SECT. I. The Definition of the Soul, as given in our oppoſite Eſſay, examin'd and proved erro⯑neous.

IT may, perhaps, be expected that this Eſſay, as it is written in Oppoſition to a foregoing, ſhould deny, without Diſtinction, every thing that has been before prov'd or aſſerted; but it is eſteemed more requiſite to the Author's Deſign, to prove the Immortality of the Soul, without ſo much as endeavouring to confute the Arguments made uſe of to the contrary, as the Concluſions drawn from a wrong Repreſentation of ſuch Arguments: We ſhall therefore, to avoid long and tedious enquiry, allow every Aſſertion to be [4] juſt, that doth not ſtand diametrically oppo⯑ſite to that great and important Truth, the Soul is and muſt be immortal.

To proceed therefore, with the ſame De⯑gree of regularity as our oppoſite Eſſay, we ſhall firſt conſider the Definition there given us of the Soul; which is the following.

• 1ſt. We allow that the Soul is an intel⯑lectual Being, not at all ſubject to the Acci⯑dents and Properties of Matter in general; ſuch as Solidity, Extenſion, Contraction, Ex⯑panſion, or any Quality whereby it is rendered local, or in a capacity to take up the leaſt, or the moſt infinite Space.
• 2dly. That this intellectual Being is acting on only a particular Part of Matter, i. e. the Body, by certain inexplicable means, as ut⯑terly unknown to us, as the means how the Planets act in the Orbits, by wonderful de⯑pendencies on their proper Centers of Gravi⯑tation; all which we can attribute to nothing but the Will of the great Creator, from whom they have received ſuch neceſſary Laws as are ſtiled the Laws of Nature
• [5]3dly. That the Soul is nothing but that Power in Man, or rather acting on the Body of Man that enables him to perceive, to re⯑flect, and to will.
• 4thly. That the Soul is a perpetual, or conſtant Power of thinking; and that, upon its ceaſing to be Active, it muſt immediately ceaſe to be. —

It is, ſays our oppoſite Eſſay, from theſe ſtated Principles, that a late Philoſopher, meaning Dr. Watts, draws the Inference of the Soul's being immortal.— But, perhaps, it may be found, at leaſt, I am firmly per⯑ſuaded, that there is no Man but muſt be conſcious on reading the Works of that learned Gentleman; it was from a far more ſublime Idea of the human Soul, that he drew thoſe Concluſions: For notwithſtanding the above Definition does not contradict the philoſo⯑phical Idea, entertained of the Soul by the beſt and moſt rational Philoſophers, it is, nevertheleſs, a very imperfect one; and not in reality that of the Soul of Man: For a juſt Definition muſt conſiſt of every eſſential Property, belonging to that which is defin'd; and that this does not is plainly confeſs'd in [6] Section the 5th of our oppoſite Eſſay, where it is ſaid that goodneſs of Heart and the Power of judging of Truth as to the fitneſs and unfit⯑neſs of things are eſſential to the Soul.—Now both theſe Properties are evaded in the Defi⯑nition, under the general Term of Reflection or Reaſon; and tho' that Eſſay may be ſup⯑poſed to prove that a Soul, capable of both Reflection and Reaſon, may be as liable to Mortality as the Brutes; which, as is fairly enough prov'd, are as capable of ſome kind of Reflection and Reaſon as ſome of the loweſt of Mankind; yet it is no where prov'd that a Soul, poffeſs'd of Goodneſs of Heart and that innate Power of judging of Truth, may be, or is ſubject to Annihilation. — It is, indeed attempted to be prov'd, that this Power of judging of Truth is implanted in the Brutes; but it will appear by and by, the Sagacity of their Actions may be much more eaſily accounted for, without this ſup⯑poſition; and as to this innate Goodneſs of Heart, there made neceſſary to the Produc⯑tion of Virtue, notwithſtanding it is allowed to be eſſential to the Soul, it is not at all brought to ſtand in the Compariſon between the Souls of Brutes and Men. It is impoſ⯑ſible then this Compariſon can be juſt, unleſs [7] every eſſential Quality, Mode and Property exactly anſwered, both in the Souls of Brutes and Men, to each other. And this Manner of Reaſoning, however, ſmoothly it might be ſwallowed by that weak-thinking Part of Mankind, the Deiſts, is as ſtupid and ridicu⯑lous, as it would be to aſſert, that a Horſe, becauſe he has a Head, Legs, and other Parts ſimilar to ſome other Animal, muſt be ſuch an Animal.

There is, indeed, a very great Error in ad⯑judging the Source of Virtue to that Good⯑neſs of Heart, naturally implanted in the Soul; or, as Watts calls it, a Diſpoſition to⯑wards Goodneſs, appearing in ſome Degree in all People. For if, as is alſo allow'd by our oppoſite Eſſay, that is the greateſt Act of Virtue which is calculated to produce the greateſt public Happineſs, it will be found, that Men may have too much as well as too little of this natural Diſpoſition to Goodneſs, or, as Mr. Fielding terms it, Milk of human Kindneſs. But this will more evidently ap⯑pear by and by.

[8]The above Definition of the Soul muſt needs be imperfect, as there is a Neceſſity we ſhould have a Source for Virtue in the ratio⯑nal Mind, and which is allowed eſſential to the Soul, and expreſſed by the Term Good⯑neſs of Heart. And yet this is found inſuf⯑ficient of itſelf to produce Virtue, which is afterwards allowed to be owing alſo in a great Degree to that innate Knowledge of Truth, and that it is from theſe two Powers operat⯑ing in Conjunction, that ariſe Actions of Vir⯑tue.—Our oppoſite Eſſay, in this Point, ſeems plainly to be calculated for the Rea⯑ſonings of the Deiſts; or, certainly it would never have proceeded upon a Definition of the Soul, that wanted even the moſt eſſen⯑tial Property belonging to it—the Source of moral Virtue. And how few Men muſt there be, or, otherwiſe, how beſotted are they, who can think that a juſt Definition of the Soul of Man, that has neither the Word, or the Meaning of the Word, CONSCIENCE, in it.

If I could be perſuaded, indeed, that there was no ſuch ſacred Impulſe implanted in the Nature of Man, to direct his Actions; I could eaſily agree with our oppoſite Eſſay, [9] in earneſt, to favour the Doctrine of the Soul's Mortality. But it is on this only I depend for the Confutation of that Opinion. It is on this implanted Power, or, in the Lan⯑guage of the ſacred Writings, this Law of God written in our Hearts, I am confident I can make appear the true Source of the Uni⯑verſality of that Opinion, that the Soul is im⯑mortal.—From this, the Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments; and from this, that wide Difference we may reaſonably make between ourſelves and the Brutes—be⯑tween the Powers of inanimate Things, or that general Power the Law of Nature; and that intellectual, immortal Being, the Soul of Man.

That we may not, however, be accuſed of leaving the Reader in the dark, concern⯑ing what we intend by the Word Con⯑ſcience—our Meaning is, an Impulſe, na⯑turally implanted in the Soul, that infallibly tells us, we ſhould act unto all men as we would have them act to each other; not as we would have them act to us in particular, or thoſe we are partial to; for, in ſuch a Caſe, our Affections would ſo far prevail, that, per⯑haps, there would be no ſuch Thing as Ju⯑ſtice, [10] or, at beſt, very little in the World. As for Inſtance; ſuppoſing it in my Power, ought I to ward off the Puniſhment due to a Villain; becauſe, were I in his Circum⯑ſtances, and he in mine, I ſhould no doubt be deſirous of his doing me the ſame kind Office.—Certainly, No.—Conſcience tells us, that we ſhould act to each other, as In⯑dividuals, agreeable to the Duty we owe all Mankind, viz. that of promoting the pub⯑lick Happineſs. So that when this tender Diſpoſition to Goodneſs, or Goodneſs of Heart, above mentioned, influences us to a Pity for any particular Vice or Perſon, that may occaſion us to act partially, to the Pre⯑judice of the publick Good; ſuch a Diſpo⯑ſition, at that time, is ſo far from being the Source of Virtue, that it is a very great Weak⯑neſs, nearly bordering on actual Vice itſelf.

Now, that there is ſuch an innate Prin⯑ciple implanted in the Soul of Man, tho' the Arguments of our oppoſite Eſſay allow it, I need go no further than to appeal to every Man's ſelf for an Evidence of it.

SECT. II. The Univerſality of the Opinion in relation to the Soul's Immortality, enquired into.

IN the ſecond Section, our oppoſite Eſſay, after having notic'd how extenſive and general the Opinion of the Soul's Immorta⯑lity is; which, with ſome Degree of Juſtice, is attributed chiefly to the Prejudice of Edu⯑cation, proceeds to examine, ſuppoſing it not to be communicated by any adventitious Means, whether or no it be an ìnnate Idea naturally implanted in the Soul: And, from Mr. Locke's Denial of the Doctrine of innate Ideas, a Concluſion is drawn, that this Be⯑lief of the Soul's Immortality ariſes only from the Powers of Reaſon being vitiated and miſ⯑led by a certain Pleaſure attendant on our Ideas of Immortality; and alſo that it is not owing to the juſt Exertion of that implanted Knowledge of Truth, or Power of judging of the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things, which (notwithſtanding the Doctrine of in⯑nate Ideas is diſallowed) is granted to be eſ⯑ſential to the Soul.

