208. Effigy, Image, Statue.

CORPOREAL repreſentation, is the common idea of theſe three words; but, an effigy, is, to ſupply the place of the real thing; an image, is, to ſhew the attitude, [2]and, deſign, but, in miniature; a ſtatue, the ſame; but, as large as life.

Perſons, who draw on themſelves the popular odium, are, ſometimes, hung in ef⯑figy. Images are made of china, ſilver, &c. and, ſet up in houſes, by way of ornament. We erect ſtatues of our kings, in grateful remembrance of them.

209. To Give, Preſent, Offer.

Of theſe three words, that of give, is, generally, uſed in a familiar ſenſe; that of preſent, in a reſpectful one; that of offer, in a religious one. We give to our ſervants. We preſent to princes. We offer, to God.

We give, what we would have received. We preſent, what we think, will be agree⯑able. We offer, what, we imagine, will be acceptable.

[3]We cannot give, what does not belong to us, nor offer, what is not in our power; but, we, ſometimes preſent, what is neither ours, nor, in our power to give.

210. Frugality, Oeconomy,

Frugality, implies, only, diſcretion of ex⯑pence; oeconomy, includes, in its idea, ſome kind of management, in order to eke mat⯑ters out.

Frugality, is, generally, the province of the husband; whoſe buſineſs is, to take care, his expences do not exceed his in⯑come: oeconomy, is, principally, the care of the wife; whoſe ſtudy is, by a prudent management, if poſſible, to make up every deficiency.

211. Cloaths, Dreſs.

Cloaths, expreſs, ſimply, that, which covers the body; and, includes all, for that purpoſe, from head to foot, and, nothing more; it is for this reaſon, we ſay, with propriety, the neceſſaries of life, conſiſt in meat, drink, lodging, and, cloaths. Dreſs, has a more confined meaning; beſides, that, of a bare covering, it, includes in its idea, a relation to form and faſhion; as well to the ornaments, as the neceſſaries; thus, we ſay, a Spaniſh dreſs; a Hunga⯑rian dreſs; a rich dreſs, &c.

Though the ſword and cockade, cannot be called cloaths; they are, nevertheleſs, part of the dreſs of an officer.

212. Wonder, Aſtoniſhment, Amazement, Conſternation. Surprize.

Of theſe words, that of wonder, implies, admiration at ſomething extraordinary; aſtoniſhment, is, a ſudden confuſion of mind, ariſing from either fear or wonder; amaze⯑ment, implies, a greater degree of aſtoniſh⯑ment; conſternation, ſuch a degree, as almoſt borders upon horror, ariſing, chiefly, from dreadful circumſtances; as to ſurprize, it means, only, being taken unawares.

Of all theſe words, wonder, and, ſurprize, are ſuppoſed to be neareſt to each other, in ſignification; but, even between theſe, may be obſerved a difference; the firſt, be⯑ing generally, conſidered, as relative to things, good in themſelves, the latter, with reſpect to either good or bad. We are apt to wonder when a bad man does good, and, be ſurprized, when a good man does ill.

[6]Beſides, wonder, includes in its idea, ſome ſmall degree of conſideration; ſur⯑prize, does not.

If a mean-ſpirited perſon, whom I have inſulted, ſhould come to me, in order, to ſollicit a reconciliation; I ſhould naturally, ſay; I am ſurprized, at his coming, but, when I reflect on the meanneſs of his ſpi⯑rit, I do not much wonder.

Wonder and ſurprize, act upon the mind; aſtoniſhment and amazement, upon the ſenſes; conſternation, upon the heart.

The words aſtoniſhment, and, amazement, equally, with that of ſurprize are uſed, be the matter referred to, either good or bad; but, conſternation, is never made uſe of, but, with reſpect to bad.

We wonder, and, are ſurprized, at the miraculous events of providence. We are aſtoniſhed and amazed, at the extra⯑ordinary qualities of the magnet. An un⯑expected calamity, will throw us, often, into the greateſt conſternation.

213. Liberality, Generoſity, Bounty.

A ready and willing diſtribution; accor⯑ding to our abilities, is the general idea of theſe three words; but, they have each, a particular one, as follows: liberality, im⯑plies, acts of mere giving or ſpending; generoſity, acts of greatneſs; bounty, acts of kindneſs.

A liberal man, gives, freely; a generous man, nobly; and, a bountiful man, charitably.

Liberality, is a natural diſpoſition: gene⯑roſity, proceeds from elevation of ſentiment; bounty, from religious motives.

Liberality, denotes, freedom of ſpirit; ge⯑neroſity, greatneſs of ſoul: bounty, openneſs of heart.

Too great liberality, borders upon pro⯑fuſeneſs; it then, becomes a fault. Gene⯑roſity, is a princely quality, and, if it does not exceed the bounds of our abilities, is, always, commendable. Bounty, is an amia⯑ble virtue, and never goes unrewarded.

214. Prepoſſeſſed, Opiniated, Obſtinate, Infatuated, Headſtrong.

Theſe epithets denote a folly, which con⯑ſiſts in being too much wedded to our own opinion; but, that, which is particulariz⯑ed by the word, prepoſſeſſed, ſeems to ariſe, from exceſs of prejudice, which ſeduces, and, cauſes us to think, what we have preconceived, the beſt; paying lit⯑tle or no regard to the opinions of others. In one opiniated, this folly ſeems to be, the effect of an over-fondneſs for his own notions, and, a contempt for thoſe, of o⯑thers. Obſtinacy, ſeems to ſpring, from an affected perverſeneſs, which renders it intractable, and, which, againſt the rules of good-breeding, will never give way. An infatuated perſon, is ſuppoſed to be folly-ſtruck, to ſuffer ſome loſs of reaſon, which is the occaſion of that inflexibility we obſerve in him. As to the word, head⯑ſtrong, though, often, uſed as ſynonymous [9]with the above; it appears to me, to have a greater relation to a man's actions, inti⯑mating a blind determination, that ſtops his ears to every argument, and, renders him ungovernable.

Prepoſſeſſed, and, opiniated, imply, a mind, ſtrongly, prejudiced; obſtinate, and, head⯑strong, an unruly will; infatuated, a wan⯑dering in the dark.

Thus, to be prepoſſeſſed, opiniated, or, infa⯑tuated, is involuntary; to be obſtinate, or, headstrong, voluntary.

A perſon prepoſſeſſed, follows his own opinions, after examining in ſome ſort, thoſe of others. One, who is opiniated, follows his own notions, implicitly, with⯑out ever liſtning to thoſe of others. Obsti⯑nacy, purſues its own way, in ſpite of every oppoſition, and, often, through mere ca⯑price. Infatuation acts ſo ſtrongly, as in ſome meaſure, to take away that reaſon, which is the light of the mind; and thus dark⯑ening it, leads a man into the groſſeſt er⯑rors. The headſtrong perſon, often, acts through a ſpirit of oppoſition, and ſeldom leaves his courſe, till he has completed his ruin.

215. To Lift, Raiſe,

We lift, in taking any thing up; we raiſe, in ſetting it upright, or, placing, ac⯑cording to ſome order. Thus, we lift a weight, &c. we raiſe the head; we raiſe a ladder; we raiſe a maſt.

216. To Institute, Found, To Eſtabliſh, Endow.

To inſtitute, is, to create and form things, having ſome relation to the author, or, him, who firſt contrived, or, laid down the plan. To found, is, to give birth to ſuch plan. To eſtabliſh, is, to fix that plan, upon a laſting baſis. To endow, is to pro⯑vide the neceſſaries, for its ſubſiſtence.

[11]After univerſities were once inſtituted, colleges were founded, though not at firſt endowed; ſince which, thoſe noble inſtitu⯑tions, have been well eſtabliſhed, by ſuch en⯑dowments, as do honour to our country.

217. Chance, Fortune.

Chance, forms neither order or deſign; we neither attribute to it, knowledge, or, will, and, its events are, always, very uncertain. Fortune, lays plans and deſigns, but, with⯑out choice; we attribute to it, a will, with⯑out diſcernment, and, ſay, that it acts, blindly.

The chief of our ſucceſſes, are more owing to chance, than ſkill: it is, ſome⯑times, a long while, before fortune will look upon us, with a favourable eye.

218. Lot, Deſtiny.

Lot, ſuppoſes, diſtinctions, and, a method of deciſion; we attribute to it, a hidden determination, which keeps us in doubt, till the inſtant, it ſhews itſelf. Deſtiny, forms deſigns, diſpoſitions, and, connec⯑tions; we attribute to it, knowledge, will, and, power; its views are determined, and, unalterable.

Lot, decides; Deſtiny, ordains.

We obſerve many, ſo extremely raſh, as to leave their lives, to the lot of a die. Whatever deſtiny decrees, is inevitable; be⯑cauſe we can neither force its diſpoſition, nor ſee, beyond the reach of its light.

219. Religion, Piety, Devotion.

The word religion, is not conſidered here, as ſignifying the worſhip we owe to the Deity, and, the tribute of our dependance upon him; but, as denoting, a quality of the ſoul, and, a diſpoſition of the heart, towards God: it is in this ſenſe, only, that it is reputed as ſynonymous, with the other two. This diſpoſition, then, prevents our fail⯑ing in any part of our duty, to the Supreme Being. Piety, makes us acquit ourſelves with greater reſpect and zeal. Devotion, adds to this, outwardly, a ſerious, compoſed behaviour.

It is ſufficient, for a worldly perſon, to be religious; piety, agrees beſt with perſons, who pride themſelves in virtue, and, as to devotion, it is the employ of people, per⯑fectly, recluſe.

Religion, is more internal; piety, is, both internal, and, external; devotion, is, ſome⯑times, more external.

[14]Where there is no integrity, there is no religion. He, who fails in his reſpect, for religious worſhip, fails in piety. Devotion, unleſs ſincere, is mocking the Moſt High.

220. Able, Skilful, Learned.

That knowledge, which we can reduce to practice, makes us able; that, which requires ſpeculation, makes us ſkilful; that, which fills the memory, makes us learned.

We ſay, an able preacher or lawyer, a ſkilful mathematician or philoſopher; a learned hiſtorian or civilian.

Able, ſeems to imply, ſomething, more extenſive; ſkilful, ſomething, more pro⯑found; learned, ſomething, more univerſal.

We become able, by long experience; ſkilful, by deep ſtudy; learned, by great reading.

221. Empire, Kingdom.

Theſe are names given to different do⯑minions, whence princes take the title of emperor, or, king; 'tis not, however, in this alone, that their difference conſiſts.

It appears to me, that the word, empire, conveys an idea of a vaſt territory, com⯑poſed of various people; whereas, that of kingdom, implies, one more bounded; and, intimates the unity of that nation, of which it is formed. It is, perhaps, from this difference of idea, that the different deno⯑mination of ſtates, and, the titles their princes enjoy, take their riſe; if it is not, the only reaſon, it is at leaſt, the common one, as, we may remark, in the empire of Germany, the empire of Ruſſia, and, in the Ottoman empire, of whoſe diverſity of peo⯑ple and nations, the world is well acquaint⯑ed; on the other hand, we ſee, in thoſe ſtates which bear the name of kingdom, ſuch, as France, Spain, Poland, &c. that [16]the diviſion of provinces, does not deſtroy the unity of the people.

There is in kingdoms, a uniformity of fundamental laws; the difference of parti⯑cular laws, ariſing from different cuſtoms, which, in no reſpect, hurt the unity of po⯑litical adminiſtration. It is, from this uni⯑formity, or, ſingle government, that the words king, and, kingdom, take their riſe; for this reaſon, alſo, though there may be many perſons in the adminiſtration, there is, nevertheleſs, but one prince, or, ſove⯑reign miniſter: but, it is not the ſame in empires; one part of which, is, ſometimes, governed by fundamental laws, very dif⯑ferent from thoſe, by which, another part of the ſame empire is governed: this di⯑verſity, deſtroys the unity of government; and, 'tis the ſubmiſſion of certain chiefs, to the command of a general ſuperiour, that preſerves the union of the ſtate: it is, alſo, from this right of governing, that the words emperor, and, empire, are derived. Hence it is, that there are many ſove⯑reigns, and, kingdoms, in the ſame empire.

The Roman dominion, was, originally, a kingdom; being formed of one ſingle people; the name empire, was not given it, [17]till ſuch time, as it brought under its ſub⯑jection, other foreign ones, who became, though in themſelves diſtinct nations, members of that ſtate, and, over whom, the Romans eſtabliſhed one government, tho' they had ſeparate adminiſtrations.

The advantages we find in the ſociety of a body politic, contributes as much, on the part of ſubjects, to form kingdoms, as the deſire of governing, on the part of princes. It was ambition, alone, that formed the plan of empires, which were eſtabliſhed, and, are ſupported, chiefly, by the force of arms.

222. Power, Ability, Faculty,

Theſe words are explained, and, taken here, in a moral and literal ſenſe: They all ſignify, a diſpoſition in the ſubject, by means of which, it is capable of acting, or, producing an effect: but, that of power, reſults from ſupply, or, liberty of acting; ability, riſes from ſtrength; faculty, from natural properties.

A man, without the aids of grace, has not, even, the power of doing good. Youth, is in want of wiſdom, to deliberate; old age, of ability, to execute. The human mind has the faculty of reaſoning.

Our power, frequently, diminiſhes; by long uſe. Age deſtroys our ability, to ſatisfy the paſſions, though it does not, our deſires. The mind, will often, loſe its [19] faculties, by accidents happening to the organs of the body.

223. Pleaſure, Delight.

The idea of pleaſure, is, of a good, much more extenſive than that, of delight; be⯑cauſe, this word relates to a greater num⯑ber of objects, than the other; whatever agreeably affects the mind, the heart, the ſenſes, the fortune, &c. produces pleaſure. The idea of delight, riſes upon that of plea⯑ſure, by force of opinion; but, is never⯑theleſs, a good, of much leſs extent, with reſpect to objects; it is limited, properly, to ſenſation, and, has a particular relation, to good entertainment.

True philoſophy, finds pleaſure in every occupation. There cannot be a greater delight, than, in the true reliſh of innocent mirth.

[20]There is ſtill another ſenſe, in which theſe words are uſed; that, in which we ſay, of a perſon, that, he gives himſelf up, entirely, to pleaſures; that, he enjoys the delights of the country. Taken in this laſt ſenſe, they have, equally, as, in the other, their differences, and, particular niceties. Thus, pleaſures, relate, more, to perſonal practice, ſuch as cuſtoms, paſtimes, and, recreations; delights, more, to the charms which are furniſhed by nature, art, and, opulence; ſuch as, ſweet habitations, ſtu⯑died conveniences, and, choice company.

224. Content, Satisfaction.

Content, alludes, properly, to that in⯑ward ſerenity of heart, which renders the ſoul ſedate and compoſed. Satisfaction, re⯑lates, more, to the paſſions; being a change, owing to ſome ſucceſs, in which we hug ourſelves.

No reſtleſs, or, turbulent man, can ever enjoy true content. Satisfaction, hardly, ever, accompanies immoderate ambition.

225. Excurſion, Ramble, Jaunt.

Excurſion, ſuppoſes, a pleaſurable expe⯑dition to ſome diſtant place, determined on, ſome time before. Ramble, implies, an irregular roving, in places unthought of, till the time we arrive there. By jaunt, is underſtood, a walk or journey; agree⯑able to the perſon, who takes it, but, held in contempt by others, or, conſidered, as an act of levity.

We ſay, innocent excurſions; wild ram⯑bles; and, imprudent jaunts.

Excurſions are neceſſary to perſons, in a ſedentary way of life, in order, to unbend the mind, and, exerciſe the body. Ram⯑bling, is an evident ſign of an unſteady diſpoſition. Jaunts, in parties of pleaſure, have been, often, attended with calamitous conſequences.

226. Ale-houſe, Public-houſe.

Nothing is more common, than the ge⯑neral uſe of theſe terms, to expreſs one and the ſame thing, but, with great impro⯑priety: though every ale-houſe is, un⯑doubtedly, a public-houſe; it does not fol⯑low, that every public-houſe, is an ale-houſe. Public-houſe, is a more extenſive expreſſion, implying a houſe, open for the entertain⯑ment of the public; whereas, ale-houſe, is more limited, denoting, a particular ſpecies of public-houſes, that, which is appropriated to the ſale of beer. Thus, taverns, coffee⯑houſes, &c. are public-houſes; but, not ale⯑houſes.

Gentlemen frequent many public-houſes, without any ſort of diſgrace; but, it, al⯑ways, leſſens their character, to be ſeen in an ale-houſe.

227. Lie, Falſehood.

Contrariety to truth, is the general idea of theſe two words; but, that of lie, ſup⯑poſes, always, ſomething criminal; where⯑as, that of falſehood, does not.

