An ENQUIRY into the DANGER, &c.
[3]I CANNOT ſay that I am of the Num⯑ber of thoſe, who wiſh, that if we have a War with the Dutch they may beat Us; becauſe it has ſomething in it ſo unnatu⯑ral, for an Engliſhman or a Britain to rejoyce in the Deſtruction of his own Country, and in the Triumph of our Neighbours of any kind over Us, that he cannot ſee it without Horror and Averſion; yet I cannot but ſay, I wiſh thoſe, who talk with ſo much Satisfa⯑ction of a War with the Dutch, would look a little into the certain Conſequences of ſuch a War, whether Victory or Diſadvantage on Our Side ſhall attend it.
I take a War with the Hollanders, to have this very unhappy Circumſtance in it, That if we are beaten, it may be [...] ruin imme⯑diately, and if we conquer, it may be our ruin hereafter, ſo that in general, get or loſe in the Field, we ſhall certainly loſe in the War.
The immediate Loſs of our Ships, of our Men, of our Trade, and the farther load⯑ing this Nation, with a mighty and inſup⯑portable Expence, are the common Topicks [4] of thoſe who argue in the uſual Methods a⯑gainſt this War; but though theſe are con⯑ſiderable, and ſhall have ſomething ſaid to them in their Courſe; yet theſe are the leaſt of the Evils, which if our Fore-ſight is not clouded by the Power and Influence of Par⯑ties found, may be by neceſſary and inevttable Conſequences, to follow the entring at this time upon a War with the Dutch.
The Situation of the Dutch, their Strength at Sea, their Poſſeſſions in the Eaſt and Weſt-Indies, and their reigning Influence in the North and East Seas, are Reaſons why we muſt expect uncommon Miſchiefs ſhould at⯑tend our Trade in the beginning of ſuch a War; this was always the Effect of a Dutch War, and it was remarkable, that in the laſt War with the Dutch we loſt 2000 Sail of Ships great and ſmall the firſt Year: No part of our Commerce is free from them or out of their reach: On the contrary, ſome of the beſt Parts of our Trade are in great Danger of being entirely loſt to them, ſuch as the East-India, African and East Country Trades in particular; it is apparent, if a due Enquiry were made, we ſhould ſee ſmall hope of continuing and preſerving our In⯑tereſt in them under a War with the Dutch; their Collonies of ſuperiour Strength lying ſo near ours in the two Firſt, and their Po⯑tent Alliances in the latter, enabling them effectually to ſupplant Us.
The Diſturbance they always upon theſe Occaſions gave us in our Home Trade, and the impoſſibility of our carrying it on, but with [5] manifeſt Diſadvantage, is a ſtrong Argument to open our Eyes in the Caſe of a Dutch War; there are other Parts which reſpect our Coal and Salt Trade, our Corn Trade, our Hull and Lynn Carriage, our Trade to Scot⯑land, and our Fiſhing Trade: In all which, the Interruptions of Commerce by a Dutch War have been ſuch, as have been felt by all our People.
The Gentlemen who are ſo fond of this War with the Dutch, have perhaps not yet examin'd the Trading Conſequences of it, and as they are Landed Men, and fancy they are no way dependent upon Trade, they have forgotten, what ſo often, and by ſo many unanſwerable Arguments has been proved to them, viz. That as Trade only was the Original Cauſe of the encreas'd Va⯑lue of Lands, and the high Rents which now the Gentlemen receive; ſo the decay and ruin of Trade, muſt of courſe ſink the Value of Land, lower the Rents, and re⯑duce the Tenant, to an incapacity to ſup⯑port the Landlord; by which means, a War will of courſe affect the Landed-man as well as the Merchant: Wherefore the Landed Gentlemen are deſired to give themſelves the Trouble to enquire into the following Par⯑ticulars, as they are likely to be affected by a War with the States General.
First, Whether the Landed Men about New Caſtle upon Tyne, will not be effected by the interruption of the Coal Trade? Whe⯑ther when Coals are at 4 l. a Chaldron at [6] London, and on the Coaſts, it will not con⯑ſiderably leſſen the Conſumption? And whether in the laſt Dutch War the Quantity of Coals carry'd out were not leſſen'd above 50000 Chaldron in a Year?
Secondly, Whether the Landed Men borde⯑ing upon all the Coaſts, from Hull in the North, to the River Thames, and on to the Coaſt of Kent and Suſſex, will not be affe⯑cted by the Stop put to the vaſt Exportation of Corn to Holland, &c. the want of which Sale, muſt of neceſſity make the Price fall in England, by which the Tenant, not be⯑ing able to get a Market for his Corn, is diſabled to pay his Rent, or hold his Farm without an Abatement?
Thirdly, Whether the Stop, put to the vaſt Exportation of our Woolen Manufactures to Holland, and which will be interrupted, if not prohibited by a War, will not ruin Mul⯑titudes of our Manufacturers in the Coun⯑try, leave the Poor without Employment, and prevent or greatly leſſen, not the Con⯑ſumption of Wool only, but the General Conſumption of Proviſions, by which the Landed Men's Eſtates, muſt of courſe be re⯑duced, and their Rents remain unpaid?
Theſe Things, if it was imagin'd, any Man could object againſt them might be farther enlarg'd upon, and the particular Trades which would ſuffer in ſuch an Inter⯑ruption [7] of Commerce, might be examined, where it would appear.
That the great Trade of Broad Cloath, Kerſies, &c. one of the greateſt Branches of Trade in England, particularly at Leeds, Hu⯑thersfield, Wakefield, Hallifax, Bradford, Roch⯑dale, and the adjacent Parts, and where it is by modeſt Computation ſuppoſed, Four Hundred Thouſand People are employ'd and maintained in the Woolen Manafacture, that this great Trade is principally main⯑tained and ſupported by the Exportation to Holland.
That the Stop to that Exportation, muſt of neceſſity encourage the Dutch, in the Making the ſame kind of Goods in their own Country, particularly at Leyden, where they have for ſome Years endeavour'd it, and are Daily improving.
That above Two Hundred Thouſand Pound Value of the ſaid Goods are Yearly exported to Holland.