[12]In Anſwer to this, —we will take it for Truth, that there are no Ideas innate, any otherwiſe than our oppoſite Eſſay allows. It is there aſſerted, that no Man can think o⯑therwiſe than that two and two make four— that when a Globe is exactly fitted into a round Caſe, there is a Fitneſs between theſe two Things, and ſuch like.—This he is convinced of from that certain and unaltera⯑ble Impulſe within, —now equally eſſential to to the Soul, equally powerful to eſtabliſh its own ſacred and undeniable Truths, is that Impulſe called Conſcience.

It behoves us then to conſider how far may a Man's Conſcience convince him that the Soul is immortal;—but, before we re⯑ply to this, we ſhall a little examine the rea⯑ſon given in our oppoſite Eſſay as the Source of this Opinion.—It ſays, ‘It is probable that a Man, who had never heard of the Soul's being immortal, might nevertheleſs be of that Opinion: Yet this Belief is oc⯑caſioned more by the Will influencing, or as it were bribing the Reaſon ſo to con⯑clude, than from the natural Power of judging of Truth, which is eſſential to the Soul: For, from the Pleaſure ariſing from [13] our Ideas, it is natural for the Soul to will or deſire never to be robb'd of that Pleaſure, which muſt ceaſe in its Non-exiſtence.’

To this an Objection is there propoſed, by ſaying, ‘The Reaſon is ſubject to the Will, not the Will to the Reaſon; for you cannot think or perceive what you will.’—This is allow'd true; but thus anſwered: ‘Tho' the Will is not the Director of the Reaſon, it can and plainly doth impoſe falſe and ſpecious Propoſitions on the Judgment, in favour of its own Cauſe, and the Conclu⯑ſions form'd in Conſequence of theſe, is called Partiality.’

If this then be the Caſe, that the Will doth miſlead the Reaſon to conclude, from a Deſire of the Soul's Immortality, that that Doctrine is true; why may not a Deſire of having it otherwiſe, equally miſlead the Rea⯑ſon on the other Side alſo?—and this is ap⯑parently one great Proof that thoſe People who oppoſe the Immortality of the Soul, whatever may be their Pretenſions, are really very deſirous that it ſhould be mortal.— And this, very aptly, agrees with the Re⯑flection there made, of the Difficulty attend⯑ing [14] the Perſuaſion of People into a Belief of any Syſtem, againſt which they are biaſſed and partial; and the eaſier Con⯑currence to the Credit of any thing by thoſe who are no ways prejudiced againſt it.— After this, our oppoſite Eſſay proceeds to remark, that all, or the greateſt Part of Mankind, have naturally the Deſire of Im⯑mortality; and that the Reflection Cato makes is applicable to all.

But this is no more evident than the Aſ⯑ſertion, that the Philoſophical Antients believ'd as much as the Moderns, this Opi⯑nion of the Soul's Immortality; of which Socrates is brought as an Inſtance; for So⯑crates himſelf ſays, that the Things relating to the Soul's Immortality, were diſbelieved by the greateſt Part of the World.—Cicero ſays, that his Opinion about the Soul's Im⯑mortality was contradicted by moſt of the [15] Epicureans, as well as the learned of other Denominations.— Ariſtotle did not at all believe it, as he maintain'd Death to be the moſt terrible Thing in Nature, as putting an End to every Thing.—Lipſius ſays, that it was often controverted by the Sto⯑icks, who were indeed very dubious con⯑cerning the Veracity of it.—The learned Dr. Clark alſo tells us, there were many whole Sects of Philoſophers, who abſolute⯑ly denied the Immortality of the Soul, and that even the wiſeſt and beſt of them did not always expreſs themſelves with the ſame Confidence concerning it.—Dr. Prideaux ſays, it is generally agreed among the An⯑tients, that Pythagoras was the firſt Greek who taught this Opinion,— we are alſo in⯑formed, by many, that the Egyptians were the firſt who aſſerted the Immortality of the Soul, or its Tranſmigration. Now from theſe Inſtances it appears, that what was in our oppoſite Eſſay offer'd for the Argument, had very little Veracity in it, and I think it very rational to believe, that, if ſuch a ſtrong Deſire of Immortality was eſſential to the Soul of Man, all theſe Philoſophers would have found Reaſons, of ſome Kind or other, to ſupport themſelves in the Be⯑lief [16] of this Doctrine; however they might duſſent in other Points of leſs Importance. It is alſo plain, that a Man influenced with ſo ſtrong a Deſire of Immortality, could not be brought to acquieſce in the Unbelief of it, without ſome very ſtriking Proof to the contrary; and I am pretty certain it will be allowed on all Sides, that the antient Philoſophers had much leſs to offer againſt the Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality, than even a modern Deiſt.—But let us come now to conſider, by what Means a Man's Conſcience may convince him, that the Soul is immortal.—Our oppoſite Eſſay al⯑lows, that the Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments, if true, would make ſtrongly for the Immortality of the Soul; and ſays, that the Opinion of ſuch a Neceſ⯑ſity has been entertained by Philoſophers of all Ages.—Now, tho' we dont allow e⯑ven this Opinion to have been ſo general as there intimated, as it would of neceſſity have made the Doctrine of the Soul's Im⯑mortality equally univerſal, yet we muſt own theſe were the Sentiments of the wiſeſt and beſt of thoſe Philoſophers, and their only Reaſon for believing the Soul immor⯑tal. — If it can be prov'd then, that this [17] implanted Impulſe, call'd Conſcience, can rationally convince a Man, that there is a Neceſſity for future Rewards and Puniſh⯑ments; it is plain, that the Opinion of the Soul's Immortality is not owing to the Will offering ſpecious and deluding Propoſitions to the Powers of Reaſon; but that it is owing to a juſt and right Uſe of thoſe Pow⯑ers, implanted in the Soul, that occaſions a rational Conviction, which is allow'd, even in our oppoſite Eſſay, to make ſtrongly for the Soul's Immortality: And, that this is the Caſe, will evidently appear when we come to conſider the ſixth Section of that Eſſay.

SECT. III. Reaſons for the Mortality of the Soul exa⯑mined.

IN this Section of our oppoſite Treatiſe, is pretended an Examination of the Proofs offer'd, in Favour of the Immortality of the Soul, wherein the two Corollaries of Dr. Watts, in which he gives his Reaſons for ſupporting that Doctrine, are with ſome Juſtice ſhewn to have leſs Weight than they [18] are generally ſuppoſed.—Nevertheleſs the Arguments, there made uſe of, are very far from ſupporting the oppoſite Opinion.

The chief Point there controverted, and on which the whole Weight of that Section depends, is, that the Powers of Reflection or Reaſon, are equally liable to be affected by Accidents peculiar to the Body, with the Powers of Senſation; as is inſtanc'd by Ex⯑amples of Lunatics and maim'd Perſons. And, upon this Argument, which we will ſuppoſe to be true, it is concluded, that when the Powers of Senſation, ceaſe to act by Death, the Powers of Reflection ceaſe alſo; and, ceaſing to act, conſequently ceaſe to be: And thus the Soul, conſiſting only of theſe Powers, ceaſes to be, or is annihilated.

In anſwer to this, —if, when theſe Powers ceaſe to act, they ceaſe to exiſt, and, if a Lunatic may be entirely incapable of Reaſon or Reflection, as in our oppoſite Eſſay is ſuppoſed, thoſe Powers ceaſing to act, conſequently ceaſe to be: How comes it then, that he is reſtor'd, ſo as to be capa⯑citated to reflect and judge, as nicely as ever, unleſs, by the Reſtoration of the Body, [19] this eſſential Property of the Soul again ex⯑iſts; which is ſtupidly conſidering the Soul as owing itſelf to, or a Property of, the Bo⯑dy, in direct Oppoſition to what our oppo⯑ſite Eſſay allows, viz. that the Soul is a Being in itſelf, and not a Property belong⯑ing to Matter.—Or, ſuppoſing, that while either the Powers of Senſation or Reaſon re⯑main active, we ſhould ſay the Soul exiſts, as undoubtedly it does, and that, tho' the Soul, in all its Faculties, ceaſing to be active, ceaſes to be, (tho' ſeveral of its eſſential Qualities may ceaſe to act and yet exiſt, as hereafter will appear) yet, notwithſtanding, as the Powers of Reaſon, in our oppoſite Eſſay, are eſteemed the moſt ſublime Fa⯑culties of the Soul; how comes it that theſe Powers of Reaſon, may ceaſe to be active, and yet thoſe of Senſation retain their native Uſe and Vigour; while, if thoſe of Senſation ceaſe to act, it is ſaid, thoſe of Reflection muſt ceaſe to act alſo; and ac⯑cordingly the Soul ceaſe to be.— And this is allow'd in our oppoſite Eſſay, where it is aſſerted, a Lunatic that cannot remem⯑ber, reflect, or judge, may be ſenſible he hears, ſees, and feels.

[20]Now, is it not rational to conclude, if theſe eſſential Powers of Reflection or Rea⯑ſon can remain inactive, and the Powers of Senſation perform all their intended Offices; that, on the other Side, thoſe of Senſation may ceaſe to act, and yet thoſe of Reflec⯑tion remain active and exiſting: Or elſe, we make the Powers of Reaſon much more liable to be affected with Accidents, peculiar to the Body, than thoſe of Senſa⯑tion, and ſo ſubject the greater Faculties of the Soul to the leſs: By which means, our oppoſite Eſſay has been fooliſhly endeavour⯑ing to prove, that the Powers of Reflec⯑tion or Reaſon are not immortal, after hav⯑ing taken it for granted, thoſe of Senſation are not, which, according to this Conclu⯑ſion, are leſs affected by the Body than thoſe of Reflection.