If queſtioned in a cauſe, wherein bound to tell the truth, we do not, we are guilty of a lie; if we deviate from truth, where there is no ſuch obligation; it is no other, than a falſehood.

Lies are, always, ſinful; falſehoods, many times, juſtifiable. A lie, is an offence to God, and, a diſgrace to man. A bene⯑ficial falſehood, is preferable to a deſtruc⯑tive truth.

228. Sea, Ocean.

By ſea, is underſtood, a large body of water, oppoſed to land, confined within certain bounds; by ocean, a much larger body, whoſe utmoſt verge is not particu⯑larly known. Thus, we ſay, the Baltic ſea; the Mediterranean ſea; the Adriatic ſea; but, the Weſtern ocean; the Atlantic ocean; the Pacific ocean: So, again, the wide ſea; but, the vaſt ocean.

229. Social, Sociable.

Of theſe two words, that of ſocial, re⯑lates, more, to a chriſtian-like diſpoſition; that of ſociable, more, to a familiar one.

[26]'Tis goodneſs of heart, that makes a man ſocial; ſweetneſs of temper, that makes him ſociable.

Humanity, benevolence, beneficence, friendſhip, &c. are the ſocial virtues; good-nature, good-humour, condeſcenti⯑on, &c. are the qualities, that render ſociable.

230. Luxury, Voluptuouſneſs.

In the general ſenſe of theſe words, luxury, implies, a giving one's ſelf up to pleaſure; voluptuouſneſs, an indulgence in the ſame, to exceſs.

The luxury of a people, is the forerun⯑ner of their ruin. The voluptuous man wallows in ſenſuality, and, is void of the feelings of humanity.

Beſides this diſtinction, there is one, far more delicate, and refined; and, which re⯑quires ſome attention to be thoroughly [27]conceived. Notwithſtanding, cuſtom has, always, made uſe of the word voluptuouſ⯑neſs, in a bad ſenſe, equally, with that of luxury; it appears to me, that it may, ſometimes, be uſed, with propriety, in a good one. To comprehend this, properly, it muſt firſt, be conſidered, that luxury, im⯑plies, groſs corporal indulgence only; vo⯑luptuouſneſs, mental, as well as corporal. Thus, ebriety, epicuriſm, venery, &c. are each, a ſpecies of luxury; but, we may be voluptuous, even, in things innocent in themſelves, as, in the rapturous enjoyment of a fine proſpect; the ſtudied delightful⯑neſs of a rural retreat.

In this ſenſe, luſt, indulged to exceſs, is luxury; love, indulged to exceſs, voluptu⯑ouſneſs.

231. Sober, Temperate, Abſtemious.

A man may be ſober, and, not temperate; temperate, yet, not abſtemious.

In that ſenſe, in which theſe words are reputed ſynonymous, ſobriety, implies, pre⯑ſent freedom from the power of ſtrong li⯑quor; temperance, ſignifies, moderation in drinking; and, by abſtemiouſneſs, is under⯑ſtood, a refraining from all ſorts of liquor, that may intoxicate.

Some men, who have the character of being ſober, very little deſerve it; as their freedom from intoxication, is more owing to ſtrength of conſtitution, which reſiſts the force of ſtrong drink, than, to the vir⯑tue of temperance. An abſtemious perſon, practices the virtue of ſelf-denial, and, by a rigid abſtinence from all liquors, that may hurt him, keeps his head clear, and his conſtitution ſound.

[29]A ſober man, may drink much, and, not be affected with it. A temperate man, drinks little. An abſtemious man, drinks not at all.

Note. By the word drink, here, is meant, the uſe of ſtrong drink.

232. Sharp, Sour, Acid.

Theſe words expreſs different degrees of ſourneſs; ſharp, implies, ſourneſs with⯑out aſtringency, or, a ſmall degree of ſourneſs. Thus, wine, beer, &c. grow, frequently, ſharp, by long keeping. Sour, includes in its idea, little or no acrimony. Thus, cyder, vinegar, verjuice, &c. are ſour, but, palatable; made ſo, for uſe. By acid, is underſtood, a corroſive ſour; as the acid lemon; the acid vitriol, &c.

233. Unreaſonable, Inconſiſtent, Abſurd.

The general idea of theſe three words, is, incongruity; but, that of unreaſonable, implies, rather, non-agreeableneſs to rea⯑ſon; that of inconſiſtent, contrariety of act, or, argument, where one part, deſtroys the other; that of abſurd, ſeems to inti⯑mate, both.

Nothing can be more unreaſonable, than requeſting the ſervices of another, to his detriment; he who complies with ſuch requeſt, would act very inconſiſtently; and, both, would commit the groſſeſt ab⯑ſurdity.

He, who endeavours to raiſe his own name, by cruſhing that of another; acts unreaſona⯑bly. He, who would be thought a man of ſenſe and learning, and, ſtrives to ſupport that character, by a contumelious con⯑tempt of others; acts inconſiſtently. He, who is culpable in either of theſe particulars; acts abſurdly.

234. Abſtinence, Fast.

Abſtinence, implies, a forbearance from ſuch food, as, is ſuppoſed to pamper the fleſh; faſt, a refraining from all ſorts of food. Wedneſdays and Fridays are ap⯑pointed, by the church, as, days of ab⯑ſtinence; Aſh-Wedneſday and Good-Fri⯑day, as faſt-days.

235. Contiguous, Adjacent.

By the word contiguous, is underſtood, ſo ſituated, as to touch; by adjacent, ſo lying, as having nothing, of the ſame kind, between: Thus, one houſe, or, one room, is contiguous to another; but, we ſay, an ad⯑iacent church; the adjacent village.

[32]The true ſenſe, then, of theſe words, is, that contiguous, implies, actual contact; adjacent, only, hard by.

236. Benevolence, Beneficence.

Of theſe two words, one, is the in⯑tention; the other, the act; benevolence, being, the deſire of doing good; beneficence, actual goodneſs.

A benevolent man, delights in beneficence.

Providence has, ſufficiently, evinced its love to mankind, by planting in our nature, a benevolent diſpoſition, and, re⯑warding the effect of that diſpoſition, beneficence.

237. Acquainted, Familiar, Intimate.

A ſlight or initial knowledge of any one, conſtitutes acquaintance. To be fami⯑liar, requires an acquaintance of ſome ſtand⯑ing. Intimacy, ſuppoſes, ſuch an acquaint⯑ance, as is ſupported by friendſhip.

Theſe words, then, riſe one upon the other, by gradation; intimacy, reſulting from cloſe familiarity, which, proceeds from long acquaintance.

Thoſe, who are apt to be familiar, on a ſlight acquaintance, will never acquire any degree of intimacy; as forwardneſs of that ſort, generally, meets with the contempt of mankind.

238. Pillar, Column.

By the word, Pillar, is underſtood, a ſupporter of ſome roof; by the word, co⯑lumn, a particular kind of pillar, that which is round: thus, every column, is a pillar, tho' every pillar, is not a column.

In moſt buildings, where the beauty of the architecture is ſtudied; columns are gene⯑rally inſulated; whereas, ſquare pillars, are, for the moſt part, ſet within a wall, ſhew⯑ing, only, a fourth or fifth part, of their thickneſs.

239. Servitude, Slavery.

The ſtate of a hired ſervant, is ſervi⯑tude; that, of one mancipated, is ſlave⯑ry; the one, is voluntary; the other, in⯑voluntary. Servitude, is a kind of willing bondage, if the expreſſion may be ad⯑mitted; Slavery, is a yoke, dreaded by all mankind.

Servitude, is, in ſome meaſure, honour⯑able: Slavery, generally, contemptible.

All perſons, ſtrictly ſpeaking, are in a ſtate of reputable ſervitude, with reſpect to one another; but, ſlavery, has been ever conſidered, as derogatory to the character of man.

240. Amuſement, Diverſion.

The general idea of theſe words, is, in⯑nocent recreation; but, that of amuſe⯑ment, implies, tranquil entertainment; that of diverſion, tumultuous merri⯑ment.

Card-playing, concerts, plays, &c. are amuſements; cricket, cudgel-playing, horſe⯑races, &c. are diverſions.

Some perſons are ſo quietly inclined, as to find great amuſement in reading; while others, are of ſuch a riotous diſpoſition, as to imagine all diverſion, conſiſts in uproar and confuſion.

241. Satire, Lampoon.

Satire, is general; being a poem, in which, the folly and wickedneſs of the times, are ſeverely, cenſured; written with an intent to reform. Lampoon, is a po⯑em alſo, but, perſonal; containing in⯑vective reflections againſt one perſon in particular; with a deſign, only, to vex.

A ſatire, then, is commendable; a lam⯑poon, ſcurrilous. The laſh of ſatire, has been, often, found more beneficial to a ſtate, than the ſcourge of power. The writer of a lampoon, may be well compared to a bee, whoſe ſting, wounds but ſlightly, and, whoſe malicious act, is ſure to be pu⯑niſhed by the whole ſwarm.

242. Steeple, Spire, Tower.

By theſe three words, is meant a high building, raiſed above the main edifice; but, that of ſteeple, is more general; thoſe, of ſpire, and, tower, more particular.

Steeple, implies, the turret of a church; be it of what form ſoever. By ſpire, is underſtood, a ſteeple, riſing taper to the top. By tower, is implied, a ſquare ſteeple.

Spire, and, tower, then, are certain kinds of ſteeples. The ſteeple of St. Bride's church, London, is a ſpire; the ſteeple of St. Andrew's, a tower.

The words, ſteeple, and, ſpire, are never applied, but to churches: The word, tow⯑er, is, ſometimes, made uſe of, with reſ⯑pect to other large edifices.

In former times, palaces, and gentle⯑men's ſeats, were, commonly, built with [39] towers; ſuch as, the tower, at St. James's, London; the tower, at Lord Rochfort's feat, at St. Ofyth, Eſſex.

Spires, are generally, erected upon tow⯑ers. Bells, are, uſually, hung in towers; weather-cocks, commonly, fixed on ſpires.

243. Religion, Perſuaſion.

The ſenſe, in which theſe words are held as ſynonymous, is that, of a certain ſyſtem of divine faith and worſhip. But, that, which religion, implies, ſeems to be one, more general, and, eſtabliſhed; that, which, is underſtood by perſuaſion, more particu⯑lar, and, vague.

By perſuaſton, then, is meant a deviation from ſome ſettled religion.

The divine ſyſtems of the church of England, and, of the church of Rome, [40]are religions; thoſe, of a Preſbyterian, and, a Lutheran, are perſuaſions.

244. Letter, Epiſtle.

Cuſtom has made the word, letter, of more general uſe, than epiſtle: letter, be⯑ing quite familiar; epiſtle, rather pedantic: but, this is not the only obſervation, I would make. Letter, appears to me, more proper, when the matter relates, to private correſpondence; epiſtle, when the buſineſs is public. Thus, we ſay, letters of friendſhip; letters of buſineſs; but, if theſe letters relate to public matters, or ap⯑pear in print, we may, with elegance, call them epiſtles; as Paul's epiſtles; Ovid's epiſtles; Melmoth's epiſtles.

245. Gold, Golden.

The preſent age has made an innovati⯑on, with reſpect to theſe two words, con⯑verting the ſubſtantive gold into an adjec⯑tive; and, altering the ſenſe of golden, which, in reality, implies, made of gold, into that of gilt. In this corrupted ſenſe, then, I am obliged to conſider them; as ſuch, the word, gold, relates to the metal, of which a thing is made; that of golden, to the hue, it bears. Thus, we ſay, a gold ring; a gold watch; a gold buckle; but, the golden lion; the golden head; the golden lamp. That, theſe ideas are, often, con⯑fuſed, is very evident; as, we, ſometimes, hear of a golden cup, or, a golden ewer. Should it be ſaid, ſuch a one, ſtole a golden cup, from the houſe, with the golden lamp; we muſt either imagine, that, both cup [42]and lamp were of ſolid gold; or, that, they were only gilt.

246. Endeavour. Effort.

Endeavour, is, labour directed to ſome certain end; effort, is, a laborious endea⯑vour.

When we would accompliſh a deſign, we uſe our endeavours; if we meet with any conſiderable and unexpected obſtacles in the way, we apply our utmoſt ef⯑forts.

247. Mute, Silent.

By mute, is underſtood, incapability of ſpeech; by ſilent, a voluntary forbear⯑ance.

In eaſtern countries, nobles have mute attendants. Silence, is a mark of wiſ⯑dom.

A man had, ſometimes, better be, abſo⯑lutely, mute, than, inadvertently betray himſelf; as is, frequently the caſe, by too great a volubility; and, which Silence, on⯑ly, would prevent.

248. Beam, Rafter.

Tho' the diſtinction of theſe words, may be thought uſeleſs to the general rea⯑der; yet, to him, it is more parti⯑cularly, ſerviceable; they being ſel⯑dom, if ever, confuſed by the carpenter, or, builder. By beam, then, is meant, the main piece of timber, that ſupports the houſe; by rafter, the ſecondary timber, which is let into the great beam: To make them better underſtood, beams are thoſe timbers, that girt the top of a building; rafters, thoſe, that ſupport the tiling.

249. Room, Chamber, Apartment.

With reſpect to the two firſt; room, is a general expreſſion; chamber, a particular one. Room, implies, any divided part of a houſe. Chamber, is a room, appropri⯑ated to ſleep in.

By apartment, is underſtood, a ſet of rooms, convenient to dwell in.

We ſay, a ſpacious room; a ſnug cham⯑ber; a commodious apartment.

Some chambers, are ſo contrived, as to conceal the bed, and, make the room, fit to entertain company. Many families of ſlen⯑der fortune, chooſe rather to live in elegant apartments, than, in indifferent houſes.

250. Houſe, Tenement.

The preſent ſignification of theſe words, is, that houſe, means, a dwelling, diſtinct by itſelf; tenement, part of a houſe, di⯑vided off, for the uſe of another family.

We ſay, a ſpacious, magnificent houſe; a ſnug, pretty tenement.

Large houſes, which the owners find dif⯑ficult to ſet, to one family, are, frequently, converted into ſmall tenements, and let out, to many.

251. Lodging, Apartment.

Lodging, relates, more, to a ſet of rooms, appropriated to a family, in ſome private houſe; apartment, more to a convenient dwelling, in ſome public edifice.

The firſt or ſecond ſtory of a houſe, let out, is called a lodging: any particular range of rooms, in a large building, ſo al⯑lotted, as to contain a number of families, one over another, is called, an apartment. As, the apartments, in an hoſpital; the apartments, in an inn of court; the apart⯑ments, in a palace.

It is, in ſome reſpect, mean, to live, in a lodging; but, perſons of great fortune, have dwelt, with credit, in apartments.

252. Warmth, Fervency.

Conſidering theſe words, in a religious ſenſe; that of fervency, ſeems to riſe upon warmth; warmth implying, a flame of devo⯑tion, in oppoſition to coolneſs; fervency, great heat of mind, as oppoſed to cold⯑neſs.

Warmth, is, in ſome meaſure, neceſſa⯑ry; it will make us punctual, in the exer⯑ciſe of our duty, thro' a ſenſe of gratitude and affection: fervency, has a dangerous tendency; it will, if not kept within due bounds, drive men into enthuſiaſm.

Warmth, is the offspring of a good heart; fervency, of a weak mind.

Warmth, makes the heart beat high in the cauſe of God. Fervency, will carry us into a vain conſidence, of having ſome intercourſe with the Deity.

253. Plenty, Abundance.

By plenty, is underſtood, enough, and ſome little to ſpare; by abundance, more than enough; or, a conſiderable deal over.

He, that wants but a yard of cloth, and, poſſeſſes a yard and a quarter, has plen⯑ty: he, that needs but one yard, and, has ſeveral, may be ſaid to have, abundance.

A contented man, will be ſatisfied, tho' he ſhould fall ſhort of plenty; but, the co⯑vetous man, is ſtill graſping for more, even, though he enjoys abundance.

254. Surmiſe, Suſpicion.

Surmiſe, is, imagination in general, with⯑out certain knowledge: Suſpicion, is ima⯑gination of ſome ill, without proof.

Surmiſe, is, often, uſed, with reſpect to things, good in themſelves; ſuſpicion, ne⯑ver, but, with regard to things, that are ill.

Surmiſe, is, an imperfect notion, or, a kind of conjecture, riſing in a great mea⯑ſure from curioſity; ſuſpicion, ſuppoſes, a degree of fear and jealouſy, concerning things not known.

We ſhould never build an opinion upon bare ſurmiſe, which is, at beſt, but a ſan⯑dy foundation. Suſpicion, is, in reality, its own tormentor; raiſing in the mind, a thouſand apprehenſions, which is no eaſy matter, afterwards, to quell.

255. Sequel, Concluſion.

Sequel, is the ſucceeding part; concluſi⯑on, the cloſe.