That the North-Riding of York-ſhire, Bi⯑ſhoprick of Durham, and great part of Lan⯑caſhire, and Weſtmoreland are ſupported, by breeding and feeding Cattle, for the Con⯑ſuption of the West Riding; and if the Dutch Trade receive ſuch a Check, or Interrupti⯑on, the Conſequence is evident; the poor People will want Employ, which want of Employ is immediately felt, in the Con⯑ſumption of Proviſions, and that again in the Rent of our Lands: And indeed it cannot be a little wonder'd at, to ſee the Landed Men in this Nation, value them⯑ſelves [8] ſo much, upon their running down our Trade, as if the Lands had no Depen⯑dance upon Trade, or that Lands cou'd hold up their Value, if our Trade were decay'd: This Article of the Dutch Trade, will ſatisfy any reaſonable Perſon, that it cannot be; I pray God, we do not too fatally try the Experiment at this time, nor is this the leaſt Reaſon why I mention this Argument at this time, that our Landed-Men may learn to know what made them rich, and what may again reduce them to what they were ſome Ages ago.
It is true, Trade has given us no Land, Britain is no larger than it was before; but it is not unworthy our Thoughts, and may be proper to recommend it to theſe Gentle⯑men to conſider, That Trade has added a new Value to what we had before; the Rents of Lands are riſen in time to ſuch a Degree, that what was formerly worth 10 l. per Ann. is now worth 100 l. per Annum, and what has done this? What, but our Trade? Our Ge⯑neral Commerce, which had it been more effectually covered, encouraged and under⯑ſtood, would have been able to have done much more.
Come we next to ſpeak to the Corn-Trade; this is more ſenſibly underſtood by thoſe Gentlemen, whoſe Eſtates lye near the Sea, more particularly upon the Coaſts of Lin⯑colnſhire, Yorkſhire, and the ſeveral Countries which border upon the Humber, or on the Navigable Rivers, emptying themſelves in⯑to the Humber, as alſo upon the Coaſts of [9] Norfolk, ſuch as Yarmouth, Cromer, Clye, Wells, Burnham and Lynn, the Navigations of the River Ouſe, and the Towns of Wisbich, and Spalding in the Iſle of Ely; again, on the Coaſts of Suſſex, Eſſex, and Kent, all which Counties, find their Daily Advantages from the incredible Quantity of Corn every Year exported to Holland, without which Expor⯑tation, it would be impoſſible for the Te⯑nants in thoſe Countries to vend the Corn they owe, and by Conſequence, the Lands in thoſe Counties, muſt either lye unma⯑nur'o, or at leaſt be laid down, and only em⯑ploy'd in breeding of Cattle, a poor Trade and which is now left to the Northern and Weſtern Parts of England, and to the Highlands of Scotland; the Conſequence of which would be the leſſening the Value of Land, ſinking the Rents, and reducing the Eſtates of the Landed Men.
Theſe would be ſome of the more imme⯑diate Conſequences of a War with the Dutch, and are mention'd here, becauſe as Mankind are more apt to be ſenſible of that Miſchief moſt, which touches them ſooneſt; it can⯑not but be very reaſonable to expect, That theſe People, however at preſent unaffected with the Danger of a War with Holland, may think fit to change their Minds, when they examine more ſtricly into the thing, and ſhall find, that they will be immediate⯑ly touch'd by it in the moſt ſenſible part.
There are ſeveral other immediate Caſes, in which a War with Holland will affect us, in Matters of Trade, and which it having [10] been ſo long ago, ſince we had ſuch a War, our People are a little too apt to forget: But which if they pleaſe to recollect them⯑ſelves, they will find, will more nearly touch them, than perhaps they are aware of, as eſpecially the Price of Coals, touch'd at before, which will particularly affect the Inhabitants of this City and County's adja⯑cent, where Three Pounds and Four Pounds a Chaldron have been accounted but a mo⯑derate Price for Coals, and which is occa⯑ſion'd by the direct Situation of the Hollan⯑ders, whoſe Ports immediately opening to the North Channel, the Colliers Ships are in ten Fold more danger from them, than they can be from the French Privateers, in Caſe of a War with France. It is needleſs to en⯑large how many other Trades this will affect, how much dearer it will make all ſuch Goods as are wrought by Fire, but eſpecially how ſeverely it will pinch the midling Families of our Tradeſmen and the Poor, who have no Relief in Caſe of Cold Weather about this City, there being no Woods and Forreſts as in the Country, to ſupply them with Fewel, and who are put to inexpreſſible Hardſhips in the Winter for want of Coal.
The Rates of Salt, another Neceſſary of Life, is a Thing deſerves our Conſideration in Caſe of Trade; the City of London, and all this Part of England, being ſupply'd with Salt from New Caſtle upon Tyne, from whence the Danger being ſo great, the Price of Salt was frequently in the late Dutch War, although no Tax was then upon it, at 4 d. [11] per Pound, and may now poſſibly be double that Price.
Theſe are Matters of Trade, and indeed are but a ſmall part of what might be ſaid upon that Subject, but however, may ſerve to ſhew, That a War with Holland can ne⯑ver happen, without plunging us into many great Difficulties, ſuch as will juſtify me in ſaying, That we ought never to engage in ſuch a War, without ſuch an abſolute and un⯑avoidable Neceſſity, as will abundantly make the bearing all theſe Inconveniences eaſy and rational to Us.
But alas! theſe are but the ſmaller Conſi⯑derations in this Caſe, and are mentioned here in order to make good the firſt part of the Argument, laid down in the beginning of this Work: The more fatal Conſequences of a War with the Dutch, are ſuch as reſpect the Politick Concerns of Europe, and are of infinite Value to Us: I ſhall examin them apart.
- I It muſt be a War in Defence of Popery.
- II. It muſt be ruinous to the Proteſtant In⯑tereſt.
- III. It muſt be Dangerous to the Hannover Succeſſion.
- IV. It muſt be fatal many ways to us, who are to be engag'd in it.
- V. It muſt be a War againſt the general Incli⯑nation of the People.
- VI. It muſt be a War, in which the greateſt Succeſs will be a Loſs to Us.
- [12] VII. It muſt be a War, in which we are very likely to have the Diſadvantage.
- VIII. It muſt be a very bloody War, that will be far from being carry'd on in Jeſt, as the preſent War with France has been, eſpecially at Sea.
I cannot promiſe to go thorow all theſe effectually, in the ſhort Compaſs of this Tract: However, I ſhall begin, and ſpeak⯑ing more largely to thoſe which are moſt neceſſary, I ſhall touch lightly the reſt, and perhaps ſpeak more effectually to them hereafter.