Hence we muſt certainly conclude, that either the Powers of Reaſon and Senſation, as there underſtood, do not perfectly con⯑ſtitute the Soul of Man; or, that they may ceaſe to act, or, to the utmoſt of our Apprehenſion, appear ſo to do, without ceaſing to exiſt; both of which will, by and by, be made evident.—Yet, for the [21] preſent we ſhall conclude with the former, that there may be Souls that have both the Powers of Reflection and Senſation, and yet not be eſſentially the ſame with the Soul of Man.

What therefore is ſaid in this Section, re⯑lating to thoſe Powers, that are here ſuppos'd, or we will allow prov'd, to be ſubject to Ac⯑cidents peculiar to that Body or Part of Mat⯑ter on which they act, does not in the leaſt argue againſt the Immortality of the Soul of Man, as it has been prov'd in Sect. I. it doth not conſiſt only of thoſe Powers.

There is alſo, in this third Section of our oppoſite Eſſay, another Objection endeavour'd to be ſolv'd or rather evaded; and this is one of Watts's Aſſertions, that—the Soul cannot lay aſide its own thinking, —it cannot put itſelf out off Being.

To this it is anſwered, that it is poſſible for a Man to take a Piſtol and blow his Brains out; by which Action he, at once, annihilates the Powers of Senſation, no inconſiderable Eſ⯑ſence of the Soul.

[22]We will ſuppoſe then, in order to re⯑ply to this, that every Man is ſo far a free Agent, that he may or may not, juſt as he pleaſes, annihilate the Powers of Senſation; for Dr. Watts himſelf ſays, that the Soul, in a ſeparate State from the Body, is freed from all the Avocations of Senſations and ſenſible Things: And there⯑fore we may ſay, tho' not very juſtly, Death annihilates the Powers of Senſation.—But, what if it does, is the Soul thereby annihi⯑lated, becauſe one particular Property of it is render'd inactive; a Property, there allow'd, eſſential to it no longer than while acting on the Body, and at its Departure from which, there ſeems no manner of Neceſſity for it to be poſſeſſed off—Certainly, No;—unleſs you will ſay that a Man, born incapable, or de⯑prived of ſeveral of the Means of Senſation, as hearing, ſeeing, &c. is not poſſeſſed of a perfect human Soul; becauſe all the Powers of Senſation, eſſential to the Soul's Exiſtence, do not appear to be active, ſo, conſequently, do not exiſt. And this, no one will pretend to aſſert; becauſe the Reaſon why thoſe par⯑ticular ſenſative Qualities of the Soul are thus, inactive, is, for the moſt part, apparently, occaſioned by ſome Defect in the bodily Or⯑gans [23] of Senſation; as is plain, from the many Cures that have been performed on Perſons born with and long labouring under ſuch Defects; I ſay, this, no Body will pre⯑tend to offer for that Reaſon, unleſs at the ſame time it be alſo aſſerted, that an Oculiſt that reſtores a Man, born blind, to ſight, adds a new Faculty to his Soul, which was before as imperfect as his Body: which is, in Effect, making the Soul owe its Exiſtence to the Body; a Manner of Reaſoning, which, as our oppoſite Eſſay diſallows, has no need here of being diſproved, as elſe it might ea⯑ſily be.

Is it not obvious then, from hence, that the Powers of Senſation are all perfect in the Soul; tho' from the Defects of that Body, on which it acts, it ſhall not be able to ac⯑quire one Idea relative to thoſe Things, of which, had the Organs of the Body been perfect, it muſt have known ſomething.

Hence alſo it is clearly evident, with what has been above ſaid concerning the Powers of Reflection or Reaſon, that thoſe both of Senſation and Reflection may be inactive, at leaſt ſo to our ſtricteſt Inquiry, and yet have their Exiſtence in the Soul, whether acting [24] on or in a State of Separation from the Body. For, tho' Dr. Watts allows, the Soul is free from all the Avocations of Senſations and ſenſible Things, when parted from the Body, yet it cannot be argued from hence, that the Soul is bereft or deprived of the Powers of Senſation, any more than that the Soul of a Man, which, by the Imperfection of his Body, is a Stranger to the Avocations of many of theſe Senſations, therefore it is not poſſeſſed of thoſe Powers; which, from what we have juſt inſtanc'd, is evidently falſe. Thus, the Powers of Senſation may exiſt in the Soul, after the Death of the Body; and, ſuppoſing the Truth of the Re⯑ſurrection of that Body, be immediately able to act on it without receiving any new eſſen⯑tial Properties of Exiſtence.

Neither do thoſe Arguments at all claſh with that Axiom of Dr. Watts, that the Soul is a conſtant or perpetual Power of thinking, and that upon its ceaſing to be active it muſt immediately ceaſe to be; for, even ſuppoſing that by Death the Powers of Senſation, held eſſential to the Soul, ſhould be annihilated; yet, if thoſe of Reflection remain active, the Soul certainly exiſts as a perfect Being, as [25] much as when it was acting on a Body, whoſe Defects were ſuch that render'd many of the Powers both of Reflection and Sen⯑ſation inactive, and in this Senſe, non-exiſting.

And there is none, I believe, ſo abſurd as to imagine, that, tho' a Man ſhould be born blind, deaf, or devoid of the Faculties of Memory and Reaſoning to the greateſt De⯑gree, on theſe Accounts, his Soul has not as good a Title to Immortality, as thoſe Men who are poſſeſſed of all theſe Qualifica⯑tions.

Upon the whole then, tho' the firſt Co⯑rollary of Dr. Watts is remarkable, more for the Veracity of its Aſſertions, than for the Weight of Argument in favour of the Soul's Immortality; yet his ſecond Corollary ap⯑pears evidently juſt and rational;—‘That when the human Body dies, the Soul ex⯑iſts and continues to think and act in a ſeparate State: And, when it is freed from all the Avocations of Senſations and ſenſible Things, it will live more entirely in the Reflection on its own Operations, and will commence a State of Happineſs [26] or Miſery, according to its former Con⯑duct; either rejoicing in the Teſtimony of a good CONSCIENCE, or under inward and bitter Self-Reproaches, from the Conſciouſ⯑neſs of its own Guilt.’

SECT. IV. Reaſons to think the Immortality of the Soul neceſſary.

THE firſt Reaſon our oppoſite Eſſay pretends to take under Conſideration is, that it may be thought neceſſary to the Ho⯑nour and Wiſdom of our great Creator, that a Soul, poſſeſſed of rational Faculties in ſo high a Degree, and capable of ſuch extraordinary Attainments, ſhould be continued longer in. Being than the ſhort Space of Time, allotted for the Life of the Body.—

In Anſwer to this, it is ſaid, that as we are ſo ignorant of the eſſential Greatneſs of the Deity, as well as thoſe great and extra⯑ordinary Qualifications we may imagine the Soul poſſeſſed of, we cannot form any juſt: Idea of what Conſequence we are in reſpect to its wonderful and incomprehenſible Na⯑ture.

[27]Well, tho' we ſhould allow that all Man⯑kind are as ignorant of the Nature of the di⯑vine Being, as the moſt impartial Inquirer a⯑mong the Deiſts; who will fairly own he knows nothing at all about him; yet, as by Compariſon we may attain in ſome degree the Ideas of high, noble, &c. we ſhall, in the Words of our oppoſite Eſſay, by looking round to the ſenſible Creatures about us, and by making ſome juſt Compariſons, ac⯑quire a better Idea of ourſelves?

Suppoſe then we ſhould grant, that the Brutes, each in their Kind, act as wiſely for the Preſervation of themſelves and their Spe⯑cies as the wiſeſt and beſt of Mankind; is it not evident that even the neceſſary Means of our Preſervation are infinitely ſuperior to thoſe of Beaſts—but this ſhall appear here⯑after—And tho' we ſhould allow, that ſome of the loweſt of Mankind entertain as mean and groveling Ideas of Things as the Brutes; is this the leaſt Proof that the Souls of M [...]n are eſſentially the ſame with theirs? On the contrary, have not we, notwithſtanding thoſe Appearances, the ſtrongeſt Arguments to conclude, even the meaneſt human Soul has infinitely the Preference, when we ſee [28] every one of thoſe Animals, in ſome Degree or other, ſubjected to his Uſe and Service— Neither is our Reaſoning guilty of any Error in this Point, from an innate, partial Pride, that tells us, the Brute Creation live not ſo much for themſelves as for us; ſince it is quite of a different Nature with that Man⯑ner of Reaſoning, which Mr. Pope exclaims againſt, in the following Lines:

And thus again in the following;

[29]Now here the Poet juſtly lays the Imputa⯑tion of Pride on Man, for preſuming to, think the numberleſs Worlds of Light, and that vaſt Univerſe, opening to our Know⯑ledge, made only for himſelf.—But our Reaſoning, in ſuppoſing ourſelves of a far ſuperior Nature to thoſe Beings and Things that are ſubject to us, is quite, otherwiſe; and that the Brutes are ſo, notwithſtanding all the Encomiums he gives them, Mr. Pope himſelf owns, in ſpeakihg of that Inſtinct that directs them in their Actions;—he ſays;

So that nothing can more ſtupidly or unjuſtly degrade the Dignity of the human Soul, than making it eſſentially equal to the Brutes, or Powers of inanimate Things: as [30] they are in our oppoſite Eſſay—and, tho' the divine Being, as Popc ſays,

Yet, tho' the one affects him, as the ſu⯑preme Author of all, no more than another; neither diminiſhing or increaſing the Luſtre of any of his eſſential Perfections; are we from thence to infer, that a Hero is not, in this juſt Gradation of Nature, more eſſen⯑tially eminent than a Sparrow; or that a Bubble of Air and a whole World of ratio⯑nal Creatures are exactly the ſame; the one not more high and noble than the other. I think the moſt bigotted Deiſt will own a Concluſion in the Affirmative here, ſtupid indeed.