The ſequel continues; the concluſion ends.

A ſtory is unintelligible, without its ſe⯑quel; but, not ſo, without its concluſion; the concluſion, being comprehended, in few words; the ſequel, requiring many.

The ſequel, in part, forms the ſtory; the concluſion, puts the finiſhing ſtroke to it.

Before we paſs any judgment on what we hear, we ſhould attend to the ſequel, and wait till the concluſion.

256. To Diſperſe, Scatter.

The act of ſpreading abroad, is the general idea of theſe two words; but, that of diſperſe, ſeems to imply, ſome ſort of order and care: that of ſcatter, means, to throw about, looſely and careleſly.

In order, to ſow a field, we diſperſe the ſeed, in different places. He, who ſcatters his wealth, without making a proper uſe of it; will one day come to want.

To diſperſe, is, always, voluntary: to ſcatter, is, frequently, involuntary.

When a family of children are come to years of maturity, they, generally, diſperſe themſelves into various parts. It is, al⯑moſt, impoſſible to carry a load of hay, from one place to another, without ſcatter⯑ing ſome of it.

257. New, Freſh, Recent.

That, which has not been uſed, is new; that, which is not ſtale, is freſh; that, which has juſt happened, is recent.

We ſay, of cloaths, that, they are new; of topics, that, they are freſh; of actions, that, they are recent.

A thought, is new, by the turn we give it; freſh, by the ſenſe, it expreſſes; recent, by the time, of its production.

New things carry with them a credita⯑ble appearance. Freſh matters, are food for tatlers. We are more affected with re⯑cent ſtories, than, with thoſe, of long date.

258. Expreſſion, Word.

Theſe words have been treated of be⯑fore, when that of expreſſion, was conſi⯑dered, as implying, a phraſe of ſpeech; but, there being another ſenſe, in which, it is uſed, as ſynonymous with word, it may not be unneceſſary to ſhew the diffe⯑rence between them: and, as the diſtincti⯑on is very delicate, we muſt view it with attention.

Expreſſion, then, repreſents the meaning: a word expreſſes the idea, which we em⯑ploy to form that meaning. It is in order to uſe the expreſſion, that the word is eſta⯑bliſhed. The firſt, is natural, general, and, univerſal among all men; the ſecond, is arbitrary, and, different according to the varied cuſtom of the people. The YES, and, the No, are, always, and in all pla⯑ces, [55]the ſame expreſſions; that is, they carry the ſame meaning; but, that mean⯑ing is not expreſſed by the ſame words, in all languages, and, on all occaſions.

We have the gift of expreſſion, and, the knowledge of words: we give a turn, and, juſtneſs to the one; we chooſe, and, range the others.

The production of ſenſe, and, formati⯑on of a propoſition, are what we expect from an expreſſion: but, a word, is, com⯑monly, of no other value, than to make a part of that ſenſe, or, of that propoſi⯑on. Thus, expreſſions, differ among themſelves, according to the difference of the ſenſes they bear; and, words differ a⯑mong themſelves, either, by the ſimple ar⯑ticulation of the voice, or, by the dif⯑rent ideas they convey. A word, is no otherwiſe bad, than, by its not being in uſe, in the polite world.

A variety of expreſſions, proceeds not, al⯑ways, from the fertility, and extent of the mind. An abundance of words, enriches [56]not the language, unleſs thoſe words convey an abundance of ideas.

259. Not, No.

Not, barely, expreſſes the negation; no, ſtrengthens, and, ſeems to affirm it. The firſt, often, denies the thing, in part only, or, with limitation; the ſecond, denies it, always, abſolutely, wholly, and, without reſerve. Thus we ſay, he has not money; he has not patience; meaning, he is not over⯑burthened with either: but, when we ſay, he has no money; he has no patience; we would be underſtood to ſay, he has none at all.

It is on account of this limitation, that the word not, is, generally, uſed in com⯑pany, with thoſe words, that mark, either [57]the degree of quality, or, quantity; ſuch as, MUCH, VERY, ONE, and the like.

There is not, commonly, much money to be found, in the poſſeſſion of men of letters. The major part of thoſe, who fre⯑quent divine ſervice, are not, very devout. It, often, happens, that he, who has not one ſingle penny, in his pocket, is much happier, than many rich men.

260. Great, Sublime.

Theſe words here, are conſidered, in no other ſenſe, than, as they relate to lan⯑guage; in which, that of great, ſeems to me, to have more relation to the learning, or, the nature of the ſubjects we treat of; and, that of ſubtime, more, to the ſpirit and manner, in which we treat them.

[58]Lock, on Human Underſtanding, is a very great work; Milton's Paradiſe Loſt, is very ſublime one.

Great, or, ſcientific pieces, are, often, ſtarched, and, diſcover the labour of the author; but, ſublime pieces, tho' compoſ⯑ed with a great deal of art, ſeem, always, natural.

Studied words, known only to the learn⯑ed, joined to profound and metaphyſical reaſonings, form the great, or, elevated ſtile; expreſſions, equally juſt and brilli⯑ant, joined to beautiful thoughts, finely and nobly turned, conſtitute the ſublime.

It is not poſſible, for every work to be great; but, it may be ſublime: ſublime works, however, are more rare, than great ones.

261. To Excell, be Excellent.

To excell, ſuppoſes, a compariſon; is, being ſuperior to all of the like kind; ex⯑cludes equals, and, is applied to all ſorts of objects. To be excellent, is, being in the higheſt degree, without any ſort of compariſon; it admits of equals, and, a⯑grees beſt with things of taſte. Thus, we ſay, that Titian excelled in colouring; Michael Angelo in deſign; and, that Gar⯑rick, is an excellent actor.

Perſons, who excell in any particular art, gain a name. The more excellent, the meats, the more dangerous, the feaſt⯑ing.

261. Lazy, Indolent.

A lazy man, never goes through with an undertaking. An indolent man, will un⯑dertake nothing. The firſt, wants cou⯑rage and reſolution; he ſtops, he turns, he fears, and, changes, preſently. The ſe⯑cond, wants will and emulation; one can⯑not animate, or, make him ſenſi⯑ble.

The lazy man, is a burthen to ſociety. The indolent man, is an enemy to him⯑ſelf.

262. To Name, Call.

As much as theſe words differ in in their meaning, they are, nevertheleſs, uſed, fre⯑quently, to expreſs the ſame idea; the ab⯑ſurdity of which is groſs. We name, to diſtinguiſh in converſation: we call, as for help, when wanted.

The Lord called every living creature be⯑fore Adam, and, he named them.

It is not proper, to name all things by their names; nor, call all ſorts of people to our aſſiſtance.

264. Quality, Talent.

Qualities, form the character of per⯑ſons; talents, are their ornament. The firſt, render them, either, good or bad, and have a great influence over their morals. The ſecond, make them uſeful or enter⯑taining, and go a great way towards mak⯑ing them eſteemed.

We may uſe the word, quality, either, in a good or bad ſenſe; but, we cannot take that of talent, in any other, than a good one.

Man, is a mixture of good and bad quali⯑ties, ſometimes, ſo ſtrange as to poſſeſs the extremes of each: There are perſons, poſſeſſed of ſuch talents, as make them⯑ſelves [63]admired, and, yet, give ſome pain to others, who would be witneſſes of them; but, in this caſe, I ſhould think it more eligible, to endure the caprice of the enter⯑taining, than the diſagreeableneſs of the tireſome.

The qualities of the heart, are, more eſ⯑ſential; thoſe of the mind, more brilliant. Talents, which are of uſe in neceſſity, are more neceſſary; thoſe, which conduce to entertainment, are beſt rewarded.

Our qualities render us, either, beloved or deſpiſed. Our talents, make our compa⯑ny coveted.

Excellent qualities, joined to rare talents, conſtitute great worth.

264. To Extol, Praiſe.

We extol a perſon, to procure him the eſteem of others, or, raiſe his reputation; we praiſe him, to teſtify the eſteem, we have for him, or, to applaud him.

To extol, is, to ſay a great deal in the fa⯑vour of others, and, aſcribe to them great qualities, whether they poſſeſs them or not. To praiſe, is, to approve, with a kind of admiration, whatever they ſay or do, whether they deſerve it or no.

We extol the abilities of a man; we praiſe his conduct.

The word, extol, ſuppoſes, that the perſon, of whom we ſpeak, and the per⯑ſon, to whom we ſpeak, are diffrent; which the word, praiſe, does not.

[65]Quacks, never fail to extol themſelves; they promiſe, always, more than they can perform; and, pride themſelves in an ima⯑ginary eſteem. Conceited perſons, fre⯑quently praiſe themſelves, and, are gene⯑rally well ſatisfied with that praiſe.

It is far more ridiculous, in my opinion, for a man to praiſe himſelf, than extol him⯑ſelf: for, we extol ourſelves, through a de⯑ſire of having the eſteem of others, which is a vanity, one may look over; but, when we are guilty of ſelf-praiſe, it is done, through the great eſteem we have for our⯑ſelves, which is a pride inſufferable.

265. Darkneſs, Obſcurity.

Darkneſs, ſeems to ſignify, ſomething re⯑al, in oppoſition to light: Obſcurity, is, a mere privation of brightneſs.

We ſay, often, of darkneſs, that, it is thick; of obſcurity, that, it is great.

Conſidering them, in a figurative ſenſe, darkneſs, implies, a ſtate of life, in which, we are ſhut up from the world; as, the ſtate of a hermit; the ſtate of a recluſe. By obſcurity, is underſtood, a ſtate of retire⯑ment, or, a ſtate unnotic'd; as, when we re⯑treat into the country, far from the obſer⯑vation of the public eye.

He, who lives in a ſtate of darkneſs, is uſeleſs to ſociety, and, dead, as it were, to mankind. He, who lives in a ſtate of obſcurity, enjoys a ſerenity, unknown to him, who revels in the open world.

266. To Feel, Handle.

We feel, lightly; we handle, with the full hand.

We feel, a column, to know, whether it be made of marble or wood; we handle ſtuff, to know what ſtrength it has, or, what body it is of.

It, often, happens, that a thing, though diſagreeable to the eye, ſhall be agreeable to feel. There is no pleaſure in handling any thing, that is rough.

267. Tranſlation, Verſion.

Tranſlation, relates to the turning into modern language; verſion, into ancient. Thus, the Engliſh Bible, is a tranſlation; but, the Latin, Greek, Arabic, and, Sy⯑riac Bibles, are verſions.

Tranſlations, to be perfectly good, ſhould be neither, more or leſs, ornamented, than the originals. The antient verſions of ſcrip⯑ture, have acquired, almoſt, as much au⯑thority, as the Hebrew text.

A new tranſlation of Virgil, and, Horace, would, ſtill, pleaſe, notwithſtanding the ma⯑ny, that have appeared. The time, when the verſion of the Septuagint was made, is unknown.

268. Vile, Bad.

Although the firſt, of theſe words, is not in very general uſe, with reſpect to the ſenſe, in which, I would here conſider it; yet, it is not ſo entirely diſuſed, but, that I may characteriſe it, without fear of impropriety. As to the ſecond word, it is not here taken in all its ſignifications, but, in that only, in which, it is uſed as ſynonymous with the firſt.

Uſeleſsneſs, and, little or no value, make a thing vile. Defect, and, loſs of merit, render it bad. Thence it is, we ſay, in a myſtic ſenſe, that, we are vile creatures; intimating, that, we are nothing, with reſpect to God, or, that, he does not ſtand in need of our ſervices; and, that, we ſay, he is a bad chriſtian, who is void of faith, or, who has, through ſin, loſt the grace of baptiſm.

[70]He, is a vile ſubject, who is fit for no⯑thing, or, who cannot be of any ſervice to the community. He, is a bad ſubject, who will not attempt to do good, but, gives way to every vicious inclination.

A vile man, is contemptible, and, be⯑comes the outcaſt of the world. A bad man, is condemnable, and, draws upon himſelf the hatred of every honeſt per⯑ſon.

In ſpeaking of uſeful things, as ſtuffs, linen, and, the like, the word vile, riſes upon that of bad. That, which has been much uſed, but, will ſtill ſerve, upon an occaſion, is bad: that, which cannot be uſed any more, or, that, we cannot uſe, with credit, is vile.

Bad cloaths are not, always, a mark of poverty. There is, ſometimes, more pride under a covering of vile rags, than, under that, of gold and purple.

269. Matter, Subject.

Matter, is that, which we uſe, in the work; ſubject is that, on which, we work.

The matter, of a diſcourſe, conſiſts in the words, in the phraſes, and, in the thoughts; the ſubject, is that, which we explain, by thoſe words, thoſe phraſes, and, thoſe thoughts.

The reaſonings, the paſſages of holy writ, the characters of paſſions, and, the maxims of morality, are the matter of ſer⯑mons; the myſteries of faith, and, the precepts of the goſpel, ought to be the ſubject.

270. To Mask, Diſguiſe.

In order, to mask, it is neceſſary, to cover the face with a falſe viſage; but, to diſguiſe, it is ſufficient, to change the common appearance.

We mask ourſelves, to go to a ball. We diſguiſe ourſelves, to bring about an intrigue.

271. View, Proſpect.

The ſight of ſomething diſtant, is the general idea of theſe words; but, that of view, ſeems, in my opinion, to imply a ſight, more extenſive, than, that of pro⯑pect. [73]Thus, we ſay, a little, or, confined proſpect; but, a long, or, extended view.

Beſides, there ſeems to be leſs variety in a view, than, in a proſpect. Thus, we ſay, the pleaſing proſpect of the neighbouring villages. The fine view of a diſtant moun⯑tain.

272. Hovel, Shed.

A hovel, is a ſmall place, indifferently, run up, with mud walls, in order, to preſerve things from the weather: a ſhed, is, a ſup⯑ported roof only; a place covered, over⯑head, but, open, on the ſides; generally erected as a dry ſtanding-place for carts, or, other things.

Hovels, are ſeldom ſeen, but, in country places; ſheds, frequently, in towns.

The poor, in many parts of the king⯑dom, are reduced to the neceſſity of dwel⯑ling [74]in huts, very little better, than hovels. Happy is the traveller, in bad weather, to take ſhelter, even, under a ſhed.

273. Oval, Oblong.

By oval, we mean, that, which is regu⯑larly ſo; by oblong, that, which reſembles the longitudinal ſection of an egg, whe⯑ther regular or not.

Tables are, frequently, made oblong, tho' not, exactly, oval.

We may ſay, with propriety, that an oval, is oblong; though cuſtom will not ad⯑mit us, to invert the expreſſion.

274. Miſt, Fog.

By miſt, is underſtood, a thin cloud, hanging very low; or, rain, ſo extremely ſmall, as not to be perceived in drops. By fog, is implied, a moiſt vapour, near the ſurface of the land; or, water, ſo denſe, as to obſcure the ſight.

The miſt, falls; the fog, riſes.

A miſt, prevents our ſeeing things at ſome diſtance; a fog, thoſe, immediately before us.

Some days, are ſo extremely miſty, as, to obſtruct proſpects; others, ſo very foggy, as, to be unhealthy, and, miſlead the traveller in his way.

275. Genteel, Elegant.

Genteel, implies, ſomething above the common run; elegant, means, beautiful without grandeur.

Genteel, carries with it the idea of ſome⯑thing, reputable; elegant, of ſomething, taſty.

By a houſe, genteely furniſhed, is under⯑ſtood, a houſe, containing every neceſſary, good, and, creditable; by, elegantly furniſh⯑ed, is meant, genteely, and, in ſuch a man⯑ner, as, to pleaſe without elevation.

Genteel, relates, more, to the neatneſs, and, goodneſs of the furniture; elegant, more, to the diſpoſition of it.

A man's notions, are diſcovered in the genteelneſs of his houſe; his taſte, in the elegance.

276. To Beat, Strike.

In order, to beat, we muſt redouble the blows; but, to ſtrike, we need give only one.

We are never beaten, without being ſtruck; but, we are often ſtruck, without being beat.

We never beat, but, with deſign; we, often, ſtrike, by accident.

Wiſe men have ſaid, that the rod ſhould be, always, on the back of children: thoſe therefore, who have the bringing of them up, ſhould never think differently: how⯑ever, we are to interpret theſe words, no otherwiſe, than alluding to fear, not ima⯑gining, that we are to be, conſtantly, beating them; for nothing is more oppoſite to good education, than the example of violent con⯑duct, and, ſevere diſcipline. The precep⯑tor who ſtrikes his pupil, does it, oftener, through haſtineſs of temper, than, deſign of correction.

277. Coward, Poltron.

The coward, will fire up, upon the leaſt offence, but, proceed no farther. The poltron, is ſo meanly ſpirited, as, through want of courage, to take every inſult, calmly.

The coward, draws back; the poltron, dares not advance.