I. It muſt be a War in Defence of Popery.
I know it has been argued on many Oc⯑caſions, That this War was not begun on account of Religion, it was the Argument the Papiſts and French Advocates ſtrove to make uſe of all along, ſubtilly to engage the Zea⯑lous People the more ſincerely in their Quar⯑rel, and ſtir them up to Blood and Deſtru⯑ction: We find many Inſtances of this, in the Accounts of the laſt few Years, eſpeci⯑ally in the King of France's Letter to the Pope, relating to the Duke of Savoy, who was then newly come over to the Confede⯑rates, wherein he complains of his Royal Highneſs joining with Hereticks and the Ene⯑mies of God's Church, meaning the Pruſſian and Saxe-Gotha Troops, whom he calls Ene⯑mies to GOD and his Church, and which he ſays they impiouſly brought into Italy: But after all that has been ſaid on that Head, [13] tho' we are not now on the Foot of a Reli⯑gious War, yet if we fight with the Dutch, we certainly fight againſt the Proteſtant Re⯑ligion in Defence of Popery; perhaps it may not be immediately concern'd, but it is ſo in its viſible Effects, and no Man can be ſo blind as not to ſee it. The Powers hereby protected are all Popiſh; Popiſh, even to Bigottry, eſpecially the Spaniards. They have not only ſtrengthened themſelves againſt the Proteſtant Religion, but by the Deſtruction of the Proteſtants themſelves, and that in the ſevereſt manner.
Let any Man but take a View of them ſeparately in France; how has the French Go⯑vernor expelled 400000 Proteſtants out of their Dominions, ſuffering all the Damages, which the loſs of ſo many Subjects, and their moveable Eſtates, muſt of neceſſity be to a Nation, rather than not to root out the Proteſtant Religion; and indeed they have rooted it out of moſt part of the Nation, and one Age of Perſecution more will moſt effectually do it. How have they ſince pur⯑ſued the poor Remains of the Proteſtant Re⯑ligion, in the Mountains of the Cevennes, and put all that have fallen into their Hands to Death, by the cruelleſt Torments imagina⯑ble? How have they lately done the ſame in the little Principallity of Orange, tho' in all probability they were to reſtore that Country upon a Peace? In Spain, how have we found the Averſions of the People, to our great Damage in the War there, while our Troops have been Maletreated by the [14] Spaniards and Portegueſe, even while we came there to aſſiſt them, rejecting their own Deliverance, I ſpeak of thoſe well affected to King Charles III. only becauſe the Aſſiſtance brought them was carry'd on by Heretick Forces, and that the Proteſtants were ſo odious to them, that they could not bear to be deliver'd by them. Theſe are the People we muſt fight for, when ever we take up Arms againſt the Hollanders; for theſe the Blood of Engliſh Men and Britains is to be ſpilt, and the Wealth of a Proteſtant Nation exhauſted, and that not only for the People of theſe Nations, but for their very Religion too; could we diſtinguiſh between the Men and their Principles, be⯑tween the Intereſt of the Nations, and the Intereſt of their Religion, it were the bet⯑ter to be born with: But our Caſe is ex⯑tremly hard, for it is not ſo much the Na⯑tional Intereſt, as the Religious Intereſt that eventually will be the Concern of the War, and we fight even for Popery it ſelf: The Propagation of the Bigottry and Su⯑perſtition of thoſe Nations being ſo twiſted with their Power, that the latter never goes without the former, and they never did extend their Conqueſt and Dominions to any Place, where they have not eſta⯑bliſhed their Idolatry and Superſtition, nay, nor where they have not apply'd themſelves to expunge and race out the very Name of the Proteſtant Religion, and the leaſt Re⯑mains of the Proteſtant Worſhip. This con⯑firms the Head I am upon, that when ever [15] the unhappy Hour ſhall come, that the Sword ſhould be drawn in this Quarrel, it is drawn by the Nature and Conſequence of the Thing, in Defence of POPERY; What Proteſtant then can think of this with⯑out Horror? How ruinous muſt this be to the Proteſtant Intereſt! How deſtructive to the Safety of Religion, to the Freedom of Conſcience, and to the Proſperity of the Churches abroad! Of which by it ſelf; but particularly, how dreadful a Work muſt this be for Proteſtants to do? With what Face can any Man, who is a Profeſſor of the Proteſtant Religion, draw his Sword in ſuch a Quarrel? And which is ſtill worſe, how can any Proteſtant put his Hand to the contriving and bringing to paſs ſuch a War. I have no Hand in, or Eye towards, who is, or is not concern'd in the Meaſures that have a Tendency to this; ſome ſay one ſide are guilty of it, ſome the other, and both ſeem to agree that it will be a Conſequence of what is now doing; but I am deſirous faithfully to repreſent to both Sides, what the meaning of a War with Holland is, what it implies, and what Effects will neceſſarily follow, that both Parties may lay their Hands upon their Hearts, and reflect with Seriouſneſs what they are about, when they draw their Swords againſt their Brethren.
II. It muſt be ruinous to the Proteſtant Intereſt.
This is little more than the Reverſe of the other as to the part of Religion, becauſe [16] the Defence of Popery muſt be the Ruin, or at leaſt the Damage of the Proteſtant Reli⯑gion; but I chooſe to call this the Proteſtant Intereſt, becauſe tho' the Religious Intereſt depends upon it, and muſt follow the Fate of it upon all Occaſions, yet the Civil and Politick Intereſt of the Proteſtants, is what I am now ſpeaking of, and how far the preſent Caſe will affect it will ſoon appear: Nothing is more evident, than that the King⯑doms of Great Britain and Ireland, in Con⯑junction with the States General, are the main Strength of the Proteſtant Intereſt in the World. The Princes of Germany, with the Kings of Sweden and Denmark are conſi⯑derable, it is true, and not at all to be de⯑ſpiſed; but alas! how long would all theſe, put together, be able to ſupport the Prote⯑ſtant Cauſe, or to defend themſelves againſt the Power of French and German Popery! How ſoon would the Light of the Prote⯑ſtant Religion in the World be extinguiſhed, if the Popiſh Powers of Europe were com⯑bin'd againſt thoſe few Northern Provinces! But the Center of Proteſtant Strength lies in the joint Forces, Power and Wealth of the Two Maritime Potentates, Great Britain and Holland, their Forces by Land have alone been able to match the Popiſh Powers of Europe, and to look the King of France in the Face, and their United Force at Sea is ac⯑knowledg'd to be ſuperiour to all the known World, tho' all their Naval Strength was put together.
[17] Upon this Strength the Proteſtant Inte⯑reſt, ſpeaking of ſecond Cauſes entirely de⯑pends, this makes the Proteſtants formi⯑dable to the World; this alone has re⯑ſtrain'd the Popiſh Powers of the World from over-running them many Ages ago: Farther than this, it may not be unneceſſary to reflect, what Blows the Proteſtant Inte⯑reſt has already received in theſe 20 or 30 Years paſt, how much weaker it is by Con⯑ſequence than it was before, and thereby how unable to reſiſt the Effects of new Enemies, if join'd together; much more, how little need there is to have yet deeper Wounds made in their Intereſt, than was before: Theſe things are evident in the following Particulars.
