is certain he would have been much better qualified for the taſk, if that acuteneſs and judgment in which he excelled had been principally employed in the ſtudy of the ſtatute books, and the whole theory, practice, and hiſtory of our Laws. He then would have been intitled to entire credit with re⯑gard to what he had ſaid on the change of the legal Con⯑ſtitution [62]at the acceſſion of King William, on the maxim, Cuilibet ſuâ in arte credendum.

Now what Hume omitted, and what he was not, from a long and neceſſary courſe of ſtudy, ſo well able to effect, has been done by Judge Blackſtone, at the end of his Commentaries on the Laws of England. After he had recently finiſhed a full ſyſtematical account of the whole, he gives a hiſtory of the variations the Law has under⯑gone, divided into periods, as above deſcribed. The reign of Charles the Second forms a period by itſelf, and the fifth in order; and from ſo complete a view of the ſubject he lays it down, that ‘the Conſtitution of Eng⯑land had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between Liberty and Prerogative was happily eſtabliſhed by Law in the reign of King Charles the Second^*;’ ‘wicked, ſanguinary, and turbulent,’ as he had before admitted it to have been. He adds, in a note below, that ‘the point of time at which he would chuſe to fix this theoretical perfection in our public Law, is in the year 1679; though thoſe which followed it were times of great practical oppreſſion^†.’ And in the laſt para⯑graph of his work, he ſtates that our Laws and Liberties were totally eclipſed at the Norman Conqueſt, and ‘were not thoroughly and completely regained till after the Reſtoration of King Charles; nor fully and explicitly acknowledged and defined till the aera of the happy Re⯑volution^‡.’ Thoſe liberties, when they were fully and completely regained, were then as ſecurely ours as law, in the turbulent ſtate of ſociety which then ob⯑tained, could render them; and the explicit acknowledge⯑ment [63]of ſome pre-exiſting laws and their principles can⯑not be conſidered as even a change of them; it cannot amount to new-modelling a Conſtitution; or what Mr. Hume (as quoted above) calls a new ſettlement of the whole Conſtitution: nor is ſuch a change to be found in the improvement of a definition. The greateſt alteration made in the Law was, that the King ſhould be of the Proteſtant religion. Otherwiſe, the Bill of Rights, though contain⯑ing matter of great conſequence, was abſolutely decla⯑ratory; ſtating certain points either to be already the Law of the Land, or contradictory thereto. In a word, the Conſtitution of England, as exiſting in 1679, ſtood on the footing of Law in 1688; and if we admit with Blackſtone, that it had attained theoretical perfec⯑tion at the firſt period, I ſhould hold it a libel on the Revolution to ſay after Mr. Hume, that a new ſettlement was then made of the whole, or that any other Conſtitu⯑tion was then eſtabliſhed. What then was the Revolu⯑tion, as it affected the Conſtitution? A ſucceſsful re⯑ſiſtance againſt an attempt to overthrow the ſyſtem of Government eſtabliſhed by the Laws. And what is it now to act upon Revolution principles? To reſiſt all attempts, whether popular, ariſtocratical, or regal, to ſubvert ſuch Government. The Revolution was the conſervation of the Conſtitution already eſtabliſhed by Law, which was arrived at ſuch perfection, that any attempts, by violence, at a ſuppoſed improvement of it, would have been in the higheſt degree criminal.

THE preſent general intereſt in the queſtion, how far the Revolution was a change of the pre-eſtabliſhed form of Government and of the Laws, has led me into a con⯑ſiderable length, perhaps more than neceſſary, from my [64]direct object. In what precedes, however, it will be found, that the principles, on which what the Author of the Letter has ſaid on the Revolution, which ſeems to have given offence, may be juſtified at their full extent. I come now to their application. It is not of the na⯑ture of a Conſtitution to be free from the attempts of external force: but ſo early as the year 1679, that ‘of England had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between liberty and prerogative^*.’ The people had ſufficient power, reſiding in ‘their own hands, to aſſert and preſerve that liberty if invaded^†;’ as the event proved in 1688. The Conſtitution therefore wanted neither formation nor eſtabliſhment; the exertion of power already poſſeſſed was become, indeed, highly ne⯑ceſſary; it was well exerted, and the Conſtitution was ſaved. Hence the Letter-Writer juſtly reprobates thoſe who, diſguiſing other principles under the name of Re⯑volutional, "idolize a Revolution in the abſtract^‡;" that is, any change of governors or legal forms of Govern⯑ment; thoſe who ‘have no love for the Conſtitution, but for that which was formed at the Revolution,’ previouſly to which it was perfectly formed, and, according to the opi⯑nion of Blackſtone, eſtabliſhed in full vigour, and before James the Second aſcended the throne; and hence the Author very rightly laughts at the ‘diſappointment and diſcomfiture of theſe idolizers of a Conſtitution ſup⯑poſed to be eſtabliſhed at the Revolution, on diſco⯑vering, at length, that they have beſtowed their ap⯑plauſe and affection upon ſhreds and patches of old date^‖,’ which they ſo oſtentatiouſly affect to deſ⯑priſe, [65]although the records of what they had imagined to be a new Conſtitution made in 1688. It is likewiſe by the ſame reſpectable, and I ſuppoſe Conſtitutional au⯑thority, that of the Commentaries, we are informed, that public law had attained its theoretical perfection in 1679; though the years which immediately followed it were times of great practical oppreſſion^*. This has been cited before for another purpoſe; but I may ſay here, that on ſuch authority the Letter-Writer might very well pronounce of the politicians deſcribed above, ‘that if they had lived in the wicked reigns of Charles the Se⯑cond and James the Second, they would have enjoyed in theory, though not in practice, (and theory, of the two, is more conſidered by modern reformers,) as good a Conſtitution as they have had ſince, with the ſingle exception of a Proteſtant King^†.’