Cowards, they ſay, will fight, when deſ⯑perate. We muſt not depend on the ſuc⯑cour of a poltron.

278. To Think, Study, Muſe.

We think, quietly, and, orderly, to be, thoroughly, acquainted with our object. We ſtudy, with inquietude, and, without order, to attain our wiſhes. We muſe, deeply, to paſs away the time agree⯑ably.

The philoſopher, thinks, on the arrange⯑ment of his ſyſtem. A perſon, in difficul⯑ty, ſtudies, for expedients, how to get out of it. The ſolitary lover, muſes, on his miſtreſs.

I have, often, remarked, that obſcure things, frequently, appear clear to thoſe, who know not how to think properly; they comprehend, but, are not able to ex⯑plain. It is an act of prudence, to ſtudy to avert ſuch evils, as threaten us. The pleaſure of muſing, is, perhaps, moſt agree⯑able, but, leſs uſeful.

279. Sign, Signal.

The ſign, makes known, and, is, ſome⯑times, natural. The ſignal, gives notice, and, is, always, arbitrary. The appearances of the face, are, commonly, the ſigns, of what paſſes in the heart. The hoiſting of a flag, in one ſhip, is, a ſignal to another.

We make ourſelves underſtood, by the deaf, by ſigns. The readieſt way of making perſons underſtand us, at a diſtance, is, by ſignals.

280. Only, Alone.

When, ſpeaking of a thing, we make uſe of the word, only, we mean, there is no other of the ſame kind; when that of, alone, that, it is not accompanied with any other.

A child, that has neither brother or ſiſter, is, an only child. A perſon when by himſelf, is ſaid, to be alone.

That thing muſt be very rare, of which we can find only one. Nothing is more tireſome, than to be, always, alone.

281. Love, Gallantry.

As different as theſe words may appear, they have, nevertheleſs, been, and, are ſtill, frequently, uſed, as ſynonymous, when in⯑tended to imply courtſhip. It may not be then unneceſſary, to point out their pecu⯑liar ideas.

Love, is more ſanguine, than gallantry; having for its object, the perſon, whom we are ſtudious to pleaſe, through a view of poſſeſſing; and, whom we love as much, on her account, as our own: it takes poſſeſſion of the heart, ſuddenly, and, owes its birth, to a certain ſomething, which enchains the ſentiments, and, draws the eſteem, with⯑out any examination, or, information. Gallantry, is more ſenſual, than love; hav⯑ing for its object, the ſex; we enter into in⯑trigues, in hopes of enjoying it, and, love, [83]more on our own account, than on that, of our miſtreſs. It acts upon the ſenſes, much more than upon the heart, and, is more, owing to conſtitution, and, com⯑plexion, than, to the force of beauty.

The one, has a power of making thoſe perſons agreeable in our eyes, who ſtudy to pleaſe the object of our love, provided, they in no reſpect raiſe our jealouſy. The other, engages us to keep an eye upon all thoſe, who are capable, either, of forward⯑ing, or, hurting our deſigns; and, to watch them, as we would a rival, taking every advantage within our reach.

The firſt, leaves us not the liberty of choice; it commands in the beginning, as a maſter, and, reigns, afterwards, as a tyrant, till we are accuſtomed to its chains, by length of time; or, till they are broken by the efforts of powerful reaſon, or, the caprice of continued vexation. The ſecond, ſuffers, ſometimes, another paſſion to get before it; reaſon and inte⯑reſt, often, hold the bridle, and, make it give way to our ſituation, and, affairs.

Love, attaches us, ſolely, to one perſon, and, delivers up our heart, without reſerve, [84]ſo as to engage it, wholly, and, make every other object, of what beauty or merit ſo⯑ever, indifferent to us. Gallantry, rivets us, generally, to all perſons, who are either beautiful or agreeable, and, unites us to thoſe, who make the leaſt returns to our eagerneſs and deſire; in ſuch a manner, however, as leaves us no liking for others.

It appears to me, that love, delights in difficulties; ſo far from being weakened by obſtacles, they, generally, increaſe it; and, we make it one of our moſt ſerious engagements. As for gallantry, it baniſhes formality, is leſs accuſtomed to difficulty, and, is often entered into, merely, for amuſement. It is for this reaſon, we ob⯑ſerve more ſpirit of gallantry in men, than love: for, it is rare to find a firſt love, fol⯑lowed by a ſecond; and, I doubt, whether ever it can be ſaid, by a third: but, gal⯑lantries are, ſometimes, without number, and, ſucceed each other, till that age ar⯑rives, when their ſource is dried up.

There is, always, honeſty in love; but, it is troubleſome and capricious; we con⯑ſider it, now-a-days, as a diſtemper, or, as a weakneſs of mind. In gallantry, there [85]is a degree of knavery, but, it is free and good humoured; and, is become the taſte of the age.

Love, deſigns on the imagination, the flattering idea of eternal happineſs, in the entire and conſtant poſſeſſion of the object we love. Gallantry, fails not to paint there the agreeable image of a ſingular pleaſure, in the enjoyment of the object we purſue; but, neither the one, nor, the other, co⯑pies after nature; experience ſhewing us, that their colours, however agreeable, are, equally, deceitful. All the difference we find, is, that love, being more ſerious, the unfaithfulneſs of its pencil, gives greater offence; and, the recollection of the pain it has given, in ſeeing it ſo ill rewarded, creates our diſguſt; whereas, gallantry, be⯑ing more wanton, we are leſs ſenſible of the fallacy of its colouring, and, the vain notions we have of being arrived at the end of its deſigns, reconcile any diſappoint⯑ments, we may have met with.

In love, it is the heart, which, princi⯑pally, taſtes the pleaſure; the mind, making itſelf a ſlave, without any regard; and, the ſatisfaction of the ſenſes, contributing leſs [86]to the ſweet enjoyment, than a certain con⯑tentedneſs of ſoul, which produces the charming idea, of being in the poſſeſſion of what we love, and, receiving the moſt ſenſible proofs of a tender return. In gal⯑lantry, the heart, is leſs affected with the object; the mind, being more free, to in⯑dulge itſelf, and the ſenſes, more atten⯑tive to their own ſatisfaction, partake the pleaſure with greater equality; voluptuouſ⯑neſs, contributing more to its enjoyment, than the delicacy of ſentiments.

When we are too much tormented by the caprices of love, we endeavour to diſen⯑tangle ourſelves, and, become indifferent. When we are too fatigued by the exerciſes of gallantry, we take a reſolution to deſiſt, and, become ſober.

Exceſs makes love degenerate into jea⯑louſy; and, gallantry, into libertiniſm. In the firſt caſe, we are ſubject, to trouble of mind; in the ſecond, we are in danger, of deſtroying our health.

Upon the whole, love, is, generally, juſti⯑fiable; gallantry, always, blameable.

282. To Lower, Let down.

We make uſe of the word, lower, with reſpect to diminiſhing the height of things, or, to certain motions of a body; we lower a beam; we lower the ſails of a ſhip; we lower a building; we lower the eyes, the head. We uſe the expreſſion let down, with regard to things, made to cover others, and, which being lifted up, leave them uncovered; we let down the lid of a trunk; we let down the eyelids; we let down the lappets, or, the gown.

The contrary, of to lower, is to raiſe; that, of to let down, is, to lift up.

To lower, is in uſe, in the neuter ſenſe; to let down, is not.

Rivers lower in the ſummer. Tall perſons are obliged to lower their heads, when they paſs through ſmall door-ways. It is dan⯑gerous, to let ourſelves down, as advan⯑tages, are, frequently, taken of it. It is not [88]a prince's letting himſelf down, even to fa⯑miliarity, that acquires him the reputati⯑on of being good; but, the mildneſs and equity of his government.

283. Plant, Herb.

A Plant, is, any vegetable production ariſing from ſeed; but, ſeems confined to ſuch, as are not very large. Thus, ſaplings are the largeſt, that ſhould be called plants. Herbs, are thoſe plants, whoſe ſtalks are ſoft, and, have no woody ſubſtance in them, ſuch as, graſs, hemlock, &c.

The knowledge of plants, is both uſeful and entertaining. There are many medi⯑cinal qualities in herbs.

284. To Grow, Increaſe.

Things grow, by the nouriſhment, they receive; they increaſe, by the addition, that is made to them, of the ſame kind. Corn grows; the harveſt increaſes.

The better, we manure the land; the faſter, the trees grow; and, the more, our revenues increaſe.

The word, grow, ſignifies, only, the augmentation, independant of that, which occaſions it. The word, increaſe, gives us to underſtand, that, that augmentation is cauſed, by a freſh quantity which, caſually, joins it. Thus, to ſay, that, the river grows larger, is, to ſay, only, that, the water is riſen, without expreſſing, that, it is become ſo, by the arrival of an additional quantity of water: but, to ſay, that, the river is increaſed, is, to ſay, that, it is ſwelled, by [90]a freſh quantity of water. This diſtinction, is, extremely, delicate; it is for this reaſon, therefore, that we make uſe of the words, grow, and, increaſe, indifferently, on many occaſions, where that delicacy of choice, is of no great importance, as in the exam⯑ple I have mentioned; for, we may ſay, with equal propriety, that a river either grows larger, or, increaſes, although, each of theſe words, has its particular idea. But there are other occaſions, where, it is pro⯑per, and, ſometimes, even, neceſſary, to pay a regard to the peculiar idea, and, make ſome kind of choice between theſe terms, according to the ſtrength of mean⯑ing, we would give our thoughts: for ex⯑ample, when we would be underſtood to ſay, ſpeaking of the paſſions, that, they are in our nature, and, that the nouriſh⯑ment, we take to ſupport life, at the ſame time, gives ſtrength to them; the uſe of the word, grow, would be elegant. Other⯑wiſe, we might employ that of increaſe, with reſpect, either to the paſſions, or, the talents of the mind.

[91]The paſſions, in general, receive birth, and, grow, with the man; but, there are ſome, which exiſt, but, for a time, and which, after having increaſed, to a certain age, diminiſh, and, diſappear, with the powers of nature: there are others, which laſt the whole life, and, which are always increaſing, ſo as to be ſtronger in old age, than in youth.

Love, which forms itſelf in infancy, grows, with age. True courage, never brags; it increaſes, at the ſight of danger. Ambition grows, proportionably, as our wealth increaſes.

It is eaſy, to ſee, through all theſe ex⯑amples, that, one of theſe words will agree in ſome places, in which the other will not: for what perſon is ſo little delicate, in ex⯑preſſing himſelf, as, not to perceive, by his natural taſte, if not on reflexion, that, there is more propriety in ſaying, ambition grows, proportionably, as our wealth in⯑creaſes, than to ſay, ambition increaſes, pro⯑portionably, as our wealth grows. If it is not difficult to perceive this delicacy, it is, [92]to explain the reaſon of it: to do this, I muſt expreſs myſelf, a little metaphyſically, and, have recourſe to ſuch ideas, as may enable me to explain it: theſe ideas, however, ſhall be no other, than the proper ones. Since wealth conſiſts in many different things, which unite them⯑ſelves in the poſſeſſion of one ſingle perſon; the word, increaſe, which, as I have ſaid before, denotes the addition of a freſh quantity, agrees better with it, than, that of grow, which, preciſely marks the aug⯑mentation of one ſingle thing, cauſed by ſome ſort of nouriſhment. For this ſame reaſon, the word, grow, agrees beſt with ambition, it being a ſingle paſſion, to which wealth ſerves, as a kind of nutriment, to ſupport it, and, make it act, with more force and ardour.

Corporeal things grow, by an inward and mechanical addition, which is, in effect, their proper and real nutriment; they in⯑creaſe, by the bare outward addition of a freſh quantity of the ſame matter. Spi⯑ritual things grow, by a kind of nouriſh⯑ment, [93]conſidered in a figurative ſenſe; they increaſe, by the addition of degrees, they bear.

An egg does not begin to grow, in the ovaria, till it teems, that is, till fruitful⯑neſs, has made it fit, to receive nouriſh⯑ment; nor, does it leave the body, till its bulk is, ſufficiently, increaſed, to cauſe an alteration in the membrane, that en⯑cloſes it.

Our pride grows, in proportion, as we exalt ourſelves; and, increaſes, ſometimes, till we become contemptible in the eyes of the world.

285. To Riſe, Get up.

To change our poſture from recumbent, to erect; is the true meaning of the verb, to riſe; whereas, to get up, implies, rather, to climb: thus, we riſe, from the ground; we riſe, from our bed; we riſe, from our ſeat. We get up ſtairs; we get up a lad⯑der.

286. Copy, Model.

The ſenſe, in which theſe words are re⯑puted ſynonymous, does not, inſtantly, pre⯑ſent itſelf to the reader; the firſt glance of the eye, that ſhews us a copy, made after an original work, and a model, made as the original of a work, throws them, ſo far diſ⯑tant from each other, as, not to admit the leaſt ſimilitude; but, a ſecond reflection, will make us ſenſible, that cuſtom has uſed theſe two words, under one common idea, on many occaſions; and, that, to denote equally, the original, after which a work is made, and, the work, made after the original; copy, having been underſtood, as well as model, to mean the firſt work, by which we, form the ſecond: and, model, as [96]well as copy, the ſecond work, formed after the firſt. Thus, then, they have been con⯑ſidered, as, in a manner, doubly ſynony⯑mous; but, they have each their peculiar ideas, as follow.

In the firſt ſenſe, copy, ſhould be never uſed, but, with reſpect, to the manuſcript of an author, upon which the printer works. Model, may be uſed, on every other occa⯑ſion, as well, with reſpect to morality, as the arts.

A proof ſheet is not, often, very incor⯑rect, unleſs the copy is ſo. Bookſellers, who, often, refuſe to purchaſe excellent co⯑pies; frequently, buy bad ones, at too great a price. There is no perfect model of virtue. I ſhould imagine, that the arts and ſciences would gain more ground, if artiſts and authors would purſue more their own genius, than imitate the models, they meet with.

In the ſecond ſenſe, copy, is uſed, for painting; model, for relief. A copy, ought to be faithful; a model, juſt. The ſecond, of theſe words, ſeems to ſuppoſe, a greater reſemblance, than the firſt.

[97]Some copies, are ſo, extremely well per⯑formed, as, to be little inferior to the ori⯑ginals. Models of antiquity, are, frequent⯑ly, more expreſſive, than modern origi⯑nals.

287. Preciſion, Abſtraction.

The common idea of theſe two words, is, that of a ſeparation made, by the force of the mind, in the conſideration of ob⯑jects; but, difficult as it is, to find out their peculiar ideas, and, determine their reſpective characteriſtics, I have attempted it, in the beſt manner, I am able.

Preciſion, then, ſeparates things, diſtinct in themſelves, in order, to prevent the confuſion, which ariſes from a jumble of [98]ideas. Abſtraction, if I may uſe the expreſſion, ſeparates things, that are in themſelves inſeparable, in order, to conſider them apart, independent one of another. The firſt, is the effect of the juſtneſs, and, clearneſs of the underſtand⯑ing, which prevents our adding any thing, that is uſeleſs, or, foreign to the ſubject we treat of; conſequently, it will agree, in every circumſtance, either, with reſpect to affairs, or, ſciences. The ſecond, is the effort of a metaphyſical mind, which re⯑moves, from the point of view all, that we would detach from the ſubject; it in ſome reſpect mutilates, but, ſometimes, contributes to the diſcovery of truth, and, ſometimes, draws it into error. We may however uſe it, but, with care.

It appears to me, that preciſion, is, more applicable to things, which may not only be conſidered apart, but, may be con⯑ceived, to be one, without the other, ſuch as, for example, alms, and, charity; and, abſtraction, more particularly, to things, which may indeed be conſidered apart, but, which cannot be conceived to [99]be one, without the other, as, body, and, ſize. Thus, the deſign of preciſion, is, to prevent a wandering from the ſubject, re⯑moving, for that purpoſe, all, that is foreign to it; and, that of abſtraction, to obviate our entering into the utmoſt ex⯑tent of it, conſidering only one part, with⯑out any regard to the other.

There is no ſcience more certain, or, more clear than, that of geometry; it mak⯑ing very exact preciſions: There are, how⯑ever, certain metaphyſical abſtractions, blend⯑ed with it, which make geometricians fall into errors, equally, with others; not in⯑deed when ſize and quantity are in queſti⯑on, but, with reſpect to phyſics.

Our ideas cannot be too preciſe; but, it is, ſometimes, dangerous, to have them too abſtracted. The firſt, is the ſurer way of arriving at the truth, in ſcience, and, our aim, in affairs; whereas, the ſecond, often, puts us farther from both.