It is true, if the Soul of Man, in its high⯑eſt Perfections, was capable of no better Reaſoning; there would be Room ſufficient for us to conclude the Souls of Brutes eſſen⯑tially equal to our own: Since theſe Senti⯑ments ſo well become them, as the above, I hope not too often quoted Author inſtances; [31] where, in expoſing the falſe Reaſonings of Pride, he ſays,

It may be thought, indeed, that Mr. Pope argues ſtrongly againſt this Suppoſition of the Brutes being ſo far beneath us; and that he lays us upon a Level in the following Lines; which for their extraordinary Beauty and Elegance, I cannot forbear quoting—Speak⯑ing to Man—

It may be thought, I ſay, that here our Poet lays us upon an Equality with the Brutes, becauſe he intimates that we are uſe⯑ful to the Beaſts, as well as they to us; and that their own Pleaſure and Satisfaction ex⯑cites them to the Services they pay us. This is very far from being a juſt Concluſion; for the ſame Author, when he ſays, Na⯑ture ‘Made Beaſt in Aid of Man, and Man of Beaſt,’ gives a comparative Degree of Eminence, by ſaying, that the ‘One all extending, all preſerving Soul, Connects each Being, GREATEST with the LEAST.’

[33]Is it not idle then to conclude that, be⯑cauſe this Author ſays,

that he thought a Bear a Creature of equal Dignity with a Monarch?—I think it ex⯑treamly ſo.—

Neither doth it at all appear that, becauſe every Creature that is of Service to Man, is ſo from Self-Love or from an innate Plea⯑ſure attending on its Actions, and not from a Deſign of obliging Mankind; it is not evi⯑dent, I ſay, becauſe of this, that thoſe Creatures are created leſs for the Service of Man, or more for themſelves: As, in this, there appears the infinite Wiſdom of our great Creator, in rendering that a Pleaſure to every Creature which anſwers the End of its Creation; which, in the Brutes, is that, I conceive, of being ſervice⯑able in ſome Degree to Man. Now, the Reaſon why Man acts to ſerve the Brute-Creation, is partly from Self-Love, and [34] partly thro' Compaſſion; as Mr. Warburton elegantly obſeves:—For, ſays he, ‘Reaſon endowing Man with the Ability of ſetting the Memory of the paſt, and conjecturing about the future; and paſt Misfortunes making him apprehenſive of more to come, this diſpoſes him to pity and relieve others in a State of Suffering, and the Paſſion growing habitual, naturally extendeth its Effects to all that have a Senſe of Suf⯑fering.’—So far thro' Compaſſion.—But, continues he, ‘This is not all; Man's In⯑tereſt, Amuſement, Vanity, and Luxury, tie him cloſe to the Syſtem of Benevolence, by obliging him to provide for the Sup⯑port of other Animals; and tho' it be, for the moſt part, only to devour them with the greater Guſt, yet this does not abate the proper Happineſs of the Ani⯑mals, ſo preſerved, to whom Providence has not given the uſeleſs Knowledge of their End.’

So that, from hence it is plain, that every Creature in the Brute Creation, tho' acting from Principles in themſelves, and for their own Happineſs, may yet be juſtly.eſteemed as living for the Uſe and Service of Man.— [35] Now, that Man doth not live in the ſame Manner for the Uſe of Beaſts, is evident; becauſe the chief Services that Men perform to the Brutes, are from political Ends; for,

And that, Self-Love is the ruling Principle in Man, with reſpect to the animal Cre⯑ation, is plain, ſince he either preſerves or deſtroys them, juſt as his Intereſt or Incli⯑nation leads him.

It will further appear that the Brute Cre⯑ation were particularly deſigned for the Service of Mankind, by that very Inſtinct, or innate Pleaſure which they feel in acting according to their Natures, and which, in the Compariſon between Brutes and Men, in our oppoſite Eſſay, is brought to prove their eſſential Equality in rational Knowledge: And this will be evident in their Actions be⯑ing [36] inſtrumental to the Inſtruction of Man and Improvement of his Reaſon, as the Poet ſays;

Thus, every Way it is plain, that the animal Creation live for the Uſe and Service of Man, who is the ſuperior Creature in his own Syſtem of Knowledge; and in the Scripture Phraſe, Lord of all, in that Sy⯑ſtem. But whether Man may not be e⯑qually ſerviceable to ſome Degree of Beings, as much above him as the Brutes are below him, as may be thought to be hinted by this Line; ‘From Brutes what Men, from Men what Spirits know.’ [37] is not at all to the Purpoſe: or, ſuppoſing it to be true, ſhall we, becauſe we muſt ſubmit to own there may be Beings of a ſu⯑perior Nature, for whoſe Uſe, as well as ours, the vaſt Univerſe may be deſigned; ſhall we, I ſay, degrade ourſelves ſo much as to own we are eſſentially the ſame with the loweſt, becauſe we are not of the higheſt Order of Beings.—I think this is not at all Reaſon.

We may, therefore, acquire both the I⯑deas of high and noble, with reſpect to the eſſential Qualifications of human Nature; and therefore; it is a Reaſon, why it may be thought neceſſary to the Honour and Wiſdom of our great Creator; that a Soul poſſeſſed of rational Faculties in ſo high a Degree, ſhould be continu'd longer exiſting than the ſhort Space of Time allotted for the Life of the Body.

The ſecond Reaſon, in this Section of our oppoſite Eſſay, that is conſidered as ſupporting the Doctrine of the Soul's Im⯑mortality, is the ſeeming Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments; which Prin⯑ciple, it is there ſaid, can have no other [38] ſolid Foundation in the rational Mind than the abſtracted Notions of Virtue and Vice. For if our Actions were neither good or evil, where is the Neceſſity of Rewards or Puniſhments?—It then proceeds to deter⯑mine what is Virtue and its oppoſite Vice.

SECT. V. Virtue and Vice, their Foundation and Eſ⯑ſence conſidered.

THERE has been nothing, ſays our oppoſite Eſſay, in all the Syſtems of Philoſophers, ſo much conteſted as this— What are Virtue and Vice—This Point, indeed, has been ſurprizingly debated, con⯑ſidering that every Man, tho' he has no Faith at all in Revelation, has naturally im⯑planted in him a ſacred Impulſe, that can never fail of convincing him, if conſulted, how he ought to act; being a juſt Standard of Wrong and Right.—It is ſomething ſtrange, therefore, that Men ſhould diſpute on Terms, whoſe Meaning they are all ſen⯑ſible to be but one and the ſame Truth.

With reſpect to the Eſſence of Virtue, we ſhall agree with our oppoſite Eſſay, in the [39] Words of Mr. Brown, that it is no other than the Conformity of our Affections with the public Good, or the voluntary Production of the greateſt Happineſs, and the oppoſite to this, conſequently, Vice.

We will proceed then to conſider the Foundation, or Source, of this Virtue, in the Soul of Man.

Dr. Watts allows the Source of Virtue to be that innate Knowledge of Truth, implanted in the Soul; whereby we judge of the Fit⯑neſs and Unfitneſs of Things: But our for⯑mer Eſſay chuſes, becauſe of ſome little In⯑conſiſtencies ſeemingly attendant on that Syſtem, to declare it is that pathetic In⯑ſtinct and Diſpoſition toward Goodneſs, as Watts calls it, or as it is called there, Good⯑neſs of Heart, and not the Knowledge of Truth that is the Cauſe of moral Virtue. And yet our oppoſite Eſſay is afterward o⯑bliged to bring in this Knowledge of Truth, as eſſential to Virtue, in aſſiſting this Diſpo⯑ſition to Goodneſs in its Offices; without which, it is there made plain, that Diſpo⯑ſition would not be apprehenſive when to act juſtly; and, upon that Power of judging of [40] Truth being vitiated or miſled, this Diſpo⯑ſition to Goodneſs does not contribute to Virtue.

Now, the Powers, both of Goodneſs of Heart, and the Knowledge of Truth, are here made equally eſſential to the Production of Virtue; and both are, in Reality, equally incapable of that Office; ſince it is owned, on the oppoſite Side of the Queſtion, that the Powers of Reaſon may be miſled by ſpe⯑cious Propoſitions being offered to them by the Inclinations and Paſſions attending hu⯑man Nature; as it is ſaid, in the 5th Sec⯑tion of our oppoſite Eſſay, ‘Many People run into Vice, by becoming familiar to Actions which at firſt a ſeeming Neceſſity for, impoſes upon the Reaſon to conclude in ſome Meaſure juſtifiable. As a Man that is ſtarving, might poſſibly prevail on his Reaſon to conclude, that his Condition extenuates the Crime of his robbing on the Highway, and he may ſilence his na⯑tural Diſpoſition to Pity or Goodneſs of Heart, from a ſpecious Suppoſition that the Loſers may not be in a Condition to want, and therefore Miſery may not be the Conſequence of ſuch an Action: And [41] thus he goes on, from one Step to another, till this natural Diſpoſition to Goodneſs is not apprehenſive when to exert itſelf.’