IN the beginning of the page from which the laſt cita⯑tion is made, he affirms that ‘the other points, which were twelve in number, were, as I have ſaid, known to be the Law of the Land before, and were now de⯑clared and ſecured by expreſs definition in Parliament.’ This was done by the Bill of Rights. Theſe obſervations on the effect of the tranſactions of that time on the Con⯑ſtitution, cannot be cloſed without a brief expoſition of the nature of that Bill. Its object, according to the Letter-Writer, was ‘only, that what had been the recent cauſe of alarm, what was ſo deeply impreſſed on the minds of all, and what might be thought, from late experience, to be of a nature that required it ſhould be ſolemnly inculcated, might be held up for admonition to future [66]ages^*’ In theſe two paſſages nothing more is to be found than the ſentiments that Blackſtone had expreſſed, with a little more vivacity, that ‘our Liberties and Laws, extinguiſhed by the Norman Conqueſt,’ ‘were thoroughly and completely regained before the Revo⯑lution,’ and ‘at that happy aera explicitly acknow⯑ledged and defined^†.’ Both theſe writers agree that the object of the Bill of Rights was to reaſſert thoſe parts of the Laws and Conſtitution which had been violated in act, or of which doubts were entertained; and another authority of great weight may be brought to ſhow (what is indeed obvious in itſelf), that all change of the legal Conſtitution was ſedulouſly avoided, even ſuch as might appear evident ameliorations, and which recent experience ſeemed to call for. ‘One thing (ſays Dalrymple) very remarkable in the Declaration of Rights is, that it condemns not the ſuſpending and diſpenſing powers, but only thoſe powers as exerciſed by King James.’—‘And in the laſt great article of all,’ (that Parliaments ſhould be frequently aſſembled,) ‘the words—frequent Parliaments—left the intervals of their aſſembling, and the duration of their ſitting, as undeterminate as ever^‡.’

THE ſpirit with which this Declaration was penned may be gathered from what paſſed at the vote of Abdi⯑cation, when ‘the wiſer part of the Whigs, at the head of whom was Mr. Sommers, perſuaded their Party to make their own ſentiments of liberty bend to the na⯑ture of the Conſtitution, and to the principles of the Tories;’ ‘ſome of them having pointed at laying [67]ſuch reſtrictions upon the authority of either King or Regent, as would have reduced the offices almoſt to empty titles^*.’ This ſober ſyſtem, though tranſient, was adhered to in drawing up the Declaration of Rights^†: if in any part of it they had aimed at even an ameliora⯑tion of the legal Conſtitution, we might expect to have ſeen it done with regard to the ſuſpending power, and the aſſembling of Parliaments. But on ſo fair a ground they ſcrupulouſly abſtained from it, and confined themſelves to the ſimple declaration of the letter of the exiſting Con⯑ſtitution, on thoſe points in which it had been endan⯑gered. The Revolution conſiſted in the voluntary abdi⯑cation of James; his will being demonſtrated by three overt acts, ſpecified in the Vote of the Convention; and its proper definition is, a Revolution by Abdication. But as the whole definition is too long, either for con⯑verſation or writing, it were to be wiſhed, that in giving a ſhorter name to this event, we had formed it upon the language of Parliament, and called it the Abdication. The name contains a moral leſſon of ſufficient ſtrength to any future Prince inſtructing him, that a certain period gravi documento in poſterum ſancitum fuit; ne quis unquam Populo injuriam opportunam reputaret ^‡. It likewiſe holds out no equivocal ſenſe, like the term Revolution, which a pernicious demagogue can catch hold of, to ſubvert that very Conſtitution which the tranſactions of 1688 ſaved from ſubverſion, intire and without change^‖.

[68]THE term Revolution itſelf, being equally applicable to all changes of Government or Governors, good or bad, is generical. There are many ſpecies of Revolutions, and bad men avail themſelves of the ambiguity of the term. From the praiſes of the Revolution of 1688, the populace are eaſily induced to believe a Revol [...]tion of another ſpecies muſt be likewiſe good; in the event they may find it the greateſt of evils. The botaniſts tell us, that that excellent root the potatoe is of the genus Sola⯑num; yet if any perſon, deſcribing its wholeſomeneſs and good qualities to one not acquainted with the plant, ſhould inſtruct him only in its generical character or marks, which he afterwards diſcovering very clearly in the nightſhade, ſhould eat it with confidence, his life would pay for the error he was led into: and into this error our political botaniſts appear to have led a neighbouring nation.

THERE is a circumſtance of ſome curioſity in the hiſ⯑tory of the Bill of Rights; to which, as it tends to juſtify the Letter-Writer's account of the ſtate of Parties at the Revolution, which has been obj [...]cted to with much aſperity, I ſhall here give a place. After the Con⯑vention became a Parliament, the Commons, in which [69]the Whig Party intirely prevailed^*, turned the Declara⯑tion of Rights into a Bill, which they ſent up to the Peers, in which Houſe the Tories had a majority. Upon the ſuggeſtion of the King, Biſhop Burnet propoſed, as an additional clauſe, that the Princeſs Sophia of Hanover, and her poſterity, ſhould ſucceed to the Crown in caſe of the death of the daughters of James the Se⯑cond without lineal heirs. This Amendment was adopted by the Lords; and the Bill of Rights, with this addition tacked to it, was flung out of the Houſe of Commons, and by the Whig Party^†. In the following Seſſions they again declined to admit the ſucceſſion of the Houſe of Hanover as a part of the Bill^‡; but the obnoxious clauſe being ſtruck out, at laſt it was ſuffered to paſs^‖.