Preciſion is the gift of nature, receiving its birth with the mind; thoſe, who are endowed with it, are excellently qualified for converſation; we liſten to them with [100]pleaſure, becauſe they liſten to us, in re⯑turn: they underſtand what is ſaid to them, equally, as they make themſelves under⯑ſtood. Abſtraction, is the fruit of ſtudy, produced by profound application; thoſe, who are familiar with it, talk of common things, ſometimes, with too great refine⯑ment; ſimple, and, natural ſubjects, are in their converſation, very difficult to com⯑prehend, in the manner, they ſpeak of them.

Preciſe ideas, embelliſh common lan⯑guage, and, make it in my opinion, ſub⯑lime. Abſtracted ideas, are very tireſome, they ſeem to me, to be of little uſe, except, in the ſchools, or, in certain learned de⯑bates.

We expreſs by preciſe ideas, the moſt ſimple, and, moſt ſenſible truths; but, we cannot prove them otherwiſe, than, by ideas, very abſtracted.

288. Juſtneſs, Preciſion.

Juſtneſs, prevents our running into er⯑rors: preciſion, removes every thing, that is uſeleſs.

The preciſion of diſcourſe, is, a common mark of the juſtneſs, of the mind.

289. Aſtronomer, Aſtrologer.

The aſtronomer, is, thoroughly, acquaint⯑ed with the courſe, and, motion of the celeſ⯑tial bodies; the aſtrologer, reaſons upon their influence. The firſt, obſerves the ſtate of the heavens, marks the order of time, the eclipſes and revolutions which ariſe from laws, eſtabliſhed by the firſt ſpring of nature, in that immenſe number of ſpheres of which the univerſe conſiſts; and, hardly ever errs in his calculations. The ſecond, foretels events, caſts nativi⯑ties, prognoſticates rain, cold, heat, and, all the variations of the weather; but ſel⯑dom, if ever, calculates to any purpoſe. The one, explains what he knows, and, merits the eſteem of the learned; the [103]other, vends his imaginations, and, ſeeks the admiration of the vulgar.

We apply ourſelves to aſtronomy, through a deſire of knowledge. We dive into aſtrology, from diſquietude about events to come.

The generality of people, look upon aſtronomy, as a ſcience of mere curioſity, and, of little utility; not reflecting, that, its object, is the arrangement of ſeaſons, the regulation of time, and, the various motions of the heavenly bodies; all which, is of great ſervice to agriculture, to the proper ordering of every thing, in civil and political life, and, is the neceſſary ground⯑work of geography, and, the art of naviga⯑tion. But, when, on ſuch reflections, they come to know, that, without this ſcience, hiſtory and chronology would be nothing but confuſion, perpetually, contradicting each other, on account of the different manner, in which different nations regu⯑late their days and years; they would pay that reſpect to aſtronomy, and, its profeſſors, as their merit deſerves. Astrology, is, at preſent, much leſs in vogue, than it was, [104]formerly; either, becauſe men are grown leſs credulous; that, the love of truth, is more the taſte of the learned part of man⯑kind, than, the deſire of dazzling, or, im⯑poſing upon the world; or, becauſe the brilliancy of reputation, does not, in this age, depend, ſo much upon the number of fools we make, as, upon the approbation of the diſcerning, and, the wiſe.

290. Attachment, Paſſion, Devotion.

Although the word attachment, may, ſometimes, be uſed, with reſpect to things bad, in themſelves; it is, however, appli⯑ed, with more propriety, when an honeſt or moderate paſſion is in queſtion, than, either [105]of the two others. As, for example, we are attached, to our duty, to our friends, to our families, and, to virtuous women, whom we eſteem. That of paſſion, is more applicable with reſpect to things, leſs ap⯑proved, or, when they are carried to ex⯑ceſs; thus, men, are ſaid to have a paſſion for gaming, for women, &c. As to the word devotion, though I have ranked it here, as moſt agreeable to the other two ſubſtan⯑tives; the idea, it is ſuppoſed to convey, is beſt comprehended by the preterite of the verb, devote; the ſubſtantive devotion, being, very rarely uſed in this ſenſe: by it, then, is underſtood, an implicit obedi⯑ence, or, a perfect diſpoſition to conform in every thing. Thus, we ſay, a man is devoted to his prince, to his maſter, to his benefactor, to a lady, who has acquired an abſolute empire over him.

Attachment is ſtrong; paſſion, is violent; de⯑votion, has no reſerve.

The firſt, unites us, to what we love; the ſecond, to what we thirſt after; and, the third, makes us ſubmit, to the will of thoſe, we are deſirous of ſerving.

[106]The manners of the preſent age have baniſhed from the laws of friendſhip, all attachment, contrary to intereſt. We dare not confeſs a paſſion, for any thing, through fear of cenſure. We, often, obſerve that thoſe perſons, who devote themſelves to others, in expectation of future advantage, are, frequently, diſappointed.

Life, would not be agreeable, without ſome attachment. A paſſion, for any one thing, generally, gives as much pain, as pleaſure. It is difficult, to pleaſe the great, without devoting ourſelves, entirely, to their will.

291. In love, Lover.

It is ſufficient, to regard with paſſionate affection, in order, to be ſaid, with propri⯑ety, that, we are in love; but, we muſt teſtify that affection, in order, to be called a lover.

We become in love, with a woman, whoſe beauty affects the heart; we become her lover, by waiting on her.

Variety of tender ſentiments, crowd into the breaſt of a man, in love. Paſſionate airs, appear, with caution, in the behaviour of a lover.

We are, often, very much in love, with⯑out daring to appear a lover. We, fre⯑quently, declare ourſelves a lover, without ever being in love.

It is, always, the paſſion, that conſtitutes our being in love, of which, the poſſeſſion [108]of the object, is the only end we propoſe. Reaſon and intereſt may form the lover, of whom, an honeſt eſtabliſhment, or, ſome particular advantage, is the chief aim, or, tendency.

It is very, rare, to be in love, with two perſons at the ſame time; there is none, that I ever heard of, except, Phillis of Siro, who was ſo much in love, with two men, that ſhe could not give the preference, or, her company, to either one, or, the other: but, it is not, very, rare, to find a man, at the ſame time, the lover, of many miſ⯑treſſes; which, they continue to be, fre⯑quently, to the very hour of marriage. We may, alſo, be in love, with one perſon, and, the lover of another; I ſpeak of that caſe, where intereſt engages us to the one, whilſt, we ſigh in ſecret for her, whom it is not convenient for us, to marry.

Aſſiduity, finds opportunity to favour the deſigns of a man in love. Riches, give the lover, a great advantage over his rivals.

292. Abſent, Inattentive.

Theſe two words, equally, expreſs want of attention; but, with this difference, that, it is our own inward ideas, occupy⯑ing us, ſo fully, as to prevent our atten⯑tion, to any other thing that offers, which renders us abſent; whereas, 'tis ſome freſh outward object, attracting our attention, in ſuch a manner, as to turn it, from what, we at firſt gave it to, or, from what we ought to give it to, that makes us inatten⯑tive. When theſe faults are become habi⯑tual, they are very inconvenient in our commerce with the world.

We are abſent, when we think not of any preſent object, or, any thing, that is ſaid to us. We are inattentive, when we pay more regard to any other object, than, to that, which is propoſed to us, or, when [110]we liſten to any other converſation, than, to what is addreſſed to us.

Very ſtudious perſons, and, thoſe, who have great affairs upon their hands, or, are endued with ſtrong paſſions, are more apt to be abſent, than others; their internal ideas and deſigns quite engroſſing them. Young people are the moſt apt to be inat⯑tentive; a mere nothing, being ſufficient to amuſe and divert their attention.

Our abſence of mind, is owing to thoughtfulneſs; our inattention, to cu⯑rioſity.

The mind of an abſent man, is never where, he himſelf is; nothing round him, makes the leaſt impreſſion on him; he is, often, at Athens or Rome, in the midſt of London or Paris; and, frequently, muſes upon politics, or, geometry, while the con⯑verſation, perhaps, runs upon love, or, gal⯑lantry. The mind of an inattentive man, is, always, preſent with him; is caught by every thing, he either ſees or hears; he quits his attention to one thing, in order, that he may attend to another; liſtening to all that is ſaid, both on the right and [111]left; he, frequently, underſtands not tho⯑roughly, or, comprehends but in part, which makes him liable to take things, ſometimes, in a quite oppoſite ſenſe, to what they are meant.

The abſent man, cares little for conver⯑ſation; the inattentive man, loſes the fruit of it. When we are in company with the former, we had beſt give ourſelves up to ſilent meditation; when, with the latter, we had better wait for their attention, till every other object is out of their way.

A new paſſion, if ſtrong, ſeldom fails to render us abſent. We can ſcarce help being inattentive, when liſtening to a tire⯑ſome ſtory; or, when we hear, on the other ſide, ſomething more intereſting.

293. To Conduct, Guide, Lead.

The two firſt of theſe words, ſuppoſe a ſuperiority of light, which, the laſt, does not; but, on the other hand, the laſt, car⯑ries in its idea, a degree of credit and aſ⯑cendancy, entirely foreign, to the other two.

We conduct, and, guide thoſe, who know not the way; we lead thoſe, who cannot, or, care not to, go by themſelves.

In the literal ſenſe, it is, properly ſpeak⯑ing, the head, that conducts; the eye, that guides; and, the hand, that leads.

We conduct an affair. We guide a tra⯑veller. We lead an infant.

It requires underſtanding, to conduct, in buſineſs; politeneſs, ſhould be our guide, in all proceedings: Taſte, ſhould lead the way, in pleaſures.

[113]We are conducted, ſtep by ſtep, that we may do, exactly, what is neceſſary. We are guided, in roads, to prevent our loſing the way. We are lead, to the knowledge of people, in order, to procure their ac⯑quaintance.

Wiſe men do not conduct themſelves, by the light of others, ſo much as by their own. An attentive peruſal of the goſpel, is ſufficient to guide us, in the way of ſal⯑vation. It is great weakneſs, to ſuffer ourſelves to be lead, in all our actions, by the will of another; ſenſible perſons, will, indeed, conſult a friend in matters of doubt, but they make their determinati⯑ons themſelves.

294. To Fortify, Garriſon.

We fortify a town, in ſtrengthening it againſt attacks, by walls and works. We garriſon it, by placing ſoldiers in it, to de⯑fend it.

We are ſaid to fortify, ſtrongly; to gar⯑riſon, largely.

A town without a ſoldier, or, any one inhabitant, may be fortified, but, cannot be garriſoned.

Some fortified places, require a grea⯑ter number of men to garriſon them, than others.

295. Entire, Complete.

A thing is entire, when, it is neither mu⯑tilated, broken, or, divided, but when all its parts are together, as they ought to be. It is complete, when it wants nothing, but, has every thing, that is neceſſary.

The firſt, of theſe words, relates, more, to that totality of parts, which conſtitutes the whole of a thing; the ſecond, more, to that totality, which contributes to its acci⯑dental perfection.

Small families in the country, occupy entire houſes; but, in London, they have ſcarcely complete apartments.

296. Diſgraceful, Scandalous.

Both theſe words, expreſs the effect of thoſe actions, that hurt the reputation of thoſe who commit them; with this difference, that a diſgraceful action, is an obſtacle to glory, loſes us the eſteem, and, draws on us the contempt, of the honeſt; whereas, a ſcandalous action, is a ſhame⯑ful blot in our life, deſtroys our honour, and, draws on us the hatred of the juſt.

He, who has the folly, or, the misfor⯑tune to do any thing diſgraceful, ſhould be very careful, not to give himſelf any un⯑becoming airs. When we have been guilty of any thing ſcandalous, the beſt thing we can do, is to hide ourſelves, entirely, from the eyes of the world.

[117]Nothing is more diſgraceful to men, than meanneſs of ſpirit; nor, any thing more ſo to women, than gallantry carried to exceſs. Nothing is more ſcandalous, to all ſorts of people, than to be puniſhed, according to the ſentence of public juſtice.

297. Reſerved, Modeſt.

The advantage of theſe two qualities, is confined to the perſon who poſſeſſes them; they contribute to his perfection, and, are nothing to others, but, an object of ſpecu⯑lation, which merits their approbation; but, is, ſometimes, injurious to their ſatis⯑faction.

[118]We are reſerved, in our words and ac⯑tions. Taking too great a liberty, is the fault, in oppoſition; when that liberty is carried to exceſs, and, we are, in no reſ⯑pect, reſerved, it becomes impudence. We are modeſt in our deſires, in our geſtures, and, in our dreſs. There are three kinds of modeſty, thoſe, of the heart, the mind, and, the body; but, their oppoſite vices are not all expreſſed by the word, immodeſty, which denotes, only, that, which regards the body, proceeding from the indecency of geſtures and cloaths. That vanity, which we aſſume, in giving ourſelves bold and unbecoming airs, is the vice in oppoſition to modeſty of mind: that, which is contrary to modeſty of heart, is immoderate ambition, which makes us covet all that comes in our way, and, all that we can poſſibly attain.

Reſervedneſs, is good, at all times; but, it is, abſolutely, neceſſary, in public, and, in company with our ſuperiors; any li⯑berty, they may ſeem to wink at, giving ſome degree of offence: for, they reſerve to themſelves a certain title to reſpect, the [119]failure of which, they conſider, as an un⯑pardonable fault. Modeſty, is an ornament to perſons, who have ſome pretence for carrying their head higher than others; and to thoſe, who are poſſeſſed of ſome known and diſtinguiſhed merit; but, to all other perſons, it is an indiſpenſable virtue, and, a quality, without which, they cannot appear becoming, or, avoid ridicule.

298. Aſhamed, Baſhful.

It is the reproach of conſcience, that makes us aſhamed; but, the ſentiments of modeſty, that make us baſhful. Both one and the other, throw a colour into the face, but, when we are aſhamed, we redden; when baſhful, we bluſh.

We need never boaſt, or, be aſhamed of our birth; which is a mark, only, of pride; but, it is praiſe-worthy, in all ranks of people, both high and low, to be aſhamed of their faults. Although baſhfulneſs is a virtue; there are, nevertheleſs, occaſions, when it would paſs for weakneſs and ti⯑midity.

299. To Finiſh, Ceaſe, Leave off.

We finiſh, by putting the laſt hand to a work. We ceaſe, in quitting it, entirely. We leave off, in diſcontinuing.

To finiſh a diſcourſe, properly, we ſhould do it, juſt before it begins to grow tireſome. We ought to ceaſe from our purſuits, as ſoon as we diſcover them to be uſeleſs. We ſhould not leave off work, but, to refreſh ourſelves, that we may begin again, with freſh ſpi⯑rits, and, more vigour.

Man is born to trouble; he has no ſooner finiſhed one affair, than another ſuc⯑ceeds; he may indeed ſeek repoſe and tran⯑quillity, but, Providence will not permit him, in this life, to ceaſe from labour; and, if want of ſpirits, or, fatigue induces him, ſometimes, to leave off his work, it is not, for any length of time; he is, preſently, [122]obliged to return to his taſk, and, continue his employ.

That is, certainly, a good maxim, which ſays, we ſhould not begin a thing, which we cannot finiſh; but, that, in my opinion, is much better, which forbids our ceaſing from one work, in order, to begin another, without neceſſity obliges us. When our mind is employed, it is neceſſary, ſometimes, to leave off; not, at that time, when the ima⯑gination, full of fire, finds itſelf beſt capa⯑ble of its taſk; but, only, at the firſt inſ⯑tant, we perceive it flag; it being wrong, either, to ſtop it, in its career, or; attempt to drive it, when it ſtops.

Perſons, who never finiſh their ſtories, ceaſe talking, or, leave off; are as little fit for converſation, as thoſe, who never ſpeak a word.

300. To Invent, Find out.

We invent, new things, by the force of imagination. We find out, things, that are hidden or unknown, by examination and ſtudy. The one, denotes the fruitfulneſs of the mind; the other, the penetration.

It is the principle of mechanics, to invent tools and machines; of phyſics, to find out cauſes and effects.

The ventilator was invented, by Dr. Hales. Harvey, found out the circulation of the blood.

301. Joy, Gaiety.

Joy, is in the heart; gaiety, in the man⯑ners. The one, conſiſts, in the ſweet ſenti⯑ments of the ſoul; the other, in the agree⯑able ſituation of the mind.

It, ſometimes, happens, that the poſ⯑ſeſſion of a good, from which, we expected, a great deal of joy, gives us, a great deal of uneaſineſs. It is, often, owing, to a turn of imagination only, that the bittereſt tears, are ſucceeded, by the greateſt gaiety.

302. Project, Deſign.

A project, is, a plan, or, an arrangement of means, in order, to execute a deſign. The deſign, is, what we propoſe to execute.

We, commonly, ſay of projects, that, they are fine; of deſigns, that, they are great.

The beauty of projects, depends upon their order and magnificence. The grandeur of deſigns, riſes from the advantage and glory they may procure. We ſhould not ſuffer ourſelves, to be dazzled with the beauty of the one, or, the grandeur of the other; for practice does not, often, agree with ſpeculation; the admirable order of a ſyſ⯑tem, and, the advantageous idea, which we form from it, do not, always, prevent projects from running aground, or, put deſigns out of the poſſibility of failing.