From hence it is own'd, that the Powers of judging of Truth are incapable of influ⯑encing this allowed, innate Goodneſs of Heart, at all Times, to Virtue: Bút that it is ſubject to Deception, and may be led to Actions of Vice, and at the ſame time ima⯑gine ſuch Actions not criminal: And with reſpect to Goodneſs of Heart, it is evident, from what has been ſaid in Sect. 1. of this Eſſay, that the Liberty of its Action would in many Caſes produce actual Vice, and that it equally may or may not be inſtrumental to Virtue.

Now, all theſe Difficulties ſeem'd to be ſolved in adjudging the Foundation of Virtue to that Power, I call, Conſcience; and which, I believe, is the ſame Impulſe that Dr. Watts meant by his Term, the innate Knowledge of Truth: But, by the Definition he gives of it, our oppoſite Eſſay makes it appear that, in its acting on the ſame Prin⯑ciples, it will ſometimes produce Happineſs, and ſometimes Miſery; ſo, conſequently, be [42] Virtue and Vice, alternately; as is exampled in the breaking or keeping of Contracts.

And, as that Diſpoſition to Goodneſs, be⯑fore ſpoke of as the Source of Virtue, is, when not influenced by Juſtice, a very weak, if not vicious Faculty in the Soul, ſo is this innate Knowledge of Truth alſo; for, tho' this Power may be juſtly conſcious that two and two make four, and that certain moral Duties are as juſtly requiſite, as Watts ſup⯑poſes; yet, as this Power, relating to Num⯑bers, however juſtly conſcious it may be, that two and two make four, three times three, nine, &c. it is liable to draw Concluſions oppoſite to theſe, in the Calculation of per⯑plexed and intricate Ratios. So, relating to moral Duties; tho' this Power, the innate Knowledge of Truth, may convince a Man that he ought to act juſtly, and that in judg⯑ing between two Men, he ought not to be partial to either; yet it may ſo happen, from a Combination of perplex'd and intricate Circumſtances, that thoſe very Means he takes to do this, tho' the beſt that appear to his moſt impartial Reaſon, are the very re⯑verſe to the Juſtice intended.

[43]So alſo it may happen, from, our Inabi⯑lity of foreſeeing future Events, that the Means taken to promote the greateſt public Happineſs, allow'd in our oppoſite Eſſay to be Virtue, may be the very Means to pro⯑mote the Contrary.

From hence then appears, the Inſufficiency of that innate Power of Reaſon to direct us in the common Affairs of Life: Surely then, that very Reaſon will dictate to us, how in⯑ſufficient itſelf is to determine; in what De⯑gree we ſtand with reſpect to that Power that gave us Being; and how little; or how much, we poſſeſs of its Nature, in its Immor⯑tality.

But from this it may be objected; if I al⯑low ſo much the Inſufficiency of Reaſon to determine this; how can I pretend to prove what I am attempting?—To this I ſay— I attempt rationally to prove it. Now, the ſtrongeſt Argument that can be drawn from the impartial Powers of Reaſon, is all the Proof Reaſon can give: So that a rational Proof can have no other Meaning than the moſt probable Concluſion, that can be drawn [44] from an impartial Enquiry into the Point in Queſtion.

It appears then the moſt probable Con⯑cluſion, to adjudge the Source of moral Vir⯑tue to that Power called Conſcience. And then the Caſe will ſtand thus; every Man, havïng within him this ſacred Impulſe, ſhould act, upon all Occaſions according to its Dictates: and, as this Power was given by our Creator to every Man under Heaven, ro diſtinguiſh him from the Brutes, and make him worthy of being what his Maker de⯑ſign'd him, the Chief of all his own Sy⯑ſtem; it will infallibly convince him, when⯑ever his Inclinations and Paſſions will permit him, to liſten to its Deciſion; whether or no he acts right. So that, ſeeing the In⯑ſufficiency of our innate Knowledge of Truth, a Man does not commit a virtuous Action, when going contrary to the Dictates of his Conſcience, even tho' the ſtrongeſt Appearances of the Conſequence of that Action ſhould be, the Promotion of the greateſt public Happineſs. And a Man ought never to act contrary to the Dictates of that Conſcience, tho' the Conſequence of his Actions ſhould appear that of promoting [45] public Miſery: For, as no Man can think that the Author of all Things implanted that Principle in our Souls, for any other Deſign than that of promoting our general Happi⯑neſs, is it not ſtupidly preſumptuous to think our Creator knew leſs than we the neceſſary Means to that Happineſs. It is alſo plain, that, if Mankind were void of thoſe baſe In⯑clinations and Paſſions, which are allowed on all hands to be the Occaſion of the great⯑eſt Part of our Miſeries, and acted from the unprejudiced Dictates of their Conſciences; that we ſhould have no Neceſſity for Divi⯑nity, Politics, or Law. But as it is otherwiſe, every Man being born with thoſe Paſ⯑ſions in ſome Degree, we find that innate Impulſe is not ſufficient to influence us to that Virtue, it is an infallible Judge of.— I don't ſay, that a true Believer in the Syſtem of Chriſtianity, is not virtuous from a much more noble and ſacred Principle than this of Conſcience.—I reaſon here as a Deiſt, and am fixing the Foundation of moral Virtue in the rational, not the religious Mind.

It may, perhaps, be aſked here, to what Purpoſe then is that innate Power of judging of Truth implanted in the Soul, if it is not [46] to direct the Mind to Actions of Virtue; or to what Purpoſe that innate Goodneſs or Tenderneſs of Heart, before ſpoke of.—I anſwer—They are both neceſſary to pro⯑mote the public Happineſs, and yet neither of them indiſpenſably neceſſary to conſtitute a Man virtuous.—And tho' I allow the Criterion, or Teſt of Virtue, is the Confor⯑mity of our Affections with the public Good; I allow it, becauſe I affirm, that acting from the Dictates of Conſcience, is Virtue; and that if all Men were to act from thoſe Dic⯑tates, the World would be compleatly hap⯑py. Yet, nevertheleſs, as the Paſſions and Inclinations of Mankind, as has been before obſerved, are ſo prevalent as often to ſilence this ſacred Impulſe; this pathetic Diſpoſition to Goodneſs is neceſſary to excite Benevolence, and the Power of Reaſoning of the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things, to direct that Benevolence in the Promotion of the public Happineſs.

Now, it is poſſible for a Man, out of an extraordinary Tenderneſs of Mind, and from an uncommon Share of Reaſoning, to be greatly inſtrumental to the public Good; and yet, at the ſame time, be leſs virtuous than a Man, who is more guided by the [47] Impulſe of his Conſcience, and has leſs of either of thoſe other Powers in his Nature. Thus, a Man, that equally acts from the Dictates of his Conſcience with another, will be equally virtuous; notwithſtanding the ſuperior Powers of Reaſon and Benevo⯑lence in the one, render him far more con⯑ducive to the public Happineſs.—This will appear in the following Inſtance.— Suppoſe two Men were ſeparately to judge and decide the ſame Cauſe; both of them equally acting from the Convictions of Con⯑ſcience: The one having naturally a great deal of Compaſſion, and therefore very de⯑ſirous of having Juſtice done to the Sufferer; having alſo a large Share of the Powers of Reaſon to enable him to detect and unriddle a ſpecious contriv'd Evidence, formed to ſcreen the Guilty: He, therefore, gives his Deciſion in favour of the Innocent. The other, having leſs natural Tenderneſs to ſym⯑pathize with the Diſtreſſed, does not ſee the Injuries committed, in the ſame Light; therefore is leſs excited to give the Cauſe on that Side; and, having alſo leſs of the Power of Reaſon to judge in an intricate Cauſe, is led aſtray by the artful Pretenſions offered on the Side of the Offender, and therefore he [48] gives his Deciſion directly oppoſite to Juſtice. —Now, both theſe Men are equally vir⯑tuous, tho' the Conſequence of their Actions, ſo oppoſite to each other, can never be thought to conduce equally to the public Good: For the Act of the Conſcience is as juſt in one as the other; as, the Cauſe, tho' it is in Reality the ſame to both, is not ſo to the Conſciences of both; if it was, their Deciſion would have been the ſame; and it is undoubtedly no Crime in a Man to judge wrong, if he judges, to the beſt of his Know⯑ledge, right.

Upon the whole therefore, it is evident, that neither that innate Power of judging of Truth, or that pathetic Inſtinct, call'd Goodneſs of Heart, is the Source of moral Virtue: and, notwithſtanding they are both requiſite to balance the Frailties of human Nature, and by that to preſerve the neceſſary Medium of the public Happineſs, yet Actions of Virtue have another Foundation, and a⯑riſe from an infallible Conſciouſneſs within the Soul, that never influences us to one Action, whatever may be its Conſequence, contrary to Virtue.

[49]Now, our oppoſite Effay ſays, Where is the Juſtice or Neceſſity that Men ſhould be puniſhed or rewarded, for acting from Prin⯑ciples, which they did not give themſelves, nor can poſſibly diveſt themſelves of? Certainly, there is none—and therefore no one will be puniſhed for acting from that ſacred, Principle in, the Soul, his Conſcience.