[70]To render the King's revenue annual would abſolutely deſtroy his independence, and render him a cypher in the Conſtitution; reducing it to a government of the two Houſes, or ultimately to that of an Elective National Aſſembly. Yet this very party, in the Houſe of Com⯑mons, having poſtponed the ſettlement of the revenue till the 10th of December 1689, voted it then for one year only^*.

WITH theſe events in his recollection, any man, at⯑tached to this ſolemn Declaratory Act, to the Houſe of Hanover, or to a mixed Monarchy, may ſay, if the au⯑thors of theſe meaſures were active in producing the Revolution, that although ‘that event was brought about by the energy, good ſenſe, and firmneſs of ſome of the beſt and greateſt men in the Nation, it was of a nature unlike moſt good things) to be helped on by the concurrence and approbation of ſome of the worſt men that could be found^†.’ But in the defence of theſe men and their meaſures, I do not ſee that thoſe Whigs, ‘who mean no otherwiſe than well toward the antient Government and Laws of the Land^‡,’ are any further intereſted than the members of the Church of England in the vindication o [...] the Anabaptiſts at Mun⯑ſter in the laſt century, becauſe the latter called themſelves Proteſtants. But perhaps the time is not yet come when any Party will venture to claim the national confidence by a deciſive cenſure of the evils that have been commit⯑ted or attempted by thoſe who have aſſumed and perhaps uſurped their names; and the ſucceſſors of theſe men were too long permitted to range themſelves among them. [71]However, the fermentation of the time has been of uſe to the dignity of the Whig Party; a natural ſeparation has taken place, and this feculence has ſubſided. They are completely ſeparated from that ſubdiviſion, formerly incorporated with them, the ſchool of the Eclectics, who combined a profeſſion of the political theory of Harry Vane with the political practice of Lord Shaftefbury, and who had obtained to be of the number, or, in the words of the Letter-Writer, ‘had taken their ſtand among the Whigs^*’ before 1688. I ſhall conclude what I have to ſay about the Revolution, by proving this point; that after having cleared the Writer of the accuſation of having treated that event as a farce, I may not be in⯑volved in it myſelf for having ſaid that the change then effected in the Conſtitution itſelf was minute, and that the object of the Bill of Rights was to preſerve the Conſtitu⯑tion in its then exiſting form. It may alſo teach thoſe who venerate our legal liberties, and even the independence of the popular Eſtate of the Legiſlature on the power of the Crown, ſo to continue to diſtinguiſh themſelves from this faction, that they may never again have the appearance of belonging to them, to aid them in their deſigns to overwhelm both in one common ruin. I ſhall therefore here ſhew the neceſſity of the Revolu⯑tion in one point of view, in which our more ele⯑gant and popular hiſtorians have not diſtinctly placed it.

AFTER the ſeizing of the charter of the City of Lon⯑don, in the reign of Charles the Second, many of the richer Corporations purchaſed new ones. There appears to have been no diſpoſition to grant them gratis, even [72]upon voluntary ſurrender^*. The terms of theſe new charters were ſuch as to leave the nomination of the re⯑preſentatives of thoſe Corporations almoſt entirely in the power of the Crown. After this wide breach in the Conſtitution, the ſervility of James's firſt and laſt Par⯑liament was not ſufficient to anſwer all his purpoſes. The charters of the moſt numerous claſs of the Corpo⯑rations, that is of the poorer boroughs, had not been yet called in. To induce them to a general ſurrender, he determined to grant new ones without fees^†. Under theſe new charters the Crown had ultimately the power of nominating to all offices: but to add to this influence in elections, all which fell little ſhort of abſolute nomi⯑nation, James inſtituted a ſet of officers, called Regu⯑lators, to examine the qualifications of electors, and ex⯑clude all ſuch as adhered to the Teſt and penal ſtatutes^‡. The Houſe of Commons then conſiſted of 513 members; of which, by this arrangement, 421 would have been effectually nominated by the Crown^‖. Nor did he want agents to aſſiſt him in the completion of his plan to ren⯑der his power predominant in all the Corporations; a plan which his brother had left imperfect: he might dread, or he might be averſe to the experiment. I copy the words of Coke, a cotemporary writer, a zealot for the principles of Whiggiſm, and therefore an unexcep⯑tionable evidence, when cenſuring the conduct of that Party. ‘The Whigs were but too forward to congra⯑tulate the King on his deſigns, and in humouring him in giving him up their charters; as the Tories, in King Charles's reign, in their abhorrences of the [73]King's calling a Parliament, and as forward then, as the Whigs now in ſurrendering their charters^*.’ It muſt be admitted here, that this charge upon the Whigs is too general. There then exiſted a numerous body among them who were, to uſe the language of the times, "Tories in the Church, and Whigs in the State^†." Theſe muſt have been in the moſt diametrical oppoſition to the plans of James. The ſection of the Whig Party here meant, muſt be ſuch of the bigoted ſectaries who mingled with them; and we may add to theſe, all who could, by the emoluments of office, or the love of power, or the deſire of trampling upon their formidable rivals, be blinded to a danger, apparently both diſtant and contingent. But unfortunately that ſpirit was then ex⯑tremely prevalent: and the diſtribution of rewards by James points out that the agents of this ſervice are here rightly aſſigned. The offices of all the Corporations whoſe charters were ſurrendered, had, before this, been filled with thoſe who had oppoſed the Excluſion Bill: ‘theſe were now turned out with diſgrace, and thoſe who appeared moſt violently againſt him were put into the magiſtracy^‡;’ the Corporation of London was filled up with Diſſenters, and afterwards that of every other town^‖.