- 1. The Extirpation of the Proteſtants of France.
- 2. The Succeſſion of the Roman Catho⯑lick Houſe of Newburgh to the Pala⯑tinate.
- 3. The going over of the Elector of Saxo⯑ny to the Romiſh Church.
- 4. The weakening and oppreſſing the King of Sweden, and diveſting the Swedes (who are Guarrantees of the Treaty of Weſtphalia) of their Dominions in the Empire.
- 5. The Danger of a Popiſh Succeſſor to the Crowns of Great Britain and Ireland.
In conſidering theſe Things, what Re⯑flections muſt needs follow to any one, who [18] with an impartial Eye, and a juſt Concern for the Proteſtant Intereſt, can look on the approaching Danger of a bloody War be⯑tween Great Britain and the States General; what a mortal Wound this would be to the Proteſtant Intereſt, What a Breach it would make in the Proteſtant Strength, and how effectually it would expoſe the Proteſtant Cauſe to be over-run by the Arms and In⯑tereſt of the Popiſh Princes, who we have always found ready to devour them.
Let thoſe who want Examples to illuſtrate this, look back upon the Year 1672, when this Nation gull'd by the Arts and Politicks of Popiſh Councils, was drawn in to fight againſt the Dutch; How did it open a way to all thoſe terrible Conqueſts, which the French King made upon the Dutch, by which he was within a Trifle of diſſolving their State, and uniting them all to the Kingdom of France, and by which we had like at that time to have overwhelm'd the Proteſtant Religion in the World? And in a Word, by which this Nation alſo was at laſt brought to ſuch a Deſperate Point, that had not the Revolution fallen in to reſcue us from the Danger, we had fallen into the Ballance of Power on the Popiſh Side, and had help'd to outweigh the Proteſtants, to their univerſal Deſtruction: This may ſerve to warn us all from falling into the like Blind⯑neſs of Meaſures, and nothing is more won⯑derful, than to find our People ſo willing to run into it.
[19] What can our falling upon the Dutch at this time imply? What can the Effect of it be? Will it not be an immediate weakening of them in their Defence of the Proteſtant Religion, and a direct ſtrengthing their Ene⯑mies to deſtroy them? And will it not be an effectual weakening of us alſo, ſo as at laſt perhaps to render us both too weak to do that, tho' join'd together, which either of us are able to do now apart, in Defence of what is the mutual Intereſt of both?
Add to this how both Nations are al⯑ready exhauſted, and emptied by the long and continu'd Burthen of this heavy and ex⯑penſive War, that as it has been theſe 22 Years dreining us, it will require twice that time at leaſt to reſtore and recover us: So that we are in a much worſe Condition to waſte one another farther; ſince it will of courſe ſo entirely expend our Strength and Capacity for our mutual Defence, that it muſt render both Sides an eaſie Prey to the Enemy, as is happily expreſs'd by the Fable of the two ſmall Birds, who having been long fighting together, the Eagle came and ſnatch'd away both.
Let every conſidering Proteſtant ſummon his Reaſon, and in the moſt affectionate man⯑ner perſuade the Nations, if it be poſſible, to avoid ſo dangerous a Step as this, which has a direct Tendency to deſtroy the Pro⯑teſtant Intereſt in the World, and which cuts off the Hands that ſhould defend it; let them conſider how the Enemies of our Re⯑ligion would rejoice; how they would pro⯑miſe [20] themſelves from theſe Diviſions and Diſtractions among Proteſtants, that one time or other they ſhould break in and de⯑vour the whole Intereſt; let them remem⯑ber that the like Strife among Chriſtians, was the very thing that let Mahomet the Great into Europe, and gave leiſure and op⯑portunity to the Barbarians, to overthrow the Remains of the Grecian Empire, take Conſtantinople, and plant themſelves and their Pagan Superſtition on the Ruins of the flou⯑riſhing Chriſtian Churehes: This was the time the famous City of Conſtantinople was taken, and the Emperor Conſtantine ſlain in it, after a long Siege by the Turks: Not one of the Chriſtian Princes of Europe ſending the leaſt Help, or ſtirring one Foot to the Aſ⯑ſiſtance of the Chriſtian Emperor, who loſt his Life in the Storm of the City; not that the Chriſtian Powers of Europe were not able to have reliev'd the City, and to have driven the Turk out of Europe, but they were univerſally embroil'd in furious Wars againſt one another, France was juſt reſcuing its ſelf out of the Hands of the Engliſh, under the weak and divided Reign of Henry 6th; and Germany was embroil'd in Wars between the Emperor Fredrick and the Pope, by which Means every Hand was employ'd, and that Power which ſhould have protected the Chri⯑ſtian Intereſt was weaken'd to that Degree, that the Chriſtians were in no Condition to oppoſe the victorious Turks, but let them quietly over-run a great part of Europe. I would have all thoſe, who are deſirous of [21] engaging theſe two Proteſtant Nations, in a War one with another, read that melan⯑choly Story, and conſider how exactly this would be the Caſe, between Papiſts and Proteſtants: Let them conſider, what De⯑predations the Popiſh Powers of Europe would make on the Proteſtant Princes du⯑ring ſuch a time: Let them examin in what Poſture we ſhould be to protect the Proteſtant Intereſt, in Caſe of any Excurſion of its Popiſh Enemies; how it would leſſen the Figure the Proteſtants now make, weaken their Hands, render them Contemptible to their Enemies, and lay them open to the Attempts of thoſe, who have been hitherto reſtrained only by fear, from devouring them.
3. Nor would Victory on either hand mend it, for the Proteſtant Intereſt being coucerned, but as one Body in the whole Quarrel would equally ſuffer, which Side ſoever obtained the Victory; and this leads me to the Third Head, viz.