[126]The experience of all ages, teaches us, that heads, fruitful in great deſigns, and, excellent projects, are, frequently, chimeri⯑cal.

The word project, is taken, alſo, for the thing we even propoſe to execute, as well, as that, of deſign. But though theſe words, conſidered in that ſenſe, are, more, nearly ſynonymous, we ſhall, nevertheleſs, find a difference, very conſpicuous to thoſe, who have any delicacy of taſte. The following, is ſuch, as I am able to diſcover.

It appears to me, that project, relates, to ſomething, more, diſtant; deſign, to ſomething, more, near. We make pro⯑jects, for the time to come; we form de⯑ſigns, for the time preſent. The firſt, is, more, vague; the other, more, deter⯑mined.

The project of an avaritious man, is, to enrich himſelf; his deſign, is, to amaſs money.

A good miniſter of ſtate, has no other project, than the glory of his prince, and, the happineſs of the ſubject. A good ge⯑neral, ſtudies as much to conceal his own deſigns, as, diſcover thoſe of his enemy.

[227]The union of all the ſtates of Europe, into one ſingle republic, for general go⯑vernment, and, the diſcuſſion of their parti⯑cular intereſts, without changing the inte⯑riour government, peculiar to each of them, was a noble project of Henry the IVth of France; but, perhaps, more difficult to execute, than the deſign of univerſal monar⯑chy, in which, Spain was at that time buſied.

303. To Oblige, Engage.

To oblige, implies, rather, ſomething of force; to engage, rather, ſomething, agreea⯑ble. Duty, and, neceſſity, oblige us; pro⯑miſes, and, good manners, engage us.

Convenience, often, obliges thoſe, who are abroad, in the world, to do things, they, very much, diſlike. complaiſance en⯑gages [128]thoſe, who are not, very, choice in their company, ſometimes, to enter upon bad actions.

304. Alſo, Likewiſe.

Alſo, relates more to number and quan⯑tity, its proper office is, to add, and, to augment.

Love is, not only, liberal, but, alſo, pro⯑digal.

Likewiſe, is uſed, with moſt propriety, when it relates to ſimilitude or com⯑pariſon; its particular office, is, to denote the conformity, and, equality of things.

When the body is ſick, the mind is ſo, likewiſe. Politeneſs is not, only, to be met with in London, but, likewiſe, in country places.

305. Upright, Up.

We are upright, when, we are neither crooked, or, ſtooping. We are up, when, upon our feet.

A graceful air, requires us to be upright. Reſpect makes us, ſometimes, hold our⯑ſelves up.

306. Flags, Colours.

By the word flags, we underſtand, en⯑ſigns, hoiſted upon the top of towers, caſtles, or, churches. The word colours, implies the jack, enſign, and, pendant of a ſhip; or, the ſtandard of a regiment.

[130]The arms of England, are generally, painted upon flags; the union, upon colours.

The firſt, for the moſt part, is uſed in the ſingular number; the ſecond, never. We ſay, the flag, of a fort; the colours, of a regiment. Engliſh flags, except thoſe, on which, the arms of the country are painted; are, com⯑monly, of one colour; ſuch as, white, blue, &c. But, colours, are of many.

Flags, are hung out, on days of public rejoicing; and, frequently, hoiſted, as ſig⯑nals. Great reſpect is, uſually, paid to the colours of a regiment, as military honour ſeems, there, to be, chiefly, centred.

307. Trench, Ditch.

A trench, is either a channel, made in lands, by digging out the earth, in order, to carry off the water; or, earth thrown up, in order, to defend ſoldiers, in their ap⯑proach to a town, or, to guard a camp. Ditch, is, a trench, cut in the ground, be⯑tween two fields, in order, to ſeperate them.

The earth, dug from trenches, that ſerve as drains, is, generally, ſpread, ſo as to leave no heap. The earth, dug from dit⯑ches, is, uſually, thrown up into a bank, on one ſide.

Trenches, are, commonly, regular. Dit⯑ches, are, often, irregular.

The largeneſs of a ditch, is determined, by the wideneſs of the trench.

308. Fine, Delicate.

To conceive things, that are fine, we need, only, ſufficient comprehenſion; but, it requires taſte, to conceive that, which is delicate. The firſt, is within the reach, of many perſons; the ſecond, but of few.

A fine diſcourſe is, ſometimes, uſefully, repeated to thoſe, who do not, at firſt, com⯑prehend it: but, he, who perceives not the delicate, at firſt glance, will never perceive it. We may ſeek, the one; but, muſt catch, the other.

The word, fine, is of more extenſive uſe; we apply it, equally, with reſpect to the ſtrokes, of ill-will, as to thoſe, of good. The application of the word, delicate, is more rare; it agrees not with any thing malicious, but, is uſed, with moſt propriety, with reſpect to things, in themſelves, flat⯑tering. Thus, we ſay, a fine ſatire; a delicate encomium.

319. Steadineſs, Conſtancy, Reſolution.

Steadineſs, prevents our varying, and, ſupports the heart againſt levity and curi⯑oſity, which, diverſity of objects may pro⯑duce: it riſes from preference, and, juſti⯑fies choice. Conſtancy, prevents, our chang⯑ing, and, furniſhes the heart with reſources againſt being diſguſted, or, tired with the ſame object: it reſults from perſeverance, and, gives a luſtre to attachment. Reſolu⯑tion, prevents our giving way, and, endues the heart with ſtrength, to reſiſt the at⯑tacks it meets with: it ſprings from reſiſ⯑tance, and, throws a brightneſs upon vic⯑tory.

Rakes, pride themſelves, more, in being fickle, than, in the ſteadineſs of their en⯑gagements. If the affections of the ladies, do not laſt, for ever; it is leſs owing to a [134]want of conſtancy, to the perſons they love; than, to a want of reſolution, in the object of their affections.

310. To Conceal, Diſſemble, Diſguiſe.

We conceal, by a profound ſecret, that, which we would not have known. We diſ⯑ſemble, by reſerve, that, which we would not have appear. We diſguiſe, by contrary ap⯑pearances, that, which we would not lay open to the penetration of others.

It requires care and attention, to conceal; art and cleverneſs, to diſſemble; labour and cunning, to diſguiſe.

He, who would conceal, throws, as it were, a veil, over himſelf, that, he may not betray himſelf, through indiſcretion. He, who would diſſemble, throws a veil, over the eyes of others, that, what he does, or, ſays, [135]may not fall within the reach of their know⯑ledge. He, who would diſguiſe, never opens himſelf, any otherwiſe, than, to elude.

Were we to enter into affairs of intereſt, or, policy, we ſhould, always, conceal our de⯑ſigns; often, diſſemble; and, ſometimes, diſguiſe them: with reſpect to matters, which concern the heart, we ſhould be more frank.

It is ſufficient, to conceal, from thoſe, who cannot ſee, without ſome additional light; we muſt diſſemble, with thoſe, who can ſee, without any ſuch acceſſary bright⯑neſs; but, it is neceſſary, to diſguiſe tho⯑roughly, from thoſe, who, not content to piece through the darkneſs that oppoſes, ex⯑amine into that light, with which, we would dazzle them.

When we have not reſolution, to cor⯑rect our faults, we ſhould, at leaſt, have wiſdom, to conceal them. That maxim of Louis the XIth of France, which ſays, in order, to know how to reign, we ſhould know how to diſſemble; is very juſt, even, with reſpect to domeſtic government. When the neceſſity of circumſtances, and [136]the nature of affairs, require us to diſguiſe, it is political; but, when urged to it, thro' an inclination to cheat or ſhuffle, it is kna⯑viſh.

311. To Adjuſt, Reconcile.

To adjuſt, ſuppoſes ſome diſpute, or, diſ⯑agreement. To reconcile, ſuppoſes, only, ſome diſtance, or, difference.

We adjuſt matters; we reconcile minds.

It ſeems impoſſible, to adjuſt the liber⯑ties of the Gallic church, with the preten⯑ſions of the court of Rome; ſooner or la⯑ter, one muſt neceſſarily deſtroy the other; for, it will, always, be difficult to reconcile the maxims of their parliaments, with the opi⯑nions of the conſiſtory.

We uſe the word, adjuſt, with reſpect to opinions, which oppoſe one another; and, [137]that of reconcile, with reſpect to paſſages, that ſeem to contradict each other.

Want of juſtneſs in the mind, is what, commonly, prevents ſchoolmen, from ad⯑juſting their diſputes. A preciſe knowledge of the value of every word, in all the dif⯑ferent circumſtances, wherein, they may be uſed, would go a great way, towards recon⯑ciling authors.

312. To Bring, Fetch.

To bring, implies, conveying a thing, ourſelves, from one place to another, in oppoſition to the verb, ſend. To fetch, implies, going to a place, in order, to bring.

He, who fetches a thing, is, always, ſuppoſed to bring it; but, he, who brings it, is not, always, ſuppoſed to fetch it. Thus, we cannot fetch, without bringing; but, we may bring, without fetching.

[138]If we ſend for a workman, in any branch of buſineſs, in order, to make, or, repair, he, naturally, brings his tools with him: ſhould he leave any behind, through for⯑getfulneſs, he is obliged to go back, and, fetch them.

313. To Swallow, Gulp.

In the literal ſenſe, theſe words are more nearly ſynonymous, than, in the figurative; yet, even in that, they will admit of ſome diſtinction. We gulp, in order to ſwallow. This, however, is not the only difference. By ſwallowing, we underſtand, taking down the throat, ſimply; by gulping, we mean, ſucking down, eagerly, or, without intermiſſion.

With reſpect to eating, ſwallowing, carries in its idea, the act of chewing; gulping, does not.

[139]The glutton, will gulp down, a greater quantity of food, in five minutes; than a moderate eater, would ſwallow, in half an hour.

In the figurative ſenſe, gulping, rather, implies, a difficulty of ſwallowing.

We are all too apt to ſwallow flattery; and, as fulſome as it may poſſibly be, there are ſome vain perſons, that will make a ſhift to gulp it down.

314. Detraction, Defamation.

Injuring the reputation, is the general idea of theſe two words; but, that of de⯑traction, implies, the taking off from a man's good name; defamation, the giving him a bad one. Were we to be ſilent, when aſked the character of a worthy man, [140]it would be detraction. Were we to vilify him, by declaring him guilty of infamous practices; it would be defamation.

Defamation, is puniſhable by human laws; detraction, is not.

The one, is an open and ſcurrilous way of injuring the reputation; the other, a cloſe and demure one.

There are thoſe, accuſtomed to detraction, who would fly the thoughts of defamation; little imagining, that both are, equally, bad; being, two different means, only, working to the ſame end.

315. Meager, Lean.

In that ſenſe; in which theſe two words, are reputed ſynonymous; meager, ſignifies, want of fleſh; lean, want of fat.

Meagerneſs, ſuppoſes, a waſte of body, owing, either, to a bad conſtitution, or, a ſcarcity of food. Leanneſs, ſuppoſes, no want of fleſh, being oppoſed, only, to cor⯑pulency, or, fatneſs.

A man may be lean, yet, not meager.

The lean, are, uſually, ſtrong; the mea⯑ger, commonly, weak.

The firſt, is, generally, a mark of beg⯑gary; the ſecond, frequently, denotes, the perſon accuſtomed to labour.

Activity attends the lean; Indolence, the meager. Many perſons, if poſſible, would chooſe to be lean; but, none, would care to be meager.

316. Sailor, Seaman, Mariner.

Theſe words denote perſons, who live by the ſea, or, practiſe navigation; but, ſai⯑lor, in my opinion, is uſed, with moſt propriety, with reſpect to the common men, or, in the ſea phraſe, thoſe, before the maſt. Seaman, agrees beſt, with re⯑gard to the ſuperior claſs of the ſhip's company, ſuch as, the officers, boatſwain, gunner, &c. Mariner, relates, more, to choſe, who gain their livelihood at ſea, but, who are, generally, their own maſters; as fiſhermen.

Sailors, are ignorant of navigation, and, are they, who work the veſſel, by the direction of others; ſeamen, are ſuppoſed, to un⯑derſtand it; and, are they, who, general⯑ly, direct it: mariners, are ſuppoſed, to have [143]no greater knowledge of the art, than ſuch, as is ſufficient to ſerve their purpoſe; working their veſſels, themſelves.

Both ſailors, and, ſeamen, take long voya⯑ges; whereas, mariners, do little elſe, than coaſt.

We ſay, an able ſailor; an expert ſea⯑man; a bold mariner.

The great hardſhips the poor ſailors un⯑dergo, one would imagine ſhould be ſuffi⯑cient, to endear them to their country. It is not every captain of a ſhip, that is a good ſeaman. Mariners, earn their bread very hard; they, not only, being obliged to work more than other men, but, are in dai⯑ly danger of their lives.

317. Grot, Grotto.

Though theſe words are, evidently, one and the ſame, grot, being no more, than, an abbreviation of grotto; yet, cuſtom has made them expreſſive of different ideas.

Grot, then, ſeems to denote ſomething, more natural; grotto, ſomething, more arti⯑ficial.

The firſt, is, in effect, the work of na⯑ture; the ſecond, the work of art.

The one, implies, a cool cave, appro⯑priated to pleaſure, ſtony, rough, irre⯑gular, and, overgrown with moſs; the o⯑other, a pleaſurable cave, or, room, orna⯑mented with ſhell-work.

We ſay, a pretty grot; a beautiful grot⯑to. It is, as much out of the power of the moſt ingenious artiſt, to make a grotto, a⯑ny thing equal to a grot; as it is, for art, to rival nature.

318. Cave. Cell.

The ſenſe, in which, theſe words are eſ⯑teemed ſynonymous, is that, of the retired dwelling of ſome religious perſon.

Cave, is, a habitation under ground, made, either, by art or nature. Cell, is, ſome little dwelling, raiſed above ground.

We dig a cave. We build a cell.

Hermits, or, ſuch perſons, as chuſe to ſeclude themſelves from the world, bury themſelves in caves, they may chance to meet with; or, wear out their lives in cells, remote from public view.

319. Broad, Wide.

By broad, is underſtood, extended each way; as broad-cloth; a broad-brimmed hat. By wide, is meant, broad, to a certain degree; as three inches wide; four feet wide.

Broad, ſeems to be confined to things of leſs extent; wide, to thoſe of greater. Thus, we ſay, a broad bean; a broad face; a broad back; a broad apron; a broad table-cloth; but, a wide room; a wide ditch; a wide field; the wide ocean.

320. School, Academy.

School, implies, a place, of diſcipline and inſtruction; academy, a place, where the ſciences are taught.

School ſeems appropriated to the teaching of children; academy, to that of youth.

In ſchools, are taught, languages, wri⯑ting, muſic, dancing, &c.; in academies, natural and experimental philoſophy, geo⯑graphy, geometry, aſtronomy, ethics, rhetoric, &c.

Schools, begin the education; academies, finiſh it.

Children, who learn to read, with a tone, at ſchool, ſeldom get the better of it, even, when they are grown up. Academies, are the nurſeries of learned men.

321. Bleſſing, Benediction.

Benediction, appears to me, to be limited, to the decretory pronounciation of happi⯑neſs. Bleſſing, is a more general expreſſion, intimating, the various means of happineſs.

Religious men, find as much comfort, in the benediction of the church; as others ex⯑perience, in the bleſſings of life.

Bleſſing, ſeems to intimate, divine favour; benediction that, which is human.

We ſay, the bleſſing of God; the bene⯑diction of the prieſt.

Heaven ſhowers down its bleſſings upon the virtuous. The benediction of a good man, is a very deſirable thing.

322. Ambaſſador, Reſident.

The general idea of theſe words, is, that of a miniſter, repreſenting the perſon of his ſovereign, ſent from one court to another; but, ambaſſador, ſeems to be ſuperior to that of reſident.

The firſt, are, generally, men of greater rank; the ſecond, of leſs.

Ambaſſadors, are not ſuppoſed, to ſtay long at the court, to which they are ſent; their office being, to tranſact ſome ſtate affairs between the two powers. Reſidents, are ſuppoſed, to reſide, for ſome conſidera⯑ble time, as a teſtimony of the good harmo⯑ny between the two ſtates.

The Earl of Northampton, was ſent from London, ambaſſador, to Venice, in the year, 1764, during the time that Mr. Murray was there, as reſident.

323. Dregs, Sediment.

Dregs, are groſs; a ſediment, is fine.

After the dregs are taken away, there will, frequently, remain a ſediment.

We ſay, the dregs of wine; the dregs of melted tallow; but, the ſediment of water; the ſediment of urine.