THUS the King had completed, or nearly completed, the ſeizing into his own hands the effective nomination [72]of 421 Members of the Houſe of Commons, and, by reducing it to a total dependence upon himſelf, annihi⯑lated the Third Eſtate, by annihilating its uſe: and with an independent income of £. 2,150,000 a year, which he managed with a rigid oeconomy, he dictated his arbi⯑trary will to the Nation at the head of a regular army of 20,000 men. Such were the formidable machines which he had prepared to batter down the bulwarks of the Con⯑ſtitution. There were likewiſe other violations of Law, and uſurped powers, which alone would have ren⯑dered the meaſures purſued againſt him neceſſary. He had, it is true, begun to retract; but the wind ſhifted, it blew the Dutch fleet back, and he re-retracted; and the Revolution conſiſted, almoſt ſolely, in the expulſion of ſuch a Sovereign^*.

[73]EVERY Revolution muſt be defended on the neceſſity of the individual caſe; and no arguments drawn from this example can be brought to juſtify a Revolution in any [74]caſe, not of the ſame kind, much leſs Revolutions in general. As for inſtance: It is a common belief that the firſt Revolution in Poland was a good one; yet not one particular argument in favour of that of 1688, will apply to the latter; nor can any conſequences be drawn from a Revolution of perſons or governors, whereby the Laws and Conſtitution were intended to be preſerved, to prove the utility of a Revolution, whoſe end is to effect a change in them, let the nature of that change be what it will; and he ſeems to me to be ignorant of the merits [75]of the Revolution, or to traduce it, who commends it for being what it was not. It would be ignorance, in an eulogium of Newton to praiſe him as a ſublime poet, or Locke for his ſkill in naval tactics; and if I were to celebrate the perſonal courage of Auguſtus, or the con⯑jugal fidelity of Henry the Fourth, I ſhould be ſuppoſed to be advancing ſome ſly invectives againſt them. Per⯑haps not to find in one Revolution ſufficient grounds for another, may be to make it of no conſequence; to make a farce of it: for nothing, with ſome perſons, can be of conſequence in the firſt, which is not ground for a ſecond: but to others it may ſtill ſeem that the right of reſiſtance is one of the jura extremae neceſſitatis; and therefore it may be of ſome danger to be always inculcating it into the minds of the popu⯑lace. We know that by the ſame laws of extreme ne⯑ceſſity, a man may take a loaf of bread or a few pounds of meat from his neighbour to ſave himſelf from periſh⯑ing; but if in all the churches and chapels of his Majeſ⯑ty's dominions, this were to be perpetually preached and enforced in every pulpit, upon the great principle of ſelf-preſervation, the enlightened populace would always con⯑ceive themſelves to be in extreme neceſſity, and hold themſelves in readineſs to exerciſe this right.

FROM what has been ſaid above on the Conſtitution, and the different ſenſes given to that term, it appears the Letter-Writer is a friend to the Laws and Liberties of his country; and equally ſo in the unreſerved approba⯑tion, which in the Firſt Part he has been ſhown to have given to the national moderation, dignity, and greatneſs, manifeſted in the Revolution in 1688; and in cenſuring the equivocal uſe of the term to effect a ſecond, different [76]in its nature and conſequences. The equivocal uſe of the word Conſtitution is of equal danger, as it is per⯑verted to the ſame purpoſes; and he treats it in the ſame manner, both as to its genuine and adulterated ſenſe, which at the proper places I ſhall ſhow as I go on.

ONE might think the word Conſtitution^* rather more untractable, and leſs liable to perverſion, than the term Revolution; but by a dextrous treatment it has been moulded down to ſerve the ſame purpoſes. It will be of uſe, therefore, to commence theſe obſervations with a definition of the term Conſtitution, in its genuine and original ſenſe. Our Laws are diviſible into two claſſes: Thoſe which relate to the ſubject as ſuch; and thoſe which relate to the Governors as ſuch; or in the exerciſe of the functions of Government. The whole maſs of the latter form the Conſtitution of Government; the parts of which are found ſcattered up and down in the Statute and Common Law; and the Conſtitution is, in this ſenſe, what is ſo already conſtituted, and nothing elſe. But the preſent Conſtitution might have been called by the ſame name when it was future, and the ſame liberty is now taken. Another Conſtitution, which ſome perſons are deſirous of eſtabliſhing, is called the Conſtitution; and neglecting to diſtinguiſh which they [77]mean, they attribute to the word uſed in the ſecond ſenſe, that which is true of the firſt—the obligation to venerate and ſupport it, &c.

IT is of a Conſtitution differing from that which is de⯑fined by Law, that the Letter-Writer ſpeaks thus: ‘The Government we know, and the Laws we know, but the Conſtitution we know not^*.’ This ſtrong diſ⯑junction ſhows him to have meant a ſyſtem of Govern⯑ment different from what the Laws have here eſtabliſhed, and this admits of plain proof. The preceding page is taken up in ſhewing that it has become a doctrine in ſome other countries, That nothing is intitled to be called a Conſtitution, but a ſyſtem ſpringing out of an act declaratory of abſtract principles, as of the Rights of Man^†; whence they tell us that we have ‘no Conſti⯑tution’. To this he ſubjoins, that we ‘may, with⯑out yielding anything, take theſe Conſtitution-makers at their word; and at once allow that we have no Con⯑ſtitution in the ſenſe in which they underſtand it.’ And continuing to employ the word in the ſame ſenſe, ſix lines after follows the paſſage quoted: ‘The Govern⯑ment we know—and the Laws we know—but the Conſtitution we know not.’ There is no doubt that certain general principles may be inferred from the Laws, relating to our Governors as ſuch; but theſe in⯑ductions are not a part of the body of the Law. The object of Civil Law is human acts: it ordains what is right or expedient in act, and forbids the contrary: theſe are its limits, and it extends no further. There⯑fore [78]ſuch abſtract principles are not the objects or ſubject-matter of Law. Nor ought a ſyſtem of ſuch opinions, to be declared by a particular law, to form a foundation for all the reſt. And thoſe who would do this, either in the whole or in part, are the Conſtitution-makers againſt whom he in many places declares Let us at leaſt extract wiſdom from what muſt long be a ſource of grief even to us; but when the curtain draws up, and we ſee a Conſtitution brought forward upon the ſtage, dreſſed with this lofty [...]thuraus to give it ſtrut and dig⯑nity, depend upon it the piece that is going to be per⯑formed is a tragedy.