If there be a Man then, that, laying his Hand on his Heart, and aſking his Soul the Queſtion, can reply to himſelf that he has always acted agreeable to that Principle, whatever may have been the Effect of his Actions, whether Happineſs or Miſery to himſelf or others, he may reſt aſſured, he has nothihg to fear from future Puniſhments: And this he may ſafely do, if he has had ever ſo little of this pathetic Diſpoſition to Goodneſs in his Nature, or has been ever ſo weak in his rational Determinations: The more, indeed, a Man has of the former, the more Pain he will feel in doing juſtice to the Guilty, and the more Pleaſure in protecting the Innocent; and the more Judgment he has in the latter, the better he will be capaci⯑tated to do both; and make the public Hap⯑pineſs oftner the Conſequence of his Virtue.

SECT.VI. The Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſh⯑ments examin'd.

HAving now very plainly prov'd, and of which every Man is an Evidence to himſelf, that Virtue and Vice do exiſt in the Nature of the Soul, and what they indiſput⯑ably are; we come now to examine the Ne⯑ceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments: Which, it has been allow'd, if the Actions of Men were neither good or bad, there would be no need at all of.

But, ſeeing it is quite the contrary, and that there is no Man whoſe Conſcience can aſſure him he never diſobey'd its Dictates, we muſt own we are all guilty: And as Mi⯑ſery is the neceſſary Conſequence of Vice, all of us muſt have a Share in Proportion to that Guilt: And, on the other hand, as Happineſs is the Conſequence of Virtue, every Man muſt have his Share in Propor⯑tion to that Obedience he has paid his Con⯑ſcience.

[51]And it is in vain to form an Objection to this; by ſaying, our Actions, whether good or ill, cannot affect the ſupreme Being: This is not all to the Purpoſe.—He has im⯑planted a Law in our Hearts, and ourſelves are the Umpires to determine it: So that, if a Man cannot, upon his. Conſcience, acquit himſelf of all Guilt, it is in vain, even if he could juſtly ſay he has hurt No-body but himſelf: For that Man equally acts con⯑trary to this Law, given him by his Creator, when he acts prejudicial to himſelf, as when he offends others: So that, ſuppoſing the divine Being ſhould inflict a Puniſhment on us, in Return for our Vices; we, ſee here his infinite Wiſdom in the contriving it; ſince he is not excited to it from any Prejudice our Actions are capable of doing to him, but is called upon to do it, by that Sentence of Condemnation every Man paſſes on himſelf: For, as has been before obſerv'd, if there be a Man whoſe Conſcience can acquit him, he may be certain, whatever he be, that the ſupreme Being will acquit him alſo.

It is clearly evident then, from what has been offer'd, that there is a Neceſſity Miſery ſhould be the Conſequence of a Man's being [52] vicious, and Happineſs the Reward of his Virtue: And from this there will appear a great deal of Reaſon to expect a FUTURE Diſtribution of this Happineſs and Miſery, according to the Part every Man has acted in this Life.

Our oppoſite Eſſay, in Contradiction to this, would infer, that the ſupreme Being doth actually diſpenſe Juſtice to all the human Race, tho' by Means, inexplicable to us, in this World: and that the Ballance of Happineſs and Miſery is adjuſted at the Death of every Man.

And this is offer'd to invalidate that appa⯑rent Neceſſity of ſuch a future Diſtribution, from the Sickneſs, Anguiſh, and Perſecution of the Virtuous in their Life-time; while many of the Wicked ſeem to be entirely free from thoſe Inconveniencies.

We ſhall therefore juſt conſider the Weight of this Inference.—It is allowed that, if Juſtice is diſpers'd to us in this World, it is done by inexplicable Means; but, by what⯑ever Means it may be ſuppos'd to be done, it is undoubtedly evident we ſhould be ſen⯑ſible [53] that it was done; or elſe that Man's Conſcience is a Liar, that arraigns him, in his laſt Moments, for Actions which the Miſeries, daily attendant on human Nature, have accounted for.

But to corroborate what our oppoſite Eſ⯑ſay here affirms, it is ſaid, it is impoſſible to tell how much Vice is atton'd for by the Pains of the Body and Mind; by which it is inſinuated, that a raging Fit of the Gout or Tooth-ach, may be inflicted on Mankind as a ſufficient Reward for their Vices.—This is a Manner of Reaſoning ſuited to the Deiſts, indeed; for can any rational Man conceive that ſuch Incidents are adequate Puniſh⯑ments for our Crimes? or, if they were, that theſe are ſo diſtributed between the Vir⯑tuous and the Wicked, as to make up their Ballance of Happineſs and Miſery in this Life?—Certainly, No.—Stupid, reſolutely ſtupid, indeed, muſt they be who can ſit down with ſuch Concluſions.

Suppoſe, indeed, we allow that theſe Frailties, conſtantly' attendant on human Na⯑ture, are the Effect of Vice in general; is it not ridiculous from thence to infer they are [54] ſo of Vices in particular?—Is it a Crime in a Man, that, being neceſſitated by the Bu⯑ſineſs of Life, he runs in Danger of Misfor⯑tunes incident to ſuch Buſineſs, and really falls under thoſe Misfortunes?

Is it a Crime for a Man to catch a Cold, or be particularly liable to tormenting Diſ⯑eaſes?—There needs no Reply to theſe Queſtions.—And, if our Reaſon is capable of determining any thing, few things are more eaſy than for us to be ſenſible, that the Miſeries daily incident to Mankind, with reſpect to Diſeaſes and other Misfor⯑tunes of the Body and Mind, are diſtri⯑buted amongſt us without any partial Di⯑ſtinction, relating to Vice or Virtue, in the Perſons afflicted with them. For the Sun ſhines upon the Unjuſt as well as the Juſt: And the vicious Man is equally intitled to the Bleſſings of Nature, in this World, as well as the Virtuous.

Neither is it at all contradictory, our grant⯑ing that ſometimes, in the Ways of Provi⯑dence, Virtue may eminently meet its Re⯑ward in this World, or that Vice may meet as conſpicuous and remarkable a Puniſhment: [55] Yet when the Inſtances on this Side are ſet in Competition with the many of thoſe, in which Virtue has been, degraded and Vice bore away in Triumph, that Approbation and Reward, which ſhould have been paid to its Oppoſite, we ſhall find ourſelves inclin'd to think the good Things of this Life rather the Concomitants of Vice than Virtue.

Hence then we muſt conclude, from the ſtrongeſt Appearances of Reaſon, that theſe Weakneſſes of Nature, ſo far from yielding us ſatisfactory Cauſe to think them Pu⯑niſhments for Vice, are very convincing Proofs of the Neceſſity that there muſt be others, and in a Life after this.

Our oppoſite Eſſay then, has here ad⯑vanced nothing to diſprove the Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments.

With the ſame Weakneſs alſo, is advanced a pretended Parallel of Juſtice in the Deſigns of our Creator, with Reſpect to us and the Brutes.—It ſays—In whatſoever Degree we are pleas'd to conſider ourſelves above the Brute Creation, No-body will deny, but that the great Creator acts with impartial Juſtice towards [56] every one, even the moſt minute and inſignifi⯑cant of his Creatures.—Why is it then that a Horſe, Dog or Cat ſhall be nouriſhed and fed with all the Neceſſaries of Life, while others of their Species ſhall be ſubject to hard Labour, Whipping, or being worried to Death?

From whence it is inferred, that our great Creator diſpenſes Juſtice to theſe Creatures, ſuppoſing them mortal, in this Life; and, if to them, why not, by ſome ſuch Means, to us? But before we pretend to determine whether or no ſuch Sufferers as theſe are to be recompenced, or to have Juſtice done them, as here ſuppos'd, it is proper we ſhould know what Injuſtice there would be done them, if ſuch Recompence and ſuppoſed Juſtice were neglected; and I think it is obvious, none at all.

Suppoſing the Beaſts free from any Im⯑putation of Guilt, whereby they may be thought to deſerve either more or leſs of their Creator; what Right, in the true Idea of Juſtice, have they to expect any thing more from their Maker than he has been pleaſed to confer on them?—Shall the Clay reply unto the Potter, wherefore haſt thou faſhioned [57] me thus? Has not the ſupreme Being un⯑doubtedly a juſt Right to do what he pleaſes with every Particle of Matter, and every Power in the Univerſe?—Moſt certainly he has: And, therefore, it is no Injuſtice to any Creature, that it is made more vile, or leſs happy than another; ſeeing it has no Merit at all in itſelf, nor more than a Crea⯑ture that is leſs happy than it.

Has Man then any Right to reply to his Maker, even ſuppoſing that, acting from the Paſſions and Inclinations of his Nature, he has not the leaſt Imputation of Guilt laid to his Charge? Has he any Right to com⯑plain that theſe Evils, attendant on his mortal Frame, are unjuſtly laid on him; tho' he be ſuppoſed free from Guilt, and, therefore it may be ſaid, he deſerves not to be afflicted with Pain; yet, as he can have not the leaſt Merit but what was conferred on him, what Title has he to the leaſt Satisfaction or Plea⯑ſure?

If therefore we enjoy the Bleſſings and Comforts of Humanity without deſerving them, with equal Juſtice the Sufferings and Inconveniencies of it may be inflicted on us; [58] without which, thoſe Bleſſings and Comforts would be leſs ſweet, and leſs valuable than they now are.

Thus, it is extremely clear, that nothing is more rational than for us to conclude, there is a Neceſſity of future Rewards and Puniſhments; not only from our abſtracted Notions of Virtue and Vice, but from the Sickneſs, Anguiſh and Perſecutions of the Virtuous, in this Life; while many of the Wicked are much more free from thoſe Em⯑barraſments.