324. Lofty, High.

Lofty, ſeems to carry with it an idea of magnificence, which high, does not. Thus, we ſay, a lofty room; the lofty cedar; but, a high houſe; a high tree.

With reſpect to other things, 'tis the ſame. Thus, it is in the power, only, of a ſevere fit of ſickneſs, or, a heavy ſtroke of adverſity, to lower the high looks of the great, and, the lofty imaginations of the proud.

325. Betwixt, Between.

If any two words, in the Engliſh lan⯑guage, may be ſaid to carry the ſame mean⯑ing, theſe, in ſome reſpect, may. As a ſtudied delicacy, here, is not, immediately, eſſential, cuſtom has made no other diſtincti⯑on, than, that, of uſing the word, between, on every occaſion, as, being ſofter on the tongue; and, almoſt baniſhing the uſe of the word, betwixt, as, being much harſh⯑er: but, as I deviate, from the common opi⯑on, and, think, there is no word ſo trivial, but the choice of it, on particular occaſions, may be neceſſary; I hope, I may not be condemned, as too nice, with reſpect to the word before us.

Betwixt, then, appears to me, to be uſed, with moſt propriety, when that, which is [149]in the middle, is, as it were, embraced by the other two; between, when that, which is in the middle, is at ſome diſtance, from the other two. Thus, to ſpeak properly, with reſpect to a houſe, ſtanding in a row, we ſhould uſe the word, betwixt; as, for example, the houſe, I dwell in, ſtands be⯑twixt two high houſes: but, with reſpect to a tree, ſtanding in a line with others, we ſhould uſe the word, between; as, for in⯑ſtance, the oak tree, I mentioned, ſtands between two elms.

326. Middle, Midſt.

A thing is, in the middle, when it ſtands at an equal diſtance from the two extremes; it is, in the midſt, when it ſtands, in the cen⯑ter of a great many.

Thus, we ſay, in the middle of a pond; in the midſt of a crowd.

There cannot be a more tormenting ſi⯑tuation, than to hang in the middle between hope and fear. Providence, ſometimes, has taken a man out, from the midſt of miſ⯑fortunes, when he has ſeen no viſible way of eſcaping.

327. Marſhy, Boggy.

Marſhy lands, are thoſe, that lie low, and, are watry; boggy lands, are thoſe, where there are many quagmires.

In walking over the firſt, we ſink not deeper than our ankles. In paſſing over the ſecond, we may, entirely, be loſt.

Marſhy lands, frequently, produce fine meadows; boggy lands, are, wholly, uſe⯑leſs.

328. Rough, Rugged.

Roughneſs, is a ſmall degree of rugged⯑neſs; ruggedneſs, a great degree of rough⯑neſs.

Smooth, is the reverſe of rough; level, the reverſe of rugged.

We ſay, a rough hand; a rugged road.

329. Ray, Beam.

A beam, ſeems to me, to be more pow⯑erful than a ray, caſting a greater degree of light, and, heat.

We ſay, rays of light; beams of the ſun; by the firſt of which expreſſions, we mean, that, thoſe are rays, which ſhine, early, in the morning; by the ſecond, that, thoſe are beams, which gleam at noon.

We, frequently, apply the epithet chear⯑ful, to the word, ray; that of ſcorching, to the word, beam.

The rays of the ſun, being ſeparated by a priſm, is the original of colours. The beams of the fun, collected into one point, by means of a convex lens, will ſet fire to any thing they touch.

330. Clergyman, Parſon.

There are three ranks of clergymen, be⯑low that of a dignitary, viz. parſon, vicar, and, curate. Parſon, is the firſt, meaning, a rector, or, he, who receives the great tythes of a benefice. By the word, par⯑ſon, then, is implied, one of a particular claſs of clergy; whereas, by the word, cler⯑gyman, is underſtood, any perſon, ordained to ſerve at the altar.

Parſons, are, always, prieſts; many cler⯑gymen, are, only, deacons.

Every biſhop, dean, &c. is a clergyman; tho' not, always, a parſon.

[155]As the general and indiſcriminate uſe of theſe two words, has rendered it neceſſary, I have pointed out the diſtinction, that ſhould be made between them; but, am of of opinion, as cuſtom has thrown into the word, parſon, an idea of contempt, it would be better, not to uſe it at all; but, when we have occaſion to point out one, of that claſs of clergymen, who enjoy the great tythes of a living, to ſubſtitute in its room, that, of rector.

331. Suffocated, Smothered, Choaked.

Death, brought on, by a ſtoppage of breath, is the general idea of theſe three words; but, that of ſuffocated, implies, an ex⯑tinction of life occaſioned by being in a place where we cannot breathe; that of ſmothered, by being in a place, where we are not ſuffered to breathe; that of choaked, by having the wind-pipe cloſed.

Thus, men are, frequently, ſuffocated by ſmoke. Perſons, raving mad, when in curable, are, ſometimes, ſmothered, between two fea⯑ther beds. Malefactors, when hanged, are choaked.

It has happened, that travellers, by fal⯑ling into bogs, have been, ſometimes, ſuf⯑focated, [157]before aſſiſtance could be had. Children, are, frequently, ſmothered, in bed, thro' the careleſneſs of nurſes. Perſons are often, choaked, by eating too greedily.

The words, ſmother, and, choak, are, often, uſed in a figurative ſenſe; the word, ſuffocate, never.

We ſmother a flame. We choak a paſſage.

It is an act of charity, to ſmother the failings of another. When intereſt is pre⯑dominant, it is ſure to choak up all the ave⯑nues to the heart, which, would, otherwiſe be open to the cries of diſtreſs.

332. Cloak-bag, Portmanteau, Trunk.

Theſe are machines for carrying cloaths on a journey. Cloak-bags, are made of lea⯑ther, contrived to be laid upon the back of a horſe; portmanteaus, and, trunks, are of wood, generally, covered with hair, and, made to be carried before, or, behind a car⯑riage; with this difference between them, that, portmanteaus, are long, and, their lids round; whereas, trunks are made ſquare, every way.

333. Rule, Order.

Rule, reſpects, properly, thoſe things that ought to be done; order, the manner, in which they ſhould be done. In the idea of the firſt, there ſeems to be ſomething, ariſing more, from natural right; in the idea of the ſecond, ſomething, reſulting more, from poſitive right.

Equity and charity ought to be the two grand rules of our conduct; they may, even, deviate from all kind of order.

We ſubmit to rule. We conform to or⯑der. Although the firſt, is much more in⯑diſpenſable, it is, yet, much more broke through; the particularity of order, mak⯑ing a greater impreſſion on us, than, the ad⯑vantage of rule.

334. Regular, Methodical.

We are regular, in our conduct. We are methodical, with reſpect to our af⯑fairs.

A regular man, is careful of his reputa⯑tion; he runs into no exceſs. A methodi⯑cal man, takes care of his time; he gives no way to diſſipation.

With reſpect to expences; we are regu⯑lar, in relation to, the bounds we ſet to them; methodical, with regard to, the manner of them.

Regular perſons, are always, admired; methodical perſons, are, frequently, laughed at.

335. To be ſorry for, Regret.

We are ſorry for the misfortunes of ano⯑ther; we regret his abſence. The one, is the effect of pity; the other, of attach⯑ment.

Grief, occaſions our ſorrow: repentance, excites our regret.

A court favourite, in proſperity, is the object of envy; but, when he falls into diſgrace, no one is ſorry for him. Thoſe princes, who are moſt commended, du⯑ring their life, are not, always, moſt regret⯑ted, after their death.

The expreſſion, ſorry for, when uſed, with reſpect to ourſelves, in ſome meaſure, changes its ſignification. Retaining the common and general idea of ſenſibility, it [162]ceaſes to expreſs that particular motive of pity, that makes us ſympathiſe, inwardly, for the diſtreſſes of others; and, in its room, marks, only, a certain uneaſineſs, which diſcovers itſelf, outwardly. When we are ſorry for the misfortunes of others, we are, often, inwardly touched, and, per⯑haps, no outward ſign of it ſhall appear: when we are ſorry for our own; we ſhew it, outwardly, in order, to draw the compaſſi⯑on of others. This expreſſion is, ſome⯑times, uſed, in another ſenſe, beſides that, mentioned; inſtead of motives of pity, it denotes, motives of repentance: In this ſenſe, we ſay, he is ſorry for the ſteps he has taken.

As much taken up, as we may be, with ourſelves, there are eertain moments, when we are ſorry for the diſtreſſes of o⯑thers. However philoſophical we may pretend to be, it is extremely difficult, to ſuffer, a long time together, without ſhewing ſome ſigns of ſorrow. Mercenary people, are ſorry for every ſtep they take, that does not turn out to advantage. We often, [163]ſeem to regret the abſent, in order, to affront the perſon preſent.

A hard heart, is ſorry for no one. An in⯑ſenſible man, is never ſorry for any thing, that happens to him. A miſerly perſon, regrets every morſel he eats.

We ſhould never be ſorry for a man, who ſuffers deſervedly; for ourſelves, when we can procure no kind of comfort; nor, for any trouble we take, when prudence enjoins it. we ſhould not regret the departure of a friend, when his abſence, will turn out to his advantage.

336. Rivulet, Brook, Stream.

Rivulets, and, brooks are certain ſpecies of ſtreams, which are running waters; with this difference, that a rivulet, runs between banks; whereas, a brook, winds its way, through the meadows, or, by a hedge ſide.

A rivulet, is, a much larger ſtream, than, a brook.

Fiſh are found in rivulets; but, never in what we, properly, call, brooks there not being ſufficient depth of water.

We ſay, the rapid ſtream; the clear ri⯑vulet; the gurgling brook.

Heavy rains will ſwell a ſtream, in ſuch a manner, as to overflow the neighbouring grounds. Poets are, very, luxurious, in their deſcription of rivulets, and, brooks.

337. Stream, Current.

A ſtream, iſſues from a head, and, moves forward, with a continuity of parts. A cur⯑rent, is a certain progreſſive motion of ſome fluid body. Theſe words, in the literal ſenſe, are applied to water. Thus, we ſay, the stream of a river; the current of a ſea.

Streams, are, frequently, rapid; currents, are, ſeldom ſo.

In the figurative ſenſe, theſe words, convey the ſame ideas. Thus, we ſay, a ſtream of light; a current of air.

338. To Swear, Make eath of.

Cuſtom has made the word, ſwear, to ſignify, the profane and illegal uſe of the ſacred name, in common converſation; whereas, by the phraſe, make oath of, is un⯑derſtood, the divine name, uſed ſolemnly, on legal occaſions, in confirmation of the truth.

In courts of judicature, we are required to make oath of every thing we have to ſay. He, who ſwears, upon every occaſion, gives us to underſtand, that his bare word is not to be credited.

339. Pleaſing, Agreeable.

It is the air and behaviour, that renders pleaſing; good ſenſe and good humour, that renders agreeable.

We love, the company of a pleaſing man; becauſe he charms. We covet, the com⯑pany of an agreeable man; becauſe he di⯑verts.

Well-bred perſons, are, always, pleaſing. Merry perſons, are, commonly, agreeable.

How difficult is it, to avoid being at⯑tached to one, of a pleaſing addreſs, and, a⯑greeable coverſation!

It appears to me, that it is, more, the behaviour, than the air, that makes the men pleaſing; and, that, it is, rather, the air, than the behaviour, that makes the wo⯑men, ſo. It ſeems to me, alſo, that, it is, rather, good ſenſe, and, a livelineſs in [168]converſation, that conſtitutes agreeableneſs, in the men; and, that, it is an even tem⯑per, and, a merry diſpoſition, that eſta⯑bliſhes that quality, in the women.

When theſe words are uſed, otherwiſe, than to denote perſonal qualities, that of plea⯑ſing, properly ſpeaking, implies, ſomething, which flatters the ſenſe, or, ſelf-love; that, of agreeable, ſomething, which agrees with the taſte, and, the mind.

It is pleaſing, to have, always, deſireable objects before us. Nothing is more agree⯑able, to a joyous man, than good company.

It is, ſometimes, dangerous, to approach that, which is pleaſing to the ſight; and, it may happen, that, what is very agreeable, may be very prejudicial.

340. Graces, Charms.

Graces, reſult from natural politeneſs, accompanied with a noble freedom; it is a varniſh, that appears in our converſation, our actions, and, our carriage; making us pleaſe in every thing we do. Charms, riſe from an aſſemblage of fine touches, ani⯑mated by good-humour, and, good-ſenſe; and, are, ſometimes, far ſuperior to what is, perfectly, agreeable.

The body, ſeems to be more ſuſceptible of graces; the mind, of charms. We ſay, of a lady, that ſhe walks, dances, and, ſings with grace; and, that her converſa⯑tion is full of charms.

What can a man deſire more, in a lady, than, an outward union, of graces, and, [170] charms; and, an inward compoſition, of ſolidity, in her diſpoſition, and, delicacy, in her ſentiments.

341. Ready, Eaſy.

Both the one, and, the other of theſe words denote that, which is done without difficulty; but, the firſt, excludes diffi⯑culty, which ariſes from obſtacles and op⯑poſitions; the ſecond, that which ſprings from the very nature of the thing. Thus, we ſay a ready entrance, when no one ſtops the paſſage; an eaſy entrance, when the paſſage is large and commodious. For the ſame reaſon, we ſay, of a woman, without reſerve; that, ſhe is ready of ac⯑ceſs: [171]and, of a ſhoe, that does not pinch; that, it is eaſy.

It appears to me, beſt, to uſe the word, ready, in naming the action; and, that of eaſy, in expreſſing the event, of that action. Thus, ſpeaking of a commodious harbour, I ſhould ſay, we have there, a ready land⯑ing; and, that it is eaſy, to land there.

Of theſe two adjectives, there are form⯑ed, two adverbs, eaſily, and, readily. Which, beſides the difference of ideas, remarked in their originals, have one peculiar to themſelves; which, I ſhould not, here, omit taking notice of. In ſpeaking, then, of a ſenſible perſon, I ſhould, rather, ſay, he comprehends eaſily, and, pardons rea⯑dily; than, that he comprehends readily, and, pardons eaſily. This choice of words, I muſt confeſs, is delicate; but, as I, can perceive the neceſſity of it, why ſhould not another, do the ſame?

342. Flat, Inſipid.

That, which is flat, does not pierce the taſte; that, which is inſipid, does not touch it, in the leaſt. Thus, the laſt, riſes upon the firſt; the one, wanting, only, a degree of ſeaſoning; the other, wanting it, en⯑tirely.

In works of the mind, they are both very far from pleaſant: but, the flat, ap⯑pearing to affect the graces; diſpleaſes: the inſipid, appearing to have no know⯑ledge; tires.

In relation to the beauty of the ſex, I do not think the word, inſipid, ſhould be uſed, but with reſpect to thoſe, who are of a diſpoſition, wholly, inſenſible: but, we ſay, beauty is flat, when it is not animated, and, [173]when it has neither the charms of vivacity, nor thoſe of ſoftneſs.

343. To Keep, Detain.

We keep, what we intend not to part with. We detain, what we propoſe not to reſtore.

We keep that, which is our own. We detain, that, which is another's.

The miſer, keeps his money. The debtor, detains the property of his creditors.

The honeſt man, finds a difficulty, in keeping what he poſſeſſes; when the rogue, finds none, in detaining what he has taken.

344. Complicated, Involved.

Affairs, or, actions are complicated, one with another, by their mixture and mutual dependance. Perſons are involved in ac⯑tions, or, in affairs, when they are far im⯑merged in them.

Things, extremely complicated, become obſcure to thoſe, who have not ſufficient underſtanding or diſcernment, to unfold them. If we are, often, in company with raſh people, we are liable to be involved in diſagreeable matters.

The moſt complicated affairs, become ſimple, and, eaſy to be underſtood, in the mouth, or, in the writings of an able ad⯑vocate. It is dangerous to be involved, even innocently, in the crimes of the great; as, at thoſe time we are, always, the [175]dupe, and, are ſure to be ſacrificed to their intereſts.

Complicated, has a ſubſtantive, in general uſe; involved has not; but, in return, that, has a verb, in general uſe, which, the other has not. We hear, frequently, of com⯑plication; ſeldom, of involution; ſo again, we meet, frequently, with the verb, to in⯑volve; ſeldom, with that, of to complicate.

Nothing embarraſſes phyſicians more, than a complication of diſorders, of which, the remedy of one, ſhall oppoſe the cure of another. It is very diſagreeable to have ſuch acquaintance, as involve us, always, in their own faults.

345. For, As to.

However ſynonymous theſe may be, for, ſeems to me, to agree beſt when, ſpeaking of a perſon or thing which governs the following verb: As to, appears to me, to be uſed, with moſt propriety, when, ſpeaking of that, which is governed by the verb. I ſhould ſay, then, for my part, I will not interfere in ſuch matters, as do not concern me; as to me, all things are indifferent.