LET us now examine what the Letter-Writer has ſaid on the exiſting Conſtitution, by Law eſtabliſhed. In the ſame paragraph from whence the laſt paſſage is cited, he gives his opinion, that ‘the Engliſh Government is real and ſubſtantial; we ſee and feel it; we can take its height and its depth; we know its movements, be⯑cauſe they are regulated by eſtabliſhed and known Laws. This is the only Conſtitution ever ſuppoſed or named by men of ſober minds and ſound under⯑ſtanding; that is,—the Conſtitution of our Government, or the Conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Law^*.’ I have no occaſion to ſhow that he holds out this idea of the Con⯑ſtitution as a preſervative againſt Republican principles, or at leaſt thoſe which tend to incline many greatly to increaſe the weight in the popular ſcale, and thus en⯑deavours to repreſent them as viſionary and fantaſtic theories. But this fact which he lays down may be em⯑ployed to another purpoſe: it may be applied with [79]equal ſucceſs againſt the reveries of unlimited Monarchy⯑men; and we find, in effect, he had before expreſsly thus applied it. "I always thought," ſays he, ‘that Eng⯑liſhmen required plain and defined ſentences for the Charter of their Rights and Liberties; that they claimed to have known, written, and expreſs Laws to govern them.’ ‘That the divine indefeaſible rights of Kings, with other fancies of former times, were exploded prin⯑cipally, becauſe they were poſitions that had no warrant from the known expreſs Laws of the Land, but reſted on general reaſoning, from topics not known to the uſage and Laws of the Country^†’

IT is in the Common Law and Statutes alone that we are to ſearch for the rules which regulate the actions of our Governors as ſuch, or for the Conſtitution. Proteſtants ſearch for the principles of their religion only in the letter of the Revelation; and Engliſhmen for the principles of the Conſtitution in the letter of the Law. It is not acceſſible in the original, indeed, to every one, to whom ſome knowledge of thoſe principles is neceſſary. Expoſitors and Commentators are of high utility, but their authority is to be eſtimated excluſively by the care with which they follow the letter of theſe originals, and explain with equal accuracy, fullneſs, and force, what regards the conſtituent powers of the Conſtitution. The real Conſtitution, and the hiſtory of its variations, are finely delineated in Blackſtone's Commentaries; and although I would not ſubſcribe to everything he lays down, where he comes to treat certain parts of the ſubject philo⯑ſophically, yet a diligent ſtudy of this work I eſteem as [80]the beſt preſervative againſt the flux and reflux of popu⯑lar errors, which at different paſt periods have made the general idea of the Conſtitution ſhift like a looſe ſand⯑bank.

THERE are other ſchools in which this knowledge is ſometimes ſought. Debates in Parliament will have their uſe in giving perfection and ornament to it. But here conſiderable caution is required: they are to be read as the arguments of Advocates in a court, giving the moſt ſpecious dreſs to the ſide on which they are re⯑tained; not as the judgment of the Bench. When the State is divided into Parties, either of them will tell you this is true of their opponents. But there is one caution here particularly neceſſary: when we are examining the argu⯑ments of the Party who propoſed any law, we ought to inſpect very cloſely whether the principles they lay down do not extend farther than the actual law itſelf; for to the principle, in that extent, that law has given a tacit negative: it is therefore unconſtitutional. And I believe an obſervance of this caution would have ſuppreſſed in embryo many very brilliant remarks on the nature of the Conſtitution.

THE Codes which contain our civil and religious duties are liable to the ſame abuſes of miſinterpretation: the Conſtitution has its Methodiſt Preachers. There were [...]y enthuſiaſts formerly, who could ſee nothing in the Laws but what made for the Royal power. There were [...] Lawyers of this claſs formerly, and there is a nume⯑rous body of ignorant fanatic Preachers now belonging to it, who reſolutely overlook all theſe texts, and can ſee nothing but what exalts the popular branch of the [81]Government over the other two. There is likewiſe an⯑other ſet of profeſſors of Conſtitutional Science, formed upon the model of the Socinians, who now uſurp the name of Rational Divines. Theſe men borrow a good deal from the ſchool of the Metaphyſical Politicians, whom I ſhall preſently notice. Theſe expoſitors of the Law and Conſtitution thus furniſhed the plan of their relations, the Divines. The profeſſional man of this ſect, when he finds anything in his book which will not ſquare with them, cuts the knot by affirming it is not Law; becauſe Law being the perfection of reaſon, muſt concur with his reaſon. And ſometimes he goes an⯑other way to work; impoſing his own ſenſe upon the words of Law; for which purpoſe he has a private code of verbal criticiſms, which the grammarians who have ſeen it, declare to be ſo profound as to ſurpaſs their com⯑prehenſion. At ſome ſeaſons the whole weight of popu⯑lar favour will be ſo flung into one ſcale, as almoſt to overſet the balance of the Conſtitution; and at other times it ſhall be caſt into the other. The error of the Multitude is always called by them a Conſtitutional Truth. At ſuch times he will obtain the reputation of a Conſti⯑tutional Lawyer, who flings his whole weight into the overloaded ſcale.