III. It must be a War, in which the greatest Succeſs will be a Loſs to Us.
It will be to no purpoſe for any Side to boaſt of Victory in this War, ſince their very Conqueſt is their Loſs, and they are juſt ſo much weaker in the Proteſtant Cauſe, as by their Conqueſt they have weaken'd their Brethren, ſince in their Common Intereſt they are but one Body, and have but one [22] Strength, one Intereſt, and one Foundation upon which they ſtand; it is very unhappy that theſe things cannot pierce a little into our Thoughts, but that we are all intent at ſuch a time as this, either on puſhing on a War, or ſettling a particular Peace, and leaving the Views and Proſpects of eſtabliſhing Europe, we are turning our Eyes upon a Breach with our Proteſtant Allies; I do not deſire to con⯑cern the preſent Debates among Us about War and Peace in this Matter, I have no⯑thing to do with who directly, or who con⯑ſequently puſh on a War with the Dutch, but directing my Speech to both Parties, I would faithfully repreſent to them, the Ruin and Diſtreſs that ſuch a War would bring upon the Proteſtant Intereſt in general; how which Side ſoever get the better, Popery alone gains by the Victory; every Battle fought weakens the very Conqueror as Pro⯑teſtant, as much as it does thoſe that are beaten: This is what I would move them to do, that they may if poſſible find out ſome happy Medium, either on one Side or other; I do not undertake here to ſay what, but I ſay, ſome happy Medium, to prevent the giving up the Proteſtant Cauſe to be de⯑voured by the Popiſh Tyrants of the World; that Proteſtants may not whet their Swords againſt one another, as they already do their Tongues in a Dreadful and Implaca⯑ble manner; That they would remember every Drop of Blood they ſhed in this Quar⯑rel, leaves them juſt ſo much the leſs to op⯑poſe againſt Popiſh Power, when that Day [23] ſhall come, as undoubtedly it will, when the Fate of the whole Proteſtant Interest may be try'd by the Sword, and the Forces of all Europe ſhall be divided in a Religious War; I can compare this unhappy Caſe of a War, between Britain and Holland, to nothing ſo well, as to the War between the Children of Iſrael, againſt their Brethren of the Tribe of Benjamin.
This is remarkable for the fury of it, as ap⯑pears in the Tribes Swearing, binding one another by an Oath, or a great Oath as the Text hath it, That every Man that came not up to the Lord at Mizpeth, that is, to fight againſt Benjamin, ſhould be put to Death; and another Oath they had alſo made, viz. That they would not any of them give their Daughters to a Benjamite.
The Story is too well known to repeat the Particulars, the War was carry'd on with great Fury, and was very bloody, as ſuch Wars always are; it was ſo bloody that they ſpared neither Age, Sex or Condition, no, nor the very Cattle; but burnt down all their Cities, and all that came to hand, Judg. 20. 48. So that the Tribe of Benjamin was entirely cut off, only Six Hundred Men being left alive of the whole Race: And what Joy had Iſrael of this Victory! they had no ſooner done it, but ſee the Title or Con⯑tents of the next Chapter. The People bewail the Deſolation of Benjamin: vide Mr. Pool's An⯑notations and Contents, on Judges xxi.
[24] Next ſee the manner of their bewailing it.
And the People came to the Houſe of God, and a⯑bode there till even before God, and lift up their voices, and wept ſore: And ſaid, O LORD God of Iſrael, why is this come to paſs in Iſrael, that there ſhonld be to day one Tribe lacking in Iſrael? And it came to paſs, on the morrow, that the People roſe early, and built there an Altar, and offered Burnt Offerings, and Peace Offerings.
And again, v. 6. And the Children of Iſrael repented them for Benjamin their Brother, and ſaid, There is one tribe cut off from Iſrael this Day.
See here the mournful Satisfaction of Vi⯑ctory over our Friends! what is the Engliſh of it but this, There is one Tribe cut off from Iſ⯑rael? That is, ſhould we now be invaded by the Heathen, by the Canaanites, the Philiſtines or the Midianites, or any of the Barbarous Na⯑tions; there is one Tribe leſs, to help de⯑fend the Borders of Iſrael: Our Brethren of Benjamin are cut off, and we are left naked on that Side, we are juſt ſo much the weaker by our Victory.
How exactly does this anſwer to the Caſe before us? Should either Side prevail, ſhould we beat, ſhould we conquer the Dutch, ſhould the Heathen (French) fall in upon them, and over-run them entirely, as in 1672 they had almoſt done, by our infatuated Aſſiſtance, what would be our Joy in this Conqueſts? Should we not reflect on our ſelves after it, and repent our ſelves for Benjamin? Should we not ſay, why is this come to paſs among Prote⯑ſtants, that a Tribe or Nation of Proteſtants is [25] now lacking in Iſrael? Should we not lament for Benjamin, that a Tribe was cut off from the Proteſtant Strength?
On the other Hand, ſhould this War fall heavy on Us, and though Ruin is what we pretend not to fear, yet might it not ſo weaken us, as to expoſe us an eaſy Prey to the Pretender and his Party, which would be the worſt ſort of Ruin; would not the Dutch themſelves, and the whole Body of the Proteſtants of Europe, Bewail the Deſolati⯑on of Benjamin, and repent them for having loſt a Tribe from the Proteſtant Iſrael?
Let all thoſe, as well of one Side or other, who are either haſty for, or indifferent in the Caſe of a War with the Dutch, look into theſe Things, and conſider ſeriouſly what they are doing; conſider the Conſequence of a War, in which, whether conquering or conquered, the Intereſt of the Proteſtant Religion ſuffers, and the Strength of the Proteſtant Powers is weakned, and we ſhall all have Cauſe to bewail the Deſolation of our Brethren.
IV. This War will be dangerous to the Proteſtant Succeſſion.
By the Proteſtant Succeſſion, I ſuppoſe all Men will underſtand me, to mean the Succeſſion of the Houſe of Hannover to the Crowns of Great Britain and Ireland, after the Demiſe of Her Preſent Majeſty QUEEN ANNE, and I have good Reaſon, from the Iniquity of the Times, wherein Jacobite Di⯑ſtinctions [26] are very ſubtle and many, to make this Explanation. Now let any Man but ſeriouſly examine the Conſequences of a War, with the Guarrantees of that Succeſſion, and what will he infer, but that however intentio⯑nally it may not be ſo, yet effectually and eventually, it will be a War againſt the Suc⯑ceſſion it ſelf; not that I enter here into the Caſe, whether the Guarrantee of the Dutch were neceſſary, as was thought by way of Treaty: Let that be as it will, this is cer⯑tain, That the Dutch as a Proteſtant State, Ally'd in Intereſt to both, viz. to the Houſe of Hannover and to the Britiſh Nation, and their own Safety, abſolutely requiring, that this Nation ſhould never come into Popiſh Hands, are an undoubted Natural Security to the Proteſtant Succeſſion, and unleſs their Power be broken by ſuch a War as this, muſt be ſuppoſed always to be ready by a natural Conſequence, to aſſiſt and ſupport the ſaid Succeſſion, and all the Friends of it, with all their Might; they can do no other, if they are not like us infatuated and blind to their own Safety and Intereſt; nor is this the leaſt part of our Security againſt the Pretender, and all the Jacobite Enemies of the ſaid Proteſtant Succeſſion, eſpecially thoſe of them who are Abroad.