If then there be a Neceſſity for a future Diſtribution of Juſtice, the Opinion of the Soul's Immortality has not its Source from a vitiated Power of Reaſoning, but has its Foundation naturally implanted in the Soul. And, ſeeing it is ſo, it is no Wonder that Opinion is ſo extenſive: But, on the con⯑trary, it is ſomething remarkable that it was not ſo univerſal, or rather ſo general, in the earlieſt Ages of the World as it is now.

Having now conſidered the Objections made to the Proofs and apparent Reaſons for the Immortality of the human Soul, and [59] finding them irrational and groundleſs; we will proceed to examine the Reaſons that induce ſome Men to think it otherwiſe.— To this End we are led to conſider our Re⯑lation to thoſe Creatures, whom we don't ſcruple to pronounce have no Title to Im⯑mortality.

SECT. VII. Our Relation to the Brute Creation conſider'd.

IN this Section of our oppoſite Eſſay, is drawn a Parallel betwen Mankind and the Brutes; reſpecting the Conſtitution and neceſſary Preſervation of the Body.—We are ſubject to Death, as they are.—We cannot live without Suſtenance any more than they. —are as liable in our Natures to Hurts, Pains and Diſeases, as they—and the like.

From this Manner of Compariſon there⯑fore, ſhould be inferred a Similarity, affecting the eſſential Dignity of Brutes and Men; or elſe it is of no Uſe to the Point in De⯑bate. And yet, it is plain, no ſuch Infe⯑rence is drawn: For, after this, it is allowed that, all Matter is eſſentially the ſame, and differs only in its Modification; but that the [60] different Modification of Matter gives it no ſuperior or inferior Degree of Merit. So that this Parallel, relating to the Bodies of Men and Brutes, can have no other Effect than to convince us, they are both equally liable to Pains, Diſeaſes, and Death: A Truth ſufficiently evident, without any great ratio⯑nal Enquiry: And yet ſuch Arguments as theſe are thought of great Conſequence, a⯑mong the Deiſts; and make up great Part of their learned and rational Syſtems: For which Reaſon it is introduced in this Diſ⯑quiſition.—We ſhall therefore paſs over this Section, with only remarking, agree⯑able to our oppoſite Eſſay, that the Form or Body of Man gives him no manner of Title to Immortality, or any Pre-eminence, in the Order of Beings, to the Brutes: But, there being Inſtances of Creatures, ſo nearly re⯑ſembling the Human as well as the Brute Species, that it has been impoſſible to de⯑termine by their Form, to which they moſt properly belong'd; it is therefore, we may juſtly conclude, that, whatever may be the Form or Properties of Bodies, animated by Souls of any Degree, that the Similarity of theſe Properties is not the leaſt Indication of the eſſential Similarity of ſuch Souls.

[61]We ſhall, therefore, proceed now, to ex⯑amine how nearly the Souls of Brutes and Men reſemble each other.

SECT. VIII. The Souls of Brutes and Men compared.

OUR oppoſite Eſſay here ſays that, becauſe, it is not allowed that Spirit is a Property of Matter; but, that the Soul, either of a Brute or Man, is an exiſtent Be⯑ing; the actuating Principle of a Brute muſt, therefore, be of the ſame Kind with that of Man; as if it was impoſſible that two Beings ſhould be eſſentially different. And then it proceeds to ſay, what poſſible Degree of Inferiority, ſuppoſe the loweſt, can affect any Being ſo much as to make it mortal, while another Being, acting in the ſame Manner, is immortal.— Here again. it is taken for granted, that two Beings, be⯑cauſe ſuch, and not Properties of Beings, muſt act in the ſame Manner, without con⯑ſidering their eſſential Properties. To de⯑termine therefore, whether they act in the ſame Manner, or how far they are eſſen⯑tially ſimilar, we will compare a juſt De⯑finition of the Soul of Man, with the moſt exalted One of that of the Brute.

[62]We have, in the firſt Section of this Eſſay, ſhewn the great Imperfection of the Definition, there repeated, of the human Soul; which is, indeed, as applicable to the Brutes as to ſome of Mankind.

Suppoſe then, that we allow, agreeable to the Concluſions drawn in Section the ninth, of our oppoſite Eſſay, that the Souls of Brutes are capable, as well as ſome Men, to reflect, judge, and reaſon of Cauſes and their Effects; the ultimate End of their Actions is their own Preſervation and Bene⯑fit, and the Source of them an innate Self-Love, that directs them to that End.

This is the moſt noble Definition that can poſſibly be given of the Soul of Brutes.

Now, having made it evident, that the Soul of Man, having implanted in it the ſa⯑cred Impulſe of his Conſcience, acts, not only rationally from Self-Love, to his own Preſervation and Benefit, but from the Dictates of that Conſcience, impartial and juſt. It is equally evident, that it is by much eſſentially ſuperior to that of the Brute; and that their Manner of Acting is widely [63] different. And this Concluſion is juſt, even tho' we allow, that the Powers of Reaſon are, in the Brute, ſuperior to thoſe in ſome Men, whom we do not ſcruple to pro⯑nounce have immortal Souls.

Our oppoſite Eſſay ſays, take the moſt ignorant of all the human Species, and compare his intellectual Faculties, to thoſe of a Locke, a Newton, or a Boyle,—What a wonderful Difference! and yet we allow the one a Soul as immortal as the other,— undoubtedly.—A Man who, thro' the natural Weakneſs of his Underſtanding, may be incapable of entertaining any, but the moſt ſimple and obvious Truths, may yet act more from the Dictates of his Conſcience, than another, who, with all the Advanta⯑ges of intellectual Powers, is capacitated to entertain every Branch of the moſt intricate Knowledge. An artleſs illiterate Plowman may be a more conſcientious or virtuous Man than the moſt learned and wiſe Philo⯑ſopher.

So that the Dignity of the rational Pow⯑ers, in the Soul, does not determine its Immortality; notwithſtanding, we have al⯑low'd, [64] in Sect. 4th of this Eſſay, that the extraordinary Acquirements of thoſe Pow⯑ers in the human Soul, may juſtly give us Reaſon to believe our End ſhall not be like that of thoſe Animals, whoſe Underſtand⯑ings are calculated to render them obedient, or, in ſome Degree, ſerviceable to Man.

Now, as it appears, that the eſſential Pro⯑perties of the Souls of Brutes and Men are not the ſame, and that their Manner of Ac⯑ing is not the ſame, the Argument offered on this Suppoſition, has no Weight at all.

We ſhall not here pretend to juſtify Bi⯑ſhop Burnet's Suppoſition, that, becauſe the Souls of Brutes are incapable of Good or Evil, Rewards or Puniſhments, therefore, they may be perpetually rolling about from one Body to another; neither, ſhall we commend Dr. Watts for giving up the De⯑ciſion, relating to theſe Souls; in which, tho' he might be at a Loſs to determine, whether the Brutes have Souls or no, he might eaſily have made it evident, that, ſuppoſing they had Souls, they were not only of an inferior but of a different Nature, to the Souls of Men. And therefore, no Concluſion could be drawn, let the Caſe be [65] decided either Way, with Reſpect to their having, or not having, Souls, that could affect the Nature, Reaſon, or Religion of Mankind.

SECT. IX. The Underſtanding of Men and Brutes con⯑ſidered.

HAVING already determined, that no comparative Degree, in the ratio⯑nal Faculties of the Soul, can entitle any Creature, more or leſs, to Immortality: We enter on the Subject of this ninth Sec⯑tion, meerly to conſider, whether or no, the Sagacity, appearing in the Actions of Brutes, may not be better accounted for, than by our attributing to them the Pow⯑ers of Reaſon.

It is ſaid, in our oppoſite Eſſay, that, as the ſame Effect muſt proceed from the ſame Cauſe, therefore many of the Actions of the Beaſts being reaſonable, they muſt be en⯑dowed with Reaſon. It is true, they act wiſely, for the Service and Preſervation of their Species; but this no Proof they act ra⯑tionally; for, tho' Men ſometimes, or for the moſt Part, acting rationally do con⯑tribute [66] to the Service and Preſervation of Mankind; yet. ſo imperfect are thoſe rational Powers in the Soul, in foreſeeing the conſequence of our Actions; that it often happens, that, acting according to the moſt reaſonable Deſign of promoting Good; proves the Production of Evil.

Thus, then, the remarkable Sagacity of the Brutes in their own Preſervation; is no Proof they are poſſeſſed of Reaſon; becauſe the Powers of Reaſon are not always pro⯑ductive of that Preſervation: And it is plain; that Inſtinct: ſerves the Purpoſes of the Ani⯑mal equally as well as, or better than, Reaſon.

For, as Mr. Pope ſays,

Now, that Reaſon and Inſtinct are not the ſame Powers, as our oppoſite Eſſay would infer, will be evident in comparing both. The Powers of Reaſon are capable of entertaining Knowledge, and of making ſur⯑prizing progreſſive Improvements in that Knowledge, by Inventions and Diſcoveries; many of them to the Deſtruction, not the Preſervation of their Species: And while [67] theſe Inventions have been formed to the Prejudice of Mankind, equally ingenious have been the Improvements made on the other Hand for their Benefit: Thus, Diſco⯑very advancing upon Diſcovery, each ſuc⯑ceeding Age has acted in a different Sphere of Wiſdom; and the neceſſary Means of our Preſervation, are ſo far ſuperior to thoſe of the Brute-Creation, that they are infinite⯑ly greater than thoſe of Men in former Ages.

Our progreſſive Knowledge in Arts and Sciences, the neceſſary Means of the Ser⯑vice and Preſervation of Mankind, ſuffici⯑ently evidence this.