LAST, but not for their inferiority in rank to either of the preceding claſſes, we may place the Metaphyſical Politicians. And theſe are divided into two ſects: one, ſetting out from the doctrine of the good effects of union of power, concenter it abſolutely; the other, now, from the abuſe of it, diſperſe it to the utmoſt, by equaliſing every man's ſhare. Theſe walk in the "via regia," the "high priori road" of the ſcience of politics; and make [82]a ſhort cut to all their concluſions, by the uſe of cer⯑tain things called Abſtract Principles; and of theſe they prepare the bread of life for the Conſtitution. Now an abſtract principle is a thing very like a Caſ⯑ſava root; if you grate it, and preſs the virulent juices out of it, it makes a very nouriſhing food; but if you uſe it without that preparation. it is a poiſon. Theſe philoſophers formerly have gone very ſlightly through this courſe of manipulation; but now they omit it en⯑tirely, and the Abbé Sieyes has condemned it as an ‘at⯑taint upon principle.’

BUT I paſs from theſe men, and the confuſion they have introduced into our notions of the Conſtitution, to deſcribe one dangerous but ſp [...]cious ſource of error, in arguing on it. When we conſider the power of any one of its conſtituent parts ſeparately, and the reaſons urged for it, we may ſometimes [...], by analogy, that more ſhould be added to it; and [...]y will, at firſt view, conclude that this is an argument for ſo doing. But it will be [...]ſily ſhewn that this is not concluſive; for by adding [...]o any one power. we deſtroy the pre-eſtabliſhed balance and proportion of the three: and if the Conſtitu⯑tion were good before, if the effect of the change be ſmall, it is almoſt a movement without a motive; if great, it is an evil; it generates a new Conſtitution, diffe⯑rent from that found before by experience to be good. The identity of mixed Conſtitutions depends upon the ſame conſtituent parts being combined in the ſame man⯑ner and in the ſame proportion, like that of a medical compoſit on; for if you vary the proportion of the in⯑gredients of the latter, though you preſerve the num⯑ber, its effect may greatly vary; in one proportion [83]the compound may reſtore a man to health, in a dange⯑rous illneſs; in another, put an end to his exiſtence.

IT follows from this, that when any man or ſet of men are charged with wiſhing to make a great change in the exiſting Conſtitution; if they barely declare them⯑ſelves friends to a Government by King, Lords, and Commons, they do not thereby diſclaim that charge. For this purpoſe they muſt make an addition to this de⯑claration, and ſay, that each ought to poſſeſs the ſame powers they now hold. For a Party who may wiſh to bring the Government of Great Britain very near to a Democracy, to an Ariſtocracy, or to pure Deſpotiſm, with two almoſt non-effective pageants of power, to ſup⯑port the names of its other two conſtituent parts, may with equal truth make the ſame declaration. Of the equivocation I am deſcribing, it is to be feared there are too many inſtances. I illuſtrate this matter farther, by examples taken from our own hiſtory.

HENRY the Eighth trampled upon the Lords and Commons; in the reign of Henry the Sixth, during ſome time before the civil wars, the Nobility tyrannized over the King and the people; and before Charles the Firſt quitted the metropolis, the Commons had effec⯑tively reduced the Peers and the King to cyphers; and if any of theſe three uſurpations had been confirmed by the forms of Law, it would have been a Govern⯑ment by King, Lords, and Commons: but it could not take place now without a ſubverſion of the exiſting Conſtitution.

[84]THE defence of the Conſtitution, as it is now fixed by Law and Cuſtom, is and ought to be the common center of union, both to thoſe who conſider it as arrived at that degree of practical perfection, that no farther expe⯑riments ſhould be tried upon it, and thoſe who, allow⯑ing much that is excellent in it, full retain an idea that it might be worth the while to attempt ſome farther mode⯑rate ameliorations of it. I freely declare in favour of the former, and even on ſpeculative principles; but on the points in which theſe allies differ I urge nothing. In the little I have to [...]. I hope to be in concurrence with the ſentiments of the latter. While the preſent fermen⯑tation in the minds of the populace is kept up by every claſs of ſe [...]tious agit [...]rs, to attempt any change in the exiſting proportion of the [...]ree powers, does not ſeem mo [...]e ſafe than the c [...]ging of the poſition of an army wh [...]n the enemy [...] approached cloſe up to it, and is about inſtantly to commence [...] attack, which almoſt inevita⯑bly muſt terminate in a total rout. If you ſhould carry your point now, your victory the agitators will repre⯑ſent as theirs, and they will meet with ready belief. They and their Party will grow in courage, in number, in force, and in conſequence, moſt probably too high for you and your former opponents, if united, to make a ſtand againſt them; and the Conſtitution you will have to live under, will at leaſt be much more remote from what you have fixed upon in your minds as a ſtandard, than the preſent.