Thoſe then who propagate, whether o⯑penly or clandeſtinely, a Breach between the Two Nations, are ſo far real Enemies to the Hannover Succeſſion, let their Views and Deſigns, Meaſures or Pretences be what they will, ſuch, while they cry out Zealouſly [27] for the Proteſtant Succeſſion, would do well to tell Us, how ſhall the Elector of Hanno⯑ver ſupport his Right? How ſhall he come over hither with Forces and Armies in caſe of a contending Pretender, who may be pri⯑vately convey'd hither before him? How ſhall he recover the Poſſeſſion, or come to the Aſſiſtance of his Friends and their Inte⯑reſt, who may be oppreſs'd by a Jacobite Faction; if the Dutch are ruin'd, and their Naval Strength broken by that very Nati⯑tion they ſhould come to ſave?
A War with Holland, would in many re⯑ſpects therefore be a War againſt the Prote⯑ſtant Succeſſion, as well as againſt the Pro⯑teſtant Religion; nay ſome who have exa⯑min'd that Affair very nicely, affirm with me, That there is indeed no other real Danger of the Hannover Succeſſion, but the ruining the Dutch, for that whatever the Artifice of Parties may bring to paſs, and however the High flying and Jacobite Party in League with France, and other Popiſh Powers, may form a Conjunction of Intereſt, ſo as to erect the Pretender; nay, tho' they were to ſet him upon the Throne, yet that there will al⯑ways be ſuch a Body, of the beſt, the wiſeſt, and the moſt conſiderable People of this Na⯑tion, ſteady to the Intereſt of the Houſe of Hannover, and firm to the Solemn Abjuration they have made of the Pretender, that on the firſt appearance of the Proteſtant Suc⯑ceſſor, with any reaſonable Force to ſup⯑port them, they would ſhow themſelves able to overthrow all their Enemies, and reſtore [28] the Nation to the Right Eſtabliſh'd Succeſ⯑ſor, in ſpight of all the Oppoſition, that the Enemies of the Proteſtant Intereſt could make: But if the Dutch before this ſhould be oppreſſed by a War, and their Naval Strength and Power broken by us, in vain we may ſtretch out our Hands to the Succeſ⯑ſor for help, who cannot without a Fleet yield us that Aſſiſtance, or do himſelf that Juſtice, which otherwiſe he is very well able to do, ſo that fighting againſt the Dutch, is cutting off the Right-hand of the Succeſſi⯑on: On the other hand, ſhould the Forces of Britain be broken or weaken'd in this War againſt the Dutch, ſtill ſo much the leſs able we ſhall be to reſiſt the Efforts of the Pretender, whether he comes back't by a French or a Spaniſh Power, or depending upon the Intereſt of his Jacobite Friends and Faction at Home; a Nation exhauſted, impoveriſh'd, and tyr'd out with War, cannot be in ſo good a Condition to reſiſt an Invader, nor ſo warmly inclin'd to engage in a new War, againſt Tyranny and Oppreſſion, as while we are whole and in Condition; ſo that which way ſoever we take this War, and which way ſoever the Succeſs of a Dutch War ſhall fall, it will be Dangerous if not Fatal to the Proteſtant Succeſſion of the Houſe of Hannover.
V. It muſt be a War fatal many ways to Us, who are engag'd in it.
[29] This, beſides what relates as before to the Proteſtant Intereſt, and the Hannover Succeſſion, will be conſider'd, as it reſpects our Commerce, our publick Credit, our ex⯑hauſted Circumſtances, and our general Ci⯑vil Intereſt; what relates to Commerce, has been touch'd at already, and I may only add this, that as our Trade in general is already prodigiouſly ſunk, by the long Interruption of 22 Years War; the Damage of which will not in ſome Ages, if Ever, be wholly repair'd; So a War with Holland at this time, would give ſuch a Blow to that Part which remains, that in general our whole Trade would be overwhelmed in Dif⯑ficulties and Confuſions inextricable; the Employment of the Poor, by the Stop and Interruption of Commerce in the preſent Wars, has in ſeveral Parts of England been quite ſtopt, in others they are taken off of the Manufactures they were originally bred to. So that whole Towns remain now Deſtitute of ſo much as the appearance of thoſe Ma⯑nufactures they were formerly wholly ta⯑ken up with; our Colonies Abroad, by the ſtop of the Conſumption and Exportation of their Produce, occaſion'd by the War, are oblig'd to leave Planting, as in Virginia in particular, and apply themſelves to Manu⯑factures, by which in a few Years the ſup⯑ply of Woollen Manufactures, which uſual⯑ly was ſent from hence, will be effectually ſtopp'd. All theſe and many more will be encreaſed by a War with the Dutch, to whom, including Hamburgh, at this time, we ex⯑port [30] more of our Woolen, Manufactures than to all Parts of the World beſides, tho' put together.
What then ſhall be the Condition of our People, when as before the Export of our Broad Cloth, Kerſies, Serges and Stuffs, of which the Dutch now receive ſuch great Quantities ſhall be ſtop'd, and when the poor People, who now live upon thoſe Em⯑ployments, ſhall be deſtitute of Work, and be left to ſeek their Bread? Let thoſe People that think a War with Holland of no Conſequence, conſider of ſome Equivalent for this, and of opening ſome Trade for the vent of our Manufactures, which ſhall ſufficiently ſupply the Poor with Labour, and raiſe Money effectually to pay them.
If theſe Things were conſider'd, we ſhould be more cautious, as well of coveting to make a War with the Dutch, as of pleaſing our ſelves with the Hopes that the Dutch will force us to it.
I ſhall not touch at the Conſequences, which ſome have already ſpoken to, in caſe the Dutch and the Emperor, puſhing on the War without Us, ſhould reduce France, and and recover Spain, not only without any Aſ⯑ſiſtance from Us, but even againſt our Will, the many ways this may be fatal to Us, are better thought of in private, than made pub⯑lick, and it is hoped the Prudence of our Al⯑lies may avoid puſhing us to thoſe Extreme⯑ties: But I cannot omit mentioning again, tho' ſpoken to before, how evidently ſuch a War would open a Door to the Pretender, and [31] expoſe theſe Nations, as a Prey to the Jaco⯑bite Intereſt, as well at Home as Abroad; for as ſome Men hope, ſo I cannot but ſee, that in caſe of a War with the Dutch, the At⯑tempts of the Jacobite Party will be inevita⯑ble; nor can they be ſo blind to their own Intereſt, as not to know it; and this is the true Reaſon, that you cannot converſe at this Time with a Jacobite, but you diſcover his moſt Paſſionate Deſire of a War with the Dutch; all their Emiſſaries are buſie, Ex⯑claiming againſt the Dutch, and Exaſperating our People againſt the Dutch, and if the States-General do ſtand out againſt the Britiſh Mea⯑ſures, or take any Step that ſeems a little diſ⯑obliging, theſe Men, far from doing Juſtice on either Hand, ſet all their Emiſſaries at Work, to aggravate it, and make it appear worſe than really it is: On the other Hand, the ſame Party in Holland act the very other Extreme, and there they exclaim againſt the Britiſh Meaſures, tell the Dutch they are Mal⯑treated, that the Britiſh Parliament has uſed them barbarouſly; That the Britiſh Miniſtry impoſe upon them, and cram the Peace down their Throats, and the like: The Reaſon is evident, they ſeek nothing but a Breach, be⯑cauſe they ſee clearly that a War is the only Step that can make way for their Intereſt, and open a Door to the Pretender.