Now the Knowledge of the Brutes, and the neceſſary Means they take for their Pre⯑ſervation, are undoubtedly the ſame as they were four Thouſand Years ago.

It may be objected to this, indeed, by ſaying, that Man, having invented other Means for the Deſtruction of the Beaſts, than were practis'd. in the earlieſt Ages, we muſt conclude, from hence, that the Brutes take their more improv'd Methods for their Preſervation.

[68]This Objection, however, has very little in it; for, ſuppoſing that a Beaſt does now very prudently avoid Means taken for its Deſtruction, which thoſe of former Ages never met with; this is no Proof that its rational Faculties are more inveſted with Knowledge than its Predeceſſors; ſince, had the ſame Circumſtance attended a Beaſt of the ſame Kind many Centuries ago, we have not the leaſt room to imagine, but that it would have avoided that Circumſtance with equal Circumſpection and Prudence.

The Difference between the Powers of Inſtinct and Reaſon, will further appear in comparing the Effects of both.

In Man, we are obliged to own that the Powers of Reaſon, given him by his Creator, are not ſufficient to acquaint him with the Sciences of Commerce and Government, in their greateſt Perfections, without long Application and Study; and that theſe Arts have riſen to ſuch Perfections has been ow⯑ing to the gradual Improvement made by Men of the moſt refined and extenſive Un⯑derſtandings.

[69]In Brutes, we ſee no Improvement of their Sciences.—The Bees always had the ſame unalterable Laws and Politics as now— The Piſmire the ſame Oeconomy.—The Spider the ſame Art, and every other Animal the ſame Knowledge, in theſe Reſpects, as now.—And it is plain, theſe Sciences are not in them the Production of Reaſon, but of Inſtinct; for, if of Reaſon, wherever there was an equal Share of the Cauſe, there would be ſo of the Effect; and as Man is allowed, in his higheſt Perfections, to have a greater Share of Reaſon than any of the Brutes; he would undoubtedly be more a⯑ble to act as they do: and yet, who like the Spider

Now, ſo far from our Reaſon's being able to direct us in this, we cannot deviſe by what Means it is done.

So the wonderful Mechaniſm of the Birds, —each, in its ſeveral Kind, ſingular and inimitable, not only impracticable to us, but to Creatures, ſo little remov'd from [70] them in their Species, that we can ſcarce tell the Difference, unleſs by theſe Indica⯑tions of their particular Inſtinct.

In the Mechaniſm of Men, we ſee, even the ſtrongeſt Genius, muſt be indebted to long Application and Practice, before he ex⯑cels in any Art; whereas, in that of the Brutes, we ſee the firſt Attempt equal in Beauty and Elegance to the laſt.

It is poſſible this laſt Aſſertion may be de⯑nied; as it is the Cuſtom of Deiſtical Diſ⯑putants, to deny every Thing that they think cannot eaſily be proved, tho' there be not the leaſt Room to queſtion its Veracity; but while there is not one Reaſon brought to make us doubt this to be Truth, why ſhould we queſtion the moſt impartial Evidence of our Senſes?

Upon the whole then, there appears the ſtrongeſt Probability for us to conclude, that the Sagacity of the Brutes, reſpecting their Actions, is not the Effect of Reaſon; but of Inſtinct: And this is their unerring Guide.

[71]But whether this be ſo or no; and, tho' the Brutes ſhould be equally poſſeſs'd of ra⯑tional Faculties with Mankind; all their Sa⯑gacity cannot, as has been before proved, give them the leaſt Title to Immortality.

SECT. X. On the Probability and Poſſibility of the Soul's Immortality, with a rational De⯑finition of God.

IN this laſt Section, of our oppoſite Eſſay, it is inferred from the Similarity of na⯑tural Powers, in their Beginning, Progreſs and Decays that all Powers are ſubject to Annihilation; becauſe it is exampled, that, many of them may ceaſe to act; and, as Spirit or Power is allowed to be nothing but Action, and upon its Ceſſation of Acting it muſt ceaſe to be, therefore they may be an⯑nihilated.

It is alſo aſſerted, that all theſe Powers, whether acting on inanimate Things, by ap⯑parent Neceſſity, or rationally and freely, as is ſuppoſed, in Men and Brutes; yet, as [72] effect of the ſame Cauſe, they muſt be all exactly of the ſame Nature; and therefore all equally ſubject to Annihilation—Here then is the pretended Poſſibility of the Mor⯑tality of the Soul—The Probability is drawn from the Ceſſation of Action, or the Anni⯑hilation of theſe Powers, after the Diſper⯑ſion of that Part of Matter in which they acted.

In Anſwer to the former—If, as Effects of the ſame Cauſe, all theſe Powers are eſ⯑ſentially the ſame, every Thing that is the Effect of the Being of God muſt be ex⯑actly the ſame too; and then a Man, a Horſe, a Tree, a Muſhroom, have no eſ⯑ſential Difference; and yet, ſuppoſing this to be true, it is evident that, with reſpect to Duration of Exiſtence, there is a wide Di⯑ſtinction: And tho' we allow that the Powers acting on Plants, are the ſame in one Plant as another; yet we ſee ſome flouriſh but a few Days, and die; others again are more than an hundred Years in arriving to their Perfection: ſo that the Power which acts on a Muſhroom may exiſt but for a Day or two—That upon a Flower ſomething longer, [73] and that upon an Aloe a Century of Years— If this then proves no eſſential Difference, their being of the ſame Nature with the Soul of Man, does not at all argue, that that Soul may not exiſt ten thouſand Years, or to all Eternity.

In anſwer to the latter—Notwithſtand⯑ing the Powers acting on inanimate Things, as Plants, Trees, &c. may be annihilated upon the Diſperſion of that Matter on which they act: it is becauſe the proper Frame of that Matter is immediately affected by their acting; whereas the Souls of Men and Brutes are allow'd capable of acting on them— ſelves, that is, by Reflection; for tho' the Organs of the Body, in this State of Union are aſſiſtant to the Powers of Reflection, yet the Conſequence drawn from Propoſitions, &c. is a pure Act of the Soul. Hence then the Power of acting on Men and Brutes muſt be left out of this Syſtem; and the Arguments, already advanced, have not on⯑ly more than amounted to a Probability that the Soul of Man is immortal, but have proved it neceſſary, on account of that ſa⯑cred Impulſe implanted in him, called. Con⯑ſcience. [74] —Now our oppoſite Eſſay, not ſuppoſing the Beaſts capable of Virtue and Vice, 'twould be needleſs to prove they are void of that Impulſe, as they undoubtedly are; and of which, if required, might be given undeniable Demonſtration; but, as all the Reaſons offer'd in Oppoſition to the Im⯑mortality of the Soul of Man, in that Eſſay, which are the great Artillery of the Deiſts, are ſufficiently confuted, in their own Man⯑ner of Reaſoning. I have finiſhed the De⯑ſign of theſe Diſquiſitions.

From what has been proved then to judge of the Eſſence of God—It is rational to con⯑clude we are not left ſo ignorant of his Na⯑ture, as only to know him as the firſt Cauſe of all Things and no further. Every Man from the Dictates of Conſcience, is obliged to own, that the Author of all Things has a Right to diſpoſe of them at his Pleaſure, therefore there can be no Injuſtice in the di⯑vine Being; and this Source of moral Vir⯑tue in the Mind, convinces us, it being the only infallible Impulſe in human Nature, and coming from that firſt Cauſe, that this is the trueſt Image of God. — Therefore [75] the divine Being muſt be all Virtue and Holineſs. — The daily Works of Providence muſt fill every Man with Ideas of the infinite Wiſdom and Power of this firſt Cauſe.—So that it is evident, that the Author of all Things or GOD, is infinite⯑ly wiſe, holy, juſt and powerful, and tho' our Ideas of Holineſs, Wiſdom, &c. are the Effect of the rational conſcientious Mind, as a ſecondary Cauſe; yet, they have their Foundation in God: And, though they may fall ſhort of giving us a compleat De⯑finition of the divine Being, they are juſt, though faint, Copies of its infinite Per⯑fections.

Since the Cauſe is really ſo then, and the rational Powers are ſo ſubject to Error, is it not to the Intereſt of every Man, inſtead of perplexing himſelf with metaphyſical Queſ⯑tions, to enquire, whether he acts according to the Dictates of his Conſcience.

For, however other Points may be deter⯑mined, this is of the laſt Importance, and, perhaps, the only one in which he is an infallible Judge.

[76]And with reſpect to reveal'd Syſtems of Religion; the Believers of them, if falſe, can be no Sufferers in the End, if they act equally in Obedience to their Conſciences, and it is not at all irational to conclude, that ſome Men may have had a larger Share than others, of that Knowledge of the Deity, which is to beacquir'd by the Dictates of Con⯑ſcience; and, which may be juſtly called, In⯑ſpiration: And that Syſtem is, undoubtedly, the moſt probable to be truly revealed, that is moſt agreeable to that ſacred Im⯑pulſe: And, that the Chriſtian Syſtem is ſo, is allowed by our oppoſite Eſſay, when it ſays, it contains a Syſtem of Morality, truly juſt and noble.

Thus, Reaſon convinces us, that, being in itſelf, ſo liable to Error, it is rational for us to believe in the Chriſtian Syſtem of Religion, notwithſtanding there may be ever ſo many apparent Abſurdities attend⯑ing it. For, after all our Enquiries, we are obliged to own