WITH two or three miſcellaneous obſervations, I ſhall cloſe a Tract, that has grown to a much greater length than I expected. I muſt remark on the Letter-Writer, that Calvin did not concur with Beza on the [85]ſubject of Church Government by Biſhops^*. There is no Divine of the Church of England now, who would ſpeak the language of the former. I have not his works, but I find in the Preface to the Clergyman's Vade Mecum, that in his Anſwer to the artful and elegant work of Cardinal Sadolet againſt the firſt Reformers, he cer⯑tainly does ‘anathematize all thoſe who do not revere and pay the moſt profound obedience to that hierar⯑chy in which Biſhops retain their eminence; but ſo as to ſubmit to Chriſt Jeſus, and depend on him as their Head^†.’ Now I have never heard even of Archbiſhop Laud. that he fulminated an anathema againſt all who did not "moſt profoundly revere" the Epiſcopal Church Government in England. But of Beza, the Marquis D'Argens informs us, that at the conferences at Poiſſi, by his declaration againſt the Epiſcopal Government, ‘he loſt the fineſt opportunity poſſible of introducing a thorough reformation in the Gallican Church^‡.’ If Bayle had known this par⯑ticular, he would not have been perplexed to aſ⯑ſign the reaſon why thoſe conferences were ſo unex⯑pectedly broken off. We alſo find in the Hiſtory of Geneva, that the citizens founded a College for the education of foreigners reſorting thither; and the cir⯑cumſtance immediately following it is, that the Duke of Savoy and Charles the Ninth of France remonſtrated ſtrongly with the Republic, that the ſtudents on their return excited their ſubjects to diſobedience and ſedi⯑tion [86] ^* The name of Hugonot, according to De Thou, was not originally that of a ſect, but of a political Party, and borrowed from Geneva, which was divided into two claſ⯑ſes; the Eignots, or confederates by oath; and the Mama⯑lues, or Egyptian ſl [...]ves^†; which ſeem very well to anſwer the modern terms of Party in France. What a leaven of Republicaniſm they there got and diffuſed in their na⯑tive conntries, debaſing the ſuperior purity of their doc⯑trines, we ſee in an unmived and unequivocal light in one part of the hiſtory of that kingdom. The Edict of Nantz had been paſſed ſeven years; Henry the Fourth, their patron, was ſtill on the throne; his adminiſtration with reſpect to them was ſuch, that they wiſhed him immortal. It is the Proteſtant Duke of Sully that is their accuſer. If we may believe that great man, ‘a ſcheme had been formed for eſtabliſhing a kind of a Common⯑wealth; or at leaſt a body apart from the reſt of the kingdom, by an aſſociation among the Proteſtants^‡.’ He names the men who formed it. The hiſtorian con⯑tinues — ‘The body of the Proteſtants did not ſee the thing in this light, and when they did, they diſap⯑proved it.’ Sully muſt have been ſo willing to be ſatisfied, that I cannot ſuppoſe he was not. We all ſtop ſhort, by a kind of inſtinct, in the inveſtigation of facts, the reſult of which will give us pain. His declaration likewiſe by no means exculpates thoſe who guided their councils. It was perhaps impolitic, when the ſtorm was weathered, to draw aſide the veil attempted to be drawn over the conſpiracy. The Hugonots had been formed [87]into ſomething like an imperium in imperio for years; and it is not likely that the diſciples of Geneva ſhould form a Republic without knowing it. Though I admit, if a man were to ſet up the frame of a houſe upon my ground, and upon my threatening a proſecution he were to conſent to remove it, and were to tell me, that when he cut out his timbers into proper ſcantlings, adapted them to one another, framed and pinned them together, he did not know it was a houſe which he had been fram⯑ing, and that "he looked upon it in another light," the point ſeems to me ſo exceedingly difficult of proof, that I ſhould not conteſt it, though I knew he had been edu⯑cated in a carpenter's ſhop.

IT remains to conſider what the Letter-Writer has ſaid on the late Trials of certain perſons for Treaſon. The material part of it is as follows: ‘They were indeed acquitted by a Jury, but they have been ſince found guilty by their Country, on the evidence of the pro⯑ceedings at the Trial^*.’ This is firſt brought as a proof, that he does not treat Juries with due reverence. I ſubſcribe without heſitation to their abſolute neceſſity, as I do to our mode of making Laws; but as I do not ſup⯑poſe myſelf treating the Legiſlature of the kingdom with contempt, when I find fault with a law enacted by it, which muſt have been ſo often debated, and have received three ſuch important ſanctions, every Engliſhman has ſure⯑ly the full right to treat the verdict of a Jury, decided at once, with the ſame freedom, without an impu⯑tation of want of reverence for that excellent inſtitu⯑tion. The voice of the Law itſelf is on this ſide. To [88]guard our liberties, and in tenderneſs to perſons arraign⯑ed, no ſecond trial takes place in criminal caſes at the ſuit of the Crown; but it is not to be ſuppoſed that Juries are more infallible when ſitting on ſuch cauſes than in civil caſes, in which the Law itſelf ſuppoſes that they may give a verdict contrary to evidence, by allowing a new trial in ſuch caſes.

THE Jury mentioned before were acknowledged by the Judge to have diſplayed "the moſt unwearied attention "and the moſt diligent inveſtigation." They alſo brought in their verdict after much private deliberation. But what does this amount to? That they went through all the forms of buſineſs with the ſtricteſt attention to decorum. The point where he ſtopped directs the at⯑tention decidedly to what he was ſilent upon. I think to remember having obſerved this when I firſt ſaw the words. It is a "ſilence that ſpeaks;" and I think on the ſide of the Letter-Writer. Do not Judges frequently expreſs their ſatisfaction at a verdict? and did this Judge appear to have been backward in giving approbation where he could do it with propriety? Theſe conſtruc⯑tions of ſilence, when certain decorums impoſe it, are at leaſt as old as Menander, whom I quote in the margin, and who obſerves, "they ſpeak many things ^*." And if the authority of a Poet will not do, we may bring that of an Hiſtorian; that when by the ſtate of political affairs great men are induced to ſhow ſome things and keep others back, the public attention is ſtrongly called to the latter. Was not the memory of Brutus and Caſſius im⯑preſſed upon every Roman's mind moſt ſtrongly, be⯑cauſe [89]the diſcretion of one of their deſcendants con⯑cealed their ſtatues on a well-known occaſion?