VI. It muſt be a War againſt the General Incli⯑nation of the People.
[32] This ſeems to want no Proof, even the Queen herſelf and the Miniſtry, however it may ſeem, are averſe to it, and the Meaſures ta⯑ken with the Dutch, however Calculated to carry on the Peace with the French, have plainly diſcover'd, that it is not the Inclination of the Miniſtry to break with the Dutch if they can avoid it; they cannot but ſee, that it will be Ruinous to our Trade, and that the Burthens muſt be intollerable that muſt follow, eſpecially our preſent Impoveriſh'd Circum⯑ſtances conſider'd: Nor can it be Reaſona⯑ble, that the Miniſtry, who give the Ex⯑hauſted Condition of the Nation, as the beſt and firſt Reaſon for making a Peace with France, ſhould at the ſame Time be ſo re⯑gardleſs of that exhauſted Condition of the Nation, as to lead them into a War with Holland; this would be to deny what they had alledg'd before, and Contradict what was the main Argument given, for Convin⯑cing us of the Neceſſity of former Meaſures, viz. That the Nation was Reduced, Exhau⯑ſted, Impoveriſh'd, and the like, and that ſome Ages were requir'd to reſtore our Cir⯑cumſtances, and this was acknowledg'd in many Caſes to be true; but the People will, of courſe think themſelves banter'd and jeſted with in all that, if we think fit now to run into another War, which may be e⯑very way as fatal and as chargeable as the other.
As to the Inclination of the common Peo⯑ple, that has many Ways been try'd, the Averſions that formerly were in our People [33] againſt a Dutch War, were too well known to thoſe who obſerv'd it, viz. with what Backwardneſs they Engag'd! with what Re⯑luctance they Liſted! how the poor Seamen were dragg'd into the Service, like a Bear to the Stake! It would be too long to enter upon the Reaſons and Conſiderations which moved this Averſion, the Thing ſpeaks itſelf; they have been long our Friends and Con⯑federates, have often Aſſiſted, Relieved, De⯑liver'd Us in our Embroiled Circumſtances, and we cannot without Reluctance, deſire to fight againſt a People whom we have ſo often acted in Conjunction with: We have look'd upon them as our Friends, as our Bre⯑thren, in the late War, and it muſt be with Regret, that our People ſhould rejoyce in contrary Extremes, and ſheath their Swords in the Bowels of thoſe, who they ſhook Hands with before.
Trade, our mutual Converſe in Buſineſs, and the long Interwoven Intereſts of the two Nations, cannot but Contribute to this Inclination; and the Damage we ſhall feel, and that immediately too, will aſſiſt to form the Averſions which are in our Minds againſt the War, and make our People abhorr the Thoughts of it; but I need not inſiſt upon this, which every Man knows to be Fact, and can trace the Original of; I come now to conſider the two laſt Articles, viz.
VII. That it will be a War, in which we are very likely to have the Diſadvantage.
[34]Not that I am of the Opinion that the Dutch will beat Us, as ſome People talk, and yet farther from pleaſing myſelf with the Hopes of it, as ſome pretend we do; but if, as before, we ſhall be Loſers, even by the Succeſs we may pretend to have in it, what then muſt be the want of that Succeſs, if ſuch a Caſe alſo ſhould happen? Let thoſe who calmly Examin Things at all, look back on the Stop of Trade, Loſs of Shipping, Ruin of Merchants, want of Employ for our Peo⯑ple; mention'd before in this Tract, and judge for themſelves, as to the Advantages to Us; but if we ſhould have the worſt of it at Sea alſo, as no Man can Anſwer for the uncer⯑tain Events of War; if our Navy ſhould be Defeated, our Ships, which are our Strength, receive any fatal Blow, which we are not ſure of the Diſadvantages which will follow to us, are ſuch, as I ſhall, in hopes they will never happen, conceal for the preſent.
Laſtly, No more ſhall I think to terrifie any from a War with the Dutch, by telling them it will not be a War to be Trifled with; that the Engliſh and Dutch when they uſed to meet at Sea, do not uſe to make a Jeſt of it; fight⯑ing with the Dutch has always had a diffe⯑rence in it from fighting with other Nations: Theſe fight at a diſtance, and lie and pelt one another, while they are a quarter of a Mile or half a Mile off, or pour in their ſmall [35] Shot upon one another, to pick off their Men; but when the Engliſh and Dutch for⯑merly uſed to meet, three Sea fights have been fought with near 80 Sail of a ſide in one Summer, the great 3 Deck Ships of 100 Guns each, ſink and burn by one another's Side, and the Squadrons lie Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm, pouring in their Croſs-Bar, Double Head and Round, and tearing one another with that dreadful Fury, that nothing on Earth can be ſpoken of, to deſcribe thoſe Sea fights by; let thoſe who remember the laſt Holland Wars, tell us, whether the hot⯑teſt Action we have had at Sea during this War, can be compar'd to the Way of fighting between Us and the Dutch? And there is no Queſtion to be made but the like muſt follow again, if a New War begin; This ſeems evi⯑dent, that the Animoſity between the Nati⯑ons, is like to be as great as ever, and per⯑haps greater; and the War, if ſuch a miſe⯑rable Event ſhould follow, will be Proſecu⯑ted with the greateſt Fury that any War e⯑ver was between Us.
Having thus laid down the Conſequences of ſuch a War, it cannot be thought that any one in theſe Nations, who is a Friend to the Proteſtant Succeſſion, to the Prote⯑ſtant Religion, to the general Intereſt of the Proteſtant Powers, to Trade, to the Poor, or indeed to themſelves, can deſire to have theſe two Proteſtant Nations engag'd with one another, eſpecially at ſuch a Time as this. It is an invidious Task to go about here to make Enquiry who are, or are not deſi⯑rous of this War? Or who among us may, [36] by puſhing on their ſeparate Schemes, bring it to paſs by the Conſequence of theſe Schemes, whether involuntarily or other⯑wiſe, it is too evident where this lies, to need an Enquiry, but as I have made this Piece hitherto independent, and look nei⯑ther way, as to Parties, ſo it ſeems not at all needful: The Advice is to both, or all our Parties, that they would conſider very well what they are doing, what Intereſt they are carrying on; whoſe alone will be the Advantage; to whom will be the Joy of ſuch a War: For if theſe are our Dan⯑gers, and if all theſe Diſadvantages threaten us by a War with the Dutch, it cannot be, but that a Proportion of Gain and Advan⯑tage will accrue to the Enemy, for what is our Loſs, muſt on the other Hand be their Advantage.