The religion, of the underſtanding part of mankind, conſiſts in a lively faith, a pure morality, and, in a ſimple conduct, guided by divine authority, and, ſupport⯑ed by reaſon. For that, of the people in general, it conſiſts in a blind credulity, and, in exterior practices, authoriſed by education, and, corroborated by the force [177]of cuſtom. As to that, of thoſe, belong⯑ing to the church, we can determine nothing concerning it, unleſs we could de⯑tach them from their temporal intereſts.

346. Trade, Buſineſs, Profeſſion.

In the ſenſe, in which theſe words are eſteemed ſynonymous, that of trade, im⯑plies, a manual occupation; that of buſineſs, ſuch an occupation, as conſiſts, only, in buy⯑ing and ſelling; that of profeſſion, ſuch, as reſults from the lucrative uſe of the ſciences. Thus, the occupations of a carpenter, taylor, baker, &c. are trades; thoſe of a linnen-draper, mercer, haberdaſher, &c. are buſineſſes; thoſe of a phyſician, coun⯑ſellor, muſician, &c. are profeſſions.

[178]In point of rank, profeſſions take place of buſineſſes; buſineſſes, of trades.

347. Divination, Prediction.

Divination, brings hidden things to light; prediction, fortells what will come to paſs.

The firſt, regards things preſent and paſt. The objects of the ſecond, are things to come.

A learned and diſcerning man, one, who knows what relation, the leaſt outward ſigns, bear to the motions of the ſoul, rea⯑dily, paſſes with the world, as well-ſkilled in divination. A wiſe man, one, who ſees what will be the conſequences of certain principles, and, the effects of certain cauſes, may paſs with the people, as hav⯑ing the knowledge of prediction.

348. To Reprove, Reprimand.

He who reproves another, points out his fault, and, blames him. He who re⯑primands, pretends to puniſh, and, morti⯑fies the offender.

We reprove a friend. We reprimand a child.

Reprove, is ſeldom uſed, but, with re⯑ſpect to the faults of the mind; repri⯑mand, with regard to the manners and con⯑duct.

We, ſometimes, reprove one, who knows better, than ourſelves. No one has a right to reprimand, but ſuperiors.

349. Auſtere, Severe.

We are auſtere, by our manner of liv⯑ing; ſevere, by our manner of thinking.

Softneſs, is the reverſe of austerity; it is rare to paſs, immediately, from one to the other; a common, regular way of life, is the medium, between the two. Re⯑miſſneſs, and, ſeverity, are the two ex⯑tremes, in one of which, we are ſure to fall; few perſons being able to diſtinguiſh the true medium, which conſiſts, in an exact and preciſe knowledge of the law.

We are auſtere, only, with reſpect to ourſelves; but, we may be ſevere, as well with reſpect to others, as ourſelves.

Enthuſiaſts give themſelves up to the exerciſes of auſterity; this was, alſo, once, the cuſtom of recluſes. Some caſuiſts af⯑fect to diſtinguiſh themſelves by a ſevere [181]morality; extending it, even, 'till it loſes ſight of every degree of reaſon.

An austere life, conſiſts in the privation of pleaſures and conveniences; we, ſome⯑times, embrace it through a taſte of ſingu⯑larity, and, would fain have it thought to proceed from a principle of religion. Mo⯑rals, too ſevere, may equally, with morals too remiſs, wound the regularity of man⯑ners.

350. Tempeſt, Storm.

By tempeſt, is underſtood, the utmoſt vio⯑lence of the wind; by ſtorm, a commotion of the elements.

Tempeſts, are more dreadful at ſea, than ſtorms.

We uſe the word ſtorm, to denote any violence of weather; but, then, in order, to determine what weather we mean, [182]we are under a neceſſity of adding ſuch other words to it, as ſhall expreſs the idea, we want to convey. Thus, we ſay, a ſtorm of wind; a storm of hail, &c. but, the word tempeſt, is underſtood to be, neither more or leſs, than, as was ſaid before, the ut⯑moſt violence of the wind: ſhould this exceſs of wind, be atttended with rain, thunder and lightning, it, then, becomes a ſtorm.

We, may, ſay, with propriety, a great ſtorm; but a great tempeſt, would be ab⯑ſurd.

Words cannot deſcribe the diſtreſſes of ſeamen, when out, in tempeſtuous weather. Stormy weather, is, generally, ſucceeded by ſerene.

351. To Appear, Seem.

I know not how much I may differ from the reſt of my countrymen; but, the verb, appear, in my opinion, relates, more, to the eye; ſeem, more, to the imagination.

An object, always, appears leſs, the far⯑ther it is off. Many things ſeem practica⯑ble, which cannot be carried into execu⯑tion.

352. Fast, Hard.

The ſenſe, in which theſe words are ac⯑counted ſynonymous, is that of quick mo⯑tion; but, faſt, denotes quickneſs, without force; hard, quickneſs, with violence. Thus, to run, ride, or, rain faſt, implies a quicker motion, than common; but, to run, ride, or, rain hard, ſome degree of force or violence.

With reſpect to work, faſt, means expe⯑ditiouſly; hard, laboriouſly. Thus, he, who works faſt, will ſoon have done. He, who works hard, will ſoon be weary.

353. Clock, Dial.

Theſe are both time-pieces, with this difference, that the clock ſtrikes; the dial, does not. 'Tis, for this reaſon, we call that plate, which determines time, by a ſhadow, in the ſun, a ſun-dial.

The clock, tells, the hour; the dial, ſhews, it.

Dials, were long in uſe, before the in⯑vention of clocks.

354. Every, All.

Though the word, every, is, more fre⯑quently, made uſe of, by itſelf; it is, ſome⯑times, connected with the word, ONE; eſ⯑pecially, when uſed as ſynonymous to all. [186]As, all of us; every one of us. Theſe ex⯑preſſions ſhew, that every, is, rather, parti⯑cular, relating more to individuals; and, that all, is rather, general, relating to the whole; the word, ONE, being added to every, ſpecifying that determination.

Every, includes, always, in its idea, the word all; though all, does not, always, include the word every: that is, all, ſpeaks in general, only; whereas, every, excepts none.

Every man is, undoubtedly, bound to aſſiſt his neighbour. All men, are mer⯑cenary.

All, ſeems to me, to be the plural of every; every being, conſtantly, applied to the ſingular number; all, to the plural. Thus, we ſay, every man; every thing; every part, &c. but, all men; all things; all parts, &c.

355. Pity, Compaſſion, Commiſeration.

I cannot ſay, whether in the character⯑iſing of theſe words, I may fall in with the opinion of the public; but, with reſpect to the two firſt, pity, ſeems to me, to be, rather, particular, and, to be uſed, with moſt propriety, with regard to perſons, we have ſome knowledge of; whereas, compaſſion, is more general, and, may be uſed, equally, with reſpect, to thoſe we know, as, to thoſe we know not.

We are ſaid, to pity the diſtreſſes of a friend; and, compaſſionate the misfortunes of a ſtranger.

Pity, ſeems moſt applicable to the firſt emotions we feel, at the ſight or deſcrip⯑tion of an object in diſtreſs; riſing from tenderneſs of heart. Compaſſion, ſeems to [188]reſult from reflection, on the unmerited ca⯑lamities of another; ſpringing from the trueſt benevolence.

Thus, we ſay, it was through pity, we were led to compaſſionate his caſe.

Commiſeration, in my opinion, implies a fellow-feeling, or, the bearing a part in another's woe, and, riſes from ſympathy.

We, naturally, commiſerate the ſorrows of one, we love.

According to this interpretation of the words, we may pity, and, yet, not have compaſſion; we may have both pity, and, compaſſion, yet, not commiſerate.

The word pity, on ſome occaſions, has been made uſe of, by way of contempt; as I pity her pride: but it ſeems hare, to be uſed, rather, ironically, than, to imply, in its real ſignification, any degree of ſcorn.

356. Slippery, Glib.

Glibneſs, implies, a great degree of ſlipperi⯑neſs; ſlipperineſs, a ſmall degree of glibneſs.

All ice is ſlippery; but, that, which is, remarkably, ſmooth, is glib.

The proper, and, literal definition of ſlippery, is, affording no firm hold, or, footing; that of glib, made eaſy to be moved. In this ſenſe, the firſt, denotes, ſomething, natural; the laſt, ſomething, not ſo.

An eel is ſo ſlippery, as to be difficult to hold. Wet weather, ſucceeded by a froſt, makes the ways ſlippery. Oiling, the fly of a jack, makes it run glib.

So, in the figurative ſenſe; ſpeaking of a woman, fond of gallantry; we ſay, ſhe is a ſlippery dame. Nothing is of a more ſlippery nature, than true happineſs; it ſlides [190]through the fingers, even, while we think, we hold it faſt. Strong liquor, on different perſons, has different effects; ſome, it ſickens; others, it ſtupifies; of others, again, it makes the tongue run ſo glib, as to be, greatly, entertaining.

357. Ridicule, Deriſion.

Laughter in ſcorn, is the common im⯑port of theſe words; but, that of ridicule, implies, contemptuous merriment; that of deriſion, ſportive inſult.

We, ridicule, in order, to ſhew another his fault, and, induce him to amend: We never deride, but, with the utmoſt con⯑tempt.

A friend will, often, ridicule; none, but an enemy, derides.

[191]If we have done any thing deſerving ridicule, we ſhould endeavour to retrieve our character, leſt we become the deriſion of all who know us.

358. To Cry, Weep.

Shedding of tears, is the general ſenſe, in which theſe words are underſtood; but, to cry, implies, ſhedding of tears, audibly; to weep, ſhedding of tears, with ſilence.

Children, commonly, cry; grown per⯑ſons, generally, weep.

'Tis not the noiſe we make, that denotes a greater or leſs meaſure of grief; for, the ſecret weeper, may be more diſtreſſed, than one, who crys, aloud.

Crying is found, by experience, to give greater relief to ſorrow, than, bare weep⯑ing.

359. To Shake, Tremble.

Both theſe words imply, being agitated with a vibratory motion, but, as this mo⯑tion ſeems to ariſe from different cauſes, it renders the choice of them, neceſſary.

Shake, appears to me, more applicable to a tremulous motion, occaſioned by cold; tremble, to a like motion, occaſioned by fear.

We ſhake with cold; we tremble with fear.

When the blood is chilled, we, naturally, ſhake. The very thought of danger, will make the coward, tremble.

The verb ſhake is often uſed in the ac⯑tive ſenſe; the verb tremble, never. Thus we ſhake the houſe; ſhake a tree; ſhake hands, &c.

360. Pedigree, Genealogy.

Pedigree, is our lineal deſcent from ſome anceſtor, ages back, pointed out: genea⯑logy, is a hiſtory of ſuch pedigree.

We trace our pedigree. We write our ge⯑nealogy.

It is, ſometimes, neceſſary, to examine into our pedigree, in order, to claim or ſe⯑cure our property in lands. The tranſmit⯑ting of genealogies to poſterity, though they may be, in ſome reſpect, uſeful, is a ſtand⯑ing mark, of the vanity of our anceſtors.

361. Prebend, Prebendary.

Prebend, implies, a certain ſtipend, granted to the clergy, in cathedral churches: prebendary, denotes, properly, the perſon who receives that ſtipend. Though it is well known to every one, that, one of theſe words, implies, the ſtipend; the other, the ſtipendiary, yet I thought fit to take no⯑tice of them, eſpecially, as it gave me an opportunity of correcting their erroneous uſe; it being common, to employ the word, prebendary, to expreſs, the benefice; and, that of prebend, to denote, the dignitary; whereas, they ſhould be reverſed; i. e. Prebend, ſhould be uſed to mark the of⯑fice: prebendary, to point out the perſon, filling that office.

362. Diſcourſe, Converſation.

The general import of theſe words, is, the mutual intercourſe of ſpeech, but, that of diſcourſe, implies, ſerious or ſet talk, upon any particular ſubject; that of converſation, ſuch, as is eaſy and familiar, and, not con⯑fined to any particular topic.

Diſcourſe, is, generally, formal; conver⯑ſation, commonly, chearful.

The attention of men is ſo much ſcat⯑tered, by diſſipation, that, when together, excluſive of buſineſs, they ſeldom en⯑ter into any diſcourſe, that is improving: but, their general converſation runs on things, in their nature, trifling, and, impertinent.

363. Impertinent, Impudent, Saucy.

Nothing is more general than the indiſ⯑criminate uſe of theſe words, though none differ more among themſelves: if a man gives rude language, how common is it to ſay, he is an impertinent, impudent, or, ſaucy fellow. One would imagine their peculiar ideas, are ſo well known, as to render it unneceſſary, to take farther notice of them; but, as ſome people never ſee the ſtum⯑bling block till they fall over it, it may not be unneceſſary to give them a perfect view of it: in order to which, I need, only, define them.

Impertinent, then, means, intruding, and, meddling with what, no way concerns us. Impudent, implies, ſhameleſſneſs, or, want of modeſty. Saucy, means, inſolent, and, abuſive.

To ſhew a further difference between them, or, give any examples of their uſe, would be needleſs.

364. Tongue, Language.

I know not whether in characteriſing theſe words, I may fall in with the taſte of the public; but, according to my opinion, tongue, ſeems, to agree beſt with a corrupted language, that is, tongue, appears to be more particular, or, provincial; language, more general, or, national. Thus, I would ſay, the vulgar tongue; the mother tongue; the Yorkſhire tongue; but, the Engliſh lan⯑guage; the French language; the Spaniſh language.

That, of the Indians, may be, rather, called a tongue, than a language; it being neither formal, or, regular.

The generality of people, content them⯑ſelves, with ſpeaking the tongue, common to the place they are bred up in; without paying any regard, to the beauties of their native language.

365. Fuddled, Drunk, Intoxicated.

With reſpect to the two firſt of theſe words, drunk, riſes upon that of fuddled; fuddled, implying, a leſs degree of inebria⯑tion; drunk, a greater. As to the word intoxicated, its greateſt diſtinction is, that, whereas fuddled, and, drunk, are ſeldom uſed, in the figurative ſenſe; that, is hardly ever, in the literal.

Half a pint of wine, will make ſome men, drunk; when others, ſhall drink a gallon, without being, the leaſt, fuddled. Good ſucceſs will, ſometimes, ſo intoxicate a perſon, as to take him off from his buſi⯑neſs, and, render him diſagreeable to all his acquaintance.

366. Bargain, Agreement, Contract.

Bargain, is more limited, relating to ſale; agreement, and, contract, are more general, implying, any ſort of ſtipulation; with this difference between them, that agreement, ſeems to denote, a verbal one; contract, one, that is written.

It is a mark of honeſty, in dealing, never to draw back from a bargain, once made. Such is the unſteadineſs of mankind, that we are, frequently, obliged to enter into contract, in order, to bind them to their agreement.

367. Mine, My own.

Though many are of opinion that, the the word, own, is added to the poſſeſſive pronoun, my, by way of emphaſis, or, cor⯑roboration, only; yet, cuſtom ſeems to have thrown into the idea of the ex⯑preſſion, my own, a greater degree of pro⯑perty, than, into that, of the word, mine. Thus, a workman, to whom certain tools have been appropriated by his maſter, for the work he is imployed on, might, with propriety, ſay, theſe tools are mine, though, at the ſame time, they are not his own, be⯑ing the property of his maſter. So, again, a wife, might lay claim to the cloaths ſhe wears, and, ſay, they are mine; though, ſhe could not ſay, with propriety, that, they were her own, being, in reality, the pro⯑perty of her huſband. On the other hand, the expreſſion, my own, may, with elegance, be uſed, by the perſon, in whom the ſole right of a thing, is veſted.

368. Nigh, Near.

I will leave it to the deciſion of the curi⯑ous, whether or no, the word near, is not a corruption of nigher, the comparative of nigh: be this as it may, near, in my opinion, implies, a leſs diſtance than nigh. Thus, I ſhould ſay, when we come nigh to ſuch a place, we ſhall be near home: the nigher the enemy, the nearer the danger. As a farther proof of this, ſpeaking of the cloſe tyes of kindred, we uſe the word near, in preference to that of nigh, as implying a leſs diſtance, or, greater degree of conſangui⯑nity, between the two perſons. Thus, my brother's child is my near relation, or, is nearly related to me.

369. Efficacious, Effectual.

With reſpect to theſe two words, that of efficacious, ſeems not ſo powerful, as that of effectual. The firſt, gets the better of moſt obſtacles; the laſt, of all.

By an efficacious remedy, we put an effec⯑tual ſtop.

370. Width, Wideneſs.

Width, ſeem, more applicable to things ſmall in themſelves; wideneſs, to thoſe, which are large. Thus, we ſay, the width of paper; the width of cloth; but, the wide⯑neſs of a ditch; the wideneſs of a field.