LET the queſtion now be conſidered in another point of light. We are to obſerve that the word Evidence bears, in common converſation, two ſenſes; according to the ſpecies thereof conſidered; hiſtorical or judicial evidence. The evidence may be enough to make any man believe the exiſtence of a plot, or come up to the point here called hiſtorical; but it may fall ſhort of that degree of ſtrength the Law requires to take away the life of an in⯑dividual, or judicial evidence. And where the evidence is only of the firſt magnitude, or (as it may do) where it much exceeds the weight required by the firſt, but ſtill falls ſhort of the ſtandard of the ſecond, the Public MUST condemn, and the Jury MUST acquit; each with the ſame matter before them. The national tranſactions with foreign Nations in peace and war, are ſolely guided by the firſt ſpecies of evidence. Senates proceed in their de⯑clarative deciſions on the firſt ſpecies of evidence, when they think the State in danger, to give the watch-word to the People: Courts of Juſtice on the ſecond. If nothing but judicial evidence were hiſtorical evidence, hiſtory muſt be a blank, or at leaſt half the inſtructive, leſſons it holds out to mankind muſt be blotted out: and upon that evidence men muſt ſpeak, or be reduced to mutes.

JURIES are adjuncts to the Royal Executive Power; and the Letter-Writer is charged with having ſaid that they may be "lopped off" without detriment to the State. But in effect, he nowhere ſuppoſes the axe ap⯑plied [90]to this ſubſidiary and occaſional power at all: and when in other caſes he ſuppoſes it to be applied, he repreſents the monarchical trunk as being in conſe⯑quence "ſhorn of its honours;" and if he holds the latter may be done without detriment to the State, he is a Republican; if both conjointly, an Anarchiſt. But I have never heard that the ſuppoſed Author of the Let⯑ter holds any ſuch political hereſies, which I am ſure are not to be found there. It is true, however, that when the kingly power was in this country ‘ſhorn of its honours,’ Juries, in caſes then called caſes of High Treaſon, were "lopped off." We are expreſsly told, that Cromwell and the Parliament ſet them aſide, and erected "High Courts of Juſtice^*." And to ſuperſede them in like manner, very ſoon after they were introduced, the French Republicans copied this precedent in their Revolutionary Tribunals; and if the ſame Republican uſurpation ſhould again take place in this country, Juries may be once more ‘lopped off.’

THERE is another charge of a ſimilar formation brought againſt what the Writer has ſaid on the late Verdicts. A great Orator has been made in the public papers to declare, that it is aſſerted in the Letter, that ‘the verdict of Juries is not a final deciſion in trials at Bar.’ This I have not ſeen there; no more did he, if by Bar he means the legal Bar. But there is another and an awful Bar, at which ſuch verdicts have been often ſet aſide, as contrary to evidence; that of impartial poſterity; [93]that of hiſtory; that even of the men who live at the time when they are given, after the [...]erment attending ſuch a cauſe has ſubſided; for even this laſt muſt be granted, unleſs we ſuppoſe truth to be a volatile ingre⯑dient like camphor, which being mixed in that com⯑pound called a verdict, it ſhall thus retain, as to ſenſe, the full odour thereof for a given time or number of years; ſmell faintly for a ſecond term; and be quite flat always afterwards.

YET if we grant this, as highly probable, to thoſe who contend for this philoſophical hypotheſis, they muſt, according to their own principles, at the ſame time admit it to be poſſible, that it may be ſome⯑times infuſed therein in a liquid form like aether; and in caſes where the ingredient is only ſo blended in the compound, a man ſhall appear as the innocent victim of State perſecution to-night, and be univerſally believed an acquitted felon to-morrow; for evaporate this aether will. You may as eaſily fix "Hermes," which it is known cannot be done without the powder of precipita⯑tion. I have ſaid it before, and I repeat it again, Juries are of the moſt abſolute neceſſity to guard ſubjects againſt the oppreſſion of governors: but it does not follow that any dozen of reputable ſhop-keepers, or farmers, or mer⯑chants, or eſquires, in his Majeſty's dominions, are jointly veſted with the ſublime gift of infallibility. The ſublimeſt monuments of human wiſdom and virtue are diſhonoured by being praiſed for what they are not. When we find them dreſſed out in ſuch fantaſtical at⯑tributives, we ſuſpect, perhaps, the deſign of ſuch need⯑leſs extravagance, but we directly ſtrip off the frippery. [94]And I believe any man of taſte would do the ſame, if a French taylor and a French perruquier had exhauſted all the wonders of their art upon the Farneſian Her⯑cules.

To return to the doctrine I am conſidering; which is, that the verdict, which is deciſive in a trial, ſhould decide every man's opinion. Thoſe who hold this doctrine are prepared, I ſuppoſe, to defend the legality of the deciſion on Algernon Sidney, and all the ver⯑dicts in the war of legal murders carried on by both the factions in the latter end of the reign of Charles the Second. To me it appears, that during all the time in the laſt century, in which the Republican Party appeared viſibly in exiſtence and in action, until it dwindled into obſcurity, the political Trials by Jury form no ornament to the page of our hiſtory: a brilliant exception or two may, however, be alledged.

FOR theſe reaſons I think the Letter-Writer guilt⯑leſs, in toto, of all the charges I have ſeen brought againſt him. If the Public attributes the work to the true Author, it is every man's duty, who thinks as I do of his paſt merits and the general importance of his political character, and who has opportunities, to take up his defence.

THIS Tract was ſent to the preſs without the Writer's being able to read the whole together. He had the choice of abiding the cenſures of all inaccu⯑racies ſo cauſed; or to have delayed the publication [95]too long; and he has choſen the former, becauſe on all ſuch occaſions, that little ſacrifice ought to be made. It ought, alſo, to be announced; becauſe, in ſuch a circumſtance, a Writer is intitled to certain allowances.