I know, and eaſily foreſee many Things will be objected here, and it may be neceſ⯑ſary to ſpeak to them all in their Order, tho' our Space at the end of this Work is too ſhort, to ſay all that might be ſpoken—The Objections are ſuch as theſe, viz. Tho' it be true, that the Conſequences of a War with Holland, are, as you have ſaid, yet what muſt be done? We are not to let the Dutch inſult us, becauſe it is our Diſadvan⯑tage ſo many ways to have War. That if the Dutch reject the Meaſures propoſed for their Advantage, and Ours too, and car⯑ry Things on to an extravagant Height, THEY force the War and not WE: That by doing what is incompatible with our [37] Intereſt, they in Effect declare the War; ſo that it is They make War with the QUEEN, not the QUEEN with Them: That the Dutch are acted by a Faction from hence, who prompt and perſuade them to ſtand out, and put them in hopes, that their do⯑ing ſo, may bring Things to a new Turn here, and put a new Face upon our Affairs, and that all theſe Things puſh the preſent Miniſtry upon the neceſſity of taking the Meaſures they now purſue, to preſerve the preſent Government; and if the Dutch join with a Party here, who oppoſe Her Ma⯑jeſty's juſt Meaſures, they bring the War upon themſelves, and that Party here are the Cauſe, and ought to bear the Blame of the War, and of all the Inconveniences and Da⯑mages that may follow.
It is not my Work here to argue for or againſt the Parties, as I ſaid before, I am rather for giving all the Latitude to the Objectors on either Hand, and therefore I willingly, for Arguments-ſake, allow all the Objection; but without entring into the Merit of the Caſe on the one Side, or the Other, the Conſequences of the War, not the Neceſſity of it, is the preſent Argument before us.
If there is a neceſſity for a War with the Dutch, I am ſorry for that unhappy Circum⯑ſtance; but without entring into a Diſpute of the Fact, my Draught of the Conſequences lies as a Caution to all Parties to conſider, with the utmoſt Seriouſneſs, what that Ne⯑ceſſity is, and if poſſible to remove thoſe [38] Cauſes, which bring that Neceſſity on; for if the Effects of a Dutch War are as before, we ought to be very well ſatisfy'd, that our Rea⯑ſons for it are of ſufficient Weight to ballance all the Evils that follow; and if on a due Enquiry it ſhould be found that theſe Neceſ⯑ſities are of our own making, and that we maliciouſly on both Sides puſh one another on to the Extremities, which in their own nature procure this Miſchief. The Excuſe of its being neceſſary will dwindle away into, and plainly diſcover, a wicked Plot to bring this War upon the Nation, even for the ſake of thoſe very Miſchiefs that ſo neceſſarily attend it.
As to letting the Dutch inſult us, and put⯑ting the Cauſe of the War wholly upon them; if this were true, or ſhould appear, all that has been ſaid will lye againſt the Dutch, and not againſt Us, and were I to write this in Holland, I would perhaps be able to ſhew the Dutch, how many ways a War with Britain may be fatal and dange⯑rous to them, as well as to us Us: Many of the Arguments before-mention'd, hold good on their Side, as well as Ours. The Hanno⯑ver Succeſſion is, tho' ſomething more re⯑motely, as much their Concern as Ours; the Proteſtant Intereſt ought to lie as near their Hearts as ours. The Interruptions of Commerce, the Loſs of Ships, Trade and Goods; Theſe are Things they will bear their ſhare of, no Queſtion with us: If they gain by the War; if they Beat us, they will have as much Cauſe to mourn for [39] their Victory as We for our Loſs; and as the Author of the Review ſays very well, ‘"The whole War is but the ſame thing as a Man cutting off his Left Hand with his Right."’
The Advice is to them therefore, equally as to us, tho' not quite with the ſame Con⯑cern; they ought to ſtudy all the Methods poſſible to avoid this Breach; they ought to conſider and duly weigh the General Prote⯑ſtant Intereſt, and rather abate in ſome of their Demands for Peace-ſake, and to avoid the threatning Danger: In ſhort, both Nations, and every Party or Faction in both Nations, ought to conſider well what they are doing, and to what a deſperate Condition the Pro⯑teſtant Intereſt will be reduced, and nothing but ſuch unavoidable neceſſity as will juſtify them before God and Man, ought to be allow'd as a Reaſon for this War.
I might deſcend here to other Particu⯑lars, but as they ſeem to lead more directly into our preſent Party Diſputes, which in this Tract, I purpoſe not to meddle with, I omit them, and chooſe to let this Animadverſion reſpect every Side, that if poſſible it may be uſeful to them all; and may bring all Parties ſeriouſly to apply themſelves, if poſſible, to heal this Breach now while it is young, and before the Wound feſters, before it comes up to an In⯑flamation and Mortification, when all the Endeavours will but encreaſe the Miſery, and be ineffectual to the Cure.
[40] It is our preſent Misfortune, that our People on both Sides ſeem not to ſee into the Miſchiefs of the preſent Caſe, the Willingneſs on one Hand, and the Uncon⯑cernedneſs at the Conſequences on the other, which unhappily appear among our People with reſpect to a War with Holland are very ſurprizing, and it ſeems to me to ſignify, that neither of the Parties have duly weigh'd the thing: Theſe Sheets are written, that they may not want a Light to ſee by in this Caſe, nor plead Ignorance of the Effects, when they may have brought them upon us too late.
As to thoſe who profeſs it their Deſign to overthrow the preſent Settlement of this Nation, I mean the Enemies of the Revolu⯑tion, the Friends of the Pretender, the favou⯑rers of Popery and Tyranny; theſe Sheets are not written for their Conviction, I do not ſo much reproach them with deſiring a War with the Dutch, becauſe it ſeems the only way to bring all their Deſires to paſs.
But this may be drawn from thence as a moſt direct Conſequence, viz. That the pre⯑ſent Popular Cry againſt the Dutch is a ſad Token of the Growth and Encreaſe of Jacobitiſm among Us, and of the growing Intereſt of the Pretender.